572

THE SEABED ARMS CONTROL ISSUE 1967·1971

A SUPERPOWER SYMBIOSIS?

James A. Barry, Jr.

Advances in marine engineering, life Navy's Sealab experiments, as well as support, and other technologies are con­ similar programs by the Soviet Union, tinuing to render the ocean floor at suggest that it may soon be possible for increasing depths accessible for resource men to work for extended periods of exploitation, scientific research, and, time at great depths. In short, the potentially, military uses. The avail­ seabed is becoming a tempting area for ability of high-strength steels and alumi­ future military and economic expansion num alloys, fiberglass reinforced plastic, by the technologically advanced powers, titanium, and beryllium could presage an unclaimed domain of increasing the construction of submarine hulls for salience in the relations between the operation at 20,000 feet-far deeper superpowers. 1 than the record depth attained by the Since 1967 the international com­ bathyscaphe "Trieste." Nuclear energy munity has demonstrated more and could enable such vehicles to operate at more concern for the future of this vast maximum depth for extended periods. domain, comprising some 70 percent of The application of high-strength ma­ the earth's surface. Although some of terials to undersea structures coupled the advanced nations had shown interest with new developments in remote in establishing control over the seabed sensing and manipulation (telechirics) since World War II, it remained for tiny could, in the foreseeable future, render Malta to bring the seabed issue to the the ocean floor open to both economic forefront of international politics with and military exploitation. The U.S. impassioned pleas to the United Nations 573 to preven t a mad scram hIe for the ocean technology-dependent issue which is floor. Since that time there has been likely to occur with increasing fre­ some moderate progress toward assert­ quency in the relations of nations. But ing international control over the un· more important, it is a useful vehicle for claimed reaches of the ocean bottom, the study of changing superpower rela­ bu t to many this has amounted to tions and the burgeoning of a multipolar nothing more than tokenism. international political system. This Thus, despite some accommodation, paper examines the seabed arms control the seabed issue remains a perplexing treaty negotiations from 1967 to 1971 political and technological problem. It is and the treaty's relationship to changing a nexus of difficulties-security inter­ United States-Soviet relations. ests, participation of noncoastal states The military and economic potential in decisions, preservation of existing of the seabed was recognized as far back claims to territorial seas, and freedom of as World War II. In September 1945 navigation are but a few of the seem­ President Truman issued a proclamation ingly insurmountable problems which declaring that the United States re­ the international community faces in garded the natural resources of the trying to unravel this issue. seabed and subsoil of the Continental Given these difficulties, it is of great Shelf beneath the high seas but con­ interest that in the past few years a large tiguous to the coasts of the United number of states, including the United States as appertaining to this country's States and the Soviet Union, have been jurisdiction and control. Other states, able to reach an accord on banning notably the United Kingdom, Australia, nuclear weapons and other weapons of and the oil-rich Trucial States of the mass destruction from the seabed. The Persian Gulf followed suit. A number of negotiations provide an excellent case Latin American States, particularly study of the machinations of interna­ Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru, claimed ex­ tional politics. clusive jurisdiction not only over the The birth of the seabed issue and the seabed and its subsoil to a distance of acceptance of the treaty banning weap­ 200 miles, bu t in some cases to the high ons of mass destruction also can be seen seas above. These rapidly escalating as a microcosm of superpower relations. claims alarmed many members of the The seabed arms control treaty, perhaps in ternational community, especially better than any other international when they infringed on traditional con­ agreement in recent history, illustrates cepts of freedom of the seas. In an the shifting power relationships which attempt to head them off, the United have accompanied the waning of the Nations General Assembly referred the bipolar, cold war relationship of the issue to the International Law Commis­ immediate postwar years. It is a prime sion in 1951. The Commission refused example of what we might call, for lack to sanction the unilateral claims of of a better term, "superpower sym­ states as a basis for an international law biosis," i.e., a relationship in which of the seabed, but agreed to prepare a advanced states with divergent goals draft set of rules which eventually temporarily join forces to achieve a evolved into the 1958 Geneva Conven­ specific end_ They eschew collision poli­ tion on the Continental Shelf. This cies for collusion even, as in this case, provided the only constructive set of when the net result is a treaty which rules on the seabed to which the inter­ neither state favors in its entirety. national community had given its assent The seabed arms control issue, then, when the seabed arms control issue was is important for a number of reasons. In raised in 1968. itself it is a prime example of the sort of The 1958 Convention is extremely 574 limited in scope. It deals only with the applied to the problem of regulating the Continental Shelf and not the seabed as use of the seabed, is its failure to define a whole. The Continental Shelf is de­ the precise limits of national jurisdic­ fined as: tion. It provides a definition of the ... the seabed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf that is technology­ submarine areas adjacent to the dependent, thus increasing the tempta­ coast bu t ou tside the area of the tion to the developed states that they territorial sea, to a depth of 200 intrude into the unclaimed domain of meters or, beyond that limit, to the seabed. In effect, the convention where the depth of the super­ provides that any action which a state is adjacent waters admits of the ex­ technologically capable of