Uva-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
'Qui C'est Ce Monsieur Mali Qui Remplace Les Francais?' Analyzing the Kel Tamasheq Conflict of Mali from the Perspective
Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University Nijmegen MSc Human Geography, specialisation: Conflicts, Territories and Identities Supervised by Dr. Henk van Houtum ‘Qui c’est ce monsieur Mali qui remplace les Francais?’ Analyzing the Kel Tamasheq conflict of Mali from the perspective of identity Ieteke Elze Schouten [email protected] Amsterdam, August 2010 OI VA VOI1,2 Hora It's all about identity Construction of a family Of difference and simile What I give you and you give me It's all about identity This tribal sense of dignity Of tolerance and unity Of prejudice and bigotry It's all about identity A web of who we'd like to be Let's cut and paste our memory A dark and timeless industry It's all about identity A strength and solidarity A dazed, confused desire to find A place and time in history It's all about identity Or how the sheer majority Impose a predetermined badge And wait to judge you silently It's all about identity A retrospective odyssey But where I live and who I meet Are stronger in defining me From the album: Laughter Through Tears (2003) 1 Saint Girons, 2008:27 2 Oi Va Voi is a Klezmer/dance band influenced by folk music from eastern Europe. The band originates from London and most of the members have a Jewish background. 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS When writing the acknowledgements, I cannot help to ponder over the fact that I am so grateful that this work is now completed. The patience the people close to me have showed was unending. -
A Multivocal Analysis of the 2012 Political Crisis in the Divided
One hippopotamus and eight blind analysts: a multivocal analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali Baz Lecocq, Gregory Mann, Bruce Whitehouse, Dida Badi, Lotte Pelckmans, Nadia Belalimat, Bruce Hall, Wolfram Lacher To cite this version: Baz Lecocq, Gregory Mann, Bruce Whitehouse, Dida Badi, Lotte Pelckmans, et al.. One hippopota- mus and eight blind analysts: a multivocal analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali. Review of African Political Economy, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2013, 40, pp.343 - 357. 10.1080/03056244.2013.799063. halshs-01395536 HAL Id: halshs-01395536 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01395536 Submitted on 10 Nov 2016 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts: A multivocal analysis of the 2012 political crisis in the divided Republic of Mali Extended Editors Cut* Baz Lecocq, Gregory Mann, Bruce Whitehouse, Dida Badi, Lotte Pelckmans, Nadia Belalimat, Bruce Hall, Wolfram Lacher∗ I. Introduction In 2012, the political landscape in the Republic of Mali transformed rapidly, drastically, and unpredictably. The formation of a new Tuareg political movement—the National Movement of Azawad—in October 2010 and the return to Mali of Tuareg with military experience from the Libyan conflict in August 2011—bringing along heavy weapons and logistical supplies— made speculation on renewed violence on the part of separatist Tuareg inevitable. -
The Status Quo Defied the Legitimacy of Traditional Authorities in Areas of Limited Statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya
The Status Quo Defied The legitimacy of traditional authorities in areas of limited statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya Fransje Molenaar Jonathan Tossell Anna Schmauder CRU Report Rahmane Idrissa Rida Lyammouri The Status Quo Defied The legitimacy of traditional authorities in areas of limited statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya Fransje Molenaar Jonathan Tossell Anna Schmauder Rahmane Idrissa Rida Lyammouri CRU Report September 2019 supported by NWO-WOTRO September 2019 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. Cover photo: Djermakoye Amadou Seyni Magagi, Harikanassou, Boboye, Niger Chef traditionnele du Kanton de Kiota, Harikanassou, Boboye, Niger © Alfred Weidinger | All Rights Reserved Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright, trademark and / or other laws. Should a user download material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, or the Clingendael Institute, for personal or non-commercial use, the user must retain all copyright, trademark or other similar notices contained in the original material or on any copies of this material. Material on the website of the Clingendael Institute may be reproduced or publicly displayed, distributed or used for any public and non-commercial purposes, but only by mentioning the Clingendael Institute as its source. Permission is required to use the logo of the Clingendael Institute. This can be obtained by contacting the Communication desk of the Clingendael Institute ([email protected]). The following web link activities are prohibited by the Clingendael Institute and may present trademark and copyright infringement issues: links that involve unauthorized use of our logo, framing, inline links, or metatags, as well as hyperlinks or a form of link disguising the URL. -
If Our Men Won't Fight, We Will"
