AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

AIR SUPERIORITY IN TACTICAL AIR WARFARE . . . AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION . . . FUTURE OF NATO

MARCH-APRIL 1968

A I R U N I V E R S I T Y RE VIEW THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Air Superiority in T actical Air Warfare...... 2 —' Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, usaf Aer o medica l Evacuation in Southeast Asia ...... 16 — Lt. Gen. Kenneth E. Pletcher, usaf (mc ) Vie w s on Aer o spac e Power...... 30 Col. Donald F. Martin, usaf T he Future of NATO...... 40 __ Dr. Thomas C. Schelling I so l a t io n ist Critics of Amer ica n Foreicn Policy...... 48 — Dr. Paul S. Holbo W hat Is STOL?...... 58 _ Lt. Col. Walter P. Maiersperger, usaf (Ret) Air Force Review Standardization: P r er eq u isit e for Equitable Manpower Dist r ibu t io n .... 63 Maj. Gen. Bertram C. Harrison, usaf D esicn , C onstruction, and Oper a t io n of Missil e Fa c il it ie s ...... 66 — Roman A. Metz Military Affairs Abroad T he Soviet Pil o t and Psyc h o l o g y...... 73 _ Dr. R. H. Stacy Mrs. O. S. Fedoroff In My Opinion A P roposed Code of Ethics for Air Force Officers...... 77 ^ Capt. Howard G. Janssen, usaf Books and Ideas Marshall as Wartime Lea der ...... 83 — Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr. T he Redisc over y of Ren e Fonck...... 89 _ Maj. Philip M. Flammer, usaf T he Story of the Soviet Red Army—or at Lea st Half the Story...... 92 — Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting T he Contributors...... 94 —

the cover Address manuscripts to: Editor, Air Univer- The destruction of a MIG-17 was recorded by sity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, Max- well Air Force Base, Ala. 36112. Printed hy an F-105’s gun camera as the MIG crashed Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. over North Vietnam, where our air superiority Subscriptions are sold by Air University "has yet to be seriously challenged,” accord- Book Department, Maxwell Air Force Base, ing to General Bruce K. Holloway. In the lead Ala. 36112: yearly $4.50, back issues 75 article, “Air Superiority in Tactical Air War- cents. USAF recuhhinc pu bl ic a t io n 50-2. fare," General Holloway discusses the essen- tial elements of air superiority and con- siders it in past and future perspectives. Vol. XIX No. 3 M arch-April 1968 UP

AIR SUPERIORITY IN TACTICAL AIR WARFARE

Gener a l Bruce K. Holloway TWENTY-SIX million living Americans are veterans of military service, and most of them have served in wartime. How many of these 26 million ever had to face an enemy who held air superiority? Not many: the 20,000 Army, Air Corps, and Marine troops who were cut off and overrun in the Philippines immediately after Pearl Harbor; scattered units in the Pacific during the early days of World War II; the soldiers and airmen in the Southwest Pacific prior to our defeat of Japanese air power at Wewak in August 1943; U.S. forces in North Africa up to the battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943. In all, probably no more than one out of 150, for after February 1943 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the U.S. and our allies had undisputed air Force based in Italy gained air superiority superiority in the Mediterranean and Western there and carried fighter sweeps and escort Europe; after August of 1943 we had it in the missions deep into Germany. Pacific. From that time on, there were iso- Air superiority came hard and high. Al- lated and relatively rare instances in which though the Allied air forces had won air our opponents gained temporary, local air supremacy over Normandy and the Channel superiority, especially in the Pacific, but these coast by the time of the invasion, Luftwaffe were the exceptions. attacks on our bomber formations continued In Korea we won air superiority twice— at a high level throughout the fall and winter from the North Korean Air Force in the first of 1944-45. Not until the closing days of the two months of that war, and again from the war was theater-wide air supremacy finally Chinese Air Force after November 1950. The achieved. latter was a novel kind of air superiority, pro- We entered World War II underestimat- phetic of things to come; I will discuss it later. ing the importance of air superiority and the In South Vietnam, our air superiority has difficulty of winning it. We were unprepared come by default. In North Vietnam it has yet both qualitatively and quantitatively. But we to be seriously challenged. emerged from that war with an unrivaled A generation of American fighting men mastery of the employment of air power. has almost forgotten what it is like not to We learned the hard way that air superiority have air superiority—what it is like to lose is the key to effective use of air power, mobility except by night; to be cut off from which is in turn the key to successful surface supplies and reinforcements; to be constantly operations. under the watchful eye of enemy reconnais- In the years since then, that lesson seemed sance aircraft; to be always vulnerable to to be forgotten or ignored, or set aside, twice strafing and bombing attacks; to see one’s and relearned twice: first, in the period be- fighters and bombers bum on their hard- tween World War II and the Korean War, stands; to be outnumbered, outgunned, and when hopes for a stable, peaceful world were outmaneuvered in the air. high. Korea at least temporarily changed that We sometimes forget, too, the cost of hope. Again between 1954 and the early 1960s gaining air superiority from a well-equipped, there was a widely held belief that strategic well-trained, and determined enemy. In the nuclear superiority was virtually a universal European and Mediterranean Theaters alone, deterrent and that any war which happened U.S. air forces lost 4325 fighters and bombers by accident or miscalculation was likely to be prior to June 1944. Nearly 17,000 of our air- measured in terms of hours or days. In that crew people were killed in action, and more context, tactical air superiority was again than 21,000 were missing or prisoners of war. neglected. The fighter losses were largely a result of the The United States was not the only nation battle for air superiority. A major part of our that learned in World War II the value of air bomber effort in preparation for the Allied superiority and the exorbitant cost of not invasion was devoted directly or indirectly having it. Hitler launched his attack on the to the air superiority mission. Soviet Union with 164 divisions supported by From D-Day until the German surrender 2000 German combat aircraft and 700 combat on 8 May 1945, a period of eleven months, aircraft of his allies. The Russians opposed the U.S. Eighth and Ninth Air Forces and the that force with about 119 divisions and some First Tactical Air Force flew 320,000 sorties 5000 aircraft, most of them designed for sup- to maintain the air superiority that we had port of ground forces. Within a week the won at so great a cost. This was about 25 Luftwaffe, with superior fighter aircraft and percent of the total number of sorties flown pilots, had achieved air superiority on the during that eleven-month period. In addition Eastern Front. Probably more than 4000 Soviet to these sorties, fighters of the Fifteenth Air aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in AIR SUPERIORITY IN TACTICAL AIR WARFARE 5

the air during that week. Luftwaffe fighter higher-priority theaters were taken care of. pilots scored phenomenal numbers of kills Despite these handicaps, we were able to against inferior Soviet aircraft. They con- maintain air superiority at times and places of tinued to shoot down Soviet aircraft wholesale our choosing. In three years of operations, the until the Allied offensive had turned full-tide Fourteenth Air Force destroyed 2300 enemy against Germany; her fighters were deprived aircraft at a cost of 500 of our own bombers of bases, fuel, and supplies; and the U.S.S.R. and fighters lost from all causes, combat and had achieved air superiority on the Eastern noncombat. The 23d Fighter Group and its Front. This expensive lesson in air superiority predecessor, the American Volunteer Group, was not lost on Soviet airmen. shot down ten Japanese aircraft for every one Five years after V-E Day the Soviets were of ours lost in combat—a total of 1238 kills. putting into the field jet fighters that were Our fighters and bombers sank and damaged technically the equal of any air superiority more than two million tons of shipping, killed fighter in the world. Before the close of 1950 an estimated 60,000 enemy troops, and, to- we were to find out in mic Alley just how good gether with the Chinese Army, tied down their fighters were. nearly a million Japanese troops in China. Again, during the second phase of the Korean War, air superiority was relative, but Air Superiority— in a different way. From November 1950 to What and How Much? June 1953, air battles between usaf F-86s and Chinese MIG-15s were waged continually Air superiority is a relative term, relative along the Yalu. The kill ratio was heavily in our in both degree and scope. It is officially de- favor, but the Communist fighter force was fined as “that degree of dominance in the air never eliminated, since we were not able to battle of one force over another which permits attack its bases across the river in Manchuria. the conduct of operations by the former and Nevertheless, we had a degree of air superi- its related land, sea and air forces at a given ority approaching supremacy. The Commu- time and place without prohibitive interfer- nists were prevented from deploying their ence by the opposing force.” That official fighters to North Korea bases, which were con- definition establishes a minimum requirement tinually neutralized by Far East Air Forces for air superiority: the elimination of prohibi- bombers and fighter-bombers as soon as they tive interference. We want always to do much were completed. As a result of our bombers better than that. and fighters penning up the mig’s , there were At the other end of the air superiority virtually no air attacks on U.S. troops or sup- spectrum lies air supremacy, “that degree of ply lines during the entire course of the war. air superiority wherein the opposing air force Our interdiction attacks greatly complicated is incapable of effective interference.” That the enemy’s logistic problem, and by the war’s desirable goal may be unattainable, even un- end usaf pilots claimed 145,000 enemy troops necessary, against either a formidable oppo- killed by air-to-surface firepower. Only three nent (such as the Japanese Air Force of World Americans are known to have been killed on War II) or a less formidable enemy operating the ground by enemy air action. from sanctuaries (the Chinese Air Force during What constitutes an acceptable degree of the second phase of the Korean War) or a air superiority will depend on a wide range minor power whose equipment is supplied by of circumstances including the kind of war a noncombatant third power (as in Vietnam). postulated, types of weapons employed, both In China during World War II our air geographical and political environments, and superiority was, indeed, relative. We were economic factors. This is a problem that has constantly outnumbered by enemy fighters and to be considered in our force planning. It in- bombers; we were inadequately supplied and volves some very difficult decisions on alloca- equipped with what was left over after the tion of resources among mission areas, systems 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW and subsystems, and force levels. forces, his research and development activities, In a general nuclear war even immediate and the courses of action open to him. This air supremacy would not be enough to prevent information is helpful in determining both the grave damage to our own country from an design characteristics of our fighters and our enemy’s striking force which included both force levels. But because of the lead time missiles and bombers. A high level of air required to take an advanced fighter from superiority could, however, decide the final concept to flight line, intelligence is not an outcome: which contestant emerged with the infallible index of long-range requirements. greater degree of viability. Whether such an The Soviets may not themselves know what outcome could be described as “victory” is their newest fighters will be like in, say, 1975, another question. Losing less than an oppo- and certainly they have not settled on force nent seems at least better than losing more. levels for that period any more than we have. But since there could be no winner in the Nevertheless, technical intelligence is a use- traditional sense, our first-priority task is to ful long-range guide, and in the short term deter general nuclear war on terms that do it can provide us valuable information on not involve a bargaining away of national hardware in-being, tactics, training programs, objectives in order to avoid a nuclear exchange. and deployments. Air superiority is an important element in A second element of air superiority is deterrence or in the outcome of general war. our own scientific/technical/industrial com- In many ways it is easier to plan for in gen- petence and capacity. In this respect the United eral war than in other types of war, since the States enjoys a potential advantage that is strategic bomber threat to this country is quite unmatched by any other country, particularly well known both quantitatively and qualita- in industrial capacity—and industrial capacity tively, and the options open to a potential is a major determinant of success in a long enemy are fewer than in limited war or in- war of attrition. In World War II we did not surgency. We have available, or potentially gain air superiority in any major theater of available, warning systems, an advanced inter- operations until we had achieved numerical ceptor, and an airborne warning and control superiority in fighter aircraft. system (awacs) to supplement missiles as a During that war the eleven leading U.S. counter to the threat of general war. I do not aircraft companies produced 229,554 planes. propose to deal in any greater detail with this Contrasting these figures with recent approved special area of air superiority but rather will buys of military aircraft, including Army heli- limit my observations to theater air superiority, copters and light aircraft (between 2300 and which is primarily a task for tactical air forces. 3000 a year), gives a rough indication of the additional capacity that could be generated in an emergency. Air Superiority— But we cannot count on throwing a switch How and With What? and increasing production overnight by a factor of ten or five or even two. Hot produc- Air superiority begins far from the battle- tion lines are a requisite for rapidly accelerat- field and long before the battle. Often the ing the output of current models. The lead tendency is to look first and perhaps only at time for developing and producing a new the end process, the battle itself, and to ignore advanced aircraft is considerable; under op- that portion of the air superiority iceberg timum conditions it is probably between three lying below the surface. and five years, depending on the type of air- What are the elements that underlie the craft. And production of aircraft does not battle for air superiority? There are at least six. alone bring a combat force into being. Crews Perhaps the starting point is intelligence have to be trained, a wide range of supporting information concerning the quantitative and systems and procedures provided. Scientific qualitative strength of the potential enemy's and technical competence are essential but Although our bombers inflicted severe damage on the oil refineries at Ploesti, Romania. 1 August 1943. the cost was heavy. Germany's leading World War 11 ace, Erich Hartmann, alone claimed seven of our fighters that day—convincing evidence that professional ex- perience is an important element in air superiority. 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

not a safe substitute for forces-in-being. Many of the World War II lessons are still One of the most important but least tan- relevant today, even though weapon systems gible elements of air superiority is doctrine. have changed drastically in the intervening This is a great lesson of World War II, where 25 years. One of the most important lessons faulty doctrine brought us close to disaster in is the early advantage held by the side that the European Theater. enters a war with sound doctrine. During the 1920s and ’30s, air leaders had After World War II, our doctrine—so far given lip service, but not much more, to air as air superiority was concerned—lay dormant superiority. The belief was widely held that while we adjusted to nuclear weapons and bomber attacks on enemy industry and popu- stringent budgets. We were concerned primar- lation centers would force surrender early— ily with the fighter’s interceptor role, not with perhaps without the commitment of huge a possible battle for tactical air superiority. ground forces. Most airmen agreed that enemy The Korean War saw a revival of World “pursuit” aviation, as it then was called, could War II doctrine, with some modifications. not seriously interfere with a determined But after 1953, air superiority, so far as fighter bomber attack. aircraft were concerned, was again limited As a result of the lack of emphasis on largely to the defense of the U.S. against enemy fighter aviation, VIII Fighter Command P-38s bombers. Our tactical fighters were designed and P-47s based in England were severely primarily for nuclear war where penetration range-limited when they first were committed was more important than maneuverability, to combat in 1943. They could escort the bomb- ordnance load-carrying ability more important ers only to the European coast or a little be- than armament, alert status more important yond and could not stage offensive fighter than sustained sortie rates. The tactical fighter sweeps to clear the skies of enemy fighters. became less and less an air superiority system, The myth of bomber invulnerability was ex- more and more what once was called an ploded over Schweinfurt, Regensburg, Kiel, attack aircraft. and other targets in Germany before the end Since the beginnings of jet aviation, it is of that first year of combat, with losses on only in the last three years that real recognition some missions running as high as 50 percent. has been given to the need for a true air supe- After the second Schweinfurt raid of 14 Oc- riority fighter in the types of war most likely tober 1943 (Black Thursday), no more un- to occur. With the exception of the F-4 we do escorted bomber penetrations were attempted not, even now, have a first-line tactical fighter until the Luftwaffe fighter threat had been that was designed primarily for air-to-air com- reduced. bat and only secondarily for the reconnaissance, Belated attention was given to fighter interdiction, and close air support roles of tac- range extension in late 1943. P-47 combat tical aviation. We now see quite clearly the radius was extended from 175 miles to 400 need for one. miles with belly tanks. Our fighters began Throughout history, doctrine developed in scoring heavily on offensive fighter sweeps time of peace more often than not has failed into Germany, and by the spring of 1944 the to stand the test of war. Quite consistently, it tables had been turned. The Allies were in has had to be drastically modified or scrapped control of the air over Germany. The arrival altogether once the shooting started. The side of the P-51 in the summer of 1944 tightened that refused, or was unable, to change its doc- this control. By war’s end, the P-51’s radius of trine fought at a disadvantage. Witness the action was greater than that of the B-17, and Luftwaffe of World War II. our mastery of German skies was complete." We have better methods and means for studying doctrine ( and tactics) than in the past, “For a detailed discussion of the fighter range problem and of the part Allied bombers played in gaining air superiority, see and a better appreciation of its importance. "The Defeat of the German Air Force,” Military Analysis We therefore should do better in the future, Division, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, January 1947. but with no guarantee of infallibility. Flexibil- AIR SUPERIORITY IN TACTICAL AIR WARFARE 9

ity and depth of forces are two hedges against latter stages of World War II, when we had man’s inability to see into the future with heavy numerical superiority over enemy air clarity. forces that had already lost a high percentage The other elements of air superiority that of their experienced pilots. Or in Korea, where I’d like to discuss all relate directly to people. combat-experienced usaf pilots were matched They are professional experience, training, and against new and inexperienced North Korean command judgment. and Chinese air forces. It is tempting to assume It probably is not possible to quantify the that similar kill ratios would apply against the value of professional experience—of combat experienced, well-trained pilots of a major experience. We all know it is important; but power; hence that we can accept technical how important and how to weight combat ex- parity or numerical inferiority or both. We can- perience as compared to technical factors and not rely on experience as a substitute for tech- to an opponent’s experience curve are questions nical excellence, sound doctrine and tactics, and with no clear answers. adequately sized forces. Germany’s leading World War II ace, Obviously, not all pilots committed to Erich Hartmann, is a good example of the value battle will have had previous combat experi- of experience. All of the 352 air-to-air victories ence. Training, then, becomes an important credited to Hartmann were against Soviet pilots element in air superiority. Between 1954 and except for 7 U.S. fighters claimed over Ploesti. 1962 the usaf training curriculum for fighter After 100 missions on the Eastern Front, he had pilots included little, if any, air-to-air combat. scored 7 victories. Three months later, with 200 This omission was partly a result of doctrine, missions, his score stood at 34 kills. The follow- which then regarded tactical fighters primarily ing month ( August 1943), he shot down 49 Rus- as a means for delivering nuclear ordnance. It sian aircraft; in September, 25; in October, 33. was partly a reflection of concern for flying Several times in the later stages of his combat safety. In any event, as late as October 1963 it career he was credited with shooting down an was reported that only four of 30 pilots in one enemy aircraft with a single cannon shell. fighter squadron had ever shot aerial gunnery. The value of experience also was clearly This deficiency has been corrected. Aerial gun- evident in Korea. Thirty-nine usaf pilots be- nery, missile firing, and combat maneuvering came jet aces in that war, but only five were are now important parts of the training pro- below the rank of captain. As a group, they gram. averaged about 2500 hours’ flying time, 2000 A final element in the air superiority equa- hours in fighters, 80 previous combat missions, tion is command judgment in the use of tactical and two World War II victories. These 39 jet air resources. That judgment has to be based aces accounted for 312 mic kills, or 40 percent on experience, assisted by the best operations of all mig’s shot down. analysis that can be done in an often fast-devel- Our Vietnam experience has been some- oping situation. It is a decisive element in the what comparable to Korea but not exactly par- battle for air superiority. Correct allocation of allel, since most of our World War II fighter effort among tactical air tasks spells the differ- pilots and many of the Korean veterans either ence between success and failure. Without air are no longer on active duty or are not avail- superiority the other tasks, and hence surface able for cockpit assignments. But the usaf operations, are much less likely to succeed. pilots who have shot down MIG-17s and -21s A properly balanced force allows the com- over North Vietnam averaged 1779 hours’ fly- mander maximum flexibility in the allocation ing time and 1250 hours in jets as of December of his resources. All tactical combat aircraft 1967. are effective in varying degrees in interdiction The level of recent combat experience in and close air support. But not all tactical air- the usaf is higher than that of any other air craft were designed for or are effective in air- force. We should not, however, overstress the to-air combat (the A-7, for example, which is kill ratios achieved by U.S. fighter pilots in the an attack aircraft rather than fighter). The Air 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Force is attempting to determine the mix of Vietnam, attacks on enemy fighters have been tactical aircraft types that will allow us to carry conducted entirely by U.S. fighter pilots, who out most effectively our tactical air missions have destroyed some enemy aircraft on the under combat conditions that can be reason- ground and 101 in aerial combat as of 31 ably postulated. It seems highly unlikely that December 1967. there will again be an all-purpose tactical air- Success in defeating or neutralizing the craft, like the P-51, that can meet standards of effects of surface-to-air fire is largely a function technical feasibility and cost effectiveness. An of electronic subsystems, with which we have acceptable degree of design compromise prob- gained a great deal of experience in Vietnam, ably will continue to narrow, but it is likely to and of refinement of our stand-off air-to-surface remain greater in an aircraft intended primarily missiles. Further development of both elec- for air-to-surface missions than in an air supe- tronic countermeasures and missiles certainly riority fighter. is related to, but largely independent of, tac- tical fighter development. On the other hand, success against fighter Air Superiority aircraft that are likely to be in the Soviet inven- in tlie Future tory in the mid-1970s (and hence available to other potential U.S. opponents) cannot be as- Planning for air superiority in the future sured by economically or technically feasible has to be based on three cardinal points: modifications of current U.S. fighters. The most (1) Control of the air will continue to be a pressing single air superiority problem is that first-priority military objective, since the effec- of developing a fighter that will be superior in tiveness of all other tactical air force tasks, the air-to-air combat to any that may fly against us. freedom of maneuver of surface forces, and In order to establish performance param- hence the likelihood of successful surface oper- eters for an air superiority fighter, we must ations depend on it. have in mind the kinds of future wars in which (2) We cannot assume that air superiority the United States could become involved and will be achieved by default at any level of the special fighter requirements these wars conflict. might create: (3) As the Chief of Staff stated in his letter (1) Small to medium conventional wars w'ith on air superiority to the major commands, dated no well-defined battle lines. In a war of this 3 May 1965: “Regardless of the tactical air task kind—similar but not necessarily identical to or mode of attack, survival of the fighter air- Vietnam in political, geographical, and mili- craft we commit is at some time likely to hinge tary environments—there might or might not on air-to-air capability." be air opposition. If there were, the fighter air- Achieving or maintaining air superiority craft probably would be Soviet-designed and in the kinds of war that are most likely to hap- would likely include current ( but probably not pen depends in a major way on two things: the the most advanced) types. In order to control ability to counter enemy surface-to-air missiles this type of war and contain it at the lowest and gun fire, and the ability to defeat opposing possible level, rapid establishment of air supe- fighters in air-to-air combat. riority would be an important objective. Quick Of all enemy aircraft destroyed by aaf reaction and the ability to operate from rela- fighters in World War II, about 60 percent tively undeveloped bases would be necessary. were shot down in air-to-air combat and 40 In addition, performance characteristics supe- percent destroyed by fighter strafing or bomb- rior to those of first-line Soviet fighters would ing. After the early elimination of the North Korean Air Force by bombers and fighters in The activity over Emden, Germany, on 27 September the summer of 1950, maintaining air superiority 1943 teas part of the Allied effort to win and hold con- against the Chinese Air Force in the Korean trol of the air during World War II—a continuing effort War was largely an air-to-air fighter show. In until the Luftwaffe teas finally defeated late in the war. 4 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW be mandatory, as they would be in all other One of the prerequisites of air superiority is scientific, types of war. technical, and industrial competence. The seemingly endless production line of Convair B-24s was typical (2) Medium to large conventional wars of our World War II industrial capacity, but such contiguous to Soviet, Communist Chinese, or achievement does not result from brief crash programs. other Communist-controlled territory. In this type of war, there could be well-defined battle lines, and probably there would be high- quality air opposition. The likelihood of sanc- numbers of aircraft committed, control and tuaries and necessary restrictions on military warning, equipment of bases, sortie rates, and operations would reduce the opportunity to rules of engagement. The overriding con- defeat air opposition by attacking the enemy’s sideration, however, is the quality of fighter air forces on the ground. This would put opposition that would be characteristic of air- a heavy premium on air-to-air combat and to-air combat across the full spectrum of con- would very likely make a superior combat flict. We must achieve technical superiority radius highly desirable in our air superiority in as many parameters as possible—speed, fighters. acceleration, ceiling, maneuverability, rate of (3) Large-scale conventional war against a roll, climb, armament, and electronics—and major opponent, in which his most advanced must design our tactics to take advantage of fighter aircraft would be used against us. This the areas of superiority that we achieve. kind of war would very likely become a war Since the Korean War, Soviet-designed of attrition in which all our air resources could fighters have consistently had a ceiling ad- be used to gain air superiority—and all the vantage over U.S. fighters, somewhat better enemy’s resources would be used against us. acceleration, and better maneuverability. Our It would involve, on a recurring basis, combat fighters have consistently had better combat in the air and attacks on air bases, communi- radius, firepower, avionics, and payload. As a result, our margin of superiority for inter- cations, po l , surface-to-air defense, production bases, and other air facilities. It is quite diction and close support tasks has been great, likely that there would be no sanctuaries and but our margin of superiority in air-to-air that the restrictions on use of air power neces- combat has been extremely narrow and sig- sary in (1) and (2) above would not apply. nificantly dependent on the skill and experi- Our own active air defense and passive meas- ence of our pilots. This margin could become ures would be an important factor in the dangerously thin in a situation where we had counterair battle. to fight for air superiority against a well- trained enemy. (4) Theater war, with low-yield nuclear One approach to the problem of air su- weapons. Air-to-air combat capability would periority in the future would be to modify be extremely important in this type of war existing tactical fighters. The A-7 attack air- because of the destructive potential of the craft is not a candidate, because of its low nuclear ordnance carried by even a single speed. The F-100 is too limited by perform- aircraft. ance, and the F-105 was designed as a com- (5) High-intensity nuclear war. This is the promise fighter, heavily weighted in favor of only type of war in which the tactical air the air-to-surface roles. The F-4 has by far effort would be secondary to strategic forces. the best air-to-air characteristics of our current All the varieties of combat in which our tactical fighters, but by the mid-1970s its tactical fighters might engage have one thing technology will be about fifteen years old. To in common. The opposition probably would make any of our current fighters at all com- be equipped with first- or second-string Soviet- parable to fighter aircraft which the U.S.S.R. designed fighters. Among the levels of war will almost certainly have in its inventory six outlined above, the differences in combat en- or seven years hence either would be techni- vironment would be considerable, respecting cally impossible or, if possible at all, would V m 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW require very extensive airframe and engine an infrared (m) or electro-optical missile for changes, would not allow the advantage of shorter ranges. mating these changes with integrated arma- The effectiveness of fighter missiles can ment and avionics, and, most important, could be significantly reduced by high-G maneuvers not take full advantage of the most advanced on the part of the target aircraft and by count- technology. ermeasures. Also, there are limitations on use For all these reasons, the Air Force has of missiles when friendly and hostile aircraft vigorously supported the development of an are mixed together in combat. These limita- advanced fighter designed primarily for air-to- tions are a major reason why an air superiority air combat but also able to perform other fighter must also be equipped with guns. tactical air tasks without compromising its There are other persuasive reasons for principal role as an air superiority fighter. developing new and better guns for our We are working on the design of this fighter, fighters, reasons that have been demonstrated the F-X, with the Office of the Secretary of repeatedly in Vietnam. In the most likely com- Defense and with Navy participation. bat situations, the probability of surprise at- The technical characteristics of the F-X tack on an enemy fighter is very low. We have been established with reasonable preci- would anticipate that most contacts will be sion after more than a year of study. Of the made in areas where enemy fighters are op- advances incorporated in the contemplated erating under ground-controlled interception design, these are the greatest: (cci) procedures and hence will be aware of the presence of our fighters. Integral airborne • A tremendously improved thrust-to- weight ratio, which, coupled with a low wing electronic warning systems further reduce the loading, will produce high rnach and ceiling likelihood of surprise. Also, while attacks along with superior climb, acceleration, and beyond visual range are possible, they will turn ability throughout the flight envelope. depend on much better means of positively identifying an enemy aircraft than we now • Advanced avionics and armament, have or will have, probably, at the time the which will provide the necessary ability to F-X could become operational. A tactical air- defeat any foreseen adversary with a wide borne warning and control system, similar to variety of weapons, including missiles and the awacs, which is envisioned as a working guns, in a hostile electronic environment. partner of the proposed advanced interceptor, Although the design is optimized for air-to- would greatly reduce the identification prob- air combat, preliminary studies show that the lem; but it seems unlikely that enough enemy range-payload characteristics of the F-X may fighters could be killed at very long range be superior to those of the F-4E. to determine the outcome of the air battle. The armament systems proposed for the In most cases, we probably would have to F-X are of particular interest to me. Even continue to close with enemy fighters, maneu- though the armament of our current fighters ver into firing position, and attack with guns. is superior to that of the MIG-21, I feel that The only countermeasures to gun fire are we have not been as imaginative in the devel- target aircraft performance and pilot skill. But opment of armament, particularly guns, as we even the excellent M-61 gun, which has been should have been. so successful against mig’s in Vietnam, will not The F-X will have both air-to-air missiles be good enough in the future. As greater and guns. No single air-to-air weapon can fighter speeds and altitudes have decreased provide the range of coverage needed: that is, maneuverability in absolute terms, aerial gun- from less than 500 feet to a range in excess nery has become increasingly difficult. For of that of weapons used by an enemy. Prob- example, kill claims in World War II were on ably two types of missiles will be needed: a the order of .5 or .6 of firing passes made. semiactive radar-guided missile for all-weather The ratio of kills to firing passes for the F-S6 operations and attacks at long range, and in Korea was reduced to .3. This reduction AIR SUPERIORITY IN TACTICAL AIR WARFARE 15

is a function of the difficulty of closing to forces. Because technical ability does not rec- effective range. As aircraft performance in- ognize national boundaries, our margin of creases, the firing ranges increase, and firing superiority over a first-rate opponent is likely angles-off target decrease. In World War II, to be narrow in the first three areas, but there the tactical cone of fire was about 20° at must be some margin of superiority in each 1000 feet; in Korea, 6° at 1400 feet. Many one. We have the resources to assure numeri- Korean combat veterans attributed their suc- cal adequacy. Cumulatively, these four factors cess against MIG-15s in about equal parts to spell the difference between success and either combat experience and the combination of stalemate or failure. superior armament, plus the radar range- The Vietnam war has shown once more computing sight then in use. that the firepower of tactical aircraft is a de- For the F-X, we will investigate a new cisive factor in conventional warfare, as it was gun with very high muzzle velocity, a flat in World War II and Korea. The ability to trajectory, and a variable rate of fire up to deliver that firepower accurately and effec- about 6000 rounds per minute. Developing a tively, when and where it is needed, depends gun that will be effective in combat up to on our control of the air. The effectiveness of mach 2+ is extremely important. all lines of communication depends on control I believe we are approaching—or already of the air. The survival of helicopters and have reached—the practical limitations of per- other low-performance air vehicles depends formance in a gun where all the energy is on it. The outcome of the ground battle de- imparted to the projectile within the gun pends on it. barrel. One feasible solution is a machine gun In the final analysis, gaining and holding that fires rocket-propelled projectiles. A spin- air superiority rest on our ability to defeat an stabilized rocket projectile, comparable in enemy in air-to-air combat. That is a fact, size and weight to a 20- or 30-mm shell and whether we are free to attack his bases and fired from a gun-type barrel, should give supporting facilities and to destroy some of greatly reduced times of flight with at least his aircraft on the ground, or whether his air as good accuracy as the M-61 gun at ranges resources are secure in a sanctuary area. from 500 to 1500 yards. A recognized ability to win air superiority rapidly and decisively is a deterrent to con- ventional war, just as nuclear superiority is T he outcome of the air-to-air battle for air a deterrent to general war. Our objective is superiority, and all which that battle deter- to deter both kinds of conflict. mines, depends on four factors: airframe per- The air superiority fighter is a most im- formance, armament effectiveness, pilot pro- portant key to that goal. ficiency, and numerically adequate fighter Hq United States Air Force ^ - W m ^ * jf e ^ / ■ i w v.'V i > . CTf > 1 / • * y ' J0S _^, IkX __ I^L.^m r T*^r/ / AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 17

