Transforming Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance

S. R. OSBORNE AND B. C. PRINDLE

Scott R. Osborne and CAPT Brian C. Prindle, USN

Although we cannot predict future security conditions, we can be certain that the environment will be marked by the unexpected. However, the kinds and scope of the con- ﬂ icts we will face, the requirements for naval forces, and other unknowns will surely entail the deterrence and defeat of asymmetric threats. The Navy’s Maritime Patrol and Recon- naissance (MPR) forces must be postured to sustain and advance a broad, competitive advantage over emerging 21st century threats, and the MPR community must enhance core mission capabilities with intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities that in turn support the Navy’s transformation roadmap, Sea Power 21. MPR force transformation will be realized through co-evolving concepts of operation, changes in organizational structure, and innovative applications of legacy capabilities and newly developed technologies associated with Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs), and high-ﬁ delity trainers. MMA, teamed with robust and mature UAV capabilities, could be the basis for a radical change in the conduct of maritime warfare.

INTRODUCTION The Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance (MPR) procedures along with the development of new weapons, community has a long and rich history of transforma- sensors, and procedures to counter emerging maritime tion in operational concepts and weapons systems (see threats, particularly German and Japanese submarines. the article by Keane and Easterling, this issue). The During the Cold War, the MPR force performed armed MPR force has its roots in maritime warfare, primar- surveillance and reconnaissance of Soviet submarines ily anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and surface warfare and surface action groups over open oceans. Today, (SUW), and has always been responsive and adapted the MPR ﬂ eet of P-3C aircraft is performing a variety to changes in targets of interest and operating envi- of operations beyond traditional ASW and SUW mis- ronments through both evolutionary and revolution- sions—maritime interdiction, counterdrug activities, ary initiatives. maritime shipping protection, and overland strike mis- In the early years, the MPR force performed coastal sion support. These activities are being conducted in lit- reconnaissance missions that were subsequently ex- toral environments by adapting and improving sensors tended to open-ocean patrols during World War II. This and systems designed for Cold War threats and missions. transition involved adaptation of legacy capabilities and The time is right, however, to transition the current

