JOURNAL AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE

ROYAL SOCIETY O F NEW SOUTH WALES

Volume 139 Parts 1 and 2 (Nos 419–420)

2006

ISSN 0035-9173

PUBLISHED BY THE SOCIETY BUILDING H47 UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, NSW 2006 Issued September 2006 THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF NEW SOUTH WALES

OFFICE BEARERS FOR 2006-2007

Patrons His Excellency, Major General Michael Jeffery AC, CVO, MC Governor General of the Commonwealth of Australia. Her Excellency Professor Marie Bashir, AC, Governor of New South Wales. President Prof. J. Kelly, BSc Syd, PhD Reading, DSc NSW, FAIP, FInstP Vice Presidents Mr D.A. Craddock, BSc (Eng) NSW, Grad. Cert. Management UWS. Mr J.R. Hardie, BSc Syd, FGS, MACE. Mr C.M. Wilmot two vacancies Hon. Secretary (Gen.) Dr E. Baker PhD ANU, MSc USyd, BSc (Hons), GradDipEd (Distinction UTS), AMusA, MRACI, CChem. Hon. Secretary (Ed.) Prof. P.A. Williams, BA (Hons), PhD Macq. Hon. Treasurer Ms M. Haire Hon. Librarian Ms C. van der Leeuw Councillors Mr A.J. Buttenshaw Mr J. Franklin Prof. H. Hora Dr M. Lake, PhD Syd Ms Jill Rowling BE UTS, MSc Syd A/Prof. W.A. Sewell, MB, BS, BSc Syd, PhD Melb FRCPA Ms R. Stutchbury Southern Highlands Rep. vacant

The Society originated in the year 1821 as the Philosophical Society of Australasia. Its main function is the promotion of Science by: publishing results of scientific investigations in its Journal and Proceedings; conducting monthly meetings; organising summer science schools for senior secondary school students; awarding prizes and medals; and by liason with other scientific societies. Special meetings are held for: the Pollock Memorial Lecture in Physics and Mathematics, the Liversidge Research Lecture in Chemistry, the Clarke Memorial Lecture in Geology, Zoology and Botany, and the Poggendorf Lecture in Agricultural Science.

Membership, as an Ordinary, Associate or Absentee Member, is open to any person whose application is acceptable to the Society. An application must be supported by two members of the Society. Subscriptions for the Journal only are accepted. The Society welcomes, from members and non-members, manuscripts of research and review articles in all branches of science, art, literature and philosophy for publication in the Journal and Proceedings.

ISSN 0035-9173

Copyright The Royal Society of New South Wales does not require authors to transfer their copyright. Authors are free to re-use their paper in any of their future printed work and can post a copy of the published paper on their own web site. Enquiries relating to copyright or reproduction of an article should be directed to the author. Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 1–7, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/01001–7 $4.00/1 A Modified Approach to an Analytical Solution of a Diffusion Model for a Biotechnological Process

t. pencheva*, i. hristozov* and a.g. shannon †

Abstract: Biotechnological processes are objects with distributed parameters characterized by a complicated structure of organization and interdependent characteristics. Partial dif- ferential equations are used for their behavioural description with modelling in relation to diffusion phenomena considered in this paper. Furthermore, an application of the theory of partial differential equations to obtain a direct analytical solution of the model is considered. This is in contrast with less direct approaches in the literature. The behaviour of the model developed here accords well with real phenomena.

Keywords: Continuous Biotechnological Processes, Distributed Parameters Objects, Partial Differential Equations.

INTRODUCTION

Biotechnological processes (BTP) are characterized by complicated reactions and interdependent characteristics which lead to complicated mathematical descriptions. In order to develop a more complete and precise model, space distribution of the process variables can be considered and included in the model. This determines the behavioural description of BTP as objects with dis- tributed parameters (ODP), using partial differential equations (PDE) or systems of PDEs. The processes in general have wide application in biology and medicine, for instance, in determining erythrocyte sedimentation rates (Reuben and Shannon 1990). The modelling of BTP as ODP has not been widely studied. In most studies the authors have chosen some method, for example finite differences or orthogonal collocation, to represent the PDE with a finite number of ordinary differential equations. Bourrel et al. (1998) have merely considered the processes in steady-state. Babary et al. (1993) and Julien et al. (1995) have applied the orthogonal collocation method. Dochain et al. (1997) and Jacob, Pingaud et al. (1996) have exploited the methods of both finite differences and orthogonal collocation. Jacob, Lann et al. (1996) have also applied the method of lines and the orthogonal collocation method. The PDE have been approximated by a system of ordinary differential equations in all these studies. To overcome the approximation errors in such approaches one possible way is to use the PDE directly. Hence an elaboration of some new methods and approaches for the description and control of biotechnological process is appropriate. The twofold aim of this paper is both to model substrate space distribution for a specific class of biotechnological processes, and to obtain an analytical solution of the PDE in the model.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A class of fixed bed biotechnological processes is considered wherein the active biomass is kept within the vessel, while the substrate and product flow through it (Babary et al. 1990, 1993). This type of bioreactor is called a biofilter (Figure 1). The problem is to describe the process as an object with distributed parameters and thus to obtain a model of a specific class of BTP. 2 PENCHEVA et al.

WASTEWATER

B IO M A S S

F IX E D B E D

AIR WASHING CLEAN WATER

SLUDGE WASHING OUTLET

Figure 1: A fixed bed bioreactor

The non-uniformly distributed media elements on the apparatus cross-section, as well as the presence of turbulent diffusion, are expressed as follows (Schmalzriedt et al. 1995):

∂c 1 ∂ ∂ 1 ∂ ∂c ∂ ∂c + (rurc)+ (uzc)= Deff r + Deff + ∂t r ∂r ∂z r ∂r  ∂r  ∂z  ∂z  (1) + reaction + mass transfer gas/liquid where c is a differentiable function to describe concentration; r, z are radial and axial co-ordinates, respectively; Deff is the turbulent diffusion coefficient, and ur, uz are radial and axial components of the rate vector. In fact Equation 1 represents the equation for the material balance of the concentration. The material balance of the substrate S can be considered in the following two cases:

when the diffusion of substrate S is regarded as negligible, and • when the diffusion of S is accounted for in the axial direction. • The first case when diffusion of the substrate S is regarded as negligible has been presented previously (Pencheva et al. 2003; Pencheva 2003). In this paper, the latter, more complicated, case is discussed.

MODELLING OF THE SUBSTRATE

When the space distribution of the substrate S is considered at this stage, the diffusion in one direction, (for example, axial), is given, while the variables do not change in the other direction (Babary et al. 1990, 1993). According to Babary et al. (1990, 1993), the turbulent diffusion coefficient Deff is considered to be a constant and the mass transfer from a gas to a liquid phase is not examined. As was demonstrated in Pencheva et al. (2003) based on (Babary et al. 1990, 1993), the axial component of the rate vector uz can be expressed as: F u = (2) z B where F is the flow rate, constant in the considered direction, via the bioreactor cross-section B. The reaction in the system when the substrate S is modelled is presented as follows (Farlow 1982):

reaction = kµ(S)X (3) − where X is a differentiable function to describe the biomass concentration [g/l], µ(S) is a specific growth rate of the biomass, and k is a yield coefficient. This relation describes the biochemical ANALYTICAL SOLUTION OF A DIFFUSION MODEL 3 mechanism in the system, expressed as the substrate decrement due to biomass accumulation in the culture medium. When the biomass X is modelled, the reaction of the system can be presented as follows:

reaction = (µ (S) k ) X (4) − d

−1 where kd is a death coefficient of the biomass, [h ]. The kinetics for the specific growth rate of the biomass are assumed to be: S µ(S)= µmax (5) kS + S

−1 where µmax is the maximum value of µ(S) [h ], and kS is a saturation constant [g/l]. Thus, on the basis of Equations 1–3 and Equation 5, the following parabolic model is obtained for the substrate space distribution, when the diffusion phenomena are considered:

∂S ∂2S F ∂S S = Deff 2 kµmax X (6) ∂t ∂z − B ∂z − ks + S

The other basic biochemical variable when modelling BTP is the concentration of biomass. Due to the fixed bed reactor, the cell biomass is uniformly distributed in the cultural medium. Therefore, the variation of biomass will be examined in relation to time only:

dX S = µmax kd X 0 z H (7) dt  ks + S −  ≤ ≤

Hence, Equations 6 and 7 constitute the mathematical model which describes the BTP in a biofilter as an ODP when the diffusion phenomena are taken into account. When BTP are described as an ODP, the initial conditions should be specified and in this case they can be given as follows: −z2/b S(z, 0) = S0e and X(0) = X0 (8)

where S0 and X0 are the initial concentrations and b is a constant. The families of curves, which represent the numerical solution of the model in Equations 6–7 by the method of lines are given in Figures 2 and 3 for the substrate and biomass, respectively. The results indicate that the model described by Equations 6 and 7 predicts behaviour similar to a real biotechnological process.

SOLUTION OF THE MODEL

There are two fundamental approaches when BTP are examined as an ODP: in the first one, the PDE, which describe the mathematical model of the processes, are approximated by ordinary differential equations. Most authors have chosen some method, for example, finite differences or orthogonal collocation, to represent the PDE with a finite number of ordinary differential equations (Babary et al. 1990, 1993; Dochain et al. 1997; Jacob, Pingaud et al. 1996; Jacob, Lann et al. 1996; Julien et al. 1995). In this way BTP are presented in a standard form and conventional control theory can be applied. However, the application of this approach leads to the introduction of approximation errors. Other authors (Balakrishnan 1976; Pencheva 2003) have applied the theory of semi-group linear restricted operators, but in this paper the theory of PDE is used directly. 4 PENCHEVA et al.

S u b stra te

S , [g /l] 3

2 .5

2

1 .5

1

0 .5

0 0 0 5 0 .2 1 0 1 5 0 .4 2 0 T im e [h ] 2 5 0 .6 L e v e l [m ]

Figure 2: Numerical solution of space distribution of substrate concentration

B io m a ss

X , [g /l] 2

1 .5

1

0 .5

0 0 0 5 0 .2 1 0 1 5 0 .4 2 0 T im e [h ] 2 5 0 .6 L e v e l [ m ]

Figure 3: Numerical solution of space distribution of biomass concentration

Equation 6, which describes the concentration of the substrate S, is in fact a non-homogeneous non-linear equation of convective diffusion. So to obtain an analytical solution of this equation a new modified approach, based on existing methods, has to be developed. This approach is based on a transformation of the equation for convective diffusion into the simpler equation for heat conductivity. This modified approach consists of the following steps (Pencheva 2003): Step 1. According to the theory of PDE, in order to obtain a solution of a given non-homogeneous equation, one first needs the corresponding homogeneous equation to be considered under non- homogeneous initial conditions. Step 2. For a solution of the corresponding homogeneous equation a modified approach is then used, consisting of the following steps: Step 2.1. transformation of the initial equation of convective diffusion to the much simpler equation for heat conductivity, using the following relation:

− ut u(z 2 ) S (z,t)= e 2Deff f (z,t) (9) where f(z,t) is a solution of the heat conductivity equation. ANALYTICAL SOLUTION OF A DIFFUSION MODEL 5

Step 2.2. solution of the equation for heat conductivity. Step 2.3. solution of the initial equation for convective diffusion based on Step 2.2. Step 3. The final step involves obtaining a solution of the initial equation for convective diffusion as a non-homogeneous equation examined under homogeneous initial conditions. Additional diffi- culties spring from the fact that the non-homogeneity in the equation introduces a non-linearity as well. The general solution of the non-homogeneous equation is the sum of the results from Step 2 and Step 3. The homogeneous equation, which corresponds to (6), can be given in a general-type formula:

∂S ∂S ∂2S S = D S uS where S = , S = and S = (10) t eff zz − z t ∂t z ∂z zz ∂z2

Therefore, by the application of the transformation (9), the solution of (6) is contracted to the solution of the heat conductivity equation. On the basis of the theory of PDE, the following solution of heat conductivity equation is then obtained:

+∞ 2 1 − (z−ξ) f (z,t)= ϕ(ξ) e 4Deff t dξ (11) 2 πDeff t Z−∞ where ϕ(ξ) is the initial condition forp the heat conductivity equation, which overlaps with the initial condition of the corresponding homogeneous equation (10) which, in turn, corresponds to (6). When the initial condition is as described in (8) and the solution obtained for the heat conductivity equation is replaced in (9), the solution of (10) is:

− F − F t [z ] H − 2 B 2B S0 −ξ2− (z ξ) S(z,t)= e 2Deff e 4Deff t dξ (12) · 2 πDeff t Z0 The relation (12) represents a solution of thep homogeneous equation (10), corresponding to the non-homogeneous equation (6), considered under non-homogeneous initial conditions. In terms of the theory of PDE to obtain a solution of the non-homogeneous equation (6), it is necessary to examine the non-homogeneous equation (6) under homogeneous initial conditions. Consequently the general solution is presented as a sum of the two cases and is given as follows:

− F − F t [z ] H − 2 S0 B 2B −ξ2− (z ξ) S(z,t)= e 2Deff e 4Deff t dξ + 2 πDeff t Z0 p (13) +∞ 2 t − (ξ−z) 1 S 4D (t−τ) [ kµmax X(τ)] e eff dξ dτ Z0 Z−∞ 2π D (t τ) − ks + S eff − If the following assumption,p which is meaningful from a biotechnological point of view, is also accepted:

S S0 = µL (14) kS + S ≤ kS + S0 then the solution of (13) comes down to the following final form:

− F [z− F t ] B 2B H (z−ξ)2 t S0 −ξ2− µLkµmax S(z,t)= e 2Deff e 4Deff t dξ X(τ) dτ (15) 2 πDeff t Z0 − √π Z0 The solution of (15),p when the values of the biomass numerical solution are given, is shown in Figure 4. Although the values of the constants used for the numerical solution represented in 6 PENCHEVA et al.

Figure 2, and those used for the analytical solution (Figure 4), are the same, it can be seen that both figures do not correspond closely. The differences are due to the assumption (14), which allows an analytical solution to be developed, but partly eliminates the non-linearity of the model.

S u b stra te

S , [g /l] 0 .3

0 .2

0 .1

0 0 0 5 0 .2 1 0 1 5 0 .4 2 0 T im e [h ] 2 5 0 .6 L e v e l [m ]

Figure 4: Analytical solution of space distribution of substrate concentration

This type of family of curves, which represents the analytical solution in Equation 15, illus- trates that the model obtained behaves similarly to a real biotechnological process. Moreover, it represents the effective application of the modified mathematical approach using the theory of partial differential equations to obtain an analytical solution of the model. The basic aim of this paper is to present a modified mathematical approach using the theory of partial differential equations for obtaining an analytical solution of the model with the rendering of the substrate diffusion. It is interesting to note that after the comparison and the statistical evaluation (Pencheva 2003), it is found that the differences between the results obtained with and without the rendering of the diffusion phenomena are less than 7% for the substrate and less than 15% for the biomass. At the same time, rendering of the diffusion phenomena leads to a more difficult mathematical description. Therefore, where it is not essential, diffusion phenomena in the system can be regarded as negligible without loss of generality.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The following conclusions can be summarised from the foregoing: The equation of material balance of the variable S, which describes the variation of the substrate § in the biotechnological processes in a biofilter, with regard to diffusion phenomena, has been derived. The distribution of biomass concentration in the culture medium is uniform because of the fixed bed bioreactor. The numerical solution of the mathematical model of substrate space distribution, presented by § the method of lines, demonstrates that the model displays behaviour similar to a real biotech- nological process. By applying the developed modified approach within the theory of PDE, the analytical solution § of the mathematical model of the substrate space distribution has been found. The analytical solution achieved also shows the efficiency of the direct application of the theory § of PDE without resorting to other, less direct, mathematical methods. ANALYTICAL SOLUTION OF A DIFFUSION MODEL 7

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Gratitude is expressed to two anonymous referees whose constructive criticism contributed to an improved presentation.

REFERENCES

Babary J.P., Tali-Maamar, N. and Dochain, D., Jacob J., Lann, J.M., Pingaud, H., Koehret, 1990. Modelling and Control of Distributed B., N’Guyen, K.M. and Capdeville, B., 1996. Parameter Bioreactors, Ist Int. Conference Dynamic Simulation of Submerged Packed and IV th School for Young Scientists, Varna, Biofilters in Wastewater Treatment Plants, Bulgaria, 21–27. Computers Chem. Eng. 18, S639–S663. Babary J.P., Tali-Maamar, N., Damak, T. and Julien S., Babary, J.P. and Nihtila, M.T., 1995. Nihtila, M., 1993. Modelling of Distributed On Modelling of Boundary Conditions and Parameter Bioreactors, Proc. Modelling and Estimation for Fixed-Bed Bioreactors, Math. Control in Biotechnological & Environmental Mod. of Syst. 1, 233–263. Systems, Sofia, Bulgaria, 10–33. Pencheva T., 2003. Modelling of a Class of Balakrishnan A.V., 1976. Applied Functional Biotechnological Processes as Objects with Analysis. Springer-Verlag, New York, Heidel- Distributed Parameters, PhD Thesis, Sofia. berg, Berlin. (In Bulgarian). Bourrel S.V., Babary, J.P., Julien, S., Nihtila, Pencheva T., Hristozov, I. and Shannon, A.G., M.T. and Dochain, D., 1998. Modelling and 2003. Mathematical Modelling of Continu- Identification of a Fixed-Bed Denitrification ous Biotechnological Processes, Int. J. Math. Bioreactor, J. Syst. Anal., Mod. Simul. 30, Educ. Sci. Technol. 34(4), 593–599. 289–309. Reuben A.J. and Shannon, A.G., 1990. Some Dochain D. and Perrier, M., 1997. Dynami- Problems in the Mathematical Modelling of cal Modelling, Analysis, Monitoring and Con- Erythrocyte Sedimentation, IMA Journal of trol Design for Nonlinear Bioprocesses, Ad- Mathematics Applied in Medicine & Biology vances in Biochemical Engineering Biotech- 7, 145–156. nology 56, 167–197. Schmalzriedt S., Jenke, M. and Reuss, M., Farlow S.J., 1982. Partial Differential Equa- 1995. Modelling of Stirred Tank Bioreac- tions for Scientists and Engineers. John Wi- tors, Pre-prints of the 6th Int. Conference ley & Sons Inc., New York. on Computer Applications in Biotechnology, Jacob J., Pingaud, H., Lann, J.M., Bourrel, S., Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 159–166. Babary, J.P. and Capdeville, B., 1996. Dy- namic Simulation of Biofilters, Sim. Pract. and Theory 6, 335–368.

* Centre of Biomedical Engineering “Prof. Ivan Daskalov” Bulgarian Academy of Sciences 105, Acad. G. Bonchev Str., Sofia 1113, Bulgaria email: [email protected], [email protected]

Warrane College, University† of NSW, PO Box 123 Kensington, NSW 1465 Australia email: [email protected]

(Manuscript received 20.02.2006, accepted 06.05.2006)

Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 9–9, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/01009–1 $4.00/1 Atomic Australia and Nuclear New Zealand

anna binnie

INTRODUCTION tively. It should be noted that both scientists had been students of the legendary Antipodean, The following four papers in this issue of the Ernest Rutherford. Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales were presented at a session The second session focussed on two effects of entitled ‘Atomic Australia and Nuclear New nuclear science in Australia and New Zealand. Zealand’ at the Australasian Association for the The first looked at the British tests at Mar- History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Sci- alinga, not from a political perspective, but ence Conference in Dunedin, New Zealand, in from the perspective of the soldiers who were December 2005. The papers were originally pre- stationed at there before, during and after the sented in two sessions. The first focussed on tests. The final paper discussed effects of the two individuals, Oliphant and Marsden, who ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative on New Zealand sci- were instrumental in the introduction of nuclear ence and society, and the lead up to the rise of science to Australia and New Zealand, respec- the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand.

Anna Binnie History and Philosophy of Science Department The University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW 2052 Australia email: [email protected]

Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 11–22, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010011–12 $4.00/1 Oliphant, the Father of Atomic Energy

anna binnie

Abstract: Sir Marcus Oliphant, perceived by several generations of Australians as the kindly public face of Australian physics, may be regarded as the individual who introduced the concept of an atomic bomb to the World. Oliphant did not discover fission, nor did he work on the fission process, but he was responsible for bringing together the people and the information required for the development of both the atomic bomb and civil atomic energy. Yet he was a man noted later for speaking out publicly against nuclear weapons, so how can these two statements be reconciled?

Keywords: Sir Marcus Oliphant, atomic energy, atomic bomb, Australia

INTRODUCTION Rutherford and associating with the other gifted young men such as James Chadwick and John Oliphant had been living in Britain at the out- Cockcroft, both of whom would both play ma- break of the war and he had no hesitation about jor parts in the development of atomic science. becoming involved with the work of war. It was This association would result in what can best his radar work during the war, his position as be described as a brotherhood of Cavendish men Professor of Physics at Birmingham University, and would include all Cavendish alumni. and his Cavendish network of colleagues that In October 1937, Oliphant took up a posi- gave him access to those in positions of author- tion as Professor of Physics at Birmingham Uni- ity that would bring about Britain’s commit- versity. As an experienced researcher, Oliphant ment to develop the atomic bomb. It was also wanted to follow research directions started at during the war that Oliphant insured that Aus- the Cavendish. He was determined to have his tralia had knowledge of the developments of the own accelerator so he could continue his re- British bomb project. After the war, Oliphant search into nuclear physics. The cyclotron, a returned to Australia and became an advocate new type of accelerator developed by Ernest of the civil uses of atomic energy. He espe- Lawrence at Berkeley in California, could de- cially espoused the development of an atomic liver much more energy to the accelerated power station and a desalination plant in the protons than either the Cockcroft-Walton or Port Pirie region of his native South Australia. Van der Graaff designs of linear accelerators. He later became involved with the Industrial In fact, Oliphant wanted a bigger version of Atomic Energy Committee and it was through Lawrence’s machine [2]. This interest in the cy- his impatience and the actions that resulted clotron would bring Oliphant into contact with from this that lead to the establishment of the Lawrence, with whom he would form a working Australian Atomic Energy Commission. While relationship in the years to come. he was never a Commissioner and was never At the outbreak of the Second World War, employed by the Commission, his influence in Oliphant and many of his team at Birming- the development of Atomic Energy in Australia ham were working for the Admiralty on radar. is such that he can be considered as father of This work was a highly secret operation and atomic energy. those scientists resident in Britain who were foreign nationals or those regarded as being THE MAUD COMMITTEE enemy aliens were left to do their own re- search. Two of these scientists who had made In 1927, Oliphant arrived at the Cavendish Lab- their way to Birmingham University were Otto oratory in Cambridge as an 1851 Exhibition Frisch and Rudolph Peierls. In early March Scholar[1]. Oliphant was to spend the next 1940, Oliphant received a short note from Frisch ten years at the Cavendish working with Ernest and Peierls, entitled ‘On the Construction of a 12 BINNIE

