Sea Mines and Naval Mine Countermeasures: Are Autonomous Underwater Vehicles the Answer, and Is the Royal Canadian Navy Ready for the New Paradigm?
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SEA MINES AND NAVAL MINE COUNTERMEASURES: ARE AUTONOMOUS UNDERWATER VEHICLES THE ANSWER, AND IS THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY READY FOR THE NEW PARADIGM? Lieutenant-Commander J. Greenlaw JCSP 39 PCEMI 39 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le Minister of National Defence, 2013 ministre de la Défense nationale, 2013. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 39 – PCEMI 39 2012 – 2013 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES - MAITRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE SEA MINES AND NAVAL MINE COUNTERMEASURES: ARE AUTONOMOUS UNDERWATER VEHICLES THE ANSWER, AND IS THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY READY FOR THE NEW PARADIGM? By Lieutenant-Commander J. Greenlaw, RCN Par capitaine de corvette J. Greenlaw, MRC This paper was written by a student La présente étude a été rédigée par attending the Canadian Forces un stagiaire du Collège des Forces College in fulfilment of one of the canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une requirements of the Course of des exigences du cours. L'étude est Studies. The paper is a scholastic un document qui se rapporte au document, and thus contains facts cours et contient donc des faits et des and opinions, which the author opinions que seul l'auteur considère alone considered appropriate and appropriés et convenables au sujet. correct for the subject. It does not Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la necessarily reflect the policy or the politique ou l'opinion d'un opinion of any agency, including the organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le Canadian Department of National ministère de la Défense nationale du Defence. This paper may not be Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, released, quoted or copied, except de citer ou de reproduire cette étude with the express permission of the sans la permission expresse du Canadian Department of National ministère de la Défense nationale. Defence. Compte de mots: 19 887 Word Count: 19 887 i TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS i LIST OF FIGURES ii LIST OF TABLES iv ABSTRACT v CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 1 OPERATIONAL VIGNETTES 2 INTRODUCTION 5 CHAPTER TWO – THE THREAT 14 THE SEA MINE AND ITS HISTORY 14 SEA MINE TYPES 22 NAVAL MINE WARFARE PRINCIPLES 32 CHAPTER THREE - NAVAL MINE 36 COUNTERMEASURES NMCM OPERATIONS 36 THE NMCM CHALLENGE 44 CHAPTER FOUR - UNMANNED SYSTEMS 53 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAV) 55 UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES (UGV) 62 MARITIME UNMANNED SYSTEMS (MUS) 68 CHAPTER FIVE - UNMANNED UNDERWATER 75 VEHICLES WHY UNMANNED? 75 REMOTELY OPERATED VEHICLES 78 AUTONOMOUS UNDERWATER VEHICLES 88 CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION 114 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 119 BIBLIOGRAPHY 122 ii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 - The Role of the RCN 2 Figure 2 - Iraqi Sea Mines 7 Figure 3 - Legacy Sea Mine 21 Figure 4 - Iraqi Minelayer 22 Figure 5 - Libyan Sea Mine 24 Figure 6 - Rising Sea Mine 26 Figure 7 - Bottom Sea Mines 27 Figure 8 - Layered Defence 30 Figure 9 - Mine Warfare Family Tree 38 Figure 10 - USN Marine Mammals 40 Figure 11 - Air NMCM 42 Figure 12 - Clearance Diving 43 Figure 13 - USN Sea Mine Casualties 45 Figure 14 - Repair Cost versus Sea Mine Cost 46 Figure 15 - The Vicious NMCM Cycle 47 Figure 16 - Unmanned Systems Family Tree 55 Figure 17 - US DoD Budget for Unmanned Systems 56 Figure 18 - UAVs operated by the CAF 61 Figure 19 - Canadian Army UGVs 63 Figure 20 - US Military UGV Family of Systems 67 Figure 21 - RCN USV Targets 71 Figure 22 – DORADO Minehunting USV 73 Figure 23 - RMS TDP 74 Figure 24 - UUV Concept 76 Figure 25 - RCN ROVs 83 Figure 26 - ROV Operations 84 Figure 27 - Expendable Mine Disposal Systems 87 iii Figure 28 - AUV Sonar Image 93 Figure 29 - Cost Benefit of AUVs 94 Figure 30 - Various AUV Systems 99 iv LIST OF TABLES Table 1 - Sea Mine Summary 31 Table 2 - Available COTS AUVS 100 v ABSTRACT In an era where sea mines are less expensive, becoming more sophisticated, and more assessable to rogue nations and non-state actors, the Royal Canadian Navy will be required to search, detect, classify and dispose of these weapons which can have a significant impact on its ability to manoeuvre. When operating in an environment with a credible sea mine threat, this deficiency may prevent the RCN from achieving its primary strategic goal, which is one of Global Deployable Sea Control. Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) possess the potential to provide the RCN with a cost effective capability to counter the sea mine threat, and at the same time, reduce the risk to its maritime forces and personnel. In acquisition of these unmanned systems, the RCN can take advantage of these emerging technologies by integrating AUVs into the future fleet in order to address future sea mine threats. In arguing that AUVs are the most efficient option to re-introduce a full NMCM capability into the RCN, this paper will conduct a review of the sea mine threat, and a summary of NMCM as a naval warfare discipline. As with any new combat system or operational capability, the acquisition of AUVs into the Navy will undoubtedly come with numerous challenges to overcome. The paper will review some of the potential challenges that relate to personnel and training; technology; interoperability; and legal factors. Finally, by identifying significant key issues, future roles, potential challenges and lessons learned; it is hoped that this paper will assist in any future RCN AUV acquisition, which will enable the RCN to meet its assigned roles in the domestic, continental, and international operating environments. 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Whoever can hold the sea has command of everything.1 -Themistocles (524-460 B.C.) In an era where sea mines are less expensive, becoming more sophisticated and more assessable to rogue nations and non-state actors; the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) will be required to be able to search, detect, classify and dispose of these weapons which can have a significant impact on its ability to manoeuvre. When operating in an environment with a credible sea mine threat, this deficiency may prevent the RCN from achieving its primary strategic goal, which is one of Global Deployable Sea Control.2 Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) possess the potential to provide the RCN with a cost effective capability to counter the sea mine threat, and at the same time, reduce the risk to its maritime forces and personnel. In acquisition of these unmanned systems, the RCN can take advantage of these emerging technologies by integrating AUVs into the future fleet in order to address future sea mine threats. 1 John Bartlett, Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations, 16th Ed, ed. Justin Kaplan (Boston: Little Brown, 1992), 62. 2 Department of National Defence, Horizon 2050: A Strategic Maritime Concept for the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: DND, 2012), 14. 2 OPERATIONAL VIGNETTES The RCN's strategic documents: Leadmark 2020 and Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark; both define three roles of the RCN as being: military; diplomatic; and constabulary. It is also recognized that in the modern context, the RCN will rarely conduct these three roles in isolation, and that the application and overlap of these three roles describes the central theory of naval strategy, which is referred to as Use of the Seas or Sea Control.3 Figure 1 - The Role of the RCN. Source: Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020.4 3 Department of National Defence, Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark (Ottawa: DND, 2005), 18. 4 Department of National Defence, Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: DND, 2001), 34. 3 It is within the context of these naval roles that the following vignettes were developed from current and past RCN operations. It should be noted that the insertion of AUVs should not be considered as overly futuristic or even as a new concept; however to the RCN the employment of AUVs will enable a new paradigm in Canadian maritime operations. Scenario 1 The Canadian Naval Task Group is deployed to the Caribbean, to conduct humanitarian relief operations, as a result of a natural disaster. Due to significant underwater obstructions and damage to the main port facilities, the humanitarian and disaster relief supplies are unable to be disembarked. Naval clearance divers deploy man-portable AUVs from small craft in order to survey the underwater damage. This aids in underwater salvage operations in order to open the port to relief supplies. This contribution earns significant diplomatic visibility for Canada.5 Scenario 2 The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has been tasked to support the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) during a major domestic security event in 5 Naval Clearance Divers were deployed to the US Gulf Coast as part of Hurricane Katrina relief (OPERATION UNISON 2005), where they conducted underwater search and salvage operations. Department of Nation Defence, “OPERATION UNISON,” assessed on 13 January 2013, http://www.cjoc.forces.gc.ca/cont/unison/index-eng.asp. 4 Vancouver. The RCMP has received a report that a potential Maritime Improvised Explosive Device (MIED)6 has been laid in the vicinity of Vancouver Harbour. With the port closed to commercial and civilian traffic, the RCN deploys its Naval Mine Countermeasures (NMCM) team.