The Case for Israel – Chapter3

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The Case for Israel – Chapter3 3 The Arab Refugees (1) Why the Refugees fled in 1948 More than half a million Palestinian Arabs left Israel in 1948 during the Israeli War of Independence. Approximately one fifth of them found permanent homes, or resettled, in other Arab countries. The Arabs left Israel for a number of reasons. A major contributing factor was that a substantial proportion of the Palestinian Arab middle and professional classes emigrated voluntarily with much of their property as soon as it was proposed that a Jewish state should be established in the country. They found ample opportunities open to them in the rest of the Arab world. Many of the rank and file Arab peasants in towns and villages therefore fled because they had been deserted by their leaders and they believed propaganda from the radio stations of neighbouring Arab states. Another reason lay in the fact that Palestinian Arabs were traditionally accustomed to temporary flight as a means of avoiding involvement in any kind of warfare. When rival Arabs raided villages the weaker village residents usually fled, and returned after the raids to restore their homes and repair damage. Only a very small percentage of the overall Arab civilian population left directly as a result of the Israeli Army. This took place in Ramleh and Lydda where the Army was forced to bring about evacuation after the residents had continued indulging in acts of armed hostility after the capture of the towns. The overwhelming majority of Arabs fled because they were urged to do so by their leaders. There would have been no refugee problem if leaders of the Arab states had not 38 The Arab Refugees 39 declared war on Israel and urged their Palestinian kinsmen to evacuate Israel and return after the destruction of the Jewish state. It has become fashionable for pro-Arab apologists to claim that the refugee problem was brought about by the victorious Israelis either chasing the Arabs out or terrorising them by indulging in atrocities. The only atrocity that Arabs can refer to is the tragedy of Deir Yassin where 200 Arab villagers were killed in the course of a battle with Irgun forces. The Irgun were one of the minority anti-British underground movements that operated until the establishment of the Jewish state and the creation of a single Israeli army. The incident was unreservedly condemned by all Jewish authorities, despite the fact that the Irgun leaders maintained that the Arab deaths could not have been avoided. Menachem Begin, the Irgun leader, conceded that the Hagana had warned them against the attack. However, he claimed that the village was in a strategic position and that prior to the attack repeated loudspeaker warnings in Arabic had appealed to non-combatants to evacuate the village. Instead, the village became an armed fortification and directed effective fire against the Irgun troops. A prominent inhabitant of the village subsequently declared in the Jordanian newspaper Al Urdun (April 9, 1953): The Jews never intended to hurt the population of the village, but were forced to do so after they met enemy fire from the population, which killed the Irgun Commander. The Arab exodus from other villages was not caused by the actual battle, but by the exaggerated description spread by Arab leaders to incite them to fight the Jews. In view of oft-quoted Arab denials that they themselves urged the Palestinian refugees to leave, the following extensive documentation primarily from Arab sources refuting this is incorporated: Monsignor George Hakim, the Greek Catholic Archbishop of Galilee, informed the Lebanese newspaper, Sada al Janub (August 16,. 1948): The refugees had been confident that their absence from Palestine would not last long, that they would return within a few days, within a week or two. Their leaders had promised them that the Arab armies would crush the Zionist 'gangs' very quickly and that there was no need for panic or fear of a long exile. 40 The Case for Israel Emile Ghoury, Secretary of the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee, in an interview with the Beirut Telegraph (September 6, 1948): The fact that there are these refugees is the direct consequence of the act of the Arab states in opposing partition and the Jewish state. The Arab states agreed upon this policy unanimously and they must share in the solution of the problem. The Economist (October 2, 1948) London: During subsequent days the Jewish authorities, who were now in complete control of Haifa (save for limited districts still held by the British troops), urged all Arabs to remain in Haifa and guaranteed them protection and security. As far as I know, most of the British civilian residents whose advice was asked by Arab friends told the latter that they would be wise to stay. However, of the 62,000 Arabs