“Super-bomb” based on a Nuclear Chain Re- The MAUD Committee produced its report action in Uranium’. The notion of using the on 30 June 1941, recommending that a bomb fission reaction to power a bomb had already was feasible and that atomic energy could also been discussed in scientific circles but it was be a useful source of electrical power [9]. A mi- thought that such a device would require sev- nority report produced by Blackett suggested eral tons of the rare uranium isotope, uranium- that the full-scale plant to produce the bomb 235. The Frisch-Peierls note described that a be set up outside Britain, possibly in the US fission explosion could be achieved using only or Canada. This minority report was taken a few kilograms of pure metallic uranium made up by the Ministry of Aircraft Production [10]. up of the uranium-235 isotope. The note con- The MAUD Committee ceased to exist in De- tinued to discuss the possible method of obtain- cember 1941 but its work had been taken over ing this isotope in sufficient quantities (thermal by the Tube Alloys Project that had been es- diffusion of uranium hexafluoride gas), the con- tablished in October that year to develop the struction of the bomb and possible radiation ef- British atomic bomb. fects of fission products after its explosion [3]. While those around him were involved in the The note is significant in that it was short; it uranium and fission work, Oliphant continued was written in a non-technical style so that a with his work on radar, specifically on mag- non-physicist could readily understand most of netrons. Collaboration had been established be- its content but it contained enough technical in- tween Britain and the US in the development formation to allow physicists to make their own of more sophisticated magnetrons. In August calculations in verification. 1941, Oliphant went to the US essentially to The memorandum had arrived on Tizard’s continue work on this partnership. However, be- desk by the 19th March with a covering note fore he left Britain he was approached by Thom- from Oliphant. The covering note suggested son who asked him to investigate why the US that a Committee be established comprising had not responded to the contents of the MAUD G.P. Thomson, Patrick Blackett, Oliphant and Committee Report which had previously been Tizard [4]. Tizard in turn sent a copy to Thom- sent to the US [11]. At this time Britain wanted son who wanted to discuss the contents with to establish a joint uranium project that in- Oliphant and Cockcroft [5]. On the 10th April, cluded exchanges of information [12]. When Thomson, Oliphant, Cockcroft and another ex- Oliphant was finally able to free himself from Cavendish physicist, Philip Moon, met under radar work to follow the mission entrusted to instructions from Tizard, at the Royal Society him by Thomson, Oliphant was shocked to dis- headquarters with the purpose of determining if cover that the MAUD Committee’s report had such a ‘super-bomb’ could be constructed [6]. languished unread in the safe of Lyman Briggs, the head of the National Bureau of Standards By June this small committee of essentially in Washington and Chairman of the Uranium ex-Cavendish physicists had grown to include Committee [13]. the Nobel Laureate Norman Haworth and an- other ex-Cavendish man, C. Ellis. The Com- Oliphant now attempted to enthuse Briggs, mittee had become known as the MAUD Com- but failed. He then attempted to interest Van- mittee. Both Frisch and Peierls were excluded nevar Bush and James Conant (Bush was Pres- from the Committee but were included in the ident of the Carnegie Institution and Chair of Technical Sub-committee [7]. Oliphant would the National Defence Research Committee and himself be excluded from the MAUD Commit- Conant was a member of the Uranium Commit- tee in 1941 when it would undergo a reorganisa- tee ) in the findings of the MAUD Committee, tion. Oliphant was then relegated to the Tech- with a similar result to that experienced with nical Sub-committee [8]. However, Oliphant, Briggs. Oliphant was not easily deterred. He unlike other members of this Sub-committee, now went to Berkeley to visit Ernest Lawrence would not be working directly on research into with whom he had been corresponding for a the bomb. number of years. The result of this visit was OLIPHANT, THE FATHER OF ATOMIC ENERGY 13 the production by Oliphant of a summary of of producing 100,000 horsepower for very many the MAUD Committee report [14] and the in- years without any fuel whatsoever. It would spiration to produce enriched uranium through be of the greatest possible importance to Aus- electromagnetic separation using Lawrence’s cy- tralia, with her isolated coal-fields. I am con- clotron as a mass spectrometer [15]. Lawrence fident that the scientific and engineering prob- took Oliphant’s summary and met with Conant lems will be overcome and that Australian ura- and Arthur Compton. This meeting ultimately nium, will prove as valuable to the country as led to a restructuring of the US Uranium Com- oil-wells have to America’ [17]. mittee and ultimately to the establishment of Casey made at least two copies of this note. the Manhattan Project [15]. The original was sent to Prime Minister Robert Menzies, (1894–1978), and what is remarkable is that very little was done with the information it FOREVER AN AUSTRALIAN contained. Political turmoil hit Australia within weeks of the despatch of the note, when the While in Washington, in August 1941, Marcus general election brought not only a change in Oliphant was invited to a dinner party hosted Prime Minister but also a change in the govern- by Dr Darwin, the grandson of Charles Darwin, ing party and consequently the memo was vir- and his wife at which the Australian Minister to tually forgotten. The new Prime Minister was the US, Richard Casey, was also a guest. It was John Curtin. Curtin took office a few months in this capacity that Oliphant was introduced before the Japanese entered the war and hence to him. Oliphant initially discussed radar work had other more pressing matters to consider. with Casey but later mentioned a new scientific project that was currently being undertaken in Casey sent the two copies of Oliphant’s note, th Britain [16]. It was obvious from Casey’s replies on 17 September, to David Rivett, as ‘Secret that he knew nothing of the MAUD Committee by Safe Hand’. Rivett was then the Executive or the uranium project, so Casey asked for a Officer of the CSIR [17] and the covering letter note on this matter. gives the impression that Rivett and Casey were The next morning, 26th August, Oliphant on familiar terms, Casey stated: sent Casey a four-page letter, effectively sum- ‘. . . I gather he (Oliphant) came from Ade- marising the findings of the MAUD Commit- laide in the first place and has been working in tee which at this time was secret. Oliphant, England for the last fifteen years. He seems to in his covering note, suggested that Australia be regarded as a man of some note. Darwin should ‘do some work on the energy machine, speaks of him with great respect. He has been so that if and when she wishes to exploit it she working on radio-physics for the British Admi- will have something with which to bargain’ [17]. ralty lately and is in this country in this connec- The other significant aspect of this note was the tion. ...Oliphant began to speak more gener- stress for the peaceful uses of the ‘Uranium En- ally of new applications of scientific knowledge ergy Machine’, but he did mention the require- to war purposes and in due course asked me if ments for a bomb and the possible radioactive I was aware of the work that is being done in after effects of such an explosion [17]. Oliphant England in connection with Uranium. . . . I said even suggested that this form of energy could that I was unaware of this – and pressed him use Australian uranium: for further information – whereupon he told me ‘It is possible to make a machine in which about it. I asked him if he would let me have the production of energy is less violent than in a short memorandum on the subject, which he the bomb and which could be used for the com- did the next day. . . . I have since discussed it mercial production of power. Such a machine with Munro – and he tells me that you will un- could be realized at the present time . . . by mix- doubtedly have been relevantly informed by Sir ing uranium oxide with “heavy water”, or deu- John Madsen’ [18]. terium oxide, or possibly also with carbon or Rivett responded to Casey on 8th November, beryllium . . . Such a machine should be capable stating ‘ . . . I am rather hoping that Madsen will 14 BINNIE come back with something in his head and in terials for magnetron research with him [20]. his bag about all this, and, in the meantime, I Frederick White (1905–1994) was then Chief of am treating the file as very strictly confidential’ the Division of Radiophysics in CSIR. [18]. Sir John Madsen (1879–1969) was Profes- On the 24th February, McDougall responded sor of Electrical Engineering at the University to Rivett that the British Admiralty, saying ‘Ti- of Sydney and was involved with the Australian zard wholly concurs desirable Oliphant go to Radar project and the CSIR (Council for Sci- Australia’ [20]. What Oliphant had hoped to entific and Industrial Research ). Australia was achieve is unknown but he was now to be re- also at war with Germany at this time. Rivett united with his family whom he had sent to the and the rest of CSIR were too much involved safety of Australia two years before. Events with the Australian radar project to be con- moved swiftly with Oliphant finishing up at cerned with some new research project that at Birmingham and leaving the United Kingdom the time was still of a theoretical nature and un- 19th March. Australia House wrote to CSIR on der a military classification. According to Tim 31st March informing them of Oliphant’s de- Sherratt, Rivett did not just ignore the note, parture [21]. The journey was not as swift as he ‘began to seek more information through his Oliphant had expected since Oliphant is next scientific contacts, and tried to arrange for in- heard from in Capetown on 23rd April request- creased Australian involvement in the work. He ing to return to Britain, ‘owing to transport de- was, however, unsuccessful’ [19]. lay and possibility of no return from intended destination’. The request was refused by the In December 1941 Japan attacked the US Australian High Commission in London. What Naval Base at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, bring- now followed was what could best be described ing the US into the Second World War. Within as a comedy of errors. Rivett had decided that months the Japanese military moved south to Oliphant was not required because the local occupy most of South-East Asia. Once Sin- group had made considerable head way on the gapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942, radar project. Rivett then informed the Aus- Oliphant saw Australia as being under threat, tralian High Commission to allow Oliphant to and immediately offered his talents to the ser- return to the UK. However, the telegram recall- vice of his country, especially in the area of ing Oliphant ‘missed’ him. radar research. On the 14th Feb 1942, Stanley Bruce (1883–1967), the Australian High Com- During his entire journey, Oliphant had not missioner in London, sent a memo to the Prime been in contact with his family who by this time Minister, John Curtin, stating that Professor were quite naturally concerned about his wel- Oliphant was offering his services to Australia fare. His wife Rosa sent a letter to Rivett that and ‘In addition to RDF his knowledge covers arrived on 11th May stating that she was wor- other branches of Scientific Warfare’ [20]. RDF ried that she hadn’t heard from Oliphant for stood for radio direction finding, later called two months. On 13th May Rivett replied sug- radio location, and is now known as radar. gesting that Oliphant was on his way back to The other branches of Scientific Warfare re- UK since Rivett believed that Oliphant had re- ferred to his knowledge of atomic energy. Riv- ceived his message in Bombay. Letters were ett was swift to reply and on 18th February now passed between the CSIR and the Navy sent a note to the Prime Minister’s department in an attempt to discover where Oliphant ac- stating, ‘Am strongly recommending Minister tually was [21]. The search for Oliphant ended accept offer’ of Oliphant coming to Australia. on 26th May when Oliphant, who was in the The following day, Rivett sent another note to Physics Department at University of Western the Prime Minister’s Department stating ‘Mad- Australia in Perth, sent a telegram to Rivett sen and White welcome proposal’ and on 20th ‘please instruct authorities here urgent priority February Rivett sent a further memo to the act- air passage for me plane leaves six am Perth ing Australian High Commissioner in London, time tomorrow’. Oliphant arrived in Melbourne Mr McDougall, asking Oliphant to bring ma- on 29th May. That night Oliphant went to Syd- OLIPHANT, THE FATHER OF ATOMIC ENERGY 15 ney with Madsen and White, where he started [27]. Rivett may well have thought his problems work at the National Standards Laboratory on with Oliphant were over but on 28th November 30th May [21]. Oliphant cabled Rivett with a request for money Rivett and the CSIR may not have wanted and a fast passage from Durban. Oliphant and Oliphant for the radar work and Oliphant cer- his family did not get their fast passage and tainly did not want to remain in Australia but were there until the 14th January. He arrived in he was part of the radar team and the CSIR the UK on 1st March 1943 [26]. was going to make use of his expertise. This ar- rangement was to be short lived with Oliphant and his family leaving Australia within months THE MANHATTAN PROJECT of his arrival. Before Oliphant left Australia, he made a short visit to Wellington in New Zealand When Oliphant returned to Birmingham in to address a meeting of New Zealand scientists early 1943, his work on radar was virtually com- who were working on radar. plete. The work on Tube Alloys was continuing Oliphant initially wanted to leave Australia but Oliphant was not a member of this project. with his family on 19th August but was forced to Yet he did manage to glean that progress was remain until October. On 27th August Oliphant very slow. The processes devised for the enrich- had presented to the CSIR a paper entitled ‘Re- ment of uranium were not producing a large port on Uranium as a Source of Energy’ [22]. enough yield quickly enough. Now Oliphant This was Oliphant’s attempt to encourage the suggested an alternate proposal, that of elec- CSIR to ensure that control of uranium ore de- tromagnetic separation using a cyclotron [28]. posits was vested in the Commonwealth govern- He sent his proposal to Edward Appleton, who ment [23]. Oliphant himself claims that he did was secretary of the Department of Scientific not suggest that the government should control and Industrial Research under which Tube Al- the uranium deposits, but that ‘if there was ura- loys operated. Appleton sent his note onto the nium in the country that it would be wise not to leaders of the Tube Alloys project with the sub- let it go overseas unless they decided that they sequent request that Oliphant join the project didn’t want to use it themselves’ [24]. Regard- [29]. less of whether Oliphant used the term ‘control’ Britain had earlier been decided to move or not, he still attempted to alert the scientific some of the Tube Alloys work to the safety of community of the need for uranium and indi- Canada. Scientists in the US were working on rectly of the potential uses of atomic energy. their own uranium project. Negotiations be- The CSIR Minutes of Executive Meeting tween Britain, Canada and the US resulted in 23rd October 1942, under item 2 Uranium, Sir the Quebec Agreement, which was signed on David Rivett referred to secret correspondence 19th August 1943 [30], and it should be noted in connection to uranium [25], which could only that Oliphant accompanied the British delega- be related to the British request for uranium to tion for these discussions, returning to Birm- be used in the Tube Alloys project. At this ingham in September [31]. Australia was kept meeting Marcus Oliphant was also appointed informed of the developments concerning the as an advisor to the Radiophysics Division of lead up to the Quebec agreement by Oliphant, CSIR [25]. This was the division of CSIR that who had briefed Stanley Bruce in London on would ultimately be responsible for research 16th August. Oliphant again stressed that Aus- into atomic energy. tralia should secure its uranium deposits [32]. Oliphant was finally given permission to As Oliphant was well aware of the secrecy of leave Australia from Melbourne on 27th Octo- his mission to the US, one wonders what was ber [26]. On 31st October 1942, Rivett sent Oliphant’s motivation in attempting to keep a cable to the Australian High Commission in the Australian Government informed of these London, informing them of Oliphant’s return events. 16 BINNIE

With the agreement signed, all the Tube Al- AUSTRALIA WANTS ATOMIC loys personnel were transferred to continue work ENERGY in Canada or seconded to the US project, now called the Manhattan Project. In November Shortly after Oliphant returned to Britain in 1943 Oliphant was posted to Berkeley to work 1945, he became involved in another new with Ernest Lawrence on the electromagnetic project, that of setting up a British atomic separation of uranium isotopes. Oliphant, dur- energy research establishment. Cockcroft had ing his posting to Berkeley, returned to Britain been the Director of the Canadian Experimen- for visits during February and March 1944 and tal Atomic Energy Plant during the war and had again from November 1944 to early March 1945. also returned to Britain at the conclusion of the He left Berkeley and the Manhattan Project in war [36]. By April 1945, Cockcroft and Oliphant March 1945 [33]. toured a number of sites that were being consid- ered as possible locations for this new establish- While Oliphant was working at Berkeley, he ment. The site most favoured and hence recom- attempted to get other Australians working on mended was a disused airfield at Harwell near the project. In part, he must have realised that Oxford. By July, the British Atomic Energy the knowledge gained by these physicists could Research Establishment had a director, Sir Ed- be utilised in post war Australia. Oliphant ward Appleton, and the support of the newly went so far as to nominate whom he wanted elected Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. to join him and January 1944, Oliphant sent Harwell was to be the location of an experi- his request to David Rivett stating; ’Would you mental reactor which had been designed by the release Burhop for the duration to take part Graphite Group that had been formed in 1944 in urgent semi-theoretical work on tube alloys in Montreal [37]. problems ...On account of his past experience Australia wanted access to atomic energy in- Burhop could advance materially the use of the new weapon’ [34]. Burhop kept his superior in- formation, which it had been denied during the war. As soon as the war was over Australia formed of his work at Berkeley, writing to Rivett in June; ‘ . . . My own feeling is that this project again made overtures to Britain for this infor- mation. Ben Chifley, Australia’s Prime Minis- is very important for the future of Australia and ter, sent a cable to Stanley Bruce in London on the present time is a golden opportunity to get th knowledge of the techniques that, it seems, will 6 September 1945 stating: prove vital for the future of the country. In ‘Repeated attempts made throughout war my opinion there are in Australia several peo- have failed to obtain for Australia information ple who have had the right type of training that on research . . . on utilization of atomic energy. would make them suitable to pick up the vari- This development is of very considerable im- ous techniques involved and would enable them portance both in regard to its wartime appli- to make a significant contribution to the work’ cation and its peacetime possibility as a source [35]. of power . . . my Government would appreciate an opportunity of contributing to the research As is now well known the collaboration be- and . . . If the United Kingdom Government is tween the three nations did produce an atomic willing to release information to us . . . request bomb. In fact it produced three; one was made you endeavour to ascertain if Professor H.S.W. from enriched uranium and two were made from Massey or Professor O.M.L. Oliphant would be plutonium. The first bomb exploded was a plu- permitted to come to Australia to communicate tonium bomb. As a result the Second World this information’ [38]. War ended on 15th August 1945. With the end Chifley had thought that by supplying of the war both in Europe and in the Pacific, Britain with uranium ore during the war, many of the scientists working in Canada and Britain would in return provide Australia with the US wanted to return to their homes and information on atomic energy, but this infor- families. mation was not forthcoming. Chifley received OLIPHANT, THE FATHER OF ATOMIC ENERGY 17 a reply, on the 26th September, from Evatt, more, he is anxious that if he should accept ap- who was in London and had been in contact pointment this should be done with the good- with Oliphant. Again Oliphant informed the will of his fellow scientists in the United King- Australian government that the British gov- dom and the United Kingdom Government to ernment was in the process of establishing whom he feels a considerable debt of gratitude. atomic research facilities that would research Furthermore, he points out that the work he both military and peaceful uses of atomic en- would do here should be regarded as part of ergy. Oliphant had recommended that since the general British Commonwealth contribution Britain would have the necessary facilities, Aus- to the development of knowledge in the field of tralia should seek to send scientists to be trained atomic physics and that he should have contin- in Britain. ued opportunity for consultation and collabora- The process for establishing the United Na- tion with fellow scientists working in the United tions Atomic Energy Commission commenced Kingdom’ [42]. on 3rd October 1945 when President Truman Oliphant had wanted to continue playing a announced to Congress that he was about to part in applied research into atomic energy and initiate talks with the UK and Canada ‘on the was not prepared to forego that type of involve- international control of atomic energy’ [39]. The ment on his return to Australia. notion of ‘control of atomic energy’ was a eu- Atlee responded to Chifley’s request on 4th phemism for maintaining the status quo and not March and stated: sharing atomic secrets with anyone. These dis- ‘ ...In so far as his work was concerned with cussions with the UK and Canada were only rel- fundamental physical research of a non-secret evant because Canada had a reliable source of character, we should hope that he might have uranium ore and the US had none, and the UK the fullest opportunity for consultation and col- had been involved in atomic energy from the laboration with fellow scientists working in the beginning and was badgering the US to share United Kingdom . . . There are as you know, the knowledge and technology that the US had aspects of atomic energy which much of our developed during the war years based on the in- knowledge in this country is derived from the formation that Britain had first shared with the work we did during the war in conjunction with US. the Americans and the Canadians. Professor On the 26th March 1946 Ben Chifley re- Oliphant who played such an important part in ceived a cable informing him of Oliphant’s ex- that work, will know that the war-time partner- pected visit to Australia [40]. Records from ship has placed hither to certain limits on our the National Archives of Australia indicate that freedom to co-operate on atomic energy with Oliphant had agreed in March to be part of Aus- other countries, even within the Empire. You tralia’s delegation to the United Nations Atomic will remember that I explained the position at Energy Commission [41]. I suspect that it was our meeting here last May’ [42]. during this visit that Oliphant and Chifley met This reinforced the conditions that the U.S. and not at the Commonwealth Prime Minis- had placed on both the United Kingdom and ters’ Conference that was held in Britain in May Canada concerning the sharing of knowledge 1946, as has been stated in the Oliphant biog- and information on atomic energy and related raphy written by Cockburn and Ellyard. technologies. th On the 4 February 1947, Chifley sent a Oliphant by this time had the ear of the note which had been drafted by Coombs, to Australian Prime Minister and over the next Atlee that stated: decade would continue to have this type of fa- ‘Professor Oliphant has made it clear that miliarity with Chifley’s successor, Robert Men- he could not take up a position here until zies. During the period 1946 to 1950, there his present obligations in the United Kingdom would be much negotiation between Oliphant are complete. And it is understood that this and the Australian officials who were attempt- may take another two or three years. Further- ing to bring him out. In August 1950 Oliphant 18 BINNIE

finally arrived in Australia [43]. He took up Development, a representative of CSIRO and the position of Director of the Research School three technical experts, under the chairmanship of Physical Sciences at the Australian National of Marcus Oliphant [46]. Oliphant had ‘agreed University. with the view that Defence and other aspects of Atomic Energy could not be separated’ [46]. However, in a note sent to the Secretary of De- INDUSTRIAL ATOMIC ENERGY fence by the Acting Secretary, it became obvious COMMITTEE that the Minister of Defence ‘did not wish De- fence to be associated at this stage with CSIRO Australia had, more from good fortune than on the committee, although he did say that De- by design, become involved in the international fence could be added later.’ The rationale for politics of atomic energy and its control by this Ministerial decision was evident later in this its membership of the first Security Council of note, ‘He (Dedman) mentioned that the govern- the United Nations and as such a member of ment was desirous of setting up an atomic pile the United Nations Atomic Energy Commis- in South Australia for the generation of electri- sion. This was a position that Australia wanted cal energy as a counterpart in that State to the to maintain. It was a new technology and at Snowy River Scheme’ [46]. the time there was no reason to suppose that Australia could not join the elite technologically This committee was later renamed as the In- dustrial Atomic Energy Policy Committee and advanced atomic club. After all, many of her th sons had been involved in the development of was established on 19 August 1949 by Chifley. the atomic bomb and were now working on the It was to advise the government on the possible development of atomic energy. industrial applications of atomic energy and to suggest a program for its development. It was John Dedman, as the Minister responsible answerable to the Minister responsible for the for the CSIRO, wrote on 27th June 1949 to CSIRO [47]. Oliphant was to be the Chairman the Minister of Defence (one notes with some and the other members of the committee were amusement that the Minister of Defence was also John Dedman), stating that ‘The executive representatives of the Departments of Supply and Development, Treasury and the CSIRO and of CSIRO has recently advised me that it is dif- ‘three technical men, familiar with the physi- ficult for it to formulate future policy on many different aspects of atomic energy with which cal, chemical and minerals problems that will require consideration’[48]. the Commonwealth Government may be con- cerned without collaboration of your Depart- Oliphant initially was involved with the ment of Defence and of the Department of Sup- works of the committee by correspondence but ply and Development’ [44]. He suggested that a was to take a more active role on his return to group of officers from the CSIRO, the Depart- Australia in 1950 [23]. Menzies, who by this ment of Defence and the Department of Sup- time was Prime Minister, endorsed Oliphant ply should meet ‘with the view to advising the as chairman but also included his own nomi- three Ministers concerned as to the interdepart- nees, one of whom was Professor Philip Baxter. mental machinery which should be set up to Oliphant was an active chairman and made in- advise Cabinet on policy matters’ [45] concern- dependent submissions to Menzies concerning ing atomic energy. By 26th July a group repre- the development of atomic energy in Australia. senting the CSIRO, the Department of Defence When Oliphant discovered in February 1951 and the Department of Supply and Develop- that Menzies did not see Mr Clement Attlee, ment met at CSIRO Head Office in Melbourne the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, [45]. to discuss ‘cooperation in the field of atomic This meeting recommended the formation of energy’ [49], Oliphant went so far as drafting an Atomic Energy Policy Committee. Initially a note to Attlee stating that ‘Detailed explo- this committee was to have representatives from ration of uranium ores at Radium Hill in South the Departments of Defence and of Supply and Australia has proved that at least 600 tons of OLIPHANT, THE FATHER OF ATOMIC ENERGY 19 uranium is recoverable as oxide’ [49] and that sponse other members of the Industrial Atomic since a joint program of development would be Energy Policy Committee were being brought useful to Australia, ‘authority be given for tech- secretly into the discussion. nical discussions’ between Oliphant and Cock- The first shot was fired by Harold Breen, on croft, who could then make recommendations in 23rd April 1951 when he sent a copy of Menzies’ the development of atomic energy in Australia letter to Attlee, with Attlee’s response, to the [49]. Secretary to the Department of Defence, with a This draft letter, based on a report that cover note stating that ‘No member of the Com- Oliphant had prepared on behalf of the Indus- mittee was aware of the first cable’ [50]. The trial Atomic Energy Policy Committee, which Secretary of Defence responded saying that the recommended the adoption of an atomic energy Defence Department had no official representa- program in Australia, was sent to Menzies, by tion on the Committee. By 4th May, Breen had Oliphant, with the instructions that Menzies met with two other members of the Committee, ought to send it to Attlee. Menzies obediently Martin and White, who were in general agree- cabled this letter, unaltered, to Attlee who re- ment as to what should be done. They produced sponded that there were issues of security due a report that was critical of Oliphant’s views on to the constraints of the tripartite agreement atomic energy, suggested that the Committee and that not all information available to Britain would need to be reconstituted. The cover note could be freely passed on to Australia [49]. to this report was written by Breen and sent to Specifically Attlee’s reply stated ‘We have Menzies on 7th June 1951. Breen refers to the to regard our commitments under the tripartite issue as the ‘Oliphant-Uranium matter’. The agreement between the United States, Canada final paragraph of the cover note states: ‘I am and ourselves. Complete separation of power particularly anxious to know if any Australian and military programs for the use of atomic scientific help may be needed by the United energy is not possible and a worthwhile pro- Kingdom in Australia in the near future because gram for industrial power could not be carried of a certain event which is being planned and out without the use of classified information. which may occur in Australia. You are aware of . . . In these circumstances we should in the first this possible project. White and Martin do not place need to have from you assurance that any know’ [50]. This is a reference to the forthcom- Australian project in the industrial field would ing British atomic tests which were to be held be dealt with as ‘classified’ to the extent that in Australia commencing in 1952. this is necessary under the rules agreed with Oliphant’s reply of the 28th May drew a ‘slap the United States and Canada.’ The response on the wrist’ by the Secretary of the Prime Min- concludes with ‘This need not, however, hold ister’s Department, suggesting that Oliphant up essential preliminary work such as ore min- should meet with the Industrial Atomic En- ing operations’ [48, 49]. Quite clearly Britain ergy Policy Committee and present a report. was unwilling to share information but it still Oliphant did what he had been asked [48]. The wanted its uranium ore. Committee met and recommended that it be Oliphant was shown a copy of this response disbanded and replaced by a new committee and in return responded, on 28th May 1951, ‘constituted under one of the Departments of with a willingness to accept the notion of se- the Defence group’ [51]. The machinations of crecy of any information made available from the Secretaries of the Departments of the De- Britain. He concluded: ‘Assuming that the fence Group resulted in The Industrial Atomic Government agrees to ‘classification’ of work Energy Policy Committee being reconstituted on atomic energy, I assume that the project under the Department of Supply. Howard Beale must be transferred to a Ministry which has sent a letter on 4th April 1952 inviting the re- the necessary machinery for dealing with clas- spective Departments to nominate their rep- sified information’ [49]. Even before Oliphant resentatives. Oliphant, however, did not hear had a chance to write a reply to Attlee’s re- about the changes to the new committee until 20 BINNIE almost three weeks later when he received a let- of Professor J.P. Baxter of the Atomic Energy ter from Menzies asking him to act as a consul- Commission, who said “I have known Mark for tant to the committee. Oliphant objected vocif- years, and cannot conceive of him harbouring a erously [51]. The committee remained in exis- disloyal thought”’[54]. The opinions expressed tence until November 1952 when it was reduced by Oliphant were shared by many loyal Aus- in size and changed in composition to allow for tralians. Another quote from the vetting pro- the easy transition for the new Commissioners cess for the Australian Atomic Energy Commis- who would run the new organisation once the sion stated ‘extensive enquiries failed to reveal Atomic Energy Act 1953 was enacted [52]. any evidence of Professor Oliphant’s interest in, or membership of, any organisation of security interest’ [54]. OLIPHANT AND NATIONAL Two later notes from Oliphant’s file indi- SECURITY cated that he was under some form of casual surveillance. On 11th June 1956 Oliphant re- It has already been noted that Oliphant had ceived gifts from Peter Kapitza. Kapitza had a somewhat relaxed approach to security. His been a fellow Cavendish student and had re- reputation was further damaged by two different turned to his native Russia just before Stalin ‘spy scandals’. The first was the revelation, in closed the borders of the USSR thus effectively March 1946, that Alan Nunn May had acted as making Kapitza a captive in his homeland. It a spy for the Soviet Union. Nunn May had been was quite natural for Oliphant and Kapitza to an undergraduate in Oliphant’s Physics Depart- correspond and even exchange gifts. A later en- ment in Birmingham. What added to the scan- try included that on 10th January 1957 Petrov dal was that Oliphant knew Nunn May’s family stated that Oliphant was known to him. Petrov who lived near the Oliphants in Birmingham had been a minor diplomat in the Russian Em- [53]. The second scandal was the famous Klaus bassy in Canberra and had defected dramati- Fuchs affair. Fuchs was arrested in Harwell in cally. Oliphant as Professor of Physics at the early 1950, as a Soviet agent. Fuchs had worked Australian National University had attended at Birmingham with Rudolph Peierls and Otto diplomatic functions and hence this comment Frisch and later on the Manhattan Project [53]. by Petrov had little impact. Both spies were Birmingham men and Oliphant was their Professor, so now Oliphant was tar- One insightful entry in Oliphant’s file, dated th nished by guilt through association. 14 July 1954, stated ‘there is evidence of ri- The Australian Security and Intelligence Or- valry existing between Professors Messel and ganisation, ASIO, had the responsibility of vet- Oliphant . . . a campaign is on the way to dis- ting all Public Service appointees. It also estab- credit Oliphant and have him removed from his lished files on individuals who may have posed post which would be taken over by Messel’ [54]. a security risk; the outspoken Oliphant had If Oliphant was aware of this rivalry, he cer- such a file established. The file contains alle- tainly did not exhibit any malice towards Mes- gations of a trivial nature which indicate that sel. Meanwhile Messel was busy establishing the Oliphant held strong views and was willing to first university fundraising foundation in Aus- express them. In 1953 there were two assess- tralia, at the University of Sydney. ments made of Oliphant; one dated 17th Au- Finally, Oliphant was not just concerned gust stated, ‘we have an unconfirmed report with atomic energy. He was also an advocate that he expressed horror at the dropping of the of other forms of energy production. An article bomb on Hiroshima, a civilian target, and ac- in the Sydney Daily Telegraph dated 19th July cused the American Government of a breach 1951 stated that Oliphant ‘ . . . suggested that of faith in that regard; his contention being Australia could build a solar radiation power that they had promised that if the bomb was station using huge aluminium mirrors to reflect produced, it would be used only on a mili- the sun’s rays and drive steam power generators tary target . . . I would also quote the opinion . . . ’ [55]. Oliphant was certainly a man of vi- OLIPHANT, THE FATHER OF ATOMIC ENERGY 21 sion, he could see the potential of solar powered [18] Visits: Oliphant N.L. (Prof), National electricity generation more than 50 years before Archives of Australia A3300 (A3300/7) 217 the first solar pilot steam generating plant was [1941 File - Yellow Tab]. established by David Mills in the Hunter region, [19] T. Sherratt, On the beach: Australia’s north of Sydney in 2004 [56]. Oliphant would nuclear history, http://www.asap.unimelb. continue with his researches and would later be- edu.au/pubs/tps/tps on the beach.htm. come Governor of his home state, South Aus- [20] Visit of Professor M.L. Oliphant to Aus- tralia. By the time of his death in July 2000, tralia, National Archives of Australia A1608 Oliphant would have regained much of his ear- (A1608/1) A565/1/2 War Sector. lier reputation purely from his great integrity. [21] Professor Marcus Lawrence Elwin Oliphant, He was seen as a prominent opponent of the National Archives of Australia A8520 nuclear arms race. (A8520/11) PH/OLI/8. [22] www.info.dfat.gov.au/historical, Volume 7, 163, Rivett to Smith. REFERENCES [23] A. Moyal, The Australian Atomic Energy Commission: a case study in Australian sci- [1] S. Cockburn and D. Ellyard, Oliphant; The ence and government. Search, 6, 365–384 Life and times of Sir Mark Oliphant. Axiom (1975). Books, Stepney, South Australia (1991), p. [24] A. Moyal, Interview with Sir Marcus 31. Oliphant December, National Library of Aus- [2] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 73. tralia Oral History, 1992 P13 TRC-2890. [3] M. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, [25] National Archives of Australia A688 1939–1945. Macmillan, London (1964), pp. (A8688/1), Book 14, Council for Scientific 389–393. and Industrial Research Executive Commit- [4] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 100. tee - 14th Minute book 8/12/41 to 25/11/42. [5] Gowing (1964), p. 43. [26] Australian National Archives A8520 [6] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), pp. 95, 100. (A8520/11) PH/OLI/8. [7] Gowing (1964), pp. 45–46. [27] Australian National Archives A1608 (A1608/1) A565/1/2 War Sector. [8] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 102. [28] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 110. [9] Gowing (1964), pp. 394–436. [29] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 111. [10] Gowing (1964), p. 92. [30] Gowing (1964), p. 171. [11] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 103. [31] Oliphant, Marcus Lawrence Elwin Pt3, [12] L. Arnold, A Very Special Relationship: National Archives of Australia A6119 British Atomic Weapons Trials in Australia. (A6119/62) 453. Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London [32] www.info.dfat.gov.au/historical, Volume 6, (1987), p. 3. 258, Bruce to Curtin. [13] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 104. [33] Australian National Archives A6119 [14] R.G. Hewlett and O.E. Anderson Jr, The (A6119/62) 453. New World: A History of the Atomic Energy [34] www.info.dfat.gov.au/historical, Volume 7, Commission, Vol. 1: 1939–1946. University 4, Rivett to White. of California Press, Berkeley (1962), p. 43. [35] www.info.dfat.gov.au/historical, Volume 7, [15] R.G. Hewlett and O.E. Anderson Jr, The 192, Burhop to Rivett. New World: A History of the Atomic Energy [36] Atomic Research Establishment – Eng- Commission, Vol. 1: 1939–1946. University land, National Archives of Australia A 816 of California Press, Berkeley (1962), p. 44. (A816/1) item 3/301/428. [16] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 112. [37] Gowing (1964), p. 281. [17] Atomic Energy- Prof Oliphant’s Memo, Na- [38] Outwards Most Secret, National Archives tional Archives of Australia A3300/7 218. of Australia A3196, 1945, Folder. 22 BINNIE

