How Hybrid Regimes Respond to Mobilized Protest

CEU eTD Collection Cohen William The CaseofRussiaduringthe2011-2012ElectionCycle. How Hybrid Regimes Respond to Mobilized Protest

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts ofArts ofMasters degree the for requirements the of fulfillment Inpartial CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY EUROPEAN CENTRAL POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT ADVISOR: MATTEO FUMAGALLI

BUDAPEST, HUNGARY BUDAPEST, 2012

CEU eTD Collection activity protest 2011-2012election the during cycle. then used as for increased a prism analysinghowthe Putin/Medvedev regime to responded combination of coercion, channelling and political technology. This theoretical backgroundis by manageand to hybrid regimes mobilized garnersupportfor protest theregime a through the democratic process. The thesis then goes on to discuss the various strategies that are used seeking to maintain a veneer of democracy while simultaneouslythesis controlling discusses the challenges the andoutcome dangers that mobilized of protest pose to hybrid regimes mobilization and the largest anti-regime protests since the fall of the Soviet Union. This The Russian election cycle in was 2011-2012 characterized byincreased oppositional ABSTRACT ii

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CEU eTD Collection http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/02/27/120227fa_fact_ioffe 3 tigers-of-opposition November07,2011. http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/vladimir-gelman/russias-communists-paper- 2 2012). 1 notoriously theprotests, stating hemistook stance whitethe toward that ribbons protestors would seem, Kremlinthe took by initially Putin surprise. a haughty took and dismissive followingunexpected wassomewhatand dissent protests elections parliamentary the parties was—and largely fractured andineffectual remains—so thethat sudden surge in class city dwellers to nationalists, along with several registered but unrepresented political Meanwhile, unofficial the opposition, composed disparateof groupsrangingfrom middle- failed to attract significantsupport or draw large numbers of participants at their rallies. issues (LDPR), and a Just Russia—generally follow the ruling United Russia party on all key Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia for much government decade, theofficially sanctionedparties—the of past opposition the may be coming an to end. its and some of popular so-called erodeand the support that “Putin hasbegun consensus” to Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, this election cycle suggested that the regime is losing parliamentary and presidential elections underVladimir Putin and then rulingthe tandem of some whichmobilized largest earlywere the actions sincethe 1990s. Unlikeprevious 1. INTRODUCTION Ioffe, Julia, “The Master and Mikhail.” In Vladimir Gel’man, “Russia’s Communists: the Paper Tigers of Opposition.” the On

Judah, Ben and Wilson, Andrew,.

2 , are regarded and frequently referred to as frequently to and “loyal regarded the , are referred opposition,” The election 2011-2012 cycle inRussia was accompanied bynumber of protests, Although various disparate groups and groups Although disparate partiesvarious in hadbeen the to opposition 1

The End of the Putin Consensus The New Yorker 1 , February 27, 2012. . (European Council on Foreign Relations, Relations, Foreign on Council (European . Open Democracy 3 and have generally

and, it , CEU eTD Collection 6 for “fairadvocating elections.” event were attending muddling dialogue the somuchsome that attendees of pro-Putin believedrallies that they opposition’s rallying call for “fair elections” by calling in turn for “clean elections,” thieves” to opposition figures and andparties, in a more successful example byhijacking the quicklythat became synonymous with United Russia—by applying the phrase and “crooks and coined phrase thieves”—a bloggerleader by andanti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny Examples includearather unsuccessful attempt togetrid of nicknamethe “party of crooks figures. Meanwhile, the Kremlin did its best to hijack the narrative of the opposition. 5 2005)Press, 4 to how elements of political technology were utilized in their response. In addition to this, I outlining and examining regime’s the response to opposition, particular attention will be paid surge in popular dissent accompaniedthat the 2011-2012electoral cycle in Russia. In opposition activities and released black PRdocumentaries and avoided by media of coverage State-controlled exaggerated outlets the authorities. the turnout counter protests, with many attendees beingbussed in paidand/or for their participation and pro-Putin mobilizing in utilized also were resources Administrative elections. presidential turnout in the parliamentary elections and then a strong pro-Putin turnout in the March politics.” “virtual as commonly toas“political Andrew what hasWilson and referred characterized technology” dissent. This response relied heavily on tactics from the playbook of what in Russia is forwore condoms, but authorities the quickly formulated aresponse to this sudden upsurge in See,for example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoIxj_OxR-0 In Russian, the words for “fair/honest” and “clean” are are “clean” and “fair/honest” for words the Russian, In Wilson, Andrew, This thesis will examine the tactics employed by the authorities in response to the Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World 4 Administrative were resources used toensure asolid Russia pro-United

2 chistiye 6

and and chestniye kompromat respectively. respectively. . (New Haven: Yale University on opposition opposition on 5 thus thus CEU eTD Collection (New York: Cambridge University 2011).170-174Press, longer-perspective coercive and channeling efforts fail or short-term solutions are needed to 8 1-25. 7 increased mobilization and such of youth state through pro-Kremlin groups as of society civil activities NGOs and the media, restricting of increasedthe control through for channeling political energy away from oppositionthe intosupport and of regimethe main strategies regime’s the discuss will I then activists. toopposition in relation employed channeling. managingfor dissentas protest asbeing divided into basic two categories: coercion and Russia. it whatto preventperceived acolored imported asavery to being real revolution of threat elite for preventing andmanagingand dissent protest. Orange Revolution andhow exampleinformed this post-Orange the strategies of Russianthe to the in how themes relation these of with a discussion willconclude chapter The regimes. how it can be a slippery slope from dissent torebellion when opposition mobilizes in these mobilized Particular protest. attention bewill paidtosingle-party and hybrid regimesand regime types andthespecific challenges different posed andto risks typesof by regimes section dedicated to the exploration of how dissentand protestfunction across different chapter will begin with a discussion of hybrid regime classifications. This is followed by a such as Putin’s Russia and explore how these regimes react to and handle dissent. The achieve itsgoals. to failure opposition’s the will attempt toaddress to what extent this response was effective and what impact it had on Robertson, Graeme, Graeme, Robertson, Horvath, Robert, “Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution." 7 The second chapter will elaborate onby willin The second pursued elaborate strategies chapter the order Putin’s regime In the first chapter, I will discuss how dissent and protest function in hybrid regimes For For these I utilizepurposes Graememodel Robertson’s hybridof regime strategies 8 In subsequent sections, Iwill outline coercive strategies that Putin’s regime has The Politics or Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia

3 Europe-Asia Studies, Nashi 63, 1 (2011), . When When . . CEU eTD Collection responded way the itdid and what implications may havethis in future.the evaluate why regime andtry cycle to the election activities the during protest increased be discussed and examples provided. protests.The andresults use mobilize counter black of PRandfalse will election drama also pad election usedto were resources administrative how protesters, against intimidation and what extent usedcoercion the regime will to assess I Afterthis, protests. counter by chapter andandnarrative achronicle providing the of pro-regime oppositional protests in mobilized popularthat protest placetook during 2011-2012election the begincycle. I the analyze inpolitical tothesudden Russia’s to how surge regimetechnology responded order Russian politics. in technology contemporary Democracy inthePost Soviet World, technology political of study authoritative in his Wilson’s Andrew as “political technology” are often employed in Russia. Working on the models proposed by manage dissent and channel public opinion toward a candidate, an arsenal of devices known In the conclusion, Iwill reevaluate how Russia’s current regime responded to and of channeling coercion, models 3,Iuseemploy theoretical In Chapter the I introduce and discuss strategies of political 4 Virtual Politics: Faking CEU eTD Collection 9 democracy around the world put authoritarian regimes seeking to remain in powerin a manage protests in Russia and under Putin today. to by methods employed regimes Iwillhighlight chapter In nextthe action. collective elites in hybrid regime types are particularly susceptible tobeing toppled as a resultof will be followed by a discussion of the role protest plays in different regime types and why regarded asa hybrid regime andthemost influential competing classification theories. This the case of Russia under Putin. Iwill begin with a brief elaboration of why Russia can be 2.1 Classifying Regime inPutin’sType Russia 2. in Chapter manage dissent.These responsesand thetechniques they employed will furtherbe discussed undertake mobilization designeda number informed to decision to the of projects state elites in Putin’s regime that a color revolution would be exported to Russia between 2000-2005which inspired genuine—and not entirely unreasonable—concern among Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine across Serbia,Georgia, swept that revolutions” “colored so-called particularly in hybrid regimes. I will conclude the chapter with a discussion of the wave of be followed by a brief discussion of how mobilization occurs, across a variety of regimes and will This dissent. managing when face regimes hybrid challenges specific the examine then Putin, handle and manage dissent. Iwill begin with a classification of the regime and will In this Iwill chapter, introducingbe theways thathybrid regimes, such as Russia under 2. THEROLEOFMOBILIZATIONIN HYBRID REGIMES Horvath 2011, 1-25, The end of the Cold War and the subsequent proliferation and exportation of In this section I will be discussing the role of protest in hybrid regimes by focusing on

5 9 . This concern CEU eTD Collection University 2005).Press, 15 13, No.2 (2002): 51-65, 14 13 Endowment forInternational Peace, 2003), 6. 12 11 (New York: Cambridge University Press ,2010), 3. 10 position. difficult post-authoritarian countries, transitions to democracy todemocracy transitions inpost-authoritarian countries, orpartial ended failure. complete inmany However, of these countries. of agenda Western was on the itsand implementation were overthrown. fell Atsupport apartor region sametime,the popular gained democracy communist countries that fell countries into that communist this gray fully than zone be could considered democratic. other.” at the democracy endone gray andconsolidated spacebetween the authoritarianism at occupies vast that zone as “a to refers what Marina Ottaway into moved number afarcountries of greater However, Turkmenistan) have respondedby intodrifting deeper isolation and authoritarianism,. KoreaNorth or democratize, countries (e.g. ofincreased some pressureto In this environment that occupy this gray zone, it is time to abandon some of the key assumptions from transition has persuasively argued, in light of the high number of regimes—some of them quite stable— Freedom House. to Free” according “Partly and “semidemocracy,” “semi-authoritarianism,” regimes,” varietythe regimeof subtypes it.within These have included, among others, “hybrid course or, as M. Steven Fish puts it, becoming “derailed.” regimes likeRussiahaving arethus described democratic ascasesfallen development of off Hybrid democracy as agiven. to transition assumes and democratization around centered is Thediscourse aspiredemocracy largely toward. as anideal countries post-authoritarian that Fish , Steven M.,, M.,, , Steven Fish Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A, "The Rise Of Competitive Authoritarianism," Authoritarianism," OfCompetitive Rise A, "The Lucan Way, and Steven Levitsky, Levitsky Wayand 2010, 3. Ottaway, Marina Levitsky Wayand 2010, 3. War” Cold The After Regimes - Hybrid Authoritarianism “Competitive A, Lucan Way , and Steven Levitsky, Scholars have employed a multitude of terms to describe this gray zone and classify , Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism 14 Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure ofOpenPolitics 10 The problem with many of these terms is that they are too centered on Throughout thisnumber period, a of authoritarian regimes aroundthe 12 Indeed, assoon as 1995, theremore were developing and post-

6 15 However, as Thomas Carothers (Washington, DC: Carnegie (New York: Cambridge Journal Of Democracy 11 ,

CEU eTD Collection 20 http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/sovereign_democracy_4104.jsp concise definition of “ an amalgam of democratic and authoritarian elements occupying the havefor themore opted genericfor “hybrid which term regime”, I employ Luke March’s thesis does not attempt to situate itself as a comparative study of different regime types, I precisely within precisely within between this gray democracy zone and authoritarianism. rather views the gray zone of hybridity as goal. democracy Russia’s but regime strivingis fact to to reflect transition the not that current 19 Succession 18 17 (“ democracy” “directed or “managed” and the regime,terms hasproposed democracy” “sovereign type democracy, Vladislav Surkov, one of the main architects and ideologists of Putin’s 16 constitutionalism,” of informal practices which subvert democracy and “undermine the spirit of avariety incorporates that regime administrative its of para-constitutional realities democratic between focusing non- disconnectand the the on Russia’s liberal constitution democratic all. democracy to areat very gray including the notion these transitioning that countries zone such as Russia, of regimes discussion the heavily influenced that literature to democracy their opponents butin incumbents’ which abuse of state the places them a significant at advantage vis-a-vis existdemocratic institutions andarewidely viewed as primary the means of power, gaining formal in which regimes “civilian as define they which authoritarianism,” “competitive See, forexample, Levitsky & Way 2010; Robertson 2011 Krastev, Ivan , “Sovereign Democracy, Russian Style.” On Sakwa, Richard, Levitsky & Way 2010, 5 Carothers, Thomas,“The End of the Transition Paradigm” in Paradigm” Transition ofthe End Thomas,“The Carothers, 16 Buildingthis, on Levitsky andWay more the authoritarianism-centered propose term Regardless of specificthe term is applied, Putin’s Russia is widely regarded asfalling . (Cambridge: Cambridge University 2011),Press, 47. upravljaemaja demokratija”

“ The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev 17 Richard Sakwa has recently proposed “dual term Richardtodescribe hasthe state” recently proposed Sakwa 18 Moving evenfarther away ideal- centeredfrom around classifications

). 19 7 Surkov’s terms are appealing in that they Open Democracy Journal of Democracy , November16, 2006. 13, 1 (January 2002), 6-9. 20 Given that this CEU eTD Collection 25 24 23 22 Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Fall, 2009), p. 504 21 itcan lead mobilized, subversive to activities. hold views that do not conform to the norms of a given political system.When dissent is momentum. The role of mobilization which be discussed in more detail in the next section. revolution, mobilization with acting as lynchpinthe holdsthat itall together and provides each other. I conceptualize oppositional activity on akind of scale, ranging from dissent to considering how the concepts of dissent, protest, rebellion and mobilization are related to Regimes 2.2 TheSlippery Slopefrom Dissent toRevolution inAuthoritarian and Hybrid mobilization "gray" zone between liberal democracy anddictatorship.” outright semidemocracy, to a drift toward more authoritarian moretendencies authoritarian adrifttoward to semidemocracy, much of his first term, making liberal astable toward a seeminglysincere Russia during commitment democracy decades. two past the over dynamic hybridhas that exhibited ahigh level of across differentdrift subtypes of hybridity dynamicquite andmustconstantly evolve in survive,order to Russia is an especially are in general regimes hybrid while because, Russia with applicable is especially This time. longerhas the of advantage toRussia’sregime overa beingof period applicable consistently Horvath 2011; Robertson 2011 Gill,G., “A New Turn toward Authoritarian Rule Russia”in in Sakwa, Richard, 6 p. 2010, Robertson March, Luke, "Managing Opposition ina Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition," Slavic The foundation of all oppositional activity isin dissent, which individuals orgroups Before proceeding into the dynamics of opposition in hybrid regimes,it is worth 25 during his second term. Putin: Russia's Choice 23 which justified the more democracy-centered term more which term the democracy-centered justified of 22 For instance, even under Putin there has been a drift away from

, (London, UK: Routledge, 2004), 40. 8 Democratization 24 and increased state andincreased state 21 This generic term also 13, 1 (February 2006), 58-72 CEU eTD Collection Political Conflict." 27 http://www.echomsk.spb.ru/news/politika/na-mitinge-za-chestnye-vybory-v-moskve-prinyata-rezolyutsiya.html in have place recently Russia taken that activities opposition mostof the revolution. While or fundamental nature of the system, and a successful rebellion would resultin a regime change whogovernsis andwhat thestructure of authority.” authorities particular or personnel" and "rebellions dealing with fundamental issues such as who distinguish between protests "aimed at limited issues such as changing the policies of reforms. change, organizers chose tofocus thedemonstration’s goals noton revolution, buton specific elections. registration of opposition political holdingparties fairand parliamentary and presidential election chief Vladimir Churov, the freeing of those arrested during similar rallies, five key demands. These were the cancellation of parliamentary elections, the firing of resolutions and demands—in thiscase, widespread addressing electoral fraud including and during the 2011-2012election cycle in directed atRussia were a specific issue with specific 26 ( elections” ‘fair/honest rallies for or meetings example, peaceful that For demands. the makespecific typically of subcategories protests something, usually a specific policy or incident. Demonstrations and rallies are then differentiates resistance from protest, where actors lash out and seek to change or curtail protest onlyit inseeks that somethingto reject is that imposed upontheresistor. This refuses to go to war or one refuses to pay taxes. Resistance, then, differentiates itself from directly basis for resistance, which occurs when an individual or group holding dissenting views Craig , Jenkins, J. and Schock, Kurt. "Global Structures and Political Processes in the Study of Domestic "Na mitinge 'Za chestniye vybory' v Moskve prinyata rezolyutsia." rezolyutsia." prinyata v Moskve vybory' chestniye 'Za mitinge "Na The development of intoprotest rebellion is clarified neatly by andJenkins Schock, However, when dissent goes beyond seeking only to subvert the system it serves as a refuses to accept something or comply with some kind of order, as when a draftee 26 While some of the activists present at these meetings were seeking regime regime wereseeking at thesemeetings present While activists of some the Annual Review of Sociology

, Vol. 18 (1992), 162 miting zachestnie vybory 9 27 Rebellion, then, is more focused on the Ekho Moskvy, February 20123, ) that took place took that )