HOUSANDS of U.S. fighting men are Jeep and ambulance trips from the battle- alive today because speed, new tech- field to treatment points are almost a thing of T niques, and trained personnel of aero- the past. Airlift cuts shock and infection among medical evacuation teams are giving the wounded by at least two-thirds, more than wounded in Vietnam better than twice the doubling their odds for survival. No one is chance of survival than ever before. more than 25 minutes away, by air, from life- The movement of patients from the battle- saving surgery. Further, the skills of medical field and initial treatment points to specialized and surgical specialists now can be concen- medical facilities has long been a problem and trated in the United States at institutions major concern of field commanders. The sooner where the best of modem equipment already a patient receives professional medical atten- is installed and working. tion, the more likely he will recover and the The benefit of quick evacuation to the sooner he will return to duty. This is especially morale of the fighting man—and his family—is important in combat, where troop strength an obvious but important answer to the why must be maintained at the highest possible of aeromedical airlift. Only one percent of all level. The key to the problem is speed—getting personnel injured by hostile action in Vietnam the patient to an adequate medical facility as die after reaching a medical facility. In Korea, quickly as possible. where fewer than 15 percent of the wounded New lifesaving techniques and equipment were moved by helicopter, the rate was 2.5 being used in Vietnam today include frozen percent; and in World War II, with no heli- whole blood, artificial kidneys, blood volume copters, the rate was 4.5 percent. machines, and an ultrasound device that can locate shell fragments deep within the body the how of aeromedical airlift by sonar. But the biggest step forward is the rapid airlift of wounded from the battlefield Aeromedical evacuation can be separated to a facility where they can be given the ad- into four distinct systems: (1) forward aero- vantages of these new developments. medical evacuation, (2) tactical and intra- Although Air Force C-141 Starlifters can theater aeromedical evacuation, (3) strategic airlift a patient from Vietnam to a hospital in and intertheater aeromedical evacuation, and the United States in less than 24 hours, the (4) domestic flights. most critical period occurs within the first few Although the first three systems operate hours after he is wounded. In Vietnam, be- independently of each other, each includes cause of the terrain, dense foliage and other personnel of all services, and a common pur- overland hazards, moving wounded by ground pose combines their efforts, providing an in- transportation is virtually impossible. Evacua- tegrated, smooth-running operation. The key tion by air is the only solution. word in management of the Air Force aero- Why the emphasis on airlift of casualties medical lifeline is “flexibility.” Scheduled flights to the United States? move patients within Vietnam and to hospitals Field hospitals in Vietnam need bed outside the combat area. But where those space. No more than 60 percent of beds should flights stop first—or last—or whether they stop be full at any one time. When new casualties at all—is determined by the seriousness of ill- come in, “old” patients must go. And in Viet- ness or injury of patients and by the need for nam, the only quick way out is “up.” bed space in field hospitals. Jet-evac of casualties makes sense from a Evacuation from the battlefield is gener- logistic point of view. There is no wasted air- ally by Army or Marine helicopters that op- lift with jet-evac. C-141 Starlifters that speed erate during the heat of battle, many times troops and cargo to the war zone are refitted— under intense enemy fire. It is estimated that on the spot—with aeromedical equipment and more than 90 percent of all U.S. wounded in supplies for a return trip with a full load of Vietnam are evacuated from the combat area patients. by helicopter. In some cases, where the terrain 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

and conditions permit, the wounded are evac- Southeast Asia, for example, air movement of uated directly from the combat area by Air patients within the battle area and to U.S. Force C-7A, C-123, or C-130. These missions military hospitals in Japan, Okinawa, or the are extremely dangerous and require a very Philippines is the job of intratheater airlift. high degree of professionalism on the part of Control of intratheater flights in Southeast the crew members. Casualties are airlifted to Asia rests with a command post at Tachikawa treatment points within the combat area, and Air Base, Japan. Serving as primary aircraft here we enter the second stage of the system- for intratheater air evacuation, C-118s are tactical and intratheater aeromedical evacua- single-purpose aircraft, used only for aero- tion. Patients are airlifted from airfields within medical flights. the combat zone to facilities outside the com- The third portion of the system, strategic bat area, and between points within the and intertheater aeromedical evacuation, is theater. This is the phase of the evacuation the responsibility of the Military Airlift Com- with which pa c a f is concerned. mand (ma c ), which provides flights from over- Intratheater flights move patients within seas areas to the United States. Regularly a specified overseas area or combat zone. In scheduled flights leave from Tan Son Nhut, Cam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang Air Bases in Vietnam for aerial ports at Andrews afb, Mary- land, and Travis afb, California. The aircraft The Military Airlift Command and Pacific Air Forces stop en route at Yokota ab, Japan, a patient share responsibility for aeromedical evacuation in the Pacific. PACAF handles intratheater and in- transfer point. Patients destined for hospitals country airlift, and MAC controls intertheater and east of the Mississippi fly to Andrews; those domestic flights to hospitals in the United States. for hospitals west of the Mississippi fly to Travis. The domestic phase of the system, which moves patients from ConUS points of arrival to their final destinations, is also operated by ma c . Aeromedical evacuation units do not determine the patient’s destination hospital; instead, this is the responsibility of the origi- nating medical facility in conjunction with several regulating agencies. The first agency is the Far East Joint Medical Regulating Office (fejmro), located at Camp Zama, Japan. If a patient is to be hospitalized in the Far East or Southeast Asia, fejmro determines where he goes. Prior to a patient’s leaving an over- seas area, the Armed Services Medical Regu- lating Office (asmro) in Washington, D.C., determines where he will be hospitalized in the United States. When he arrives at either Andrews or Travis, the patient is moved by trunk and feeder lines to his destination hos- pital. Trunk flights move on schedule be- tween seven main transfer points throughout the U.S.: Travis, Buckley, Kelly, Maxwell, McGuire, Andrews, and Scott afb. At the transfer point nearest his destination hospital, the patient boards a feeder flight for the final leg of his journey. AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 19

In the States the 375th Aeromedical Air- up, change into pajamas, and rest there for the lift Wing Command Post at Scott monitors first time a little while before continuing on all trunk and feeder flights, with an aircraft to their destination hospital. taking oflF or landing every 17 minutes. A While casualty staging units are normally telephone “hot line links each of the seven a function of fixed base medical facilities, this transfer points to the command post at Scott. is not the case in tactical operations. Casualty Hot lines permit conference calls between any staging units can operate from tentage (with or all units. Status boards at the command accommodations for 25 beds) and can be post show how many patients need to be rapidly deployed to forward airheads in sup- moved, what aircraft are available to move port of combat operations. By providing a them, and the progress of each enroute patient. patient holding capability and good communi- cations with the support base, these facilities permit efficient use of backhaul cargo aircraft determining patient destinations for aeromedical evacuation. One of these units Several policies and factors determine was deployed to Khe Sanh in support of where a patient is to be hospitalized. Gener- Marine operations at Hill 881 during April ally speaking, a patient who is to be hospital- and May 1967, and its accomplishments ized for 60 days or more will be returned to earned the plaudits of the then Marine Com- the United States. For fewer than 60 days, mander, Lieutenant General L. E. Walt. he will go to a hospital within the Pacific Military hospitals at Da Nang and Cam Command (pa c o m). But this is not a firm Ranh Bay now have 100-bed casualty staging policy; it is flexible enough to allow a patient units. The Tan Son Nhut facility has 85, and to remain at a pa c o m hospital up to 120 days Clark and Yokota have 250. (The Yokota csu if hospital space is available. The 60-day policy is actually located at Tachikawa, and patients applies to all hospitals within pa c o m except are bussed to the airfield at Yokota.) At Travis Vietnam, where the normal limit is 30 days. A patient normally will not move unless bed space is available for him elsewhere. In Patients are moved to the United States on C-14I Starlifters, using one of the three Pacific area evacua- Vietnam bed space in all hospitals—Army, tion routes. Wounded can be airlifted from Tan Son Navy, and Air Force—is controlled by a joint Nhut, Cam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang Air Bases to state- medical regulating office at Saigon head- side hospitals for treatment in less than 24 hours. quarters of the surgeon, U.S. Military Assist- ance Command, Vietnam (ma c v). Aeromedical evacuation patients have their own “hospitals” while awaiting a flight. Casualty staging units (csu) provide complete hospital staff and facilities for airborne pa- tients at all transfer points and aerial ports. These casualty staging units, a part of the aeromedical evacuation system, are an integral function of the local base medical facility. However, they are physically separated from the main area so that the daily routine of local patients is not disturbed by the constant movement of aeromedical evacuation patients. Casualty staging units accomplish several functions. First, they are collection points for patients to be moved by air. Although patients do not spend much time there (the average stay is 6 to 24 hours), they can get cleaned

'Cotwnlly ilog-ng unJn The domestic phase of the evacuation system moves patients htj trunk and feeder lines from arrival points to their destination hospitals. A command post at Scott AFB monitors these flights with the help of a telephone hot line interconnected to the seven transfer bases.

and Andrews, where jet overseas flights off- specialty and other military hospitals. They load patients for transport throughout the decide where patients will go and send cor- U.S., staging units now accommodate 250 and roborating wires to ma c v and receiving hos- 150 patients, respectively. (A new building, pitals. How fast patients leave for destination which will permit a 230 transient patient load, hospitals is up to attending physicians, who has been requested for Andrews.) decide priorities. In-country air movement of patients rep- An “urgent’’ case will go immediately. But resents a joint effort of people at the originat- severity of an illness or injury does not auto- ing hospital, the medical regulating office, and matically give a patient an “urgent" priority. the local aeromedical evacuation unit, ma c v’s The governing factor is timing—to save a life medical regulating office also coordinates air or forestall serious medical complications. movement of patients to other U.S. military “Priority” patients, those who need prompt hospitals is up to attending physicians, who medical care not available locally, move within operations. 24 hours. All other patients fall into the "rou- Clinical information on patients is fed by tine” category with a time limit of 72 hours. phone or teletype from the ma c v regulating In Southeast Asia, all “routine” and most office to the parent unit in Washington. Medi- “priority” patients can be handled on regularly cal teams at asmro headquarters cross-check scheduled flights because of their frequency. diagnoses with a list of beds available in But immediate movement of an “urgent" case 1

means just that. An aircraft already in the air may be diverted, or an alert aircraft may be launched for a special flight. Air, medical, and ground crews of aeromedical units are on alert around the clock and must be able to launch a flight within an hour after a call comes in. Within Vietnam, air evac missions are flown on C-7As, C-123s, and C-130s. The great- est number of patient moves within the theater during 1966 were by C-130s. They accounted for more than 36,000 patient moves, averaging nearly 100 patients a day over a period of one year. The biggest job in converting cargo or passenger aircraft into airborne wards is re- moving cargo pallets or passenger seats and installing vertical poles to support litters. How long the job takes depends, of course, on the number of seats and litters needed for a spe- cific flight. Starlifters have been reconfigured in as little as 25 minutes.

Because of Vietnam’s terrain, dense foliage and other overland hazards, moving ivounded by ground trans- portation is almost impossible. An Army “Dust Off” helicopter makes a pickup from the battlefield. . . . Aeromedical technicians load patients onto a C-130 Hercules bound for Clark AB in the Philippines. A flight nurse (1) holds glucose bottles while patients board a C-118 for evacuation to a staging hospital in the Pacific theater. (2) Patients move into a C-130 for a flight to Clark AB, with litters loaded five per tier. (3) Others are put on a C-123 at a forward landing strip. (4) An ambulance prepares to transfer patients to a C-141 at Da Nang Air Base. (5) A C-141 takes to the skies on an airlift mission.

24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

A control center at Hickam afb, Hawaii, on a routine basis. C-118s are used almost monitors intertheater aeromedical flights in exclusively on these missions. the Pacific. In contrast with the “all-prop” The second type of scheduled flight uses C-118s and C-131s of the domestic force, long- backhaul cargo aircraft, normally the C-130. range overseas flights are jet. The 500-mile- The aircraft originates on its scheduled re- an-hour C-141 Starlifter, which flies all inter- supply mission and is reconfigured as an air theater flights, will hold 80 litter patients or evac flight for the backhaul. Sometimes the 124 ambulatory patients or a combination of mission originates with a medical crew and both. equipment on board, or it may pick them up Not all ma c air evac flights originate in at the airfield where the patient movement Vietnam. Some are scheduled from Clark ab mission originates. Aircraft used to support in the Philippine Islands, ma c flights depart- this type of mission operate on a scheduled ing Clark take one of two routes: the northern resupply basis. route, which takes them to Andrews or Travis Unscheduled aeromedical evacuation via Yokota, or the southern route with brief flights pose the most problems, as they are stops at Guam and Hickam. When serious normally diverted cargo missions reconfigured bum cases are on board, flights continue on for air evacuation. Unscheduled evacuation from Travis to the bum center at Brooke Army flights fall in one of three categories: urgent, Hospital, San Antonio, Texas. priority, or special. Efficient utilization of un- Scheduled flights within pa c o m fall into scheduled missions requires maximum co- two categories. First, there are the air evac ordination among the aeromedical evacuation flights that return recovered patients inbound control centers (aecc’s ), airlift operations or to the theater and evacuate patients outbound airlift control centers, transport squadrons, AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 25

and the individual aircraft crews, as well as Preparations for the arrival of an aero- extensive coordination among the medical medical aircraft are just as thorough, medi- facilities involved. cally and administratively, as those for its All planes subject to diversion or rerouting departure. Nurses and flight surgeons from are equipped with litter brackets and other the staging unit meet each aircraft for a plane- equipment necessary for transporting patients. side briefing by the flight nurse and a per- Each airframe has the physical capability of sonal check of patients who need immediate supporting an aeromedical evacuation require- attention. ment in the event it must move patients. Flight-line radios can beam information When a medical facility generates the on the needs of seriously ill patients to the requirement for an aeromedical evacuation staging unit even before the ambulances leave flight, the lines of communication and co- the aircraft. And the flight surgeon in charge ordination are essentially the same as for may alert the main hospital to admit a patient scheduled flights, regardless of the patient whose condition has deteriorated in flight. movement precedence. The main difference It happens infrequently, but some patients is the time permitted for completion of the die on aeromedical aircraft. There have been mission. six deaths on Pacific flights carrying war Better than 65 percent of all aeromedical casualties since November 1965. When death evacuation missions within Vietnam are un- occurs in flight or within 24 hours after arrival scheduled. Depending on casualties and the at a destination hospital, the senior medical urgency of the movement, aircraft are often attendant prepares an on-the-spot narrative diverted from their primary function and re- report. The report and all other medical rec- configured to meet this requirement. ords are checked by mortality review commit- tees at Travis, Andrews, or Scott hospitals. Autopsies are performed, the purpose of the review being to determine if aeromedical evacuation contributed to the death. As stated previously, the mortality rate is small when the total number of patients airlifted within and from Southeast Asia is compared with the mortality rates of past wars.

expert care of the patient Before a patient boards an airplane, there are many things to be done. The load plan, for example, must be completed. All patients have designated spaces on an aeromedical aircraft. Where they go depends on their classifica- tion-litter, ambulatory, psychiatric, or non- psychiatric. Other considerations are severity of condition, need for observation, and per- sonal comfort. The more seriously ill patients are placed as far forward in the aircraft as possible, closer A PACAF C-118 configured for litter and ambulatory to the nurse’s station. Patients who need the patient's can carry a desired load of 56. . . . A litter most attention go in lower litter spaces, as do patient receives an injection from a male nurse those with large casts, to make it easier for during a flight from Vietnam to a PACOM hospital. the flight nurse to care for them. Although 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW use of tranquilizers has eased the problem of flight to 43,000 feet, with exposure to rapid moving psychiatric cases, these patients still decompression. must be placed where they can be watched. The number of flight nurses on board an Not all patients should fly—unless, of aircraft varies with the size of plane and course, local medical resources are not ade- patient load. Jet flights normally carry two, quate. Physicians—Army, Navy, and Air Force but domestic C-131 flights as a rule need only —must know in what cases physiological re- one. strictions apply. Expansion of air in body Three or more medical technicians are on cavities, for example, is in proportion to in- board aeromedical aircraft to help the flight crease in altitude. The pressure of air intra- nurses, the number depending on size of air- cranially following a skull fracture could be craft and patient load. The technicians also are hazardous. Expanding gas also can cause specially trained for their airborne duties. All acute pain for the man in a recent post- are graduates of Air Force medical technician operative state. And although cabin pressure programs and other courses required for those at 5000 feet may be comfortable for most who work in aeromedical evacuation. Their patients, those with anemia and heart or pul- training covers similar subjects but is less monary problems must be watched for hypoxic technical than that of the flight nurse. symptoms. Low humidity (3-25 percent on C-141 jets) can create difficulties for tracheostomy Lifesaving devices patients by drying mucosal surfaces and thick- ening tracheal secretions. Despite bulk and weight limitations, many A portable respirator can be put on a litter for air move- devices used in wards on the ground can be ment; the oxygen tanks are used in transporting pa- used just as effectively in the air. Some respi- tients between the hospital and the aircraft. . . . The rators, for example, have even been success- Stryker frame enables seriously injured patients to be turned periodically with a minimum of motion. fully miniaturized. The “ground” doctors have help, though. Air Force flight surgeons, trained in aviation medicine, are assigned at all aeromedical de- parture points to assist hospital staff members. Flight surgeons may or may not be mem- bers of the medical flight crew, but on occasion they accompany a seriously ill patient. When- ever possible, they check patients and their clinical records prior to movement by air to insure their adaptability to flight. Flight sur- geons also are on hand to check patients on aircraft arriving at aeromedical transfer points. In the air, unless a flight surgeon is on board, the flight nurse is in charge. Like the flight surgeon, she has been specially selected and trained for work on her airborne ward. All flight nurses are graduates of a con- centrated six-week course at the usaf School of Aerospace Medicine, Brooks afb, Texas. The course covers subjects from aviation phys- iology and psychology to ditching and survival procedures. Physiological training also is part of the course and includes an altitude chamber AERO MEDICAL E\\\CVATIOS IS SOVTHE.\ST ASIA 27 the system in action After gi\ing the patient emergency treat- To understand better the complete pic- ment. the aid station arranges to have him ture of the aeromedical evacuation s>-stem and moved by Marine or Army helicopter to a its related activities, let us follow- a hypotheti- Marine Collection and Clearing Company at cal patient moving from the battlefield to a Hue. hospital in the United States. At Hue. Corporal Smith receives more Corporal Smith, a 25-year-old Marine, is extensive medical treatment, and physicians leading his platoon on a scouting mission just there determine whether he will go further in south of the Demilitarized Zone in South Viet- the system or be treated at a paoom hospital. nam His platoon is ambushed, and a hea\y In this case, the injuries require immediate fire fight follows. Smith becomes a casualty, hospitalization and further treatment. Smith’s sustaining head and shoulder wounds. In the name is forwarded to Da Nang, the nearest field he is given first aid by a Medical Corps- aeromedical evacuation control center. man. placed on a Utter, and moved to a medi- It has been determined that Corporal cal aid station set up to handle casualties of Smith’s injuries are of an urgent nature. He this and similar operations. must be moved immediately Since there are 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW no scheduled flights planned, a pa c a f cargo evacuation policy, and he must be returned aircraft is diverted or a plane launched to to the United States. Clark Hospital tele- airlift the patient. In any event, the patient phones the asmro in Washington and obtains must be moved within two hours. the destination. Corporal Smith is airlifted to Da Nang Since Corporal Smith is from Denver, by a C-130. He is met at the airfield by a Colorado, Fitzsimmons Army General Hos- Marine ambulance and carried to the 350-bed pital is chosen. Clark Hospital then notifies Navy hospital about six miles away. He re- the Military Airlift Command that the patient mains there until his injuries are evaluated is ready for movement, and transportation is and a determination is made as to where he arranged on a ma c C-141 to Travis. Smith will will be hospitalized. If the attending physician remain at Travis until he can be placed on a determines that he will be fit for duty within scheduled flight to Denver via the ma c domes- 30 days, he will most likely remain at the Da tic aeromedical evacuation system. Nang hospital. If his injuries are such that treatment will continue for up to 60 days, he progress for the future will go to an offshore pa c o m hospital. When Corporal Smith is ready for trans- The aeromedical evacuation system is con- fer, the Navy hospital obtains a new destina- tinually undergoing modifications to provide tion from the Saigon office of the fejmro. In better service for the sick and wounded. this case, Clark Hospital is chosen as the best Standard now on aeromedical flights is an facility for further treatment. oral hygiene kit. Disposable, spongelike oral The hospital then advises the aeromedical tissue cleansers are attached to short plastic evacuation office at Da Nang that the patient handles and dipped into a two-ounce poly- is ready for movement. The detachment ar- ethylene bottle of mouthwash (also part of ranges to have him moved on one of the the kit), to eliminate bad taste in the mouth. scheduled flights from Da Nang to Clark. He Low humidity in aircraft accelerates the de- is again transferred by ambulance to Da Nang hydration process and causes oral problems and to the casualty staging unit. This air- for both patients and crews. conditioned modem medical facility is de- New litters that slide out like drawers to signed as a holding station for as much as 24 permit easier bedside care of patients in flight hours for patients awaiting transfer on aero- were tested on aeromedical jet flights in 1966, medical evacuation flights. and the Air Force hopes they will soon be Upon arrival at the csu, Smith is placed standard equipment. in a hospital bed, provided proper hospital “Disposables” are being suggested to re- clothing, and prepared for air evacuation. His place more permanent types of aeromedical baggage is identified and tagged, his medical equipment, such as litter pads. Scientists at records are assembled, orders are published, the School of Aerospace Medicine are design- and a dressed litter, including mattress, is pre- ing one that will float, to serve as survival pared for his use in flight. equipment in sea ditching. Accelerated age Upon arrival of his scheduled aircraft, and impact tests soon will show what the new hospital personnel place him on board, and pad will tolerate. Also important to learn is he is flown to Clark on a pa c a f aircraft. At how comfortable the pad will be for a mini- Clark his condition is again assessed and his mum of 21 hours. time to recovery estimated. If he is expected Soon to come off the drawing board is a to be able to return to duty before the time bacteriological isolation unit. (Patients with limit set by dod and cincpac evacuation policy, highly contagious diseases cannot now be he will be held within the theater and re- moved by air.) Units will be self-contained, turned to his unit upon recovery. and humidity, temperature, and oxygen will In this case, his injuries are such that re- be controlled from outside. covery time will probably exceed the cincpac Not on the drawing board yet but defi- AERO MEDICAL EVACUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 29

nitely on the way is an airborne intensive care offices and then will be fed to computers. The unit with up-to-date equipment needed for result will be assignment of bed space at the care of the seriously ill. hospital best equipped to meet the patient’s Biggest boon to patients will be the needs. In the case of casualties returning to medium-range jet aircraft recently authorized the U.S., computers automatically will select by dod. The first aircraft will be used in the a specialty hospital as close as possible to the domestic system, but the Air Force hopes patient’s home. eventually to have an all-jet aeromedical force. Aeromedical control centers overseas and The aircraft will have a capacity of 30 litter in the U.S. will use computers on a day-to- patients or 40 ambulatory patients or a com- day basis to produce ready-made itineraries bination of both, with the target date for and flight plans for movement of patients to delivery set for late 1968. hospital assignments determined by asmro Plans for streamlining administration of computers. the aeromedical evacuation system are moving Aeromedical evacuation is and will con- along with acquisition of the all-jet airlift tinue to be a joint humanitarian effort by force. The Air Force hopes that use of com- people of all the military services. Troops puters will simplify the “who goes where and wounded in battle, felled by accident, or when" of aeromedical evacuation. As in the stricken by disease have a better chance of past, planners at military hospitals, domestic surviving today—often for complete recovery— and overseas, will report patients for aero- than at any time in the history of warfare, medical flights on a day-to-day basis. Reports thanks to a streamlined and flexible aeromedi- as to diagnosis, special equipment needed in cal evacuation system. flight, priority, and other medical and personal Hq United States Air Force data will go to appropriate medical regulating VIEW S ON AEROSPACE POWER

Colonel Donald F. Martin

ODAY the Air Force is composed of this trend substitute a genus of military weapon diverse skills and disciplines. Tomor- system “operator”?—an operator whose primary T row we must expect the trend toward concern is the manipulation of weapon systems specialization to continue, with even more in combat? It is, perhaps, all too possible. shredouts required to cope effectively with the Of course specialization produces a degree accretion of knowledge important to national of expertise obtainable in no other way. We defense. are inundated with knowledge, and there are Yet, is it possible that our efforts toward only 24 hours in a day. increased professionalism will result in the vir- But the “force” which creates the need for tual elimination of professional airmen? Will our individual skills is the Air Force. The Air VIEWS ON AEROSPACE POWER 31

Force, with its contribution to national de- rillas by definition do not have air power fense, is our entire reason for being. General support. If an external power supporting an McConnell has a sign on his office door which insurgency were to employ air power (except reads: perhaps for clandestine aerial resupply) to aid The Mission of the United States Air Force Is the insurgents, the conflict would no longer To Fly and Fight. Don’t You Ever Forget It. conform to the concept of guerrilla warfare. It It is a motto credited to the 388th Tactical would take on the overt aggression character- Fighter Wing, Korat, Thailand. istics of a limited war. Likewise, if guerrillas With specialization upon us, we cannot themselves possessed air vehicles, the conflict let the entire job of being professional airmen would involve a level of military sophistica- fall to the commander, the planner, or a select tion and directness associated with the clash few. We must all make even' effort to remain of modem military forces. professional airmen. There is more to being an In its present state of technological devel- airman than wearing the Air Force blue. And opment, air power, with its required support- there is certainly far more to being a profes- ing structure, would provide a precise military sional airman than supporting or operating a "point of focus,” clarity, and definition to an weapon system. important part of the battlefield that would be The professional airman, whether logisti- entirely incompatible with guerrilla warfare, cian, comptroller, or information specialist, which capitalizes upon concealment, surprise, must have a grasp of the fundamental polem- and lack of a front line. Thus, air power can ics inherent in military theory. This awareness be exploited, on a continuing basis, only by and understanding of competing or comple- that military force within the country which is mentary military viewpoints comprise one defending against the guerrillas. Moreover, if of the characteristics which sets the profes- the conflict were to remain a guerrilla war, air sional military man apart from those individ- power could not be used by the guerrillas ual, narrow disciplines he employs in his daily even in the third and final phase when large pursuits. pitched battles may be expected, as at Dien While most of us do not expect to qualify Bien Phu. While the French there may have as expert strategists or tacticians, many stu- recognized their air monopoly for the applica- dents of national defense and all professional tion of military force against the Vietminh, the airmen can form opinions with regard to the inept manner in which they employed their military instrument, based upon their indi- quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate Air vidual experiences and persuasions. What fol- Force could not reverse their hopeless position. lows is the statement of one airman’s views Those mistakes are not being repeated. on several aspects of aerospace power—views The military/political environment ob- which have evolved during 25 years spent in taining in Southeast Asia today is different in a variety of Air Force occupations, hopefully important respects from that which existed in as a professional airman. These views are the Indochina war of the early 1950s. One added to the continuing dialogue found in significant difference lies in the availability the pages of Air University Review in the now of superior air power in quantity. hope that they may be useful in stimulating Several years ago air power in Vietnam the specialized reader to crystallize his own was limited by constraints placed upon its thinking on similar issues. composition and employment deriving from the 1954 Geneva accords. One such constraint prevented utilization of our more effective air- Guerrilla Warfare craft, including jets, and another prohibited combat by aircraft manned by usaf crews. Guerrilla warfare has one unique charac- Widespread and continuing violations teristic for airmen which sets it apart from of the Geneva accords by the Communists all higher intensities of military conflict. Guer- made it militarily and politically important in n 1963-64 for the United States to bring into- play our most appropriate air delivery vehi- cles, in quantity, armed with more effective conventional weapons, managed in a manner to increase effectiveness and decrease com- mand redundancy, and employed in support of ground forces so as to (a) place the Viet km L _ Cong on the defensive by spoiling operations and then (b) find, fix, and neutralize them. In Vietnam tactical air power has proven to be the most efficient casualty-producing means on a man-for-man basis. However, its greatest potential in guerrilla conflicts is when nationalist/allied forces are on the offense, rather than the defense. While air power has been decisive in de- fensive operations by reason of its quick re- sponse and concentration of firepower, it can and should take a much greater toll of guer- rillas in offensive operations. With ground forces in the role of finding, concentrating,

Ml and fixing the vc, close air support becomes a most effective means of ehminating guerrillas, usually without the necessity for ground forces physically overwhelming enemy defensive po- sitions and strong points except in mop-up actions. VIEWS ON AEROSPACE POWER 33

