Thesis (Final Version)

國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University

碩士論文

Master’s Thesis

政治大立

學國論文題目

‧ Headwinds in Facility Siting: The case of Wind Turbines

‧ N a y t t i i s o r Implementationn in Yuanli, Taiwane a v l i Ch Un en gchi

Student: Fichet Jean-Baptiste

Advisor: Tang Ching-Ping

中華民國 104 年 7 月

July, 2015

論文題目

Headwinds in Facility Siting: The case of Wind Turbines

Implementation In Yuanli, Taiwan

研究生：費尚恩 Student: Fichet Jean-Baptiste

指導教授：湯京平 Advisor: Tang Ching-Ping

治政大立國立政治大學學

國亞太研究英語碩士學位學程

‧ 碩士論文

‧ N

a y t t i i s o r n A Thesis e a i v l n Ch U Submitted to International Master’sengc Programhi in Asia-Pacific Studies

National Chengchi University

In partial fulfillment of the Requirement

For the degree of Master in Taiwan Studies

中華民國 104 年 7 月

July, 2015

Acknowlegements

First-of-all, I am grateful to the Gods for the good health and wellbeing that were necessary to complete this thesis.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Tang Ching-Ping, my adviser, for providing me with all the necessary support during my research.

I place on record, my sincere thank you to Lai Yu-Han, who took on her time to accompany me to the village of Yuanli and introduced me to the local people.

I am also grateful to my committee members, Prof. Wei Mei-Chuan and Prof. Lee Jack, for their support, suggestions and治 encouragement. 政大 I also take this opportunity to立 express gratitude to all of the IMAS program and the friends I made there for their help and support. I also thank my parents for 學 the unceasing encouragement, support and attention. 國

Last of all, I would like to thank my friends and everyone else‧ who helped contribute to this project, and to my best friend Kleub Découpin, thanks for

‧ keeping me company onN long walks.

a y t t i i s o r n e a i v l C n hengchi U

Abstract

Taiwan has gained its economic growth at a price of environmental degradation since the 1960s. Water, air, and solid waste pollution problems were brought about by intensive industrialization and urban expansion without taking much environmental concerns into account. However, in the last thirty years, Taiwan has brought more than four hundred environmental laws and regulations, and has seen environmental movements and NGOs across the island evolving in tandem with the democratization process. Likewise, the Taiwanese authorities have seriously worked on the challenges surrounding the problem of carbon mitigation and adaptation despite 治 the obstacles due mainly to a very conservative state-owned energy政 sector and a 大 small-size territory, which, according to national energy立 authorities, would not allow for major development 學 of renewable energy facilities. In 2009, the long-awaited Renewable Energy Act 國 was passed, which enabled the Taiwanese government to promulgate favorable

‧ Feed-In-Tariffs (FIT) regulations for renewables. In 2010, the Taiwanese

‧ government further encouragedN renewable energy efforts by fostering energy a y t t i conservation and emissioni reduction policies through the sestablishment of two o r n e cross-ministerial commissionsa at the Executive Yuan v level. From then on, the l i development of renewables madeC a great leap forwardn in the country. However, hengchi U Taiwan has encountered obstacles in its renewable energy projects development. NIMBY-characterized movement against wind farms has been one of them where protests have slowed down and even interrupted the process. Looking at the very intense and revealing case of Yuanli (Miaoli County) wind power project, and drawing on the academic literature as well as interviews, this thesis is aiming to bring the research a step further than the simple (and often simplistic) NIMBY-related explanation. Therefore, this case study also intends to shed light on political, cultural and institutional aspects inherent to Taiwan that seem to constitute an impediment to the success of wind power facility siting in the country.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 ...... 1

1.1 Background ...... 1

1.1.1 Environmental protection and wind power situation in Taiwan ...... 1

1.1.2 Wind power facility siting ...... 2

1.1.3 The genesis of the Yuanli protest ...... 4

1.2 Key concepts ...... 5

1.2.1 Facility siting ...... 6

1.2.2 NIMBYism ...... 6 政治 1.3 Research method, dissertation structure and analytical framework大 ...... 7 立 1.3.1 Qualitative research ...... 學 ...... 7

1.3.2 Research structure國 ...... 7

1.3.3 Analytical framework ...... ‧ ...... 8

‧ 1.3.3.1 Transaction costN ...... 8 1.3.3.2 Public participationa ...... y ...... 9 t 1.3.3.3 Institutional designt ...... i ...... 11 1.3.3.4 Social capital ...... i ...... s ...... 12 o r n e a i v Chapter 2 ...... l C ...... n ...... 14 he i U 2.1 Why Taiwan & why Yuanli ...... ngc...... h ...... 14

2.1.1 Why Taiwan ...... 14

2.1.2 Why Yuanli ...... 15

2.2 The event, the questions it raised and what we can learn from it ...... 17

2.2.1 The proceedings ...... 17

2.2.2 The questions the protest raised ...... 20

2.2.3 What can we learn from what happened in Yuanli? ...... 21

iii

Chapter 3 ...... 25

3.1 Lack of public participation ...... 25

3.1.1 The importance of defining “public participation” ...... 25

3.1.1.1 What is public participation ...... 26 3.1.1.2 The objectives of public participation ...... 27 3.1.1.3 Who should participate? ...... 29

3.1.2 The benefits of public participation in regards to the Yuanli case ...... 29

3.2 Legal issues ...... 31

3.2.1 Lack of government commitment and incentives to foster wind power in Taiwan ...... 31

3.2.1 Unsteady legal procedure ...... 32

3.2.3 insufficient safety regulations ...... 政治...... 34 大 3.3 Institutional problems ...... 立 ...... 36

3.3.1 Unreliable institutional organization ...... 學 ...... 36 國 3.3.2 Lack of involvement from the institutions ...... 38

‧

Chapter 4 ...... ‧ ...... 40 N a y 4.1 Institutional design ...... t ...... 40 t i io s 4.1.1 Institutions and their designn ...... r...... 40 e a i v 4.1.2 The instruments and objectives of institutional designl C n ...... 41 he i U 4.1.3 The conditions to achieve institutional designngch ...... 44

4.2 The development of social capital ...... 47

4.2.1 The generation of Social Capital – The citizen-centered model ...... 47

4.2.2 The generation of Social Capital – The institution-centered model ...... 49

4.2.3 The development of social capital from an institutional perspective in Taiwan ...... 51

4.2.4 Concluding remarks ...... 53

Chapter 5 ...... 55

5.2 Recommendations ...... 56

5.2.1 Policy recommendations ...... 56

5.2.2 Recommendations for future studies ...... 59

References ...... 60

Appendices ...... 66

政治大立學

國

‧

‧ N a y t t i i s o r n e a v l i Ch Un engchi

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1. Environmental and Health Impacts of Wind Power…………………...3

Figure 1. Map of the initial wind power project in Yuanli…………………….18

Table 2. Safety regulations regarding distances between public facilities and windmills put in place by certain private wind power companies and by certain local governments in the US and Canada………………………………………35

治政大立

學

國

‧

‧ N

a y t t i i s o r n e a v l ni Ch U engchi

List of Acronyms

AEC – Atomic Energy Council

BoE – Bureau of Energy

CY – Control Yuan

EPA – Environmental Protection Administration

DECC – United Kingdom Department of Energy & Climate Change

EY – Executive Yuan

FIT – Feed-In-Tariffs 政治 ITRI – Industrial Technological Research Institute 大立 IV – InfraVest Wind Power Group 學國 MOEA – Ministry of Economic Affairs

‧

MOFA – Ministry of Foreign‧ Affairs N

a y t NIMBY – Not In My Backt Yard i i s o r n e NGO – Non-Governmental aOrganization v l i Ch Un REA – Renewable Energy Act engchi

SEA – Strategic Environmental Assessment

UK – United Kingdom

vii

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

1.1.1 Environmental protection and wind power situation in Taiwan

In Taiwan, democratization has brought many benefits in terms of developing environmental protection mechanisms and programs. It has contributed to develop certain appropriate institutions at the national level, and it has also brought environmental issues on local electoral agendas. Finally, environmental政 groups治 and associations, which have grown over the years, have been able to highlight various local environmental大 concerns. However, influencing national authorities on立 crucial environmental policies and methods still remains a 學 problem since the government has, according to many analysts, feigned to really grant 國 importance to the development of renewable energy (Tang, 2000). However, much like in the rest of the world, energy issues and problems related to pollution are‧ alarming experts and public authorities. As we know,‧ Taiwan Power Company (Taipower), the state-owned unique N

a y electric power provider on the island, has accumulated huge financialt debts and licenses on i t 1 2 the nuclear energy power io plants are coming up. As the environmentals problems are n r becoming more and more apparenta and the future of fossil energye is uncertain, wind power l i v could play an important role in C the country’s energy n transition. But the often-heard hen hi U assumption expressed by Taipower is that the potentialgc for wind power in Taiwan is low. A very dangerous assumption that has been challenged by other experts according to whom the key barrier to utilizing wind energy lies mainly in the lack of political impetus and a framework for promoting renewable energy in Taiwan:

“Taiwan Power Company […] estimates that wind power potential is moderate, and as a result, it prioritizes other technologies and other policies for achieving national strategic energy goals. On the other hand, Infravest – a private wind power developer – contends

1 Nuclear power in Taiwan accounts for 5,028 MWe of capacity by means of 3 active plants and 6 reactors, which makes up around 8.1% of its national energy consumption, and 17% of its electricity generation as of 2013. 2 According to the Atomic Energy Council (AEC), Taiwan's first nuclear power plant is set to be decommissioned from 2018-19, while the second is set to close between 2021 and 2022.

that wind power potential is much greater than Taipower estimates and harnessing this potential could contribute significantly to achieving national strategic energy goals.” (Valentine, 2010, p. 22).

So, as it seems, Taiwan has still a lot of potential to develop onshore and offshore wind power. Besides wind power could contribute to help deal with many fundamental issues the country is facing:

“Wind energy simultaneously possesses economic, eco- logical, and social benefits, and would contribute to establishing an autonomous and disaster-resilient power supply system in Taiwan, an area subject to such phenomena as earthquakes and typhoons” (Yue et al., 2000, p. 962). 治政大立 1.1.2 Wind power facility siting 學

The development or國 siting of facilities that are perceived to be hazardous and risky such as nuclear plants, high-level waste projects or industrial projects‧ remains a very perilous

policy problem for industrialized‧ nations around the globe. Intense opposition almost always N dispute attempts to site facilitiesa because of social or/and environmentaly concerns. Most of the t t i time, local communities wanti them located somewhere else, a reactions often referred to as the o r ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY)n syndrome. In the case of wind powere capacity, the situation is a i v slightly different in the sense thatl surveys generally show strongn overall public support for Ch U wind energy, while projects themselves oftenen g seemch toi also suffer from the NIMBY effect. Indeed, one of the most characteristic features of wind power is how society’s view towards it clearly stretches between the national and the local level. Typically, all the benefits (environmental, social and economic) of wind power are always emphasized and prized at the national level, while the negative effects are exclusively local. There are indeed various environmental and health impacts related to wind power that people generally see as a threat to the preservation of their living conditions and the condition of their environment.

Table 1 Environmental and health impacts of wind power3

Visual impact

Visual impact is the most problematic effect of wind power and also what most often causes objections from authorities and the public. The tall turbines are visually dominant in large areas of the landscape while the rotating blades further attract people’s attention. The problems of visual impact are often exacerbated by the fact that the most attractive sites for wind turbines tend to be in open landscapes of natural beauty, relatively untouched by human interference. Visual impact cannot be solved by technical measures or regulations but a well-planned siting can reduce the effects on the landscape. How wind turbines should be sited depend on the characteristics of the landscape and on the meaning it has to the people inhabiting it.

Noise

There are two kinds of noise from wind turbines: a swishing sound from the rotating blades and noise coming from the machine house. The swishing sound is dominating and can create serious nuisance for neighbours. Basically, the problems of noise can be avoided by using sufficient safety distances between turbines and houses and the level of noise outside houses allowed by authorities vary between 40–45 dBA (the same levels allowed for industrial enterprises). However, there are cases where the regulations have not been followed政 or where治 the noise levels have turned out to be higher than expected, which has lead to complaints from people living close大 to turbines. Shadow and light effects 立學 When the weather is sunny, there can be periodical shadows as well as reflexes from the rotating blades, which can cause nuisance國 to people in the vicinity. Reflexes can be avoided by the choice of material while shadow effects can be minimised by the way turbines are sited in relation to houses, outdoor areas and working places. Although the problem increases with‧ higher turbines, shadow effects is an issue that can normally be solved.

‧ N Birds and other animal life a y t There have been a number oft studies on the impact of turbines on birds, especiallyi migrating ones. i s Although collisions and deaths odo occur, the studies suggest that the impact is fairly low, especially n r compared to other constructions sucha as electrical transmission lines. Noe effects have been observed on land living mammals. Concerning off-shore wind power, knowledgei v about the effects on marine l C n life is still limited and more research is neededhe in nthisg field.ch i U Other

Wind turbines also have effects that are not directly linked to environmental or health issues. Turbines might come in conflict with military interests, since they can constitute physical obstacles to planes and artillery ranges and create electromagnetic interference which disturb radar signals and telecommunications. Turbines can also disturb civil telecommunications and television broadcasting.

A special characteristic of visual impact, or other issues related to the influence of wind turbines on people such as noise pollution, is that there is no objective ground to measure it. Therefore, the level of impact depends a lot on personal preferences. Government agencies and project developers involved in such developments sometimes see this attitude of

3 The information about the impacts of turbines comes mainly from Jamil Khan’s article Wind Power Planning in Three Swedish Municipalities (2003)

resistance among local people as an inconsiderate and selfish behavior since wind power is seen as working actively towards pollution mitigation i.e. common good. As a consequence, stakeholders often react surprised and even annoyed when faced with this kind of opposition. Meanwhile, other experts would adopt another stance on the issue and, on the contrary, stress the importance of involving citizens to hear their preferences in order to deal with complicated decision-making.

In spite of it all, there is a consensus nowadays among researchers to affirm that basing a siting process on one view of fairness inevitably encounters resistance. Therefore, siting controversies go generally beyond the NIMBY syndrome and involve a clash of social views on a fair and legitimate process and outcome (Wolsink, 1994; Burningham, 2000; Linnerooth-Bayer, 2005). Over the years, one common治 response to siting controversies in many different countries has been the use政 of monetary and大 non-monetary compensation. But, once again and for different reasons,立 there has been growing evidence that compensation is not as effective as simple economic theory would suggest. Experience學 has shown that people associate compensation with國 the degree of risk of the project, which means that the more the

government is ready to offer the more suspicious people can get. Compensation‧ is not to be banned but, if utilized, such integration of the compensation tool in the siting process should

‧ N also be paired with institutions making sure their program as well as the goals and process are a y t clear. t i i s o r n e a v Because the democratic systeml in Taiwan is very recenti and still under development, Ch Un it becomes even more interesting to observeen theg c conflictshi over facility siting to understand how much it is related or not to the democratic maturity of the country, but also to observe to what political, institutional and cultural extent it is different from other more mature democracies where the siting process is relatively successful.

1.1.3 The genesis of the Yuanli protest

In the case of the township of Yuanli (Miaoli County) in Taiwan, local residents launched, in September 2012, their resistance movement against InfraVest Wind Power Co Ltd., a German wind power company charged with building 14 wind turbines in the area. The developer acquired the construction permit in 2009, but the construction in itself started early

2013. At first, local people had a very abstract idea about what is wind power and what it means to erect wind turbines in their village, so when the developer started the construction and villagers realized what it really meant, they naturally panicked.

