The Ground Observer Corps Public Relations and the Cold War in the 1950S

The Ground Observer Corps Clymer

The Ground Observer Corps Public Relations and the Cold War in the 1950s

✣ Kenton Clymer

Ground Observer Corps, Hurray! Protects our Nation every day. Protects our ºag, Red, White and Blue, They protect everyone, even you. Always on guard with Watchful eyes, Never tiring they search the skies. From now to eternity we shall be free, America’s guarded by the G. O. C. Tony Parinelli, Leominster, MA1

This article examines the development and demise of one of the least studied elements of U.S. homeland defense efforts in the 1950s: the Ground Ob- server Corps (GOC). In an earlier article I explored the origins of the GOC.2 Here I focus on the development of the organization in the mid-1950s until its deactivation in 1959, showing that the GOC never came close to achieving its goals for recruitment and effectiveness. Despite the grave shortcomings of the GOC, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) continued to support the organization, evidently because the GOC served the public relations interests of the Air Force, U.S. air defense, and, more generally, the Cold War policies of the United States. The lack of widespread public support for the GOC provides some credence to the contrarian view about the overwhelming fear of an imminent Soviet nuclear strike on the United States that is commonly said to have characterized U.S. society in the 1950s.3

1. Tony Parinelli, “G.O.C.,” in Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL), White House Central Files (WHCF), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Ofªcial File 1953–1961, Box 82, Folder 3-C-14 (1). 2. Kenton Clymer, “U.S. Homeland Defense in the 1950s: The Origins of the Ground Observer Corps,” Journal of Military History, Vol. 75, No. 3 (July 2011), pp. 835–859. 3. Orthodox accounts of American anti-Communist and anti-Soviet fears in the 1950s include

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The GOC was an organization born of the Cold War. Its roots, however, stretched back to the period immediately preceding U.S. entry into World War II, when ground observers were part of the Aircraft Warning Services. They continued to serve in observation posts throughout the war. Afterward, as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated into the Cold War, U.S. of- ªcials increasingly feared that a new war would occur, one that would proba- bly include Soviet air attacks on the U.S. homeland. But those who feared an attack faced a major problem: the American public was insufªciently con- cerned about the Soviet threat to rally to the colors. The Soviet Union had, after all, been a crucial wartime ally in the defeat of Nazi Germany; the U.S. army had hastily demobilized; and people wanted to return to “normalcy” after a brutal war. They might well be tempted to revert to an isolationist foreign policy. To counter this, national security ofªcials set out to educate the public about the threat, even raising the prospects of war against the former ally. This required creating a certain level of fear without, however, sowing panic and with assurances that war would not be all that devastating.4 Among their recommendations was the creation of a strong civil defense capability. The advocates of a strong national security state won a major legislative victory in 1947 with the passage of the National Security Act. The act recon- ªgured the government to wage the Cold War and established the basis for civil defense.5 In this context the idea emerged of a system of ground observers to help detect Soviet nuclear bombers if they were ordered to attack the

Richard Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (London: Methuen, 1960); Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, “U.S. Culture and the Cold War,” in Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, eds., Rethinking Cold War Culture (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001); Stephen J. Whitªeld, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Tom Englehardt, The End of Victory Culture, rev. ed. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007); and Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). Contrarian views include Peter Filene, “‘Cold War Culture’ Doesn’t Say It All,” in Kuznick and Gilbert, eds., Rethinking Cold War Culture; and Richard M. Fried, The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 4. The tensions and inconsistencies involved in these matters are astutely examined in Andrew D. Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red: Civil Defense and American Political Development during the Early Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2001) and in Michael J. Hogan’s comprehensive book, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954 (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1998). 5. For general background about the origins of the national security state, see Hogan, A Cross of Iron. For the larger cultural milieu, see Whitªeld, The Culture of the Cold War; James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and David Halberstam, The Fifties (New York: Villard, 1993). Among the important studies of civil defense in the 1950s are Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red; Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Dee Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); and David F. Krugler, This Is Only a Test: How Washington D.C. Prepared for Nuclear War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

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United States. Radar, still in its infancy, was not fully deployed and in any event had numerous limitations, the most notable of which was that it could not yet detect low-ºying aircraft. Ground observers were needed until such time as radar could provide more protection.6 Over the next few years, discussion, planning, and even some testing of a prototype ground observation organization took place. But not until 1950 was the organization ofªcially established. Despite growing concerns at high levels in the government, there was not a sufªcient sense of urgency until the Soviet Union detonated its ªrst nuclear bomb in August 1949. Only then did civil defense become a high priority for Harry S. Truman’s administration. The president, who had previously favored only a modest civil defense initia- tive, “did an about-face,” and “civil defense planning went from low-key to frenetic.”7 Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, who had wanted to keep defense costs low, was soon gone, and the administration adopted an expansive security study, NSC 68, that called for greatly increased defense expenditures. NSC-68 was fully implemented after another shock: the outbreak of the Ko- rean War in June 1950, which at the time was widely understood as an act of Soviet-inspired aggression that foreshadowed further Soviet military advances elsewhere. Amid these surging fears of vulnerability, Congress passed the Civil Defense Act that created the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). Another result was the formation of the GOC. The GOC consisted of observation posts, initially limited to states lo- cated on the coasts, the Canadian border, and the Great Lakes. The system was later expanded to all 48 states. The volunteer observers looked for aircraft and conveyed news of sightings via telephone to “ªlter centers.” Although a rigorous study of who volunteered has not yet been done, photographs and published accounts suggest that the volunteers were widely representative of the general populace. They ranged in age from preteens to senior citizens, in- cluded men and women and people of various racial groups. Filter center volunteers, on the other hand, may well have been predominantly middle-class women. In New Haven, women constituted some 98 percent of the volunteers, although the more important positions (the “ªlterers”) went to men. A few USAF ofªcers were assigned to the ªlter centers, but civilian volunteers, who plotted the trajectories of reported aircraft on large tables, constituted the overwhelming majority of the centers’ personnel.8

6. Very little scholarship has appeared about the Ground Observer Corps. In addition to Clymer, “Homeland Defense,” see Denys Volan, “The History of the Ground Observer Corps,” Ph.D. Diss, University of Colorado, 1969; and Kenneth Schaffel, The Emerging Shield: The Air Force and the Evo- lution of Continental Air Defense (Washington, DC: Ofªce of Air Force History, USAF, 1991). 7. McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home, p. 14. 8. Clymer, “Homeland Defense,” pp. 849–850.