As counter tactics, the guerrilla options medium in which air power functions produce are either to infiltrate the attacking govern- the same effects upon all air vehicles. Inherent ment troops and try to maintain very close advantages and limitations imposed upon air but distinct frontal contact with them, or to power under combat conditions are unaltera- break contact and try to flee. The compara- bly the same for all services. For example, the tive attractiveness of these two defensive tac- loss of air vehicles to ground fire over the tics is markedly influenced by the disparity target is influenced by the type, deployment, in numerical strength, firepower, and aggres- intensity, and accuracy of the ground fire, as siveness between the guerrillas and the gov- well as the number of simultaneously attack- ernment forces, and the ability to close the ing air vehicles, their physical characteristics guerrillas’ escape routes. as a target, speed, method of attack, and the .An evaluation of the desirability, or even intensity and accuracy of integral counterfire. necessity, of employing parallel air force It would seem that the absence of an “air command and operational control structures war” in a guerrilla environment obscures cer- appears to require a review of certain funda- tain fundamentals applicable to the employ- mentals of air power which have become ment of air power at higher intensities of con- quite clear to the professional airman over the flict (e.g., achieving air superiority, isolation course of the past fifty-odd years. In the air of the battlefield, and classic interdiction), over Vietnam today operate aircraft of the with the result that fragmentation of air re- Vietnamese Air Force and of the U.S. Army, sources and use of obsolescent air vehicles Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force. Some are permitted, even encouraged, due to the of the missions performed by air vehicles in lack of opposing air power. However, it could counterguerrilla warfare are close air support, be dangerous indeed to base future Air Force direct (but not close) air support, interdiction, composition and structure on the U.S. expe- escort, armed reconnaissance, airborne for- rience in Southeast Asia, which is the product ward air controller, combat liaison/observa- of political constraints that may not again tion, airborne/airland assault, and airborne/ obtain. airland resupply. Although it is sometimes In any event, the capability of air forces overlooked, a single type of air vehicle may to fight at higher intensities of conflict should perform several different missions effectively. in no way be degraded to accommodate Requirements for support of air vehicles increased effectiveness in purely guerrilla include ordnance (for offensive air vehicles), struggles. If the need is great enough, then crews, ground servicing and maintenance per- separate air vehicles optimized for guerrilla sonnel/facilities, po l , communications systems warfare in various geographical environments (including communications interface between should be created; they could be “written off” “users’’ and “providers”), navigational aids, and or taken out of play at higher intensities of command and control systems. These are req- conflict. uisite to the employment of air power ir- respective of which service may own, direct, or operate particular air vehicles. Limited War Similarly, the versatile nature of vehicles constructed to function in the atmosphere, Proceeding up the ladder of “escalation” coupled with the three-dimensional medium (as it is popularly known) from guerrilla war- in which they operate, makes it virtually in- fare, one encounters limited war. There may evitable that air vehicles belonging to one be several rungs on the ladder between guer- service will essentially duplicate (with varying rilla and limited war,1 but for purposes of this degrees of effectiveness in the performance of article it is enough to distinguish between singular design parameters) the capabilities of those lower-intensity conflicts wherein the in- air vehicles belonging to other services. surgents have no air capability, the defenders Finally, the physical characteristics of the having a monopoly, and those higher-intensity 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW conflicts0 wherein both adversaries are ex- the West Europeans. The basis for their con- pected to employ air—at least initially until cern was understandable. Two tenets of con- the air war is won and one nation possesses ventional war were particularly alarming and the capability to penetrate any portion of the distasteful: (a) that a successful offense should opponent’s territory with acceptable attrition. be based upon numerical superiority on the The decisive nature of such military ad- order of three to one over the defense, and vantage has been amply illustrated in recent (b) that a successful conventional defense years by the Middle East conflicts of 1956 and must be constructed in depth. Collapse of the 1967, which saw the destruction of the Arab Maginot Line, virtually intact, supported the air forces in a matter of hours, with all that latter tenet.3 such loss implied for continued Arab resistance. Being constructed for purposes of defense Limited wars of substantial duration are rather than offense, nato ground forces were wars of attrition in the classic sense. They may numerically inferior to those of the U.S.S.R. be “limited” only in the sense that certain and the Eastern bloc.° This, on the surface, weapons are not employed, certain targets are gave rise to the expectation that the only avoided, or the conflict is confined to certain possible nonnuclear response to a massive at- political entities or geographical areas. All tack would be a well-conceived retrograde wars of recent times have been limited in the maneuver designed to slow, stall, and contain respect that total annihilation of the opponent the attack—at least until the political leaders and “stone upon stone” destruction were not of the attacking force could be made to come carried out. to their senses, realize the enormity of their Some six years ago, attention was focused act, and appreciate the fact that the conse- on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization quences of continuing the aggression would and the then new strategy of conventional be U.S. use of nuclear weapons, with all the defense and “negotiating pauses.” The “trip implications which this would have for both wire” strategy, which the “flexible response” sides. replaced, had been designed to act as a trigger So far, so good. Yet there were those in for “massive retaliation” should aggression West Germany ( and other Western European by sizable forces be directed against nato nations) who were unhappy with the options —particularly West Germany—even if the ag- available to nato at this juncture, particularly gression were committed with conventional if the Communists did not elect to return to weapons. the prehostilities boundary with nato. If the The Kennedy Administration was opposed attackers held their ground and refused to di- to this all-or-nothing choice, feeling it to be vest themselves of territory already taken, too restrictive. President Kennedy wanted numerically inferior nato forces lacked the many “options,” or alternatives, for many pos- superior conventional strength in-being to sible eventualities. Of particular concern was counterattack successfully and retake the lost the policy that the United States must not be territory. Worse, if tactical nuclear weapons bound to making a nuclear response to a con- were then employed against the attackers, “the ventional attack. A virtual blueprint for the bomb” would fall on VVest Germany, since that new Administration’s military policy was would be the location of the most threatening found in General Maxwell Taylor’s The Un- part of the enemy forces. Not entirely without certain Trumpet.2 reason, some argued that conventional de- The possibility of a limited conventional fenses in nato, based upon numerical inferior- war in Europe arose, to the consternation of ity, would be far more costly and destructive to the defending nations than to employ tac-

“Treatment of the air war in the north is intentionally tical nuclear weapons at the outset of aggres- omitted. While effectiveness of air strikes there may he legit- imately examined to a limited extent, such operations are so closely attuned to political considerations as to make objective “The importance of the numerical/qnalitative disparity and meaningful evaluation of purely military considerations was significantly reduced in Secretary McNamara’s budget pre- virtually impossible at this time. sentation before Congress in 1964.* VIEWS ON AEROSPACE POWER 35

sion, hoping that the shock effect would re- portion of the strategic forces would ulti- store sanity'. Or, failing that, they argued that mately be classified as a “general” war be- atomic destruction of the aggressor’s forces cause, regardless of the apparent success of an would then take place on his homeland rather opponent’s conventional efforts on the battle- than wait until he had occupied nato territory field, the “loser” need not submit without em- and then use nuclear weapons in an area pop- ploying, or threatening to employ, its nuclear ulated by friend and foe alike in an equivocal capability in an effort to reverse or modify the effort to dislodge him. Regardless of the true outcome. merits of the competing points of view, they In bringing strategic nuclear forces into engendered nationalistic feelings on the Con- play, a nation may have a variety of options tinent. for employment, depending upon the size and The new U.S. military policy also held diversification of tbe nuclear force. Alterna- implications for our Asian commitments. Since tives range from the initial destruction of a the possibility of involvement with Communist single target, usually depicted as a city, to the China’s military forces in Southeast Asia can- exchange of complete arsenals under a coun- not be ruled out at this writing, that policy wall tervalue targeting concept. be very cursorily treated with these few ob- The counterforce concept of war, even at servations. Anticipating involvement in an ever the highest intensities of conflict, has as its ob- larger ground war on the Asian mainland jective destruction of the opposing military should be expected to raise immediate ques- force to the degree necessary to achieve un- tions of calling up the reserves,0 raising draft questioned military ascendancy, if not absolute quotas, imposing price and wage controls, and military dominance, and the acceptance by the rationing—or use of nuclear weapons—all of opponent of terms for cessation of hostilities in which are politically sensitive issues in any sit- consonance with national objectives." In an uation wherein an urgent, fearsome threat to environment in which major powers with dif- U.S. security' is not completely apparent or fering political objectives possess sufficient nu- generally agreed to. clear weapons to assure inflicting an unaccept- With regard to conventional limited war, able level of damage from a second-strike particularly a greatly expanded ground war on posture, viability in nuclear weaponry is de- the Asian mainland, it would be difficult to pendent upon a capability for the utmost dis- foretell at the outset if the U.S. people would crimination in the application of nuclear force. willingly pay the price required of a long- For example, if a particular crisis warrants drawn-out classic war of attrition. Over a pe- resort to nuclear weapons to achieve military riod of time, pressure could conceivably build or political advantage, they should normally to employ our most effective weapons. be applied against selected targets in such a discriminating fashion that the urban/indus- trial base remains largely undamaged. Under General War these conditions the opponent may be made to realize that his nation and people, as a socio- Admittedly, attempting to define “general war” is to enter a semantic morass.' Yet our economic entity, are very much alive although national military budget is structured around they may have lost substantial military forces. strategic forces, which connote general war, If enemy leaders are aware that their country and general-purpose forces, which would seem is largely unharmed, it would be difficult in- to connote all lesser intensities of conflict. deed for them to reach a decision to launch a Moreover, I am persuaded that only the use countervalue (city-busting) attack, with the of nuclear weapons and employment of some full realization that in so doing they would be exposing to annihilation by their opponent’s •Quite apart from the issue of calling up the reserves in response to Chinese Communist intervention with military forces, remaining forces7 the very life of the nation the question has been raised by Congress and news media with they were seeking to protect. regard to the war in South Vietnam should the need for further increases in military manpower rise significantly. In nuclear warfare, care must be contin- 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ually exercised to assure that there remains ment of its nuclear force against the attacker’s as wide a difference as possible between the cities a totally irrational act entirely unsuited desired response, dictated by realistic political to the situation. In such a case, the availability objectives, and the unwanted irrational resort of some degree of counterforce capability to indiscriminate destruction. One should al- would become critical to the smaller power— ways seek to make the desired response far or accommodation to the opponent’s demands more attractive to the opponent than his futile would appear to be far more attractive than resort to certain national suicide. “national destruction.” Discrimination in the application of nu- Today the U.S. has the strategic “edge,” clear weapons places a premium upon ac- if not overwhelming superiority, and some curacy and small yields for most military tar- measure of “damage limiting” capability. It gets. So often one forgets that a 1-kiloton could possess a far more discriminating coun- bomb exerts 1000 pounds per square inch terforce capability if it deemed the need overpressure outward for some 150 feet from urgent to national security. the center of the explosion. Few targets would seem to require more than 1000 psi to effect their destruction. The central problem in the Military Superiority discriminating application of nuclear weapons, then, is not in packaging 1 kt in a warhead or Some basic tenets of military power are bomb. Rather, it is in acquiring, identifying, presently open to question. One involves the penetrating to, and placing the warhead ac- utility of military superiority.8 curately upon the target. Oddly enough, U.S. strategic predomi- For these reasons, as well as the quantita- nance has had a beneficial effect upon the tive/qualitative requirements of offensive ve- international demeanor of the world’s second- hicles and defensive systems, the newest mem- most-powerful nation. Something of a detente bers of the “nuclear club” do not possess the would appear to exist, at least for the moment, variety of alternatives for employment that between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Yet that are available to the major nuclear powers. same U.S. military power has not, thus far, “More bang for a buck” was, and is, a truism. clearly demonstrated a comparable ability to Larger megaton weapons are far more eco- influence decisively the external conduct of nomical and possess far less utility. the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [North A nation with only a few nuclear weapons Vietnam] (drv) and Communist China. obviously must plan to employ them against Based upon the present U.S. experience significant area targets (cities), since such in Southeast Asia, it could be concluded that weapons are ideal for creating gross devasta- the influence of total force superiority is mini- tion. Moreover, the targeting of purely military mal at the lower intensities of conflict and that forces may be expected to require numbers of its influence tends to increase as the intensity weapons greatly exceeding those available to of conflict increases.8 the new and small nuclear force. The value of the air power contribution to On balance, however, it would seem that overall military superiority in Southeast Asia a nuclear capability limited by size and com- continues to be debated. The Viet Cong have position to counter-city employment could no air power. Communist China does not as only protect against a similarly conceived yet have a large deliverable nuclear capability. counter-city attack. Perhaps more important, Despite the advantages this situation would such a restricted nuclear capability for as- seem to offer, U.S. air power is alleged by some sured destruction could give a false sense of not to have had the desired influence upon the security to its possessor. For example, if the Southeast Asia conflict. It has been said that larger nuclear power did not “cooperate” by air power has been given every opportunity attacking the small power’s urban/industrial to display its decisiveness—and has failed to base, the smaller power might find employ- deliver. VIEWS ON AEROSPACE POWER 37

If total force superiority, including un- be beneficial to both sides. However, just as questioned air superiority, cannot effectively our unilateral decision to stop nuclear testing elicit the desired response from our opponents, was made capital of by the U.S.S.R., which then the utility of that military superiority, of subsequently broke the moratorium, we could itself, would seem to be limited to deterring not unilaterally restrict our military space ef- direct attack against the U.S. proper. Alterna- forts to the development and employment of tively, perhaps the lesson may be that latent passive or purely defensive weapons without military superiority is of questionable utility some risk to our security. As a personal view, in dealing with the lower intensities of conflict. it would appear to be in consonance with the Such a conclusion comes hard indeed, even if recent space treaty if the United States were it is the well-reasoned product of the real- to perform the research necessary to develop- world political environment. Bringing total ment of a military space capability, against military superiority to bear in conflicts with the possibility of the need arising, while stop- limited objectives cannot be accomplished ping short of actually producing any system without risk; however, our military defeat is not permissible under the treaty. not an option available to our opponents at the For perhaps the indefinite future, the lower intensities of conflict. Nor is our acquies- United States should expect to furnish the bulk cence to a less-than-favorable negotiated set- of the strategic defense of the free world. Our tlement a remote possibility’ for our opponents, allies should continue to be asked to furnish if we do not wish to submit to it. stepped-up contributions of conventional forces for the lower intensities of conflict, as in Southeast Asia. Even if this were to come Military Strategy about, it would seem that the U.S. experience for the Future in Southeast Asia demands a substantial in- crease in U.S. general-purpose forces for land, Fear of nuclear weapons—regardless of sea, and air. size and manner of employment—and the Based upon the past, it would seem that corollary fear of uncontrolled or uncontrollable as the intensity level of conflict decreases, di- escalation represent the single largest factor rect involvement of U.S. forces should cor- which will, realistically, influence our future respondingly diminish until, at the level of military strategy. For this reason, maintenance true guerrilla warfare, the U.S. contribution of a distinct margin of nuclear superiority should be principally materiel and the training should remain the foundation of our future of indigenous forces.10 Conversely, as the in- military strategy. tensity of conflict increases, so must direct As an inherent aspect of total force supe- participation of greater numbers of U.S. forces. riority, emphasis should be placed on acquir- Finally, at the highest level of conflict, general ing the technology required for a military ca- war, the defense of the free world must con- pability in space. To date we have displayed tinue to depend, for the near tenn at least, al- only passive space systems: communication, most entirely upon U.S. forces in-being. Thus, navigation, meteorology, geodesy, reconnais- viewing the spectrum of conflict from cold war sance, and space-vehicle cataloguing seem through guerrilla and limited war to general well established. war, we see an ascending order of relative U.S. There is also some agreement within the commitment to the total free world effort—a s professional military that the world needs or well as an ascending order of threat to U.S. may shortly need a space system to inspect national security. and neutralize, if necessary, hostile, nonco- When addressing the problem of future operating space vehicles. military strategy to achieve national objectives, Hopefully, the passive nature of our space writers obscure an important issue by their program may influence Russian efforts and be- conflicting conceptual articles on “victory,” havior in space. If this comes to pass, it could “win,” “overkill,” “mutual deterrence,” “finite 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

deterrence,” “flexible response,” the “oceanic a more difficult problem. There are finite limits theory,” and the like. Irrespective of the partic- on the number of U.S. troops that could pru- ular political environment in which the mili- dently be deployed in support of counter- tary is called into play, and despite political insurgency operations. or policy constraints upon military operations, With regard to limited conventional war the U.S. must continue in the future to build along the lines of classic wars of attrition, the toward a capability to defeat potential oppo- capability of U.S. forces obviously is dramati- nents decisively. cally influenced by the opponent, the area of Any lesser goal, such as attempting to the world involved, and the course of conflict judge the composition and force posture of a during the buildup phase. Keeping the ocean military establishment necessary merely to lines of communication open against the 25- “deny the enemy his objective” from a position odd Chinese Communist submarines presents of “stability” or “parity” could become ex- an entirely different prospect from that of tremely dangerous. keeping them open in the face of 400 to 500 If the ultimate national objective is to be Soviet subs. content with perpetuating a stalemate, that Likewise, ground force requirements to objective may be achieved—but it could prove defend nato are easier to accommodate than deficient, and then all would be lost. On the similar requirements to defend effectively other hand, striving for unmistakable superior- against large-scale use of Chinese Communist ity may not produce an unbeatable, or certain, forces in Asia. The outcome of an air war be- defense—but such an objective would seem to tween U.S. forces and the Chinese Commu- have a far better chance of achieving the lesser nists can be predicted with high confidence, state of stalemate. while the outcome of a conventional air war involving the U.S.S.R. is equivocal at best. Yet it seems improbable indeed that serious con- On Balance ventional conflict between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could take place in the near term Capabilities of the individual services to without the introduction of nuclear weapons. carry out the military strategies for various in- The outcome of most wars cannot be pre- tensities of conflict are obviously equivocal in dicted wfith certainty. The course and termina- many instances. However, certain generalities tion of armed conflict are the result of the may be made with reasonably high confidence. interaction of many influences, some of which The prospects of general nuclear war cannot be reliably tested in peacetime. eventuating in the near term are minimal, due It is likely that at least some careful cal- in part to unquestioned U.S. nuclear offensive culations prior to the recent Arab-Israeli wrar capability and in part to the inevitable gross showed the well-armed, quantitatively supe- devastation that would result from use of the rior Arab bloc as far stronger than the forces higher-yield weapons in an environment vir- of Israel. Yet the skilled employment of tac- tually devoid of highly effective active and tical forces in the conflict proved otherwise. passive defenses. Perhaps the greatest benefit for professional At the lowest intensity of overt military airmen to be derived from study of that war conflict, guerrilla war, the experience, tactics, is the re-emphasis it gives to the importance and doctrine exist within each service for en- of basic doctrine for effective employment of gaging collectively in potentially effective in- air forces. surgency and counterinsurgency. While this The decisive nature of aerospace powder, know-how may be imparted to local forces, when skillfully employed, is a visible lesson and U.S. industrial capacity is unquestionably from past and present. The import of those capable of supplying the materiel needs of sev- experiences lies unrecognized or neglected eral guerrilla conflicts simultaneously, commit- only at great peril for our nation and the free ment of U.S. ground forces in quantity poses world. Thus, it behooves the Air Force to con- VIEWS ON AEROSPACE POWER 39

tinue to shape its thinking on the future use tary decisions—notwithstanding the likelihood of its forces with the objective of winning mili- of termination of conflicts in other ways. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

Notes 1. Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New tional Strategy,” Air University Review, XIV, 4 (September- York: Horizon Press, 1962), pp. 185-208. October 1963), 21-36. 2. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New 6. Richard Fryklund, 100 Million Lives (New York: York: Harper, 1960). Macmillan, 1962), pp. 20-32. 3. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Dimensions of Military 7. Donald F. Martin, “Manned Combat Aircraft in Nu- Policy,” in Chap. 1, Vol. IV. National and Military Strategy, Air clear War," Flying, September 1963. War College Associate Programs, 1963-64 edition, p. 34. 8. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: 4. “How Many Military Options Are Enough?” Supple- Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 579-80. ment to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders. No. 130, 9. Rodger Swearingen, “Mao Tse-tung: Ruler of Red April 1964, pp. 23-24. "Capabilities and Employment of Gen- China," in Focus: World Communism (Boston: Houghton eral Purpose Forces,” Chap. 9, Vol. IV, National and Military Mifflin, 1964), p. 80. Strategy, Air War College Associate Programs, 1963-64 edition, 10. Statement (author unnamed) before House Foreign p. 12, citing Armed Forces Management, Vol. 10, April 1964. Affairs Committee, 2$ March 1964, in Chap. 16, Vol. IV, 5. Woodford A. Heflin, “Terminology Control and Na- National and Military Strategy, Air War College Associate Pro- grams, 1963-64 edition, pp. 32-35.

Additional References The following useful sources supplement those cited in the Kaufmann, William W. The McNamara Strategy. New York: notes. Harper & Row, 1964. "Counterinsurgency in Perspective," Chap. 10 of Vol. IV, Na- Kissinger, Henry A. The Necessity for Choice. New York: tional and Military Strategy, Air War College Associate Pro- Harper, 1961. grams, 1963-64 edition, pp. 9-10. Morgenstem, Oskar. Question of National Defense. New York: Fall, Bernard B. Street Without Joy. Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1964 Random House, 1959. (revised). Morgenthau, Hans J. Impasse of American Foreign Policy. Chi- Fall, Bernard B. The Two Vietnams. New York: Praeger, 1963. cago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Hadley, Arthur T. The Nation's Safety and Arms Control. New Schelling, Thomas C., and Morton H. Halperin. Strategy and York: Viking, 1961. Arms Control. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. Halperin, Morton H. China and the Bomb. New York: Praeger, Strausz-Hupe, Robert, William R. Kintner, and Stefan T. 1965. Possony. A Forward Strategy for America. New York: Harper 1961. THE FUTURE OF Jr ^ NATO - . ^ St I - l .

D r . T homas C. Schellinc

President Truman’s Secretary of State Acheson signs the North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949. THE FUTURE OF NATO 41

NTIL this year, there was a strong with a hammer for so long that it felt good tradition about how to begin a speech when he quit, nato was banging its head hard U on the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- for several years until, about a year ago, it nization. The accepted form ran something like stopped; and the relief is spectacular. this: “nato finds itself today in greater dis- In any case, things are quiet, if not en- array than ever before in the six years—eight couraging. And there is probably a certain rec- years, ten years, twelve years ( whatever the ognition that no matter what General de year in which the speech was being given)— Gaulle says, and no matter what changes take since it was established.” An alternative ver- place in the world, it is almost as hard to dis- sion was: “nato is in deeper crisis today than continue an organization as to initiate one. ever before since it was established in 1949. nato, therefore, won’t really go out of busi- On the one hand, disarray; on the other, crisis. ness on the 20th anniversary because there Actually, this year they aren’t making isn’t that much initiative in the world. So nato either statement about nato. I read recently has a future, whether it likes it or not. a speech I received in the mail from an old There are those who say it isn’t really friend, Harlan Cleveland, who is our Ambas- nato any more: with France out, in any effec- sador to nato. It was a buoyant speech. He’s tive operational sense, how can it be nato? a buoyant man, but not so buoyant that he One thing we may have learned in the last could give that kind of a speech about nato year is that France’s being in or out does not unless he felt that way. And I asked myself, make quite all that difference. But this de- “Why is it that this year is not a gloomy year pends a little on what nato is—whether it is for NATO?” essentially a military force, a basis for political One possibility is that when you’ve ac- collaboration, a commitment to each other’s complished a successful move from, say, Paris security, or a cultural institution carrying on to Brussels, you have such a sense of accom- the Marshall Plan. plishment that you forget that you didn’t want I am not going to talk about nato’s future to move originally. Another is that the war in over the next two, three, or four years. It is Southeast Asia diverts attention from all the more interesting to think about what nato was nato problems. Possibly it is that General de when it started almost twenty years ago. That Gaulle was an enormous preoccupation as long is a long time—almost as long as it takes a baby as he could threaten to be beastly, but once to grow up and reach voting age. The world he’s actually been beastly he doesn’t hold has changed since then. If nato is to go on for much over us any more. And part of the ex- another two decades in one form or another, planation may be that nato is like the man we ought to think about the decades rather who had been hitting himself on the head than the few years just ahead. What was nato to begin with? It was not really a military organization. It was not a de- fense force, nato initially was a scheme where- The second of the General Thomas D. by the United States got itself obliged to White Lectures was presented at Air Uni- defend Europe, with nuclear weapons if neces- versity on the evening of 18 October 1967, sary. nato was a technique for getting the continuing the general subject of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Dr. Thomas C. United States committed to participation in Schelling, Professor of Economics at Harvard the defense of Europe. This fact shows up University, gave his audience the benefit of clearly in the testimony that went into the broad firsthand acquaintance with European Senate ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty problems, and here his message has been and the Congressional authorization for sta- adapted for the readers of Air University tioning, indefinitely, American troops abroad Review. in peacetime. The Administration’s argument The Editor was not that six American divisions by them- selves could defend Europe. The argument 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

was not that six American divisions added to of a North Atlantic area that we were com- indigenous European forces would make a mitted to defend, so that the Russians would decisive difference between weakness and know we were obliged, and so that Norway strength in the defense of Europe. The argu- would then not be fair game for Russian ment instead was that six American divisions aggression. would make clear to the Soviet Union that if Two events gave rise to nato. T h e first there were a war in Europe the United States was a simple one. The British, in February would be in it, whether it wanted to be or not. 1947, said they could not finance the Greek Six divisions located in defensive positions government any longer in its war against Com- cannot look the other way, cannot gracefully munist guerrillas. This announcement crystal- evacuate, cannot die unnoticed; and one way lized what later came to be known as the Tru- to make clear to the Soviet Union that if Eu- man Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. I doubt rope is attacked the United States cannot whether nato could have existed without the stand idly by is to put troops there that will be Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan created an actively engaged. It has even been facetiously institution, a tradition, a set of work habits remarked that it was not just 250,000 troops among nations, that made nato as an orga- that mattered but their wives and children, nization possible. The second event was the too. If the object is to show the Soviet Union blockade of Berlin and the ensuing 18-month that it cannot attack Europe without involving airlift, which convinced Americans and Eu- the United States, civilians may be almost as ropeans that the Russians were not only poten- useful as troops. tially but actually a menace. This is the principle that we have seen all These two events gave rise to nato the along operating in Berlin. VVe have had in treaty and nato the cooperative association. Berlin some seven thousand American troops; What gave rise to nato as a defense program together with the French and British the num- was the Korean War. That war occurred be- ber was about twelve thousand. What can cause the United States did not know how to seven thousand troops do, surrounded by articulate its intentions—possibly because it twenty or more Soviet divisions? What they did not know its own intentions. The Secre- can do is to die—to die suddenly and dramati- tary of State, you may recall, had spoken of a cally. There is no place to go, no escape. By United States strategic defense perimeter that threatening to die in a manner that could not excluded South Korea. He then said that for go unnoticed, a handful of American troops other reasons we were obliged to defend South has made Berlin, for twenty years, one of the Korea. The manner of his saying this may most impregnable military bastions that the have seemed to damn with faint praise our world has known. obligation to defend Korea; and North Korea This kind of “trigger” is what nato was launched an attack that I think would not have originally. Notice that, in contrast to most mili- been launched had it been clear what the tary alliances in recent history, nato was not, United States would do. in spite of what we have always declared, It was hard for them to know what we really a mutual-defense or reciprocal-defense would do, since we probably didn’t know our- arrangement, nato was an arrangement where- selves. Had we attempted to articulate what by the United States got itself committed to our response to the Korean War would be, it the defense of West Europe. would have been exceedingly difficult to make The example of Norway is interesting. a threat that might deter the Soviet Union. Be- Norway is indeed strategically important. But cause the one thing we probably could not the reason why it was important that Norway have said—because we did not anticipate it— be in nato was not that Norway could make was that we would quadruple our defense either a military or a geographic contribution budget. This was the era of defense budgets to the Treaty; it was that the United States that were crawling down toward about 13 wanted to be obliged to treat Norway as part billion dollars per year. A year or two earlier THE FUTURE OF NATO 43

the Joint Chiefs of Staff had felt they needed ogy throughout the Soviet bloc while in the the preposterously large figure of 22 billion West an appealing successor to European na- dollars for defense; Secretary of Defense For- tionalism was always an aspiration, never a restal says in his diaries that he thought that reality. Soviet army strength appeared so large would bankrupt America and play into the in relation to the uniformed manpower of the Russian hands but that we needed at least 16 Western countries as to cause a sense of almost or 17 billion dollars. Under his successor, Louis hopeless inferiority that no rational population Johnson, the figure was getting down toward count was ever able to dispel. And Communist 13 billion. With the Korean War it boomed China was seen to be a militant extension, east- quickly to 65 billion dollars. No great harm, ward and southward, of a bloc centrally di- no great strain: the economy reacted with rected from Moscow and adding enormously vigor and elasticity’. But who could have told in manpower and territory to a single mono- the Russians that the Korean War would lithic menace. launch an arms race in which our defense budget would never fall below 50 billion dol- lars per year and that this would happen only T HE worl d is different now, and a few months after we were talking about 15 looks different, from the way it was and the billion or so as the upper limit? It was this way it looked in the early 1950s. Most impor- boost in the defense budget that really led to tant of all, we have learned that coexistence the conception of nato as not merely a U.S without major war is possible. We are now obligation to defend Europe but a major mili- more than two-thirds through the decade of tary program for the armament and defense of the 1960s. a decade at the beginning of which Europe. a noted scientific author proclaimed it a “math- The Truman Doctrine stated the basic ematical certainty” that nuclear weapons, even premise on which American foreign policy' if only bv some kind of accident, would blow was to rest; that the northern half of the globe up the world within ten years. Twenty years was divided into two parts, one part Commu- without nuclear war is no guarantee that we nist and one part threatened by Communism. can extend it to 120 or even to the next 20; it The Communist part was credited with a dis- is enough, though, to replace despair with cipline that the “free” part lacked, had a drive hope and to give reason for believing that at toward expansion without scruple as to means, least the major nuclear powers have acquired a goal of total world conquest, a willingness to some experience and some confidence which risk violence and engage in war if necessary, will make the job easier during the second 20. and a political capacity for imposing on con- We have learned that the Communist quered areas a regime that could neither be world of the twentieth century is no more overthrown nor separated from the Soviet immune than a “capitalist world” ( or a “royal- bloc. The Soviet bloc was credited with a ca- ist world”) to schism, invective, territorial dis- pacity for never losing what once it gained, so putes, ideological hostility, rivalry, resentment, that, even if its foreign adventures alternately and even the acknowledged possibility of mili- succeeded and failed, it would win when it tary engagement. We were slow in the LJnited succeeded and hold its own when it failed. States, terribly slow, to recognize the Sino- As so commonly happens, the menace was Soviet split for what it was, probably because oversimplified. Unity in the Communist world we wrongly believed it couldn’t happen, partly was taken for granted while disunity in the because we may have let our own propaganda Western world had to be continually, and talk us into believing in a monolithic image of never successfully, striven against. Soviet the Soviet bloc as constitutionally insuscepti- threats were credited absolutely while the ble to internal division. Even yet we may not credibility of the American counterthreat have shaken off altogether an evaluation of was perpetually debated. Nationalism was ex- China that credits it with the full potential pected to be smothered by Communist ideol- support of Soviet nuclear strength. 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