CEU eTD Collection more end clearly at the willbeillustrated relationship This revolution. lead to can sometimes revolution: under larger the umbrellafor liberal of support democracy itself) andculminating with psychological level, liberal or democratic systems, which by allowing differing positions most basic on the seedsof eliminate the dissent seekto systems, which totalitarian in to existing closest either come (which would absolute consensus at scale beginning in reaction. government the from and opposition the both violence—from invoke to likely more are rebellion especially and protest although tactics, non-violent and violent both as awhole. structure and power government the asacts against of rebellion can beinterpreted phallus on of St. Petersburg’s bridges just before it rose toface city’s just FSB headquarters the bridges Petersburg’s phallus on of St. instigate a rebirth of and amoreAlthough seeks to protest general between group ostensibly the rebellion. as overturning police cars, police as overturning 31 30 http://plucer.livejournal.com/297581.html 29 28 For instance, the activities of the art group exceptions. havebeen several aimed there atspecificreforms, protests been havepeaceful Plutser-Sarno, Alexei, http://plucer.livejournal.com/265584.html Plutser-Sarno, Alexei, http://plucer.livejournal.com/531761.html Plutser-Sarno, Alexei, one of Voina’s chief ideologists, chronicles its activities on his blog. In this case: Free Voina, "What is Voina?." http://free-voina.org/about consensus Based this scale, we can see that dissent is a slippery slope where peaceful protests protests is wherepeaceful dissentslope aslippery scale, wecanseethat Based this a on categories oppositional various depictthese I will abovethe Based on discussion can utilize andrebellion change/revolution regime protest, resistance, that I would add Absolute

а Dissent leftist artistic front in the futurist tradition of the 1920s,

29 burning police trucks Resistance

Voina Protest 10

(Russian for “war”) line havepushedthe

30 or, most famously, painting an enormous Rebellion

Regime change

28 Revolution actions such such actions

CEU eTD Collection in Russiaunder Putin which have blurred lines the between various types of oppositional nonexistent. being on borders sometimes it point that the fineto isextremely from rebellion protest lineis separating trait the that shared regimes, one of authoritarian varies types amongst becomes a threat where opposition 35 somewhere between these two poles of totalitarianism anddemocracy. poles totalitarianism two of these between somewhere individual level,may pose a threat to the integrity of the regime. Most hybrid regimes lie 34 44. South America, and Post-Communist Europe mobilization 33 Cambridge University Press, 1998), 204. 32 regime. in ademocratic robustness of indicative be even may demonstrations because institutions are strong enough to absorb such opposition. Infact,large orstructure fundamental a challengesof regime the rebellionnature that the constitute extremely mobilized involvingwell protests hundreds of thousands of people donot even societies, in isbecause democratic This point the it of rebellion. reaches until democracy In democratic systems, protest rarely representa serious threat to the fundamental system of largely determined by the type of regime and its capacity to absorb or manage dissent. are categories lines handle The level a system andoppositional between can opposition of the regime types. different athreatto constitutes to revolution, it does not account for different points at which different oppositional activity can escalate quickly dissent While revolutions. colored of the in discussion chapter of the the Linz and Stepan 1996,38 Arendt, Hannah, Hannah, Arendt, Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, Tarrow, Sidney, Beginning in the second chapter I will provide examples of Beginning in have Iwill chapter second that of actions the examples occurred provide On the other hand, in a totalitarian system with a high degree of state-directed 33 which seeks to obtain total control Power inMovement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics The Origins OfTotalitarianism The Origins Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolodation: Southern Europe,

(Baltimore and London: JohnHopkins University Press,1996), , (San Diego: Harcourt, 1951). 11

34 the very existence of dissent, even on an on even dissent, of existence very the , 2 35 Although the point point the Although nd ed.(Cambridge: 32

CEU eTD Collection 40 39 38 Regimes." Regimes." 37 2007), 116. Companion toSocial Movements line within rules,operate the between acceptable and and respected well-defined authoritarian regimes typically do not allow an officially sanctioned field for opposition to relatively modest protest cannot be safely absorbed by the regime. In other words, because for evena necessary mobilization waveslevels by of which theshock the caused oppositional 36 as long as it does not violate the "rules of contestation." mobilization foster actually and ideology, is bynature here very democracies, point that their opposition movementand thus mobilization is key the collectiveto action. collectively." toact the readiness increasing to grow in scale and scope is mobilization. Iwill define mobilization as the “process of 2.3 MobilizedProtest inDifferent Regime Types opposition to avoid the slidefrom dissent to rebellion. activity. Iwill also discuss the methods employed by the regime to manage and curtail seekmobilize to participants, and allowingfor "peaceful and orderly opposition." actively civil that society haveautonomous valueandparties political participation, popular levels mobilization of and lack a ideology.guiding Ibid., 44 Ibid, 44-45 Linz and Stepan 1996,38 Tilly 1978, as cited in Ulfelder, Jay. "Contentious Collective Action and the Breakdownof Authoritarian Edwards, Bob and McCarthy, John D., "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization." In In authoritarian systems, however, the low level mobilizationof creates a situation in The driving force between these categories of oppositional activities that enables them enables them that activities of oppositional thesecategories force between The driving AccordingLinz to andStepan’s typology, authoritarian generallyregimes lowexhibit International Political Science Review , ed. Snow, David A, Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi. (Oxford: Blackwell,

, Vol. 26, No. 3(2005), 312. 36 12 Individuals most act as groups to create strong

38 Democratic regimes, on the other hand, 40

Blackwell 39 The key CEU eTD Collection GA (1999). Atlanta, Association, Science Political American of the meeting annual at the presented 43 Political Science Review 42 41 themselves in greater danger than democratic states when opportunities open..." "while authoritarian suppressstates try protest, to they also radicalize itand put thus intoa rebellion within an authoritarian regime. This is illustrated by Tarrow who notes that, would be safely absorbed by most democratic regimes has the potential to rapidly cross over is protest unacceptable means muchless that mobilized This clear. kind the of protest that functioning local-level organizations," influence over policy, controls most access to political power and government jobs, and has regimes,for which Ulfelder uses Geddes’ definition as regimes in which "the party has some action. forms of collective non-violent with faced when down break to likely more and vulnerable especially are shown, has Ulfelder themselves view the protests as rebellions and react to them in this manner. theregimes isthat inregimes is and so thin rebellion authoritarian protest between line main the that of the one reasons aswell. regime Indeed, the radicalizes suppression very the act of regimes, hybrid especially of authoritarianism, versions in that softer momentum there arises the potential alternative support base for elites within the regime, Furthermore, the gains once opposition to make legitimacy further—or concessions. erodes legitimacyleaders and put in difficult the position of either having touse suppression—which context, virtually any non-violent, political demonstration can cast doubt on the regime’s country’s citizens as a whole—hence justifying the lack of oppositional parties. In this Geddes, Barbara, “Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game-Theoretic Argument." Paper Argument." of aGame-Theoretic Test Empirical Breakdown: “Authoritarian Barbara, Geddes, Ulfelder, Jay "Contentious Collective Actionand the Breakdownof Authoritarian Regimes." Tarrow,209 Mobilized protestposes a stronger threat to single-party regimes, which, as Jay , 26, , no. 3(2005),p. 314.

42 43 This is because of tendencythe of single-party to claim that they fully represents the interests of the 13

41 International Iwill show CEU eTD Collection regimethe managed in of democracy Russia.” transformation of that…marked asa“preventative aprofound referred to counter-revolution thinking of the Russian elite, prompting the Kremlin developto what Ivan Krantsev has somewhat different conditions, Lebanon (2005). These events had a profound impact on the leaders in GeorgiaSerbia Ukraine(2000), (2003), (2004),Kyrgyzstan (2005) and, under observed in so-calledthe revolutions,” “color from which authoritarian2000-2005 ousted I argue applies to hybrid regimes such as Russia under Putin as well. This is process can be 47 46 45 44 in regimes, breakdown of single-party thelikelihood regime increases 2.4 Color Revolutions asaStimulus forState Mobilization in Russia revolutions. colored the form of these responses in the next chapters, but first Iwill provide an overview of the level of uncertainty that often elicits a strong response from the hybrid regime. I will discuss a intocreates rebellion quickly escalate for to dissent potential the Furthermore, regimes. they do not have the capacity to absorb oppositional activity to the same extent as democratic because opposition of levels low even to vulnerable be can regimes hybrid that shown have I shouldandfuture prospects their considering regime the collapse. nervous be getting simply might or opposition the to sympathetic ideologically be may who and is still challenged in a similar way way in asimilar challenged is still and everything. As Sakwa puts it, United Russia “was not aparty regime, because while United Russia does control quite a lot, but it does not control Russia’s hybrid doesnotquite regime meet standards the for asingle-party authoritarian Krastev 2006 Ulfelder2005, 316-319 Sakwa 2011, 28 Ulfelder2005, 317 As discussed in the previous section, well-mobilized collective action significantly significantly action collective well-mobilized section, previous in the discussed As

14 47 In this section, Iwill briefly outline theories

in power, but aparty 44

46 a vulnerability which which vulnerability a of power” power” CEU eTD Collection 53 52 51 50 Wave”, Fourth the on Perspectives 49 Michael "Transitions from Postcommunist." Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions." 48 sudden widespread indignation over this single issue, make individualsfeel more confidentin incident, such as electoral fraud, can both provide a focal point for protest and, given the achieve the same benefits without the risks? Nevertheless,it seems that a controversial remains—why should anindividual goingrisk when, tothe streets if do,stayingothers in will affects the society as a whole .However, even in this situation, the collective action dilemma their chances for success until there is a violation or injustice, such as electoral fraud, that with the government. arisesthat from unpleasantexperiences thatthis individual has in their on-going relationship an Tucker treats individual’sperceived challenge desireor duty to the regime assomething regime of success" chances address these in grievances lifedaily entail arelikely to coupledhigh costs with lowvery dilemma because, "where citizens have strong grievances against the regime, attempts to action of collective the challenge asanoffshoot regime the to mobilization low frames analysis Joshua Tucker's(2007) electionof thepresence a contested is thekeyfactor.He encouraged mobilization haveelection and preceding beenwidely political crises askey factors emphasized that approach of the Russian regime’s strategy to maintain power. the on had threat perceived this effect the discuss then and Revolution Orange the to relating because it isbecause itprovides acollective violation for afocal that mobilization andpoint protest Ibid. Tucker2007, 541. Ibid,540. Tucker2007, 536. Kuzio. Taras, “Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Post-Communist Countries: Comparative Diffusion The Phenomena: Political Modular in Example and "Structure R., Mark Beissinger, In identifying the causes behind the Orange Revolution, presence the of a contested 51 An incident of electoral fraud, however, "changes this calculation dramatically" dramatically" calculation this "changes fraud, however, of electoral An incident 50 Thus, "shirk" potential andprotesters not mobilize do challenge to the 53 They likewould challenge to the regimefeel butdo not in confident 48 and lowered the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of the public Demokratizatsiya

Perspectives on Politics Journal of Democracy, , 16,, no.1 (2008), 101. 15

16, no. 3 (2005), 7 3 (2005), no. 16, , 5, no. 2 (2007), 261 and McFaul, 49 .In 52 . CEU eTD Collection 56 History instances. evenin andcross-country protest, mobilization mobilizationfor wecan Thus, protest and that conclude mobilization furtherbreed fosterseeking toprotest and in non-democratic rebellion by regimes resources the providing that originated chiefly in Serbia and were then exported, with the help of various NGOs 55 or modesof contention" repertoires, frames, "mobilizational included sharing emulation actions of others through analogy and emulation." challenging the with connections forged agents in which way by the rather but shock, single a Soviet late the periodapplicable but here) this isnotmobilization modular that "produced by more likely to participate in protests. He also notes (referring to nationalistmobilization in chancesthat argument perception Tucker's success the of for better makeanindividual will pursue mobilization. In this sense, Beissinger presents a kind of cross-country version of one country can setan example encouragespotential opposition activistsin countries other to 54 calls wave" of an"interrelated Beissinger (2009) revolutions. in Mark canresult this what following example, its is start countries setandother precedent When this mobilization. for mass point tipping the have reaching that prevented constraints for inthreshold triggering mobilization mass countries with similar structural other regime change or revolution. When this occurs, it sets a kind of precedent that can lower the intomobilized taps into amomentum that can quickly lead to outright rebellion and possibly butunexpressed individual with discontent government,the this from step individual dissent likelihood they that themselves willbecome actively involved. isthere If widespread increasesthe a large This expecting expectation that participate. will numberof people Beissinger 2007, 261 261 2007, Beissinger Beissinger, Mark R. "Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism." Beissinger, Mark R. "An Interrelated Wave." , 18, no. 3 (2009b), 340 340 3 (2009b), no. 18, ,

Journal of Democracy 16

55 In the case of the Color Revolutions, this , 20, no. 1 (2009), 74-77. 54 Thus, successful protest in Contemporary European 56

CEU eTD Collection 62 61 NGOs contributed furtherNGOs contributed tothesense being Kremlin’s of siege. under Western of assortment by an in part funded were in Ukraine activists pro-Yushenko That 60 59 58 57 colored style revolution coming Russia to Horvath was,asRobert argues benefits, of monetization by further fearselites’ in aggravated were a series ofprotests early tothe 2005 relating Marat Gel’man Ukrainetravelingwork to toonYanokovich’s campaign. interference came largely in the form of political technologists such as Gleb Pavlovsky and Kremlin had quite obviously and unsuccessfully interfered in the election. In part, this face to the Putin’s’ government, both in terms of its foreign policy goals and also because the was compounded by several factors. First of all, the defeat of Yanukovich was a slap in the ThisfearRussianext. mightcome to a colored revolution were concerned that government activities. “defeatproof” the system and channel potential oppositional moreenergies into pro-Kremlin situation. political international and domestic the to both related government in Putin’s elites the how on can safely conclude that Putin’s regime viewed it as a threat and this had a significant impact were downin Kiev and wearing orange ribbons in companythe Yushenko. of opposition figures such as Boris Nemtsov, then leader of the party Union of Right Forces, formsof included that seizing control of informationthe crackingenvironment, down on revolutions, they a moreon took urgentnature afterwards. This channelingtookon a number Robertson2011, 15 Horvath 2011 Sakwa, Richard, Robertson2011 contains an extensive case study of these protests.basic For background, see pp. 164-178 6 Ibid, Horvath 2011, 6-7 Looked at in this context, it seems reasonable that the elites in the Russian These developments led the regime to embark upon a series of activities designed to 62 While some of these processes were already underway before the colored colored before the underway were already Whileof processes some these Russian Politics and Society 59 lending credence to the elite’s sense that they were under siege.

, 4 th ed. (Londonand New York: Routledge,2008), 343 17

60 Whether or not a 61 57 , areal threat, we Meanwhile, 58 The Kremlin Kremlin The CEU eTD Collection revolutions. maintain dominance and the forms of response to opposition as a partial result of the colored inmorediscussed detail 2wherein Chapter Iwill United examine how Russia has to worked tactics overlap with the shady world of post-Soviet political technology, which will be NGOs, creating pro-Kremlin movements social and groups such as

Nashi . Some of these CEU eTD Collection consideringprotesters not whether or toparticipate in oppositional activities andthus “altermanipulatedfor elections thecalculus” potential at can,toparaphrase Joshua Tucker, injustice of sense This collective group. individual or just one against than as awhole rather fraud afocal canprovide forand, protest point in injusticeperpetrating against populacethe losses, in hand, buton other electoral resultthe electoral procedures todemocratic adherence even average popularity, as we have seen evidenced in the colored revolutions. Full opposition. of levels widespread 63 provide potential for animpetus contentious activity to electoral needed tomaintainsupport a grippower, on but the on it handother has the On double-edged sword. onethe it hand,can compensate for sufficientlevels of genuine tendency is to resort to manipulative tactics and electoral fraud. This strategy, however is a democratic process. However, when a hybrid regime’s popularity begins to slide, the regime—purporting to be a democracy while simultaneously controlling the outcome of the elections. recent most the during opposition to regime manifested under the current regime. Then,in Chapter 3, I will examine the responses of the with specific examples to show how coercion, channeling and political technology have in areemployed define and terms waysillustrate these these the techniques theory coupled responses to real and perceived threats in Russia under Putin. In the following sections I will In this thesis Iwill befocusing on useof channelingthe coercion, as political and technology 3. HOWHYBRIDSREGIMES DISSENTMANAGE ANDPROTEST Robertson2011, 173 Elections, then, pose a particularly serious challenge to hybrid regimes with low or There are a variety of responses available to regimes as they seek to manage protest. As discussed in the previous chapter, Russia under Putin is an example of a hybrid

63 may that more powerful trigger and CEU eTD Collection fundamental fundamental available:options negotiate orput down. protests the Putin under asRussia such regimes hybrid stable in relatively outcome of the elections. That being said, no political system is completely airtight, and even control attempt the to but hold elections They authoritarianism. and democracy substantive other option of down,putting however, protests is arisky strategy. Indeed, hybrid regimes regimethe potentially have much gainto by aligning themselves with protesters. the The risk is that signaling a willingness to negotiate can create a situation where rival elites within Another action. collective for further a precedent andset activity oppositional may encourage because itleads to concessions and if the regime gives in to the demands of protesters, this primary the toelitesstrategies available insuch witha regime whenconfronted protest. make use of Graeme Robertson’s model in which coercion and the channeling of dissent are 3.1 Coercion and channeling coercion, channeling and political intechnology regime’s protest.the response to place and must be responded to. In the upcoming sections I will be discussing the roles of 68 67 66 65 64 protest. simultaneously preventing them from radicalizing and resorting tomore violent forms of while system in the participating from challengers potential exclude must regimes regime, preventing and managing protest requires a complicated balancing act. In this case, dilemma. action collective the ameliorate Ibid, 172 Robertson2011. Forstability see Levitsky Way and 2010, 197-201 Ibid, 173 Tucker2007, 541 65 When faced with mobilized authoritarian protest, and hybrid regimes have two As we have seen, hybrid regimes attempt to maintain a balancing act between By describing the potential courses of action available to elites in hybrid regimes, I