carrying out ploitation of the natural resources is legal and, further, that that action can of the said areas? have the side effect of appropriating The Continental Shelf Convention submarine lands to national jurisdiction. confers on the coastal state exclusive The situation under the 1958 con­ rights over the Continental Shelf for the vention is analogous to that faced by purposes of exploring it and exploiting the international community a few its natural resources and, by implica­ years ago when a few advanced sta tes tion, for military purposes as well. It were on the threshold of developing provides, however, that this jurisdiction space weapons. Today, marine science shall not extend to the high seas and and technology are opening an entirely airspace above the shelf, a provision new and unclaimed world-a domain which has not induced some states to that not long ago was every bit as abandon their previously claimed 200 remote as the outer planets. Just as mile limits nor deterred others from international machinery was established advancing similar claims. The Continen­ to define the status of heavenly bodies tal Shelf Convention states that occupa­ and to prohibit certain military actions, tion or explicit proclamation is not the need has been perceived to regulate required to make the coastal state's the actions of states in exploiting the jurisdiction effective, thus leaving open ocean floor for military and economic the possibility of emplanting secret purposes. facilities while remaining within the This need has been forcefully high­ letter of the law. lighted by the Maltese Ambassador to The 1958 Continental Shelf Conven­ the United Nations, Avrid Pardo. In tion was successful in constraining the 1967 he ou tlined to the General As· rising tide of excessive claims to subma­ sembly his view of the dangers inherent rine lands. But it was a compromise in the lack of international controls over document hammered out over a period the seabed. 3 In addition to citing mili­ of months to accommodate the interests tary dangers, Ambassador Pardo ex­ of some 66 states which rarely saw eye pressed concern that the developed to eye on the important issues. It was a countries would appropriate vast areas stopgap measure and, like all stopgap of the seabed, thus shutting out the measures, it has deficiencies. As we have poorer nations from a source of great seen, it leaves the door open for clandes· revenue and an opportunity to upgrade tine military operations on the ocean their technical capabilities. Such devel­ floor. Its scope is extremely limited. opments, he said, would further increase Further, it fails to set up any interna­ friction not only among the advanced tional machinery to oversee the opera­ nations, but between the developed and tion of the convention. less developed countries as well. But the most glaring deficiency of Motivated by his concern over the the Continental Shelf Convention, when military potential of the seabed, but 575 more immediately by the prospect of tional framework in which the seabed raising revenue by developing the ocean arms issue was worked out. There are floor, Pardo proposed that the interna­ also, of course, a host of informal tional community declare the seabed, relationships and communications chan­ beyond the limits of national jurisdic­ nels which are more difficult to discern. tion, to be the common heritage of all Obviously, the superpowers engaged in mankind_ This concept has become a some private consultations with each cen tral theme in discussions of the other and, probably to a lesser extent, seabed issue and has increased the pres­ with their allies. Nevertheless, the agree­ sures on the superpowers to negotiate ment reached bears the unmistakable away their technological advantages_ stamp of the United Nations, and its Spurred on by the Pardo speech, the negotiation in this forum is one of the United Nations General Assembly primary factors which helped to fashion voted, on 18 December 1967, to estab­ the final shape of the treaty. lish an ad hoc committee "to Despite the progress made by mod­ study ... the reservation exclusively for ern science in exploiting the ocean peaceful purposes of the seabed ... 4 Both depths, the seabed remains a hostile the United States and the Soviet Union environment. The greatest achievements were made members of this body. The of technology must be brought to bear United States sponsored the resolution, in order to achieve any measurable together with a number of other states. degree of success in harnessing its poten­ The Soviets, however, declined to act as tial as a location for military operations. cosponsors. In fact, the Soviet delegate Most obvious, of course, is the require­ to the General Assembly indicated that ment for life support systems for men his government felt that it was risky to working on the ocean floor, a pre­ create a new body. The issue was, in his requisite for many operations. Further, view, too complex to attack without structures emplanted on the seabed further study. Further, he felt, "Dis­ must be able to withstand tremendous armament, and, primarily, nuclear dis­ pressures and must be secured against armament, would preclude the ocean­ shifting currents. Ordinary sensing de­ bed from being militarily exploited."s vices, such as radar, are virtually useless The work of the ad hoc committee under water. Only sound has proved to was taken over a year later by a perma­ be a reliable undersea sensor, and even it nent, 42-member committee.6 This or­ is extremely limited in range. Wholly ganization has been the focus for much new methods of communications and of the discussion on limiting military control must be worked out for military uses of the seabed, but, as the Soviet structures on the ocean floor. Thus it is U.N. delegate predicted, it has compli­ evident that the use of this environment cated the issue more than it has clarified for military purposes is difficult and, as it. All of the productive work on the a consequence, expensive. seabed arms control question has been Nevertheless, it appears that the accomplished under the auspices of the momentum of technology has driven Conference of the Committee on Dis­ military strategists of both the East and armament (CCD), formerly the Eighteen West to consider placing military-related Nation Disarmament Conference structures on the seabed. For example, (ENDC). Both superpowers have pre­ the U.S. Defense Science Board has ferred to concentrate their seabed arms considered mounting large missiles in control efforts in this body, possibly for silos on the ocean floor. Such installa­ the sake of a better coordinated overall tions, like ballistic missile submarines, arms control policy. would be relatively invulnerable to at­ This, then, is the formal organiza- tack but could carry much larger 576 missiles than subs can. The United hardly surprising, then, that the United States has also proposed huge self­ States and the Soviet Union, which have propelled vehicles which would crawl both been concerned about the impact along the ocean floor, carrying mis­ of expensive military programs on their siles. 