[39] Atomic Energy Commission, National [49] AAEC establishment and organisation, Archives of Australia A1838 (1838/283) item National Archives of Australia A1209 item 720/1 Part 1. 1957/4723 Part1. [40] National Archives of Australia A 816 [50] Australian National Archives A816/43 item (A816/1) item 3/301/428. 11/301/810. [41] Australian National Archives A1838/283 [51] Australian National Archives A816/43 item 720/1 Part1. 11/301/810. [42] Professor Oliphant, National Archives of Australia A461 (A461/7) BL 340/1/1. [52] Australian Atomic Energy Commission An- [43] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 171. nual Report No 1 (1953), p. 8. [44] Defence Representation on Atomic Energy [53] Cockburn and Ellyard (1991), p. 133. Research Advisory Committee, Australian [54] Australian National Archives A6119 National Archives A5954/69 item 1385/7. (A6119/62) 453. [45] Industrial Atomic Energy Policy Commit- tee, Australian National Archives A816/43 [55] Australian National Archives A6119 item 11/30/810. (A6119/62) 452. [46] Australian National Archives AA A5954/69 [56] Lecture Delivered to the Royal Society of item 1385/7. New South Wales on 1st September 2004 by [47] Australian Atomic Energy Commission An- Dr David Mills, Head of the Solar Energy nual Report No 1 (1953), p. 7. Group, Physics Department, Sydney Univer- [48] Australian National Archives AA A816/43 sity, entitled ‘Low Cost Solar Thermal Elec- item 11/301/810. tricity’.

Anna Binnie History and Philosophy of Science Department The University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW 2052 Australia email: [email protected]

(Manuscript received 22.05.2006, accepted 03.07.2006) Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 23–38, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010023–16 $4.00/1 Ernest Marsden’s Nuclear New Zealand: from Nuclear Reactors to Nuclear Disarmament

rebecca priestley

Abstract: Ernest Marsden was secretary of New Zealand’s Department of Scientific and Industrial Research from 1926 to 1947 and the Department’s scientific adviser in London from 1947 to 1954. Inspired by his early career in nuclear physics, Marsden had a post-war vision for a nuclear New Zealand, where scientists would create radioisotopes and conduct research on a local nuclear reactor, and industry would provide heavy water and uranium for use in the British nuclear energy and weapons programmes, with all these ventures powered by energy from nuclear power stations. During his retirement, however, Marsden conducted research into environmental radioactivity and the impact of radioactive bomb fallout and began to oppose the continued development and testing of nuclear weapons. It is ironic, given his early enthusiasm for all aspects of nuclear development, that through his later work and influence Marsden may have actually contributed to what we now call a ‘nuclear-free’ New Zealand.

Keywords: Ernest Marsden, heavy water, nuclear, New Zealand

INTRODUCTION to nuclear weapons development – which he was happy to support in the 1940s and 1950s In the 1990s, Ross Galbreath established Ernest – changed in his later years. By necessity this Marsden as having been the driving force be- article includes some material already covered hind the involvement of New Zealand scientists by Galbreath and Crawford but it also covers on the Manhattan and Montreal projects, the new ground. The principal sources for this ar- creation of a nuclear sciences team at the De- ticle are the records of the DSIR, External Af- partment of Scientific and Industrial Research fairs Department, and New Zealand Atomic En- (DSIR), and the subsequent plans for a nuclear ergy Committee held at Archives New Zealand reactor in New Zealand [1]. In an article about in Wellington, and Ernest Marsden’s personal New Zealand’s involvement in the British hy- papers held at the Alexander Turnbull Library drogen bomb tests of 1957–58, defence historian in Wellington. Biographical pieces in the his- John Crawford identified Marsden as advising tory of science in some cases overlook the insti- Prime Minister Sidney Holland against allowing tutional and wider social context of science. In the United Kingdom to test hydrogen bombs on the case of the present study, however, which New Zealand territory. Crawford also covered concerns both the very small country of New the joint United Kingdom-New Zealand plans Zealand and a field as focussed as nuclear sci- for the establishment of a heavy water plant ence, the very reverse is true. In this case, to provide raw materials for the British nuclear one person significantly shaped both the insti- energy and nuclear weapons programmes, but tutional setting and the wider social environ- it was outside the scope of his article to cover ment for his science and we learn much about Marsden’s initiation and encouragement of the the context precisely by examining his influence. heavy water project [2]. Ernest Marsden’s wide experience, outspoken- This article focuses on Ernest Marsden ness and apparent capriciousness towards nu- as the brains behind New Zealand’s nuclear clear weapons development makes him an in- schemes in the 1940s and 1950s, adds the con- teresting study, providing some insight into the text of his early work in the radiation and nu- changing attitudes to nuclear development in clear sciences, and examines how his attitude the nation of New Zealand as a whole. 24 PRIESTLEY

ERNEST MARSDEN AND THE NEW PHYSICS

Ernest Marsden was well known in early twentieth-century scientific circles as a result of his hands-on involvement in the birth of nuclear physics. In 1909, Marsden was a 20-year-old un- dergraduate student at Manchester University, under Ernest Rutherford. Marsden had been as- sisting Hans Geiger with experiments in which a beam of alpha particles was scattered after pass- ing through a thin metal foil, and in response to Geiger’s advice that Marsden was now ready for a research project of his own, Rutherford asked Marsden to see if he could get evidence of alpha particles directly reflected from a metal surface. In a now famous experiment, Mars- den observed that instead of passing through, a tiny fraction of alpha particles were deflected straight back from a thin gold foil. Rutherford later described this result as being ‘almost as incredible as if you fired a fifteen-inch shell at a piece of tissue paper and it came back and hit you’. After pondering this result for two years, Rutherford came up with a new theory for the structure of the atom. He proposed an Fig 1. Ernest Marsden, secretary of New atom with a centralised concentration of mass Zealand’s Department of Scientific and Indus- and positive charge – which he called the nu- trial Research from 1926 to 1947. Photo: Sir C. cleus – surrounded by empty space and a sea of Fleming Collection, Reference number F-18564- orbiting negatively-charged electrons [3]. 1/4, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, In 1915, on Rutherford’s recommendation, New Zealand. Marsden came to New Zealand to replace Thomas Laby as Professor of Physics at Victoria Marsden used his characteristic enthusiasm, University College in Wellington. In 1922 Mars- along with his lifelong interest in radiation and den turned from research to bureaucracy. He nuclear sciences, to initiate a number of projects first became Assistant Director of Education, that kept New Zealand in touch with interna- and in 1926 was appointed Secretary of New tional developments in the field. In the late Zealand’s new Department of Scientific and In- 1930s, with a young scientist called Charles dustrial Research, the DSIR. The people who Watson-Munro, he conducted a survey of ra- worked with Marsden at the DSIR described his dioactivity in New Zealand soils in an (unsuc- ‘infectious enthusiasm’ and ‘irrepressible opti- cessful) attempt to establish a connection be- mism’ [4]. As one DSIR staff member said about tween radioactivity and the regional incidence Marsden and his deputy Frank Callaghan, ‘Dr of goitre [6]. He also established a cosmic-ray Marsden spends his time giving the moon away meter at the DSIR’s Magnetic Observatory in and Mr Callaghan spends his time getting it Christchurch [7]. back’ [5]. ERNEST MARSDEN’S NUCLEAR NEW ZEALAND 25

In 1939 Marsden pioneered the non-medical here!’ During the elevator journey Marsden put use of radioisotopes in New Zealand. An an- in a good word for New Zealand’s participation imal wasting disease known as ‘bush sickness’ in the bomb project. He followed this up in Lon- had been found to be linked to a deficiency don with Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the in cobalt. Using a small quantity of radioac- Exchequer. Many of the Commonwealth sci- tive cobalt prepared in Ernest Lawrence’s cy- entists working on the British nuclear research clotron at the University of California Marsden programme had, like Marsden, been students or worked with Watson-Munro on a series of exper- colleagues of Ernest Rutherford and Marsden iments to determine the role of cobalt in animal was able to successfully trade on his reputation metabolism [8]. of being involved in the birth of nuclear physics [10]. THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND Following the necessary protocol, the British NEW ZEALAND’S Government asked New Zealand Prime Min- CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ister Peter Fraser for five New Zealand men MANHATTAN AND MONTREAL to join the British nuclear research team [11]. Robin Williams, a young DSIR physicist, re- PROJECTS called reporting to Wellington in July 1944 to find Ernest Marsden ‘cock-a-hoop about the With the outbreak of the Second World War fact that he had managed to get a number of Marsden was given the title of Director of Scien- New Zealanders in on the atom bomb project’ tific Developments, in which role he was charged [12]. Robin Williams was joined by Bill Young, with mobilizing New Zealand’s scientific man- George Page and Charles Watson-Munro. Their power. Marsden made several wartime trips terms of employment seconded them to the UK to the United Kingdom, mostly to advance DSIR for ‘a period of one year or for the dura- a secret programme to develop radar in New tion of the war, whichever is the longer’. Mars- Zealand. While radar development was initially den was very keen for New Zealand to launch the Allies’ top priority, the United Kingdom and an atomic research programme when the war United States soon began attempts to develop finished and following the secondment the men an atomic bomb [9]. In December 1943, Mars- were required to return to New Zealand for at den was travelling through the United States least one year [13]. In late July 1944 Williams on his way to the United Kingdom where, in and Page arrived in San Francisco to work with Washington DC, he chanced upon James Chad- Ernest Lawrence and Mark Oliphant on the wick (scientific director of the British nuclear re- electromagnetic separation of uranium. Two search project), Mark Oliphant (an Australian other New Zealanders were already working at physicist working on the British nuclear pro- Berkeley, having arrived from the United King- gramme) and Danish physicist Niels Bohr, who dom with the British team [14]. had been smuggled out of Denmark and was travelling under an assumed name. Following In Canada, a team of mostly English and the August 1943 signing of the Quebec Agree- Canadian scientists, led by another Rutherford ment, Chadwick and Oliphant – like Marsden, old-boy, John Cockcroft, had begun a project to they had both worked with Rutherford – were develop a heavy-water nuclear reactor. Watson- in Washington with the top secret task of ar- Munro and Young travelled to Montreal from ranging details of scientific cooperation between New Zealand and Ken George reported directly the United Kingdom and United States’ nuclear to Montreal from his post as the DSIR’s scien- research programmes. Oliphant later recalled tific liaison officer in Washington. As part of the they were in their hotel lobby waiting for the Canadian team, they began work on building a elevator when they felt taps on their shoulders low energy atomic pile, using natural uranium and turned to find Marsden in full military uni- fuel and heavy water as a moderator [15]. Mars- form. They were taken aback to hear Marsden den, as a scientist turned administrator, was say, ‘I can guess why two nuclear physicists are tremendously excited about these new applica- 26 PRIESTLEY tions of nuclear physics and felt stymied and to Nancy Sound, but failed to find any promis- frustrated in his administrative and manage- ing sources of radioactive minerals [22]. rial role. He wrote regularly to the American- In August 1945 the Manhattan Project cul- based scientists, asking, sometimes inappropri- minated in the dropping of atomic bombs on ately, for details of their research. In response to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. In recogni- Cockcroft’s request for three more New Zealand tion of the military and economic importance men, Marsden offered himself, ‘in any direc- of uranium, the New Zealand Atomic Energy tion of work, for any period of time’ [16]. His Act was passed on 7 December 1945 to give the offer was ignored and three more young New State full ownership and control over uranium Zealand scientists were sent to join the Mon- and other radioactive elements, with the Minis- treal team. The New Zealanders in Montreal, ter of Mines having power to control the min- led by Watson-Munro, played a major role in ing and disposal of uranium-bearing rock and the construction of the Zero Energy Experimen- its products [23]. In January 1946 Marsden or- tal Pile, or ZEEP, the first nuclear reactor built ganised a second New Golden Hind expedition outside the United States, which was completed – this one not secret – to complete the initial in September 1945 [17]. survey with a search of the rocks, beaches and gravels in the Southern Sounds from Preserva- tion Inlet up to Thompson Sound. As the only WARTIME URANIUM SURVEY result of the two-year survey, uranium-bearing minerals were found in gold dredge tailings on Unable to participate in the North American the West Coast, but their quantity and concen- nuclear research programme, Marsden directed tration was deemed too small to permit their his enthusiasm to a search for uranium in New economic recovery [24]. Zealand. The United Kingdom had initiated a Commonwealth search for uranium in 1942, but had excluded New Zealand, whose geology A NUCLEAR NEW ZEALAND was not considered promising [18]. In Decem- ber 1943, while on his fruitful trip through the After the war, Marsden started to enact his vi- United States, Marsden had taken matters into sion for a nuclear New Zealand. If he couldn’t his own hands, writing to the Director of New be part of the big science taking place in Eu- Zealand’s Geological Survey to ask him to ini- rope and America he would make it happen at tiate a search for radioactive minerals in the home. In January 1946 Marsden gained Cabinet South Island [19]. The New Zealand War Cab- approval to establish a new team of 10 scientists inet approved funding for the uranium survey at the Dominion Physical Laboratory. Their in July 1944 and a team of DSIR physicists mission was to carry out fundamental and ap- assembled at the Dominion Physical Labora- plied atomic research and advise on atomic en- tory in Wellington to start work on the ura- ergy and the application of isotope techniques nium project [20]. In October 1944, a min- to problems in agriculture, health and indus- ing engineer and a physicist, carrying a Geiger try. The same Cabinet decision allowed for the counter to measure radioactivity, began secretly secondment of physicists, chemists or engineers exploring beach sands along the West Coast of to nuclear organisations in the United Kingdom the South Island, from Karamea to the Moer- and Canada to ensure New Zealand kept up aki River. Surveys of Stewart Island beach and to date with new developments and techniques. river sands, and of beach sands and dredge tail- An annual budget of £19,000 was allocated to ings at Gillespies Beach, followed [21]. In March implement these proposals [25]. 1945, the DSIR chartered the Government ship In 1946 Watson-Munro and three of the New Golden Hind, and the secret uranium sur- other New Zealanders left Canada for the vey was extended. The ship sailed down the newly established United Kingdom Atomic En- South Island’s east coast and around Bluff to ergy Research Establishment in Harwell, while investigate the eight sounds from Milford Sound another three of the New Zealand team re- ERNEST MARSDEN’S NUCLEAR NEW ZEALAND 27 mained in Canada. In the United Kingdom, year to run. The project would use the skills of Watson-Munro took charge of the construction the New Zealand scientists who had worked on of a Graphite Low Energy Experiment Pile, or the North American nuclear programmes and GLEEP, the first nuclear reactor in the United would take one-to-two years to build [32]. The Kingdom, which was completed in August 1947 Minister of Scientific and Industrial Research, [26]. Before returning to New Zealand, Watson- however, was critical of the report, questioning Munro, in consultation with Marsden, submit- the need for a New Zealand pile on the basis that ted a report to the New Zealand Government radioisotopes were available from overseas and on the construction of a low energy atomic pile New Zealand scientists would be best trained in in New Zealand. The pile was recommended more sophisticated offshore facilities [33]. Henry on two grounds: for the production of radioiso- Tizard, scientific advisor to the British Min- topes for industrial and agricultural research; istry of Defence also gave the proposal a luke- and to serve as the nucleus of an atomic re- warm reception, telling Marsden the defence ar- search project [27]. Marsden also believed the guments in favour of the pile were weak [34]. pile would provide a ‘long term contribution to Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, Commonwealth defence’ [28]. In August 1947, sought the opinion of the British Prime Minister based on Marsden and Watson-Munro’s report, on the value of the project [35]. Clement Atlee New Zealand’s newly-established Atomic En- replied favourably, saying the project would be ergy Research Committee recommended the of advantage to the Commonwealth and offering construction of an Australasian low energy pile the assistance of the United Kingdom Govern- in New Zealand [29]. ment [36]. Marsden continued to advocate for construc- In September 1947 Marsden left his position tion of an atomic pile in New Zealand [37]. as secretary of the DSIR to become the DSIR’s But with him being away from New Zealand, Scientific Adviser in London. When Marsden and – despite Atlee’s offer of assistance – with arrived in London, he and Watson-Munro met limited government support for an atomic pile, Lord Portal, head of the Atomic Energy (Re- many of the DSIR’s original nuclear sciences view of Production) Committee, to talk about team moved into other areas of research. Two the Commonwealth atomic pile. They discussed of the New Zealand scientists who had worked the advantages of a small atomic pile in New on ZEEP and GLEEP, Charles Watson-Munro Zealand for research purposes, to be followed up and George Page, eventually moved to the Aus- by a large power production pile in Australia, tralian Atomic Energy Commission Research ‘capable of producing fissile materials suitable Establishment, where Watson-Munro became for the manufacture of atomic bombs’ [30]. On director [38]. The DSIR nuclear sciences team receiving sympathetic responses to the proposal Marsden had established continued, though from both Lord Portal and John Cockcroft, who rather than operating a research reactor they was now director of the Atomic Energy Re- were focusing on measuring environmental ra- search Establishment at Harwell, Marsden was dioactivity, using radioactive tracers, and ex- tremendously excited. He admitted he had ini- perimenting with radiocarbon dating [39]. tially thought the reactor proposal was an ‘am- bitious dream’, but was now convinced it would be ‘a statesmanlike step to take at higher levels HEAVY WATER FOR THE BRITISH with enormous repercussions for the good of our NUCLEAR PROGRAMME country’ [31]. In late 1947, in response to a min- isterial request, Marsden and Watson-Munro From London, while continuing to promote the provided an advisory report, which was agreed construction of a low energy atomic pile [40]. to by John Cockcroft, on the construction and Marsden also encouraged the New Zealand pro- use of an atomic pile in New Zealand. The re- duction of heavy water as a moderator for port recommended a graphite uranium pile cost- British atomic piles [41]. In 1949 Marsden reit- ing £100,000 to construct and up to £35,000 a erated an earlier suggestion to John Cockcroft 28 PRIESTLEY

[42], that New Zealand’s geothermal steam – Staff on 19 March 1954, Sir Norman Brooks, which was being investigated for electricity gen- Secretary to the Cabinet, reported plans to im- eration – could be used to concentrate heavy prove Britain’s capacity to manufacture hydro- water through fractional distillation [43]. Cock- gen bombs by obtaining thorium from South croft was receptive to Marsden’s suggestion and Africa and heavy water from New Zealand [50]. a DSIR scientist, J.A. (Tony) McWilliams, was The next week Marsden was advised that the transferred to Harwell to study the distillation United Kingdom might reopen discussions on of ordinary water to heavy water through use of the heavy water project. Loathe to put the rea- geothermal steam [44]. In March 1952 the New sons for the renewed interest in writing, Mars- Zealand government received formal advice that den cryptically described it to the DSIR secre- the British authorities attached great impor- tary in New Zealand as ‘a very special urgent tance to the development of additional supplies important reason’ [51]. On 23 April 1954, Vis- of heavy water and requested a thorough survey count Swinton, Secretary of State for Common- of its potential production in New Zealand be wealth Relations, advised Sidney Holland that, undertaken as a matter of urgency [45]. Mars- on the basis of new cost and supply information, den continued to encourage the project, liais- the United Kingdom Government now wanted ing between Harwell, the DSIR and the Prime to proceed with the heavy water project but this Minister’s Department. Economic production time attached great importance to maintaining of heavy water by distillation depended on the secrecy [52]. On the same day, Cabinet autho- design of an efficient production plant and the rised Holland to tell the British High Commis- availability of sufficient steam. Distillation ex- sioner that the New Zealand Government was periments continued at Harwell, while in New willing to go forward with the proposed com- Zealand, the DSIR focussed on assessing the bined heavy water and electricity plant in the availability of geothermal steam and its cor- Wairakei geothermal area [53]. While Marsden, rosive properties and conducting heat transfer in London, knew of the secret plans to develop tests [46]. On a visit to New Zealand in Septem- a hydrogen bomb and of its links to the heavy ber 1952 John Cockcroft met with Cabinet and water plant, it is unclear how widely this was the Defence Science (Policy) Committee and known in New Zealand. A report on the revived made it clear the British wanted heavy water heavy water plans in a Prime Minister’s Depart- not just to use as a moderator in atomic piles, ment file deduced from official statements and they were also interested in it from a ‘defence press reports that the project was now focused research angle’ [47]. more on civil development of atomic power and less on defence requirements [54]. In May 1953 the New Zealand Cabinet ap- proved in principle the construction of a joint By July 1954, moreover, this surmise proved New Zealand/United Kingdom combined heavy correct. When the British cabinet formally water and electricity generating plant [48]. The decided to proceed with building a hydrogen focus now moved to determining the economics bomb, heavy water was abandoned in favour of of the project and the nature of the agreement other materials [55]. But revised cost estimates between New Zealand and the United Kingdom. from American sources meant New Zealand In December 1953, however, the British High heavy water was again considered attractive Commissioner in Wellington informed Prime for the United Kingdom’s nuclear reactor pro- Minister Sidney Holland that the Atomic En- grammes and in February 1955 Geothermal De- ergy Board in the United Kingdom had decided velopments Ltd, whose shareholders were the that it could no longer recommend British par- New Zealand Government and the United King- ticipation in the project, citing the possibility dom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), was that the United States might soon be offering formed to produce electricity and heavy water heavy water at ‘a keen price’ [49]. In March at Wairakei. Marsden, who had retired from 1954 the heavy water project was briefly re- the public service at the end of July 1954 and vived. At a meeting of the British Chiefs of returned to New Zealand, was appointed tech- ERNEST MARSDEN’S NUCLEAR NEW ZEALAND 29 nical adviser to the Board [56]. The Ministry Strait cable, which was also being considered of Works would be responsible for constructing [66]. Not everyone shared his enthusiasm for the the planned plant, which aimed to be ready for nuclear option, however, and in 1956 Marsden heavy water production by 30 June 1957, and told the Dominion newspaper that those who for electricity production a year later [57]. De- were holding New Zealand back from nuclear sign work proceeded to the stage where prices power were ‘lazy-minded conservative diehards for equipment, materials and labour could be who are afraid of change’ who were afraid that accurately estimated but this doubled the cost nuclear science had become ‘a malevolent, un- of the plant, raising the cost of the heavy wa- cultured arbiter of our destiny instead of the ter it would produce from £44,000 to £90,000 traditional servant of the industrial revolution’ per ton [58] and in January 1956 the UKAEA [67]. Marsden’s enthusiasm for things nuclear, advised that, faced with the projected price in- however, had limits, and following revelations creases, they felt forced to withdraw from the about world-wide radioactive fallout from nu- project [59]. Plans were revised to construct a clear bomb tests, he began his own research into larger power station to absorb the steam, which the effects of fallout in New Zealand and the would no longer be needed for heavy water pro- Pacific Islands, and in a small way – through duction [60]. his advice to Prime Ministers Sidney Holland and Keith Holyoake – he actually helped to keep New Zealand ‘nuclear free’. RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT AND By 1955 the United Kingdom needed New NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE Zealand’s help for another aspect of their nu- PACIFIC clear programme. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies had ruled out the testing of hy- Marsden had a very active retirement – as well drogen bombs on or near the Australian main- as conducting his own research, he was a mem- land so when the United Kingdom began plans ber, and later chairman, of the Defence Scien- to test the hydrogen-bomb, a new test range tific Advisory Committee. He was a member of had to be found. Scientists from the Aldermas- New Zealand’s Atomic Energy Committee, set ton weapons development laboratory estimated up in 1958 to advise on New Zealand’s activi- the site should be at least 500 miles from inhab- ties in atomic affairs, including the organisation ited land or shipping lanes. The best options and administration of the DSIR’s new Institute were considered to be ‘various remote islands or of Nuclear Sciences [61]. He was part of the New the icy wilderness of Antarctica’ [68]. The Ker- Zealand delegation to the 1958 International madec Islands, a New Zealand territory some Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic En- 1000 km north-east of New Zealand (and now ergy [62]. Marsden encouraged the government part of New Zealand’s largest marine reserve), support of uranium prospecting that began in was chosen as the most promising site. In May 1954 and at the second reading of the 1957 1955 Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Min- Atomic Energy Amendment Act, which dealt ister, contacted Sidney Holland to request the with the search for uranium, the Minister of use of the Kermadec Islands for the bomb tests. Health took the opportunity to speak on Mars- Eden described how the weapons could be ei- den’s role in the birth of nuclear physics [63]. ther exploded on one of the islands from a tower, His speech was later discussed in Cabinet, after or fired in a ship anchored near an island, and which Marsden was recommended for a knight- asked if Holland would agree in principle to the hood [64]. Marsden became Sir Ernest Marsden weapons trials so the United Kingdom could in- in 1958 [65]. vestigate the site further. Eden concluded by Throughout the 1950s, Marsden continued expressing his earnest ‘hope that, in the in- to recommend the construction of a research terests of our common defence effort and the reactor in New Zealand while also advocating importance of the deterrent for Commonwealth nuclear power as a cheaper option than a Cook Strategy, you will find it possible to agree’ [69]. 30 PRIESTLEY

Fig 2. Source: Auckland Star, 27 April 1956.