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Organizationally, the GOC was a strange hybrid. It was treated as part of the USAF’s Air Defense capability, and the various Air Defense headquarters across the country were charged with overseeing its activities. For recruitment purposes it was often referred to as an “auxiliary” of the Air Force, thus presumably making it more glamorous and attractive than other civil defense or- ganizations, most of which, despite the Soviet test, had trouble recruiting volunteers. But the observers were civilians, and state civil defense ofªcials were responsible for organizing the posts, recruiting volunteers, and paying most of the costs. The USAF was responsible for training. The FCDA in Washington played only a supporting role, but the White House was deeply involved, particularly when it came to directing publicity and national recruiting efforts. Particularly helpful in this regard was the Advertising Council, an umbrella organization of advertising agencies that publicized numerous governmental and quasi-governmental activities. In the case of the GOC, the Advertising Council worked closely with the White House and the USAF to produce and distribute large amounts of publicity materials, saving the government mil- lions of dollars. This divided responsibility for the GOC led to numerous problems. State ofªcials often felt left out of the planning and resented edicts from the USAF. Air Force ofªcials complained that state and local civil defense ofªcials were not doing a good job of recruiting volunteers and of meeting stated objectives. Hoping to recruit 500,000 by July 1951, ofªcials barely managed to recruit 200,000 by early 1952, and by the end of the year the ªgure used was lower, at 150,000 active volunteers. Only a small percentage of the posts operated on a 24-hour basis. Organizational problems explain in part the GOC’s failure to come close to meeting its initial ambitious objectives. But ofªcial reports and studies at the time repeatedly noted public apathy and indifference, and even sometimes hostility, toward the program.9 The USAF did not cancel the program in the ªrst few years in part because ofªcials thought that the GOC, whatever its limitations, was an important supplement to the still primitive radar system but also because it provided good publicity for the cause of Air Defense. In particular, the thousands of volunteers across the country would be well situated to support USAF and Air Defense objectives and, more generally, the Cold War policies of the United States. Thus, even if the GOC was of questionable value in providing warning of an imminent Soviet attack, it served a wider political purpose and was thus worth supporting. This public relations aspect, evident early on, be- came more pronounced as the organization matured. In July 1952 the GOC entered a new phase with Operation Skywatch.

9. Ibid., pp. 835–859.

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This was an attempt to integrate the GOC fully into the Air Defense system by putting it on a 24-hour basis. However, the results of Operation Skywatch in the latter half of 1952 were less than stellar. Despite a frenetic advertising campaign designed to recruit participants, the number of volunteers did not increase signiªcantly, if at all, during Skywatch. Furthermore, the number of posts that were operational was discouraging. The Air Force estimated that it needed 14,006 observation posts. Of the 8,964 posts in January 1953, only 1,616 were staffed with volunteers, and only 720 operated on a 24-hour basis.10 The government, as on many previous occasions, responded to this situation by expanding its recruiting efforts. On 7 December 1952, Truman, who was about to leave ofªce, called on citizens to volunteer. “Because of the immense destructive power of the atomic bomb we must maintain vigilance so that our cities and our industries will be less vulnerable to devastating attacks,” the president stated.11 An article in Aircraft Flash, the GOC’s ofªcial magazine, reported in January 1953 that the advertising campaign was “now just beginning to get into full swing.”12 The arguments in favor of the GOC remained familiar. The Soviet Union possessed increasing numbers of nuclear weapons and an ever-growing number of bombers to deliver them. The ªgure commonly used was 400 such bombers, but a ªgure of 700 was also now heard, and in January 1953 Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg claimed that the Soviet Union had “nearly a thousand bombers with the range to reach all important targets within the United States....Thethreatisgrave.”13 Military leaders argued that radar was still insufªcient and that ground observers were abso- lutely essential for positive identiªcation of planes. The need for the GOC grew even more urgent as the months passed, according to Air Force ofªcials, because the Soviet Union, they believed, had developed the capability of jam- ming radar signals. In September 1953, for example, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force H. Lee White stated that the United States was “more than ever de- pendent on the GOC because it has become entirely possible for a radar screen to be blocked out completely by approaching aircraft.”14 Even though

10. Spencer R. Quick to Allan Wilson, 13 January 1953, in Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), Inde- pendence, MO, Harry S. Truman Papers, White House Correspondence Part III, Spencer R. Quick Files, Box 1. 11. Statement by the President, 7 December 1952, attached to Quick to Wilson, 8 December 1952, in HSTL, Truman Papers, Correspondence Folder 2, Quick Files, Box 7. 12. “. . . debt of gratitude,” Aircraft Flash, January 1953, p. 2. 13. “grave,” Aircraft Flash, March 1953, p. 2. 14. Department of Defense, Ofªce of Public Information, “Remarks by Assistant Secretary of the Air Force H. Lee White ...,”mimeograph, 30 September 1953, in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, James M. Lambie, Jr., Records, 1953–61, Box 5, Folder GOC General (1).