Under the current regulation, the city council has to gather local residents to inform them about the project and the way it will be developed before the construction starts. Therefore, in Yuanli, local officials were indeed commissioned to explain the project to the local people before a spade was even fixed to the ground. They then handed the meeting minutes and the conclusion of the meeting to the national authorities in charge. So, as a matter of fact, local people were informed in accordance with the regulation requirements. However, when the construction got off, local people started protesting. When officials visited the village to meet the protesters, the local residents qualified the former public hearings as 4 治 “illusory meetings.” According to them,政 the time setting and大 the people invited were planned by the local officials in order to立 prevent any opposition by the local people from happening. Most of the concerned population was not well informed and did 學not have the opportunity to participate in the meetings:國 this is the root of the core dispute.

‧ The residents have then accused InfraVest of not following all the legal requirements

‧ N for such infrastructure and worried that the low-frequency noise generated by the turbines will a y t cause annoyance and even tdevelop health problems known as wind i turbine syndrome from i s o r living so close to them. At then beginning, local people had faith ethat the government would a v listen to their complaint, but theyl gradually realized that nonei of the concerned public Ch Un institutions was willing to help them. Besides,eng thec developerhi was refusing to listen to their demand on the ground that they duly followed the legal process. Very soon, the residents formed the Yuanli Self-Help Group, which eventually gathered and protested at the Bureau of Energy (BoE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Executive Yuan (EY), the Control Yuan (CY) and in front of the InfraVest (IV) office in Taipei.

1.2 Key concepts

Before embarking on the main body of this dissertation, it is important to clarify the key and at times controversial concepts, which are at the very basis of this study: the term “facility siting” and the concept of “NIMBYism”.

4 This expression was used by Prof. Fan during the interview the author conducted on March 11, 2015.

1.2.1 Facility siting

Facility siting often implies more than the simple fact of finding a site to establish a facility. Facility siting involves for the developers to take into consideration the impact of the facility on the chosen site and to assess the possible consequences for the population as well as the environment around. There can be short-term as well as long-term effects that the developers cannot neglect given that regulations usually compel them to insure that the integration of the facility will not, by one way or the other, jeopardize the equilibrium of the local area. According to S. Hayden Lesbirel, siting is an uncertain game for both developers and community interests because, “in many cases, developers are unable to win approval to build projects in the face of concerted opposition” and “[local communities] often view that the risks are high in relation to any potential benefits accrued” (2005, p. 1). 治政大 1.2.2 NIMBYism 立 NIMBY is used to describe opponents of new developments學 who recognize that a facility is needed but are opposed國 to its siting within their locality:

‧ “In plain language... the motivation of residents who want to protect their turf. More

‧ formally, NIMBY refersN to the protectionist attitudes of and oppositional tactics adopted a y t by community groupst facing an unwelcome development ini their neighbourhood... io s residents usually conceden that these 'noxious' facilities are necessary,r but not near their a e homes, hence the term 'not in my back yard” (Dear, 1992,i p.v 288). l C n hengchi U Nimby implies that there is an awareness of the need for development, but is sometimes used to describe opponents that are not fully aware of the society’s need for this new facility. It is therefore important to first consider the origin and the rationale behind the dispute instead of immediately using the term NIMBY to characterize the opposition, as we know that “empirical work indicates the range of concerns and motives for opposition which cannot simply be labelled as NIMBYism” (Burningham et al., 2006, p. 3). Nevertheless, many researchers nowadays describe any local opposition as NIMBY regardless of what seems to motivate that opposition:

“The problem with the use of NIMBY is that rarely is it defined the same way by different researchers. In fact, it is sometimes used as a catchall term to label the

opposition – or worse, to imply that citizens have illegitimate or irrational selfish (or narrow) reasons for opposing facilities” (Hunter and Leyden, 1995, p. 602).

For all the reasons explain above, this essay will carefully use the term NIMBY in order to avoid an over-simplification of complex responses to land-use decisions. The author believes that its use is rarely helping to understand the contexts, processes and motivations at stake.

1.3 Research method, dissertation structure and analytical framework

1.3.1 Qualitative research

The study has a qualitative approach, since the focus is on social processes and interactions between actors instead of a statistical治 assessment of wind power development in 政大 Taiwan. The purpose of this case立 study is to reconstruct the planning process as well as roles and actions of the different stakeholders in order to understand why學 the siting of the facility has failed. The discussion國 also covers other aspects such as the relevance of citizen participation in facility siting versus the bureaucratic approach and the role of the institutions

‧ in shaping the planning process. The empirical material consists of semi-structured

‧ interviews, a one-day fieldN study, written materials produced by the various institutions in a y t charge, the developer of thet Yuanli wind power project (InfraVest) andi the local residents of io s Yuanli, Miaoli County. The interviewsn were made in person and lastr ed between one and two a e hours. In total, ten interviews were conducted with importanti v stakeholders such as social l C n activists who took part in the Yuanli protesthe,n renewablegchi energyU experts in Taiwan, academics in charge of negotiating the project and the developer (InfraVest). Besides, this study is also broadly based on the review of the research that have been made over wind power projects development in Taiwan and abroad as well as research focusing on the general aspects related to facility siting, public participation, institutional design and social capital.

1.3.2 Research structure

For the purpose of this study, the research analysis will be divided into three distinct parts. First, this study will offer a detailed description of the case, its origins, causes as well as consequences. It will also explain the reasons behind the selection of this case and assess the value of this particular wind power project in Taiwan. By basing our analysis on what we

have learnt from the Yuanli experience in the first section, we will, in a second part, attempt to understand and circle out the key issues around wind power facility siting in Taiwan. Certain methods used in the facility siting process in Taiwan could benefit from a more democratic approach as well as a restructuration of the legal system surrounding wind power energy. We will then further elaborate, in a third part, on a theory based on institutional design and social capital to offer our perspective on the issues at stake and the situation in Taiwan regarding wind power development. By adopting a different angle than the traditional NIMBY-based theory, we hope that these social science concepts can shed new light and would better address problems that seem to be recurrent in the Taiwanese society. This is not to completely negate the NIMBY approach, which has brought a lot of understanding to the intricate problem of facility siting, but basing our analysis on the specific case of Yuanli and judging from what our qualitative research has brought,治 we suggest that it is simply essential to reach further than the NIMBY analysis政 and focus on the大 roles of the institutions and their influence on such complex phenome立 na. Therefore, we focus, on our last part, on two social science theories that we consider could bring some missing pieces學 to the facility siting puzzle. We explain what new options國 and solutions institutional design and social capital can bring to

better approach the issues of wind power facility siting and how the‧ relations between them can enhance the democratic aspect of the process. To conclude, the author will offer his

‧ N personal comments and policy recommendations that could hopefully be favorable to any a y t stakeholder involved in windt power projects in Taiwan as well asi future research on the i s o r subject. n e a v l ni Ch U 1.3.3 Analytical framework engchi

1.3.3.1 Transaction cost

In economics and related disciplines, a transaction cost is a cost incurred in making an economic exchange. The level of transaction costs influences the level of economic activity by determining which type of governance structure is the most efficient. This type of cost exists because of incomplete and asymmetric information and the fact that people in general have limited cognitive and calculative abilities. Arguably, transaction cost reasoning became most widely known through Oliver E. Williamson's Transaction Cost Economics. As an

analytical tool it is mostly used to explain economic problems where asset specificity5 plays the key role (Williamson, 1981). Today, transaction cost economics is used to explain a number of different behaviors. In the case of wind power projects, transaction costs can include the search and information costs, i.e. the cost for the developers incurred in finding a location suitable to implement the project. Likewise, the costs can include the bargaining costs, i.e. the costs required to come to an acceptable agreement with the other stakeholders. Finally, the costs can also include policing and enforcement costs, which is the cost of making sure that the other parties stick to what has been initially agreed upon, and taking appropriate action if this turns out not to be the case. Obviously, any type of protest against a wind power project will eventually raise the transaction costs, especially for the private company developing the project. Innovative policies have generally failed to contain the high transaction costs related to the difficulties of locating治 unwanted projects, which remains a very important problem for companies dealing政 with facility大 siting: 立 “The transaction costs involved in reaching political settlements學 are likely to be high were communities expec國 t net negative spillover effects from the project and where they

can mobilize political power to stall or block decision processes.‧ […]. Given the high levels of conflict in siting processes, the negotiating costs of reaching agreements are

‧ N very high. For instance, developers often have difficulties getting parties to reveal their a y t preferences” (Lesbirel,t 2005, pp. 3-4). i i s o r n e a v Therefore, if one wants to lreduce the transaction costs,i understanding and effectively Ch Un dealing with the social environment wheree then gfacilitychi will be sited is as important or more important even than the legal and technical mechanisms put in place to implement the project.

1.3.3.2 Public participation

Citizen participation is a process which provides private individuals an opportunity to comment on regional plans and to influence public decisions. That opportunity has long been a component of the democratic decision-making process and is supposed to improve regional decision-making by providing leadership and consensus building on key plans and policies. In

5 Asset specificity is a term related to the inter-party relationships of a transaction.

short, public participation is a means to ensure that citizens have a direct voice in public decisions.

Many developers or institutions choose to exclude or minimize public participation in planning efforts claiming citizen participation is too expensive and time consuming. Yet, many citizen participation programs are initiated in response to public reaction to a proposed project or action. There are indeed tangible benefits that can be derived from an effective citizen participation program. Webler (1999, p. 59) identifies five benefits of citizen participation to the planning process:

• Information and ideas on public issues • Public support for planning decisions 治 • Avoidance of protracted conflicts政 and costly delays 大 • Reservoir of good will which立 can carry over to future decisions 學 • Spirit of cooperation and trust between the developer and the public 國

So, in discussing the theory of public participation, it is interesting‧ to review broad

theories of decision-making‧ structure. Generally, researchers identify two broad decision- N making structures: the technocratica approach and the democratic y approach (Desario & t t i Langton, 1987). The basic i understanding behind the technocratic approach is that experts o s n r should be best suited to make thea complex technical decisions needede to the success of public l i v development projects. Democratic C decision-making, on then other hand, is based on the h i U assumption that all who are affected by ae givenng decisionch have the right to participate in the making of that decision. Experience has shown that a growing number of people are becoming more skeptical towards the expert approach, realizing that it not only failed to resolve social problems involved in the development but also contributed to them. This realization is more apparent in the West where most of the literature about public participation comes from, but is also attracting more and more attention in the East among researchers and experts dealing with public decision-making, and more specifically facility siting in our case.

1.3.3.3 Institutional design

In the realm of socio-political science, one can think of institutional design as a concern with the role of institutions in social life, and the way in which societies shape and reshape those institutions in turn. Institutional design stresses the important and independent role that is, and should be, played by institutional factors in social life. But, it also puts the emphasis on why political actors should take into account how the working of institutions depends on properties of the citizens and not only rules and incentives. Institutions, in this case, are not necessarily governmental entities or political bodies:

“Social institutions are sets of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways. These rules (1) provide information政 about how治 people are expected to act in particular situations, (2) can be recognized by those who are members大 of the relevant group as the 立 rules to which others conform in these situations, and (3) structure the strategic choices 學 of actors in such a way as to produce equilibrium outcomes” (Knight, 1992, p. 54). 國

‧ When we speak of institutional design, we do not envisage the design and redesign of just

‧ formal institutions in theN sense, for example, of constitutional structures bearing on the

a y foundation of principles and laws of a country, or of any governmentt institution bearing on t i i s any national administration.o We use the term “to cover interventionsr in any of the n e arrangements that coordinate thea behavior of individuals in society”i v (Pettit, 1996, P. 55). l C n These arrangements range from legallyh establishedengc hproceduresi U to political decision-making, but also extend to social conventions and norms, which gradually emerged in a society. By institutions is meant the rules that cover such things as property transfers or bargaining processes; and these are all subjects that are especially relevant in the Yuanli case.

Institutional design theory is based on the realization that small deviations from the existing conditions and structures may be of benefit to the system to which those institutions are attached. The idea is that small changes in conditions might make institutions that were working sub-optimally before acting in a more appropriate way to society now. This theory contradicts one of the bases of institutional theory that states that one of the most desirable attributes of an institution is stability. The author argues that since problems may occur in a large variety of different political settings, there is no one single design rule that is likely to

emerge as the more optimal of all. Therefore, much like their environment around them, institutions with their hardware as a set of norms, rules, operating procedures, customs and principles must change and thus be designed and redesigned overtime. That way customs, norms, ideals, ideologies and so forth, serve as the basis for the legal system. The laws and legal rules created within that system amend the institutional setting in turn.

What is institutional design theory for and to whom is it addressed? In every society there are a variety of more or less rooted problem that institutional design could contribute to solve. Besides, in a democracy, any citizen has an interest in how social life is arranged and who are in a position to make a change that would instigate a rearrangement. So, ideally, every democratic citizen has an interest in institutional design.

1.3.3.4 Social capital 治政大 What is social capital? How立 is it different from other forms of capital? All sorts of capital are built as a result of time and effort, transactions and transformation學 activities: we invest to make situations slightly國 different than they were in the past. It produces a flow of future returns, which benefit some and may harm others. In brief, social capital is shared

‧ understandings, norms, rules and expectations. However, the theory around social capital is

‧ more complex than a singleN definition could explain. The way we define the institutions for a y t example, as being the rulest -in-use is one of them, but it is alsoi the trustworthiness io s relationships built overtime between individuals but also between ther institutions and society. n e a v It is also important to note that lsocial capital takes a long i time to build up, but can be C Un destroyed very rapidly. Once it’s destroyedhe itn is galsoc veryhi hard to rebuild.

There has been a growing interest in social capital in recent times. One of the key reasons is the link of social capital to collective action. It is pretty hard to think about any development of any kind without thinking about how one can solve collective action problems. Collective action is any goal that must require the input of more than a single individual; whatever is jointly produced is shared. The problems of collective action require gaining some forms of social capital to solve it. However, collective action is difficult to achieve because gaining the input from a variety of people can be a very complex task. So, one has to build trust in order to make everyone successfully contribute.

In the area of local economic development, social capital basically comes from the empirical observation that the relationship of a particular person who knows somebody else makes something happen. Particular networks, relations with certain other people over time and over distance actually play an important role in a business environment. These relationships are seen as resources that can be used in the economic arena, hence the term capital. In a social science point of view, people do not develop these relationships to make money, but they have developed these relationships for all kinds of reasons overtime. The basic principle behind social capital is that “the presence of dense networks within a society, and the accompanying norms of generalized trust and reciprocity, allow citizens to overcome collective action problems more effectively” (Hooghe, 2003, p. 1). In that sense, it fits perfectly to the issues encountered in wind power facility siting where trust is embedded in a project that requires collective action (the input of治 a multitude of individuals) within a given society. Social capital is then seen as an 政important resource 大available to communities. 立 Indeed, the need for social capital is felt in a great deal of 學contemporary development practices and, today, academics國 focus largely on the importance of creating social capital

when building infrastructure. The reason behind this recent enthusiasm‧ for this concept is that analysts gradually realized that we need new tools to get a more accurate appreciation of the

‧ N multiplicity of problems that should be addressed. Engineers have a tendency to think that an a y t infrastructure project needst a great amount of technique to be successful,i but sometimes i s o r forget about the importance ofn building social capital to make ite work in the environment a v where it will be located. l i Ch Un engchi The purpose of this study is to focus on the institutions as the instrument to generate social capital and as a result generalized trust.