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MPR force to one equipped, managed, and trained to DEFINING TRANSFORMATION combat ever-evolving 21st century threats. The primary purpose of military transformation is to The Navy has recently reaffi rmed the importance of develop the capability to perform military operations, ASW and SUW mission areas to protect the Fleet. By including operations other than war, more effectively virtue of speed, area of coverage, versatility, and payload, and with fewer casualties. Many defi nitions of military manned and unmanned MPR aircraft will continue to transformation exist, both within and outside the DoD. be indispensable against emerging maritime threats. No Some defi nitions focus narrowly on technology, others on other U.S. military aircraft of the future will be as well organizational change, and still others on doctrine and suited for locating and destroying enemy submarines strategy. However, the defi nitions appear to broadly align and surface vessels as Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft into two major groups: revolutionary and evolutionary. (MMA). The revolutionary group describes transformation The systems needed for MMA to conduct ASW as a discontinuous or “leap-ahead” change that pro- and SUW missions under diffi cult environmental con- motes movement of resources (money, manpower, and ditions must be robust. Gaining and maintaining mari- doctrine) away from current weapon system technolo- time superiority in the face of modern threats requires gies and attendant tactics, techniques, and procedures an integrated suite of sensors covering the broad (TTPs) to entirely new technologies and new TTPs. On spectrum of information provided by electro-optical, the other hand, the evolutionary group takes a coun- infrared, radar (including synthetic aperture radar terrevolutionary approach, advocating incremental, sys- and inverse synthetic aperture radar), acoustic, mag- tematic change to military capability by using current netic, and electronic support measures, among others. capabilities in new ways or with modernizing technolo- But it makes no sense to develop and fi eld an expen- gies to achieve radical improvements over time. Since sive, limited-mission platform, such as MMA, just the future is unknown, the evolutionary group deems to sit and wait for ASW or SUW threats to become it imprudent to cut current, proven capabilities solely active. in favor of new, unproven, and likely high-risk invest- To be cost-effective, MPR aircraft must add value to ments. They also contend that revolutionary capabilities other warfare areas, such as intelligence, surveillance, may not match future threats any better than adapta- and reconnaissance (ISR), even while conducting tion of current technology and that proven approaches core missions, and they must also participate in all can be modifi ed by applying updated technology or used levels of confl ict, not just war. MPR aircraft and mis- with revised TTPs, with lower cost and risk, to meet the sion systems must have fall-out capability to justify emergent threat. development and operating costs. Making ISR infor- Upon consideration of both sides of this debate, the mation derived from sensors and mission systems devel- reality is that the DoD will need to affordably garner oped specifi cally for ASW and SUW available to the the best capabilities from both, for adoption of solely warfi ghter enables the MPR force to transform special- one approach would incur risk in the DoD’s ability to purpose MPR capabilities into a widely used warfi ght- counter the broad spectrum of future threats. A properly ing service. transformed military can develop signifi cant advantages Since the fi rst Navy patrol squadron (VP) was com- over a potential enemy. However, the process may also missioned in 1922, through today’s enhanced P-3C air- introduce risks that, if not properly managed, could dan- craft, the MPR community has provided timely ISR gerously undermine military capability.1–5 information to the warfi ghter as fall-out of its primary Notwithstanding the ongoing debate over how best ASW and SUW mission capabilities. As such, the Navy to defi ne and manage transformation, several key tenets is now engaged in a program to evolve and revolution- of transformation help to characterize it and, more ize the capabilities of the current MPR force. With the importantly, what it provides the warfi ghter. Although MMA and several unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology is viewed as the underlying enabler, military initiatives, the MPR community will be positioned to transformation requires the co-evolution of technology, continue traditional armed ASW and SUW missions operational concepts, and organizational structures to and is poised to provide enhanced ISR capabilities well conduct war in dramatically new ways. Transformation into the 21st century by again adapting legacy and newly is not about marginal improvement to capabilities but developed sensors and systems to the unforeseen, unex- rather about fundamental changes that result in new pected, and unplanned situations that may arise. behaviors. Furthermore, transformation embraces new Insight into how and where MPR transition fi ts into and innovative ways of using existing resources.2,4–6 the larger DoD transformation of the U.S. services will be gained by broadly defi ning transformation and exam- THE NEED FOR DOD ISR ining the specifi c need for ISR transformation across TRANSFORMATION the military, with emphasis on naval ISR transforma- The DoD is undertaking a huge modernization effort tion activities. to change from a force designed, equipped, staffed, and