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no one thought the U.S. air defense system, including ground observation, could stop all enemy aircraft, advance warning provided by observers could dramatically reduce casualties. The obstacles that had hindered previous recruiting efforts had not disappeared, however. In January 1953 an article in Aircraft Flash cited a number of attitudinal problems, beginning with the “misconception” that the capability of modern U.S. aircraft made the GOC obsolete. If U.S. ªghter-interceptors were already as outstanding as advertised, the doubters asked, and if the speed of aircraft was constantly increasing, why were ground observers needed? A similar argument was that radar had improved so much that human observation was no longer required. Although such arguments were deemed “falla- cious,” they proved effective enough to constitute a drag on recruitment efforts.15 Another continuing obstacle to recruitment was the divided responsibility with respect to the GOC. The lines of authority between the USAF and the state civil defense authorities remained ambiguous, and communication with state civil defense directors, who were supposed to be in charge of ªnd- ing volunteers for the posts and ªlter centers, remained strained. In February 1953, Spencer Quick (the Truman administration’s ofªcial in charge of publi- cizing the GOC who was held over to serve a few weeks in Dwight Eisen- hower’s White House), military personnel, and members of the Advertising Council attended meetings with civil defense directors at three Air Force bases and found the audiences “hostile and unreceptive,” although Quick claimed to notice a change in attitude after the meetings. A major complaint they heard was that Air Force and FCDA policies concerning the GOC were “fuzzy and needed realignment quickly.” According to one general, responsibility for the GOC should have been clearly assigned to the Air Force or the FCDA, but not both. The trips revealed the “lack of real cooperation between the State and local FCDA people and the Air Force counterparts.”16 In one important sector of the country, the number of civilians who volunteered for both the local posts and the ªlter centers was down “apprecia- bly,” according to air defense personnel.17 To remedy the problem, the Air Defense Command (ADC) was forced to deploy military personnel to staff GOC posts. The result was an increase in the number of operational posts, but the principle of using civilian volunteers was compromised. In addition

15. “. . . at this late date,” Aircraft Flash, January 1953, p. 2. 16. Spencer Quick, Memorandum for Charles Jackson, 12 February 1953, in DDEL, Eisenhower Pa- pers, Lambie Records, Box 5, Folder GOC General (1). 17. “History of the 26th Air Division (Defense) 1 January through 30 June 1953” (unpublished), pp. 40–45, in Maxwell Air Force Base (MAFB), Montgomery, AL, Air Force Records (AFR), K-Div-26-HI, January–June 1953, Vol. 1, 3-1.518-1A.

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to the usual reasons cited for the difªculties in recruiting volunteers (including the lackadaisical efforts of the civil defense ofªcials and such problems as boredom, unwillingness to drive miles into the countryside to stand watch in cold weather in an unheated building in the middle of the night, and so forth), an ofªcial report mentioned the end of the Korean War as an important factor. The outbreak of the war in 1950 had resulted in a modest uptick in the number of volunteers. But now, as one former GOC volunteer put it, “the war ended and there was no necessity for the lookout.” Or, as another dropout stated, the problem was too much “doubletalk by Administration leaders. [There is] complete apathy on the part of the local citizens, who are not convinced that there will be a Soviet attack.”18 The USAF downplayed the importance of the end of the Korean conºict, arguing that “the signing of the armistice in Korea has little or no effect on the status of Air Defense. The threat to freedom still exists.”19 Nonetheless, enrollment in the GOC increased only marginally, and that was in part because military personnel were stafªng some posts. At the end of the year only about 100,000 active volunteers were in place, even though ofªcials by this point wanted 16,000 posts (up from 14,000 at the beginning of the year) and hoped to attract 950,000 observers (up from the 500,000 mentioned in earlier years). All in all, the recruitment of volunteers in 1953 represented a “poor showing.” “It is just criminally shortsighted,” said Val Peterson, the new FCDA director, that the country did “not have a strong Ground Observer Corps.”20 In January 1954 an important meeting of USAF and state civil defense administrators was held at Ent Air Force Base in Colorado. Participants concluded that the effectiveness of the GOC was “far below” what was required and that the Corps should be returned to a “standby status,” much as it had been at its origins.21 The conference also revealed that disagreements and tensions continued to characterize the relationship between USAF and state of- ªcials over such matters as funding and who was responsible for which aspects of the GOC. Some state delegates wanted Congress to pay for the administra-

18. Ross Federal Research Corporation, “Report to the Advertising Council Concerning Factors Inºuencing Membership in the Ground Observer Corps” (unpublished), January 1955, in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 21, Folder Ground Observer Corps—General, 1955. 19. Air Defense Command statement, 6 August 1953, in Directorate of Historical Services, Ofªce of the Command Adjutant, “Semi-Annual Historical Report, Number 6, Narrative, December 1953” (unpublished), p. 42n35, in MAFB, AFR, K410.01-4, Vol. 1, July–December 1953. 20. Ibid., pp. 40–41. The report indicated that 300,000 people were enrolled in the GOC but that only 100,000 were active members. 21. “Proceedings: Civil Defense-Ground Observer Corp Conference, January 7–8, 1954,” (unpublished), pp. 33, 51, in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 13, Folder Proceedings.

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tion and recruitment efforts at the state and local levels; others wanted the federal government to provide matching grants to the states; and still others wanted no funding at all from the federal government. A motion to request matching grants failed, 19–13, with six delegates not voting. A follow-up meeting in February of a new coordinating organization, the Ground Observer Corp Review Council, consisting of six USAF and federal and state civil defense ofªcials, reviewed the results of the January meeting. The Council’s chairman, Worthington Thompson, representing the Ofªce of the Secretary of the Air Force, concluded that the division of authority regarding the GOC was now clear, although this merely reafªrmed the original division of having the states recruit and administer the program while the USAF assumed responsibility for training. Also reafªrmed was the principle that the Air Force would not pay for observation posts. Thompson claimed that better coordination was evident among USAF, FCDA, and state ofªcials.22 But these and other matters were never entirely resolved to the satisfaction of all interested ofªcials. The assistant secretary of the Air Force wrote in a personal note in July 1954 that the lack of “major policy developments since Colorado Springs” meant they were in “a period of consolidation of gains” and were try- ing to persuade the dissenters among the state civil defense directors to accept the majority positions.23 At least some of those who wanted to increase the importance of the GOC felt that the frightening Soviet test of a hydrogen bomb in August 1953 (and expectations that the USSR would soon develop even more powerful and sophisticated nuclear weapons and delivery systems) made the case for an enhanced GOC and should serve as a valuable recruiting device. In February 1954, for example, Representative Sterling Cole, a Republican from New York and long-time member of the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, insisted in a sobering speech that new advances in Soviet weaponry demanded “an acceleration of our efforts to improve our defenses.”24 James M. Lambie, who headed the Eisenhower administration’s publicity effort for the GOC, read Cole’s speech and concluded that “we will see developing a keener interest in and greater awareness of the need for civil defense and prep-

