86'- ' Its Departure for Overseas Duty in Great Britain

CHAa IV *I 'THE STORY OP VIII FIGHT CM " began The formation of a long-range fighter organization VIII Interceptor early in 1942 with the activation of the Fighter Comnand, at Coand, which later was renamed the VIII 1, 1942. The Comanding Selfridge Field, Michigan on February who had been in oamand Officer was Colonel Laurence P. Hiokey, VIII Interceptor of the Sixth Pursuit Wing, from which the to Charleston, South Command was developed. The Command moved to be close to the Carolina on the 11th of February in. order located at Savannah, headquarters of the 8th Air Force, then The 8th Air Georgia, where it was preparing for embarkation. be prepared to carry Force was organised in such a way aa to invasion of North Afrioa out the "Torch Plan' for the eventual General Frank O'D. which oame in November, 1942. Brigadier shortly before Hunter assumed oommand of the organisation

Officer Richard The author is indebted to Chief Warrant (*1 - at VIII Fighter A. Bates of the A-2 Section (Intelligence) history of the Comnand. Comand for the facts about the early whn it _as activated in Febru- Mr. Bates was its lst Stergeant of the became Teohnical Sergeant ana Chief Olerk ary, 1942, hiatorian until July IntelligenCe Section and was its official data was not otherwise available. The Sta- 1943. Much of this later, has Control Office which was establiahed muoh tistical but these facts proided-invaluable data on later operations, from his own records, from his friends "'oaptured for posterity" are based on his and from a most retentive memory. The facts of twenty- i months in the Theater. seprienoe Squadron (ormerly 2 - General Hunter was an ace of the 103rd Group, World War I.) the Lafayette Squadron) of thx 3rd Prsu.t - 86'- ' its departure for overseas duty in Great Britain. '

The VIII Fighter Command established its headquarters at

High Wycombe, England on May 12, 1942 with six officers and other fifty enlisted men, in the first of three echelons. The officers, two echelons arrived early in June. A small nucleus of the Station Commandant, Adjutant General, A-2 and A-4 officers, com- Medical and Signals officers arrived in advance and the on plete headquarters was set up at Bushy Hall, Hertfordshire

July 27, with about fifteen officers and 200 enlisted men.

Prom that small nucleus the VIII Fighter Command eventually

grew, despite many vicissitudes and disappointing set-backa,

to three wings and fifteen groups, a total of about 30,000 es- officers and men, which included the vast number of ground in the air. tablishments necessary to keoop its thousand aircraft up a Thus in May, 1942, work was begun on the plan to build

fighter force formidable enough to meet the enemy's greatest lair, strength and with enough range to tackle the enemy in his skies. If and to eliminate his fighter force from Earopean freely and that became an actuality, the bombers could range precedents upon smash Germany's will to resist. There were no given which to work for never before had a fighter force been other such a goal. With the knowledge gained from watching

operations, the strategic plans were laid, while the technicians

- 8'7 - ' .',7 , ...... y' ^H BEB@' , .; , A -E A.ShA or.,.

strove to achieve more and more range

Fighter Command set as the goal, full and adequate escort of the "Flying Fortresses" (B-17's) and "Liberatora" (B-24'sl of the 8th Air Force on their daylight strategic raids deep into

Germany, in order to prevent the enemy fighters from bothering their "Big Friends". Thus assured of an unmolested bomb run on important industrial targets, the bombing would attain the pre- oision necessary to knock out the factories and stop production of vital war products. It was a strategic goal which might not be possible of attainment without such escort.

P-38'o FLY THE ATLANTIC

A hint of what would have to be done later, by the VIII

Fighter Command, is found in a history-making flight of P-38's under the command of General Hunter. That flight of short- range fighter aircraft across the Atlantic Ocean was epoch- maling since, if successful, it would save most of the time needed to prepare aircraft for shipment by sea and subsequent reassembly upon arrival in England, besides an enormous amount

of cargo space would be made available for other vital war ship- ments. The submarine menance was at its height and every ton

of cargo space saved was vital. General Hunter and four of

his staff, including Colonel Ben S. Kelsey, Colonel James E.

Briggs, Colonel John K. Gerhard and Major Cass. S. Hough*3 undertook the task of preparing to fly the "Lightning*"-'

(P-38'a) to Ebgland. General Hunter and his staff flew in two

B-17's which acted as guides for the eight fighter aircraft.

They took off from Presque Isle, Maine on July 18 and landed in Preatwick, Scotland on July 27, having came via Goose. Bay,

Labrador, (B.W.1), Greenland, Iceland, and Stornoway, Scotland.

With the offioers in the B-17'a, it is interesting to note, were also the following technical enlisted men who partioi- pated in the historic flight: - T/Sgt. (now 1st Lt) William T.

Hogg, M/Sgt (now C.W.0.) Clarence C. Breed, M/Sgt (now Capt.)

Robert H. Shafe, S/Sgt. (now M/Sgt) Fmanuel Helzer, Sgt (now

T/S3gt)Joe Earley, and Sgt. (now S/Sgt) Donald W. Dunbar. It was the first time fighter aircraft had ever been called upon to make suoh a flight, the majority of it over water; a great deal of unpredictable weather had to be encountered, but sany lessons, learned during that flight, have been invaluable in

(e3 - Colonel Case S. Hough, former head of the Air Technical Section of VIII Fighter Co--and, became Deputy Chief, under Col. Kelsey, of the Technical Engineering Section (now called the Technical Section} of the 8th Air Force at Bovingdon and was primarily responsible for the development of the 'Belly Tanks" which made long-range fighter escort a reality. He has supplied most of the data for this great achievement as recorded in this book, as well as many other technical improve- menta in our fighter aircraft. He is a great test pilot and dove the P-38's and P1-47's at the incredible speed of over 700 miles per hour and lived to record his findings. Colonel Hough is oae of the greatest, though little publicised, operational engineering technicians of the 8th Air Force.

- 89 - in the technical reaearoh conducted to perfect long-range , fighter aircraft.

The first organizational blueprints for the VIII Fighter

Cociand called for a large force of fighters to be built around the two groups, the lot and 31st, which were already assigned to the comand. The former was equipped with P-S8's, all of which had been flown across the Atlantio, and the latter was given the famoua British 'Spitfireoa. Both groupa retained

those two types of aircraft while under control of the VIII

Pighter Comand, until they were posted to the Mediterranean

in October, 1942.

iST FIG=TB (GOUP *4

The lat Fighter Group, rich in history of World War 1, was

divided between Cohill and Kirtor-in-Lindsey on June 10, 1942.

The 71st and 94th Sqaedrons operated from Ibaley, and later

from Coxbil34 all began their first operations from these RAP

stationa. The firat to arriv in Eagland in early May, was the

31st Fighter Group, with the 307th, 308th and 309th Squadrons;

they were located at Atoham on July 11, 1942. A training

(*4 - The 94th ('Hsat in the MRg") and the 27th wyre, together with the 95th and the 147th, the four famous aquadrons of the lat Purauit Group of World War I.)

90,- program was :*stituted imn diately in order to get inexperieno- - ed pilots and ground orew on an operational status an soon as possible. It was only the close co-operation and full support of the RAP that the task was completed and the 31at Group was able "to go on Ops" (Operations) early in August, and took part in the Dieppe raid. The 307th Squadron operated from Biggin

Hill, the 30Oth from Kenley and the 309th Squadron from West

Hampnett, all fighter fields, which were loaned by the RAP. On

August 24, the 307th Squadron moved to Merston and the 308th

Squadron joined the 309th at West Hampnett, a satellite air- field of famous Tangemere of the Battle of Britain days. The group remained on an operational status until October 10, 1942 at whioh time it was removed from the operational list in order to prepare for the North African invasion. The 1st Group was

also first to become operational with four sorties by the 94th

Squadron on August 29th, which consisted of two "sorambles" by

two aircraft each. No enemy aircraft were seen and the flights

were entirely uneventful, but they marked the first time the

P1-38's were used on operational flights in the war against

Germany, indeed the first American fighter planes to go into

action over Europe in World War II.

- 91-

^Ss: : E ^*^~~~~~~~~~~~ f"; IR.A.FP. LIAISON WITH THE VIII PIaHT.: OW;! -

'It was in late May, 1942, when w wero nformed W first squadrons of Amrioan fighter pilots were about to arrive in this country. Two asrodromes were to be put at their dis- poaal, one at Goxhill and the other at Atcham. I had been Seo- tor 1.0. at Digby with the R.C.A.F. at the time and was posted to Goxhill as Intelligenoe Liaison Officer. On arrival there I was informed that only the ground personnel were arriving imne- diately and that the pilots were flying their aircraft from

America via Iceland and would probably arrive about two weeks later. The Liaison party consisted of an Administrative

Officer, Signals, Equipment, Tactical (a flying type) Intelli- genoe, and as a temporary measure, a catering officer.

"The Administrative Officer had taken a great deal of trouble to make everything as comfortable as possible for the new arrivals including hot meals to be served immediately upon arrival; fires were lighted in all their huts. In accordance with military tradition, the trains were scheduled to arrive

in the middle of '-he night. Each train-load was met by mem-

bers of the Liaison party and shown the way up to the camp by RAF guides. Each party after being fed was taken off by a

(*5 - No person has done more for the establishment of good relations between VIII Fighter Comrand and the RAP than S/Ldr John L. Harrison, first Intelligence Liaison Officer attached, by the RAP, to whome the author is indebted for these notes. All Groups had several RAPFA for liaison. at leant on arrival. i- -- --

-' -if, ,.-,1- J-^ %-- n , F :) 01 7 - - S .4:

:e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7 - guide to their sleeping quart4

Goxhill as it really was a dii very early the first morning as they were not in bed much before

0400 hours, and the first thing that had to be done was to give security lectures, as American higher ocmmand had decreed that none of the new arrivals could leave the field until they had been given a security talk and had seen two films, one entitled

"Next of Kin", and the other "Target for Tonight". Both of these films were aimed against careless talk. At this time there were no American security officers to deal with these matters and it fell to the RAF I.L.O. to deal with them. The only place available for these lectures was in the gymnasium which only held about 300 men, so the lecture had to be given at seven different times that day. The films then had to be

obtained and shown. Goxhill had never been used am an opera-

tional station so that even a projector had to be obtained and

collected from a nearby bomber station. For the same reason,

there had never been an RAF Intelligence Officer on the station

and there was in consequence no intelligence set-up available

on the station and no material with which to commence work.

*The I.L.O. decided to take the *bull by the horns", skip

channels and proceed to London by oar and beg, borrow or steal

as much material as possible. Arriving in London, a visit was

first made to the RAF map section at Fighter Comnand.

_ _V - 7)1 -

9 st , -.. " !sI ? , g,**', I'/ - If - S -3'x -*. "at91 * -e' fly^'-s .- S * Y-: ; SS'5 g P,, r9 Quantities of mapwere sorted out, packed up and put into the oar. Next, a visit to Intelligence was made, where photos, posters, silhouettes of aircraft and everything else necessary to assist pilots in aircraft recognition training were secured.

A trip out to Wembley yielded a stock of model aircraft sufficient for the needs of three squadrons and group intelligence. A kind offer on the part of the holders of these stocks was re- jected on the grounds that things had been lobt that way before.

Next a visit to an air-sea rescue department for "gen'" and posters regarding this important subject, and finally to the department dealing with all small accessories, such as, colored pins, tapes, flags, etc. necessary to an intellige seset-up, completed the collection. On returning to Goxhill, the Tactical

Officer and I.L.O. got busy, together, in putting up a lecture room, recognition and cinema room combined, a briefing room, and Group Intelligenoes offices.

"After about a fortnight there was great great excitement amongst the "G.I." t s when it was announced that the first of the P-38's had landed in Scotland and would be flying down the next day. In a'few days most of the pilots had arrived, the

Headquarters Squadron with two Squadrons stayed at Goxhill, while on Squadron ws quartered at Kirton in 4Indsey about 18

("6 - RAP for wgeneral information".)

94 - / ; 9 4 . : ~~~~~r 1 ' i .

* < ;t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i;; by air. At. miles away by road and a matter of a few minutes Group conhanded by Air this time Goxhill belonged to the 12th John N. Vice-Marshall Saul who flew down to welcome Colonel

Stone and his men. Group came down and "Many staff officers from the 12th Intelligence Liai- conferences were held with the Tactics and drawn up for a son Officers and a schedule of training was The Liaison Staff ground school, lasting about a fortnight. as R/T Conmunioa- at Goxhill lectured on such varied subjects and S.B. 158 tions, Operations, Air-Sea Rescue, Recognition and non-opera- (rules relating to recognition and operational and gun defended tional flying, colors of.the day, balloon stations gave their ser- areas). Many RAP officers from other to give talks to the vices in their spare time and flew up K. Callahan (Major then) pilots. At this time, Colonel Lawrence training with came up several timea to discuss Intelligence it was agreed to -the I.L.O. and at the latter's suggestion and Squadrons to various send all the S-2 officers of the Group I.L.O. made the necessary RAP stations in the 11th Group. The the first part of S-2 arrangements with 11th Group and took they met most of the Officers down to Pighter Gcomand where around the operational RAP Intelligence Officers and were shown were taken on to 11th room and war roon. After lunch they

- 95 - Group at Uxbridge and, after being taken on another tour of inspection, weor assigned to various l1th Group stations and dispatched by oar to their various destinations. "The pilots having finished ground school were now more in contact with the RAP Tactical Officer who flew with them both in Squadron and Group formations. He also gave them talks on his experience in combat and the formations adopted by his squadron in battle and also those adopted by the enemy. He flew with some of the senior pilots to Farnborough where Colo- nel Stone tried out his P-38 against the PW 190 which had been captured intact. It was sometime during this period that the station was formally handed over to the Americans and 'Old Glory" replaced the "Union Jack" outside Headquarters buildings. The chief change noticed by the British officers under the new regime Was the abolition of tea in the afternoon, but the 0.0. who was a humane man, set aside a small room near his office, where the British officers could congregate and brew themselves a cup of tea about 4 o'clock. In fact, it was no unusual thing for the C.O. to drop in for a cup himself! During this period all sections and all ranks had been working hard together. At this time the Signals Officer was particularly busy with the radio sets in the P-38's, but eventually after considerable trouble all these difficulties were solved and about eight weeks after arrival the Group was sent down to Ibaley from

,-! -- ,96 -

; ' "1' "' " f Sn } X ~l " i ~ ~ .. ,.: f w which station they went on two or three offensive sweeps and were then ordered to North Afrioan.