“If our men won’t ourmen won’t “If This study is a gender based confl ict analysis of the armed con- fl ict in northern Mali. It consists of interviews with people in Mali, at both the national and local level. The overwhelming result is that its respondents are in unanimous agreement that the root fi causes of the violent confl ict in Mali are marginalization, discrimi- ght, wewill” nation and an absent government. A fact that has been exploited by the violent Islamists, through their provision of services such as health care and employment. Islamist groups have also gained support from local populations in situations of pervasive vio- lence, including sexual and gender-based violence, and they have offered to restore security in exchange for local support. Marginality serves as a place of resistance for many groups, also northern women since many of them have grievances that are linked to their limited access to public services and human rights. For these women, marginality is a site of resistance that moti- vates them to mobilise men to take up arms against an unwilling government. “If our men won’t fi ght, we will” A Gendered Analysis of the Armed Confl ict in Northern Mali Helené Lackenbauer, Magdalena Tham Lindell and Gabriella Ingerstad FOI-R--4121--SE ISSN1650-1942 November 2015 www.foi.se Helené Lackenbauer, Magdalena Tham Lindell and Gabriella Ingerstad "If our men won't fight, we will" A Gendered Analysis of the Armed Conflict in Northern Mali Bild/Cover: (Helené Lackenbauer) Titel ”If our men won’t fight, we will” Title “Om våra män inte vill strida gör vi det” Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--4121—SE Månad/Month November Utgivningsår/Year 2015 Antal sidor/Pages 77 ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Utrikes- & Försvarsdepartementen Forskningsområde 8. -
The MLNA's Fight for a Secular State of Azawad
The MLNA's Fight for a Secular State of Azawad By: Anna Mahjar Barducci* On April 6, 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) seceded from Mali unilaterally and declared an independent State of Azawad. The MNLA is a secular Tuareg1 movement whose goal is the establishment of a secular state in Azawad that will respect the rights of all ethnic groups in the region (Tuareg, Moors2, Songhai and Peul). The MLNA has declared itself a partner of the West in the war on terrorism. However, despite its secular and pro-Western character, immediately after the secession the MNLA became the target of a smear campaign by international media,3 which tried to paint it as an Islamist movement. The campaign served the interest of the Malian government and of neighboring countries, which want to delegitimize the MNLA's struggle in order to avoid recognition of the State of Azawad. MLNA Seizes Two Historic Opportunities The MNLA seceded from Mali by taking advantage of two historic opportunities. One was provided by the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Desperately struggling for his survival, Gaddafi armed the Tuareg population in northern Mali, hoping they would help him quell the uprising against him. However, instead of turning their weapons against the Libyan rebels, the Tuaregs used them to take control of their own country. They were assisted by Tuaregs who immigrated to Libya in the 1960s and 1980s in search for a better life and joined the Libyan army, who defected from the tyrant's army and came to the aid of their brothers in Azawad. -
(Between Warrior and Helplessness in the Valley of Azawaɤ ) Appendix 1: Northern Mali and Niger Tuareg Participation in Violenc
Appendix 1: Northern Mali and Niger Tuareg Participation in violence as perpetrators, victims, bystanders from November 2013 to August 2014 (Between Warrior and Helplessness in the Valley of Azawaɤ ) Northern Mali/Niger Tuareg participation in violence (perpetrators, victims, bystanders) November 2013 – August 2014. Summarized list of sample incidents from Northern Niger and Northern Mali from reporting tracking by US Military Advisory Team, Niger/Mali – Special Operations Command – Africa, USAFRICOM. Entries in Red indicate no Tuareg involvement; Entries in Blue indicate Tuareg involvement as victims and/or perpetrators. 28 November – Niger FAN arrests Beidari Moulid in Niamey for planning terror attacks in Niger. 28 November – MNLA organizes protest against Mali PMs Visit to Kidal; Mali army fires on protestors killing 1, injuring 5. 30 November – AQIM or related forces attack French forces in Menaka with Suicide bomber. 9 December – AQIM and French forces clash in Asler, with 19 casualties. 14 December – AQIM or related forces employ VBIED against UN and Mali forces in Kidal with 3 casualties. 14 December – MUJWA/AQIM assault a Tuareg encampment with 2 casualties in Tarandallet. 13 January – AQIM or related forces kidnap MNLA political leader in Tessalit. 16 January – AQIM kidnap/executes MNLA officer in Abeibera. 17 January – AQIM or related forces plant explosive device near Christian school and church in Gao; UN forces found/deactivated device. 20 January – AQIM or related forces attacks UN forces with IED in Kidal, 5 WIA. 22 January – AQIM clashes with French Army forces in Timbuktu with 11 Jihadist casualties. 24 January – AQIM or related forces fires two rockets at city of Kidal with no casualties. -
Tuareg Nationalism and Cyclical Pattern of Rebellions