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 24, NUMBER 3 (2003) 277 S. R. OSBORNE AND B. C. PRINDLE managed to fi ght the former Soviet Union into a force With so many facets to the ISR domain, the most that is better matched to projected 21st century adver- important issue is to determine what characteristics of saries, including nonstate and terrorist threats (Fig. 1). ISR capability are needed to support warfi ghting needs A key component of this transformation is DoD’s ISR in the 21st century. No consensus within the DoD has capability. Here, ISR refers to the larger collection of been reached on the exact nature of future ISR capabil- systems and personnel that derive information about ity; however, fi ve characteristics have emerged as leading the battle space from sensor data and then provide this candidates: information to a decision maker. As evidenced by recent 1. Worldwide perspective military operations (e.g., Operation Enduring Freedom 2. Fusion in Afghanistan), sensors are playing an increasingly 3. Detail important role in modern warfare. One could view the 4. Persistence Special Operations ground forces in Afghanistan as 5. Responsiveness highly capable “smart sensors.” Emerging as the most important needs in today’s A brief discussion of each characteristic follows.1 confl icts are the ability to sense the environment and Observation of 21st century threats will require more the enemy within it and the ability to deliver critical ISR of a worldwide perspective from ISR systems than that information to all who require it in a timely and useful needed for the 20th century. The nature of the threat manner. Thus, modern warfare appears to be moving during the Cold War required ISR capabilities to focus away from a concentrated focus on weapons effects to narrowly on a small number of well-known, high- a balanced match of sensor and weapons effects. The priority geographic areas to meet warfi ghting needs. concern now is not so much one of weapon accuracy In contrast, the emerging threat of the 21st century is and reach, but rather a matter of sensor accuracy, resolu- widely dispersed geographically, and coverage of these tion, and reach. regions requires a worldwide perspective from ISR Our military has demonstrated that if it can fi nd a systems. Now that a new threat can materialize from target, it can render that target operationally ineffec- within a state that appears nonthreatening, future ISR tive in accordance with the emerging joint operational systems must also be capable of observing more places concept of effects-based operations. But adversaries are more often.1 taking measures, sometimes extreme, to prevent U.S. The 21st century warfi ghter will rely heavily on ISR systems from detecting targets. Although the DoD the fusion of information about an entity of inter- determines the accuracy and resolution of sensors, the est derived by correctly combining observations from enemy can infl uence sensor reach through concealment, multiple, dissimilar ISR sensors. The fusion process camoufl age, and deception tactics.1,2,7 is technically challenging because the information content of one ISR sensor may be vastly different from the information gathered from another ISR Spectrum of new Warfare and conflict resolution JF C2 sensor. A further complication is operational challenges characteristics goals the potential lack of opportunity Uncertainty 20th 21st Agility to continuously observe measurable century century events, or signatures, of targets of Nature of threats • Superior decision interest. Efforts are under way in • Nation states Massed Dispersed making • Subnational actors force force research and development programs • Organization • Flexible • Individual networks Information Knowledge synchronization to develop multi- or hyper-spectral • National challenges based based fusion techniques that also consider • Shared understanding the temporal effects of observable Reactive Proactive Role of military signature emissions. • Responsive and • Defend interest U.S. military Interagency/ tailorable The 21st century warfi ghter will • Stabilize/monitor only multinational organization • Provide civilian also need more detail about entities support Deconflicted Integrated • Dispersed of interest, for instance, to success- ops joint ops command fully use precision weapons. Preci- Scenario Intermittent Continuous • Operation-wide sion weapons can incapacitate tar- • U.S. only pressure pressure integration gets in ways not readily observable • Coalition • Interagency/coalition • Simultaneous C2 with traditional imaging techniques, • Homeland security Precise Precise processes targeting effects thus requiring alternative, more detailed ISR information to formu- Figure 1. Changing characteristics of warfare from the 20th to the 21st century to achieve late a battle damage assessment of joint force (JF) command and control (C2) goals. an engagement. Incapacitation of a