"WhIle this Group was at Goxhll another gruup mm training Mlong the ame lines at Atoham, Withina& vry short timo after

the departr of the let Plghtor Group, the 52nd lighter Group arrived, under the COand of Colonel Dixon M. Allison and a mimilar progr- wa oarried out, only this tmo the group was

equipped with Spitfireo whioh relieved the RAF Signals Officer of a good deal of his worries. Thi group taed until Novem-

ber and everything worked very moothly between the Liaison party and the Aerioans. By this tdm all the mebers of the Laai on part knew what was required of them and were vry happy in their relations with the Amrioans. As soon aa this group had left another group as due in, but their arrival was delayed and in oonsequenoe the main foroe had to proceed to Kir-

ton in LIndsey while one Squadron oame to Gojill, a reversal

of previous arrangeents. The roason for this was that yet another Group, the 78th, was expected to arrive at any moment. This neoessitated a good deal of movement between Goxhill and lKrton on the part of the Tactioal lying Liaison, Signals, and Intelligene Officers. This group wa fitted out with P-39's and the ground training of two squadrons took place at Kirton while the ground traning of the other took place at Gox- hill. When the 78th Pighter Group arrived, Goxhill was filled

97- -- , , !

_ l D~~~''L **?.'g f _ w~ ^ ' 1' ' ; 1 "^ X to overflowing as the whole group took up its quarters there.

This was possible a all this ti building had been going an and the station was considerably enlarged.

"The 78th Group was equipped with P-38'sa, so ere again, the RAF was busy with l/T equipment.

'Colonel Armand Peterson, a magnificent pilot and ooemand-

ing offioer of the 78th, was very keen on the ground training, and this was soon in full swing. The Liaison party at this time included a Sergeant who specialised in recognition train-

ing, who lectured once a day to all pilots for the first two

onths that they were there. Recognition is usually regarded

by pilots as a boring subjeot to be 'sweated out", and as

quickly as possible, but this sergeant was such a master of his

subject and know the knack of making it so interesting that

pilots would ask him to give extra lectures over and above

those already on the schedule. When an Amerioan instructor was

brought in to carry on with this trainig, our Fighter Counand,

in their wisdoa (:), posted the sergeant to a RAP station to

take up weather work, a subject of which he had no knowledge

vhatsoever! After this group had been in Pigland about two

months, most of the junior pilots and all the aircraft were

sint to North Africa, leaving Colonel Peterson a handful of

Squadron Comanders and senior pilots to form and train a new

A- 96 group. This ws a great blo justly proud of his P-38 outfit. 'Pilots began to arrive and ground training began all over again. Colonel Peterson was een to visit RAP stations and meot s*m of the fighter boys and the I.L.O. visited the Wing Connander and Sqiadron Conanders of the Polish Wing from]ir- ton in Lindsey and arranged for thor to fly over and met the Americans. Their visit was a great success and later, arrange- mouts were made for the whole Polish Wingcf Spitfires to fly ovr and give an exhibition of their method of flying battle formation. An hour before the aircraft arrived, a Polish pilot came over and explained on a blackboard the various forma- tionm that wero going to be adopted and the reasons for them. This proved a great succooess and the Amerioans became great friends with the Poles; regular visits wore made between the two stations for the rest of the time the 78th remained at Ooxhill; in fact, the Poles oontinued to visit the group even after they had moved down to Duxford.

"The move to Duxford meant the use of a good deal of -tact and discretion on the part of the Liaison Officer who aoom- panied the group from Gohill, for Duxford was one of the first of the old RAP stations to be handed over to the Americans. A rusning struggle took plaoe between th incoing Liaison Officer

- 99-

_Mao to secure certain and the outgoing RAP. Eacoh party wanted and other things things such as projectors, Runt trainers, the RAF personnel necessary for pilot training. However, Aaerioans very welcome remaining on the station, made the make their move-in as and did everything in their power to simple as possible.'*

EARLIEST OPERATIONS early months by Although the operations of the first anall in comparison VIII Fighter Comnand units were very or later activities of with either the RAF Fighter Command our beginning of an the VIII Fighter Comnand, they marked from anything seen air offensive that was to become different of aerial warfare in which before in any Theater of War, a type territory deliberately fighter pilots went deep into enemy enemy to coae up off his looking for trouble and daring the usual short thrusts airfields, instead of going out on the types of operations, from their home bases. The RAP in two (large scale bomber- "Rodeos" (Fighter Sweeps) and "Cirousses" in enticing the Huns to fighter missions), had some success by the short range come up and fight, but both were limited first fighter sorties by VIII of their fighter aircraft. Those the normal pattern of aerial Fighter Command aircraft followed

(now Squadron/ (7 - So been on his work was Flight/Lieutenant RAF coolleagues accused him of Leader John Harrison that his being anti-British: - Author) - 100 -

* -, '' * warfare very closely, either "Rodeos", "Rhubarba" (harrassing J attacks against ground targets or low flying aircraft), or short-range fighter escort and it was not until some time later, with the advent of the P-47 "Thunderbolt", the improved P-38 and the P-1 "'Mustang" that fighter pilots started to roam far and wide over Europe, looking down into the very file rooms and mess halls of the Luftwaffe to knock out the enemy wherever he could be found. It was from these early sorties, however, that the experience and knowledge was gained that

made long-range fighter escort work a success. NEW ARRIVALS.

During the first weeks of operations, ending on September 1, 1942, the 31st Group ohalksd up its first claims of two destroyed, four probably destroyed, and two damaged while on a total of 906 offensive and defensive sorties. The lst Group failed to register any claims on the four sorties they flew. The Luftwaffe had begun to "fight shy" and conserve its planes in the effort to build itself back to full combat power. In all, seven pilots of the 31st Group were lost. Two new groups were weloomed to the small force the Comand had, and by the end of August, 1942, four groups were either operational or undergoing extensive training; these were the 1st, 14th, 31st and 52nd. The 52nd Group had arrived in Eglinton, Northern Ireland on July 13. The 2ndSquadron of the 52nd Group moved

- 101 ": ;

i.i. 6, Z to Goxhill and on to Biggin Hill, where it trrivea onep,

25. The 4th Squadron remained at Eglinton until Septaombpe3, at which time they moved to Goxhill. The 2nd and 4th Squadrons of the 52nd Group also returned to Goxhill at that time. The

14th Fighter Group with the 48th and 49th Squadrons flew their

P-38's across the Atlantic and with the ground echelon of the

50th Squadron arrived at Atoham on August 18. The VIII Fighter

Comand had finally started to take shape and give some basis for its designation as a Co-eand.

FIRST ONE OVER.

The first United States Air Force fighter pilots to fly operationally in the ETO were Major Fred Dean, 308th Squadron,

Major Marvin L. MoNickle, 307th Squadron, of the 31st Group,

Major Harry Thing, 309th Squadron and Captain M.P. Davis, 1st

Lt. Winfred L. Chambers, and Lt. Col. Albert P. Clark, all three of the 31st Group. On July 26, 1942, they joined with an

RAP Squadron of Spitfires from Biggin Hill on a weep against objectives between Gravelines, St. Omer and Abbeville. Lt.

Col. Clark failed to return from this mission, but was later

reported to be a prisoner of war.

DIEPPE. August 1q. lq42

2nd. Lt. Samuel S. Junkin received the first victory

credit for destroying an FW 190 over Dieppe, France, on August

19, 1942, while taking part in the Combined Operation which

- 102 -

Li, -I,, , , . u was called Sample Invasion". Lt. Junkin and 2nd Lt t

Wells shared the first decorations awarded. Lt. Junkin was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and the Purple Heart, while Lt. Wells was awarded the Purple Heart Posthumously.

Both were pilots of the 31st Fighter Group.

That famous day marked the opening of the VIII Fighter

Command operations under its own control in the European War.

During the day a total of eleven missions were flown, mounting

123 sorties, all in direct support of the landing and withdrawal operations on the beaches of Dieppe. The group claimed one destroyed and five damaged for the loss of four pilots and eight planes. The experience gained by the 31st Group proved of very great value in their future role in the North African invasion.

"EAGLES" LEAVE THE R.A. F.

During the month of September and October 1942, two events took place, the former of which seemed to strengthen the Command, and on the latter to strip it of practically all of its strik- ing force. On September 29 one of the most colorful oeremonies in the history of the Command took place at Debden, an old and famous RAP station, the home of the famous Eagle Squadrons of the RAP. The 71, 121, and 133 RAP Squadrons' flying personnel, all of them Americans, were transferred to the U.S. Army Air

- 103-

:1,, 1111!11, 11'

II ,f II-, !" : I j .- o:,1 , ` ! Forces and were formed into a Fighter Group, to be known as the

4th Fighter Group. The Group had officially been activated at

Bushy Hall, Hertfordshire on September 12, but it was not until the 29th that the personnel were transferred to the Conmand.

The ground personnel of the NOth Squadron of the 14th Fighter Group were used to form the oadre of ground personnel for the

4th Group, the air echelon had remained in Iceland to help de-

fend that area. The transfer and review was attended by Air

Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas of the RAF Fighter Command,

Major General (now Lt. General) Carl A. Spaatz and Brigadier

General Hunter. Following the inspection, the Stars and Stripes was raised beside the Union Jack while an RAF band played the

"Stars Spangled Banner", once more to show the very close

friendship and co-operation between the RAF and the United

States Army Air Forces.

The oeremony's spirit of celebration however, was dampened,

for the 133rd Squadron, now to be known as the 336th Squadron,

on September 26, lost eleven comrades while flying across the

Channel on a mission with B-17's; twelve Spitfires took off to

escort the bombers, but became lost in very bad weather over

France and only one pilot returned from the mission: Between

the time when the members of the Eagle Squadrons were sworn

into the American Anrm and the time they started to operate as

the 4th Fighter Group, they were placed on detached service

- 104 -

/ ; ·: , ,i

so with the RAP and continued to fight and fly with the RAP, that the records of that period are a part of RAF Fighter

Command's history and not of the VIII Fighter Command.

Colonel Edward Anderson, formerly of the 1st Fighter Group Duke- was put in command of the 4th Group with Wing Commander

Wooely, one of the RAP's leading pilots, as flying commander,

until such time as one of the American pilots could assume

that responsibility. Major (now Colonel) Chesley G. Peterson, his of the 4th Group, was placed in command of flying after work return from the United States, where he had been sent to Wing with the Materiel Planning Council. The Group, under opera- Commander Duke-Wooley'a leadership, was qualified for remained tional status immediately, though the RAF ground staff to take on duty until American ground crews were fully trained Thus care of the Spitfires, with which the group was equipped.

the Command had five groups under its jurisdiction, one with

many hours of battle experience.

Regarding the transfer, Major Gus A. Daymond, a transferee

said, "We all feel like we are walking on air. This is some-

thing I'veawaited for a long time. I naturally regret leav-

ing such a great outfit as the RAF, but we'll always be flying

side by side with them on future missions." 1st Lt. Forrest

"Pat' Dowling, another Eagle Squadron member said, 'I've had

a darned good time with the RAF, but I'm glad to be over in

the U.S. Forces. It is a swell feeling to be wearing the U.S.

- 105- .....- uniform and flying a Spitfire with the Air Force insignia of a country on it." So muoh for the favorable events which tended to strengthen the VIII in that onmentoua period of September and October, 1942. AFRICAN INVASION

The. VIII Fighter Cnnand, however, received an organizational body blow on September 14, 1942, when four of its five groups were transferred to the XII Fighter Canmand in order to par- tioipate in the impending invasion of North Africa. Although the groups wre transferred on that date, they continued to operate under the control of the VIII Fighter Comand until October 10. The 4th Group only, was not transferred to the XII, in accordance with an agreement between 6ur officials and the RAP, that the ex-EPgle Squadrons should remain in the British theater of operations. In addition to the transfer of the bulk of the operational personnel of the VIII Fighter Comnand, many of its headquarters staff were also taken into the XII and all were assigned the task of helping to plan one of the most diffi- oult invasions in history. A small staff of Officers of VIII Fighter Coanwad, oomposed of Brigadier General (now Major Gener- al) Prank O'D. Hunter, Colonel James E. Briggs, Colonel Jack W. Hoover, Colonel Don R. Ostrander and Lt. Col. (now Colonel) Case S. Hough, wore assigned the task of training the oreow and

- 106 -

* - * -.. * -/ ' : .'* . i *<- *'*' :g:::~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*'^ L ; '^: ~ dispatching the aircraft which flewto North Africa- for the 'Torch Plan" invasion of November, 1942.