Holland was wary of the British request Without bluntly advising Holland to refuse and took note of negative publicity surround- the request Marsden suggested the Auckland Is- ing earlier newspaper reports of British plans lands, some 320 kilometres south-south-west of to test in Antarctica. He sought the opinion New Zealand, as a preferable alternative to the of Ernest Marsden, who advised Holland that Kermadecs [70]. while an isolated island in the Pacific was ‘a log- ical choice’ for the proposed weapons test, the On 15 July 1955 Holland warned the British Kermadec Islands were not necessarily the best High Commissioner in Wellington that the use option. He acknowledged the weather was suit- of the Kermadecs for nuclear tests would be able but noted the presence of occasional ships a ‘political H-bomb’ in New Zealand – not and aircraft in the area and reminded Holland of least because they would take place in an elec- the Japanese fishermen who suffered radiation tion year – and declined the British request sickness – one died – after their boat was un- [71]. Eden expressed his disappointment at Hol- intentionally stationed 135 kilometres from the land’s refusal, reiterating the importance of the United States’s first hydrogen bomb detonation planned trials to the ‘defence of the free world’ at Bikini Atoll on 1 March 1954. Marsden ac- and advising that if Britain did not find a suit- knowledged the Government might on the one able alternative he might be compelled to ask hand feel a ‘moral obligation’ to cooperate with Holland to reconsider the matter [72]. Britain the British request but on the other hand might looked for a new site and in 1956 eventually ‘feel that the sacrifice and difficulties in the use settled on Christmas Island and Malden Island of the Kermadecs is questionable’. (now part of the Republic of Kiribati). ERNEST MARSDEN’S NUCLEAR NEW ZEALAND 31

While not offering New Zealand territory grown on the island to be up to 100 times nor- for the tests, Holland still supported them in mal [80]. His findings caused quite a stir inter- principal. New Zealand was happy to assist nationally, with the popular press picking up on the United Kingdom with logistical support for Marsden’s assertions that Niueans were a mas- the bomb tests and in May 1956, when three ter race. Not only were they taller, much hap- Labour MPs asked if Holland would protest pier and less prone to disease than other races, at the continuation of nuclear bomb tests in he was reported to have said, selective breeding the Pacific. Holland replied that ‘the devel- had led to the population building up a resis- opment of this branch of the nuclear sciences tance to radiation which would be advantageous must continue’ and ‘periodic tests are essential in the event of a nuclear war [81]. Despite crit- to this work’ [73]. In a later statement he added icism of his theory, Marsden persisted, stating ‘New Zealand will be helping to ensure that the in 1962, ‘My contention that the people of Niue United Kingdom remains in the forefront in the Island would be better off in a nuclear war than field of nuclear research’ [74]. the rest of us is a good story and I’m sticking to it!’ [82]. RETIREMENT PROJECTS ON Another of Marsden’s high profile projects RADIOACTIVITY was his investigations into the radioactivity of tobacco. By the 1960s, links between cigarette At about the same time that he was advising smoking and lung cancer had been established. Holland against allowing the United Kingdom Marsden saw the striking increase in British to test hydrogen bombs in the Kermadec Is- deaths from lung cancer as being possibly linked lands, Marsden was beginning his own research to increased imports of Southern Rhodesian to- into the biological effects of background radia- bacco, which he had found to have high levels of tion. In his retirement he worked up to six days polonium-related radioactivity [83]. In 1965, at a week, from either his attic laboratory at his Marsden’s request, the DSIR’s chemistry divi- home, or as a guest worker at the DSIR’s Do- sion developed a new type of cigarette filter to minion Physical Laboratory or the Royal Can- reduce the amount of polonium inhaled when cer Hospital in London [75]. He was passionate smoking cigarettes [84]. about this new line of work, telling a colleague Despite his seemingly eccentric scientific ‘I wish I could start my career again and work pursuits, Marsden maintained his international on these radiobiological problems’ [76]. Mars- scientific connections and was held in high re- den liked an audience and received a lot of press gard by the physics community. While working coverage – he sometimes talked up the effects of on his retirement projects he corresponded with radiation from bomb tests and sometimes mini- some of the top Commonwealth nuclear scien- malised them, pointing out radiation levels from tists – including John Cockcroft and William fallout were very low in comparison to natural Penney in the United Kingdom, and Charles background radiation [77]. He rightly, however, Watson-Munro in Australia – using his connec- said the effects of radiation from bomb fallout tions to call in favours for advice or equipment were not fully understood and deserved further that may otherwise have been difficult to obtain. study [78]. Much of Marsden’s research was in- In return, Marsden was known to send eminent teresting and unusual and attracted coverage in scientists parcels of New Zealand lamb, to arrive the daily press. His most publicised findings just in time for Christmas [85]. In 1961 he was came from his research into Niue Island, where invited to be President of the Rutherford Ju- a DSIR Soil Bureau study had showed the is- bilee International Conference in Manchester, a land’s soil had unusually high levels of radioac- gathering of 500 of the world’s leading physicists tivity [79]. This prompted Marsden to further to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the research and he found the radioactivity of food discovery of the atomic nucleus [86]. 32 PRIESTLEY

A ‘NUCLEAR-FREE’ NEW lack of investment in defence science, including ZEALAND? telling Prime Minister Keith Holyoake that New Zealand had been ‘grossly discourteous and neg- ligent of opportunities to help Britain’ in this In 1959, by which time the United Kingdom area [90]; a reference to New Zealand’s contin- had completed its nuclear testing programme ued failure to construct an atomic pile [91]. in Australia and the Pacific, Marsden began speaking out against the testing of nuclear But why, at the same time as implicating weapons. He highlighted the worldwide increase New Zealand in the United Kingdom’s failure in radioactive fallout resulting from Russian and to keep up with the arm’s race, was Mars- American nuclear tests and told the Auckland den speaking out against nuclear weapons? As Star ‘the time has come for an absolute stand- journalist Tony Reid described in a newspa- still on such atomic explosions to give time for a per profile of Marsden, his attitudes to nu- proper assessment of the damage already done clear weapons development were, ‘ambiguous to us and to our children even yet unborn’ [87]. and sometimes contradictory’ [92]. It is pos- This wasn’t the first time Marsden had pub- sible that despite his initial personal misgiv- licly opposed nuclear weapons. Following the ings about the post-war development of nu- Second World War he had supported the 1946 clear weapons, Marsden’s loyalty to Britain, Baruch Plan, which called for international in- along with the close involvement of many of spection of all nuclear-related facilities to en- his friends and former colleagues in the British sure they were not working on atomic weapons nuclear programmes, caused him to push these and stipulated that the United States dispose misgivings aside. Marsden was easily seduced of its atomic weapons, stop all weapons work by science – as demonstrated by his willing- and turn over its atomic energy knowledge to ness in early 1945 to leave his position as head the United Nations. In a 1947 speech, Mars- of the DSIR to take a junior physicist’s role den, who advocated atomic energy as being of on the North American nuclear programme – ‘untold benefit to the world’ said that it was and the development of nuclear weapons was not, however, safe to develop atomic energy on at the forefront of scientific and technological a world-wide scale until there was a practical development. Once the British nuclear test- and enforceable agreement that it would not ing programme was concluded, therefore, and be used for atomic bombs [88]. No such agree- with evidence of increased environmental ra- ment was put in place and his stated views on dioactivity resulting from bomb fallout, Mars- atomic weapons seem to conflict with his con- den had no hesitation in publicly opposing nu- current plans for development of a nuclear re- clear weapons. actor in New Zealand, which he promoted as After a number of anti-nuclear statements to being of defence significance to the Common- the media from 1959 onwards, Marsden began wealth. They also conflicted with his support, communicating his anti-nuclear weapons sen- in the early 1950s, of British plans to develop timents to Prime Minister Keith Holyoake in nuclear weapons, and his enthusiasm for New 1961 [93]. Then in 1963, when the French an- Zealand to assist the British nuclear programme nounced their proposal to move their test site to by constructing a nuclear reactor, and providing the South Pacific, Marsden advocated, in a let- heavy water and uranium. ter to Holyoake, a nuclear-bomb free Southern After the British nuclear programme was Hemisphere. He pointed out that fallout from concluded in 1958, Marsden declared that New nuclear bomb tests had so far impacted more Zealand was partly to blame for the Common- on the Northern Hemisphere than the South- wealth ‘falling miserably behind in nuclear de- ern, and called on Holyoake to announce that velopment’. If there was a third nuclear power, New Zealand would not provide any assistance Marsden declared, there would be no ‘bombing to countries carrying out bomb tests in the competition’ between Russia and America [89]. Southern Hemisphere, and suggested he call on Marsden continued to criticise New Zealand’s other Southern Hemisphere countries to do the ERNEST MARSDEN’S NUCLEAR NEW ZEALAND 33 same [94]. In May 1963 the New Zealand Gov- radioactive fallout from nuclear bomb tests, and ernment formally protested to the French Gov- the potential biological effects of environmental ernment over their preparations for a nuclear radiation, and in so doing helped to encourage test at Gambier Island [95]. Later that year the country on a path to what we now call a New Zealand being the first country, after the ‘nuclear free’ New Zealand. United States, United Kingdom and USSR, to ratify the Partial Test Ban Treaty, demonstrat- ing, in Holyoake’s words, New Zealand’s ‘desire to see an end to nuclear tests that are likely to give rise to contamination of the atmosphere’ [96]. While focussing on his research into envi- ronmental radioactivity, Marsden continued to speak out against nuclear weapons development and testing. On a visit to South Africa Mars- den described the hydrogen bomb as ‘the most striking example of the possibilities of misuse of modern scientific knowledge’ [97]. In June 1965 he told Salient, the Victoria University student newspaper, ‘we must do what we can to stop nuclear warfare. We must do what we can to promote nuclear disarmament’ [98]. In 1966, the year France began testing nuclear bombs in the Pacific, a stroke left Marsden confined to a wheelchair, and in December 1970, at the age of 81, he died.

CONCLUSION

In 1985, 15 years after Marsden’s death, New Zealand gained international attention for its Fig 3. Sir Ernest Marsden in June 1961, on nuclear-free policy, which was enshrined in leg- board the Sydney Star at Bluff, New Zealand, islation two years later. By 1970, however, testing the radioactivity of a sample of seawa- the year of Marsden’s death, New Zealand was ter. Photo: Reference number F-153607-1/2, already on a path to being nuclear free. In Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New 1968 the New Zealand Government had rati- Zealand. fied the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu- clear Weapons, and was now making diplomatic ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS protests over French tests in the Pacific, mon- itoring fallout in the South Pacific, and work- This paper was researched as part of a PhD ing internationally towards disarmament [99]. thesis supported by a University of Canterbury Ernest Marsden, who had a significant role in Doctoral Scholarship, and was completed dur- establishing and encouraging nuclear science in ing a residency at the Stout Research Centre New Zealand, had a lesser-known role speaking for New Zealand Studies at Victoria University out about against nuclear weapons development of Wellington. It was first presented as a pa- and testing. Through his advice to Prime Min- per at the Australasian Association for the His- isters Holland and Holyoake, and through his tory, Philosophy and Social Studies of Sciences regular public lectures and statements to the conference in Dunedin in December 2005. For media, he alerted the country to the extent of feedback on a draft of this article, and on earlier 34 PRIESTLEY thesis content that contributed to this article, I [10] Margaret Gowing, Britain and atomic en- am indebted to my PhD supervisors at the Uni- ergy, 1939–1945, London, Macmillan & Co versity of Canterbury, Dr Philip Catton (philos- Ltd, 1964, pp. 247–249; Sir Ernest Marsden ophy), Professor John Hearnshaw (physics) and 80th birthday book, pp. 101–103. Associate Professor Philippa Mein Smith (his- [11] World War II narrative no. 9, Atomic En- tory). ergy, AAOQ, W3424 (box 16), ANZ. [12] Robin Williams, Reflections on my involve- ment in the Manhattan Project, seminar at REFERENCES Victoria University, 10 August 2001. [13] Terms of employment memos, 19 July 1944, References given in the text are listed below nu- SIR1, W1414, 74/10, ANZ; World War II nar- merically. Following this, lists of primary and rative no. 9, Atomic Energy, AAOQ, W3424 secondary sources are provided. (box 16), ANZ. [1] Ross Galbreath, ‘The Rutherford connec- [14] Page to Marsden, 19 September 1944, SIR1, tion: New Zealand scientists and the Manhat- W1414, 74/10, ANZ; Gowing 1964, p. 258. tan and Montreal projects’, War in History The other two New Zealanders were R.R. 2, 3 (1995), pp. 306–319; Ross Galbreath, Nimmo and Maurice Wilkins (later to win a DSIR: Making science work for New Zealand, Nobel Prize for his role in the discovery of Wellington, Victoria University Press, 1998. DNA’s double-helix structure). [2] John Crawford, ‘”A political H-bomb”: [15] Gowing 1964, pp. 275–280; SIR1, W1414, New Zealand and the British thermonuclear 74/10, ANZ. weapon tests of 1957–58’, The Journal of [16] Marsden to Cockcroft, 26 March 1945, Imperial and Commonwealth History, 26, 1 SIR1, W1414, 74/10, ANZ. (1998), pp. 127–150. [17] C.N. Watson-Munro, in Sir Ernest Marsden [3] Ernest Rutherford, ‘The development of the 80th birthday book, p. 103–4; SIR1, W1414, theory of atomic structure’, in Joseph Need- 74/10, ANZ. ham and Walter Pagel (eds), Background to [18] Gowing 1964, p. 297. modern science, London, Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1938, pp. 61–74 (quote from p. 68); [19] Retold in Marsden to Hon. D.G. Sullivan, Ernest Marsden, ‘Rutherford at Manchester’, 6 July 1944, SIR1, W1414, 74/10, ANZ. in J.B. Birks (ed) Rutherford at Manchester, [20] Marsden to Hon. D.G. Sullivan, 6 July London, Heywood and Company, 1962, pp. 1944, SIR1, W1414, 74/10, ANZ; Marsden to 7–11. Hon. Minister of SIR, 17 October 1945, SIR1, [4] Marsden Booklet Editorial Panel, Sir Ernest W1414, 74/2/4, ANZ. Marsden 80th birthday book, Wellington, [21] Author’s interview with Jim McCahon, A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1969, pp. 33, 57, 81. Wellington, 16 October 2002; D.S. Nicholson, [5] W.M. Hamilton in Sir Ernest Marsden 80th Comprehensive report on survey for radioac- birthday book, p. 99. tive minerals, EA2, (box 1948/6b), 111/18/3, [6] E. Marsden and C. Watson-Munro, ‘Ra- part 1, ANZ. dioactivity of New Zealand Soils and Rocks’, [22] D.S. Nicholson, Comprehensive report on New Zealand Journal of Science and Technol- survey for radioactive minerals, EA2, (box ogy (NZJST), 26, 3B (1944), pp. 99–114. 1948/6b), 111/18/3, part 1, ANZ. [7] New Zealand Appendices to the Journals [23] Atomic Energy Act, New Zealand Statutes, of the House of Representatives (NZAJHR) 1945, pp. 364–370. 1936, Vol. 3, H-34, p. 108. [24] Nicholson 1955; D.S. Nicholson, Compre- [8] SIR1, 20/4/2, Archives New Zealand, hensive report on survey for radioactive min- Wellington (ANZ). erals, EA2, (box 1948/6b), 111/18/3, part 1, [9] Galbreath 1998, pp. 109–139. ANZ. ERNEST MARSDEN’S NUCLEAR NEW ZEALAND 35

[25] Cabinet approval dated 25 January 1946, [41] Marsden to Callaghan, 6 September 1951, noted on 17 December 1945 recommendation, MS papers 1342-001; Holland to Marsden, 30 EA2, (box 1948/6B), 111/18/3, part 1, ANZ. July 1954, MS-Papers 1342-002, Alexander [26] C.N. Watson-Munro in Sir Ernest Marsden Turnbull Library, Wellington (ATL). 80th Birthday Book, pp. 103–4. [42] Cockcroft and Marsden had discussed this [27] Report on Atomic Energy (not dated) EA1, possibility as early as January 1946. Mars- W2619, 121/2/1, part 1, ANZ. den to Cockcroft, 15 January 1946, MS pa- pers 1342-055, ATL. [28] Draft memorandum by Marsden, 18 September 1947 and A.G. Osborne to Sec- [43] Marsden to Watson-Munro, 20 October retary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1949; Watson-Munro to Marsden, 7 Novem- 26 September 1947, AAOQ, W3424, 74/20/- ber 1949; AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, (1947–55), ANZ. Vol. 1(a), ANZ. [29] Minutes of meeting of Atomic Energy Re- [44] D.W. Fry to Marsden, 14 August 1951, search Committee, 26 August 1947, SIR1, AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, Vol 1(a), 74/13/1, ANZ. ANZ. [30] Watson-Munro to Shanahan, 17 Septem- [45] Letter from Office of the High Commis- ber 1948, EA, W2619, 121/2/1, part 1, ANZ; sioner for the UK in Wellington, 17 March Margaret Gowing, Independence and deter- 1952, AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/, Vol. rence: Britain and atomic energy 1945–1952: 1(a), ANZ. Volume 1, Policy making, London, Macmil- [46] A.D. McIntosh to Office of High Commis- lan, 1974, p. 36. sioner for the UK, 13 June 1952, AAOQ, [31] Marsden to Shanahan, 11 December 1947, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, Vol 1(a), ANZ; J.A. AAOQ, W3424, 74/20/- (1948–49), ANZ. McWilliams’s report on Harwell secondment, n.d. but c. June 1953, AAOQ, W3424 (box [32] Marsden and Watson-Munro, An atomic 5), 74/22/-, Vol. 2, ANZ. pile for New Zealand, AAOQ, W3424, 74/20/-(1947–55), ANZ. [47] Minutes of the 16th Meeting of the Defence Science (Policy) Committee, 9 October 1952, [33] Callaghan to Marsden, 28 January 1948, AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, Vol. 1(b), AAOQ, W3424, 74/20/- (1947–55), ANZ. ANZ. While in New Zealand Cockcroft also [34] Tizard to Marsden, 21 April 1948, AAOQ, raised the question as to the availability of W3424, 74/20/- (1947–55), ANZ; Gowing bulk supply of electricity for use in a uranium 1974, p. 33. enrichment plant. [35] Peter Fraser to Clement Attlee, 11 Au- [48] Foss Shanahan to Acting Prime Minister, 19 gust 1948, AAOQ, W3424, 74/20/- (1947– May 1953, AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, 55), ANZ. Vol. 2, ANZ. [36] Clement Attlee to Peter Fraser, 30 Septem- [49] Geoffrey Scoones to Sidney Holland, 11 De- ber 1948, EA, W2619, 121/2/1, part 1, ANZ. cember 1953, ABHS 950, W5422 (box 166), [37] Marsden to Shanahan, 10 February 1948, 111/18/3/1, part 1, ANZ. AAOQ, W3424, 74/20/- (1947–55), ANZ. [50] Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-bomb, [38] Galbreath 1998, p155; C.N. Watson-Munro Houndsmills, New York, Palgrave, 2001, pp. in Sir Ernest Marsden 80th birthday book, 40–45. pp. 103–4. [51] Marsden to Hamilton, 24 March 1954, [39] Galbreath 1998, pp. 156–165. AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, part 3, [40] See, for example, Notes for Prime Minister ANZ. in connection with visit to Harwell, 17 De- [52] Viscount Swinton to Holland, 23 April 1954, cember 1948, EA, W2619, 121/2/1, part 1, ABHS 950, W5422 (box 166), 111/18/3/1, ANZ. ANZ. 36 PRIESTLEY

[53] Note of Cabinet meeting on 23 April 1954 [68] Lorna Arnold, ‘A very special relationship: in ABHS 950, W5422 (box 166), 111/18/3/1, British atomic weapon trials in Australia’, ANZ. London, HMSO, 1987, pp. 101–102; Arnold [54] Report on heavy water, 7 May 1954, ABHS 2001, p. 95. 950, W5422 (box 166), 111/18/3/1, part 1, [69] Eden to Holland, 18 May 1955, ABHS 950, ANZ. W4627 (box 3544), 121/5/2, part 2, ANZ. [55] Arnold 2001, p. 59. [70] Marsden to Holland, 10 July 1955, ABHS 950, W4627 (box 3544), 121/5/2, part 2, [56] The Dominion, 23 February 1955, ABHS ANZ. 950, W5422 (box 166), 111/18/3/1, ANZ. [71] Arnold 2001, p. 96; Crawford 1988, p. 133. [57] Summary of Draft Heads of Agreement Between UK and NZ, ABHS 950, W4627, [72] Eden to Holland, 2 September 1955, ABHS 121/2/2, part 2, ANZ. 950, W4627 (box 3544), 121/5/2, part 2, ANZ [73] NZPD, Vol 308, 1956, pp. 574–5. [58] F.M. Hanson, Commissioner of Works, to Prime Minister, 18 May 1956, ABHS 950, [74] Press statement, 28 May 1956, ABHS 950, W4627, 121/2/2, part 2, ANZ. W4627 (box 3544), 121/5/2, part 2, ANZ. [59] UKAEA to Finance Minister and Geother- [75] W.M. Hamilton to Marsden, 7 March 1957, mal Developments Ltd, 19 January 1956, MS papers 1342-005, ATL; Marsden to L. ABHS 950, W4627, 121/2/2, part 2, ANZ. Farrer Brown, 28 March 1960, MS papers 1342-010, ATL; L.S. Hearnshaw in Sir Ernest [60] F.M. Hanson, Commissioner of Works, to Marsden 80th Birthday Book, p. 75; Ernest Prime Minister, 18 May 1956, ABHS 950, Marsden curriculum vitae in Sir Ernest Mars- W4627, 121/2/2, part 2, ANZ. den 80th Birthday Book, p. 12. [61] Press statement on NZAEC, 9 July 1958, [76] Ethel W. Wood, in Sir Ernest Marsden 80th ABLP, W4215, 1/1, part 1, ANZ. birthday book, p. 25. [62] W.M. Hamilton’s Report on the Second UN [77] See, for example, newspaper clippings in Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic MS papers 1342-378, MS papers 1342-379, Energy, 10 February 1959, ED1, W2673, ATL. 20/0/22/5, part 2, ANZ. [78] See, for example, Evening Post and the [63] New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Dominion 6 June 1962, MS papers 1342-379, (NZPD), 1957, Vol. 311, pp. 684–686. For ATL. an account of New Zealand’s government- [79] M. Fieldes, ‘Radioactivity of Niue Island supported uranium prospecting programme, Soils’, New Zealand Soil News, 3 (1959), pp. see Rebecca Priestley, The search for uranium 116–120, MS papers 1342-270, ATL. on the West Coast of New Zealand 1940s- [80] Marsden to Dr S. Biesheuvel, 18 August 1970s, New Zealand Geographer, 2006 (in 1960, MS papers 1342-011, ATL. press). [81] E. Marsden, ‘Radioactivity of soils, plants [64] J.R. Hanan, in Sir Ernest Marsden 80th and bones’, Nature, 187, 4733 (1960), pp. Birthday Book, p. 129. 192–195; Daily Express (Sydney), 12 April [65] Nature, 181, 4602 (1958), p. 86. 1961, MS papers 1342-377, ATL. [66] See, for example, Memo from Marsden to [82] The Dominion, 17 April 1962, MS papers Cabinet Sub-committee (not specified which, 1342-381, ATL. but probably Atomic Energy), December [83] Ernest Marsden, ‘Some aspects of the rela- 1956, MS papers 1342-328, ATL; The Domin- tionship of radioactivity to lung cancer, New ion, 11 September 1957, MS papers 1342-387, Zealand Medical Journal, 64, 395 (1965), pp. ATL. 367–376. [67] The Dominion, 18 February 1956, EA1, [84] The Dominion, 15 October 1965, MS papers W2619, 121/2/1, part 1, ANZ. 1342-377, ATL. ERNEST MARSDEN’S NUCLEAR NEW ZEALAND 37

[85] For example, in December 1962 Marsden Primary Sources sent lamb to John Cockcroft, Nobel Prize winner and ex-director of the UK Atomic En- 1. Administrative archives: Archives New ergy Research Establishment at Harwell and Zealand/Te Whare Tohu Tuhituhinga O J.S. Mitchell of the University of Cambridge. Aotearoa, Head Office, Wellington Cockcroft to Marsden, 21 December 1962 and AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/-/-, Atomic energy, Mitchell to Marsden, 29 December 1962, MS general, 1944–50. papers 1342-015, ATL. [86] John B. Birks in Sir Ernest Marsden 80th AAOQ, W3424, 74/20/-, Atomic energy, con- Birthday Book, p. 26. struction of ‘pile’ in New Zealand, 1947–55. [87] Auckland Star, 8 May 1959, MS papers AAOQ, W3424, 74/20/-, Atomic energy, con- 1342-386, ATL. struction of ‘pile’ in New Zealand, 1948–49. [88] E. Marsden, The Atomic Age, unpublished AAOQ, W3424 (box 16), World War II Narra- talk to National Dairy Association of New tive 9, Atomic energy. Zealand in 1947, MS papers 1342-269, ATL. AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, Atomic [89] Evening Post, 6 June 1962, MS papers 1342- physics, production of heavy water, Vol. 1(a). 379, ATL. AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, Atomic [90] Marsden to Holyoake, 14 January 1963, MS physics, production of heavy water, Vol. 1(b). papers 1342-016, ATL. AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, Atomic [91] In the 1948 report on amplification of rea- physics, production of heavy water, Vol. 2. sons for an atomic pile in New Zealand, Mars- AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, Atomic den, in response to a query on the cost of physics, production of heavy water, Vol. 3. building an atomic pile in New Zealand, said ABHS 950, W4627 (box 3544), 121/5/2, Atomic ‘New Zealand is not contributing her share energy, general, part 2, 1954–56. to either defence science or atomic energy in the Commonwealth’; AAOQ, W3424, 74/20/- ABHS 950, W4627, 121/2/2, Atomic energy, re- (1947–55), ANZ. search in New Zealand, Wairakei heavy water [92] Newspaper clipping, n.d. but ca 1964, and project, part 2, 1956–72. paper not identified in MS papers 1342-387, ABHS 950, W5422 (box 166), 111/18/3/1, ATL. Atomic energy, heavy water, 1952–55. [93] Marsden to Holyoake, 23 December 1961, ABLP, W4215, 1/1, NZAEC, Formation, organ- MS papers 1342-014, ATL isation, policy, part 1. [94] Marsden to Holyoake, 16 March 1963, MS EA, W2619, 121/2/1, Atomic energy research papers 1342-016, ATL. in New Zealand, part 1, 1948–49. [95] New Zealand External Affairs Review, 13, EA1, W2619, 121/1/1, Atomic energy, general, 5 (1963), pp. 25–26. part 1. [96] NZPD, Vol 337, 1963, pp. 2695–6. EA2, (box 1948/6B), 111/18/3, Atomic re- [97] Newspaper clipping, publication not identi- search in New Zealand, part 1. fied, n.d., but possibly 1961, MS papers 1342- ED1, W2673, 20/0/22/5, Atomic power, part 2. 387, ATL. [98] Salient, 29 June 1965, MS papers 1342-386, SIR1, 20/4/2, Radioactivity, artificial. ATL. SIR1, 74/13/1, Radioisotopes committee circu- [99] Kevin Clements, Back from the brink: lars. The creation of a nuclear-free New Zealand, SIR1, W1414, 74/10, Atomic energy team. Wellington, Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson SIR1, W1414, 74/2/4, Second Golden Hind ex- Press, 1988, pp. 59–62. pedition. 38 PRIESTLEY