64 As with most aspects other of being ahybrid 20

66 protest does protestinevitably take 68 Negotiation is risky risky is Negotiation 67

CEU eTD Collection 72 71 Theory,1 (2003), 21: 44-68 70 69 bechanneling amore viable appearsto strategy. solution to help fill in the gap and ensure electoral success. In the long-term, however, regime does not want to resort to coercion, political technology can be used as a short-term fails later, a and whenchanneling aswillbe However, discussed formation process. the designed to create prevent the need for using coercion by preventing dissent while itis still in coercion situations: and channeling. Russia’shybridhow useful toprotest for conceptualizing categories regime responds formanaging protests. Graeme Robertson, building on Oberschall With inmind,this hybridregimes such as RussiaPutin’s amore adopt complicated strategy for hybrid whointend regimes give impression to the they that democraticsupport processes. down popular protestis never an optimal for any solution itisregime, particularly suboptimal is and how legitimate the regime is at the international level. Thus, while using force to put putforce down to popularas protests, raisesthis questions abouthowdemocratic the system attempting to maintain the appearance of democracy do not have the luxury of using outward categories and the difference between them: between and difference the categories Earl 2003, 48 Robertson2011, 174 Sociological In Repression.” ofMovement a Theory Toward taxes: and gas, tear “Tanks, Jennifer, Earl, See Oberschall, Anthony, Beyond this, coercion is often more of a short-term strategy than channeling, which is available, the timing of protests, and/or flows of resources to movements.” involves more indirect repression, which is meant to affect the forms of protest police andmilitary intimidation action (e.g., and direct violence). Channeling uses involves repression showsand/or offorce“Coercive forms of and other standard Social Conflict and Social Movements

71 Earl provides the following definition of these 21

(Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall, 1973). 69 and Earl 70 , proposes two 72

CEU eTD Collection atleast twenty on out werecalled forces thespecial While figures. opposition of harassment and consisted more arrests of coercion period of preventative repertoire during this manifestations of coercion took on a more preventative and less outwardly brutal nature. The hierarchy, with specialthe forces being themost brutal. forces. The amount of violence used tended toincrease as the response moved up the was notsufficient, local army troops would be summoned and, if necessary, Moscow special local andand regional KGBpolice with officials tasked firstresponse. the providing repression under Khruschev became more structured into a hierarchy of applied force, with manner, was the normal response to any sign of rebellion. As Mark Beissinger notes, use of violent repression, generally carried out by the NKVD and often in an arbitrary Union and continues in the Russian Federation today. In the Soviet Union under Stalin, the cooperation. The use of coercion to maintain has alongpower history Soviet the throughout activists and preventative arrests. It can also take place behind the scenes to extort conclusions whoorderedthem. about activitiesandthese todifficultiesleads in presence of the quantifying andcoercion drawing of nature thecovert here to “Unobserved” refers by attacks or assailants. threats unidentified 75 University Press, 2002), 331 74 73 Earl puts it, “ actors—often anonymous—who harassand/or attack participants of oppositional activity. As iscases—coercion performed notonly by andpolice military forces, butalso by various other brutal most the especially cases—and many in that note to important is it Russia, Putin’s 3.1.1 T Ibid, 331 Beissinger, Mark, Earl 2003, 50 Coercion can take a variety of forms,including physical violence, harassment of Coercion, or the use of force, has been an important tool for regimes historically. In private agents Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State can also exert also can

unobserved, coercive 22

75 By the Brezhnev period, pressure,” (Cambridge: Cambridge 73 such as death 74 If this CEU eTD Collection arrested for failure to pay a fine for organizing one such rally. She had received no notice of for monthly right advocating the to assemble was unsanctioned peacefully) demonstrations agencies Nizhny . In withone activist associated Novgorod, Strategy 31 (agroup holds that to extremist activities and othercriminal activities by police,the FSB and otherstate various prevent intheir attendance, to order justbefore protests checks document in routine leaders activist of detainment the including years, the over forms numerous on have taken harassment forms of police agencies. Coercive various state by or and police the is conducted harassment this sometimes and uncommon not is intimidation and harassment http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/russia-harassment-of-critics. 82 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/810fa868-6d2c-11e1-b6ff-00144feab49a.html 81 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/02/russian-election-monitors-harassment?intcmp=239. 80 http://lenta.ru/news/2012/05/07/chistye/ 79 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/world/europe/19europe.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. 78 77 76 environmental aswastheallegeddemonstrations, caseof the beating police of arrested thepolice usingforce curtailing police havebeenaccusedof harassment, excessive with all the protest activity" she will "never get out of this place." this fine, andwas allegedly by told policethe officer questioning herif that she "keeps up people white the wearing with ribbons associated the election 2011-2012 protests, activists underYeltsin, these tactics have reemerged once again Putin’sduring presidency. Khrushchev. or Stalin under occasions during Brezhnev’s rule, the level of violence applied was significantly lower than summoning ofindependent election monitors "Russia: Harassment of Critics." Clover, Charles, "Fear aspolice summon Russian blogger." Elder, Miriam. "Russianelection monitors complain of state harassment." "Na Chistyx zaderzhali prudax lyudej s belimi lentochkami." May 07, 2012 Myers, Stephen Lee. "Russia Detains Opposition Leaders Until 189 p. They 2011, Miss a Protest." Robertson Ibid, p.331 Coercion of activists under Putin’s government ismultifaceted underCoercion affair. of Preventative a government Putin’s activists 76 TrustLaw Following a period of decline in state use of coercive tactics on

. Human. Rights Watch, 01Mar 2012. 80 23 andleaders activist

Financial Times, Guardian 82 Mar 13,2012. 81 Inaddition non-violent to for questioning related December 2, 2, December 78 New York detainment of detainment of , May 19, 79 the the 77

CEU eTD Collection damage thanbenefits toPutin’s especially government, in terms itsof reputation activistwhowas poisoned figures opposition inLondon—violencemore against causesfar AlexanderPolitkovskaya or former KGB-agent Litvinkenko—a fringe turned anti-Putin direct orders from the Kremlin, and in fact in some of some instances, such as the murders of came on attacks these is that evidence whatsoever no There with regularity. some government the oppose figures who activist journalists and attacks on that ascertain reasonably establishing guiltfor these attacks is well beyond the realm of this thesis, we can occur Anna Politkovskaya, startlingly high number of killings of journalists who were critical of the regime, notably men, whom he claims were likely associated with the youth group. critical pro-Kremlin about articles youth group reporter associated with the liberal opposition movement who had written a number of 88 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/weekinreview/15chivers.html?_r=1&ref=annapolitkovskaya. 87 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/opinion/12Kashin.html 86 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/world/europe/18impunity.html?pagewanted=all. 85 84 moscow. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/27/letter-prosecutor-moscow-district-anikin-aa-re-violence-khimki-forest- of Moscow." forest 83 brain-damage.speak due unable to to legleft helostandwas one that assailants by anonymous severely so wasbeaten authorities) activistup, another Khimki forest (who hadpublishedlocal anewspaper article criticizing attacks on associates, findinghis dogdead on his porch front and then having hisblown car or anonymous figures in civilian clothing. by agents violence, involving are especially often state perpetrated plain-clothes those either activists demonstrating against removalthe of Khimki forest. "Russian activist found murdered." murdered." found activist "Russian Chivers, C.J. "A Journalist’s Revelations, in Life and inDeath." Kashin, Oleg. "A Beating on My Beat." Levy, Clifford J. "Russian Journalists, Fighting Graft, Pay in Blood." "Russia: Harassment of Critics." 2012. Williamson, Hugh. "Letter to the Prosecutorof the Moscow District AnikinA.A. re: violence in the Khimki Human Rights Watch 87 and a board member of Memorial, Natalia Estemirova. member and of Natalia Memorial, aboard

BBC News . Human Rights Watch, 27 Jul 2011. New York Times, New Times, York 85 Another example is Oleg Yashin, a , July , 15,2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8152351.stm. 84 After enduring anonymous numerous threats, 24 Nashi

December11, 2010. . Hewasbrutally beaten by youngtwo New York Times New York Times 83 Other coercive acts, acts, Other coercive 86 There have also been a , October15, 2006. 17 May 2010, 30May. Kommersant 88 While

CEU eTD Collection mobilizationthe activist of pro-state groups. and on organizations, down society NGOs andmass control civil of cracking media, the state media.” focus on“influencingboth capacity the of people toprotestand howprotestappears in the opposition. the from great deal hasof goneintodevisingeffort tools sophisticated forchannelingenergy away repression method has becomeindirect preferred the for managingactivity and a oppositional 3.1.2 U C and are thus more free to get their hands dirty. Kremlin actors who are less concerned with maintaining a veneer of democratic legitimacy morethe explicitandviolentforms of coercion are often performed by network of a pro- the form of preemptive harassment or excessive use of force in breaking up protests, while Putin’sresponds tomobilized government implementedState protest. coercion often takes subject toany restraint.” of effective kind that local elites will behave as badly as circumstances allow them to, if they are then to be Wilson, invokingWilson, Lenin’sadage intimidation oppositionagainst participants togain favor the of regime.the As Andrew 91 90 186 2005), Press, 89 actors, including suchyouth groups as pro-Kremlin for andeager local officials incentives in however, place Thereare, protests. extremist who pro-Kremlin act coerce actors to oppositional figures into abandoning their internationally. This suggests that Putin’s regime may not be fully in control of some of Ibid, 174 Robertson2011, 174 Wilson, Andrew, While coercion has been used in contemporary Russia, in recent years channeling or We can conclude that the selective use of coercion does play a part in that way that 91 Some of the basic techniques that are used to channel dissent in Russia, include Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World 90 Channeling strategies are numerous and multifaceted, but they Channeling and strategies multifaceted, butthey largelyare numerous

Kto kogo? Nashi 89

(“Who does whom in?”), notes, wecan“assume whom in?”), notes, does (“Who , to contribute, to to this atmosphere of violence and 25

. (New Haven: Yale University CEU eTD Collection a plurality biases. least of environment in the 1990s in Russia was characterized by fairness or objectivity, there was at media be the it claimedcannot that while Thus, of interests their owners. the according media Meanwhile, were biased privately owned andinconsistent. often outlets blatantly exercised some authority over news coverage on state owned news outlets, this was spotty at times thestate While by various oligarchs. were controlled that newsoutlets privatized regime by controlling the information upon which the public its forms opinion. for the can be support attempts topreemptivelycreate seenasaform that of channeling This environment. information the over control asserting and media independent on attack an 3.1.2.1 Channeling themedia next section. shady world of post-Soviet political technology, which will be discussed in more detail in the illustrate the way channeling functions in Russia. Some of these tactics overlap with the by Wegren, Stephen K. and Ed. Herspring , Dale R. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 4 93 92 suchand groups as information crackingenvironment, down on NGOs, creating pro-Kremlin social movements Thisafterwards. channelinga numberon took formsincluded of that seizingcontrol of the nature urgent more a on took they revolutions, colored the before underway already oppositional energiesmore into pro-Kremlin activities. embark upon a series of activities designed to “defeat proof” the system and channel potential Lipman, Maria and McFaul, Michael. "The Media and Political Developments." Developments." Political and Media "The Michael. McFaul, and Maria Lipman, Ibid, 15 In the1990s, mediathe landscape inRussia was by of characterized rise the One of ways the Putin sought toensure dominance the was of state the by launching As argued in the previous chapter, events events As arguedin chapter, of coloredregime previous ledthe the to the revolutions Nashi . Iwill describe these forms of channeling giving, examples to 93 This atmosphere resembled a chaotic group debate, in which one

92 While some of these processes were While processes of some these After Putin's Russia th edition), ,113 . edited. CEU eTD Collection such as nowdefunct the such well-established reliably and such independent, as the newspaper http://nymag.com/news/features/russian-revolutionaries-2012-1/ 97 96 for-now.html?pagewanted=all. May.2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/arts/television/putins-rivals-in-russia-gain-a-place-on-the-air- 95 94 mediathese doubled outlets as some of primarythe of duringorganizers protests the the in with fashion some back” the Michael Idov has characterized Russia’s version of station are -primarilymedia in andtolerated outlets formats. online radio print, forming oppositional ideas infirst place. opposition the of discussion television. Saturating this coverage with pro-Kremlin stories and little or blatantly critical policies. tostate dedicated array of print outlets, and the coverage on these outlets was exclusively—and often crudely— media outlets. By 2004, the Kremlin was in control of all major television stations and avast state-owned on coverage influence overthe of increasedamount began exerting an state the was largest media private country’s dismantled.Media-Most, Meanwhile, company, holding NTV and Boris Berezovsky’s ORT,werebrought undercontrol by state 2001, andthe Gusinsky’s Vladimir stations, television privately-owned main the of Two media. controlled samestory. the covered media outlets biased could gleansomething resemblinginformation objective by thewayscomparing different Idov. Michael "The New Decembrists." NewDecembrists." "The Michael Idov. Lipman McFaul and 2010, 122 Stanley, Alessandra, "On Russian TV, It Isn’t All About the Strongman." Ibid, 118-121 Ekho Moskvy. While Russian television is tightly controlled by the state, a number of independent oligarch- of system the on attack an launched Kremlin the term, first in Putin’s Early Magazines with independent or even oppositional slants come and go, Russian Newsweek 94 95 Around 70%percent of Russians gettheirfrom news the is aneffective waytopreemptively publicthe prevent from

97 and points out that in many cases journalists and editors of of editors and journalists cases many in that out points and New Yorker . In other cases, the media is clearly oppositional. . January 22, 2012. 27

Esquire Esquire as “a monthly anti-Putin screed New York Times Kommersant’ 96 Some of these are 13 Feb 2012, or the radio CEU eTD Collection inquiry into financing the of areorganized. demonstrations placeswhereoppositional primarily the also are They information. oppositional and independent of exchange the for venues blogging platformlivejournal.com enjoy a high level of popularity and serve as key the presence. Social networking sites such as facebook and Vkontakte, along with twitter and the exclusively all online, andkey independent opposition-slanted media have astrong online 2012http://tvrain.ru/news/prokuratura_prishla_na_telekanal_dozhd-173348/ the internetregards with mixture incomprehension a campaign and disdain. of Putin’s for examplesuggesting,is internet that the and pornographic “50%percenthe material” that whostarted his own video blog andis often seen with his iPad,Putin has made remarks Putin being somewhat behind on the times. While Medvedev is an enthusiastic internet user outlets such as openspace.ru and slon.ru and the online television station mediaindependent andmedia slant with an thrives inRussian oppositional cyberspace. While 100 2012http://runet.fom.ru/Proniknovenie-interneta/10420 99 98 country’sthe regularly.used the internet population penetrationinternet in By Russia, however. winterthe of 2011-2012 approximately half of oppositional media. such that hopes small concessions will serve topacifymembers of population the seeking allowing some independentmedia outlets, the state tolerates a small amount of dissent,in biweekly Moscow 2011-2012 election cycle whichwillbefurther discussedlater. This appliesespecially the to "Internet v Rossii: dimamika proniknovenie. Zima 2011-2012 gg." Fond Obshestvennoye mnenie, April 24, 24, April mnenie, Obshestvennoye Fond gg." 2011-2012 Zima proniknovenie. dimamika v Rossii: "Internet Ibid "Prokuratura prishla na telekanal Dozhd'." On Dozhd'." telekanal na prishla "Prokuratura While there have been some attempts to lash out at online media, including recent This consolidation of media under state control has coincided with the rapid rise in Big City Big ( Bol’shoi gorod Bol’shoi Dozhd’

100 , itremains thriving. In part this maybe a symptom of Dozhd' ) and arts and entertainment weekly weekly ) andand entertainment arts 28 , February 15,

99 Thisisimportant to notebecause Dozhd’ Afisha exist . 98 By CEU eTD Collection 102 101 or criminal organizations posing as NGOs—it put the fates of NGOs at the whims of the upsides to the law—it raised the bar for qualifying as an NGO and helped weed out for-profit governmentwithin sixmonths in continueorder to their operations. came thatlaws effect intoin 2005and late early requiring reregister with the NGOsto 2006, placeform These changescamein couldof in Russia.the several take similar events elite that played these groups in revolutionscolored in countriesother and possibly fears amongst the NGOs in Russia. This has been a response to the influx of Western-funded NGOs, the role away from opposition haschange been to anumber oflaws concerning theoperation of 3.1.2.2 Regulating NGOsand Civil Society information environment and preventatively channel away dissent. beginning to have enormous implications both on the Kremlin’s attempts to control the Chapter 3,this gapwherepeople different gettheir news andinformation is already mobilizinginformation and people behind Astheir we movements. respective will see in plays adefiningin role strategiesthe used and by state the oppositionthe in distributing the television and those who get their news from the internet. Additionally, this difference NTV: with interview in an statement telling managerfor 2012election,the film the Stanislavdirector Govorukhin,made thefollowing Sakwa 2008, 343-344 Asquoted on: http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1509374/citata_nedeli This highlightsattitude theincreasing gap Russians between whoget their news from controlled by the US State department.” statements. I don’t even know what twitter is. It would be a useful thing if it all wasn’t the internet or on twitter, they write that I made some statements. Ididn’tmake any “For me the internet is garbage, because it is all lies. Well, take for example now on Another strategy employed by the regime in order to preventatively channel support support channel preventatively to in order regime by the employed strategy Another