Tuareg Nationalism and Cyclical Pattern of Rebellions: How the past and present explain each other Oumar Ba Working Paper No. 007 Sahel Research Group Working Paper No. 007 Tuareg Nationalism and Cyclical Pattern of Rebellions: How the past and present explain each other Oumar Ba March 2014 The Sahel Research Group, of the University of Florida’s Center for African Studies, is a collaborative effort to understand the political, social, economic, and cultural dynamics of the countries which comprise the West African Sahel. It focuses primarily on the six Francophone countries of the region—Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad—but also on in developments in neighboring countries, to the north and south, whose dy- namics frequently intersect with those of the Sahel. The Sahel Research Group brings together faculty and gradu- ate students from various disciplines at the University of Florida, in collaboration with colleagues from the region. Abstract: This article stresses the importance of history in understanding the cyclical pattern of Tuareg rebellions in Mali. I argue that history and narratives of bravery, resistance, and struggle are important in the discursive practice of Tuareg nationalism. This discourse materializes in the episodic rebellions against the Malian state. The cyclical pattern of the Tuareg rebellions is caused by institutional shortcomings such as the failure of the Malian state to follow through with the clauses that ended the previous rebellions. But, more importantly, the previous rebellions serve as historical and cultural markers for subsequent rebellions, which creates a cycle of mutually retrospective reinforcement mechanisms. About the Author: Oumar Ba is a Ph. -
[.35 **Natural Language Processing Class Here Computational Linguistics See Manual at 006.35 Vs
006 006 006 DeweyiDecimaliClassification006 006 [.35 **Natural language processing Class here computational linguistics See Manual at 006.35 vs. 410.285 *Use notation 019 from Table 1 as modified at 004.019 400 DeweyiDecimaliClassification 400 400 DeweyiDecimali400Classification Language 400 [400 [400 *‡Language Class here interdisciplinary works on language and literature For literature, see 800; for rhetoric, see 808. For the language of a specific discipline or subject, see the discipline or subject, plus notation 014 from Table 1, e.g., language of science 501.4 (Option A: To give local emphasis or a shorter number to a specific language, class in 410, where full instructions appear (Option B: To give local emphasis or a shorter number to a specific language, place before 420 through use of a letter or other symbol. Full instructions appear under 420–490) 400 DeweyiDecimali400Classification Language 400 SUMMARY [401–409 Standard subdivisions and bilingualism [410 Linguistics [420 English and Old English (Anglo-Saxon) [430 German and related languages [440 French and related Romance languages [450 Italian, Dalmatian, Romanian, Rhaetian, Sardinian, Corsican [460 Spanish, Portuguese, Galician [470 Latin and related Italic languages [480 Classical Greek and related Hellenic languages [490 Other languages 401 DeweyiDecimali401Classification Language 401 [401 *‡Philosophy and theory See Manual at 401 vs. 121.68, 149.94, 410.1 401 DeweyiDecimali401Classification Language 401 [.3 *‡International languages Class here universal languages; general -
IMRAP, Interpeace. Self-Portrait of Mali on the Obstacles to Peace. March 2015
SELF-PORTRAIT OF MALI Malian Institute of Action Research for Peace Tel : +223 20 22 18 48 [email protected] www.imrap-mali.org SELF-PORTRAIT OF MALI on the Obstacles to Peace Regional Office for West Africa Tel : +225 22 42 33 41 [email protected] www.interpeace.org on the Obstacles to Peace United Nations In partnership with United Nations Thanks to the financial support of: ISBN 978 9966 1666 7 8 March 2015 As well as the institutional support of: March 2015 9 789966 166678 Self-Portrait of Mali on the Obstacles to Peace IMRAP 2 A Self-Portrait of Mali on the Obstacles to Peace Institute of Action Research for Peace (IMRAP) Badalabougou Est Av. de l’OUA, rue 27, porte 357 Tel : +223 20 22 18 48 Email : [email protected] Website : www.imrap-mali.org The contents of this report do not reflect the official opinion of the donors. The responsibility and the respective points of view lie exclusively with the persons consulted and the authors. Cover photo : A young adult expressing his point of view during a heterogeneous focus group in Gao town in June 2014. Back cover : From top to bottom: (i) Focus group in the Ségou region, in January 2014, (ii) Focus group of women at the Mberra refugee camp in Mauritania in September 2014, (iii) Individual interview in Sikasso region in March 2014. ISBN: 9 789 9661 6667 8 Copyright: © IMRAP and Interpeace 2015. All rights reserved. Published in March 2015 This document is a translation of the report L’Autoportrait du Mali sur les obstacles à la paix, originally written in French. -
Unemployed Intellectuals in the Sahara: the Teshumara Nationalist Movement and the Revolutions in Tuareg Societyã