7 These "crawlers" would be con­ economies, would show interest in trolled by umbilical cords, a concept limiting what could become history's which has been proven out by the deep most expensive arms race. Typically, submergence vehicle CURV III. Also however, the two states have ap­ discussed have been nuclear mines situ­ proached the issue of controlling mili­ ated in strategic ocean areas. 8 tary programs on the ocean floor from In addition to such offensive weap­ different points of view. Nevertheless, it ons, there are a variety of defensive is evident that the seabed issue has the systems which could be installed on the potential to serve as the catalyst for ocean bottom. According to The New what may be termed a "superpower York Times, the United States has an symbiosis," in view of the vested inter­ extensive series of ocean-floor-mounted est of both powers in maintaining an sensirig devices designed to pick up acceptable rate of economic growth in sounds emitted by passing submarines in the face of escalating arms costs. Thus, the Atlantic and Pacific. The U.S. Navy despite the military potential of the is also said to have similar devices in key seabed, there are powerful pressures narrows; for example, the Straits of which tend to drive the superpowers Malacca and Gibraltar. Although the toward accommodation. Soviet Union does not discuss such After some initial reluctance to en­ devices directly, we can infer from dorse the formation of the Seabed certain of their public statements that Comrillttee, the Soviet leadership ap­ they too have seabed installations, at parently arrived at the conclusion that least close to their own shores. One the control of arms on the ocean floor Soviet commentator, for example, has was an issue worth exploring. It was the stated that "modern naval defense in­ Soviet U.N. Representative Yakov A. cludes coastal fortifications and various Malik who first broached the question defensive installations sited on the sea­ of demilitarizing the seabed in an inter­ bed off shore.,,9 Some observers have national forum. In June 1968 he called suggested that the Soviets are far behind for outlawing the use of the ocean floor the United States in the development of for military purposes as a prerequisite to underwater detection devices, 10 but the any agreement on the exploitation of public literature on the seabed problem subsurface resources. 12 That same is insufficient to draw any firm conclu­ month the Soviet delegate to the ad hoc sions as to who is ahead. It is significant, Seabed Committee proposed a draft however, that both superpowers are resolution which called on all govern­ apparently actively pursuing the em­ ments to utilize the seabed and ocean placement of defensive installations on floor beyond the limits of national the seabed. jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful pur­ The difficulties of operation in the poses. He also suggested that the Eigh­ deep ocean environment suggest that teen Nation Disarmament Conference the installation of military devices on be requested to consider the question of the seabed would be an extremely ex­ prohibiting the use of the sea and ocean pensive undertaking. One scientist has floors beyond territorial waters for mili­ stated that the cost of a complete tary purposes. During these early underwater defense system would months of seabed discussions, most of "make the space program budget look the other committee members focused miniscule by comparison." I I It is their attention on the matter of regu- 577

3 lating economic exploitation. I The seabed arms control proposal fits Only a few days later the Soviet both of these criteria. The Soviet Union, Government issued a statement which with the world's largest submarine helps to place the seabed issue in per· force, is no doubt greatly concerned spective. On the occasion of the signing about the effectiveness of U.S. undersea of the Non·Proliferation Treaty, Premier surveillance. If they could succeed in Kosygin submitted to the United Na· demilitarizing the seabed, the Soviets tions a nine·point proposal entitled could force the United States to dis­ "Urgent Measures for Ending the Arms mantle its antisubmarine listening de­ Race." I 4 The Soviets memorandum vices, thus reducing Western defenses called for negotiations on the following against submarines. If, as noted earlier, points: the Soviets are indeed behind the West 1. Banning the use of nuclear weap· in this aspect of military technology, ons. they would have less to lose from a 2. Ending the manufacture of nu­ defensive standpoint and more to gain clear weapons and the destruction of by enhancing the safety of their subma­ existing stockpiles. rines in the open ocean. Failing this, the 3. Limiting and then reducing the Soviets could also benefit from any means of delivering nuclear weapons. measure which could reduce the pres­ sure probably being exerted by some 4. A ban on flights of nuclear weap­ groups within the U.S.S.R. to expand on-carrying bombers outside national the arms race to the ocean floor. Al­ airspace. though there is no direct evidence to 5. A ban on underground nuclear support the assessment, it seems reason­ tests. able to suppose that there are those in 6. au tlawing biological and chemical the Soviet Navy and the defense-relateq. weapons. ministries who would favor such a 7. Liquidation of foreign military move. While the pressure for adopting bases. such a course might not have been great 8. Regional disarmament. in 1968, it is more likely to grow than 9. Banning the. establishment of to decline with the passing of time. In fixed military installations on the sea­ view of the enormous