29 101

102 While there were were Whilethere CEU eTD Collection

instigate regime change. instigate success—to become theRussiansuccess—to invanguard youth stylethe of did these particularlygroups not thehide fact that they were trying—albeitwith minimal Yabloko, the Union of Youth “for the Motherland” and the National Bolshevik Party, and time, wereanumber there of oppositional in youth groups operation. These included Young movements. political actively eitheror pro-Kremlin into harmless organizations increated in2005 an channeleffort to youth energies away from existing oppositional youth Young Guardof United Russia(“ after the OrangeRevolution. youth of mobilization ledstate increase to recognition stability. While Kremlinthe had dabbledin youth prior creation the of groups tothis, this mobilized youth groups, such as state’s channeling tactics was they that illustrated to Kremlin thepotential elites danger that 3.1.2.3 Increased State Mobilization and Youth Groups 107 106 105 104 103 in activities involvement of the moreNGOs. civil societies and the government and advise on legislation, which allows the government Chambers, by appointed Kremlin,the toprovide designed aforum for interaction between practices. accounting of stricter implementation the restrictions onthe way NGOs—and especially foreign NGOs—can be funded and required authorities couldwho approveordeny requests asthey saw fir. Schwirtz, Michael. "Russia's political youths." Horvath 2011, 14-17 93 2011,1 Robertson Sakwa 2008, 343-344 Robertson2011, 192-193 The largest pro-Kremlin youth are groups One of the most palpable ways that the colored revolutions impacted Onepalpable Russian most revolutionsthe colored impacted the of the ways that 107

Otpor Molodaya Gvardia EdinoiRossii”Molodaya Gvardia in Serbia or Demokratizatsiya 105 30

Nashi 104 Pora There was also anew system of Public . 15.1 (2007): 74-75. (“Ours”) and the more moderate more moderate (“Ours”) andthe in Ukraine, couldtoregime pose 103 Pora Other changes Other put in Russian). Both were with the ability to 106 At the Atthe CEU eTD Collection 110 Vladislav Surkov. of the recently defunct Foundation for Effective Politics, and implemented with support from intopro-Kremlin political endeavors. The project was the brainchild of Gleb Pavlovsky, head called“Moving Together” that was one of Kremlin’sthe earlier attemptsatchannelingyouth 112 111 109 of this, see the following 108 jobless a for people.” young, space safe create political primary are: goals primary above’ ‘from initiatives modernizing if achieved be only can movement our of goals ultimate goals of the opposition. Thus, Nashi regime. the protect to attempt an in organizations such promoting intentionally is regime be ideology behind appearsto guiding of democracy” the “sovereign and violence.” domestic leadership,” “uniting the Russian youth” and youth issues such as “to fight hazing in the army “belief in patriotism modernization,” and the of future of “future andits Russia” the global personal public ostracism.” public personal “About Ibid Interview with Gleb Pavlovsky in BBC Horvath 201,14-17. The exact level ofSurkov’s patronageof Nashi ’s manifest is alsointeresting in that at times it attempts to take on the rhetoric and Nashi scenario worked outin Ukraine revolution” and Georgia.”“Orange in an Russia of independence and sovereignty the reject to “…the against the struggle unnatural between union andoligarchs liberals whostrive Additional goals include creating a “reserve of cadres for implementing implementing for cadres of a “reserve creating include goals Additional manifest. http://img.nashi.su/nashi.su/admin/data/3/9/manifest1.doc Nashi is lead by whoVasily hadYakimenko, previously headed youth another group .” http://nashi.su/projects 108 As Pavlovsky it,put “We felt we had to act quickly.We needed to 111 While Surkov’s exact level of involvement is unknown, his notion notion his is unknown, involvement of level exact Surkov’s While 112 Or, “the formation of an active civil society [because] the

Nashi Russia,Putin and the West aims “to expose corruption corruption bribe-takers expose aimsandto “to expose 31

110 Nashi 109

According to . is unclear. For a more detailed discussion discussion detailed Fora more unclear. is Nashi Nashi’s Nashi’s indicating that the the that indicating website, its CEU eTD Collection

kompromat demonstrations. Inaddition arrangingto demonstrations and the type harassment of and had over 300,000members into andyouth channeling nonconformist movement. the disaffected minor conflicts with regional United Russia officials are primarily part of a strategy for that assert Horvath patronage, state andwithout exist dependent on state couldthe potentially http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/2842/1/Atwal_11_PhD.pdf and Youngthe Guard of United Russia.”(2011): Submitted as aDoctoral Thesis. 22 Apr. 2012. 117 115 114 113 conflict with United Russia officials.While ithas been argued that minor occasionally and of criticism to extended occasionally has rhetoric anti-establishment context of the 2011-2012 election cycle in Chapter 3. In the case of then turning it against the opposition is a common tactic that will be discussed more in the a: describes manifest the opposition, rely on political support ‘from below.’” 116 Studies Atwal, Mary "Investigating the democratic effects and state-sponsored youth participation in Russia: Nashi Atwal, Maya, “Evaluating Nashi’s Sustainability: Autonomy, Agency and Activism.” In Ibid Ibid Horvath 2011, p. 16 , 61:5 (2009) 743-758 It seems that attempts to channel youth was somewhat effective, and at its peak This rhetorical strategy of adopting the language and themes of the opposition and Putin.” international Thisunion is terrorists. by kept together onejust thing: of hatred and foundations international Westerner],ultranationalists, or Westernizer [ Westernizers fascists, of “…union harvesting campaignsdescribed in section 3.3.1, 114

Nashi’s occasional use of anti-establishment rhetoric and instigation of instigation and rhetoric anti-establishment useof occasional 117 and hasbeen successful at delivering sizable participation in its

113 Having adopted liberal rhetoric the of the Havingadopted zapadnik 32

in Russian, which can be either be either can which in Russian, Nashi is rumored to have a to isrumored Nashi Nashi 116

is entirely not , the adoption of 115 authors such as authors Europe-Asia Europe-Asia Nashi CEU eTD Collection Putin to manage dissentin the lead up to the recent elections. political technology so that we may further explore techniques employed in Russia under elections. In the next section, however, I will introduce the concepts of virtual politics and will inThesebe applied 3as strategies again Chapter part of 2011-2012 discussion the the of examining the media, formation of pro-state activist groups and .the regulation of NGOs. some of specificthe ways they have been used in Putin’s Russia tomanage dissent by continue to exist and play a prominent role in Putin’s channeling strategies. counter protests. As such it is likely that either which such youth groups as levelunprecedented of duringoppositional the2011-2012electionprotest cycle, during state mobilization of the youth. This need was reiterated when the regime was faced with an in materialize Russia, While for channeling potential dissent away from the opposition and intosupport for the regime. 120 http://exile.ru/print.php?ARTICLE_ID=18776&IBLOCK_ID=35 119 2012http://echo.msk.ru/blog/danilalindele/891253-echo/ 118 provocateurs “battle wing” bringsthat infootball hooligans toinfiltrate opposition demonstrations as agent Ibid. See also Atwal 2009. Guillory, Sean, "Nashi: Is It Really The End?." "Boevoe krylo dvizheniya 'Nashi". Kto organizoval vesporyadki 6 Maya?" Ekho Moskvy, May 22, Nashi Coercion and channeling are both used in different contexts and I have illustrated illustrated I have and contexts in different used both are channeling and Coercion The creation of pro-Kremlin youth groups represents one of the key state strategies ’s future has been in doubt for years since the failure of a color revolution to 118 and physically andintimidate attack opposition participants. 120 it is clear that elites in Putin’s administration recognize the need for Nashi

and played Young Guard arole in pro-Kremlinorganizing Exile 33 . Aprril 22, 2008. Nashi

or a similar youth organization will will organization youth a similar or 119

CEU eTD Collection is-it-alive-and-flourishing-in-former-ussr Democracy 122 21. Business 121 isintechnology” demand. particular authoritarian control and simulations of democracy intersect, that so-called “political at least on paper, appear to be democratic procedures. It is in this area,in which soft image ofbeing democratic while countries simultaneously controlling theoutcome of what, mechanisms of repression to manage dissent, hybrid regimes attempt toat least evoke the blunt on more rely can regimes totalitarian and authoritarian While regimes. hybrid Soviet manipulation takes on paramountimportance in establishing and maintaining control in Post- andmanageand dissent protest.In conjunction with coercion and channeling, political regimes tend to utilize a combination of coercion and channeling in order to maintain control a fine line in and democracy,between authoritarianism and “gray this political zone” 3.2 Political Technology and Virtual Politics inContemporary Russia “virtual politics” and the role they play in the contemporary Russian politics. virtual. the country’s citizens and foreign actors are left unable to determine what is real and whatis sameat the time—saturate politicalthe so majoritythoroughly environment both the that of which multiplereal layersofmeaning—both and deceptiveand both real often and deceptive in system apost-modern politics,” byWilson as asystem “virtual of can be characterized political the political has the that technology environment saturated sothoroughly process Wilson, Andrew, "’Political Technology’: Why is it Alive and Flourishing in the FormerUSSR?” On Alena. Ledeneva, . (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 29-30. For amore in depth discussion, see Carothers 2002, 5- As discussedin previousthe hybrid chapter, such regimes as Russia under Putin walk This chapter is “political toadiscussion This chapter of and dedicated of technology” concepts the , June, 17, 2011. http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrew-wilson/political-technology-why- How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and

122 In Russia and much of the Post-Soviet world political 34

121

Open Open CEU eTD Collection “political technology,” and its practitioners as “political technologists.” Atitsmostbasic technologists.” as “political practitioners andits technology,” “political channeling. important. More generally,it could be said that political technology lies on the fringe of oppositiona fake into opposition ultimately party that Kremlinthe supports on everything siphoningUnited support Russiato Putin, or butby siphoning supportaway from substantive Academic Edition. EncyclopædiaBritannica Inc., 2012. 24 2012April. 123 of attempting to manipulate the way an event is interpreted by others” level, political technology occupies many of the same roles that “spin”—“ unlikeHowever, opposition. incorporate longer term channeling strategies todirectsupport away form substantive do Party, Liberal-Democratic of Zhirinovsky’s creation the e.g. strategies, technology With political technology, everything is less straight-forward. For example, some political same the with aregenuine these movements openly time genuinesupporting Putin. actors creation of pro-Kremlin youth groups, utilize elements of political technology. However, at term strategy. However, at times the distinction is blurry. Some channeling strategies, e.g. the manipulation—and siphoning—of opinionpublic through political istechnology amore short designed to siphon support away from opposition and toward the regime, while the difference between them along temporal lines: channeling entails long-term strategies formation of public opinion and to be discussed later in this chapter. Firstly, Idefine the some ways channeling overlaps with certain politicaltypes technology dealing with the attempted tosiphon awayfromsupport andsupportingopposition toward the regime. In 3.2.1 D P T The Oxford English Dictionary (OED)." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online Online Britannica Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia (OED)." Dictionary English Oxford The In Russian, strategies and tools of political manipulation are generally referred to as Channeling, as discussed in Chapter 1, is one way that Putin’s government has Nashi

, Zhirinovsky supports the regime notby directly 35

123 —and public —and public the act or practice or act the CEU eTD Collection Communist Russia.” 125 University Press, 2005), 41. 124 much deeper, defining very nature the of politicalthe system. relations do in Western countries. However, in much of the Former Soviet Union,its use goes of political procedures. these inmanagingplays outcome the technology need role something tobecontrolled—and enormous the that that democratic procedures—as demokratija” “managed” or“directeddemocracy” Surkov’s democracy,”term (“ although tools are successfully maintainapplied to political control can be regardedas a “virtual in A these leaders. legitimacysystem which a degree political of and bestow on thus support are employedin and togarner tools that appearanceof the andstrategies order support regimes is vital to maintaining control. Political technology and virtual politics, then, are the authoritarian competitive eveninhybrid or atleasta layer legitimacy—which generate of that publicthe is seen as a sort of gullible grey mass that needs bemanipulated to in to order based on the lack of viable alternatives, not on trust in its institutions.” is [that] still acceptance as“resigned characterized has accurately Vladimir Gel’man that wider public support. apeculiarrather mixture much of andthemanufactured appearance public genuine of support RussianThus, for legitimacy leaders,least is, at toan derivedfrom extent, support—or public democratic system in which populace the itsselects leaders based on popular preferences. time Russia is a hybrid regime that attempts to at least give the appearance of being a Gel’man, Vladimir, “Regime Changes Despite Legitimacy Crises: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Post- in Loyalty and Voice, Exit, Crises: Legitimacy Despite Changes “Regime Vladimir, Gel’man, Wilson, Andrew, Political technology in Russia regards elites as the only key players, It is in of contextthis faked popularand support faked democracy “virtual or politics” In contemporary Russian politics, however, political support is often a fragile thing ) perhaps better conveys the manner in which many of Russia’s elites regard Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. Journal of Eurasian Studies

1(2010), 61 36

(New Haven: Yale Yale Haven: (New 125

124 upravljaemaja but at the same CEU eTD Collection includingwebsite, www.inosmi.ru, www.lenta.ru, and gazeta.ru. information www.primakov.ru and similar www.lujkov.ru, the to politicians’ real pages exceptfilled with using the internet in his efforts, initially setting up slanderous clone websites, e.g. international NGOs operatingin Russia. has Pavlovsky provenhimself particularly at adept inPavlovsky 1999-2000, coordinated Civicthe Forum and theassault oversaw on in 1996. After successfully for credit Yeltsin’sclaiming reelection and then Putin’s campaign whogot his with start inYabloko 1990sbeforethe working Yelstin’s on reelection campaign enough to believe in ideologies. job ideologies for is, themassesview as whom whose in create they butgullible to part, political programmers.” setters, 131 130 129 128 http://www.openspace.ru/media/net/details/36463/ Luzkov smoking.”quit beyond their control. 127 126 and theperformance move forward, tools and strategies of political technology are the narrative devices used to compose the play ideology beyond pursuing their own personal interests. Politics is viewed as theater, and the political wholackanysubstantive for elites often arecreated ideologies political creative Gleb Pavlovsky interview with Aleksandr Morozov. Morozov. Aleksandr with interview Pavlovsky Gleb http://www.lujkov.ru Wilson 2006, 54-55 Wilson 2006, 41 Gleb Pavlovsky interview with Aleksandr Morozov. Morozov. Aleksandr with interview Pavlovsky Gleb Wilson 2006, 89-118 One of key the figures in politicalthe technology milieu today is Gleb Pavlovsky, Meanwhile, the political technologists view themselves as “puppet-masters, scene- The use of political technology is rooted in a kind of capitalistic nihilism in which in which nihilism capitalistic of in akind isrooted technology political of use The 129 along the lines of “Interesting Fact: In 1973, after a serious heart attack, 127 130

Helater founded a number of highly influential news portals and

128 In other words, they are mercenaries who lack ideology lackideology mercenaries words, who Inother they are 126 although its practitioners maintain that the outcome is outcome the that maintain practitioners its although 37 Open Space.