We have learned, too, that the under- professional bureaucrat, that one has to accept developed world is extraordinarily difficult to their testimony as significant. What appears influence, to manipulate, or to control—by to be happening in Eastern Europe contra- Americans with all their money and arma- dicts the expectations of some of the best ments or by Russians with all their money and social scientists in the West, who did not be- armaments. It is nearly a decade since the en- lieve ten years ago that the process of “liber- tire Middle East seemed almost in the clutches alization” or “modernization” could go so far, of the Soviet Union, but the Russians find a or that the vitality of national and regional Nasser as hard to clutch as we do. The stun- cultures could flourish so. ning change in the politics of Indonesia during Communism in its doctrinaire form has the past two years contradicted the forecasts been something short of an economic success, of the most knowledgeable American experts and it is becoming harder and harder to sweep and proved that Communist political manip- the evidence under the rug. I was recently ulation is capable of failing even on the very behind the Iron Curtain talking to economists brink of success. And we have only recently —well-educated, sophisticated professionals fa- recovered from a brief panic at the thought miliar with Western economics—and the con- that a few hundred Chinese or Cubans with versation sounded like conversations with a few truckloads of machine guns and radio Western European economists in 1948, ’49, transmitters would, with cheap and subtle ’50. There are all the usual problems of over- violence, subvert and then control central controlled economies, bureaucratic rent con- Africa and Central America. trols, exchange rates out of line, excessive Most extraordinary of all is the discovery attempts at wage uniformity, great inefficiency —a discovery' important to social science as and some bureaucratic demoralization result- well as to foreign policy—that the countries ing from a 20-year or 15-year experiment in that had Communist regimes imposed on doing by ideology what the market does bet- them by Soviet force and subversion could ter. And, just as many developing countries become less, not more, ideologically Com- learned a decade ago after flirting with social- munist with the passage of time. They can ism, some of the Eastern European countries become less, not more, tightly integrated into are discovering that, whatever else there is to the Soviet bloc with the passage of time. And say about Marxism-Leninism, it does not have they can raise a generation under Communist the key to the running of a country’s economy. rule that attests the durability of national They are facing a new problem, too, in identity and cultural continuity in a way that Eastern Europe: reconciling the Communist ought to enrage an old Bolshevik as much as Party with the government bureaucracy. This it puzzles the Western scholar. The crushing could happen only in a one-partv country; in of Budapest in 1956 was more like the begin- a multiparty system the parties compete and ning than like the end of an evolutionary have no authority. In a country in which the process, a process that shows that even in a party is the ultimate authority, something Communist world both internal politics and eventually occurs that we called, in this coun- foreign relations have a dynamic character try thirty years ago, the “managerial revolu- that neither a Communist nor a non-Com- tion”—the development of a professional class, munist social theorist can fully understand, a bureaucratic class, composed of people more predict, or control. identified with the job they do from day to What has been happening in Eastern Eu- day than with the ideology and philosophy rope is documented by so many scholars, jour- that goes with it. There is a tendency for party nalists, and travelers, whose interests range leadership to become older in years and less from business management to scientific meet- in touch with what is going on. One of the ings, from poetry and editorials to the way questions that has surfaced in Yugoslavia, and people talk privately and in public, from the is widely discussed and about to surface in role of the party or the police to the role of the other countries, is what the role of the part)’ is THE FUTURE OF NATO 45

going to be if it is not to become a collection countries, the idea that Germany and the of superannuated revolutionaries. Foreign re- Netherlands, France and Italy, or Japan and lations tend to be handled more by party Korea should form a “community” because than by diplomatic establishments; but for they are close together on a conventional map the internal running of the countries, there is may be becoming an obsolete idea. When it emerging what is almost a "two-party system,” is suggested that Britain should join “the the party and the government functionaries. continent,” in the present age one should ask, We have learned some things, too, about “Which continent?” our side of the Iron Curtain. One is that the The same question is at least as pertinent “nation,” as a political and geographical unit, to Japan, which so often has to be considered, is not too small or too politically obsolete to geography notwithstanding, as part of the command the loyalty and interest of its cit- European continent or “Atlantic Community.” izens. Larger “communities may be desirable, This is not to deny that history, tradition, but not to fill some vacuum of national dis- and culture provide some regional basis for illusionment. In the early 1950s there were collaboration in common institutions or that many who feared (and some theorists who geography does determine some joint economic hoped) that the traditionally defined sovereign interests. It does suggest, though, that we nation was unsuited to the modern world and should be careful in applying nineteenth-cen- would have to be submerged in some drasti- tury economic geography to political group- cally different federal or supranational system. ings in the late twentieth century. Today the traditionally defined “nation" looks There is another development—one that pretty viable. Militarily, of course, many proud used to be wished for without much hope but countries are too weak to stand alone against is now looked at askance by our European a major adversary, or a bloc of major ad- friends. That is rapport between the United versaries; but the twentieth century is no States and the Soviet Union. We had the different from the nineteenth in that respect. nuclear test ban in 1963, but that was not a Economically there is much to gain through convincing display of Soviet-American com- the merging of markets and the elimination mon interest: the two countries got into the of barriers to trade, capital flow, and the test ban by a process of worldwide pressure movement of people; but doing so now seems and propaganda debate, rather than recogni- compatible with a modest diminution of tion of a common security interest. Eight or “sovereignty.” ten years ago, if you had gone to a conference A consequence is that “regionalism” may almost anywhere around the world, delegates be losing its appeal, and properly losing it, as from various countries would have asked, a basic mode of organization. Regionalism was “Why cannot the United States and the Soviet expressly allowed for in the United Nations Union get together and keep nuclear weapons Charter, and for a decade it was a great from spreading?” Now if you go to a con- hope for European unity. The idea has been ference almost anywhere around the world, applied, somewhat sporadically, to Asia, but particularly in Western Europe, the ques- Africa, and Latin America. The idea was that tion is, “Why must the United States and the geographical propinquity gives countries a Soviet Union get together to deny the spread great deal in common, that neighborliness is of nuclear technology?” the stuff of which federation is forged, and Several things have happened. One is that that a country’s geographical location deter- most European countries no longer see a clear mines its interests and responsibilities towards and present danger of Soviet military aggres- other countries. For land warfare that un- sion. They can afford the luxury of being con- doubtedly still is true; but in the age of jet cerned with things that were suppressed by travel, supertankers, satellite-relayed commu- higher-priority problems ten years ago. Most nications, and the increasing similarity of of what has exercised nato for the past four consumption patterns among the developing or five years has not been how to meet the 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

menace of Soviet military aggression; it has I do not think the problem is one of tech- been internal to nato—each country thinking nological “gap.” There surely is a wealth gap about its role within the alliance, its future, —we are richer than they are. Twenty years and its diplomatic status. Those who think ago there was the notion of a “dollar gap”; it that America and the Soviet Union may be did not materialize as a persistent trend in getting together undoubtedly have some pretty world economics, but as a possibility it was good evidence. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation a logically sound notion. Now what seems to Treaty—the draft treaty as it now stands—is be the gap is essentially the higher per capita not something that the two countries were gross national product of the United States pushed into by the pressure of world opinion. compared with the European gnp. W h a t e v e r It is something that these two countries finally role one imputes to education, technology, arrived at in spite of accumulating world native skills, special resources, etc., it turns opinion against it. Preserving what is left of out that countries that have saved and in- the nuclear monopoly may not look good to vested in capital equipment over the past fifty many countries of the world, but it is a dra- years more than other countries are bound to matic reminder that we and the Russians da be richer. It is probably simpler to call it a have at least some interests in common. wealth gap than a technology gap. I think it has been noticed, too, that in If anyone insists on putting it in terms of spite of the war in Vietnam Soviet-American technology, the gap in technology between, relations are remarkably cordial. The kind of say, Sweden and Portugal is greater than the vituperation that was customary before, say, gap between the average European country the Cuban missile crisis just does not go on and the average state in this country. We between the two countries now. The treat- have technological gaps within this country, ment of American visitors to scientific and too; Congress is exercised about the tech- other conferences in the Soviet Union is more nology gap between the Harvard-Mrr area in friendly and relaxed than it ever was. The Massachusetts and Middle Western states that Russians like to say that there can be no are not becoming computer centers. progress on disarmament and arms control as Why is it that the technology gap gets so long as the war in Vietnam lasts; but they much attention? I think it is because the Euro- seem almost to be saying that this is a tem- peans resent American wealth as well as lead- porary disruption of the normal business of ership and particularly resent this effort by us getting on in a cooperative way. This is and the Soviet Union to deny them nuclear noticed by our European partners, who are technology. This relates closely to the nuclear becoming strangely jealous at the breakdown weapon issue in Europe, which is the hammer in the polarization of East-West rivalry. that was hitting us on the head for several There is a special sign of this jealousy. years. In the nuclear debate we allowed nu- Much is said these days about a technological clear weapons to acquire almost the status of gap between the United States and Europe. a “sixth freedom,” the birthright of a nation— It is hard to know what is meant by a tech- the thing possession of which meant it had nological gap, but the idea seems to be that reached national manhood or advanced tech- we have more and better technology than nological status. I think that’s over now. We they have. There are some who go further and tried for several years to reconcile two notions: say that the United States, through a con- that Germany should have at least some capa- scious and deliberate policy, sometimes in bility to fire nuclear weapons, in spite of the collusion with the Soviet Union, is trying to wishes of other nato countries, and that Ger- deny modem technology to our European many should not have precisely that capa- partners to keep them in a subservient posi- bility. And it turned out that as long as the tion economically and technologically. This is debate remained legalistic, these were wholly a bitter situation to have come up between us unreconcilable notions. For some reason, and and the Europeans. I suspect it was fatigue as much as anything THE FUTURE OF NATO 47

else, this argument has died out. It is only five years since the missile crisis My own feeling is that Germany would in Cuba, six since the Berlin wall went up. be wise to recognize that while nuclear weap- The Russians now seem reasonably well be- ons might give prestige to Germany, Germany haved, but we cannot guarantee that they will would also give prestige to nuclear weapons. be six years from now. It would be enor- Germany is one country in the world that mously difficult, maybe impossible, to recreate without nuclear weapons can claim to be tech- nato if we suddenly needed it; and even those nologically advanced, industrially dynamic, who think that for the moment we hardly important, and in no need of nuclear weapons need it ought to realize that as insurance just to prove that it is a real country. I tried against sudden need in the future we should to argue a year ago, in speaking with Ger- take nato seriously. mans, that the real prestige item among the In my evaluation, the essential element smaller countries of the world was not going goes back to what nato was in 1949 and 1950: to be nuclear weapons but troops that would the U.S. commitment to the worth and impor- actually fight, with officers and noncoms that tance of Western Europe as expressed in a could lead them. Since the brief war in June physical capability to help—even in a physical of this year in the Middle East, I have the inability to avoid being engaged—in the de- impression that this has been borne out. I fense of Europe if Europe has to be defended. cannot imagine that possession of nuclear If all goes well, nato is not going to have weapons would have obtained for Israel the the vitality we would like, nato gets its vital- prestige that an army of disciplined, highly ity from a clear and present danger from the motivated human beings can provide; and I East or from bitter division within the alliance. suspect that the Germans would be wise to So if all goes well, nato will languish. The rest their prestige upon having the best army important thing, and it is hard, is to maintain in Europe rather than worrying about nuclear some kind of steadfast commitment, of mili- weapons. tary presence, over there, not because the asymmetry between us and Europe requires us to protect them and not them us but be- Let me sum up. The original clear and present cause that is where the frontier is and we are danger isn’t there, and it is futile to suppose all part of the Western world. We must not that European countries will be as exercised become so bemused with modem transport about nato military force in the years to come that we think we can pull the troops back as they were in the 1950s. They are evidently easily and get them there in a hurry in a crisis. going to go on worrying much more about It takes more than transport to get them there their own internal problems than about ex- in a crisis; it takes resolve and new decisions. ternal danger. I believe, too, it is futile for We would be wise not to allow uncer- nato to try to enhance its position by going tainty or misinterpretation by the U.S.S.R. into cultural and economic fields; defense of what the United States would do if the organizations are conservative organizations Russians should attempt to take military ad- and amply preoccupied with the business of vantage of some European military weakness. defense without becoming economic and so- We would be wise to keep in mind that not cial councils. long before North Korea attacked South Korea We have now almost twenty years of U.S. the United States withdrew troops from South investment in nato, represented by men and Korea and very likely inadvertently signaled equipment in Europe, testifying to the impor- something about its intentions in a way that tance of Europe. In spite of our preoccupation proved costly, not only for us but for our with Southeast Asia, I do not see how there enemies. can be any question but that Europe is the Cambridge, Massachusetts part of the world that most matters to us, as well as to the Soviet Union. HOSE who are responsible for the na- ISOLATIONIST tional security of the United States T consider it essential that this country CRITICS OF maintain its international commitments and its leading role in world affairs. A majority of AMERICAN Americans, according to the polls, support such policies and might approve more aggres- FOREIGN sive measures in the Vietnam war. Yet antiwar protesters also make themselves heard; the POLICY polls suggest that a substantial minority of the population would avoid “another Vietnam”; and there is relentless criticism of foreign aid A Hi s t or i c al programs. Perspective Both those who defend the general course of American foreign policy and the protesters themselves would be well advised to recognize that there has been a tradition in the United Dr . P aul S. Holbo States of opposition to foreign involvement and war. Such views of the country’s foreign policy can be characterized as isolationism, if that term is understood properly. No formal CRITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 49

definition has much validity because the fea- if aggressive Secretary of State. And in 1885, tures of isolationism are not always the same. to mention only one more example of wise But isolationism’s typical forms and persist- isolationism, the Cleveland administration re- ent characteristics can be seen in historical jected the General Act of the Berlin Confer- perspective. ence on the Congo, to which the Arthur Since 1941 there have been derogatory' administration had sent delegates, because it overtones to the tenm “isolationism,” which might have involved the United States in the conjures up memories of Senators Henry Cabot colonial partition of Africa.3 Lodge, Robert M. La Follette, and the other It is not so easy to make a case for the members of the “Battalion of Death who benefits of twentieth century isolationism.4 In helped to defeat Woodrow Wilson’s League of the 1920s, for instance, there was an ostrich- Nations in 1919. Or it recalls the efforts made like reaction against the First World War. The in the 1930s to keep the United States from nation did not withdraw altogether from the joining the struggle against Hitler’s Germany world arena after 1920, but even those Ameri- and Tojo’s Japan.1 cans who still worried about the rest of the Even those persons who cannot remem- world failed to concern themselves with the ber, or who do not know much about, the problems of European security and rising controversies over foreign policy of the late Asian nationalism. Instead they concentrated 1930s react almost instinctively against the on plans for international organization and term “isolationism.” For over two decades arms limitation and on legal means to avoid American schoolchildren have been learning war. It is not properly understood that these that isolationism is bad. Because of the con- activities were often isolationism in disguise. notations of the word, it is applied more There was, for example, an isolationist cautiously today than in the past, which is aspect to support in the United States for the altogether proper. More important, there has League of Nations. Many enthusiasts favored been an increased awareness since 1941 that the League as a way to keep the peace with- the United States was not an isolationist na- out involving the United States in the strug- tion throughout its history. The fact is that gles of the world. This outcome would, indeed, Americans from the Founding Fathers through have been the millennium; but neither the Theodore Roosevelt generally recognized the Republicans nor the Democrats were quite importance of Europe to their country and prepared to bring it about. were sometimes adept manipulators of the The Washington Arms Limitation Con- European balance of power.- ference of 1921-22, which was supposed to be There has always been isolationism in the a substitute for the League, for alliances, and United States, however, and sometimes it for armaments, aroused American enthusiasm. proved a good policy. President John Adams, The isolationists of that day seemed to believe who distrusted England and France equally, that prohibiting preparedness would promote attempted with success around 1800 to free peace. “War,” said Republican Senator Hiram his country from European entanglements. Johnson of California, “may be banished from Secretary of State John Quincy Adams insisted the earth more nearly by disarmament than in 1823 that the United States should main- by any other agency or in any other manner.” tain an independent course in foreign policy, Just before the Washington Conference con- an idea that contributed to the making of the vened on Armistice Day, 1921, several thou- Monroe Doctrine. President Abraham Lincoln sand women marched down Pennsylvania sensibly filed away a memorandum from Sec- Avenue in Washington, D.C., carrying ban- retary of State William H. Seward suggesting ners denouncing war. “Scrap the battleship,” that the United States become involved in a their placards read, “and the Pacific problems war with England, France, and Spain as a will settle themselves.” Throughout the 1920s means of reuniting the Union. “Only one war and early 1930s, American diplomats, with at a time,” the President reminded his able their naval aides carrying slide rules to calcu- 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW late “ratios” of warships, tried to scrap the powers on world problems. He had no luck battleship, the cruiser, the carrier, the de- in persuading either his own chief, President stroyer, and the submarine.5 They were still Herbert Hoover, or the incoming president, at it when the Japanese walked out of the Franklin D. Roosevelt, to adopt these policies, London Naval Disarmament Conference and though Roosevelt toyed with the suggestions the League of Nations in 1935. briefly.7 In 1933 Roosevelt vaguely promised There was also a scheme for outlawing the League of Nations that the United States war, promoted by many of the peace workers, would not interfere with actions taken to pre- who were numerous in the 1920s, and by a serve peace. There was an outcry in Congress Chicago lawyer named Salmon O. Levinson. at even this timid proposal, and Roosevelt If war was legal, Levinson and his followers quickly retreated. He also gave up his idea of wanted to declare it illegal; if war was non- appointing an ambassador to the League of legal, as many authorities contended, they Nations. In the same year he scuttled the still wanted to declare it illegal. The Kellogg- London Economic Conference.8 The United Briand Pact, which was an outgrowth of the States, under the New Deal, would go it alone idea of outlawry, provided for the renuncia- in economic and political affairs. tion of war.'1 War in self-defense was still For more than a decade before the New permissible, whereupon undeclared wars be- Deal, novelists, playwrights, poets, and schol- came fashionable. Manchuria in 1931 was just ars had been establishing the mood for the the first of a series. isolationism of the 1930s. Such persuasive There is a lesson to be learned from the writers as John Dos Passos, E. E. Cummings, history of the 1920s, for three of the essential Maxwell Anderson, and Ernest Hemingway characteristics of American isolationism are chronicled the absurdities and degradation of apparent: excessive faith in international or- the World War. Some historians and political ganization; a belief that peace can be attained scientists contributed to the same attitude by through the limitation of armaments; and a arguing that Russia and France, not Germany, tendency to seek legalistic solutions. These had been responsible for the war; and they characteristics were to recur in later times. made much of the secret, imperialistic agree- Only a few Americans, including Secretary of ments between the victorious Allies. State Henry L. Stimson, thought of inter- But it was the depression that provided national affairs in terms of diplomacy with the great impetus for the efforts during the power. 1930s to isolate the United States from inter- After 1928 there was less stress on inter- national troubles. Americans commonly traced national organization as a way of avoiding the origins of the depression to the Great War foreign conflicts. The League was already a and mistakenly attributed United States inter- dead issue, and the World Court would soon vention to “warmongering" bankers and busi- be abandoned by its presumed friends. But nessmen, who were currently in low esteem. the idea of disarmament, now in the form of Certain spokesmen for conservatism, such as nonarmament, and legalistic means of avoid- the Chicago Tribune, applauded the isolation- ing intervention became more popular than ist foreign policy of the Roosevelt administra- ever with the onset of the Great Depression. tion. But the supporters of the New Deal and Altogether the 1930s were to comprise the other liberals and progressives were the lead- peak period of American isolationism. ers in exposing the “causes of war" and pointed The New Deal itself contributed substan- the direction to “permanent peace." tially to the isolationist sentiment in the One such man was Senator Gerald P. United States during this decade. The out- Nye, progressive Republican and representa- going Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, tive of the socialistic North Dakota Nonparti- urged that sanctions be imposed against Japan san League, who headed the Special Senate for its aggressions in Manchuria and that the Committee Investigating the Munitions Indus- United States consult with the European try. The committee had been set up as a result CRITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 51

of persistent demands by the pacifist Women's it was Beard’s early retirement from Columbia International League for Peace and Freedom, University to his dairy farm in Connecticut led by Dorothy Detzer. This and other pacifist that led him to propose such a program. Iso- groups had called for investigation and regu- lation, said Morison, breeds isolation.1'' But lation of the international munitions traffic, many Americans thought much as Beard did which they blamed for causing war. during the 1930s. The so-called Nye Committee met for two Other elements added to American iso- years, from 1934 to 1936, with the general en- lationism in this decade. Agitators of left and dorsement of President Roosevelt. Senator Nye right preached the doctrine. These included demonstrated that President Wilson had not Father Charles Coughlin, Senator Huey Long, been candid in 1919 when he stated that he Dr. Francis Townsend, the Reverend Gerald L. was unaware of the Allies’ secret wartime K. Smith, and Congressman William Lemke.11 treaties; the committee charged, too, that Various ethnic elements added distinctive American armaments-makers had made huge flavors: a few Scandinavian and Irish-Ameri- profits during the First World War and dis- cans, some German-Americans, and after 1935 closed that the munitions industry had al- Italo-Americans.12 Some of these individuals legedly helped to break up the Geneva and groups continued to be active up to and Disarmament Conference of 1927. The com- even during the Second World War. But the mittee did not claim that economic interests real core of the isolationist movement lay in had caused the war or led the United States Congress with the staunchest supporters of into the war, but this was the popular view.9 the New Deal, such as Senators Burton K. The legislative result was the Neutrality Laws, Wheeler, George Norris, Homer T. Bone, a legalistic solution for keeping the United Henrik Shipstead, Emest Lundeen, Gerald States out of future wars by forbidding the Nye, “Young Bob” La Follette, and others sale of strategic commodities, the lending of whom President Roosevelt often relied on for money, and travel by Americans during war- votes. time. Beginning in the late 1930s, however, Another influential man who thought a the progressives who opposed intervention in great deal about the domestic and foreign foreign wars were joined by a number of problems of the United States at this time was conservative businessmen and others who the historian Charles A. Beard. He described opposed President Roosevelt’s domestic pro- his ideas in a series of books and articles, gram, and by a new, largely younger group notably The Open Door at Home, written in of liberals. The businessmen included General 1934, and The Devil Theory of War, which Robert E. Wood, William Regnery, Edward appeared several years later. Beard, too, was Rickenbacker, Colonel Robert R. McCormick, a liberal, determined that reform should not and Joseph P. Kennedy. The liberals included be shunted overseas again as it had been in young Chester Bowles, Robert Hutchins, and 1917 when so many progressives marched off William Benton as well as the veteran re- to war with Wilson. He felt that there was too formers John T. Flynn and Oswald Garrison much to be done at home to let “giddy minds” Villard. R. Sargent Shriver and other college involve the United States in “foreign quarrels.” students helped to form the America First Thus he recommended that the United States Committee, which brought together the isola- renounce all "engines of war and diplomacy,” tionists of left and right.13 Colonel Charles A. restrict and control foreign trade, reduce its Lindbergh was the most prominent spokes- merchant marine, convert the Navy to a coastal man of the America First Committee. One of defense force, and evacuate the Philippines; Iris chief themes and one of the main princi- then the United States could undertake a kind ples of America First was the idea of impreg- of super New Deal on the model of the Ten- nable national defense, “Fortress America,” nessee Valley Authority. Professor Samuel armed against the world. This was isolation- Eliot Morison quipped a few years later that ism in its most concrete form. Another and 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

more effective argument of the committee was While the United States neglected its that the President had too much power and military strength after the war, it did not was leading the nation into war. Only Con- retreat altogether. President Harry Truman gress, the isolationists insisted, could declare mustered the fleet in the eastern Mediterra- war. Such suspicion of the President and the nean in 1946 and forced the Russians to with- argument that Congress must have charge of draw from Iran. In 1947 he proclaimed the foreign policy have been other enduring char- Truman Doctrine for aid to Greece and Turkey acteristics of twentieth century isolationism. to combat Communism. Containment and the The America First Committee was an ac- Marshall Plan of economic reconstruction en- tive and effective organization. It worried sued, to be followed by the Berlin Airlift in President Roosevelt, who often feared the iso- 1948-49 and the creation of the North Atlantic lationists more than he need have done. He Treaty Organization in 1949. usually dodged when the America Firsters Many of the old isolationists had been re- challenged his programs or asked him where tired from public life by this time; and others, the United States was heading. Sometimes he notably Republican Senator Arthur Vanden- retreated.14 Yet, by the autumn of 1941 there berg of Michigan, were converted to hard- was no doubt that the President expected headed internationalism. Vandenberg advised the United States to go to war against the Truman “to scare hell out of the country” to Axis, but how it would occur was unclear. win approval of the Truman Doctrine, and the The America First Committee held its President followed his advice. Mr. Truman last meeting on 7 December 1941. During the also sounded the tocsin of a worldwide cru- colossal struggle following Pearl Harbor, iso- sade on behalf of freedom.18 lationism was an ugly word in the United That such language was necessary is a States. Pundit Walter Lippmann, among reflection of the persistent hold of isolationist others, kept up a steady assault on the iso- thinking throughout the late 1940s. Polls re- lationists. In 1943 he accused them of having vealed that only 49 percent of the people succumbed to “mirages,” illusory hopes for favored aid to Turkey, and only 56 percent peace, disarmament, and collective security, favored aid to Greece. To win the support of by which he meant excessive faith in agencies the isolationists, advocates of the Marshall such as the League of Nations. The isola- Plan had to argue that the plan would be a tionists, he charged, had been too fearful of one-shot way of getting Europe back on its entangling alliances and had failed to “appre- feet, so that presumably we could go our own ciate the long-established commitments of the way and not be touched for further loans. United States.”13 President Truman came under fire from The Japanese attack had at last made isolationists of both left and right. Secretary Americans realistic about international affairs, of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, the last of or so it was claimed. But early during the war the liberal New Dealers in the Truman admin- Americans again began to stress international istration, spoke out against his chief’s policies. organization as the main agency of permanent He especially condemned the “Get tough with peace. At the Yalta Conference in February Russia” policy. “Getting tough,” said Wallace, 1945, President Roosevelt told Josef Stalin, to “never brought anything real and lasting. . . . the consternation of Winston Churchill, that We must not let our Russian policy be guided the United States would not keep its forces or influenced by those inside or outside the in Europe at the end of the war.18 As soon as United States who want war with Russia. ’19 the war was over, we dissolved our armed His argument was but a variant of the familiar forces, so that by April 1946 they had been isolationist plaint that seditious elements were reduced by seven million men. Secretary of seeking to drag the United States into a foreign the Navy James V. Forrestal exclaimed in war. despair that “we are going back to [sleep] at A few days later the President wrote to a frightening rate.”17 his mother and sister in Missouri: “Well, I had to fire Henry today... ,”20 But ex-Secretary Wallace continued to charge that the “Martial Plan,” as he termed it, was an attack on the Soviet Union. And he led a revolt of liberals and fellow travelers against the President, ac- cusing him of betraying the ideals of inter- national cooperation laid down by Franklin Roosevelt. The lunatic-fringe and Communist elements in Wallaces Progressive party weak- ened his candidacy in the election of 1948, however, and Mr. Truman’s surprising victory dealt a near death blow to left-wing isolation- ism.21 The idea of general disarmament, which was Moscow’s line through early 1950, at- tracted only scattered support, largely among the sign-bearing sects.

