The U.S., Germany, and Nord Stream 2 U.S
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PERSPECTIVE Russia poses a strategic challen- ge for both the United States and Germany, having increa- GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ORDER singly resorted to the use of force against its neighbors and of so-called »active measures« against Western democracies. In response, the U.S. and Euro- THE U.S., pe have imposed punitive eco- nomic sanctions on Moscow. GERMANY, AND Germany and the United States differ in their approaches to Rus- NORD STREAM 2 sia’s energy trade with Europe, giving rise to a potential stum- bling block over Nord Stream 2, an undersea natural gas pipeline between Russia and Germany that is now nearly complete. Matthew Rojansky December 2020 Threatened U.S. sanctions on entities involved in completion of the pipeline project have provoked strong opposition, even as opinion within Germany and Europe is divided over NS2. Both sides hope for resolution of this impasse with the arri val of a new U.S. administra - tion in 2021. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ORDER THE U.S., GERMANY, AND NORD STREAM 2 U.S. Russia Policy For over half a century, Europe has imported natural gas Any hopes that the shared challenge of the COVID-19 pan- from the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. This rela- demic in 2020 would bring an easing of these tensions were tionship of mutual dependency in the energy sphere has re- dashed with the outbreak of protests and violence in Bela- mained largely stable, despite tumultuous episodes in polit- rus and full-scale fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, ical relations between East and West from the Cold War to as well as the attempted murder of opposition leader Alex- the present. Some Westerners point to decades of energy ei Navalny. Although official Washington and Berlin have no interdependence as a model for relations with Russia more illusions about the array of threats and challenges posed by broadly, and argue that more such engagement and ex- Russia and have been notably aligned in their policy re- change is needed. Others cite recent cases in which Russia sponses, important differences in emphasis and long-term has threatened to shut off the gas, or actually done so, such expectations should not be understated. as in its disputes with Ukraine, as evidence that Russia will abuse its energy leverage and so this leverage should be re- The 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy emphasizes »Great duced, not expanded. Power Competition« among the United States, Russia and China. Russia under Vladimir Putin is seen by the majority of In 2015, a consortium of Gazprom and European energy leaders on both sides of the aisle and by most of the nation- majors announced plans to expand the existing undersea al security establishment in Washington as an inveterate foe, gas pipelines from Russia to Germany with a new project, with the single notable exception of President Donald dubbed Nord Stream 2 (NS2). Though the German govern- Trump, who declared that, »getting along with Russia« is »a ment has described it as a purely commercial project, critics good thing, not a bad thing.«1 Yet the Trump Administration insist that its main purpose is to advance the Kremlin’s geo- effectively continued a number of Russia policies inherited political interests. Thus, NS2 has become a focal point for from the Obama Administration, including support for NA- the broader Western debate over how to manage difficult TO enlargement, additional U.S. troop deployments in East- relations with Russia. ern Europe, training, equipment and financial support for Ukraine and Georgia, and perhaps most importantly, sanc- Pending U.S. sanctions legislation and enforcement actions tions targeted against long lists of Russian state officials, pri- that would target Europeans connected to the project have vate citizens, and entities. provoked acute objections from Germany and other Euro- pean states, while exacerbating other strains in the transat- The U.S. State Department describes sanctions as a neces- lantic relationship. With the Biden administration set to take sary answer to Russia’s »malign behavior, such as in re- office in Washington in January, and Bundestag elections in sponse to aggressive actions against the United States and Germany that may reshuffle the political deck in 2021, it is our allies and partners.