Chapter 2

The Yuanli case

2.1 Why Taiwan & why Yuanli

2.1.1 Why Taiwan

Without delving into this complex subject matter that would require further elaboration, it is still very important to stress the fact that Taiwan is a very young democracy, but also a very special type of democracy. Various essays have been written on the subject, explaining that Taiwan’s democracy has considerably progressed since its shaky foundations were first laid in the late 1980s, but also政 acknowledging治 that there is room for deepening and consolidating the democratic regime (Diamond, 2001; Wong大 2003). Moreover, Taiwan’s democracy is very unique in the立 sense that it differs from the liberal democracy experienced in the West on some very fundamental ethics and values. As Shih Chih學 -Yu argues in his book, “while the central concern 國of liberal democracy is to limit the necessary evil of government power, there is no such evil force assumed under Confucianism where‧ power is composed of

morals” (Shih, 2007, p. ‧ 33). Democracy in Taiwan would thus be tinted with Confucian N ethics, which could explaina why often elected officials are seen as “caringy leader[s] whom t citizens must trust. These electedt ‘gentlemen officials’ do not reflect iwhat people want; they io s n r determine what is good for the people”a (Shih, 2007, p. 141). Taiwane is a democracy where a l i v majority of leaders actually take actions C in a very technocraticn manner, which in turn allows h i U the developers to care less about the local epopulationngch affected by the project than they would have to in another country where they are implemented.6 So, in that sense, the government used the expert approach (Leiss, 1996). In the expert approach, risk management and project planning are seen as strictly technical tasks, which are best carried out by experts. In this theory, very little importance is given to the involvement of local people in the decision- making process. As we have seen in Yuanli, even though public participation is legally biding according to EIA regulations in Taiwan, public hearings have been limited to simple information to the public in order to raise the awareness about the necessity of wind power, but never to involve the locals in the siting process. Those are very interesting observations

6 InfraVest, the developer of the Yuanli project, is a German company that already developed wind farms in Germany, Spain and Turkey, where regulations are more strict in terms of how much involvement of the local people is required.

for our research since they help to apprehend some of the governmental institutions’ decisions and understand the logic behind it. Taiwan’s democratic system also makes facility siting, that usually requires a strong level of public engagement and/or participation to be tolerated by the local population, very interesting to analyze. Observing facility siting in Taiwan helps to better delineate the barriers to facility siting and to comprehend the complexity of the issues at stake.

Another dimension to consider is the fact that such wind power facilities, most of the time, are and will be located in remote places where people have little idea about wind power projects and how important this kind of developments are to the country. This ignorance does not contribute to the acceptance of such projects and it is another challenge that the authorities have failed to adequately address so far. Indeed, Taiwan治 has been dealing with facility siting issues for a long time. It is a very small政 territory with a high大 population density where it is obviously difficult to establish any立 facility far from any population. Therefore, dealing with the population is inevitable and Taiwanese authorities have 學 been confronted to local opposition many times in 國the past.7 But, even though such protests have happened at other

locations before, Yuanli is the first case of local opposition with such‧ violence and intensity and it is also “the first time it brings a real debate around the process and the way it should be

‧ N handled in Taiwan.”8 a y t t i i o s n r a e 2.1.2 Why Yuanli i v l C n he i U Yuanli has a strong community whereng peoplech are very united and usually stick together. This solidarity has been a rampart to what local people have judged to be unfair decisions. As Mrs. Lin expressed in the interview, “the sense of community is very strong in Yuanli. Besides, the local residents were more combative than most people because it is a fishermen village. Fishermen have to deal with the adversity of the environment.”9 This is one of the reasons that made the protest so fierce. For example, one of the wind turbines was supposed to sit very close to a residential area in the village, where six houses are illegally built on public property land. People living in these houses are very poor and have been

7 Similar protests against unwanted wind power facilities have happened in Sanzhi (New Taipei), Xinpu (Hsinchu), Houlong (Miaoli), Lukang (Changhua), etc. 8 Interview with Prof. Fang conducted on March 11, 2015 9 Interview with Mrs. Lin conducted on January 9, 2015

staying there illegally for more than two decades. Politically speaking, none of the officials would speak out for them and the private company can always ignore them since they don’t have any legal legitimacy. Likewise, it is hard to say if they can, legally speaking, be defined as stakeholders. However, the village as a whole has been very supportive towards those six households. When the protest was still going on, IV argued in a statement that some of the local residents’ opposition was driven by selfish motives and some of the protesters’ goal was in fact to use the protest as a tool “for raising the profile of different [local politics] agendas.”10 On the other hand, the Yuanli Self-Help Group and the protesters in general have stressed the feeling of injustice that this wind power project has brought to the village and the fact that, more than anything else, they care about the present and next generations and the environment in which they will grow up in. 治 At first, the project in Yuanli was政 not seen as controversial,大 or at least it wasn’t expected to bring about such intense立 protest that would have strong impact at the local and national level. But, as it turns out, the experience of the Yuanli學 onshore project has left a pretty important trauma for國 the local people and the authorities that were in charge of it. As a consequence, trust in the government and in the developers is quite‧ low nowadays among

some of the local people. A‧ statement that was underlined by InfraVest afterwards: “we regret N that some of the core activistsa in Yuanli still go against us. It probably takesy much longer time t t 11 i to repair the connection andi build up the trust.” This kind of distrusts has its own roots and o r (re)building it is not an easy task,n especially in Miaoli where offshoree wind farms are actually a v 12 i planned to be built in the future. lIndeed, one of the chosen nsites is close to Yuanli, where it Ch U is now very difficult to undertake any projecten thatg wouldchi not trigger opposition and skepticism within the local population:

“When researchers held a meeting to explain to the local population the future offshore wind power projects, at first local residents refused to sign the attendance sheet. It actually happened in the past that the developer would go to local sites where a project would be built to organize a meeting, which initially was supposed to aim at explaining the benefits and disadvantages of the project. However, a lot of times the project’s developer simply organized a quiz show and a gift give-away, and asked the local

10 Statement issued by InfraVest on June 17, 2013 11 Interview with YD Chang from InfraVest conducted on February 25, 2015 12 Three modeling projects for offshore wind power in Taiwan: 2 are in Zhanghua, 1 in Mioali.

people to sign the attendance sheet and eventually used these signatures to declare that the local people were in favor of the project. It happened very frequently in the 1980s, 1990s, but even after 2000 we can still hear this kind of stories.”13

It is thus necessary to learn lessons from the past and to try to understand the controversy around renewable energy in order to tackle the issues at their very roots. The Yuanli case is very special in terms of how violent the conflict became at some point, but very representative of how the government has been dealing with wind power development on the island. This case crystallizes the common distant political attitude that the institutions generally adopt when dealing with local protest, while taking initiatives and being increasingly involved in the issue could probably benefit both to the local people and to the institutions in terms of mitigating the conflict 治 and building trust between the different stakeholders. The Yuanli experience is政 very important 大 to understand certain key issues, obstacles that block a productive立 process. 學 By making the facility國 siting process even more difficult than in the past, all of these

issues that very clearly emerged during the Yuanli protest are increasing‧ the transaction costs for a majority of stakeholders in their attempt to launch other wind power projects.

‧ N

a y t t i i s 2.2 The event, the questionso it raised and what we can learnr from it n e a i v l C n 2.2.1 The proceedings he i U ngch The developer initially planned on building 14 windmills in less than three kilometers, whereas all three townships located above Yuanli have about one windmill erected every kilometer. In the end IV was only able to construct four turbines. Among these four turbines, the developers were able to secure agreement for two of them and agreed to deconstruct the other 2. One of them has already been taken down so, in the end, there are presently three wind turbines sitting close to the village of Yuanli.

13 Interview with Prof. Fang conducted on March 11, 2015

治政大立學

國

‧

‧ N

a y t t i i s o r n e a i v l C n he i U Figure 1 Map of the initial wind power projectng inc Yuanlih – 14 turbines were supposed to be built along the Township coastline

Why did they want to build so many turbines in such little area? According to the social activists interviewed, there are reasonable doubts that the extraordinary number of turbines in this township was due to the fact that the developer could have compensated the township mayor quite handsomely. It was said that the developers actually financially compensated the local government for each wind turbine established in the village, officially and under the table. A statement that was not opposed by Prof. Fan when the issue was raised during the interview: “Nobody would do something that extreme without getting any benefit in return. That’s just common sense.” However, the main issue resides in the way this project

was handled by the public authorities and the developer rather than on allegations regarding the possible corruption of local officials.

People in Yuanli have expressed various concerns ranging from a lack of proper consultation to certain legal issues. For example, local residents have claimed that, at first, the developer intentionally held the public hearing a little further than where the opposition was the most important. Because there is one single EIA for 3 different townships (Yuanli, Houlong, Zhunan), the developer could apparently choose one of the three to hold a public hearing for issues concerning turbines in another township. It was said that the developer held the first public hearing at a location where the risk for the local population was the lowest, so that they could avoid real opposition from the locals. This is why some of the residents complained that the only moment where the local治 people knew about the implementation of wind turbines near their village is when政 the construction was大 about to start. Those methods were consistent with the law but立 it is also way to take advantage of some loopholes in order to avoid facing opposition. In a nutshell, how IV manages the construction學 and the operation of renewable energy facilities國 and how the company acts with local people is always legal but

not always considered appropriate by the local people. ‧

‧ N The developer also intentionally excluded certain requirements to fit local a y t circumstances, such as the tsafety distances between wind turbines andi public facilities. The i s o r reason behind this method is nthat the regulations for an EIA aree in principle. The EIA is a a v general process, which means thatl it does not state specific i requirements regarding wind Ch Un turbines development projects. Therefore, ewhenng it ccomeshi to the developers trying to establish a project within their EIA report, they can intentionally overlook certain facts that actually poses risk to local residents. However, the EIA committee members wouldn’t notice because they wouldn’t be so familiar with the specific requirements for wind turbines development and also unfamiliar with the local conditions.

When they felt that their village was at risk, local people turned to local politicians as well as the council representative for support. At first, they would have high expectation given that those are people they are familiar with. As the protest would grow, officials from the BoE paid a visit to find a solution to the persistent problems. Local residents’ level of trust was still high and they had faith that the public authorities would come up with a decent settlement agreement. However, BoE officials never really responded to locals’ requests nor

questions. Eventually, even congressmen Lin Shu-Fen14 visited the village and reacted by asking the BoE to take actions, which eventually asked the developer to hold a public hearing in accordance with the administrative procedure law. However, the BoE was not expressively showing its involvement in the public hearing, which gave the impression to the protesters that they were still not taken seriously and that none of the public institutions were really willing to help them.

This was not only affecting the local residents’ life but also represented a heavy burden for the developer. The construction was delayed by the protest, it caused financial stress and they had difficulties securing additional finances for later stages.

2.2.2 The questions the protest raised 政治大 According to most experts立 and academics interviewed, one important reason for the lack of participation was that planners and politicians considered學 that people did not know much about wind power in國 the remote places were most of the wind turbines are sited,

therefore their participation and feedback was most of the time considered‧ irrelevant to the

complicated and very technical‧ process. This less thorough and technocratic process meant N that neighboring residents could not influence issues such as the location, size of turbines and a y t distance between turbines. Thet lack of participation contributed largelyi to a negative attitude i s o r towards wind power in the villagen since people felt that they dide not have the possibility of a v influencing the development. Asl a consequence neighboringni residents in Yuanli have Ch U protested against the wind power projecte n ong theirch owni initiative, especially during the construction since they apparently did not know what was going to happen beforehand.

When focusing on facility siting issues in Taiwan, one is always confronted to the duality developer versus local people. The big interrogation is where is the government? Local people want to know exactly what is the government attitude and position. It is a misleading assumption to think that local people care in priority and solely about compensation. However, what people gradually realize is that, in the public sphere, BoE officials and officials dealing with energy issues in general are more friendly toward renewable energy, but during conferences and among experts they sometimes show a less

14 Lin Shu-fen is a member of the Democratic Progressive Party who is in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan.

moderate stance for renewables and a strong support to pursue the development of fossil fuels. Officially they have a very open attitude toward renewable energy, but in fact the government and Taipower keep raising barriers to the development of renewable energy projects. This ambivalence in the public authorities’ inclination could partly explain why there is so little official engagement from the institutions in wind power projects and why they so often hand down the responsibility to the developer.

Finally, many public hearings and local meetings have been held without bringing any change, but rather stirring up the opposition. Why? Because those meetings were not held in accordance with the administrative procedure law, which was the alibi of some lawyers when they went to defend the Yuanli case in front of the LY. Only a public hearing held in accordance with the administrative procedure law治 would have its conclusion legally binding for the developer, which, in that case, could政 not bypass its 大legal obligations anymore. Indeed, public hearings can be easily manipulated立 if they are not well regulated. Yuanli people have had a very bad experience with what they call an “illusory 學 meeting”, which gradually increased skepticism among國 the villagers every time public hearings were organized. The

questions that often came out regarding the public hearing formerly ‧ held is why only certain people and organizations are invited and who decided it?

‧ N

a y t t i io s 2.2.3 What can we learn fromn what happened in Yuanli? r a e l i v The planning approach still raises some C problematic issues: n hen hi U gc • First, there is no public debate about land-use in Taiwan and about the selection of areas that are suitable for wind power, which means that the first time people can give their opinion is when they are face-to-face with a specific project located in their vicinity.

• Second, conflicts of interests within the institutions and lack of effective participation mean that there is an increased risk that conflicts will be discovered late in the process when a lot of effort, time and money have already been invested.

• Third, one other major problem is that, oftentimes, public participation ends up being information-giving only. A legally binding public hearing must be performed under a very strict procedure but, in most cases, the developers only perform a slight consultation: “if we really want to learn from the Yuanli case, we need sincere public participation, whether it is a public participation conformed to the administrative procedure law, or through citizen cooperation where, for example, local residents can actively participate by investing in shares of the development project.”15 However, developers keep going through the “traditional” way, which is to go to the village and simply talk to the local officials in order to obtain their agreement. Besides, developers often adopt a very cynical stance on the situation where they refuse to understand the complaints after compensation was distributed among the local people. Nevertheless, public engagement under the治 form of a citizen financial investment in the creation of the project is very政 difficult to put 大 in place right now, because local people would only invest立 money if they understand clearly the benefits and can be sure they will have a return on investment. Banks in Taiwan學 will not give them this kind of guarantee if國 the policy at the national level is not clear. Financial, societal and

environmental benefit to the project must be clearly explained‧ to the people engaged in this kind of investment. However, it is not impossible to imagine for the future ‧ N since such engagement has already been successful in the past in Penghu Island.16 a y t Moreover, involvementt of the local population into the economici value of wind power i s o r projects has been put n forward by analysts as one of the e success factors behind the a v wind power developments lin Denmark and Germanyn (Toke,i 2000).17 It is the main Ch U factor that contributed to the widee acceptancengch i of wind power at the local levels. In Germany for example, the most common forms of local economic involvement are wind farms jointly owned by local farmers and organizations ran by commercial developers who, in fine, sell shares to local people. Parts of why this local economic

15 Interview with Prof. Fan conducted on March 11, 2015 16 Stephanie Chao, First 'citizen' wind farm to cease operations by 2016, The China Post, April 29, 2015 http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/04/29/434716/First-citizen.htm Even though Penghu Energy Tech Co. has announced the wind farm will actually undergo liquadation and disband, this project had the advantage of integrating local people in the process, thereby reducing the chance of local opposition. 17 Germany and Denmark are the two most successful countries in Europe in regards to the national development of wind power

ownership scheme was successful comes from the strong support brought by national authorities and national council.

• Finally, protests around wind turbines cannot simply be explained using the NIMBY argument. Even in Miaoli, people and associations keep claiming that they support renewable energy, but before anything happens they want to know if there are very clear norms and regulations on how to develop renewable energy in Taiwan. Dr. Fang conducted many interviews with local people where he realized that, indeed, they care about the policies surrounding wind power projects, but also the energy transition policy put in place by the Taiwanese government. Local keep asking: “if we support wind power, can we really reduce the use of fossil fuel and the use of nuclear energy”; or “if we support offshore wind power, can we have a clear governmental role map 治 18 about how they intend to manage政 our ocean resources”.大 In fact, their questions focus on the big picture. 立學 A few important lessons國 emerge from this debate:

‧

• First-of-all, developing‧ such project is not simply about following the legal structure. N In order to effectively deal with such wind power project, the government needs to a y t focus on the overallt policy and have a very clear target in termsi of renewable energy i s o r or for the energy mix. nIf the target is clear it will be muche easier to persuade local a v people: “if you clearly explainl to the local people the nnationali situation around energy Ch U issues, they actually start to understanden gthec challengeshi that the country is facing.”19 If one can bring a clear map of what is going to happen in the village and why it is important for the national development, a constructive discussion can definitely happen between experts and locals.

