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Fortress Russia: Political, Economic, and Security Development in Russia Following the Annexation of Crimea and its Consequences for the Baltic States Editor: Andis Kudors The Centre for East European Policy Studies University of Latvia Press Rīga, 2016 The project was implemented by the Centre for East European Policy Studies with the support of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Editor: Andis Kudors Assistant to the editor: Anna Lasmane Authors of the articles: Roman Dobrokhotov, Aleksandr Golts, Riina Kaljurand, Andis Kudors, Ainārs Lerhis, Nerijus Maliukevičius, Dmitry Oreshkin, Simonas Algirdas Spurga, Sergey Utkin, Liudas Zdanavičius English language editor: Emily Kernot www.endtoendediting.com Layout: Ieva Tiltiņa Cover design: Agris Dzilna © Roman Dobrokhotov, Aleksandr Golts, Riina Kaljurand, Andis Kudors, Ainārs Lerhis, Nerijus Maliukevičius, Dmitry Oreshkin, Simonas Algirdas Spurga, Sergey Utkin, Liudas Zdanavičius, 2016 © The Centre for East European Policy Studies, 2016 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016 ISBN 978-9934-18-119-1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Andis Kudors Introduction 5 Part I: Ideology Dmitry Oreshkin Putin’s Third Term Ideology 11 Ainars Lerhis Back to the USSR: A Selective Approach to Russian History 29 Part II: Politics Simonas Algirdas Spurga and Nerijus Maliukevičius Russian Media Politics Before and After the Annexation of Crimea 49 Andis Kudors Near the Fortress: Ukraine’s Echo in Political Relations between Russia and the Baltic States 71 Sergey Utkin The Eastern Vector in Russian Foreign Policy: Complimentary or an Alternative to Europe? 91 Part III: Economics Roman Dobrokhotov The Economic Situation in Russia after the Annexation of Crimea and its Influence on Russian Policy 111 Liudas Zdanavičius Economic Development in Russia after 2014 and its Consequences for the Baltic States 129 Part IV: Security Aleksandr Golts Russian Military Reform and its Implications 151 Riina Kaljurand The Annexation of Crimea and its Implications for the Baltic States’ Security 169 Andis Kudors Conclusion 189 Notes on Authors 192 Introduction INTRODUCTION The ‘red fortress’, ‘the Soviet fortress’, ‘the nationalist fortress’, ‘the besieged fortress’ — these are just a few terms used at various times to describe what was going on in Russia in its different historical epochs The theme of a fortress is inseparable from the defence arena If Russia has to defend itself, then who is the attacker? The TV channel RTR Planeta explained in their news of December 2015 that the Baltic States became militarised; NATO planes located in Estonia and Lithuania, therefore, could reach St Petersburg in fifteen minutes… This context does not leave much room for surprise that amendments to the National Security Strategy adopted on 31 December 2015 formulated the approach of NATO close to Russian borders as a threat Does Vladimir Putin really think that NATO plans to attack Russia? Presumably he does not But this is not what really matters The most important thing is whether Russian society will believe the stories regularly shown on TV, telling them Russia is a besieged fortress from enemies who do nothing else than forge plans to attack and divide the country Vladimir Putin as the Prime Minister, back in 1999, said in a TV interview: “A constant pointing to the foreign countries as the source of all our negations is wrong; it is incorrect in its very essence All the negations are within us Everything derives from our own disorder and weakness ” What has changed during those fifteen years of Putin’s reign? Why is all the evil now coming from outside? The ‘coloured revolutions’ of 2003–2004, the ‘Arab spring’ protests at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow 2011, economic stagnation in Russia, Ukraine’s rapprochement to the European Union and falling ratings of Putin at the beginning of his third presidential term, are among the reasons that compelled the lord of the Kremlin to begin patriotic mobilization in 2012–2014 Russian elite were worried that they would have to compete in fair elections and found it unacceptable Quoting President Lukashenka of Belarus: “We have learnt from Lenin that power must be held with hands that do not tremble” Regretfully the Russian political elite continues the Leninist tradition, i e standing for the rights of workers and peasants in words, but in practice treating people like ‘masses’ that may and must be manipulated The number of Russian multi-millionaires has grown rapidly under Putin, so why risk political pluralism and lose the immunity of the elite? Let us persuade the commoners that they are besieged and must support the ‘leader of the nation’ Putin — as a security officer he will certainly know how to protect the fortress against the immoral and unspiritual besiegers As Andrei Kolesnikov points out, Putin’s ideological offer unfortunately has demands: “Demand for an eclectic brand of Russian national-isolationist ideology was delayed by the period of political and economic reforms in the 1990s, but Putin has managed to create a product that is in demand and can be easily and profitably sold, thus making it accessible to everyone 