22. Minutes of the Ground Observe Corps Review Council, 18 February 1954, in DDEL, Eisen- hower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 13, Folder GOC Convention 1954. 23. Worthington Thompson to James M. Lambie, 27 July [1954], in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 13, Folder GOC Convention 1954. 24. Press Release, “Remarks of Representative Sterling Cole at the Joint Luncheon of the 38th Annual Convention of the National Sand and Gravel Association and the 24th Annual Convention of the National Ready Mixed Concrete Association,” Chicago, 17 February 1954, in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 13, Folder GOC Correspondence 1954.

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aration for attack,” although he acknowledged that it would still be a chal- lenge to overcome skepticism about the “actual usefulness” of the GOC.25 By all indications, however, even the Soviet Union’s possession of the H-bomb did not stir much desire to volunteer for the GOC. Recruitment remained a chronic problem. An Air Force report noted that, absent an emer- gency, “the vast majority of Americans would rather play bridge, watch televi- sion, or go to bed.”26 By mid-1954, as Lambie wrote, a major problem had developed with “attrition” of volunteers who faced “disparagement of friends or acquaintances.” He hoped to get President Eisenhower to write a letter of encouragement to all volunteers.27 Another response to the loss of volunteers came from the ADC, which sponsored a “Seminar on Community Leader- ship.” Held on the campus of Colorado College in June 1954, this “unprece- dented project in the history of the GOC” attracted nationally known authorities on community relations to conduct seminars for ªlter center and GOC squadron commanders to help them develop more public support for the GOC. The very fact that such a conference was held suggests that attracting more volunteers remained difªcult. The conference’s keynote speaker, Ralph McGill, editor of the inºuential Atlanta Constitution, observed that gaining the support of “a not-yet-fully informed or convinced general public” would require the “patience of Job.”28 McGill’s point was well taken. A for- mal study of “Recruitment for the GOC Program,” completed in early 1955, concluded that there were “no short cuts to successful recruting [sic] and the achievement of a stable, efªcient GOC program. Recruiting is time- consuming, laborious, and, at times, frustrating work.”29 At the ofªcial level, however, the Soviet hydrogen bomb test had created a new sense of apprehension and urgency. “We need a strong and efªcient Ground Observer Corps to supplement our radar network,” General Ben- jamin W. Chidlaw, the USAF ofªcer in charge of the GOC, declared, “because, despite Kremlin double-talk, the Soviet Union Air Force is rapidly increasing its capability to launch—at any time—from any direction—a dev-

25. James M. Lambie to Frank W. McWalters, 27 March 1954, in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 13, Folder GOC Correspondence 1954. 26. Eastern Air Defense Force, Air Defense Command, United States Air Force, “History of the 26th Air Division (Defense) for the Period 1 January–30 June 1954,” (unpublished), p. 10, in MAFB, AFR, K-DIV-26-HI, Jan–Jun 1954, Vol. 1. 27. James M. Lambie to Bryce Harlow, 25 Mary 1954, in DDEL, WHCF, Eisenhower Papers, Ofªcial File 1953–1961, Box 82, Folder 3-C-14 (1). 28. “GOC Commanders Complete Intense Study of Community Leadership in Week Long Semi- nar,” Aircraft Flash, August 1954, pp. 6–7. 29. Joseph J. Rosa, “Recruitment for the GOC Program” (unpublished), April 1955, p. 1, in MAFB, AFR, K410.663-68, Apr. 1955.

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astating surprise attack against any part of the United States.”30 That the USAF had increased its commitment to the GOC by this time is clear. One example was its decision in 1954 to expand and open its GOC school to civilian volunteers. Established in 1951 at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, the school was initially only for military personnel. Civilians were ªrst admitted in 1954, making up 50 percent of the enrollees, and the enrollment was dou- bled to 32. Classes met for two intensive weeks of instruction and were re- peated several times a year. Aside from instruction in such topics as air defense, ªlter center operations, post operations, and training of instructors, a larger purpose—which was always a part of the rationale for the GOC—was identiªcation with the USAF and, more generally, “with the nation and what it means.”31 With this renewed attention, some improvement in the GOC system was evident in 1954. A major test, Exercise Sky Scan, took place in May, June, and October. The results were mixed, but according to a summary the exercise demonstrated the overall effectiveness of the GOC to spot and report aircraft. “Here is a report that all persons connected with the GOC can be proud of,” commented the FCDA director.32 Given the new sense of urgency, a heightened commitment to civil defense, and an apparent improvement in the organization’s effectiveness, the USAF decided in September 1954 to expand the GOC. Previously operational in 36 states (in what was called the Skywatch area), GOC posts were now to be organized in all 48 states, and GOC posts in several states would be required to operate 24 hours a day, forming the new Skywatch area. Some 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 volunteers would be required, a considerable increase from the previous (and never reached) goals.33 The original goal of expanding the GOC to all states and requiring some to have posts operating around the clock had to be postponed (supposedly because of “delays in coordination”34), but by September 1955 the GOC had at least been organized in all 48 states, and efforts were underway to upgrade the operational status of more posts to 24 hours. Although the number of volun-

30. Press release, “One Million Volunteers Needed to Sky-Watch against Sudden Air Attack,” 1 April [1955], in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 21, Folder Ground Observer Corps— General 1955. 31. “Academics and the GOC,” Aircraft Flash, September 1955, pp. 4–5, p. 8. 32. “Exercise SKY SCAN,” Aircraft Flash, February 1955, pp. 4–5. 33. Press release, “One Million Volunteers Needed.” The ªgure of 1,500,000 appeared in “Con- tinental Air Defense Command Brieªng” (unpublished), 10 May 1955, p. 15, in MAFB, AFR, K410.328-2, 10 May 1955. 34. Joseph D. Hornsby to Commanders, Air Defense Forces and Air Divisions (Defense), 14 October 1955, in K410.663-15, 1955, AFR, MAFB.