278 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 24, NUMBER 3 (2003) TRANSFORMING MARITIME PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE target does not imply physical damage, but instead means rendering the target “operationally useless” through effects-based operations. Determining whether a target has been rendered operationally useless demands a high degree of detail from ISR capabilities and could require fusion of multiple ISR observations.1 The fourth characteristic, persistence, is an enabling factor for the fi rst three. The behavior of emerging threats and their attendant signatures could be tempo- rally and/or spectrally sporadic or random. This behavior leads to a requirement for ISR systems with long Figure 2. Sea Power 21 operational concepts triad, supported by dwell times (i.e., persistence) in order to have “eyes on FORCEnet integrated capabilities. target” for immediate observation of a change in state of the target. Detailed, long-term observation of entities within an area of interest is key to proper combat identi- The Navy and Marine Corps are committed to estab- fi cation and the ability to maintain full awareness of all lishing the environment, culture, and processes required activities of friendly, hostile, and neutral entities.1 to generate and sustain transformational thinking and Finally, responsiveness as a characteristic of ISR action. Co-evolving emerging technologies and innova- capabilities is probably as important as the other four tive operational concepts—along with the aligning of characteristics combined. Having all of the “right” organizational relationships to exploit them—will allow information, even when provided to the “right” user, the development of new naval warfi ghting capabilities. is tactically useless unless it is made available at the While the capabilities of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea “right” time. The perceived lack of timely access to Basing enabled by FORCEnet form the core of naval tactically useful information is the longest-standing transformation activities, developing the concomitant complaint against today’s ISR systems. Nevertheless, culture of innovation requires the establishment of pro- the way intelligence is being produced is changing cesses that nurture continuous innovation. such that tactically actionable information (the right A second triad represents the instantiating processes: information to the right user at the right time) derived Sea Warrior (development of a force with the knowledge, from ISR sources can be delivered directly to forces in skills, and abilities to function effectively across the the fi eld. Future warfi ghting forces will require improved range of military operations), Sea Trial (concept develop- responsiveness of ISR systems to be successful on the ment, experimentation, and validation), and Sea Enter- 21st century battlefi eld.1 prise (business processes that empower and equip the warfi ghter with needed capabilities). Of the three, Sea NAVAL TRANSFORMATION Trial is of most interest here. Sea Trial is the Navy pro- Naval transformation will support joint transforma- cess of integrating emergent concepts and technologies tion by expanding the options available to joint force that leads to continuous improvements in warfi ghting commanders to project power, assure access, and protect effectiveness while maintaining a strong commitment and advance U.S. interests worldwide in the face of to innovation. It is based on the mutually reinforcing emergent threat technologies and strategies. The Naval mechanisms of technology push, concept pull, and spiral Transformation Roadmap 6 explains the naval contribu- development. Sea Trial will better align efforts through- tion to joint warfi ghting and describes concepts, capa- out the Navy, implement a lasting process of transfor- bilities, and processes necessary to achieve future war- mation, and, most importantly, improve the delivery of 6 fi ghting capabilities expressed in Naval Power 21,8 the enhanced warfi ghting effectiveness to the Fleet. top-level Navy/Marine Corps vision of a transformed Additional transformational capabilities will surely naval force. arise as new concepts and technologies are generated Sea Power 21, the Navy’s component of Naval Power by service organizations that value innovation, promote 21, will be realized through a triad of interdependent change, and take advantage of opportunity. Often, these operational concepts (Fig. 2): Sea Strike (projection new ideas will depend in part on using existing capabili- of offensive military capabilities), Sea Shield (projec- ties in novel ways. tion of defensive capabilities), and Sea Basing (forward presence of military capabilities and resources indepen- NAVAL ISR TRANSFORMATION dent of national boundaries). In addition to this triad, FORCEnet enables the operational concepts in Sea ISR Pursuits Power 21 by integrating sensors, networks, decision aids, ISR enhancements planned by the Navy and Marine weapons, and supporting systems into a single, compre- Corps include improved networking, integration of hensive architecture.6,8 legacy and new systems, and modernization of organic