who formerly lived in Haifa, not more than 5,000 or 6,000 remained. Various factors influenced their decision to seek safety in flight. There is but little doubt that the most potent of these factors were the announcements made over the air by the Arab Higher Executive, urging all Arabs in Haifa to quit. It was clearly intimated that those Arabs who remained in Haifa and accepted Jewish protection would be regarded as renegades. The Jordanian daily newspaper, Falastin (February 19, 1949): The Arab states which had encouraged the Palestine Arabs to leave their homes temporarily in order to be out of the- way of the Arab invasion armies, have failed to keep their promise to help these refugees. Habib Issa, editor of Al Hoda, a New York Lebanese newspaper (June 8, 1951): The Secretary-General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha,assured the Arab people that the occupation of Palestine and of Tel Aviv would be as simple as a military promenade . He pointed out that they were already on the frontiers and that all the millions the Jews had spent on land and economic development would be easy booty, for it would be a simple matter to throw the Jews into the Mediterranean . Brotherly advice was given to the Arabs of Palestine to leave their land, homes and property and to stay temporarily in neighbouring fraternal states, lest the guns of the invading Arab armies mow them down. Kul-Shay (Moslem weekly), Beirut (August 19, 1951): Who brought the Palestinians to Lebanon as refugees, suffering now from the malign attitude of newspapers and communal leaders, who have neither honour nor conscience? Who brought them over in dire straits and penniless, after they lost their honour? The Arab states, and Lebanon amongst them, did it. The Jordanian daily newspaper, Al Urdun (April 9, 1953): For the flight and fall of the other villages it is our leaders who are The Arab Refugees 41 responsible because of their dissemination of rumours exaggerating Jewish crimes and describing them as atrocities in order to inflame the Arabs . By spreading rumours of Jewish atrocities, killings of women and children, etc. they instilled fear and terror in the hearts of the Arabs in Palestine until they fled leaving their homes and property to the enemy. The Jordanian journal, Ad-Difaa (September 6, 1954): We were masters in our land, happy with out lot . but overnight everything changed. The Arab government told us "Get out so that we can get in" — so we got out but they (the Arab government) did not get in. Mahmoud Seif ed-Din Irani, With the People (Amman, Jordan 1956 ): All of a sudden, the people of Jaffa began to evacuate their town, abandoning it in the middle of a fight, even before its climax . I now see that we fought only half-heartedly . Our many quarrels kept us too busy. We left the country of our own free will believing we were going on a short visit, a trip and soon we would return as if nothing had happened and as if there had never been a war. Bulletin of the Research Group of European Migration Problems, January 1957 (The Hague), pp. 10-11. As early as the first months of 1948 the Arab League issued orders exhorting the people to seek temporary refuge in the neighbouring countries, later to return to their abodes in the wake of the victorious Arab armies and obtain their share of abandoned Jewish properties. The Secret Behind the Disaster, by Nimer Al-Hawari, former Commander of the para military Arab Youth Organization in Palestine: The Arabs' eyes were blinded and their brains clogged. They were confused by promises and deluded by their leaders. The Palestinian Arabs were ignorant and easily led astray. They were short-sighted and unthinking and subjected to a gangster leadership . which herded them like docile sheep . Many left temporarily, they thought, to await the passing of the storm . The leaders rattled their sabres, delivered fiery speeches and wrote stirring articles. Iraq's Prime Minister had thundered "We shall smash the country with our guns and destroy and obliterate every place the Jews will seek shelter in. The Arabs should conduct their wives and children to safe areas until the fighting has died down." The Cairo daily - Akhbar el Yom (October 12, 1963): The 15th May 1948 arrived . On that very day the Mufti of Jerusalem appealed to the Arabs of Palestine to leave the country, because the Arab armies were about to enter and fight in their stead. In the light of this, the contrasting appeals of the Jews who urged the Arabs to remain should be noted: 42 The Case for Israel The Assembly of Palestinian Jewry (Vaad Leumi) (October 2, 1947): The Jewish people extends the hand of sincere friendship and brotherhood to the Arab peoples and calls them to co-operate as free and equal allies for the sake of peace and progress, for the benefit of their respective countries.
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