DOCSLIB.ORG

A Survey of Ottoman Anti-Submarine Measures in the Dardanelles 1914-15

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Survey of Ottoman Anti-Submarine Measures in the Dardanelles 1914-15 1 A survey of Ottoman Anti-Submarine Measures in the Dardanelles 1914-15 By Harvey Broadbent, Senior Research Fellow in Modern History, Macquarie University. Paper delivered to the Kings Hall Naval Conference, Canberra, 22 May 2015 Background The Ottoman Empire entered the war on 31 October 1914 when Russia declared war on her after ships of the Ottoman navy, including the acquired old German cruisers Goeben (re- named the Yavuz) and Breslau (renamed the Midilli) gifted to Turkey, bombarded Russian Black Sea ports on 29 October (Sevastapol, Novorossisk, Feodosia, and Odessa). This was a pre-emptive strike, which had military and political strategic reasons behind it (which are not dealt with in this paper), and only minor damage was inflicted (on two small warships and six merchantmen). However, it was a success for Germany, as it propelled Russia to declare war on the Ottoman Empire and by 5 November, her allies Great Britain and France, too, were at war with what was left of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Government had actually mobilised its armed forces on the outbreak of the European war in August and had gradually been drawn into the conflict by German machinations, internal Ottoman politics and British failures in diplomacy.1 Planning Ottoman defensive considerations during this period was something of a nightmare. By the nature of its geo-political position the Turks would have to defend at least four potential fronts—the Caucasus in the East, Sinai/Palestine and Suez in the south, together with the Mediterranean (e.g. Iskendurun/Alexandretta) and the Dardanelles Straits/Black Sea/ and Aegean approaches. Three of these became a reality-Caucasus, Suez-Sinai and of course the Dardanelles Strait. The Strait had always featured prominently in Ottoman defensive considerations and previous belligerent enemy states’ offensive considerations, especially since the British navy under Admiral Sir John Duckworth had penetrated to Istanbul (Constantinople) in 1804. So the Strait and its shores, the Gallipoli Peninsula and the Anatolian side as its guardian terrain, had to be secured. German naval assistance was sought from their naval mission, 1 Turkish General Staff, The History of the Turkish Armed Forces Ottoman Period, First World War, Volume V Book 1, The Dardanelles [Çanakkale]Front Operations. Turkish General Staff Publications, Ankara 1978. Referred to subsequently as TGSH History (Turkish General Staff History). p. 2 and Chapter 2 2 which had replaced Admiral Limpus’s British naval mission. 600 German defence specialists were sent, in attempted secret, to help the Ottomans on mine, gunnery, fortifications and torpedo warfare for the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. At sea this meant laying a serious minefield and improving and updating shore fortifications.2 The Strait was only partially defended with laying of a cursory minefield and strengthening of the forts with their 12 and 15 inch cannons. Ottoman ships at this point needed to negotiate passage through the minefield and this was done by a pre-selected route (see Map 1).3 The British reply to the Ottoman fortification strengthening work, with German assistance, was a naval blockade of the Strait from the Aegean by their Mediterranean naval squadron, which began on 26 September 1914. In response, the Ottoman Government closed the Strait on 29 September. Now it was crucial to stop intruders and potential enemies from the south. On land to protect the shores, the 3rd Army Corps was initially deployed by 3 November and gradually reinforced until the Ottoman 5th Army was created in time for the Gallipoli Campaign in April 1915, putting 80, 000 or so troops to garrison the Peninsula. This military deployment corresponded with the first naval offensive activity. As 3rd Corps were settling their deployment on 3rd November 1914, British First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, it seems, though records are not clear on this, had ordered the British Navy to bombard and try to reduce the outer forts of the Strait. In so doing the British issued a strong message to the Ottomans that the expected front at the Dardanelles was earmarked for operations.4 The intention of the attack was essentially to test the fortifications and measure the Ottoman response. The results were deceptively encouraging. In a 