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 24, NUMBER 3 (2003) 279 S. R. OSBORNE AND B. C. PRINDLE sensors for persistent ISR. The primary effort is the ary forces to outmaneuver adversaries spatially and tem- concept of network-centric warfare that links weapon porally. Persistent ISR capabilities for naval forces are systems in local- and wide-area networks. Examples are being modernized and will signifi cantly improve the the Cooperative Engagement Capability for air and mis- contributions of naval surveillance and reconnaissance sile defense and the emerging Navy and Marine Corps assets to joint battle space awareness. In addition, data Intranet to exchange information and control actions. links will be enhanced to enable forward-deployed forces For networking and analysis, the Distributed Common to use timely intelligence information collected and, in Ground Station-Navy (DCGS-N) forms the foundation many cases, assessed by national and joint collection sys- to bring all sources of intelligence together, while the tems (e.g., space-based radars) and intelligence analysis Naval Fires Network (NFN) is a major effort supporting centers. Persistent ISR will be supported by state-of-the- the Navy’s end-to-end process of identifying and strik- art radio-frequency, cyber-exploitation (information ing targets. operations), and other sensitive sources of information As for sensors, the focus is on unmanned platforms that contribute to advantages in battle space aware- with new sensors for better signals intelligence and mea- ness and targeting. A family of Navy and Marine Corps surement of signature intelligence. Naval organic intel- UAVs, equipped with various sensors, will play a key role ligence data will be fused with data from the broader in extending the reach, coverage, and persistence of the national and joint intelligence activities within the naval ISR systems that provide information to the joint DCGS-N program, the Marine Air-Ground Intelli- force.6 gence System, and the NFN. This fusion will improve the accuracy and speed of producing actionable tactical Transformation Assessment intelligence (Fig. 3). The new DCGS-N family of sys- Are the above naval ISR pursuits truly transforma- tems features common components, open architecture tional? This question is answered by assessing naval ISR design, adherence to interoperability standards, and transformational activities against measures of effective- excellent “reach-back” connectivity.1,6 ness (MOEs) such as those proposed by Vice Admiral Combined with joint and national ISR systems in the Arthur Cebrowski (USN, ret.), Chief of the DoD Offi ce Expeditionary Sensor Grid, naval ISR capabilities will be of Force Transformation. signifi cantly increased by the next generation of MMA Cebrowski has identifi ed several criteria for assessing and naval unmanned vehicles with advanced, mission- the transformational qualities of military programs,1,2,7 reconfi gurable sensors and payloads. The Expeditionary the most important being the interoperability of the Sensor Grid, which will extend from subsurface to space, weapon system or operating procedure. “Interoperabil- will provide pervasive, persistent battle space sensing to ity” means that the system can function and communi- create shared awareness throughout the theater and sup- cate information easily with a variety of other systems, port agile, adaptive battle force operations.6 including joint, allied (e.g., NATO), and ultimately Persistent naval ISR, in conjunction with networked coalition systems. Interoperability, as realized through joint and national capabilities, provides prompt and the Navy’s Network Centric Warfare effort, appears precise battle space awareness at any time and in any to be the centerpiece of naval ISR programs. Conse- weather, allowing commanders a signifi cant advantage quently, naval ISR enhancement efforts seem to meet in the application of both force and decisive maneuver. the all-important interoperability MOE (Fig. 4). Most critically, persistent ISR enables naval expedition- Two additional criteria identifi ed by Cebrowski are (1) whether the system helps the user change warfi ghting methods, (a) (b) as opposed to merely improv- 1.0 1.0 ing existing methods, and (2) whether the system can address 1 0.5 0.5 a wide range of threats. Changes in warfi ghting methods resulting from system enhancements are 0 0 perhaps best illustrated by example. Operationally, some degree Ϫ0.5 Ϫ0.5 of transformation appears to have already occurred as demonstrated by the successful integration of Ϫ1.0 Ϫ1.0 naval ISR assets, particularly the P- Ϫ1.0 Ϫ0.5 0 0.5 1.0 Ϫ1.0 Ϫ0.5 0 0.5 1.0 3 and space assets, with Air Force Figure 3. Example of improved position estimation from the fusion of three independent position observations: (a) three sensor position estimates (“hits”) and (b) fused sensor assets to produce persistent surveil- position estimate. lance and a common operating pic-

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Figure 4. Combining multiple independent track information enhances and extends coverage while minimizing interference effects. The composite “picture” is then shared among all users. The benefi ts of sensor networking include near-real-time exchange of sensor mea- surement data, cueing of remote sensors, jam resistance, and low probability of intercept. ture of the battlefi eld for all combat assets operating As noted earlier, MPR transformation will be pro- in Afghanistan. This was not the case during Desert vided in the technologies associated with MMA, UAVs, Storm, where the services operated cooperatively, but and high-fi delity trainers to reduce force structure and essentially independently. Finally, naval ISR programs total life-cycle costs. MMA—coupled with ubiquitous, appear to be designed to address such threats in both long-dwell UAVs—fi ts this transformational paradigm littoral and urban warfare environments and prom- for MPR by providing the foundation for a radical new ise to provide the detail and persistence warfi ghters way to conduct maritime warfare, whereas high-fi delity believe they need to defeat the threats under uncertain trainers can be used to maintain operational readiness and challenging conditions. of fl ight crews while reducing fl ight hours on airframes. In summary, at least from a high-level perspective, In addition, since a primary measure of transformation naval ISR efforts appear to have the appropriate charac- is interoperability, MPR forces will address this MOE by teristics to be transformational.1 providing timely on-scene information about the battle space to the carrier battle group and other forward- TRANSFORMATIONAL PARADIGM deployed maritime forces. Recall also that, because of their speed, area of cov- FOR MARITIME PATROL AND erage, versatility, and payload, manned and unmanned RECONNAISSANCE aircraft will be indispensable against maritime threats. Combatants have three primary objectives: fi nd, Armed ASW and SUW will be the core missions of assess, and kill or neutralize the enemy. Since inception, MMA and cornerstones for Sea Shield. MPR forces have satisfi ed these objectives, which are sup- UAVs are a pillar of transformational technologies for ported today by large numbers of P-3s and concomitant MPR. MPR needs a fl eet of long-range, highly persistent force structure. The current MPR force structure relies UAVs having a variety of sensor payloads for search and on P-3 aircraft for training, transiting, searching, local- localization missions. Payloads could potentially include izing, and attacking on the open oceans, in the littorals, electro-optical, infrared, radar, signals intelligence, and more recently, over land as a use of legacy maritime communications intelligence, hyper-spectral, or other capability not employed since the Vietnam War. acoustic and nonacoustic sensors. UAVs could be fl own