• Second, communicating and engaging with the local residents at different steps of the process is of crucial importance; it is necessary in order to escape the feeling of injustice and avert the crisis. For example, Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), which was in charge of communicating with local people at first, has gradually lost trust from Yuanli people. Local residents ended up reaching up to other national

18 Interview with Prof. Fang conducted on March 11, 2015. 19 Idem

agencies such as the MOEA and the legislative Yuan. But when MOEA received the petition from the local people, they forwarded it to the BoE, and when the LY held a public hearing they also sent the conclusion to the BoE. None of the institutions wants to bear the responsibility. That is also one of the main problems. Public authorities that seem to be in a relevant position turn to BoE, but the BoE is only a second tier governmental agency, it is very weak in the hierarchy. It is a jurisdictional issue: which of these institutions is responsible? Supposedly, EPA is at the same level than the MOEA on the institutional hierarchy, but the EPA would always transfer the responsibility to the BoE. In fact, the jurisdiction is not only unclear for the wind power, but for energy issues in general.

• One final obstacle to build trust lies in the治 fact that political situation in certain local areas in Taiwan is very primitive政 with a lot of exchange大 of interests between different political actors, not to mention立 corruption cases. In order to offer guarantee to the locals that these dubious methods will not occur in the process,學 a designated institution at the national level國 should be responsible for supervising the project and the exchange

between private actors and local officials. ‧

‧ N

a y t t i i s o r n e a i v l C n hengchi U

Chapter 3

Barriers to wind power facility siting in Taiwan

3.1 Lack of public participation

“Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens at the relevant level.”20 Researchers and experts generally agree (Shepherd, 1997; Pasqualetti et al., 2002; Dietz, 2008) on the importance of public participation in regards to renewable energy facility siting, or when a project involves an EIA. In addition, many of those researchers point to the fact that an early and substantial participation that takes local opinions into account can contribute to a more considerate siting and provide the tools to handle potential conflicts of interest. Within an EIA,治 public participation is without a doubt considered an integral part of the assessment政 procedure. Taiwan大 is no exception to the rule, and public participation is present立 in the EIAs since EIAs have been in use. But beyond this generally accepted procedure, opinions of the precise meaning,學 objectives and adequate representation of public participation國 in EIA diverge considerably. Taiwan, for example, has had for years this way of doing where public participation, consultation‧ and engagement have

been confused and used in‧ the same way in different contexts. A close look at Taiwan’s past N experience in terms of EIAa and public participation shows that it is nevery really clear, even t t i for the institutions in chargei, what public participation and EIA involvess and requires. There o r are large disagreement amongn researchers, political experts ande citizens as to the specific a i v nature and objectives of public l participation in EIA. Hencen the importance of reaching Ch U harmony on what public participation shoulden meangc hin icases of wind power facility siting in Taiwan.

3.1.1 The importance of defining “public participation”

Because “it is often difficult to understand whether those talking about people’s participation mean the same thing or simply use the phrase as a kind of magical incantation” (hughes, 1998, p. 23), researchers have stated three questions, which, once answered, draw the limits to what public participation is supposed to offer, who it involves and what are its objectives (Glucker et. al., 2013). Questions are listed as such:

20 Declaration of the United Nations (UN) 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development, Principle 10.

• What is public participation? • What objectives of public participation can be distinguished? • Who should participate and why?

3.1.1.1 What is public participation

To the question “what is public participation”, it is important to first delineate its definition and pay attention to not use it as a catch-all phrase for different types of public involvement techniques, which often leads authors to use the terms “participation”, “consultation” and “engagement” interchangeably. Therefore, the term “participation”, according to Hughes, is appropriate only政 in cases治 where participants have significant control over the decision-making process and are thus able to influence大 it (Hughes, 1998). Public participation under this definition立 would thus seem to be absent from the Yuanli case, where 學 so-called public participation resulted in a mere consultation where people were given an 國 explanation and pieces of information but never truly participated in the project. As early as in

1969, Arnstein affirmed that participation is “a categorical term for‧ citizen power. It is the

redistribution of power ‧ that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the N political and economic processes,a to be deliberately included in the future”y (Arnstein, 1969, p. t t i 216). So, 50 years ago, Arnsteinio was already saying that public participations is a means to n r empower marginalized people, a which is a concept especially relevante for the Yuanli case l i v where local residents already had trouble C making their voicen heard from the very beginning he i U and had to fight to stop being left aside. ngch

Experience has shown, and it is also the case in Yuanli, that less active forms of participation, such as information provision or mere consultation, may actually trigger other forms of public participation such as public mobilization or social protest (O’Faircheallaigh, 2010). In Yuanli, extensive social protest has led the government to decommission some of the disputed turbines, which had previously undergone an EIA and obtained the different permits legally necessary (see Appendix 1). This demonstrates that, in a democratic system, even a closed bureaucratic and technocratic EIA process can be challenged if the public becomes aware and starts to protest against it, as few as the local protesters can be. As Clarke and Harvey put it, “the number of EIAs that have invoked informal participatory action is an

indication that formal mechanisms are not as effective as they should be” (Clarke & Harvey, 2008, p. 1).

3.1.1.2 The objectives of public participation

It is also essential to highlight a certain number of key objectives to understand the benefits of public participation and how it can be detrimental to the development of an environmental project if not carried out or carried out the wrong way. Glucker et al. have managed to divide these objectives into 3 categories: the normative rationale, substantive rationale and instrumental rationale (2013).

The objectives behind the normative rationale治 are closely associated with ideals that are at the very essence of deliberative政 democracy. First大-of-all, public participation shall enable people affected by a decision立 to influence in some way that decision. Since the Yuanli wind power development affect local people’s quality of life, it would學 be thus undemocratic or even unethical to prevent國 this public from effectively participating in an EIA. Likewise, an

EIA should provide participants with the opportunity to actively exercise‧ citizenship, i.e.

make sure that the authorities‧ are involving as many members of the concerned public as N possible so that they can “developa their full potential as citizens” (O’Faircheallaigh,y 2010). t t i Finally, public participationi in EIA shall “empower formerly marginalizeds individuals and o r groups” (Glucker, 2013). One nof the goals of public participation ise to achieve more equitable a i v distribution of political power so thatl certain groups that haven trouble having their voice heard Ch U or that are excluded from any meaningfule participatngchioni in decision-making can finally reach out and influence the development of the project. Authorities have to make sure that the citizens are actors in the project and not passive individuals, which often contributes to the feeling of victimization that is very present among local people that sometimes suffer from development projects instead of realizing and appreciating the benefits. Moreover, as Jamil Khan stressed in his paper, “the fact that renewable energy projects tend to be small-scale and are often initiated by actors at the local level, increases the possibility for the economic development of people from the local community, which can help to create a feeling of ownership in project and thus increase the likelihood of acceptance” (2004, p. 3). The development of wind power in Denmark, for example, is a good demonstration of the potentials of economic involvement (Brunt & Spooner, 1998). Even without pure economic engagement, the small-scale of the projects has enabled the local population to actively

participate in the planning process and to some extent influence the decisions about the facility siting.

The substantive rationale revolves around the idea that public participation improves the quality of the decision output (Connelly & Richardson, 2005), which means that effective public participation is supposed to contribute to better decisions by allowing for more perspectives. Experts and decision-makers sometimes underestimate the importance of socially relevant and value-based knowledge when collecting information for the development of a project. For example, inhabitants can be consulted in order to retrieve information about the local flora and fauna, which the experts could have missed in their analysis of the site and which the proposed project could have an influence on. Moreover, some of what can be acceptable and/or free of risk治 can never be fully assessed unless the public gets involved given the plurality 政of standpoints that大 stems from the complex nature of environmental issues. Likewise,立 Shepherd and Bowler affirm that “even when the scientific characterization of risk is thorough, complexities persist because what學 is ‘acceptable’ depends on more than scientific criteria;國 acceptability depends on public perception” (1997, p. 727).

On top of that, public participation has the benefit of testing the robustness‧ of information from other stakeholders’ sources. As O’Faircheallaigh puts it, some stakeholders may be

‧ N prone to exaggerate potential project benefits (O’Faircheallaigh, 2010, p. 21). One recurrent a y t example would be the developerst exaggerating the benefits broughti to society and more i s o r specifically the local communityn where the project is to be developede that usually constitute a v the major justification for big infrastrl ucture projects. i Ch Un engchi The instrumental rationale focuses on two elements, which ought to be at the center of local people’s concerns in regards to the Yuanli case, namely generating legitimacy and resolving conflict. In any democratic system, it is inherent to the regime that any governmental project or any project going through the approval of governmental institutions should receive general public support and the compliance of the local people directly affected by the project, which would in fine improve the acceptance and legitimacy of decisions. Besides, as Runhaar puts it very well, involvement of all stakeholders is essential because decision-makers depend on their support since they “control critical resources such as land, real estate or the ability to protest” (2009, p. 201). Participation leads toward legitimization since people may develop a sense of control over the process. However, in order for them to feel that way, their input needs to be taken into consideration, which means that more than

just being able to express their ideas, they also need to be able to influence decision-making to a certain extent. Regarding conflict resolution, facility siting has an extreme tendency to build up tension between the different stakeholders, which often turns into a long-lasting conflict. Indeed, “because of the diversity of interests, citizens and project proponents will inevitably encounter conflict” (Shepherd, 1997, p. 729). Public participation seems to be the only tool to make the conflict resolution process productive rather than destructive. In a nutshell, it helps reducing alienation of the individual and it participates in generating an active rather than reactive role in resolving conflict.

3.1.1.3 Who should participate?

Among the scholars who address the question治 “who should participate”, using “the public”, “stakeholder” and “citizens” interchangeably政 seems大 to be common phenomenon. In fact, it would be ideal to have anyone立 who may have something to contribute to be permitted to participate. However, for practical reasons it is necessary to學 set limits to whom could participate. Therefore, it seems國 relevant to differentiate between segments of the public depending on the angle we use to approach the issue. This perspective‧ has been suggested by

Dietz and Stern, which ‧ state that one should use “stakeholders” when talking about N

“organized groups that area or will be affected by or that have a strong yinterest in the outcome t t i of the decision”. On the contrary,i “ the general public” is not directlys affected by a decision o r but may have some interest in nit (Dietz, 2008, p. 15). In the Yuanlie case, this view on how to a i v define participants and who doesl it include is definitely then most relevant since the local Ch U residents of Yuanli obviously match the stakeholders’engch definitioni offered by those two authors. The delimitation of people who should actively participate is also important in order to assist institutions in targeting and listening to the core of interested people. This way these institutions and the developer can efficiently use their resources to consider and respond to stakeholders’ input. Indeed, we have seen in Yuanli, stakeholders complaining that their comments were not often taken into account by authorities, which has led these people to refrain from formally participating in official meetings and to make use of informal forms of participation instead such as protests, hunger strike, etc.

3.1.2 The benefits of public participation in regards to the Yuanli case

Not everyone is in support of enhanced public participation in wind power facility siting. For example, in Taiwan, developers (public or private) sometimes see the local residents as an inconvenient reality. However, developers who believe that residents should be pushed to the side spend a lot of time, energy and money doing so, thereby raising the transaction costs. Moreover, local residents who are subject to these methods feel that they have been abused. It gradually builds a lot of mistrust and confrontation. And, as it turns out, project development does not function well when there is an adversarial relationship. On the contrary, a majority of the experts and academics interviewed would favor a participatory approach (Leiss, 1996), which relies on the fundamental trust from the public in the developer and in the project. This approach is characterized by the use of deliberative methods to involve the public in planning, and often strives to go beyond mere consultation. This preference shows the importance of an open 治and transparent planning process during all the different steps in order to achieve facility政-siting success.大立 However, public participation is obviously not a new concept學 in Taiwan; the developer is required to consult local國 people when wind power projects are undertaken. But the

challenge here is the ability to engage these local people in a meaningful‧ participation. If residents are sufficiently empowered to have a voice, the question becomes how does that

‧ N voice gets utilized. One of the things that we can observe in the way these wind projects are a y t handled in Taiwan is that it’st one step to create an opportunity for residentsi to participate in i s o r meetings, it’s another step all togethern for that participation to leade to meaningful changes as a v far as the program design and programl implementation are concerned.i And for this to happen, Ch Un residents should first be educated about theire nrightsgc andh itheir ability to influence the process if it is in their power.

One of the multiple advantages of giving this opportunity of participating to the local people is to reconnect Taiwanese people with political life. Indeed, the process that authorities put in place today is completely operated under a top-down movement, which gives very little room for people to engage in changes that occur in the Taiwanese society. As a consequence, people feel easily excluded and, oftentimes, think of protesting as the only way to get their voices heard. For that matter, Taiwan’s government could reorient its public engagement process to be less about telling people options and having them react to it, and more about listening to the opinion and the expectations of the local people. Likewise, encouraging residents in participating and engaging them in developmental aspects builds a sense of trust,

a sense of mutual mission, and ultimately this respect is necessary for both sides to believe that they are joining forces in working for the common good.

Public participation is also a crucial tool to take into consideration and assess some of the elements of the environment that have an influence on the siting process and would not enter into the equation otherwise. Indeed, a special characteristic of visual impact, or other issues related to the influence of wind turbines on people such as noise pollution, is that there is no objective ground to measure it. Therefore, the level of impact depends a lot on personal preferences. Hence the importance of involving citizens to hear their preferences in order to deal with complicated decision-making.

Finally, another benefit of public participation治 when it’s duly regulated is that the various exchanges between the developer政 and the residents 大are controlled and recorded, which prevents from any of the stakeholders立 to come back on their decisions without proper justification. As Professor Gao put it bluntly during the interview,學 “developers and local residents are unable to eat their國 words and say contradictory words later in the process.”21 In a

nutshell, it helps to avoid misunderstandings and the spreading of rumors.‧

‧ N a y t 3.2 Legal issues t i i s o r n e 3.2.1 Lack of government commitmenta and incentives to fosterv wind power in Taiwan l ni Ch U engchi The Feed-In-Tariffs (FIT) has been raised in 2010 due to the passage of the Renewable Energy Act (REA) in 2009, which could indicate that the government is more devoted to the development of renewable energy. But, in reality, the developer (here IV) is fighting every year for better FIT rates. So, the fact that the government recently raised the tariffs does not mean that the government is more committed but rather that it finally responded to the developers’ request. Besides, the REA was stalled in the legislative Yuan for 9 years before it was passed. There were lots of disputes between different groups of interest before it could be passed. The FIT was one of the essential contributions of the REA. But even if the mechanisms now exist, the developers still have to regularly persuade the government to improve the FIT rates. In addition, unlike the publication of multi-year FIT in most European

21 Interview with Prof. Gao conducted on February 22, 2015

countries, Taiwan’s government publishes the tariff each year, a scheme that has already been criticized and blamed for the lack of investment security in the long-term planning of large wind power plants, which require a long construction period. These problems are all indicators that one of the determinant obstacles at the moment is that public authorities don’t believe/understand that renewables can play a major role in Taiwan. To this regard, some NGOs have been criticizing the government for not being very sincere with developing renewable energies in Taiwan. Developers that want to promote renewable energies in Taiwan don’t have enough data or research materials because the government is not investing in any. Furthermore, there is no balanced discussion between the foreign developers and the governmental entities.