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teers and posts had not increased much, the number of active posts had grown from 5,452 to 9,230, a sharp increase. The number of posts operating on a 24-hour basis had also increased, albeit not as dramatically, from 1,427 to 1,598. Also, the training of volunteers had reportedly improved considerably, giving them much better detection and tracking skills. In 1955 140 GOC volunteers were trained at the USAF Ground Observer School in Florida. An unannounced test of the system, Skyscan 1955, was also quite successful. In addition, numerous changes were made to bolster morale. New awards for service were established, Aircraft Flash was expanded and its circulation increased, volunteers were given tours of various USAF facilities, and Air Force personnel made more visits to ªlter centers and posts.35 Nevertheless, even at the end of 1955 the GOC was not close to achieving its new goals, particularly of having most posts in the new Skywatch area operating around the clock. If the ªgures reported for September 1955 were accurate, there was actually a decline in the number of posts by the end of the year, when the USAF reported that 7,918 were considered active (compared to 9,230 in September) and that only 1,365 of these operated on a 24-hour basis—hardly an impressive number. As the report states, “thus, of more than 16,000 posts needed in the critical SKY WATCH areas, only 1,365 were operating as required.”36 Or as an ofªcial history of the ADC noted in 1957, although the objective of having 24-hour operation of posts had been in effect in the Skywatch areas since 1953, “the response of the public to around-the- clock-duty had been far short of the desired goal.”37 Recruiting for ªlter centers was relatively easy because they offered more opportunities for social in- teraction. The observation posts were a different matter. As with other major decisions affecting the GOC, the transition to an expanded system did not go as easily as hoped. Reminiscent of problems in im- plementing the original Skywatch in 1952, delays in getting the new program under way persisted. “Loose talk” about implementation of the program “has been going on for nearly a year and a half,” the Air Force’s GOC project of- ªcer complained. “This extended period of time, coupled with many slip- pages and the invalidation of various dates which have been mentioned, has

35. Directorate of Civil Air Defense, Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations, “Progress Report, 30 August 1954–1 September 1955” (unpublished), pp. 1, 5, 8, in MAFB, AFR, K410-663-14, 1955; “Skyscan- 1955,” Aircraft Flash, December 1955, pp. 7–8; and Continental Air Defense Command and Air De- fense Command, “History July–December 1955” (unpublished), pp. 51, 54, in MAFB, AFR, K410.01-6, July–Dec 1955, Vol. 1. 36. Continental Air Defense Command and Air Defense Command, “History July–December 1955,” pp. 49–51. 37. “History of the Air Defense Command July–December 1957” (unpublished), p. 44, in MAFB, AFR, K410.01-8, July–Dec 1957, Vol. 1.

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been extremely detrimental to the program.”38 Furthermore, although Skyscan 1955 showed that training had improved, much remained to be done. Even while praising the results of Skyscan, one report noted that improving detection and tracking skills was to receive “the major emphasis for the next twelve months.”39 But before more training took place, the authorities needed to recruit several hundred thousand more men and women. They planned to accomplish this in the ªrst six months of 1956, a difªcult task in view of the “failure in retention of GOC members, apathy, disillusionment, and lack of reassurance that the Ground Observer Corps is and will continue to be important to CONAD [Continental Air Defense Command].” The strategy was not just to try to attract volunteers but to do so in the larger context of improving “the health of the GOC part of the surveillance network.” Ofªcials used a variety of methods, including awarding prizes to supervisors who were particularly successful. Ordinary volunteers also received prizes for excellence. Thus, for example, “the outstanding volunteer woman” might receive an orchid from the local ºorist; other volunteers might receive passes to movie theaters or be given rides on USAF aircraft.40 Such activities may have had some impact on recruitment and retention of volunteers in the ªrst part of 1956. The USAF began to be more actively involved in these efforts and, perhaps more importantly, began to assign ofªcers and airmen to the GOC for speciªc terms of service, normally three years with the possibility of extension for another year. This “provided for continuity in ªeld training and stabilizing the interest and efªciency of civilian volunteers.”41 However, the goal of 1 million to 1.5 million volunteers disappeared, and nothing more was said about it. The notion that so many volunteers could be found in peacetime was always a pipe dream, and the goal of putting the entire system on a 24-hour basis was even more far-fetched. Furthermore, new radar was gradually being deployed that could detect low-ºying aircraft, making the GOC much less necessary. At the highest levels of government, strategic thinking was changing in a

38. Owen F. Clarke to Commanders at Eastern Air Defense Force and Stewart Air Force Base, 31 Oc- tober 1955, in MAFB, AFR, K410.663-14, 1955. 39. Directorate of Civil Air Defense, Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations, “Progress Report, 30 August 1954–1 September 1955,” p. 8. 40. Barney Oldªeld, “The 1956 Campaign for a Million GOC Volunteers,” in MAFB, AFR, Air De- fense Command, “Brieªngs and Correspondence, 1956,” K410.663-15, 1956. 41. Robert B. Beardsley and Thayer S. Olds, “History of Joint 26th Air Defense Division and 26th Air Division (Defense) January–June 1956,” p. 14, in MAFB, AFR, K-DIV-26-HI.