131

CEU eTD Collection back perhaps nevermoved on—or andinformal beyond—collusive andpractices strategies politics—of conforming to Western notions about democracy. At the same time elites fell simultaneously attempting to maintain the appearance—both in domestic and foreign idealsWestern and withdrawing into increasingly authoritarian whiletendencies was andenormously inunpopular elites beganthis context farther moving away from early caused 1990s country the descendto intochaos and poverty. By mid-1990sthe Yeltsin itand,has been argued that due to aseries ofmistakes during the privatization of process the move closer to the West. At the same time, however, holdovers from the Soviet mentality world. been struggling to come up with a coherent ideology and understanding of its place in the that came intobeing after the fall of the Soviet Union. For the past two decades, Russia has able to flourish in Russia largely as a result of the vacuum in political identity and ideology 135 134 133 132 Kremlin in some way. tothe always connected arealmost technologists political is that andPRconsultants political from other political technologists separating key of thatthe aspects one noted Krastev of an external counterpoint, i.e. foreign intervention.” amoral butpowerful aculturea passiveofinformation elite; lackelectorate; andcontrol; the fourpinpoints conditions under which virtual canpolitics be effectively “aemployed: Wilson in place. structural conditions informational and be certain needto there cultural, 3.2.2 WV P? ForRussian ideological and identity crisis,see Sakwa 2008, 359-361. Wilson 2006, p. 42 Wilson 2006, p. 41 Krastev, Ivan, “Democracy’s Doubles.” In 135 As Wilson notes, “virtual politics is created by supply rather than demand” In order for political technology and virtual politics to be a viable strategy for elites, Attimes ithas—as in early the Yeltsin period—seemingly sincerely attempted to 132

Journal of Democracy 38

133

, 17, no. 2(2006), 56. 134 andwas CEU eTD Collection Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). 138 137 136 manipulation. political avoiding all of these things almost all together by relying on the smoke and mirrors of simultaneously while system, functional democratic a and parties political competing that distracts and confuses the public while giving the false appearance of political discourse, system, political technology and virtual arepolitics usedto create a kind feedback of loop undergoing aserious attemptconstructa to coherent ideology ademocratic or political restore Russia’s great power status, but this was not especially successful. tappinginto public’s the wounded pride collapse the after of SovietUnionthe and trying to national identity and ideology remained. Putin spent much of his earlier years as president centralizing reforms and effectively limited electoral competition. At the same time, issues of fortune having to do with rising energy prices, but at the same time Putin launched a series of political stability had that beenin absent In part, 1990s. the this was good due to economic political technology, which thrived in the Darwinian turmoil of this period. communism and the Soviet past In many ways, the 1990s were the free-for-all glory years for to of vs.a return specter Yeltsin the to of performance Yeltsin’s judgment been havea should from what recast wassuccessfully in debate electoral example, the which brightest the its restrictiveness. emergedthat during SovietUnion, the compensate both forto its limitations and sidestep to during Yeltsin’s presidency. largerole an took on especially prime examples—it being Party Liberal Democratic phantom perestroika Judah, Ben; Kobzova, Jana and Popescu, Nicu. Wilson 2006, 38-39 Ledevna 2006,14-17 In the first terms of Putin’s presidency, Russia achieved a degree of economic and —the nationalist group nationalist—the group 136 While political technology While enjoyedpolitical technology adegreeof lateuse evenduring 137

The orchestration of Yeltsin’s reelection in is1996 perhaps Pamyat’ Dealing with aPost-BRIC Russia. and the creation of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his 39

(London: European 138 Thus, in lieu of CEU eTD Collection 141 140 ‘virtual-democracy’. May.2012. http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrew-wilson/putin-returns-but-will-russia-revert-to- 139 of andresults. manipulation the construction of parties, the destruction of others, the framing of general campaign dynamics is central to their work,” as Wilson puts it, “but by definition it extends beyond this—to the 3.2.2.1 Virtual Politics in the West controlled information sources. state- by provided that than reality of version another an and information of source alternative intervention did previously, providing an increasingly large segment of society with an in recent years the internetin Russia has come to fulfill a role somewhat akin to what foreign state’s ability effectivelyto use political technology as a means of control. Iwould argue that platform and seemingly exists toprofit from its own power. figures such as Alexei Navalny, refers to as a “kleptomatic regime” that lacks a substantive which are useful in providing a narrative that conceals what Wilson, echoing opposition their client and, often as a corollary, damage the image of the client’s rivals. employers. characters and events that fitin to a preconceived narrative that fits the needs of their information already available, political technologists are more like novelists, constructing massa chaoticbased on of narrative constructing apersuasive like commentators almost Wilson 2006, 89 Wilson 2006, 49 Wilson, Andrew, "Putin returns, but will Russia revert to ‘virtual democracy’?." On It is in this environment that political technologists were able tosupply their services, Like Western spin doctors, for political technologists “the manipulation of the media the on is having internet the impact iswhat today politics in Russia issue key One On the most basic level, the task of political technologists is to improve the image of

140 ” In other words, whereas spin doctors generally function 40

139

Open Democracy 141 In this sense, sense, In this . 08 CEU eTD Collection 142 of their employers. In contrast, political technologists in Russia operate on a much bigger floating around in the media and turn it, provide an interpretation of it that best fits the needs information existing take is to task main their stories, plant sometimes do spin-doctors manipulated and spun is not manufactured specifically benefitto some party. In the West, exists, butfull-on virtual is politics soprevalentnot in thethat information isthat being West. inthe than down top more is generally and Union Soviet important—it can generally be regarded as playing a more vital role in much of the former example. successful particularly moral and religious issues and the narrative of red states versus blue states has been a on asjudgments elections in recasting success strategists Republican scandals. sex various issues, smear campaigns based on such improbable things as Barack Obama’s birthplace and away from politicalsubstantive to argumentsdiscourse overwrought over scandalous non- role in Unitedthe which States, has seen a degree of degradation increasinglyand moved itany could political democracy, behas taken although a greater on arguedthat technology counterpart. Scouring uppieces ofinformation from a political figures’ pastis inevitable in Russian its with similarities shares West inthe technology political images, a rival’s narrative on top of what was essentially a blank slate. autobiography in run-up the tothe2000presidential election, projectingguy atough an released Putin for their andtropes campaign, to anarrative image andprovide certain inevitably a anautobiography designedtoprojectAmerican presidential release candidates political technology in Russia is similar to PR and the “spin-doctoring” in the West. Just as 143 Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin For a discussionof how Putin chose to depict himself, see Masha Gessen, Wilson 2006, 48 While—at leastinWhile—at political Unitedthe is States perhaps becomingtechnology more (New York: Riverhead Books, 2012).

142 On the most basic level of smearing 143 The Man without aFace: The Information manipulation manipulation Information CEU eTD Collection can entail blaming another party or previous regime for current problems.An example of this the discussion into terms that are more favorable to the party utilizing this strategy. points’), in which a new drama is superimposed over an old drama in an attempt to reframe Soviet politicalSoviet environment. Firstis adevice as referredto toMedvedev. transferpower of stable control, andthe2007-2008elections relied “Russia on the her from knees”narrative anda vocabulary.” even a common performances, andrepeat patters common with of politics-as-performance, “entire culture 149 flourishing-in-former-ussr04 17, 2011. Democracy 148 147 146 Academic Edition. EncyclopædiaBritannica Inc., 2012. 24 2012April. 145 144 provided the of return communism. In1999-2000,terroristattacks and arenewedin war Chechnya people to vote for the incumbent. The 1996 presidential election was cast as Yeltsin vs. the a election. Most major Russian elections have included a key dramatic narrative to compel representation (Russian for dramaturgy, i.e. “ 3.2.3 D spin—or facts and events. fieldplaying covering entire the includingsystem mere political and creation—rather than the Wilson 2006, 90 Wilson, Andrew, "’Political Technology’: Why Is It Alive And Flourishing In The Former Ussr?” Wilson 2006, 49 Wilson, 2012 Online Britannica Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia (OED)." Dictionary English Oxford The Wilson 2006, 7 Wilson identifies two subtypes of of subtypes two identifies Wilson By constructing powerful A second key type of political technology is what Wilson refers to as , http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrew-wilson/political-technology-why-is-it-alive-and- dramaturgiia “ 145 ), which usually consists of “false election drama” . The 2003-2004drama entailed bringing theoligarchs under 147

the art or technique of dramatic composition or theatrical or theatrical composition dramatic of or technique art the

dramaturgiia 148

dramaturgiia 42 politicians are able dictate the narrative of the of narrative the dictate areable politicians

that appearrepeatedlythat in Post- the perevod strelki strelki perevod 146 and encompasses the the andencompasses (‘switching the (‘switching the dramaturgiia 149 On Open Open On This This 144

CEU eTD Collection 151 150 2012 election cycle will further be discussed3. in chapter deluge consists of “the artificial polarization of choice, usually involving the threat of of meddlingWestern in Russia’s domestic politics. the United States and in this way attempting to turn the political discourse toward a narrative Putin’s policies thatwere raised by oppositionthe by casting figures opposition as agents of strategy from 2011-2012electionthe cycle wasattempting avoid questions substantive about election unto acondemnation of the existing regime. The role of serious questionsPutin about and Russia’sleadership United and attemptingturn the to raising environment, political the into drama own its injected opposition the however, time, 2011-2012 election cycle failure was the produce sufficient to issues. AsWilson has argued recently, of one keythe failures in Putin’s campaign during the policy substantive discussion than rather drama of fog in left are voters inwhich reality throughout the entire political process. The overlying goal of this is to create an alternative with emotionally issuescharged involves and creating anddirecting and virtual actors events andhomosexuality—Post-Soviet elections in the United States being turned intoa judgment on social issues such as abortion to Russia. color bringing involving revolution comingprotesters well, of threat asupposed adisastrous as will be discussed in 3,Putin’schapter 2011-2012election narrative hadelements of as this vs. communism narrative is a clear example of this strategy being used effectively. However, Wilson 2012. Ibid, 90 , democracy in danger, or scarecrow extremists taking power.” scarecrow in or , democracy danger, A second device is what Wilson refers to as While dramatic election narratives andreframing usedaround are the world—e.g.

dramaturgiia 43 goes beyond simply distracting the public

zelenye vorota dramaturgiia. dramaturgiia (‘green gates’), which (‘green gates’), 150 The 1996 democracy The1996democracy 151 aprs moi, le in 2011- the At the same Atthe CEU eTD Collection Navalny ‘s oppositional government. arefinanced ‘s Navalny by oppositional States United activities the a leaked were that phoneconversations www.lifenews.ru, on wire-tapped (authentic) Boris Berezovsky with of picture Navalny be aphoto-shopped to out turned what Aeroflotinto off-shore accounts. (Led. 61). More recentexamples include the appearance of has to do with allegations that Berezovsky set up a shell company embezzleto funds from example toalleged Aprominentfrom second category economic 1990s the relates crimes. financed by 61) (Led. foreigners. A moreexample recent is Congress as the program explained that itis illegal for Russian presidential candidates to be financed by oligarch Vladimir Guskinsky, acitizen of Israel, shown at the World Jewish 2000 election Yablokosuggestingpresidential that Grigory Yavlinsky’s campaignwas being activities. Examples includepolitical stories ran on the state televisionindividual’s channel an in ORT (now Channel 1) in the malfeasance or indiscretions to relating information key key of types material” January 09, 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/09/russian-navalny-fake-photo-smear 156 Reporter, 155 154 153 152 captive massaudience.” insubstitute informational space a virtual version of opponent’sthe image—if foronly a The end goal with Black PR is, as Wilson puts it, “to virtualize the client’s opponent, to public distribution negativeof information malignto imagethe of orsomething.someone 3.2.4 I BPR W Parfitt, Tom, “Russian Protest Leader Alexei Navalny Is Target Of Fake Photo Smear.” In the the In Smear.” Photo Of Fake Target Is Navalny Alexei Leader Protest “Russian Tom, Parfitt, o Naval'nogo.'" zuby slomatete gebnei krovavoi s 'Vy govorili: "Mne Viktor, Dyatlikovich, Wilson 2006, 70 Wilson 2006, 70 Ledeva2006, 32-33 A key type of black PR is A third key type of political technology used in Russia is Black PR, which entails the June 27, 2011 http://www.rusrep.ru/article/2011/06/27/fsb ), which consists essentially mudslinging.of kompromat 153 : political, economic, criminal and private. (60-62) First is

Kompromat 44 (in (in Russian derived from

154 Alena Ledeneva has identified four kompromat alleging that Alexei “compromising Russian 155 156 Guardian The The or , 152

CEU eTD Collection

grew suspicious and left. young women he met at anight club, was set up for him in the same apartment, but that he Limonov and writer Viktor Shenderovich, Viktor writer and Limonov sex tapeshave leaked been allegedly involving Bolshevik leaderEduard National opposition for heartsurgery. Switzerland 1990sattemptedthe cast doubtto hison health andsuggested he wasplanning atrip to sexual orientation, etc.. For example, a Kremlin-orchestrated attack on Evgeny Primakov in information anindividual’sabout personal life,including questions of morality, health, company of videoanother was released allegedly in Fishman showing his underwearusingcocaine in the website the of Russiayouth United group the http://www.kp.ru/daily/24339.4/530152/ 165 164 163 162 161 against-opposition.html http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7528316/Kremlin-accused-of-honey-trap-campaign- 160 159 158 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b536af4-2a76-11e1-9bdb-00144feabdc0.html 157 Russian Solidarnost’ opposition figures—political analystDmitry Oreshkin, aleader of oppositionthe group examples of this include the March 2010 release of a series of videos featuring three leaders. opposition fellow berated vulgarly Nemtsov Boris in which site, news Kremlin-friendly 'Klubnicha': Grekh dimplomata." Komsomolskaya Pravda, August 6, 2009 http://www.compromat.ru/page_29133.htm Ledeva2006, 64 Yashin, Ilya. http://yashin.livejournal.com/894296.html Ibid. opposition." against campaign of honey-trap accused "Kremlin Andrew. Osborn, Entry “Fishman,for Mikhail.” http://lenta.ru/lib/14204335/ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nXbivy9i2zg protesters." split to of move accused "Kremlin Charles, Charles, 157 Newsweek The third category of Ilya Yashin and editor and chief of the oppositional leaning (and now defunct) а semi-nude women. —paying bribes to traffic policemen. traffic to bribes —paying 161162 163 The final identifiedcategory by Ledeva involves scandalous

In additional to the example above, a slew of hidden camera kompromat 160 Ilya Yashin alleged that a similar trap, involving two 164 relates Recent activities. to allegedrelates criminal American 45 Molodaya Gvardia

165 158 Financial Times and British These videos initially appeared on . 159 Several later Several weeks 166 , December19, 2011. Telegraph consular workers. March 29, 2010. CEU eTD Collection negative information. This,in turn, can lead the release of Russians to constantly ask themselves who stands to benefitfrom any revelations or pieces of media. the of distrust its accuracy publicskepticismdespite totheRussian of high level contributes of public’s bribes or having sex did less to discredit these figures than to provoke indignation toward example, the of accuracy the toward skepticism effectiveness of of effectiveness limited to unreliable areperceived stories scandalous That these contributes asbeing importantly, the majority of of majority the importantly, order to producecompromisinginformation on opposition figures. groups such groups as youth in agents pro-Kremlin yearsin enthusiastic that overly recent indications There are are paid topublish—either directly from orin clients increased form readership. the of published largely due economic incentivesfor both thosearepaidgather to itand who those branches. security Soviet other and unemployed who sought new work using the same skillset they learned working for the KGB security experts of hugenumbers state Union left of Soviet the after collapse the prevalent Post-Soviet Affairs 171 170 169 168 167 Russian-brothel-video.html. 2009. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/5788090/British-diplomat-James-Hudson-resigns-over- 166 For a general discussion of distrust in the media, see Scott Gehlbach, “Reflections on Putin and the Media.” Media.” the and Putin on “Reflections Gehlbach, Scott see media, the in of distrust discussion a general For Ledeva2006, 71 Guillory 2012. Ledeva2006, 72-74 Ledeva2006, 69 Bingham, John. "British diplomat James Hudson resigns overRussian 'brothel' video." In some cases the compromising information is accurate, in others it is not. More Much of the the of Much kompromat Nashi 26,1 (2010) kompromat kompromat 171 and As a corollary to this, Iwould propose that the public’s reasonable leaks described aboveinvolving opposition figures paying police Molodaya Gvardiya Molodaya kompromat kompromat in Russia.would I add continued the that reporting of is by industry security became harvested private that the kompromat 167

Kompromat is viewed by publicthe as fabricated unreliable. or 46 contributes to the widespread tendency of of tendency widespread the to contributes have taken have taken settingto incriminating up in traps

continues to be harvested, fabricated and and fabricated harvested, be to continues kompromat 169

to backfire. For Telegraph kompromat July 10, 168

170

CEU eTD Collection 2012 election cycle saw the release of numerous pieces of of pieces of numerous saw release the cycle election 2012 preferred strategiesmaintaining preferred for an advantage electoral outcome of elections in Russia has taken on greater importance and become one of the 3.2.5 A P A R regime. the against backfired 174 173 172 that entities and benefit those in power. projects political of financing indirect the is common most and Third results. altering or the ballots in with as tampering results, alter electoral to resources” administrative certain way and obstructing voters whom they cannot control. Second is using “concealed andmostcrude type consistsoflocal officialstheir people using vote toorder clout a to political technologist, identifies three key types of abuse of administrative resources. The first branch of bureaucratic political technology. more of of candidates.” one of campaigns electoral for purposes andassociated of abuse) material with advantages bureaucratic public institutions resources protest. In Russian, the use of administrative resources is a euphemism for the “the use (or support for Putin and aspart of government’sthe increasingresponse to levels of anti-regime Chapter 3,were used extensively in 2011-2012 electionthe incycle channelattempts to from benefit to stand who Nashi Putin’s regime and padding the vote in Russian elections, either in the ways outlined above or Wilson 2006, 72-73 Ledeva2006, 47 Wilson 2006, 38;Wilson,2012. for manufacturing the materialsby and correlation toward Putin and United Russia Over the past decade, the use of administrative resources in order to influence the influencethe in to order resources useofadministrative decade, the past Over the This can take a variety forms.of Wilson, relying on interviews with a Ukrainian 174 All of these categories play a large role in generating support for Nashi

’s activities. As willbein discussed Chapter 3, 2011- the 47

172 kompomat and, as will be discussed in 173 In other words, it is the , some of which CEU eTD Collection was fired forpushing hard too for asecond Medvedev term, hasclaimed that Surkovwas in 2011 and then after Surkov parliamentarythe elections in 2011.Pavlovsky,December who isthat suspectthis mistake largely of a resultof departures the Gleb inPavlovsky spring the provide opinion. narrativeand and influence an that political technology voter I electoral regime did much rely too administrativeon technology and neglect aspects the of channeling term application of political technology. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, Putin’s ideology of sovereign democracy—which in many ways is simply a more advanced and long- to incorporate channeling—e.g. the creation of creation channeling—e.g. the to incorporate he neglectnot did resources useof administrative the increasing in while because credit this, wouldmove itwell intofull authoritarianism. However, Wilson not givedoes Surkov enough fell,popular support relying exclusively onadministrative resources to remainin power long waspopular. regime asthe as only andcould function resources administrative Wilson argues that the type of system Surkov curated runs the risk of relying too heavily on administrative resources to hold the system together and control the political environment. of his notion managedof democracy. untilSurkov, who 2011wasdeputy December head of presidential the administration, aspart electoral campaigns. incumbent finance inspectors, fire and authorities tax as the such 180 179 178 177 176 175 for political purposes, proceedings judicial of outcomes the influencing entail can resources administrative outcome, fraud.electoral through outright Ibid, 85-86 Ibid, 85-86 Ibid, 85 Ibid, 84 Ibid, 82-84 Ibid, 75-79 Increased use of administrative technology in Russia was championed by Vladislav by in waschampioned Vladislav Russia technology useof administrative Increased 176 politically politically inspectionsmotivated by governmentagenciesvarious

175 Inaddition being to usedtoinfluence anelectoral 179 178 Managed democracy relies extensively on on extensively relies democracy Managed