20-minute bombardment, a single shell struck the magazine of the fort at Seddulbahir at the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula, displacing (but not destroying) 10 guns and killing 86 Ottoman soldiers. Total casualties during the attack were 150, of which 40 were German. The most significant consequence was 2 Wolf, Klaus. Gallipoli 1915: Das Deutch-Türkische Militarbündnis im Ersten Weltkrieg, Report Verlag, Bonn, 2008. p.76ff 3 TGSH, Sketch (Kroki) C 4Rudenno, Victor. Gallipoli, Attack From the Sea, Yale University Press, Newhaven and London, 2008. p.27ff 3 that the attention of the Ottomans was drawn to strengthening their defences, and they set about expanding the mine field.5 People familiar with the Dardanelles Campaign are well aware that the first phase of Allied operations was to be purely naval, ending in failure to breach the Narrows on 18 March 1915. This paper is not concerned with the details of this action except to consider how the Strait’s defences were developed and how they were to impact on the operations of Allied submarines throughout 1915. Defence against attempts to force the Strait in 1915 Defence of the Strait was shared between Turkish and German commanders, Cevat Pasha, Turkish Commander of Strait’s Forts and Vice Admirals Guido von Usedom and his No. 2 Vice Admiral Merten. They were appointed by leader of the German Naval Mission, Admiral Souchon with the imprimatur of Enver Pasha, Ottoman War Minister and Deputy Commander-in-Chief to command all sea-based operations.6 This split command in the Strait was a manifestation of the Ottoman-German alliance and not always advantageous. A glance at the situation of the Strait’s defences on the 18 March, as the British and French Fleets assaulted, shows how far these defences had been developed since the outbreak of the war (see Map 2). The Strait is 35 miles from top to bottom. As a result of an appreciation, based on the November 1914 experience, that the vulnerability of the outer forts was not to be easily put right, Cevat developed a three sector defensive system. "Outer", "Intermediate" and "Inner", with the balance of defence strength being shifted to the Intermediate and Inner forts. The main foundation of the defence had to be the extended minefield, concentrated at the Narrows. This became well-known to the Allied fleet, especially as their minesweepers had failed and continued to fail to clear them. The British naval squadron’s use of North Sea Trawlers as minesweepers together with their civilian skippers is well recorded. There were 11 main lines laid across the Strait near the Narrows and containing a total of between 399 mines by 18 March, mainly German with some Russian ones retrieved from the Black Sea. Most were designed to withstand the strong current of the Strait.7 5 TGSH op. cit. Chapter 2 6 By historical precedent, the Ottoman Sultan, Mehmet V, held the title of Supreme Commander-in-Chief 7 TGSH op. cit. Chapter 2 4 A few days before 18 March, undetected by the British fleet and their aerial reconnaissance, the 11th line had been laid in Erenköy Bay under cover of night by the Nusret minelayer. This line caused the ultimate loss of the Bouvet and Inflexible. By December 1915 the number of lines was to be increased to 18 and the mines to 552. Mines in lines 1-10 were spaced 44 to 55 yards apart, and line 11 110 to 165 yards apart. The later lines 14 and 15 were comprised of two deep lines intended for destroying submarines. The Turks also had floating mines at their disposal—estimated at 50 in number. In addition to mines at the Narrows three 18 inch torpedo tubes were installed on the pier at Kilid Bahir, giving a point blank range field of fire across the Strait.8 The role of the forts was to protect the minefield from sweeping as much as bombarding warships. There was massive increase in numbers of guns on the forts and batteries. (see Map: Fields of Fire). The field of fire of the principal forts was below the minefields. Thus a barrage could be maintained on ships entering the Strait before they could reach the minefield to sweep them. Mobile artillery, mainly howitzers, 24 of them, were positioned along the both sides of the Strait. These were especially effective against the enemy minesweepers. They would move from one position to another, dragged by oxen teams to avoid the enemy getting a fix on them. Smoke canisters were used at various intervals to confuse the enemy gunners to draw fire away from the mobile batteries. It was the Ottoman tactic that the forts and batteries, mobile or fixed, protected the minefield. 