expenditures bed and also any other military activity. which would probably be required for Of course, the Soviets no doubt an effective seabed strategic weapon realized that many of these topics were system, it is not surprising that some simply not negotiable in the present elements of the Soviet leadership would political context. It is unlikely that they be interested in foreclosing the seabed seriously considered that such a compre­ option not only for the West, but for hensive package could ever be adopted, their own military establishment. bu t they no doubt saw considerable Not surprisingly, Washington viewed propaganda value in making the pro­ the Soviet nine-point proposal as un­ posal. In addition, they probably hoped acceptable. In July of 1968, however, that some of the points could be dis­ President Johnson responded by urging cussed, since each of them could benefit the Disarmament Conference to adopt a the U.S.S.R., either by constraining "workable, verifiable and effective Western military capabilities, and thus agreement to bar the use of the seabed improving the Soviet Union's net se­ for the emplacement of weapons of curity posture, or by narrowing the mass destruction."ls Thus he declined realm of strategic competition, thereby to consider demilitarizing the ocean freeing resources for the development of floor in favor of a limit on the deploy­ nonmilitary sectors of their economy. ment of nuclear weapons and other 578

(unidentified) weapons of mass destruc­ vessels and the participation of military tion. personnel in scientific research projects The remainder of the year saw little on the ocean floor. Other states ex­ progress on the seabed arms control pressed doubts about the proposed issue. The Soviet delegates to the Sea­ 12·mile limit.2o As a consequence of bed Committee and the Disarmament these disagreements, the United States Conference continued to stress demili­ submitted its own draft on 22 May tarization, while other nations called for prohibiting nuclear weapons, weapons the use of the seabed for "peaceful of mass destruction, and associated purposes," not excluding defensive mili­ fixed launching platforms on the seabed tary operations.16 In December the beyond a 3-mile limit, with verification General Assembly created a permanent by observation and consultation.2 1 Seabed Committee, but this develop­ It is interesting to note that, in the ment received scant attention in the days immediately preceding the Soviet 1 Soviet press. 7 proposal, there was no hint in the press The Soviets seized the opportunity that such a move was forthcoming. In afforded by the change of U.S. adminis­ fact, on the day before the draft was trations in January 1969 to reiterate presented at Geneva, the Soviet repre­ their nine·point proposal to the United sentative to the Conference was quoted States.18 They followed it up with the as saying, "The question of banning the su bmission, on 18 March of a draft use of nuclear weapons ic; being placed treaty on the demilitarization of the in the foreground." He also mentioned seabed to the Disarmament Conference barring the manufacture and stockpiling at Geneva. The Soviet treaty would have of nuclear weapons, bans on foreign banned nuclear weapons and military bases, chemical and biological weapons, installations of any kind on the ocean and nuclear bomber flights as well as floor beyond a 12-mile limit. It pro­ regional disarmament.2 2 The seabed vided for inspection of underwater issue was conspicuous by its absence. structures on the basis of "reciprocity," We might speculate that the details of apparently meaning that only nations the proposal were still being worked out which had seabed structures could in­ at the highest levels and that Soviet spect those of other nations. A number representative Roschin was not free to of nations were not satisfied with this discuss it even though he probably knew method and asked for clarification. In that the move was forthcoming. This addition, the conference split on the view tends to be confirmed by the fact scope of the ban. A majority of the that it was Kosygin himself who made members supported the U.S.S.R.'s call the first announcement of the draft 2 for total demilitarization, while the treaty to the press. 3 It is possible then, United States and its allies "maintained that some interests in the Soviet Union that a total ban on military activity on were opposed to any proposal, which the seabed, particularly the emplace­ foreclosed the possibility of future ment of equipment for tracking poten­ Soviet military exploitation of the tially hostile submarines would not per­ ocean floor. mit coastal states to take necessary and At about this time there began to be vital measures for defence and would hints that some states were wary of also be unverifiable in the difficult what could turn out to be superpower marine environment.,,19 U.S. officials collusion to block arms control prog­ also feared that a ban on all military ress. The British, Canadian, and Nigerian activity could be interpreted to include representatives at Geneva urged that the communications and navigation equip­ seabed issue be shelved temporarily in ment used by both civilian and naval favor of a ban on underground nuclear 579

testing. The implication was that the this was, in the Soviet view, only a step United States and the U.S.S.R. were toward the eventual demilitarization of deliberately placing an issue of little the ocean floor. consequence-the seabed-ahead of The agreement appears to have been more vital issues. These fears were to a rather straightforward case of compro­ become more pronounced as the nego­ mise. The Soviets gained U.S. assent to a tiations proceeded. 24 12-mile limit, which they probably saw Over the next few months the princi­ as a valuable bit of leverage for the pals exchanged views on the treaty, with U.N.