The lack of legal structure in Taiwan surrounding治 the implementation of wind power at the regional level has been coupled with政 a rather weak大 government policy towards wind power. On the one hand, there立 seems to be general support for wind power and an acknowledgement at the government level that it should represent學 an important part of the renewable energy system.國 On the other however, the government has been reluctant to

introduce measures that would ensure a stable development of onshore‧ and offshore wind power across the island, both in terms of management of facility siting and through the use of

‧ N planning and development regulation. a y t t i i s o r n e a v 3.2.1 Unsteady legal procedure l ni Ch U engchi The EIA procedure is a crucial step of the siting process, but the one undergone in the Yuanli case has received a lot of criticism from the opponents of the project, namely the Yuanli Self-Help Organization.22 EIA is not the last barrier before starting the construction of a wind power farm (cf Appendix 1), but it is a key milestone since it goes through a very long time examining all the environmental aspects of the issue. It takes 2 years before obtaining the approval if we include all the surveys. In theory the EIA is opened to everyone, as the information and the discussion held during the meetings are transposed online under a public domain. People can ask their questions, questions should be addressed during public hearings,

22 Response to InfraVest's June 2013 Statement regarding the Yuanli Self-Help Organization, July 17, 2013 http://residentsinyuanli.blogspot.tw/2013_07_01_archive.html

and the EIA report submitted to the EPA. The EIA committee itself is composed of 8 to 9 members from the civil society or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and some other official representatives. Overall there should be 10 or 15 people represented. The local government is also invited to take part in the EIA to provide its own perspective on the situation. In theory, the EIA process is a chance for all the stakeholders to express their views and opinions, but it often becomes a platform for the local government to express its support for the project and confront the NGOs. The local government is usually taking side with the developers. The local people have very little chance to express their opinion during the whole EIA process since none of the organizations that could represent them are invited on the committee.

The government also needs to promote wind治 power and foster communication with the Taiwanese people beforehand in order 政 to raise the awareness大 and understanding. Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA)立 can help this process and contribute to the acceptance of wind power across the island. But it is obviously not enough, because學 SEA is completed on a national scale and, as a result,國 can overlook some local concerns. But the reason why SEA is

fundamental is because it can only be taken care of by public authorities‧ and thus cannot be contested afterwards like a potentially biased study conducted by a private company could be.

‧ N For onshore wind power, it would seem like the time has passed already because the a y t implementation regulations t have been the same for years and there isi very little chance that i s o r the government will change themn now. However, for offshore winde power, SEA is a good and a v feasible idea. Thus, as a complementl of the case-by-case EIA,i an SEA prepared by public Ch Un planning authorities could increase the legitimacyeng candh thei efficiency of the process. However, such process needs to be participative, open and transparent to be truly effective, as it is the case in many European countries.

Compensation is another important contentious issue since compensation mechanisms have been handed over to private companies to deal with in the past, and a lot has been done under the table. A lot of protesters expressed the doubt that the motive behind the local magistrate being so supportive of the development of wind power in Yuanli had to do with the possibility that he received black money from the private sector. In the west, compensation wise, governments usually foster a public-private partnership: on the one hand, a compensation for the local people from the private side and, on the other hand, institutional supports under the form of a continuous financial help. It should be a regulated program and

not just a case-by-case engagement. Ultimately, the idea is to turn the public-private partnership into an institutional work.

3.2.3 insufficient safety regulations

Windmills in general present a certain degree of safety risks. Each windmill in Yuanli is a hundred meter tall and the length of one blade is 35 meters. In the past, a blade actually broke and got detached from the turbine in Houlong Township ( 後龍鎮 ). It is an internationally recognized safety risk when wind turbines are located near houses. There should be a minimum safety distance between the wind turbines and any housing project. Likewise, since windmills are made of fiber-glass it can poison the land if it breaks down and falls onto the ground. Therefore, there must be a safety distance between the turbines and not only the housing facilities but also the fields, or治 any relative public places. Because of the 政大 safety incidents, several groups 立and environmental organizations in Taiwan began to look for international standards or other countries practices when it comes to safety distances between 學 wind turbines and public places (cf Table 2). 國

‧

‧ N

a y t t i i s o r n e a i v l C n hengchi U

治政大立學

國

‧

‧ N

a y t t i io s n r e a i v Table 2 Safety regulations regardingl Cdistances between publicn facilities and windmills put in place by certain private wind power companiesh and by certaini U local governments in the US and Canada engch

On the table, we can see the internal policies of different countries’ wind turbines companies as well as regulations set up by certain local governments. There are flexibilities on the safety distance, the larger the turbine the larger the safety distances are.

In Denmark, the government introduced land-use directives in 1994 and 1999, which made compulsory the inclusion of wind turbines in regional and municipal plans. The land- use directives put pressure on municipalities to consider developing wind power. The state, on the other hand, handles common guidelines such as safety distances, the height of turbines and how to site turbines in the landscape (Brunt, 1998). These are all important problems that

can only be regulated at the national level, which is something that remains to be done in Taiwan, and something that the protest in Yuanli was aiming at.

3.3 Institutional problems

3.3.1 Unreliable institutional organization

The main regulation behind wind power development is the electricity act, which states that before the erection of wind turbines, the developer needs to obtain the construction approval and then the power license. After obtaining the power license, wind turbines can be commissioned. In the earlier stage, which is the concession approval, the developer needs to first obtain the local government approval. The local治 government will look at the developer’s 政大 proposition and see if it goes along立 or contradicts its existing or future plans. The developer also needs land use approval. Most of InfraVest’s wind turbines are學 located on land owned by the National Property Bureau國 or by the Forestry Bureau. So, in Taiwan, according to the power generation industry regulations, if a developer wants to get approval for

‧ onshore/offshore wind power, the company needs to get at least 13 approvals from at least 6

‧ or 7 different administrationsN before it can start the construction; a very complicated process a y t that requires a lot of time andt where the developer is expected to deali with a lot of different io s government structures. n r a e i v l C n Thus, one of the problems obviouslyhen gliesc h ini theU government’s organization. For example, in Germany, UK23 or Denmark, the government integrates environment, energy and climate change all together into one institution. It’s a first level institution under the prime minister. In Taiwan, the important number of institutions prevents from a good coordination of all the information. Such organization structure worked in the past for conventional energy, but it causes problem for the development of renewable energies. For example, if the BoE and the EPA are entangled in their respective roles, the whole process will be slowed down or stalled as a result. The government sometimes organizes inter-governmental platform but it takes quite a long time and it does not always come to meaningful conclusion. Because each institution has its own goal it does not help for collaboration. When a project is on its way,

23 In the UK, before the Department of Energy & Climate Change, there was no jurisdiction responsible for the renewable energy development.

each institution has to hope that the other institutions will compromise in certain areas of the process. For that matter, Taiwan needs an institution at the ministerial level that would be in charge of renewable energies, climate change, carbon mitigation, etc. In Taiwan, the institution in charge of climate change is the EPA and the ministry of Foreign Affairs.24 In a strict institutional point-of-view the MOFA being involved in issues related to climate change makes very little sense and is very confusing for anyone working under this political apparatus. The BoE, on the other hand, is looking after energy issues. If the EPA is promoting research on energy issues, the BoE considers that the EPA is crossing the lines. In fact, cross- government coordination is something Taiwan lacks greatly, but the problem could be solved at the EY level. Indeed, if there are two different institutions that don’t cooperate under the same authority, this authority should deal with the issue. For example: 治 “Former EPA Minister Shen wanted政 to have a discussion大 with Taipower, telling them that they should cut their emissions立 and develop more renewable energies. He told them that there are some really good practices in the UK that Taipower學 should try to follow, try to investigate more.國 The BoE wasn’t happy about that because they consider that it’s

not the role of the EPA to enter in contact with Taipower. Taipower‧ has actually the capacity to do something but the lack of collaboration between the BoE and the EPA

‧ N prevent the EPA from discussing with Taipower. Taipower refuses to work with the a y t EPA and solely communicatet with the MOEA.”25 i i s o r n e a v Within the institutions themselves,l the organization can be confusini g as well. For example, Ch Un the communication platform between differentengc divisionshi inside the BoE is not well established. For a single piece of information, the developer sometimes receives many times the same request from different divisions within the BoE. There is actually an efficient coordination office for nuclear energy topics within the BoE, and though there is a quasi- governmental institution for wind power - Thousand Wind Turbine Promotion Office – the information still cannot be effectively collected and consolidated. BoE is the competent authority to deal with the developer, but even till now the developer has to argue or fight to get simple documents accredited. Regarding the construction approval for example, even after all those years IV still has to urge the BoE to be efficient and speed up with the process. The

24Climate change issues are also related to international participation issues given Taiwan’s unique international status. 25 Interview with Kathy Lee from the British Trade & Cultural Office on January 26, 2015.

problem that is very rooted within the institutions is not solved; they only attempt to solve some problems when protests arise at locations where the facilities are to be implemented.

3.3.2 Lack of involvement from the institutions

The public hearings are always mandated to be undertaken by the developer but never by the institutions during the development. The developer sometimes wishes that the institutions would also get involved in the public hearings. One of the criticisms often raised during the public hearings is that the developer only invites people who they know will not create trouble. But the developer constantly tries to involve these public institutions to make the protesters realize that what the company is doing is regulated. As a consequence, developers in Taiwan sometimes feel that they are治 left alone when dealing with the protest. If the institutions organized the public hearings,政 there probably大 would not be a problem of representation anymore since the立 institution in charge would play the role of mediator between the different parties. The key question is about the trust學 between the developer and the local people. If the developer國 does not succeed in building this relationship based on trust, local people will not believe the developer’s words, even if it does everything‧ according to the

rules. Therefore any wind‧ power development needs a neutral party - the third party - to N convey the information ora message to local people. Naturally, local peopley will criticize the t t i process, but at least this wayi is theoretically more objective. The trusts can be built in many o r different ways, but one of the firstn steps could be that a public authoritye takes charge of public a i v hearings or meetings. l n Ch U engchi The other reason behind this lack of involvement is that BoE’s power is weak considering its rank in the government institutional hierarchy, so it does not play a very proactive role in the development of wind power. Besides, the BoE is highly conservative in the way decisions are taken and in the way the energy is produced in Taiwan. The BoE never actually stand up to defend the developer in case, for example, the developer is attacked with unfounded allegations:

“In reality, institutions would rather not be involved unless problems that directly threaten their operations happen. They are very passive in waiting for the developer’s application. If everything goes well then it is for the best, but if something goes wrong they will literally wait until the protesters enter their office to get involved with the

issues. Actually, they don’t really know how to deal with the protest. Most of the time, the developer has to deal with it itself.” 26

So it seems of crucial importance that the roles of the different stakeholders need to be set out. At the national level, the government should regulate, incentivize, enable, and might even help with some preliminary investigation. At the project level there is the developer, which has a different role and different responsibilities than the government, but the institutions and the developer must work together in order to gain legitimacy in the message they convey and the framework they set. If a community has been well informed, people should know what the developer is supposed to do, who gives a permit, who sets the policy. In Taiwan that is not understood at all: 治 “In Europe, these channels are very政 well established, 大we know who does what now, and it’s been going on for a while.立 In Taiwan, all they have had is state-owned enterprises, whether it’s nuclear, or gas, or coal, which do what they need學 to do, and because it’s not opened privatized market,國 those companies have been able to do just what they want 27

clearly.” ‧

‧ N In the end, it seems like the government is not very committed to development of wind power, a y t so that would explain why tthe institutions in charge are so passive wheni problems related to i s o r wind power appear in the society.n e a i v l C n hen hi U gc

26 Interview with Kathy Lee from the British Trade & Cultural Office on January 26, 2015. 27 Interview with Alexander Chapman from CIER on Dec. 12, 2014

Chapter 4

The necessity for Taiwan of offering a new institutional design and developing social capital.

4.1 Institutional design

Institutions, in the sphere of social and political science, “deal with the control of the use of force within the society and the maintenance of internal and external peace of the boundaries of the society, as well as control of resources for the implementation of various goals and the articulation and setting up of certain goals for the collectivity” (Goodin, 1996, p. 22). 治政大 4.1.1 Institutions and their design立

學 In his description of institutions, Offe (1996) offers an interesting view on how to 國 assess the quality of these institutions. Institutions, according to him, must not just perform

‧ the task, which is incumbent upon them, but they must also “function” properly, i.e. to be

‧ trusted and yield beneficialN or at least tolerable outcomes. In a nutshell, their actions must be

a y widely supported by society while they reach the goal that was set fort them. In some cases, t i i s institutions can fulfill their o duties in the long run but still be criticizedr and cause social n e troubles by the way in which theya have reached these goals. Ini vthe end, if institutions create l C n more problems than they actually solve,h institutionalengch reshapingi U becomes necessary to readapt to the new circumstances. The creation of institutions, or the building of enhanced social, political, and economic institutions is generally considered to be the central problem that societies confront once they reach their process of democratization. Besides, as democracy consolidates in these said societies it is usually necessary for these institutions to go through a process of redesign in order to adapt the new needs of people. According to Roger E. Kasperson (2005), in order to achieve greater siting success in a democratic regime, major rethinking must be done regarding institutions and how they manage siting processes. Thus, it is important to search for more suitable institutional design. “Just as siting processes are in metamorphosis, so are the institutions”, he writes.

There are basically three ways in which social institutions can change over time. First, social change might occur by accident. Second, social change might be related to evolution, in a sense that society is naturally adapting to a new environment. Third and most interestingly, social change might be the product of intentional intervention, that is to say that change might be the result of deliberative intervention coming from goal-seeking agents. The third point is where the theory of institutional design unfolds.

When talking solely about design, researchers generally refer to other fields of science such as architecture and engineering in order to offer an adequate definition. Perhaps, to put it simply, one can say that “design is the creation of an actionable form to promote valued outcomes in a particular context” (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987, p. 201). But, more importantly, it is the object of this design that we are interested治 in. By institutional design we mean “the design of policies, of mechanisms, and of政 whole systems.” (Goodin,大 1996, p. 31). 立 Thus, one major principle that the theory of institutional design學 generally encompasses is that humans are fallible國 and that societies ought to change. An advocate of institutional

design understands the fact that no design is optimal and every design‧ is an adaptation of the institutions to the present social situation. In that sense, “it is far better to design our

‧ N institutions in such a way as to be flexible in time” (Goodin, 1996, p. 40). Thus, we might say a y t that revisability is an importantt principle of institutional design. Indeed,i institutional design i s o r does not necessarily suggest then devising, from scratch, of new sociale arrangements, but it is a v meant to observe the existing sociall arrangements to see if theyi are satisfactory and apply Ch Un certain revisions if deemed necessary. Perhaps,en gto cspeakhi of institutional intervention would be even more helpful to the understanding of the concept

4.1.2 The instruments and objectives of institutional design

Following Pettit’s theory (1996) on institutional design, there are clearly two measures that stand out as instruments “for altering the opportunities and incentives of individual agents and, thereby, their aggregate behavior” (p. 55). In other words, so as to operate institutional design, designers have two important instruments – sanctions and screens – to make sure that the new design can be effective. Sanctions can come in negative and positive forms, which means that the negative sanction will penalize the agent for the failure of choosing appropriately and the positive sanction will reward him for the appropriate choice. Obviously,

sanctions are clearly in operation when we can identify a sanctioning agency, but as Pettit (1996) stresses, there is no need for a sanctioning agency for sanctions to exist. To put it simply, it does not matter if the rewards or penalties are imposed intentionally by other agents, what matters is that they exist since they can also simply be the effects of natural causes. For example, in the case a wind power project, the simple fact of a longer process raising the transaction costs for the developer as well as the government can be considered a negative sanction. Sanctions, in this broad sense, will usually be recognized by the parties whom they affect. Thus, sanctions “may serve to reinforce a certain form of behavior even though they do not help to produce it” (Pettit, p. 58). The second instrument or attribute of institutional design is screens, which have the effect of recruiting, for certain tasks that require institutional design, those individuals that are more likely to behave in the manner that is socially valued. The simple acts of appointing certain治 people for certain offices or imposing certain criteria or constraints for eligibility政 are essentially大 methods of screening that the institutional designer will try to立 control. In the Yuanli case or in any wind power project in Taiwan and elsewhere, the procedure whereby certain people from學 only certain organizations can participate in an EIA國 committee, or the requirement that members of the committee

include representatives of certain groups, or else that the membership‧ be approved by some other authority are all obvious screening devices. In the case of Taiwan, certain of these

‧ N screening methods have been highly criticized instead of being deemed to be useful devices a y t since they would not allowt for all the interested parties to be represented,i thus altering the i s o r democratic process. Hence, then importance of reconsidering the e institutional design so that a v this established procedure could bel changed and hopefully improved.i In institutional design, Ch Un one should look to screening initiativese thatn g fitc thehi circumstances prior to making any sanctioning intervention and, in turn, these sanctions should be taken in a supportive way. By supportive sanction, we mean deliberative habits, which would constitute or produce the desired behavior. For example, in Yuanli, a lot of experts interviewed argued that it would probably have helped or, at least, it would have done no harm if the government institutions behind the projects were getting more involved in the implementation process or if they were compelled to take the role of a third party when disputes emerged between local people and the developer.