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way that did not favor the continuation of the GOC. In 1955 the National Security Council established the Net Evaluation Subcommittee “to provide integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR in the event of war, to inºict direct injury upon the continental U.S. and U.S. installations over- seas.” In its ªrst report the subcommittee considered two possible Soviet plans: (1) a surprise attack on the United States with no warning; and (2) an attack in which the United States had enough warning to mobilize all its military and civil defense assets. Although the full report has not been released, the committee apparently highlighted the difªculty of protecting the country against a nuclear attack, even with a good deal of warning, and emphasized that a nuclear war would be catastrophic. The report thus implicitly rejected the reasoning of those like General Chidlaw who argued that advancing Soviet nuclear capabilities urgently required a strengthened GOC. Such cau- tionary assessments soon inºuenced Eisenhower himself, causing him to move toward a view that “war no longer has any logic whatever.” Originally believing that the United States was sufªciently powerful to work its will on the world if necessary, the president came to accept that thermonuclear war would be devastating to both sides and therefore that both sides would behave conservatively.42 This made the GOC less important. In February 1957 Hector Perrier of the Advertising Council, who was involved in preparing the GOC account, observed that doubts had arisen about whether the Corps was “still essential to national defense” and whether the advertising campaign was still urgently needed.43 In early April 1957 the West- ern Air Defense Force recommended reducing the number of GOC posts in its area of responsibility from 4,327 to 3,266.44 The next month, Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining formally disapproved a recommenda- tion to expand the GOC to 24-hour status (primarily because the ADC was not effectively using much of the information provided by observers). “The entire program should be subjected to a searching re-appraisal,” he wrote.45 Soon the GOC came to resemble its original conªguration. Posts along the coasts and the Canadian border remained on full alert, with 24-hour op-

42. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 263d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 27, 1955,” in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. XIX, pp. 126–30; and Andrew P. N. Erdmann, “‘War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever’: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution,” in John Lewis Gaddis et. al., eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 87–119. 43. Hector Perrier to Hayes Dever, 27 February 1957, in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 36, Folder Ground Observer Corps—Correspondence 1957. 44. A. D. Fallows to Commander, Air Defense Command, 3 April 1956, in MAFB, AFR, K410.663- 15, 1956. 45. Nathan F. Twining to Earle E. Partridge, 8 May 1956, in MAFB, AFR, K410.663-15, 1956. Par- tridge was commander of the Air Defense Command at Ent Air Force Base.

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eration whenever possible. Many other posts and ªlter centers were placed on standby status, though to avoid the negative implications of “standby” they were called “ready reserve,” and those not on standby were referred to as “operational ready.” The entire GOC system, not just the segments operating on a 24-hour basis, was now referred to as Skywatch. Finally, hoping to avoid the embarrassment of previously announced timetables for changes in the program that had not been met, USAF ofªcials agreed that no timetables would be announced in public. However, they did want to be as open as possible with volunteers to prevent feelings of marginalization and to help volunteers understand the reasons for the changes. Finally, the USAF was, as ever, well attuned to political realities and was not above making decisions based on political considerations, particularly in a presidential election year.46 Thus, for example, in 1956 the ªlter center in Baltimore remained open largely for political and public relations reasons.47 Ofªcials hoped to minimize the unhappiness that was likely to result from the decision to reduce the GOC. They consulted with the governor of each state and the state director of civil defense. They scrupulously avoided terms like “cutbacks” and “standby” and emphasized that the GOC would still be needed for some time to come and that training would continue even in the “ready reserve” areas. In at least some areas they prepared for questions that were likely to arise, so that they could respond effectively and promote the beneªts of the new status. In the eastern part of the country, beginning in October 1956, letters designed to enhance morale went out twice a month from the local ADC to volunteers.48 Despite ofªcial efforts to keep things low-key, word leaked out about the plans to scale back the GOC, including some distorted reports that the entire GOC was no longer needed. The anxiety and unhappiness that resulted could be seen in Ohio, where careful preparations had been made. In frustration, the American Legion rescinded a commitment to fund the construction of a post. In the Columbus area, stafªng of GOC posts dropped precipitously. In one town the mayor, noting the already dire ªnancial straits of his community, declined to spend money on a post and stated that in general people were

46. A convenient source for information on these developments is “Ground Observer Corps Review Council Digest of Minutes of Second Meeting Held in Washington, D.C., 8 August 1956” (unpublished), in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 29, Folder Ground Observer Corps— Misc. Printed 1956. 47. Kenneth P. Berquist, “Outline Plan for the Reduction of the Ground Observer Corps to Standby Status,” 6 August 1956, in MAFB, AFR, K410.663-15, 1956; and N. B. Harbold, “Subj: ‘Outline Plan for the Reduction of the Ground Observer Corps to Standby Status,’” 22 August 1956, in MAFB, AFR, K410.663-15, 1956. 48. John C. Henderson and Austin W. Keneªck, Jr., “Historical Report of the 58th Air Division (De- fense), July through December 1956” (unpublished), pp. 11–14, in MAFB, AFR, K410.663-15, 1956.

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confused about what lay ahead.49 In some areas disaffected volunteers complained to their representatives, who made inquiries. Even the GOC’s ofªcial magazine, Aircraft Flash, acknowledged in an editorial that announcements about the changes seemed to suggest that the GOC was “losing its importance in Air Defense, and it has a dampening effect on the spirit of many volunteers.”50 On the other hand, the state directors of civil defense, who were consulted early on about the proposed changes, were presumably less upset. Many of them had never given the program their full support and had had contentious relations with the Air Force. The cuts in GOC coverage continued. Monetary allocations and personnel were reduced. One account referred to ªscal year 1958 outlays as an “aus- terity” budget.51 “With funds for expansion of the radar and weapons inven- tory ever more difªcult to come by,” another report stated, “the GOC was bound to be sacriªced to some degree.” In the eastern district, for example, ªlter centers were reduced from 35 to 28, and the number of posts on 24-hour duty declined from 27 to 16.52 The GOC was not eliminated, in part because early warning systems in Canada and at sea had not yet been fully evaluated, but strenuous efforts to recruit more volunteers ended. Instead the emphasis was put “on the quality of volunteers”; those who remained in the posts that were still operating were thought to be “dedicated, not . . . half- interested.” The new motto was “‘train and train,’ not ‘recruit.’”53 In August 1957, in a sign that the days of heavy recruitment were over, the USAF asked the Advertising Council to stop its work on behalf of the GOC. “I think we can assume that the job is done and we can stop everything with the exception of what we decide to do for the Air Force during GOC week,” wrote T. S. Repplier, a major ªgure in the advertising campaign.54 By this time, ofªcials in the ADC and the Ofªce of the Secretary of the Air Force were considering whether to deactivate the GOC altogether. Inªghting and disagreements ensued. The ADC wanted to place the entire GOC on ready reserve immediately but did not want to demobilize it entirely.