«2 In view of the miniscule trade rela- worth more closely examining the dispute over NS2 in the tionship between the U.S. and Russia (less than one percent context of U.S. and German views of Russia and approach- of total U.S. trade in 2019),3 U.S. sanctions have their great- es to one another, as well as the prospects for a way for- est impact by blocking non-U.S. firms from dealing with tar- ward. This paper will present each of these topics in turn, geted Russian individuals and entities. This »secondary« ap- offering insights from policymakers involved with the issues plication of sanctions has been embraced by official Wash- on both sides. ington as a means of forcing even close allies and partners to choose between maintaining ties with Russia and doing business with the U.S. economy. As Secretary of State Mike U.S. RUSSIA POLICY Pompeo put it in July 2020, »it’s a clear warning to compa- nies [that] aiding and abetting Russia’s malign influence pro- Russia poses a strategic challenge for both the United States jects will not be tolerated. Get out now, or risk the conse- and Germany. Since Moscow’s 2008 war with Georgia, it quences.«4 has increasingly resorted to the use of military force in con- flicts with its neighbors. Russia’s 2014 assault on Ukraine, There is strong bipartisan agreement in both chambers of seizure of Crimea and incursion into Donbas resulted in a se- the U.S. Congress on Russia sanctions, buoyed by wide- vere break in relations with the West as a whole. The Oba- spread negative perceptions of Russia in the United States. ma Administration responded with a three-part pressure For many Republicans, Russia remains the adversary it was strategy: reassurance of East European NATO allies closest during the Cold War and even much of the post-Cold War to Russia by rotating small contingents of U.S., German, Brit- period, and any effort to engage or moderate tensions, such ish, and other forces eastward; efforts to compel Russia to reverse course through sanctions; and diplomatic isolation 1 https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/04/03/trump-russia-get- to underscore Russia’s severe breach of the rules-based in- along-stupid-people-sot-ip.cnn ternational order. For the most part, the strategy had sup- 2 https://www.state.gov/caatsa-crieea-section-232-public-guidance/ port from U.S. allies in Europe, including Germany. 3 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/rus- sia-and-eurasia/russia#:~:text=U.S.%2DRussia%20Trade%20Facts&- Yet since that time, Moscow has responded with growing text=The%20U.S.%20goods%20and%20services,goods%20im- ports%20totaled%20%2422.3%20billion. hostility to Western pressure, including an onslaught of so- 4 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-toughens-stance- called »active measures,« such as cyber attacks, information against-2-russian-gas-pipelines-to-europe/2020/07/15/e932ebcc- warfare, and even targeted assassinations on European soil. c6aa-11ea-a825-8722004e4150_story.html 1 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – THE U.S., GERMANY, AND NORD STREAM 2 as the 2009 Obama Administration »Reset,« is seen as mis- support in the former East Germany, the Alternative for Ger- guided. For many Democrats, Russia is an adversary first and many and the Left Party, are far more inclined to forgive or foremost because of its interference in U.S. domestic poli- justify the Kremlin’s violations of international norms than tics, apparently in support of President Trump’s 2016 elec- are politicians from the current ruling coalition of Christian tion and to exploit divisions along political, racial, and soci- Democrats and Social Democrats, or the Green Party, which oeconomic lines. Overwhelming majorities in both parties takes a tough line against Russian human rights abuses and also support embattled former Soviet states like Ukraine and aggression in Ukraine. Georgia in their ongoing conflicts with Russia. Since the Kremlin has hardly altered its behavior, and Americans are Even within the current CDU-SPD governing coalition, views increasingly disconnected from Russia in trade, diplomatic on Russia are not uniform. For some Social Democrats, the and people-to-people ties, U.S.-Russia relations appear to 1970’s »New Eastern Policy« (Neue Ostpolitik or simply Ost- be caught in a vicious cycle. politik) of Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt is the dominant point of reference for thinking about Russia. While a majority of the party has supported pressure on Russia through sanc- GERMAN RUSSIA POLICY tions, the champions of a modern Ostpolitik see weaponiza- tion of trade through sanctions as a counterproductive vio- German views of Russia have tracked with those of the rest lation of the principles of good neighborhood, or perhaps a of Europe and of the United States, especially since 2014. betrayal of Brandt’s legacy. Moreover, German leaders are Germany has joined the US in opposing Russia’s aggression under constant pressure from the public debate within Ger- against Georgia and Ukraine, Berlin itself has been a target many that is sharply divided over the root causes of the cur- of Russian political interference, and in recent years Ger- rent conflict. In that context, some argue forcefully that, mans have been especially outraged by murders and at- »the West has exploited Russia’s weakness, it has betrayed tempted murders apparently ordered by the Kremlin on Eu- Gorbachev by stationing NATO troops in the former Eastern ropean soil.