C onservative isolationism was more influential in the late 1940s. It was char- acterized by faith in so-called traditional foreign policies, by a distaste for the affairs of distant lands, and by pragmatic calculations, often stated in financial terms. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, “Mr. Republican,” supported the containment of Soviet expansionism, but reach for security by reliance on the United he opposed stationing American troops over- Nations, and on alliances with nations from seas and favored extending the Monroe Doc- Norway to Australia. It is a policy that builds trine to Europe instead of creating the North on the theory that our dollars can buy many Atlantic Treaty Organization. During the Ko- things that are not purchasable—the wall to rean War, while General Dwight D. Eisen- resist, the will to re-arm, the will to fight in hower was trying to make nato a reality, another man’s cause.” We should save our former President Herbert Hoover spoke in strength, he added, for no other country would terms reminiscent of Lindbergh’s Fortress create a Marshall Plan for us.23 America: “I suggest that air power and the Walter Lippmann criticized both the Tru- navy is the alternative to sending American man administration and its critics. The Presi- land divisions to Europe. With our gigantic dent’s mistake, he said, was in adopting the productive capacity and with our economic “Wilsonian system of ideas,” a crusading doc- strength we can build and sustain overwhelm- trine “generating great popular fervor” and ing air and sea forces and hold them on our creating the impression that all wars are wars home ground ready in case of attack. . . . to end wars. This once-and-forever ideology, We should not create land armies for expedi- Lippmann argued in his book Isolation and tions into the quicksands of either Europe or Alliances (1952), had been widely influential. China.”22 He conceded that this Wilsonian ideology ap- Joseph P. Kennedy summed up the con- pealed to the emotions and was the easy way servative isolationists’ thinking in a widely to win the approval of Congress. But he publicized speech in Chicago in 1951. Calling warned that there would be a reaction against for “disentanglement” from our commitments the crusading spirit when the American peo- and programs, Mr. Kennedy stated: “The basic ple discovered that there was to be no end difficulty is . . . a policy that purports to of crusades. The making of a new order, he 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

added, was a task “which our generation may tions of ballistic missiles for the defense of hope to see begun but cannot hope to see Europe had not been considered fully. The completed.”-4 solution that he suggested was disengagement Lippmann’s warning of future weariness —“a general withdrawal of American, British, was sensible; but the letdown he predicted and Russian armed power from the heart of did not come, largely because the Communists the Continent”—and the neutralization of repeatedly aroused us and stirred our energies. Germany, which might then be united. Ken- The Berlin blockade, the Czechoslovakian nan proposed in addition the creation of a coup, and the Korean War made nato pos- nuclear-free zone in Europe.26 sible and gave it vitality. The news that Klaus Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev liked Fuchs had delivered American nuclear secrets the idealistic scheme, and Poland was soon to the Soviet Union speeded work on the hy- promoting its improved version of disengage- drogen bomb. And the United States began ment in the Rapacki Plan. But former Secre- to rearm for conventional war. Yet the limited tary of State Dean Acheson protested strenu- war that occurred in Korea was hard to under- ously against the whole idea. He revealed that stand, particularly when the United Nations Mr. Kennan had proposed disengagement pre- forces became trapped in truce talks while viously, as early as 1949, and that the Truman the Communists strengthened their defenses, administration had rejected it at that time. and because fear of expanding the war pre- Mr. Acheson scored the “new isolationism” of vented a strike at the aggressors’ sanctuary in Kennan and other advocates of disengage- Manchuria. ment, calling it “utterly fallacious” and dan- A reaction against the Korean “police gerous “because the harder course which it action” and the loss of China contributed to calls on us to forego has been so successful.” the election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952. The struggle of two World Wars, great world But the mood of the nation was to contain leadership, and vast national effort has ended, Communism wherever it became a danger, Acheson lamented, “by bringing back the old not to isolate the United States from the rest yearnings and errors under a new name. ‘Dis- of the world. Democratic critics and self- engagement,’ it is called now; but it is the styled realists objected to Secretary of State same futile—and lethal—attempt to crawl back John Foster Dulles’s policies of “liberation” into the cocoon of history.”27 When Mr. Ache- and “massive retaliation.” They found the for- son and others finished their scathing com- mer to be infused with a moralistic desire to mentaries on the new isolationism, the illu- end the stalemate of containment, and they sions of a diplomatic detente faded away and charged that the latter overemphasized nu- the hard real world again appeared. clear weapons instead of conventional armies, There were further yearnings for isola- allegedly for the sake of economy. But the tionism during the last Eisenhower years and arguments that ensued had a strongly partisan the thousand days of John F. Kennedy. These flavor, and neither the administration nor its took the form of appeals to end the “interna- critics urged a return to isolationism.25 tional arms race” or for a cessation of nuclear The first sign of a retreat came in 1957, tests. Unfortunately the Soviet Union engaged as the focus of the Cold War again centered in what the Kennedy administration termed on Western Europe. George Kennan, author “nuclear blackmail” on the issue of Berlin and of the containment policy, contended that set- punctuated its appeals for “general and com- tlement of the German problem was essential plete disarmament” without international in- for a relaxation of tension. Kennan argued spection by setting off in 1961 twenty-one that the Hungarian revolution of 1956 had atmospheric explosions, ranging up to fifty proved that the Communist satellite armies megatons or more. The tiny claques of nuclear were not reliable and that the likelihood of pacifists meanwhile continued to voice their a Soviet invasion of Western Europe was over- “Better Red Than Dead” slogan. rated. He also pointed out that the implica- It is not easy at this time to account for CRITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 55

the small but perceptible increase of criticism chev’s motives were unimpeachable and that of American foreign policy in the early 1960s. the Soviet missiles in Cuba were harmless. One factor in the situation seems to have been The director of sa n e also asserted, at a rally in an overreaction against the excesses of "Mc- New' York City on the Sunday following the Carthyism.” Among certain liberals, at least crisis, that the peace movement had prevented among the pseudosophisticated, anything anti- w'ar!30 Few Americans were impressed by the Communist became suspect. Charges also were claim. Professor H. Stuart Hughes, running for voiced that American policy was based on a senator in Massachusetts on a platform of dis- mistaken conception of monolithic Commu- armament and disengagement, received only nist unit)', despite the fact that the Kennedy fifty thousand votes. And just one candidate administration repeatedly spoke of the frac- anywhere in the country was elected on sa n e’s tures in the Communist bloc.28 There was in platform. addition a vogue of guilt-ridden fascination Exulting in its victory over Khrushchev, with the anticolonialist nationalism of certain the Kennedy administration relaxed its pres- newly emerging countries and with Castroite sure on Cuba and negotiated the limited nu- Cuba and Communist China. The feeling that clear test-ban treaty w'ith the Soviet Union. an affluent—some said hopelessly decadent— The treaty was reminiscent of several of the United States was neglecting its own social international agreements of the 1920s in both problems added to the unease, especially its superficial pretensions and its restricted among idealistic younger people who had no scope; even hard-line anti-Communists in the memory of the Korean War or even of the in- Senate voted for ratification of the treaty on ternational crises of the mid-1950s. Certain the grounds of its military insignificance. But other persons of pacifist or neo-isolationist in- zealous agents of the New' Frontier proclaimed clination suffered from a nuclear-devastation that a detente with the Soviet Union might mentality. Faced with the horrors of nuclear now' be possible, while books appeared claim- war, they asked, w’hat choice could a sane man ing that the Cold War at last was over.31 make? Their answers to the question, while Most New' Frontiersmen who w'ere closer emphatically humane, tended towards vast to the center of power worried about the dis- oversimplification. Catchall peace organiza- array in nato and the mounting conflict in tions, such as Turn Towards Peace and the South Vietnam. President Kennedy himself National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy had been intensely concerned about Southeast ( sa n e), u’ere formed as umbrellas for the newr- Asia almost from the moment he took office in isolationist spectrum. The number of adherents January 1961. Later that year, after careful wras small, but they were passionate and out- consultations, he ordered a substantial increase spoken. in the American military commitment to South The events of the Cuban missile crisis of Vietnam, a decision that fit his persistent prior 1962 shattered illusory hopes for a new' world emphasis on conventional military prepared- order. President Kennedy stood firm against ness and counterinsurgency warfare.32 By the the Russian thrust, all the w'hile keeping dip- time of his death in 1963, large numbers of lomatic channels open. The President felt that American troops were engaged in combat in it w'as necessary to have a showdowm with the Vietnam. Soviet Union, though not to humiliate the ad- The crisis there nevertheless received little versary, and to combine firmness w'ith flexi- attention from Americans, perhaps because bility.21' Cuba, the Congo, and Berlin were more dra- Ironically, when the crisis was past, the matic or because the political situation in new isolationists criticized the President more South Vietnam was so complex. American sharply than the Soviet Union did. Several domestic issues, particularly involving civil peace organizations castigated what they rights, also absorbed the attention of persons termed the “Kennedy system,” calling it a who might otherwise have become alarmed “warfare state.” They contended that Khrush- over foreign policy. During the Presidential 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW campaign of 1964 the two candidates appeared President was unnecessarily involving the to stand for abstract principles of restraint or country in foreign war, allegedly in a futile of victory, which again diverted attention from struggle undertaken against the popular will; the concrete problem. Consequently it was not that the United States should avoid land war- until 1965 that the majority of Americans fare abroad; that the civilization or culture of really became aware of the war, by which time the country where the battle was being waged it was undoubtedly too late to affect the course had traditions that were irreconcilable with of American policy. There probably was never American values; that the United States has any substantial inclination among the public neglected to rely on international organiza- to do so anyhow, despite some unhappiness tion to restore peace; that America was sup- over the costs and nature of the war. porting a decadent, corrupt foreign govern- After February 1965, though, there was ment; that we were breaking international law an outburst of antiwar protests, rallies and by our activities; that we were suppressing a marches, and “teach-ins,” more substantial native nationalist movement, or engaging in than anything of the kind that had occurred another crusade, or searching for absolute vic- since 1948 if by no means rivaling the isola- tory; that we were dominated by military-in- tionist activities of the 1930s. It is not possible dustrial thinking; and that we were creating in the space of this article to evaluate the domestic divisions and ignoring problems at views of the new critics, who have received home.33 It also appears that the objections to such widespread attention. It is nevertheless escalation of the war, or to the bombing of useful to know that many of their views fit North Vietnam, are derived in part from the into the tradition of American isolationism. Of extreme fear of war that has long been charac- course by no means all of the new isolationists teristic of the isolationist mind and that has would necessarily agree with the isolationists been especially prominent during the atomic of an older generation; but the patterns of era.34 their thought are remarkably similar, and their This is not to say that the views of the ideas often identical. critics should not be heard merely because One can, for example, find numerous ante- they have often been heard before. Nor does cedents in the history of twentieth century it mean that all their arguments are necessarily isolationism for each of the charges voiced wrong now. But modem history does not stand against American policy since 1965: that the convincingly on their side.35 Eugene, Oregon

Notes 1. Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Armaments ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948). Ray- Betrayal (New York: Macmillan, 1945). Manfred Jonas, Isola- mond G. O’Connor, Perilous Equilibrium (Lawrence: University tionism in America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, of Kansas Press, 1962). 1966). 6. Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time: The Origins 2. Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven: Yale University Press, Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), esp. 1952). L. Ethan Ellis, Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign pp. 189-256. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise Relations, 1925-1929 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University of America to World Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer- Press, 1961), pp. 193-212. sity Press, 1956). Norman Graebner (ed.). Ideas and Diplomacy 7. Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (New York: Atheneum, 3. Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of John Adams (Phil- 1964) , chaps. 21, 23, 24. adelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957). Dexter Per- 8. Robert A. Divine, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Collec- kins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown. tive Security, 1933," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 1963). David M. Pletcher describes the background of the Congo XLVIII (June 1961), 42-59; Divine. The Reluctant Belligerent: episode in The Awkward Years: American Foreign Relations American Entry into World War II (New York: John Wiley. under Garfield and Arthur (Columbia: University of Missouri 1965) , pp. 3-5. Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Press, 1962). Great Depression: Hoovcr-Stimson Policy, 1929-1933 (New 4. A general account is Selig Adler, The Isolationist Im- Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 270-77. pulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York: Collier 9. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, p. 9. Wayne S. Cole, Books, 1961). Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations (Minne- 5. J. C. Vinson, The Parchment Peace (Athens: University apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 67-121. of Georgia Press, 1955). Merze Tate, The United States and 10. Charles A. Beard, Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels CRITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 57

(New York: Macmillan, 1939). Samuel Eliot Morison, "History his speech announcing his views on massive retaliation appears Through a Beard,” chap. 15 in By Land and By Sea (New York: in the New York Times, 12 January 1954, and in Hugh Ross Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 328-45. (ed.). The Cold War: Containment and Its Critics (Chicago: 11. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval, Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 30-41. Professor Ross also conven- Vol. m in The Age of Roosevelt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, iently includes a rejoinder by Chester Bowles and a later modi- I960', pp. 15-125. fication by Dulles. 12. Louis Gerson, The Hyphenate in Recent American 26. George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 112-23. (New York: Harper Sc Brothers, 1957). 13. Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle Against 27. Dean Acheson, "The Illusion of Disengagement," Intervention, 1940-1941 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Foreign Affairs, XXXVI (April 1958), 371-82. Khrushchev’s Press, 1953). On Mr. Shriver, see New York Times, 7 March appraisal appears in New York Times, 3 June 1957, and in Ross, 1961. The Cold War, pp. 50-52. 14. Divine. The Reluctant Belligerent, pp. 75 ff. Dorothy 28. Edmund Stillman and William PfaflF, in Power and Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933- Impotence: The Failure of America's Foreign Policy (New York: 1938, Vol. XIV in Harvard East Asian Series (Cambridge: Har- Vintage Books, 1966), pp. 131-83, exemplify such thinking and vard University Press, 1964), esp. pp. 369-442, 536-44. Paul S. describe an alleged rigidly ideological American foreign policy. Holbo (ed.), Isolationism and Interventionism, 1932-1941 (Chi- 29. A lively account is Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (New cago: Rand McNally, 1967). York: Bantam Books. 1966). Theodore Sorensen and Arthur M. 15. Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Schlesinger, Jr., have written lengthy accounts in their biogra- Republic (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1943), pp. 47-81. phies of John F. Kennedy. 16. Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, Vol. VI 30. Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course: The Cuban Mis- in The Second World War (New York: Bantam Books, 1962), sile Crisis and Coexistence (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, p. 303. 1963), p. 90. 17. A study of the politics of demobilization is badly 31. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Cold War . . . And After needed. Suggestive comments appear in R. Alton Lee, “The (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 131 ff. Professor Army 'Mutiny’ of 1946,” The Journal of American History, Lerche is more optimist than isolationist, however. LIII (December 1966), 555-71. 32. Jean Edward Smith, “Kennedy and Defense: The 18. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 12 Formative Years," Air University Review, XVIII, 3 (March- March 1947, pp. 1980-81. April 1967), 38-54. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in 19. Vital Speeches, XII (1 October 1946), 738-41. World Affairs, 1961 (New York: Vintage Books. 1962), pp. 20. Harry S Truman, Year of Decisions (Garden City: 203-5. Doubleday. 1955), I, 560. 33. A concise statement of the argument from domestic 21. A sympathetic account of the Wallace movement is divisions and neglected problems at home appears in Walter by Karl M. Schmidt, Henry A. Wallace: Quixotic Crusade, 1948 LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966 (New (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1960). York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), pp. 256-59. 22. New York Times, 10 February 1951. 34. An excellent commentary on this mentality is by 23. Joseph P. Kennedy, “Our Foreign Policy, Its Casualties Robert W. Tucker, “Nuclear Pacifism,” in Charles O. Barker and Prospects,” address before Economic Club of Chicago, 17 (coordinator). Problems of World Disarmament ( Boston: Hough- December 1951, partially reprinted in Robert A. Goldwin et at. ton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 158-70. (eds.). Readings in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford 35. It is argued in a recent study that the majority of University Press, 1959), pp. 168-75. Americans are essentially moderate in viewpoint on the Vietnam 24. Walter Lippmann, Isolation and Alliances: An Ameri- war. open-minded on policy options, and subject to effective can Speaks to the British (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952). leadership. Sidney Verba, et al., “Public Opinion and the War 25. Dulles's statement on liberation appeared in his article, in Vietnam," The American Political Science Review, LXI (June “A Policy of Boldness,” Life, XXXII (19 May 1952), 146-60; 1967), 317-33. \The term “short takeoff and landing,” applicab) \earlier airplanes as the Ford Tri- Motor, is on1 defined today, as is the STOL plane. Thus the t

L ieu t en a n t Colonel W alter P. M aierspercer, USAF (Ret)

HE question in the title suggests that the term “short takeoff and landing” Tneeds definition, and so it does. But since the word “short” has only relative mean- ing, an explicit definition in few words is diffi- cult, if it is to have engineering values. Since the term has been variously and loosely ap- plied, this is my attempt to put the st o l con- cept into a tighter frame of reference. When the Wright brothers made ready on the day of their historic flight, they realized that the wind velocity was greater than the stalling speed of their machine. They could have risen vertically that day had they so chosen. Instead they completed the laying of 60 feet of wooden 2"x4" rail on the sands of Kitty Hawk, to be used for a takeoff runway so they would be at a comfortable speed mar- gin above stalling speed when they lifted off. They chose to do it this way so they would WHAT IS STOL? 59

have additional control over their machine in by formulas. The Federal Aviation Regulations the air. specify the proper climb-out and approach Ever since, the rules of safe conventional speeds as a percentage of airspeed margin flight have defined a necessary airspeed mar- above the power-off stalling speed of the air- gin over and above the power-off stalling plane for tlie condition under examination. For speed of the airplane. At first, the low power- multiengine airplanes, conditions governing to-weight ratio caused the early flyers to real- performance with at least one engine inopera- ize that any attempt to climb at too steep an tive are specified. For example, at the correct angle would cause the machine to lose speed climb-out speed (i.e., margin above power-off and settle back onto the ground. Aerodynami- stalling speed) with one engine inoperative, cally speaking, the high angle of attack pro- the airplane must demonstrate a certain rate duced so much additional induced drag that of climb or angle of climb. Airfields from the total drag was greater than the thrust which the airplane is licensed to operate must available, so the machine slowed and then set- be long enough to allow the airplane time to tled down. reach the specified climb-out speed, or it must After World War I, engines were more be shown that the takeoff can be aborted and powerful but still none too reliable. To be the airplane can be stopped without going off safe, a climb-out after takeoff had to be made the end of the runway. at sufficient speed so that, if the engine quit, All these traditions and regulations for the airplane could be nosed over and a glide safe flight are now known as the conventional established at an airspeed high enough above mode of flight, which the term ctol (conven- the stalling speed to permit a successful flare, tional takeoff and landing) now designates. or transition, for landing to be made. If the The invention of the helicopter brought climb-out was too steep, or if the engine quit into being a new mode of flight, vertical take- too close to the ground, the climbing speed off and landing (vt ol ). Quickly it was realized would be too low to permit nosing over into a that the safest way to operate this aircraft was good gliding speed, and a crash would follow. very nearly the conventional airplane way. For Thus the conventional flight rule was estab- safest operation, the vertical climb is limited lished that a safe climb-out speed is the stall- to a few feet above the surface, quickly fol- ing speed plus the margin for a safe gliding lowed by acceleration to climb-out speed; and speed (to permit a landing flare to be made) in the landing approach, deceleration from plus the margin needed to nose into the glide. approach speed back to hover is also done These early pilots normally made their close to the earth’s surface. There is little basic landings power-off so as to obtain the neces- difference between safe airplane and safe heli- sary practice for the frequent occasions when copter practice. a real-life emergency power-off landing had to Instead of a dread of stalling, as in fixed- be made. The pilot always cautioned himself wing airplanes, the dread in helicopters is to never to try to stretch the glide by raising the lose rotor rpm. This happens when gliding nose, as this would cause a loss in airspeed power-off at too low a forward speed to keep and preclude his ability to execute a proper the rotor going fast enough to store the requi- landing flare. It was recognized as being more site energy for the flare. The cure is the same dangerous to stall at a low height and hit the as in recovering from a graveyard glide in an ground than to sail straight ahead into what- airplane: dive to regain proper airspeed and ever obstruction presented itself at proper proper rotor rpm. gliding speed. The stretched glide, the slow What can happen when the helicopter glide, was called the “graveyard” glide. makes a straight vertical climb or descent, As commercial aerial transportation de- with no forward airspeed? In such operations veloped, flight operating rules were codified the pilot gambles that the engine will not fail by government regulating agencies, and proper during certain portions of the vertical flight. climbing and gliding speeds were established If engine failure occurs close to the ground, 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the helicopter simply pancakes back onto the feet in length, assuming a vertical climb to ground without damage. If the failure occurs 35 feet at time of engine failure. above a certain height, the helicopter in fall- When vt ol airplane developments started, ing can gain forward speed and maintain rotor following the successful development of gas speed sufficient to execute a landing flare. At turbine engines during World War II, there intermediate heights, engine failure will result was a big hue and cry from the helicopter pro- in a crash because of insufficient height to ponents that such an airplane was unsafe be- achieve the proper forward speed to maintain cause it could not autorotate. This undeniable the rotor rpm to complete the landing flare. “special case” logic forced the vtol airplane There is a combination of height and air- proponents to install a sufficient number of speed from which a helicopter can lose its engines in their designs and connect them in engine and enter safe autorotational flight. such a way that the loss of any one engine in Such a curve is plotted for each model of vertical flight would not prove fatal. Also, one helicopter. In pilot’s terminology, it is known of the vtol designs that seems most ideal for as the “dead man’s curve,” not too different short-haul transportation, the tilt wing, has from the “graveyard glide” terminology of air- transition characteristics that reduce its power plane flight. The helicopter manufacturer nat- requirements drastically almost as soon as urally prefers that this curve be known as the transition from vertical to horizontal flight is height-velocity curve. Whatever it is called, started. In other words, the time interval dur- the condition of less height or less forward ing which a single engine failure could have speed than called for on the curve is not con- serious consequences is reduced to a very few sidered safe by conventional flight standards seconds. In any case, the dangers inherent in and is avoided as much as possible in heli- the vtol mode of flight were and are fully copter operations. recognized, having been learned from twenty Multiengine helicopters reduce the area years of helicopter experience. under the curve in proportion to the number No sooner did the vt ol airplane prospects of engines they carry, their overall power-to- appear promising than a new rash of propo- weight ratio, and other factors. Ideally, there nents of another kind of airplane appeared. is a requirement to produce a multiengine These voices argued (and no one denied it) helicopter that can suffer the loss of one engine that a vtol airplane was not only less efficient and continue forward flight without having to than a conventional airplane but also less enter a controlled descent. For central city op- efficient than something they proceeded to erations and for low weather minimums, this call an st o l airplane. To this day the st o l is really the only safe way. Meanwhile, verti- term and the st o l airplane remain undefined cal flight in helicopters more than a few feet except in a very general sense. off the ground is practiced mostly in commer- Be assured by st o l proponents that st o l cial or military “crane” operations, not in pas- does not mean the World War I airplane, or senger transportation. Government regulations even a Ford Tri-Motor or a Bellanca, all of governing climb-out and approach conditions which most certainly made short takeoffs and for transport helicopters contain provisions landings. All sorts of airplanes can be found regarding engine-out conditions and heliport that were designed to take off over a 50-foot size, generally similar to those which apply to obstacle in less than 3000 feet, 1500 feet, 800 airplane operations. The minimum-size heli- feet, and even 500 feet. These distance re- port is one on which the operator can demon- quirements are all to be found in various strate a safe return to the ground following government specifications seeking to identify engine failure. The minimum heliport varies a particular design as st o l . But none of the according to the model helicopter in use and older designs qualify. In fact, few of the the environmental conditions prevailing at the commercial designs that are advertised as st o l site. It is interesting to note that one source designs meet government requirements. What indicates the minimum heliport should be 700 is the nature of this paradox? WHAT IS STOL? 61

Government st o l specifications usually cannot enter a safe gliding speed unless it exclude the older designs and the newer com- has reached a considerable altitude. A multi- mercial designs by combining an airspeed re- engine airplane making an st o l climb will quirement with a given takeoff requirement start settling immediately after an engine in such a way that they cannot qualify. In failure. The perilous difficulty of an airplane other words, the government st o l specifica- operating in the st o l mode of flight is that the tions require a speed range—a ratio of top only way it can regain lift is to reach a higher speed to power-on stalling speed—plus a take- airspeed. It cannot do this by lowering its off requirement that necessitates a special de- nose, hoping thereby to reduce its induced sign. What kind of a design is it? drag and accelerate, for instead the result will To begin with, the st o l airplane requires be loss of aerodynamic lift and consequent far more power than a ctol airplane, and so it faster settling. If the airplane raises its nose, is less efficient and more expensive. Since it it will create more induced drag, slow down cannot \tol, it is not directly comparable in even more, and settle faster. In either case mission capability to either the vt ol airplane contact with the ground is inevitable unless or the helicopter, although it is constantly the plane is high enough to dive and thereby compared to them. What else is distinctive regain a conventional speed margin above about the design? When takeoff and landing the stall. performance is computed for the st o l design, In the landing condition, the same pre- one discovers that a new reference airspeed dicament exists. The st o l landing is made at may be in use. Not power-off stalling speed speeds below the normal gliding speed. In but power-on stalling speed may be the refer- some recent military st o l designs, the ap- ence. Also, the margins above power-off stall- proach was to be made at speeds 20 knots ing speed for climb-out and approach are below the power-off stalling speed of the air- reduced. An examination of this st o l mode plane. The rate of descent was to be held to of flight reveals a serious compromise of both design limits of around 10 feet per second by ctol and vt ol flight traditions. I shall discuss the use of engine power. In this particular here only the longitudinal aspects. In practice, design, the wing was totally immersed in the lateral, directional, and cross-coupling and propeller slipstream, which gave the necessary thrust-coupling effects provide additional com- lift when power was applied. Unfortunately, plications. Assuming all these are brought such lift vectoring also produces an associated under control (though in practice they have thrust vector, which tends to speed up the not been yet), how do st o l operations com- plane. To prevent this, the flaps came down pare with traditional flight along the longitu- more than 90 degrees. Thus thrust was neu- dinal axis? tralized in the landing configuration to the In st o l takeoff and landing operations, degree that the aiqjlane had a total drag lift is produced by the direct or indirect ap- greater than the thrust available from both plication of thrust to augment the lift pro- engines. The airplane had a negative rate of duced by the forward motion of the wings of climb with full-down flaps under the full the plane. In its usual form, the lift obtained power of both engines. During an approach from power is produced by the action of the to landing it is obvious that the airplane could propeller slipstream on highly flapped wings. not execute a missed approach, even with both It could take other forms. Jet lift engines engines operating, unless the missed approach could produce direct lift to augment the lift procedure was started at sufficient height to of the wings. The point is that the takeoff or raise the flaps to their best lift-over-drag ratio, landing is made at an airspeed less than the possibly at some slight sacrifice in altitude. If traditional margin of airspeed above power- the airplane lost an engine during the ap- off staffing speed. proach (and if only the pitch axis is consid- In a single-engine airplane st o l takeoff, ered), it would immediately sink at a rate if the engine is lost during takeoff the airplane exceeding its landing-gear design vertical sink 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW speed. Its only chance to recover would be to may be increased by this technique, but none- regain conventional gliding speed by lowering theless this is the technique preferred by the its nose and raising its flaps. At low altitudes manufacturers and the one they are selling this would only result in hitting the ground their customers. The point about Beta control harder. is that in itself it is a recognition on the part Aircraft companies that advertise st o l of the st o l manufacturers that high lift de- airplanes take a more conservative approach. vices and reduced margins above the stall may They do not base their performance figures be advantageous theoretically, but Beta con- on climb-out and approach speeds below trol is safer. power-off stalling speed, but usually they re- With this background, how’ can st o l be duce the conventional margins by 30 to 50 defined? One definition of st o l might be “that percent. Since this is not a government-vafi- mode of flight in which part of the lift is in- dated performance criterion, some manufac- duced by power.” Since this definition would turers publish two sets of takeoff and landing also satisfy the powered flight of any airplane performance figures, one labeled as govern- at high angles of attack, it is obviously too ment-approved certification figures, the other broad. My suggested definition is to the point: labeled “st o l '’ performance. One company, The st o l mode of flight is one during which to its credit, even publishes the margin above an airplane taking off or landing is operated stall at which the charts are calculated. The at climb-out and approach speeds lower than latest trend among st o l manufacturers is to the conventionally accepted margins of air- maintain a conventional margin above stalling speed above the power-off stalling speed of speed during the approach for landing and to the airplane. reduce the glide distance from the 50-foot Where does my definition of st o l leave obstacle to the point of flare by depending on a so-called Beta control of the propeller. This the several airplanes being manufactured and is a variable pitch control between the normal advertised as st o l airplanes? It leaves them cruise settings and full reverse pitch which as excellent airplanes when operated ctol, allows the turbine engine to be maintained at that is, with recognized safe certificated mar- a high power rpm setting, while at the same gins above the stall. They are a class of air- time adjusting the propeller pitch to produce planes which, to be certified at takeoff and either positive or negative thrust. In this way approach speeds lower than traditional ctol the angle of descent can be regulated while margins, must approach the full measure of maintaining a full margin of speed over the reserve power and control necessary for vt ol stall. It is obviously a far safer procedure than certification. It remains to be seen whether reducing stall margins because neither an en- this can be done without making the st o l gine failure nor a sudden gust can apprecia- airplane just as expensive as the vt ol . When the st o l adopts conventional mar- bly affect the pilot’s control over the airplane. Full reverse pitch and power are applied after gins of control, the title question, “What is st o l ?” can be answered: Safe st o l is short the flare is completed, to stop the airplane. The total landing distance over an obstacle CTOL. McLean, Virginia

References Brown, D. A. "727 Investigation Underscores Sink Rate,” Avia- Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California. tion W eek, 14 March 1966. U.S., Department of the Navy. "Request for Proposal for Light Quigley and Innis. "Handling Qualities and Operational Prob- Armed Reconnaissance Airplane ( COIN),” 5 December 1963. lems of a Large Four-Propeller STOL Transport Airplane,” U.S., Federal Aviation Agency, Federal Aviation Regulations. NASA TM D-1647, Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, "Part 23, 25, 27 and 29 Airworthiness Standards for Air- California. planes and Rotocraft.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Quigley, Innis, and Holzhauser. “A Flight Investigation of the Printing Office. Performance, Handling Qualities, and Operational Character- Wimpress, John K. “Short Take-Off and Landing for the High- istics of a Deflected Slipstream STOL Transport Airplane Speed Aircraft,” Astronautics and Aeronautics, February Having Four Interconnected Propellers," NASA TM D-2231, 1966. Air Force Review

STANDARDIZATION: PREREQUISITE FOR EQUITABLE MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION

Major Gener a l Ber t r a m C. Harrison

The Air Force urgently needs imaginative, perceptive management programs and techniques to insure that we get the absolute maximum value out of our resources. This is particularly important right now and in the days ahead when our operations in Southeast Asia place mounting demands on our human and material resources-1 Gen er a l John P. Mc Connell

NE EFFO RT toward fulfilling the need terms of the diverse organizational structures O expressed by General McConnell is the and operating procedures prevailing through- usaf Management Engineering Program. This out much of the Air Force. Seldom have two program is primarily concerned with the equi- bases in two different commands been or- table distribution of the Air Force’s manpower ganized in the same way, nor have similar resources. The principal method for accom- base functions been operated alike. Conse- plishing this task is through the development quently it has been extremely difficult for the and application of work center manpower management engineers to develop standards standards. These standards relate actual and that could be applied across command lines programmed workload to man-hours expended in an equitable manner. The purpose of this in such a way as to provide a common basis article is to present the background and effects for determining manpower requirements of this problem and review the Air Staff throughout the Air Force. efforts to solve it. Recently the Air Staff has acted to remove a major obstacle to rapid development of these sorely needed manpower standards. This ob- background stacle has been inadequate standardization in During World War II the lack of standard 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

organizational structures and the existence of supervision to be authorized in a manpower split command responsibilities were recog- standard, it is necessary that the structure be nized as major problems. Following the war essentially the same for like bases. Further, Headquarters usaf instituted a standardized if organizational elements are known by dif- base-level organization Air Force-wide and ferent names, perform different tasks, or even controlled changes from the Air Staff level. the same tasks in different ways, then the job This policy existed until 1955, at which time of establishing a manning standard for the the pendulum swung back the other way. function on an Air Force-wide basis becomes A policy of flexibility was instituted which extremely difficult. The management engineer- permitted individual major commanders con- ing technicians at different bases would be siderable latitude in determining the orga- observing all kinds of “nonstandard” work, nizational structure of their subordinate units. and the resulting standard times would be Actually, the 1955 policy change merely for- useless. Once a standard has been established malized a situation that already existed: and implemented for a function, it is impera- namely, that the policy of standardized organi- tive that local commanders and supervisors zation had not been working for some time. continue to maintain its integrity throughout Numerous deviations had been made to ac- its life cycle; or, stated more simply, once commodate varying missions, concepts of op- standardization has been achieved, it must be eration, deployment, and similar factors, thus maintained. To do less is to invite manning making it a standardized organization in name problems within the function—manning prob- only. lems which are difficult and expensive to The new policy of flexibility existing after correct. 1955 provided a climate for organizational experimentation. Frequent changes were made, the solution and wide variations existed in the structure and terminology of similar units. As Director of Manpower and Organiza- By 1962 the pendulum had again swung tion at Headquarters usaf, I have been work- back to Headquarters usaf control. One of the ing closely with the other Air Staff director- primary reasons for the policy reversal was an ates for some time now in support of more April 1961 letter from the recently appointed standardization. Headquarters usaf Operat- Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, ing Instruction No. 25-4, applicable to the in which he stated: “We should avoid using entire Air Staff, contains this caution: different terms to mean the same thing.” About Common manning standards cannot be the same time the Chief of Staff, General achieved until like-type operations in the field Curtis E. LeMay, is quoted as having said, are standardized. The manpower standard for “I want a standardized Air Force.” Late in one work center would not necessarily be ac- 1961 a usaf Inspector General report had curate for a similar work center that differs in directed Air Staff attention to organizational organization, processes, equipment, etc.3 variances and ineffectiveness in usaf organiza- tional planning and control. The end result of In addition to our actions within the Air all these actions was a 1962 directive to the Staff to achieve standardization, we have con- major commands, calling for functional stan- tinued to enlist the support of commanders dardization wherever feasible and returning to and supervisors at all levels. In a recent Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, the sub- Headquarters usaf significant control over organizational structure Air Force-wide.2 ject was approached in this manner: . . . standardization wherever possible must the problem be stressed and insisted upon; not because of blind obsession for uniformity, but for the posi- Since the organizational structure within tive benefits that standardization provides. It a function has a significant effect on layers of permits selection and use of the best proce- AIR FORCE REVIEW 65

dures and methods. It permits the development and processing desired local deviations to and use of engineered performance standards standardized Air Force organizations and will having wide applicability—which in tum en- take action to extend them Air Force-wide if larges the scope for comparison of one activity warranted. When in doubt or in need of assist- with another. It simplifies the identification of ance, one should call on his servicing man- problem areas and their underlying causes.4 power and organization office. The standardization drive seems to be working. Air Force Manual 26-2, Organization F rom this brief discussion it can be seen that Policy and Guidance, contains many standard a major obstacle to producing valid Air Force structures for functions such as accounting and finance, maintenance, supply, personnel, manpower standards has been a lack of stan- dardization among bases and within functions. etc. The manual also reaffirms that one of the Air Force’s organizational objectives is to Units and functions with similar missions and ‘ standardize to the extent consistent with ef- equipment have seldom shared a common fective and efficient mission accomplishment.” organizational structure, nor have they used The manual then lists five specific benefits to the same methods and procedures to ac- be derived from standardization: (1) promot- complish identical tasks. This basic lack of ing organizational stability; (2) facilitating Air “commonality” has thwarted attempts by the Force-wide management improvements; (3) management engineers to develop manpower facilitating the development of standards and standards that could be applied on an Air performance comparisons; (4) lessening orien- Force-wide basis. As a direct consequence, the tation time when personnel are transferred equitability and validity of our functional from one unit to another; and (5) improving manpower needs have often been open to communications by enabling all Air Force per- question. sonnel to attach the same meaning to a given Fortunately, this major weakness seems organizational term.5 That these are worth- to have been identified in sufficient time to while benefits goes without saying. permit corrective action by the Air Staff. All this is not to say that the Air Staff Standardized organizational structures have has a corner on the brain supply. Far from it. been developed and implemented for several A multitude of good ideas is available through- large functions, thereby permitting the appli- out the Air Force, just waiting to be tapped. cation of Air Force manpower standards. But to realize the full benefits of any sound Equal manning for equal workloads through- improvement, it must be processed upward out the Air Force has been assured for many for eventual application to all similar units. functions. In this age of centralized control Isolated instances of unilateral deviation from and cost-effectiveness methodology, no other established norms which are neither reported approach can seriously be entertained. Clearly, nor evaluated are next to useless and fre- standardization is a prerequisite for the equi- quently cause trouble. In this regard, com- table distribution of our scarce manpower mand management engineering teams are resource. uniquely suited to assist in testing, evaluating, Hq United States Air Force