2. Manuscripts and personal papers: Alexander 5. Personal interviews and accounts Turnbull Library, Wellington Jim McCahon, author’s interview, Wellington, Ernest Marsden’s personal papers, specifically 16 October 2002. MS papers 1342-001; MS papers 1342-002; Robert (Robin) Williams, Reflections on my in- MS papers 1342-005; MS papers 1342-010; volvement in the Manhattan Project, seminar MS papers 1342-011; MS Papers 1342-014; at Victoria University, 10 August 2001. MS papers 1342-015; MS papers 1342-016; MS papers 1342-055, MS papers 1342-270; Secondary Sources MS papers 1342-269; MS papers 1342-328, ATL; MS papers 1342-377; MS papers 1342- Arnold, L. A very special relationship: British 378; MS papers 1342-379; MS papers 1342- atomic weapon trials in Australia, London, 381; MS papers 1342-386; MS papers 1342- HMSO, 1987. 387. Arnold, L. Britain and the H-bomb, Houndsmills, New York, Palgrave, 2001. 3. Official records Clements, Kevin. Back from the brink: The cre- ation of a nuclear-free New Zealand, Welling- New Zealand Statutes, 1945. New Zealand Par- ton, Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, liamentary Debates, 1956, Vol. 308; 1957, 1988. Vol. 311; 1963, Vol. 337. New Zealand Ap- Crawford, J. ‘A political H-bomb’: New pendices to the Journals of the House of Rep- Zealand and the British thermonuclear resentatives, 1936, Vol. 3, H-34. weapon tests of 1957–58, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 26, 1 4. Books and journal articles (1998), pp. 127–150. Marsden Booklet Editorial Panel, Sir Ernest Galbreath, R. The Rutherford connection: New Marsden 80th Birthday Book, Wellington, Zealand scientists and the Manhattan and A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1969. Montreal projects, War in History 2, 3 (1995), Marsden, E. and Watson-Munro, C. ‘Radioac- pp. 306–319. tivity of New Zealand Soils and Rocks’, Galbreath, R. DSIR: Making science work for NZJST, 26, 3B (1944), pp. 99–114. New Zealand, Wellington, Victoria University Marsden, E. Radioactivity of soils, plants and Press, 1998. bones, Nature, 187, 4733 (1960), pp. 192–195. Galbreath, R. Marsden, Ernest 1889 – Marsden, E. Rutherford at Manchester, in J.B. 1970. Dictionary of New Zealand Bi- Birks (ed) Rutherford at Manchester, Lon- ography, updated 7 July 2005, URL: don, Heywood and Company, 1962, pp. 7–11. http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/. Marsden, E. Some aspects of the relationship Gowing, M. Britain and atomic energy, 1939– of radioactivity to lung cancer, New Zealand 1945, London, Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1964. Medical Journal, 64, 395 (1965), pp. 367–376. Gowing, M. Independence and deterrence: Nature, 181, 4602 (1958), p. 86. Britain and atomic energy 1945–1952: Vol- New Zealand External Affairs Review, 13, 5 ume 1 Policy making, London, Macmillan, (1963), pp. 25–26. 1974. Nicholson, D.S. Wartime Search for Uranium, New Zealand Journal of Science and Technol- ogy (NZJST), 36B (1955), pp. 375–396 Priestley, R. The search for uranium on the Rebecca Priestley West Coast of New Zealand 1940s–1970s, PO Box 7145, Wellington South New Zealand Geographer, 2006 (in press). New Zealand Rutherford, E. The development of the theory email: [email protected] of atomic structure, in Joseph Needham and Walter Pagel (eds), Background to modern (Manuscript received 10.03.2006, accepted science, London, Cambridge University Press, 03.07.2006) 1938, pp. 61–74. Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 39–50, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010039–12 $4.00/1 British Nuclear Testing in Australia: Performing the Maralinga Experiment through Verbatim Theatre

paul brown

Abstract: This paper reports and comments on, in a way that is relevant to historians of science, an outcome of the 2002 Adelaide Festival of Arts, which initiated a program of cultural activities associated with Maralinga, the site of the British permanent testing facility from 1956–67. In its original conception, this particular festival focussed on themes of ecological sustainability, truth and reconciliation and cultural diversity.

Keywords: Maralinga, Adelaide Festival of Arts, theatre, nuclear veterans

CONTEXT ceived a radiation dose at the test site that has been responsible for their illnesses [3]. The Since 2002, reflection on British nuclear testing Royal Commission itself recognized the techni- has intensified in Australia and New Zealand, cal difficulties in veterans making such a case, as the fifty year anniversary of each test pro- and the absence of documentation (due to loss gram passes, and the implications of the tests or obfuscation) worsens their situation [4]. are variously acknowledged and evaluated [1]. At the same time, in those countries which RESPONSE THROUGH CULTURAL hosted tests and in Britain, the quest inten- PROJECTS sifies for compensation for traditional owners of contaminated country, nuclear veterans and The purpose of this paper is to report and com- other affected communities. The Royal Com- ment (in a way that is relevant to historians mission into British Nuclear Testing, estab- of science [5]) on an outcome of the 2002 Ade- lished in 1984, and which reported at length in laide Festival of Arts, which initiated a program 1985, anchors the public understanding of how of cultural activities associated with Maralinga, the Australian tests were conducted, and de- the site of the British permanent testing facility tails the serious social and environmental con- from 1956–67. In its original conception, this sequences they caused [2]. particular festival focussed themes of ecologi- Nuclear test veterans in Australia and cal sustainability, truth and reconciliation and Britain have never felt great comfort from the cultural diversity [6]. Many of the projects in- conclusions of the Royal Commission. The find- volved an exploration of scientific and techno- ings do clarify the dangers veterans faced, and logical concerns. An objective was: the breakdown of protocols which may have ‘to re-examine the cross roads of science, caused their illnesses. The inquiry also helped technology, ethics and religion. It is imperative, explain the fears veterans still experience due as technological and scientific research changes to secrecy and mismanagement on the part of the way that we inhabit the world around us, scientists and authorities. However, the Com- that we explore and identify meaningful ways mission recommendations have offered little as- to create space for ceremony and for engaging sistance for veterans in their struggle for recog- with current ethical debates’ [7]. nition and compensation. In the years since Pursuing these objectives, the festival, the blasts, in both Australia and Britain, only through its directorate, its Artists Advisory a handful of veterans or their families have Committee and teams of professional artists, achieved victories in compensation cases. This embarked upon ten Maralinga projects, includ- is largely because procedures place burden of ing performance and visual arts, and featuring proof on veterans to demonstrate first that they both the Aboriginal experience and the experi- attended the tests, and second that they re- ence of other Australian communities [8]. 40 BROWN

In this context, the Australian Nuclear Vet- Clelland, remains the most extensive social, po- erans Association, with funding from the Aus- litical and scientific ‘negotiation’ to have taken tralia Council for the Arts, began an oral his- place. The inquiry heard testimony from Aus- tory and ‘verbatim theatre’ project in 2003 [9]. tralian and British nuclear veterans, and tak- The approach involved establishing a research ing also the advice of scientific experts, pro- team of academics and theatre workers who con- duced a number of findings relevant to veter- ducted taped interviews with surviving veter- ans’ health. For example, the Royal Commis- ans, widows of veterans and veterans’ children. sion found that so-called ‘safe-firing’ protocols The focus has remained on Maralinga, although were underpinned by the pre-1958 ‘paradigm’ the stories of Monte Bello, Christmas Island or which assumed there were ‘safe levels’ of ra- other tests sites are of equal importance [10]. diation dose, prescribed via the concept of a Carefully transcribed, the interviews have be- ‘permissible weekly dose’ (Conclusion 50) [14]. come the basis of theatre workshops and ul- The Commission concluded that, within this timately a play script, which in coming years paradigm, policies on radiation exposure were will be performed by major theatre companies, ‘reasonable and compatible with international schools and community groups. In 2005 the recommendations applicable at the time’ (Con- project broadened to include research, inter- clusion 51). views and workshops with British veterans and However, the Commission found there were theatre workers, and to date, public readings serious and minor departures from compli- have taken place in both Britain and Australia, ance with internationally recognised procedures with seasons of the play planned in both coun- (Conclusion 52), and that overall many of tries for 2006 and beyond [11]. the tests violated ‘safe firing’ protocols. The The play, with the working title ‘Half a Commission also concluded that the Atomic Life’, creates a dramatic structure for the per- Weapons Tests Safety Committee (AWTSC) formance of stories owned by Australian and headed by Ernest Titterton [15] had been un- British veterans and their families. Interview willing and unable to intervene (Conclusion 47). fragments or ‘grabs’ are edited together to cre- Further, the Commission argued that safety ate monologue or dialogue for actors [12]. The measures taken in the 1950s would be consid- project trades on current interest in forms of ered inadequate by today’s standards, noting documentary theatre made popular in both that since 1965 radiation protection measures Britain and Australia, where analysts have re- have been based on the assumption that ‘any ex- marked on the potential for constructing ‘truth’ posure may involve some risk’ (Conclusion 53). through documentary theatre for a society no Such findings set the scene for an exploration longer trusting of government reports, newspa- of the health issues now affecting veterans, who per stories or other forms of ‘official’ history were variously deployed in a wide range of tasks [13]. In theatrical circles, ‘Half a Life’ is also associated with the preparation and aftermath cutting edge because it brings together environ- of bomb tests. For those men working in for- mental and cultural activity, while contributing ward areas immediately before and after tests, to the collection of ‘verbatim’ plays devised in and for personnel observing the explosions, pro- Britain and Australia over the last decade. tocols were relatively well delineated [16]. How- ever, the Commission findings imply that relax- IMPLICATIONS OF ROYAL ation of rules, discipline and protocols in the COMMISSION FINDINGS weeks and months between tests created an un- controlled experiment into the effects on service- Although since 1985 there have been many anal- men working on contaminated land, exposed yses and public campaigns associated with the frequently to dust, with a vast array of equip- atomic tests, the Royal Commission into British ment, some of which would have been radioac- Nuclear Testing, presided over by Justice Mc- tive. BRITISH NUCLEAR TESTING IN AUSTRALIA 41

In a finding that continues to frustrate vet- from their experience at Maralinga’ (Conclu- erans, the Royal Commission concluded that ill- sion 132). There has been no systematic as- ness, disease or abnormality cannot be unequiv- sessment of the long term psychological impact ocally associated with radiation exposure, ex- of the tests, even though anecdotally it is widely cept possibly in a case of exposure well above known that many veterans have sought psychi- the dose limit (Conclusion 62). The Commis- atric counselling [19]. sioner went further, stating that ‘Their expo- These circumstances – an incomplete scien- sure to radiation as participants in the trial pro- tific testing program and abiding fear and un- gram has increased the risk of cancer among certainty amongst veterans – indicate the need nuclear veterans’ but that this increased risk for new knowledge, if possible to be constructed cannot be quantified (Conclusions 74, 75); fur- through integrated social processes. This is the ther, there is now little prospect of carrying out context for the ‘Half a Life’ theatre project. any worthwhile epidemiological study of those involved in the tests (Conclusion 201). At the EXAMPLES OF FINDINGS FROM same time, the Commission pointed to serious inadequacies in official reports on human health THE ORAL HISTORY AND impacts and other outcomes of the tests. For THEATRE PROJECT example, the Commission found that the report by the Australian Ionising Radiation Advisory The ‘Half a Life’ oral history and theatre project Council was not an adequate scientific account parallels and complements work by veterans of the testing program; nor could the Donovan in both Australia and Britain to understand Report [17] be regarded as an adequate epidemi- more completely the impacts of their service ological study of the health of atomic test per- at Maralinga and other test sites. Consistent sonnel (Conclusions 195–200). with the Royal Commission findings, ‘Half a Life’ indicates veterans themselves had little un- Since the Commission’s report in 1985, there derstanding of the overall plan for the tests, have been attempts to systematically study the and of the exact nature of the scientific experi- health of veterans, there have been new revela- ments involved. Yet veterans and their families tions as government documents are made pub- have the wherewithal to extend or make new lic, and evidence has been brought forward in knowledge about their ill health; this is knowl- a number of compensation claims by veterans edge relevant to overall understanding of the [18]. Equally systematic has been the defen- tests. It is knowledge which, if communicated siveness and counter-argument by government through public processes and through veterans’ departments in both Britain and Australia. In networks, can address the ‘fear of the unknown’ terms of negotiated public understanding of the that haunts many veterans and their families. tests, the causal link between service at Mar- Once complete, the play script for ‘Half a Life’ alinga and veterans’ health problems remains will report some of this new knowledge about as controversial as it was at the time of the the British nuclear tests at Maralinga. What Royal Commission. Because of this, we could follows here is a brief and selective summary of say simply that the Maralinga experiments are findings, drawn from interview transcripts and incomplete: If one purpose of the tests was to from the processes of play-making which have assess the behaviour and resilience of men under involved theatre workers, researchers and veter- atomic fire, then the results of that experiment ans. are not yet confirmed. Indicating other uncertainties, the Royal HIDDEN EXPERIENCE Commission also found that ‘Operation of the need to know principle and the minimal amount Secrecy has played an important part in the of information given to participants has been lives of veterans and their families. Men who a factor contributing to participants’ concerns have remained silent about their experience at and fears regarding what might have resulted Maralinga have done so because of continuing 42 BROWN allegiance to the secrecy agreements they signed HEALTH IMPACTS at the time of the tests. But for some this has meant their families remained ill informed un- Several of the interviews for ‘Half a Life’ con- til serious illness or psychiatric counseling cause vey details of cancer and other illnesses affect- details to emerge. Secrecy, when coupled with ing veterans and their families. For example, government inaction, and with the methodolog- the following account is laced through with the ical difficulties indicated by the Royal Commis- humour often found in veterans’ testimony, even sion, has delayed for up to fifty years individual when describing horrific circumstances. attempts to gain compensation; this greatly ex- Ric (RJ/sc25): ‘I came back from Mar- acerbates the problem of proving a causal link alinga, and got married as you know, and then between illness and radiation exposure. The we came back over to New South Wales . . . But ‘Half a Life’ project is one way that previously I’d been getting these bouts of nausea n’ diar- hidden experience can be consolidated and re- rhea n’ stuff, and ah, the doctors’ at Richmond vealed. In some cases, the interview process decided I had radiation poisoning . . . So they itself becomes the means by which knowledge put me in hospital and put me in a ward on my is extended and communicated within the fam- own, with a verandah outside . . . and ah, every ilies, as shown in this exchange between Ric now and again, they’d wheel somebody past on Johnstone, President of the Australian Nuclear the banana cart . . . and on this occasion, they Veterans Association, and a veteran’s widow. wheeled a guy past who was sort-of sitting up The interviewer asks what the widow knew of . . . but, sorta laying down, but in a sorta situp her husband’s job at Maralinga. Ric answers: sort-of position, and he looked in and saw me, and I saw him, and waved because I recognized Ric (RJ/bb): ‘Total response, that’s what his face, ‘cos he was also at Maralinga ...The it’s called, yeah. All sorts of things, they have next, time the doctor came into my room, I said, buildings out there, two story buildings, which ‘That bloke next door’s a mate-o-mine’, ah, and they built [for testing in the blasts]. They I was up, I was able to get up and walk around, had brick buildings, concrete buildings, prefab- so I said, ‘I’ll go in and say g’day to him, and ricated buildings. They had ah, all sorts of see him’, n’ he said ‘no ya can’t do that, ya vechicles, trucks, tanks . . . aircraft put around can’t’, and I said, ‘well what’s he in there for, at different places. And ah, one thing that most what’s he being treated for?’, and ah, the doctor people don’t know is, that they had lots of an- said ‘That’s all, private information, we can’t imals too. They had goats and pigs and, and tell you about our patients’. But the next day rabbits in cages, they had ah, carrier pigeons. the male nurse came in . . . and I said, ‘What’s And we had an animal mortuary, where we used up with my mate next door there?’, n’ he said to take the animal carcasses back to. That’s the ‘Oh he’s got a broken leg’ ...I said ‘Oh really, sort of thing Reg would have been doing, go out a broken leg, how did he do that?’ He said with a truck to bring ah, carcasses back or some- ‘I dunno, fell off a truck or something’ . . . ’Oh thing, and take them to the mortuary . . . Some righto’ I said, ‘Well can I get up and go and of em were actually just boxed and sent back to see him?’ He said ‘Oh no, you’re not allowed in the UK. And then, the next day, they’re burned there’ . . . and I said ‘Oh-alright’. I never, never and the ashes are tested for Strontium 90 or saw him again and never, what I should-of-done Radium 223 or whatever the element might be was gone in anyhow, but I didn’t . . . And a cou- they’re looking for. It was a big deal.’ ple of days later, I said ‘How’s me mate goin’ next door?’ and they said ‘Oh, he died’ . . . I said ‘Died of a broken leg!?’ And they said (laugh- Bev (BB/rj): ‘No he didn’t talk much about it.’ ter) ‘There were complications.’ . . . So I think he was there for the same reason I was. But Ric (RJ/bb): ‘Only to me and, and Lex and the this ah, and this orderly told me later, that he others, when we all got together [in the 1970s] had some sort of blood condition too, which is we sort of started talking about it’ [20]. why I was there, and eventually when they let BRITISH NUCLEAR TESTING IN AUSTRALIA 43 me out, they said I was lucky because they had unique.’ blood, leukemia going on. My red cells were Rev John (REVJ62): ‘The other side of the eating the white cells or something, was how it story is, that, last August, I had my first grand- was described to me, or the whites were eating child, from my youngest son. He didn’t know it the reds, I think, yeah I think the whites were but I was most careful in asking questions about eating the reds . . . but I suspect the guy next this birth, was she normal, you know, has she door . . . his bone marrow didn’t pick up again got two heads, or fifteen arms or whatever, was ...But my bone marrow had come good, and she breathing properly, were all the tests done was starting to regenerate fresh, blood cells, so on her . . . And she was a perfectly normal baby. I survived’ [21]. He doesn’t know why I was asking that, but I was greatly concerned in case there was going to The veterans’ testimony also includes de- scriptions of health impacts suffered by their be something wrong with this baby. And until I die I might well have a huge conscience that ‘genetically impaired offspring’. The project findings emphasize that even where direct some form of deformity was passed through my causal links cannot be proved, it is the fear that genes’ [22]. illness may be associated with radiation expo- sure at Maralinga which plays out prominently LIFE BETWEEN THE BLASTS in the later part of veterans lives, especially each man’s fear that he has imparted genetic defects One of the most important types of testimony to his family. A British veteran conveys this emerging from the ‘Half a Life’ project is the alongside his humorous recounting of his acci- detailed description of camp life between the dental exposure to radiation: blasts. Previous public records (films, news sto- Rev John (REVJ6): ‘I must be the only ries and even the Royal Commission) have given Church Minister with a radioactive bum. We emphasis to the experience of the men during were up there one day in the forward area, and and immediately after the blasts. Such testi- it was boiling hot and I’m a 19 year old, at the mony is certainly important, as the men recall time. Entirely innocent, this is just a great lark and eloquently recount the sights and sounds and a holiday. And ah, it was boiling hot and, of the blasts. But in ‘Half a Life’, interviews and the Sergeant said, ‘Lets have a break’. So have also explored the daily lives of the men what I did, and two or three others, is that I in the long periods of preparation and then actually crawled inside the rim of one of our clean up associated with the tests. Men were great big lorries, lorries. And so you put your typically assigned for up to nine months, even bum here, and your rest, feet rest there and you though bomb tests were clustered within just a put your shoulders on a bit of the curve of the few weeks. This meant long periods with min- inside of the rim of this great lorry. Well of imal work, with the opportunity for exposure course the lorry had been driving around the to radioactive materials through a wide range forward area and so all the dust is, is hot. And of recreational and other ‘unofficial’ activities. what happens, that transfers, not only through Several examples are contained in this scene ti- your overalls, this so-called protective layer, but tled ‘Hot Zones’, as follows. into your bum. And lo and behold for 4 or 5 Danny (DM49/51): ‘There were weeks, of us . . . and when it came to our bums, ding, sometimes months, between the bomb tests. ding, ding, ding, they were all clanging cymbals You just wandered where the hell you wanted. and great, loud noises. And we had to scrub We were told it was safe.’ and scrub and scrub, with just ordinary run- Dawn (DC48): ‘People think that there was ning, running water out of a shower, until the a big fence around everything . . . Geiger counter went down sufficient and we were Danny: ‘I can’t even remember if, there counted to be safe. So this was why I laugh and must have been military police in the camp say, ‘The Reverend John Walden, only Minister though, there must have been military police in the world with a radioactive bum.’ I’m quite in the camp, I can’t actually remember seeing 44 BROWN any. It was very, very relaxed security.’ UNRULY TECHNOLOGY Malcolm (MS13): ‘There was equipment left everywhere.’ Official accounts of scientific experiments or of John (JM11): ‘We worked on vehicles, which the introduction of new technology typically had been driving around here, there and every- give focus to the intentions of the experiments where, and we worked on them and underneath and to the results as measured against those in- them, and obviously all the dust and dirt and tentions. The physical dimensions and direct so on, er, even to the minor thing like changing impact of the blasts, the short term effects on a wheel, er, y’ you were liable to dislodge dirt structures, equipment, and men in the field – and dust from under the vehicle.’ all these were efficiently recorded at Maralinga. Bob (BS29,79): ‘Most of the normal dust, Likewise there was an ‘orderly’ character to field they’d never bother with decontamination . . . ’ studies of the spread of atmospheric pollution, Malcolm: ‘And the first thing you did after even though these were not without their con- you’d serviced the vehicle was get a shower, and troversy [25]. However, the British nuclear test- get the ooze off you know.’ ing program has also been an open-ended ex- Bob (BS50): ‘We used to race the fer- periment, with outcomes never anticipated, and rets, the ferrets had supposedly been, or dingos ways of measuring those outcomes never fore- rather, scout cars had supposedly been decon- shadowed. taminated. We had a racetrack down in the Bryan Wynne has used the term ‘unruly bush.’ technology’ to emphasize the unintended conse- Dawn (DC48): ‘For each, each blast, there quences of experiments with science and tech- was something to be built, so you were, you were nology, and to highlight the threat to technical passing where this one had been built for a pre- systems that arise from uncontrolled and uncon- vious blast, to build, eh, build the other one. So trollable circumstances [26]. That Maralinga you were passing where it’s been.’ experiments were ‘unruly’ is made clear by ‘Half a Life’ participants, in the stories above, and, as Rick S (RS7,8): ‘So we were working in ra- a further example, in this testimony from an of- dioa . . . in contaminated area.’ ficer’s daughter who was eight when her father Avon (AH25): ‘And we were actually work- served at Maralinga: ing there for a few weeks before we found out Dagmar (DR7): ‘Ah yes, ah yes each time he there was even a bomb let off there ...But the came back [to base near Adelaide], he would be, scientists would often come, used to often come the . . . they um, they suggested that mum put a dressed immaculately but with a pair of white bunk in the ah the ah bunk bed, in the corner of rubber boots on, an’ no-one took much notice of the kitchen for him and then they put a yellow that, at first, but then it became evident they tape about 3 feet around the whole area and were takin’ precautions not to get their boots we’d hand him his meals on a tray . . . um, and contaminated. So they wore them while they we’d all . . . the whole family would all be inter- were at these sites where they were aware that viewed by ASIO and the British Officers, yeah it was contaminated, but we weren’t . . . an it and.. just did what they told us um . . . they made some of us think’ [23]. took off rather quickly after they arr took their radioactivity measurements. (DR8) Yes . . . and COMMENTARY we weren’t allowed to approach him, um and we were meant to stay outside the barrier of The ‘Half a Life’ playscript is built from ma- the tape ...um so he was ah ...probably really terial such as the fragments and scenes above as far away as, as ever . . . And we weren’t al- [24]. The findings raise some issues of concern lowed to go and play . . . so one day he called to analysts of knowledge formation, science and the dog and the dog ran over to him and um technology systems. The remainder of this pa- ...ah ...Dad grabbed me when I went for the per provides brief comments on selected well- dog. He grabbed me and just held me’ [27]. known themes. In this story fragment, the imperatives of BRITISH NUCLEAR TESTING IN AUSTRALIA 45 family relations intervene in the orderly conduct becomes a pre-condition for knowledge forma- of science. Making use of Bryan Wynne’s terms, tion [31]. these imperatives provide a ‘contextualisation’ which challenges the universality normally be- A project such as ‘Half a Life’ indicates the lieved (by scientists, by the public) to be the possibilities for engendering suspended doubt, possible and desirable outcome of scientific re- developing trust, and from this, producing search. The ‘technical system’ of a properly contextualised knowledge. As an example of conducted atom bomb test is unable to allow a Community Cultural Development (CCD) for a dog, an eight year old daughter or an emo- project, ‘Half a Life’ uses processes which are tional man, which break down the integrity of just as intentional, just as institutionalised, just the testing regime in an uncontrolled way. On as governed by set protocols as is the official pro- the other hand, this doesn’t mean an under- duction of scientific knowledge. CCD is char- standing of such ‘unruly’ outcomes is unattain- acterised by participatory activities in which able. community members of various backgrounds and beliefs work with (commonly but not al- PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF ways) professional arts workers, to make cre- SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE AND ative works that deal with issues and concerns TRUST important to the community. Meanwhile these activities enhance that community’s capacity to make decisions, take actions and undertake fur- Briefly surveying the debates about so called ther developmental work. Typical procedures ’Public Understanding of Science’ over the last include steering groups, partnerships between fifteen years (and Wynne’s analysis sits in this organisations, workshops, training sessions, re- context), we can notice that the idea that sci- hearsals, exhibitions, performances, with feed- ence should be undertaken in public has taken back and cross-checking mechanisms such as deep root [28]. So too has the need to bring trial readings, discussions groups, web-based in- alongside science other forms of knowledge, such teraction, surveys, and media documentation as ‘lay’ and ‘indigenous’ knowledge, and with [32]. this to privilege equally contextualised knowl- edge alongside the universal knowledge claims of science [29]. In practice, to do this requires In all such activities, information and ideas sophisticated processes of public participation circulate in an environment of suspended doubt, in knowledge production, and we can look to often ostensibly for the purpose of making a examples such as science shops and consen- common creative work. This is how contex- sus conferences, standing committees of stake- tualised knowledge is produced. Such ways of holder experts, and other forms of participatory making knowledge through arts and cultural democracy that attend decision making pro- projects, and the importance of this for decision cesses. These have been reasonably well studied making, are increasingly well understood. For across many fields [30]. Taking this further, an- example, in the British experience, long range alysts of controversy and public participation studies have evaluated the feedback loop be- processes have noted the importance of trust in tween cultural activity and government policy all its forms. In his seminal discussion of ‘sus- across many sectors, with the arts influencing pended doubt’, Gavan McDonell has described policy through discoveries made in participa- the processes by which participants in decision tory projects [33]. Meanwhile, the interpreta- making processes put aside their disagreements tions made in this paper are underpinned by a and their (sometimes) seemingly incommensu- broader study hosted by the Australia Coun- rable values and assumptions, in search of the cil for the Arts. This research has confirmed knowledge that is needed to make sense of ev- the connections between CCD and policy and eryday life. In such processes, which should be programs across sectors such as health, environ- allowed to play out over time, provisional trust ment and rural development [34]. 46 BROWN