70 guns and six searchlights protected the minefield at the Narrows. So searchlights played an important role in keeping the Strait defended at night. The further tactic was that these guns of the fixed and mobile batteries were protected by the large calibre guns of the forts, which in turn were protected from the enemy fleet by the mobile howitzers. These fired on the enemy ship to keep them moving so no concentration of fire onto the forts could be achieved, thus increasing inaccuracy. All these defences could be employed against submarines—the surface ones of course only seriously effective if and when a sub surfaces for any reason. When it came to underwater defences then more submarine-specific measures were necessary.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Perceptionsjournal of International Affairs
    PERCEPTIONSJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PERCEPTIONS Summer-Autumn 2015 Volume XX Number 2-3 XX Number 2015 Volume Summer-Autumn PERCEPTIONS The Great War and the Ottoman Empire: Origins Ayşegül SEVER and Nuray BOZBORA Redefining the First World War within the Context of Clausewitz’s “Absolute War” Dystopia Burak GÜLBOY Unionist Failure to Stay out of the War in October-November 1914 Feroz AHMAD Austro-Ottoman Relations and the Origins of World War One, 1912-14: A Reinterpretation Gül TOKAY Ottoman Military Reforms on the eve of World War I Odile MOREAU The First World War in Contemporary Russian Histography - New Areas of Research Iskander GILYAZOV Summer-Autumn 2015 Volume XX - Number 2-3 ISSN 1300-8641 PERCEPTIONS Editor in Chief Ali Resul Usul Deputy Editor Birgül Demirtaş Managing Editor Engin Karaca Book Review Editor İbrahim Kaya English Language and Copy Editor Julie Ann Matthews Aydınlı International Advisory Board Bülent Aras Mustafa Kibaroğlu Gülnur Aybet Talha Köse Ersel Aydınlı Mesut Özcan Florian Bieber Thomas Risse Pınar Bilgin Lee Hee Soo David Chandler Oktay Tanrısever Burhanettin Duran Jang Ji Hyang Maria Todorova Ahmet İçduygu Ole Wæver Ekrem Karakoç Jaap de Wilde Şaban Kardaş Richard Whitman Fuat Keyman Nuri Yurdusev Homepage: http://www.sam.gov.tr The Center for Strategic Research (Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi- SAM) conducts research on Turkish foreign policy, regional studies and international relations, and makes scholarly and scientific assessments of relevant issues. It is a consultative body of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs providing strategic insights, independent data and analysis to decision makers in government. As a nonprofit organization, SAM is chartered by law and has been active since May 1995.
    [Show full text]
  • ALBANIAN SOLDIERS in the OTTOMAN ARMY DURING the GREEK REVOLT at 1821 Ali Fuat ÖRENÇ
    CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Epoka University IBAC 2012 vol.2 ALBANIAN SOLDIERS IN THE OTTOMAN ARMY DURING THE GREEK REVOLT AT 1821 ∗∗ Ali Fuat ÖRENÇ Introduction Ottoman Army organization had started to deteriorate from the mid-17th century. Military failures made the social and economic problems worse. In this situation, alternative potentials in the empire appeared because of the increasing military needs of the central government and the provincial governors. By the way, general employment of the Albanian warriors who were famous with their courage and strength became possible.1 There were a lot of reasons for employing Albanian warriors with salary while there was Ottoman regular army corps, including janissaries and soldiers from the states. Governing problems, had existed in the states and land system after the defeat in Vienne at 1683, was one of these reasons. Also after the end of the conquering era, the castles and fortresses at the borderlines were built for defense and there were not a necessary number of soldiers in these buildings. This problem was tried to by employing the warriors with long- matchlock-guns from Bosnia, Herzegovina and Albania.2 During the time, the necessity of mercenary increased too much as seen in the example of the Ottoman army which established for pressing the Greek Revolt in 1821, was almost composed of the Albanian soldiers.3 There were historical reasons for choosing Albanian soldiers in the Balkans. A strong feudal-system had existed in the Albanian lands before the Ottoman rule. This social structure, which consisted of the local connections and obedience around the lords, continued by integrating, first, timar (fief) system after the Ottoman conquest in 1385 and then, devshirme system.