In his view on institutional design, Pettit (1996) delineates two distinct dimensions to which institutional design is potentially relevant. In the end, institutional design may be oriented to the prevention of harm or the promotion of good, in the sense that it (re)directs

public or private agents “in whom a certain social trust has been invested” to perform their duties in a way that avoid harm or benefit to society. In the case of Yuanli, the author would argue that institutional design would work in favor of harm avoidance and benefit promotion by public agents. Indeed, those in public office have, through their (often inefficient) bureaucratic practices, caused a lot of harm to the society they serve, being unable to communicate and cooperate with the local people directly affected by the project they were supposed to carry out. Institutional redesign, in the Yuanli case, will oblige public trustee to perform their task in a way that benefits the Taiwanese society and its citizens. It is a desideratum of institutional design that public authorities discharge their official duties to good effect.

If we can attempt a parallel with the way治 nations across the world have dealt with carbon mitigation, we can see that the 政traditional way of 大operating has been to rely on the promulgation and enforcement of立 regulations as the primary means of pollution control. The basic regulatory idea is common: pollution is restricted by limits學 upon how much pollutant can be emitted by each source.國 However, this regulatory approach has been challenged by

environmental experts who have come to endorse a market-based ‧ system. Indeed, “policy analysts who have contemplated pollution control have almost universally concluded that

‧ N systems of regulation are necessarily inferior to quasi-market incentive systems” (Dryzek, a y t 1996, pp. 107-108). As a result,t a multitude of countries have started irethinking the way they i s o r operate, intervening in their policyn structure and reshaping the establishede programs in order a v to favor market-based antipollutionl strategies; an interventioni which is by essence what Ch Un constitutes institutional design. As a mattere ofn fact,gc anh increasingi number of academic experts now tend to favor a more participative approach to facility siting, especially in the field of renewable energy (Khan 2003; Wolsink 2005; Smith & Klick, 2007; Glucker et al, 2013). So, much like governments across the world have adopted new incentive systems based on the way markets operate in order to cut carbon emissions, there is definitely a need in an important number of democracies to rethink the government’s strategy in terms of increasing people’s participation in wind power facility siting. Taiwan is no exception to the rule, even though, as we have seen, the lack of participation is not the only obstacle to wind power projects on the island. However, as we have highlighted, the problems seem to be very structural where the roles of the different parties and the communication channels between them are neither always clear nor efficient. Thus, for that matter, institutional design of wind power facility siting can be actively shaped and developed in Taiwan, by modifying legal and

regulatory provisions and by strengthening organizational capacity and enforcement practices. But, this search for the best institutional design cannot be undertaken by outsiders, but must come from the organizational actors involved in environmental protection in Taiwan and more specifically the development of renewable energies.

4.1.3 The conditions to achieve institutional design

In addition to identifying the specific political and organizational areas to which institutional design could help achieving improvements in wind power facility siting in Taiwan, a number of feasibility considerations need to be taken into account:

• First, the scope of improvement政 in wind治 power facility siting performance is not independent from the country's finance, and changes大 also need to be assessed with respect to their financial 立sustainability. 學 • Second, as discussed國 above, administration is critical. The administration’s

implementation capacity and its willingness to introduce changes‧ need to be assessed

in order to be sure‧ whether proposed changes can be successfully implemented. N

Implementation capacitya refers to the ability to plan, implementy and manage t t i institutional and organizationalio change. s n r a e l i v • Third, there is need to reflect C on whether the proposedn changes in the institutional he i U design and/or organizational practicen areg c politicallyh feasible and desirable, in other words, whether powerful interest groups will support and drive these changes. Trade- offs may occur between what appears to be the best and most reasonable option from the institutional-organizational analysis and what is politically feasible.

As highlighted by Offe (1996), two other important considerations also have to be taken into account when institutional design is concerned. First, “the existing institutions that are to be replaced by the newly designed institutions must be both thoroughly discredited […] and must also have lost their ability to cope with functional problems in their environment (Offe, p. 210).” Basically, it means that the institutions have to change the way they are operating because, even if they were efficient before, they prove inefficient at one moment in

time in the face of, for example, technological change or further democratization of society. Thus, social crises and the loss of legitimacy which the government has suffered from in Taiwan after the Yuanli events should typically give rise to intentionally attempted institutional innovations. Second, there should be, in most cases, the presence of a model of the new institutional order that is copied and suitably adapted to the targeted society. Most of the time, institutional designs are copies to other successful designs elsewhere, and they are frequently advocated as such. Thus, “the designing of new institutions occurs through the replication of old or spatially distant ones” (Offe, p. 212). Designers typically seek inspiration and legitimacy in an already existing model and strive to apply it to their society. In fact, a lot of analysts would suggest looking at how some European countries such as Germany, Denmark or the UK deal with wind power projects implementation in order to import fundamental concepts and procedures that make治 the process rather successful in these countries. However, it is often very difficult政 to copy a system大 that is intrinsically related to a different political culture and a 立different mentality on how to implement public policies and programs. Therefore, some of the experts involved can sometimes學 gather a lot of frustration when trying to modify some國 norms or rules that seem to be easily changed but turn out to be

quite resilient given that they are caught up in the principles of the‧ concerned society. For example, in Taiwan, it is very hard to act in a bottom-up manner even for projects that

‧ N necessitate common people’s input since the norm is to take decisions in a very technocratic a y t way where experts’ perspectivet are almost always given priority comparedi to any public i s o r opinion. Indeed, the paternalistic/technocraticn approach that thee governmental institutions a v adopt in general in Taiwan is al common phenomenon, especiallyi since it is a young Ch Un democracy. It is in the political culture as ewell.ng Mostch politiciansi don’t think that people have the knowledge to fully understand the problems and what the Taiwanese society needs. As a result, there is oftentimes a feeling of resignation among officials working in these institutions because it is simply too difficult to change how the system works. In regards to government institutions themselves, a lot of experts have suggested to learn from European institutions such as the DECC in the UK in order to shape a model of environmental institution that would be efficient and flexible, having the ability to respond to the issues and enough power to coordinate with the other institutions without creating conflicts of interests within the government. For example, in Taiwan, the problem is that the EPA has been designed and limited in a way that it can never deal with energy issues. By remodeling and redesigning key institutions the government will build on trust between citizens and institutions. But the problem does not only lie between the EPA and the BoE: it’s all other agencies. Unless the

EPA becomes a more inclusive institution like the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is, many structural problems will still persist and an effective institutional design will not have the chance to be carried out.

Finally, as we have seen before, institutions must be trusted and yield beneficial outcomes to function properly, which means that their actions must be supported by the general public while they perform for the common good. However, as Brennan describes in Selection and the Currency of Reward (1996), people then often assume that the institutions are motivated directly by a desire to promote the collective interest, whereas empirical evidence shows that institutions are not all so virtuous.28 It would seem on the contrary that much like the rest of society, institutions are in general and by nature driven by self-interest. In the end, we understand that a certain “institutional治 arrangement will support selection process to the extent the arrangement rewards政 some types大 of agents more than others” (p. 272). Therefore, institutions will立 act in a certain way depending on if the agent they want the action to be beneficial to will surely get this benefit in return.學 In Taiwan, government institutions have been reluctant國 to promote certain set of more participative regulations and

norms on the basis that they didn’t have the certainty that it would help‧ wind power projects implementation on the long term. Within non-market institutions, difficulties of monitoring

‧ N and intervention tend to be higher than in market-based institutions since it is very delicate to a y t understand what these institutionst want and how they want it. But whati is certain is that a new i s o r institutional design should taken both in considerations the interestse of the people and the a v interests of the designers to have a lchance to be successfully implemented.i Ch Un engchi To conclude, the process of institutional design is always going to be limited by state- related constraints and the importance given by the public actors to the issues at stake. As a result institutional reshaping is always going to be an uphill struggle. It can only have the chance to prove fruitful to the extent that structural issues are carefully delineated and clearly targeted, and that certain conflict of interests between certain institutions can be overcome to move towards common good consideration instead of private interests.

28 « Virtue » here is in understood in the « civic humanist » sense to be the dual attribute of a capacity to discern the true public interest and a motivation to act as the public interest requires.

4.2 The development of social capital

4.2.1 The generation of Social Capital – The citizen-centered model

The term “social capital” gained popularity (and started to be widely considered by social scientists as a valuable concept to deal with collective action problems) in the early 1990s, after Robert Putnam published his article Bowling Alone (1995), highlighting the central importance of the networks of strong, crosscutting personal relationships developed over time that provide the basis for trust, cooperation, and collective action in democratic communities. His work on American society had a tendency to frame social capital as a producer of "civic engagement" and also a broad societal measure of communal health. He also transformed social capital from a resource 治 possessed by individuals to an attribute of collectives. 政大立 Robert Putnam definitely contributed to shape the discussion學 of the importance of social capital and of how國 it is perceived today in the realm of social science. His early

attempts to define social capital focused on the degree to which social‧ capital as a resource should be used for public good or for the benefit of individuals. Putnam suggested that social ‧ N capital would facilitate co-operation and mutually supportive relations in communities and a y t nations and would thereforet be a valuable means of combating manyi of the social disorders i s o r frequently encountered in modernn society. Putnam (1993, p. 167)e puts the case for social a v capital as follows: l ni Ch U engchi “Voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. Social capital here refers to features of social organizations, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.”

According to Putnam, social capital must be one of, and perhaps the single most important, core causes of economic and social success. As he stressed in many of his works, citizens in regions who are engaged in public issues and where political networks are organized horizontally and not hierarchically end up trusting one another and obey the law. “These civic communities value solidarity, civic participation, and integrity. And here Democracy works” (Putnam, 1993, p. 3). Grassroots forms of civic cooperation were

considered by Putnam to be important instruments for the accumulation of social capital. His descriptions of Southern Italy networks in Making Democracy Work prove the existence of those grassroots form of cooperation. Putnam emphasizes the importance of collective political mobilizations for the creation of social capital (Putnam, 1993).

Robert Putnam was also the first academic to bring the distinction between bounding and bridging social capital. Bounding social capital is the kind of social capital that one can share with people that have similar characteristics to his own characteristics. This is the extended relationship with one’s family or the fraternities in college. The other type is the bridging social capital, which is based on repeated interactions between business and people that initially didn’t know each other but through experience have started to trust each other. These two types of social capital are quite different治 in the sense that the old Italian district stories described in Putnam’s work often政 start with bounding大 social capital and follows up with bridging social capital to立 eventually reach the status of a trustworthy economic community. The potential strength of bridging social capital is 學 the strength of weak ties.29 What really matters in this國 kind of networks is not the people that already know each other

but it is the fact that certain people can actually have contact and exchange‧ with certain other people who are related to a different part of the game. By having this kind of contacts, one is

‧ N able to develop a much stronger chain. This is the kind of networks that were absent in Yuanli a y t and these channels never gott to be fixed. i i s o r n e a v Putnam focuses on the emergencel of grass-roots organizationi as the source of social Ch Un capital in a society. We argue that institutionsen shouldgch triggeri and foster the formation of social capital in Taiwan in order to generate cooperation between the different organs constituent to society and, in the case of wind power projects, the different stakeholders taking part and impacted by the project. However, in Yuanli, the local people have responded to the lack of social capital by creating their very own grass-root organization (the Yuanli Self-Help Group) in order to channel their complaints and messages that the government apparently refused to hear. The government and the developer have actually faced a village where the level of bounding social capital was already quite important within the community and this has enabled those people to join forces to fight a project that they thought would harm their

29 The strengh of weak ties is a social exchange theory primarily developed by Granovetter (1973), which states that weak ties enable reaching populations and audiences that are not accessible via strong ties, and thus permit the diffusion of networks.

village. Bridging social capital between the local people and the public authorities was immediately lacking and, despite their efforts, local people never had the chance to enter in some form of constructive dialogue and cooperation to eventually bridge the communication gaps between them and the institutions.

4.2.2 The generation of Social Capital – The institution-centered model

In this study, the source of social capital is reconsidered from what was advocated in Putnam’s model. Instead of the approach on social capital which stresses that generalized trust is built up by citizens themselves through a culture that permeates the networks and organizations of civil society, we adopt, in this study, the theory highlighted by Rothstein and 治 Stolle (2008), which advocates that social政 capital is embedded大 in and linked to political and legal institutions. According to 立these scholars, institutions and policies create, channel, and influence social capital. As a matter of fact, more and more researchers學 support the theory that trust may be sustained by appropriate國 institutions (Levi, 1998; Hardin, 1998). As early as in 1991, North wrote that “institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and

‧ reduce uncertainty in exchange” (North, 1991, p. 97). The underlying intuition is that we may

‧ learn about the conditionsN under which trust and social capital will emerge and be maintained a y t in a society by studying thet ways in which social institutions evolve i in the said society. For io s example, Hardin stresses the fact that existing institutions will militater towards preventing n e a v certain forms of opportunism, whichl in turn may prevent one majori source of insecurity in the C Un relationships between different actors ofh societyeng andch allowi them to trust and cooperate with each other more easily. The logic behind this is not complex: if one will be punished if he cheats in a certain sort of transaction, and if the expected costs of punishment outweigh the expected benefits of cheating, naturally the optimal strategy is to remain honest.

According to Rothstein et al. (2008, p. 7), “we can distinguish two main types of institutional arguments in relation to social capital: an attitudinal approach and an institutional-structural approach.” In the former, scholars, as we have seen previously, examine the relationship between institutional/political trust and generalized trust. However, they interpret their findings as evidence that social capital can help build effective social political institutions, which can help public authorities perform effectively, and this in turn would encourage confidence from ordinary people to trust institutions. The other approach

centers on the state as a source of social capital generation, and suggests that the government permits the establishment of reliable contracts between citizens in that it provides information and monitor legal processes. The state also enforces rights and rules and sanction lawbreakers if needed, protect from discrimination and actively support the integration and participation of citizens. This approach seems to perfectly suit Taiwan’s wind power facility siting problems in the sense that it pushes the government to enact in a particular democratic fashion that Taiwan’s society is extremely lacking. In this theory of generalized trust, the basic argument is that a biased, unfair and corrupt administrative system generally goes hand in hand with low levels of social capital. Therefore, institutions engaged in particular processes where trust is key to the successful development of the project should have in their priorities to detect and punish people who offer or take bribes, engage in clientelistic operations, cheat, or engage in other such non-cooperative operations and who therefore治 should not be trusted. “If citizens think that these order institutions do what政 they are supposed大 to do in a fair, reasonably efficient and unbiased manner, then立 they also have reason to believe that the chance of people getting away with treacherous behavior is relatively small” (Rothstein學 et al., 2008, p. 12). However, it is important 國 to underline that it is not only the efficiency with which these

treacherous behaviors can be punished that matters for generalized trust,‧ but the combination of efficiency and fairness of the institutions. If public authorities and social service

‧ N bureaucrats behind the wind power project in Yuanli cannot be trusted, then the general level a y t of trust is immediately plumt meting because these institutions are bothi representatives of the i s o r people as well as exhibitors ofn institutionalized values, their behaviore function as signals to a v citizens about the moral standard ofl the society in which they live.i Ch Un engchi The theoretical discussion and findings in this chapter are intended to situate the concept of social capital in relations to the realm of public institutions and, more specifically, the link between government institutions and the creation of social capital. We argue that some political institutions can have an impact on generating generalized trust through social capital, which would ultimately help ensuring more reliable foundations for the development of wind projects in Taiwan and reduce the chance of local protests where the facilities are to be sited. Based on this theory of institutional trust, we further argue that it is the degree of perceived fairness and impartiality of the institutions responsible for the implementation of the proposed project that serves as the crucial keystone for the building and maintenance of high institutional trust levels.

