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AMERICAN SEA POWER AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION: HOW THE U.S. MUST RESPOND TO CHINA AND RUSSIA'S GROWING NAVAL CAPABILITY by Richard V. C. Busick A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Government Baltimore, Maryland May 2020 © 2020 Richard Busick All Rights Reserved Abstract American sea power has diminished significantly since the end of the Cold War. The loss of sea power relative to rising great power competitors risks the ability of the United States to adequately advance or defend its national interests in war or in peace. The current rise of China as a sea power and resurgence of Russia as a growing undersea naval threat pose new challenges for the U.S. Navy. The purpose of this research was to determine if the Navy was prepared to meet this challenge and if not, to identify deficiencies and make recommendations for improvement. This research was conducted using a historical case study approach in which several eras were reviewed and analyzed for their lessons on sealift and naval power and their implications for today. World War II, the Tanker War of the 1980s, and the British Falkland Islands campaign were studied in regard to their implication on sealift and maritime logistics. World War II, the latter part of the Cold War, and the era of the Global War on Terror were then studied for lesson related to naval combat power. The study concluded that the United States was not prepared for the challenges of great power competition. Specific deficiencies were noted in the categories of readiness, fleet size, fleet composition, shore-based infrastructure, strategy, and doctrine and training. Lessons from the historical case studies were applied to develop a series of recommendations which, if implemented, could better prepare the United States for great power competition. Reinvigorating American sea power requires a significant national investment which is only possible through the political will of policy makers based on an engaged public. Thesis reviewers: Dr. Brett Decker, LCDR Ken Foos, USN (Ret.), Dr. Nicholas Reynolds ii This paper is dedicated to… my wife Liz, whose love, patience, and support made this work possible; my daughters, Florabelle and Viola, whose futures are bound with that of their country; my grandfather, who inspired me with a love of the sea; and to all the American sailors and mariners, past, present, and future, who have ventured forth across tumultuous seas to answer our country’s call and to protect and defend our Liberty and our way of life. iii Acknowledgements I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the professors under whose guidance I conducted this research and composed this thesis. Dr. Jacob Straus helped me get started and chart a course for the research which followed. Dr. Ken Masugi helped me to refine my writing and provided invaluable guidance as my work progressed. Dr. Kathryn Wagner-Hill helped me to pull it all together into the document which follows. I would also like to thank Dr. Dorothea Wolfson, who has helped me throughout the duration of my studies, providing me with many of the building blocks upon which my thesis would be built as well as academic guidance throughout the program. I benefited greatly from my independent study with Dr. Nicholas Reynolds, who helped me build my research and writing skills as I continued to work towards compiling this thesis. Dr. Reynolds, along with Dr. Brett Decker, and LCDR Ken Foos, USN (Ret.) reviewed the work that follows greatly improved the final result with their comments and feedback. Dr. Mark Stout helped me get started in my graduate education and provided me with a solid background in intelligence and military strategy. I would also like to thank the many navalists whose writing, blogging, or podcasts have provided me with an invaluable informal education, have informed and contributed to this research, stirred my imagination, and advocate tirelessly on behalf of the sea services. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Liz, for her patience while I spent many nights and weekends researching and writing, and who spent hours throughout my graduate studies editing and proofreading my work. I could not have completed this work without her invaluable assistance, love, and support. iv Table of Contents Title Page………………………………………………………………………………….i Abstract………………………………………………………………….……………….ii Dedication……………………………………………………………………..…………iii Acknowledgements……………………………………………………….………….….iv Table of Contents……………………………………………………………….….…….v List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………ix Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1 Why does sea power matter?........................................................................2 Key findings.................................................................................................3 Methodology................................................................................................7 What is sea power? ......................................................................................8 Why is sea power important to the U.S.?....................................................11 Mahan and Corbett: Maritime strategy......................................................23 Decline and the loss of sea power..............................................................26 The costs of sea power...............................................................................28 Public education and engagement..............................................................32 The research...............................................................................................34 Chapter One: Is American Sealift Sufficient for the Demands of Great Power Competition?………………………………………………………..…………………..38 Literature Review…………………………….…………………………..40 Sealift today……………………………………………40 v Inadequacies of current sealift capacity…………….…….43 Operations in a contested environment…………….……..45 The current threat environment………………………..…47 Literature conclusions……………………………………49 Methodology…………………….……………………………………….50 Case Study – World War II……………………………………………….51 Men and ships………………………………………….…53 Defensive and offensive measures…………………….....56 Science and technology…………………………………..59 Forward staging…………………………………………..60 American interdiction of Japanese shipping…….…….….62 Summary and lessons learned………………………….…63 Case Study – The Tanker War……………………………………………63 Summary and lessons learned……………………….……68 Case Study – The Falklands War………………………………………....69 Summary and lessons learned……………………………73 Analysis……………………………………………………………….….74 Conclusion………………………………………………………….……84 Chapter Two: Is the U.S. Navy Ready for Great Power Competition? World War II and the Cold War…………………………………………………………………….…86 Literature Review.......................................................................................88 The Threat..........................................................................89 The Fleet............................................................................94 vi The Strategy.......................................................................97 Methodology............................................................................................100 Case Study – World War II.......................................................................101 The Threat........................................................................102 The Fleet...........................................................................105 The Strategy.....................................................................110 Analysis............................................................................117 Case Study – 1980s Cold War..................................................................122 The Threat........................................................................123 The Fleet...........................................................................124 The Strategy.....................................................................128 Analysis............................................................................134 Chapter Three: Is the U.S. Navy Ready for Great Power Competition? “…From the Sea” and a Return to the Sea.…………………………………………………….……137 The Global War on Terror…………………………………………….137 The Threat……………………………………………....138 The Fleet………………………………………………...143 The Strategy…………………………………………….151 Analysis…………………………………………………156 Overall Analysis of the Three Cases…………………………………..157 The Threat……………………………………………....159 The Fleet………………………………………………...161 The Strategy………………………………………….....172 vii Recommendations……………………………………………...……….183 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...184 Conclusion…………………………………………………..…………………………186 Thesis statement……………………………………………………..….186 Chapter 1 – American sealift………………………………………...….187 Chapter 2 – American naval power: WWII and the Cold War………….189 Chapter 3 – American naval power: GWOT and today…………………191 Conclusions……………………………………………………………..193 Readiness……………………………………………….196 Fleet size………………………….……………………..197 Fleet composition……………………………………….200 Infrastructure ashore…………………………………….204 Strategy………………………………………………....206 Doctrine and training…………………………………....207 Recommendations………………………………………………………210 Limitations…………………………………………………………...…218 Recommendations for future research…………………………………..219 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...222 Bibliography………………………………………………...…………………………224 Curriculum Vita………………………………………………………………….……242 viii List of Abbreviations A2AD – Anti-access/Area denial GWOT –
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