Obtained and posted by AltGov2: www.altgov2.org ADC HISTORICAL STUDY NO. 39 THE AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AND ANTIBOMBER DEFENSE 194& -1972 ADCHO 73-8-17 FOREWORD" The resources made available to the Aerospace Defense Command (and the predecessor Air Defense Command) for defense against the manned bomber have ebbed and flowed with changes in national military policy. It is often difficult to outline the shape of national policy, however, in a dynamic society like that of the United States. Who makes national policy? Nobody, really. The armed forces make recommenda­ tions, but these are rarely accepted, in total, by the political administration that makes the final pbrposals to Congress. The changes introduced at the top executive level are variously motivated. The world political climate must be considered, as must various political realities within the country. Cost is always a factor and a determination must be made as to the allocation of funds for defense as opposed to allocations to other government concerns. The personalities, prejudices and predilections of the men who occupy high political office invariably affect proposals to Congress. The disposition of these proposals, of course, is in the hands of Congress. While the executive branch of the government is pushect' and pulled in various directions, Congress is probably subject to heavier pressures. Here, again, the nature of the men who occupy responsible positions within the Congress often affect the decisions of Congress. ·National policy, then, is the product of many minds and is shaped by many diverse interests. The present work is a recapitulation and summarization of three earlier monographs on this subject covering the periods 1946-1950 (ADC Historical Study No. 22), 1951-1957 (ADC Historical Study No. 24) and 1958-1964 (ADC Historical Study No. 26), plus additional material to bring the dis­ cussion to the end of 1972. The purpose is to provide, in one place, a wide canvas of the entire 26-year period. It is necessary to note, however, that in 1957 the defense problem suddenly became two problems when the Soviet Union demonstrated the ability to put an object into earth orbit and proved the feasibility of the intercontinental ballistic missile. This volmne deals only with defense against the manned bomber and was written by Richard F. McMullen, who has personally watched the ebb and flow. Mrs. Mary Perry typed the manuscript. L. H. CORNETT, JR. June 1973 I • iii CONTENTS FOREWORD ........................................ iii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS........................... vii INTRODUCT ION .................................... ix I. THE PLANNING YEARS, 1946-47 ............... 1 II. THE COLD WAR BEGINS, 1948-1950 23 III. THE MANUAL AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, 1951-1955 .. 43 IV. MONEY BECOMES IMPORTANT, 1956-1958 ........ 71 V. A CHANGE IN DIRECTION, 1959-1961 .......... 96 VI. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE IMPROVED MANNED INTERCEPTOR, 1962-1966 ................. 120 VII. THE DECLINE INTENSIFIES, 1967-1972 ........ 161 v I J LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS following page 1. PHOTOGRAPHS P-40 .................................... x SCR-270-D Search Radar .................. xii SCR-271 Search Radar.................... xii P-47 .................................... xiv P-61B Black Widow....................... xiv Lt Gen George Stratemeyer ............... 4 North American P-51D "Mustang" .......... 28 C-121 50 F-94 Starfire ........................... 58 Texas To~er 66 F-86D Sabre 74 BOMARC .................................. 76 F-I02 Delta Dagger...................... 80 F-I06 Aircraft Over Niagara Falls, New York ............................. 108 YF-12A 144 AWACS Aircraft Flight Test, Renton, Washington ........................... 148 EC-121T and EC-121D ..................... 168 F-I06 Aircraft Passing Over Korean Field Laborers ....................... 188 Artist's Concept of F-15 192 vii Lt Gen Thoma s K. McGehee Co mmander , ADC, 1 Mar 1970 . ... ..... 200 AWACS Aircraft a t Pet e rson Fi e ld, Colorado ... ........................ 204 F-IOI Voodoo .. ...... ..... .... ..... 208 F-l02s o f t he Mi nnesota Air National Guard .... ........... .... .... ....... 208 ClM-lOB, BOMARC .............. ... .... 220 2 . MAPS Deployment of ADC Lashup Radar Network-- Dec 1950 .............. ............. 32 Southe rn De fense Networ k ... ..... ....... 