The four groups that went to North Africa flew a total of 1,651 aorties while with the VIII Fighter Command. The recorded two destroyed, five probably destroyed and one damaged, whereas their lossew were four missing, one killed, one wounded and two prisoner of war, a score of eight for eight. A total of 2,348 sorties were flown by all units of the Command up to »8 December 31, 1942 with a total of 7J enwe aircraft destroyed,

7 probably destroyed and 4 damaged. Casualties were five missing, one killed, two wounded and two prisoner of war, a soore of 18* for 8.

So, the discouraging task of rebuilding the Coimand had to be started all over again after the transfer of the 1st,

14th, 31at and 52nd Groups, but with good heart, General Hunter and his staff set about the task immediately, using the 4th

Group as the nucleus. The 78th Fighter Group arrived in Ehg- land from the United States, with P-38 aircraft, on December

5 and moved into Goxhill for their training period. A month

later all thier aircraft and 60 pilots were transferred to

North Africa. Thus at the end of a full year and with six

months in the major Theater of War, the Command had but two

('8 - A half credit means, not that the plane was half destroyed but that the credit was shared with some other pilot, in this case presumably of another RAP Squadron.)

- 107 -

i ' . '' "' * ' ' -\ . . i ,'* .'., i ' ' I groupa, one fully operational and the other in training, a long way from the goal of three wings consaiting of fifteen groupa, which had been set some months before. (Rumora were

fairly general at "Ajax*9 that plans called for an eventual

25 groups of fighters for the VIII alone!)

The olosing months of 1942 found the groupa flying escort

to bombers, fighter sweeps, shipping patrols and 'Rhubarb"

missionsa. Between August 18 and December 20, 1942, there were

651 fighter aircraft of the Caomand dispatched on bomber es-

cort missions. These missions were all short-range, some with

B-17'8, some with B-24's and others with "Bostons' of the RAP.

None could be considered long range escort missions, which

later became the major assignmont of the VIII, but they en-

abled fighter pilots to observe the actions of bombers attack-

ing a target and many ideas of tactics to be employed on longer

range escorts, were learned. It also proved two things, first

that bombera which have an adequate fighter escort survived the

mission to attack again, and second, that bombers properly

escorted, could make their bomb runs without any fear of being

distracted by the presence of enemy fighters. The shipping

patrols and fighter sweeps were routine and boresome, but were

(*9 - "Ajax" is the code name for VIII Pighter Coimand Hea^- quarters at Bushy Hall.)

lpirri designed to give our pilots a chance to familiarize themselves with the English Channel and the French coastline, geographical knowledge which would stand them in very good stead on cloudy or murky days of which old England has more than its share.

The "Rhubarbs" flown were, for the most part, by members of the

4th Group, who had been used to that type of mission, while flying with the RAF. These operations were aimed at the dis- ruption of enemy communioations along the coast and the harass- ing of troops training in the area.

CRC' s

From the beginning, it was realized that there would be a necessity for a pilot replacement pool that would give men transition and final instructions for operations and procedures peculiar to this Theater, such as gunnery instruction and combat formation flying training for fighter units. Atcham was selected for this school and functioned as such after the departure of the three combat groups in October 1942. The 6th Fighter

Wing Headquarters, with Headquarters Squadron and such service units as were available, were stationed at Atcham and formed into the 495th Fighter Training Group. A similar organization known as the 496th Fighter Training Group, was installed at

Goxhill, which had been a training base for newly arrived

Fighter Groups, Fighter replacement pilots for both the VIII

(*10 - Combat Crew Replacement Centers.)

- 109 -

k~ ' I-II_ -1i1 and IX Fighter Commands were trained at these two stations and remained under the control of the VIII Fighter Command until

February 1944, at which time all pilots were transferred to the

VIII Composite Command. The units were knwon as CCRC 7 and

CCRC 8.

A new fighter plane, the P-47 Thunderbolt, was assigned to the Command and arrived in England on December 24, 1942.

It was with this fighter plane that the first experiments in long-range escort work were conducted. The 4th Fighter Group gave up their Spitfires and were equipped with the P-47's.

The 78th Fighter Group, although arriving in England on Decem- ber 1, 1942 with P-38's, never went operational with them, for they twoo were re-equipped with the new P-47's. Both groups were put on an intensive training program in order to thoroughly familiarize themselves with this new and much heavier fighter plane, weighing 6j tons' The 56th Fighter Group arrived in

England on January 13, 1943, already equipped with the P-47,

and promptly commenced its operational training. This re-

equipment of the groups and the technical difficulties with the

aircraft which first had to be overcome, seriously retarded

operational efforts during the first months of 1943, so it

was not until Arpil 8, 1943 that all three groups returned to

an operational status. It was felt that so much depended on

- 110 - the successful initial operations of the P-47 that nothing should be left undone to guarantee its success; therefore the performance characteristics of the plane, under combat conditions and in tactical formations, had first to be ascertained and all moehanical difficulties eliminated. In May, the first u escort mission with the "Fortresses were undertaken and the success encountered, proved well enough this airplane'a worth as & formidable weapon. By midsaumer of 1943, the proper employment of the 'Thunderbolts' for its basic job, namely, long- range escort of bombers, had been established. As a result of the training of those early P-47 pilots and the solution of the radio and mechanical difficulties, new units now arriving in this Theater from that time forward got into combat much more

quickly and efficiently than the first three groups.

6'STH & 66TH FIGHTER WINGS

The 65th and 66th Fighter Wings, originally known as the

4th and 5th Air Defense Wings and the 353rd Fighter Group

arrived in England in Early June, 1943. It was then the full

war-time organization of the VIII Fighter Command really started *11 to take shape.

(*1t - For the full organizational chart of the VIII Air Force, see Plate XI. Brigadier General Jesse Sutton commanded the 65th Wing, but was temporarily succeeded by Col. (later Briga- dier General) Ross Hoyt; Brigadier General Murray C. Woodbury led the 66th Wing and Brigadier General Edward W. Anderson, formerly of the 4th Group, the 67th Wing.) - 111- ita The 353rd Group was equipped with P47's and ooamenced training progr. The 352nd and the 355th Fighter Groups equipped arrived on July 8 and 9 respeotively and both were Ehgland, with P-47's. Thus, at the end of the first year in with the VIII Fighter Coma nd had six groups, all equipped three P-47'., three of them operational, and three in training, to each of two wings.

TH BE CMMMUAING GHEAL ita The Comand during all its formative period, through early diffioultie. and during the real start of itas operations, continued under the direction of General Hunter until August Kepner came 29, 1943. At that time, Major General William E. the United from his post as Coomander of the Fourth Air Foroe in

Statea to direct the VIII Fighter Comnand. General Kopner was

one of the early pilots of the United States AzNy Air Force. He gained diatinction and was decorated in the Army Ground daya Porcea in World War I, transferred to the Air Corps in the attain- when it was greatly reduced, became a command pilot and There ed fame for his flights in the "stratosphere balloon'. work of was little change of policy in the long-range escort predecessor the Comand, but General Kepner, even more than his the emphasised it as the first duty of the fighters to bring to bombers howe. 'Chaeing the Hun from the Sk' gave way

- 112 - : .- . - ; .\ ..-\ ..*-* : :. . :f :

"nuraing the bombers home", until such time when our astound- ing air victories oould permit more fighters to be detached for the job they loved best - "Bashing the Boche'" General

Kepner's first motto to the pilots was printed and posted in every group's briefing room. It read as follows: "We have two soores we are aiming at - first the number of bombers we bzing baok safely, and second, the number of German fighters we des- troy."

The 353rd Group was declared operational on August 12, 1943. Shortly thereafter the 20th and the 356th Groups arrived in the United Kingdom. On September 9, both the 352nd and the 355th Fighter Groups were listed as operational, and the 55th Group arrived on September 15, so the Command had, by the end of September of 1943, a total of nine groups, six of them operational on P-47 aircraft. The 67th Fighter Wing arrived in the British Isles on August 25. LIGHTNINGS

On October 15, both the 356th with -47's and the 55th Fighter Group with P-38's were placed on an operational status, but the 20th Group (also P-38's) due to difficulties in securing delivery of aircraft, did not become operational until

(*12 - In Appendix 'G" is given a full list of the Fighter Groups and their Ccmnanding Officers, and the dates on which they "went operational".)

- 113 -

r., ._.-.„. Oroups arrivd m October December 28th. The 359th and 358th wre placed on an 19th and 20th, 1943, respectively, and and 20, respeotiWly both we operatianal ba«is am De ber 13 va ehanged for the eqipped with P47' a. The 358th Group of the IX ighter COmand. 357th F4ter Ooup (flying P1', also equipped with On November 30, the 361t Group arrived until after th Thunderbolts, but they did not go operational turn of the year. under the Commd 'a Until June o0,1943, all fighter groups administrative and jurisdiotion, had been under the direot Co0mand. Prior to operational planning of the VIII Pighter been under the RAP Sector this tiu operatio^n oontrol had the arrival of ore fighter Controller at Debden. Antioipating of these groups might groups and the possibility that om on, plans were adO operate from baes oa the Continont later to assu the eadinis- for the establishent of Fighter Wings plpmnning control of the trative, operational and operational groups under eaoh of the groups. The plan was to have five three Wings. Coamands, suffered Fighter Wings, liko many of the higher organization. The vast from the growing pains of any youthful the building up of the expansion of our Air Foroee required on down the line. The ohain of ilitary organisation right

-114 -

I~~~~~ 0*~4 c g consequence was that, in order to justify some of them, sections were attached which had no real function and very little work, others were absolutely useless, and their officers and enlisted men idle and discontented. Chemical warfare for example, became nothing but a Thursday nuisance when the sounded the weekly gas alarm for a half hour. The rest of the week they had nothing to do. It is well always to be prepared, but with

oomplete air supremacy in Allied hands, it would be suicidal for the Boche to follow Douhet's precept of using poison gas.

Doubtless as our experience grows in various theaters of war, our army efficiency experts will prune off the surplus personnel, the plethora of which in our service staggers such an organization as the RAP, thinned down by over four years of war.

On June 30th, 1943, all groups were placed under the

"opa" contro4 of the 65th Wing, contact being maintained by

V.H.F. (Very High Frequency) radio after the aircraft were airborne, for recall, homing and D/? fixing. '3 On November 11, the 66th Wing became operational and took over their share of the operational control of the groups assigned to them. On

December 1, the 67th Wing assumed control of its groups and

(*13 - D/V means direction-finding by an apparatus that tells the bearing of a radio signal. Fixing means the location of an aircraft by two or more such bearings based on geometrioal triangulation.)

- 115 - r Wl'iiT% . from that tims on, each Fighter Wing had complete operational control of its assigned groups.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

A survey of the Command at the close of 1943 shows that all three Fighter Wings and twelve Fighter Groups were operational,

ten of them equipped with P-47's and two with P-38's. Of the

twelve groups assigned to the Conmand at the end of the year,

eleven were fully operational, the only exception being the had been latest arrival, the 361st Group. One group, the 359th,

put on an operational status 24 days after arrival in this

theater, in unusually fast timo. Prom Dieppe Day, Ahgust 19,

1942, until November 1943, a total of 17,740 sorties had been flown, 255 aircraft were destroyed, 47 probably destroyed and

127 damaged for the losa of 75 pilots. Of the above, from the

start of oombat operations in pril 1943, the P-47 accounted name for over 90% of the victories. It really lived up to its

of "Thunderbolt".

By December 1943, escort work had increased in range from

the early days of cover to targets just inside the French coast,

to targets as far away as Kiel, a 970 mile round-trip from the

fighters' English bases. On August 6, 1944, the 55th Group flew escort to Gdynia and back, 1595 miloes (See Plate XII).

MUSTANGS.

The 36 1st Group which had arrived at the end of November 21st, 1943, was placed on an operational status on January - n16-

:~~~~~~~ ~ ~ .[~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

,):.& 1944, flying P-47's. On February 18, the 364th Group arrived, equipped with P-38's and twelve days latter was placed on "Ops", thus the time between arrival and the operational date had been cut from months to days. The 339th Fighter Group arrived on the 4th of April and took 26 days to reach operational profioiency. It was sent out on April 20, flying P-51 'Mus- tangs' along with the older 357th Mustang Group, which had been transferred from the IX Fighter Ccumand in exchange for the 358th Group, also with P-51's. The 479th Group (P-38's) arrived on May 16 and set a record in being declared operational on May 26, just ten days after arriving in this country.

Both the 55th and 20th Groups exchanged their P-38's for P-51's in July, while the 4th, 355th, 352nd, 359th and 361st had all changed over from P-47's to P-51's before D-Day.

PULL STENGTH

So finally the organisation of the VIII Fighter Command. was complete, for with the arrival of the 479th Group, the Com- mand had the three Wings and fifteen Groups which had been set *14 as a goal so long before. The proficiency of the Command its

Wings and Groups, is attested by the shortening of the time re-

quired for groups to becoome operational; the last group took

less time becoming operational than was formerly thought neoe-

(*14 - In Appendix NG is given a full list of the Fighter Groups and their Commanding Officers, and the dates on which they went operational. In Chapter XIII will be found further data.)