4.2.3 The development of social capital from an institutional perspective in Taiwan

The idea of building social capital through an institutional perspective is rather simple and consists in the fact that people are able to trust institutions responsible for the implementation of project and public policies if they are guided by principles of impartiality and fairness. Indeed, experience has shown that it is still very difficult to site facilities anywhere even with transparency and participation approach if there is no trust in institutions and their representatives to start with. But, people are not likely to trust institutions if they think that the officials are only acting in their interests instead of striving to act in fair and impartial ways. In Yuanli, for example, the local people have repeatedly complained about the feeling of injustice the Yuanli wind power project brought to the community because of the way it was undertaken and because of the way local治 people were treated. They have felt that local people’s voice was always secondary政 to the project and大 had no impact in the decision- making process. Besides, they felt立 that the priority was given to the developer to handle the project in its own way with no actual supervision from the authorities學 in charge in the case for instance of public hearings國 or demonstrations on site. As a consequence of these actions,

Rothstein (2003) argues that people that have experienced a lack of ‧ impartiality and honesty from certain government institutions might in turn prove impartial or dishonest in the future,

‧ N because if they feel that the government does not act fairly or responsively they will have a y t more incentives to also actt unethically and maybe try to cheat the system.i In Yuanli, there i s o r were allegations coming from then developer that some of the protesterse were actually trying to a v get benefits from the protest insteadl of being truly against the projecti and its consequences on Ch Un the community. This is also one of the attributeseng ofc hNIMBYismi to be often labeled as being selfish and irresponsible regarding the country’s needs. But this feeling of rejection and selfish attitude could also well be a reaction to another form of selfish and untrustworthy attitude coming from the government institutions. So if the government is acting in an unfair manner it would, as a result, make no sense to trust the government officials if they are generally known to cheat, bribe or act on their own interest. And as we know, there have been strong doubts that the local officials were in fact corrupted and received black money to pursue a project that was obviously unsuitable to the conditions of the concerned area. Instead of creating generalized trust, these rumors and apprehension participated to generate an atmosphere of suspicion and doubts, which has undoubtedly hindered the process for the project at issue and consequently the future projects as well. One reason institutions can be trusted in general is that they are designed in way that refrains them from such forms of

behavior. Of course, institutions are not the only source of generalized trust – there are other sources that create such social capital – but in our case of wind power projects in Taiwan, we would argue that institutions are closely related to a specific aspect of social capital, which is determinant to the democratic and steady development of such projects. Therefore, the structure of contemporary government institutions in Taiwan is an important and often overlooked factor that matters for the generation of social capital and generalized trust. In Taiwan, it is very common that the institutions and the developers want the project to start as soon as possible; there is a constant hurry to reach certain targets. The government probably believes that engaging the institutions as well as local residents will actually prolong the whole process and create even more problems. Law requires public hearings, but it seems for everyone that developers and institutions often just want to get rid of it: they fulfill the requirements in the way that will provoke the less participation possible. In the end, it actually 治 30 costs more for the institutions to not fully政 respect the process.大立 One of the barriers raised by the local people in Yuanli 學 was that the wind turbines which were being built were國 breaking the fengshui harmony of the village, and as it may seem

a pretty over-the-top argument for an engineer that cares in priority‧ about the technical aspects of the project, it makes a lot of sense to the local people. Fengshui is very important in

‧ N the Chinese culture and still omnipresent in Taiwan, and it is one very exemplary problem a y t that demonstrates the crucialt aspects of building social capital. This ikind of cultural barriers i s o r that make a very strong differencen on the long term can only be dealte with if local people are a v able to participate and object theirl point of views on the situation.i Any project that involves Ch Un infrastructures that have impacts on locale populationngch arei far more complex to manage that they initially seem to be. The reason why is that the social ramifications that are inherent to such projects are infinitely more numerous than anyone could imagine and any types of project such as the wind power project in Yuanli can suffer from a lack of social capital and a lack of trust, because this is the only way to effectively reach consensus and reduce the transaction costs.

What can be improved to build social capital in Taiwan? Such project needs to be looked after, it needs a third party that is not controversial at the national level but which is

30 In addition to protests, lawsuits are often filed against some institutions by lawyers specialized in Environmental protection which also contributes to slowing down the process.

known at the local level because it helps to be accepted. This third-party must have the opportunity and the sort of spirit to play the role of the catalyst at the local level, performing transparently, openly and honestly, and trying to increasingly push others to adopt that kind of behavior. Getting all the stakeholders together around the table and let them talk to each other is not the solution, because these sorts of grand meetings usually only serve people to confirm the prejudices they have against other stakeholders in the room. This kind of situation does not allow for the people to actually get to know each other, and that is actually what it takes to make people change their mindset about other kinds of people from the business community, civil society or the government. They have to see each other in a different light and there is very little chance to obtain such results with these meetings where people in a very dull and inefficient ritual express their point of view. Therefore, we would advocate for the creation and support of multiple forms of conflict adjudication治 through fair, rapid and low-costs mechanisms including arbitration. The 政 state and its institutions大 can function as third-party enforcers, thus creating a background立 setting in which generalized trust can develop, eventually permitting the accumulation of social capital. In this view,學 state institutions offer a degree of assurance that allows國 citizens to trust the system and to trust one another.

‧ However, if we want political institutions to have a positive effect on social capital

‧ N levels, the character of bureaucracies and welfare state institutions would have to be the a y t primary areas of interest. Indeed,t in the case of Yuanli for example, iTaiwanese citizens care i s o r in priority about institutions thatn are closely related to their day-toe -day life and can have an a v impact on the project. Therefore, theyl first tried to enter in contacti with the city council and Ch Un then the BoE when the city councils did noten respondgch adequatelyi to their demand. These are the government institutions that have to be remodeled because their actions and the way they form institutions within the society have a very tangible impact on the day-to-day life of ordinary citizens.

4.2.4 Concluding remarks

To summarize, there is obviously a strong relationship between institutional structures and social capital. But, it is true that the spread of generalized trust and norms of reciprocity are complex phenomena, which cannot be explained by one factor alone. While past studies about social capital have mainly focused on the people-to-people networks in the realm of civil society, recent accounts have offered new insights on the influence of institutions on the

creation of generalized trust. Our study is embedded in this recent development of social capital research and aims at providing a different approach and understanding to the complex development that is facility siting.

This study is a first step in exploring the ways in which government policy and institutional characteristics and cleavages produce or erode social capital. Our study led to confirm the hypothesis that fair or impartial institutions could in fact play a major role in the creation of social capital in Taiwan, which would in turn generate trust among citizens concerned, impacted or threatened by the wind power project, which would then facilitate its implementation and in fine reduce its transaction costs.

治政大立學國

‧

‧ N

a y t t i io s n r a e l i v C n hengchi U

Chapter 5

Conclusion

5.1 Concluding remarks

As we know, Taiwan is aiming to implement off-shore wind turbines in the future. Some of them will be erected in areas located near places where people already have profound mistrust in the institutions carrying on such projects and the way they have traditionally dealt with the local population. Taiwanese authorities will thus have to adopt new strategies if they want to avoid protests such as the one in Yuanli, which can delay the plans and in the worst-case scenario prevent the project from being built. Our study offers to look at key social science concepts to adopt new approaches to wind power facility siting. 治政大 First-of-all, one element立 we need to acknowledge before we move on to recommendations is that, since the Yuanli case, mentalities have changed學 at the political level in regards to wind power development in Taiwan. Some important institutions dealing with 國 wind power and its development across the island including MOEABOE, its office of

‧ Thousand Wind Turbines Promotion and ITRI have spent a lot of time responding to the need

‧ of the local people, and promotingN reforms that would tackle some of what the experts and the a y t local people considered keyt problems, such as noise pollution, distancei between turbines, etc. i s This is the sign that perhapso there is potential to create changer in the rigid institutions n e surrounding energy in Taiwan. a i v l C n hengchi U In addition, some fundamental institutional change was planned to happen which augurs well for the future of renewable energies in Taiwan. Indeed, at the moment, the competent authority communicating with the wind turbines developers in Taiwan is the BoE while the EPA is only in charge of assessing the environmental oriented issues. In the near future, because of governmental reorganizations, Ministry of Economic Affairs will become Ministry of Economic Affairs & Energy, BOE will become Energy Agency, and EPA will become Ministry of Environment and Resources, which would hopefully help the communication between the different organs of these institutions as well as the other parties in relations with the EPA or/and the BoE. As a matter of fact, part of the argument of the protest was that adequate institutions should be established to regulate similar wind power projects. The regrettable conclusion that analysts established was that institutions had simply

failed to address adequately the need for consultation between government officials and publics. This lack of dialogue and agreement on facility need had then sabotaged the siting process as a whole.

5.2 Recommendations

5.2.1 Policy recommendations

“Experience from wind power planning has shown that three issues are of importance in order to achieve a development which meets environmental requirements and which can become accepted by local communities.治 First, an appropriate planning concerning the actual siting of turbines政 is crucial, since大 visual impact is the main effect of wind power and the 立 principal cause for local public opposition. Second, local involvement in the ownership of turbines can play an important學 role, since it gives the local community benefit國 s from wind power and not only burdens. Third, citizen

participation, both in general planning and in the assessment of ‧ specific projects, should

be an integral part of‧ any planning approach, since it allows for a way both to avoid N

potential conflicts anda to handle those conflicts that do arise” (Khan,y 2003, p. 567). t t i i s o r This diagnosis offered by Jamiln Khan is also quite accurate in oure case. Appropriate planning a i v and citizen participation seem to bel must-have requirements inn any facility siting process. It is Ch U simply impossible to assess the feasibility eandn thegc levelhi of social acceptance without actively promoting local people participation and without taking into account local people feedbacks. In order to do so, any project needs an objective third-party which could be embodied by institution at the governmental level making sure that the procedures are respected and that local people, just like public authorities, have room to express their opinions and to participate in the project. Taiwan, for now, does not have a highly credible referee like the Council of Environmental Quality31 to supervise the review process for EIA and to mediate between conflicting interests in development projects. Most agencies responsible for overseeing

31 The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) is a division of the Executive Office of the President that coordinates federal environmental efforts in the United States and works closely with agencies and other White House offices in the development of environmental and energy policies and initiatives.

development projects in Taiwan care less about environmental protection and the well-being of the impacted citizens than about promoting the development projects.

Most importantly, we would first argue that, in Taiwan, new institutional design is also of utmost importance to be able to deal with the structural and institutional issues anchored in Taiwan’s society. The critical role of institutional design and organizational practice for facility siting performance was explained in our study. Performance weaknesses can be caused by various bottlenecks in institutional design and organizational practice. Once the causes of weak performance are understood, appropriate changes in institutional design and organizational practice can be identified. There is no doubt that instead of focusing on the incentives, Taiwan should first try to ameliorate its already existing government institutions and compel them to better cooperate with each other.治 By institutions, we also mean to target Taiwan’s political culture that could also政 benefit from an 大institutional design. In the field of facility siting in Taiwan, it sometimes立 feels like institutions create more problems than they actually solve because, according to the institutional design theory,學 they don’t function properly. Indeed, while they國 perform for the common good (developing renewables in the

country), their actions must be generally supported by the citizens, which‧ is far from being the case in Taiwan.

‧ N

a y t Second, we argue thatt one other major obstacle to the wind poweri project in Yuanli, i s o r which could also be a barrier nto the future wind power projects one the island, is the lack of a v social capital in Taiwan and thus lthe absence of generalized trust.i Indeed, there is no doubt Ch Un nowadays – as many scholars have come toe an broadgc hconsensusi – that trust between economic and social actors play a crucial role in the economic success of industrial projects. Here trust helps to resolve the problem of social cooperation or, in other words, collective action, a situation of interdependent action for mutual benefit. Therefore, trust towards the institutions in charge of a project involving facility siting is a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the project: “social capital is not a substitute for effective public policy but rather a prerequisite for it and, in part, a consequence of it” (Putnam, 1993, p. 10). Whereas, in the past, theories over social capital have stressed the importance of interconnections and networks between citizens to enhance trust and cooperation at the same time, we argue that institutions should foster and be the guardians of social capital in order to bring a facility siting project to its completion in a democratic and participative manner. In a nutshell, we have adopted in this study a more contemporary approach to social capital than the one

suggested by Putnam, which privileges the effects of institutions and trustworthiness. It seems to be more adequate to the problems encountered in facility siting and more specifically to the case on the wind project in Yuanli, Taiwan. In fact, political cultures are not immune to change, and government policies and institutions can be instrumental in furthering or preventing these changes. In this respect, one of the main responsibilities of governments is to sense the society’s need for change. In our study, we underline the lack of social capital in Taiwan, which is, to our opinion, hindering the further democratization of the Taiwanese society as well as the performance of the political and economic system. For that matter, one of the priorities would be for the government to responsibly establish and enforce impartial and fair state structures, as well as to provide citizens with equal access to government services and equal chances to actively participate in social and political life. 治 In the end, institutional design and政 social capital are大 inter-related concepts since we can advocate that the redesign of立 the institutions can incorporate and put the accent on social capital in order to respond to the society’s changes and its new 學needs. In that sense, social capital can be linked to the國 theory of institutional design and thus offer an account on how

institutions in their variety of forms can reshape relations and interactions‧ between different actors in order to offer an alternative answer to problems that seem to be recurrent in certain

‧ N economic and social configurations anchored in certain societies (and in our case Taiwan). a y t There is also evidence thatt issues will remain if power relations i between actors is not i s o r changed. It is difficult to imaginen that certain institutions can carrye on the job in their present a v form if asymmetrical forms of cooperationl persist. Cooperativei practices should be reviewed Ch Un and enhanced in order to reach a new cooperativeengc equilibriumhi where all actors can actively and effectively participate in the process.

The findings are of course specific to this case and cannot completely form the basis of general conclusions regarding renewable energy facility siting conflicts, or even conflicts over wind power projects. They can, however, indicate interesting questions for further research.

5.2.2 Recommendations for future studies

In our study, we aim to look at public policies and institutional structures that would facilitate social capital in Taiwan. We suggest that public institutions in Taiwan should work toward promoting and supporting the development of generalized trust in order to overcome the obstacles on the road to implement wind power projects on the island. Thus, we argue that the Taiwanese government needs to realize the importance of social capital but also the value of generating generalized trust under an institutional perspective and consider it as a part of the democratic process. To make democracy work and the economy grow, citizens have to be able to actively participate. Meanwhile, governments cannot put the blame on their citizens for the lack of social capital. Instead, the policy message of this study is that the lack of social capital is caused by dysfunctional government institutions.治 The other basic idea behind our research is that the role of social capital has政 an influence on大 the development of human capital but also on the economic performance立 of governments. Social capital makes possible the achievement of ends that would be impossible without it or, to 學be more precised, could be achieved only at extra cost.國 In the end, the goal for wind power facility siting in Taiwan is the

same as in Putnam’s research: it reduces the costs of transactions. ‧

‧ N This being said, there is room to deepen our understanding about which institutional a y t aspects of democracy mightt be particularly conducive to social i capital. Besides, some i s o r important questions remain thatn could lead to further studies one the subject. For instance, a v which degree of governmental involvementl would be optimali for the maintenance and Ch Un support of social capital? Which aspects ofe governmentngchi and which characteristics of political institutions might be particularly beneficial in fostering trust and related cooperative values? To find a response to these questions, researchers can focus on how institutions enhance and detract from intrinsic motivations. The study of social capital in general needs a lot of empirical research testing theories in large-scale field studies and small-scale qualitative research.