DECISION MAKING WITH A NOTE ON LIMITATIONS OF CONTEXTUALISED KNOWLEDGE CONTEXTUALISED KNOWLEDGE

For the nuclear veterans’ associations in both We have to be careful not to suggest commu- Australia and Britain, ‘Half a Life’ is a partici- nities might generate all the knowledge needed patory way of telling their story, creating ad- using their traditional methods or community vocacy, improving networking and awareness, processes such as CCD, and there are subtleties and bringing to public attention a new body of at Maralinga that are important to understand. oral history material reporting long term social In a famous incident, Maralinga Tjarutja leader outcomes of the atomic tests. By its process, Archie Barton upbraided a government official the ‘Half a Life’ project is a ‘meeting’ between for saying that the long term problem of record- the veterans community and a younger genera- ing and monitoring contamination could be left tion of researchers, theatre workers and veter- in the hands of traditional people who could un- ans’ descendents, all wanting to understand and derstand it through their ’dreaming’. Barton’s keep alive the story of nuclear testing, then able rejection of this suggestion is based on the need through performance to communicate this story communities have for western science to be part to the public and to veterans themselves [35]. of their decision making. Maralinga Tjarutja know that western science does have some uses! The ‘Half a Life’ project supports ‘transfor- Monitoring nuclear radiation is one of them [38]. mative’ cultural activities [36] by which the vet- erans’ situation is recognized and legitimated, The same logic applies to the knowledge gen- fostering a sense of justice and healing, with erated through the nuclear veterans oral history prospects that both the process and the pub- and theatre project. As a community, veter- lic outcomes (such as readings, performances, ans will make use of the ideas and information media coverage, and documentation) will have generated and circulating in the ‘Half a Life’ impacts within decision making realms. To be project. But in their approaches to government specific, the knowledge generated through the for compensation, veterans remain hopeful that ‘Half a Life’ process, can assist in the following new techniques could become available for sci- ways. entifically demonstrating that particular forms of illness must have resulted from radiation ex- 1. The project will increase sharing of sto- posure. Veterans associations in both Britain ries, advice and resources between British and and Australia continue to work closely with sci- Australian communities of nuclear veterans. entists as a way of influencing government pol- Through this, ‘bonding social capital’ will in- icy and achieving recognition and compensation crease as the project links people inside the [39]. community of nuclear veterans in each country. The opportunity to tell their story, first hand, to other interested community members will be CONCLUSION validating and rewarding for participants, and this alone can help deal with the residual fears British Nuclear Testing in Australia and New that veterans experience. Zealand follows the well mapped contours of 2. ‘Bridging social capital’ will be enhanced by colonial science. Bomb experiments were de- the capacity to communicate the story to new vised at the ‘centre’ by British scientists re- arenas. It will take the message from nuclear quiring remote country which they could dev- veterans into other communities and groups astate in search of results relevant to Britain’s (especially other non-nuclear veteran groups Cold War political imperatives. Meanwhile, at and also young people, academic, and political the ‘periphery’, the Australian public and in- groups). This will potentially assist with deci- deed the Australian scientific community re- sion making, for example in deliberations about mained marginalised, with decisions made on veterans entitlements in the follow up to Aus- their behalf by British politicians and scientific tralian government’s recent Review [37]. teams, aided by a most compliant Prime Minis- BRITISH NUCLEAR TESTING IN AUSTRALIA 47 ter Robert Menzies [40]. control of access to the site, and compen- Perhaps the historical study of Australian sation for traditional owners, the Maralinga and New Zealand science has also typically fol- Tjarutja. lowed these contours, with focus on the relation- [3] The British and Australian approaches con- ship between ‘peripheral’ scientists and the per- trast with that of the US government. Un- ceived ‘centre’ of knowledge production. The der Ronald Reagan, the US Congress voted ‘Half a Life’ project is a different way of con- a form of blanket compensation for veterans structing a history of a scientific experiment, of US nuclear tests. In this approach, 22 with focus on a ‘peoples history’, in this case the types of cancer are accepted, on a presump- experience of nuclear veterans and their fami- tive basis, as related to the service of atomic lies. Beyond this ‘meta-science’ function, the test participants. Being there for a test and project also produces knowledge about the im- having the prescribed disease is sufficient for pacts of nuclear testing, in a way that helps compensation and health care to be provided. complete the experiment itself. The 1985 Royal This detail is from the Australian Govern- Commission report, a trail of unsuccessful com- ment’s 2003 Report of the Review of Vet- pensation cases, and recent government initia- erans’ Entitlements (The ‘Clarke Report’), tives such as the Clarke Report into Veter- accessible at http://www.veteransreview. ans Entitlements, all point to a deficit in offi- gov.au/report. cial knowledge about the outcomes of the tests, [4] Obfuscation and loss of documents by gov- and to the insurmountable difficulties in making ernment authorities are commonly reported health impact assessments using ‘normal’ sci- by veterans, for example see submissions to ence. The processes of community cultural de- the Clarke Report (see note 3), which notes velopment constitute a participatory and trans- that in Australia, of the five compensation formational form of knowledge production, with cases heard by courts, the Commonwealth findings relevant to policy and decision making. won all but one of them. In this case the contextualised knowledge made [5] This paper was first presented at the confer- between researchers, theatre workers and veter- ence of the Australasian Association for the ans helps our understanding of the nuclear test- History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Sci- ing experience, and of the long term social and ence, Dunedin, December 2005. health outcomes for men exposed to the dangers [6] The politics and outcomes of the work by of the atomic tests. 2002 Adelaide Festival director Peter Sellars and his creative team are controversial. Sell- REFERENCES AND NOTES ers was effectively sacked shortly before the festival, with his community-based program [1] The key British tests were Emu 1953, Monte overturned in part by the Festival’s conserva- Bello Island 1956, Christmas Island 1957– tive hierarchy. 58, Malden Island 1957, Maralinga 1956– [7] Peter Sellers, 2002 Adelaide Festival Pro- 1957. Details are widely available, for exam- gram overview. ple in the report of the Royal Commission [8] The author was a member of the 2002 Ade- into British Nuclear Tests in Australia, 1985, laide Festival artists advisory committee. or on the website of the British Nuclear Test [9] The author is the facilitator and script edi- Veterans Association. tor for the ‘Half a Life’ project, making this [2] The Royal Commission, led by Justice paper an ‘insider’ perspective. McLelland, recommended, in summary, ex- [10] As I have noted elsewhere ‘Ultimately, the tension of compensation provisions to cover choice to focus on Maralinga relates to the civilians as well as military personnel, the need for time and space ‘unity’ in a dramatic establishment of a register of civilian and structure. This perhaps indicates one of the military participants, a new clean-up of the limitations of theatre, rather than any sense Maralinga site with costs borne by Britain, that Maralinga has greater importance his- 48 BROWN

torically than other test sites. However, it 1985 Report of the Royal Commission into can be said that the Maralinga experience is British Nuclear Tests in Australia, Vol. III, representative of the testimony of other test Conclusions and Recommendations, Parlia- veterans; and that of all the sites, Maralinga mentary Paper No. 484/1985. saw the greatest numbers of service person- [15] It would not be overstating it to say that the nel across its decade of operations’. See Paul Royal Commission laid a great deal of blame Brown, Maralinga: Theatre from a Place of at the feet of Titterton, as the most senior War, in Gay McAuley (ed.), Ground Work: Australian scientist, and clearly a man will- Performance and the Politics of Place, Peter ing to place safety concerns below the logisti- Lang, Berne (2006). cal needs of atomic testing. [11] The four public readings, each at a differ- [16] For example, a special force of ‘Indoctri- ent stage of script development, have been at nees’ was trained for deployment at close Sydney’s Belvoir Street Theatre on 8 Decem- range to the blasts. They were issued with ber 2003 and 7 June 2004, at the University full protective clothing. It was also custom- of Leeds on 18 November 2005 and at Leeds ary that all personnel on the range would be Civic Hall on 20 November 2005. invited (along with selected members of the [12] A more detailed description of the process public such as politicians, and media), to wit- for the ‘Half a Life’ project will be published ness the tests. Protocols included facing away with the playscript. See P.F. Brown, Half a from the blast with hands tightly shielding Life, Currency Press, Sydney, in preparation. the eyes. [13] The possibility that verbatim theatre is [17] This report is by Donovan et al., Health of ‘truth’ is highly contentious. The author has Atomic Personnel, Commonwealth Depart- previously discussed verbatim theatre in the ment of Health (1983). context of an earlier oral history and verba- [18] In the 1990s, British researcher Sue Rab- tim project concerning the 1989 Newcastle bitt Roff assembled data on veterans’ health, earthquake, suggesting that it is ‘a fabrica- making use of information from nuclear vet- tion, just like any other drama spun from a erans, and newly released government docu- writer’s head. Perhaps it will seem like ‘the’ ments. See S. Rabbitt Roff, Mortality and truth. But it remains only one truth and morbidity of members of the British Nu- the construct of a particular process: in this clear Test Veterans Association and the New case a terrible event, provoking an idea for a Zealand Nuclear Test Veterans Association play, interested people to steer the project, and their families. Medicine, Conflict and then research, taped interviews, transcrip- Survival, 15, Supplement 1 (1999). Rabbitt tion, culling, editing, cut and paste, struc- Roff’s findings were strongly attacked by the turing, re-cut and re-paste, and (turning a British Government. In Australia, the Com- new corner) exploration by cast, director and monwealth Government Review of Veterans’ crew, new arrangement of the text, produc- Entitlements (the ‘Clarke Report’, see Note tion (all the usual elements) and finally the 3) highlighted the need for a new cancer and storytelling that takes place in performance mortality study, and has established a scien- ...Each exploration by cast and crew – like tific advisory body to oversee this. One objec- an archaeological dig – is bound to make tive is to reconstruct the doses veterans would new discoveries.’ This extract is from P.F. have received – an approach that has been Brown, Aftershocks, Currency Press, Sydney met with skepticism by veterans themselves. (1993), page vi. For a seminal analysis of [19] The veterans associations in both Britain verbatim theatre, see Derek Paget, Verbatim and Australia argue this. theatre: oral history and documentary tech- [20] Ric Johnstone and Beverley Beaver inter- niques. New Theatre Quarterly, 3, No. 12 viewed by Paul Brown. Bracketed annota- (1987). tions, e.g., (RJ,bb), indicate fragments or [14] The numbered conclusions are from the ‘grabs’ within the original transcript. BRITISH NUCLEAR TESTING IN AUSTRALIA 49

[21] Ric Johnstone interviewed by Paul Brown, Donell’s ideas in the realm of community cul- with veteran’s widow Sandy Caporn also tural development and specifically the Mar- present, October 2003. alinga project. See P.L. Brown, Maralinga: [22] British veteran, Reverend John Walden in- theatre from a place of war, in G. McAuley terviewed by Lucy Skilbeck and Paul Brown, (ed.), Ground Work: Performance and the April 2005. Politics of Place, Peter Lang, Berne (2006). [23] This extract is from the performance script [32] There is a wide range of literature on Com- used for a reading of the play at Leeds Civic munity Cultural Development in Australia. Hall on 20 November 2005. It is constructed Definitions, policies and case studies are read- from interviews with several veterans (Danny ily available from the Australia Council for McNulty, Rick Soweby, Bob Smith, Malcolm the Arts. Smedley, Avon Hudson, John MacIntosh), [33] See the range of reports produced by and one of the widows (Dawn Chasty). the Comedia organisation, for example F. [24] For the play script see P.F. Brown, Half a Matarasso, Use or Ornament? The Social Life, Currency Press, Sydney, in preparation. Impact of Participation in the Arts, Comedia, Also see a longer version of this summary in Stroud (1997). P.F. Brown, Maralinga: theatre from a place [34] D. Mills and P. Brown, Art and Wellbe- of war, in G. McAuley (ed.), Ground Work: ing, Australia Council for the Arts, Sydney Performance and the Politics of Place, Peter (2004). The Australia Council is the federal Lang, Berne (2006). government’s arts funding and policy body. [25] The story of Hedley Marston and the test- [35] Unpublished Report in 2004 by the Aus- ing of animals around Australia is replete tralian Nuclear Veterans Association to the with controversy. See, among other sources, Australia Council on the first stage of the R. Cross, Fallout: Hedley Marston and the project. British Bomb Tests in Australia, Wakefield [36] The ‘instrumental’ uses of the arts are well Press, Adelaide (2001). understood, for example in the way the arts [26] Brian Wynne is a well known sociologist of can be used for educational purposes. ‘Trans- science. Among several relevant publications, formative’ arts projects are those with deeper see B. Wynne, Unruly technology: practical impacts on policy and decision making and rules, impractical discourses and public un- can imply the need for change in institutions derstanding, Social Studies of Science, 18, and other social structures. 147–67 (1988). [37] Findings of the review are in the ‘Clarke [27] Dagmar Richards interviewed by Paul Report’: see Note 3. Brown, Sydney, 2003. [38] This incident is discussed by Jim Green in [28] Brian Wynne reviewed this argument, for his web article Maralinga: a host of indis- example, at a Melbourne University confer- cretions, short cuts and cover-ups. The gov- ence on Public Understanding of Science, in ernment official was Geoff Williams who in 2003. discussing the problems of long term record- [29] See A. Irwin, Citizen Science: a Study of keeping suggested to a government commit- People, Expertise and Sustainable Develop- tee that traditional ’Dreamtime stories’ would ment, Routledge, London (1995). provide a methodology. He said, ‘hopefully, [30] See various discussions in the journal Public the Aborigines themselves – they have a very Understanding of Science. good way of keeping records. I think they [31] This greatly simplifies McDonell’s study, have records going back beyond our sort of which is in G. McDonell, Scientific and every- memory, do they not? They have their own day knowledge: trust and the politics of en- way of recording things.’ Archie Barton vironmental initiatives, Social Studies of Sci- branded his comments ‘an insult to the cul- ence, 27, 834–835 (1997). Elsewhere I have ture . . . it’s an issue that’s been created by given more detail of the relevance of Mc- white man. How the hell do you get that in 50 BROWN

a Dreamtime Story?’ About Us on the website of the British Nu- [39] In the case of Joyce Northey, one of a hand- clear Test Veterans Association. ful of British veteran’s widows to gain com- pensation, the key evidence included a pho- [40] The Royal Commission concluded that ev- tograph that demonstrated her husband was idence did not exist to contradict the view present in the test zone, and technical evi- that, in agreeing to provide Australian ter- dence that the cancer he died from was highly ritory for atomic tests, Prime Minister Men- likely to be the result of radiation exposure. zies acted alone, without consulting even the For a concise summary of links between vet- Australian cabinet. See also Anna Binnie’s erans’ campaigns and scientific research, see previous paper in this issue.

Paul Brown History and Philosophy of Science Department The University of New South Wales NSW 2052 Australia email: [email protected]

(Manuscript received 22.05.2006, accepted 03.07.2006) Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 51–62, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010051–12 $4.00/1 Prospects for Enrichment: New Zealand Responses to the Peaceful Atom in the 1950s

matthew o’meagher

Abstract: The origin of the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand is discussed. An assess- ment is made of the impact of the New Zealand Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament on New Zealand politics and foreign policy.

Keywords: Anti-nuclear movement, New Zealand, New Zealand Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, politics, foreign policy, ‘Atoms for Peace’.

INTRODUCTION ful atom’ was the only or even the main fac- tor preventing New Zealand embracing the anti- This paper forms part of a wider study of the nuclear cause until the 1970s and 1980s; anti- history of anti-nuclear New Zealand before it be- communism, anti-Japanese sentiment, faith in came famous, its roots if you will, on which the and friendship towards the two original West- transformations in that nation’s identity and ern nuclear powers, and a host of factors spe- foreign policy of the 1970s and 1980s would cific to the arms race itself were more impor- grow. The heart of that project is the story tant. Nevertheless, Eisenhower’s initiative, in of a peace group I first researched as a student tandem with a coincidental burst of hope that two decades ago, the New Zealand Campaign this country might have uranium deposits of its for Nuclear Disarmament (NZCND). This coun- own to exploit, did revive official and popular try’s first exclusively anti-nuclear national or- interest in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, ganisation, it tried to convert New Zealanders to just as it did elsewhere in the world, thereby the disarmament cause in the early 1960s, and diverting New Zealanders’ attention away from was a local manifestation of the second stage of more disturbing nuclear developments. Along a three-stage global movement. In it, moreover, the way, it helped New Zealanders come to see the influence of scientists was just as significant the United States as the ‘true atomic work- as it in other Western societies [2], and kept shop of the world’, and encouraged them to be leaping out at me (in the same way that the wowed and not just concerned by its technolog- role of other groups like Christians and mothers ical might [3]. did) in the primary sources my study is based on – NZCND records, and reports on New Zealand society and politics sent home by the diplomats SCREENS AND WALLS of all three Western nuclear powers based there. In order to appreciate the full significance of By the end of 1953, nine years after Hiroshima NZCND’s contribution to the development of and Nagasaki, there was still much about nu- New Zealand politics, identity and foreign pol- clear energy that even citizens of democracies icy, one must first examine those factors – some did not know, especially in regard to its bel- obvious, some not – which mitigated against licose applications. From their wartime ori- the appeal of the anti-nuclear cause before and gins in the Manhattan Project, when the US when this group appeared. That is where this government cordoned off vast tracts of land in paper seeks to make a contribution. Its aim is to Tennessee and Washington State to build fac- discuss the influence in this country of President tories that appeared to produce nothing, the Eisenhower’s attempt to calm the rising world- vast majority of nuclear weapons-related activ- wide ‘nuclear fears’ of the mid-1950s through ities were not for public consumption, in any his ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative. It does not ar- country. In fact, the opposite was true; so gue that the ensuing excitement over ‘the peace- stringently protected did the whole process of 52 O’MEAGHER preparing for nuclear war become, that even walls to hide their preparations for nuclear com- in the democracies, defence labs and test-sites bat were, they were not the only means West- became states-within-states, replete with their ern nuclear powers employed to head off public own airplanes and nigh-sovereign secrets, and concern about what they were up to. A further surrounded by guards with orders to shoot-to- tactic – indeed, a giant distraction – was to play kill unauthorised intruders [4]. Within these en- up the peaceful potential of the atom, thereby claves, moreover, officers and officials asserted tapping into the utopian hopes and genuine sci- their control to such a degree over scientists entific excitement that immediately manifested that in the US at least the information about themselves, once the new energy source’s power the different parts of the bomb-building pro- was first revealed in war. cess was often divided between labs, and with- held from anyone whose political loyalties came to be deemed suspect. This was in sharp con- NEW ZEALAND’S FIRST trast to the pre-1939 days when scientists shared DOMESTIC NUCLEAR STEPS their research freely across borders and now neither atomic scientists nor their ideas could To understand how this tactic played out in New travel easily across the new Iron Curtain [5]. Zealand though, we first need to consider New In such a context, therefore, information about Zealanders’ prior and autonomous aspirations nuclear tests was especially guarded, if it was for the peaceful atom. In telling this story, I will divulged at all. Besides the lack of warning not address the role of Ernest Marsden in shap- Britain gave about its atomic debut described ing those aspirations in any depth, as it features elsewhere in this edition, the Soviets never did prominently in a companion paper in this issue. announce their atomic breakthrough, and nei- Nevertheless, it is impossible to leave Marsden ther President Truman nor the Atomic Energy out altogether. Once he was alerted to ura- Commission would say how many tests Amer- nium’s military potential in 1943, he not only ica conducted in the Pacific in 1951. They did set the wheels in motion by which this county’s not encourage coverage of its first H-bomb test scientists became involved in the Manhattan or convey its ‘leap in destructiveness’ [6]. In- Project, but immediately instructed the govern- deed, even some defining facts about the new ment Geological Survey team in December 1943 weapon’s dangers – the adverse consequences to see if this element was present in this country of explosions, for instance, or the handling of in any exploitable amounts. On his return from radioactive material in bomb construction – abroad in June 1944, he set up an atomic en- were not merely censored, as occurred after Hi- ergy section within the same section of the DSIR roshima and Nagasaki. With total disregard for that pioneered this nation’s breakthroughs with the health of its citizens adjoining such sites, radar. Within a week of Hiroshima, he was able they could even be hidden by government ly- to announce that small concentrations of ura- ing, as occurred when Washington told hun- nium were present in a mineral found predomi- dreds of private companies processing radioac- nantly on the South Island’s West Coast. As he tive elements there were no ‘special dangers’ for conceded, its recovery was probably not ‘eco- their workers, when America’s Atomic Energy nomically practicable’, at least not with ‘old- Commission (AEC) said the danger from its nu- fashioned methods’ [8]. The New Zealand Her- clear tests was ‘no worse than having a tooth ald later deduced from President Truman’s an- X-rayed’, when its Commissioner said America nouncement of the Bomb, that the appealing was working on a clean bomb’ while enhancing ‘possibilities of harnessing atomic energy for the radioactivity of its existing weapons, and peaceable uses’, which some had raised, ‘can when the residents of St. George, Utah, were very well be put aside for the time being’, for given assurances though tests in Nevada ‘appar- scientists were ‘definite that years of work will ently always plaster[ed]’ them with fallout [7]. be needed before the new forces can be brought under control’ [9]. Important as these physical or propaganda When it came to peaceful possibilities of NEW ZEALAND RESPONSES TO THE PEACEFUL ATOM IN THE 1950s 53 the new energy source, nevertheless, some New reading that ‘this energy is so wrapped up with Zealanders (like Britons or Americans) could the development of a country that it cannot be not let facts stand in the way of dreams. allowed to pass into the control of private in- Among those who preferred to be inspired by terests’, and that the West Coast black-sands those overseas authorities who instead empha- held ‘a fairly high percentage’ of the ‘radio- sised ‘the great possibilities if energy on the active ores we want so badly’. In January 1946, scale represented in the bomb is made avail- accordingly, the Labour government began dis- able to drive machinery and provide sources cussing the possibility of a nuclear research pro- of power’ were the Christchurch Press and the gramme, and in late 1948 Fraser discussed mat- New Zealand Herald, who between them passed ters to do with an ‘atomic pile’ with Britain’s onto their readers the speculation of the Manch- Defence Minister in late 1948. As Nash an- ester Guardian that ‘atomic power may pro- nounced to the 1948 Labour Conference, ‘rather vide energy for exploring the solar system and than have a cessation of atomic energy research, the universe’, pronounced that ‘atomic energy the Government was anxious to have it go to might supplement the power from coal, oil and the limit. Its only concern was with the use of falling water’, and noted that New Zealand’s atomic energy and he hoped that it would never Prime Minister in these years, Peter Fraser, be used for military purposes’ [13]. ‘had taken part in discussions with the British on the possibility of using atomic power’ [10]. More importantly though, Marsden, Fraser’s ADVANCES AND CONSTRAINTS deputy Walter Nash, and the Herald’s editor Leslie Munro, later New Zealand’s Ambassador Even so, Fraser had felt a need to warn MPs to the United Nations when Atoms for Peace in his speech supporting the 1945 Bill that was announced, were interested too. As Munro ‘there might be a race for atomic energy’ and noted, ‘but for a second world war, the labours that ‘prospectors from other countries had been of physicists . . . might . . . ultimately have borne wandering about New Zealand, and had found only peaceful fruit’; for Marsden, the ‘discov- quantities of uranium without notifying the gov- ery of atomic energy’ held out hopes as high ernment’. This can not pass without comment. ‘as opening up the vast mineral resources that Fraser’s intervention had been prompted by a lie beneath the gigantic icecap of Antarctica’ – complaint from an Opposition MP, W.J. Polson, including uranium [11]. that the Bill’s penalties for offenders against its provisions were ‘tremendously fierce and savage’ Convinced by its wartime results and peace- [14], which in turn suggests that the new tech- time potential, therefore, the Fraser government nology’s full import was not obvious to every- announced just four days after Nagasaki that one. In fact, even Fraser’s initial interest in it it ‘would do all in its power to aid the devel- may have been partly motivated by unrelated opment of atomic power and its application to issues, as the British politician who first asked the best purposes of mankind’ [12]. In Decem- him for Manhattan Project scientists was the ber 1945, moreover, it backed up this boast by same person he was negotiating with to renew passing an Atomic Energy Bill, which, like its a vital bulk export contract [15]. Equally, some foreign equivalents, gave the Crown a monopoly very real barriers to New Zealand’s early nu- over the development within its domain of this clear development must be outlined. In the energy and materials it relied on, and control search for uranium, for example, the afore- of research on it. With the DSIR Minister not- mentioned unauthorised survey of New Zealand ing that ‘no subject was of greater importance possibilities (by an American Embassy-linked to humanity than atomic energy’ and hoping Union Carbide mining engineer in violation of that ‘within a year or two of receiving sufficient an Anglo-American deal for Britain to search in uranium [the DSIR] will be harnessing atomic its Commonwealth) had proved fruitless, while energy in New Zealand’, the Acting Minister in 1948 the DSIR itself concluded after Mars- of Mines asserted in moving the Bill’s second den’s South Island searches that the percentage 54 O’MEAGHER of uranium oxide in the region’s rocks was too the Dominion Physical Laboratory in Lower low to make uranium extraction economic and Hutt, and a dynamic counterpart, Athol Rafter ended its hunt for the sought-after ore. In a in the Dominion Laboratory in Wellington, were setback to the development of local nuclear re- undertaking and disseminating valuable applied search, Fraser’s government had not taken up a research on such uses of isotopes in medicine, suggestion made to Marsden by Sir John Cock- industry, agriculture and geochemistry. In fact, croft, the director of British reactor projects, putting to good use both his graduate training that an experimental reactor be constructed in the US and the assistance he secured from with British help in ‘this part of the world’, even the US developer of radiocarbon dating tech- though the Americans were prepared in recog- niques, Rafter would ultimately develop appli- nition of their services to allow a limited trans- cations for isotopes of such ‘international inter- fer of atomic know-how to New Zealand and est and significance’ that he would be invited by the DSIR scientists whom Marsden had sent to the original pioneer of those techniques, W.F. the Manhattan Project had played vital roles Libby, to participate in ‘Project Sunshine’, a in helping Britain build its first experimental late 1950s U.S. Atomic Energy Commission pro- reactors in Canada and then at the UK’s own gramme monitoring the dramatically rising lev- subsequent research facility in Harwell. Once els of atmospheric radioactivity unleashed by Marsden forsook the DSIR for a spell as the the era’s many thermonuclear bomb tests [18]. government’s scientific adviser in London, there was no influential nationally-based champion of However, As Ross Galbraith and other have a New Zealand research reactor [16]. argued, the full flowering of nuclear research in New Zeland remained impeded throughout As Rebecca Priestley’s paper in this volume much of the 1950s by the fact that the new labo- has demonstrated, however, this was not the ratory Rafter proposed in 1952 for such research end of a nuclear New Zealand. The DSIR’s an- would not be built for another decade, and by nual report had still been ‘reasonably hopeful’ the cost of creating a national nuclear institute, as late as 1947 that a viable uranium deposit the way in which the siting of it became a polit- could be found on the West Coast, and five ical football (as universities pressed the need for years on an article appeared in a popular British pure over applied research, and their competing monthly (which the US Secretary of State had cases to build any new facilities on their own his Wellington Embassy investigate) claiming campuses), the failure to arrange a framework that ‘the greatest uranium fields in the world’ for ‘exchanges of information on defence science had been ‘found in New Zealand and that pro- between the United States and New Zealand’, duction will begin soon’ [17]. As for nuclear re- officials’ view as late as 1958 that atomic power search, the flamboyant Gordon Watson-Munro, production was not yet economically viable, and one of New Zealand’s Manhattan Project scien- that New Zealand could not ‘afford to gamble tists, had given an inaugural lecture as the new with the supply of power by considering the Professor of Physics at Victoria University Col- building of atomic power stations in the imme- lege on the peacetime uses of atomic energy that diate future’ [19]. Furthermore, the popular im- focussed on thermonuclear possibilities (before age of scientists in New Zealand was somewhat he was enticed to Australia). The research team ambiguous, which did not help scientists’ efforts was set up and the DSIR had announced ‘the to pitch for research resources [20]. Even so, by erection of an atomic pile’ for the use of sci- the end of that decade, and no matter how ‘slug- entists and medical researchers. In terms of gishly’, a Division of Nuclear Sciences had been applying nuclear knowledge, radionuclides were established within the DSIR, a £8,917 grant used in animal research tracer studies in 1946, had been given to the International Atomic En- for clinical purposes in Christchurch hospital ergy Agency to keep New Zealand ‘up to date in 1948 and in industrial radiography from the in the field of atomic energy’, and the coun- early 1950s, while two scientists, G. Page and try was ready to work with the Americans to Gordon Fergusson, who continued to work in take nuclear research to a new level. In fact, it NEW ZEALAND RESPONSES TO THE PEACEFUL ATOM IN THE 1950s 55 had already received its first Atoms for Peace teria, the rest of his eight years in the White gift from them, a technical library on the uses House were marked by a series of steps to por- of atomic energy that Sid Holland lauded be- tray American nuclear policy both at home and fore Parliament in mid-1955, and signed a bi- abroad in more favourable, peace-seeking terms. lateral agreement in June 1956 for ‘Cooperation Years after this ex-Supreme Commander of Al- . . . concerning civil uses of atomic energy’ [21]. lied forces in World War II (and NATO forces thereafter) said of Hiroshima ‘it wasn’t neces- sary to hit them with that awful thing’, years THE RATIONALE BEHIND ATOMS before his oft-quoted lament on leaving office at FOR PEACE the growth of his country’s military-industrial complex, and even as his nation continued to How though had the possibility of Atoms for prepare for nuclear war, the popular President Peace gifts come about in the first place? To reassured his public that ‘these armaments do answer that question, we need to discuss that not reflect the way we want to live; they merely programme and the President who announced reflect the way, under present conditions, we it. Long seen as amiable and popular but more have to live’ [25]. Contrary to his own budget- interested in golf than his job, Eisenhower has balancing instincts and belief that ‘Americans come to be reassessed as a subtle, engaged, and recoil by nature from the idea of “propaganda” publicity-savvy Commander-in-Chief, who took ’, Eisenhower approved a 50 percent increase a vital interest not just in his country’s na- in the funding of the United States Informa- tional security, but in how nuclear weapons af- tion Agency to help it study foreign attitudes fected that security, and what American vot- to the Bomb and counter the previously un- ers thought of those weapons [22]. As scholars challenged Soviet peace campaign overseas, and are now arguing, Eisenhower and his advisers sanctioned an AEC campaign at home which believed not in reducing the West’s reliance on told Americans that nuclear dangers were not as nuclear weapons but in increasing it. To him, great as often made out [26]. More dramatically, such weapons signalled Cold War resolve, were he launched two appeals at the United Nations cheaper than keeping men in uniform, the ‘best that seemed to convey a deep personal wish for guarantee against the eruption of a global con- disarmament, the ‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal of flagration’ and a ‘source of strength in dealing December 1953, and its ‘Open Skies’ successor with the Soviet Union; rather than being elim- in May 1955. inated, they should become the ‘central plank of US national security policy’. As a military The most successful of all Eisenhower’s ef- man, the President believed they would be used forts to ‘overcome’ his country’s already preva- in a future war, and also that, just as arms did lent reputation in New Zealand and other coun- not cause war, disarmament could not prevent triess ‘as a nuclear bully’ and to ‘convince the it. Only elimination of the causes of war (in his people in the world that we are working for eyes, a revolutionary change in the Communist peace and not trying to blow them to king- system) could do that. While Eisenhower was in dom come with our atom and thermonuclear the White House, though most New Zealanders, bombs’, Atoms for Peace was premised on a Americans and other Westerners and their gov- simple idea. This was that the two rival su- ernments thought otherwise on account of his perpowers and Britain hand some of the ra- deliberate sops to their fears, American disar- dioactive materials they used to make nuclear mament proposals would at best be confidence- weapons over to a new, UN-supervised Inter- building measures, at worst mirages [23]. national Atomic Energy Agency, which would For a brief moment early in his first term, make those materials available to other coun- Eisenhower did consider telling his people what tries in the world for research and other peace- the full consequences of a nuclear war would be, ful purposes [27]. Prior to this offer, progress on so as to prepare them for one should it break out most non-military utilisations of nuclear energy [24]. After concluding this might unleash hys- had stalled around the world, as post-Hiroshima 56 O’MEAGHER dreams of atomic utopias had came up against ing controlled nuclear explosions. In the cul- the technical barriers in the way of producing tural field the peaceful potential of atomic en- nuclear power cheaply and against many gov- ergy was lauded anew by Walt Disney in Our ernments’ monopolisation of the technology in- Friend the Atom, the 1957 cartoon that showed volved and the total priority nuclear weapon in schools and on television ‘how a menacing states gave to research that developed bombs giant was turned into a faithful servant’, and over that which led to power production or other in the 1967 How and Why Wonder Book of uses [28]. Before 1953, admittedly, the medi- Atomic Energy, which acknowledged that the cal applications of radioactive isotopes already atomic age had begun in deadly fashion but noted in the New Zealand context above had sought all the same to take the young ‘science- been recognised. Groups like Britain’s Atomic minded reader along the exciting road of discov- Scientists’ Association, the AEC and two ma- ery about the atom that led to the first use of jor US corporations had tried to keep pub- atomic energy in a controlled way’ [31]. lic interest in the potential of nuclear power Beyond America’s borders, the consequences alive through exhibits like the 1947–48 ‘Atomic were no less significant. Because it saw the clear Train’, which 146,000 people saw and 53,000 propaganda potential of this ‘Atomic Marshall people read about, despite government hostility Plan’, and how through it ‘atomic energy, which in England, and which UNESCO sent to Scan- has become the foremost symbol of man’s inven- dinavia and the Middle East. The 1948 ‘Man tive capacities, could also become the symbol and the Atom’ exhibit in New York’s Central of a strong but peaceful and purposeful Amer- Park toured other American cities [29]. It took ica’, the USIA went into overdrive to popularise Atoms for Peace, nevertheless, to restore global Atoms for Peace, placing celebratory articles excitement about the peaceful possibilities of and multi-media exhibits on it throughout the the new energy source, for only it linked such non-communist world. In response to their ef- possibilities to the need to make what Ike de- forts, the targets of the propaganda did line scribed to Churchill as ‘even the tiniest of starts’ up to access the American offer and sign in- in opening a hitherto-shut ‘door of world-wide dividual bilateral Atoms for Peace agreements discussion’ on humanity’s nuclear future [30]. with Washington that helped America ‘consol- idate friendly relationships with countries sym- pathetic to US economic and foreign policy in- THE INITIATIVE’S AMERICAN terests’ [32]. AND OVERSEAS IMPACT

