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Doctoral Dissertation The European Union and Russia: Partners or Rivals Ledina Ferhati A dissertation submitted to the Department of Social Sciences of the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the University of New York Tirana in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctoral degree in Humanities and Social Sciences with concentration in Political Sciences / International Relations Advisor Prof. Dr. Fatos Tarifa Tiranë, October 2019 The European Union and Russia: Partners or Rivals Ledina Ferhati A dissertation submitted to the Department of Social Sciences of the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the University of New York Tirana in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctoral degree in Humanities and Social Sciences with concentration in Political Sciences / International Relations Tiranë 2019 Approved by: Prof. Dr. Fatos Tarifa Prof. Dr. Tonin Gjuraj Prof. Dr. Ksenofon Krisafi Prof. Dr. Kseanela Sotirofski Prof. Assoc. Dr. Eva Hyskaj ii © 2019 Ledina Ferhati ALL RIGHTS RESERVED iii To my family and mentor, I couldn’t have done this without you. Thank you for all of your support along the way! iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A truly life-changing experience as the undertaking of this PhD dissertation would not have been possible without the support and guidance that I received from many people. My greatest debt is to my mentor, Professor Fatos Tarifa, for his brilliant guidance, constant support, and insightful discussions and suggestions during this entire long and arduous but otherwise exciting intellectual voyage. Without his unusually stimulating and encouraging support and guidance, his theoretical knowledge and professional experience both in academe and in diplomacy, reflected in a shelf-load of books he himself has written, this dissertation would not have been possible. I would be remiss if I did not solicitously acknowledge and appreciate the time, diligence and ideas he has so generously offered me. His enthusiasm and enjoyment in supervising my research work have been contagious and motivational for me. Having been Prof. Tarifa’s PhD student will forever be a great honor to me. I especially want to thank the faculty of the University of New York Tirana, in particular Dr. Enila Cenko and Dr. Ilir Kalemaj, who have always been very supportive and encouraging, as well as Mrs. Nertila Paskali for her meticulous ways in keeping my work on track and avoid missing deadlines. v I extend my deepest gratitude to all the members of Committee for letting my defense be an enjoyable moment. They generously gave their time to offer me valuable comments toward improving my work. Finally, I would like to convey many heartfelt thanks to my auntie, Meli, who has supported me with all her heart and in all possible ways during this challenging period of arduous work. I am particularly indebted to her for all she has done for me as well as for the inspiration in pursuing my academic goals. Many wholehearted thanks go to all my family members who have always believed in me and encouraged me to chase my dreams. vi ABSTRACT Ledina Ferhati, The European Union and Russia: Partners or Rivals? Under the supervision of Prof. Fatos Tarifa, PhD At the end of the Cold War one might have thought—and expected—that the collapse of the communist bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union heralded the advent of a “New World Order” (as U.S. President George H. W. Bush asserted), the triumph of western democratic values and the liberal economy (as Francis Fukuyama most rejoicefully proclaimed in his 1989 article “The End of History?” and again in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, as well as the unification of the European continent, “our common European home”, or the “all-European house”, a concept espoused by Gorbachev during his visit to Czechoslovakia in April 1987 (quoted in Svec 1988: 990). This picture was by no means realistic; it was too rosy and the events of the past thirty years have proved it wrong. This dissertation focuses on the relations between the European Union (EU)—hereafter used interchangeably with Europe1—and its largest bordering state to the east, post-Soviet Russia, officially known as the Russian Federation. Although their relations today are not as strained and hot-tempered as they were during the 45 years-long period of 1 I emphasize this at the outset in order to avoiding any confusion or misapprehension. vii geopolitical tension between the USSR and its satellite states (the Eastern Block) and the United States with its European allies (the Western Block) after World War II, they remain extremely important for the peace and the security in Europe, in the Broader Middle East, and Central Asia and fully justify unceasing concern and scholarly interest, particularly after the fallout over Ukraine and Syria. It is recognized that although no longer antagonistic, the relations between the EU and Russia have been in a permanent state of crisis since the collapse of the USSR. That crisis did not start with the Russian military intervention in Crimea and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation in the spring of 2014, as it is often assumed. Part of the crises between the EU and Russia goes back to the 1990s, but mostly it has evolved since the early 2000s, after Vladimir Putin assumed Russia’s Presidency and when mutual distrust flared up over the “color revolutions” in several former-Soviet republics in Eurasia, known collectively as CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)—the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005). Those events were followed by a series of ups and downs in the relations between Brussels and Moscow, namely Putin’s provocative speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, the EU-Russia modernization partnership. The 2014 crisis only revealed how deep the gap between Europe and Russia has become, fundamentally altering the setting of their relationship as it was framed by the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). This dissertation aims to contextualize the international and domestic environments in which the relations between the EU and Russia have evolved over the past three decades, the dynamics underpinning their bilateral relations, whose overall direction has clearly been viii downhill, leading to the latest EU sanctions on Russia, as well as those areas in which, through “selective engagement”, political dialogue and mutual trust can be restored and their relations can improve. The research question I attempt to answer—and which has shaped my research design throughout this work—is whether in today’s constellation of global powers Europe and Russia are (mostly) geopolitical rivals or partners. This is a basic, complex, and difficult yet essential question to answer and I hope to have been able to provide reasonable answers. I argue that although the EU and Russia are by no means in any kind of “exclusive partnership” and both sides find themselves entangled in a crisis which they will not overcome quickly, they share common interests on a broad spectrum of issues—e.g. security and the fight against terrorism, economic cooperation and trade etc.,—hence they are not only rivals but also important partners. It is further argued that although the EU and Russia see the world differently and they have different approaches to international politics, selective but serious engagement between the EU and Russia and long-term commitment by both sides, difficult as they may be to maintain, constitute the only way to ensure closer and more productive cooperation between these two major global powers which could greatly improve the international political environment. ix TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………………….iv ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………...vi TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………………….ix LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………………….xii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………………xiii CHAPTER 1. THE SUBJECT OF STUDY: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY………….1 1.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….....1 1.2 Why Europe? Why Russia?....................................................................................................3 1.3 The interplay of politics, geography, and economy………………………………………...11 1.4 The research question………………………………………………………………………15 1.5 Theoretical considerations and guidelines………………………………………………….17 1.6 The methodological approach………………………………………………………………24 1.7 Literature review……………………………………………………………………………25 CHAPTER 2. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND RUSSIA BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE COLD WAR…………………………………………………..38 2.1 A brief outlook on Russia and Europe as great powers…………………………………….38 2.2 The dualism of Russian state……………………………………………………………….50 2.3 Soviet foreign policy between the two World Wars (1918-1939)…………………………58 x 2.4 The Cold War and the Soviet threat to Europe and the West (NATO and the Warsaw Pact)……………………………………………………………………………………………...61 2.4.1 The Transatlantic Alliance…………………………………………………………..71 2.4.2 U.S. foreign policy and the post-Stalin Soviet Union……………………………….78 2.5 The End of the Cold War and the transformation of the global architecture: A new agenda for the EU-Russia Relations………………………………………………...88 2.5.1 Europe after the Cold War…………………………………………………………100 2.5.2 EU- Russia relations after the Cold War…………………………………………..105 2.5.3 The emerging unipolar international system………………………………………109 CHAPTER 3. RUSSIAN PETROPOLITICS: ITS ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE EU……………………………………………………………….112
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