-sponsored Law of the Sea Confer­ the United States maintaining that a ence to be held in 1973. In addition, by complete demilitarization would be banning nuclear weapons, they would both impractical and unenforceable. still have some hope of avoiding the The Soviet Union clarified its proposal most costly of the potential seabed somewhat by conceding that devices military systems. The United States, on such as navigation beacons could be the other hand, succeeded in excluding exempt, but insisted on including anti­ its antisubmarine devices from the ban. su bmarine devices.2s Further, the This must have caused some concern Soviets maintained, a complete ban on among those in the Soviet Union who military installations would actually be are responsible for submarine opera­ easier to police than one which pro­ tions, but it does suggest that immediate hibited only certain kinds of activities. military utility can give way to prag­ States began to identify themselves with matic economic considerations in the the proposals, with Sweden backing the Soviet approach to international negoti­ U.S.S.R. and Japan and some of the ations. NATO countries siding with the United October 1969 marked a crucial turn­ States. Canada proposed a compromise ing point in the negotiations. With the which would bar "undersea weapons, United States and the U.S.S.R. both military activities, bases or fortifications backing the treaty, passage seemed to be from which military action could be virtually assured, but even more impor­ undertaken.,,26 However, neither major tant than the issue itself was the pattern protagonist showed a willingness to of interplay among the principal inter­ accept the Canadian proposal. national actors which evolved from the Finally, in August, the superpowers compromise. From that point forward, began to move closer together. In­ the .two superpowers adopted a sym­ formed sources in Geneva suggested that biotic relationship, abandoning or sub­ a compromise could be reached. The merging their differences in order to United States and the U.S.S.R., who as present a united front to opponents of cochairmen of the Disarmament Con­ the proposed treaty. The opponents ference had extended its deliberations were many and, interestingly, included for several weeks beyond the scheduled allies of both the United States and the adjournment, agreed on a draft early in U.S.S.R., as well as nonaligned nations. October. In exchange for a widening of Over the next months, charges of super­ the exempted zone to 12 miles, Moscow power collusion and obstructionism agreed that the treaty should encompass were heard more and more frequently. only nuclear weapons and other weap­ In many ways the two giants stood 2 ons of mass destruction. 7 The Soviet almost alone against their many detrac­ press played down the compromise tors. aspect. In a statement on 7 October, Criticisms of the treaty proposal cen­ Roschin said that the treaty would solve tered around three issues: verification, "the most important part of the prob­ rights of coastal states, and the veto lem ... ,,28 but he also stressed that power accorded to nuclear weapon 580 states. Article III of the draft stated that affirmative vote by all nuclear pow­ "states parties to the treaty shall have ers.31 Fears that this would lead to a the righ t to verify ... using their own nuclear power monopoly were wide­ means or with the assistance of any spread and were apparently voiced out­ other state party.,,29 A number of side of the U.N. forum. A Soviet broad­ states, including Canada, Italy, and cast to China on 24 October took pains Sweden, considered these provisions to to deny that the seabed treaty was an be inadequate. Canada submitted pro­ "attempt to deceive the peace-loving posed changes in the form of a working people and to legalize the arms race." It paper which recommended that the further declared that "No anti-Soviet Secretary General of the United Nations slander is of any help in the matter.,,32 be given the power and the means to Apparently the Soviets were quite sensi­ assist in supervising compliance if re­ tive to criticism on this issue from the quested by states which lacked the other major Communist power. technical resources to carry out such As a result of these pressures, the 3 opera tions themselves. 0 Both the United States and the Soviet Union United States and the U.S.S.R. were presented a revised treaty on 24 Oc­ reluctant to endorse this proposal, but tober. The revision clarified the status probably for different reasons. The of the area between the 3-mile limit and United States no doubt realized that the the 12-mile contiguous zone and deleted major burden of financing an extensive the nuclear power veto provision. It U.N. verification capability would fall restored a requirement for a review squarely on the shoulders of the United conference every 5 years which had States and that it would be extremely been dropped in the first joint draft at difficult, to say the least, to get such the insistence of the U.S.S.R. It also expenditures appropriated. The Soviet provided that disputes could be taken to Union, on the other hand, was probably the Security Council and inserted a new motivated primarily by its traditional article in the preamble assuring that the reluctance to upgrade the powers of the previous rights of coastal states would Secretary General. not be altered by the treaty.33 Coastal states objected to the draft These concessions, with the possible for several reasons. First, the status of exception of giving up their veto power, the region between the 12-mile limit were not critical to the superpower and the outer boundary of territorial duopoly. It is interesting, however, that waters was obscure. It appeared to some they were able to agree on a revised as if one state could legally emplant draft within 3 weeks after having sub­ weapons between 3 and 12 miles from mitted the initial proposal. Evidently the coast of another state. A number of the pressure from allies and competitors nations also objected to referring to the alike forced them to act in concert once 1958 Geneva Convention, which nearly again in order to safeguard their com­ one-third of the U.N. members had not mon interest in having the document ratified. Finally, Canada demanded that approved. verification operations within the 12- These revisions, however, did not mile limit of a coastal state be approved satisfy the critics. Brazil reserved its by that state in advance, thus presenting position on the treaty. Canada and an apparent limitation on traditional others, including Yugoslavia, vowed to freedom of the seas. continue to voice their objections in the The other major objection was an General Assembly. The Seabed Com­ ou tgrowth of article IV of the draft, mittee complained that it had not been which specified that amendment re­ given enough time for a proper review quired a majority vote, including an of the treaty.34 While the two co- 581