    [Show full text]
  • Ottoman Merchants in the Adriatic. Trade and Smuggling
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Repository of University of Primorska ACTA HISTRIAE • 16 • 2008 • 1-2 received: 2008-01-27 UDC 355.49:343.712.2(262.3)"14/16" original scientific article OTTOMAN MERCHANTS IN THE ADRIATIC. TRADE AND SMUGGLING Maria Pia PEDANI University Ca'Foscari of Venice, Department of Historical Studies, I-30123 Venezia, Dorsoduro 3484/d e-mail: [email protected] ABSTRACT th In the 15 century sultans discovered the economic importance of the Adriatic. th They accepted doges' rule on this sea but, at the end of the 16 century, the presence of Christian and Muslim pirates marred the relations between the two states. Ottoman merchants used to cross the Adriatic to reach the markets of Venice and Ancona. Be- sides regular trade there was also smuggling: above all arms were exported to the Empire while wheat went westwards. Several links united the two commercial commu- nities: for instance, subjects of the Republic embarked sometimes on Ottoman ships; in the ports of the Serenissima the sultan's merchants used to pay the same customs as Venetians and, sometimes, they also insured themselves with Venetian companies. The th wars of the end of the 17 century put a momentary stop to Muslim commercial activi- ties in Venice and in the Adriatic. However, at the beginning of the following century, Albanian vessels charged with Ottoman goods appeared again at St. Mark's docks, even if soon after, in the 1720s', short-sighted Venetian protectionist politics pushed them to prefer the port of Trieste.
    [Show full text]
  • A History of Ottoman Military Flags Formally Independent Ottoman State, Ruled by a Sultan
    •SSVS99 Proc. XVII International Congress of Vexillology A history of Ottoman military Hags 2G1 Copyright ©1999, Southern African Vexillological Assn. Peter Martinez (ed.) White Flag was given to the Kayi Turks by a Seljuk sultan as a symbol of the feudal relation between them. Simultaneously, some territory where they could pasture their livestock was granted to them. This is how the sanjak (something like a princedom) of the Kayi tribe was established. Later, it was named after its founder, Osman. This sanjak gained its independence in 1299 and become a A history of Ottoman military flags formally independent Ottoman state, ruled by a Sultan. Similar to the Christian tradition in Europe, the flag was considered among Turks as the symbol of a feudal relation. In the Turkish language the word sancak (sanjak) means both a banner and a piece of land invested with a fief to a Jaroslav Martykan vassal tenant. The White Flag continued in use as the only symbol representing the Empire until the reign of Sultan Selim I, “The Cruel” (1512 1520). In the first years of its existence the White Fl^ was used as a symbol of Osman’s vassal ABSTRACT: This article describes the development of Turkish subordination to the Seljuk Sultan, but later its symbolism changed slightly. military flags from the first Janissary gonfalon to the regimental Although the Ottoman ruler gained the title of Sultan, he remained subordinate colours of the Turkish Republic. Drawing on original Ottoman flag to the Caliph of Cairo. Moreover, the Caliph of Cairo also gave the same vassal charts and other documents, the banners of the Sultan, military symbol to the Seljuks.
    [Show full text]
  • Political and Economic Transition of Ottoman Sovereignty from a Sole Monarch to Numerous Ottoman Elites, 1683–1750S
    Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung. Volume 70 (1), 49 – 90 (2017) DOI: 10.1556/062.2017.70.1.4 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSITION OF OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNTY FROM A SOLE MONARCH TO NUMEROUS OTTOMAN ELITES, 1683–1750S BIROL GÜNDOĞDU Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen Historisches Institut, Osteuropäische Geschichte Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10, Haus D Raum 205, 35394 Gießen, Deutschland e-mail: [email protected] The aim of this paper is to reveal the transformation of the Ottoman Empire following the debacles of the second siege of Vienna in 1683. The failures compelled the Ottoman state to change its socio- economic and political structure. As a result of this transition of the state structure, which brought about a so-called “redistribution of power” in the empire, new Ottoman elites emerged from 1683 until the 1750s. We have divided the above time span into three stages that will greatly help us com- prehend the Ottoman transition from sultanic authority to numerous autonomies of first Muslim, then non-Muslim elites of the Ottoman Empire. During the first period (1683–1699) we see the emergence of Muslim power players at the expense of sultanic authority. In the second stage (1699–1730) we observe the sultans’ unsuccessful attempts to revive their authority. In the third period (1730–1750) we witness the emergence of non-Muslim notables who gradually came into power with the help of both the sultans and external powers. At the end of this last stage, not only did the authority of Ottoman sultans decrease enormously, but a new era evolved where Muslim and non-Muslim leading figures both fought and co-operated with one another for a new distribution of wealth in the Ottoman Empire.