In the US, in keeping with Eisenhower’s broad COINCIDENTAL CATALYSTS IN approach to national security, which embraced NEW ZEALAND the nation’s economic health and historic prin- ciples as much as its diplomacy and military One of them was New Zealand. We must also defence, Atoms for Peace had deep repercus- acknowledge that two other prompts appeared sions, as the President connected it to his push independently of Eisenhower’s initiative in the to make nuclear power production commercially mid-1950s to reinvigorate attention to the uses viable by unleashing ‘the genius and enterprise of radioactive elements. The first was only fully of American business’. Soon afterward, in 1955, known by a select few officials, the expensive albeit through the will of a naval officer rather studies New Zealand undertook in response to a than that genius, the United States launched British request to examine the feasibility of us- the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, the ing the North Island’s geothermal energy belt Nautilus, and became home to the world’s first to produce heavy water for Britain’s new H- fully commercial electricity-producing reactors. bomb programme as well as electricity for lo- In engineering terms, the AEC was embold- cal use. But the other was much more public. ened to champion its ‘Project Plowshare’, which This was the news that the West Coast’s ura- claimed harbours and canals could be built us- nium deposits might be rich enough after all to NEW ZEALAND RESPONSES TO THE PEACEFUL ATOM IN THE 1950s 57 justify the huge cost of mining them, and give some of that party’s MPs complained that the a mineral-poor country a potential new energy surveying of potential ore sites ‘had been made source and form of foreign exchange. on a piecemeal and haphazard basis’, that the new incentives for prospecting were still insuf- In one of the better-known vignettes of ficient, and that the government ‘had not done New Zealand’s early nuclear history, two el- enough to encourage the finding of uranium’. derly prospectors had ventured their luck in the On the other, the local Labour member said the Buller Gorge in 1955 and come upon a seam of area’s proximity to a railway and settled com- uranium ore with enough of the right isotope munity meant that ‘never yet . . . has a prospect- to spark not just ‘a rush to buy Geiger coun- ing area been located in such favourable condi- ters’, ‘considerable amateur prospecting’ and ‘a tions’. When it became the government again rash of other discoveries’, but renewed official in 1957, indeed, Labour based a geologist in the interest in the region’s radioactive potential as region ‘to search for radioactive materials’, and well [33]. In one expression of this interest, amended the law again so as to better nego- which lasted the rest of the decade, the Direc- tiate the use of any deposits that were found tor of the Geological Survey reiterated that the with the UK Atomic Energy Authority (which prospectors’ discovery was not commercially vi- sent visitors to the field back in 1957 who now able, but only in the context of a report that told Wellington and London that ‘the outlook said it gave ‘a valuable lead as to places where for uranium discovery was very good’) [35]. prospecting might have a favourable outcome’. In a second manifestation of it, and ‘in response to the widespread interest in uranium prospect- NEW ZEALANDERS AND ATOMS ing’, he re-issued a 1954 report on ‘Prospecting FOR PEACE for Radioactive Minerals in New Zealand’ (the two prospectors had used it), which said it was As important as these real and potential min- ‘worth the attempt to find out whether radioac- eral discoveries were, and as important as tive minerals occur in quantity in New Zealand’, New Zealanders’ ongoing pride and interest in and told the US Embassy that ‘a good commer- the ‘strides’ British sources were telling them cial proposition is considered probable’ [34]. Britain was making ‘in developing power from For its part, and prompted by its back- atomic sources’ was too [36], President Eisen- benchers, who lauded the ‘near-‘miraculous’ hower’s ‘epoch-making’ speech had a impact ‘rise in importance of these radioactive miner- upon New Zealand’s early attitudes towards nu- als in the last decade’, the way ‘large deposits clear power. Within a year of his speech a could be vital to a country’s future’, and how group of American congressmen had come to see ‘we need not fear for the future of the Common- geothermal sites and to extol the peaceful uses wealth in the matter of the possession of nuclear of nuclear energy. At the UN, now-Ambassador weapons by other countries’ should ‘extensive Munro welcomed the ‘generous spirit’ behind deposits’ be found there and in Canada and the President’s ‘eloquent plea’ and the accom- Australia, the response of the country’s then- panying call from Secretary Dulles to make ‘this National government went well beyond seizing new force a tool of humanitarianism and states- the public relations opportunity of having its manship, and not merely a fearsome addition Prime Minister Sid Holland photographed hold- to the arsenal of war’. Not only was there ing a Geiger counter. It tried to stimulate more now new hope that scientists ‘from even the prospecting for radioactive ores in 1956 and smallest countries, which may have little to of- 1957 by introducing an Atomic Energy Amend- fer by way of raw materials or industrial en- ment Act to make the rewards for finds more ergy, may make vital contributions’ as Ruther- lucrative and by building a new road in the re- ford had once done, the ambassador suggested gion to help a Nelson company prospect. Sim- that if ‘real cooperation and understanding can ilarly, Labour politicians showed an interest in be built up in a joint international enterprise the uranium fields as well. On the one hand, devoted to the development of peaceful uses 58 O’MEAGHER of atomic energy, need we doubt the possibil- years’ time and that ‘it was possible to over- ity of diverting all fissile material from destruc- estimate the immediate benefits to be derive tive to beneficent ends?’ [37]. The American from atomic energy’. Prime Minister Holland Embassy observed that Ike’s appeal and the never made one government department ulti- 1955 Atoms for Peace conference in Geneva that mately responsible for considering the adoption followed it each received ‘unusually full cov- of nuclear power and no plans for a nuclear erage by the New Zealand Press Association’, power station entered the country’s formal plan and that editors were ‘enthusiastic’ about his for its energy future until 1964 [40]. Neverthe- ‘sincere’, ‘bold-sighted’ and ‘constructive’ pro- less, the National government should not have posal [38]. More notably, an interest in build- been accused of failing to consider the nation’s ing power-generating reactors i sprang forth atomic prospects. After all, it did send Mars- overnight after that Geneva conference, when den and the State Hydro-Electric Department’s the US offered to sell research reactors at half- Chief Engineer to overseas conferences on nu- price to willing partners. clear power, and on the latter’s return establish a Committee to make recommendations to it on Typically, Marsden was the first to react, ‘the implications for New Zealand on the devel- urging the training in universities of nuclear opment of the peaceful uses of atomic energy’. physicists and engineers ‘in view of [the] possible Importantly, like the Labour government that establishment of atomic power stations in [the] succeeded it, it was willing to explore Atoms North Island within 10 years’. On more than for Peace deals with the US to assist the pre- one occasion, the head of the DSIR said nu- liminary task of boosting the nation’s atomic clear power could be a solution to the North Is- research capacity [41]. land’s anticipated need (even when geothermal energy was factored into the equation) for more power by the mid-1960s, while in Parliament AGREEMENTS AND the Labour Opposition asked National minis- CONSEQUENCES ters to respond to calls from its officials and an Auckland physics professor, Percy Burbidge, to Like a parallel deal Washington signed with look into Britain’s purported advances in the Canberra the same month, the June 1956 deal provision of nuclear energy for power and plan between New Zealand’s National government nuclear reactors. Throughout 1955 and 1956, and the United States was ‘more far-reaching Labour MPs seemed oblivious to their rejection than any except those concluded with Britain when they were in government in the 1940s of and Canada’. In addition, whereas many coun- Marsden’s suggestion that a research reactor be tries simply rushed to buy the half-price US- built, and keen (like the editors of the Here & built research reactors Washington was offer- Now journal further to their left) to rush New ing in association with such arrangements, New Zealand into a nuclear-powered future. In fact, Zealand’s use of this agreement was more con- they accused their National opponents of be- sidered. As a consequence of the deal, New ing too tied to hydro-electric and coal-station Zealand received enriched uranium from the interests and afraid to act in the matter with- Americans that could have been used for a re- out British sanction or Australian precedents search reactor. In 1958 the new Labour gov- [39]. As for those rivals occupying the Treasury ernment led by Nash hosted a sales delegation benches, even they were not as hostile to nuclear from the US Atomic Energy Commission, which power as they sometimes made out. The Min- told the press ‘the offer of assistance in obtain- ister in Charge of the State Hydro-Electric De- ing a reactor’ was ‘still good’ and of the ‘var- partment said that New Zealand had a ‘vastly ious types of assistance’ that were ‘fair game’ different’ set of energy sources available to it for New Zealand to choose from. In 1960, than Britain. The Minister of Mines and one of similarly, it succumbed to the urgings of the the party’s new MPs argued that New Zealand American Embassy and was about to apply for would not be in the age of atomic energy in ten a subsidised one (instead of buying a British NEW ZEALAND RESPONSES TO THE PEACEFUL ATOM IN THE 1950s 59 model) before its application had to be with- bassador to put his country’s nuclear intentions drawn (to Foreign Affairs’ pique) when an em- in the best possible light and have his remarks barrassed State Department said US Senators reported in the press, New Zealanders’ recep- had come to consider developed countries like tion of these gifts showed they could be wowed New Zealand quite capable of paying the whole when their superpower ally showed them its cost [42]. Even so, there was always a range technological might. Indeed, a recognition even of opinion, scientific as well as political, and grew among them that America and not their even within the DSIR, that argued New Zealand beloved Britain was the global centre of intellec- had no need for a small research reactor that tual progress and true ‘atomic workshop of the would only reproduce a little of what had al- world’ [45]. ready been done overseas when its links to the As one sign of that recognition, the ris- mother country ensured it would receive the ing Labour MP Michael Moohan was very im- fruits of British research. Tto those critics, a pressed with his visit to the Oak Ridge plant series of smaller pieces of equipment that would during his all-expenses paid 1956 trip to the enhance the pure and applied research already US. As another, the executive secretary of New being done that would lead to original results Zealand’s Atomic Energy Committee appreci- would be far more useful [43]. In the end, it ated the information its US equivalent gave it was their views that won the day. When the on nuclear-related training courses available in US gave New Zealand a grant in March 1960 the USA. Even so, the most suggestive indica- it was ‘for procuring equipment and materials tion of the broad appeal of the peaceful atom for nuclear research and training’, and when appears to have come in 1960, when Aucklan- £110,000 of Atoms for Peace gifts did arrive ders and Wellingtonians flocked to their ports in in 1961 and 1962, they did so as mass spec- their thousands in welcome when the USS Hal- trometers, a pulse analyser, a differential ther- ibut underlined the ANZUS defence relationship mal analysis apparatus and other smaller items by making the first visit by a nuclear subma- that boosted the industrial, environmental and rine to this country’s ports [46]. To them, the isotope-related work of the Institute of Nuclear Halibut was no ‘death ship’, as its successors Sciences that was finally created in Lower Hutt, would be tagged by late 1970s and early 1980s and as other equipment for university radio- protesters. On the contrary, it was a symbol of chemistry and physics labs [44]. progress and its capacity to travel the oceans was a vivid and attractive manifestation of the From the American point of view the money possibilities, not the fears, that New Zealanders was well spent. In fulfilment of the original again hoped the atom could foster. propaganda aims of the Atoms for Peace pro- gramme, the US Ambassador was told, on his visit to the University of Auckland in 1961 to see REFERENCES AND NOTES the gifts the USAEC had given that institution and the laboratory created for them (and named [1] L.S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the after an American nuclear physicist), of its Vice- Bomb. Volume Three. Toward Nuclear Abo- Chancellor’s ‘very deep appreciation’, and noted lition: A History of the World Nuclear Dis- himself that ‘the professors, students, and mem- armament Movement, 1971 to the Present. bers of the executive Council were happy, enthu- Stanford University Press, Stanford (2003), siastic, and generally grateful’. Beyond the re- p. 485. cipients’ predictable pleasure at receiving good [2] M. O’Meagher, No Ordinary Cause: Retrac- equipment, the broader political advantages of ing the Roots of Anti-Nuclear New Zealand, the deal were clear. Aside from the ‘essen- in press, Chapter 8. tial boost’ it gave to the New Zealand entities [3] An extended version of this argument will working to develop nuclear research – Canter- appear in Chapter 2 of reference [2], after a bury University received a sub-critical reactor discussion of New Zealand’s contributions to too – and the opportunity it afforded the Am- the arms race. 60 O’MEAGHER

[4] New Zealand Herald, 8 August 1945, p. 7; 1954–1970. Stanford University Press, Stan- The Atomic Caf´e, video recording, produced ford (1997), pp. 150–53. and directed by Kevin Rafferty, Jayne Loader [8] Dominion, 14 August 1945, pp. 9 and 15 Au- and Pierce Rafferty, New York (1993); K. gust 1945, p. 8; N.Z.E.F. Times, 20 August Clements, Back from the Brink: The Cre- 1945, p. 4; R. Galbreath, DSIR: Making Sci- ation of a Nuclear-Free New Zealand. Allen ence Work for New Zealand. Victoria Uni- and Unwin, Wellington (1988), p. 18; D. versity Press, Wellington (1998), p. 147; O. Davidson, Nuclear Weapons and the Amer- Wilkes, ‘New Zealand and the Atom Bomb’ in ican Churches: Ethical Positions on Mod- Kia Kaha: New Zealand in the Second World ern Warfare. Westview Press, Boulder, Col- War, J. Crawford (ed.), Oxford University orado (1983), p. xi; R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: Press, Auckland (2000), pp. 271–72. The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. Simon [9] New Zealand Herald, 8 August 1945, p. 7 and and Schuster, New York (1985), pp. 230– 9 August 1945, p. 5. 31, 477; S. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A His- [10] New Zealand Herald, 8 August 1945, pp. 6, tory of Images. Harvard University Press, 8; Christchutch Press, 9 August 1945, p. 5. Cambridge, Massachussetts (1988), pp. 119– [11] New Zealand Herald, 8 August 1945, pp. 5, 27; Allan M. Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: 7; Truth, 24 October 1945, p. 13. American Anxiety About the Atom, Univer- [12] Dominion, 14 August 1945, p. 9. sity of Illinois Press, New York (2003), pp. 14, [13] 847H.00/5-1848, Record Group 59, United 53–56; L.S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the States National Archives (hereafter RG59, Bomb. Volume Two. Resisting the Bomb: A USNA); Clements (1988), pp. 19, 28; Alis- History of the World Nuclear Disarmament ter McIntosh to Foss Shananhan, 23 October Movement, 1954–1970. Stanford University 1948, in Unofficial Channels: Letters Bewteen Press, Stanford (1997), pp. 46–48. Alister McIntosh and Foss Shanaha, George [5] External Affairs Review, 2, 11, 1952, p. 30 Laking and Frank Corner. I. McGibbon (ed.), and 4, 11, 1954, p. 8; Sunday Star-Times (her- Victoria University Press, Wellington (1999), after SST), 6 August 2000, p. A9; R. Boyle, p. 67. ‘Freedom and Science: Part II-America and [14] N.Z.E.F. Times, 17 December 1945, p. 2; the McCarran Act’, Here & Now, 3, 8, 1953, Clements (1988), p. 18. pp. 13–15; A. Goodman, The Death of Amer- [15] Galbreath (1988), p. 145. ican Liberalism, Here & Now, no. 6, 1951, p. [16] R. Barrowman, Victoria University, 1899– 8; Rhodes (1985), pp. 406, 477. 1999: A History. Victoria University Press, [6] New Zealand Herald, 10 November 1952, p. Wellington (1999), pp. 165, 168; Galbreath 7, and 21 May 2001, p. A13; S. Firth and (1988), pp. 145–46, 149–52; I. McGibbon, K. von Strokirch, A Nuclear Pacific, In: D. New Zealand and the Korean War. Volume Denoon, S. Firth, J. Linnekin, K. Nero and I: Politics and Diplomacy. Oxford University M. Meleisea (Eds), The Cambridge History Press, Auckland (1992), p. 414, n. 29. of the Pacific Islanders. Cambridge Univer- [17] 844.2546/4-2652, 844.2546/6-1652, RG59, sity Press, Cambridge (1997), p. 336; S. Firth, USNA; Galbreath (1988), pp. 147–48, 154; Nuclear Playground. Allen and Unwin, Syd- Wilkes (2000), pp. 270–71 ney (1987), pp. 14, 70–71; S.S. Schweber, [18] 744.00(W)/8-2655, RG59, USNA; John In the Shadow of the Bomb: Oppenheimer, Hulston, ‘Rafter, Thomas Athol, 1913–1996’, Bethe, and the Moral Responsibility of the DNZB; F.J.M. Farley, ‘Nuclear Science in Scientist. Princeton University Press, Prince- New Zealand’ and A.L. Odell, ‘Nuclear De- ton (2000), p. 167. velopment and the University’, Here & Now, [7] Guardian Unlimited, ‘US Secretly Put Lives no. 54, 1956, pp. 5, 18; Galbreath (1988), pp. at Atomic Risk’, 7 September 2000; L.S. 154–55, 158–60, 162, 169; A. McEwan, Nu- Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of clear New Zealand: Sorting Fact from Fic- the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, tion. Hazard Press, Christchurch (2004), NEW ZEALAND RESPONSES TO THE PEACEFUL ATOM IN THE 1950s 61