3 sponsors pleaded for endorsement, Seabed Committee. 9 This turn of smaller nations, including members of events can be explained partly in terms the Atlantic Alliance, charged that the of the Soviets' continuing interest in superpowers were making their own eventually forcing the West to give up deals at the expense of the rest of the its lead in antisubmarine devices, but world. more importantly their actions were As a result the U.N. General As­ related to the timing of the announce­ sembly First (Political) Committee ment. The United States was making voted to send the treaty back to Geneva preparations to dump a quantity of for revision and resubmission at the obsolete nerve gas in the Atlantic, and next General Assembly session.3s The the Soviets probably saw a clear chance Soviets played down the rebuff. Five for making substantial propaganda gains days after the treaty was rejected by the by playing up the U.S.S.R. 's peace­ U.N., Radio Moscow called the seabed loving position on the seabed. This negotiations the highlight of the session. estimate is borne out by the consider­ It mentioned suggestions by Sweden, able press coverage given to the Seabed Canada, and Brazil but failed to report Committee's condemnation of the U.S. 3 40 the First Committee's action. 6 action. No further action was taken until the In September the superpower part­ Disarmament Conference reconvened in ners made more concessions. They April 1970. But in March, Rumania added a provision which required the called for deferring the seabed issue in parties to continue negotiations in good favor of general disarmament. Now for­ faith aimed at ending the seabed arms mal allies of both superpowers had race, with the obvious aim of placating 3 joined the opposition. 7 Sweden. Incidentally, of course, this On 21 April the sponsors offered bolstered the Soviet Union's initial posi­ more concessions. The latest revision to tion. The latest draft made it mandatory the treaty required that if any party that any state initiating verification pro­ should decide to conduct verification cedures notify all other parties of the operations within the Continental Shelf beginning of such operations and the of a coastal state, it must notify that results of the inspection. Finally, it state and invite its participation. It also added the provision that verification expressly stated that the treaty would could be accomplished "through ap­ not prejudice the claims of any nation propriate international procedures with­ under "international law," a concession in the framework of the UN and in to those who objected to using the 1958 accordance with its charter, as well as Geneva Convention as a basis for the through bi-Iateral arrangements.,,41 treaty.38 This latest version of the joint Thus the proposal placated Canada, United States-U.S.S.R. draft treaty, while not committing the United States however, still failed to provide a means to fund a separate U.N. verification of verification for those states who effort. The language was also vague lacked the capability themselves. Objec­ enough so that the Soviet Union could, tions were raised about this point, but if it desired, read it to include only the the superpower coalition was clearly Security Council and not the Secretary willing to concede points in order to General. As a result of these conces­ enhance the treaty's chances of gaining sions, the Disarmament Committee endorsement. approved the draft on 4 September by a Then, on 24 August, the Soviet vote of 24 to 1. Only Mexico demurred, Union made a surprise move by sub­ contending that the superpowers had mitting a proposal for complete demili­ retained the option of installing weap­ tarization of the ocean floor to the ons on their allies' territory.42 582

With the Disarmament Committee's ations and may have had a hand in the approval, the treaty breezed through the formulation of the Soviet position. U.N. On 17 November the First Com­ Kosygin's statement on signing the mittee endorsed it by a vote of 91 to 2, treaty emphasized the difficulty of the with 6 abstentions. Peru and EI Salva­ negotiations and repeated the assertion dor, who claim 200-mile territorial seas, that the Soviet Government regarded it voted against the resolution, while as only the initial step toward complete Ecuador, France, Indonesia, Kuwait, demilitarization of the ocean floor.4 II Senegal, and Thailand abstained. Tan­ One Soviet commentator expanded zania expressed concern that the treaty slightly on the theme that denucleariza­ did not include nuclear submarines. 43 tion was the most important aspect of The treaty then passed to the Gen­ seabed arms control when he stressed eral Assembly. While it was being con­ that utilization of the seabed for mili­ sidered, the Soviet Union showed great tary purposes is limited not by eco­ sensitivity to charges of collusion with nomic considerations, but by techno­ the United States. A Pravda article on logical possibilities and "military­ the treaty stressed that it was con­ strategic purposefulness.,,49 This state­ sidered to be only the first step toward ment provides more indirect evidence demilitarizing the seabed and that cer­ that in the U.S.S.R., as well as in the tain (unspecified) Western Powers "have West, there are pressures from the "mili­ overtly attempted to hamper construc­ tary-industrial complex" to develop and tive discussions of the disarmament deploy seabed military systems. Simi­ issue.,,44 This was apparently directed larly, in both countries, the govern­ at those who felt the Russians and the ments appear to be anxious to head off Americans were getting too cozy, while another round of expenditures on such remaining oblique enough so as not to systems before it gets out of hand. upset the burgeoning "era of negotia­ To the end, the Soviets tried to fend tions." off accusations that they were collabo­ In December the General Assembly rating with the United States for self­ adopted, by a vote of 104 to 2, with 2 serving purposes. On the eve of the abstentions, a resolution commending signature ceremony, TASS broadcast an the Treaty Banning the Emplacement of apologia for the Soviet position. Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of It is well known that after the Mass Destruction on the Seabed and development of science and tech­ Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof nology made it possible to start for signature and ratification. Again, practical use of the seabed and the Peru and El Salvador opposed the ocean floor, the aggressive im­ treaty, while France and Ecuador ab­ perialist circles started making stained.45 plans for using in military pur­ On 11 February 1971, the treaty was poses these spaces that take up signed in Washington, London, and Mos­ over two-thirds of the earth's sur­ cow, climaxing over 2 years of nego­ face ... It is the Soviet Union tiation.46 The Soviet ceremony was that proposed to use the seabed attended by, inter alia, Marshall of the and ocean floor only in peaceful Soviet Union Yakubovskiy and navy purposes .... It is no secret that commander in chief, Admiral of the imperialism placed many blocs Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorsh­ [sic] on the road to ... disarma­ kov.47 This high ranking military dele­ ment.50 gation suggests that the military in One wonders if the commentator doth general, and the navy in particular, had not protest too much! a great deal of interest in the negoti- Now that the treaty has been signed, 583 its significance lies not merely in the ficiency, however, is that it leaves the fact that nuclear weapons have been thousands of square miles of ocean floor banned from the seabed. More impor· between the coast and the 12-mile limit tantly it is a symbol, a symptom of free of any restriction whatsoever. changing power structures in an evolving There is some merit to the initial U.S. international system. Together with argument that this area is the most similar ventures, such as SALT, it marks likely region for the deployment of the dissolution of the "zero sum" seabed weapons, given its relative acces­ 5 approach to East-West negotiations. sibility. 2 Thus the treaty has not pro­ Analysis of the treaty in its final hibited the emplacement of weapons of form, however, reveals several short­ mass destruction on the ocean bottomj comings. Obviously, it does nothing to it has merely narrowed the area avail­ change the present balance of strategic able for deployment by coastal states, forces. -Conceivably, complete demili­ including those states most likely to tarization could have altered the East­ develop such weapons. West strategic balance by neutralizing It would be a mistake, however, to whatever strategic antisubmarine detec­ deduce from these shortcomings that tion systems the United States might the treaty is worthless. It has done what have deployed. This might well have any arms control measure must do­ been stabilizing in the long run, since it narrow the scope of strategic competi­ would have brought the survivability of tion. In this regard it would have been the Soviet ballistic missile submarine valuable even if it had exempted a 25 or force to a level equal to that of our a 50-mile contiguous zone. What the POLARIS force, thus giving both sides treaty has accomplished, providing it is an assured destruction capability. This, carried out in good faith, is to decrease in tum, would have increased the deter­ the temptation to develop exorbitantly rent value of both forces, all the more expensive weapon systems, those in­ so since, with present technology, ballis­ tended to carry nuclear weapons to the tic missile submarines are probably bet­ deep ocean floor. Its major value may ter suited for use as countervalue rather well have been to the signatory govern­ than counterforce systems. The com­ ments in their internal budget squab· bination of assured destruction with the blings, for it has effectively undercut lack of a first strike system on both those who would argue that permanent sides would seem to suggest a high nuclear weapon installations on the degree of mutual deterrence. deep seabed are "essential to national In addition to its failure to demilita· survival." The treaty's real importance, rize the seabed the treaty also fails to then, as a substantive arms control prohibit some kinds of nuclear weapon measure, may not be fully realized until installations as well. Article I prohibits a such time as these costly installations state only from "emplanting or em­ become technically and economically placing" a nuclear weapon, launcher, or feasible. At that time it might be useful storage facility. It does not prohibit for the administration or Politburo to mobile installations such as a nuclear have a legal excuse for saying no to its su bmarine resting on the bottom. Fur­ military-industrial lobbyists. ther, it apparently permits the deploy­ Beyond its substantive value, the ment of "crawlers," mobile missile plat­ seabed treaty is important as a symbol forms which move along the ocean of the phenomenon we have called floor. To prohibit such vehicles, it has "superpower symbiosis." During the been argued, would be to limit freedom course of the negotiations, we have seen 5 of navigation. 1 the two major protagonists move from Perhaps the treaty's greatest de- contention to collusion. This action has 584 its parallel, of course, in SALT, but also selves defending a draft treaty against in economic relations and in those attacks from members of both NATO difficult international situations which and the Warsaw Pact. The fact that they involve restrained competition-"the have now done so and that they have Middle East and Vietnam, where both accommodated to pressures from their powers have a common interest in critics suggests that all concerned have avoiding a direct conflict. realized the vastly altered rules of inter­ national conduct which have been im­ Whether or not this symbiotic rela· posed by nuclear parity between the tionship can continue depends, of superpowers as well as by the emergence course, on a myriad of factors, both of a multipolar political world. Today's internal and external to each super­ world, with its vast network of com­ power's political structure,:;, but the' munications and interdependencies, has successful negotiation of the seabed forced all states into a kind of sym­ treaty is in itself a hopeful sign. During biosis, and as long as the spirit of the intense rivalry of the fifties, when common interest and mutual collabora­ East-West relations were seen in terms tion evident in the seabed negotiations of a zero-sum game, few would have can be maintained, that relationship is predicted that the United States and the more likely to evolve into a force for U.S.S.R. would someday find them- stability and progress.