    [Show full text]
  • We Envy No Man on Earth Because We Fly. the Australian Fleet Air
    We Envy No Man On Earth Because We Fly. The Australian Fleet Air Arm: A Comparative Operational Study. This thesis is presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Murdoch University 2016 Sharron Lee Spargo BA (Hons) Murdoch University I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution. …………………………………………………………………………….. Abstract This thesis examines a small component of the Australian Navy, the Fleet Air Arm. Naval aviators have been contributing to Australian military history since 1914 but they remain relatively unheard of in the wider community and in some instances, in Australian military circles. Aviation within the maritime environment was, and remains, a versatile weapon in any modern navy but the struggle to initiate an aviation branch within the Royal Australian Navy was a protracted one. Finally coming into existence in 1947, the Australian Fleet Air Arm operated from the largest of all naval vessels in the post battle ship era; aircraft carriers. HMAS Albatross, Sydney, Vengeance and Melbourne carried, operated and fully maintained various fixed-wing aircraft and the naval personnel needed for operational deployments until 1982. These deployments included contributions to national and multinational combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. With the Australian government’s decision not to replace the last of the aging aircraft carriers, HMAS Melbourne, in 1982, the survival of the Australian Fleet Air Arm, and its highly trained personnel, was in grave doubt. This was a major turning point for Australian Naval Aviation; these versatile flyers and the maintenance and technical crews who supported them retrained on rotary aircraft, or helicopters, and adapted to flight operations utilising small compact ships.
    [Show full text]
  • Download the Full PDF Here
    THE PHILADELPHIA PAPERS A Publication of the Foreign Policy Research Institute GREAT WAR AT SEA: REMEMBERING THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND by John H. Maurer May 2016 13 FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE THE PHILADELPHIA PAPERS, NO. 13 GREAT WAR AT SEA: REMEMBERING THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BY JOHN H. MAURER MAY 2016 www.fpri.org 1 THE PHILADELPHIA PAPERS ABOUT THE FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE Founded in 1955 by Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI is a non-partisan, non-profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests. In the tradition of Strausz-Hupé, FPRI embraces history and geography to illuminate foreign policy challenges facing the United States. In 1990, FPRI established the Wachman Center, and subsequently the Butcher History Institute, to foster civic and international literacy in the community and in the classroom. ABOUT THE AUTHOR John H. Maurer is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He also serves as the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone, and do not represent the settled policy of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Foreign Policy Research Institute 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610 • Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684 Tel. 215-732-3774 • Fax 215-732-4401 FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 2 Executive Summary This essay draws on Maurer’s talk at our history institute for teachers on America’s Entry into World War I, hosted and cosponsored by the First Division Museum at Cantigny in Wheaton, IL, April 9-10, 2016.
    [Show full text]
  • Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean
    NAVAL POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN Copyright of collection © 2000 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd Copyright of articles © 2000 contributors CASS SERIES: NAVAL POLICY AND HISTORY ISSN 1366–9478 Series Editor: Holger Herwig The series will publish, first and foremost, fresh quality manuscripts by research scholars in the general area of naval policy and history, without national or chronological limitations. Furthermore, it will from time to time issue collections of important articles as well as reprints of classic works. 1. Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy, 1904–1914 Milan N.Vego 2. Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman Edited by Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy 3. Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars Rear Admiral Raja Menon 4. The Royal Navy and German Naval Disarmament 1942–1947 Chris Madsen 5. Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas Milan N.Vego 6. The Pen and Ink Sailor: Charles Middleton and the King’s Navy, 1778–1813 John E.Talbott 7. The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–1940 Robert Mallett 8. The Role of the Merchant Marine in Maritime Foreign Defence Policy Formation Edited by Greg Kennedy 9. Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia: Geo-strategic Goals, Policies and Prospects Duk-Ki Kim 10. Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future Edited by John B.Hattendorf Copyright of collection © 2000 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd Copyright of articles © 2000 contributors NAVAL POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN Past, Present and Future Edited by John B.Hattendorf US Naval War College FRANK CASS LONDON • PORTLAND, OR Copyright of collection © 2000 Frank Cass & Co.