177 48 Nashi and siphon funds from budgetthe in to order

and the attempt to introduce the attempt andthe to 180 If If CEU eTD Collection factor in this process of alternative information seeping in, tosuch an extent that one of the itthat can never exclusively dominate.” know predominate—they should reality of version their “that is system orientated politics are not airtight. Alternative information seeps in, and the main task of elites in a virtual elements of coercion or simply outrightcorruption. of political it although technology, could be arguedthatin some manifestations itcontains dramaturgiia reality.Key strategies in outlined chapter includethis the creation virtual of opposition, and truth between distinguish to impossible is nearly it inwhich reality alternative of kind the opposition. In this type of situation, political technology can be used to put voters into a away from channel dissent of isto effectively lacka failure indicative policies, asupport of to securevotes in absencethe of genuine support, andin absencethe of genuinely popular strategies that are frequently used in Russian politics. Often,it is used as a short-term strategy 3.3 Conclusion type of political influencetechnology that public opinion. neglect other may have the to led the regime and their absence that political technologists science, this suggests that a rivalry within the elite lead to the ousting of Putin’s two key 182 Duck." 181 him. with agreement Wilson 2006, 45 Hearst, David and Elder, Miriam. "How Dmitry Medvedev's Mentor Turned Him Into A Lame Guardian That being said, in a non-totalitarian society virtual politics and political technology Political technology and virtual encompasspolitics avariety manipulativeof , and black PR. The use of administrative resources also falls into the category March 02,2012 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/02/dmitry-medvedev-rivalry 181 While innerguessing atthe of workings an is Kremlin the exact not

182 Rising internet usagein Russia has played a key 49

CEU eTD Collection 184 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/a4520742-2607-11e1-856e-00144feabdc0.html 183 dramaturgiia Kremlin’sthe campaignwas almost completely devoid of ideology,any cogent narrativeor technology seems haveto fallen. This is especially the case in the recent election,in which current use of political technology in Russia, where the standards for the use of political be it;lose notevery to away endneeds with tied up.” technology as a viable long-term strategy, but “more crudely, they are happy simply to get technology in 2006, characterized them notso much as trying to effectively use political term political technology strategies. Wilson, describing elite attitudes toward political effectiveeven short- long-term channeling or orthrough governance strategies sophisticated almostif as regimethe isnottrying especially hard garner supportto either good through Perhaps thisis resultthe of lazinesselite hubris,butsince or around 2007-2008itappears 2011-2012 election cycle islikely due in failurepart tothe channel to away fully.dissent ininplace to begenerated short took term.the surge the The vocalized that during dissent arenot successful channeling andadditional theregime for strategies enough needssupport for their news. sources internet whorely and media on those state-controlled main cleavages in Russian politics lies along the line of people who rely on television and

Wilson 2006, 45 Ioffe, Julia, "Activists get connected." Political technology can be seen as a short term solution for when longer-term for whenlonger-term be solution seen can as ashortterm Political technology

Financial Times 50

[London] 16 Dec 2011, 11 May. 2012. 184 This seems to accurately the accurately Thisdescribe seemsto 183

CEU eTD Collection oppositionistblogger Ilya Varlamov becoming rallying for the points opposition. Atthe same by campaign mayoral aborted an then and Astrakhan in election mayoral adisputed with activities would take. For some time after this the focus moved from Moscow to the regions, andshape toregroup which attempted futureleaders opposition determinetime what sense this seemed to mark defeat the of movementthe and wasfollowed by a period during lower turnout than previous ones—there was something of a lull in protest activity. In some presidential election which placeprotest, took onMarch 10. After rally—which that had will likely continue to do so, I have cut the discussion off after the second major post- presidential election. Although opposition continue placeactivities totake upatpresentand announcement he that would runforagain president and continuing through March10 the summer of 2011 with buildthe uptotheDecember 4parliamentary elections and Putin’s Period4.1 Time of Research coercion, channeling and political technology havethat been discussedin chapter. previous mobilized oppositional activity. This will be approached through a prism of the theories of Union. presidencies and organized thelargest oppositional demonstrations since thefall Sovietthe of Medvedev and Putin the during time other any at been has it than mobilized more far United Russia and Vladimir Putin’s attempt toreturn to the presidency. The opposition was parliamentary elections, March presidential elections, andmore generally in opposition to activity oppositional inprotest toallegedfraudinresponse electoral December the 4. MANAGINGDISSENT DURINGTHE2011-2012 ELECTIONCYCLE The Russian election cycle of 2011-2012 was accompaniedby a level mobilized of The case study will focus on 2011-2012electionthe cycle, beginningin latethe In this Iwill chapter, examine how Putin’s responded regime to suddenthis surge in 51

CEU eTD Collection to Putin’s regime. differentgroups and their demonstrationsminimal attracted attendance andposedlittle threat foras Strategy years,31 andprotests Khimkiforest the therewaslittle between unity the various had opposition groups beenfor pushing change andorganizing demonstrations such that there would be such a high level of contentious action in the winter ahead. Indeed, while were signs of dissatisfaction and conflict among elites, but few people would have predicted comeseemed to out of nowhere.back Lookingleading atthe period upto protests, the there 4.3 Protest during 2011-2012 the Election Cycle sources. these on relied have I relevant when and YouTube, on distributed ininstances information fraud blogosphere.of Meanwhile, the electoral andblack PR were therefore in researching the history of recent oppositional events and history, Ihave sought leading oppositional figures maintainingcommonly blogs—most on Live Journal--and the of many with internet, the on active most is Russia in opposition the is that this for reason venuessuch informal ontheinternet, blogsas social andnetworks, videos. The YouTube magazine in articles section.this Inaddition I to have this, included primary sources from 4.2 A Note on Sources from late summer 2011through March 10, 2012. beincludedandin recent andsoIhave ongoing to for casestudy, the the opted time period are too these events However, movement. the within maybe place taking of radicalization demonstrationsthe increasingly offewercomposed andmore a hard-lineddegree participants time, protests seem to have lost some of the wider appeal they enjoyed in the winter, and with For many,For sudden the upsurge in duringpopular protest the2011-2012 election cycle Given the recent nature of events, I have had to rely heavily on newspaper and 52

CEU eTD Collection the first prompt was “of crooks and thieves.” Googlefield Russia, on into search the “party” word if the that, entered pointone on to the referred to United Russia as the “party of crooks and thieves,” transactions. corrupt to attention crowdsourcing project called RosPil that allows users to analyze government tenders and call aninternet figures, hadcreated years becomehas of couple key one of the opposition country. the mostfeedspopularin of becameone mocks Kremlin the Twitter that official KermlinRussia http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/06/the_kremlins_spin_machine_and_me?page=full 189 188 rospil.net/21ux 187 186 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/a4520742-2607-11e1-856e-00144feabdc0.html 185 scandals. of number violations. traffic These stories took off in committing egregious sirens pressandcausedthe a process—wasup set to provide avenueforvideos sharing and names of officials with blue allowed to turn on and essentially trafficdisobey frequentlyrules, causing mayhem in the are state the with associated individuals important that lights blue unpopular increasingly the 2011. throughout In 2010, an internetcommunity called the “Blue Buckets”—named after taken on a high level importanceof during the past year as we be illustrated in this section. going on for some time, internet as a means for spreading information and mobilizing has widespread, providing amedium for activists tocommunicate.While this process has been more have become connections andhigh-speed increased has penetration internet years, Inrecentinternet. caseon the the momentum. wasespecially This of a degree certain some Ioffe, Julia, “The Kremlin’s SpinMachine and Me.” Navalny,Aleksei, http://navalny.livejournal.com/553708.html Petrov,Nikoai, “The Navalny Effect.” http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/12/08/navalny-effect- Ibid Ioffe, Julia, "Activists get connected." As early as the beginning of 2011, there were signs that the opposition was gaining Oppositional gaining started sentiments wider traction inearlier late 2010and 186 In late 2010, Alexei Navalny, an anti-corruption blogger who in the past 185 Meanwhile, an anonymously written Twitter feed called

187 Financial Times Then in interviewa radio in early February 2011, Navalny 189 53 Financial Times Although only six percent of Russians

[London] 16 Dec 2011, 11 May. 2012. September 6,2011 188 aphrase that quickly caught CEU eTD Collection government’s the on impact no have they believe Russians of 80% politics—over towards providejustification sufficient for hisreturn to the presidency. beginningfrom this announcement and continuinghisthrough reelection, wasfailing to http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2011/10/05_e_3790830.shtml. 194 http://kommersant.ru/doc/1785754 193 http://www.comscoredatamine.com/2011/06/average-time-spent-on-social-networking-sites-across-geographies/ 192 191 navalnom 190 invoking image the of stagnation. controlled media,backwards. Outside of Brezhnev of state comparisons Putin to abounded, level,for asizable part of the population the announcement seemed to be a cynical step Russia’s party convention in September. While many Russians had expected on this some third presidential term, he announced hisintention to run for presidentagain Unitedat function as thekey organizational and communication venues for theopposition. worldwide, quo. status the Indeed,Russians are among the most active users of social networking sites in a country with high level of information control they represent asignificant departure from party of crooks and thieves” throughout the electoral season. outside of Moscow and in Siberia, I frequently heard United Russia referred to simply as “the party and the phraseof populationdescribed the accurately 28% agreed that recognized thename Navalny in April 2011 "Delu Brezhneva Verny." Verny." Brezhneva "Delu dogonit?" Brezhneva "Putin example: for See, “Average Time Spent on Social Networking Sites Across Geographies." June 7, 2011. “O partii ‘Edidnaya Rossiya.” May 20, 2012. “http://www.levada.ru/press/2011050501.html “Rossiyane ob Aleksee Naval’nom.” May 20, 2012. http://www.levada.ru/02-04-2012/rossiyane-ob-aleksee- By early November, there was a palpable sense that some of the widespread apathy sense wasapalpable thatsomeBy there of apathy widespread early the November, After years of speculation over whether or not Putin would attempt to return for a return not to would Putin attempt or overwhether yearsspeculation After of While this type of activity internet activity may on the surface seem somewhat trivial, 192 and sites such as Facebook, Vkontakte, Twitter and Livejournal have come to Gazeta,

October05, 2011. 194 Indeed, one of Putin’s keystrategical mistakes, Kommersant, 190 54 , this phrase seemed to take on a life of its own

October3, 2011 191 and even 193

CEU eTD Collection happened with (Kursk)the submarine:” “Itsank.” put it, “Welaugh used to with hisPutin [e.g. in response 2000 to questionthe “What As control away myone informational environment. through of dissent of the acquaintances such aslargermeaning takes Russia on andrepresent falling channel regime’s ability the to 199 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/opinion/sunday/political-satire-returns-to-russia.html?pagewanted=all 198 197 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/29/putin_and_the_boo_boys 196 http://www.levada.ru/15-02-2012/ob-otnosheniyakh-grazhdan-i-gosudarstva-roli-prostykh-rossiyan-v-politike 195 stage are viral hits on the internet. mandatepopular tojustify for Putin’s return a third term when videos ofhim being booed off stilldoes enjoy high a degree of support overall,itis claim difficult to an overwhelming of “return satire” the in littlebe of democracy, a liberal consequence good fightand stating they that booingnotwere him. a himfor post offans ontheloser’s comments wall to congratulating which leadhundreds Putin, not and loser the booing was crowd the that asserting incident, the over gloss to tried Putin’s secretary press an fighter. match American against mixedmartial winner of a arts stage toshouts of “goaway”deliver whiletrying aspeech to congratulating Russian the users,internet and itstartseemed to a culminatedtrend that in himselfPutin beingbooed off similarly cut off by a booing crowd. Videos of these events were viral hits among Russian in of one toread aspeechwhich team attempted captains the lauding United and Russia United Russiahadsponsored concert.the This was followed by incidentata hockey an game a rock concert in Kemerovo when the emcee was booed off stage after announcing that elections. 2007 two-thirds before the compared over to decisions See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqDqvKYDv9M Yaffa, Joshua. "The Kremlin’s Not Laughing Now." Ibid Ioffe,Julia, "Putin Boo-boys." andthe 2012. 15, February v politike.” ossiyan prostykh- roli I gosudarstva grazhdan otnosheniyakh “Ob 195 —was intoturning rancor. Support for United Russia had around fallen to 50%--

Foreign Policy Foreign 55 New Times, New York , November29, 2011.

199 ], now we laugh at him.” Even if Putin 197 196 While incidents such Whileincidents as thesewould One of the first signs of this was at February 2012.25, 198 in a hybrid regime regime in ahybrid CEU eTD Collection day, gathered 5000protesters around inprotest Moscow central to electoral the results. Bolsheviks, the Left Front and nationalist groups—resulting in over 250 arrests. small by protests unsanctioned more radical fringesof opposition—thethe National alleged began fraudinternet,the across spreading 49.32% of 49.32% of popularthe vote opposition. to be fairly strategy effective posters campaign accompanied byfordesigningwas competitions anti-United Russia crowdsourcing http://www.svobodanews.ru/archive/ru_news_zone/20111205/17/17.html?id=24411560. 207 206 2011 205 e=233 0100028713299®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100028713304&typ http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100028713304&vrn=10 204 http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2011/12/05_x_3858542.shtml 203 202 201 http://navalny.livejournal.com/617297.html. 200 for a vote specific oppositional party, butasachance tovote against United Russia. framingas a byNavalny—of not election chance the oppositional strategy—spearheaded to mocking Putin and deriding United Russia.This trend wasfurther represented by shiftthe in abuzzupcoming andthesocial election, and siteswere networking links with comments the discussing were voted never and in politics whatsoever interest no shown previously politics was intovogue coming amongyounger Russians.mine Friends of whohad “V Moskve nakanune bylizaderzhany bolee 250oppozitsionerov.”Radio Svoboda.December 05, 2011. Ibid Schwirtz, Michael. "Voters Watch Polls in Russia, and Fraud Is What They See." Central Election Commissionof the RussianFederation. “Summary of ElectionVotes.” Golosov,Grigory. “ Navalny, Aleksei. "Spoyem?." http://navalny.livejournal.com/625374.html. Navalny,Aleksei. "Itogi konkursa." http://navalny.livejournal.com/617297.html. Navalny, Aleksei. "Final'naya bitva mezhdu dobrom i neitralitetom." 201 On December4 In the run-up to the December 4 parliamentary elections, one sensed that oppositional oppositional that sensed one elections, parliamentary 4 December the to run-up the In and music videos. Nasolit’ shulerov. th , the parliamentary parliamentary , the elections took place with United Russiasecuring 204 202 203 amid widespread allegations of amidfraud. of allegations widespread

Casting the election as a rejection of United Russia turned out thatprovided adegree of unity for agenerally divided ” Gazeta, December05,2012. 56

206 and that evening there were a variety of 205 Amateur videos of New York Times 207 The next next The 200 11 12 12 11 This This CEU eTD Collection fireworks. as lighting such by Alexander Belov attended peacefully, they although did causesome minor disruptions delivered speeches. Although representednot by any speakersthe of nationalists onstage, led Bolsheviks) and key other figuresopposition such asjournalists, writers and musicians— (the Other Russia), Gennady Gudkov (A Just Russia), Eduard Limonov (National- movements—including Grigory MikhailYavlinsky (Yabloko), Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov Russia, including one with approximately 10,000 people in Petersburg. St. in event. participate the to together anarchists and nationalists liberals, communists, drawing inclusiveness, its years was twenty past things thatmade thisdemonstration unusual larger than and any demonstration inother the idUSTRE7B610S20111209?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc=71 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/09/us-russia- 214 213 http://www.thenation.com/blog/165102/russias-great-december-evolution. 212 211 210 2012. 209 protests.html# http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/world/europe/jailing-opposition-leaders-russia-moves-to-quell-election- 208 page. Facebook social networking sites, with nearly 40,000 peopleregistered attend to on event’sthe organizers protest. of the according to drawingSquare, from according anywhere 25,000, police,50,000 more, tothe to or city. in the continuedintoday nextSmaller the due protests high fizzledand then out to presence police Navalny and Ilya Yashin were arrested and sentenced to fifteen days of administrative arrest. Gutterman, Steve, "Protests across Russia to Test Putin and Opponents." Putin and Opponents." to Test across Russia "Protests Steve, Gutterman, "10 dekabrya: khronika." December10, 2011. http://lenta.ru/chronicles/protest/ Heuvel, Katrina Vanden, "Russia's Great December Evolution." Barry, Ellen “Rally Defying…” http://www.facebook.com/events/198328520252594/ Barry, Ellen “Rally Defying Putin’s Party Draws Tens of Thousands.” Barry, Ellen, "Russia Cracks Down on Antigovernment Protests." New York Times, December 6, 2011. On December 10anon-violentprotest against the elections tookplace in Bolotnaya 208

210 The protest was non-violent, and the police did not interfere. not and didthe police wasnon-violent, Theprotest 213 Smaller demonstrations took place in dozens of cities across

209 The event had been organized and coordinated on on coordinated and organized been had event The 212 57 Opposition leaders from a variety of

Nation The New TheTimes, New York . December12, 2011. Reuters , December9, 2011. 214

211 December 10, 10, December One of the CEU eTD Collection attendance ranged from with 35,000-120,000, Ria Novosti estimating 53,000based around on internet, with nearly 30,000 registered to attend on Facebook, on toattend with nearly registered 30,000 internet, temperature being -20Celsius.Bolotnaya Occuring at Square and againorganized on the elite. Kremlin the within divide increasing is an there that who has been a close ally of Putin’s since his first term,is important in that it demonstrates minister Alexei minister Alexei Kudrin booed. were former finance speakers and nationalist complete not oppositional the unity that given included speeches from a wide assortmentof althoughopposition groups, clearly was there again The demonstration were arranged. later in chapter) this willbediscussion (which moretook meaningon as andpro-government anti-Orange Revolution protests counter media—which This theprotests—usedpolice cover didbegin controlled estimates. to discrepancy between police and opposition attendance estimates is notable in that the state showed29,000 demonstrators up, while organizers claimed upto120,000. This increasing Facebook registeredto attend. on nearly people 55,000 Moscow. Like the event atBolotnaya, it was organized largely on social networks, with demonstration. 219 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/24/russia-europe-news 218 217 216 17, 2011.http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2011/12/111217_yabloko_elex_protest_rally.shtml 215 people, https://www.facebook.com/events/212286018856867/ Miriam. Elder, http://www.facebook.com/events/231653370237319/ “Na Manezhnoi ploshadi proshel miting KPRF." December18, 2011. http://lenta.ru/news/2011/12/18/kprf/ December Russia, BBC chelovek." tysyach neskol'ko sobral v moskve 'Yabloko' "Miting Yury. Malover'yan, 215 The largenext demonstration placeintook on February 4, 2012despite the One of the largest demonstrations took place demonstrationsOne took largest on December 24onProspectSakharov of the On Decembera demonstration 17, arranged by gatheredfromYabloko 1500-5000 and nextday the gathered3000-5000people forcommunists another 216 ” RussianAnti-Putin Protests Draw Thousands To Moscow Again.”