- 117 - ssary to school the pilots in geographical locations alone.

General Kepner remained in command of the VIII Fighter

Command until relieved on August 1, 1944, when he went to assume command of the 2nd Bombardment Division. He was succeeded by Brigadier General Francis H. Griswold, who had been his Chief of Staff throughout the time that he had been Command- ing General of the organization. He was succeeded in his position as Chief of Staff by Colonel Benjamin J. Webster. There were a great many rumors abroad about the reorganization of the 8th Air Force but up to the time of the conclusion of this record, it was not fully effected.

- 118 - APT - CHAPE V

STAFF WORK AT COwNMaD AND THE PLANNINO O MISSIONS

The Tactical Conaiderations.

Fighter escort for our heavy bombera became a necessity for several reasons which had an important bearing on the planning for each of the missions, and, therefore, appropriately de- serve discussion at this point: (1) It appeared that enemy fighters tend to withhold their attacks on bombers due to the threat of the fighter escort's presence. Time and again German fighters were heard over the radio refusing to attack bombers 1 when covered by our fighters. It became almost a S.O.P.

(2) When enemy aircraft did decide to attack, their formations were broken up by the compact driving attack of our fighter

squadrons and groups before the "bandits" could make a timed

and planned attack. (3) Thus the enemy was shot down or driv-

en off before he could effect serious damage, and the bombers

could continue unmolested. (4) The fighters were our only

means of dealing with the enemy's twin-engine fighters, carry-

ing long-range heavy gun and rocket projectile armament which

could therefore attack from beyond the range of the Bombers'

.50 calibre machine guns. (5) Fighters were our only means

of shepherding damaged bombers home and protecting them from

enemy attacks on withdrawal. (6) Fighters frequently were able

(e1 - S.O.P - Standard Operating Procedure, - 119 - ,.i "',, f ' .? ' ' ~ "' i':? ' - to warn our bombers of the preeLbe' fif enemies in the neih- borhood because fighters had been alerted over the radio by personnel in the Fighter Control Operations Rooms. The could then put our bombers on the alert, as the latter did not have the same extensive radio service as the fighters.

Thus the presence of fighters made possible unharassed and much more accurate bombing runs over the target. It was found that bomber crew composure was in direct proportion to the adequacy, duration and proximity of our fighter escort. After one mission early in December a critique was held at Elveden

Hall, Headquarters of the Third Bomb Division. Unknown to the bomber pilots was the presence of some of their "Little Friends"

(fighter pilots) until, as the meeting was drawing to a close,

Colonel Glenn E. Duncan of the 353rd Fighter Group introduced

himself. He rose to ask some pertinent questions on how to

improve their escort job. One bomber pilot said, "If any of

you fighter pilots intend to run for President, you let us

bombers know'" Another bomber said, 'I'll shine the shoes of

any fighter pilot of the VIII". Brim. General F.L. Anderson,

commanding the VIII Bomber Command has stated the case clearly

in his letter of August 8th, 1943 which follows:

- 120 -

77 n7 HEADQUARTERS VIII Office of the Con APO 63 1

SUBJECT: Fighter Esoort for Daylight Heavy Bombing Attacks.

TO : Commanding General, Eighth Fighter Command, APO 637.

1. It is our experience that losses due to attacks by enemy aircraft are extremely small while the bombers are escorted by fighters.

2. We are opposed by the greatest concentration of fighters existing on any front. They are handled with skill, determination and every facility to produce great mobility. I believe, however, that an adequate number of fighters would get us through this concentration and back through again on our return with small loss from these enemy aircraft. Obviously, our supporting fighters must have sufficient range to stay with present based enemy fighters as long as possible. This emphasizes the necessity of the P-47 (with pressurized belly tanks) or other aircraft with at least 300 mile operational range.

3. It is obvious that the ideal fighter protection is that which can accompany the bombers from enemy territory to Target. Failing that, the greater the escorted penetration the better. If our fighters can prevent successful attacks by enemy aircraft over the heavily defended coastal area, rela- tively unmolested flight results during the deeper penetration, where there is no such concentration of enemy aircraft. This permits the bombers to approach the target less harassed and in the offensive formation making for the most effective bombing. 4. Effective support by fighters during the greatest possible part of the total distance flown over enemy territory reduces battle damage and combat crew fatigue. As a result, the number of bombers which can be dispatched and the efficiency with which they can operate on consecutive operational days is greatly increased.

5. Escort performed by your P-47'a and the RAF Spitfires has been excellent but limited. Results of the last two escort missions by P-47's (with belly tanks) have substantiated

*'i i :: .^S-. Yi" Z"' Pr' r f t'- : .1 F." ! 'P, --- F 1114 '1: "' "I my views expressed here. If you can give us more P-47's, many of our bombers will reach the target and many more of our missions will result in complete, rather than partial success. The experience of my Command clearly indicates the need of more such Thunderbolts. F. L. ANDERSON Brigadier General, U.S. Army Commanding

Substantiation, if any is needed, for the effectiveness and

necessity of our fighter escort, is supplied in Appendix "H", a

series of excerpts from typical German radio traffic intercepted

by monitor stations during the latter months of 1943, and early

part of 1944. They were interesting reading.

A direct result of these escorted missions was to force

the already hard pressed German Air Force and German industry

to make every effort to increase their own fighter force, and

to deploy that force over a wider frontage and in greater depth.

(See Plate XIII). The ancillary services, such as searchlights,

flak, ground observation, etc., had to be greatly increased

with a consequent drain on the army's manpower pool; industry

felt this demand at a time of strain in both material and

labor force.

ENfY TACTICS.

The obvious tactics for the G.A.F. to adopt, were: (1) to

attack the escorting fighters as they crossed-in at the enemy

coast, and force them to drop their belly tanks, thereby limit-

ing the ranor of their planned wscort. (2) to follow the bomb-

- 122 -

«M~~S-; alA.

' BB~I"""! era inland, refuel and attack beyond our fighter range. (3) to rendezvous in strength and attack with his single engine fighters, at one point, in order to ansmother our covering ea- corts, thus leaving the bombers an easy prey to later attacks by twin-engine fighters deep within their lines. The last of these was so obviously the best to follow that the Germans seem to have adopted it only after all other methods failed.

These tactics, however, were the factors which had to be

considered in the planning of a mission, which is the next

topic of discussion.

COUNTER TACTICS

To meet this last enemy tactic (described above) our

staffs used several counter measures: (1) They provided longer

range fighters such as the P-38 with its 600-700 mile radius,

and the P-51 Mustang, which could do 1,600 miles on a round

trip. (2) They split up our. bomber forces to attack at first

two, then three and finelly as many as twelve targets simul-

taneously so that the enemy could never concentrate sufficient

force to stop more than part of our attack. (3} They built up

our VIII Fighter Command Groups as fast as possible, both in

strength (most groups were flying double strength by D-Day)

and by adding new groups as quickly as possible. - 123 - In April, 1944, the general tactical consideration arose;

of how adequately to cover such an enormous bomber force as the

8th was able to put up when, on some missions, 1,500 heavies took to the air at once. Assuming that adequate cover was a

ratio of one allied fighter per bomber, then 1,500 bombers

would require many more escorts than the VIII Fighter Command

alone could supply with 50 aircraft each in 15 Groups. It

then became necessary to call on the R.A.F. Tactical Command

fighters and the fighters of the 9th (Tactical) U.S. Air Force.

This proved to be good experience for the fighter pilots of

both the other forces and adequate cover was provided during

the two months preceding Invasion - on some missions a fighter

cover of 2,000 planes was provided. After June 6 (D-Day), the

VIII assisted on tactical missions in Normandy for a full month,

until early July 1944, by which time the G.A.F.'s heavy mor-

tality rate, and its added duties against the beachhead, per-

mitted the 8th to revert to strategical bombing, against great-

ly reduced enemy opposition. With our preponderant air power

we could better afford to split our forces than could the G.A.P.

We really had achieved Douhet's Air Supremacy.

Enemy occupied territory was so enormous in area and our

forces so concentrated, in both England and Italy, that he was

to all intents and purposes, operating on exterior lines. We

had the advantage of being able to st-ike at any one point in

very great strength, or simultaneously at many points, at any

- 124- --.

\i one of which we were usually superior because he was, of necessity, dispersed over the whole area. Thus the G.A.F. was de- prived, perforce, of the best fundamental type of defense, i.e. a sizable and mobile reserve to throw in once the position of our attacks had been divulged. In other words, a thousand

German fighters covering, say, five areas, could not hope to stave off 2,000 Allied fighters, whether the Allies chose to concentrate in one place or elected to attack as many as five at one time. As a matter of fact though the Germans at one time, near the close of 1943, had 2,000 fighters in their

Order of Battle, we never encountered more than 600 (during the March raids on Berlin).

PART II

"F.O." *2

PREPARATION OF THS FIELD ERDER.

We have traced in Chapter III the source of the Field

Order from its origin in directives at conferences, such as

Casablanca, to the Allied Supreme Headquarters staff, on to the

Air Ministry and thence to the Strategical Air Forces and as

(*2 - "F.O." No. at the head of every teletype ordering a mission, stands for "Field Order". The Air Forces of the U.S. Army are still earthborne to that extent. Why didn't they call them "Air Orders'? R.A.F. P.O.'s are called "Form D's".)

- 125 -

t :S »,., j _

A Aw far as Bomber Command. A simult

is sent out to the three Bomb Divisions and to Fighter Comand which undertakes the task of planning the fighter escort. Let us trace for example Field Order No. 469 of July 28th, 1944.

Zero hour was set for 7 o'clock the following morning.

The timing of the mission was announced at 5 p.m. in a warning order from 8 Air Force at High Wycombe ("Pinetree"). It was not until 9:30 p.m. that the planners were able to notify

'Ajax" of the routes, the size of the Task Forces involved and the check points along the route. This information was received by teletype at 9:35 p.m. Fighter Command immediately undertakes the task of arranging which Fighter Groups will make rendezvous with the bombers at successive check points along the various routes. This information Fighter Command decides from a Status Board, posted at one end of a high ceil- inged Operation's Roon, which is the center of Fighter Command's planning activities. This data is then telephoned and verified by teletype to 8 Air Force as soon as the Fighter Operations'

Officers have disposed their forces along the planned bomber route. At 10:30 P.M. 8 Air Force telephoned back to Fighter

Command the time at which the various Task Forces were scheduled to arrive at the check points to make their rendezvous with the fighters. There may be as many as five such Task

q i - "O Forces on a large Field Order and if the target objectives are multiple, each of these forces, in turn, may split off to two,

or even three, separate points. 8 Air Force also gives the altitude of the bombers at the check points, their expected time of leaving the English Coast, the time for crossing into

enemy territory, and the time at each of the successive check points of each of the Task Forces. Everything is ready now

for the major conference at Fighter Comammand which assembles

in the Combat "Ops" Room, attended by General Kepner, his Chief

of Staff, General Griswold, A-3, Colonel Burns and his assis-

tant, Colonel Frank B. James, (the Combat Operation's Officers),

A-2, Colonel Lawrence Callahan, (the Intelligence Officer), and

the Assistant A-2 for the Y-Service, Captain Herbert R. Elsas,

the Duty Operations' Officer and his assistants (all of whom

are former operational pilots), and finally, the 'eathor Offi-

cer on duty Major Oliver K. Jones; they gather for the final

preparation of the Fighter Command Field Order.

Every Group is assigned its rendezvous point and the time

at which it must meet the bombers there, as given in the 8 Air

Force message. The Intelligence officer supplies the information

in regard to the strength, disposition and probable re-action of

the enemy, based on the experience of previous missions. He

- 127 - Control makes suggestions as to how to keep German Fighter the fighter Stations guessing as to the target. Occasionally routes, groups were sent on the general area of the bomber of without assignment as escort to a particular formation engaring bombers. This is done in the hope of finding and and thus enemy fighters assembling to intercept the bombers but not with to prevent them from effecting an interception, This group of the thought of fooling the German controller. the missions officers considers the bearing and influence upon for Intelli- of adjacent R.A.F. or 15 Air Force bombing raids, in contigu- gence knows the number of enemy aircraft available Command's ous areas, based on Air Ministry and R.A.F. Fighter of the G.A.F." latest "Weekly Appreciation and Disposition ready reference. This data is posted on a small adjacent map for generally estimated, Strange to say, probable enemy re-action is do to meet not on the basis of what they think the Hun should of what he usually our attack and break it up, but on the basis Hun is a very me- has done on previous similar missions' The strategical thodical man! He does not seem to have any great The planners, sense, nor does he change his tactics readily. uncovered. however, can take no chances on leaving our bombers and asaigwnment The following factors control the selection, used on the mission. alone the route, of the Fighter Groups to be

- 128 -

I-NOWN a. The range of various types of fighter aircraft, estimated

for the P-47's at about 400 miles, for 3-38's at about

600 miles and for P-51's at about 700 miles maximum. The

various sizes of belly tanks available at the different

group stations is also a controlling factor in their allo-

cation. b. The experience of the groups, placing the oldest and strong-

est at the expected point of contact with the enemy.

c. The fighting record of the most experienced groups.

d. New groups are usually placed on withdrawal escort.

e. Groups under the same Win, are spaced along the route, so

far as possible, in such a way as to facilitate their suc-

cessive use of the communication channels for contacting

Control.

f. All of these considerations made very difficult the task

of assigning a particular Fighter Wing to any one Bomb Divis-

ion for escort, and emphasizes the need for a central con-

trol for all fighters, such as was provided by VIII Fighter

Command.