Notes 1. General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, United 3. Hq USAF, Headquarters Operating Instruction No. States Air Force, address before the Management Analysis Sym- 25-4, Staff Responsibilities in the USAF Management Engineer- posium, Bolling AFB, D.C., 15 February 1966, quoted in USAF ing Program, 23 December 1964, p. 3. Fact Sheet, Systems t~ Logistics Management, No. 4-66 (April 4. Major General Bertram C. Harrison, "Management 1966), Engineering—Prerequisites lor Effectiveness,” Supplement to the 2. Historical references were adapted from a speech by Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, No. 8-1966 (August Colonel John R. Kcm, Hq USAF, before the World-Wide Man- 1966), p. 11. agement Engineering Conference. Orlando AFB, Florida, 13-15 5. Air Force Manual 26-2, Organization Policy and January 1965. Guidance, 11 December 1964, p. 4. DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATION OF MISSILE FACILITIES

Roman A. Met z

HE DESIGN, construction, and operation remained to be established. Early testing be- T of missile real property and real property gan necessarily with small weapons in the installed equipment established several rec- kiloton range, to verify bomb design and to ords: they were the first Air Force facilities ascertain the magnitude. Protective construc- designed to protect against the effects of tion against the effects associated with nuclear nuclear weapons; the first major program to weapons involves a specialized field of en- employ the concept of concurrency; the first gineering which was developed by integrating mass installation of sophisticated systems by the sciences of seismology, geophysics, and advertised construction contracts; the first dynamics and related civil, structural, electri- mating of off-the-shelf real property installed cal, mechanical, and other engineering disci- equipment with sophisticated missile hard- plines. Preliminary studies in the design of ware; and the first time the Civil Engineer protective construction were predicated on the participated in the direct support to a weapon results of the early tests. As testing techniques system. and instrumentation were improved, higher- vield weapons were developed with signifi- Real property (rp) includes any right, title, cantly longer durations, which negated much or interest in land, buildings, fixed im- of the early design. Structural components provements, utility, and other permanent rather than complete structures were then addition to land. dynamically loaded in simulated tests using Real property installed equipment ( rpie) Primacord. In this way confidence was estab- is defined as those items of government- lished in the design’s capability to withstand owned accessory equipment, apparatus, effects of higher overpressure levels. and fixtures which aid in the function of With the advent of Sputnik in the fall of real property and are permanently at- 1957, the urgent need for operational missiles tached to, integrated into, built in or on dictated expeditious action. Finally selected government-owned or -leased property, as the most feasible method of providing including air-conditioning systems and operational missiles at the earliest possible equipment. date was the concept of concurrency, whereby The role of the Air Force Civil Engineer is missiles and missile components were de- to design, construct, operate, and main- signed, developed, and fabricated concurrently tain that rp/rpie necessary for the opera- with the design and construction of support- tion and maintenance of any weapon ing facilities. To the structural engineer, the system and for the shelter of men, mate- greatest challenge is in the unusually high riel, and equipment. design loads, dynamically applied. Normally, loading is expressed in pounds per square The evolution of missiles and missile fa- foot. In protective construction, the same cilities was an excellent example of the tre- numerical loading in pounds per square inch mendous rate of growth in pure science and may be required. These great loadings also technology in the early 1950s. Although the influence foundation design in protective effectiveness of the atom bomb was dra- structures. matically demonstrated in terminating the Conventional structures are free standing, hostilities of World War II, the degree of its bearing only on the ground through founda- effectiveness and the reliability of its design tions, footings, or piling. With dynamic load- AIR FORCE REVIEW 67

ing, underground structures like missile silos numerous and as widely dispersed as Minute- can bear against the soil in any direction. In man presents many problems, not only in the fact, the tremendous energy generated by de- original design but in operation and mainte- sign overpressures must be resisted not only nance as well. Dozens of power sources are by the maximum allowable deflection of a involved, each tailoring its respective power structure but by that of the surrounding soil/ transmission to suit the area served and the rock as well. Since there is no uniform soil/ prevailing weather conditions. Power trans- rock in nature, variations encoimtered at the mission systems vary from the bare minimum different sites complicate the analysis of soil systems in remote, sparsely settled areas to interaction with structures. The interrelation- good systems in areas which have reasonably ship between structures and soil/rock is typi- high demands. Blinking lights and frequent cal of the extra effort required in designing power outages during storm periods are ac- protective construction. cepted in remote areas because it is not eco- Conventional facilities are designed to nomical for power companies to double the withstand a G-force of unity, plus a small number of poles and add other desirable fraction of a G-force for earthquake areas. appurtenances. Under these circumstances, Hardened facilities must be designed for the government could not economically con- many G-forces. The selected shock spectrum tract for power other than what was available depends on the size of the weapon, the over- at each site. Missile power systems had to be pressure, the type of soil/rock, and the ma- designed accordingly. Some sources had terials of construction. Not only must the Delta-Y power connections and some had structures be designed to survive severe con- Y-Y power connections. Although either power ditions, the sophisticated electrical, mechani- source is acceptable, power sensing controls cal, communications, and electronic equip- to start prime diesel power upon commercial ment must also be protected. power failure had to be mated into the con- The magnitude of shock platforms and nected systems. the design shock spectrums used for missile Missile facilities are comprised of many facilities were unprecedented. Consider a fully integrated structural, mechanical, and elec- loaded missile, two large diesel generators trical systems that house the missile and pro- complete with an electrical distribution sys- vide power, environment, and fuel. Many of tem, an air-conditioning system with standby these systems are hazardous because of either chillers, large fuel, water, and pneumatic tanks, the fluids used or the operating pressures control systems, black boxes, and numerous needed to actuate massive silo doors. First- other equipment installed in an eight-story generation missiles like the Atlas series and structure about 45 feet in diameter. Now Titan I were fueled with RP-4 (a jet type of consider the structure, mounted on a special fuel) and liquid oxygen, stored and handled trailer, traveling down a very rough road at under cryogenic conditions. Large, high-pres- high speed. The ensuing motion is indicative sure hydraulic systems were required to actu- of the displacement, velocity, and accelera- ate the massive silo doors, elevators, operating tions encountered not only in a single degree platforms, etc. The large amounts of inert of motion but in multiple degrees of motion gases required to fuel and defuel missiles dur- as well. In a conventional structure the deflec- ing launch exercises were stored at high pres- tion of a beam is so small that, for all practical sure. Leakage and escape of inert gases pre- purposes, the floor it supports is considered sent no problem in the open but can be haz- level. In protective construction it is some- ardous to life in the confined space of a silo times necessary to use very large beams as should the ventilating system malfunction or springs. That the earth and entire structures fail. under design conditions literally move many The potential danger of a mishap to a inches is hard to comprehend. fully loaded missile during exercise or launch Prime power for a weapon system as necessitated special precautions. The launch 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW control centers were designed to resist not had to be taken. For instance, in the fabrica- only the effects of nuclear weapons but also tion of valves, fittings, piping, tanks, etc., for the effects of an accidentally ignited missile handling liquid and gaseous oxygen, it was loaded with fuel in a silo, since the amount of necessary to establish clean rooms and clean- fuel which first-generation missiles bum in liness standards exceeding those for hospital four minutes is about equal to that a modem operating rooms and pharmaceutical manufac- jet liner bums in a cross-country flight. In ad- turers. Cleanliness had to be enforced in the dition, intercontinental ballistic missiles are field, too. During installation and checkout of not air breathers and have to carry their own oxygen systems, pipe fitters wore white coats, oxidizer, another potential hazard. and the entire area was maintained at a degree Hazards inherent in the construction, in- of cleanliness never before attained for con- stallation, and checkout of missile facilities re- ventional construction. The hypergolic fuels quired special safety programs. Special knowl- of Titan II, although not as dangerous as liq- edge required to safely construct the exotic uid oxygen, required special handling be- systems on a massive scale was obtained by cause of the inherent danger of toxicity and contracts with specialists in the respective of spontaneous combustion. fields. Once this knowledge was available, it had to be disseminated to and assimilated by not only the contractors and their workmen but government inspectors and engineers and .A lmost every engineering disci- finally by the operating personnel. Precautions pline used in the design and construction of

Cutaway drawings of the launch facility (above) and launch control facility (right) constructed at Minot AFB, North Dakota, suggest unprecedented factors that led to the new engineering discipline of protective construction, involving integration of the sciences of seismology, geophysics, and dynamics with such older disciplines as civil, structural, electrical, and mechanical engineering. AIR FORCE REVIEW 09

missile facilities required the integration of at ponents were included in and furnished and least one other engineering discipline. Orient- installed under the construction contract. ing the many agency offices, designers, con- In the expedited construction of a single tractors, and inspectors involved in the conventional facility, it is not uncommon for programs with the dynamic characteristics of designers to be two weeks ahead of construc- protective construction was no little accom- tion crews. Under the concept of concurrency, plishment. The standard government procedure the partially constructed missile facilities had for constructing facilities is the formal adver- to be changed as dictated by breakthroughs in tised contract method, designed to encourage missile development. Whereas usually only maximum competition, resulting in lowest cost. one facility is involved in conventional con- Any rp/ rpie construction and supply items that struction, up to 200 identical facilities were can be adequately described by plans and/or involved in any one missile construction con- specifications are subject to this practice. tract. The concept of concurrency was neces- For uniformity and standardization of sarily expensive, but it was a price that had operating procedures and repair parts, many to be paid for earliest possible missiles. component parts of missile support equipment The number of people proficient in the were purchased in advance by the government design, construction, and handling of exotic for an entire wing under separately advertised and complicated missile facility systems was contracts and then furnished to the construc- limited. Many of these systems, usually small tion contractor or the installation and checkout in size, were designed and constructed almost contractor for installation. Less important com- on a proprietary basis. 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Inspection has always been important in but in the absence of prototype testing, quality construction work, and structures peculiar to control and reliability factors were minimized protective construction introduced new prob- in the real property installed equipment fur- lems for the inspector. The space surrounding nished by the construction contractor. Causa- a shock-mounted structure inside a silo to tive factors were specification requirements allow for movement under design conditions and available time. is referred to as rattlespace. Construction It was anticipated that the large number drawings, unlike shop drawings, can show of like facilities would introduce mass con- only so much detail. If equipment, pipes, con- struction methods, such as special boring duits, etc., encroach into this rattlespace, these equipment to excavate for silos, in the interest components could be damaged by being of economy. Apparently, the construction crushed against the concrete silo walls under schedule did not permit the time necessary for design movement and the missile rendered in- development of special equipment, for much effective. These oversights may seem simple conventional construction equipment was used and inexcusable, but we must consider the instead. One contractor did introduce an in- conditions under which this work was accom- novation in constructing the facilities for two plished. Building tradesmen were not accus- wings of a first-generation missile. Soil condi- tomed to working on swaying floors, so it was tions at the sites enabled him to excavate to necessary to crib the shock-mounted platforms. the bottom level of the silos with large earth- If the cribbed platforms were not accurately moving equipment. All structures were then positioned or maintained, rattlespace dimen- constructed above ground, and the soil was sions would have to be adjusted accordingly. backfilled around them. In subsequent opera- The same was true if a contractor furnished an tion and maintenance of the facilities, how- “equal" unit of significantly different shape ever, some settling became evident. from that designed. Although every effort was made to ensure that all missile facilities were uniform in every wing, slight variations pecu- T_J n' der the 375 series of Air Force liar to construction were inevitable. It is prac- regulations, the Civil Engineer is required to tically impossible to build dispersed facilities maintain real property/real property installed to the same degree of uniformity possible on equipment in support of a weapon system. a production line. Since the advent of missiles, this support has Indicative of the sophistication associated included actual operation and maintenance of with missiles is the fact that the air-condition- certain items of real property installed equip- ing systems must operate 24 hours a day every ment directly connected to a missile. day in the year to maintain missiles in ready- Support of missiles, officially referred to to-launch condition. Under the concept of con- as aerospace vehicle equipment ( ave), and currency, specifications had to be prepared in missile ground equipment not rp/ rpie, offi- many offices. Unfortunately, all specification cially referred to as aerospace ground equip- writers did not call for the same degree of de- ment ( age), is covered in the 67 series of Air pendability, which in the case of rpie usually Force manuals and regulations. Support of means that the unit has been manufactured for weapon systems hardware has been developed at least five years. This period allows a manu- to a fine art through years of experience. facturer to work out the bugs and develop the Repair parts for missile age and ave are req- desired dependability. uisitioned, shipped, stocked, and procured Construction materials and equipment are automatically by electronic data-processing continually being changed to incorporate new equipment. Similar procedures are used to materials and improved manufacturing proce- program for supply funds to procure repair dures. In the normal development of a weapon parts. system, testing in prototype installations would rp/ rpie construction is under convention- prove or reject these equipment components; al advertised contracts. Maintenance, repair. Maintenance men of the 321st Strategic Missile Wing check the guidance package of a Minuteman II missile in a launcher silo near Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota.

and construction are covered in the 85 series of Air Force manuals and regulations. Under the operation and maintenance (o &m ) pro- gram, repair parts for diesel generators, air- conditioning systems, etc., in direct support of a missile system vie for the same dollars that are used to replace floor covering, paint- ing, and other routine maintenance and repair work. Although missile support is assigned a high priority, the support is provided at the expense of the o &m program, which is already overtaxed. Every year more facilities are being operated and maintained with less funds and fewer people. Funds to support missile ace are programmed through Air Force Logistics Command channels, and funds to support mis- sile rpie are programmed through Strategic Air Command channels. Approval of funds for age without approval of funds for correspond- ing rpie would create chaos. Even a minor change to Minuteman, accomplished across the whole fleet, requires major funding. About a year ago Hq usaf was apprised of this dis- parity in programming and funding and is now in the process of identifying detailed Civil Engineer responsibility in support of missiles in appropriate Air Force manuals and regulations. Under current regulations, engineering responsibility for rp/rpie in support of a weapon system passes to the using command 45 days after turnover of the last facility by the contractor. Engineering responsibility in- cludes central engineering control to ensure uniformity of installations for standard opera- tion and maintenance and to update operation and maintenance manuals, sa c civil engineer- ing manuals are to rp/rpie what technical or- ders are to ace and ave. Only recen tly did sa c receive authority to organize a separate engineering staff to provide these special services. In the deployment of any modem weapon system, hardness, reliability, and dispersal are prime considerations. To visit every one of the 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sites of a dispersed Minuteman wing means mass of outside air passes through a vertical traveling about 1400 miles by the shortest concrete shaft, frost can start even at the road. Dispersal compounds construction and bottom of a ten-foot shaft and penetrate in also compounds operation and especially any direction during an extended period of maintenance, sa c missile sites are 30 to 150 extremely cold weather. Thus, a drain line miles away from a support base, and this buried below the normal frost line but three presents logistic problems in the transporta- feet horizontally from the concrete shaft can tion of men and materials out to a site and and does freeze. — Diesel generators and back. Operation and maintenance of either a associated electrical transfer gear did not at- Minuteman or Titan II wing require about tain design reliability without considerable 8,000,000 vehicle miles a year. adjustment and in some instances modifica- Since missiles and facilities were not tion. Extended periods of cold weather af- prototyped, initial operation became, in fact, fected the environmental control systems, mass shakedowns. Usually, trouble did not which in turn affected the starting capability develop at one site only. The Maintenance of the diesel engines. Accordingly, changes Data Collection System Reports and the were made to the environmental control sys- Monthly Maintenance Summary have con- tems. — Under adverse weather, especially firmed the consistency of American manufac- thunderstorms, certain conditions developed ture. Parts that were misapplied or of faulty which precluded operation of the standby design were readily identified. Under normal power systems as designed. Changes to the operation, idiosyneracies can show up. A good power generation systems and transfer gear example is a certain relay used extensively in were also necessary. Minuteman wings. The unit complied with all requirements of the specifications. However, T he design, construction, operation, and main- the heat generated in an energized unit is tenance of intercontinental ballistic missile sufficient to slowly evaporate the last coat of real property/real property installed equip- insulating varnish, and these vapors settle on ment represent a very important milestone in the contacts and entrap dust. The dust-laden the continuing effort to maintain our country contacts impair the flow of electricity when as the world’s major deterrent force against the contacts are closed and cause malfunction. aggression. The whole program was a reward- For reliable operation, the contacts must be ing challenge to the intellect of every partici- cleaned periodically, an operation not antici- pant, as much of the knowledge required for pated in initial planning. The units had been accomplishment was developed during that installed well over the guarantee period be- time period. This new knowledge was not fore the trouble developed. limited to basic science and its application but Under normal operation, design oversights included new highs in management, organi- and peculiarities or shortcomings in the vari- zation, and time phasing of construction. The ous systems are learned, and changes to missile program proved the merits of the standard operating procedures are made where Program Evaluation and Review Technique indicated. For example, frost is usually con- (pe r t ) and the Critical Path Method (cpm) of sidered to start at the surface of the ground scheduling and monitoring production and and penetrate downward. When a continuous construction. Hq Strategic Air Command Military Affairs Abroad

THE SOVIET PILOT AND PSYCHOLOGY

Dr . R. H. Stacy and Mrs. O. S. F edoroff

NEW and interesting development in logical basis is again dialectical materialism, A the training methodology for Soviet that antiquated and eminently unscientific military pilots is the emphasis being given to detritus of nineteenth-century German ideal- psychology. This psychology is by no means ism. Thus Soviet military’ psychology is always an elaborate theoretical psychology but rather kept distinct from the Western or bourgeois one applied to aviation in general and flight variety. The latter kind is, nevertheless, care- in particular; according to the definition of fully studied.® psychology by Soviet practitioners, it is a This new interest in psychology as a strict science based on “objective laws.” As means of improving the will power, motiva- we know, the application of psychology in tion, memory, speed of reaction, and scope such a field as sociology, for example, has of attention of military pilots has been noted always been viewed by Marxist theoreticians especially in the pages of the official monthly as a “reactionary and subjective-idealistic” or publication of the Soviet Air Force. This “bourgeois” (i.e., Western) tendency. So, too, periodical, founded in 1918, used to be called the methods of Freudian psychoanalysis are The Herald of the Air Fleet; in 1962, in line considered “antiscientific reactionary” psycho- with the intensive space activities of the Soviet logical theory. Such views are quite natural Union, the name was changed to Aviation and for the Marxist, since his dialectical material- Cosmonautics. (The Russians regularly use the ism (or economic determinism) hardly leaves terms “cosmonaut” and “cosmonautics” where room—theoretically at least—for anything ex- we use “astronaut” and “astronautics.”) The cept economic factors in the molding of so- magazine, intended primarily for Soviet Air ciety, and he is especially quite averse to Force officers, has always carried a wide va- accepting the Freudian theories of the im- riety of articles ranging from rather long- portance of the libido as a determining factor winded editorials vaunting the traditions of in the human consciousness. Indeed, even in Soviet arms, the advantages of the socialist the case of Soviet psychology, although the system, and the glories of Marxism-Leninism scientific basis is considered to have been °See, for example, Sovremennaya burzhuaznaya voennaya provided by the studies of the famous I. P. psikhologiya (“Contemporary Bourgeois Military- Psychology”) by a collective of authors (Moscow: Military Publishing House, Pavlov (the “conditioned reflex”), the methodo- 1964). 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

to technical articles dealing with such matters It is also interesting, by the way, that as defectoscopy, hydroplaning, fuel filtration within recent months Aviation and Cosmo- methods, and network planning. In conform- nautics has inaugurated two new departments. ity with the new aerospace coverage, there One of these is “Your Health,” dealing with have been an almost complete cessation of such matters as excessive weight, proper rest, articles on bombing and gunnery techniques and in-flight pt exercises. The title of the other (very frequent in the fifties) and a glut of may be translated as “On Ethical Behavior.” articles on sputniks, spaceships, satellite com- Under this rubric a number of instances of munications systems, and bionics. A note- immoral behavior on the part of officers have worthy development is the frequency of arti- been discussed (one of these involved a biga- cles by general officers—five of them in one mous officer who lived it up for quite a while recent issue. The Chief Marshal of the Soviet before the Communists, the watchdogs of Air Force, A. K. Vershinin, occasionally con- Soviet morality, caught up with him). tributes editorials. The spate of articles on psychology began One thing that has not changed, however, in 1966, and such articles now appear regu- is the continued emphasis on training, disci- larly under still another new department head- pline, respect for authority, and the need— ing, “Flight and Psychology.” For the most especially for the military pilot—to be in a part they are intended for command and in- constant state of combat readiness. (The Soviet structor personnel; but, since Soviet training military' pilot wears a badge indicating that doctrine also makes much of what is called he is, depending on his qualifications, a Mili- “independent study” and since officers are tary Pilot First, Second, or Third Class.) But constantly urged to broaden their scope of the authors of articles on combat training knowledge (presumably in their leisure time), methods, although they stress uncompromis- many of the articles are designed for giving ing adherence to the regulations and the need line officers the fundamentals of aviation psy- for such things as practicing cockpit actions chology practice. What is this practice? “to the point of automatism,” also call atten- As we have mentioned, it is essentially an tion to the fact that commanders must always applied dynamic Pavlovian psychology. A use the individual approach to subordinates. good example would be the so-called tech- (This latter term, by the way, is viewed by nique of “autogenous psychophysiological the Chinese Communists, who have abolished training.” Since most of us cannot, for instance, ranks in their armed forces, as further evidence salivate at will, we must elicit this response of the reactionary tendency in the Soviet by thinking of, say, sliced lemons. Thus a Union.) Commanders, these authors say, must pilot undergoing ground cockpit training can get to know the particular shortcomings and learn to elicit the appropriate emotional ten- strong points of individual pilots and must sion when an emergency situation is simulated respect them as individuals. But violations are and then learn to dissipate this tension by not tolerated, and there is frequent mention, autosuggestion. The term “psychophysiologi- by name, of officers who either have them- cal,” which is used very often in the literature, selves been guilty of violations or have over- points up the fact that, for the Soviet psychol- looked or condoned reprehensible actions on ogist, the mind or psyche is no vague self- the part of subordinates. In this connection a subsisting tiling but that our consciousness is great effort is made to inculcate in the Soviet a product of the physiological functions of officer a feeling of ethical and political respon- the brain and nervous system as a whole. This sibility as a representative of the “new moral point is always stressed, although there is a man" of the Communist order as well as little more sophistication at present than at respect for Russian—but especially Soviet- an earlier age of “vulgar materialism” when military traditions. This respect for tradition the brain was considered to secrete thought is remarkably keen in the Guards fighter units, just as the liver secretes bile. the elite of the Soviet Air Force. Another aspect of this applied-psychology MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 75

movement can be seen in the inauguration— proved, or that such “systems” may in the also recent—of a series of simple tests de- course of time, following basic training, dete- signed for readers of Aviation and Cosmo- riorate during routine duties. It must also be nautics. One of these is entitled "Test \our remembered that more and more of the pilots Powers of Observation. For example, the reporting for duty in fine units are the so- reader is asked to note how long it takes him called pilot-engineers, men with a “higher to memorize the situation in the accompany- engineering education.” These graduates are ing drawing. Then he is to turn the page and very strong in the physical sciences but rather weak in the sciences of man.® Their knowl- edge of flight psychology will apparently be supplemented through the independent study referred to. Incidentally, articles on training methods have lately been making much of this influx of pilot-engineers, pointing out the added responsibilities of commanders who now have in their units not only pilots but framed engineers, eager to keep abreast of the latest developments in technology and quick to notice any evidence of routine think- ing or outmoded ideas. note how long it takes him to spot any changes A good deal of attention is paid to the in the situation: handling of “negative emotions” (fear, tension, depression, etc.). Here, too, the emphasis is Pavlovian: since often these are, in effect, con- ditioned reflexes which have become deeply rooted for one reason or another, they must be broken down and replaced by others which are based on positive emotions. The tech- niques used are various: physical exercises, breathing-control exercises, and the use of “inner dialog”: a pilot in a difficult situation should talk to himself, saying such things as “I must “I can do it,” “I must not give in.” Pilots are also urged, in such situations, con- In the other series, “Test Your iq ,” he is given sciously to evoke thoughts with positive emo- more and more complex figures to extend in tional coloring—memories of a successful air a logical sequence. engagement, intercept, etc. True, these are simple tests (we see simi- In the pages of Aviation and Cosmonau- lar tilings every day in American newspapers tics, pilots can also read about sthenic emo- and magazines), and their efficacy in produc- tions (those which raise the level of a person’s ing any tangible results in the work of a pilot vital activities and facilitate the achievement or technician cannot, immediately at least, be of goals) and asthenic emotions (those which very great. But it must be remembered that act in the opposite way), about methods of a basic rule in Soviet training methodology training the memory, and about practicing and in pedagogy generally is to proceed from proper distribution of attention in the cockpit. the simple to the complex; this is repeated almost ad nauseam. Such tests do at least make •The Russian poet Andrei Voznesensky has supplied us the pilot conscious of the fact that he himself with some evidence that the Soviet emphasis on mathematics, physics, and chemistry in education has, in a way, "backfired." possesses various “systems,” the functions of He has stated that such studies have made students more sen- sitive to the appeals of abstract ideas and thus of heterodox which can be timed, evaluated, and even im- opinions. 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The articles on training psychology distinguish, gists not to ignore the suggestions of the pilots for example, between the operative or short- themselves! term memory and the long-term memory. Although, as we have mentioned, com- Trainees are advised to make frequent use of manders are required to insist upon strict mnemonic devices and to find, whenever pos- observance of the flight regulations and safety sible, cause-and-effect relationships in improv- measures, they are urged to avoid undue se- ing the long-term memory. It is pointed out, verity and, especially the use of excessively for example, that flight zones are better mem- harsh language. Here, they are told, is where orized not by number but by names which in- a knowledge of psychology plays a decisive volve some kind of association with a pilot’s role. “Thus,” we read in a recent issue, “it once personal experiences. As for the operative happened that an instructor-pilot was sum- memory, which is maximally loaded during moned to the commander for an unpleasant instrument flight, pilots are urged to practice, talk just before a flight. The conversation with in accordance with diagrams, the most effi- the commander so changed the mental state cient switching of attention between the vari- of the officer that at the preflight checkup the ous instruments and tables needed for making surgeon was forced to raise the question of a decision. Numerous diagrams have been grounding him that day.” published in the magazine, and there has been The name of Anton Makarenko, a school- an extensive discussion on finding optimal master and the “father of Soviet pedagogy” attention-distribution patterns. Of particular who died in 1935, is still highly revered, and concern right now is the development, through his tenets, elementary though they may seem, the cooperation of instrument designers and are still frequently quoted in the pages of psychologists, of instrument panels for air- Aviation and Cosmonautics. But in a recent craft which will facilitate, by proper grouping article a lieutenant general of the Soviet Air of dials and controls, efficient and rapid scan- Force put it very well—and thereby suggested ning. In this connection it is interesting that a prudent course for those concerned—when a test pilot recently wrote the editors, remind- he wrote that both line-unit commanders and ing these instrument designers and psycholo- physicians were now finding it more and more necessary to consult textbooks on psychology. Syracuse, New York In My Opinion