References

Aldrich, P. Daniel (2005). The Limits of Flexible and Adaptive Institutions: The Japanese Government’s Role in Nuclear Power Plant Siting over the Post War Period, Managing conflict in facility siting: an international comparison. Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 109-135. Arnstein S.R. (1969). A Ladder of Public Participation, J Am Inst. Plan, 35(4), 216-224.

Bell D., Gray T., Haggett C. (2005). The ‘Social Gap’ in Wind Farm Siting Decisions: Explanations and Policy Responses. Environmental Politics 14 (4), 460-477

Bobrow D. & Dryzek J. (1987), Policy Analysis by Design, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press.

Brennan, G. (1998). Selection and the Currency of Reward, The Theory of Institutional Design, Cambridge University Press, (1), 256-275. 政治大 Bresser Rudi, Millonig Klemens立 (2003). Institutional Capital: Competitive Advantage In Light Of The New Institutionalism In Organization Theory.學 Schmalenbach Business Review 55 國 Breukers S., Wolsink M. (2007). Wind power implementation in changing institutional

‧ landscapes: an international comparison. Energy policy 35 (5), 2737-2750

‧ Brunt, A. & Spooner , D. N(1998), The development of Wind Power in Denmark and the UK, Energy & Environment,a 9 (3), 279-296. y t t i i s Burningham Kate (2000). Usoing the language of NIMBY: A topic ofr research, not an activity for researchers. Local Environment:n The International Journale of Justice and a i v Sustainability 5 (1), 55-67. l C n he i U Burningham, K ., Barnett, J. & Thrush, D. (2006).ng cTheh limitations of the NIMBY concept for understanding public engagement with renewable energy technologies: a literature review, published by the School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester, 1-20.

Chao Stephanie, First 'citizen' wind farm to cease operations by 2016, The China Post, April 29, 2015. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/04/29/434716/First- citizen.htm (accessed April 28, 2015).

Chen Ketty, Cole Michael, Wind turbine troubles. Taipei Times, Jun 17, 2013. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2013/06/17/2003564971/1 (accessed Oct 27, 2014).

Clarke, B. & Harvey, N. (2008). Formal vs Informal Participatory EIA methods : a South Australian case study, IAIA08 Conference Paper, Perth, Australia, 1-5.

Connelly S. & Richardson T. (2005). Value-driven SEA : time for an environmental justice perspective ? Environ Impact Assess Rev, 2005, 25, 391-409.

Dear, M. (1992). Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome. Journal of the American Planning Association V58 Pt3, 288-300. De Sario, J. & Langton, S. (1987). Citizen Participation in Public Decision Making. Westport, CT: Greenwood, xii.

Diamond, L. (2001). How Democratic Is Taiwan? Five Key Challenges for Democratic Development and Consolidation. Paper for the Symposium on “The Transition from One-Party Rule: Taiwan’s New Government and Cross-Straits Relations, Columbia University.

Dietz T. & Stern P. (2008), Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment and Decision Making, Washington D. C., The National Academies Press, 2008, 1-23.

Editorial. Ma unconvincing on green energy. Taipei Times, Sept 02, 2014. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2014/09/02/2003598810/1 (accessed Oct 27, 2014). 政治大 Farrell, H & Knight, J. (2003). Trust,立 Institutions, and Institutional Change : Industrial Districts and the Social Capital Hypothesis, Politics & Society,學 Vol. 31, No. 4, 537- 566. 國

Gao, A. & Fan, C. (2014). Legal Issues of Renewable Energy in the Asia‧ Region, Recent Development in Post-Fukushima and Post-Kyoto Protocol Era, Kluwer Law

International, The Netherlands.‧ N

a y t Gao, A. (2012). Taiwan’s Recentt Efforts to Promote Renewable Energyi Development : Policy Measures, Legali Measures, Challenges, and Solutions sin the Post-Fukushima o r Era, Renewable Energyn Law and Policy Review, Vol 3, Noe 4, 263-279 a v l i Gao, A. (2013). Development of a LegalCh Framework for ClimateUn Change in Taiwan: Lessons from Europe and Germany. Carbone andn Climategchi Law Review - Issue: 1, 54-70.

Glucker, A., Driessen P.J. Peter, Kolhoff A., Runhaar A.C. Hens (2013). Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment : why, who and how?, Environmental Impact Assessment Review 43, 104-111.

Goodin, R. (1998). The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge University Press. Goodin, R. (1998). Institutions and their Design. The Theory of Institutional Design, Cambridge University Press, (1), 1- 53.

Healey P. (1998). Building institutional capacity through collaborative approaches to urban planning. Environment and Planning A 30(9), 1531-1546.

Ho, M. (2005). Weakened State and Social Movement : the Paradox of Taiwanese environemental politics after the power transfer, Journal of Contemporary China, 14(43), 339-352

Hooghe, M. & Dietlind, S. (2003). Generating Social Capital, Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective, Palgrave MacMillan, New York. Huang, Y. & Wu, J. (2009). A transition toward a market expansion phase : Policies for promoting wind power in Taiwan, Energy 34, 437-447.

Hughes, R. (1998). Environmental Impact Assessment and Stakeholder involvement, Environ Plan Issues, 21-43

Hunter, S. & Leyden, K. (1995). Beyond NIMBY: Explaining opposition to hazardous waste facilities’ Policy Studies Journal, Vol 23, No. 4, 601-619. Huysseune, M. (2003). Institutions and their Impact on Social Capital and Civic Culture: the Case of Italy, M. Hooghe & D. Stolle (Eds.), Generating Social Capital, Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective, 10, Palgrave/Saint-Martin’s Press, 211- 230.

Ibitayo O., Pijawka K. (1999). Reversing NIMBY: an assessment of state strategies for siting hazardous-waste facilities. Environment政治 and Planning C: Government and Policy 17(4), 379-389 大 Jami, A. & Walsh, P. (2014). 立 The role of public participation in identifying stakeholder synergies in wind power project development: The case學 study of Ontario, Canada, Renewable Energy 68,國 194-203. Kasperson E. Roger (2005). Siting Hazardous Facilities: Searching for Effective Institutions

‧ and Processes, Managing conflict in facility siting: an international comparison.

Cheltenham, UK, Edward‧ Elgar, 13-36. N

Khan, J. (2003). Wind Powera Planning in Three Swedish Municipalities,y Journal of t t i Environmental Planningi and Management, 46(4), 563-581 o s n r Khan Jamil (2004). Siting Conflicts in Renewable Energy Projectse : A Biogas Case Study, A. a i v Boholmand R. Lofstedt (Eds.),l C Facility Siting : Risk, Powern and Identity in Land-Use Planning, Earthscan, London. he i U ngch Klein, R. (1998). Self-inventing Institutions : Institutional Design and the UK Welfare State, The Theory of Institutional Design, Cambridge University Press, (9), 240-255.

Knight Jack (1992), Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge University Press.

Lesbirel, S. & Shaw, D. (2005). Managing conflict in facility siting: an international comparison. Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar.

Lesbirel, S. (2005). Transaction Costs and Institutional Change, Managing Conflict in Facility Siting : an international Comparison. Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 1-12. Leiss, W. (1996). Three Phases in the Evolution of Risk Communication Practices, The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, 585, 85-94.

Levi, M. (1998). A State of Trust, Trust and Governance, ed. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, New York, Russell Sage.

Linnerooth-Bayer J. (2005). Fair Strategies for Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities, Managing conflict in facility siting: an international comparison. Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 36-62. Nahapiet, J. & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social Capital, Intellectual Capital and the Organizational Advantage, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, 242-266 North, D. (1990), Institutions, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, 1, 97-112

O’Faircheallaigh, C. (2010). Public Participation and Environmental Impact Assessment : Purposes, Implications, and lessons for Public Policy Making, Environ Impact Assess Rev, 30,19-27.

Offe, C. (1998). Designing institutions in East European Transitions, The Theory of Institutional Design, Cambridge University Press, (7), 199-226.

Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994). Rules, games, and common-pool resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan政 Press. 治大 Pasqualetti, M.J., Gipe, P. & Righter,立 R. W. (2002), Wind Power In View, San Diego, Academic Press. 學

Paul Bénédique (2009). Institutional國 capital : A new analytical framework on theory and actions for economic development. MPRA Paper No. 39018. ‧ Pettit, P. (1998). Institutional Design and Rational Choice, The Theory of Institutional Design,

‧ Cambridge UniversityN Press, (2), 54-89. a y t Platje Jooste (2008). An institutionalt capital approach to sustainable development,i i s Management of Environmentalo Quality: An International Journal,r Vol. 19 Iss: 2, 222- 233. n e a i v l C n Putnam D. Robert (1993). Making Democracyhe Work : Civici U Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton : Princeton University Press.n gch

Putnam, R. (1993). The Prosperous Community, The American Prospect, Vol. 4, no. 13, 1-11.

Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, Journal of Democracy, 65-78.

Rothstein B. & Stolle D. (2003). Social Capital, Impartiality and the Welfare State : an Institutional Approach. M. Hooghe & D. Stolle (Eds.), Generating Social Capital, Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective, 10, Palgrave/Saint-Martin’s Press, 191-211.

Rothstein B. & Stolle D. (2014). The State and Social Capital : An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust, accepted for publication in Comparative Politics, 1-37

Runhaar H. (2009). Putting SEA in context : a Discourse Perspective on How SEA Contributes to Decision-making, Environ Impact Assess Rev., 29, 201-11.

Russell Hardin (2015). Trust and Trustworthiness, New York, Russell Sage.

Scott, V. (2010). Disputed Wind Directions: Reinvigorating wind power development in Taiwan. Energy for Sustainable Development 14, 22–34. Shepherd A. & Bowler C. (1997). Beyond the Requirements : Improving Public Participation in EIA. J Environ Plan Manag., 40(6), 725-38.

Shih, C. (2007). Democracy (Made in Taiwan): The “Success” State as a Political Theory, Lexington Books, Maryland.

Smith, E. & Klick, H. (2007). Explaining NIMBY Opposition to Wind Power, paper delivered at the anuual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 1-19

Stake, R. (1995). The Art of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks : SAGE.

Stolle, D. (2003). The Sources of Social 政Capital Reconsidered.治 M. Hooghe & D. Stolle (Eds.), Generating Social Capital, Civil Society and Institutions大 in Comparative Perspective, 10, Palgrave/Saint-Martin’s立 Press, 231-248 學 Tang Ching-Ping & Tang Shui-Yan (2000), Democratizing Bureaucracy : The political Economy of Environmental國 Impact Assessment and Air Pollution Prevention Fees in Taiwan, Comparative Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1, 81-99.

‧

Toke D. & Elliott D. (2000),‧ A Fresh start for UK wind power ?, International Journal of Ambient Energy, 21(2),N 67-76. a y t t i Uslaner M. Eric. 2003. Trust,i Democracy and Governance: Can Governments policies influence Generalizedo Trust? M. Hooghe & D. Stolle (Eds.), rGenerating Social n e Capital, Civil Society anda Institutions in Comparative Perspective,v 10, Palgrave/Saint- l i Martin’s Press, 171-191. C Un hengchi Van Der Horst Dan (2007). NIMBY or not? Exploring the relevance of location and the politics of voiced opinions in renewable energy siting controversies. Energy policy 35 (5), 2705-2714

Webler, T. (1999). The craft and theory of public participation: a dialectical process, Journal of Risk Research, Volume 2, Issue 1, 55-71.

Williamson, Oliver E. (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. The American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), 548-577.

Wolsink M. (1994), Entanglement of Interest and Motives – Assumptions behind the NIMBY-theory on facility Siting. Urban Studies 31 (6), 851-866. Wolsink M. (2000). Wind Power and the NIMBY-Myth: Institutional Capacity and the Limited Significance of Public Support. Renewable Energy 21, 49-64.

Wolsink M. (2007). Wind power implementation: The nature of public attitudes: Equity and fairness instead of ‘backyard motives’. Renewable and sustainable energy reviews 11 (6), 1188-1207. Wong, J. (2003). Deepening Democracy in Taiwan. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2, 235-256

Wustenhagen R., Wolskink M., Burer M.J. (2007). Social acceptance of renewable energy innovation: An introduction to the concept. Energy Policy 35 (5), 2683-2691. Yue Cheng-Dar, Liu Chung-Ming, Liu Eric (2000). A transition toward a sustainable energy future: feasibility assessment and development strategies of wind power in Taiwan. Energy Policy 29, 951-963.

政治大立

學

國

‧

‧ N a y t t i i s o r n e a i v l C n hengchi U

Appendices

Appendix 1 – Wind Power Electricity License Application

According to Electricity Registration Guideline, every kind of power plants, including wind power plant shall obtain three types of approval/license along different development stages before commissioning, and they are: • Concession Approval • Construction Approval • Power License

Concession Approval

There are 6 major approvals required for Concession Approval application along with approvals from the military, civil aviation and coastal guard, and these 6 approvals are: • Local Government Approval • Land Use Right Approval 政治 • Opinion Letter from the Land Authority 66 Environmental大 Impact Analysis • Grid Connection Approval立 • Letter of Intent from a Financial Institute 學 • Effective period for Concession Approval: 2 years 國 Construction Approval ‧ • Construction Approval shall be obtained within the effective period of Concession

‧ Approval. N a y • Apart from the technical proposal, land use conversion or land permittingt use t i document as well as renewablei energy generating equipment agreement record shall be obtained before applyingo for Construction Approval. s n r Effective period for Construction Approval: 1 year, but cane be prolonged for max. 1 • a i v year every time before expiry.l C n hen hi U Power License gc

• Power License shall be obtained within the effective period of Construction Approval. • After the power equipment being checked up and found in order, the Power License can be issued by MOEA.

Appendix 2 – Interviews

Chang YD Manager, Public Affair Dept., InfraVest Wind Power group

Chapman Alexander George Project Research Analyst, The Center for Green Economy, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research

Chen Pin-An Attorney-at-Law, Personal Data and High-Tech Law Firm. - Experienced social activist - Supporter of the Yuanli Self-Help Organization against wind turbines

Dr. Fan Chien-Te Professor and Director, Institute of Law for Science and Technology (ILST), National Tsing Hua University - Chief negotiator of the Yuanli event政治 - Currently working under the National Energy Research大 Project. 立 Dr Fang Szu-hung 學 Post-doctoral Research Fellow, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University - Adjunct Assistant Professor,國 Center for General Education, National Central University - Board Member of Green Citizen's Action Alliance ‧

‧ Dr. Gao Ming-zhi N a y Assistant Professor, The Institute of Law for Science and Technology (ILST),t National Tsing Hua University t i io s - Involved in the negotiationn process with the local people’s representatives,r NGOs and InfraVest e a i v - Currently the co-principal investigatorl C of the legal barriersn for renewable energy under the National Energy Programme.h engchi U

Dr. Lin Zi-Lun Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University - Currently handling the public participation for future offshore wind power projects.

Lee kathy Senior Low Carbon & Climate Change Officer, Prosperity Section, British Trade & Cultural Office

Lin Ying-Tzu Planner for EDS International, Inc., Environmental Design Services - Press Editor for the Yuanli Self-Help Organization

Tseng Weiwei Senior Project Manager, Development Dept., InfraVest Wind Power Group