Les Droits De L'homme En Chine Mai 2017
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China Data Supplement
China Data Supplement October 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 29 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 36 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 45 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR................................................................................................................ 54 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR....................................................................................................................... 61 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 66 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 October 2008 The Main National Leadership of the -
Retweeting Through the Great Firewall a Persistent and Undeterred Threat Actor
Retweeting through the great firewall A persistent and undeterred threat actor Dr Jake Wallis, Tom Uren, Elise Thomas, Albert Zhang, Dr Samantha Hoffman, Lin Li, Alex Pascoe and Danielle Cave Policy Brief Report No. 33/2020 About the authors Dr Jacob Wallis is a Senior Analyst working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Tom Uren is a Senior Analyst working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Elise Thomas is a Researcher working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Albert Zhang is a Research Intern working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Dr Samanthan Hoffman is an Analyst working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Lin Li is a Researcher working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Alex Pascoe is a Research Intern working with the International Cyber Policy Centre. Danielle Cave is Deputy Director of the International Cyber Policy Centre. Acknowledgements ASPI would like to thank Twitter for advanced access to the takedown dataset that formed a significant component of this investigation. The authors would also like to thank ASPI colleagues who worked on this report. What is ASPI? The Australian Strategic Policy Institute was formed in 2001 as an independent, non‑partisan think tank. Its core aim is to provide the Australian Government with fresh ideas on Australia’s defence, security and strategic policy choices. ASPI is responsible for informing the public on a range of strategic issues, generating new thinking for government and harnessing strategic thinking internationally. ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) is a leading voice in global debates on cyber and emerging technologies and their impact on broader strategic policy. -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement March 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 31 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 38 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 54 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 58 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 65 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 69 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 March 2008 The Main National Leadership of the -
LE 19Ème CONGRÈS DU PARTI COMMUNISTE CHINOIS
PROGRAMME ASIE LE 19ème CONGRÈS DU PARTI COMMUNISTE CHINOIS : CLÔTURE SUR L’ANCIEN RÉGIME ET OUVERTURE DE LA CHINE DE XI JINPING Par Alex PAYETTE STAGIAIRE POSTDOCTORAL POUR LE CONSEIL CANADIEN DE RECHERCHES EN SCIENCES HUMAINES CHERCHEUR À L’IRIS JUIN 2017 ASIA FOCUS #46 l’IRIS ASIA FOCUS #46 - PROGRAMME ASIE / Octobre 2017 e 19e Congrès qui s’ouvrira en octobre prochain, soit quelques semaines avant la visite de Donald Trump en Chine, promet de consolider la position de Xi Jinping dans l’arène politique. Travaillant d’arrache-pied depuis 2013 à se débarrasser L principalement des alliés de Jiang Zemin, l’alliance Xi-Wang a enfin réussi à purger le Parti-État afin de positionner ses alliés. Ce faisant, la transition qui aura vraiment lieu cet automne n’est pas la transition Hu Jintao- Xi Jinping, celle-ci date déjà de 2012. La transition de 2017 est celle de la Chine des années 1990 à la Chine des années 2010, soitde la Chine de Jiang Zemin à celle de Xi Jinping. Ce sera également le début de l’ère des enfants de la révolution culturelle, des « zhiqing » [知青] (jeunesses envoyées en campagne), qui formeront une majorité au sein du Politburo et qui remanieront la Chine à leur manière. Avec les départs annoncés, Xi pourra enfin former son « bandi » [班底] – garde rapprochée – au sein du Politburo et effectivement mettre en place un agenda de politiques et non pas simplement des mesures visant à faire le ménage au cœur du Parti-État. Des 24 individus restants, entre 12 et 16 devront partir; 121 sièges (si l’on compte le siège rendu vacant de Sun Zhengcai) et 16 si Xi Jinping décide d’appliquer plus « sévèrement » la limite d’âge maintenant à 68 ans. -
P020110307527551165137.Pdf
CONTENT 1.MESSAGE FROM DIRECTOR …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 03 2.ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 05 3.HIGHLIGHTS OF ACHIEVEMENTS …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 06 Coexistence of Conserve and Research----“The Germplasm Bank of Wild Species ” services biodiversity protection and socio-economic development ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 06 The Structure, Activity and New Drug Pre-Clinical Research of Monoterpene Indole Alkaloids ………………………………………… 09 Anti-Cancer Constituents in the Herb Medicine-Shengma (Cimicifuga L) ……………………………………………………………………………… 10 Floristic Study on the Seed Plants of Yaoshan Mountain in Northeast Yunnan …………………………………………………………………… 11 Higher Fungi Resources and Chemical Composition in Alpine and Sub-alpine Regions in Southwest China ……………………… 12 Research Progress on Natural Tobacco Mosaic Virus (TMV) Inhibitors…………………………………………………………………………………… 13 Predicting Global Change through Reconstruction Research of Paleoclimate………………………………………………………………………… 14 Chemical Composition of a traditional Chinese medicine-Swertia mileensis……………………………………………………………………………… 15 Mountain Ecosystem Research has Made New Progress ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 Plant Cyclic Peptide has Made Important Progress ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 Progresses in Computational Chemistry Research ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18 New Progress in the Total Synthesis of Natural Products ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement May 2007 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC .......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 30 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 37 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 44 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 45 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 52 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 May 2007 The Main National Leadership of the PRC -
Asia Focus #3
PROGRAMME ASIE QUELLE COMPOSITION DU POLITBURO ET DU COMITÉ CENTRAL CHINOIS APRÈS 2017 ? Par Alex PAYETTE STAGIAIRE POSTDOCTORAL CRSH UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTREAL OCTOBRE 2016 Septembre 2016 ASIA FOCUS #3 l’IRIS ASIA FOCUS #3 - PROGRAMME ASIE / Octobre 2016 lors que 2016 se termine et que la campagne anticorruption agressivement menée par la tristement célèbre « jiwei » [纪委] a pris fin, il ne reste que A quelques mois pour finaliser la sélection interne des cadres qui seront appelés à être élus en novembre au Politburo ainsi qu’au Comité central. Cela dit, depuis la fin de 2015, nous avons pu remarquer un certain durcissement, voire même un « repli » de la part de Xi, tant dans son attitude face au pouvoir (p. ex. retour aux idiomes/symboles maoïstes, méfiance ouverte de l’Occident, attitude de plus en plus inflexible en matière de structures internationales, etc.), que dans son attitude envers certains patriarches du Parti, notamment Jiang Zemin (président de la République populaire entre 1993 et 2003) et Hu Jintao (président de 2003 à 2013), ainsi qu’envers les autres forces en présence sur la scène politique chinoise (par exemple la Ligue des jeunesses communistes [共青团]1, la « faction du pétrole » [石油帮]2, la bande Shanghai [ 上海帮], la bande du Jiangxi [江派], etc.). Ce dernier a également resserré son emprise non seulement sur Beijing – par le biais de son proche collaborateur Wang Xiaohong [王 小洪]3-, mais bien aussi sur le pays en entier. Tandis que le temps d’« abattre les tigres » [打虎] et que les déraillements de la jiwei sont encore perceptibles, en particulier dans la province du Hebei4, fort est de constater que l’impact n’est pas celui escompté, sauf dans les cas de Su Shulin [苏树林]5 et Jiang Jiemin [蒋洁敏]6, et qu’il ne sera pas vraiment possible d’évaluer les dégâts de cette campagne avant la formation du Comité central de 2022. -
Money Changes Everything
INTRODUCTION Money, money, money! Source: Shell zor, Flickr MONEY CHANGES EVERYTHING Jane Golley and Linda Jaivin x xi Money Changes Everything Jane Golley and Linda Jaivin 2017 The Donald Trump Rooster, Shanxi province Source: YouTube CHINA STORY YEARBOOK CHINA STORY Days before the clock ticked over into 2017, and a month before Chinese New Year, a giant statue of a rooster sprang up outside a shopping mall in China’s northern Shanxi province. The statue’s designer reportedly in- tended its egg-shaped body and distinctive golden hair to convey a mes- sage of prosperity. This message was enhanced by the rooster’s unmis- takable likeness to Donald Trump, the newly elected billionaire president of the United States. In what may or may not have been ‘fake news’, CNN reported that the ‘Donald Trump Rooster’ had ‘taken China by storm’. China was well on its way towards prosperity before 2017 began. But Trump’s performance throughout the year — retracting America from its global commitments to free trade, foreign aid, and the environment, emphatically (and in bold type) tweeting that he would ‘MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN’, and ruffling the feathers of even America’s closet allies — was like gifting a golden egg on a golden platter to Chinese President Xi Jinping. And Xi was ready to receive it. Prosperity was a prominent theme in a string of significant speeches delivered by President Xi during 2017. In his January speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, he called for a doubling of efforts to ‘enable all countries to achieve inter-connected -
Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies
RELIGION AND SOCIETY IN ASIA Kuo (ed.) Kuo Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies Edited by Cheng-tian Kuo Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies Religion and Society in Asia The Religion and Society in Asia series presents state-of-the-art cross-disciplinary academic research on colonial, postcolonial and contemporary entanglements between the socio-political and the religious, including the politics of religion, throughout Asian societies. It thus explores how tenets of faith, ritual practices and religious authorities directly and indirectly impact on local moral geographies, identity politics, political parties, civil society organizations, economic interests, and the law. It brings into view how tenets of faith, ritual practices and religious authorities are in turn configured according to socio-political, economic as well as security interests. The series provides brand new comparative material on how notions of self and other as well as justice and the commonweal have been predicated upon ‘the religious’ in Asia since the colonial/imperialist period until today. Series Editors Martin Ramstedt, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle Stefania Travagnin, University of Groningen Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies Edited by Cheng-tian Kuo Amsterdam University Press This book is sponsored by the 2017 Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange (Taiwan; SP002-D-16) and co-sponsored by the International Institute of Asian Studies (the Netherlands). Cover illustration: Chairman Mao Memorial Hall in Beijing © Cheng-tian Kuo Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Typesetting: Crius Group, Hulshout Amsterdam University Press English-language titles are distributed in the US and Canada by the University of Chicago Press. -