The first draft of the Field Order was next written out

in longhand by the Duty Operations' Officer and was ready be-

tween 10:30 and 11 P.M. for the morrow's mission. Very

- 129 -

-U T11 wisely VIII Fighter Coemand used former squadron leaders who had completed their tour of duty in an operational group, for Duty Operations' Officers. This Field Order was then typed and proof-read by the Combat Operations' Officer or his Assis- tant and sent to the teletype office, where it was simultaneously distributed to the three Wings and to the fifteen groups, all of which are on the same teletype circuit. Part of the planning staff could then go to bed, at about midnight.

Sometimes on a very complicated Field Order, this session may be protracted until the small hours of the morning; in certain oases they were so delayed by necessary revisions of the order at 8 Air Force as to reach the Groups only just in time hurriedly to brief the pilots before they took off. In one case a Group received the order just in time to give it to the

Group Commander in his cockpit as the planes prepared to take off: In one very exceptional case, the squadron left without knowing where it was going and the rendezvous point had to be transmitted to the Group Commander in the air by the Chief Con- troller at the Wing. The causes ofsuch unavoidable delays were many in 1943-44, most often, however, it was the very changeable weather. *3 WEATHER AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING

How important a factor weather is on every mission is

(*3 - "Met" - to the RAF., i.e., contraction for Meteorological)

- 130 -

~ ,~f,* S f - indicated by the complexity of the conferences before "Met" gives a decision. For example, in the mission under consideration, the Weather Officers at Fighter Command, 8 Air Force, all three Bomb Divisions, and Strategical Air Force got together on the conference wire at 11 o'clock in the morning to discuss the preliminary weather forecast for the following day.

This conference determined if the East Anglian bases would be flyable or not; if the target areas would be sufficiently open for visual bombing or whether it would have to be done by so- called blind bombing (i.e., radio location). At 12 o'clock,

8 Air Force and Strategical Air Force conferred again and a preliminary operations' plan was made. At 2:30 P.M. the same headquarters discussed the general weather picture and gave a detailed forecast for bases and target areas. If a tentative target has been picked, special consideration was given to that area. This information was passed on to the operations'

Officer with a summary forecast and copies were "sent down" from Fighter Command to the three Wings. Operations' plans were generally completed after this weather "briefin f". 8 Air

Force was then in a position to name the tar.et an?` the tentative zero hour. At 9:30 P.?:., the same weather officers at various headquarters were together again on the conference wire to discuss in detail the weather at the bases, along the

- 131 -

-. t route and at the target; any chs the 2:30 P.M. forecast were indicated to the Operations'

Officers at all the Headquarters. At 10: P.M., "the weather boys" at Fighter Command, 8 Air Force, the three Bomb Divisions and Strategical Air Force again discussed the weather and made an operational forecast which was issued to all the Fighter

Groups, after having been brought to the attention of all -the

Operations' Officers at all the above Headquarters. Fighter

Command's A-3 was kept informed of all developments and weather changes during the actual course of planning and the next day throughout the execution of the mission. If Fighter Command's

'leather Officers were to disagree with the conference forecast, that fact was made known, as well as the divergent opinion of the other headquarters. It was the duty of Fighter Command

';eather Officers to keep 8 Air Force informed of weather at the fighter bases and they had to forecast the probable weather at bases during the Operation. 8 Air Force always pass this information on to their own Operations Officers so that when the planners discuss the prospects for the next day's mission they

all will have the same picture. Needless to say, in a country

like "ingland, and particularly in East Anglia, whatever the

Weather Officers at various headquarters say, right down to the

squadron level, they were seldom able to agree, they are too

iV, --z,. Xt?)*iV txI r rsjq "y - 10 '.^ W

,,R i,7 can "ever do anything frequently wrong, and not one of them Somebody once said, "If about it", as Mark Twain once said. a minute." The weather lads you don't like the weather, wait and most highly qualified are, however, about the best trained group of men in the Air Force'

Y-SERVICE is conducted The monitoring of enemy radio commnnication coordinated by linguis- at numerous stations, is filtered and at Kingsdowne. (Now at Canter- tic experts at the R.A.F. Station cross-out, the Y-Service bury) Two hours before the bombers conducts a 24-hour wire is connected to Kingsdowne, which by "Ajax" as to the route, service. Kingsdowne is "briefed" sift out of its vast number timings and target so that it may interest to the 8 Air of interceptions, the data of pertinent had this service in operation Force. The R.A.F., though it has to use it, but with the for years, has seldom had much occasion escort by the 8 Air Force, establishment of long-range fighter use for the first time. it became of very great practical at "Ajax" are responsible Three officers in the Plotting Room necessary enlisted personnel. for this service together with the two overlays maps with At the telephone outlet are posted tactical short-range data acetate coverings, one to plot the long-range missions. and the other for the strategical or

- 133 -

! . s V S * LizJ-

On these two maps are plotted ever Lneiy re-mactionn and ai?l'

tabulation is made of each enemy unit's activity. A conference

line is maintained from VIII Fighter Command to 8 Air Force and

to the three Fighter W.ings' Operations Rooms, as well as to the

new Radar Station at"Greyfriars". The large horizontal board

in the Plotting Room records the plots received by telephone

from the 11th Group of the R.A.F. Fighter Comiand and is manned

by 'AC personnel. Most of this information is short-range data

opposite the English Coast and is useful to Fighter Command

only on penetration and withdrawal escorts. Adjacent to this

is a vertical board recording the radar plots from "Greyfriars".

On both boards the R.A.F. Fighter Grid is used. Plots on the latter are numbered in chalk from one to one hundred and then repeated. The Chief Controller's post at Command is occupied by the Commanding General, or Colonel Burns, or Colonel James; the General usually sits there throughout the entire length of every single mission!

Certain general considerations affecting long-range fighter escort ate appropriate at this time.

a. It should be noted that American fighters secure

greater range by throttling down their engines to a

minimum speed during escorts until combat takes place.

- 134 -

I Maximim speed is used a

_---.. I- .- -_ oraxTo. InIs serves To conserve gas but its nharder on the engines.

b. R.A.F. fighter squadrons usually fly full out during

the whole mission and therefore have less range.

c. Enemy aircraft show little disposition to attack the

bombers when under P-47 escort for they have learned

to dread the powerful "Thunderbolt" and its ability

to take and to give punishment.

d. Ranges greater than were ever thought possible for

P-47's Groups were secured, for a time, by the relay

system, the fighters flying at a much greater speed

than the bombers direct to the rendezvous point rather

than trying to follow the bombers along the route which is frequently zigzagged. e. At probable points of contact with the enemy, addi-

tional groups are allocated to cover the bombers which

are sometimes strung along over a two hundred mile column. f. B-24's which fly a much looser formation than the B-17s

are more difficult to excort and prove more vulnerable

to enemy attack. The fighters prefor to cover the

B-17's compact formations.

1,0 9

. 1 1-10tr g. With the change-over from a majority of P-47's to a

majority of P-51's and only four P-47 Groups left in

Fighter Command at the date of writing, the "Thunder-

bolts" are used primarily on penetration and withdraw-

al; range appears now to be of greater importance than

hitting power or the ability to take punishment. Hence

the change-over.

SAFFRON. SAWSTON. WOLCOTT

FIE ORDERS AT WING.

Since the Fighter Wings of the 8th may well be described as a small scale Fighter Command, they played a necessary part in the execution of all Field Orders. Under their immediate commrand were the Fighter Control Squadrons and Signal Compan- ies, in addition to the five Fighter Groups assigned to each.

It was their responsibility to see that all orders were smoothly and meticulously carried out, and that no auxiliary function, such as the furnishing of airborne relays, was overlooked.

Thus each Wing had a "Combat Ops" as part of the A-3 (Opera- tions) Section.

When VIII Fighter Command (Ajax) wrote the Field Order it was Wing Combat Ops' function to see that it received immediate and proper distribution; in some cases when time did not permit transmission by teletype from Ajax, the Duty Ops Officer would

- 136 - take the Field Order over the 'phone and then pass all the necessary information to each Group concerned. The entire mission was then laid out in complete detail on the operation map and studied for any possible error or necessary clarifica- tion, so as to anticipate any question by the Groups. Approxi- mate take-off times were calculated and passed to the Controller and Weather Officer. The weather prediction for each base at time of take-off was checked and, should doubtful conditions be anticipated, local weather recco flights were ordered, and

Command was kept posted. Required airborne (R.T.) relay was arranged, and, where necessary, escort provided for it.

Finally, all last-minute telephone instructions flowed through

Combat Ops for immediate transmittal to their respective Groups.

In the months prior to "D-Day", when the tactical situation was not too complex, or on days when the "heavies" were not operating, the Groups would sometimes be released to the Wings for offensive operations, weather permitting (too often it did not). Wing would then write its own Field Order (See example in Appendix "T". The Operations Officer was hurriedly called by the Duty Ops Officer; excitement reigned for it was not often this opportunity was afforded the lower echelon. Axax was consulted as to the areas and times in which the other

Commands might already have planned operations, and in so doing, an area and time would be assigned to the Wing.

- 137 - A-2 (Intelligence) would then be consulted for up-to-the minute target, flak and GAP disposition; the status bboard was consulted, the Groups to participate selected and the warning order issued, followed later by the Field Order. In cases where time was too short for teletyping, the Groups would receive their instructions by telephone, security not being a primary factor under such circumstances.

WING A-2

In seeing that all orders from Combat Ops at Fighter

Command or from Wing Combat Ops were carried out smoothly,

Wing A-2 (Intelligence} played a considerable part. It was the objective of Combat Intelligence in the Wing - as opposed to other forms of Intelligence dealing with security, secrecy, discipline, etc. - to reduce, as far as possible, any un- certainty with regard to unknown factors, about the enemy.

The idea was to produce this information to assist the Groups and the Group Comnanders in arriving at their decisions and in executing the missions based on these decisions.

In order to do this, Intelligence performed two main func- tions. One function was a general one of continually gathering, collating, evaluating and interpreting information over a long period of time to have it available "on call". The other chief function of Combat Intelligence was to produce immediate 'spot" information at the time of a mission, and in the operations room

- 138 - 0 , -., : advice based on information received from "Y". . -: I I

In order to supply general, over-all information, studies were made of the enemy order of battle, to get, as completely as photo interpretation, prisoner-of-war and ground information would provide, all the knowledge available about the number and type of aircraft on enemy and enemy-occupied fields as well as what the status of those fields were. Par- ticular emphasis was laid on where and when large-scale enemy reaction would take place. Target information, with detailed photographs, sketches and narrative descriptions, were kept in the A-2 files. The target numbers used on the Field Orders were translated into exact geographical locations only after checking the secret target dossiers held in A-2's safe.

A Combat Intelligence Officer was always present in the

Operations Room at the time that a mission was in progress.

EIlisted Men constantly monitored the Kingsdowne line, which

was the central source for all translated German Receiver/Trans-

mitter information, so that the Intelligence Officer could make

his decisions, relative to the immediate location of our

fighters and bombers, as to what enemy reaction could or could

not be expected. Frequently the information received from the

Intelligence Officer was relayed over our own R/T and our

fighters were vectored to enemy aircraft where combat ensued.

-1391t"

£i It .fl^Sis' i w ' .^a ,„.~~~~A~ Hati,'y '% '; 4iriam?" -u,1'.' ' 'M 7 ? ^ In addition to this, Wing formfttrn *wti,.i+T -aB- -_._.____.. v--e HU w -i uuuu Xrom tne groups in the form of flash reports imediately upon pilots' landing and later received more detailed telephone reports and still later, but within two hours after landing, a complete teletype report.

Wing acted as a consolidating agency for these reports, and

disseminated to other Wings all current news of the mission.

The 65th Wing, after D-Day published a daily teletype bulletin

of news collected by monitoring the major radio broadcasting

stations of the continent, a service much appreciated by the

Groups of the VIII Fighter Coimuand. On the non-operational days, the 66th Wing A-2 Section arranged weekly briefings for

Group personnel on the current developments of the war on other fronts, each of its six officers specializing on a different theater of operations.

PART III

wCOLGATE". "OILSKIN". "MOHAIR" *4

The Fighter Control Squadron is the ground control center

for the five fighter groups which form a Wing. Headquarters

for the 65th Wing was located in a large brick school build-

ing at Saffron Walden near the Debden Base, headquarters of its

('4 - Codewords used to identify the Chief Controller at 65th, bbth and b7th Fighter Wing Head

". y 4th Fighter Group. The 66th Wing took over from an ~.A.F.

Sector Control Headquarters of the 12th Group located near

Cambridge, in Sawston Hall, a beautiful and romantic manor Wing house dating back to the days of "Bloody Mary". The 67th Such wac located at Wolcott Hall, not far from Peterborough. a Fighter Control Squadron has about 20 officers and 270 enlisted men.

CONTROLLER S

The name Control Center arises from the fact that in con- Battle of Britain days the British fighters were actually Group trolled and were in constant contact with the Sector or

Control Center. This procedure became the basis of control Com- for the early short-range missions run by the VIII Fighter

mand. Communication by Radio and a definite R/T (Radio-Tele- Controll- phone) procedure establishes contact between the Chief

er and the Group or Squadron Leader as soon as they become

airborne and remain within the range of communication. These

controllers are the key men of the Fighter Control Squadrons

attached to each of the Wings, and are thoroughly trained at

the Fighter Control School at the Army Air Forces Tactical

Training Center in Florida. Pilots at first were inclined to

discount their value, but once they took part in combat missions,

they soon became convinced of the vital role played by Control

in such operations. (See Plate XIV).