p. 14; H.N. Parton, New Zealand Since the versity Press, Stanford (1993), pp. 90, 282– War: 2. Science in Society, Landfall, 14, 83. 368 (1960); Rebecca Priestley, Material Ev- [30] Dockrill (1996), p. 133; Winkler (2003), p. idence, New Zealand Listener, 200, 27 Au- 146. gust – 2 September 2005, URL http://www. [31] Barr (1967), pp. 2, 6; Dockrill (1996), p. 1; listener.co.nz. McEwan (2004), p. 35; Winkler (2003), pp. [19] 944.8011/7-3056, 844.1901/3-961, RG59, 137–48; Wittner (1997), p. 156. USNA; New Zealand Parliamentary Debates [32] Clements (1988), p. 30; Winkler (2003), p. (hereafter NZPD), 1958, 316, p. 219; Farley 146; Wittner (1997), pp. 155–56. (1956), p. 18; Galbreath (1988), pp. 162–63; [33] P.M. Smith, A Concise History of New Odell (1956), p. 5; B.H. Olsson, ‘Defence Sci- Zealand. Cambridge University Press, ence in New Zealand 1948–1983’. Fact Book. Cambridge (2005), p. 182; R. Priestley, Volume Four. Auckland (1985), pp. 195, 213. Hot Property, New Zealand Listener, 201, [20] See Chapter 2 of M. O’Meagher, No Or- 5–11 November 2005, URL http://www. dinary Cause: Retracing the Roots of Anti- listener.co.nz. Nuclear New Zealand, in press. [34] 744.00(W)/11-1855, 844.2546/11- [21] Appendix to the Journal of the House of 1455, 844.2546/11-2355, 844.2546/9-1856, Representatives, 1956, A. 24, pp. 1–8; NZPD, 844.2546/12-1856, RG59, USNA; Galbreath 1955, 307, pp. 2995–96, 1958, 318, p. 1351; (1988), p. 280, n. 279. Barrowman (1999), pp. 166, 167; Galbreath [35] 844.2546/9-1856, RG59, USNA; NZPD, (1988), p. 280, n. 282; Hugh Templeton, ‘Al- 1956, 308, p. 355, 1956, 310, pp. 2539–40, gie, Ronald Macmillan, 1888–1978’, DNZB. 1957, 311, pp. 678–94; Clements (1988), p. [22] S. Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look Na- 31; Priestley (2005). tional Security Policy, 1953–61. Macmillan, [36] NZPD, 1955, 306, p. 1768, 1955, 307, pp. Basingstoke (1996), pp. xii, 133, 277; Win- 2353, 2363, 1956, 308, p. 787, 1957, 311, pp. kler (2003), p. 80. 503, 687, 690, and 1957, 312, p. 1075. [23] 744.00(W)/10-2155, RG59, USNA; D. Barr, [37] External Affairs Review, 4, 11, 1954, pp. 9, The How and Why Wonder Book of Atomic 12. Energy, Grosset and Dunlap, New York [38] 744.00(W)/12-1153, 744.00(W)/12-1853, (1967), p. 41; Dockrill (1996), pp. 4–5, 51, 744.00(W)/8-155, RG59, USNA; NZPD, 65–67, 133, 139–42, 145; D. Tal, Eisen- 1955, 307, p. 2363 and 311, 1957, p. 687. hower’s Disarmament Dilemma, Diplomacy [39] 744.00(W)/8-2655, 944.8138/4-1555, RG59, and Statecraft, 12, 176–83, 190–91 (2001); USNA; Appendix to the Journal of the House Winkler (2003), p. 81. of Representatives, 1956, A.24, p. 7; NZPD, [24] Winkler (2003), p. 145; Wittner (1997), p. 1955, 307, pp. 2353–55 and 1956, 308, pp. 150. 69, 786–87, 791; Here & Now, ‘Frightened of [25] NZPD, 1955, 306, p. 1764; J. Cox, Overkill: Atomic Power?’, no. 61, 1957, pp. 6–7. The Story of Modern Weapons. Penguin, [40] 744.00(W)/3-956, RG59, USNA; NZPD, Harmondsworth (1977), pp. 21, 159. 1955, 307, p. 2354, 1956, 308, p. 69 and 1957, [26] Wittner (1997), pp. 151–55. 311, p. 692; Priestley (2005). [27] Clements (1988), p. 30; Dockrill (1996), [41] 944.8011/7-3056, 944.8138/4-1555, RG59, p. 133; Winkler (2003), pp. 145–46; Wittner USNA; NZPD, 1955, 306, p. 1768, vol. 307, (1997), pp. 153–54. 1955, pp. 2353–55, 1956, 308, pp. 69–71, 768, [28] Winkler (2003), pp. 136, 143–44. 786–87, 790 and 1956, 309, p. 956; Here & [29] New Zealand Herald, 2 August 1949, p. 7; Now, ‘Notes’, no. 61, 1957, pp. 6–7; Docu- Winkler (2003), p. 139; L.S. Wittner, The ment 129, ‘Nuclear Tests’, in New Zealand Struggle Against the Bomb. Volume One. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand One World or None: The World Nuclear Dis- Foreign Policy Statements and Documents: armament Movement to 1953. Stanford Uni- 1943–1957, Wellington (1972), pp. 467–68; R. 62 O’MEAGHER

Galbreath, Sir Ernest Marsden 80th Birth- [44] 844.1901/10-1261, 844.1901/12-1262, day Book, Ministry for Culture and Heritage, RG59, USNA; Reese (1969), p. 285. Wellington (1969), p. 124. [45] 847H.00(W)/5-2049, 744.00(W)/10-1261, [42] 844.1901/4-2060, 844.1901/5-260, 844.1901/10-1261, 844.1901/12-1262, RG59, 844.1901/5-560, 844.1901/5-660, USNA; NZPD, 1955, 307, p. 2353 and 1956, 844.1901/12-1262, RG59, USNA; Farley 308, p. 69; Galbreath (1988), p. 169; Smith (1956), p. 18; Smith (2005), p. 182; T.R. (2005), p. 182; Keith Sinclair, A History of Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the the University of Auckland, 1883–1983, Ox- United States: A Survey of International Re- ford University Press, Auckland (1983), p. lations, 1941–1968. Oxford University Press, 253; University of Auckland News, ‘Honour- London (1969), p. 284. ing AURA’s Era’, 31, 7, August 2001, p. 16. [43] 944.8011/7-3056, 844.1901/5-260, RG59, USNA; Galbreath (1988), p. 156; Odell [46] 844.1901/3-961, 944.61/4-2760, RG59, (1956), p. 5. USNA; Clements (1988), p. 31.

Dr Matthew O’Meagher Department of History University of Auckland Private Bag 92019 Auckland New Zealand email: [email protected]

(Manuscript received 22.05.2006, accepted 03.07.2006) Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 63–64, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010063–2 $4.00/1 Thesis Abstract: An Early Carboniferous Fossil Assemblage from Fish Hill, Mansfield Basin, Australia

jillian m. garvey

Abstract of a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, La Trobe University, Victoria, 2005

This thesis investigates the vertebrate Hill locality to those with or without tetrapods taphonomy, micro- and macrofossil fauna, trace found no environmental or ecological reasons for fossils, and the depositional environment of their absence. The original argument that the an Early Carboniferous (Tournaisian, approx- Mansfield Basin was too cold for tetrapods dur- imately 350 mya) fossil fish locality, ‘Fish Hill’, ing the Early Carboniferous, the idea that they in the Hearns Mudstone Member of the Snowy may have evolved more towards terrestriality Plains Formation (previously known as the than previously thought, or that their absence Devil’s Plain Formation), Mansfield Basin, Aus- is a result of taphonomic or sampling basis, all tralia. While vertebrate material has been seem possible. known from the region since the late 1800s, the Based on the data presented here, the Fish origin and distribution of this material was not Hill assemblage is interpreted to represent a clear. To evaluate the taphonomic history and pocket of endemic fish that share close affini- search for new fossil material, three field seasons ties with Late Devonian faunas from Gondwana. between 2000 and 2003 were conducted. During This community may then have become extinct, that time the original quarries from the 1880s as there is no fossil evidence of a similar commu- were systematically re-opened and taphonomi- nity in southeast Australia after the Early Tour- cally surveyed. In addition, new quarries were naisian. The relative difficulty in determining excavated to provide access to the entire strati- the phylogenetic position of the individual taxa graphic sequence, allowing the depositional en- from Fish Hill has been impaired by the estab- vironment to be deduced. This extended the lishment, on the basis of incomplete material, work done during the late 1800s as it studied of several new genera endemic to the Mansfield each horizon on Fish Hill separately, rather than Basin. Not until more fossil material is collected considering it to be a single locality. Twenty- can this problem be resolved. one vertebrate fossil assemblages (VFAs) were This thesis also provides a new interpreta- recorded, each representing a different deposi- tion of the pectoral fin and vertebral column of tional event. Three taphonomic pathways were the rhizodontid Barameda decipiens. This in- found to have been responsible for these VFAs, creases knowledge of the morphology of the fin with autochthonous, parautochthonous and al- in the Rhizodontida. New information from an lochthonous assemblages identified. X-ray and improved casts indicates that the fin Geological investigations of the locality ex- is typical of other Carboniferous rhizodontids, tended work commenced by Sweet during the branching out into a broad paddle shaped fin. 1880s, finding that the beds were deposited by This re-interpretation also provides new infor- a large meandering river system. Three facies mation on the vertebral column of Barameda. within this system were identified: the main Descriptions of three partially articulated ver- river channel, the sand-sheet or crevasse splay, tebrate fossils identified during this research are and floodplain environments. Fossiliferous ma- discussed. These specimens provide further in- terial was recovered from all environments. The formation on the endemic taxa Gyracanthides absence of tetrapods from this palaeocommu- murrayi, Delatitia breviceps and Barameda de- nity is interesting. Comparison of the Fish cipiens. Also discussed is a new fossil locality 64 in the Snowy Plains Formation which predomi- reconstructing Late Palaeozoic environments. nately consists of G. murrayi spines. The Fish Hill fauna is significant, as it is the ear- During fieldwork all ichnofossils were liest known freshwater (non-marine) fauna from recorded and calcareous material collected to the Carboniferous. It is also the only Carbonif- sample for vertebrate microfossils. This resulted erous material from southeast Australia. in trace fossils and chondrichthyians from Fish Hill being formally described for the first time. This information greatly extends the faunal Dr Jillian M. Garvey information of the Snowy Plains Formation. Postdoctoral Fellow, Archaeology Program The information presented in this thesis in- School of Historical & European Studies dicates how important it is to consider all as- La Trobe University pects: invertebrate, vertebrate macro- and mi- Melbourne, VIC 3086 crofossils, and ichnotaxa, when studying and email: [email protected] Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 65–66, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010065–2 $4.00/1 Thesis Abstract: Impacts of Environmental Weed Invasion on Arthropod Biodiversity and Associated Community Structure and Processes

claire j. stephens

Abstract of a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia, 2005

Invasive exotic species frequently change pods and, in the absence of herbivores, the pres- natural patterns of biodiversity. This study in- ence of parasitoids of plant-associated insects vestigated the effects of one of Australia’s most on bridal creeper, showed that many species serious environmental weeds, bridal creeper used different habitat for juvenile development (Asparagus asparagoides), in remnant eucalypt compared with that used by adults. The in- woodland in South Australia. Research consid- direct effect of higher levels of leaf litter associ- ered the impact of bridal creeper on different ated with bridal creeper invasion also resulted in taxa and trophic groups (plants, arthropods and greater numbers of litter-associated arthropods parasitic Hymenoptera), high-level (orders and and their parasitoids and, in particular, the ex- families) and low-level (species) taxonomic as- treme abundance of one soil and litter parasitoid semblages, and ecological processes (parasitism species which dominated the wasp assemblage and pollination). The impact of bridal creeper that emerged from invaded habitat. Finally, on the native plant community was overwhelm- the highly specific interaction between an orchid ingly detrimental, undoubtedly due to direct in- and its pollinator was not impacted upon by the teractions with the weed such as shading and presence of bridal creeper, and may have even root competition. It was predicted therefore, been enhanced due the increase in the numbers that the replacement of a species-rich and open of its soil/litter-associated pollinator in weed- ground-cover by a closed homogenous one would invaded areas. Consequently, the ground-cover have flow-on effects to other biota in the habi- plant community that was so completely altered tat. by bridal creeper was not as important as other components of the woodland habitat, such as Despite the significantly adverse impact on the soil, leaf litter and canopy microhabitats, for the native plant community, a very abundant the reproduction and development of the major- and diverse arthropod and wasp community oc- ity of arthropod taxa recorded. curred in bridal creeper invaded habitat. There was some evidence, however, that the weed was The contrasting results for plant and arthro- not providing seasonally equivalent habitat to pod diversity found in this study indicate that that of native vegetation for several herbivo- a plant community may always be negatively rous and nectar-feeding groups. Invaded ar- impacted by a successful weed due to direct in- eas were also being used for the reproduction teractions among plant species, such as compe- and development of a diverse range of parasitic tition, that in turn reduce growth and fecundity. wasps and their hosts. However, the homoge- However, the impact of weed invasion on native nous habitat produced by bridal creeper com- fauna can be more complex. Direct (e.g., provi- pared with native vegetation was reflected in the sion of resources such as habitat) and indirect composition of the wasp assemblages in invaded (e.g., via increased leaf litter) interactions with areas. Wasp functional group analysis based the weed, species mobility, and multiple habitat on host niche associations revealed the mobility use can influence the structure and composition and multi-habitat use of parasitic wasps and, of faunal communities. These findings are im- presumably, their hosts. The collection from portant not only for considering the effects of foliage of parasitoids of litter-associated arthro- weed invasion on native biota, but also other 66 disruptions where habitat structure and com- Dr Claire Stephens plexity, rather than simply plant diversity per School of Earth and Environmental Sciences se, are modified via changes in the plant com- Darling Building (418) munity. This research has also highlighted the The University of Adelaide value of considering multi-species assemblages South Australia 5005 whose members comprise wide ranging taxo- email: [email protected] nomic, trophic and ecological classifications to investigate the impacts of habitat change. Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 67–68, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010067–2 $4.00/1 Thesis Abstract: Pacing Strategy and High-intensity Cycling Performance brad aisbett Abstract of a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia 2006

Background and Aims (4:50 0:08 min:s), averaged across fast- and The importance of pacing strategy (i.e. tac- sprint-start± time-trials was 3.6 3.9s faster tics) during short-term (2 – 6 min) exercise is (P < 0.05) than recorded in trial± one (4:54 well recognised. Pacing research is, however, 0:06 min:s). ± scarce and largely inconclusive due to non- Fast-start time-trial finishing time (4:53 significant results, small sample sizes, poor ex- 0:11 min:s) was 10.7 12.6s and 15.6 11.4s± perimental control and / or inappropriate sta- faster (P < 0.05) than± in the even-± (5:04 tistical analyses. The current thesis evaluated 0:11 min:s) and slow-start (5:09 0:11 min:s)± the variability of repeat performances using dif- time-trials for the twenty-six cyclists± tested. ferent pacing conditions, and whether differ- Physiological measurements taken in twelve of ent pacing conditions significantly affect perfor- these cyclists revealed that mean oxygen up- mance and markers of aerobic and anaerobic en- take (VO2) for the fast-start time-trial (4.3 ergy supply during high-intensity exercise. − − 0.5L min 1) was 184 180mL min 1 and 197± 299mL· min−1 higher± (P < 0.05)· than when Experimental Model − ±these cyclists· used the even- (4.1 0.5L min 1) Endurance-trained cyclists performed cycle- − and slow-start (4.1 0.5 L min±1) conditions.· ergometer time-trials using different pacing con- Markers of anaerobic± energy· supply (accumu- ditions during the first quarter of exercise. The lated oxygen deficit (AOD), blood lactate and power output during the first quarter of the pH) were not significantly different between fast-, even- and slow-start time-trials was fixed pacing conditions. The percentage increase in such that each subject would complete the first mean performance and mean VO2 using the quarter of total work (104.6 13.5kJ) in 60s, fast-start condition was not significantly corre- 75s and 90s respectively. The± sprint-start pro- lated. tocol simulated a 15-second maximal starting effort, followed by even-pacing for the remain- Sprint-start finishing time (4:48 0:08 der of the first minute. After the first quarter of min:s) was 2.7 1.7 s faster (P < 0.05)± than work, subjects were instructed to complete the in the fast-start± time-trials (4:51 0:08 min:s) remaining three-quarters of total work in the for the eight cyclists tested. The± difference in shortest possible time. finishing time occurred despite no difference (by design) in first quarter split-time between the Results pacing conditions. No differences in mean VO2 The coefficient of variation (CV), for the 18 or AOD were identified between the pacing con- subjects who completed three fast-, even-, and ditions. First quarter VO2 during the sprint- slow-start time-trials was 2.4%, 2.6% and 2.0% start trial (3.4 0.4 L min−1) was 255 211 respectively. There was no main effect for trial mL min−1 higher± (P <· 0.05) than during± the number on time-trial performance across these fast-start· trial (3.1 0.4L min−1). Following three pacing conditions. The CV for a second removal of an outlier,± the· percentage increase cohort of eight subjects performing two fast- in first quarter VO2 was significantly correlated and sprint-start time-trials was 1.4% and 1.5% (r = 0.83, P < 0.05) with the relative difference respectively. Finishing time in the second trial in finishing time. 68

Conclusion put throughout exercise. In the field, a brief The major findings of this thesis demon- maximal starting effort could also minimise the strate that a brief sprint-start followed by even- time spent accelerating up to racing speed, en- pacing is a superior strategy to fast-, even-, and abling the athlete to spend a greater proportion slow-start pacing for 5-minute cycling perfor- of the race at their optimal speed, leading to a mance. The overall∼ supremacy of the sprint- faster finishing time. Finally, to detect the small start condition may be mediated by an accel- but, important changes in performance due to erated aerobic energy supply early in exercise pacing, researchers may need to test multiple which could contribute to a higher power out- trials per pacing condition.

Brad Aisbett Bushfire CRC Postdoctoral Fellow Exercise Physiology and Metabolism Laboratory Department of Physiology University of Melbourne 3010 Victoria email: [email protected] Journal & Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Vol. 139, p. 69–70, 2006 ISSN 0035-9173/06/010069–2 $4.00/1 Annual Report of Council

For the year ended 31st March 2006

PATRONS ROYAL SOCIETIES OF AUSTRALIA MEETING The Council expresses its gratitude for their support to our joint patrons, the Governor Gen- The second such meeting, the first was in Syd- eral, His Excellency, Major General Michael ney, was held in Melbourne hosted by the Royal Jefffrey and to Her Excellency Professor Marie Society of Victoria. Matters of mutual interest Bashir, Governor of the State of NSW. were discussed and some progress made towards the formation of an umbrella group to support the aims of all the state societies at a national MEETINGS level. A reception was given by the State Gov- ernor of Victoria, His Excellency John Landy, Ten Council meetings were held monthly at the at Government House. The next such meeting Society’s Offices at 121 Darlington Rd, Dar- will be held in Hobart in 2006. lington Campus, Sydney University, in addition to subcommittees. A full day future planning LIBRARY & HERITAGE GRANT meeting was held at St Pauls College. Thanks to John Hardie and Jim Franklin. A part of our library, which has languished Our monthly lectures, at the Darlington in boxes for years, has been unpacked, sorted Centre, were well attended and many members and shelved at our new Darlington Rd premises of the audiences joined the speaker for dinner af- where they are available to members and ap- terwards, an innovation which has proved popu- proved visitors. Hard and skilful work by lar with both the speakers and the members and a small group led by Robyn Stutchbury has guests who came to dinner. A full lecture pro- gained us a Federal Heritage Grant. John gram for the year was printed and distributed Hardie accepted the grant on our behalf at a early in the year. The speakers list was: ceremony in Canberra and attended a conser- vation workshop there. Grant funds enabled us February, Dr Ann Moyle to employ consultant historians Peter Tyler and Scientific Correspondence of W.B. Clarke David Branagan to investigate the significance April, Karina Kelly of our collection of books, medals, drawings and 100 years after Einstein’s Extraordinary Year other items. The initial results are very impres- May, Dr Charlie Lineweaver sive and indicate we have a unique collection Biocosmology: a New Science of scientific and cultural history going back to June, Prof. Dan Potts colonial times. Bactrian Camels in Antiquity Acquisition of journals by gift and exchange July, Prof. Lesley Rogers has continued during the year. Exchange mate- Why did the Vertebrate Brain become rial from overseas sources has been forwarded to Lateralized the Dixson Library, University of New England August, Dr Alan Wilton in Armidale where it is available locally or on Tails of Dingoes: their Past and their Future inter-library loan. Council thanks the staff of the Dixson Library for their continuing mainte- September, Prof. Pat Vickers-Rich nance of the foreign journal portion of the So- TB: a New Vaccine and the Influence of ciety’s Collection. Genetics November, Dr Sheila van Holst Pellekaan DNA studies in Human Evolution 70 ANNUAL REPORT

ANNUAL DINNER usual Report of Council for 2004 and the au- dited financial statements for the year. Parts The Annual Dinner was held at the Forum 3 & 4 were published in December 2005. During Restaurant University of Sydney on Friday 10th the year we have received requests for permis- March 2006 and was well attended. The after sion to reprint material and for photocopies of dinner address was given by Dr Tim Entwisle, our journal articles going back to the 19th cen- Executive Director of the Royal Botanic Gar- tury, dens Council wishes to thank the referees for their time in refereeing our papers and our editor Pete AWARDS Williams and particularly our Webmaster Mike Lake for preparing and typesetting the master pages for printing and for maintaining our web Edgeworth David Medal 2005: site, http://nsw.royalsoc.org.au. We must Dr Christopher Barner-Kowollik, UNSW also record the generous contribution of Richard Clarke Medal 2005 (Geology): Evans who has scanned numerous volumes of Professor Mark Westoby, Macquarie the Journal and Proceedings of the Society for University our web site. Walter Burfett Prize: A/Professor Brett Neilan, UNSW Eureka Prize for Interdisciplinary Bulletin Research for 2005: The Bulletin and Proceedings of The Royal So- The Royal Society’s Prize [initiated by NSW ciety of NSW has been published monthly dur- and with contributions from the other state ing the year. A new fast printer has enabled RSs, principally Victoria] went to Dr Brendan us to undertake Bulletin printing in our office Burns and A/Prof. Brett Neilan of UNSW and instead of contracting it out. We are indebted Prof. Malcolm Walter of Macquarie University. to the authors of short articles and information submitted to the Bulletin and members who as- The Walter Burfett prize fund has been sisted in preparation and distribution. augmented by a generous donation from Anne Thoeming, his daughter. Council decided, with SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS BRANCH her approval, to change the award to a medal instead of a cash prize. The medal has been de- The Southern Highland Branch held ten meet- signed and made, using photographs of Walter ings with an average attendance of 65 members.. Burfett provided by Ann Thoeming. The first The Branch has sent out 60 monthly Newslet- such medal has been awarded to A/Professor ters to members and about 150 notices of meet- Brett Neilan of UNSW, winner of the 2004 Wal- ings each month to other interested people. ter Burfitt Prize. The Branch Committee for 2004/2005 was: Chairman: Mr H.R. Perry BSc PUBLICATIONS Vice-Chairman: Mr C.F. Wilmot Hon. Secretary/Treasurer: Journal Ms Christine Staubner Member: Miss Marjory Roberts Volume 138 of our Journal Parts 1 & 2 were pub- lished in August 2005. It contained the Pres- The Chairman of the Southern Highlands idential Address ‘A Hundred Years after Ein- Branch, Roy Perry thanks the management of stein’s Extraordinary Year’ by Karina Kelly, Fitzroy Inn for their wonderful after-meeting ‘Ideal Energy Source by Mark Oliphant’s Beam dinners, the many fine guest speakers who vis- Fusion’ by Heinrich Hora and ‘The Rev. W.B. ited us, the Council of the Society for its support Clarke and his Scientific Correspondents’ by and the local Branch Committee for their hard Ann Moyal, a number of thesis abstracts, the work. The Royal Society of New South Wales Council’s Financial Report for 2005

The Royal Society of New South Wales Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 2005 are published in the Bulletin & Proceedings.

NOTICE TO AUTHORS

General Tables and Illustrations should be in the form and size intended for insertion in the master Manuscripts should be addressed to The Hon- manuscript - 150 mm x 200 mm. If this is orary Secretary, Royal Society of New South not readily possible then an indication of the Wales, Building H47 University of Sydney NSW required reduction (such as ‘reduce to 1/2 size’) 2006. must be clearly stated. Tables and illustrations Manuscripts will be reviewed by the Hon. Ed- should be numbered consecutively with Arabic itor, in consultation with the Editorial Board, numerals in a single sequence and each must to decide whether the paper will be considered have a caption. for publication in the Journal. Manuscripts Half-tone illustrations (photographs) should be are subjected to peer review by an indepen- included only when essential and should be pre- dant referee. In the event of initial rejection, sented on glossy paper. manuscripts may be sent to two other referees. Maps, diagrams and graphs should generally Papers, other than those specially invited by the not be larger than a single page. However, Editorial Board on behalf of Council, will only larger figures may be split and printed across be considered if the content is substantially new two opposite pages. The scale of maps or dia- material which has not been published previ- grams must be given in bar form. ously, has not been submitted concurrently else- where nor is likely to be published substantially References are to be cited in the text by giving in the same form elsewhere. Well-known work the author’s name and year of publication. Ref- and experimental procedure should be referred erences in the Reference List should be listed to only briefly, and extensive reviews and his- alphabetically by author and then chronologi- torical surveys should, as a rule, be avoided. cally by date. Titles of journals should be cited Letters to the Editor and short notes may also in full – not abbreviated. be submitted for publication. Details of submission guidelines can be found Three, single sided, typed copies of the in the on-line Style Guide for Authors at manuscript (double spacing) should be submit- http://nsw.royalsoc.org.au/ ted on A4 paper. Master Manuscript for Printing Spelling should conform with “The Concise Ox- ford Dictionary” or “The Macquarie Dictio- The journal is printed from master pages pre- A nary”. The Syst´eme International d’Unites (SI) pared by the LTEX2ε typesetting program. is to be used, with the abbreviations and sym- When a paper has been accepted for publica- bols set out in Australian Standard AS1000. tion, the author(s) will be required to submit the paper in a suitable electronic format. De- All stratigaphic names must conform with tails can be found in the on-line Style Guide. the International Stratigraphic Guide and new Galley proofs will be provided to authors for names must first be cleared with the Cen- final checking prior to publication. tral Register of Australian Stratigraphic Names, Australian Geological Survey Organisation, Reprints Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia. The codes An author who is a member of the Society will of Botanical and Zoological Nomenclature must receive a number of reprints of their paper free. also be adhered to as neccessary. Authors who are not a members of the Society The Abstract should be brief and informative. may purchase reprints. CONTENTS

Vol. 139 Parts 1 and 2

PENCHEVA T., HRISTOZOV I. AND SHANNON A.G. A Modified Approach to an Analytical Solution of a Diffusion Model for a Biotechnological Process 1

BINNIE, A. Atomic Australia and Nuclear New Zealand 9

BINNIE, A. Oliphant, the Father of Atomic Energy 11

PRIESTLEY, R. Ernest Marsden’s Nuclear New Zealand: from Nuclear Reactors to Nuclear Disarmament 23

BROWN, P. British Nuclear Testing in Australia: Performing the Maralinga Experiment through Verbatim Theatre 39

O’MEAGHER, M Prospects for Enrichment: New Zealand Responses to the Peaceful Atom in the 1950s 51

ABSTRACTS OF THESES

Garvey, J. M. An Early Carboniferous Fossil Assemblage from Fish Hill, 63 Mansfield Basin, Australia Stephens, C.J. Impacts of Environmental Weed Invasion on Arthropod 65 Biodiversity and Associated Community Structure and Processes Aisbett, B. Pacing Strategy and High-intensity Cycling Performance 67

ANNUAL REPORT OF COUNCIL FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31st MARCH2006 69

ADDRESS Royal Society of New South Wales, Building H47 University of Sydney NSW 2006, Australia http://nsw.royalsoc.org.au

DATE OF PUBLICATION September 2006