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 24, NUMBER 3 (2003) 281 S. R. OSBORNE AND B. C. PRINDLE singly or in constellations. They could be used by joint tactical-level intelligence about the battle space that services and allies in other missions and for homeland MMA could provide. From the outset, MMA requires a defense, border patrol, and counterdrug operations. wide spectrum of communications capabilities to com- UAVs could also be used initially by MPR forces to municate and interoperate not only with naval forces, search the seas and littorals and provide data when but also with joint, allied, and coalition forces. This is timely dissemination of data is not critical. MPR UAVs a shift away from the independent operations of the could also provide cueing data to remote decision makers, Cold War toward operations where MMA and UAVs while the more robust capability of the manned MMA is are highly interactive contributors to the battle space used more judiciously and launched only when necessary. picture. UAVs could reduce the requirement for manned surveil- Being responsive to forward-deployed forces also lance in low-intensity, routine search, or hazardous mis- requires the MPR force to have fl exible capabilities. This sions and signifi cantly reduce MMA life-cycle costs. A would apply particularly to UAVs that would provide the balanced blend of manned and unmanned capabilities bulk of the on-station time during a mission. The ISR could transform the way the MPR force conducts future capabilities needed to fulfi ll the MPR role in the vari- missions. ous levels of intensity in future missions will best be met The end-state for MPR transformation is a complete with a fl exible sensor confi guration. Trades can then be migration to unmanned platforms. In some circles, made, for example, between payload and mission endur- MMA is described as the last manned MPR platform to ance and range. An MPR payload that is tailored to be fi elded. If current UAV technology were more mature, meet a variety of ISR mission needs would be a transfor- perhaps MMA would not need to be developed. However, mational capability for the MPR community. such is not the case, and a capabilities bridge is needed to get the MPR community from today to a future time CONCLUSION when an unmanned platform can complete the full range To seize the advantage over potential adversaries of tasks required for ASW and SUW missions. MMA in the face of modern threats, U.S. naval forces must provides that bridge as an evolutionary capability while exploit the power of information (Fig. 5) and must be the revolutionary UAV capability is matured. postured—through technological advances, changes The operation of manned platforms is expensive, in force organizational structures, and experimentation and employing them as training systems to maintain with innovative concepts of operation—to sustain and crew readiness levels increases life-cycle costs through advance a broad competitive advantage. extra hours of airframe use and increased maintenance. Naval transformation is a continuous process that MPR will decrease these costs through the application culminates in a set of complementary capabilities in of high-fi delity trainers to augment actual fl ight time, support of joint forces. The naval services are embarked much as commercial airlines use fl ight simulators for on a wide range of initiatives to radically change orga- pilot training. Current MPR trainers, although suffi cient for personnel to learn the systems they operate, Information quality typically lack the fi delity required (current, accurate, secure) to adequately train pilots on the true aerodynamic characteristics and performance of MPR aircraft. Blue information position Trainees learn to fl y the simulator, but then need an equivalent amount of time in the cockpit to learn to fl y the real aircraft. The advanced Information application of high-fi delity trainers advantage and fl ight simulators would increase Red information position operational readiness while reducing fl ight time on aircraft. The last major component of Content MPR transformation addresses in- (completeness, relevance) teroperability, especially timely information fl ow to the carrier battle group, special operations forces on Timeliness the ground, and other forward- (relative to task) deployed maritime fi ghting units Figure 5. Achieving an information advantage over adversaries requires outperforming that would benefi t from access to the competition in the multi-dimensional information space.