49. Charles R. Stapp and Broun H. Mayall, “Ground Observer Activities Report” (unpublished), 20 November 1956, in MAFB, AFR, K410.663-15, 1956. 50. “. . . we still need the GOC,” Aircraft Flash, May 1957, p. 2. 51. “History of the Air Defense Command July–December 1957,” p. 43. 52. “History of Eastern Air Defense Force January–June 1957” (unpublished), pp. 43–46, in MAFB, AFR, K412.01 Jan–Jun 1957, Vol. 1. 53. V. D. Flynn, Robert T. Bussjaeger, and John T. Fitzwater, “History of 33rd Air Division (Defense), Oklahoma City Air Force Station, Oklahoma, from 1 January 1957 to June 1957” (unpublished), p. 36, in MAFB, AFR, K412.01 Jan–Jun 1957, Vol. 1; and “History of Eastern Air Defense Force January–June 1957,” pp. 46–47. 54. T. S. Repplier to Hector Perrier, 9 August 1957, in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records 1957, Box 36, Folder Ground Observer Corps Correspondence 1957.

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The Air Force, however, proposed a phased program whereby certain areas would be placed on ready reserve by November 1957 and stations along the coasts would remain on full alert until the spring of 1958 when they, too, would stand down. Unlike the ADC, the USAF did want the eventual demo- bilization of the entire GOC. The ADC opposed the idea, leading to further negotiations, and ultimately the parties agreed to put the entire GOC on ready reserve as of 1 January 1958, with no mention made about deactivating the organization. The GOC still had tasks to do, and deactivation was not set until after a reappraisal in the summer of 1958. Colonel Owen F. Clarke, the USAF project ofªcer for the GOC, made the ofªcial announcement on 14 November 1957 in Washington, DC, at a meeting of the National Associ- ation of State and Territorial Civil Defense Directors.55 In Virginia soon after Clarke’s announcement, the Harrisonburg News- Record complained about apparent plans to retain the GOC even after the program’s raison d’être had been undermined. Supposedly the GOC would be looking for airplanes in distress, reporting dangerous weather patterns, and so forth. “But,” the editorial added, “perhaps the major reason—given little publicity—is the casually mentioned idea that the Ground Observer Corps hopes to get more persons interested in the Air Force and ‘enlarge the under- standing of air matters by the general public.’” The GOC would thus become “a public ‘lobby arm’ of the Air Force in its struggles with Congress and with the other services. ...Itisdiscouraging to see a branch of the services cyni- cally converting to its lobbying purpose a now outmoded program for which patriotic Americans signed up when it was needed.”56 The News-Record editorial writers understood the situation well. What they had almost certainly picked up on was Clarke’s comment to the state civil defense directors that “no other group is better equipped and positioned at the community level to take an active hand in the enlightening of all citizens on the danger confronting this nation in the Atomic Age. In fact, GOC volunteers have been doing this ever since the GOC was organized.”57 To be sure, building support for the USAF’s air defense mission was an important, if seldom discussed, aspect of the GOC’s justiªcation from its in- ception, and it helps explain why the GOC was retained in spite of serious questions all along about its effectiveness. Originally designated “to ªll low al-

55. “History of the Air Defense Command July–December 1957,” pp. 41–49. 56. Newspaper clipping, “Federal Agencies Die Hard,” Harrisonburg [VA] News Record, 12 De- cember 1957, in Air Defense Command, “Ground Observer Corps Correspondence, 01-01-1957– 12-31-1957,” in MAFB, AFR, K410.663-17. 57. “Presentation by Colonel Owen F. Clarke, USAF Ground Observer Project Ofªcer before the Na- tional Association of State & Territorial Civil Defense Directors, Washington, D.C., Thursday, 14 November 1957,” in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 36, Folder Ground Ob- server Corps—Air Defense Command Reports 1957.

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titude gaps in the radar system,” it “never managed to do so successfully,” an ofªcial history of the Western Air Force stated in 1957.58 Yet the GOC continued to exist, with plans for expansion, and it was ultimately killed largely because of budgetary pressures. Arnold Jones, deputy director of the Bureau of the Budget, wrote in 1957 that the bureau “has consistently believed that the Ground Observer Corps program has a very low priority and that it con- tinues to receive support by the Department of Defense chieºy because it has had substantial public relations value in the past.”59 Although the GOC was more than a “public ‘lobbying arm’” for air defense and the USAF more generally, there is no question that Air Force ofªcials saw the GOC as a valuable tool for advancing their own agendas, as well as the larger Cold War policies of the United States. In a 1956 letter, Major General Norris Harbold emphasized the GOC’s advantages to the Air Force. GOC volunteers, he wrote,

are really selling the Air Force to civilian communities and to a great number of American families. The good public relations and the recruiting value to the Air Force is immense. In fact the returns to the Air Force from this may be greater in the long run than the accomplishment of the assigned mission.60 The next year, when a reduction of GOC operations was clearly ex- pected, another air defense ofªcial said it was “important that we retain the goodwill and support for the Air Force of as many of the loyal and dedicated volunteers as possible by an orderly phase out of the program.”61 Or,asGen- eral Hugh A Parker, commander of the Western Air Defense Force, noted in February 1958, “feelings of indifference, lack of purpose, and resentment are growing among the civilian volunteers,” and if this continued it “could very easily neutralize the tremendous gains in public support that the Air Force has enjoyed in recent years, and could subsequently tend to negate necessary public support for other more important USAF projects.”62 Although ADC ofªcials had recommended deactivating the GOC entirely as of 1 January 1959, the USAF had demurred, pending a more complete review. In February 1958, responding to the Air Force’s position, Major-