    [Show full text]
  • Download PDF File
    Issue No: 49 | Mart 2018 TREVOR CROWE CLARKSON ISTFIX VESSELS VALUE Tanker-Boxship Turkey’s Freight Values Of Close Together Shipping Turkish & Data Index World Fleets HARUN ŞİŞMANYAZICI “The man who fits many lives in one life” “Hayatı birden fazla yaşayan adam” www.seanews.com.tr Mart / March - 2018 Issue/Sayı 48- March 2018 Lojitürk lojistik, Danışmanlık, Yayıncılık ve Turizm Hizmetleri Ltd.Şti. adına Editörden/from the Editor İmtiyaz Sahibi ve Sorumlu Yazı İşleri Müdürü Değerli Seanews Dear Seanews Readers, Publisher / Editor in Chief Okurları, Fulya Tekin İstikbal Hello. We’ve had a busy agenda Genel Koordinator / Coordination Merhaba. Yoğun bir again. We celebrated March 8th Nermin İstikbal Ocaklı gündem yaşadık. 8 Mart World Workers’ Women’s Day with Dünya Emekçi Kadınlar Yakamoz activity. On March 17, Yayın Türü / Type of Publication Günü’nü Yakamoz at the Çırağan Palace, Hosted by Ulusal-Uluslararası Aylık Süreli etkinliği ile kutladık. Minister of Transportation, Maritime National/International Monthly 17 Mart’ta Çırağan Fulya Tekin İstikbal Affairs and Communication, Mr. Sarayı’nda Bakanımız Sn. Ahmet Arslan, at which Prime Yayın Kurulu / Editorial Board Prof. Dr. Oğuz Salim Söğüt Ahmet Arslan’ın ev sahipliğinde Sayın Minister Binali Yıldırım made the opening Kapt. Ahmet Ağaoğlu Başbakanımız Binali Yıldırım’ın açılış speech, the “International Maritime Summit” was Prof. Dr. Selçuk Nas konuşmasıyla denizcilik sektörünün önde attended by leading domestic and foreign guests Doç. Dr. Özcan Arslan gelen yerli ve yabancı konuklarının katıldığı of the maritime industry. The DTO elections were Müh. Yılmaz Onur “Uluslararası Denizcilik Zirvesi” gerçekleşti. concluded with the victory of the “Chamber of Müh. Feramuz Aşkın DTO seçimleri “Hepimizin Odası” ekibinin all of us” team.
    [Show full text]
  • THE MODERNIZATION of the OTTOMAN NAVY DURING the REIGN of SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ (1861-1876) By
    THE MODERNIZATION OF THE OTTOMAN NAVY DURING THE REIGN OF SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ (1861-1876) by DİLARA DAL A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies Department of Classics, Ancient History and Archaeology College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham April, 2015 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT The main focus of this study is to examine the modernization of the Ottoman navy during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, exploring naval administration, education, and technology. Giving a summary of the transformation of shipbuilding technologies and bureaucratic institutions of the Ottoman naval forces between 1808 and 1861, it analyses the structure of the Ottoman navy, its level of development in comparison to previous periods of time, and the condition of the vessels making up the naval fleet from 1861 to 1876. It also intends to evaluate the character of existing administrative structures at the outset of Abdülaziz’s reign in 1861 and the nature of subsequent changes, including structural reorganization of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, the Ministry of Marine, and the Naval Academy, as well as advancements in military training and seafaring; all within the context of the impact of these changes on the military, political, and economic condition of the Empire during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz.