282 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 24, NUMBER 3 (2003) TRANSFORMING MARITIME PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE nizational arrangements, adopt fundamentally different tic approach is required. concepts for military operations, and alter existing operational concepts with the incorporation of advanced REFERENCES technologies to achieve profound increases in military 1Chizek, J. G., Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance and 6 Reconnaissance, Report for Congress (RL31425) (31 May 2002), capabilities. available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31425.pdf (accessed 16 Oct While the Navy acknowledges that manned airborne 2003). ASW and SUW capabilities are still needed, the MPR 2Information Technology Association of America interview with VADM A. K. Cebrowski, USN (ret.), Director of Force Transforma- community must take advantage of this requirement tion, Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense (Aug 2002), available at http:// and pack MPR assets with the capability to support Sea www.oft.osd.mil/library/library.cfm?libcol=1 (accessed 16 Oct 2003). Power 21. MPR must work to minimize the missions 3“What Is Transformation?” Transformation Trends, speech at the Center for Naval Analyses on 20 Nov 2002 given by VADM A. K. necessary for manned platforms and off-load fl ight hours Cebrowski, USN (ret.) (2 Dec 2002), available at http://www.oft.osd. to UAVs for long-duration search and localization mis- mil/library/library_fi les/trends_166_transformation_trends_2_decem- sions. High-fi delity trainers will further off-load fl ight ber_issue.pdf (accessed 16 Oct 2003). 4Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee Hear- hours for training, thus reducing the necessary force ing on Military Transformation by Deputy Secretary of Defense P. structure for MMA sustainment. Wolfowitz (9 Apr 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ MMA will have a robust capability that will support speeches/2002/s20020409-depsecdef2.html (accessed 16 October 2003). Sea Strike missions of persistent ISR and precision strike 5Bennendijk, H. (ed.), Transforming America’s Military, National and will participate as a principal node in FORCEnet. Defense University Press (2002). Additionally, MMA will possess a number of sensors to 6Department of the Navy Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access— From the Sea, available at http://www.oft.osd.mil/ (accessed 15 Oct support high-intensity missions such as localization and 2003). attack/strike warfare. 7”Defense Trends: Sensors Key to Future Force,” Transformation Until data transmission rates, artifi cial intelligence, Trends, Australian Broadcasting Corp. interview with VADM A. K. Cebrowski, USN (ret.) (24 Jul 2002), available at http://www.oft.osd. and the fusion of distributed sensors replace the capa- mil/library_fi les/trends_152_transformation_trends_24_july_issue.pdf bilities of large manned platforms with an array of (accessed 16 Oct 2003). integrated sensors, MMA will be the core capability 8Naval Power 21—A Naval Vision, Hon. G. R. England, Secretary of the Navy (Oct 2002), available at http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/ of MPR. This applies to ISR as well as ASW and navpalib/people/secnav/england/navpow21.pdf (accessed 16 Oct SUW missions. As technology advances, the fusion 2003). of distributed sensors and a remote but immediate ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The authors thank Commander Joseph W. Rixey, USN, kill capability will obviate the need for large manned for his contribution to the “Transformational Paradigm for MPR” section. aircraft. However, that is a generation away, and an affordable and effective transformation to this futuris-

SCOTT R. OSBORNE is a member of APL’s Principal Professional Staff in the Power Projection Systems Department’s Aviation Systems Group. He received a B.S. in electrical engineering from The Stevens Institute of Technology in 1970 and an M.S. in electrical engineering from the JHU Whiting School of Engineering in 1973. Mr. Osborne has been a member of the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft Inte- grated Program Team since 2001 and a full-time member of the Off-Board Systems Team where he contributes to the development of the MMA Operations Require- ment Document and C4I Support Plan. He has also conducted C4ISR architecture analyses for the Joint Strike Fighter Program Ofﬁ ce. His e-mail address is scott. [email protected].

THE AUTHORS

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