FOOTNOTES 1. W.T. Burke, Ocean Science, Technology and the Future International Law of the Seas (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965), p. 10·39. 2. United Nations, Conference on the Law of the Sea, Convention on the Continental Shelf (Geneva: 1958), art. 67. 3. United Nations, General Assembly, Annual Report of the Secretary General, Official Records, 23rd sess., supp. 1 (A/7201) (New York: 1968), p. 45-46. 4. "Reservations of Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor for Peaceful Purposes," United Nations Monthly Chronicle, January 1968, p. 30. 5. Ibid., p. 31. 6. "Reservations of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor for Peaceful Purposes," United Nations Mon thly Chronicle, January 1969, p. 56. 7. "Extending the Arms Race to the Ocean Deeps," The New York Times, 30 March 1969, sec. 4, p. 7E:1. 8. "Parley Ask Ban on Deployment of Nuclear Arms on Ocean Floor," The New York Times, 6 May 1968, p. 2: 2. 9. I.U. Tomlin, "Keeping the Sea-Bed Out of the Arms Race," International Affairs (Moscow), January 1970, p. 42. 10. Thomas J. Hamilton, "U.S., at Geneva, Prepares to Fill in Gaps in Proposed Treaty to Bar Nuclear Weapons from Seabed," The New York Times, 24 March 1969, p. 13: 1. 11. Sandra Blakeslee, "Seabed Potential for Arms Studied," The New York Times, 8 October 1969, p. 7:1. 12. "Moscow Would Bar War Use of Sea Bed," The New York Times, 21 June 1968, p. 3: 1. 13. "Ad Hoc Committee on Peaceful Uses of Sea-Bed Begins Second Session," United Nations Monthly Chronicle, July 1968, p. 47. 14. Pravda, 2 July 1968. 15. "Johnson Says U.S. and Soviet Union Will Set Arms Talk Shortly," The New York Times, 17 July 1968, p. 1 :4. " . 16. "Ad Hoc Committee on Peaceful Uses of Sea-Bed Adopts Report to Assembly, Umted Nations Monthly Chronicle, August-September 1968, p. 100. 17. "Reservations of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor for Peaceful Purposes," p. 53. 18. "Soviets Willing to Start Missile Talks," The New York Times, 21 January 1969, p. 2: . 19. United Nations, General Assembly, Annual Report of the Secretary General, OffICIal Records, 24th sess., supp. 1 (A/7601) (New York: 1969), p. 30-31. 585

20. Thomas J. Hamilton, "Soviet Submits a Draft Treaty to Bar Arms from Ocean Floor," The New York Times, 19 March 1969, p. 14:3. 21. United Nations, General Assembly, Annual Report of the Secretary General, 24th sess., p.31. 22. TASS International Service, 17 March 1969. 23. Radio Moscow, 18 March 1969. 24. Thomas J. Hamilton, "U.S. and Soviet Are Opposed on Plan to Debate Seabed First," The New York Times, 21 March 1969, p. 22. 25. "Soviet Wants Seabed Ban to Include Listening Devices," The New York Times, 9 May 1969,p.24:1. 26. Thomas J. Hamilton, "Canada for Seabed Arms Ban; Stands Between U.S. and Soviet," The New York Times, 14 May 1969, p. 14: 1. 27. "U.S. and Soviet Gain on a Seabed Treaty," The New York Times,S October 1969, p. 12:7. 28. TASS International Service, 7 October 1969. 29. "Text of Draft Banning Nuclear Weapons on the Ocean Floor," The New York Times, 8 October 1969, p. 6:3. 30. "Verification Issue at Seabed Meeting," The New York Times, 10 October 1969, p. 44:8. 31. "Text of Draft Banning Nuclear Weapons," p. 6. 32. Moscow Radio Peace and Progress, 24 October 1969. 33. James F. Leonard, "U.S. and U.S.S.R. Agree on Draft Treaty Banning Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed," The Department of State Bulletin, 3 November 1969, p. 365·368. 34. "Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Seabed," United Nations Monthly Chronicle, December 1969, p. 79. 35. Henry Tanner, "U.N. Committee Votes to Refer Seabed Treaty Back to Geneva," The New York Times, 13 December 1969, p. 6:1. 36. Moscow Domestic Service, 18 December 1969. 37. Thomas J. Hamilton, "Rumanian, at Arms Conference, Protests U.S.-Russian Priorities," The New York Times, 6 March 1970, p. 6:3. 38. James F. Leonard, "United States and U.S.S.R. Table Revised Draft Treaty Banning Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed," The Department of State Bulletin, 25 May 1970, p. 663-667. 39. Thomas J. Hamilton, "Soviet Asks Seabed Arms Curb in Surprise Move at U.N. Parley," The New York Times, 24 August 1970, p. 33:2. 40. TASS, 18 August 1970. 41. Thomas J. Hamilton, "Compromise Set in Seabed Treaty," The New York Times, 1 September 1970, po 9: 1. 42. Thomas J. Hamilton, "Arms Talks Close as Vote Supports Treaty on Seabed," The New York Times, 4 September 1970, p. 1:4. 43. "Peaceful Uses of Sea-Bed, Committee Begins Consideration," United Nations Monthly Chronicle, December 1970, p.-46. 44. Pravda, 19 November 1970, p. 19. 45. "Disarmament. Assembly Adopts 11 Resolutions," United Nations Monthly Chronicle, January 1971, p. 29. 46. "Treaty Banning Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed Signed by 62 Nations at Washington," The Department of State Bulletin, 8 March 1971, p. 288-290. 47. TASS, 11 February 1971. 48. TASS International Service, 11 February 1971. 49. Izvestia, 11 February 1971, p. 2. 50. TASS International Service, 10 February 1971. 51. Gerard Smith, "Ambassador Smith Presents U.S. Views on Seabed Proposal at Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference," The Department of State Bulletin, 21 Apri11969, p. 333-337. 52. Adrian S. Fisher, "U.S. Submits Draft Treaty Banning Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed," The Department of State Bulletin, 16 June 1969, p. 520-524. ----0/----