- 141 - r £ 5 I.

In the R.A.F. Sector and Group Control Centers, the Con- trollers are usually former pilots, taken off of 'Ops" because of are, or disability or unsuitability for active flying status; many are veterans of the Battle of Britain; nowadays active pilots are seldom over 26 years of age! In the U.S.

Army Air Forces, business and professional men, lawyers, merchants, bank clerks, etc., became Controllers as was necessary in a rapidly expanding air force which needed every one of its active flying pilots; and a superb job these controllers have done:

"A' CHANNEL.

Contact is maintained, throughout the mission as long as the planes are within range, on the Operational or 'A" channel, on a frequency which is exclusively for that group. 5 The

Controller at Wing Headquarters passes on to the Group Leader all pertinent data by which he may be aided to carry out his mission, such as the position and timing of the bombers, their altitude and position relative to cheek-points, all of which data the controller. has received over a conference wire to

*Ajax", "Pinetree", "Widewing", and the other two Wings, and

(75 - "A" Channel is also used by pilots of a group to contact their own control tower at their home base.

- 142 - of him. These plots, in turn, are kept constantly moving across the board by "plotters", usually enlisted men of the

Fighter Control Squadron who receive their data by telephone

from the radar stations along the coast which plot all air-

borne aircraft 24 hours of the day. They assign a number to,

and trace the course of, every plot as it moves across the

board. All conversation between the controller and the group

as well as ittra-plane communication of the group is recorded

by a monitor who keeps a log for reference.

"D" CHANNtL.

This channel is occasionally used by the Chi3f Controller

and Group Controllers to convey the warnings of enemy aircraft

in the neighborhood of our formations (but usually "A" Channel

is used for this purpose). This data is received by the '!Winf

Intelligence Officers from VIII Fighter Command as described

above. "D" Channel is on a frequency common to all Groups of

the same Wing. Actual interceptions of enemy formations have

been made far -within enemy territory by this weans. Its pri-

mary purpose, however, is for hominpg and f-xinj lc3t aircraft,

or planes in difficulty. It is also used to locate groups

above an overcast, and to vector them to a rendezvous. It is

often used as an auxiliary Air Sea Rescue channel.

- 143 -

f -^ ''e fcA. S i' -' i-: y 1t" '- ~ . a "C" CHANNEL.

This channel is used for communication between the bombers and fighters on operational missions and for landing instruction to aircraft forced down on American fields, other it is operated on than their own home bases. Like "B" channel land- a frequency common to all fighters in the Command. For station ing on their own fields the pilots contact their

Controller in the tower over "A" Channel and he is directed signs. by visual signals, rockets, warning flares, or ground

"(GEYR IARS" known as "MEW", A new type of control is now in use and is "see" up to 250 or "Microwave-Early-Warning". This system can auxiliary miles' range, and plots not only direction, but with take care equipment, altitude as well. They cannot adequately as new equip- of more than two or three groups at a time, but that, by their ment arrives and crews are trained, it is hoped that they will added efficiency and a fair degree of mobility, which are solid- be able to displace the fixed control stations for a war- ly anchored to the soil. They are ideally suited every few days. fare of the mobile type where airfields move up

"B" CHANNIEL - AIR SEA RESCUE -"MAYDAY"' 6 is used only On yet another frequency is Channel "B" which

a plane in (e6 - "Mayday" is the international code call from when a pilot is about to "ditch" or "bail-out". distress R.N. Liai- The author is indebted to Lt. James Chaplin, of son Officer at Ajax for most of the above account the Air Sea Rescue Service. - Author.) ' X . ;. -1 4 - ." " : ~~~~ 5~~~~~ in case of emergency by a pilot who seems likely to have to

"bail out" (Parachute) of his plane or "ditcl' (i.e., to bring it down on the water); as is very infrequently the case with fighters, there is a tremendous lot of water around these

British Isles' Chnngel "B" is therefore used exclusively for

Air-Sea Rescue procedure on a frequency common to all fi -hters of the Command, and a fixing system similar to the emerrency homing is used for this purpose.

"The lesson is, never to give in, never, never, never.

Not in any event, great or small." These lines of Winston

Churchill's typify the spirit of all those who are connected with Air Sea Rescue v*ork, and are imprinted on the minds from the Commanding General down to the Private on the Triangulation

Tables.

Air-Sea Rescue ix a Service, whose praises have been left unsung since the war broke out, yet is of unsurpassed value to our airmen, esoecially from the point of view of morale. A

Navy Pilot once said, "There is nothing more pitiful than the sight of helpless men in the water, even if they are on a raft; they look so small and weak, and when you bring your plane do.n or your boat alongside, the looks of joy and gratitude on their faces pays you back a hundred times. You'd go through anything to help them". A typical case of rescue was the action taken

- 14) -

: ' & - : by Flying Officer E. Wilson, an Australian, who took off in his Walrus amphibian over wintry channel seas to save the life of Captain (now m!ajor) Preddy of the 352nd Group, who had fought in defence of Darwin, Australia and New Guinea, before he came to the European Theatre of Operations. For four and a half hours after landing, on a sea too rough for a take-off,

Wilson clung to the wing of his "kite", and when he was picked up by a naval craft his arm, which had been hooked around the strut, could not be straightened until it had been thoroughly thawed out. After the rescue Wilson and Preddy joined in conversation and discovered that they had many common friends.

There was built a lasting friendship like thousands of others which will unite our two peoples in the post-war period.

On one bad day over 110 American airmen were rescued from

their "dinghies" (inflated rubber rafts) or from their still-

floating planes by this service. In many cases where "ditch-

ing" is too sudden or unexpected, or when it is impossible

through radio failure to secure the fix, other Allied fighter

aircraft circle the spot, radio their own position and thereby

help to effect the rescue. Pilots who have "ditched" success-

fully and have been rescued, for a time proudly (but unoffi-

cially) wore a silver dolphin! (Since ruled out by an U:SSTAP

- 146 - directive: Like the :urple Heart, awarded for wounds received in action, it is not a decoration after which airmen yearn' Three Air-Jea Rescue incidents are recounted in Appendix "I". In 1943, Air Sea es3cue was able to save the lives of 589 aviators of the 8 Air Force and in 1944, 856 of the 8 and 9 Air Forces. The percentage of incidents (which A/S/R defines as any aircraft knowl or believed to have gone down in the sea), where rescue has been successfully effected, has risen from !3? in 1943 to almost exactly 50" in 1944, with a steady rise shown from the 20o and 21, of the bitter months of January and

February, / to the splendid figure of 73 in July, 1941.

In addition to "Mayday" calls, in July 1944, 59 fighters and 111 bombers were controlled by the A/S/R frequency and helped to cross into friendly territory, 95;} of which would have been, but for this service, potential ditchinP prospects.

Insuperable difficulties have been encountered by all those concerned with Air Sea Rescue, especially during the transition period when the 65th Fighter Wint, on behalf of the whole VIII Fighter Command, took over our share of the Service from the R.A.i.. As the power of the 8 Air Force grew, so did the new Air Sea Rescue Organization, each Section relieving the over-loaded oopposite number at Air Defence of Great Brita.n.

- 147 -

,- Xi, A complete plot was manned, it ws linked up with the new fixer stations; the .,potter Squadron, ably led by Capt. R.P. Gerhart,

flying a P-47 fitted with two M. type dinghies and smoke oanni-

sters, took over duty. The B-17 with U.S. Airborne lifeboats

and P.B.Y's to assist the stalwart 277th and 278th Squadrona

arrived and finnaly American-manned launches to assist the

H.:;.L.'s (High Speed Launches) and P...L.'s (P.escue Motor

Launches). The or-anization of the plot, the trninin,0 of the

men Nwho control it, "sweatingr out' rescue incidents, while try-

in~g to visualize each individual's situation, the diplomatic

relationships, and a hundred and one other problems are a

credit particularly to the tireless energies of Vlajor '7illiam

A. Trippett, Captain F'.,'. Graf and Capt! in ..G. iac!.:ahon. It

should be said with the gratitude of the VIII Fighter Coimand,

thut without the services of the Royal Navy, the i'oy.l Air

Force, the Royal National Life Boat Institution, Trinity House,

H.L.. Coastguards and the BRoyal Observer Corp3, all joined

together as a team, the Air :;ea !escue .ervice could not have

attained the competent standard of today; Squadron Leader Brown,

the late Flight Lt. Lindsay and Flight Lt. .'Vatson are men to

whom American pilots owe much.

- 148 - CHAP=VI -

THTuLaBOLTS. LIGHYINGS NlMUSTANGSr. to tech- (This ohapter, like Chapter II is of primary interest the story nicians and may be emitted by readers who wish only of the work of VIII Fighter Ccnand.)

1. The P-47 (Thunderbolt) The decision to use the fast, powerful Republio's P-47 Theater "Thunderbolt" for the basic fighter in the European research of Operations was made in early 1943. The outstanding of the 8th and testing carried on by the Air Technical Section the WVstern Air Foroe is the key to its successful career on

Front, and is the subject of a later chapter. of It must now be examined as an unsurpassed instrument

destruction, together with its ceorades, the P-38"Lightnging the P-47 and the P-51 'Mustange. The 'plying Milk Bottles", as how- is sometimes called, because of its peculiar silhouette, its 8 - .50 ever, was the toughest fighter in the theater, with the propeller caliber machine guns mounted in the wings, beyond take puniah- arc; it could give terrific punishment, and it could of its ment and bgttle damage better than any other fighter of rang., day. Its great weight of 8 tons, caused a sacrifice

and in oonsequence, it had to be used generally on penetration

and withdrawal support on the longer missions when sufficient

*t- Fighter aircraft are numbered in series with the prefix uPs for pursuit, in the Ary Air Foroes offioial deasg- used) nation. The more popular names are also oemonly - 149-

2,3 escort was available to detail ot

portion of the trip. But, pilots used to say of the, "the

P-47 's come back". Pilot OoD Mona.

Pilot Opinions, on the airfields, are usually the best

criterion of judgement of a plane, for after all, the pilots'

lives depend upon them. The 'Thunderbolt" pilots were often

reluctant to exchange them for the more vulnerable, but longer

ranged P-51 "ustangs". They agreed that it had an abundance

of firepower and performed better, the higher the altitude of

action, excelling above 5,000 feet. They felt it could do

everything the enemy could, and often a little better even

than the FW 190, its greatest rival. It gave very little me-

ohanioal trouble onoe the early difficulties were ironed out; pilots soon learned how to get the maximn range out of them

by "nursing the throttle' to minim4 cruising speed,. on long

esoorts. The addition of external tanks which alters the

center of gravity in soam aircraft, made very little difference

to the P-47 which never was tricky when so loaded.

In dives they could catch up to the early advantage

gained by the HE 109 and PW 190, as the enemy would gain 200

yards in the first 2,000 feet. Thereafter, it would be about even, with the P-47 gani4ng and overtaking the Hun after 7,000

-150 - lot~ ~ 4 to 10,000 feet. It was faster than any Hun at any altitude and one onto a Yun's tail, he was a gone goose" unless an opportune oloud was about. It had meellent visibility fremthe oookpit especially with the new canopy, and firepower superior to any enom fighter. Its versality and ability to absorb puniesornt, whether used an a fighter, as a figher-bomber or as a dive-bomber, gave the pilot supreme confidenoe that his mission would be aocmpliahed suooessafully. When up against the Geman twin-engine planes, JU 88, ME 110, B 210, or the M3 410, it was like *shooting fish in a rain barrel". Moreover, the 'Thunder- bolt' pilots frankly conoede without any argument, that it was better than any other Allied Plane: The confidence of our pilota in their planes was evidence of a very healthy morale. Ita heavy oonamption of fuel was its weakness. Its silhouette was unmistakable.

COmmeriaon with the FW IQo. '2 The following article gives ms interesting data an tests conducted to ocmpare the P-47 with the PW 190.

('*2- Informational Intelligence Swuary - No. 44-14, 30 April 1944)

- 151 - 'P-47 vs. W-iqO TRIAL TESTS

1 Altitudes Climb and aooeleration tests were performed to 15,000 feet. Other flying characteristics were oheooked in flights between sea level and 10,000 feet. 2. AiJrft employed. The airplanes used in the testa were a P-47D4 with combat load and an FW 190 with two loaded cannons mounted in the wings and two loaded 30 oaliber machine guns, firing through the propeller. The P-47 was equipped with water injection. The FW 190 was in exoeptionally good condition for a captured airplane, and developed 42 inches (manifold pressure) on take-off. 3. Pilot Personnel. The pilot of the P-47 had nearly 200 hours in P-40 type airplanes, with seventeen months of combat experience and had flown the test airplane five hours. The pilot of the FW 190 had 300 hours in twin- engine aircraft and 500 hours in single engine airplanes, but had not combat experience. He also had five hours in the test airplane. Thus the pilots were about evenly matched. 4. Lenath of Tests. Pour separate flights of one hour each were conducted. All spoeds reported are Indicated Air Speed.