5 Fortress Russia: Political, Economic, and Security Development in Russia .. Putin as a brand is also part of this product, this new ideology” 1 It is regrettable that a part of Russian society is open to lying back and drifting into an unfree state This collection of articles deals with political and economic processes in Russia from the annexation of Crimea until late 2015 The book is subdivided into four parts: “Ideology”, “Politics”, “Economy” and “Security” The part on ideology is the first because the walls of “Fortress Russia” is rather ideological than physical Russian expert Dmitry Oreshkin draws attention to the duality of Russia’s/Soviet ideology: one ideology for the elites, another for the ‘masses’ He examines the ‘mirage of Eurasianism’ which served as an ideological justification for Russia’s invasion in Ukraine Oreshkin cautions that Putin’s ideology and policy are steering Russia close to cataclysms that can be dangerous to neighbouring countries, too The article by Ainārs Lerhis about specific interpretations of history in Russia and its use in politics, finds its place in the ideological chapter because historical myths play a major role in Putin’s ideology Lerhis analyses how the absence of a de- Sovietization process affects the perception of history and Russia’s policies, where the idea of Russia as a great power is similar to both Soviet and Tsarist times Lithuanian researchers Simonas A Spurga and Nerijus Maliukevičius study Russia’s media policy before and after the annexation of Crimea The Russian media have played a principal role in the aggression against Ukraine, because the information war is among key methods of the hybrid war Maliukevičius and Spurga show that internal infringements of media freedom is taking place in order to not disturb Putin’s regime Still, cultivation of the besieged fortress ideas in Russian media plays out like a bad trick — when the population of Russia, afraid of the outer world, supports Putin’s aggressive foreign policy they eventually antagonize the free world against Putin’s revanchist regime and sometimes against Russia as a whole Sergey Utkin in his article looks back to Russia’s historical choice between Western and Eastern directions Russia frequently talks about Eurasianism and a new turn towards Asia but its thoughts and attention constantly return to Europe Cooperation with China is a general prospect, however, there is no present evidence that it could compensate anytime soon for the damage Russia suffered by neglecting sustainable development and ignoring international law with regard to Ukraine Part III “Economics” include articles from Roman Dobrokhotov and Liudas Zdanavičius who analyse the economic situation of Russia before and after the annexation of Crimea L Zdanavičius’ article gives a detailed overview of the degree that the economies of the Baltic States have suffered from Russia’s economic problems and sanctions The final part of the book deals with the security topics of Russia and the Baltics Aleksandr Golts analyses the modernization processes of the Russian defence system which began with great ambition but is experiencing corrections in 1 Andrei Kolesnikov, Russian Ideology after Crimea, September 22, 2015, http://carnegie ru/ 2015/09/22/russian-ideology-after-crimea/ihzq 6 Introduction 2016 because of the economic recession Defence expert Golts stresses the Kremlin has a specific understanding about Russia’s security, which rather resembles “deterrence–parody game”; it gives Putin the possibility to demonstrate to Russian society that he can contain the US and NATO thanks to growing Russian military capabilities Riina Kaljurand analyses in her article whether Russian foreign and security policy objectives have changed in general or specifically in the Baltic region after the annexation of Crimea Baltic countries as Russia’s neighbours are not in a position to guess whether the next military venture by the Federation could or would not take place on their territory, therefore they have seriously reconsidered their defence capacities and are taking active steps to decrease the risks What is the essence of Putin’s ideology and where does it lead Russia? What kind of fortress is modern Russia? Is Russia’s economic self-isolation possible? Can the Russian economy survive and be self-sustainable? What are the consequences of Russia’s economic crisis in the Baltics? Will Russia’s armament programme proceed as planned? What security measures should be implemented in Baltic countries to reduce the risks posed by Russia? Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian and Russian researchers seek answers to these and other questions in this book On behalf of the authors I would like to thank the financial supporter Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung in the Baltic States and its coordinator, Dr Werner Rechmann, whose support has been vital for this work We are grateful to the Regional Projects Manager of FES in the Baltic States Regīna Plīkša for her active contribution in the practical management of the project Andis Kudors, January 2016 7 Part I: Ideology Fortress Russia: Political, Economic, and Security Development in Russia .

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