58. Directorate of Historical Services, Ofªce of Information Services, Western Air Defense Force, “History of Western Air Defense Force 1 January–30 June 1957,” p. 38, in MAFB, AFR, K411.01 Vol. 1, 01-01-1957–6-30-1957. 59. Arnold R. Jones to James M. Lambie, 1 February 1957, in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Re- cords, Box 36, Folder Ground Observer Corps—Correspondence 1957. 60. Norris Harbold to Partridge, 21 May 1956, quoted in Volan, “History,” p. 143. 61. John M. Konosky to Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command, 10 Octo- ber 1957, in MAFB, AFR, Air Defense Command, “Ground Observer Correspondence 01-01-1957– 12-31-1957.” 62. Hugh A. Parker to Joseph H. Atkinson, 12 February 1958, in MAFB, AFR, Air Defense Com- mand, “Ground Observer Correspondence, 1958,” K410.663-18, 1958. Atkinson was commander of the Air Defense Command at Ent Air Force Base in Colorado Springs.

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General Harold W. Grant, the ADC’s deputy for operations, recommended “retaining the Ground Observer Corps as a part of the Air Defense surveillance system as long as there is an operational requirement for it.” Others dis- agreed. General Parker wrote, “with due respect to the thousands of civilian volunteers who have participated in the program, we believe the GOC should be eliminated from the Air Defense surveillance team.” His superior ofªcer, Joseph Atkinson, agreed, though because the USAF had not yet reached a decision he ordered Parker to continue supporting the GOC “due to the public relations aspect of this program.” Atkinson did, however, reiterate his recom- mendation to the Air Force that the GOC should be deactivated as of 1 Janu- ary 1959.63 In September 1958, after months of inaction during which time the ADC did its best to keep up morale among GOC volunteers, President Eisen- hower heard from the secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, all of whom recommended that the GOC be deactivated on 1 January 1959 and that an announcement to this effect be made on 17 September 1958.64 After several more weeks the White House decided “to hold in abeyance” the proposed deactivation of the GOC.65 Finally in November the White House announced that the GOC would be deactivated on 31 January 1959. Eisenhower sent letters to all the GOC volunteers, thanking them for their dedicated participation in “the greatest civilian volunteer peacetime defense organization this nation has ever known.”66 With that, the GOC ceased to exist, although in at least some states efforts were made to incorporate the GOC into state civil defense orga- nizations with the posts continuing to function, though primarily to report on sabotage, aircraft in distress, and dangerous weather conditions.67 Most of the patterns that had developed early in the evolution of the GOC continued throughout its existence. Friction and misunderstandings

63. Harold W. Grant to the Commander, Air Defense Command, 24 February 1958, in MAFB, AFR, Air Defense Command, “Ground Observer Correspondence, 1958,” K410.663-18, 1958; Parker to Atkinson, 12 February 1958; Joseph H. Atkinson to Hugh A. Parker, 6 March 1958, in MAFB, AFR, Air Defense Command, “Ground Observer Correspondence, 1958,” K410.663-18, 1958; and Joseph H. Atkinson to Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, 17 March 1958, in MAFB, AFR, Air Defense Com- mand, “Ground Observer Correspondence, 1958,” K410.663-18, 1958. 64. Neil McElroy to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 9 September 1959, in DDEL, Eisenhower Papers, Lambie Records, WHCF, OF 1953–61, Box 82, Folder 3-C-14 (2). 65. R. W. Puryear to the Chief of Staff, 1 October 1958, in MAFB, AFR, Air Defense Command, “Ground Observer Correspondence, 1958,” K410.663-18, 1958. 66. Dwight D. Eisenhower to each Ground Observer Volunteer, 1 January 1959, in DDEL, Eisen- hower Papers, Lambie Records, Box 42, Folder Ground Observer Corps: Conference 1958. 67. Illinois Ofªce of Civil Defense, Operational Instructions Ground Observer Corps Revised, 22 November 1958, in MAFB, AFR, Air Defense Command, “Ground Observer Correspondence, 1958,” K410.663-18, 1958.

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between the USAF and the state directors of civil defense were reduced but by no means eliminated. The allocation of responsibility for the GOC was never fully sorted out, although over time the Air Force took on more of the bur- den. Supporters of the GOC were continually frustrated by the civilian apathy they encountered and the subsequent difªculty in recruiting and retaining volunteers. They never came close to achieving the number of volunteers needed or the number of posts required, particularly the number of posts they wanted to operate 24 hours a day. In that sense, this article reinforces contrarian views regarding alleged public hysteria about a probable Soviet air attack on the United States that is commonly said to have marked the early Cold War years. Civil defense as a whole had problems with recruits, but the GOC was more closely tied to the glamorous USAF and thus should have had less difªculty attracting volunteers.68 If the populace were really as frightened about an imminent Soviet attack as the government thought it should be, citizens presumably would have volunteered in large numbers. That the GOC always struggled to recruit volunteers, even in the face of such shocking developments as the ªrst Soviet nuclear bomb test, the Korean War, and the Soviet hydrogen bomb test, suggests that hysteria was less pervasive than is commonly asserted. One need not question the sincerity of ofªcials who set up and sought to strengthen the GOC. More so than the wider public, they genuinely feared Soviet intentions and thought the GOC could be a valuable addition to homeland defense. But over time the public relations value of the GOC be- came a more important reason to preserve the organization. GOC members, ofªcials hoped, would promote USAF objectives (particularly its air defense mission) and support Cold War policies generally. The GOC would serve as a kind of Air Force spearhead into the population, generating interest in and support for the USAF, its programs, and U.S. Cold War objectives. Whether these objectives were achieved among volunteers remains to be investigated. But, in view of funding pressures, the GOC’s inºuence among the wider population was never sufªcient to merit the survival of the Corps.

68. See, for example, Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon.

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