Recorded Results

1. Aoeleration. a. - 210 mp.h. to 275 m.p.h. at 2,000 feet. The FW 190 accelerated faster than the P-47 and gained approximately 200 yards during the acceleration. b. - 210-275 m.p.h. at 5,000 feet. Results, same. o. - 200 m.p.h. to full power at 5,000 feet. The PW 190 accelerated faster than the P-47 initially and gained about 200 yards, but at a speed of 330 m.p.h. the P-47 rapidly overtook the FW 190 and gained about 2,000 yards very quickly and was still accelerating. Water injection was used by the P-47.

-152 - . d. - 220 m.p.h. to 300 m.p.h. with full throttle at 15,000 feet. Again the FW 190 initially gained about 200 yards, but the P-47 quickly overtook it. The PW high speed supercharger out in auto- matically at this altitude, and this supercharger seemed to out in at lower altitudes when a speed in excess of 340 m.p.h. was attained by diving. 2. Climb. a. - 2,000 feet to 7,000 feet, starting at 250 m.p.h. Both airplanes were pulled up rapidly to the angle of maximum climb and held until an altitude of 8,500 feet was reached. The FW 190 climbed faster than the P-47 through the first 1,500 feet, but the P-47 quickly overtook it and steadily outclimbed it by 500 feet per minute. The P-47 used water injection and slightly overheated, while the FW 190 did not overheat. b. - 10,000 feet to 15,000 feet, starting at 250 m.p.h. Again the FW 190 initially outclimbed the P-47 through the first 1,000 feet; however the P-47 rapidly overtook and reached 15,000 feet while the FW 190 was at 14,500 feet. 3. Divie. 10,000 feet to 3,000 feet, starting at 250 m.p.h., diving at angle of 65 degrees with constant throttle setting. The FW 190 pulled away rapidly at the beginning, but the P-47 passed it at 3,000 feet with a much greater speed and had a decidedly better angle of pull-out.

4. Turning. a. - Turning and handling in excess of 250 m.p.h. The two airplanes alternately turned on each other's tail, holding in the turns as tightly as possible, and alternating the turns first left then right. The P-47 easily out-turned the FW 190 at 10,000 feet and hat to throttle back in order to keep from over-running the FW 190. The superiority of the P-47 in turning increased with altitude. The FW 190 was very heavy in fore and aft control, vibrated ex- oessively and tended to black-out the pilot. b. - Turning and handling below 250 m.p.h. Turns were made so rapidly that it was impossible for the airplanes to accelerate. In making the usual rather flat turns in a horizontal plane,

- 153 - the FW 190 was able to hang on its propeller and turn inside the P-47. The FW 190 was also able to accelerate suddenly and change to a more favorable position during the turn. However, it was found that the P-47 could get on the tail of the F.w 190 by making a figure eight in a vertical plane. In this manoeuver, the P-47, which was being pursued by the FW 190 in level flight, attempted to execute a series of climbs, slow turns, and dives which would end up with the positions reversed and the P-47 on the tail of the 17! 190. The manoeuver started with a steep climbing turn to near stalling point, followed by a fall-off and fast dive which ended in a pull-out and fast climbing swoop which again carried the plane up to the stall and fall-off point. The P-47 built up more speed in the dive than the FW 190 with the result that the Thunder- bolt also climbed faster than the FW 190 and also higher. The P-47 pilot merely waited for the FW 190 to reach its stalling point below him and turned very neatly on the tail of the falling away FW 190. With its much greater diving acceleration, the P-47 soon caught the FW 190 in the second dive of his manoeuver.

5. General FPlin Characteristies of PW lq. a. - The PFW 190 performed nioley in all acrobatic man- oeuvers, except that the sensitivity of fore and aft controls made low altitude manoeuvere dangerous. b. - This airplane had an extremely bad high-speed stall in turns. This was hot so evident in high speed pull-outs, but if trimmed and pulled hard enough, it spun violently straight down without warning. c. - Aileron control was very good at all speeds and rudder control was normally good. d. - Forward and side visibility were very good, while rear visibility was very poor. *. - The cockpit was uncomfortably mall for e. pilot taller than 5'8". f. - Bailing out of this airplane would be difficult for any pilot. g. - The airplane was quite nose-heavy, which would make dead-stiok landings dangerous and high speed dives near the ground, disastrous.

- 154- h. - The engine seemed to run ver roughly at all '&' times and the vibration transmitted throug the control column almost completely destroyed any feel of the flying oharaoteristios. This charao- teristic was partly responsible for the lack of warning in high speed stalls.

6. General Plying Characteristics of I47. a. - The P-47 had good visibility in all directions, and had no bad characteristics in take-offs, landings or in flight. b. - All controls were good. o. - The nose was too large to allow good visibility for strafing, but with practice, this airplane might prove successful in ground attack. d. - The inability of the airplane to pull out of vertical dives made low altitude dive-bombing impracticable.

Conclusions

The P-47 with its tremendous firepower, is at least as good as the FW 190 at low altitude. There should be no question about engaging the FW 190 in dog fight at low altitude; but it should be remembered that the FW 190 is a good airplane and has advantages at slow speeds.

Improvements have constantly been installed to better its performance. Capt. Carl M. Bremer, the Assistant A-4 (Supply) of the 66th Fighter Wing has listed these developments as follows:

'P-47's originally had the Pratt-Whitney R-2800-21 engines, a 12'2" Ourtiss, Eleotric 4 standard blade, constant speed propeller and internal fuel supply of 205 gallons in its main fuselage tank and a 100 gallon auxiliary fuselage tank. "This plane has been constantly modified, improved and changed to meet operational requirements. Some of the major improvements and modifications and the order in which they were applied, are as follows:

'A four point suspension 200 gallon belly tank was the first external fuel tank adopted. It was not very practical because of the difficulty of installment, and because this tank was

- l-51l - f' < ; i -:.e.

: UN 1 :,.,IDO"^ -.' i -, "' W i. - normally used on operational miso 100 gallons of fuel, and was never completely filled. This was followed by the installation of air pressurization with controlled pressure to the belly tank. "The installation of 2-point suspension bomb rack and sway braces were more efficient and permitted the use of a 75 gallon belly tank. Later on came the adoption of British made 100 gallon tanks. "A big step forward was the replacement by R-2800- 63 and R-2800-59 engines incorporating the water injection system and the modification of these airplanes and R-2800-21 engines to use water injection. "The changeover to 13' paddle-blade propellers and use of both Curtiss Electric and Hamilton Standard Constant Speed propellers, came next. 'Installation of additional bomb shackles on the wings and necessary plumbing in order to use jettisonable fuel tanks. "Use of 150 gallon drop tank on the belly shackles. "Addition of "Bubble Canopy" and an increase in the capacity of the main fuselage tank to hold 270 gallons of fuel.

"Several more changes and modifications were made, which increased operational efficiency, but they cannot be discussed because they are still of a secret or confidential nature. At the present time, additional oxygen supply is being installed, sufficient for 6 hours use of oxygen by the pilot. The average fuel consumption per hour on the average long range mission is approximately 100-105 gallons per hour. The average oil consumption per hour on the average long range mission is 6.5 quarts per hour. The average number of engine hours before changing engines is 197 hours.

That the "Thunderbolt" was a "killer" was common knowledge in the Coamand. Operational Research statisticians, however, have made careful analysis of the combat (photographic) results of the firing of the 8-gun P-47's and have deduced some interesting results. They are briefly listed for their technical interest: - 156-

-4,7- Z4, 1, , , r, - , 04 17" ,1-1-ij,`-- - r 1 I-- I*-, , A Critioal Analysis of the P-47's Pilot's firing.

(1) The duration of fire is not a decisive factor in determining the outcome of a combat. (2) The average number of bursts of fire per combat was 4.2. (3) The most frequent length of a burst of fire was 0.3 seconds. (4) The average length of a burst of fire was 0.94 seconds. (5) Pilots' estimates of range were nearly twice the actual range. (6) The average pilot under-estimates the range by 29% (7) More than half the fire is delivered at more than 300 yards. (8) 20% of the fire is delivered at more than 600 yards. (9) According to ranges, the results ordinarily were about as follows: at 658 yards - no claim; at 392 yards - "Damaged"; at 323 yards - "Probably Destroyed' at 253 yards - 'Destroyed". (10) Out of 111 combats studied, 37 claimed the eney plane as 'Destroyed". (11) Lot us take a statisticians typical combat; - "The Thunderbolt pilot opens fire at 500-600 yards which he estimates to be 300 yards, on a deflection angle of 30 degrees. He gives four or five bursts of about a second each, closes to 200 yards, more closely astern. His channel of fire wavers erratically over a 2 degree arc, but crosses the line of flight between 1 degree and 2 degrees astern. He loses muoh amiuni- tion by faulty aim of his bullet stream, which is tbe chief cause of unsuccessful attacks, not, as is generally thought, is it due to an insufficient des- sity of bullets in the fire pattern. If the pilot closes in to about 250 yards, he will get a viotAory but two thirds of the enem aircraft attaoked esape damage. A table of technical data on the P-47 is to be found in Appendix 'J".

2. P-38 *Lightnine, (See Plates IV and XV)

The P-38 Lockheed "4IhUtning", beooause of its ran6g was the first Anerican fighter plane flown across the Atlantic to this theater. Its pilots grew very fend of its great

- 157- characteristics. In the Mediterranean Theater, it proved to be first class, but in Northern BEropean skies, it had defects which caused it to be displaced later by the P-51 "Mustang".

Pilots who have flown the, express opinions of the P-38 about as follows:

"We cannot get above the Hun in a P-38, nor match his performance above 25,000 feet, for above 22,000 feet we develop mechanical difficulties on long range escort, chiefly because the engine throws oil at high altitudes. But we can outpace him at any altitude, even though above 18,000 feet we cannot outdive him. Below 18,000 feet, we can catch him in a dive, and "sho nuf" can outclimb him, "out-zoom" him or turn inside him; we are at least his equal on straight and level flight. If the bombers aren't too high, and we don't have to stretch the range too far, we feel we have the best ship for operational duty against the "Jerries" for he can't get away from us below 18,000 feet."

Technicians say of the "Lightning".

"This airplane is equipped with one V1710-89 right hand rotating and one V1710-91 left hand rotating engine. This is the only American built airplane used over here with the propellers on each engine rotating in opposite directions. This airplane employs 11'6" 3-standard blade, full feathering, Curtiss Electric propellers. "The P-38J model had the same fuel capacity as the P-38H and in addition was modified with an additional 60 gallon fuel tank in the leading edge of each wing. "Both models of the P-38 aircraft can carry two external jettisonable fuel tanks of 165 gallons capacity. "No pressurization is applied to jettisonable tanks on P-38 aircraft. "The average fuel consumption per hour per average mission is 110 gallons per hour. "The average oil consumption per hour varied with type of mission; above 25,000 feet the average is 4-8 quarts per hour; below 25,000 feet, the average is 1-2 quarts per hour. " The average engine hours varied with the type of mission; above 25,000 feet, the average was 80 hours 14 minutes; below 25,000 feet, the average time is approximately 155

- 158-

,,',,- hours.. . altitude airplane was definitely not a high "This was due up to the period of June 1, 1944. This plane extreme cold to mechanical diffioulties ind ced by encountered at high altitudes. 3 supply is enough for 6 hours. "The oxygen altitudes in winter." "The cockpit is extremely cold at high in Appendix "J" (See Technical data on the P-38 may be found Plate XII) and XV) 3. The P-I "IMustaen (See Plates V "Mustang" in late The adoption of the P-51 North Amerioan the decision to displace 1943, by the VIII Fighter Commaond, and must have been the P-47's largely, and the P-38's entirely, with the need for dictated by strategidcal reasons connected John G. Winant longer and deeper escorted missions. Ambassador Air Attache at the B- and the late Colonel Thomas Hitchcock, early decision. Col. bassy, were largely instrumental in that features for the P-51. Hitchcock lost his life testing some new proved its supreme The tactical work, in which the P-47 had than the con- worth, had evidently become of lesser importance of the 8th. This tinuation of the primary strategical missions a tactical force was especially true since the 9th, essentially handle its own work was by now at full strength and able to

in the ETO, it was not a high (53 - "At the time of its arrival been plane. Since then, the difficulties have altitude with any "ironed out" and today it compares favorably Hough) fighter, at any altitude." - Col. C.S.

- 119 -

~::, ? . S r i/ lt i

,;,,'.r_: I , ViPII-_' LIIIII A 0-( van,'z , , I' it11'i

for without the diversion of the 8th'. fighters to a task used, whioh they were not intended, but for which, when so later. they far exceeded all expectations, as we shall see to proponents The s*tory of its development mast be encouraging long ranged of strategical air warfare, who base their ideas on fighters. *4 MUSTANGS

Hastanrwith Alliaon EiaInes. Commission}) "In April, 1940, the B.A.C. (British Aircraft view to their approached the North American Aviation Inc. with a After producing Kittyhawk P-40 aircraft to a British contract. suggested due consideration, the North American Aviation Inc. with that they could produce a fighter of their own design time days) better characteristics in a shorter space of (120 to this and at less cost than the P-40. The B.A.C. agreed general course and requested that the design conform to the improved arma- operational requirements of the P-40 except for

ment. satis- "A preliminary design was produced and considered Baker and factory by Sir Henry Self, Air Vice-Marshal G.B.A.

(*4 -This Memorandum was sent to the author by Wing Commander Nigel Tangye, RAF Liaison Officer at U.S.S.T.A.F.)