218 However, theappearance ofKudrin, a Kremlininsider 58

217 The police estimated that around that The police estimated 219 estimates of actual of actual estimates Guardian 2411 2010. CEU eTD Collection election.html?pagewanted=all http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/europe/observers-detail-flaws-in-russian- 224 223 February 26, 2012. “http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/26/russians-protest-putin-moscow 222 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/05/upping_the_ante?page=full 221 220 an sizeanalysisthe of of the crowd squareand the it.occupying density of the Kazakhs joined in Kazakhsjoined the broke out. abrawl and League of (one Voters of electionthe put monitoring together by groups andactivists), then the from conflict activists some with instigated provocateurs excesses.”The or provocations were quoted as saying they arrived to “control the eventso that there won’tbe any a indicate that group reports 50provocateursof “Kazakhs andsome inwhoaround papakhas” unsanctionedin protest Revolution Square. Whilethe policedidnot put down, protestthe figures in previousthe led protests, afarleft faction of 300peoplearound in their own liberal participants than previous actions. Meanwhile, Sergei Udal’stvo, one of the key demonstration the attendance, less was more anddominated united by andmiddle-class center. city encompasses the that road heldhands formed and ahuman chain Moscow’s around Garden Ring—a 15.6km circular more, larger events in the nearfuture, this turned out to be the last event of its size. monitors. including putting and puttogether train volunteersserveover 20,000 to aselection planning of eventtheoppositionthis was preparingfor theMarch election,presidential giving “bad”or“very bad” rankingstoonein polling three visited. stations allegations offraud, detailed both online byvolunteer election monitors and OSCEmonitors Barry, Ellen. "After Election, Putin Faces Challenges to Legitimacy." “Zamikaya krug. Elder, Miriam. “Russians Protest Against Vladimir Putin By Forming Human Chain In Moscow Ioffe, Julia, “Upping the Ante.” http://ria.ru/infografika/20120203/555809005.html. On February On February (police26, 11,000-34,000 andorganizer estimates respectively) people On March 04, Putin was once again elected president. This was accompanied by 221 Although the atmosphere at this demonstration theatmospherewas optimistic Although and promised atthisdemonstration Lenta, Lenta, February 2012.26. http://lenta.ru/articles/2012/02/26/ring/ Foreign Policy Foreign

222 While this demonstration did have a e high level of . February 5, 2012. 223 59

New York Times, 220 224 March 25, 2012. Parallel to the the to Parallel On March 05, CEU eTD Collection 227 226 225 Facebook on registered Although police granted apermitfor 50,000demonstrators, although only 6500 around broken. allegedly whose arm was activist including one brutality, accusations of police were There Udal’stov. been appliedatprevious protests,arrested an estimated 250people, including Navalnyand the square. Special police forces (OMON) moved in and, with a degree of force that had not aroundbut 500more activists, including Navalnyand remained, Udal’stov, leave refusing to sweeping up trash around the attendees’ feet. Gradually, the majority of the crowd dispersed, was approved to last until which 20:00, at workers entered point crowdandthe began peacefully and was from various by accompanied leaders. opposition speeches Themeeting attendFacebook. hadregistered toon under 10,000 protesters 23,000 around showed up protestto Pushkin Squareto theelections 228 place, revolutions took to where appliedintended Putin strategies the colored regime P A 4.4 H R G R I L D disappointment. a was this that point the to changed had things event, significant a been have seemed while several torecognizeparticipants that, protesters beforemonths 20,000 would although generalthe mood was markedly less festive thanthe previous events and protest against Putin. The demonstration was non-violent, and met with minimal arrests, "Mitinga 5 marta: khronika." http://www.facebook.com/events/382708068424764/ http://ria.ru/infografika/20120306/585313251.html http://www.facebook.com/events/388283827867165/?notif_t=event_invite On March 10thefinal large protest of 2011-2012the campaign place.cycle took Disturbed by and increasein the wary activities oppositional of of fate the countries 227

228 and actually only 20,000 around New Arbat on gathered Street to Lenta

03 05 2012. http://lenta.ru/chronicles/thedayafter. 60

226 The demonstration started out out started demonstration The 225 after just CEU eTD Collection http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/13/russia-police-beat-detained-protesters. 230 violence-arrests-moscow. moscow." 229 being detained. being forcewhile reports of they beaten protesters andthere were process, used adegreeof police arrestedhundreds of alongdemonstrators with several leaders.key opposition In this to some degree. eventhat when not employed in wayspronounced this strategy is effective andstill employed reaction. However, I will now describe the instances of coercion that did occur to illustrate force in obvious way. Itfor this reason that coercion did not figure heavily in the state discussed previously, regimes that claim to be democratic to use outright force cannotuse incidences of coercion, primarily in putting down unsanctioned protests. However, as Role ofCoercion4.4.1 introduced. political were technology from where strategiesframework coercion, previous of the the chapters and channeling oppositional activity from taking place. These reactions can be examined using the minimize the effects of protest, curb dissent and preventmore threatening forms of included protests—which policeevents—the all use did interfere largest not the or coercion in wearing ribbons, especially harassing people regions. white the excessive use of force in detentions, denying arrestees food and water, and instances of following protests presidential unsanctioned the Theseaccusations included election. “Russia: Police Beat, Detained Protesters,” Elder, Miriam. "http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/05/russia-election-violence-arrests- At the first spat of sizable unsanctioned rallies after the parliamentary elections, the the elections, parliamentary the after rallies spat ofsizableunsanctioned first At the The responseincreased of protestto didPutin’s regime mobilized include some Guardian 229 , December, 5,2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/05/russia-election- Similar accusations emerged in relation to the police’s handling of of handling police’s the to in relation emerged accusations Similar

Human Rights Watch, 61

March 13,2012. 230 With sanctioned sanctioned With CEU eTD Collection rights-defenders. 234 233 Watch 2011. 232 http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/06/russia-respect-right-peaceful-protest 231 applying pressurevaries by organization. There are reports of coercionoutright hinted or includes employees of state agencies, teachers and students on stipends. The exact style of (peoplefinancially dependent on in state the some way)attendinginto protests. counter This peoplemobilizing attend fallskey into pro-regimegenerally to demonstrations two strategies: Putin, it appears that many were either pressured or paid toparticipate. The process of actively supporting Putin and regime. the Whilesome were attendees genuine supporters of counter protests. Generally, these fell into twocategories: anti-Orange protests and rallies 4.5 C P cycle. election place this during to any extent,. significant over recent years, recent over mediacontrolled harassedtheindependent monitoringelection GOLOS. group state- the authorities and protests, to in of coercion responding instances to isolated observed globally and sought tomaintain the appearance of a democratic regime. In addition interpreted ascoercion. interpreted maybe which media outlets independent GOLOS andvirtually on all DOS attacks also coercive elements in some of the information war strategies (discussed below), such as Lokshina, Tanya. “"Russia: Expert Testimony on the Situation forHuman Rights Ibid Defenders" “Russia: Stop Harassing Election Monitors, Release Demonstrators.” “Russia: Protests Go onPeacefully.”

http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/05/russia-stop-harassing-election-monitors-release-demonstrators , January 26, 2012 First, is the use of administrative resources and pressure to push so-called arrange was to tothe responses oppositional protests One key of the government While there has been a degree of harassment and coercion of oppositional activists activists andof oppositional coercion harassment a degree of been has While there 234 the authorities mostly avoided coercive responses to the protest that took protestthe that mostly to responses theauthorities coercive avoided . “http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/26/russia-expert-testimony-situation-human- 233 231

perhaps because the regime realized these events would be events these realized regime the perhaps because

Human Rights Watch, 62

December6, 2011. Human Rights Watch,

232 December 5, December Human Rights There were There were budzhetniki

CEU eTD Collection years old, from smaller cities around Moscow. Some attendees were quoted as saying that cities and camped outin fairground.a According activists toreports, wereprimarily 18-19 5000 again daystwo later.Itwaswidely thatreported activists werebussedin from other counter protests with 15,000peoplearound on December 4,2011andthen drawing around http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2012/02/120224_putin_rally_internet.shtml 237 236 235 to meet and whom to contact, the amount participants will be paid, and how long it will take. such as massovki.ru. Here organizers indicate location and time of the demonstration, where helped support. to providedby theyhave andbreaks treatmenttax compensated through regime preferential the each participant. on was spent case of February the 23 pro-Kremlin demonstration, 22,000rublescounter around (~$725) endeavor. Although reliable figures are hard to come by,it has been estimated that, in the bussed in,fed, and given a free time and an excursion around the city. This is a costly butoccurs more often isparticipation merely with andfacilitated, encouraged being attendees allegedly largecame from lessthan200km organizations Again,from Moscow. coercion regime. In the case of the largest pro-regime demonstrations, the majority of the participants providing and food. transport beingthreats used, butmore commonly ismerelyattendance andencouraged made easy by 10,000-12,000 rubles10,000-12,000 (~$330-400). to media, and distributingmaterials insupport of the regime arebelieved tohave received Bulin, Dmitry. "Runet obsuzhdaet, kto oplachival miting za Putina" Ibid “Ekhstrennoe byuro Puin ico.” http://echo.msk.ru/blog/k_borovoi/861787-echo/ 0223 2012 After the opposition protests began, protests After the opposition the to sympathetic businesses private or companies owned state through is Second, 237 One of the methods for gathering participants is through ads on websites websites on ads is through participants gathering for methods the of One

235 So-called agitators, active suchasspeaking who roles took So-called agitators, 236 The expenses businesses incurarebelievedbe to Nashi 63

was the quickest to mobilize, arrangingquickest to was the BBC Russia, February 24, 2012. CEU eTD Collection http://kommersant.ru/doc/1866809 02 06 2012 used extensively inmobilizingwith many event, the transported to participants sitethe on had sameday. Sakharov takenplace Prospect the that on tothisthan more oppositional protest significantly the coverage protest dedicated State-media 244 02 04 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/europe/tens-of-thousands-protest-putin-in-moscow-russia.html?_r=1 243 242 http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1483343.html 241 240 rally.html?_r=1&ref=world 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/world/europe/attendance-is-light-at-united-russia- governmentwhowere instigating acolored revolution would that bedisastrous for Russia. inflated. Poklonnaya Hillin Moscow.Police estimated attendance at138,000, although wasthis likely Moscow. in place took that demonstration revolution “anti-Orange” police,independent 500according to radiostation Echo people of Moscow) an gatheredfor universities andschools and pressured students rallies. the toattend to bring people out, with some participants reporting that classes had been cancelled at their less. Russia. Police estimated the crowd at 25,000, although eyewitnesses claimed it was much 239 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2101741,00.html?xid=gonewsedit 238 McDonalds. and Moscow freemeals they afree mainly hadat to were offered they because trip come Borodina, Arina. "Bolotnaya--ne Poklonnaya, i naborot." i naborot." Poklonnaya, "Bolotnaya--ne Arina. Borodina, Barry, Ellen. "In Biting Cold, Protesters Pack the Center of Moscow." http://www.ria.ru/infografika/20120203/555840256.html "V Mockve prokhodit 'antioranzhevy Regunum,miting'" December24, 2011 Ibid Schirtz, Michael. "Few at Putin Party’s Rally, and Even FewerWillingly." Shuster, Simon "The Empire Strikes Back: Putin Sends in the Storm Troopers." 239 Press interviews with attendees suggested interviews hadbeen administrative that Presssuggested attendees resources with used By February a 4, 2012, much larger anti-Orange demonstration was organized at These actions continued andonDecember 24,several thousand (8000according to The nextbig place counter-demonstration took onDecember 12in of support United 242 Speakersdenounced oppositional as tools of protesters Unitedthe States 238

Kommersat 244 Administrative resources were resources Administrative , February 6, 2012. New York Times 240 241 Time

, December7, 2011. , December 13, , December 243

CEU eTD Collection 2012.http://kommersant.ru/doc/1879337 248 247 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc-rss/1864540 02 03 2012 environment that is relatively free from state control and influence. As such, one of the main in informational has internet an resulted rise the of the television, newsfrom get their the environmentby focusing primarily on television. We have seen whilethat most Russians still forsupporttoward thegovernment. Putin’shas governmentcontrol sought information tothe of the key ways that hybrid regimes seek to channel support away from opposition and Channeling MediaCoverage and 4.5.1 victory into square,wherePutin speech delivered the ateary followed with theirsigns for of processions organizers organization particular participants celebrate Putin’s victory in election.the Dozens ofbusesfilled the surrounding and streets, On March 04, tens of thousands of pro-Putin demonstrators arrived to Manezhnaya Square to privateattendance companies.this wasorganizedprimary andthat demonstration, through 246 245 speech by at LuzhnikiPutin stadium. Fatherland holiday on February 23, gathering around 120,000people and with culminating a allegedly told they would fired if seen at opposition rallies. were as RosNeft such of companies employees Meanwhile, intoattending. were coerced governmental institutions, such as the Russian Postal Service and United Energy Company, arrive meeting, the to at expected were 12% of employees least pressured One leaked toattend. documentfrom Russian Pension the Fund at showedthat buses,agencies and companiesowned of were private and employees government state Kozenko, Andrei. "Glasny den' kalendarya." "Putinvystipil na v mitinge 'Luzhnikax." February 2012.23, http://lenta.ru/news/2012/02/23/putin/ Kozenko, Andrei. "Grazhdan sklonyayut k Poklonnoi. k sklonyayut "Grazhdan Andrei. Kozenko, Adaganev,Rustem, http://drugoi.livejournal.com/3691948.html As discussedin Chapter 2,control of information the andmedia is environment one Likely the largest pro-Putin rally took place on the national Defender of the

247 It was reported that there were fewer there were that was reported It Kommersant, 65 Kommersant

February 24, , February 3, 2012. 246

245 while employees of other budzhetniki at 248

CEU eTD Collection 252 251 in Moscow and Petersburg. “What protests?” she asked. “I think Iheard something, but I a wentto gethaircut, andaskedshe thehairdresser thought what of protests the taking place television vs.internet faultline continued toexist. For instance,in inIrkutsk mid-December I much greater degree than before, pro-Kremlin activities still received more airtime, and the blacklisted from state television, were allowed to appear on shows with a talk showformat. been traditionally have who Nemtsov, Boris as such figures, opposition moderate more the of stations continued tocover them in this manner. One other positive development is that some 250 now.html?pagewanted=2 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/arts/television/putins-rivals-in-russia-gain-a-place-on-the-air-for- 249 they believed hadthere beenelectoral fraud. demonstrators’the complaints anddemands were addressed only extentthe to of saying that state-controlled television stations. The coverage was dry butmore or less objective, although up after the December 10 opposition demonstration, which was covered on all three major rallies. exclusively topro-government dedicating their almost coverage unsanctioned following protests parliamentary the elections, with state television channels provided virtually nocoverage of oppositional activities. This continuedinitial through the opposition movements opened up to alimited degree. channeling efforts primarily on television, but at the same time television coverage of the theregimefocus its protests, election to information continued cycle and accompanying fromnews television andwho those getnews from internet.the During the 2011-2012 linesfault in Russian politicallies culture betweenthe portion of publicthe whoget their Alexandra Stanley, “On Russian TV…” TV…” Russian “On Stanley, Alexandra Alexandra Stanley, “”On Russian Tv, It Isn’t All About The Strongman.” BBC Monitoring, BBC Monitoring Whilemain the television stations didbegin coverage to the opposition to a protests Until the major protests in early December, the state controlled television stations , December7, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16067899 December10, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16128473