    [Show full text]
  • Geographical Constraints to Soviet Maritime Power Brian Needham University of Rhode Island
    University of Rhode Island DigitalCommons@URI Theses and Major Papers Marine Affairs 1989 Geographical Constraints to Soviet Maritime Power Brian Needham University of Rhode Island Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds Part of the Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, and the Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology Commons Recommended Citation Needham, Brian, "Geographical Constraints to Soviet Maritime Power" (1989). Theses and Major Papers. Paper 305. This Major Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Major Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact [email protected]. GEOGRAPIllCAL CONSTRAINTS TO SOVIET MARITIME POWER BY BRIAN NEEDHAM . A PAPER SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MARINE AFFAIRS UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 1989 MAJOR PAPER MASTER OF MARINE AFFAIRS APPROVED _ Professor Lewis M. Alexander UNNERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 1989 TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page Table of Contents i i INTRODUCTION 1 BACKGROUND 3 Recent History 3 Status of the Soviet Navy 4 Missions of the Soviet Navy 5 GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTRAINTS 8 Physical Constraints 8 Political and Legal 9 Military 1 0 THE NORTHERN FLEET 1 3 THE BALTIC FLEET 17 THE BLACK SEA FLEET 22 THE PACIFIC FLEET 26 ALTERNATIVES 31 Overseas Bases 31 Offensive Operations 32 Defensive Operations 32 Change of Policy 33 i i CONCLUSIONS 35 N01ES 37 BIBLIOGRAPHY 39 Orientation Maps 40 iii GEOGRAPHIC CONSTRAINTS TO SOVIET MARITIME POWER INTRODUCTION Despite Soviet military expansion on land immediately following World War II, maritime strategy remained defensive in nature and the four Soviet Fleets operated largely in the vicinity of their own bases.
    [Show full text]
  • Model Ship Book 4Th Issue
    A GUIDE TO 1/1200 AND 1/1250 WATERLINE MODEL SHIPS i CONTENTS FOREWARD TO THE 5TH ISSUE 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 2 Aim and Acknowledgements 2 The UK Scene 2 Overseas 3 Collecting 3 Sources of Information 4 Camouflage 4 List of Manufacturers 5 CHAPTER 2 UNITED KINGDOM MANUFACTURERS 7 BASSETT-LOWKE 7 BROADWATER 7 CAP AERO 7 CLEARWATER 7 CLYDESIDE 7 COASTLINES 8 CONNOLLY 8 CRUISE LINE MODELS 9 DEEP “C”/ATHELSTAN 9 ENSIGN 9 FIGUREHEAD 9 FLEETLINE 9 GORKY 10 GWYLAN 10 HORNBY MINIC (ROVEX) 11 LEICESTER MICROMODELS 11 LEN JORDAN MODELS 11 MB MODELS 12 MARINE ARTISTS MODELS 12 MOUNTFORD METAL MINIATURES 12 NAVWAR 13 NELSON 13 NEMINE/LLYN 13 OCEANIC 13 PEDESTAL 14 SANTA ROSA SHIPS 14 SEA-VEE 16 SANVAN 17 SKYTREX/MERCATOR 17 Mercator (and Atlantic) 19 SOLENT 21 TRIANG 21 TRIANG MINIC SHIPS LIMITED 22 ii WASS-LINE 24 WMS (Wirral Miniature Ships) 24 CHAPTER 3 CONTINENTAL MANUFACTURERS 26 Major Manufacturers 26 ALBATROS 26 ARGONAUT 27 RN Models in the Original Series 27 RN Models in the Current Series 27 USN Models in the Current Series 27 ARGOS 28 CM 28 DELPHIN 30 “G” (the models of Georg Grzybowski) 31 HAI 32 HANSA 33 NAVIS/NEPTUN (and Copy) 34 NAVIS WARSHIPS 34 Austro-Hungarian Navy 34 Brazilian Navy 34 Royal Navy 34 French Navy 35 Italian Navy 35 Imperial Japanese Navy 35 Imperial German Navy (& Reichmarine) 35 Russian Navy 36 Swedish Navy 36 United States Navy 36 NEPTUN 37 German Navy (Kriegsmarine) 37 British Royal Navy 37 Imperial Japanese Navy 38 United States Navy 38 French, Italian and Soviet Navies 38 Aircraft Models 38 Checklist – RN &
    [Show full text]