I. IB fi -si«

- 160 -.. Mr. H.C.B. Thomas. The latter, in conjunction with :4 1e0ber of North JAerican Aviation wrote the detailed specifications in the New York office of the B.A.C.

"The selection of the fuselage shape, wing section, pro- file and aerodynamic features were of North American's own design, but influenced to some extent by the P-40. The detailed design, installation and mock-up were supervised by

Group Captain Adams and Mr. H.S. Howett of the B.A.C. The order did not pass through Wright Field. The U.S.A.A.F. were not interested in this aircraft until long after deliveries had started on the British contract. The Allison engine, having a low altitude rating, made the aircraft unsuitable for employment in Fighter Command and it was used in Army Co- operation Command for low altitude attack.

Mustanz with Merlin ZEwine.

'Meseers. Rolls Royce were impressed with the performance

of the Mistang fitted with the Allison engine and during May,

1942, made estimates of the performance of the aircraft if

fitted with the Merlin 61. As a result of these estimates,

instructions were given for a trial installation to proceed

and, ultimately, Messers. Rolls Royce were given a contract to

modify five aircraft, the first one flying on the 13th of

- 161 - October, 1942. 5 At the same time as Rolls-Royce were asked to carry out their trial installations, negotiations were commenced with the Americans to do a similar trial installation with the Packard version of the Merlin 61. The fitting of a

Merlin brought the aircraft into the fighter class."

Development of the P-'51 Mustang

"The distinction of being the first single-engined fighter based in Great Britain to penetrate into Germany belongs to the Mustang. On October 21, 1942, a number of aircraft of this type attacked targets on the Dortmund-Qns Canal, a mission which involved an out-and-back flight of 600-700 miles. "The Mustang is a war-baby with an interesting history. Although now hailed in the United States as the fastest fighter in the world, it has experienced serious growing pains and the vitalizing effect of a major operation. Until the invasion of Sicily, it was used solely by the Royal Air Force. "Within 100 dayd, North American, designed, built and flew the N.A. 73 Mustang - a truly remarkable achievement. Passing all tests satisfactorily, the Mustang was put into production before the end of 1940. The U.S. Army auth- orities took delivery of two of the early production Mus- tangs for experimental test. "The Mustang I was fitted with Allison V-1710-F3R engine, rated at 1150 h.p. at 11,700 feet, and had an armament of four 0.50 inch and four 0.30 inch machine guns. Two of the .50 caliber guns were mounted in the fuselage, one on each side of the engine crankcase and synchronized to fire through the air-screw, but all other guns were in the wings. The Mustang made its first flight in the British Isles in November, 1941, and it went ifito operational use in July, 1942.

(*5 - Flight tested by Colonel Cass. S. Hough, who said, "It wasn't good. They were fast, but the directional stability was poor. When modifiad by North American, they proved satis- - factory. *6 - "Aircraft Recognition" - Volume II, Number 6 February, 1944 - Page 109 -) - 162- -

ag i "Although designed as a fighter, the Mustang's power plant was unsuitable for operation at the heights to which the enemy had been driven by the Spitfires and Hurricanes. It was therefore remustered as a reconnaissance fighter. Equipped with a camera, it was used for dual-purpose low- altitude sweeps over enemy-territory, attacking all manner of targets and collecting valuable information, both visual and photographic, for the army. The oblique camera for low reconnaissance was installed behind the pilot in place of the port backward-vision panel.

"Development proceeded with a view to improving the tactical qualities. The Mustang Ia appeared with a new Allison engine rated at 1125 h.p. at 15,000 feet and an armament of four 20nm. cannon. This was followed by the Mustang II (P-51a) with an armament of four 0.50 inch machine guns, and all in the wings. However, the lIustang possessed aerodynamic qualities which could be better exploited with a more suitable power plant. Several examples were therefore fitted with the'lMerlin engine in England by Rolls- Royce. Flying trials of the re-engined Mustang confirmed all expectations. Immediate steps were taken by North American to re-design the Mustang to take the new power plant. A version of the Merlin then in production by Packard was the MK XX or V-1650-1, but progress was being made in the design and tooling-up for the Packard development of the Merlin 61, known as the V-1650-3, incorporating the two-speed, two-stage supercharger made famous by Rolls- Royce. Changes were made in the Allison-powered Mustang to enable it to function as a low-attack fighter-bomber so as to maintain production until the new Merlin engine could be run into the production line. Dive-brakes and racks for two 500-pound bombs were fitted to the wins, and thus was evolved the A-36 Invader, which went into action over Sicily and Italy and earned special credit from Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, Commanding the North African Air Forces. The A-36 was supplied to the R.A.F. for test, but it was never adopted for service. The new Mustang with the Packard V-1650-3 Merlin engine will replace both the Allison powered P-51 and A-36. It will, however, incor- porate the best features of both types and will be an outstanding fighter. Many superlatives are being accorded

- 163 -

I ;, i,':t . :v. ,- .% _ ,

Be ,r¢,>r * ' SS , (ssB? the new model in the United States. To quote from a re- cent report issued by the Office of War Information: 'Now in production is the new P-51 with a highly supercharged Packard-built Rolla-ROyce Merlin engine similar to the Merlin 61 in the newest Spitfires. Its performance is reported as even better than that famous ship's. The new engine gives the plane the highest ceiling (up to 40,000 feet) and the highest speed (well over 400 m.p.h.) of any fighter in existence. Those last few words can perhaps be challenged on behalf of certain existing but unmention- able fighters, but there is little doubt that when the new Mustang goes into service, it will be at the top of its class in the Air Forces of the Allied Nations."

Captain Bremer remurks, regarding the P-51:

"The first P-51 aircraft used by the 8th Air Force was the P-51B model. This plane had Packard-built Merlin V-1650-3 engines, and a 11'2' 4 paddle blad Hamilton Standard constant speed propeller. 'This plane originally had a -min left wing fuel tank of 92 gallons, and a main right wing fuel tank of 92 gallons. All these planes were modified, before ever being used operationally, by the installation of an internal fuse- lag fuel tank with an 85 gallon capacity. Jettisonable wing tanks of 75 gallons capacity were used under each wing. Air pressure is applied to external tanks. In- stallation was made of 2 additional oxygen bottles to increase aopply up to 6 hours endurance. V-1650-7 engines were nstalled a a changeover to Jettisonable 108 gallon wing tanok instead of 75 gallon tanks. "Tear drop side paoele in the *B', followed by the balloon hoods (which wre produced in the U.K.) were installed on P-51 B&C aircraft, for better visibility. 'The real clear vision "bubble canopy" came in with the P-51 D. "A revision was made in the arasmmnt of P-51D aircraft, when 6 - .50 caliber machine guns were mounted in vertical position instead of the 4 - .50 caliber guns mounted in angle. "There are other changes and modifications made to increase operational efficiency of this aircraft, which are classed secret and confidential and cannot be discussed at this time.'

- 164 I» ..

bnA. 's .

a -1, I An interesting comparison, from an unknown pilot, of the

P-51B and its German adversaries, is of sufficient value to

be included:

"The P-51B now in use, is different from the P-51A in that the P-51B has a different type engine, a four-bladed propeller, air intake immediately below the propeller hub, a somewhat deeper fuselage and a slightly larger fin and rudder. "With long range Jettisonable fuel tanks, in place, it is slower by approximately 35 miles per hour than it is without such tanks. "The P-51B without wing tanks is nearly 50 miles faster than the FW-190 at altitudes up to 28,000 feet, increasing to 70 miles per hour faster above 28,000 feet, and it has superior speeds at all altitudes in comparison with the ME 109G, its advantage increasing from 30 miles per hour at 16,000 feet to 50 miles per hour at 30,000 feet. It outdives the FW190 from all altitudes and can out-dia- tance the ME 109G in a prolonged dive. In turns it can out-turn the FW 190 but not to any great degree, and is greatly superior to the ME 109G. The FW 190 slightly exoells the P-51B in rate of roll, whereas the ME 109G and the P-51B are similar in rate of roll."

Technical data may be found in Appendix "J". See also

Plates V, XII and XV.

The developments and performances of the aircraft used by the Germans and that of our own fighters during the first half of 1944 will be of great interest to aeronautical engin- eers and pilots. It should be read in connection with plates

III, IV, V, XII, and XIV.

-_6 - HEADQUARTRS (P-Aj G-D-17 VIII FIGHT2. CWCLA)I Air Technical ;ection APO 637, AA- Station F-341 31 December 1943

7MGRANIMDUM:

TO : Commanding General. Fighters Performance of U.S.A.A.F. and G.A.F. as follows: 1. Inclosed are four sets of curves (Plate IV) a. P-38H versus German fighters. (Plate III) b. P-47D versus German fighters. (Plate V) c. P-51B versus German fi-hters. USAGA and GAP d. Estimated maxim=m performance (Plate XV) fighters -- Spring 1944. 1, 2 and 3 (a.b.c. The figures contained in charts 2. is believed, are the speeds and climbs which, it abovej theater today. The comparative performance in this represent British sources plus informa- German figures are derived from types. Performance of the tion gained by flying in German what we believe to be the P-38H, P-47D and P-51D represent today. They are all at C!ar Emer- operational speeds and climbs water injection and paddle blade gency Power but do not include propellers, nor any special fuel. Effort USAAP and 3. The chart, labeled "Estimated 1,aximum what we believe the Fighters -- Spring 1944" represents GAP and what we have every reason Hun can and will do this spring rill be able to do using everything to believe our own fighters Tho German available to increase their performance. we have but we have reason figures, of course, are estimated fighter and if anything, conser- to believe the estimates are accurate on the known horsepower vative. The estimates are based

- 166 - ratings of the engines now being put into German fighters, coupled with the existing broad knowledge of the capabilities of the airframe in which these engines are installed. Although independently calculated by this Section, our GAF estimates correspond closely to tentative figures compiled by the British.

a. So far as our own fighters are concerned, it will Oe noted that the P-38J shows considerable improvement in speed and climb over the P-38H. This is due mainly to new turbos and better inter-cooling. In the case of the P-47, the speed and climb figures take into account the extra performance available with water injection and paddle blade propellers and some performance increase based on the use of 160 grade fuel.

b. If the new 160 grade fuel is available for our use, the biggest gain in performance will probably be in the _-47 with some slight increase in the P-38. Until such time as the skirted pistons are available for the V-1650-3 engines in the P-51, the new fuel will not add to the Mustang performance. This statement is based on the opinion of Rolls Royce that the present engine will .not permit the use of any more power than is now beiut used until these new pistons are installed.

4. It is readily apparent that the FV 190 with the DB 603 engine (referred to as the FW 290) at War Emergency Power will be more than a match for anythin; we can offer up to roughly 26,000 feet. While the P-51B appears to out speed the PF 290 at and above 26,000 feet, it is our opinion that the all around manoeuverability of the F/'290 will more than make up for the slight speed deficiency at extremely low altitudes. *7

5. It is obvious that the German Air Force in its new types has placed its emphasis on performance at altitudes and at altitudes where most of our bomibin.; missions are run. While P-47 and P-38 show increased performance, all the increase is due to such things as water injection and new fuel and takes place below their present critical altitudes because of turbo over-speeding. No matter what is developed to provide increased engine power, until such time as existing turbos are up-rated for maximum speed, the extra performance will all take place below the now critical altitudes.

(*7 - It must be understood that the Technical Section, in para- graph 4, is not making the mistake of underestimatingr the enemy They had a case to make for more P-l's, at the time so greatly needed for our lonr, range escorts. -- Author.)

- 167 - 6. Information culled from all available sources indicates the following major changes in GAP flying equipment:

L. rEAinea. The DB 603 will be in big production by early spring. It appears that initially the engine will be rated at 1800 horsepower (all figures on the chart were figured of at this horsepower), increasing to 2200 horsepower by fall 1944. The 801 engine is presently re-rated to 2000 horsepower. Production plans call for a new engine of this type to deliver 2500 horsepower (probably not before late fall, 1944). b. Propellers. The only notable change in propeller types is the M!teP8 which provides for full feathering and a reversal of pitch in 1- seconds. This, of course, will make for greatly reduced landing run. c. There is no reported shortage of Iso-octane fuel; as a matter of fact, all reports indicate a surplus. The failure of the GAP to capitalize fully on large quanitities of Iso-octane fuel is due, it is believed, mainly to a shortage of critical engine materials, that is, basic metals. There appears to be no chances of the GAF securing these metals, so the development of high powers from present engine types is definitely limited. d. EqpnAt. The only new item of flying equipment worthy of mention is a new parachute built into the pilot's seat with a device for jettisoning pilot and seat when the pilot desires. This is reported to be equipped with an auto- matic altitude compensating device which, as the pilot bails out at high altitude, delays the opening of the parachute until the pilot has reached a safe altitude. Emergency oxygen is built into this seat-parachute combination.

CASS S. HOUGH, Colonel, A.C., Chief of Section.

These then, are the three major types of American aircraft

which were used by the VIII Fighter Command in its epoch making escort missions. :!e must pass on to the story of the development of the belly-tanks which gave all three types their great-

- 168 - range and achieved, as Wing Camnander Tangye put it, "the marvel of appearing suddenly over Berlin", without fanfare or boasting, or even a previous hint that this was about to

happen or indeed that it was anything at all unusual' The

modesty of the VIII Fighter Command in this respect hardly

accorded with the publicity minded American citizen's ideas

of how a war ought to be run, nor indeed with the reputation

Americans in general earned from foreigners.

: 1:* " f - 169i - ; _