Chapter 3 Section 5
SECTION 5: CHINA’S DOMESTIC INFORMATION CONTROLS, GLOBAL MEDIA INFLUENCE, AND CYBER DIPLOMACY Key Findings • China’s current information controls, including the govern- ment’s new social credit initiative, represent a significant es- calation in censorship, surveillance, and invasion of privacy by the authorities. • The Chinese state’s repression of journalists has expanded to target foreign reporters and their local Chinese staff. It is now much more difficult for all journalists to investigate politically sensitive stories. • The investment activities of large, Chinese Communist Par- ty-linked corporations in the U.S. media industry risk under- mining the independence of film studios by forcing them to consider self-censorship in order to gain access to the Chinese market. • China’s overseas influence operations to pressure foreign media have become much more assertive. In some cases, even without direct pressure by Chinese entities, Western media companies now self-censor out of deference to Chinese sensitivity. • Beijing is promoting its concept of “Internet sovereignty” to jus- tify restrictions on freedom of expression in China. These poli- cies act as trade barriers to U.S. companies through both cen- sorship and restrictions on cross-border data transfers, and they are fundamental points of disagreement between Washington and Beijing. • In its participation in international negotiations on global Inter- net governance, norms in cyberspace, and cybersecurity, Beijing seeks to ensure continued control of networks and information in China and to reduce the risk of actions by other countries that are not in its interest. Fearing that international law will be used by other countries against China, Beijing is unwilling to agree on specific applications of international law to cyberspace. -
Detecting Digital Fingerprints: Tracing Chinese Disinformation in Taiwan / Key Findings
Detecting Digital Fingerprints: Tracing Chinese Disinformation in Taiwan / Key Findings Executive Summary Taiwan is on the frontlines of the Chinese methodological concerns around standards of Communist Party’s (CCP) international influence attribution in information operations (IO), and operations,1 and what happens on the island often use of sensitive technical data in the process of serves as a harbinger for how China will operate analysis and attribution. Independent entities also elsewhere. In 2018, the island’s local elections face difficulties in their assessment of potential were subjected to myriad online disinformation interference by China in the 2018 elections, notably campaigns2 that favored a Beijing-friendly agenda, because the Taiwanese online information space attempted to undermine democratic integrity, is unique and conducting a postmortem without and systematically attacked democratically consistent monitoring and real-time data collection elected politicians whose positions did not align is practically impossible. with China’s strategic interests. However, despite Yet, when asked whether a foreign actor was likely the assertion of Chinese interference by several to target Taiwan’s 2020 Presidential and Legislative intelligence agencies and governments, clear election with disinformation, Wu Jun-deh, Director evidence linking disinformation during the local of the Cyber Warfare and Information Security elections to mainland Chinese actors has not Division at the Institute for National Defense and been publicly shared. Security Research (INDSR), said “Of course, the This is not a unique scenario: governments answer is China.” around the world have discussed foreign In June 2019, with the 2018 local elections as interference campaigns without being able to a point of reference, Graphika, Institute for the share much public evidence to accompany Future’s (IFTF) Digital Intelligence Lab, and the these assessments. -
China Human Rights Report 2017》
臺灣民主基金會 Taiwan Foundation for Democracy 本出版品係由財團法人臺灣民主基金會負責出版。臺灣民主基金會是 一個獨立、非營利的機構,其宗旨在促進臺灣以及全球民主、人權的 研究與發展。臺灣民主基金會成立於二○○三年,是亞洲第一個國家 級民主基金會,未來基金會志在與其他民主國家合作,促進全球新一 波的民主化。 This is a publication of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD). The TFD is an independent, non-profit foundation dedicated to the study and promotion of democracy and human rights in Taiwan and abroad. Founded in 2003, the TFD is the first democracy assistance foundation established in Asia. The Foundation is committed to the vision of working together with other democracies, to advance a new wave of democratization worldwide. 本報告由臺灣民主基金會負責出版,報告內容不代表本會意見。 版權所有,非經本會事先書面同意,不得翻印、轉載及翻譯。 This report has been published by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. Statements of fact or opinion appearing in this report do not imply endorsement by the publisher. All rights reserved. No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form or by any means without prior written permission of the publisher. 臺灣民主基金會 Taiwan Foundation for Democracy 臺灣民主基金會 Taiwan Foundation for Democracy 《China Human Rights Report 2017》 Contents Foreword..................................................................................................... i Preface........................................................................................................ 1 Human Rights Dialogue and Confrontation between China and the West during 2017 ................................................................................. 29 Political Human Rights ...........................................................................