251 66 As the protests continued, the main television

249

New York Times 250 This began to ease , February 14, 252

CEU eTD Collection all hison blog. There was little that was controversial in the emails, and Navalny responded by posting them not, or emailinternet. days Navalny’sten wasleakedonto the later correspondence private paying established bloggers topoststories maligning Navalny’sreputation. 254 http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/48964.html 253 Belkovsky, hinted which that Navalny might be receiving money from him.While Navalny included finding someone like wholooks Navalny and taking According to the article, strategies that United Russian officials had discussed with the firm 10,000,000 rubleswith contract a PRfirm conducta to black PRcampaign against Navalny. black PRwaswidespread. informationinvolving wars andblack PRwereused throughout electionthe cycle. Usageof 4.6.1 I BPR W oppositional activity. 2011-2012 election cycle in pursuitof electoral victory andin increasedresponse to outline some of specific in instances the was used during political the which technology political technology, but at the same time this was not used very effectively. This section will 4.6 UseofPolitical Technology in the Regime’s Response on every television evening. she listened radio, tothe including thenews, all work andday at watched the evening news don’t remember whatit was about.” I asked her if she followed the news, and she said that Navalny,Alesksei, http://navalny.livejournal.com/635635.html detektiv.” Politicheskii Naval'nogo. na . “Zakaz Irek Martazin, In October, an article in an article In October, In responding increased to oppositional activity, political technology strategies In formulating aresponse surgeinthe to Kremlinthe protest, heavily relied on 254 The emails did include correspondence with the exiled oligarch Stanislav

Novaya Gazeta 67 reported thatUnited Russiaa hadtaken out

Novaya Gazeta kompromat , October17, 2011. pictures of pictures of him and 253 By coincidence CEU eTD Collection “Sieg Heil.” depicted Navalny in a shirtreading“I am a fascist,” performing Hitler salutesand shouting russia.html 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/world/europe/smear-attempt-against-protest-leader-backfires-in- 259 12, 2012.Http://Www.Guardian.Co.Uk/World/2012/Jan/09/Russian-Navalny-Fake-Photo-Smear 258 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/leaks-target-nemtsov-before-rally/450256.html 257 256 Groups-Priorities Guardian 255 abodybuilder. Stalin, Hitler, boastfully posting the picture on his blog and then other users posting pictures of him with Arguments and Facts and by newspaper the People’sFront All-Russia produced coalition called a pro-Putin with Putin.” Thephotograph was quickly tobephotorevealed shopped and waslikely “ infeatured andthecaption Navalny somethat cities together standing Berezovsky and Boris andfigures, referring tothem “scaredas “hamsters” penguins.” phonereleased tapped conversations of Nemtsov Boris speaking poorly opposition other of showed that Nashi between in Asimilar leakedcorrespondence out came February, story when manufactured. were ones these that claimed he weregenuine, emails mostthe of that confirmed

"Alexei hasNavalny never hidden Boristhat Berezovsky himmoneygives for struggle the Kramer, Andrew “Smear In Russia Backfires, And Online Tributes Roll In.” Smear.” Photo Of Fake Target Is Navalny Alexei Leader Protest “Russian Tom, Parfitt, Rally,” Before Nemtsov Target , “Leaks Alexander Bratersky, Ibid Elder, Miriam, “Emails Give Insight Into Kremlin YouthGroup's Priorities, Means And Concerns.” In organizers andvarious bloggers,including several well-known opposition bloggers, In December, the state-owned television station Channel 1 showed a cartoon that In early January a photograph was leaked on internetandthe and printed distributed On the even of the December 24 protest, a website linked to the Kremlin, lifenews.ru, , February 7, 2012. Http://Www.Guardian.Co.Uk/World/2012/Feb/07/Nashi-Emails-Insight-Kremlin- 256 Nashi

was paying them writeto blog posts that were sympathetic to Putin. . 258 Thiswas aninstance 259

68 kompromat

Moscow Moscow Times, backfiring, with Navalny Navalny with backfiring, 257

New York Times December20, 2011. Guardian, , January 8, January January 255 The

CEU eTD Collection many of them Additionally,offline. social networks and feeds twitter used toorganize oppositional media outlet, along LiveJournal, with were subjected toDOSattacks took that during both parliamentary the and presidential elections, thewebsites virtuallyof every couldprotests putthem at risk for falling ill with pneumonia and infections.respiratory anti-governmentrallies. Russia’s chief sanitary inspector warned peopleattending that in information from bizarre was distributed sometimes order todiscouragepeople attending meetings?” at opposition doing consulate American of the workers are these shows footage of a man saying “I understand” don’t in German and asks the viewer, “what discredit pro-Putinthe for payingrallies people toparticipate.Meanwhile, documentary the pro-Putin rallies so that they can film them and put the videos on in internet in an attempt to Discourages-Attendance.Html December9, 2011. Http://Www.Nytimes.Com/2011/12/10/World/Europe/Russia-Allows-Rally-But- 262 besmirching-protesters-stirs-outrage.html?pagewanted=all Reaction.” 261 260 of paying Kenyan students, “ areaccused organizers Opposition much more.” get class creative the of representatives the filled with cookies. “Bums 300 get rubles,” says theannouncer, “while look people wholike acrowd abox withfighting over of image of people juxtaposed an “money cookies,” and of oppositional organizers paying people in participate demonstrations in exchange for the opposition and turn them around on the opposition. Thus, a dramatic voice-over informs NTV. wasairedon that Protest” calledof sense a “Anatomy of word) loosest the was adocumentary (in the movement Schwirtz, Michael, “Russia Allows Protest, But Tries To Discourage Attendance.” Attendance.” ToDiscourage But Tries Protest, Allows “Russia Michael, Schwirtz, Barry, Ellen & Schwirtz, Michael, “Russian Tv Broadcast Besmirching Protesters http://www.ntv.ru/video/peredacha/296996/ Draws A Furious Internet attacks—which have elements of coercion—were also common. Before and In addition to the above smear campaigns and use of One of mostthe incredible instances of black PRbeing usedin response tothe protest New York Times , March 24,2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/world/europe/russian-show- gasterbaiters

260 The film attempts to take on the rhetoric and allegations of of andallegations rhetoric onthe totake film attempts The from Uzbekistan” and “bums with signs” to attend attend to signs” with “bums and Uzbekistan” from 69

kompromat New York Times , avariety of 261

, 262

CEU eTD Collection 267 http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120221/171440562.html 266 support.html?pagewanted=all 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/world/europe/in-russia-vote-fear-of-hardship-fuels-putin- 265 264 http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-16108876 Russia’s domestic politics. In this vain, Putin accused Hilary Clinton of sowing protest in narrative devices, including hyped upaccounts of American interventionism interferingin narrative. no with overarching employed werehaphazardly themes two extremes: stability vs. chaos and status quo vs. disastrous revolution. discussed in Chapter 2in an attempt to polarize the public’s perception of available options to opposition. 263 fear of 1990s the Thus, already main used before. wererunningthe devices narrative Russian on the public’s low on 4.6.2 T U D directions to pro-Putin rallies. falsedistribute information whereabout an oppositional would be,rally sometimes providing by out andhijacked bots. computers opposition rallies were flood with spam and pro-government information that was likely sent Wilson, “Putin Returns.” Bennetts, Mark, "Russia‘Faces Orange Revolution Threat’ AfterPolls." Schwirtz, Michael, "Fear of Return to '90s Hardship Fueld Support forPutin." Wilson, “Putin Returns.” “Russian Twitter political protests 'swamped by spam'.” Wilson has characterized this as a “grab bag campaign” in which a variety in avariety bagrecycled as a“grab this which characterized campaign” Wilson has dramaturgiia Unlike Russian previous 2011-2012 the elections, election cycle wasunprecedentedly 266 Both of these narratives utilized elements of of the elements utilized of Both narratives these 265 and the supposed threat of a colored revolution that was posed by the . 264 Putin’s campaign relied heavily on the same tropes and drama he had

263 Ialso observed that in some cases this spam would 70

BBC News, December9, 2011. zeleniye vorota Ria Novosti 267 New York Times In addition to the above , February 21, 2012. strategy , March 3, CEU eTD Collection 271 270 269 Among hundredsof videos documenting these alleged fraud, included apolling station that instances of Numerous fraud by alleged activists weredocumented volunteer andvoters. groups drove of people city cast aroundthe ballots atto multiple polling stations. in voting,” which buses “carousel was so-called in widely election used parliamentary the and tampering with ballots in poorly pollingguarded stations. fraud was perpetrated in a variety of ways. On the crudest level,it consisted of ballotstuffing electoral widespread fraud in both parliamentary the protests. oppositional numerous forms throughout the entire electoral cycle and consistently in reaction to during electoral heavily 2011-2012 onadministrativein the procedures cycle. This came 4.6.3 A R dramaturgiia 2012http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/03/05/russia-election-violations-idINDEE82408120120305 273 criticized-by-west.html?_r=2 December5, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/world/europe/russian-parliamentary-elections- 272 12/8/2011 268 tokeeptheirorder attention. newer andbiggermore and frightening drama with higher stakes needs be into produced Arab Spring. Russia and attempting toinspire a revolution along the lines of the colored revolutions or

http://www.golos.org/asset/5606 http://www.golos.org/asset/5223 Wilson, “Putin Returns.” Grove, Thomas, "Russia's Election 'Carousel'--a Tale of Alleged Fraud." Fraud." ofAlleged Tale 'Carousel'--a Election "Russia's Thomas, Grove, Schwirtz, Michael, “Voters Watch Polls In Russia, And Fraud Is What They See.” Elder, Miriam “ The most egregious abuses of administrative resources were used to perpetrate egregious abuses wereusedtoperpetrate resources The most of administrative Putin’s relied regime andmanage electoral protest, In order success to produce One issue with with issue One http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/08/vladimir-putin-hillary-clinton-russia?intcmp=239 268 .

Vladimir PutinAccuses Hillary ClintonOf Encouraging RussianProtests.” dramaturgiia 269

In election,this Putin’s campaign failed producenew to is that with time voters grow inured to it, and as such 71

270 and presidential elections. 272 Reuters Another strategy that was that Anotherstrategy , March5, New York Times Guardian 273 271

This , ,

CEU eTD Collection to be especially high in Caucasus. the rescheduled during timestheprotests at Bolotnaya Squarewas scheduled. December 10, for instance, students in Moscow schools were required to come toclasses On theoppositional theregime’sto protests. response ways they other that were applied to were there However, resources. from administrative support mobilizedextensive with were in formulating aresponseto oppositionalthe As protests. outlined above, pro-regime protests Russia andPutin. governmental employees and employees of businesses vote state-owned to in of favor United and the accompanying protests, cameras were installed in polling stations across the country. in all stationspolling after widespreadthe allegations fraud of in parliamentary the elections observers. instances were also of andpressuring threatening station election polling employees forinstance, registered 99.76% of votes being cast for Putin with a 94.89% turnout. 283 http://www.rferl.org/content/election_observers_claim_fraud_intimidation_in_russian_vote/24504685.html March 4,2012. 282 Gazeta 281 280 chechnya.html 5, 2012.http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/europe/fraudulent-votes-for-putin-abound-in- 279 278 277 276 275 274 ballots, was withproviding voters pens with erasable ink, http://img.lenta.ru/news/2011/12/09/anotherbrick/pic.jpg Balmforth, Tom “Election Observers Claim Fraud, IntimidationIn Russian Vote.“ "VPodmoskov'e nablyudatelyu ugrozhala, chtoby pokinulon uchastok, a zatel podozhgli ego kvartiru." http://ria.ru/vybor2012_hod_vyborov/20120304/584254067.html Kramer, Andrew. "At Chechnya Polling Station, Votes for Putin Exceed the Rolls." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hLs8kv3u1hw&feature=player_embedded New York Times, March http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=xsilxis5oJw http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=KTbdeyfXeGE http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Hw-5y9fy4zU http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=ezEFUGcdShE#! , March, 4,2012. http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2012/03/04/n_2228529.shtml 275 Besides applying administrative resources to pad the election results, they were used wereused crude electoral In addition resources to pressure fraud,to administrative casting ballots, 281 The authorities did addressthis issuetosome extentby installing webcameras 282

276 insecureballot boxes

279 The results of the presidential election in Chechnya, 72

274 277 polling station employees altering and carousel voting. Radio Free Europe Free Radio 278 283 Fraudappeared Additionally, 280 There There , CEU eTD Collection 284 people from participating in oppositional protests. pad both to electoral victory inand also attempts tomobilizeprotests and counter discourage were employed extensively, resources samethe time, administrative narrative. At electoral technology. of political playbook the from strategies short-term heavily on regimerelied the however, that is complementary to the regime, helped keep a lid on the situation. At the same time, yearssuch pursued ago, mobilizational the benefits of technology and, to a lesser extent, coercion. Long-term channelling strategies that were inandmobilized dissent protest a variety reliedof political ways that channelling, on level andof mobilizeddissent oppositional The regimeactivity. responded to this increased During election 2011-2012 and the Russiafacedanunprecedented cycle Putin United 4.7Conclusion men dodgingatprotests. draft the werecirculatedrumors by anonymous publicofficials thatthepolice would for search young Schwirtz, Michael, “Russia Allows Protest…” Dramaturgiia was used less in this election than in the past, leaving a vacuum in

284

Nashi and skewed television coverage CEU eTD Collection authoritarianism—in order to maintain control. Instead, Putin relied more on a combination of hallmark coercion—a to outright need toresort not did ageneral regimerule the as popular, as in the cancellation of gubernatorial elections in the aftermath of Beslan. That said, strikingly authoritarian reforms were implemented precisely when he was at his most in factsome most hislegitimacy.Hedid, and of to Putin’s challenges of absence credible authoritarianism.is That not tosay Putin that did notdabble in authoritarianism evenin the resortingcoercion political or control tooutrightand ensureregime survivalwithout maintain and enough mandateto basicobserve democraticobtain still strong procedures successful regimethe points, has enjoyed enoughgenuinepopularit support was able that to democracy and authoritarianism is at the heart of Putin’s hybrid regime. Atits most democratic environment. the controlling simultaneously while beademocratic country to appearing between balance fragile the maintain to struggled recently has government Putin’s the that shown mobilization andaccompanied protests that popular 2011-2012electionthe havecycle, I how in tothesuddenincrease regimeassessing the oppositional dissent, responded channeling andpolitical technology.in Finally, using these categories as fora prism demonstrate how the regime’s response relies on a constantly changing mixture of coercion, informs their decisions andstrategies for handlingdissentand I protest. have also tried to based ontheexample challenges Orange these the anddangers—especially of Revolution— hybrid light toshedposes onhow of to and attempted Russianelite’s recognition the regimes regimes. Additionally, Ihave discussed the specific challenges that mobilized popular protest 5. CONCLUSION Maintaining thisfragile balance and successfully walking thefine line between In this thesis Ihave exploredrole what dissentandmobilized play protest in hybrid 74

CEU eTD Collection 286 Guardian 287 285 forhard asecondMedvedev term and hassuggested thatSurkov agreed with him after departure in parliamentary the wasfiredforelections December. Pavlovksy pushingtoo of departures the of Gleb inPavlovsky April and Surkov’s Vladislav 2011 temporary key mistakes during this campaign season. mixed with a lack of electoral drama were, as Andrew Wilson points out, was one of Putin’s narrative thatwould somehowhelp justify to hisThe lack return. ofjustification for his return he to couldFailing that, resorted have courting popular by opinion making popular policy thatmadedecisions a palpable difference. through be would version ideal democratically most The ways. of in avariety this done adequately explained why he needed for toreturn athird presidential Hecouldterm. have and one of the main catalysts for the surge in oppositional activity was that Putin never his increased adequately expectations. Indeed,failed torespond one these of keymistakes to their standard of living rises and basic needs are satisfied is nothing new. However, Putin has classes thatare protesting againsthim. Thetendency of public’sthe toriseexpectations as “creative” middle very and the liberal created which prosperity, increasedeconomic with with isPutin in many a ways product hisof own success. decline. As Brian Whitmore and Kiril Kobrin have pointed out, increasing dissatisfaction strategies out of political technology. Until recently, this combination was sufficient. more short-term to regime tovote, the resorted enough voters engage apathetic to was needed opposition support forand toward theregime.was not When enough that additional or drama long-termof channeling strategies siphon to publicthe away from potentially supporting Wilson, “Putin Returns…” Hearst, David & Elder, Miriam, “How Dmitry Medvedev's Mentor Turned Him Into A Lame Duck.” In Whitmore, Brian and Koburn, Kiril. Recently,however, popular support for Putin and United Russia appears to be in , March, 02, 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/02/dmitry-medvedev-rivalry

Power Vertical Podcast dramaturgiia 286 These failures may have been partially a result 75

and political technology andto drum political up a technology , December12/06/2012 285 His first two terms coincided coincided terms two first His 287 and may may and The The CEU eTD Collection 288 his lefthaveon accord own http://www.izvestia.ru/news/510564 290 289 FreeRadio Europe devours its own children.” must, as the saying goes, modernize or die, although as Surkov once said, “stabilization channeling and short-term use of political technology, all guarantees are off. The regime tackle the serious issues by raised failing opposition the or, update that, its repertoire of less However,ifworked. Putin’sthe noteither regime does pursuepopular policies and still weak anddivided enough,and statestill the and strong popular enough, this that more or isThe very victory manage dissent. electoral opposition and attempt—not effectively—to secure heavy to administrative narrative on opposition’s and resources to resorting reliance address and failed most to election the recentPutin’scrooks campaign Inthis thieves.” same time, the opposition has advanced its own narrative of United Russia as the “party of support for weavemaintain asufficiently together recognized needto the to narrative public powerful being called a political technologist) left without people on staff who were able to or loss its of twokey political technologists Surkovwould (although certainly approvenot of Whitmore, Brian, “The End of the Surkov Era: The System Eats Its Architect.” On "Vladislav Surkov: 'Sistema uzhe izmenilas'.'" Wilson, “Putin Returns…”

а regimeis that still on running Russianpublic’sthe fear of 1990s.Atthe the , December28, 2011. 290 288

and takingmost ofhis team along with him. Izvestia, 76

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