222 viii Introduction WORLD WAR I I AND BEFORE (U) In the early thirties thoughtful theorists like Captain Claire Chennault studied air defense techniques, such as the integration of ground-based early warning systems and fighter aircraft. Chennault received little support within the Air Corps. The air doctrine of the time stressed "air defense," but the type of air defense that called for destruction of the enemy's power to make war--in short, strategic bombing. The Air Corps of that day was controlled by officers who later came to be known as "big bomber" people. The subsequent unopposed bombing of Ethiopians by the Italians and the regular bombing of Barcelona by German and Italian aircraft during the Span­ ish Civil War served only to strengthen the convictions of the proponents of strategic bombing. Effective defense against such attacks was not believed possible. (U) It was not until after the beginning of World War II, therefore, that the U. S. War Department undertook serious study of air defense against the manned bomber. On 20 December 1939 the public was informed that the War Department had created an Air Defense Command to "further ix the development of means and methods for defense against air attack."l The Air Defense Command was actually organ­ ized on 15 March 1940. It was commanded by Brig. Gen. 2 James E. Chaney. (U) The initial ADC was located at Mitchel Field, New York. It was a small planning organization which commanded no troops, other than those assigned to the im­ mediate headquarters, controlled no installations and owned no combat aircraft. It did, however, study the British experience during the Battle For Britain, made plans for the establishment of an active air defense sys­ t e rn in the United States and trained senior officers in the theory and practice of air defense. After Army maneu­ vers in the northeastern United States in August 1940 and January 1941, ADC was satisfied that the P-40 pursuit air­ craft cou ld cope with the B-18 bomber if given adequate warni ng . Th e wo rk o f the first ADC was then done and it was disbanded on 2 June 1941. Responsibility for the plan­ ning , as well as operation, of the air defense system was then ha nded to the I Interceptor Command of the First Air Force . This responsibility was decentralized later in the I. Unpublished manuscript, P. Alan Bliss, Air Defense of the Continental United States, 1935- 1945, I, p.-78 (here­ i naft er cited as "Bliss"). 2. TAG to CG, 1st AF, "Creation of Air Defense Com­ mand," 26 Feb 1940. Cited in Bliss, I, p. 78. x I summer of 1941 when the Second (northwest), Third (south­ east), and Fourth (southwest) Air Forces also created Interceptor Commands. There was no national headquarters for the supervision of air defense of the United States. 3 (U) Although the four Interceptor Commands busied themselves with the recruitment and training of civilian ground observers, the establishment of filter centers and information centers that consolidated and evaluated the reports telephoned by ground observers, the selection of sites for radar installations and the air defense training of aircrews, the air defense network was far from complete at the time of Pearl Harbor. Only eight SCR-270 and SCR­ 271 search radars were in operation on 7 December 1941-­ 4 one in Maine, one in New Jersey,and six in California. (U) Following the Japanese attack, the Eastern and Western Defense Commands assumed r~sponsibility for the protection of the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, respectively. The area of responsibility of the First Air Force was con­ currently stretched southward to cover the entire east coast. The same action was taken with respect to the Fourth Air Force on the west coast. The Second and Third Air 3. GHQ AF to TAG, "Inactivation of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Air Defense Command," 2 Jun 1941. BliSS, I, pp. 24, 84-86, 95-99 and 116. 4. BliSS, I, pp o 196-200. xi I Forces then concentrated on training. The War Department put both coasts into defense category "C" (minor attack probable) and expended special effort on the erection of a chain of radar stations, about 70 miles apart, along both 5 coasts. (U) By the middle of 1943 a total of 95 radar stations had been built, 65 along the west coast and 30 along the eastern shoreline. But by that time some of the steam had already been taken out of the air defense effort. Allied successes in North Africa and the South Pacific had less­ ened the possibility of a direct attack on the United States, so, on 20 April 1943, the War Department lowered the defense category of both coastlines to "B" (possible minor attack). Six months later, on 30 October 1943, the defense category dropped to "A" (possibility of isolated raids). The disintegration of the defense system had al­ ready begun, since the First and Fourth Air Forces had been relieved of their assignment to Eastern and Western Defense Commands on 10 September 1943 and returned to the direct control of Army Air Forces. This action constituted admission that training had been given priority over air defense. The release of ground observers and the closing 5. Bliss, II, ppo 1-2, 9 and 231. xii First U.S. long r ange early warning r a are Orig i nally mobile, it had a range o f ~ b ou t 150 mile s depe i n on he type of antenna used. Re p laced in 1943 by the SCR - 271 GCl - SCR-271 SEARCH RADAR of filter centers and information centers accelerated. In May of 1944 all remaining civilian volunteers were re­ leased with a letter of thanks from the Secretary of War.