IRSH 49 (2004), Supplement, pp. 87–109 DOI: 10.1017/S0020859004001658 # 2004 Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis Unemployed Intellectuals in the Sahara: The Teshumara Nationalist Movement and the Revolutions in Tuareg Societyà Baz Lecocq Summary: In the past four decades the Tuareg, a people inhabiting the central Sahara, experienced dramatic socioeconomic upheaval caused by the national independence of the countries they inhabit, two droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, and prolonged rebellion against the state in Mali and Niger in the 1990s. This article discusses these major upheavals and their results from the viewpoint of three groups of Tuareg intellectuals: the ‘‘organic intellectuals’’ or traditional tribal leaders and Muslim religious specialists; the ‘‘traditional intellectuals’’ who came into being from the 1950s onwards; and the ‘‘popular intellectuals’’ of the teshumara movement, which found its origins in the drought-provoked economic emigration to the Maghreb, and which actively prepared the rebellions of the 1990s. By focusing on the debates between these intellectuals on the nature of Tuareg society, its organization, and the direction its future should take, the major changes in a society often described as guarding its traditions will be exposed. INTRODUCTION ‘‘In this still untamed Sahara – among the camel herdsmen, young Koranic students, government officials, and merchants now anticipating a more peaceful and prosperous future – we were seeking rhythms of life unbroken since the time of Muhammad, 1,300 years ago.’’1 When the Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger ended in the second half of the 1990s, journalists set out to look for the unchanging character of Saharan life, ruled by tradition and ways as old as mankind. -
Rethinking the Response to Jihadist Groups Across the Sahel
Research Rethinking the response Paper to jihadist groups across Africa Programme the Sahel March 2021 Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a world-leading policy institute based in London. Our mission is to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world. Contents Summary 2 01 Introduction 3 02 Governments and armies in the Sahel: structural failures 6 03 The case of northern Mali 10 04 Niger: a counterexample 14 05 The role of local militia groups 18 06 The limitations of proxy warfare 20 07 Conclusion: the end of military cooperation? 24 About the author 27 Acknowledgments 27 1 Chatham House Summary — Rather than the ideology of global jihad, the driving force behind the emergence and resilience of non-state armed groups in the Sahel is a combination of weak states, corruption and the brutal repression of dissent, embodied in dysfunctional military forces. — The dominant narrative of a global jihadi threat has overshadowed the reality of the key role played by military nepotism, prevarication and indiscipline in generating and continuing conflict in the Sahel – problems that long predated the ‘war on terror’. Moreover, it has pushed the international community to intervene to regulate local conflicts that have little to do with global terrorism or religious indoctrination. — Mali offers a clear example of this. The widespread use of poorly controlled militias, the collapse of its army, two coups – in 2012 and 2020 – and a weak state presence in rural areas, on top of a history of repression and abuse suffered by its northern population, has done much more to drive the growth of insurgent groups than did the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, Salafist indoctrination, or alleged support from Arab countries. -
Reconstructing Local Orders in Mali: Historical Perspectives and Future Challenges
Local Orders Paper Series BROOKINGS PAPER 7 | July 2017 Reconstructing local orders in Mali: Historical perspectives and future challenges ANDREW LEBOVICH ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to first and foremost thank Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shadi Hamid, and Harold Trinkunas for their invitation to participate in the Local Orders Seminar in early 2016, which allowed for an early presentation of what would become this paper. I would also like to extend my deepest thanks to Shadi and particularly Vanda for their kindness and infinite patience with delays on my end and the exigencies of doctoral research and travel while writing and revising this paper. They have shown uncommon grace throughout this process, and repeatedly pushed me to write and present this material in a form more approachable and digestible for a non-academic readership. Their comments and edits, as well as those of the anonymous reviewers, have made this a significantly stronger paper than it would have otherwise been. Additional thanks are due to Bradley Porter for his own tireless organizational efforts, as well as to Anthony Yazaki for his expert editing of the penultimate version of this paper. This publication could not have been finished without their tireless efforts. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recommendations of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by any donation. Local Orders Paper Series ABOUT THE RECONSTITUTING LOCAL ORDERS PROJECT Led by Brookings Senior Fellows Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shadi Hamid, and Harold Trinkunas, the Brookings Seminar on Reconstituting Local Orders seeks to better understand how domestic political order breaks down and is reconstituted.