A PROPOSED CODE OF ETHICS FOR AIR FORCE OFFICERS A Common-Sense Approach

Captain Howard G. J anssen

EADERSHIP is the key to every act by any written ethics inspired by the times. The re- L-J group of human beings; without leader- mainder of that story is familiar to us all: the ship there is only anarchy. The leader directs American society became the most stable of a group toward either “good” or “bad” goals. all nation-states in several centuries. But if Leadership therefore tends to stabilize a so- the values in those times were “good,” a strik- ciety whether or not that society views its ing example of “bad” values exists in more goals at any point along the moral spectrum modern times. of good and bad. Obviously, the degree of A second example of values that inspired stability determines the strength of that so- strength was Hitler’s Germany. No one will ciety, and the degree of “goodness” or “bad- deny that Germany temporarily became a ness” denotes its standard of values. Two highly stable and strong nation, gaining its examples of values at either end of this moral goals with great success. Hitler’s ethics were spectrum illustrate the stability and resultant embodied in the following translated quota- strength of the two societies: Revolutionary tion from Mein Kampf, which later became America and Nazi Germany. the basis for many written codes of ethics Of the many conflicts in history, the adopted and followed by Nazi military and American Revolutionary War should be rec- political organizations: ognized as one of the most notable. The prob- ability of success under the severe conditions He who would exist must fight; and he who does not battle in this world of eternal conflict and imbalance of power of the time was does not earn his right to existence.1 extremely poor. Yet despite impossible odds and intolerable conditions in the struggle with Although it is another matter, the reader might the world’s most experienced and professional ask: If Hitler’s ethics were so well stated and army, General Washington led his revolution- at the base of Germany’s temporary success, aries to victory. At the base of this historical why did Nazi Germany meet such disaster success must have been an intangible driving in the end? Perhaps a partial answer can be force of such intensity that fledgling America s inferred from a quote by Field Marshal Hel- defeat would have been impossible. I submit muth von Moltke, a nineteenth century Prus- that this force was a peculiar brand of un- sian military genius who was admired and 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW studied by Hitler: “Eternal peace is only a the subject will stimulate an interest in a pro- dream and one that is not the least bit attrac- fessional code; the more talk about the sub- tice.”'- Hitler therefore emphasized an ethic ject, the more likely it is that the Air Force of conflict, as opposed to peace, which led will take up the subject officially. him to attempt military maneuvers far beyond I believe that the impact of a code of realistic execution. These grandiose schemes ethics for Air Force officers will have the fol- undoubtedly contributed to finally inducing lowing effects; an uninspired and hopeless spirit in the Ger- 1. It will induce pride of belonging to the man people. Thus history illustrates that a Air Force, since it will define the standards degree of military success is linked with ethics. required for “membership” in the profession. Ethics comprise a peculiarly interesting 2. It will provide a guidepost of profes- rationale that determines the quality of lead- sional and personal behavior for Air Force ership in any organization. Since the leader officers; as such, it will serve as one concrete is decisive in the military, and since a very measure of an officer’s efficiency. significant expression of a state’s strength lies 3. It will standardize and aid in under- in its military establishment, it follows that the standing the ethics demanded of an officer; ultimate success of that nation-state’s military with proper emphasis, the code’s effects will organization hinges on the way its leaders eventually shape and raise the quality of the view and apply ethics. I maintain that ethics, officer coqxs. as understood by military leaders, will deter- 4. It will eventually help raise the desira- mine how well any nation-state is able to bility of the Air Force as a career, since the achieve its national objectives. image of the officer should be substantially Decisions and leadership are practically raised in the public’s eye. synonymous concepts in the military. The key 5. It will make unnecessary various regula- to our country’s survival may literally rest tions, directives, and codes for specific situa- upon our military leaders’ decisions. Since tions (such as the “conflict of interest" regula- ethics must be involved in decisions, a leader tion, AFR 30-30). can never accurately test the “rightness” or Many people avoid the subject of ethics “wrongness" of his decisions unless he has a simply because it is usually accompanied by standard against which he can measure them. an aura of some “untouchable” quality for the I contend that a body of values or code of nonacademician. Therefore, my task is to try ethics woidd provide him with that measure- to reduce a few key words to levels of under- ment. standing: code, values or ethics, and military My present purpose is to define a particu- professionalism. Our level of understanding of lar set of ethics applicable to the Air Force, these words should be nonabstract and in but first 1 will discuss ethics as seen from the terms of military thinking, which is essentially military' viewpoint. My ultimate aim is to sug- conservative and pragmatic. The military mind gest a written code of ethics for Air Force must be more realistic than idealistic, since it officers, the adoption of which would help is basically pessimistic in its view of human dispel any confusion officers might have about nature; i.e., human nature is imperfect and at ethical behavior. For I contend that no officer the root of conflict. today can afford not to know exactly where A key word is “code” itself; our “code’ he stands in today’s world of continuous con- must contain the “values” or “ethics” that re- flict. I do not pretend to offer a code of ethics flect the “military professionalism” which is that will stand all tests and criticism; the pro- our group’s essence. I define a code as a posals in this article are my own attempt to written accumulation of human experiences construct a code within certain limits and which, in the context of a particular organiza- criteria. I am especially interested in the re- tion or group, are considered “good" and there- action of other Air Force officers to the need fore are worthy of documenting as a reminder for such a code. I believe that discussion of to the members of that organization of the IN MY OPINION 79

standards of conduct considered necessary to device: a code of ethics. Before we can con- achieve organizational goals. The “values” to struct a code, however, we must be acquainted be found within a code are those which are with the criteria used to measure any code. unique to the purposes of that organization. Many problems are inherent in the task Values differ from organization to or- of constructing a code of ethics, and they can ganization. Values are those subjective judg- be debated forever, since there is no absolute ments which members of an organization quality about ethics. Ethics, as we have seen consider “good or “bad with regard to meet- in the examples of Nazi Germany and Revo- ing the expectations of the organization's goals. lutionary America, are relative only to one’s Ethics are reflected in the values chosen as view of “good” or “bad.” However, one must acceptable by an organization and are a way have a basis of logic for each word used in of managing negative human desires and a code. My logic depends on the following urges for the good and general welfare of that three factors: mechanics, suitability, and value organization. insertion. Military professionalism is distinct from all The first, mechanics, means that the code other “professionalisms” in that it emphasizes must serve an immediate and practical pur- the methods of organizing and managing con- pose. It must not be a vague statement of flict as an instrument in the service of the morality or pious platitudes. It must be con- nation-state in which it exists and upon which crete, comprehensible, and nonabstract. It the nation depends for its existence. The ethics must be timeless and unchanging. The me- of military professionalism give birth to the chanics of the code must include a nonabso- values of the military profession, and upon lute quality; that is, it is not a law but is more these a code can be built. a creed or way of life. As a creed it should Military ethics, seen in the nonabstract instill in the officer confidence that he is fol- context I have defined, are concerned primar- lowing the expectations and standards of the ily with managing the negative features of profession. Finally, the code should not indi- human nature toward a regulated goal. The cate a higher ethical standard than that which military officer must understand this concept is realistic and attainable by the individuals and commit himself to it; if he does not, he of high quality whom the profession seeks to will be a liability to the mission in the face attract and retain. of crisis or danger. Faced with danger or The second factor, suitability, involves the crisis, the officer can ill afford to reflect upon expression of the desired standard which is the philosophical aspects of his decisions; he created from the vast range of different morals, requires a standard of measurement which values, ideals, hopes, and attitudes held by gives him immediate confidence that his de- many people to whom the code applies. This cision is “right.” factor is the most difficult to determine even To establish a basis for the decisions that within the restricted context of the Air Force are involved in the military profession of “con- organization, since we are dealing with many flict management,” the officer coq)s has de- different individuals. veloped certain devices that tend to channel The third and final factor in constructing the forces of the individual psychological a code is value insertion. This criterion might makeup into distinctive common patterns. The be briefly described as the patriotic tone of officer uses these devices to prepare himself the code. This quality largely determines how and his men for that crucial moment when the professional member will accept the code their professionalism will be put to the ulti- and its premises. Since emotions are a more mate test. Some of these devices are the uni- primitive feature of man’s makeup than the form, the parade, the oath of office, the salute, intellectual training which he acquires, the special honors, awards, medals, and the privi- proper appeal to emotion will have a more lege and status that accompany rank. I con- lasting impression on an individual. The emo- tend that our profession lacks a most important tional value imparted to an individual will 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW tend to linger at the “gut level,” to be called of many officers to live up to a code of be- upon when needed, much as a physiological havior implicit in military life.”3 The board reflex. was chaired by Brigadier General Harold Q. An outstanding example of a limited code Huglin. of ethics is the “U.S. Fighting Man’s Code of The project was later transferred to Air Conduct,” constructed to serve the American University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, military man, including the officer, immedi- and on 25-26 September 1948 seven selected ately prior to or after his capture. In this code social scientists and five military advisers met one finds the three fundamental factors of an to determine the precise methods of research ethical code: mechanics, suitability, and value necessary to identify and analyze the values insertion. peculiar to the Air Force officer corps. The Having combined my definition of a code committee established the necessary criteria, of ethics with the discussion of three criteria, and the project was then assigned to Chaplain I can now offer my own definition of what a (Colonel) Wallace I. Wolverton. code of ethics for Air Force officers should be: Wolverton’s research group performed ex- A written guide to the standards of personal haustive analysis over two years, using 460 Air and professional behavior expected of all U.S. Force officers as subjects. Unfortunately, the Air Force officers in the management or em- project was abandoned before the team could ployment of their aerospace weapons. It is formally evaluate its data and publish its final ironic that the other major professions of the report, probably due to the outbreak of the world have codes of ethics. In fact, many pro- Korean conflict, when many members, includ- fessions feel their codes are an indispensable ing Colonel Wolverton, were reassigned. part of their training and education. There are To my knowledge, this research is the hundreds of codes, ranging from those for ac- most thorough and authoritative work done counting and breweries to those for undertak- in the area of ethics in the Air Force. Its final ing and warehousing. How is it, then, that we results and findings must be reviewed, evalu- have not developed an Air Force code? ated, and interpreted before they can be offi- Since America is a great melting pot of cially approved for use in constructing a code ideals, hopes, and aspirations, we should know of ethics. However, I consider this research with a fair degree of certainty what the most and its eleven ethical themes so important that common and desirable values are to Air Force a brief review of them is appropriate. These officers, to provide a starting point for con- themes establish a common set of values upon structing a valid code of ethics. The sociologist which we can construct a code of ethics and psychologist would probably insist, and unique to the Air Force officer’s profession. rightly so, that we make a scientific study of 1. Power Ethic: foregoing personal advan- the values which we consider most desirable tage out of consideration for the rights of and most common to the group. This would other persons or groups of persons. be an enormous undertaking, since we are 2. Manners Ethic: observance of decencies, dealing with complex concepts: the human in the practice of good manners, or in a respect mind and what things are considered “good” for the sentiments of others. or acceptable. However, the undertaking has 3. Appetitive Ethic: foregoing sensory grati- already been researched and nearly completed! fication to the extent that officers use liquor Shortly after V-J Day, the Chief of Staff moderately, engage only in acceptable sexual convened a special board of top military lead- relationships, and abstain from displays of ers and civilian sociologists, to consider the violence. feasibility of a code of ethics for Air Force 4. Honesty Ethic: honesty in dealing with officers. It was felt that many Air Force lead- others and candor in admitting one’s own ers had become “aware of the fact that the errors and faults. problems of reconversion to a peacetime force 5. Self-giving Ethic: aid to others, even at were excessively complicated by the failure cost to self; as advice, rehabilitation, correct- IN MY OPINION 81

ing injustices, recognizing the unrecognized my nation, my highest duty is to the American merits, taking responsibility for others' faults people, whose freedoms were forged from or failures. blood and sacrifice and are expressed in the 6. Duty Ethic: professional thoroughness Declaration of Independence and the Consti- (steadiness, skill, and workmanship); or initia- tution of the United States of America. I will tive and originality in meeting problems. render unquestioned fidelity to my Com- 7. Tension Ethic: decisiveness, courage or mander in Chief, the President of the United firmness in the face of uncertainties, risks, or States, and to the provisions expressed in my pressures. Oath of Office. 8. Objectivity Ethic: seeking and sharing My profession demands unswerving dedi- knowledge needed for the best performance cation to my nation and its allies against all of tasks; or a scientific attitude in dealing with enemies. I will never knowingly or willingly problems or data, as opposed to arbitrariness, break the high trust given to me in this mis- prejudice, rashness, or evasion. sion. To do so would risk my nation’s security. 9. Management Ethic: providing for the My profession demands that I be highly best possible functioning of personnel. skilled in using or supporting the instruments 10. Prophetic Ethic: taking action with a of aerospace warfare. I pledge myself to be view to remoter consequences; wider implica- always prepared to use these instruments tions of relationships than those immediately efficiently when called upon. involved, although the latter may seem to be I am mindful that my position and re- more urgent. sponsibilities were made possible by the sac- 11. Heroic Ethic: taking actions or positions rifices of Americans before me; I will do my which reaffirm or clarify purposes, principles, utmost to live up to their courage, strength, or procedures.4 vision, and teamwork, which underlie my free- Now that we have identified some values dom. I dedicate myself without reservation as common and desirable to the Air Force officer, a proud member of the Aerospace Team. we must consider our uniqueness within the To these ends I pledge myself as an officer military establishment. As the air arm, the Air and a gentleman to observe the following Force still suffers from the uncertainties of American ideals: growth. However, we are entering maturity, and we have been entrusted with the most Article I massive weapons of destruction known to man. I will display self-control and honorable We have been named by our nation as the conduct at all times; unquestioned loyalty, pioneers and explorers of space. Our country- obedience, honesty, and integrity are my men have assumed that we have the necessary watchwords. vision, spirit, courage, and self-discipline to explore the new frontiers beyond our earth. Article II As we enter maturity, I believe a code of I will not be deterred in serving my coun- ethics should state our resolve to muster the try when its survival is at stake; the call to strength and confidence necessary to meet and duty, unselfishness, humaneness, and genuine conquer the future. I propose the following concern for my men, as well as all men, will Aerospace Officer’s Code; I enjoin the reader guide me toward this end. to test it against the definitions and criteria I have outlined. Article III I command awesome aerospace weapons for my country. Yet this grave responsibility The Aerospace serves to constantly remind me that I am a Officer’s Code humble and modest man, in peace or in war, dedicated to the principles of self-determina- As an Aerospace Officer in the service of tion, freedom, and peace. 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

A rticle IV ranked the Air Force officer twelfth out of Above all, as an Aerospace Officer whose fourteen professions ranging from doctors and realm of duty is both on earth and in space, lawyers to television announcers and teachers.5 I realize that I must be strong and uncompro- Many Air Force officers are concerned about mising in my convictions, courage, and vision. our current state of ethics and suggest in their I draw these strengths from the trust and con- theses and articles that we must establish some fidence given to me by my nation. As an higher ethical standard than we now have. American myself, I will always trust in my I believe so much evidence points up not men, my fellow officers, my team, and my only a possible real lack of ethics but also an nation’s principles that permit man to choose absence of standards expected of the officer his own way. that we cannot rationalize the question with the usual platitudes. I realize that the mere creation and adoption of a code of ethics will T hroughout this article I examined the im- not change things overnight. But at least we plicit question whether there is actually a will have defined what is expected of the Air need for a code of ethics. I believe I have Force officer. With a well-written code of answered the question in the affirmative. But ethics, no officer could deny what his relation- I pose the problem with the question: Are we ship to himself, his peers, his service, or his as Air Force officers ready to meet the chal- country should be. Somehow the mere fact lenges demanded today? We have inherited that ethical values committed to the written a place in American society quite unlike that word can make them more meaningful seems which our military forebears held. We now to me reason enough for us to adopt a code hold the unique position of having important of ethics without further delay. responsibilities in technological, economic, In this world, where the lines between moral, and political roles. The American pub- freedom and slavery have been drawn, we lic, in spite of temporary and localized ebbs hold the gravest responsibility ever held by and tides of opinion, has great trust in the any military establishment. We cannot afford Air Force if for no other reason than it is the the luxury of apathy, lethargy, or confusion bulwark of defense in an age haunted by such about what our mission is or what our profes- expressions as “overkill” and “total annihila- sional aspirations should be. Each of us who tion.” However, in spite of the Air Force dons the military uniform identifies himself officer’s awesome role in history, he is not with a special class that must demand an viewed by the public as a professional. almost religious adherence to the highest per- Many reports place Air Force officers near sonal and professional standards. Those who the bottom of any comparative rating scale do not accept this commitment are not profes- of the various professions. In 1958 a thesis sional, nor are they desirable in the corps. by Lieutenant Colonel Milton Frank, usaf, San Antonio, Texas

Notes 1. Soldatengci.it: Eine Dcutung nus Bekcnntnissen der Director: Colonel (Chaplain) Wallace I. Wolverton, Air Uni- Front ("Spirit of Soldiery: An Interpretation of Confessions from versity, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1950, p. 3. the Front"). No author. Berlin, Germany: Nibelungen Verlag, 4. Ibid., pp. 65-361. 1941. p. 14. 5. Lieutenant Colonel Milton Frank, “The Low Prestige 2. Ibid., p. 148. Attributed to the Air Force Officer Career by College Educated 3. Colonel Ladson G. Eskridge, Jr., "Ethical Judgements Adult Civilians and 'New Approach’ to Raising It,” unpublished of a Group of Air Force Officers,” unpublished research report master’s thesis. School of Public Relations and Communications, on a project assigned by the Chief of Staff, USAF, Project Boston University, 1958. p. 51. Books and Ideas

MARSHALL AS WARTIME LEADER

Dr . I. B. H olley, J r .

T FIRST GLANCE one might question Al. why two such dissimilar books as The Second World War: A Military History and George C. Marshall—Ordeal and Hope, 1939- 1942\ should be yoked together for a joint form today have no meaningful memory of the review, but there is a rationale even if it is war. Few of today’s captains were even bom not immediately self-evident. Can one truly at the time of the Munich crisis. Yet it is pre- appreciate a biography-in-depth, such as cisely these young men who must recover Pogue’s Marshall, without a working familiar- World War II vicariously in the written word ity with the background, the grand panorama if they are to profit significantly from a biog- of events leading up through World War II? raphy of General George Marshall, however For those of us who lived through the war, ably written it may be. For this reason, the for the generation already mature when the publication of Collier’s one-volume history of crisis arrived, no synthetic chronology in retro- the war was welcomed: there is a crying need spect is necessary. For us, history is the event for such a book. itself and not the written chronicle. If one can A one-volume history of World War II recall, all too painfully etched in memory, the is welcome for yet another reason. Current commingled mood of consternation, dismay, events induce a myopia in all of us; today’s and determination on the eighth of December campaign tends to become the norm. New 1941, that grim morning after, then almost threats, new problems, deadlier weapons, fresh without realizing it one has an invaluable heroes crowd the headlines. At a time when context within which to read and understand the armed forces of the United States find Pogue’s remarkable contribution to the litera- themselves stretched woefully thin, pitted ture of leadership. But what of those who do against a fifth-rate (?) power in a relatively not remember the event? It is worth remind- narrow though distant theater of action, it is ing ourselves that fully half the men in uni- decidedly useful to have a compact history fBasil Collier, The Second World War: A Military History (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1967, $8.95), xvi and 640 pp. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall—Ordeal and Hope, 1939- 1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1966, $8.95), xviii and 491 pp. 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

in which the multiplicity of demands and the was to “prevent her ally Britain from assert- contradictory pressures of another more truly ing naval supremacy throughout the world.” global war are drawn into focus within a (p. 9) One could, presumably, read such a single volume. connotation into the slogan “A Navy second Moreover, Basil Collier’s credentials for to none,” but should one? writing such a book would appear to be im- In Collier’s hands, even U.S. aid to Britain peccable. No cloistered scholar he. A novelist gets grudging treatment; the bases secured in with several volumes to his credit, he served return for 50 destroyers are described as “sac- with distinction as a squadron leader in the rifices.” When it comes to the Japanese decla- Royal Air Force during “their finest hour.” ration of war, one is left with the impression Subsequently he was a Fighter Command his- that President Roosevelt and his colleagues, torian, and more recently he has produced in failing to take the stiff line advocated by several volumes of military history and Churchill, needlessly fostered Japanese aggres- biography. sion. And so it goes in chapter after chapter. For many reasons, then, this reviewer Partisan bias is only one source of irrita- approached Collier’s volume with enthusiasm; tion. Another is the freewheeling prose the here at last was the promise of just the sort author employs, repeatedly insinuating more of book that has long been needed, a judi- than he documents. One example will serve to cious, broad-brush treatment, comprehensive illustrate this practice. German fuel produc- but concise, taking full advantage of the in- tion improved somewhat in 1944, Collier dispensable but too voluminous literature, writes, “because the Allies made fewer attacks official and unofficial, that has been pouring on oil targets as a result of bad weather and from the presses for the past twenty years. their inability to frame a program of strategic Unfortunately, these expectations were not bombing to which the commanders of their fulfilled. This is not the long-awaited book. heavy bomber forces could be persuaded to To begin with, the point of view of conform.” (p. 421) There is a significant issue Collier’s narrative is distinctly British, more here, but is it legitimate history to toss off such particularly that of the British government. sardonic allegations without a word of justifi- This in itself would not be detrimental if the cation or supporting evidence? author had faced the fact consciously and Undoubtedly a large part of Collier’s diffi- openly. Instead, the reader is left to discover culty in this volume stems from his defective the orientation for himself, largely by his use of the available sources. A survey of his unanswered queries about what the French documentation offers a clue: the book appears or the Germans or others thought about any to have been written from a thin gloss of one given problem. What is more, the book is layer of secondary accounts, and that layer is marred throughout by an ill-concealed anti- usually a British one. This reviewer would be American bias. Surely no fair-minded reader quite willing to concede that in some particu- would resent explicit criticism of the position lar instance the better part of a debated issue taken by the United States on a given issue between, say, Montgomery and Eisenhower if the case were put on its merits, pro and might, on the evidence now obtainable, lie con, as seen from the historical perspective with the former. But to pass judgment almost now possible. But Collier’s bias is of a more exclusively on the basis of accounts drawn elusive character, often more a matter of tone from one side of the argument, as Collier than of assertion. Sometimes, however, his seems to do, is patently unfair and unprofes- assertions are blunt enough, so much so as sional. For example, in the chapters on the to leave the reader wondering how two read- conquest of Germany, the main source is a ers of the same sources could find such differ- volume in the British official history, and the ent facts in them. Surely many readers will American counterparts are virtually ignored. be surprised to learn that one of the important Worse yet, in the chapters on the conquest of aims of America’s foreign policy in the 1920s Japan, where the operations were often over- BOOKS AND IDEAS 85

whelmingly American, the same sources domi- shuttlecock desert war in North Africa is a nate. Of 62 footnotes in Chapter 21, only model of clarity and compression, aided by a about a dozen refer to a scattering of Ameri- generous allotment of maps. Each of these can sources, while 28 cite one volume and 18 chapters abounds in valuable insights. The cite another volume in the United Kingdom relationship between the local theater and the military series. larger global scene is appropriately empha- Collier’s bibliography confirms this im- sized, as is the relationship between air power pression. Of some 228 titles listed, only about and ground operations. However, logistical 72 appear to be non-British. The seven-volume considerations in the theaters and production .Army Air Forces official history by Craven on the home front are inadequately treated. and Cate is not even listed, while French, In sum, the difficult task of writing a one- German, Russian, and Japanese sources are volume history remains to be done. limited to a handful. Most surprising of all perhaps is the neglect of Australian sources, which is disappointing from an author who B y contrast, Forrest Pogue’s sec- has contributed to the generally excellent Brit- ond volume in his multivolume biography of ish official history. General George C. Marshall is an entirely On the other hand, the book does have different kind of study. His first volume, its merits. Not surprisingly, the author is at subtitled Education of a General, covered his best when dealing with the air war on the Marshall’s career to the time of his selection western front. There is a good chapter on the as Chief of Staff. Tbis one is confined to the Norwegian campaign, and the account of the years 1939-1942.

General George C. Marshall spent most of the war years directing the effort from Washington, but he enjoyed the opportunity to visit our far-flung fronts and American servicemen there. 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

A multivolume biography, especially one this. But the sheer bulk of the evidence, appearing by installments, poses serious prob- impressive as it may be, is not the most im- lems of organization and artistry. Although portant point. Far more significant is the ap- the author has endeavored to make this par- proach taken. General Marshall himself set ticular segment of his subject’s life a coherent the pattern when he refused to make unilat- entity, readers who wish a rounded portrait eral retrospective judgments on individuals. of Marshall the man must read all the volumes “I don’t think it would be quite fair because as a single narrative. This is not to suggest, the officers would have no chance to answer. however, that one should delay reading until . . .” (p. 443) This generous spirit, so char- the whole series is published; there are plenty acteristic of the man, Pogue has faithfully of riches to be mined from this book even if adopted as his own. one must wait for the complete account. On controversial issues, hostile critics are Although this volume represents only a given their say, and opposing views are care- truncated portion of the Marshall portrait, in fully cited. Throughout there is an even- many respects the years that it covers were tenored refusal to resort to stridency. For the most important period of his career. The some readers this may appear as a fault, General himself regarded the span of months muting the abrasive clash of personalities to from the fall of France to Pearl Harbor as his produce an unrealistically bland assemblage most crucial period. Valuable lessons may be of supporting characters. Serious readers, how- learned from the later wartime years of peak ever, will gladly trade a certain loss of dra- production and full mobilization, but the most matic intensity for the fuller, fairer record important insights are those to be gleaned afforded here. from the period when the nation was divided, Inevitably, in a study of the period from the troops were untrained, and weapons were 1939 to 1942, the dramatic focus gravitates to lacking. As Marshall put it: Study the first six the Pearl Harbor episode and the sensitive months, not the last six. And it is precisely the question of individual responsibility for the virtue of Pogue’s work that he has written disaster that marked the nation’s entry into the kind of biography that can be studied in the war. Here the author threads his way depth. Indeed, its most ardent readers will judiciously through the morass of evidence, undoubtedly be those conscientious young the written record, the subsequent testimony, officers who have discovered that the best and the partisan literature which surrounds professional education is what they dig out that event. It is by now an old story, told and for themselves as they read, reflect upon, and retold; he imparts little that is entirely new, reread books such as this. certainly no great revelations or fresh evi- No small part of the virtue of this book dence of a spectacular nature. What he does is the meticulous craftsmanship that has gone offer is a clear narrative in which the mistakes into its composition. As an Army historian in and errors of judgment made by all parties, World War II and as the author of The including General Marshall, are dispassion- Supreme Command in the Army’s official his- ately described and assessed. tory series, Pogue came to his task with years In the final analysis Pogue finds that it of experience and an impressive familiarity was circumstance rather than specific individ- with the personalities and sources involved. ual misjudgment that precipitated disaster. By Once embarked upon the biography, he spent way of example, consider this evaluation of thousands of hours interviewing literally hun- the fact that so many failed to appreciate the dreds of individuals—privates, generals, and significance of the crucial Japanese messages statesmen—at home and abroad. He and a intercepted and successfully broken by the considerable staff of assistants went through chief Army cryptanalyst: “A more serious weak- a mass of official files, private diaries, pub- ness was that recipients were not permitted to lished papers, and the like, in a way only keep a file of copies for comparison and care- possible for a subsidized enterprise such as ful study. The intercepts had to be returned BOOKS AND IDEAS 87

to the central file as soon as they were read and talked the way they believed a leader and all but a master copy destroyed. As a should.” p. 149) How does one deal with a result the cumulative evidence of Japanese mercurial President, with public critics, with intent was never spread out for examination tlie gentlemen of the press? at one time/’ (p. 198) This kind of sober analy- At another level, what is the difference sis may be far less dramatic than sensational between the regular enlisted soldier of peace- disclosures about individual misdeeds, but it time and the citizen soldier of wartime, and is more meaningful to the student of command. how does one deal with them most effectively? If one reads history to learn, it is well to (“Soldiers will tolerate almost anything in an remember that more is to be gleaned from the officer except unfairness and ignorance.” p. study of processes than from personalities. In I l l ) And how does one get the best results any future context, entirely new and complex when confronted with the countless political personalities will dart across the stage in rapid sensitivities of the National Guard? How does succession. But the processes or institutional one cope with soldier and home-front morale? factors, while changing, will change more (In what other nation would a Chief of Staff slowly, and procedures from 1941—such as the devote precious time every day to answering handling of secret information—will undoubt- personally a half-dozen letters from soldiers or edly continue to offer insights in 1971 and per- their families?) How can one be sure that the haps for still later generations. best men are promoted and the unfit are elim- Interesting and informative as the chap- inated? How does one go about selecting, ters on the Pearl Harbor disaster certainly are, training, and testing that inner circle of ad- they do not represent the real heart of this visers upon whom one must rely when there book. The soul-searing trial of George Mar- is no time for deliberation and verification? shall is only a single facet of what is in effect As the narrative unfolds, anecdote by an intensive study in command, a veritable anecdote, one learns how a planning staff manual on the art of leadership. In the space proceeds, how grand strategy is hammered made available by a multivolume approach, out amidst conflicting pressures, why maneu- the author is able to treat in lavish detail one vers are so necessary, and why physical fitness episode after another illustrating Marshall’s and stamina are no less important than brains. techniques for exercising leadership. These Here, too, one leams the tricks of the trade range from the evidently intuitive to the in practical ways, such as how to conduct an shrewdly contrived. And whether one aspires inspection. to be a future Chief of Staff or must settle From the book as a whole, taken as a for some lesser role, the insights offered here study of command, one observation emerges will more than reward the effort expended. inescapably: Behind all the skills or devices Some of the subjects Pogue develops in of leadership, as practiced by George Mar- depth can be suggested in a series of questions shall, lay a single all-important, all-pervasive that every student of command will appreci- attribute—integrity. This point is made re- ate: How does one achieve a proper relation- peatedly in one way or another (“a decent ship with one’s civilian superiors? When does regard for the opinions of others; a code of a proper subordination require one to speak the gentleman to be observed” p. 40), but it out boldly? How can one best relate to and is illustrated most forcefully in the account of make use of a valuable but prickly personality Marshall and the “plucking board” appointed (such as Bernard Baruch)? What is loyalty? to eliminate old and ineffective officers. So How can one be effectively loyal to a superior self-effacing was the Chief of Staff that he (Secretary Woodring) with whom one dis- urged upon the President his willingness to agrees and whom one probably dislikes? (“I submit his own name and step aside for a can t expect loyalty from the Army if I do not younger man. give it. p. 22) How can one appear most But Marshall was not replaced by a effectively before Congress? (“Marshall acted younger man, and for the future of the air 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

arm this fact made a great deal of difference. service there had something to do with the The long struggle for a separate air force led decision. But Pogue flatly asserts that Mar- almost inevitably to exaggerated accounts of shall’s “overrating of the current capacity of the the tensions and hostilities allegedly inhibit- heavy bomber” also helped develop the notion ing the new service within the Army. In reality, that the islands could “play a key role in de- Marshall was remarkably friendly to the Air terring further Japanese expansion toward the Corps. True, he resisted the move for an im- south.” (p. 186) mediate separation, but largely because he The high price of this “success” in selling realized, correctly, that the necessary re- air power to the Chief of Staff was almost sources, especially the trained staff officers, for immediately apparent. General Lewis Brere- such a radical step simply were not available. ton, who was selected to command the new Probably the best measure of Marshall’s air concentration in the Pacific outpost, was genuine appreciation of air power is reflected appalled to discover that his bomber force was in his protracted struggle to prevent the Presi- to be built up long before adequate fighter dent and even Secretary of War Stimson from aircraft would be available to defend it. The stripping the Army of its meager input of air- swift destruction of Brereton’s forces by the craft in order to supply the British. Here again Japanese invaders scarcely a year later would Pogue keeps the problem in perspective. In seem more than enough to have shattered retrospect, with one’s view obscured by those Marshall’s unrealistic expectations. But he did hundred thousand aircraft produced in the not lose faith in his aviators. Even when they peak year of 1944, one can easily forget how squandered the time given by a nine-hour hard Marshall had to fight. It helps if one advance warning and lost half their aiqffanes recalls that as late as April 1940 a House com- on the ground, he continued to be a generous mittee cut the Army’s allotment of new planes advocate of greater air power and further for the following year to a mere 57 items. autonomy for the air arm. In passing, it should Pogue drives the point home, and incidentally be remarked that the author sheds no new underscores Marshall’s appreciation of air light on this long-unanswered historical ques- power, in his account of how the General had tion why MacArthur’s aircraft were caught so to struggle to dissuade President Roosevelt flatfooted. from turning over to the British every other Despite the disasters in the Pacific, Gen- B-17 that rolled off the production line. A eral Marshall soon gave concrete evidence of poor public speaker, the Chief of Staff could his continued belief in both air power and his be eloquent when he spoke from strong con- airmen by his thoroughgoing reorganization viction. And in one dramatic encounter he of the Army in March 1942. Not only did he stunned the President into at least temporary choose a tough and colorful flyer. General Joe acquiescence by grimly announcing that he McNamey, as the principal draftsman—better had only 49 bombers in the entire United said “hatchetman”—of that reorganization, but States fit for duty. the structure that emerged, the Army Air General Arnold and his enthusiastic young Forces, marked the real beginning of mean- subordinates were, if anything, rather too suc- ingful autonomy for the air arm. The author’s cessful in their pleas for air power. Pogue detailed account of the skillful tactics Mar- makes it clear that they oversold Marshall shall employed to push through this massive on the B-17 and its potential. For many years reorganization is a textbook in itself. He tells previously, official thinking in the War De- how the coup was planned, how the opposi- partment had regarded the Philippines as in- tion was circumvented, and, above all, the defensible. Then late in 1940, under Marshall’s price the Chief of Staff had to pay in human lead, this policy was reversed. Doubtless the relationships. presence in the islands of such a strong per- Certainly no single feature of Pogue’s sonality as MacArthur and Marshall’s own book makes a greater impression than do his emotional attachment stemming from his early reiterated accounts of the enormous pressures BOOKS AND IDEAS 89

—moral, social, physical—that must be home phasis is on the tension, the crushing burdens, by those in command. The anguish of the under which the Chief of Staff labored as he Chief of Staff when compelled to dismiss sought to reconcile the exigent demands of an faltering officers, the shattered friendships, the invasion of North Africa and a secondary recrimination of wives and families—all are theater in the Pacific, where the unexpected poignantly described. So too are his relations reverses at Guadalcanal threatened to absorb with such difficult personalities as General an incredible share of available resources. Hugh Drum, General “Vinegar Joe” Stillwell, and, of course, General Douglas MacArthur, all of whom stand revealed in skillfully drawn Read this book. Do more than read it: Study sketches garnished with anecdote. There are it. Though it is only a fragment of the Pogue happier sketches, such as those of Marshall’s portrait of General George Marshall, it is an warm relations with Sir John Dill, chief important fragment; one sees the man, warts British representative in Washington, and and all, sometimes ill-tempered, sometimes with a rising young staff officer named Eisen- gravely mistaken, but unfailingly a man of hower. But, friendly interludes apart, the em- remarkable strength of character, a true leader. Durham, North Carolina

THE REDISCOVERY OF RENE FONCK

Major Philip M. F lammer

OR many years, a major gap in the other- Fwise overloaded field of World War I aviation history has been the conspicuous failure to tell the story of Captain Rene Fonck, a superb airman, the top French ace, and the ranking Allied ace as well. The recent and dramatic upsurge of inter- est in World War I aviation makes this the ideal time to rectify the unfortunate oversight. Welcome news, then, is the announcement that Doubleday & Company, Inc., and the editors of the “Air Combat Classics” series have 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW made Fonck’s memoirs available under the title, fashionable to believe that Guynemer had not Ace of Aces, t died at all but had flown directly into heaven. By official count, Fonck shot down 75 “Surely he was a god,” one otherwise careful German airplanes; by his own tally, he had an biographer noted. additional 52 unconfirmed ones, enough to Perhaps the main reason for inundating make him the most effective fighter pilot of Guynemer with honors was the fact that this the war. On 9 May 1917 he shot down six frail and sickly flyer matched perfectly the in a single day. Three months later, on 14 popular image of what a World War I ace August, he shot down three in the space of should be. Courage rather than cunning, elan ten seconds, and the following month (on 26 or spirit rather than skill were the keys. Blind September) he had another sextuple. Yet to danger, he would brave the enemy field of throughout his career, first as a pilot of ob- fire to trigger off a few shots at murderously servation planes and then as a fighter pilot, close range. His own pain or death counted he was never touched by an enemy bullet. for nothing. He would willingly fight any Fonck’s incredible record speaks for itself. time, any place, against any odds. While both sides had superb airmen who were Of course Guynemer paid the price. Eight not aces and aces who were mediocre airmen, times he was shot down, more than any other Fonck was clearly in a class by himself. As ace. Also, on numerous occasions he came Kenneth Driggs, an early chronicler of World back from combat with his plane badly shot War I aviation, put it, “No other man, living up. But this only added to the luster. “Guyne- or dead, has ever equalled this marvelous mer the Miraculous” had an image etched in pilot in air dueling.” Why, then, the long neg- blood, some of it his own. lect? In a recent book on the French aces of Guynemer’s dash and daring contrasted World War I, for example, a respected author sharply with Fonck’s cold, knifelike efficiency. devoted less than two pages to Fonck and set Fonck truly admired “our national hero” and those in a chapter about an American airman counted him among his friends, but he be- who flew for France. Another author, in a lieved Guynemer’s method of attack to be book on the same topic, made a single refer- foolish. If the overall purpose was to hurt the ence to Fonck, remarking as a passing thought enemy as much as possible, there were obvi- that he was the one to shoot down the killer ously better ways of doing it. of Georges Guynemer. Fonck found his guide to aerial combat To this reviewer, several explanations in birds of prey, which he had watched and occur. The first lies in the overshadowing pres- admired since childhood. They shunned chiv- tige accorded Guynemer before and after his alry; they made a cautious and patient ap- death. With 54 victories, Guynemer was a proach, followed by a sudden swoop and swift living legend, with the title “Ace of Aces” kill. Could not these same techniques, he rea- before he vanished on 11 September 1917. soned, be applied to air combat, where the After his death, of course, his prestige soared game of survival was much the same? Fonck even higher. Tributes, books, and articles ap- believed they could, and in time he adopted peared by the hundreds, his last citation was the clever and delicate maneuvering into the duly inscribed on the walls of the Pantheon in most favorable position, the sudden kill, and Paris, and French air forces began the tradi- the refusal to fight against prohibitive odds. tional ceremony of gathering each year on the To gain the advantage, Fonck went to anniversary of his death to hear the citation lengths undreamed of by most airmen. He read: “Legendary hero, fallen at the full height studied his opponents carefully, acquiring, as of glory. . . Indeed, in some circles it was he put it, “a thorough knowledge of the strat-

fRene Fonck, Ace of Aces, trans. Martin H. Sabin and Stanley M. Ulanoff, ed. Stanley M. Ulanoff (“Air Combat Classics"; Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967, $4.95), xxv and 164 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

egy of the enemy fighter, reconnaissance, and to emphasize the snarling dogfights, the spec- range-intelligence pilots.” He also kept his tacular deaths, and the flowing gore. Bullets senses honed to razor’s edge, even to the point must be “splattered by the thousands" and of avoiding completely the wartime necessities cockpits “awash with blood.” With every ad- of alcohol and tobacco. Finally, he practiced venture necessarily an epic, the writers auto- self-control the same way he practiced marks- matically turned to Guynemer and a hundred manship. “To obtain good results,” he once lesser fights who “make good copy.” On the counseled, “you must know how to control other hand, since Fonck’s exploits, by contrast, your nerves, how to have absolute self-mastery, are relatively dull and uninteresting, he was and how to think coolly in difficult situations. tacitly passed over. Fonck himself obviously I have had to duel with great Boche aces and sensed this lack of interest. He passes off seven have had the patience, while fighting, to wait kills in the month of October 1917—including for the moment my adversaries gave way to three in one day—with the terse comment, nervous irritation—the fatal mistake. . . .” “During the month of October 1 succeeded Still, Fonck’s marvelous self-mastery' would again in some good kills but the story does have let him lag in the ranks of the aces had not offer anything particularly exciting to he not been blessed with incredible aerial recount.” marksmanship. Admitting that his aim was The overall result of Guynemer’s domi- “legendary among my comrades,” he added, nating shadow and the imaginative, journalis- “My bursts are from eight to ten bullets at tic approach to World War I aviation has been the maximum, and I often do not use more a conspicuous lack of good foundation material than three.” Perhaps no other airman on either on Fonck, particularly for the serious, English- side of the fines could say with the certitude speaking student or reader. Many of those with and calmness of Rene Fonck that two of the a compelling interest in the subject do not even enemy escaped “certain death” because of the know that Fonck wrote his own storv, which “jamming of my machine gun.” was published in Paris in 1920 under the title, In his own story', Fonck does not seem to Mes Combats. And those who have known of have resented Guyoiemer’s glory or comparison it have been at a loss to explain how such an of himself with the super hero. On the con- important book could escape translation into trary', he greatly admired Guyaiemer and fists English year after year. as one of his proudest moments his victory It is safe to say that most readers, like this over one Captain Wissemann, an obscure Ger- reviewer, will find some faults with Fonck’s man airman who claimed to have shot down book. Despite the claims of the editors, Fonck Guynemer.® He does say that he took over was not as gifted with the pen as fie was with his friend’s title of “Ace of Aces,” but then this the plane. Also, the book is lamentably short. was a title that had to be given him by others. One cannot read it without wishing that Fonck Overall, however, the public was not generous had taken the time to describe his techniques with Fonck, and by the time he began cutting and combats in considerably more detail. a path through the Germans, the French peo- These failings, however, are minor com- ple had already chosen their supreme hero. pared to the overall worth of Ace of Aces. The Henceforth they automatically judged Fonck’s very fact that the most accomplished airman exploits in Guynemer’s shadow. of World War I wrote the book about his fly- A second and more tragic reason for the ing experiences qualifies it for wide dissemina- neglect of Rene Fonck lies in the attitudes and tion. The fact that it fills a gap in a prime field ambitions of those who have exploited the of interest, rectifying an oversight and perhaps aces for literary profit. For some reason, all an injustice, marks it for an honored place too many aviation writers have felt compelled on the bookshelf of every student of aviation °There is considerable doubt as to Wissemann's claim. history. Fonck seems to accept it at face value, but most authorities, noting discrepancies as to time and place, pass the claim off as United States Air Force Academy a bid for instant fame. THE STORY OF THE SOVIET RED ARMY- OR AT LEAST HALF THE STORY

Dr . K ennet h R. Whiting

ULL-DRESS histories of the Soviet with some aspect of it would run into the hun- F Armed Forces are not as plentiful as the dreds. They range from Raymond GarthofFs importance of the subject would seem to war- classic analysis of Soviet tactics and strategy rant. D. Fedotoff White’s The Growth of the in his Soviet Military Doctrine to Alexander Red Army, published by the Princeton Univer- Werth’s Russia at War, 1941-1945, which al- sity Press way back in 1944, was a pioneering most uncritically accepts the Russian version work and is still a landmark in the field of Soviet of the conflict. military history. In fact, White’s book held its The development of the Soviet Armed pre-eminence until the publication of John Forces since 1945 has received far less cover- Erickson’s comprehensive volume in 1962.1 age, which is understandable although regret- Both of these scholarly tomes, however, leave table. The fact is that the Russian armies have off just as the Red Army was getting its real not been engaged in hostilities, with the excep- baptism of fire in World War II, or, as the tion of a rather inglorious escapade in Hungary Soviets call their part of that war, “The Great in 1956, and “peacetime” armies are not as ex- Fatherland War.” In 1959 Michel Garder’s citing to write about as those which are at war. Histoire de L’Armee Sovietique brought the However, the works of Garthoff, Dinerstein, story up to 1958,2 but the lack of any citations Wolfe, and others in the last two decades pro- for M. Garder’s sometimes fascinating state- vide excellent analyses of Soviet military doc- ments was enough to drive any self-respecting trine, strategy, and weapons development in student of the Red Army to drink. the postwar period. For those who read Russian, there has The point I am making is this: To get a been a veritable deluge of memoirs, histories, complete picture of the development of the and specialized articles dealing primarily with armed forces of the Soviet Union from 1918 to the Great Fatherland War. The Soviets have the present, one has to consult a veritable li- even produced a six-volume work, Istoriya brary of books and articles. With the exception Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo of Garder’s slight volume, the whole story was Soyuza, 1941-1945 (“The History of the Great just not available in a single book. This is the Fatherland War of the Soviet Union, 1941- vacuum which Malcolm Mackintosh has at- 1945”), written by a horde of Soviet scholars tempted to fill with his latest book.f On the dust and published between 1960 and 1965. This jacket of the book are the dates “1918-1966,” work has enabled the historian, carefully dis- which one assumes is a promise, or at least an counting Soviet biases, to get a better-rounded implication, that the two decades since 1945 picture than when he was entirely dependent would finally get a more adequate historical upon the German accounts of the war. Finally, coverage. Upon examination of the book, how- in the last few years a Soviet journal, Voenno- ever, the coverage of the last two decades turns Istoricheskiy Zhurnal (“Military-Historical out to be skimpy, to say the least. Only fifteen Journal”), has provided much excellent mate- percent of the book (44 of 312 pages) is devoted rial with which to fill in many gaps. to the 1945-1966 period, while thirty-five per- Any enumeration of all the books and cent (110 pages) goes to the two decades before articles available in English which deal either 1939, already so well done by Erickson, and fifty with the Great Fatherland War as a whole or percent (158 pages) is taken up with \\ orld

f M alcolm M ackintosh, Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces (New York: Macmillan, 1967, $6.95), 320 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

War II, about which there is already a plethora use airborne forces in maneuvers. But the whole of accounts. In short, Mr. Mackintosh’s pub- program was nearly wrecked in the 1937-39 lishers have whetted the reader’s appetite with period when Stalin’s paranoiac purge of Tuk- those nice dates on the dust jacket, but the con- hachevsky and some 35,000 other high-ranking tents of the book do not live up to the billing. officers in the Red Army brought the whole Furthermore, like M. Garder’s opus, the book is military machine to the verge of chaos. The almost entirely lacking in such scholarly ap- results of the Stalinist bloodbath showed up paratus as citations of sources to back up the in the poor performance of the Red Army in narrative ( about thirty all told) and has a the winter war with Finland (1939-40): well meager bibliography of twenty-eight items, over a million well-armed men were stalled for although the author does enumerate his main months before a thinly defended Finnish line, sources in the preface. Much of this criticism and the Soviet losses were almost unbelievable. is unfair, however, as Mr. Mackintosh makes no This bitter experience did, however, pinpoint pretense that this is a work of original research some of the Red Army’s worst shortcomings aimed at a scholarly audience. On the contrary, and resulted in the replacement of Voroshilov it is frankly a short history of the Soviet Red as the defense chief, an event long overdue. Army based on the standard accounts available Mackintosh is at his best in describing the in Russian and English, and it should be judged “human” element in the purges, but like all as such. historians he is unable to explain why it hap- Mackintosh shortchanges the Civil War, pened. This is a task for the student of ab- especially the momentous events of the key normal psychology, not for the historian. year 1919, but he does an excellent job in de- The heart of the book, the story of the scribing the war with Poland in 1920. He also Great Fatherland War, is well written. There points out that the bitter feuds which emerged is plenty of material for the historian to work as a result of the catastrophe before Warsaw with, it is an exciting story, and the author does were to have ominous repercussions in later not let himself get bogged down in irrelevant years when Stalin and his buddies, Voroshilov detail. His own experience with the Red Army and Budenny, got Tukhachevsky’s head on a during World War II gives an immediacy to his platter. writing; he shows a feel for the magnitude of The great debate over the proper military the conflict as the enormous armies seesawed doctrine for the new Red Army—in other words, back and forth over the plains of Russia. what form and size it would take, what its It is the last section of the book, the history tactics and strategy would be—is handled in a of the Red Army since 1945, that is disappoint- rather cavalier fashion by Mackintosh. On the ing. The whole saga of the transformation of other hand, he expertly describes the semi- the enormous ground-force-dominated Red secret Reichswehr-Red Army collaboration be- Army that emerged from World War II into the tween 1921 and 1933 in about six pages—a mas- present Soviet Armed Forces, replete with terly feat of condensation. sophisticated weaponry and technologically His account of the transition of the Red skilled personnel, is handled in an almost dis- Army from a predominantly militia force ( with dainful manner. The reader gets the impression a regular force of only 563,000) in the 1920s to that the author simply tacked this skimpy sec- a multimillion-man regular army in the late tion onto the main body of the work to give 1930s, when the industrial base to make the the appearance of completeness—or at least live transformation possible had been erected, is up to the billing on the dust jacket. very well done. This was the heyday of I have a great deal of sympathy for Mr. Tukhachevsky’s influence on the Red Army’s Mackintosh in his dilemma of how to get a half- tactics and strategy—tactics and strategy that century of history into a slim volume; I have took advantage of the mobility engendered by tried the trick myself with less than magnificent the acquisition of aircraft, tanks, and motor results.3 But in a world that is inclined to look vehicles. He was even the first commander to with awful fascination at the enormous military 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW machine now available to the Kremlin rulers, But for all the weeping and wailing of this one any book that advertises itself as a description reader about the anticlimax of Mr. Mackintosh’s of the development of that force up to 1966 and opus, it is nevertheless a good little history of then treats the climax of the story in the last the Red Army from 1918 to 1945 and is well two decades in such a slighting manner is worth reading for that period. bound to irritate a large number of readers. Aerospace Studies Institute

Notes A History of the Soviet Army, New York: Praeger, 1966), and 1. John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military- the story has been brought down to 1964. John Erickson has Political History, 1918—1941 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, inserted some notes and references in this edition. 1962). 3. Kenneth R. Whiting, The Development of the Sooief 2. The work is now available in English (Michel Garder, Armed Forces, 1918—1966 (Maxwell AFB: Air University, 1966).

The Contributors

of Requirements, DCS/D, to 1955; Adviser in Aviation Medicine to the Deputy Commander, Ninth Air Force, Central Government, China, to 1946. to 1957; Deputy Commander, Twelfth Other assignments have been as In- Air Force, to 1959; Director of Opera- structor and Department Head, USAF tional Requirements, DCS/O, Hq School of Aviation Medicine, to 1950; USAF, to 1961; Deputy Commander, student. Strategic Intelligence School; Chief of Staff, and Deputy Com- Assistant Air Attache, London, to mander in Chief, U.S. Strike Com- 1953; Surgeon, 19th Air Division, mand, to 1965; Commander in Chief, SAC, and Director, Base Medical U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and Com- Services, Carswell AFB, Texas, to mander, Fourth Allied Tactical Air 1957; Base Commander, RAF Bur- Force, Germany, until his present derop Park, and Commander, 7505th assignment in August 1966. USAF Hospital, England, to 1959; Assistant for Life Sciences, Deputy Inspector General for Safety, Norton AFB, California, to 1961; Command Surgeon, Military Air Transport Serv- ice, to 1963; Deputy Surgeon General, USAF, to 1966; and Command Sur- geon, Strategic Air Command, until his present appointment on 1 Decem- ber 1967.

G en er a l Bruce K. H olloway (USMA) is Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. After pilot training in 1938, he served two years with the 6th Pursuit Squadron and the 18th Pursuit Group in Hawaii before study- ing aeronautical engineering at the California Institute of Technology. In China from June 1942 to December 1943, he became a fighter ace while L ie u t e n a n t Gen er a l Kenneth E. serving first with the American Volun- P letcher (M.D., Washington Uni- teer Group (Flying Tigers), later, after versity) is Surgeon General, United its absorption into the U.S. Army Air States Air Force. He was commissioned Forces, as Commander, 23d Fighter in the Medical Reserve in 1936 and C olonel Donald F. M artin is Chief, Group. In 1946 he commanded the entered active duty in 1940, attending Plans and Programs Division, Office first jet-equipped fighter group at Medical Field Service School, Carlisle of Information, Office of the Secretary March Field, California. Other assign- Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the School of the Air Force. He entered the serv- ments have been as student. Air Com- of Aviation Medicine, Randolph Field, ice as an aviation cadet and was grad- mand and Staff School (1947) and Texas, where he remained two years uated from pilot training in 1943. National War College (1951); as to teach. After duty in the Office of Assigned to the Eighth Air Force, Chief, Air Defense Division, DCS/D, the Air Surgeon, he served as Surgeon, England, he flew 30 combat missions. Hq USAF, to 1953; Deputy Director 1st Air Division, Okinawa, then as His postwar assignments have been as student. Statistical School, Harvard University; in the Comptroller's Office, Headquarters Air Materiel Command; in the Comptroller’s Office, 59tli Air Depot Wing, Burtonwood, England, 1948-51; in the Directorate of Flight Safety Research, Norton AFB, Cali- fornia, 1951—54; as student. Air Com- mand and Staff College, 1955; in the Strategic Air Command, 1955—58, be- coming Deputy Director of Opera- tions, 38th Air Division, in 1957; in the Directorate of Plans, DCS/Plans and Operations, Hq USAF. 1958—63; D r . P aul S. H olbo (Ph.D., Univer- M ajor Gen er a l Ber t r a m C. H ar- in charge of Project CHECO (Con- sity of Chicago) is Associate Professor rison (USMA) is Director of Man- temporary' Historical Evaluation of and Director of Graduate Studies in power and Organization, Hq USAF. Counterinsurgency Operations), Hq History, University of Oregon. He During World War II he served in PACAF, 1963-65; and in the Tactical served with the U.S. Army, 1951—53. and commanded bomb groups in both Evaluation Center, Hq PACAF, from 1965 until his present assignment in He has taught at the University of the China-Burma-India and Mediter- June 1966. Colonel Martin completed Chicago and lectured at Reed College, ranean Theaters. Postwar assignments the Air War College Seminar Pro- University of Illinois, and Indiana have been as Commander, 320th University. He is Chief Reader for Wing, Walla Walla, Washington, 1946; gram in 1966. the Advanced Placement American as Commander, Munich Air Base, History, Educational Testing Service, later 60th Troop Carrier Group, Wies- Princeton, New Jersey, and Examiner baden AB, to 1948; in Strategic Air in American History, College En- Command as deputy or commander trance Examination Board, New York. of groups, wings, or divisions, 1950- Professor Holbo is editor of Isolation- 57; in Hq USAF as Deputy Director ism and Interventionism. 1932—1941 of Personnel Procurement and Train- (1967), and his articles and reviews ing, to 1960; as Deputy Commander, have been widely published in profes- Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area, to sional journals. 1962; as Director of Systems Inspec- tion, USAF Inspector General, Norton AFB, California, to 1963; and as Deputy Inspector General, USAF, at Norton, until his present assignment in July 1965. General Harrison is a graduate of the Command and Gen- eral Staff School and the Armed Forces Staff College. Dr . T homas C. S chelling (Ph.D., Harvard University) is Professor of Economics and a faculty member of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. From 1948 to 1953 he was with the ECA Mission to Denmark, the Office of the ECA Spe- cial Representative in Paris, the Spe- cial Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Di- rector for Mutual Security, and the Foreign Operations Administration. L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Walter P. From 1953 to 1958 he was in the De- M a iersperc er , USAF (Ret), (B.M.E., partment of Economics, Yale Univer- College of the City of New York) sity. During 1958-59 he was with the is Senior Aeronautical Engineer, Re- R oman A. M et z (B.S., University of RAND Corporation. During 1965-66 search Analysis Corporation, McLean, Wisconsin) is a Systems Consultant, he was Acting Director of the Center Virginia. He completed flying training Maintenance & Engineering, for op- for International Affairs. He has been in 1940 and served throughout World erational intercontinental ballistic mis- a regular lecturer on national security War II in engineering assignments in siles and Command Consultant foi policy at several war colleges and the Australia, Far East Air Forces, Neth- Protective Construction, Headquarters Foreign Service Institute and a con- erlands East Indies, and at Wright Strategic Air Command. During sultant to the Departments of State Field, Ohio, as Chief Engineer in World War II he was chief of the and Defense, the Arms Control and charge of reconstruction of captured hydraulic and pneumatic laboratory Disarmament Agency, the RAND foreign airplanes. In 1946 he was of the Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Corporation, the Institute for Defense USAF Technical Observer on Cana- Company. Afterward he served five Analyses, etc. He was a member of dian Arctic Exercise "Musk-Ox.” years with the Omaha District Corps the Scientific Advisory Board, USAF, After a year with Trans World Air- of Engineers on design and construc- 1960-63, and of the Research Ad- lines, he rejoined the Air Force and tion of dams and flood control proj- visory Board, Committee for Eco- served as Chief, Special Projects ects. He has been with SAC since nomic Development, 1961-64. Dr. Branch, Weapon Systems Division, 1950 except for three years as engi- Schelling is the author of Arms and Wright Field, 1947-53; and Staff neer with engineering and consultant Influence (1966), Strategy and Arms Engineer, Directorate of Research firms in New York and Omaha. Mr. Control (with Morton H. Halperin, and Development, Hq USAF, 1953- Metz is a Registered Professional 1961), The Strategy of Conflict 57. Since his retirement he was with Mechanical Engineer, Nebraska, and (1960), International Economics All American Engineering Company his articles have appeared in Air Force (1958), and National Income Behavior and International Resistance Company Civil Engineer and other professional (1951). until his present position in 1964. journals. the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces from 1945 until he accepted an appointment at Duke in 1947. Professor Holley is the author of Ideas and Weapons (1953) and Buying Aircraft: Air Materiel Pro- curement for the Army Air Forces, a volume in the official history. The United States Army in World War II, as well as of numerous articles and reviews in professional journals.

C aptain Howard G. J a n ssen (B.A., University of Colorado) is an intelli- gence programs officer at Headquar- ters USAF Security Service (USAFSS), San Antonio, Texas. After four years Dh . R obert H. S tacy (Ph.D., Syra- of enlisted duty with the U.S. Air cuse University) is Assistant Professor Force as a language interpreter of Russian Literature and Editor, (1955—59), he received a degree in Translation Center, East European languages and Soviet/Central Euro- Language Program, Syracuse Univer- pean Affairs and taught high school sity. He served with Army Military German and Russian. He returned to Intelligence during World War II as the Air Force and was commissioned an aerial photo interpreter. Although at Officer Training School in 1962. M ajor Philip M. Flammer (Ph.D., his primary interests are literary and As an intelligence specialist he has Yale University) is a Tenure Associate historical, he has a special interest in served six years overseas, returning Professor of History, U.S. Air Force Soviet military aviation. Dr. Stacy from Berlin, Germany, to his present Academy. He entered the Air Force has written a number of articles on assignment in July 1966. Captain in 1953 and after flying training was Russian literature for professional Janssen was graduated from Squadron assigned to the 1st Weather Group. journals. Officer School in April 1967. Offutt AFB, Nebraska, as pilot, group comptroller, and historical officer. His next assignment was at Hq Air Weather Service, Andrews AFB, Maryland, where he became Chief. Historical Division, and earned his master’s degree in history at George Washington University. Since 1958 he has been with the Department of History, USAFA, except for two years at Yale under the AFIT program. Major Flammer’s articles have ap- peared in Air University Review, Air Power Historian, and Military Review.

D r . Kenneth R. W hitinc (Ph.D., Harvard University) is a member of D r . I rving Brinton Holley, J r . Aerospace Studies Institute and of the (Ph.D., Yale University) is Professor, faculty. Air University. He formerly History Department, Duke University, taught Russian history at Tufts Col- and a colonel in the Air Force Re- lege. Dr. Whiting is the author of The M rs. O lga S. F edoroff (B.S., North- serve, in which he takes an active Soviet Union Today: A Concise Hand- western University) is an instructor part in reserve affairs. He enlisted in book (1962) and of numerous studies and translator. East European Lan- the Army, rose to staff sergeant as an and monographs on Russian subjects, guage Program, Syracuse University. instructor in aerial gunnery, was com- including Readings in Soviet Military Mrs. Fedoroff is also secretary- missioned from Officer Candidate Theory, Essays on Soviet Problems of treasurer of the New York-New Jersey School, and served as a gunnery Nationality and Industrial Manage- Regional Chapter, American Associa- officer in the First Air Force and in ment, Iron Ore Resources of the tion of Teachers of Slavic and East technical intelligence at Headquarters U.S.S.R., and Materials on the Soviet European Languages. Air Materiel Command. He was on Petroleum Industry.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “The KC-135 in Southeast Asia” by Major Frank H. McArdle, USAF, as the outstanding article in the January- February 1968 issue of the Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF Lieut en a n t Colonel Eldon W. Downs, USAF, Editor Jack H. Mooney, Managing Editor Major Robert G. S pa r k ma n , USAF, Chief, Acquisition Branch Edmund O. Barker, Financial and Administrative Manager John A. W est c ot t . J r .. Art Director and Production Manager Enrique Gaston, Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L. Mido si May Patterson. Assistant Editor, Portuguese Language Edition Wil l ia m J. De Paola, Art Editor and Illustrator Fir st Lieut en a n t Jer r y R. Stringer, USAF, Editorial Project Officer

ADVISERS

C olonel Mer r itt G. Garner, Hq Military Airlift Command C olonel Alfred J. L yn n , IIq Strategic Air Command C olonel Marvin M. Stanley, Hq Tactical Air Command C olonel Rea de F. T il l e y , Hq Air Defense Command L ie u t e n a n t C olonel Cec il C. F urbish, Hq Air Force Logistics Command L ie u t e n a n t Colonel James F. Sunderman, llq U.S. Strike Command D r . H arold Hel fma n , Hq Air Force Systems Command L a V er n e E. W oods, Hq Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories

ATTENTION

Air University Review is published to stimulate professional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents re- flect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi- tors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Depart- fffent of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW