SURPRISING RUSSIA 2015

SENTIMENTS OPINIONS VALUES UDK 316.3(470) BBK 60.59(2Ros) З76

The editorial board of the “Platform” Centre for Social Design includes:

A. Firsov (Project Leader), N. Kolennikova, D. Lisitsyn, D. Seryogin and E. Shipova.

Surprising Russia 2015. — Moscow: Eksmo, 2016 — 208 p. (Russia by the numbers.)

ISBN - 978-5-9907855-1-9

The “Surprising Russia” annual edition compiled by Russia’s leading social re- search centre and think tanks aims to study current social trends. The book contains research data and presents the viewpoints of prominent Russian ex- perts. The series has been published since 2014.

UDK 316.3(470) BBK 60.59(2Ros)

© Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) © Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research (ISEPR Foundation) © “Platform”, Centre for Social Design INTRODUCTION 3 INTRODUCTION

RUSSIA’S TRANSFORMATION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE

VALERY FEDOROV, Director General, Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM)

he contemporary world is still characterized by the persistent belief that elab- Torate and tricky techniques allow sociologists to efectively map popular senti- ments, even if it is impossible to obtain exact measurements. To what extent is it rea- sonable for Russians to share his belief?

Let us not forget that sociology as we know it today emerged and developed in Western Europe and Northern America. Non-Western societies, including Russia, are structured diferently, which was recognized as long ago as in the 1950s – 1960s along with the emergence of modernization theories. Te debate whether non-West- ern societies have fundamentally diferent central pillars or merely lag behind the Western civilization is far from over and is likely to stay just as intense for years to come. Tus such circumstances encourage us to just take it for granted that public opinion in Russia takes shape and operates diferently than in the US or Germany. It implies that apart from the Western peculiarities and stumbling blocks of its stud- ies we must take into account specifcally Russian features and complicating factors.

Furthermore, one should take into consideration the history of Russian social studies. Soviet sociology’s development was deliberately impeded and crammed into an ill-ftting ideological mould. Yet when the country managed to throw of the shackles of the past, the pendulum swung the other way: Russian sociologists set to myopically apply Western conceptions to Russia’s reality. Incidentally, they still adhere to this approach. As a result, amid pluralism, we lack empirical research, which describes Russian society adequately, let alone fundamental research projects.

What do opinion poll results that our colleagues and our research centre obtain reveal? Te answer should at least rest upon the analysis of the existing landscape 4 SURPRISING RUSSIA and the society. To conduct such a study, one must be aware of trends over several generations, rather than just a few decades. In this context, we are faced with another currently insurmountable obstacle. Our country started to conduct systematic opin- ion surveys only in 1989 and 1990. With the period too short and the changes too sweeping, it is virtually impossible to make good use of the frst opinion polls’ fnd- ings. Indeed, the nation, its sociopolitical make-up, as well as vocabulary and values have transformed profoundly. Nowadays Russia’s sociology has to fulfll quite a mod- est task: scholars need to constantly accumulate, store and reveal this data to reveal trends over time. Terefore, this work makes it more likely that the qualitative inter- pretation of the data will be given in the not-too-distant future.

Meanwhile, sociologists have constructed a rather paradoxical picture of new so- cial norms and attitudes pervading our society. We are witnessing the steady rise in tolerance towards other religions, ethnic groups, beliefs and even sexual orien- tation. At the same time, new values and leanings remain mostly abstract whereas daily routines are visible and concrete. Te new ways have yet to be internalized, in other words, people need real motivation coming from within. Consider, for in- stance, the following case. We want to move like the wind on city speedways rather than get stuck in trafc jams. Yet when it comes to cutting down several trees to build them, we will vehemently oppose it (here we have the NIMBY-efect, that is “not in my backyard!”). It is related to our unwillingness to break certain habits for the sake of abstract common betterment or shared values, even if we voice our support for all these projects and convictions.

Te transformation of the long-established way of life, customs, traditions and landscape represents a long and painful process in what we call democratic societies. It is true of the enforcement of new social norms which goes beyond simple decla- rations as well as construction processes and local attitudes to them. To reconcile newly articulated interests with conservative beliefs, one needs time, which, as they say, is a great healer, as well as values shared by elites, business circles and society. Additionally, this mechanism will need an efective method of harmonizing difer- ent interests. Broadly speaking, it is necessary to produce the culture of compromise and respect for the interests of “the other”, rather than “wage war to the bitter end”. If society is unable to foster the culture of consensus, democracy will not be achieved. Basically, democracy is a system of confict management. It does not cause rivalries. Rather, democracy is a product of disputes, as well as a civilized means of resolving all diferences. Te lack of overt conficts will hamper any democratic development. Democracy handles confict, thus legitimizing it. Under such circumstances, confict is not obviated instantaneously; conversely, its long-term settlement implies a step- INTRODUCTION 5 by-step approach. Opponents are not defeated or eliminated; they become at least competitors and at best partners.

Te third edition of “Surprising Russia” demonstrates how the vivid image of Rus- sian society analyzed with various sociological instruments gets even more specifc and complete. Values, underlying principles, and individual leanings put together create a comprehensive picture, thus shedding light on such a complex, “hidden”, but still extremely interesting society. 6 SURPRISING RUSSIA

PUBLIC OPINION AND EXECUTIVE DECISION-MAKING

DMITRY BADOVSKIY, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research (ISEPR Foundation), Civic Chamber member

ublic opinion is a key factor for modern states in decision-making at the na- Ptional and international level. Public opinion is shaped by electoral competition alongside basic democratic principles, such as political representation and public interest.

Meanwhile, the relations between Realpolitik and decision-making and public opinion are a two-way street. Political developments and processes afect constitu- encies; they bring about evolving public opinion and changing assessments of var- ious issues.

State and political leaders turn to opinion polls on the regular basis. Te general public learn about the fndings ad-hoc mainly via mass media, with the informa- tion matching the pace and the ideas of the news feeds. Such data tends to be highly relevant and applicable but soon we lose their very track in the wild stream of in- formation.

In other words, though opinion poll results concerning specifc events and cases appear regularly, the need for a systematic sociological analysis of a wide range of issues remains. It is this very comprehensive and accurate picture, underpinned by the relevant expert opinion that largely contributes to efective decision mak- ing in various spheres. Tis is relevant for politics as well as management in other realms, as well as for society at large as a tool for better self-analysis.

Te annual edition of Surprising Russia aims to facilitate reaching these objec- tives. Tis review presents public opinion on the most burning issues, followed by comments of notable political scientists and analysts; sociologists and other ex- perts. INTRODUCTION 7

I believe that the book has the potential to become a manual for policymakers in everyday management and decision-making. It would help them as well as other readers to learn more about Russia and its society. Te Surprising Russia seeks to promote understanding.

PART 1 FACE TO FACE WITH THE WEST WE AND THE WORLD: UKRAINE: FAMILY CONFLICT? COOPERATION RUSSIA’S PIVOT TO ASIA: WHAT ARE OUR EXPECTATIONS? AND CONFRONTATION MIDDLE EAST HOTSPOTS

AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, ITS FOUNDATIONS AND ROLE IN SOCIETY HISTORICAL MEMORY AND STATE SYMBOLS CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? CRIMEA IS OURS: WHEN THERE IS NO ROOM FOR QUESTIONS DEFENSE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: ARMY AND POLICE

DEFENDING OURSELVES. LIFE UNDER SANCTIONS. THE YEAR OF CRISIS: CRISIS: ADAPTATION STRATEGY STRESS-RESISTANCE TEST

RUSSIA’S QUALITY OF LIFE FAMILY AND SOCIETY: TRADITION AND MODERNITY TRADITIONAL VALUES SACRED AND PROFANE: CHANGING BOUNDARIES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES HOW WE PERCEIVE “CULTURE” INFORMATION SOURCES: POPULARITY AND TRUST 10 SURPRISING RUSSIA

FACE TO FACE WITH THE WEST

ussia’s public sentiment towards the Western world has shifed from extremely Rfavourable to highly unfavourable since the 1990s. Initially, Russians stressed their readiness to deeply integrate with the West while nowadays they have become suspicious of collaborating with it and even experienced a feeling of alienation. Te year 2015 appeared to have reached its turning point.

Twenty fve years ago the political awakening that followed the end of the Cold War substantially contributed to the development of relations. Te number of Rus- sians believing in America’s hostility achieved the margin of error. As far back as ten years ago more than 50% of Russian citizens were sure that the leading European countries were seeking to adopt a rapprochement policy.

Yet all the euphoria started to fade afer the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Te developments in Georgia, the Middle East and Ukraine caused disillusionment and mistrust, primarily, in terms of the US activities. Currently, from the perspective of most Russian residents, the West seems very unfriendly if not belligerent towards Russia. Te United States is perceived as a principal enemy of Russian society, its cul- ture and values. Even Germany, which has been considered to be a Russian ally thus far, belongs to the rank of competitors and potential opponents.

Diferences over the military campaign in Syria, the airliner bombing over Egypt’s Sinai desert, as well as the recent downing of a Russian military jet by Turkish forces throw into sharp relief the new splits thus changing the world right in front of our eyes. It is exemplifed in a situation when traditionally popular destinations sud- denly have transformed into foes’ strongholds. Cultural disagreements have also begun to surface everywhere: the West has recognized conservative but moderate sympathies of Russians as “irrelevant”. As a result, Russian citizens have appealed to the countries, which come closest to their ideals, particularly to BRICS, and neigh- bouring states, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Yet experts maintain that the door to the West remains open. Common ancestry, a shared cultural code and countless treaties make a new thaw in EU-Russia relations in- evitable. A range of EU countries can be regarded as our cultural allies. Tey include, for instance, Serbia and Greece, which, as two-thirds of Russians have pointed out, deserves support amid the fnancial crisis. Fighting terrorism, understanding new challenges and sympathizing victims of terrorist acts have laid a new foundation for improving relations. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 11

THE DIVIDED WORLD

he attitude towards social environment has polarized Russian society. Almost half Tof Russian citizens feel surrounded mostly by opponents. Terrorist acts and emo- tional fare-ups following the downing of a Russian war-plane reinforced the feeling of an omnipresent threat. In contrast, the rest of respondents look forwards to the fu- ture with optimism, highlighting that the world community can be friendly with us.

SOME PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT DIFFERENT ENEMIES CHALLENGE OUR SOCIETY AND VALUES, WHEREAS OTHERS DO NOT SUPPORT THIS STATEMENT. WHAT IS YOUR VIEWPOINT ON THIS? Closed-ended question, only one response is possible, %. VCIOM, 2015

We are encircled by enemies on all counts 12 4 8 Apart from many enemies we also have friends We have enemies, but still there are more friends 42 34 Basically, we do not have any enemies Don’t know

Mounting tensions, as well as a highly biased attitude towards Russia have prompted Russians to divide this world into two groups, namely “friends/allies” and “enemies/ opponents”. Te selective approach is applied to all Western countries. Te USA is re- garded as a major source of threat, a key ideological and political opponent of Russia. Tat is the assessment of US striving for a global-power status. Te degree of suspi- ciousness in the relations between Ukraine and Russia is rather low.

IF ANY FOES THREATEN YOUR SOCIETY, CULTURE AND VALUES, NAME THEM, PLEASE Close-ended question, only one response is possible, %. VCIOM, 2015

USA, Barack Obama 37 Europe 9 Ukraine and its government 8 Islamists 3 Fascists 2 People themselves 2 Bent ofcials 2 Great Britain 2 NATO 1 Alcohol and drug addicton 1 Lack of culture, moral decay 1 Germany, Angela Merkel 1 Poland 1 Other religions, sects 1 Oppositon 1 Haters 1 All 1 Other ethnic groups, cultures, natons 1 Others 11 Don’t know 37 HOW DOES THE US GOVERNMENT TREAT RUSSIA: IN A FRIENDLY

WAY, NOT IN A VERY FRIENDLY WAY, IN A HOSTILE WAY?

Close-ended question, only one response is possible, %. VCIOM, 2015 59

40 2015 г. 35

1990 г.

1990 г. 32 23 2015 г. 1990 г.

3 2 6 2015 г.

2015 г. 1990 г.

IN A FRIENDLY NOT IN A HOSTILE СANNOT SAY WAY IN A VERY WAY DEFINITELY FRIENDLY WAY

While in the 1990s Russia cherished hopes for a friendship or constructive polit- ical dialogue with its great overseas neighbour, currently these plans have been revisited. Even those people, who are not eager to label the US as Russia’s oppo- nent, are sure that Americans treat the Russian Federation as an adversary. WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE UNITED STATES,FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE?

1990 2015

35 COUNTRY WITH HIGH QUALITY OF LIFE 12

COUNTRY, WHERE SUCCESS DEPENDS 20 ON YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS 7

COUNTRY WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART 1 5 TECHNOLOGIES 7

13 FREE SOCIETY 5

COUNTRY CHARACTERIZED 5 BY A WIDE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR 11

COUNTRY WITH HIGHER CRIMINALITY 1 RATE AND MORAL DECAY 15

COUNTRY WHERE THERE ARE NO Close-ended question, 1 WARM RELATIONS AMONG PEOPLE 15 only one response is possible, %. COUNTRY WITH RACIAL VCIOM, 2015 1 DISCRIMINATION 9

What is more, the image of the USA as a country, which opens up equal oppor- tunities, has undergone considerable changes. Contemporarily, Russians associ- ate the USA as a country with higher criminality rates, moral decay, the absence of warm relations between people, a wide gap between rich and poor, as well as ra- cial discrimination. 14 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

EVGENY MINCHENKO, President and Chief Executive Ofcer of MINCHENKO CONSULTING Communication Group

How Russia Astonished the World in 2015

ussia’s reason and restraint, as well as persistence really dazed the world commu- Rnity. Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in New York could have been much tougher. Russia’s leader and diplomats made hercu- lean eforts to convey the message to the American ruling class. A range of mediators, such as Henry Kissinger, also played their pivotal role. Nevertheless, the US is still witnessing a high level of mistrust towards Russians.

On Development of US-Russia relations

Historically, our relations have passed through several stages. Te frst one was the pe- riod under Boris Yeltsin. At that time Russia’s elites viewed the USA as an elder brother, who was leading us to prosperity right smack to the family of world major democracies. Russian society had real Americamania, which reached its peak when the song by the Kombinaciya musical band “American boy, I will go with you” was written. Incidental- ly, the then president adored dancing to that music. However, the aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia became a crucial point. Te fact that Yevgeny Primakov, who was prime minister then, turned his government plane around over the Atlantic Ocean afer learning that the US was about to begin its military in- tervention in Kosovo, signifed cooling in the bilateral relations. Following this event each year brought changes for the worse. A new stage of thawing was linked with the early years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. In 2001 and 2002 Russia included in a coun- ter-terrorist coalition was a military ally of the United States, which allowed silencing an anti-American campaign. Actually, our Western partners do not realize that Vladimir Putin has been the most Western-oriented politician throughout recorded history of Russia. Originally, he wanted to incorporate Russia into Greater Europe, and he did his best to achieve this goal. Yet when Putin started waging war on terrorism initiated by George W. Bush, he saw the US reciprocation in a form of NATO’s expansion to the east. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 15

Ten the war between Russian and Georgia erupted in 2008. Russian society infu- enced particularly by the black-and-white accounts of the both countries’ mass media was gradually demonizing the USA. At the same time, Russian society does not display any aggression towards Ameri- cans. Tere is a negative perception of the American elites, while common Americans are regarded in quite a friendly way at the grassroots level. Recently, a Western propa- ganda machine has started cultivating a myth about the original corruption of Russian values and beliefs, whereas the Russian mass media has avoided using such methods. Russia is a potential enemy for the USA, because it constitutes something which is unpredictably dangerous, disturbing, obscure and even mysterious. Paradoxically, sooner or later each American, with whom I speak about Vladimir Putin, poses a question: “Does your president, Vladimir Putin, always go topless? In fact, he is somewhat terrifying. He is always fexing his muscles”. Strange as it may be, the only photo session featuring topless Vladimir Putin shocked everybody. Obviously, there are also Putin’s fans in the US. His image is attractive for white men, who are middle-aged and less-educated. In the crudest form, we are speaking about the electoral base of the Tea Party movement. Tey describe Putin in the following way: “He is a real guy and alpha male. We want to have such a peerless president”.

Actually, our Western partners do not realize that Vladimir Putin has been the most Western-orient- ed politician throughout recorded history of Rus- sia. Originally, he wanted to incorporate Russia into Greater Europe, and he did his best to achieve this goal.

On prospects for improving US-Russia relations

It is impossible to improve the relations with the USA only on the level of leadership’s rhetoric. Te communication between two countries should comprise business cir- cles and a wide program of popular diplomacy. Moreover, exchange programs in such spheres as education, science, culture and so on should be introduced. Unfortunately, now we are subverting our programs, which is a very myopic approach. It is neces- sary to support the intermingling of diferent cultures and get rid of prejudices. 16 SURPRISING RUSSIA

FYODOR LUKYANOV, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Afairs

On confrontation with the US

he current state of Russia-US relations can be described as paradoxical. Te game Tof ambitions and competition persist, but US President Barack Obama is not will- ing to be involved in any confict. He is not a president in the conventional sense of this word. Generally, he is indiferent to foreign policy. Initially, he started with a premise that he would limit himself to delivering keynote speeches to the Islamic world, Euro- peans, Chinese, Russians and Latin Americans on how the world had changed. Indeed, he made his statements, but instead of having any positive efect they marked a period of strange policies, which could be characterized as a movement towards getting out of external commitments and optimizing of the world presence. Yet America is a cen- tral element of the current world order. How is it possible to leave the system, which is evolving around you?

On Russians’ negative a!itude towards Americans

Our relations with the West go through specifc circles. We have completed a cy- cle of illusions and begun a cycle of disillusions. It will end (incidentally, we are close to it) and we will understand that a beautiful picture of the global word led by the USA has just disappeared. It will happen not only for Russia, but for all actors. A rapprochement will start but on the basis of new factors.

On the Syrian factor in the relations between the USA and Russia

When Russia entered the war in Syria it showed its commitment to engaging in diferent global conficts, whether they were violent or impossible to settle. One of the key rules of international relations is that activities rather than words mat- ter. When you start acting, everybody pays much more attention to you. US President Barack Obama is being criticized for his fawed strategy in the Middle East, for the ab- sence of any clear ideas goals. Te US is not aware of what to do in this region and with Russia. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 17

ALEXANDER OSLON, Director General of the Public Opinion Foundation

On the reassessment of roles in the international arena

ver the recent 25 years the vision of the world was formed in the framework Oof globalization. We really believed that the global was becoming more glo- balized, the distance between countries and cultures was getting smaller. All of us were partners, and there were no enemies. At frst the 1998 bombing of Yugoslavia challenged this statement. And then it was followed by the sympathy for the victims on September 11, 2001, although this event also could be explained with the help of the old system. Ten Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan came, but still America and the USA in our perception were a centre of the whole civilization. Western sanctions contributed to the collapse of the prevailing paradigm. Tey could not be regarded as pragmatic ones at all. Of course there are problems which tend to be perceived as a catastrophe. But in case with sanctions people saw West’s absolutely behaviour. Tere were no fears. Te overwhelming majority of our citizens understood that sanctions had hit our economy, but we were strong and would overcome. However, we have redrawn the map of the world. New volatile areas have emerged, one of them is Iraq controlled by ISIS. Te second one is Syria, where unclear and wrong things happen. Remarkably, the US has turned out to be outside such areas.

On sudden love for Belarus

Te reassessment has its own values: when you negatively assess the situation in one country, you can also fnd countries which deserve only positive remarks. A key il- lustration is Belarus, from the perspective of Russia’s society. In 2015 many citizens started to believe that Belarus was a member of our own family. 18 SURPRISING RUSSIA

SEARCHING HIGH AND LOW FOR ALLIES

ver the recent decade Russians have reconsidered not only the relations with Othe USA, but also with Western Europe. Now citizens believe that the EU is not eager to endorse a rapprochement stance towards Russia.

ARE THE KEY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EAGER TO ENDORSE A RAPPROCHEMENT STANCE TOWARDS RUSSIA? Сlosed-ended question, one response, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015

2006 2015

57 43 37 26 20 17

Yes, they are No, they are not Don’t know

As Russians point out, Russia has always expressed its willingness to improve rela- tions with Europe. Te imposition of sanctions has made people think that the Western countries are to blame for cooling relations.

RECENTLY, HAS THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP SOUGHT TO ADOPT A RAPPROCHEMENT POLICY TOWARDS THE MAJOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES? Сlosed-ended question, one response, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015

2006 80 2015 67

19 16 14 4

Yes, it has No, it has not Don’t know PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 19

While two years ago the majority of people praised Germany as a main promoter of the Russian interests in the European Union, currently the attitude towards this country is quite controversial. More than 40% of Russians still view Germany as a stra- tegic partner and a potential ally. But almost the same number of people are inclined to portray the country as an economic and political competitor, and even a potential enemy.

WHAT ROLE DOES GERMANY FULFILL IN THE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA? Сlosed-ended question, one response, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015

15 13 It is a friendly state, ally It is a strategic and economic partner

17 It is an economic and political enemy 29 It is a hostile country. Don’t know 26

Te infuence of the EU and the US, rather than the Ukraine crisis and sanctions prevents both countries from improving their relations. Russians believe that Germany is a victim of circumstances.

IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT HAMPERS RUSSIA-GERMANY RAPPROCHEMENT TODAY? open-ended question, not more than three answers, answers given by at least 1 % of respondents), %. VCIOM, 2015

Infuence of U.S. and E.U. 33 Situaton in Ukraine 13 Sanctons 9 Politcs of the country and its leadership (Merkel) 7 Diferent politcal views; politcal diferences 2 Memory of Great Patriotc War 2 Economic issues 1 Diferent mentality, culture 1 Germany’s ambitons and superiority 1 Nothing hampers 1 Other 3 Don’t know 33 20 SURPRISING RUSSIA

For the Russian population the West is not a homogeneous entity. Apart from insti- gators responsible for the anti-Russian boycott there are also so called unwitting ac- complices and victims of circumstances. Te citizens’ assessment of the Greek events fully demonstrates it. We feel sympathy for Greece not only because we have identical religious beliefs but because we are on the same side of the fence. Our fellow citizens blame the Eu- ropean Union, which has always given credits to Greece, for the economic recession.

IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION IS TO BLAME FOR THE GREEK CRISIS – GREECE OR THE EUROPEAN UNION? Сlosed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Greece; the country has accumulated debts and now refuses to pay them of within the time specifed 24 30 European Union that gave more debts to Greece 4 than it is capable of paying back Other 42 Don’t know

Tree-fourths of respondents believe that Russia should back Greece through dip- lomatic assistance in negotiations and greater economic cooperation, rather than through fnances. Terefore, many citizens have started to treat Greece as a potential ally, a weak chain in Europe’s anti-Russian strategies.

IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD RUSSIA PROVIDE ANY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE? IF YES, WHAT KIND OF ASSISTANCE? closed-ended question, not more than three answers, %. VCIOM, 2015

Diplomatc assistance in negotatons 33 between Greece and Europe

No help should be provided to Greece 33

Economic assistance in lifing the ban on the Greek goods, 30 development of Russian tourism, etc.

Financial aid (subsidies and credits to Greece) 11

Other 1

Don’t know 11 PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 21

Te tragic events in the world make Russians feel sorry for citizens of any Western country. Moreover, they are ready to support them. Te overwhelming majority of Rus- sians immediately found out that the terrorist attack had been perpetrated in November in Paris. From the very beginning of November 14, 2015 people came to the French embas- sy to express their condolences and mourn those who had died.

A SERIES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS HAPPENED IN PARIS LAST WEEK. DO YOU KNOW/HAVE YOU HEARD / DO YOU HEAR FOR THE FIRST TINE ABOUT THAT? closed-ended question, one answer, % of those who know about the events. VCIOM, 2015

6 1 I am well aware of that

I heard something but I do not know any details 34 This is the frst time I hear 59 Don’t know

Yet any aggressive actions towards Russia require adequate responses, from the perspective or respondents. Russia’s society was shocked by the fact that Turkey had downed a Russian fghter jet. Te majority of citizens think that it is necessary to tough- ly respond to what has happened and people are waiting for the government’s decision. One in ten hope to restore friendly relations with Turkey and propose sof approaches to the country. Only 1% of people agree to ignore the events.

HOW SHOULD RUSSIA ACT WITH TURKEY, WHICH HAS DOWNED A RUSSIAN WAR-PLANE? Closed-ended question, one response, %. VCIOM, 2015

Tough economic measures 25 (food embargo ban on tourism, etc.) Tough military measure 23 (declaring war supportng Turkey’s enemies) Tough diplomatc measures 8 (cutng all tes, closing border, etc.)

Sof diplomatc measures, reconciliaton 11 (protest note, demanding apologizes, reaching consensus etc.)

We should ignore the sitaton, 1 no measures are needed

Don’t know 38 WHAT ORGANIZATIONS FROM THE LIST BELOW

SHOULD RUSSIA COOPERATE WITH?

Closed-ended question, any number of responses, %. VCIOM, 2015

BRICS (Brazil-Russia- India-China-South Africa) 54 Eurasian Economic Union 36 Collectve Security Treaty Organizaton 29 World Trade Organizaton 26 G20 26 G8/G7 23

Council of Europe, Parliamentary As- sembly of Council of Europe 19 NATO 11

Friend/enemy division can be clearly seen in the preferable vector of international cooperation chosen by Russian respondents. In an attempt to fnd allies, Russians appeal, above all, to BRICS states which, by the way, are trying to challenge the au- thority of most developed economies. As regards the Eurasian Economic Union member states, we share common history, economic space, similar issues and be- liefs with them. WHAT KIND OF RELATIONS DO RUSSIA

AND BELARUS HAVE NOW?

Closed-ended question, one response, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015 2013 2015

32 GOOD 79

27 POOR 6

DON’T 41 KNOW 15

Surprisingly, over the last two years, Belarus has become a close and, what is more, native land for Russians. However, Russians may have assessed the situation un- consciously: they may have forgotten that two years ago they perceived the relations with Belarus dif erently. From their perspective, our bilateral ties have failed to un- dergo substantial changes. 24 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

FYODOR LUKYANOV, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Afairs

Why Germany is tantamount to Europe

urope as a consolidated entity, especially, towards Russia, does not exist. Tere Eare many countries which merely do not care. Tey include Southern Europe and for instance, Ireland. At the same time, there are European nations greatly concerned about Russia. I mean Eastern Europe, which nowadays prefers articulating its inter- ests in a very clear way. In addition, there are major European powers, among which Germany constitutes a driving force. Terefore, when we consider Russia-EU relations, we had better analyse relations between Russian and Germany. Germany is experiencing the most difcult transformations. While in the past this country acted on the basis of the following principle “Do not touch us, tell, how much we have to pay”, now Germany believes that it is ready to play frst fddle in Europe. Angela Merkel’s sombre approach to Russia is primarily linked to the sacrifces which you have to make in order to become a European leader. It is impossible to draw upon Poland, with preserving specifc relations with Russia. Now the pendulum of the Russian-German relations has swung to a negative side. In a certain period, the situation will improve. Te German establishment will come to a conclusion that the European balance is heavily conditional upon the constructive ties with Russia, otherwise the niche of Russia’s supporters will be occupied by other actors. For instance, currently France is attempting to fll this vacancy, particularly when fghting terrorism has been very much in the foreground recently. And we know that traditionally, Germany does not act as an independent player in tackling such is- sues. In addition, the refugees’ crisis has provoked serious political problems within Germany’s borders.

On the ways of world development

Te birth pangs of a new multipolar world will be quite evident. Obviously, the nu- clear weapons will shield the world from waging a total war, which in its turn could create a world hierarchy. However, local conficts can escalate. Ukraine and Syria may have a cascading efect on the international system. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 25

A crisis point will come when Americans and the Chinese start to toughly compete somewhere in the South or East China Seas. As a result, a new balance will emerge because the world cannot exist without it. Te system will include various elements, as multipolarity is a very complicated form of a word order. Last year in one of his speeches, Putin argued that the multipolar world did not bring us any positive results, because it begot chaos and anarchy. He was talking sense. Te main battleground is regulations and standards, rather than military might. From the military viewpoint, the EU is a weak organization. Te same concerns its political signifcance. But when it comes to common standards, it turns out that Eu- rope has the most powerful base, which it imposes on others. And it is Europe’s beating heart and sword. Russia seeks to introduce such a system in the framework of the Eur- asian integration processes. Te way to a new world balance constitutes in elaborating new standards and their implementing. I cannot imagine other things.

The German establishment will come to a conclu- sion that the European balance is heavily condition- al upon the constructive ties with Russia, otherwise the niche of Russia’s supporters will be occupied by other actors.

On Russia’s benefits

Our competitive advantages in the international arena involve military might and our readiness to fex muscles. But nowadays it is too expensive. However, we have one more potent instrument, such as political will, as well as capacity of fast deci- sion-making and performing. Tis quality is harder to fnd in the world. A curse of modern democracies is that you cannot push any decisions. Obama’s ac- tivities are under strict control of the Congress, lobbyists and other institutions. Eu- rope is facing the same thing. In this respect, our model has its advantages: we have decided something and then put our ideas into practice. As regards other spheres, primarily, economic ones, our positions are quite simple. 26 SURPRISING RUSSIA

SHINSKY PAVEL, Director General, French-Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIFR)

On whether Russia has friends in Europe

owadays there is a prevailing opinion that our relations both with the US and NEurope are souring, which forms the distinct impression that Russia has an- ything but foes in the West. It is noteworthy that the Russian society’s discourse is dominated by a belief that all European countries are our enemies. Surprisingly, even educated people express such a point of view. Meanwhile, it is not the case. France is a vivid example, which proves that the above-mentioned argument is fim- sy. Our economic and political ties are quite strong and dynamic.

On the role of France’s president

François Hollande is the only leader of a major world power, who has restrained himself from criticizing Russia and its moves. Te incumbent French president channeled determined eforts into forming the so-called Normandy format provid- ing a platform for the implementation of Minsk agreements. Incidentally, Hollande warmly welcomed Vladimir Putin in the Elysee Presidential palace. In October 2015 Agriculture Minister Stéphane Le Foll visited Russia during an agricultural fair and met with his Russian counterpart. Moreover, Ms Ségolène Royal, Minister of Ecolo- gy, Sustainable Development and Energy, paid an ofcial visit to Russia from 26 to 28 October 2015. Both sides agreed to relaunch the intergovernmental commission on cooperation: its members did not come together for two years! All these development demonstrate that at an ofcial level France has decided to collaborate with Russia.

On se!ling Russia-France Mistral dispute

Obviously, being aware of France’s readiness to cooperate, the Russian leadership is willing to accommodate the French approach. In this case, the Mistral case sym- bolizes the development of our bilateral relations. Russia had its legal right to impose penalties, which would have hit prime contractor DCNS and the STX Europe ship- yard in Saint-Nazaire. Instead, Russia decided to arrive at a compromise. Tanks PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 27 to it, lengthy negotiations on the Mistral sale contract failed to become a stumbling block to promoting our long-term relations.

On economic relations between Russia and France

France and Russia have deliberately designed a specifc model of interaction, which undoubtedly enables both countries to gain benefts, especially, economic ones. Ac- cording to the Central Bank estimates in 2014, the volume of foreign direct invest- ments in Russia decreased from 69 billion dollars to 21 billion dollars, with France contributing 2,1 billion dollars to Russia. Only ofshores and Switzerland, which is not a EU member state, invested in Russia more than France. Remarkably, France prefer propping up large projects. Terefore, when you have bought Rosbank or such a giant corporation as Avtovaz, there is little scope for maneuvering or taking immediate de- cisions about leaving the Russian market. French investors place a premium of Russia’s economy. Tey have localized their industries, thus demonstrating their commitment to close collaborating with Russia.

France and Russia have deliberately designed a specific model of interaction, which undoubtedly enables both countries to gain benefits, especially, economic ones.

On US factor in relations between Russia and France

Te reason for France’s independent position towards Russia is that France has the most difcult relations with the United States, in comparison with other Cen- tral European powers. In this case, it is worth highlighting record fnes imposed by the USA on French bank BNP Paribas BNPP.PA. France fully realizes that it will be able to preserve its crucial role in Europe’s diplomacy only if it does not serve the US interests. On balance, France is interested in further strengthening its relations with Russia. 28 SURPRISING RUSSIA

VLADIMIR PETUKHOV, Chairman of VCIOM Scientifc Council Ph.D. in Philosophy

On the demand for state’s retaining its great power status

CIOM and ISRAS research projects indicate that in Russian society demand Vfor strengthening positions on the world stage has been growing steadily over a long period of time. In the 2000s Russia’ humiliation syndrome related to the fact that Russia was being treated as a losing power in the Cold War became a thing of the past. Nowadays the majority of Russians are ready to make sacrifces for Rus- sia’s reinforcing its status in the international arena. Yet this attitude is not consistent with revanchist sentiments or nationalist populism. Most citizens believe that deal- ing with political, socioeconomic and cultural problems in Russia, as well improving social welfare and security, instead of pursuing aggressive external policies, can serve as a reasonable prerequisite for Russia’s getting back on track. Russian residents are realistic about Russia’s potential and are not ready to demand for return of the Sovi- et-great power status.

On a new matrix of threats

Up to the mid 2000s Russians maintained that the country faced primarily internal threats. At the same time, with escalating demands for Russia’s performing a greater role in the international arena the matrix of threat also started to undergo signifcant changes, thus shifing the focus from the issues at home to the problems abroad. Russian society was increasingly aware of the fact that the price for a higher interna- tional status would be a more confrontation from other external actors, namely the increasing likelihood of new conficts and challenges. Consequently, Russian society is experiencing diferent trends: on the one hand, the majority expect Russia to unlock its great power potential, and extend its spheres of infuence (67%), on the other hand, people are afraid of a new Cold War period in the relations with the West (58%). PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 29

On our relations with Germany

According to my viewpoint, now it is possible to speak about Russia’s attitude towards any country only when this country can be politically comparable with Russia itself. In other words, it should be treated as an equal partner. Obviously, one can wonder whether we have good relations with such states as Slovenia or Argentina, but in fact we do not take them into consideration. We predominantly concentrate on the USA, China, the leading countries of Western Europe and some neighboring post-Soviet countries. Germany is one of the most important states for Russia, above all, due to some his- torical reasons. Te German Democratic Republic was a Warsaw Pact member state, and the Soviet Union played frst fddle in preparing grounds for Germany’s reunifca- tion. We have too many things in common. Terefore, in spite of a negative response to the events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Russian society welcomes Germany, even though support for this country’s activities has fallen signifcantly.

According to my viewpoint, now it is possible to speak about Russia’s a"itude towards any coun- try only when this country can be politically compa- rable with Russia itself.

On feasibility of society’s expectations

Russians can sacrifce many things for their country’s interests, greater security and international authority. In general, citizens approve of following the realist approach in foreign policy, in other words, of adjusting Russia’s foreign policy strategy with regard to its objectives. Undoubtedly, Russia has its own national interests and agen- da in the world. I would like to emphasize that this program is completely diferent from the Soviet one. Although our country is going to great lengths to fnd its niche in the international community, Russians hold that the countries’ external policy should promote both respect and better living standards. 30 SURPRISING RUSSIA

UKRAINE: “FAMILY CONFLICT”?

ndoubtedly over the last twenty fve years Ukraine has become a foreign state Ufor Russia, but we are still concerned about the situation there in the neighbour- ly manner. Te majority of Russians are certain that its neighbour is not doing well. Te way out of the crisis is nowhere in sight, and the situation is very likely to worsen further.

Meanwhile, they regard Ukraine as a loser as the country has sufered only losses from Euromaidan. Tey blame the government’s policy alongside the intrusion from outside. Still the question why Euromaidan took place proves to be too difcult and tricky to answer. Te big number of those who did not give any answer about the caus- es of Maidan – 40 % – point to that. But nobody questions the very fact that Rus- sian-Ukranian relations have reached the stalemate eventually.

Te reasons are apparent. Russians did not want such turmoil - both political and economic – at home, which is why they did not show any sympathy to Euromaidan. Af- terwards, when Ukraine was torn apart by civil strife, Russians had no choice. Our peo- ple showed compassion with the unrecognised republics. LNR and DNR proclaimed themselves pro-Russian and the ofensive launched by Ukrainian armed forces, was regarded as an attempt to wreak vengeance on Russian sympathizers. Te Russian vol- unteer militia which provided assistance to LNR and DNR received the backing of two thirds of Russians. Finally, the recent attempts to impose the blockade against Crimea through sabotage and terror attacks have aggravated the situation afer the short-term truce.

But what stance should Russia take on Donbas? Tat is a painful and sensitive issue. It is out of the question to leave the unrecognised states on their own and to exchange the refusal to support for improved relations with the Ukraine and the West.

Russians would rather sacrifce their interests than publicly abandon their mates. However, gross political interference (e.g. the recognition of the sovereignty of the states) is not supported unanimously. Te all-out war to the bitter end is even less appealing. So, what is needed is a compromise, but it is yet to be worked out. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 31

***

fer more than a year afer the coup in Ukraine the vast majority of Russians note Athe adverse efect the events have had on the country. Te consequences of the frst Maidan and the “Orange Revolution” a decade ago were not that visible to Russians.

DID UKRAINE BENEFIT FROM MAIDAN OR LOSE? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. *Back in 2005 the questions was: «to your mind, did Ukraine beneft from the “Orange Revolution” or rather lose?» 83 October 2005* February 2015 36 26 29

8 3 8 6

It quite benefted It rather lost In essence nothing Don’t know has changed

Wondering about the possible causes of Euromaidan, Russians are mostly puzzled. Con- sidering the situation from all perspectives and trying to visualize it, our citizens still fail to understand the root causes which led to such a U-turn in the neighboring country. Te desire of protesters to join the EU is hardly considered the cause of the coup. Many assigned the role of the trigger to the US and believe that without the external interference Euromaidan would not have occurred.

WHAT CAUSED THE EVENTS LATER REFERRED TO AS EUROMAIDAN? Open-ended questions, any number of answers, %. VCIOM, 2015

American provocaton, Western infuence 22 Improper state policy 16 Struggle for power, territory, money 11 Discontent people (living conditons did not satsfy) 8 Desire of the populaton to join the EU 2 Step against Russia, the Russian-speaking populaton 2 Revival of Nazism 2 People’s folly 1 Money laundering 1 Fault lines (the diferences between Eastern and Western Ukraine) 1 Other 2 Don’t know 38 32 SURPRISING RUSSIA

In October 2014 Russians still cherished faltering hope that the situation in Ukraine would change for the better or at the very least the crisis would deteriorate further. But all these hopes were doomed to disillusionment. Now the majority of those surveyed point to ever worsening situation and still do not see any prospects of overcoming the economic and social crisis in the neighbouring state.

UKRANIAN CRISIS INDEX It is based on the question: “How do you assess the latest developments in Ukraine – are they for the better or for the worse?” It relied on the yes- and no- answers ratio, Index is measured in points and can vary between -100 and 100. The higher the index, the more certain people are about the possible normalization of the situation. VCIOM, 2015

30 21 20 -7 10 0 -12 -10 -20 -30 -40 -43 -34 -39 -46 -50 -58 -60 February/14 March/14 April/14 June/14 August/14 October/14 January/15 September/15

Russians believe that the Russian-Ukrainian relations have reached the lowest point ever recorded. In this context the hostile treatment of Crimea (e.g. blasts of power lines serving Crimean residents) result in further deterioration of the situation.

RUSSIAN-UKRANIAN RELATIONS INDEX It is based on the question: “How would you assess the current relations between Russia and Ukraine It relied on the yes- and no- answers ratio, Index is measured in points and can vary between -100 and 100. The higher the index, the better the relations are. VCIOM, 2015

26 30 20 20 14 10 0 -10 -6 -2 -20 -15 -30 -26 -40 -29 -50 -56 -60 March/98 June/99 Dec/00 Oct/01 Oct/05 Nov/13 Jan/14 March/14 Sept/15 PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 33

Most fellow citizens have a positive perception of Russians who joined the militia in the Donbass. Russian volunteers are perceived by the majority of people as those who are ready to risk their lives in order to help “their brothers” in a just war, a few Russians call their actions selfsh.

WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE TO RUSSIAN VOLUNTEERS IN THE DONBASS MILITIA? Closed-ended question, one answer,%. VCIOM, 2015

13 Fully positive 28 11 Quite positive Rather negative 11 Fully negative 37 Don’t know

In this situation the “non-interference” stance no longer seems so appropriate to Rus- sians as half a year ago. An increasing number of people consider it necessary to rec- ognize the independence of LNR and DNR. One in four Russians supports the idea. Nevertheless, the share of those who suggest making LNR and DNR the Russian re- publics has not grown: citizens understand the profound damaging consequences for the Russian Federation both in political and economic terms.

TO YOUR MIND, WHAT POSITION SHOULD RUSSIA TAKE WITH REGARD TO DONETSK AND LUHANSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Not interfere, stay neutral 45 31 13 Recognize DNR and LNR as independent states 26

18 Let LNR and DNR become part of the Russian Federaton 16 12 Help DNR and LNR to become more autonomous in Ukraine 12

Help Kiev restore control over the territories of DNR and LNR 4 3 8 Don’t know 12 April 2014 September 2015 IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD RUSSIA STOP SUPPORTING

DONBASS REBELS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS

WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Russians should stop support ng the Donbass rebels to improve relat ons with the West and Ukraine 11

Russians should not stop support ng Donbass rebels to improve relat ons with the West and Ukraine 58

Russia should not try to seek the improvement of its relat ons with Ukraine and Western countries 15

Don`t know 16

Russians consider pro-Russian people in Eastern Ukraine friends, threatened by political and cultural annihilation. And a friend in need is as friend indeed. T at is why most Russians are convinced that the Russian authorities should stick to their decisions and refuse to abandon the Donbas militia to improve relations with the West and Ukraine. WHICH OF THE TWO APPROACHES PROMOTES

RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN A BETTER WAY?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

The war to the bit er end, even with heavy losses, but giving hope for a rapid 10 resolut on of the conf ict

Peace talks, “frozen” conf ict, It will require concessions from Russia and involves considerable costs to support the People’s republics 74

Don’t know 16

However, few support the idea of the war “to a bitter end”. T e Russians are wea- ry of the protracted conf ict and ready to compromise. However, 75% of the citi- zens questioned are ready for the f nancial burden that Russia will bear to support the republics. 36 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

MIKHAIL REMIZOV, President, National Strategy Institute

On the Leverage behind the Coup

he main causes of Euromaidan are internal. Some of them have been in place Tfor a long time. Ukrainian nationalism, ideology shared by a signifcant part of the intellectuals, civil servants and youth has been developing since late XIX - ear- ly XX century. Even in the Soviet period, cultural policy was predominantly shaped by Ukrainian nationalists. But Western NGOs also interfered in diferent spheres. Te EU-Ukraine Association Agreement became a catalyst. Poland, Lithuania, Ger- many, and the European Commission were trying hard to have the Agreement signed by the Vilnius summit. Te Russian stance was largely ignored; the conclusion of the Agreement was to be portrayed as a geopolitical victory over Russia. And the coup was triggered by parties which interfered from outside and provided swif assistance. It seemed prudent to wait for the outcome of the election, which would most likely have result- ed in the victory of the opposition candidate, did it not? Perhaps the United States doubted the Yanukovych possible defeat, and in this case separatist uprising were to have started in Western Ukraine. Tat is this scenario of the Ukrainian State col- lapse would have suited Russia best. As a result, it is very difcult to determine meth- odologically what exactly happened. Tat would be absurd to speak about it in the upbeat tone denoting the events as a historic event and as a revolution. We do not deal with a root-and-branch change of the social development model. But if we defne “revolution” as a radical political transformation which involves the participation of broad masses, it can be called a revolution. And just like any revolution this one was characterized by the struggle of clans, external intervention, anarchy and banditry.

On Russian way to exert influence on the situation

Afer the collapse of the Soviet Union there were ample opportunities to use “sof” power, including Te media, regional infuence, the impact on diferent social and PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 37 political groups. But these tools have not been used at all or have been exploited ex- tremely inefciently. Now Russia lacks “sof power” tools there. Moderate pro-Russian strategies taken within the legal framework face impediment and even crackdown. Tere are econo- my-related tough levers. But the strategic lever applicable over a long period of time is the ability to infuence the sentiment of Russian and Russian-speaking population on the South-East of Ukraine Over the past year the situation in this respect has de- teriorated. Donbass did very badly. Te socio-economic situation there is worse than anywhere else in Ukraine. No one would like to experience it. Te support for Kiev has hardly increased, but the belief in life changing for the better has been shattered. Nevertheless, Russia can try to win over the Russian-speaking population; it may suggest a pattern that could prove to be infuential.

Just like any revolution this one was characterized by the struggle of clans, external intervention, an- archy and banditry.

About Russian citizenship for Ukrainians

Granting Russian citizenship to Ukrainians is a way of evoking dual loyalty. Today the Federal Migration Service insists on the renunciation of Ukrainian citizenship as the Ukrainian law demands. In fact, this law can be simply neglected, and there is hardly a need to require any evidence of the renouncement of the Ukrainian citi- zenship. First of all, it can be applied to residents of Donetsk and Lugansk, who stay in the “gray” zone and whose fundamental civil and human rights are not respected. Apparently whatever the scenario – Ukrainian, Transnistrian or Crimean – things are likely to stay the same for a long time. In any case, granting Russian citizenship in these areas is absolutely justifed. 38 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EGOR HOLMOGOROV, Writer, publicist

On reasons for supporting volunteers

olunteers in Donbass have been commended as for a long time there was so- Vcial demand in Russia for the image of a man, who believes that fghting for his friends is in his own interests and acts of his own free will. We have the im- age of drafees, who are obliged to join the ranks and fght in the public interest at the public expense. Te alternative is a rebel, someone like Stenka Razin and Emelyan Pugachev, a man who seeks to destroy the state mechanism. But the image of a volunteer, fghting for freedom, was lacking. A volunteer does not obey orders and seeks to establish a better social order. He fghts on his own against power abuse, arbitrary state and the infringement on human dignity. Te only short period when this type was in demand in Russia was the First and Second Narodnoe Opolcheniye (Militia) in 1611-1612. Militiamen also opposed the system of the Polish invaders, as well as the Rule of the Seven Boyars. I think that the phenomenon that we witnessed in the Donbas region will have a long-term social and psychological efect as it has plugged a very important gap in Russian social psychology.

On the a!itude to Donbass accession and Western pressure

Russians have consistently been preparing for possible struggle for Sevastopol for 25 years, while the Donbass issue virtually emerged out of the blue. Tose who never lived in the Soviet era, may even have been slow to realize where Donbass is. One needed time and experience, including emotional distress, to understand that our people dwell there, and we must protect them. Society has come to understand that the search for dialogue with the West on this issue is vain. Russian patterns of con- duct are considered inappropriate or absurd. Tey use new sanctions rather than lif the previously imposed. Te required way of acting is unacceptable for us both on moral grounds and due to national self-esteem. Tat is why society deems it un- necessary to relate public opinion to the outside world. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 39

On the future of Ukraine

In the XIX and XX century world politics predominantly revolved around the manip- ulation of ethnic identities. Te easiest way to, geopolitically speaking, tear Ukraine away from the rest of Russia is to say that the Ukrainians are a separate nation with a diferent language, culture and history. Tese technologies have been brought to perfection, though the viability of Ukraine under the regime which is openly hos- tile to Russia is questionable. It has come to my attention that many patterns of the late 1990s - early 2000s are now used on a larger scale. I think that, strange as it might seem, the scenario of Chechnya in the 1990s will unfold in Ukraine. Despite open hostility to Russia, internal processes resulted in the emergence of the elites in 1999 that preferred unity. Te large-scale geopolitical reintegration of Ukraine and Russia is inevitable.

The downward trend in Russia’s history came to an end. The question is about the means of implement- ing the Russian World project and its future format.

On the future of Russia’s relations with the former Soviet states

Te downward trend in Russia’s history came to an end. Te question is about the means of implementing the Russian World project and its future format. Will it be a militarized zone or a zone where mutual understanding and friendliness fourish. If, say, Latvian borders were transparent enough and the visa regime were liberal enough for a Russian to freely enter the state, communicate in the native language, feel at home, the issue of sovereignty would not be raised at all. We will see in the near future which way the situation will unfold. Will they follow the path of confict and the one of dialogue? 40 SURPRISING RUSSIA

MIKHAIL POGREBINSKY, Director, Kiev Center for Political Research and Confict Studies

On the essence of Ukrainian events

bufer state, balancing between Russia and the West and enjoying certain sover- Aeignty, has tried to morph into a part of the Euro-American world. Te transition is not completed yet, but the country has already lost its sovereignty to outer forces. Washington along with Brussels and Berlin defne Ukraine’s internal as well as foreign policy. Tey can even dictate to Ukraine whether to appoint or dismiss key policymak- ers. Te attempt to transform has cost Ukraine part of the territory and population, has reduced its economic potential to a great extent, and has brought about a plunge in living standards and steeply declining democracy standards. Tey frst described it in the PR way as the “Revolution of Dignity” against the corrupt regime and for the association with the EU, and then called it a “national liberation war.”

On the State of Ukrainian Society

Ukrainian society - the Crimea and Donbas are excluded from the category – are in total disarray. Tose who previously supported the “Revolution of Dignity” are now disappointed in its leaders and believe that in general, “the country is going the wrong way.” But most people blame Russia and Putin for all the troubles. Te loss of the Crimea and the military defeats in the East fuel anti-Russian sentiment even further. It looks as if the Greek-Catholic “Austrian” part of Western Ukraine in cooperation with the bureaucratic Kiev has signifcantly strengthened its infuence on Central Ukraine and in part on the South-East. Tus, the dividing line has shifed eastward. Meanwhile, local elections on October 2015 revealed that the pro-Russian sentiment is still strong. All the large cities in the east and in the south voted against the new government which came to power afer Euromaidan. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 41

On probable restoration of the relations between Russia and Ukraine

Te national identity of the Ukraine is largely determined by a person’s nationality rather than the native language or traditions. Te quasi-state of the Ukrainian SSR gave major impetus to the emergence of a separate Ukrainian nation, and this process gained momentum afer the formation of the state. Te West-inspired “perestroika” and the collapse of the USSR marked an important step in promoting sovereignty. Te dissolution of the USSR was perceived by Ukrainian intellectuals as a way out of isolation and an opportunity to join the “family of civilized nations.” In their turn, the attempts to engage Ukraine in the Eurasian integration projects were viewed as the restoration of the USSR. Te appeal to shared past does not evoke an attractive image of the future.

Progress, if any, will be achieved only when the au- thorities in both states -as well as both societies – share a quite similar set of ideas about the future layout and, therefore, an almost identical vision of global issues.

Progress, if any, will be achieved only when the authorities in both states – as well as both societies – share a quite similar set of ideas about the future layout and, there- fore, an almost identical vision of global issues. Today even the prerequisite for such developments are missing. State-to-state relations between Russia and Ukraine will be marked by wariness, even in the medium term. In the short term they will stay strained. Even the change of the ruling elite will not help to improve the situation. Fruitful economic cooperation in the mutually benefcial areas can be partly re- stored if political tensions are defused. 42 SURPRISING RUSSIA

RUSSIA’S PIVOT TO ASIA: WHAT ARE OUR EXPECTATIONS?

he issue of Russia’s turn to Asia has arisen because Russia has always tilted west- Tward due to its geographical location and historical roots. Although in the past millions of Russians moved east in order to colonize lands, thus transforming the country into an Asia-Pacifc power, from the cultural perspective, contemporary Russians (at least, 50% of them) tend to associate themselves with Europe. At the same time, it does not prevent them from considering attractive economic and political op- portunities in Asia. Russia’s eastward shif is nothing but a more systemic and active attempt to realize its potential.

Asia’s window of opportunities had opened much earlier than Western sanctions imposed on Russia accelerated this trend, which was proved by various opinion surveys. Year by year Russians increasingly perceived China as a friendly country. Currently, the majority of Russian citizens embrace the same viewpoint, thus sup- porting the very idea of two countries’ rapprochement. Tere is much controversy about the tactics of their interaction. One in fve people believe that it is necessary to act more assertively, while one in fve respondents call on the Russian leadership to be more cautious of promoting relations with China. Te concerns about China and other countries in Eastern Asia are related to market and demographic expansion risks.

Russia’s partners in Asia encompass viable economies, which are incommensurate with Russia’s economic make-up given a range of indicators. An idea of heavy depend- ence on Eastern “friends” results from their economic predominance. Almost 50% of respondents emphasize this risk, which, however, can be balanced by Russia’s infu- ence on the world stage. Russians assume that in this realm China is not a comparable with our country. An ideal scenario may consist in the fact that developed economies in Eastern Asia will help Russia to reinforce its positions and fulfll its potential. More than 50% of citizens agree that in 15 or 20 years the Far East will be able to enjoy its economic prosperity.

We can assume that in the 21st century the so-called Eurasian approach is like- ly to dominate Russians’ minds: neither Eastern, nor Western path will be chosen. Instead, Russian citizens will cherish their own identity incorporating the features of the two civilizational platforms. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 43

***

s time passes by, Russians are increasingly aware of Russia’s place among other Acivilizations. According to more than 50% of people, despite the worsening re- lations between the West and Russia, we are closer to Europe for cultural and mental reasons. Yet more than one-fourth of respondents do not have a concrete answer to this question.

SOME PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT RUSSIAN CULTURE, TRADITIONS AND HISTORY ARE CLOSER TO THE WESTERN WORLD, WHILE OTHERS THINK THAT RUSSIA IS CLOSER TO ASIA. WHICH OF THESE TWO STATEMENTS DO YOU ADHERE TO? Closed-ended question, one response, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015 1999 55 2015 45 38

28 18 16

Generally we are closer Generally we are Don’t to Europe closer to Asia know

At the same time, against the background of the current external situation, there is ferce disagreement between cultural preferences and the principles of economic and political pragmatism. Russians do not consider a multi-vector foreign policy as relevant any more. A focus is shifing from a “who we should be friends with” question to a necessity to choose one of the several global directions. From the citizens’ perspective, now the East is a leader in this realm. However, the West has also acquired new supporters.

WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR RUSSIA NOW: STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TIES WITH THE WEST OR CHINA? Closed-ended question, one response, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015

10 West 19

27 China 32

It is important to foster relatons 50 both with the West and China 35

June 2014 Don’t know 13 14 April 2015 44 SURPRISING RUSSIA

Russia’s interaction with China is inevitably perceived as an underlying principle of the pivot to Asia. Over the course of the ten years, Russians’ visions of the relations with China have underdone substantial changes. Contemporarily, more than three- fourths of citizens argue that Russia and China are real friends.

IS CHINA A FRIENDLY OR UNFRIENDLY NATION FOR RUSSIA? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015

1999 77 2015 48

30 21 14 9

Friendly Unfriendly Don’t know

However, such a stance does not hamper the cultivation of myths about the possible negative consequences of Russia’s turn to Asia. Te majority of Russians fear to face a massive infux of Asian migrants and piles of cheap and poor quality goods from China. Almost 50% of respondents are suspicious of the fact that Asian tigers may use Russia as a means of achieving economic and political goals, which will lead to under- mining partnership between Russia and the West.

IN YOUR OPINION, DUE TO RUSSIA’S “TURN TO THE EAST” WHAT IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FOLLOWING THINGS MAY HAPPEN IN FIVE OR TEN YEARS? (closed-ended question, one answer per each line, %. VCIOM, 2015

Cheap and poor quality goods from Asian countries 29 such as China, Korea will overfow Russian market 64

Mass fow of Asian migrants to Russia 32 (China, Korea, etc.) 61

China will use Russia to increase its infuence 36 in the world 53

Russian economic and politcal cooperaton 36 with the West will weaken 51

Asians countries will buy Russian natural resources 45 for cheap prices (oil, gas, soil) 46

Far-Eastern and Siberian natve populatons 47 will be displaced by people from Asia (Korea, China, etc.) 44

Completely confdent; I think it is unlikely to happen Completely confdent; I think it is likely to happen PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 45

Tere is no denying that generally, trust in Russia’s government may promote solidarity with its decisions. Te majority of the population endorse Russia’s turn to the Eastern world and one in fve people urge the state to be more active in this feld. Yet the above-mentioned fears and concerns also play their part: almost 30% of re- spondents suggest following a more cautious and open-eyed approach.

WHAT POLITICS REGARDING THE “RUSSIAN TURN TO THE EAST” SHOULD RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES ADHERE TO? Closed-ended question, one answer, %, VCIOM, 2015

Russia should act more actvely following this directon 22

Russia should pursue the same politcs 37

Russia should slow down and be more reserved 23

Russia should abandon the idea to turn to the East 5

Don’t know 13

Russia’s turn to Asia implies concentrating rather on the development of Far East- ern territories. Two-thirds of Russians make an assumption that in the foreseeable future, namely in 15 or 20 years, the Far East is bound to be the most afuent re- gion of the country. It is quite possible to link this optimism with the currently ta- bled federal proposals regarding the creation of “territories of priority development” in the Far East.

IN YOUR OPINION, IS IT POSSIBLE TO MAKE RUSSIA FAR EAST ONE OF THE MOST DEVELOPED AND PROSPEROUS TERRITORIES OF RUSSIA? All-Russian survey data; % of respondents, VCIOM, 2015

Even today the Russian Far East is one of the most developed Russian territories 5 4 9 5 Yes, this territory may become one of the most prosperous in 15 or 20 years Yes, in a long-term perspective (in 40 or 50 years) 20 this territory can be one of the most developed and prosperous territories of Russia No, it will hardly ever happen 57 I am not interested in any information concerning the Far East Don’t know WHICH OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES IS DEVELOPING

MORE SUCCESSFULLY? 70

Closed-ended question, 20 one answer, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015

10

RUSSIA CHINA DON’T KNOW

As the majority of Russians put it, now China is developing more successful- ly than Russia. It is not a surprise, because the Chinese economic miracle has amazed the whole world. However, Russians may be envious of their former so- cialist partner’s success, as at the end of the 1980s China faced far worse condi- tions as compared to Russia. WHICH OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES HAS MORE POLITICAL

WEIGHT IN THE WORLD ARENA?

Closed-ended question, 65 one answer, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015

21

15

RUSSIA CHINA DON’T KNOW

In spite of China’s achievements, respondents maintain that Russia still has a con- siderable weight in the world. T is can be explained by the fact that China is viewed as an inward-looking civilization, from the cultural and political perspective, rather than a player putting forward its global agenda. 48 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

ALEXEY MASLOV, Professor, Head of the School of Asian Studies, National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Member of executive commitee of Russian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce

On preparation for Russia’s turn to Asia

echnically, the abrupt pivot to the Eastern world is impossible. It is necessary Tto prepare some grounds for it. Russia’s plans to turn to Asia can be traced back at least to the mid-2000s. At that time the elites mused about fostering trade and political ties with the East, particularly, not only with China. Te idea consti- tuted in the fact that Russia should be a regional power playing its own game with Asia. Tis preparation partly brought its positive results. For example, now we have the most comprehensive normative framework for working with China. Incidentally, we started to establish it in the mid-1990s. Yet we are facing major difculties while trying to cement ties with South-Eastern Asia due to the lack of preparation. From my point of view, this process need seven or eight years. It is also worth mentioning that Russia has competitors in the region, for instance, the USA adopted its rebalance to Asia simultaneously with Russia. Te US strategy involves a new foreign policy towards India, changes in the relations with Japan, as well as new stages of negotiat- ing with China. Under such circumstances, Russia should redouble its eforts while paving the way for its turn to Asia.

On China’s place in Russia’s Eastern strategy

China remains a dominant partner. It is our neighbor and the largest trade partner which we have established good political relations with. Nevertheless, our ties are ra- tionalizing, which is linked to China’s economic slowdown and to the fact that China has started to possess itself as a key player in Russia’s political and economic sector. As a result, our friendship is analyzed through a trade and geopolitical prism. Im- proving this situation needs placing China among other competitors. Instead of de- priving China of access to our market we should cement our relations with South Korea and Japan, develop ties with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and reconstruct our partnership with Mongolia and India. In case of implementing these measures our relations with China will be more pragmatic and may promote our friendship. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 49

On the necessity of the mental pivot towards China

Two-thirds of Russia’s territory lie in Asia, with Russia failing to perceive itself as an Asian power from the ethnic and cultural perspective. Under such conditions, it is necessary for us to fnd a niche in the Asian labour division and policies. Accom- plishing this task presupposes tabling adequate and rational proposals. For instance, we should not encourage our Asian partners to invest in building of Russia’s railways by complaining that we do not have enough resources for this. Rather, we should put a premium on the fact that we can share profts and shoulder responsibility while collaborating with Asia. In order to be incorporated into the Eastern economic sys- tem we should change our mentality. For starters, we urgently need a new generation of talented and hardworking cadres.

In order to be incorporated into the Eastern eco- nomic system we should change our mentality. For starters, we urgently need a new generation of tal- ented and hard-working cadres.

On the search for common markets in other countries

Nowadays the East is interested in Russia as a market for importing goods, an export- er of fossil fuels, as well as a transit point to the West. But Russia needs developing its own production. A key to success is the production of good at home and then their transferring to other countries. I believe that Russia may introduce this meas- ure. Russia’s labour costs are much lower than in China. Russia is promoting an idea of creating “territories of priority development” with zero tax rate. Vladivostok has been granted a status of a free port, which means a port zone under a special custom and taxation system, with a particular jurisdiction regarding investments. It is need- ed not only to produce goods and services but to sell them. We should propose our potential partners new markets where we can sell environmentally friendly, as well as raw hydrocarbons deep conversion products, or polymeric materials. Te Far East has only 3 or 4 million would-be consumers at its disposal. Terefore, the production should be not only oriented towards internal consumption, but also exporting. 50 SURPRISING RUSSIA

On stereotyped fears

We know very few details about China, and because of that we have some preju- dices towards its behaviour. For instance, one of the most widespread stereotype implies that the Chinese seek to conquer Russia’s Far East. In reality, Chinese resi- dents do not have any intention to resettle. Tus, it is foolhardy to speak about the demographic threat. It is also irrational to think that China can take over the mar- ket. Since the 1990s, China has invested 6 billion dollars in Russia, which is just a drop in the ocean. For example, China has invested 20 billion dollars in Myanmar, which is still attractive for Chinese enterprises. A further myth concerns the fact that China has always dreamt of seizing Russian swaths. Tis also is not true. China realizes that Russia’s reaction will be strong and is not willing to argue with Russia as a seminal political partner. Te 2001 treaty brought all territorial claims of both countries to an end. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 51

LEONID BLYAKHER, Head of department for philosophy and cultural studies at Pacifc State University, Editor-in-chief of the Politiya magazine

What the Far East needs for its development

ussia’s pivot to the East is quite natural due to geographical location, to name Rjust a few. Te most positive scenario is the development of infrastructure. Te Far East is regarded as a region which desperately need implementing infra- structure projects. Why has timber trade declined? Because now there are no forests along rivers and roads. Te timber transportation has doubled the material’s prime cost. In order to restart these activities we need new roads. Moreover, the region requires modernizing bridges, berthing structures and logistic warehouses. We also are waiting for power stations projects. One of the main challenges for the Far East is expensive power, which has a negative impact on prices and hampers production.

On myths and the current state of affairs

By the year 1993 fea markets got under Chinese control. Te shock of Far Eastern citizens cultivated a myth that the Chinese had occupied everything. Ten the gov- ernment and mass media also started to think the same way. A myth about the Chi- nese danger is a glaring example of how provincial stereotypes can pervade society. In fact, the situation is completely diferent. In the 2000s in the European part of Russia everybody started to think that the Far East had been under the Chinese boot, whereas in the region nobody felt this danger any more. China is becoming indiferent to the Russian Far East. Nowadays it is more ac- tive in Africa and Central Asia. China has already got everything it needs in the Far East. It is illustrated by an agricultural sector in the Amur region, which closely cooperates with Chinese markets. Tat is why now we are facing the issue of how to stir up the Chinese interest in the Far East. 52 SURPRISING RUSSIA

MIDDLE EAST HOTSPOTS

he Russian air campaign in Syria has surprised the world once again and impelled Tothers to reassess the country’s role in the world. Russia took a key proactive role in the Middle East confict.

Military support was provided outside the former Soviet Union, but Russians backed it fully. Te Soviet “international obligation” in Afghanistan evoked a negative public response, while the military operation in Syria was supported by two-thirds of Rus- sians at the onset. Te decision to launch air strikes against terrorists has reafrmed Russia’s “Crimean” claim to be viewed as an independent international actor.

It can in part be accounted for by the decision to opt for airstrikes rather that boots on the ground to avoid combat casualties. Public opinion will depend on the way the situ- ation unfolds, including the ability to prevent military deaths and reduce the growing threat of terrorism

Te confict is perceived by Russians as part of global confrontation. More than half of those surveyed consider steps taken by the US and its allies the root cause of the bloodshed in Syria. Backing President Assad in his fght against the armed op- position and ISIS terrorists, Russia seeks to restore law and order and oppose chaos managed from outside.

Every second Russian voiced his or her support for the Syrian president and the legit- imate government. Two thirds of the respondents believe that Russia’s military strategy seeks to combat and eliminate international terrorism far away from Russian borders.

Russians empathize with Syrian refugees and show respect for European states which have provided asylum. Te voluntary repatriation of refugees is considered the most desirable outcome afer the cessation of violence. Te humanitarian mission should not bring about the dissolution of Old Europe in the fow of Muslim immigrants and its complete demise. I believe that while assuming that Russia may also become the “shel- ter” for those feeing the battlefeld, Russians would like to see their country’s destiny shaped in the same way. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 53

***

he US policy is viewed in Russia as the key root cause of international confict Tin Yugoslavia, Iraq, Ukraine, and now in Syria. Our citizens believe that despite its unequal strength Russia acts a counterweight to America.

A BLOODY WAR IN SYRIA HAS BEEN WAGED FOR FOUR YEARS ALREADY. IN YOUR OPINION, WHO IS TO BLAME FOR THIS WAR? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

U.S. and its allies 56

Oppositon fghtng to establish 14 the Islamic state

President Bashar al-Assad and his allies 7

Oppositon fghtng to create 3 a democratc state in Syria

Russia 0,5

Other 2

Don’t know 19

Two-thirds of Russians would rather support a “preemptive strike” to eliminate the ter- rorist threat in Syria than adopt a wait-and-see approach, and they approve active steps taken by the Russian authorities.

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS DO YOU MOST AGREE WITH? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Russia should abstain from engaging in the Syrian confict 7 not to provoke Islamic terrorists into attacking Russia 29

Russia should engage in the Syrian confict to attack the Islamic terrorists far away from its borders rather than let them penetrate the Russian territory

64 Don’t know 54 SURPRISING RUSSIA

Unlike the Afghan campaign, in Syria Russia has refrained from a ground oper- ation. By minimizing losses airstrikes reduce the risk of public opinion fuctuations and a support decrease during the campaign

HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE DECISION OF RUSSIAN PRESIDENT V. PUTIN TO SEND AIR FORCES TO SYRIA TO FIGHT ISIL? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

7 Strongly approve 12 Quite approve 38 Rather disapprove 15 Strongly disapprove Don’t know

28

Over 50% of the Russians interviewed believe that should Russia support a party to the confict, it should be the legitimate-president. Euromaidan and the Arab Spring vaccinated the Russian society against any “orange revolution” as their immediate out- come stands in sharp contrast to stability at the earlier stage.

WHAT PARTY SHOULD RUSSIA SUPPORT IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

President Bashar al-Assad and his allies 52

Oppositon fghtng Assad 6 to create a democratc state in Syria

Oppositon fghtng Assad to create an Islamic 4 state in Syria and other Muslim states

None 13

Other 2

Don’t know 23 PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 55

Te events around Syria kindle widespread interest, the vast majority of Russians know, for example, about Middle East refugees in the European Union. Russians large- ly tend to empathize and show solidarity with Syrian refugees. Te Middle East confict does not seem too remote and external to our life.

WHAT FEELINGS DO YOU HAVE TOWARDS MIDDLE EAST REFUGEES? Closed-ended question, not more than two answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Sympathy 61

Indiference 21

Respect 5

Liking 4

Dislike 4

Condemnaton 3

Malevolence 1

Other 5

Don’t know 5

Te attitude to the party that accepts refugees is also largely positive, though more restrained. It is a mixture of respect and sympathy. At least one in fve Russians is aware of the difculties Europe has faced.

WHAT FEELINGS DO YOU HAVE TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT ACCEPT THE MIDDLE EAST REFUGEES? Closed-ended question, not more than two answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Sympathy 22

Indiference 22

Respect 29

Liking 11

Dislike 4

Condemnaton 7

Malevolence 2

Other 4

Don’t know 8 IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT SHOULD THE EUROPEAN UNION

DO REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST DISPLACED PERSONS?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

To provide them with everything they need and create conditons for permanent residence in Europe 9

To provide them with everything they need for a certain period of tme tll the end of the Middle East military 60 confict and send them back

To provide them with everything they need but not let them stay in the EU (resetling them in other 7 countries; actng as a transit zone)

To close the borders not letng them enter the EU territory 14

Don’t know 10

Russians do not welcome the idea of the Old Europe dissolution in the endless fow of Muslim immigrants and its complete demise. Most see Europe as a tem- porary shelter for those feeing the battlefeld. IN YOUR OPINION, MAY THE MIDDLE EAST REFUGEES

COME NOT ONLY TO EUROPEAN UNION BUT ALSO TO RUSSIA

DUE TO THE MIDDLE EAST MILITARY CONFLICT?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Unlikely 24

Quite likely 58

Inevitably 13

Don’t know 5

Tat may be linked to the unwillingness of Russians to let Russia turn into a “transit point” for the refugees. Still opinion polls show people’s internal readiness to assist in handling the refugee crisis 58 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

ANDREY SUSHENTSOV, Managing partner, Foreign Policy Analysis Group

On acting to the best of one’s ability

ussia’s military campaign in Syria grabbed public attention worldwide as Rus- Rsia was globally seen as lacking resources to mount a full-scale ofensive. For about two decades Russia has been under-performing. Russia has merely voiced its stance on most international issues, including Syria and Ukraine, but has not efectively promoted it. In Syria, it has adopted a proactive approach. Moreover, a down-to-earth view of the matter reveals that Russia’s military is not over- stretched in Syria. Te planning of the military campaign envisaged virtually absent assistance of external parties and greatest autonomy possible. We hardly depend on the West. Our military resources, which have been built up for years, sufce. Te military operation in Russia virtually adjusts Russian policies to Russian capacities.

On Russian interests in Syria

Russia predominantly seeks to destroy Islamists’ infrastructure. Now they have gained foothold in Syria and Iraq. Tere are at least 4-5 thousand people from the CIS, half of them Russian. A single well-trained and well-equipped person can break fragile peace in certain parts of Russia or the CIS. And a hundred foreign fght- ers returning home would pose a serious threat. Te challenge is to destroy the net- work of training camps and to prevent ISIS from streamlining training. Secondly, Russia aims to back an ally who has access to the Mediterranean Sea. Te support of the Syrian government makes him a reliable partner. It has to do both with both the naval base in the Mediterranean and ofshore energy projects in Syria as well as in Israel or Cyprus. Russia demonstrates its determination to ensure regional secu- rity and safeguard its probable projects. Tirdly, Russia’s objective is to restore its military potential at the largest arms market of the Middle East which is on the rise at the moment. One can sell GLONASS navigation system alongside missiles, ships, jets and helicopters. Fourthly, Russia wants to signal its return as a great power to world politics. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 59

On strategy flexibility

Te Russian strategy is advantageous in that it does not need to end in Russia’s victory. It is vital to achieve the key objective of preventing foreign fghters from returning home. Tis goal looks very likely to be reached. Everything else is desir- able but not mandatory. Te military base in the Mediterranean could be an ex- cellent achievement, but it is possible to do without it. Te ofshore projects seem worthwhile, but are not in the least a must. Restoring Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty would be a formidable achievement, but we are quite ready for the failure as well. Tis range of goals provides room for manoeuvre, but will not result in overstretched resources.

The Russian strategy is advantageous in that it does not need to end in Russia’s victory. It is vital to achieve the key objective of preventing foreign fighters from returning home. This goal looks very likely to be reached.

On Russian allies in Syria

Russia has shown that it is able to project power far from its borders, relying solely on its own resources. In principle, it does not need any allies. We have full support of the Syrian government, which is more than enough. But we were not alone there. Iranians also provide the Syrian state with assistance. Russian missiles few across Iran before they hit the enemy in Syria. Russia and Iran have not formed a military alliance de jure, but de facto we have reached a very deep level of understanding, cooperation and trust. 60 SURPRISING RUSSIA

ALEXANDER IGNATENKO, Expert on Islamic Studies; President, Institute of Religion and Politics

Why Russia needs the Middle East

ussia does not need the Middle East as such. Russia simply seeks to prevent the Rspillover efect in the Middle East. To achieve it, Russian military and political presence is needed in the region alongside other things. Te possible return of Rus- sian citizens afer converting to “mujahideens of the Islamic State” is a way of export- ing terrorism to Russia. Some may say that “mujahideens’” origin can be traced back to internal contradictions. But, I tend to think that they have been exported to Russia since the 1990s and have been produced by conficts in the Middle East.

Who we like in the Middle East

In short, we have a liking for everyone who likes us. And our preferences stem from the balance between pragmatism and “state dignity”. Te sympathetic attitude dis- appears when someone dares to encroach on it. It was the case with Turkey, which by downing the Russian bomber in November 2015committed an act of hostility against our state.

We have a liking for everyone who likes us. And our preferences stem from the balance between prag- matism and “state dignity”.

Who to blame for the Middle East conflict

History is to blame for the Middle East confict. It is a tangle of conficts. Saudi Ara- bia and Iran come into a confict in Sirak – that is how the territory of Syria and Iraq must be called as they geopolitically constitute one region. Sirak is also the strong- hold of the Islamic state. Each state draws its allies, both regional powers and great powers. Turkey promotes its doctrine of “neo-Ottomanism” and seeks to realize its imperial aspirations to regain control of Syria and Iraq under the pretext of fght- PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 61 ing against terrorism. While doing it, Turkey depicts Kurds rather than the Islamic State, which it openly and covertly supports and sponsors, as terrorists. Another important pretext is the “protection” of the Turkish population in Sirak. Te “Islamic State” is a most powerful trigger of the Middle East confict. Also mind regional liberation movements, including Kurds, Berbers, Baluch tribes, Copts, etc.

On reasons why Russian society approves of engagement in the Middle East War

Two trends, the public approval of the fght against the Islamic state and the highest approval rating of the president – are interlinked and interdependent. It part it can be attributed to the inertia of the masses, the bitter legacy of the Soviet Union. Such cli- chés as “the just cause of the Arab peoples” and “malicious West’ are deeply entrenched in the perception of senior citizens. Orthodox Russians point to the persecution of Christians in Sirak and stand behind the Russian authorities’ decision to sanction air-strikes against the Islamic State, which oppresses and kills Christians. Patriotic Russians – many of them are quite young – re- gard the Russian military campaign as power projection. Te only way to resolve the Middle East confict is to form an international coalition under the auspices of the UN Security Council and ensure the participation of the Sun- ni Islamic powers. Tat is what Russia seeks to achieve 62 SURPRISING RUSSIA

YAN VASLAVSKIY, Director, Rethinking Russia, International Analytical Center

On the unique nature of the Russian campaign

n 2015 Russia launched a military campaign to restore stability in Syria and to fght Iagainst international terrorism. Only Russia operates within the framework of in- ternational law. Te Syrian authorities sent a formal request. Russia considered it ap- propriate to respond by sending its air forces to Syria. Sadly, Russia’s eforts to support legitimate regimes are considered illogical by our partners.

Only Russia operates within the framework of in- ternational law.

On the role of the Middle East

Te Middle East is important for process management on the global scale, not merely in Europe or Asia. It is vital as it is rich in natural resources, which largely determines the stability of energy supplies and afects the trends in world oil and gas prices. It is a melting pot of peoples, cultures, languages, religions, which peacefully coexisted at diferent stages in history. But, unfortunately, the region is ofen ridden with civil strife.

On the Middle East context of the campaign

Over the 4 years, none of the parties to the Syrian civil war has gained a tangible advantage. Tousands of civilians have died, the terror threat is growing, posed predominantly by ISIS, as well as other extremist groups, like Te al-Nusra Front. Tey solely aim to spread terror and chaos further. ISIS plans to expand its caliphate to as far as Lisbon, and all those 4 year the group has only been expanding its reach and accumulating ever more power. When the operation was launched, Bashar al-Assad’s prospects were bleak. Te strikes launched by Americans and their allies PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 63 which have been targeting ISIS for over a year, have not produced any visible efect. It can partly be accounted for by the unwillingness to destroy the identifed targets on the ISIS territory.

On Russia’s pragmatism

Russia assesses threats to its security and global security realistically. Ofen Amer- icans are praised for their pragmatism, but Russia turned out to be more pragmatic this time. I mean the balanced assessment of the threat and the steps which take into account the risks, but at the same time are most efcient. Restraint complements pragmatism. Our partners ofen lack it and are eager to wipe out undesirable regimes, to topple and overthrow everyone and everything. Departing they leave behind them chaos and civil strife. Te pragmatic and cautious approach contributes to the ef- ciency of Russia’s foreign policy.

On the prospects of se!ling the Syrian problem

Russia’s military campaign in Syria aims to eliminate the terrorist threat, which will be followed by the restoration of order in the country. Te legitimate govern- ment of Bashar al-Assad and everyone willing to cooperate with him will undertake the task. Unfortunately, we are unlikely to see Syria return to its former borders. Today, the aim is to return to the negotiating table. We go back to where we started and to what Russia called for a few years ago - a peaceful dialogue. Support granted to Bashar al-Assad is not an end in itself. Many accused Russia of interfering with the Muslim confict, backing the Shiites and working jointly with, for example, Iran and Iraq. But we do not cooperate with religious communities. We deal with specifc states and governments. We stand for secular government, and our strategy in Syria revolves around this idea. Te most desirable outcome of the peace talks would be elections of the next leader. We must create the conditions for Syrians to have their say. PART 2 FACE TO FACE WITH THE WEST WE AND THE WORLD: UKRAINE: FAMILY CONFLICT? COOPERATION RUSSIA’S PIVOT TO ASIA: WHAT ARE OUR EXPECTATIONS? AND CONFRONTATION MIDDLE EAST HOTSPOTS

AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, ITS FOUNDATIONS AND ROLE IN SOCIETY HISTORICAL MEMORY AND STATE SYMBOLS CAN WE RELY CRIMEA IS OURS: WHEN THERE IS NO ROOM FOR QUESTIONS ON THE STATE?

DEFENSE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: ARMY AND POLICE

DEFENDING OURSELVES. LIFE UNDER SANCTIONS. THE YEAR OF CRISIS: CRISIS: ADAPTATION STRATEGY STRESS-RESISTANCE TEST

RUSSIA’S QUALITY OF LIFE FAMILY AND SOCIETY: TRADITION AND MODERNITY TRADITIONAL VALUES SACRED AND PROFANE: CHANGING BOUNDARIES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES HOW WE PERCEIVE “CULTURE” INFORMATION SOURCES: POPULARITY AND TRUST 66 SURPRISING RUSSIA

AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, ITS FOUNDATIONS AND ROLE IN SOCIETY

n 2015 Vladimir Putin’s approval rating set a new record amid the serious eco- Inomic crisis and falling living standards. Tis fact was confrmed by all polling institutions and did not provoke any considerable skepticism among specialists.

Russia’s political agenda managed to compensate for the adverse infuence of ex- ternal factors, such as soaring oil prices and Western sanctions. Te mobilization impetus of the Crimean spring was upheld by the Middle Eastern strategy, which shook the whole world.

A political course to maintain transparent elections breathed new life into the po- litical domain of Russia’s region. Te anticorruption campaign, which resulted in ar- resting one of the governors, demonstrated that curbing corruption was no longer at an impasse. Movements and groups opposing the regime were considerably os- tracised by mainstream politics.

At the same time, people started to put more trust in institutions and ofcials. Te opinion surveys indicated that many people were aware of the structure of Pu- tin’s team and did not see any necessity in changing it. Against the backdrop of the economic crisis, it was the frst time the expectation index had reached its peak over the 15 years.

Te government may have managed to synchronize their policies with society’s internal processes, involving a desire to acquire a new identity or fnd its niche in the world. Te accession of Crimea, a very small piece of land compared to main- land Russia, contributed to the changes in Russia’s development. Te feeling that the government was able to respond to people’s needs and demands laid the foun- dation for a readiness to accept all transactions and problems afer this fateful de- cision.

A new map of popular sentiments, which is fundamentally diferent from the sit- uation two years ago, has been drawn. All these events have heralded a new page in Russia’s history. PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 67

VLADIMIR PUTIN: THREE YEARS AFTER THE ELECTIONS

otwithstanding diferent predictions, a year afer Crimea’s incorporation into NRussia Vladimir Putin’s rating failed to decrease. On the contrary, through- out his 15 years at the center of Russian political life his 2015 rating was the highest one. Te consolidation over the foreign policy agenda proved to be a very efective strategy.

TRUST TOWARDS PUTIN AND APPROVAL OF HIS WORK % of respondents. VCIOM, 2015

90 88 80 79 80 79 76 74 73 73 73 68 68 66 64 64 65 56 57 58 59 45 53 53 55 53 55 54 48 49 45 47 46

23 Trust towards Putin Approval of Putin’s work 0

III.01 III.02 III.03 III.04 III.05 III.06 III.07 III.08 III.09 III.10 III.11 III.12 III.13 III.14 III.15

Te high rating of the president signifes, in the frst place, his achievements and suc- cess, which is underpinned by a higher level of respect for him over the last three years. Te 2014-2015 economic difculties failed to make people reconsider their opinion.

WHAT FEELINGS DO YOU HAVE FOR VLADIMIR PUTIN TODAY? Сlosed-ended question, not more than two responses. VCIOM, 2015

31 Respect 44 29 Hope 33 20 Trust 30 Liking 13 12 6 Admiraton 10 Indiference 9 5 Disappointment 13 3 Distrust 12 3 Skeptcism 5 2 Condemnaton 6 1 Disliking 5 1 January 2012 Hatred 1 0 March 2015 Don’t know 6 2 68 SURPRISING RUSSIA

Te majority of people believe that under Putin’s presidency their hopes have been fulflled.

HAVE YOUR HOPES REGARDING PUTIN BEEN FULFILLED OVER HIS TERM IN OFFICE? Closed-ended question, one answer. VCIOM, 2015

Defnitely yes 4 13 21 Rather yes Rather no 5 Defnitely no 9 I had no hopes Don’t know

47

Despite a widespread opinion about Putin’s personalized power, the overwhelm- ing majority of citizens think that the president has his own team, which he can rely on. Te high rating of Russia’s leader has a positive impact on his colleagues viewed primarily as like-minded people and professionals. Tus, the stereotype of the West- ern mass media about “Putin’s friends” in power cannot command broad popular support.

WHAT PEOPLE MAKE THE BULK OF PUTIN’S INNER CIRCLE? Closed-ended question, one response, % of those who believe that Putin has his own team. VCIOM, 2015

Like-minded people 37

Professionals 37

Friends and acquintances whom the president trust 13

Don’t know 13 PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 69

Over the recent three years, people have started to think diferently about the ne- cessity to recruit new members of Putin’s teams: while three years ago nearly 50% spoke for its renewal, nowadays the majority believe that Putin should preserve his team as it is.

SHOULD VLADIMIR PUTIN RETAIN THE CURRENT COMPOSITION OF THE TEAM OR RENEW HIS PERSONNEL? Closed-ended question, one response, %. VCIOM, 2015 2012 54 2015 47

30 25 23 21

It is necessary It is beter to retain Don’t know to radically renew the team as it is the personnel

Amid the economic stagnation, a higher rating of the government is quite an unu- sual phenomenon for Russian realities. It is the frst time the expectation index has set a record since 2000. We can assume that the stable economic situation in spring, as well as Putin’s approval of economic steps of the cabinet played their part.

EXPECTATION INDEX Expectation Index is based on the question “In your opinion, is the current Russian government capable of achieving any positive changes in the country in the near future, or not?» and shows the levels of expectations from the government. The index is calculated as a diference between positive and negative answers, measured in points and can vary between -100 and 100. The higher the value of Index is, the more confdence Russians have in the Russian government. VCIOM, 2015

30 25 25 20 15 15 10 7 8 4 5 0 -5 -3 -6 -7 -10 -8 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2010 2012 2013 2015 Putn’s Cabinet Putn’s Fradkov’s Cabinet Cabinet Fradkov’s Kasyanov’s Cabinet Cabinet Kasyanov’s Cabinet Kasyanov’s Cabinet Kasyanov’s Cabinet Kasyanov’s Medvedev’s Cabinet Cabinet Medvedev’s Cabinet Medvedev’s Cabinet Medvedev’s APPROVAL OF VLADIMIR PUTIN’S WORK

% of respondents. VCIOM, 2015 90 88

61 62

October October October October 2012 2013 2014 2015

T e high rating of the president contributes to the government’s rating, which can be seen above. T e approval rating which became rising in spring 2014 hit a record high of almost 90 percent in October 2015. USING THE FIVE-POINT SCALE ASSESS, PLEASE, ASSESS THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT

Closed-ended question, one response, average. VCIOM, 2015 3,67 3,49

3,19 3,21

2012 2013 2014 2015

Society’s assessment of the cabinet’s work is also related to solid support of the state. Over the recent three years the number of people who are satisf ed with the cabi- net’s activities has been constantly increasing. Nowadays, if we analyse the cabinet’ functioning through the f ve-point scale, we will see that the integral estimation has shif ed from “average” to “good” indicators. 72 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

STEPAN LVOV, Head of VCIOM Political Research Department

On the outcomes of political reshuffling

n 2015 Russia surprised me particularly by a high level of the political system’s Ilegitimacy. Te indicator of trust in Russia’s federal government represented by the president has achieved its peak. Of course, it does not result from the 2014 foreign policy events. In 2015, the state summarized the outcomes of all political processes, which started four years ago. In 2011 subjective factors played their part, thus pushing people into taking to the streets to voice their opposition. At that moment the elites began pondering about the potential threats to stability in the country and in the end, they took some responsible and decisive steps. Tese moves could be viewed as a hand reset of the po- litical machine that promoted gradual democratization of social and political insti- tutions. For instance, Russia witnessed the return of elections for regional governors with the aim of bringing about more openness in government. Tis adjustment en- abled governors to strengthen their positions and shape a more efective regional policy. Te second dimension includes dealing with opposition parties. Te 2015 regional elections demonstrated that the weight of political parties was increasing and that they were able to infuence the electoral processes. Above all, the system opposition, which encourages the emergence of a real multi-party system, is gathering momen- tum. As regards the anti-system opposition, it still does not enjoy any popularity among Russian citizens.

On democracy and authoritarianism

The wholesale democratic transformations initiated by Russia’s government led to ferce disagreements about the character of Russia’s political system. Te slow rotation of cadres has always been a boon to those who want to label the state as authoritarian. However, in Russian people’s minds the rotation at a fed- eral level is not a key criterion of democracy. Citizens believe that it is tantamount to changes in the trajectory of Russia’s development and if they endorse the current PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 73 political courses, they do not see any necessity in replacing particular parties or pol- iticians. On a regional scale, closer analysis reveals that Russians accept the practice of rotating cadres. From my perspective, Russia’s political system rests upon the principles of direct democracy. In the Western world, there are various social and political agents, which articulate their own interests and infuence decision-making. Our institutions are not strong enough to carry out such a function. Tus, the state reaches out to society. Te accession of Crimea did not need any political parties, institutions or interest groups, because the government consulted with society directly.

Over the long haul, we have been insulted by a statement that our state is not flexible and capable of heeding its people’s needs. However, it does not reflect the reality. Russia’s state may re- spond to various requests made by its citizens.

On government’s responsiveness and consensus

In order to efectively employ the mechanism of direct democracy, the government, on the one hand, should know its society’s aspirations, and on the other hand, con- stantly communicate with it. Over the long haul, we have been insulted by a state- ment that our state is not fexible and capable of heeding its people’s needs. However, it does not refect the reality. Russia’s state may respond to various requests made by its citizens. Society’s trust in the state is conditional upon diferent achievements. Very few people might avoid criticizing the state, but in certain periods all people come to a compromise. Indeed, it turns out that most citizens have similar beliefs and ide- as, but it does not hinge on any state intervention. Te forming of national idea and identity is all about history. 74 SURPRISING RUSSIA

RUSSIA’S PROBLEMS AND WAYS OF TACKLING THEM

ussian citizens are wary of material, rather than political problems. Tey ex- Rpress their great concern about their spending capacity, labour market, as well as higher tarifs for housing and utilities services.

WHAT SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS EXIST IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD / CITY / RURAL AREA TODAY? Open-ended question, any number of answers, % of those who think that the acute problems exist. TOP 10 PROBLEMS, VCIOM, 2015

High infaton, price increase 28 Low salaries, low living standards 13 High tarifs for housing and utlites services 12 Unemployment 11 Road conditon 7 Health services 5 Corrupton and bureaucracy 3 Unafordable housing 3 Development of infrastructure 3 Low pension, pension reform 3

Russian society is not inclined to come into conficts; there are no demands for changes through revolutions. Almost one-quarter of our citizens believe that it is rea- sonable to be engaged in mass protests in order to solve problems in their region.

IN YOUR OPINION, ARE THE PROBLEMS IN YOUR NEIGHBOURHOOD / CITY / RURAL AREA SO ACUTE THAT THEY CANNOT BE SOLVED WITHOUT RALLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS? Closed-ended question, one answer. VCIOM, 2015

No acute problems 36

There are serious social problems 26 but they can be solved without rallies

There are serious social problems and rallies 16 would help solve them

The problems are so serious 8 that they cannot be solved without protest actons

Don’t know 14 PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 75

Very few Russians would like a Ukrainian Maidan to take place in Russia.

CERTAIN RUSSIANS WOULD LIKE A UKRAINIAN MAIDAN TO BE REPEATED IN RUSSIA; OTHERS BELIEVE HAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE. DO YOU WANT EUROMAIDAN-TYPE RIOTS TO HAPPEN IN RUSSIA? Сlosed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

4 2

Rather yes Rather no Don’t know

94

Russians who imagine such a scenario are mostly not in favour of Euromaidan-type uprisings.

IN YOUR OPINION, ARE MASS PROTESTS SIMILAR TO THE UKRAINIAN MAIDAN RIOTS N 2014 POSSIBLE IN RUSSIA? Сlosed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

15

9 Rather yes Rather no Don’t know

76 76 SURPRISING RUSSIA

One of the most powerful levers at people’s disposal is local elections, which, in their turn, contribute to the development of civil society. At a local level, the turn- out has failed to undergo signifcant changes over the course of the recent fve years. Tis year one in two eligible people participated in such elections.

DID YOU PERSONALLY TAKE PART IN ELECTIONS? Closed-ended question, one response, % of citizens in those regions where the elections were held. VCIOM, 2015

Yes, our city/rural area conducted the elections and I participated in them

49 51 Yes, our city/rural area conducted the elections and I participated in them

A higher level of trust in the election process is accompanied by the awareness of fu- tile mass protests and anti-Maidan sentiments. Te number of citizens, who participate in elections on a regular basis, remain the same to account for 50%. In this case, Russia is closer to the USA, but lags behind Germany and France.

ELECTION SATISFACTION INDEX Election Satisfaction Index is based on the question: “Are you rather satisfed or not with the electoral procedure on Russia’s Eection Day?” and shows Russian’s satisfaction with the electoral outcomes. The index is calculated as a diference between positive and negative answers, measured in points and can vary between -100 and 100. VCIOM, 2015

22

19

13

11

3

2009 2010 2012 2013 2015 PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 77

Te number of people who are happy with the results of the regional elections on September 13, 2015 are three times higher than the number of the dissatisfed.

IN GENERAL, ARE YOU SATISFIED OR NOT WITH THE ELECTORAL PROCEDURE ON SEPTEMBER 13? Closed-ended question, % of citizens, in those regions where the elections were held. VCIOM, 2015

I am fully satisfed 11 23 I am quite satisfed I am rather dissatisfed 27 I am completely dissatisifed I cannot assess, because i do not know the outcomes 23 I don’t know 8 8

If Russians positively assess their leadership’s activities, it does not necessarily mean that they are totally blind to the relevant issues of our society. Curbing corruption is still on the agenda. Our fellow citizens believe that bribery is omnipresent, although in your own community this problem may seem minor.

HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION? Closed-ended question, one response, %. VCIOM, 2015

Very high 33 26

High 40 33 20 Average 24

Low 2 6

I believe there is no corrupton 0 1 5 Don’t know 10 In society as a whole In our community INDEX OF FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION Index of Fight against Corruption refects how successful the eforts of the country` leadership are. The higher the value of index is, the more efective the measures are. The index is based on the question “The country` leadership is constantly talking about the need to combat cor- ruption. Have you seen any results of these measures over a year?”; index is measured in scores and can vary between 0 and 100. VCIOM, 2015 5 -6 -8 -14 -14 -14

-35

2005 2006 2007 2008 2012 2013 2015

Russian society is becoming more cognizant of the leadership’s activities aimed at combating corruption. Various court cases against Russia’s governors have been a tangible proof of attacking corruption at a federal level. It is the frst time the in- dex of fght against corruption has overcome a zero mark and reached positive 5 points. THE COUNTRY`S LEADERSHIP IS CONSTANTLY TALKING ABOUT

THE NEED TO COMBAT CORRUPTION. OVER THE RECENT YEAR, HAVE YOU

MENTIONED ANY RESULTS OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES

Closed-ended question, one response, average. 39% VCIOM, 2015 33%

12% 11%

5%

Yes, lots of There are certain No real results; Situat on Don’t know ef orts are being results but they nothing has is get ng worse; made to combat are unimportant changed corrupt on corrupt on intensif es

T is year almost 50% of Russians have seen the results of curbing corruption, even though only one in ten people regard them as signif cant. T e rest assume that the government’s ef orts to get rid of bribery has come to nothing. 80 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

JOSEPH DISKIN, Deputy head of the expert council of VCIOM, Co-chairman of the National Strategy Council

On the nature of power in Russia

cannot say that the year 2015 has surprised me somehow, but this year Russians have Iexhibited a high level of trust in the state. Long time ago I put forward a theory that argues that Russia’s system of rule is based on a convention, a specifc contract on how key institutions should work. It is noticeable that our president tends to open up new felds for those who adhere to the convention, thus making them more autonomous. From my point of view, 2015 is characterized by promoting this very independence. For instance, the Central Bank has gained considerable independence and started to re- voke licenses of banks incapable of meeting regulatory standards or enmeshed in mon- ey-laundering activities, which is a vivid illustration of what is happening in Russia. As far as Russia’s elites are concerned, they are also becoming more independent from Vladimir Putin. While three years ago he was ready to arbitrate between the competing interests, nowadays his message is the following: “Go, reach a consensus and address all problems on your own”. It is noteworthy that law is increasingly transforming into a convincing argument, with the president paying closer attention to this domain.

On power and the majority

Does government shape the majority or just follow them? In Russia, these two elements are part of an interlinked process. Te majority has rather a narrow agenda, includ- ing salaries, prices, pensions, living standards, as a whole. It is also important to add to this mix national pride. Te current government is going to great lengths to secure the majority’s support, for instance through sacrifcing economic growth for high em- ployment rate. In this case, the majority are fully aware of the fact that their success is conditional upon their own eforts, but pose as subjects who need the nanny state. Under such circumstances, an unspoken social contract is concluded: the many want their government to permanently make concessions, and the state, in its turn, is not willing to express its determination, as it fears to lose the majority’s support. Tis social agreement cannot be regarded as a very dynamic one. PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 81

I am rather dejected about the fact that stability prevails over development. Te fo- cus is supposed to be shifed from a question, to what extent the political system expresses voters’ will, to a question, how it pursues the interests of society. It is high time we entered a new stage of political development. We need to elaborate the in- struments of social mobilization, so society will have to change its socio-economic behaviour. Nowadays there are many young people, who are very initiative and are ready to ta- ble their plans. It is exemplifed in a situation with ONF (All-Russia People’s Front) activists. Yet there are no mechanisms, which can support people with their projects. Incidentally, such citizens may set a good example to others, recruit the electorate or fulfll other valuable functions. At a national level, politicians realize it, while gov- ernors and mayors fail to do this.

It is high time we entered a new stage of political development. We need to elaborate the instru- ments of social mobilization, so society will have to change its socio-economic behaviour.

On the future of Russia’s regime

I suppose that with greater independence control functions will be performed. For example, the Accounts chamber of the Russian Federation, as well as Russia’s par- liament are tightening their control over the situation. Te All-Russia People’s Front behaves like a dog, which can really bite: moreover, it has already bitten to death the governor of Russia’s Sakhalin. Tis implies that regional elites will have to comply with all the terms of the con- tract, in other words, to obey law and order. I believe that through more considerable autonomy of diferent players a new mechanism of the regional establishment’s con- solidation has come into existence. Instead of reaching Moscow’s ofcials, it is more important to reach a new understanding at home. 82 SURPRISING RUSSIA

ALEXEY CHAADAEV, Director General of the “Moscow Region” think tank

On paradoxical democratization

he recent emergence of colourful speakers in those ministries and departments, Twhich avoided publicity before, can be regarded as the most curious phenom- enon. Te state represented by some ofcials acts as a blogger. Tis suggests that Russia’s government is confdent about its own strategy and appeals to the majority. Only in case of mass support it is possible to interact with the aggressive online space on the basis of the “Millions of people are ours” principle. Te second remarkable phenomenon of 2015 is the following: amid the external pressures, our country is witnessing the rise of party competition, competitive elec- tions, freedom of expression and other factors that tend to be associated with parlia- mentary democracy. Te reason for this is quite clear: Russia’s state needs a broader coalition, which will comprise not only those who have always approved of gov- ernment, but also those, who have opposed and will oppose Russia’s foreign policy. Democracy has started to be portrayed not as an imposed system, but as our own instrument of internal self-government, which we place a high value on, regardless of what our “partners” think and write. In the year 2015, it is normal for people to espouse Putin, be patriot of your na- tive country, but at the same time, cast your ballots for an opposition party. If we have arrived at broad consensus over Russia’s foreign policy, why cannot we compete while tackling various internal issues, such as elaborating economic strategy, pro- moting social progress or developing infrastructure? Tese problems are considered to be of electoral importance.

On Vladimir Putin’s image

Te rating of Russia’s leader is still extremely high, but the domestic policy sphere is undergoing so called de-personifcation, which is closely linked to the changes in generations. It seems to me that Vladimir Putin, in the frst place, is a leader of his our fathers’ generation, which managed to survive the post-Soviet transition period, double socialization and in the end got back on its feet. From the demographic per- spective, there are many of them; what is more, they belong to the ranks of the most active voters and continue condemning the 1990s. PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 83

However, these is one more generation of “children” who were born before the Pe- restroika period. Tey also attach particular importance to patriotic values, which the Crimean consensus demonstrates. At the same time, they have more demands and view democracy as an obligatory element of their life. Tey perceive the state as a faceless mechanism of rendering services. If they do not like something, they usually say: “Give me a complaint book, please” or “Call a manager, please”. Both generations trust the Russian leader in their own way. For “fathers” pow- er is highly personalized and they put a premium on Putin’s personal experience, whereas “children” see Putin as a key operator of the state’s machine. In other words, there is a mechanism with diferent levers and buttons, and the Russian president has access to its console. Putin is capable of fulflling these two roles. Te history under the “Putin is young and strong” title has required renewed importance. We can see T-shirts and jackets with our president’s portraits everywhere. Undoubtedly, Putin’s brand as a symbol of Russia is still attractive.

Democracy has started to be portrayed not as an imposed system, but as our own instrument of internal self-government.

On power and the majority

Under his presidency, Vladimir Putin has failed to heed the majority very few times. A key illustration is the case of death penalty: at that time, Vladimir Putin instituted a moratorium, while the many accepted this measure as an appropriate one. However, it was the rarest case. In most cases decision-making is heavily dependent on the majority will. Govern- ment acts in advance, which can explain the rating of 80%. Elections are transforming into a prolongation of social contract between the state and society, rather than into a means of a feedback between these two players. 84 SURPRISING RUSSIA

HISTORICAL MEMORY AND STATE SYMBOLS

tate and national symbols are powerful condensation symbols as they evoke Semotions in a citizen and condense them into one sign or act. Tey condense citizens’ perception of a state and a nation, remembrances of the past and promises of the future. In Russia, a new fag, emblem and anthem replaced the Soviet sym- bols, most powerful symbolic systems of the XX century. New symbols could not give a clear picture of the future to the public while marking a break with the past.

During Putin’s frst presidential term the authorities sought to reconcile social diferences, putting emphasis on the continuity with the previous stages of develop- ment and intergenerational continuity. Russia kept the national red-white-and-blue fag, but readopted the Victory Banner as the Red Army ofcial fag. Tey used the Soviet anthem but suggested new lyrics, while again granting the status of the of- cial symbol of Russia to the melody. Tis policy has borne fruit.

Te polls show that “war of symbols” is over in a number of cases. Te most persuasive evidence is the unanimity in the assessment of the Great Patriotic War. Te “Immortal regiment” march received support and approbation of the vast ma- jority of Russians. It turned out that the victory of 1945 is able to stir historical memory and evoke the sense of unity of the people. Tis symbol stands for all the core values which the Russians would like to preserve.

However, continuity, including intergenerational one, does not imply a wish to re- store or preserve all remnants of the Soviet past or those of earlier historical periods. Surveys reveal that new festivals such as the Day of Russia gradually take root and start to perform a consolidating function. State symbols adopted in the post-Soviet times become more meaningful over time. And the Russians more ofen see them- selves as one people, united by common values and common history. PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 85

***

new vision of Russia’s role in the world impacted on the perception of state sym- Abols: the approbation has reached new highs this year. Te Crimea referendum on whether to join Russia was held under the national tricolour fag, which for many Russians began to symbolize “Russian victory.” Most Russians overfow with pride and admiration at the sight of national symbols, and this year the feeling is stronger than ever.

WHAT DO YOU FEEL WHEN YOU SEE STATE SYMBOLS? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

67 Pride, admiraton 69 72 16 Liking 16 13 13 Indiference, nothing 11 11 0,5 Anger, shame 0 0 1 State fag Antpathy 0 1 State emblem 3 Don’t know 3 2 State anthem

However, enthusiasm about Russia’s symbols is not accompanied by the rejec- tion of others. Against the backdrop of the ban of Soviet and Communist symbols in the Baltic countries and Ukraine, Russians are tolerant towards other symbols. Swastika is the only exception; two-thirds of the population would like to see this symbol banned.

IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD THE FOLLOWING SYMBOLS BE REPRODUCED OR REUSED IN RUSSIA? Closed-ended question, one answer per each line, %. VCIOM, 2015

Swastka 62 19 20 Ukrainian coat of arms 46 16 Six-pointed star of David 50 12 Muslim crescent 55 9 UN 55 7 Red fve-pointed star 68 7 Hammer and sickle 72

It should be banned It should not be banned 86 SURPRISING RUSSIA

Te attitude to public holidays is changing. It takes time for holidays with short history, such as the Day of Russia to take root, which is quite typical of the celebra- tions, introduced “from above”. However, over ten years there have been tangible improvements in the public vision of that date.

ON JUNE 12 WE CELEBRATE THE ADOPTION OF THE RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN 1990. WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DAY OF RUSSIA? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

It is a holiday as that day Russia opted for democracy 16 27 and market economy

It is a holiday as since that day Russia was no longer obliged 10 to provide assistance to the former Soviet republics 16

I do not think this holiday is important, 19 as I do not understand what it means 12

This is a tragic day for Russia as it marked the frst step 11 to the dissoluton of the USSR 11

I do not care at all about the meaning; 39 it is nothing but a day of 28

Don’t know 5 6

2005 2015

June 12 is ever more ofen perceived as a holiday by the public, but many Russians still tend to consider it another day of. One in ten still calls the day tragic as it marked the frst step to the dissolution of the USSR. Te question about the Soviet Union is still one of the most delicate issues.

IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD THE DAY OF RUSSIA BE A PUBLIC HOLIDAY? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

24 Yes, it should No, it should not 45 Don’t know

30 PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 87

In recent years new traditions for old holidays have emerged, frst of all, linked to the Victory Day. Tey include a moment of silence during the military parade, the ribbons attached to one’s clothes or car, and fnally the march of soldiers’ relatives with their portraits along the streets of cities. Te family history of most Russians is inextricably linked to the Great Patriot- ic War, and nearly half of Russians know the details from the stories of their rel- atives or family archives. New traditions contribute to the fact that the memories of the most important victory for the nation are stirred over and over again.

DID ANY OF YOUR RELATIVES TAKE PART IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR? IF THEY DID, DO YOU KNOW ANY DETAILS ABOUT THEIR LIFE IN THAT PERIOD? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Yes, I know a lot about it from the stories or family archives (letters, photos) 6 1 9 I know that they took part, but I am unaware of the details

46 No one in my family took part in it

38 I don’t know if any relatives took part in it Don’t know

Te vast majority of Russians knew about the “Immortal regiment” march, and 13% of the respondents participated in it. For most Russian citizens it was a tribute to the memory of the dead, a gratitude to the warrior heroes. Only few considered that it was politically motivated (boost to patriotism, etc.).

WHY WAS THE “IMMORTAL REGIMENT” MARCH ORGANIZED, IN YOUR OPINION? Open-ended question, any number of answers, %. VCIOM, 2015

To remember those dead, to remember the war 73 To bring up the youth 5 To pay tribute to all our soldiers 4 To boost patriotsm 4 To unite people 2 For the veterans 1 To prevent wars 1 To prevent the distorton of history 1 Other 5 Don’t know 12 HAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE SUGGESTIONS

TO MAKE THE “IMMORTAL REGIMENT” MARCH

IMPORTANT PART OF MAY 9 CELEBRATIONS

AND HOLD IT ACROSS RUSSIA?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

I quite support it 93

I am somewhat against it 3

Don’t know 4

Te idea to hold the “Immortal regiment” marches across Russia and make them part of the May 9 ofcial celebrations, is supported by the vast majority of Rus- sians. Tey were initiated by ordinary people, but gained popularity across Russia and the state helped them gain momentum. Te head of the state contributed signifcantly to the growth of their popularity. Vladimir Putin headed the Mos- cow “Immortal regiment” march with a portrait of his father. IS THERE NATIONAL UNITY IN RUSSIA, TO YOUR MIND?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. Yes VCIOM, 2015 No Don’t know 56 54 44 35 35 23 21 21 11

2012 2014 2015

Te changing trends in Russian citizens’ opinions about national unity reveal a dramatic shif of sentiment over the past two years. Te feeling of national unity which has arisen over such a short period of time is clearly associated with shared values that have been clearly outlined in the political agenda in recent years. Difcult times brought about national unity. 90 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

VLADIMIR RUDAKOV, Member of the Advisory Board, Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research (ISEPR Foundation), Editor-in-chief, “Historian” journal

On Growing Respect for Constitutional Symbols

ver recent years respect for state symbols has surged in Russia. Tis is can Olargely be accounted for by growing respect for the native country, for Rus- sian foreign and domestic policies to handle serious socio-economic problems to minimize the adverse efect of the crisis. As it may sound pompous, but I still think that people have come to believe that symbols are not just pretty pictures, or colored lines on the fag, or a solemn melody and sound lyrics. Tey have come to believe that these symbols stand for values that are relevant to the vast majority of people in our country. Tey also share these values,including justice, unity, de- velopment and security. We have observed enthusiasm and sincerity of people sing- ing the national anthem over recent years. We can see their pride when they look at the Russian Federation fag. In 2014 many citizens celebrated the reunifcation of the Crimea with Russia by hanging Russian national fags out of the windows and on the balconies. I believe it marked the starting point of growing sense of na- tional identity and reverence for state symbols which one can be, should be and need to be proud of.

On Symbolism of “Immortal Regiment”

Apart from symbols developed at the state level, there are symbols created by so- ciety itself. In this context we should mention symbols associated with the Victo- ry Day. Te frst symbol, “Ribbon of Saint George,” is already deeply entrenched in society. A new one, the “Immortal Regiment” march, emerged during the 70th anniversary of the victory. It is a symbol of deep national communion because almost every Russian family gives special prominence to memories of the war. But this is not just a symbol of the victory, the memory of those who fought and of great sacrifce paid to crash the most dangerous and odious enemy. It is also a symbol of the emerging nation, with glorious past and optimism about the future. I think that it is the most important symbol of all the new ones. It is no coincidence that PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 91 so many people marched along the streets with portraits of their relatives. And I think that in the future the number of such people will only grow.

Over the past 15 years Russia has turned from a ge- opolitical stump into a full-fledged subject of inter- national law. It has developed its own vision of it- self and its national dignity.

One the Word “Russia” as a Modern Symbol

I would call the word “Russia” the most important symbol of the “Putin times.” Nat- urally, Russia existed before Putin. One was able to fnd it on the map; one could go there and come back. But the Russia of the1990s, sad as it may sound, was merely a bleeding part of a single body, which was called the Soviet Union. It was a crippled national entity, torn apart by conficts along its borders (that was the case of Chech- nya) and characterized by de facto missing legal, tax, and political systems, by groups monopolizing and privatizing the economy, by the abject army, and by abandoned science and culture. Tis state was prone to further self-destruction. Over the past 15 years Russia has turned from a geopolitical stump into a full- fedged subject of international law. It has developed its own vision of itself and its national dignity. In this sense, Putin has demonstrated to the world and our citizens the country, which the majority of our citizens would like to see. So now, when people say “Russia”, they mean a diferent thing, with the meaning developed over the last decade and a half. 92 SURPRISING RUSSIA

RUSTAM RAKHMATULLIN, Novelist; Winner, ‘Big Book” award

On “Russian Spring” as the Restoration of the Flag

ur fag was presented in the “Russian spring”. Apart from Sevastopol and Kerch, Othe fag was demonstrated in Novorossiya by huge masses of people. It became really symbolic at that point. Te piece of cloth, which is the state fag, is in fact endowed with meaning, though at times this fact stands out. “Russian Spring” was such a moment for our fag.

On the Triad of State Symbols

Our emblem goes back to the Byzantine Empire, the fag was introduced in the times of Peter the Great, and the anthem was composed in the Soviet era. Tese are three meaningful epochs for Russia: the Grand Duchy of Moscow, St. Petersburg’s emi- nence, and the Soviet period. Tree periods linked together to form the triad of state symbols, including the emblem, the fag and the anthem. Now it is just a kind of a statement of a historical fact. Moreover, these symbols show a progressive shif in national identity. It would be enough to say that the era of St. Petersburg’s em- inence revealed the departure from national identity associated with the Grand Duchy of Moscow, and the Soviet Union stood in contrast to the Petersburg era. Tat is, our set of state symbols is a set of identities, each of which has been signifcantly shifed away from the previous. But this is what we live with.

On possible transformation

We may see the evolution of symbols one day along with the evolution of our identi- ty. If Russia realizes that it responsible for a range of foreign states, including coun- tries of Eastern Europe, for the Christian civilization in the East, as well as such countries as Syria or Ethiopia and to a certain degree for global peace, its symbols are bound to undergo certain change. PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 93

SERGEY KHAIKIN, Head of Research, Institute for Social Marketing; Professor; Advisor to the Head of the Federal Agency for Nationality Afairs (FADH Russia)

On Importance of the Victory and the “Immortal Regiment” March

he idea to march along the streets of Russian cities with the portraits of relatives Twho fought in the Second World War emerged in the province 70 years afer the Victory Day. It was not engineered by experts in ideology, it was “heard” and picked up. Tis is an amazing idea, which emotionally united all the regions, gener- ations, peoples of our multinational country. It served as a proof that there is some- thing which can unite people, and they want to share it not only with the family but also with other citizens. Tis is partly the “national idea”, which social scientists are still looking for. Te Victory Day celebration still plays a very important role. During my sociolog- ical expeditions I hear stories about the war quite ofen. Chechens talk about their fellow countrymen who defended the Brest fortress, Crimean Tatars fnd it impor- tant to tell me about the forgotten heroes of the Soviet Union... And in Dagestan I learned that only last year the complete digitization of military archives helped a family to fnd the grave of their missing grandfather. Common history is, indeed, a strong unifying factor. But it is a retrospective approach, which is not enough. For generations to come these soldiers and ofcers will sooner or later become literary characters and heroes of the national epic.

On “Native Land” as the Main Unifying Factor

I would look for factors uniting us in environmental awareness rather than ideol- ogy, a common enemy, or one place. Each of us has their own little homeland. For people from Irkutsk it is Lake Baikal. For a person from the Caucasus it is the vil- lage where his ancestors lived, the graves of their ancestors. For someone it is a tiny little Church of the Intercession of the Holy Virgin on the Nerl River. Te premise that you need to love your land, to protect it, not to damage it, to preserve its riches gives rise to national unity. Te cult of the “native land” can unite us all, this is our national idea. 94 SURPRISING RUSSIA

CRIMEA IS OURS: WHEN THERE IS NO ROOM FOR QUESTIONS

road consensus over the accession of Crimea to Russia may surprise only those Bwho do not have any impression about Russian history and culture. Crimea is not the Kingdom of Poland, a personal union of the Russian part of Poland with the Russian Empire, which managed to gain its unchallengeable independ- ence. In Russians’ and Crimeans’ minds, Yalta, Koktebel and Sevastopol are “ours”, as it is cultural and historic fact. Terefore, as an opinion survey shows, a repeat referendum on the Crimean issue would have the same results as it happened a year ago. Te overwhelming majority of Crimeans are satisfed with their choice and the current state of afairs in the republic.

Te peninsula’s residents are full of hopes that the ongoing integration with Russia will improve their standards of living and tackle all problems of the region. In order to achieve this goal they are ready to deal with the difculties, which have stripped them of the simplest blessings of civilization.

Te events of 2015, involving the damage to key electricity pylons, which deprived Crimea of power in November, food and transport blockades from the Ukrainian territory, forced people to think that the fghting for the peninsula still had con- tinued. Nevertheless, the extremist activities from the Ukrainian side caused too many difculties, thus making even a hypothetical question about Crimea’s return impossible.

Surprisingly, for citizens of other Russian regions Crimea’s integration did not take too much time. In 2015, Russian residents regarded it as a seminal part of the country. Tey were happy to visit the peninsula, with which they had per- sonal, literature and cinematographic associations and memories. Over the year, the number of those who would like to spend their vacations in Crimea has tripled to become equal to the number of Russians, who seek to go abroad. As for some crucial moments, nothing has changed since the peninsula was incorporated into Russia. Russia has benefted from Crimea’s accession. Moreover, Crimea’s return to Ukraine in exchange for sanctions’ lifing or thawing relations with Ukraine is out of the question. PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 95

*** f a repeat referendum on the territorial status of Crimea took place currently, 90% Iwould vote for the incorporation of the peninsula into Russia, and only 5% of re- spondents would support the autonomous status of the republic as part of Ukraine. In other words, today’s referendum would demonstrate the same results as it happened in March 2014. A year afer the accession the survey shows a slight diference between the results of the referendum in March and contemporary viewpoints of Crimeans. Tis proves that the population’s decision to join Russia was not just a reaction towards the events of 2014. In this context, it is necessary to highlight Crimeans’ long-established values and beliefs, according to which they have always portrayed themselves as mem- bers of in the Russian world.

IF A REFERENDUM ON THE SAME QUESTION AS A YEAR AGO TOOK PLACE NEXT SUNDAY, WHAT OPTION WOULD YOU CHOOSE? % of respondents. VCIOM, 2015

5 I would support the accession of Crimea 5 to the Russian Federation I would support the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as part of Ukrainian territory

90 Don’t know

More than two-thirds of Crimeans claim that the integration with the Russian Federation has been successful enough, because they may have been ready to become an integral part of Russia. Nevertheless, one in four citizens of Crimea believe that now more problems remain unresolved.

HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE RESULTS OF THE ACCESSION OF CRIMEA TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION? Closed-ended question, only two responses are possible, %. VCIOM, 2015

The process of the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federaton was successful; the majority of the problems of integraton 12 have already been solved The process of the integraton of Crimea into the Russian Federaton was successful; many problems concerning its integraton were solved 51 but several issues are yet to be solved The process of the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federaton is full of problems; despite the fact that certain problems were solved, 25 most of them remain unsolved

The process of the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federaton failed, 4 in general. Most of problems have not been solved Don’t know 2 96 SURPRISING RUSSIA

From the perspective of the development’s trajectory, the assessment of rightness of all ongoing processes has a direct efect on Crimeans’ social well-being. Over the course of the year, the index of satisfaction has remained high in both Sevastopol and Crimea, as a whole.

IN GENERAL, ARE YOU POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE ABOUT CRIMEA’S CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS? Closed-ended question, one response, %. Public Opinion Foundation, October 2015

Positve 84 77 13 Negatve 21

Don’t know 3 3 The Republic of Crimea Sevastopol

Despite some challenges in the domain of communications with mainland Russia, as well as drinkable water and energy supplies, Crimeans remain optimistic. Te fact that the peninsula was in a state of emergency since an energy blockade by Ukrain- ian extremists lef nearly two million people without power in November boosted pro-Russian sentiments. In December the number of Crimeans, who had witnessed positive changes in the Republic’s life, increased to the three-quarters (at the beginning of the year this fgure accounted for the two-thirds of citizens). Kiev’s declaration that it was ready to sign a new contract to supply Crimea and Sev- astopol with electricity provided the region was recognized as part of Ukraine was met with howls of outrage from most citizens of the peninsula. Crimeans have expressed their readiness to wait until the solution to this problem is worked out. At the same time, they have voiced their opposition to signing a contact with such statements from the Ukrainian side.

ARE YOU PREPARED TO ENDURE TEMPORARY DIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH MINOR INTER- RUPTIONS IN THE ENERGY SUPPLY OVER THE NEXT THREE TO FOUR MONTHS IF A COMMERCIAL CONTRACT WITH UKRAINE FOR DELIVERY OF ELECTRICITY FOR SEVASTOPOL AND CRIMEA IS NOT SIGNED? Closed-ended question, one response, %. VCIOM, 2015

5,4 0,6 Yes, I am

No, I am not

94 Don’t know PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 97

Te overwhelming majority of citizens from mainland Russia maintain that Crimea has returned forever. At least, two factors allow people to be convinced of this. First- ly, there is a feeling of historical justice, which implies that many Russia have always regarded Crimea as part of Russia. Secondly, people are absolutely sure that Russia’s leadership will never cave in to somebody’s demands regarding the issue of Crimea’s returning.

IS RUSSIA’S DECISION ABOUT CRIMEA FINAL AND IRREVERSIBLE? OR CAN IT BE OVERRULED? Closed-ended question, one response, %. VCIOM, 2015

11 Russia’s decision is irreversible 4 Russia can overrule its decision under specifc circumstances

85 Don’t know

Russians have already got used to the fact that now the Russian Federation has the two new entities. Over the last year the number of fellow citizens, who would like to spend their holidays in Crimea, has increased substantially. Tey include those who want to support Crimeans for patriotic reasons and those who are willing to take advantage of low cost holidays at the seaside.

WHERE WOULD YOU LIKE TO SPEND YOUR HOLIDAYS IN CASE YOU HAVE A FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND NECESSARY SAVINGS? Closed-ended question, no more than two responses are possible, %. VCIOM, 2015

Abroad (beyond the borders 26 of the post-Soviet countries) 27 8 Crimea 27 The Black Sea coast of the Caucasus 19 (Sochi, Tuapse, Anapa etc.) 23

Other cites or villages in Russia 15 12 At home 14 11 In the country 10 9 In other post-Soviet countrie 4 (except for the Baltc states) 7

Baltc states 3 4 2014 3 Don’t know 5 2015 HAS CRIMEA’S REUNION WITH THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION HAD A MORE POSITIVE

OR A MORE NEGATIVE IMPACT?

Closed-ended question, one response, %. VCIOM, 2015

A more positve impact 69

A more negatve impact 14

Don’t know 17

More than a year afer the reunion of Crimea and Sevastopol with the Russian Federation the majority of Russians continue viewing these events positively. Not- withstanding the consequences of Western sanctions imposed on Russia and a log- ical fading of popular euphoria, the number of such citizens has decreased slightly (right afer the reunion the fgure was 75%). SHOULD RUSSIA RETURN CRIMEA

TO UKRAINE IN EXCHANGE

FOR SANCTIONS’ LIFTING?

Closed-ended question, one response, %. VCIOM, 2015

It should not 89

It should 6

Don’t know 5

Russians are cognizant of an ofcial position of the United States, which has called on the EU member states to keep anti-Russian sanctions in place until Russia re- turns Crimea to Ukraine. Almost 90% of our fellow citizens reject out of hand a possibility of Crimea’s reintegrating into Ukraine in exchange for sanctions’ lifing, even if not all of them are sure, whether the incorporation of the peninsula into Russia has had a more negative or positive impact on the situation. 100 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

ALEXANDER OSLON, President of the Public Opinion Foundation

How Crimea changed public opinion

Last year was marked by one of the rare historic moments when people’s hearts and minds changed. Tis landmark event of the year 2014 was called “Crimea is ours”. Its signifcance lay in the fact that people started to think diferently, rather than in the fact that some political or geopolitical tasks were accomplished. Greater self-respect and a broader historic context, where people found themselves, led to wholesale transformations in the country. In 2015, this is illustrated by socio- logical indicators and interpreted as consolidation around the government or pat- riotism. Tis profound shif produced a clear perception of ourselves in the world. Pre- viously, we were small, but then we became big. Fundamentally, nothing changed, but in our people’s minds negative attitudes gave way to positive ones. For example, we had thought that the condition of the army was poor, rather than good. How- ever, afer the milestone event we started to think diferently. Strange as it may be, the army really became improving. So, what is primary? Demand or supply? Necessity or implementation? Tese elements are two sides of the same coin: they are interrelated, thus strengthening or weakening each other in a mutual way. Your self-image may stimulate activities, which, in their turn, change realities that con- frm your perceptions, thus encouraging you to act again. Te “Crimea is ours” slogan is nothing but a socio-psychological phenomenon.

On factors of the new identity’s sustainability

Surely, it is important to do your best to constantly confrm a newly acquired identity. If you fail to do this, it will fade away. Although events, which contribute to such con- frmations, happen on a regular basis, there are some trends, which confront them. In this case, the current situation in Syria, as well as Vladimir Putin’s address at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly serve as instruments for propping up the self-image, while Transaero airlines’ bankruptcy can tarnish it. A further illus- tration is a small group of desperate bank depositors who have sufered from closing PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 101 down their banks. If you or your acquaintances have joined this group, you will def- nitely confront the so called Crimean trend. Nonetheless, the Crimean events are still playing a crucial role in society, thus constituting a counterbalance to many negative trends.

This profound shi# produced a clear perception of ourselves in the world. Previously, we were small, but then we became big.

On the value of your “own land”

One of the key characteristics of our belonging to the globalized world involved the fact that we neglected the value of a territory called “our country” or “our land”. Global brands, which one witnessed wherever he or she arrived, made a person iden- tify himself of herself with a current place of residence. Yet now this trend is coming to its end. Only because of the fact that a small piece of territory named Crimea joined Russia, Russian-speaking people started to fully assess the importance of Rus- sia as their territory or land. Each person had his or her own ties with Crimea – while some people visited the peninsula, others read about it. Now all these factors have become relevant. New ideas related to Russia as a territory have come into existence. Remarkably, these changes have happened on a global scale, thus covering those who live in other corners of the world but speak Russia and associate themselves with Russia. A conversation in your own language transfers you to a diferent world, where currently the concept of your “territory or land” is acquiring renewed and sacred importance. 102 SURPRISING RUSSIA

ANDREY MALGIN, Historician, Director of the Central Museum of the Tauride in Simferopol, Crimea

On transition

obody predicted or organized the so-called Crimean spring. It implies that in- Nitially, there were no plans to incorporate Crimea in the Russian Federation. A transition period was reported to take from three to fve years, but when the in- tegration was launched, it became apparent that it was necessary to accelerate all processes. It was exemplifed in a situation when we wanted to preserve the Ukrain- ian banking system but nobody expected it to collapse on its own. Te rapid switch- ing to the rouble, passportization of citizens, changes in the banking system proved to be sensible decisions. Yet all transformations should be accompanied by strategic planning, which is, from my perspective, lagging behind

On the possibility of returning Crimea to Ukraine

Final results of the referendum in Crimea showed that 97 percent of voters had sup- ported leaving Ukraine to join Russia, which was a very high fgure. Today there is no reason to assume that the population is disgruntled over the decision. Tis feeling is also underpinned by a sense of justice and the crisis, which hit Ukraine afer the Euromaidan. Although Crimea faced a big rise in prices, we adopted Russia’s pricing pat- tern and an increase in prices was balanced out by salary growth. Under Russia the budget sphere is alive and well in comparison with Ukraine’s rule. Obviously, there is no denying that some risk or vulnerable groups have remained. However, nobody wants to return to Ukraine. Te developments, which we have witnessed over the recent time, have dissuaded us from reintegrating into Ukraine. It is clear that Ukraine is burning bridges with Crimea. We are trying to analyse Ukraine’s activities from the mental perspective, and we are not in favour of the Ukrainian government, which has reiterated its plans to return the peninsula. Obviously, there are no plans but desires. We cannot but state that the imple- mentation of Ukraine’s plan will mean repressions and deportations of the dissent. Given there are many of us who think diferently, Crimea’s return to Ukraine will inevitably involve genocide for the majority of citizens. Crimea has decisively opted PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 103 for Russia; therefore, I am not afraid of holding the second referendum. Crimea will vote for Russia.

Crimea has decisively opted for Russia, therefore, I am not afraid of holding the second referendum. Crimea will vote for Russia.

On tourism

Ukrainian tourists have decreased in number. Now we can say that there are only 12 or 15% of them in Crimea, whereas in the past they accounted for 70%. Nev- ertheless, Russian tourists have fooded the peninsula, and Crimea does not sufer any losses. Russian tourists tend to have more exacting demands, and in this case, can be compared with Western tourists, which requires accomplishing new tasks for Crimea’s tourist sphere. Yet expectations are quite high both for coastal and ex- cursion tourism. Undoubtedly, Ukrainians expressed their interest in Crimea’s cul- tural heritage, but they regarded it as something alien to their culture. Moreover, the Ukrainian government itself failed to promote Crimean values and traditions. As regards Russia, it has a greater interest in Crimea, which is refected in a wide range of ofcial documents. It certainly makes us happy.

On historical justice and Crimea’s fate

Crimea became part of Russia twenty-fve hundred years ago. Tis period encom- passed both positive and tragic events for Crimea. Generally speaking, however, when Crimea was one of the Russian entities, it enjoyed economic growth, prosper- ity and opportunity. For almost 23 years, when Crimea was included in Ukraine, we were used to the promises that Ukraine and Crimea would join the Western world and share all its achievements. We think that these ideas are tantamount to illusions and political propaganda. We expect Russia to be a viable state, and natural resourc- es, which it is blessed with, will contribute to its stable rise. Our hopes for future afuent society rest on Russia. 104 SURPRISING RUSSIA

DEFENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: ARMY AND POLICE

he army and police, the two main defence and law enforcement forces in the Tcountry, are undergoing transformation. Tough the starting points were difer- ent, both institutions seek to achieve the same primary objective as part of the gen- eral trend - to enhance confdence in the state system and its strategy to strengthen Russia’s position in the world. As a result, the reputation of law enforcement agencies grew in 2015.

“Police” emerged during rebranding, accompanied by the reform of the Interior Ministry. But the positive image of the police was constantly tarnished by publicized ofcial malfeasance. Nevertheless, since 2010 the police’s reputation has improved somewhat, although society is still split over this issue. Today we can see a shif to a more positive image than it was fve years ago. Te public compel the authori- ties to adopt disciplinary and anti-corruption measures, which gradually improves the reputation of the police.

Te updated image of the Armed Forces was revealed by the “Polite People” (in fact, it is the new army brand) in the Crimea, modern military equipment and a num- ber of military accomplishments, in particular in Syria. Increased military budgets, which had a quite visible efect, also reinforced the image of increasing military might. In turn, the investigation of criminal cases against corrupt ofcials, including the highest-ranking ones in the Ministry of Defence, has proved that the state is really concerned about the efectiveness of military development and concentrates its at- tention on it, even though the public expected more serious consequences for those charged.

Today, the majority of Russians hold the Armed Forces in high esteem, are proud of them and have great faith in their battle efciency and war-making capacity. Since two-thirds realize a military threat to the country, the quality of the Armed Forces is of vital importance to them. Te army is the model of an efcient organization. Most people agree with the fact that the institution must have a certain infuence on society. PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 105

***

ver the past fve years, the credibility rating of law enforcement agencies has Ogrown. However, there have not been any tectonic shifs in their perception by the broad masses. Russians are equally divided over this issue. Police’s reputation, in contrast to the Army, is build to a greater extent on the daily basis and, therefore, is subject to large reputational risks. Changes in this area are un- likely to be fast.

DO YOU TRUST THE POLICE OFFICERS OF YOUR REGION? Closed-ended question, one response, %. VCIOM, 2015

3 Defnitely trust 14 29 Quite trust 32

Quite distrust 37 23

Defnitely distrust 21 23

Don’t know 11 8 2010 2015

Society is polarized in evaluating the work of the police, though there is a slight improvement in the ratings (5 years ago the negative assessment prevailed).

HOW DO YOU GENERALLY ASSESS THE WORK OF THE POLICE IN YOUR REGION? Closed-ended question, one response, %. VCIOM, 2015

Very good 1 2 13 Good 23

Average 50 46

Bad 21 15

Very bad 6 5 2009 2015 106 SURPRISING RUSSIA

In contrast, Russians’ views on the efectiveness of the Russian army and the political role of the “man with a gun” have changed over years. Te Armed forces evoke predominantly positive emotions. Negative reactions are expressed by far less ofen.

WHAT FEELINGS DO YOU HAVE WHEN YOU HEAR SOMEONE TALKING ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES? Closed-ended question, not more than two answers, %. VCIOM, 2015

Respect 40

Pride 39 Hope 20 Trust 14 Admiraton 11

Disappointment 7 Indiference 5

Distrust 4 Skeptcism 2

Condemnaton 2

Don’t know 3

Today, almost half of our citizens believe that it is necessary to maintain the in- fuence of the army at the current level; no one considers reducing its role in socie- ty. Te proportion of those who fnd it necessary to strengthen the social infuence of the army and see it as an efciency model, has increased signifcantly. Undoubtedly, it can be partly accounted for by the efectiveness of the Armed Forces during the re- cent operations (Crimea, Syria).

HOW SHOULD WE CHANGE THE ROLE AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN SOCIETY? Closed-ended question, not more than two answers, %. VCIOM, 2015

2015 9 Don’t know 25 1990

5 Must be reduced 27

Must be preserved 46 23

Must be strengthened 40 25 PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 107

Such a signifcant change of attitude to the Armed Forces may also be attributed to the growing concerns of the population about external threats. Today, the threat of war seems very real. Less than a third of the citizens hope for entirely peaceful set- tlement of conficts.

IS THERE A MILITARY THREAT TO RUSSIA POSED BY OTHER STATES? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

4 8 Defnitely yes 24 Probably yes 20 Probably no Defnitely no Don’t know

44

Citizens pay very close attention to the developments in the Donbass and Syria. Te tradition which has been revived in recent years, to watch cutting-edge military technologies during the Victory Day Parade on the Red Square also helps to strengthen the confdence of citizens in the battle efciency of the country’s army.

IN YOUR OPINION, IS THE RUSSIAN ARMY CAPABLE OF PROTECTING RUSSIA AGAINST MILITARY THREAT COMING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

1999 2015 86 70

24 10 6 4

Yes No Don’t know ARMY ATTRACTIVENESS INDEX 25 12 12

2002 2010 2012 2014 07.2015

The index is based on the question “Would you like your son/brother/husband -14 or a close relative to serve in the army?”. The index is based on the yes- and no-answer ratio. It can vary between -100 and 100. The higher the Index is, the better Russians perceive the service in the army. -54 VCIOM, 2015

T e prestige of the Army has enhanced year-to-year. In addition to the improved image of the armed forces, the Russians have gained conf dence in the state pol- icy. T is, in turn, leads to understanding that the service in defense and law en- forcement agencies is a career development strategy as well as a civic duty. WOULD YOU LIKE YOUR

SON/BROTHER/HUSBAND

OR A CLOSE RELATIVE TO SERVE IN THE ARMY?

59 Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

34

8

On the whole yes Rather no Don’t know

T e proportion of Russians assessing the service in the army positively has doubled since 2002 and constitutes the majority of the population. 110 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

STEPAN LVOV Managing Director, Social Policy Research Department, VCIOM

On Army as a Foreign Policy Argument

ince the early 2000s many called on Russia to decide on its status, whether Sit would be a great power or an important regional power in the post- Soviet space, for example, or it would be content with the role of a minor regional power. By late 2000s the demand that Russia should rightfully be seen as a great power was high: we all remember the famous Munich speech, peace enforcement in Georgia and other signifcant events, which confrmed the validity of our claims. Today it is no longer a matter of defning the task. Nowadays we should be afer the ways to fulfll it. Out sober assessment of the situation allows us to understand that the state of the economy prevents Russia from becoming a world leader in this aspect. So, the solution lies elsewhere, namely in foreign policy. Tis means that we must have a clear foreign policy stance and be able to de- fend it. Te corresponding steps taken by the country’s leaders have enjoyed un- conditional support of the majority of the population. One of the most powerful arguments is the military might of the country. A great power cannot be referred to a such and protect its interests, while distancing itself from the looming or on- going conficts. Te armed forces remain central to defending a point of view. It has predetermined the decision to restore military power.

On Army as an Institution

Public opinion surveys indicate that the image of the army has greatly improved unlike other state and public institutions. Most important, the citizens consider it to be efective, that is able to protect from external threats, if any arise. However, it traces its origin in deeply-rooted distrust. Te memories of a time when the army was associated with unsuitable living conditions, hazing, very long service, and the conficting desire to continue education, are still fresh. Moreover, we see a wave of unjustifed pacifsm pervading society. For ffeen years the idea has been imposed that in today’s world the army is not needed, that wars are a thing of the past. Natu- rally, society perceived it as a burden. PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 111

Nowadays the army can safely be viewed as a separate entity. It can set its agen- da and infuence social processes. It moulds values for society as a whole, because it opens up opportunities for those who serve in it. Today their number has increased and the army cannot accept all the willing. Competition, which one must win to ob- tain something, points to the prestige. It is also important that the army is the social ladder, a means of social mobility, though not very fast yet, which makes it possible to set up comfortably. Te question is how deeply this institution will be integrated into the social system, whether it will make it possible to make only a civilian as well as military career.

Nowadays the army can safely be viewed as a sep- arate entity. It can set its agenda and influence so- cial processes.

Now the army is a social rather than political institution. In addition, it is on the op- timal track. Te system should prevent the adoption of the “Latin American” pattern, when the army is above society and the state. Tis danger exists everywhere and always. Terefore, it is important that each institution has its own niche, a limited mandate and efcient mechanisms how to use it. 112 SURPRISING RUSSIA

DMITRY ABZALOV, President, Centre for Strategic Communications

On Army Prestige as an Institution

he public traditionally associate the army with presidential power. Just like Tin the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, nowadays it relates directly to the leader and top ofcials. Te military segment, the institution of the army as a whole, has been considered a high-level structure, the privileged direction of the state policy and a prestigious career ladder. Te army is one of the most re- spected institutions in all major countries, actively involved in foreign policy and military operations, be it the US or China. Moreover, the Ministries of Defence work hard to preserve and further improve the positive image of these institutions. Te Russian leadership has opted for the same strategy.

On the A!itude of Society to the Army

Fundamental changes have improved the perception of the army over recent years. Te newly-established contract system is a conscious personal choice in favour of the organization, and shorter compulsory military service terms have contribut- ed to its being less frequently viewed as an institution for control and supervision. Gradually, the army began to be perceived as an opportunity for professional growth and socialization, and most importantly as an institution maintaining the state. Crack-down on corruption has also increased public confdence. T e case of the former head of the department and his protégé showed that the anti-corrup- tion campaign can be waged at the ministerial level. Personnel, administrative and organizational decisions adopted afer that enhanced its efciency. Te personality of the new minister has also contributed to confdence-building. Finally, the transparency of the army has increased; it used to belong to closed or- ganizations. All these decisions related to this institution have brought about the rap- idly changing attitude. PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? 113

ALEXEY FIRSOV, Director, “Platform” Social Project Management Centre

On Internal Mobilization

or several generations the upbringing of children presupposed much atten- Ftion to military topics: people either took part in the wars themselves or lived in the cultural feld pervaded with military topics. Te history of Russia is some- what measured by wars in which it engaged. Te geography of the country, its lo- cation on two continents, peculiarities of its development also created constant tension on the borders, to say nothing of internal conficts. Cinema, literature, and education not only accentuated the tragic side of war, but also promoted some fundamental ideas and values: self-sacrifce, service, domi- nance of social over private (which is also a priority in Russian tradition). Te every- day speech is full of words originating from military terminology; we ofen do not notice them – “to hit a line”, “heads-up”, “storm”, “swivel-chair warrior.” Such a trait cannot be referred to as “militarism”, rather it is a matter of unconscious internal mobilization. Tis pattern has been given a boost over recent years to defend own external in- terests and to resist external pressure. About 70% of the population are now wary of a military confict, which the army can naturally defend from. Te army itself has become central to state policy and has been in the focus of media attention, rather than a hushed-up topic as it was in the 1990s. Te army has contributed to the repu- tation of the country in general. “Russians know how to fght,” - Western experts say, stressing that it is a rare ability in the world today.

On the A!itude to the Police

Although there is an upward trend in the improvement of the attitude, the changes per se are not very noticeable. It is predominantly caused by the fact that, unlike the army, the police are in focus of public attention on the regular basis. Te direct contact brings about the whole range of experiences, from positive to thorough neg- ative. Russia is not an exception, though. PART 3 FACE TO FACE WITH THE WEST WE AND THE WORLD: UKRAINE: FAMILY CONFLICT? COOPERATION RUSSIA’S PIVOT TO ASIA: WHAT ARE OUR EXPECTATIONS? AND CONFRONTATION MIDDLE EAST HOTSPOTS

AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, ITS FOUNDATIONS AND ROLE IN SOCIETY HISTORICAL MEMORY AND STATE SYMBOLS CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? CRIMEA IS OURS: WHEN THERE IS NO ROOM FOR QUESTIONS DEFENSE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: ARMY AND POLICE

DEFENDING OURSELVES. LIFE UNDER SANCTIONS. THE YEAR OF CRISIS: CRISIS: ADAPTATION STRATEGY STRESS-RESISTANCE TEST

RUSSIA’S QUALITY OF LIFE FAMILY AND SOCIETY: TRADITION AND MODERNITY TRADITIONAL VALUES SACRED AND PROFANE: CHANGING BOUNDARIES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES HOW WE PERCEIVE “CULTURE” INFORMATION SOURCES: POPULARITY AND TRUST 116 SURPRISING RUSSIA

DEFENDING OURSELVES. LIFE UNDER SANCTIONS.

n the early 2015 nearly half of Russians started to feel the efects and conse- Iquences of Western sanctions through soaring prices and falling living standards. Although the images of Russia’s stepped-up fght against sanctioned foodstuf, in- volving the destruction of illegal shipments at the border, evoked a mixed reaction, Russia’s popular mood did not change considerably.

Russian citizens have tended to analyse the wave of Western penalties against the Russian economy through a prism of the country’s strategic national inter- ests, rather than from the economic perspective. Western sanctions are portrayed as a means of exerting external pressure on Russia. Te majority of Russia’s popula- tion believes that inficting economic pain aims to prevent the Russian Federation from reinforcing its status as an independent actor on the international stage.

For this reason, over the course of 2015, the country’s development vector index increased signifcantly in spite of a substantial drop in the social optimism index.

Russia’s society is unwilling to focus only on the individual economic survival issues. Most citizens vehemently reject the idea of withdrawing support for the Don- bass region, let alone of returning the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine, in exchange for sanctions’ relief.

As many Russians argue, plunging oil prices have crippled the state’s economic sector. In late 2015 the number of citizens blaming sanctions for the domestic eco- nomic troubles decreased dramatically in comparison with the beginning of the year. Due to the fact the incumbent government could not bear direct responsibility for external economic factors, it managed to save face amid Russia’s overall slowdown. AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 117

***

nti-Russian sanctions quickly became an important item on the agenda. AAt the beginning of 2015 one in two demonstrated his or her awareness, with the main focus shifing from cracking down on visa-free travel, as well as banking and fnancial systems to a more pressing problem, namely export and/or import em- bargoes. Tis issue directly afected the population and what is more, was brought to the fore against the backdrop of Russia’s retaliation with import bans on most Western agricultural products, raw materials and food as a whole.

IF YOU HAVE HEARD OF ANY SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON RUSSIA, NAME THEM, PLEASE. Open-ended question, no limit applies to the number of answers, % of those who have heard of sanctions. VCIOM, 2015

24 Export and import restrictons 46 Travel ban on individuals 44 26 Economic sanctons: banking sectors, 37 bank account seizures, bans on foreign 21 funding 5 Ban on imported equipment/technologies/ 9 repair parts

Freezing some joint projects 8 of foreign companies 7 August 2014 February 2015

Almost 50% of the informed citizens felt the consequences of Western sanctions.

HAVE ANTI-RUSSIAN SANCTIONS HAD ANY IMPACT ON YOU OR YOUR RELATIVES? Closed-ended question, only one answer is possible, % of those who have heard of sanctions.. VCIOM, 2015

5 Yes 45 No

50 Don‘t know 118 SURPRISING RUSSIA

According to many Russians, the damaging efects related to the imposition of the sanctions included price hikes and declining well-being.

IF YOU HAVE EXPERIENCED ANY CONSEQUENCES, WHAT ARE THEY? Open-ended question, no limit applies to the number of answers, % of those who have heard of sanctions and believe that they have hit their personal well-being. VCIOM, 2015

Price hikes, lower living standards 85 Downsizing, cut in salaries/backdated salaries 8 Dollar and euro rate increase 5 Many goods are not available in the market 4 Rising loan and mortgage interest rates 2 Business challenges 1 Account freeze, credit card blocking 1 Economic decline 1 Other 3

Unsurprisingly, in 2015 Russians’ evaluations of their own well-being decreased, while the political climate did not undergo negative changes and the economic sit- uation slightly improved. Under such conditions, people hailed the general vector of the country’s development. Tis can be an exemplifcation of the fact that for Russians sanctions have proved to be a matter of continuity in the confrontation between Russia as a “renewed” country and the Western world. In light of these events, Ukraine, Crimea and Donbass are fading into insignifcance with the intensifying fghting for the world preeminence.

DYNAMICS IN SOCIAL WELL-BEING INDICES OVER THE COURSE OF THE YEAR (FROM FEBRUARY 2014 TILL FEBRUARY 2015) The indices for each of the indicators are calculated as a variance between the sum of positive and average evaluation and the sum of negative evaluations. They can vary between -100 and 100 points. The positive outcome demonstrates that positive evaluations prevail over negative ones. VCIOM, 2015

Life satsfacton 65 59 Social well-being 73 64 Social optmism 61 52 2014 40 Economic situaton in the country 44 2015 65 Politcal situaton 63 51 General vector of the country’s development 71 AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 119

As Russians put it, initially, the West had an intention to provoke an economic crisis in Russia and weaken its positions on the world stage. Very few people associate the imposition of sanctions with the Western goal to prevent Russia from assisting the two self-proclaimed republics in the Donbass region and to compel it to surren- der Crimea to Ukraine.

WHAT ENDS DID THE WEST WANT TO FURTHER THROUGH SANCTIONS? Open-ended question, no limit applies to the number of answers, % of those who have heard of sanctions. THE TEN MAIN CAUSES. VCIOM, 2015

It wanted to cause an economic crisis in Russia 33 It wanted to weaken Russia, hamper its development 22 in the internatonal arena

It wanted to project its power and suppress Russia 20 It was an act of provocaton to force Russia into going to war, confict escalaton 3

It aimed to create disorder within the Russian borders 3

It wanted Russia to cut of its support 3 for the Donbass region

Western leaders were under America’s thumb 2 It wanted Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine/ it had an intenton to punish Russia for Crimea 2

It was inevitable to clamp down on Russia 2 for its policy abroad

It wanted to obtain its own benefts 1

Most citizens stress that Russia should not urgently channel eforts into persuading the West to abandon its pro-sanctions stance. In the not-too-distant future Western countries will remove all restrictions because of the boomerang efect. Yet one third of the general public thinks diferently, arguing that the sanctions’ efects are too dev- astating.

SHOULD RUSSIA GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO FORCE THE WEST TO LIFT ALL ITS SANCTIONS? Closed-ended question, only one answer is possible, %. VCIOM, 2015

Yes, it should, because Russia cannot bear sanctions’ negative consequences in the economic 11 sphere 33 No, it should not, as sanctions have not only targeted us, but also backfred on the West. In this case, Western politicians are more likely to lif 57 sanctions on their own.

Don’t know 120 SURPRISING RUSSIA

Nevertheless, many Russians maintain that the plunging oil price has inficted enor- mous damage on our economic realm.

FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW, WHAT FACTOR HAS HAD THE MOST NEGATIVE IMPACT ON RUSSIA’S ECONOMY OVER THE RECENT 6 MONTHS? Closed-ended question, only one answer is possible, %. VCIOM, 2015

Falling oil prices 39

Western sanctons 19

Inital vulnerability of Russia’s economy 18

Government’s faltering steps 14

Other 2

Don’t know 8

Te beginning of the year was characterized by such popular sentiments. Over the course of time the situation developed and new events provoking a public re- sponse unfolded. Russia’s strategy of destroying piles of banned Western food polarized society, with nearly 50% in favour of this policy and 50% opposed. It is easy to explain why. Te reference to the “sacred bread” lies at the heart of many Russian traditions and is closely related to Russia’s social memory of suferings and losses.

WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE MOVE TO DESTROY FOOD IMPORTS FROM THE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE IMPOSED SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA? Closed-ended question, only one answer is possible, %. VCIOM, 2015

10

Rather positive 46 Rather negative Don’t know 44 AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 121

Our fellow citizens believe that the destruction of embargoed food is Russia’s last resort, which must have reasonable grounds. Goods of questionable quality and resulting health problems are nothing but compelling reasons. Yet only one-third of the Russian public expresses their readiness to accept the necessity of crushing illegally imported foodstufs.

FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE, IS IT POSSIBLE TO DESTROY EMBARGOED FOOD? IF YOU BELIEVE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE, TELL US, PLEASE, UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES? Closed-ended question, only three answers can be included, %. VCIOM, 2015

Destructon is needed if products are of bad quality 79 and harmful to people’s health

Destructon is necessary if food has been imported 44 with fake documents or without any documents at all

Destructon is needed if food imports do not comply 33 with Russian laws

One cannot destroy food under any circumstances 10

Others 2

Don’t know 2

Despite few improvements in the economic sector and a controversial infor- mation campaign in the context of fghting sanctions, pessimism failed to be- come deep. Rather, we are witnessing another trend. A year afer the imposition of the frst wave sanctions Russians got used to living under harsh conditions and started neglecting them. One in fve holds that Russia’s economy has benefted from Western sanctions.

CRIMEA’S RETURN TO RUSSIA AND BACKING OF THE DONBASS REGION HAVE PROMPTED WESTERN POLITICIANS TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA. HAVE THESE SANCTIONS INFLUENCED RUSSIA? Closed-ended question, only one answer is possible, %. VCIOM, 2015

Sanctons have led to dire consequences, 57 they have exacerbated all problems 47

Sancton have produced positve results and 18 improved the current state of afairs. 21

Sanctons have failed to change anything, 19 the situaton remains the same 22

Don’t know 6 10 February 2014 September 2015 OVER THE RECENT 18 MONTHS HAS YOUR CITY/VILLAGE

WITNESSED SUCH THINGS OR NOT?

Closed-ended question, one possible answer in each line, %. VCIOM, 2015

Larger share of domestc products in shops 64 25

Domestc agricultural development, the emergence of new 52 35 domestc products

Lower quality of foodstufs 26 66

Imports of banned goods 24 41 from other countries

Increased food imports from Asia, South America (you can fnd 19 56 these products in your local shops)

Food defcit 10 87

It has happened It has not happened

Te overwhelming majority of Russians have not faced any food defcit or a low- er quality of goods. Rather, fellow citizens underscore the emergence of domestic products on the shelves and associate it with the development of Russia’s agri- culture. WHAT ARE YOUR EXPECTATIONS FROM THE YEAR 2016?

Closed-ended question, one possible answer in each line, %. VCIOM, 2015 43

37 34 23 26 18

3 6 5 5

I think that I suppose that 2016 is likely I think that Don’t know the coming year in general 2016 to be difcult the next year will be hugely will be full will be very poor successful of positve events

Personally for you and your family For Russia as a whole

Although 40% of respondents believe that the country will encounter some difcul- ties in 2016, the two-thirds of Russians remain somewhat optimistic and in general, there is no tendency for worries about the future on that account. 124 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

MIKHAIL DELYAGIN, Doctor of Economics, Editor-in-Chief of the science magazine “Free Thought”

Why Russian Society still supports the state

adhered to the belief that the spring 2015 would mark the growth of protest sen- Itiments following the Crimean period of political anemia. Yet Western sanctions have prolonged it. Even though the current socio-economic policy has had a truly severe impact on Russians, they still prefer musing on this matter as follows: amid the mounting pressure from outside it is better to secretly hate your bosses instead of publicly opposing them only to be later considered as part of pro-Western forces. Tese statements of 30-year old people described as inward-looking and passive ones caught me unawares. In August 2014, patriotism and uncertainty hit their peak, as the crisis had just aris- en. Although in February 2015, Russia faced a surge of panic, in September people ex- perienced a deep relief, because they concluded that the stagnation had not degenerated into an absolute catastrophe. Under the economic slowdown, the population’s support for the government illustrates a commitment to shared values. Regardless of sanctions, nobody can promote fascist ideas, as many people highlight. According to opinion polls, 69% of people endorse such a culture, while 17% of respondents are eager to embrace liberal principles. Strikingly, people between the ages of 25 and 34 and those between the ages of 35 and 44 do not difer fundamentally. It implies that the last Soviet genera- tion and the frst post-Soviet one are similar in their assessments. Tis very fact demon- strates that school rather than socio-political environment infuences any generation. When afected by the economic crisis more and more people are becoming radical- ized. In what cases can citizens agree to live under certain restrictions? Tey are ready to put up with all troubles only if there is a higher goal. However, there will be no scope for popular forgiveness, provided the goal is not attained.

Under the economic slowdown, the population’s support for the government illustrates a commit- ment to shared values. AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 125

On sanctions’ benefits

Profts at Russia’s cheese factories have boomed as state support and bans on imports from the West force supermarkets to turn to local producers. In addition, we have managed to restore the pork production volume. At the same time, the main factor is that at a national level Russians, like Americans afer the 9/11, have begun feeling a sense of unity. It is noteworthy that our people are becoming disillusioned with the West. In fact, the Western world has committed suicide from the perspective of its image. While previously Russians portrayed the West as a place where the sun was always shining (we should admit that sometimes sunspots occurred, but it was a normal phenomenon), currently it is not perceived as a cultural and civilizational center any more.

On future expectations

Contemporarily, astounding ideas are pervading Russian society. Tey can be put in the following way: “We understand that everything is bad, the situation is going to further deteriorate, but we will deal with it. We do not know how to survive, but in the end, we will survive”. I assume that the reason for this state of afairs accompanied by infantilism and historical memory can be unconscious. When somebody complains about severe economic conditions, I tend to underline that we are living in times of trouble but I also try to remind those, who have historical memory, of the Soviet collectivization, the year 1937. Usually people, who have reasonably told me about their painful eco- nomic experience, become silent. 126 SURPRISING RUSSIA

KONSTANTIN SIMONOV, Director General of the National Energy Security Fund, First Vice-Rector for External Communications of Financial University at the Government of the Russian Federation

On Russian society’s a!itude to sanctions

n 2008, we were faced with the fnancial crisis along with the whole world. Remark- Iably, we managed to produce a theory holding that our economic pain and sufering were not intense. Consider, for instance, Alexei Kudrin’s conception of Russia as “a safe haven”. Nowadays there is a feeling that our crisis is tantamount to punishing Russia for its stance, with all citizens realizing that the current economic situation is heavily de- pendent on Russia’s foreign policy, which has commanded broad popular support so far. I remember quite well the results of an opinion survey conducted right afer the ac- cession of Crimea to Russia. It included the following question: “Can you tolerate eco- nomic troubles for the sake of Crimea’s returning to Russia?”. At least, 80% of respond- ents argued that they were ready to make such sacrifces. In other words, at that moment people clearly understood what they were opting for. At present, they are satisfed be- cause Russia has regained its position as a major world player and greater respect. Obvi- ously, this fact has lightened the burden of sanctions.

Russia has regained its position as a major world player and greater respect. Obviously, this fact has lightened the burden of sanctions.

On the efficiency of import substitution policies

Import substitution became a central plank in Russia’s response to Western sanctions in 2014. Nevertheless, Russia’s drive to promote domestic products at the expense of imports should be underpinned by creating new plants, which takes time. Even raising a cow needs several years. Te rouble devaluation stimulated import substi- tution. In fact, the cheap rouble allows encouraging Russian industries. I was greatly surprised at some news. Tis year we started negotiations on selling grain to China, which was hard to imagine earlier. Sometimes achievements of particular econom- ic sectors may bring a smile to your face. Recently, we have experienced the sharp rise in production of bags and luggage. One can mock these developments, but there is no denying that they are real facts. AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 127

How Russia can become a more successful economy

Te frst approach implies that Russia’s state capitalism and resource curse are to blame for all faults. However, well-organized institutions will serve as a magic wand. Te second approach is completely diferent. It suggests that our foreign policy is coherent and open-eyed, whereas our economic policy is shot full of holes because of the fact that Russia’s economic sector is dominated by liberals who are not cogni- zant of the necessity to employ mobilization methods, build plants with the state’s assistance and take immediate steps to overcome the crisis. Undoubtedly, adopting so called economic Stalinism means going to extremes. Yet it would be remiss to hope that some perfect institutions will be capable of sav- ing Russia’s economy. We are aware of many countries with proper arrangements, which do not enjoy impressive economic growth. Above all, I cannot agree that to- day’s model of development is exhausted. Moreover, there is no point in dramatiz- ing negative features of Russia’s economy reliant on raw materials, as their export is our specialization in the world market. Tink, for instance, of Norway, Canada or Australia. We cannot but state that efective institutions will give a fresh impetus to our economy, that it is necessary to help the private sector through enabling small and medium-sized enterprises to win contracts. All these measures are reasonable but still we should not regard institutions as a panacea. Vladimir Lenin’s idea about a brand new order, which will rise from the ashes of a previous economic make-up, will never blossom into a viable project. 128 SURPRISING RUSSIA

CRISIS: ADAPTATION STRATEGIES

s it was expected, the crisis caused popular concerns about the present and Awariness of the future. Today the two-thirds of Russians prefer to tighten the belts and reduce their spending. In the near future, the respondents expect dif- cult employment problems to come up, because this autumn they already saw their friends and relatives tackling these them. Nevertheless, the 2015 crisis did not cause such an angry response as those of 2008 and 1998. Many people understand that difculties can become graver and long-lasting. Yet panic did not sweep over society.

Experts list several reasons for such a moderate reaction to the current situation. Since early 1990s Russians who have had to overcome several severe crises, have ac- quired vast experience of adapting to such circumstances. Te crisis coincided with tough external pressure, which encourages one to be more tolerant and patient. Fall- ing oil prices are also viewed as the outgrowth of external, objective factors. Finally, the respondents feel that they run lower risks of the job loss than in 2008.

In addition, over the last few years, the Russia has developed the longer-term stra- tegic vision of the country’s future and Russians have been able to see beyond the cri- sis. Perhaps this accounts for the paradoxical results of the surveys on the space industry, showing the willingness of Russians to allocate more money there despite the economic difculties.

Paradoxically, the peak of the “satisfaction with life index” was recorded during the 2014-2015 crisis. Te factors most closely associated with the feeling of happi- ness have not changed and as usual include family, children, health, interesting work or studies. Te respondents mentioned them in earlier surveys as well. At the same time, they added a new aspect that contributed to fuller life. Te Russians felt the “nation’s backing” again. AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 129

ON SURVIVING IN CRISIS

mid high infation the last year saw a signifcant change in consumer behaviour. AAs expected, the crisis forced many Russians to tighten their belts and reduce spending, which marked a sharp contrast to the consumer boom of the last decade. Buying cheaper goods of the same category or refraining from buying certain items are the most popular ways of adapting to the current economic situation

SOME RUSSIANS THINK THAT RUSSIA HAS BEEN HIT BY AN ECONOMIC CRISIS; THEY STARTED SAVING UP, BORROWING, ACCUMULATING SAVINGS, ETC. WHAT STRATEGY DO YOU OR YOUR FAMILY MEMBERS USE? Closed-ended question, one answer, %.. VCIOM, 2015

Buy cheaper products and goods 60

Buy less or refrain from buying certain products, goods, 59 services, entertainment

Grow more vegetables and fruits, breed poultry, 37 conserve berries and fruit and store canned vegetables

Search for a beter-paid job, 32 a second job or run a business

Preserve food and buy it in advance 31

Spending savings on everyday needs 28

Borrow money from friends and relatves 23

Take on a loan, buy goods on credit 22

Get interest-free fnancial assistance 22 from relatves and friends

Save up in foreign currency (US dollar, euro, etc.), 10 pay money into a currency account

Sell property (car, apartment, country house) 5 and personal property (cloths, books, household goods) 130 SURPRISING RUSSIA

Te consumer confdence index hit the lowest level in the recorded history of meas- urements, since 2009. Most Russians consider it would be a wrong time to buy costly things

CONSUMER CONFIDENCE INDEX. VCIOM, 2015 The index is based on the yes- and no-answers ratio. The question was “Is it a good time to make expensive purchases?” The index is measured in points and can vary between 10 and 90. The higher the index, the more favourable the current situation is to make large purchases.

52 44 36 30 28 26 27

June/14 Sept/14 Dec/14 Jan/15 Feb/15 March/15 April/15

Te credit confdence index also failed to bottom out, and in April 2015 hit its lowest level in six years.

CREDIT CONFIDENCE INDEX. VCIOM, 2015 The index is based on the yes- and no-answers ratio. The question was “Is it a good time to get credit?” The index is measured in points and can vary between 10 and 90. The higher the index is, the more favourable the current situation is to take on a loan. VCIOM, 2015

40

34

27

20 20 21 19

June/14 Sept/14 Dec/14 Jan/15 Feb/15 March/15 April/15 AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 131

Over the year, the employment issue has been gradually increasing in relevance. In autumn 2015, every third person surveyed admitted to having a person who lost the job, among friends and relatives. However, it should be noted that over the whole period, the unemployment index has stayed in the negative zone. Te policies adopt- ed in the 2008-2010 crisis are actively used today by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation, bear fruit.

UNEMPLOYMENT INDEX. VCIOM, 2015 The index is based on the yes- and no-answers ratio. The question was “How many people among your relatives or friends lost their jobs over the last 2-3 months?” The index is measured in points and can vary between 100 to 100. The higher the index, the higher the relevance of the problem for the respond- ents.

-29 -29 -30 -33 -33 -33 -35 -36 -37 -44

01/15 02/15 03/15 04/15 05/15 06/15 07/15 08/15 09/15 10/15

Nearly two-thirds of Russians support the idea of minimizing expenses. Tis position is risky for producers, consumption falls dramatically.

IN YOUR OPINION, IS IT BETTER TO SAVE UP OR TO SPEND MONEY? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

It is better to spend salary or pension on things you need to buy and to invest all savings into 14 something valuable 23

It is better to spend as little as possible to save money for the future

63 Don’t know DO YOU SAVE MONEY TO BE READY FOR A POSSIBLE JOB LOSS?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Yes 25

No, but I am planning to start 16

No, and I am not planning to start 31

No, I don’t work at all 27

Don’t know 1

Te crisis has not modifed the usual money saving methods : only quarter of those surveyed save money to be ready for a possible job loss. Over the year, the fgures did not change, even though many Russians be- lieve that the “worst” is yet to come. Perhaps, the current situation is not viewed as an emergency or critical enough to dramatically transform the behavior pat- terns. PEOPLE REACT TO RISING PRICES DIFFERENTLY.

SOME CONSIDER MONEY SAVING METHODS,

SOME WOULD RATHER FIND ANOTHER

JOB TO EARN MORE. WHICH OPTION WOULD

YOU CONSIDER, THE FIRST OR THE SECOND?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. FOM (PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION), 2015

I would rather economize 55 45 33 I would rather take another job 43

February 2015 Don’t know 12 12 September 2015

By autumn 2015 there were frst indicators that the trend could reverse and con- sumption could decline. Fewer people opted for economizing and their number practically matched the number of those who would rather get a second job to generate a larger income. 134 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

KONSTANTIN SIMONOV, Director General, National Energy Security FOUNDATION; First Vice-Rector, Financial University

On the negative forecast which failed

e all remember how 2014 ended: declining oil prices, depreciating ruble, and Wthe sinister and hostile environment. Te doomsday scenario seemed to be un- folding right before our eyes, with production rates dropping and society about to dis- integrate. Terefore, I was surprised by our ability to weather the storm and to over- come the difculties. Despite several problems, we did much better in 2015 than it had been expected in December 2014.

Despite several problems we did much be"er in 2015 than it had been expected in December 2014.

On how the economy weathered the storm

Our safety net was prepared in advance. Of course, fve years ago one could hardly foresee such political developments, but our economic model presupposed money aggregation in fat years (with regard to oil prices) and increased spending in lean years. It produced the desired outcome. Contrary to the popular belief that we ex- hausted our gold and currency reserves, they are still vast. Experts believe that de- prived of an opportunity to refll our cofers we can survive 2.5 years without ex- ports.

On people’s reaction

For over a year conditions have been tough and oil markets volatile, with people be- ing on the receiving end of falling incomes and the devaluation of the national cur- rency. Nevertheless, they are getting used to the difcult economic times and they even learn how to make money in such conditions. For example, early summer saw AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 135 an increase in short-term deposits. It implies people’s unwillingness to spend money for nothing, they let it work. Even though quite soon they took money out of account to buy something, at least for a short time they reinvested in the economy. Tis be- haviour is believed to be adaptive.

On oil prices and the non-existent oil curse

For some, fuctuations in supply and demand account for market volatility. But this theory does not hold water: periods of growing prices just like periods of falling prices did not produce any change in supply and demand in 2015. Others assume the main trigger of oil price fuctuations is the dollar exchange rate and money infows and out- fows in the oil market. All transactions are made in US dollars. If the US raises its key interest rate, the dollar becomes more expensive and oil becomes cheaper. Te question is what the US stance will be. It would like to punish Russia, and hence, it needs to lower oil prices. But it will have a boomerang efect and hit its own huge oil industry. Tat is why I think the price will stabilize. Te annual average price of 55-60 dollars looks real. We are shown phantasmagoric pictures of the future when nobody needs oil. But just a decade ago the bio-fuel was declared a good substitution of oil. Nowadays the idea of bio-fuel is forgotten. Electric cars are in vogue today. But they have plenty of weak points, including their price and the costly battery replenishment. In fact, the world consumption of oil is on the rise, and we still engage in a ffeen-year-long debate whether we need the oil and gas industry. Tis is a modern industry which brings proft and creates jobs, shapes demand for goods produced by other industries and creates the so-called innovative areas of growth. Today we are constructing the “Power of Siberia” pipelines with pipes made in Russia, while Soviet gas pipelines were built with German ones. Te Prime minister said that we need to substitute imported goods in mechan- ical engineering, but who will guarantee demand? Undoubtedly, only the oil and gas industry can do it.

On how the situation will develop

I do not think we are out of the doldrums yet. It would be too naïve to expect the fast economic revival in 2016. However, the economy seems to be gradually recovering. And some facts point to that. Te end of the year saw investment growth. Te budget stayed at the previous year’s level, though with some efort. 2016 will also be difcult, but I think the start of the year will be more optimistic and less troubling than that of 2015. 136 SURPRISING RUSSIA

ALEXEY ZUDIN, Member of the Advisory Board, Institute for Social Economic and Political Studies

On similarities and differences between the two crises

he 2008-2009 crisis was linked to the end of the great era, which began afer Tthe collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Te 2014-2015 crisis marks the begin- ning of a new era characterized by considerable uncertainties. Its distinguishing feature is the major crisis of globalization in the economic, political, cultural and the geopolitical sphere. We witness the erosion of the “sof power” concept promot- ed by the West and the dying days of “democratic interventions”.

On peculiarities of Russian crisis

Te systemic nature of the current crisis in Russia can be attributed to the exhaus- tion of the old development model, typifed by its reliance on oil revenues, Western models and post-Soviet inertia, and the lacking ability to develop independently on the whole. Te dependence model was characterized by the minor role in the glob- al system, poor investment climate, need for innovation, a peripheral position of small and medium-sized businesses in the home economy, cronyism and strong state-business bonds at the regional level, and a high level of corruption.

On a possible bo!om of the crisis

Economists indulge in discussing the image of the “bottom”. But this notion is senseless, as we do not deal with the transition to a new economic model rather the restoration of the earlier order. Te way out of the crisis looks long, with much evidence to support this statement. Non-economic factors will contribute signif- cantly to the successful transition. Tis presupposes political and ideological chang- es as well as economic ones. Te ultimate goal has been formulated by the President. In essence, it is real economic sovereignty. AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 137

On peculiarities of Russian economic development

Russian economic development tends to be characterized by its deviation from the Western model, which is viewed as the ideal to live up to, and its inability to meet all the regular criteria. In fact the unifed Western model has never existed. Current- ly, Western states have developed three main models of political economy. Firstly, it is a free-market economy, with the USA as its epitome. Secondly, it is a man- aged market economy, with Germany being the most illustrative case. Finally, there is a state-regulated market economy, like the ones in France and Japan. Te Russian economic system is not a deviation. It corresponds to one of the three types, name- ly the state-regulated market economy. Terefore, the trajectory of its development must be regarded as a unique source of development rather an obstacle hindering its normalization process. Tere is no need to get rid of its peculiarities. We must learn to use them to our advantage.

There is no need to get rid of its peculiarities. We must learn to use them to our advantage.

On the way out of the crisis

Te most important factor, as I see it, which will allow to handle the crisis, will be the country’s ability to actually transform external pressure into the impetus for development. A new efcient system will arise. What aspects that will contribute to the quality system can be identifed? Tey include real positive efects of import substitution, higher export potential in industry and agriculture, the state’s ability to comply with its social obligations under new circumstances, growing competi- tion as the outcome of the political reform. Moreover, it includes more transparent and responsive institutions and political actors, and the nationalization of the elites, a government reshufe and a new political elite, the depth and the irreversibility of patriotic feelings, as well as the ability of the state and civil society to engage in jointly establishing and following the “development agenda”. 138 SURPRISING RUSSIA

LIFE GOES ON

rom February to October 2015 many fears and anxieties of Russians subsided, in- Fcluding wariness of possible income reduction and job losses. Still concerns about infation and possible escalation of international tensions are no less deep, and the lat- ter has even grown. People’s fear of possible war is not just an immediate reaction against external pressure and events in Donbass. It is deeply rooted in the cherished memories of the Great Patriotic War.

FEAR INDEX The Index is based on the yes- and no-answers ratio. The question was “How would you assess the probability of the following events in your life?” It is measured in points and can vary between -100 and 100. The higher the index is, the higher the probability of this event is. VCIOM, 2015

Internatonal tensions, conficts between natons, 16 military actons 20

Familiar goods have disappeared 19 or become very expensive; savings devalued 15

Health problems: poorer health, 2 difcultes getng medical aid and medicine, etc. 2 -1 Surging crime rate -4 Riots, internal politcal, ethnic -1 or religious conficts -7 Flood, earthquake,other natural disaster -17 -13 Declining revenues (salary cut, late payment, -5 low-wage job, switching to part-tme, etc.) -15 -18 Job loss -31 Family confict, break-up with family or relatves and friends -35 -46

February 2015 October 2015

In September 2015 over 40% of Russians expressed an opinion that darker times lay ahead of them.

HERE ARE DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS ON THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 10 IN RUSSIA. ARE THE MOST DIFFICULT TIMES OVER 21 OR ARE THEY YET TO COME?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015 44 25

They are over We see them now They are still to come Don’t know AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 139

Tus, public mood indices did not plunge as it happened in the 2008-2009 crisis, did not happen. On the contrary, there are signs of adaptation to the current social and economic situation. Financial problems and anxieties about the future do not stop Russians from en- joying life to the full. Te growth of the satisfaction with life index has recently been recorded. It happened amid the crisis in the economy and social sphere. Tis year the index beat last year’s record.

SATISFACTION WITH LIFE INDEX The Index is based on the yes- and no-answers ratio. “Anything may happen as both good and bad things may come our way. But, in general, are you happy or not?”. It is measured in points and can vary between -100 and 100. The higher the index is, the happier Russians are. VCIOM, 2015

64 64 62 55 59 59 48 43 35 31

17 6

1990 1991 1992 1998 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

For Russians happiness and satisfaction with life are closely tied to the family, the well-being of those loved ones, and interesting work.

IF YOU FEEL HAPPY, SAY WHY? Open-ended question, up to 5 answers, % of those who feel happy. TOP 10 CAUSES. VCIOM, 2015

Family well-being 37 My children or grandchildren make me happy 18 I am healthy, my relatves are healthy 12 Interestng work| studies 11 Everything is alright, everything is fne, 6 I have achieved everything I have someone I love, love, I love my relatves 6 I see no reasons to be sad 5 Sufcient fnancial prosperity 4 My friends 3 I just enjoy living 3 AT THE DAWN OF SPACE EXPLORATION RUSSIA TOOK LEADING

POSITIONS IN THIS FIELD. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING

STATEMENTS ABOUT THE POSITION OF RUSSIA IN SPACE

EXPLORATION COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR POINT OF VIEW?

Close-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

I think that Russia has preserved 30 its positions 60

I regret to say that Russia has lost 42 its positions 21

I am not concerned about Russia’s 8 having lost its positions 4

I am not interested in this question 12

12 1998 8 2015 I don’t know 3

ussia’s convincing victory in one area enhances public confdence in Russia’s abil- ity to show high results in other areas as well. Ever since 1998 Russian space exploration programmes have obtained the highest score, with the percentage of citizens who believe in Russia’s leading position in this area doubling and now constituting the majority of the population. IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD NATIONAL SPACE

EXPLORATION PROGRAMS BE EXPANDED,

MAINTAINED AT THE SAME LEVEL OR CUT UNDER

DIFFICULT ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES?

Close-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Don’t know 9 Cut 30 the programme

Expand the programme 17

Maintain the programmes at the same level 59

Russians show keen interest in new development strategies. Most citizens are sure that despite economic dif culties, public spending on the space industry must not be cut. 142 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

SIMON KORDONSKY, Head, Laboratory for Municipal Administration; Professor, Higher School of Economics

On crisis going unnoticed by the population

t is the state that is now facing a crisis rather than people. Ofcials who dis- Itribute and mobilize resources have been hit, because the resources allocated by the state have become meager and the trend seems unlikely to stop. Employees in state corporations and state-owned enterprises and pensioners can be troubled by the economic crisis, but the broad masses will not be. A prominent banker said that the dollar has reached the point it aspired: its exchange rate is of little interest to anyone. Te population is hardly afected by the crisis. It went largely unno- ticed by the population, like in 2008, as consumption and lifestyle hardly depend on the state.

On the ways of adapting to reduced economic growth

What is the popular response to the crisis? Even back in the Soviet times people kept a box of canned beef in the cellar. People plow lawns to grow potatoes, they build greenhouses to grow vegetables. Tey replace expensive gas with wood. Seasonal work gains popularity as it is not linked to the state. Farms growing cucumbers and other agricultural enterprises, fsheries, or forestry do not need state registration. People work in their garages, but are formally listed as employed. Te equipment is at home, and he makes spare car parts. In the city of Kimry the equipment to manufacture footwear was given to people, leather is dispatched, designers learn in Italy. Ten a man comes to take goods and give the money, shoes are packed and send to retailers or exported.

On the origin of the calm a!itude and readiness to crisis

Soviet life was dedicated to constant search for goods which were in short supply. Matches, salt, and sugar were hard to buy. It was a continuous crisis, with limited AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 143 opportunities to build up reserves. Te man owned just a fat, an unheated small cottage and six acres of land, a sort of a garage, and a barn. Now it is quite possible to accumulate resources. Moreover, in the post-Soviet pe- riod new communities emerged, such as long-haul truck drivers. Members of such communities have strong bonds and will stand up for one Seasonal workers, for example, those log forest work in teams and group. Tat is a collective survival strategy with its own trajectory rather than an individual one.

There are no poor people in the province. There are those who lack resources. If a person’s resources are limited, the local community usually pools mon- ey to help him.

On reciprocity

Tere are no poor people in the province. Tere are those who lack resources. If a per- son’s resources are limited, the local community usually pools money to help him. In the sauna the head of the administration told a local businessman, «You know there is a woman called Anka. She has two children; it is a single-parent family. Tink it over and suggest a way to help them.» And the businessman helps. Tis is not char- ity in its Western form as it is not a sacrifce or an act of giving away something. It is a natural state. Everyone engages in charity. I know guys who engage in wholesale and who have been sponsoring orphan asylums for 10 years. Tey meet on the regular basis, learn about children’s needs in the asylums located up to 300 km away from Moscow and satisfy those needs. Tey even bought tones of goods in China, few them to Rus- sia and distribute goods here. Over years they have developed a code of conduct as to what should not be given to orphanages to avert competition between kids. 144 SURPRISING RUSSIA

ALEXANDER OSLON, President, “Public Opinion” Fund

On the turning point

he late 2014 witnessed the event that was expected to spread panic and cause dis- Tarray. Te population noticed the economic crisis. Experts can always sense the crisis approaching or unfolding. And one of them always predicts it to hit the bull’s eye one day. However, the crisis which does not afect everyday life, money in the purse, food in the fridge, which is not visible to many co-workers or neighbours or confrmed by anyone or anything apart from the media, is not a real crisis. Te real crisis occurs when the majority of people in the country face the same trouble. It happened in 1992, when everyone saw new price tags in stores, and on January 2, 1992 a revolutionary change took place as a turning point was reached. In this sense, December 15, 2014 was also a turning point. Generally speaking, one could have expected that from that moment on everything would slide down- hill. Russia surprised everyone by avoiding the decline. Some things became worse, poorer, duller, and more monotonous, but the country survived.

On missing radical change

Diferent groups sufer from economic problems to a greater or lesser extent. For instance, depositors of the banks that went bankrupt are most likely to notice it. Tere are people who love some kinds of cheese and talk a lot about it. Tough it’s a drop in the ocean, still you can hear their voices complaining about the absence of cheese. But this does not afect everyone. Its scale is not large enough when com- pared to the social level. Terefore, there has not been any dramatic change, in general. Naturally, such a sharp depreciation of the ruble and the economic shock might have scared or an- gered someone, or make someone fall into depression. Te idea was that the crisis

I believe that the new level of self-awareness reached in 2014 has shielded the economy. AT T YA O SS STSSSSTAN TST 145 would derail the economy, right? It would have afected unemployment and pro- duction and so on. But, as polls show, nothing dramatic has actually happened, at least by now. I believe that the new level of self-awareness reached in 2014 has shielded the economy.

On new self-awareness in handling crisis

Newly found self-awareness has really compensated for visible economic changes. Self-protection is very strong, because it is metaphysical and is connected with the im- age of oneself: “I no longer respect myself, if I get wary of the events. As long as the world teeters on the brink of the complete collapse, I will not stop respecting myself.” Te sanctions regime and the crisis reveal things that would stayed hidden other- wise. Tey are caused by internal state, with whom we entered into confict. For exam- ple, take the growth in the agricultural sector. Te situation is unfolding in an unpre- dictable way, which was desirable but seemed impossible. Te same can be said about engineering, as we manufacture more hi-tech goods that earlier. Changing image of oneself brought to life or revived large-scale projects. For some it was the development of the Arctic. it has triggered the development of new technol- ogies, including liquefed gas or tanker feet. Dramatic changes in the defence industry may lead to shifs in the economy in the near future, if not today. PART 4 FACE TO FACE WITH THE WEST WE AND THE WORLD: UKRAINE: FAMILY CONFLICT? COOPERATION RUSSIA’S PIVOT TO ASIA: WHAT ARE OUR EXPECTATIONS? AND CONFRONTATION MIDDLE EAST HOTSPOTS

AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, ITS FOUNDATIONS AND ROLE IN SOCIETY HISTORICAL MEMORY AND STATE SYMBOLS CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? CRIMEA IS OURS: WHEN THERE IS NO ROOM FOR QUESTIONS DEFENSE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: ARMY AND POLICE

DEFENDING OURSELVES. LIFE UNDER SANCTIONS. THE YEAR OF CRISIS: CRISIS: ADAPTATION STRATEGY STRESS-RESISTANCE TEST

RUSSIA’S QUALITY OF LIFE FAMILY AND SOCIETY: TRADITION AND MODERNITY TRADITIONAL VALUES SACRED AND PROFANE: CHANGING BOUNDARIES AND EVERYDAY HOW WE PERCEIVE “CULTURE” PREFERENCES INFORMATION SOURCES: POPULARITY AND TRUST 148 SURPRISING RUSSIA

RUSSIA’S QUALITY OF LIFE

ver the recent 25 years Russians’ ideas about living standards along with Rus- Osia’s society have undergone signifcant changes, but the core values have re- mained the same. Tey include parenting or child rearing, life without physical and emotional illnesses, promoting peace in families, friendly communications and fa- vorite occupations. Not only do these values boil down to essentials, but also they are lasting.

At the same time, today it is possible to detect trends that earlier were obscured. Tey encompass an intention to achieve material and professional success, be social- ly recognized, develop spiritually and broaden personal horizons due to new con- tacts and travelling. Russians have started to seek more various benefts out of this life as soon as they have satisfed their basic needs. More importantly, they appreci- ate what they have reached and consider health, security and stable incomes as sa- lient elements.

As a result, global behavior standards resting upon similar beliefs about the qual- ity life are being incorporated into Russian society. Increasingly, more people view health concerns as personal responsibilities, thus giving up bad habits, doing sports, maintaining a balanced diet and being subjected to regular medical examinations. Russian citizens have become more exacting in terms of the food quality. Given the price availability, they are more ready to choose domestic products.

Most Soviet perceptions still persist. For instance, almost 50% of people realize that higher education does not necessarily lead to successful careers. Nevertheless, the majority ascribe to it a primary role in mapping out life strategies. Te Unifed State Exam is getting widely accepted because it grants pupils admission to higher education. In the labor market, stability and confdence in the future are more im- portant than high salaries. Tus, work remains the so called second home, and labor mobility has failed to become an integral part of life strategies. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 149

LIVING STANDARDS. NEW HORIZONS?

oday people want to get far more things out of life than 25 years ago. Children, Tfamilies and health still play a prominent role in Russians’ lives. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union other elements contributing to fulflling life have also become relevant.

DO YOU REGARD THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS AS IMPORTANT GOALS IN YOUR LIFE? 1989 Closed-ended question, one answer per each purpose, %. VCIOM, 2015 2014

89 Parentng or child rearing 95 82 Enjoying good health, avoiding illnesses 95 86 Creatng a family 94 75 Living according to good conscience 90 74 Good friends 89 65 Interestng job 85 48 Achieving material afuence 85 30 Reaching success in professional or social realms 79 34 Developing spiritually 71 29 Travelling, visitng new places 61

Russians portray health as a factor that has a major impact on the quality of life. Moreover, our citizens add security, stable income and available food to this list.

PLEASE, RATE THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS ON A SCALE OF 1-5 (5 MEANS ‘VERY IMPORTANT’, AND 1 MEANS ‘NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL’) Average point, answer per each characteristic. VCIOM, 2015

Health 4,78 Security 4,73 Stable income 4,68 High-quality and availability of food 4,68 Comfortable household conditons 4,66 Environment (air and water quality) 4,61 High-quality educaton 4,51 Developed communal infrastracture 4,49 Access to cultural sites and resorts 4,34 Access to high-quality goods and services 4,29 Professional career 4,10 IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT DEFINES SUCCESSFUL

PROFESSIONAL CAREER?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Stability and confdence in the future 40 High salary 19 Opportunites for personal and professional development 9 Job satsfacton 7 Climbing the career ladder 5 Professional self-realizaton 5 Recogniton from colleagues, respect from others 4 Improvement of social status 3 Internships 1 Others 1 Don’t know 5

In comparison with the late 1980s, the career factor has gained much promi- nence for Russians. It is noteworthy that successful careers are related to stability and confdence in the future, rather than high salaries and promotion prospects. Tis can explain low labor mobility of citizens – such a model still has failed to take roots in Russian society. IN YOUR OPINION, ARE THERE ENOUGH RUSSIAN PRODUCTS

IN THE MARKET TODAY?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

The amount of Russian 53 products is not sufcient 66

The amount of Russian 39 products is sufcient 32

There are too many 4 Russian products 1

Don’t know 4 1

Total respondents Respondents in Moscow

High-quality and available products constitute a sign of decent living standards and a key indicator of social well-being. Russians believe that above all domestic products tend to meet such requirements. 50% of citizens would like to have more goods produced at home in the market. In Moscow, where the issue of living stan- dards is becoming relevant, there are even more people who approve of the domes- tic sector’s expansion. 152 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

ALEXANDER OSLON, President of the Public Opinion Foundation

On the Stratum “People XXI”

n the early 1990s when the Soviet reality became a thing of the past, older gen- Ierations ceased to be a source of experience, because under new circumstances it was irrelevant. Tere was nobody to tell people what to do. Terefore, each person had to get his or her experience independently. While doing this the majority faced severe stress, whereas the minority were excited at bright prospects. At that time, they were adapting to new realities, simultaneously shaping them. At the very beginning of the 2000s our society witnessed the emergence of a par- ticular group of those who were more adapted and viewed as carriers of progress. We called them “People XXI”. Moreover, they were diferent from other people because they took advantage of new opportunities, used electronic gadgets such as mobile phones, computers, credit cards, planes, E-mails, the Internet etc. “People XXI” had another vision of career and work in order to achieve certain goals. Tey fully realized what the quality of life stood for and saw it as a very important factor. While some people regarded living standards as follows “I want to be successful in order to live a better life”, others viewed them as an instrument, “I will live a better life and then I will follow my successful path”.

When More is Be!er

In the early 2000s, this group accounted for almost 15%. But then their number started to gradually rise. Today more than 90% of adults use mobile phones, and 60% surf the Web. And in this case we do not take into consideration adolescents who are active Internet-users. It is possible to conclude that these feature cannot longer defne people of the 21st century. And we are supposed to search for other characteristics which will typify those who will structure our lives tomorrow. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 153

While some people regarded living standards as fol- lows “I want to be successful in order to live a be"er life”, others viewed them as an instrument, “I will live a be"er life and then I will follow my successful path”.

On Features of the New Stratum

Today Russian society is witnessing the emergence of a new group, which consists of people who prefer working on the Web, rather than for corporations or compa- nies. Tey like investing themselves, their ideas and energy into the virtual world. What exactly motivates them? Communication, interests, profts, self-development and chances to get results constitute their drivers. We can also add competition and recognition to this list. Basically, it is related to social networks evolving into a new labor environment. Tis form of employment is named “crowdsourcing” to diferentiate between insourcing and outsourcing. Crowdsourcing is aimed at attracting various people across the Web who have an intention to work. According to my estimates, they account for almost 10 million in Russia. Tey are willing to live a new life. Such a phenomenon is new for Russian but cannot be re- garded as something exotic. For many it has become the most popular way of self-re- alization. 154 SURPRISING RUSSIA

HEALTH AND EDUCATION AS RESOURCES

he key objective of most Russians, that is to invest in their children’s’ future, Tis closely linked to peoples’ perceptions about available and high-quality edu- cation. Pupils’ parents are quite skeptical about the quality of primary and second- ary education, even though there are those who have witnessed certain improve- ments in teaching as opposed to the times when they personally went to school. Nevertheless, memories about the highest standards of Soviet education at school, which continue having an impact on the current situation, are still vivid.

HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE QUALITY HOW HAS THE QUALITY OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOLING? CHANGED SINCE YOU WENT TO SCHOOL? HAS IT BECOME BETTER OR WORSE?

Pupils’ parents surveyed, closed-ended question, one answer, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015

4 8 12 Good Better 30 30 Average Worse Poor The same Don’t know 52 10 Don’t know 54

Te Unifed State Exam has become an intrinsic part of Russian society. Te attitude towards it has improved; more than 40% acknowledge that it has enabled many pupils to ender universities. By the way, teachers at universities believe in this.

HAS THE UNIFIED STATE EXAM MADE IT EASIER OR DIFFICULT FOR SCHOOL LEAVERS TO BE ENROLLED IN UNIVERSITY? Closed-ended question, one response, %. VCIOM, 2015

43 It has become easier to enter universites 64

It has become more difcult 27 to enter universites 17

This exam has not had any impact on this 17 13

All respondents Universities’ teachers PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 155

Te practical value of education is much higher. Here Soviet stereotypes, and mod- ern ideas about factors contributing to a person’s competitiveness seem to play their part.

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH…? Closed-ended question, one response per each line, %. VCIOM, 2015

Higher educaton will provide a person with successful career 65 28 and help to achieve goals

The signifcance of higher educaton is overrated, 52 39 nowadays you can succeed without it

Lack of higher educaton will force a person to have low salaries and a job without any prospects 42 50

Nowadays all means can be employed 39 48 to get higher educaton

I can spend all money on higher educaton 42 43

Rather agree Rather disagree

Te most important indicator of living standards is health. Te majority of citi- zens, when they are ill, go to free state-run hospitals. Besides, people are becoming more aware of their health. While seven years ago they linked their poor conditions with the low quality of life, now they tend to blame themselves.

WHO OR WHAT IS TO BLAME FOR PEOPLE’S BAD HEALTH? Closed-ended question, no more than two responses, %. VCIOM, 2015

37 We are to blame for ilnesses 47 25 Poor environment 28 Low living standards, 41 lack of money 25 Low qualifcatons 21 and negligence of doctors 23 The state which does not care 22 about its citzens 13 3 All illnesses are allowed by God 4 No one, because people have always 7 sufered from illnesses and diseases 4 2008 2015 DO YOU LOOK AFTER YOUR HEALTH

OR NEGLECT IT?

Closed-ended question, one answer, % VCIOM, 2015

I look af er my health I do not pay much at ent on to it 72 Don’t know 63 52 45 35 27

3 2 1

2008 2014 2015

Over the recent years far more Russians have started to look af er their health, with two absolutely dif erent age groups becoming active in this realm. Whereas in case of senior citizens who are more than 60 years old it is quite expected, the greater focus of young people aged from 18 to 30 years old on their health testif es to the establishment of a new social norm. IF YOU MAINTAIN YOUR HEALTH,

WHAT DO YOU EXACTLY DO?

Closed-ended question, any number of responses, %. TOP 5. VCIOM, 2015.

I do not drink and smoke 32 35

I eat healthy food 16 28

If I fall ill, I go to doctors 31 and follow their recommendatons 27 14 I do physical actvity and sports 24

I come under regular medical 12 examinatons 22

2008 2015

Giving up bad habits is still regarded as a clue to a healthy way of life. Add to this mixture new rules which enable a person to maintain his or her health. Tey in- clude healthy food, sport and regular medical examination. Terefore, Russians’ behavior now resembles Western patterns. 158 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

VLADIMIR MIRONOV, Member Correspondent of Russian Academy of Sciences, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, Moscow State University (MSU)

On Paradoxical Results of “Liberalization”

n the one hand, the liberal model of education has generated a large num- Ober of private universities which provide poor education. Te number of non- state funded places exceeded the funded ones. Tey have imposed an idea that paid education is a global trend. But two years ago Germany made its education free. It is largely free in Scandinavia. In most countries it is also the case. On the other hand, the liberal model of higher education will give greater free- dom. On the contrary, it gave rise to quite stringent standards. Students’ moti- vation in choosing their future profession is seriously undermined, which is also a consequence of the reform. Teachers have plunged into the world of excessive re- porting, uncontrolled increase in the workload and weird efciency requirements. Education has been permanently reformed for over two decades. Te third-gener- ation standard is only taking shape, and we already hear about the “3+” standard. Students have studied under constant pressure and in complete uncertainty.

On Conservatism in Education

My words should not be viewed as a reproach to children, but today the level of training in school has dropped because the focus has shifed from gaining knowledge to drilling in order to pass the Unifed State Exam. 10 years ago, when I asked freshmen who read Umberto Eco, I saw numerous hands. Today only 2-3 people raise hands. References to the fact that such exams are held worldwide is irrelevant. Even in those countries which have a similar system, it is not the only selection criterion to enter universities. T ey tried to link the exam with an opportunity to enter best universities as it was to demonstrate the level of knowledge. But the level and grades will be diferent in diferent region, even if we do not touch upon the cases of deliberately massaging fgures. It is known that Moscow and St. Petersburg show the worst results in the Russian language exam. Does it imply that children’s level of the native language is the lowest in the capitals? PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 159

Hence, the big question is whether children who have entered the best universities, were selected on the basis of fair competition, if the results and the price paid for them vary. Let me reiterate, they are in no way to blame. Moscow State University has long been accused of conservatism and opposition to reform, but it has made it possible to preserve the quality of education centers. It is not a coincidence that the government has recently realized that it is impossible to apply the same criteria everywhere. MSU and SPSU (St. Petersburg State University), for example, were given more autonomy. I believe that leading universities should be more independent in selecting their future students.

Russia is a leading country when it comes to the number of scientists who have emigrated to the West. These statistics show that we have high-quality higher education.

On why fewer is be!er

In Russia the system “higher education-school” is eroded. Te number of those who want to enter universities account for 97%, whereas in Germany only 30% go to them. In this country pupils fall into three categories, and those who fnish grammar school have a right to study at universities (interestingly, there are almost 30% of them). What we see in Russia is extreme massifcation of higher education. I would like to mention that Russia is a leading country when it comes to the num- ber of scientists who have emigrated to the West. Tese statistics show that we have high-quality higher education. However, if education faces its further decline, we may have more graduates who will live in Russia, but they will fail to under- pin fundamental sciences. We will have to buy all scientifc achievements relat- ed to state-of-the-art technologies. Given the fact that we have some demographic difculties, it is high time we started optimizing and restructuring universities. In this case I would like our specialists to seriously examine all selection criteria. 160 SURPRISING RUSSIA

SERGEI MARKOV, Member of the Public Chamber, Member of the League of Nation’s Health

On Health as a Value

hen, afer the fall of the Soviet Union social institutions collapsed, basic secu- Writy and personal income to preserve the basic living standards topped the list of priorities of Russians. Te crisis of the 1990s was over, but man stayed atomized. When lef all alone, they prioritized two values: family and health. It was linked to the fact that constant welfare growth in Russia – unlike the one in the West – has always been limited by Orthodox morality, which encourages lim- ited material consumption. Now we are witnessing an intense interest in health matters, with the number of gyms increasing and health programs broadcast daily on all the leading TV chan- nels.

Now we are witnessing an intense interest in health ma"ers, with the number of gyms increasing and health programs broadcast daily on all the leading TV channels.

On Success and Future Aims

In Russia average life expectancy is growing faster than in the EU. Te increase is 4 months a year in Europe, while in Russia it amounts to 5-6 months a year. However, given that we rise from a low point, average life expectancy should grow at least 8-9 months in a year for us to catch up with the Western fgures. We have every opportunity to achieve it. In Russia, we talk a lot about the national idea. From my point of view, the task to reach life expectancy of 100 years could serve as one. Tis aim is quite achievable. Now average life expectancy is 72 years in Rus- sia and 82 years in the developed countries of the EU. Te average lifespan of a per- son with a higher education in the European Union is 90 years. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 161

It would be extremely benefcial. If we seek to increase life expectancy in the coun- try, biotechnology, biochemistry, biophysics, medical technology, and social technol- ogy will be developed. Humanity will enter an era of long lives. A country that will be the frst to realize it and will reorient its economic, social and political institutions accordingly will join the ranks of advanced countries.

On Russian Healthcare Model

At the same time we should not copy blindly the Western European healthcare model. It is a pharmaceutically oriented system. In the West, the doctor is inter- ested in sick people, who consume as many pills as possible. We have the solid basis for our own health oriented system. I am talking about health resorts. Peo- ple should not be merely treated, and we must help them maintain their health. Te underestimation of facilities’ capacities and the attempt to use it for commer- cial goals is a strategic mistake. 162 SURPRISING RUSSIA

FAMILY AND SOCIETY: TRADITION AND MODERNITY

amily remains the dominant basic value for Russians, but its life cycle is grad- Fually ever less dependent on external regulation. Men and women are now un- derstood to shoulder full responsibility for getting married, starting a family, and preserving “the basic cell of society”. It is their private afair. It is no longer impera- tive – as it was a decade ago – that people have to maintain family ties to the bitter end. Te demand is by far less strict nowadays. Half of Russians believe that it is not anend in itself, but it depends on the circumstances. Conservative views are not re- jected out of hand. Tey are rather fexibly adapted to the real-life situation.

Basic human values stay central to children’s upbringing. Nevertheless, today par- ents also want their children to acquire practical skills and make them strive for social success. Foster children are still rare in Russian families. Material problems, bureaucracy and fear of bad heredity still stand in people’s way. However, Russians believe that if one wants to adopt a child, it must be done at the earliest age possible to raise the child as one’s own and the truth must be revealed only when a foster child comes of age.

Polls show that restrictions imposed on sexual life become private matters rather than social taboos. Te registration of same-sex marriages is the only case, which the vast majority still strongly disapprove of. Russians see homosexuality as either a social deviation or a medical condition. Tis aspect refects a particularly marked diference between cultural traditionalism of Russian society and the Western ap- proach.

When it comes to gender equality, most Russians point to remarkable progress. Meanwhile, they admit that it is more difcult for women to fnd a job and to be pro- moted to the top position than for men. Tey also acknowledge that women are still faced with numerous problems in providing their children with education and are underprotected from violence. Tus, men’s and women’s opportunities are not equal, and the equality issue is rather set aside than settled. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 163

***

amily is the most cherished life value for the overwhelming majority of Russians. FNevertheless, over a quarter of a century they have become more tolerant to di- vorce. It may be caused by the partners’ revised mutual expectations about the family life due to new cultural stereotypes; weaker social ties; or the sexual revolution, which took place 25 years later than in the West.

WHICH OF THE OPINIONS GIVEN BELOW WOULD YOU SUPPORT? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

5 One can get divorced anyway, it will not make things worse 8 13 One must not get divorced, one must avoid a divorce by all means 11 One can get divorced only when the family has practcally fallen apart 39 27 36 It depends 50 7 Don’t know 4 1990 2015

Russians rate health as the factor which impacts most on the quality of life. Tey also believe that security, a stable income, and access to reasonably priced high-quality food have a considerable infuence on the quality of life.

ASSESS THE IMPORTANCE OF EACH CHARACTERISTIC USING THE SCALE FROM 1 TO 5, WITH 5 MEANING “VERY IMPORTANT” AND 1 MEANING “NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL”. Average, answer to each line. VCIOM, 2015

66 To respect parents 60 73 To be honest and respectable 58 53 To have a thirst for knowledge 55 45 To love one’s home and motherland 50 47 To try to be empathic 42 12 To remember about one’s origin 36 15 To learn to be happy 34 To economize 25 32 34 To always be true to oneself 31 23 To openly speak one’s mind 26 6 To pursue one’s self-interest 21 7 To always strive for something new 21 3 To try to reach the positon of dominance 19 11 To work for common beterment 18 2 To remember about retributon 18 5 To learn to be thankful for small favours 13 8 To avoid standing-out 13 4 To be canny, to avoid getng tricked 13 1989 2 To be ready to land the frst punch 8 2015 164 SURPRISING RUSSIA

Te adoption issue has acquired renewed importance afer the “Dima Yakovlev Law”. It became a central item on the public agenda. However, qualitative chang- es are largely missing because of underdeveloped social skills, the ailing economy, and the red tape.

WHAT DIFFICULTIES DOES ONE TRADITIONALLY FACE WHEN ADOPTING A CHILD? Closed-ended question, up to two answers, %. VCIOM, 2015

Low average income of foster parents 32

The absence of appropriate living conditons 32

Red tape by state and municipal services 27 regulatng the adopton process

Bad inherited genetc conditons of the children 15 adopted from orphanages

Corrupton in state and municipal services 11

Numerous own children 6

Bad health conditon of the foster-parents 5

Possible claims of the biological parents 5

Most Russians believe that one can love adopted children like own ones. How- ever, the very topic remains a taboo in families. Apparently, many consider such information painful for the child and damaging for his relationship with the foster parents.

WHICH STATEMENT ABOUT THE ADOPTION DO YOU AGREE WITH? Closed-ended question, one answer per line, %. VCIOM, 2015

It is beter to adopt children before they reach three 69 21 One should not tell the child about the adopton, at least tll they come of age 59 28

The adopted child must have no direct relatves, it is beter to adopt an orphan 46 39 Children in orphanages inherit bad genes, they are predisposed to alcoholism, crime etc. 41 44

Few want to adopt a child in Russia 41 39

Many foster parents are guided only by greed and the desire to improve their living conditons 34 46

Parents who have a child will never love 25 58 an adopted kid just as strongly

Quite agree Quite disagree PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 165

Non-traditional sexual orientation is also a matter of much controversy in Rus- sian society. Te concept contradicts traditional norms and attitudes. Only a ffh of Russians has a completely tolerant attitude towards homosexuality. Obviously, it can be attributed to the fact that over a third of Russians believes homosexuality is a deviation from the norm, a disease with medical causes or social roots.

HOW DO YOU PERCEIVE PEOPLE WITH NON-TRADITIONAL SEXUAL ORIENTATION? Closed-ended question, %. VCIOM, 2015

Sexual orientaton is a private mater; it does not mater to me 22 if people have traditonal or non-traditon orientaton

Gays are dangerous people; they should be isolated from society 20

They are ill; they need medical assistance 20

Homosexuals are, of course, normal people 15 but I do not want to communicate with them

Homosexuality is a social disease; society needs treat them 15

Don’t know 8

Russians treat same-sex marriages in a by far less tolerant way than 10 years ago. Tough they initially rejected them out of hand as abnormality, their tougher stance can be attributed to a current attempt to mould national identity in detail.

DO YOU AGREE THAT SAME-SEX COUPLES (GAYS AND LESBIANS) HAVE A RIGHT TO MARRY EACH OTHER? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

34 Strongly disagree 70

Rather disagree 25 10 Somewhat agree, somewhat disagree 17 6 Quite agree 10 5 Totally agree 4 3 Don’t know 10 6

2005 2015 IN YOUR OPINION, ARE THE RIGHTS OF MEN AND WOMEN

EQUAL IN DIFFERENT SPHERES OF LIFE IN MODERN RUSSIA?

Closed-ended question, one answer per each line, %. VCIOM, 2015

RIGHTS ARE EQUAL

Right to educaton 80 90 Right to get a job 48 according to specializaton 76

Right to have free tme, 56 to rest 76 To get paid according 47 to the quality and quantty of labor 75

Opportunity to partcipate 48 in social and politcal life 74

Distributon of family 49 chores 67

2006 2015

Today women and men are becoming ever more equal, and the respondents of both genders admit it. Te number of those surveyed who see equal job op- portunities for men and women and equal treatment at work, including decent payment, as well as equality in social and political participation has increased by 50% over the last decade. HOW HAVE THE OPPORTUNITIES OF WOMEN CHANGED

OVER THE RECENT 10 OR 15 YEARS?

Closed-ended question, one answer per each line, %. VCIOM, 2015

To take care of themselves 53 25 and personal health

To do housekeeping 46 30

To get the educaton 42 28 they want

To fulfll her potental 40 34 in business and public sphere

To receive a superior positon 34 38

To fnd a job 31 48

To arrange personal life 28 42

To bring up children 26 50

To protect themselves against violence 24 41

It is easier It is more difcult

Half of the Russians surveyed think that it has become easier for women to fulfll their political and business aspirations over the past 10-15 years. However, they still face difculties what it comes to reaching the top of a career ladder as there are some invisible constraints. It is still hard for them to fnd a job or to protect themselves from violence. Although men and women are equal de jure, there is still a way to go before we get to the genuine gender equality. 168 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

LEONID POLYAKOV, Member of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights; Member of the Advisory Board, ISEPR Foundation

On Changing A!itude of Russians to Family Life

n 1989-1990, in the dying days of the Soviet Union, family was still characterized Ias a “cell of the state”, with the state and ideology strongly approving it and en- couraging people to get married and have a family. Quarter of a century later, there has been a noticeable shif to pragmatism and individualism. Te respondents avoid generalizations and prefer to consider each case separately. In this respect, we can say that family as an institution is acquiring new value as a matter of personal choice and personal efort, rather than a way of life imposed by the state.

On A!itude of Russians to Same-Sex Marriage

Free choice and pragmatism in treating family life are accompanied by the growing resistance to the very possibility of legalized same-sex marriage. Every ffh Russian is largely indiferent to one’s sexual orientation and the rest perceive homosexual- ity as abnormality (personal or social pathology). Terefore, no wonder that 80% of the population is against the legalization of gay marriage. Some of the respondents are religiously motivated. Tey perceive such sexual behavior as a strict taboo.

On Changing A!itude of Russians to Gender Issue

Te absolute majority of Russians point to gender equality in all social spheres. Moreover, women have clearly been given more opportunities with regard to personal care, house- hold management, education, and participation in politics and business. At the same time new problems associated with career aspirations, personal life, and work-family life balance emerge. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 169

SERGEY KHAIKIN, Academic Advisor, Institute for Social Marketing; Professor; Advisor to the Head of the Federal Agency for Nationality Afairs

On the Revival of Family Biography

ow every family engages in an intuitive search for family values, which is quite Nas challenging as the search for a national idea. Te revision of history, chang- ing ownership relations, and the country’s new global role force people to reconsider the approaches to their own small “states” of a family and the distribution of social roles. I believe that we are witnessing the emergence of a new man, a new psycho- logical type that will be diferent from the “Soviet type” described by sociologists in the 1980s. Te growing popularity of personal biographical interviews and family biographies refect the rising interest of people in their own lives. People turn to their personal values, and from this perspective they perceive, understand and change the world.

On the Reasons for Family Values on the Rise

Te more crucial role of the family is a very good trend, but it was linked to a need, which was not always fully realized and, hence, free. Like a corporation getting rid of bad assets, the state has stopped performing the functions which it traditionally does not have to fulfll. Te man was free from coercion and pressure, but lacked care, patronage and guarantees. Te popular ideas of “atomized consciousness”, which so- ciologists used to promote in the 1990s, refected the destruction of the social and class structure, the collapse of institutions and their replacement with idealistic and patriotic substitutes. Te family and the nation proved to be most persistent and served as a ground for solidarity. Te socio-economic factor is central to the growing role of the family. Like any economic unit, family should be cost-efective and provide its members with education, health, reproduction and development opportunities. 170 SURPRISING RUSSIA

ELENA OMELCHENKO, Member of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights; Professor, HSE

On the Value of Marriage and Domestic Partnership

etting married and starting a family rank high in the value systems of modern GRussians, but there have been major shifs in terms of age. Many researchers point to the fact that both young men and women prefer to delay marriage and par- enthood. Te second factor is a rapid development of alternative forms of partnership. We no longer deal with just civil marriage. It is partnership as a legal form of rela- tionship and a new form of households. Modern students take it for granted. Part- nership presupposes equal fnancial contribution to the household budget of both men and women, the division of domestic chores and later on equal responsibility for the upbringing of children, etc.

On the Influence of Traditional Values on Family Relationships

Modern experts in gender relations in Russia mention a new conservative shif, which is associated with a strong pressure exercised by the authorities, who appeal to traditional values. It is ofen accompanied by the references to orthodoxy and the entrenched gender identity and sexuality patterns. Family with three children, a working husband and a wife, who takes care of children and does not necessarily work, is the actively promoted image of an exemplary family. It is a very signifcant shif from, for example, the Soviet vision.

On the Aspirations of the Youth for Gender Equality

Ways of everyday gender interaction among the youth are much more versatile. Young people tend to support the idea of gender equality. How can we account for this trend? First, we owe it to consumerism and the accompanying marketing techniques which promote new products and services and shape demand and give a boost to consumers, who naturally have versatile desires. Cultural infrastructure and cultural activity PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 171 supplied to customers are just as crucial because young men and women are shown a variety of life options. Life makes young people more mobile and fexible regardless of their gender or gender identity. Te professional and intellectual level of a person matters more than the gender. In this regard, it is noteworthy mentioning that employers have become much more demanding in terms of the candidate’s professional training. Tus, the competency outweighs gender or other identity parameters.

Ways of everyday gender interaction among the youth are much more versatile. Young people tend to support the idea of gender equality.

On Violence against Women and New Sensitivity

Still, there is no internal striving to become more aggressive. In my opinion, this young generation is generally less aggressive than their predecessors. Young people are not apathetic or apolitical, which was the case in the mid-2000s. I believe that the loyalty of the young generation to the existing order is linked to a desire to wait and to fnd their place in the system. It is a natural desire to build up muscles and gain strength to take vital decisions. Terefore, in a sense, it is a quieter generation. Young people are less aggressive and more attentive to each other. It can even be referred to as a “new sensitivity”. 172 SURPRISING RUSSIA

SACRED AND PROFANE: CHANGING BOUNDARIES

he overwhelming majority of Russians state that they practice a religion. Most TRussians are Orthodox; a substantial number of Russians are Muslims. Tey follow their religion in full awareness rather than have faith on paper only. But their religious life is confned to religious institutions; people do not let it mix with social passions. On the contrary, one can see that religion hardly ever comes to the fore in social life. At the very end of the Soviet era, one hoped that religion would under- take a social mission. However, today religion is confned to parishes, communities, and private life. Delicacy in treating other people’s beliefs and feelings is publicly promoted.

Several factors contribute to it. Russia is a multi-religious state with a number of infuential religions historically living side by side. Terefore, any religious of- fense would only lead to new conficts, inficting severe damage to common bet- terment. Meanwhile, we are bombarded with international news showing numer- ous examples of destructive religious fanaticism, as well as terrorism, which ofers its own interpretations of religious tenets to justify murder. Russian citizens regard the adoption of these models at home as unacceptable. Te same is true of an incite- ment to unleash civil and social conficts.

Tis trend is accompanied with the growing respect for secularism in state afairs guaranteed by the constitution, which entails the complete separation of the state from all religious institutions. Although now in private matters people seek con- solation in religion more frequently, than 25 years ago, a clear majority of citizens are inclined to limit the social role of religion to ethics, morality and teaching. Any growing tension along the religious fault line calls for still greater caution. Russian citizens have expressed a full understanding of this demand, when they expressed their position on the terrorist attack against Charlie Hebdo. Russians rejected out of hand any idea of violence on religious grounds, while they also fundamentally opposed making something sacred for anyone the target for public ridicule. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 173

***

ussia is a multinational and multireligious state. Te exact statistics on people’s re- Rligious afliations do not exist, since the freedom of conscience and religion are en- shrined in the Constitution and these issues are considered a private matter. Most surveys give a similar picture. Over two thirds of the population belong to Orthodoxy or practice some of it. Te second largest group comprised of Muslims brings together at least 10% of the population. Te majority of Russians identify themselves with Orthodoxy, mostly because it is the cornerstone of national identity.

WHAT RELIGION OR WORLDVIEW DO YOU HAVE? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Orthodoxy 74

Atheism 10

Islam 8

I am a believer, but I do not belong to any religion 3

I am neither a believer nor an atheist 2

Buddhism 1

Don’t know 1

Despite the large gap between practicing and non-practicing believers, two-thirds of Russians consider themselves afliated to a religion. Religious tolerance is charac- teristic of Russian society: citizens understand that any sectarian strife could seriously unravel international relations.

DO YOU PRACTICE ANY RELIGION YOURSELF? Closed-ended questions, one question, %. VCIOM, 2015

4 28 Yes

No

68 Don’t know 174 SURPRISING RUSSIA

In their attitude to sacred values Russians manifest their peculiar socio-cul- tural views and mindset in the most apparent way. About seventy-fve percent of Russians are aware of what happened in the Charlie Hebdo ofces, and the vast majority of them condemn this way of defending religious beliefs. Here we seem to demonstrate solidarity with European countries as we also believe that violence must not become a means of promoting religious views.

WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS PEOPLE WHO ATTACKED THE FRENCH WEEKLY NEWSPAPER`S OFFICE? Closed-ended question, one answer, % of those who knew what had happened. VCIOM, 2015

8 I do not understand and disapprove of such actions 5 I do not approve of them but I understand the reasons 48 I understand and approve of the actions 39 Don’t know

However, the majority of our citizens do not approve of the publication either as they think that the caricatures on religious topics hurt the feelings of believers. Te position has become tougher over the past decade because the disillusionment with the West makes Russians defne their own values more clearly and draw the demarcation line between “their” culture and “our” culture. Tis year, almost two-thirds of the respon- dents are certain that such actions must be prosecuted.

IS THE PUBLICATION OF CARICATURES DEPICTING FAMOUS RELIGIOUS FIGURES ACCEPTABLE (PROPHET MUHAMMAD, JESUS CHRIST, BUDDHA ETC.)? Closed-ended questions, one answer, % of those who heard about the caricatures. VCIOM, 2015 (The question was asked in 2006 afer a Danish newspaper published cartoons of Prophet Mohammed, which sparked mass protests in Muslim countries)

No, it is totally unacceptable, as it ofends the feelings 46 of believers and it must be subject to criminal 62 or administratve prosecuton

It is somewhat unacceptable and must be publicly condemned 35 23 Yes, it is acceptable as the media enjoy the right 13 to the freedom of speech 6

Don’t know 5 9 2006 2015 PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 175

РReligion is believed to play a more important role in everyday life today than in 1990. It is known that it was extremely difcult to practice any religion in the So- viet Union, and believers were discriminated against. It took religious culture some time to take root and religious afliation has become part of national identity.

DOES RELIGION HELP YOU IN EVERYDAY LIFE? Closed-ended questions, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

It always helps 5 26

18 It sometmes helps 29

I cannot remember a single case when it helped 55 39

Don’t know 23 6 1990 2015

However, the increased importance of religion in society is viewed as a more neg- ative phenomenon in Russia in contrast to the assessment made 25 years ago. Back then, the removal of political constraints gave rise to a surge in the number of follow- ers as religion was in vogue. However, the evolving consumer society has made a lot of people immune against any kind of ideological constraints, including religious ones.

IS THE SPREAD OF RELIGIOUS VIEWS MORE BENEFICIAL OR HARMFUL TO OUR SOCIETY IN GENERAL? Closed-ended questions, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

More beneft 61 36

5 More harm 23

18 It won’t have any efect 28

Don’t know 17 13

1990 2015 SECULARISM IS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION; IT MEANS THAT CHURCH

AND RELIGION ARE SEPARATED FROM STATE INSTITUTIONS.

WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION?

Closed-ended questions, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

This provision 54 should be preserved 64

Ofcial religion should be established, like in Greece, Great Britain, 13 Saudi Arabia, etc 12

There should not be a single religion; however, the state should not be completely secular; 17 there should be a religious component 10 (like the one in the U.S.A)

Don’t know 17 2007 14 2015

Despite remarkable tolerance in religious matters, the number of those who are really bitter about a religious building for those practicing a diferent faith, next to their home has signifcantly increased over 25 years. It can be attributed to a desire to avoid any confict caused by the collision of religions and a mun- dane unwillingness to sacrifce one’s habits and comfort for the sake of rather abstract values and norms, even though it is deemed “correct”. IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT KIND OF RELATIONS

SHOULD THE CHURCH AND THE STATE/SOCIETY HAVE?

Closed-ended questions, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Church should infuence spiritual life, the issues of morality, but it should not intervene in politcs or public afairs 47

Church should deal with religions afairs; it should not intervene in the life of society or state 32

Church should take an actve part in the life of state and society and in decision-making 14

Don’t know 7

Over the past decade, the traditional link between “church” and “faith” has been blurred. In addition, the institution has been subject to public criticism for some internal afairs. Today, almost 80% of Russians do not want the Church to interfere in state afairs, but almost 50% are not against its participation in teaching society moral values and the virtues of spiritual life. 178 SURPRISING RUSSIA

ALEXANDER SCHIPKOV, Director, Moscow Center for Social Research; Acting First Deputy Chairman, ROC Synodal Department for Church-State Relations with Society and Media

On the Seeming Surge in Religious Feelings in Russia at a New Stage

eligion is highly irrational in essence. Tat is why fgures can reveal a lot, but not Reverything. Te Soviet polls showed that 15% of people were believers and 85% were non-be- lievers. Today we see the reverse proportion. 15-20% of the population are atheists, and 80% belong to a religion, at least practice it to some extent. Have we actually witnessed a religious boom? Not quite. Te Soviet polls aimed to demonstrate a decline in religious feelings. One can only guess how distorted these fgures were. I had to read a lot of papers on scientifc athe- ism compiled in the 1950s-1970s, with the scholars conducting their own surveys in some regions. We ofen come across completely diferent fgures. For example, we read about 40% of believers in a district in the Stavropol Krai. It is clear that in fact the fgure was as high as 80%, but the horrifed researcher divided it by half. I am certain that there was no surge in religious feelings in the late 1980s – early 1990s. Lots of people practiced religion before, but both researchers and respondents refrained from revealing it.

I am certain that there was no surge in religious feelings in the late 1980s – early 1990s. Lots of peo- ple practiced religion before, but both researchers and respondents refrained from revealing it.

On the “Quality” of Russian Religious Feelings

Te main question that everyone is interested in is how many Russians belong to the Orthodox Church. Polls show that from 60% to 80% practice Orthodoxy, but many people are not satisfed with the fgure due to the fact that the respondents show the attitude to Orthodoxy in diferent ways. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 179

From 4% to 10% regularly go to the church and pray. Can we say that the remaining 60-70% of the respondents are not Orthodox? No, we cannot. Moreover, we cannot even use baptism as a criterion. Adults frst fnd faith, that is they become Orthodox, and only then they get baptized. Christianity divides between hot, cold and lukewarm faith. Faith is a state of par- ticular religious tension. Tis condition is not static, and religious feelings may be- come stronger or weaker. A man may be fervently praying and be deeply religious, and the next moment they may be sitting on the beach with the friends refraining from thinking at all. Te only common element between these states is that they know that God exists. 80% of the population knows it. At the same time there is a small central group who has hot faith, say 10%. Tis group is not static; it constantly evolves, with each of the 80% joining the 10% group at some stage.

On the Links between Church and Politics

Today the Church does not afect decision-making in key areas at all. Any talk of clericalism is completely irrelevant. Clericalism is the ability of religious organiza- tions to infuence political decision-making. Te Russian Orthodox Church cannot do it and does not strive to do it. But the Church cannot stay apolitical. If a bishop in a big industrial city preach- es something he should, for example, says something on man’s moral behavior (be it abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or interest rates), he may unwittingly impact on policies. In such cases, the Church is said to be infringing to someone’s rights. But the Church simply expresses its point of view. It is fully entitled to do that under the Constitution, which recognized its mission and guarantees the right to sermons and free speech. One must also take into account that the church embraces all believ- ers which constitute a big part of Russian society. 180 SURPRISING RUSSIA

ALEXEY KOZYREV, Historian of Philosophy; Deputy Dean for Science, School of Philosophy, Moscow State University

On Twofold Secularism

would not diferentiate between the religious and the profane as I would between Ioil and water, because there are diferent models of secularism. Tere is a famous French laïcité model, which presupposes alienation and even hostility to religion. But secularism can also be seen as “world”, “public”, and the concept in this case means that people who do not belong to the clergy, belong to the world. Tey include non-ordained people - excluding priests, deacons, preachers or pastors – believers and unbelievers, people living a worldly life and having their religious needs. In this respect, the concepts “secular” and “religious” do not exclude each other. On the con- trary, they are complementary

The concepts “secular” and “religious” do not ex- clude each other. On the contrary, they are com- plementary.

On Drivers of Orthodoxy

Modern Russia enjoys an average degree of belongingness to religion. People, who take part in religious ceremonies, baptize their children, or conduct a memorial service, by far exceed 50%. But it does not presuppose that they engage in religious life active- ly and regularly. Te degree of people’s involvement has, of course, increased since the Soviet times. A number of factors have contributed to it, including the missionary activity, the construction of churches, the participation of top politicians in religious ceremonies, and TV broadcasts of religious services, and fashion, to some extent.

On how the Church Can Supplement Power

I am not an advocate of the fusion of church and state power in Russia, but the Church is evidently a strong and active lobbyist of public policy. I cannot say that this is nec- essarily bad. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 181

Te Church and the state can be allies in some aspects. Te Church can fll the gaps somewhat neglected by the government. Tis is especially true of charity, children’s funds, helping the disabled, which the Catholic Church refers to as caritative works or charitable works. Te state is responsible for them, but it is not obliged to under- take them, and the Church can signifcantly assist in this matter. In certain cases, the Church can undertake certain political activities. We can look at the map of parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church to see its missions in Indo- nesia, Cambodia and other remote regions. In these regions church diplomacy may be much stronger than state diplomacy. 182 SURPRISING RUSSIA

HOW WE PERCEIVE “CULTURE”

ultural development” implies new forms, cultural heritage studies and bet- “Cter environment. Despite its undeniable importance, there are more basic needs to satisfy. If amid the crisis 80% of the citizens prioritize cultural issues over many others, we have to conclude that in Russia culture is the key element of “our existence”, ensuring the stability of the social order. One can fnd classical designs in the past, which generates a growing interest in historical and art museums. Te names of classical books are constantly on the reading lists, which testifes to the fact that in the new social environment they still promote relevant values.

Te society contemplates its refection in the mirror of the past to deliberately create a more adequate cultural environment. But the concept of “modern culture” embraces so many global and local trends and post-Soviet art was so multifaceted, that the question about the cultural policy framework was bound to arise. Com- plete indoctrination makes art boring, full commercialization renders art stupid and close elitism turns art blind. Te 2015 public debate on artistic expression have proved the viability of sensible control, emanating from the fact that publicity pre- supposes accountability. Tat is why society must agree on what is socially accept- able.

Te framework is subject to debate and is fuid, but each segment is fxed. Te role of the “referee” is delegated to the state by most Russians. It is essential that the pro- tection of the cultural space should not be equated to the crackdown on social criticism. Te matter is that the demonstration of problems should not bring about the spread of the disease. Citizens have the right to live in a culture environment that is compatible with their ethical and aesthetic values, with a healthy and com- petitive society being one of them. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 183

***

ussia has long enjoyed a reputation of “the country with rich culture”, which Rhas given birth to myriads of brilliant writers, artists, musicians, scientists, whose works and achievements are mentioned in all textbooks worldwide and belong to world heritage. However, modern Russian culture has faced a number of challenges and contradictory trends. Te elimination of Soviet ideological bar- riers has created favorable conditions for its development, but the most difcult economic transition has marginalized cultural issues. Terefore, the vast majority of Russians prioritize the revival of culture over other issues.

SHOULD CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BE PRIORITIZED? Closed-ended questions, one answer per each goal, %. VCIOM, 2015

4 Yes, it should 16 No, it should not

Don’t know

81

Russians still read a lot. Te media, and above all, TV have come to the fore and started to dominate culture following the transition to a market economy. Tis trend is characteristic of ever state across the globe. Still, more than two thirds of the population read a book at least once a month, and half of the respondents do it on the daily basis. Over three quarters of the population read fction. Tey love both classical and modern literature. Tis is, apparently, linked to the educa- tional traditions in our country. 184 SURPRISING RUSSIA

WHAT DO YOU READ CLASSICAL OR MODERN LITERATURE MORE OFTEN? Only those who read fction (76% of the respondents) answered the question. Closed-ended questions, one answer, %. POF, 2015

3 Classical 25 25 Both Modern Don’t know

22

Despite a large amount of foreign literature available in translations, preference is of- ten given to Russian literature. Education curricula put a large emphasis on Russian classical literature. But apart from that, lots of Russian contemporary writers of vari- ous genres are in high demand. In addition, recent years have seen a growing interest in original Russian culture.

DO YOU READ FOREIGN OR RUSSIAN LITERATURE MORE OFTEN? Only those who read fction (76% of the respondents) answered the question. Closed-ended questions, one answer, %. POF, 2015

1 9 Foreign Both

43 23 Russian Don’t know

Russia has faced a problem other countries have also sufered from - popular cul- ture tried to replace local one. But over recent years interest in traditional and classical culture has gradually revived. More people attend museums, with the number of those who have never been there plummeting. Te international cultural event “Long Night of Museums” has acquired increasing popularity. Over half of the respondents have heard about it, awareness among university students has risen to 70%, and up to 90% of Moscow and St. Petersburg citizens know about it. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 185

WHEN DID YOU VISIT A MUSEUM LAST? Closed-ended questions, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

A couple of years ago 52 51 11 2-3 years ago 18 4 Last year 7 3 Half a year ago 4 5 In recent 2-3 months 9 I have never been to a museum 20 7 2009 Don’t know 5 2015 4

Citizens are predominantly interested in historical museums. Russians are typifed by their keen interest in history, roots and traditions, but in recent years this trend has become much stronger. Russians go to local history museum just as ofen as to art galleries.

WHAT MUSEUMS ARE YOU INTERESTED IN? Closed-ended questions, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Historical 50

Art (including picture galleries and museums of cinema) 30

Local history museums 27

Technical (aviaton, ship-building, technical monuments etc.) 14

Natural Science (botanical, zoological, geological etc.) 11

Literature (devoted to poets and writers) 5

None 6

Others 4

Don’t know 2 SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT EXERCISE CONTROL

OVER THE CONTENTS OF FICTION?

Closed-ended questions, one question, %. POF, 2015

82

14 4

It should It should not Don’t know

T e overwhelming majority of Russians welcome reasonable state intervention in culture. T e contents of works of art should be subject to institutional regu- lation. Business alone should not control culture to preserve the mental health and morality of citizens. WHY SHOULD THE STATE EXERT CONTROL

OVER THE CONTENTS OF FICTION?

Closed-ended questions, one question, %. TOP-5. POF, 2015

It is the state’s duty 19

Ficton contains episodes of debauchery, violence, 14 cruelty, many vulgar and immoral episodes

Ficton contains excessive, meaningless or harmful informaton 14

Ficton may not be meant for children and young people, may be harmful to them 12

It is necessary to control ideology and indoctrinaton in fcton 6 to suppress propagaton of alien ideas and culture

Today, it is especially relevant for the young generation, on whom the cultural gap with previous generations is imposed. Te traditional approach which has been in use in pre-revolutionary Russia in the XIX century and in the Soviet period, persists today. Culture should, above all, educate rather than entertain. 188 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

VLADIMIR MIRONOV, Academician, Russian Academy of Sciences; Dean, School of Philosophy, Moscow State University

On Multiculturalism as Secret Stabilizer of Russian Consciousness

rom the traditional point of view, culture is a sealed system, whose coherence Fis secured by common ethnic, religious and social roots. For every individual culture is their habitual background. Individuals are born, live and die within their culture. In today’s globalized world, traditional cultures are integrated into univer- sal communication. During their life man witnesses numerous changes and trans- formations. For the better or for the worse, one generation in Russia has recently undergone such deep transformations that might be fatal for some people and so- cieties. We have to admit that despite all troubles and heavy losses, Russian society showed resilience and a very strong ability to adapt while preserving the central pillar of its culture. We managed to hold out due to multiculturalism inherited from the Soviet times, the very multiculturalism Europe has recently called for. Now it has become apparent that this project was successfully realized in the USSR. Tere were dark episodes, linked to the suppression of peoples, but society was evolving towards the system, which would embrace all the local ethnic cultures. In fact, the USSR comprised diferent countries with their own nationalities, reli- gions, and lifestyles, and in general the system functioned. One could take a train to Tashkent. Surely, the train could be late, but it reached the destination. Maybe this cultural diversity within one cultural space, with com- pletely dissimilar people living side by side, has helped us weather the changes.

Maybe this cultural diversity within one cultural space, with completely dissimilar people living side by side, has helped us weather the changes. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 189

On Democracy as a Cultural Phenomenon

Unfortunately we were short of time to build full-fedged democracy. It can be at- tributed to Russia’s ideocratic nature and the need for such a huge country to have a rigid top-down structure (and I stress it). Te matter is that people’s perception was forced to change faster than the real change occurred. Among other things, these social transformations were accompanied by numerous corruption scandals, with several political leaders pursuing individual self-interest. As a result, democracy as a supreme cultural value was distorted by the transfor- mation process on the ground, which was proclaimed democratic, but in fact it was very ofen quite the opposite. In addition, the fact that democracy was evolving un- der specifc cultural conditions, was neglected. Russians may treat the idea to cross at once eight trafc lanes of the busiest motorway against the red light as a display of freedom. I surely exaggerate, but there is a grave problem of the national cultur- al code, which should not be overlooked. Of course, there are common economic and political principles and rules, but their practical application may difer signif- cantly in accordance with local cultural traditions. Today, the balance between international and national law is discussed from this particular perspective. For example, Gerhard Holzinger, President of the Consti- tutional Court of Austria, claims that the prevalence of the former over the latter poses a threat to democracy, as no heed is paid to the main principle of the “will of the people”. Te question is whether the legally acceptable interference on the part of the European Union into Austrian internal afairs, when people exercise their free will and adopt laws, is consistent with democracy. 190 SURPRISING RUSSIA

INFORMATION SOURCES: POPULARITY AND TRUST

nternet user rate is increasing rapidly in the country, with two-thirds of Russians Igoing online on a regular basis. However, television still serves as the key “window on the world”. If messages conveyed by diferent communication channels contradict each other, the population relies typically on television as the key source of informa- tion, which is more professionally covered and consistent with the state’s position. Central TV channels are characterized by stricter adherence to highlighting certain aspects, which does not allow much scope for adopting neutral or compromising stances. Under such circumstances, one has to make up his or her mind. Although a number of those, who fnd TV arguments rather convincing, is growing, there are increasingly more people, who do not believe that transmitted information is unbi- ased. Obviously, skeptics, who do not watch TV, tend to surf the Web, searching for information. Nowadays the Internet as an important overview/depth news medium has received a high ranking (second place), but its audience falls a long way short of the television one.

A further reason for the “exodus to the virtual world” is stereotypical television content. It is noteworthy that competitive advantages of the Internet do not boil down to its diversity. It ofers many services necessary for business and entertain- ment, including Email, social networks, databanks, digital sales and orders, stock portals, online games, flms and music. Moreover, people can get access to online versions of printed newspapers and magazines, radio stations and TV channels. Tus, it would be foolhardy to clearly diferentiate between the Internet and “con- ventional” mass media due to the fact that the former encompasses the latter.

In spite of that, Russians suppose that the Internet penetration can entail new risks. People are growing concerned about foreign information of hostile character, with one quarter of the population arguing that the Internet may jeopardize polit- ical stability. Furthermore, citizens consider it as a threat to psychological health and families. Consequently, almost 50% of Russians defend Internet regulation. Yet few are ready to fully hinge on the state regulator. Te majority insist that while mak- ing decisions Russia’s government at least must heed their positions. PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 191

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entral Russian TV news remains a primary source of information. News, analyti- Ccal and ofcial websites take second place (nevertheless, they are inferior to Russia’s TV), and the popularity of newspapers and radio continues waning.

WHAT IS THE MAIN SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR YOU ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE COUNTRY? Closed-ended question, one answer, informative answers, %. VCIOM, 2015

Television 62

Internet – news, analytcal and ofcial websites 16

Internet-social networks and blogs 6

Conversatons with people 5

Radio 4

None of the above-mentoned 4

Newspapers 3

Magazines 0

Nonetheless, if the majority of Russians receive information about a single event from diferent mass media, they are likely to trust the television version. Ofcial web- sites rank second, but their staunch supporters account for less than 15%.

IF THE SAME EVENT IS COVERED IN A DIFFERENT WAY IN MASS MEDIA (TELEVISION, RADIO, MAGAZINES, NEWSPAPERS, INTERNET), WHICH SOURCE OF INFORMATION WILL YOU TRUST? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Television 55

Internet – news, analytcal and ofcial websites 13

Conversatons with people 8

Internet-social networks and blogs 5

Newspapers 4

Radio 3

Magazines 1

Don’t know, none of the above-mentoned 12 192 SURPRISING RUSSIA

People’s trust in the major mass media remains great, but we have witnessed a cer- tain polarization of Russian society. Both the numbers of those who trust and dis- trust TV information are growing. Te fact that over the recent 25 years the citizens’ attitude towards the television’s impact on the audience has become more negative contributes to this situation. For instance, there are fewer people assuming that TV positively infuences moral behavior. Tere has been a fvefold increase in those who think that TV programs undermine standards of morality. More than one-third of Russians stress that if over the course of a month one cannot watch TV, it will do nothing but good.

DO YOU TRUST CENTRAL TV? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015

2012 2015

43 41 36 32

16 11 12 3 3 2

Yes Rather yes Rather no No Don’t know

At the same time, the recent three years have seen a decline in trust in foreign mass media. Undoubtedly, it was linked to the information war amid the Euromaidan pro- tests in Ukraine.

DO YOU TRUST FOREIGN MASS MEDIA? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. PUBLIC OPINION FOUNDATION, 2015

2012 50 2015

37

24 15 19 19 18

6 6 7

Yes Rather yes Rather no No Don’t know PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES 193

Te share of those who use the Internet daily is constantly increasing. Since 2006 the number of active Web users have risen tenfold to account for 50% of Russian citizens today.

DO YOU USE THE INTERNET? IF YES, HOW OFTEN? Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

80

2006 2015

52

31

17 14 5 1 0 Practcally Sometmes From tme Don’t know every day (several tmes a week, month) to tme or never

One quarter of Russians surveyed believe that the Internet may threaten political stability, with 50% of respondents rejecting out of hand this statement. However, more than 40% maintain that foreign countries use the Internet against Russia. Here we can see the consequences of information wars.

TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? Closed-ended question, one answer per each statement, %. VCIOM, 2015

Foreign natons use the Internet against Russia 42 31

Internet signifcantly contributes to the suicide statstcs 33 33

Internet jeopardizes family values 28 53

Internet is a threat the country’s politcal stability 24 50

Internet poses a threat to Russia’s demographic situaton 21 57

Agree Disagree SHOULD INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET

BE DISTRUBUTED FREELY WITHOUT ANY CENSORSHIP?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

Informaton on the Internet should be freely distributed 11 with no censorship

Informaton on the Internet needs to be censored 49

It depends on the type of informaton that is being distributed 40

As expected, the more one uses the Internet, the more liberal he or she is, when it comes to a range of regulatory initiatives by the Russian government. Howev- er, it is noteworthy that there is a prevailing trend: each group of respondents- from active users to non-users or dummies – includes those who mainly approve of Internet’s rational censorship. SHOULD PUBLIC OPINION BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

BY PUBLIC BODIES WHEN REGULATING THE INTERNET?

Closed-ended question, one answer, %. VCIOM, 2015

The state is obliged to consider public opinion and seek public advice 56

The state may consider public opinion but may act according to its own preferences 36

The state should not consider public opinion 9

Nevertheless, when it comes to the regulatory methods, primarily, to public opinion, certain divisions can be seen. Whereas more than 50% of our fellow citizens believe that the state is obliged to consult society, the rest of respondents do not see any necessity in it. 196 SURPRISING RUSSIA

EXPERTS COMMENT

VICTOR KOLOMIETS, Chair of Sociology of Mass Communications Department at the Moscow State University (MSU)

Why has trust in TV increased?

alf of our population do not use the Internet as a means of mass communi- Hcation; they still regard television as a key credible institution. If we consider those who use the Web but at the same time do not place trust in it, from my per- spective, we can call them culturally advanced. Tese people really understand how unreliable the virtual world can be. TV information is more accurate than the Inter- net, because on the Web you can fnd even such things that do not exist in real life. Conversely, specifc people develop television programs; information is processed and covered in a particularly professional way, thus deserving more trust even if presented in a form of chaotic jumble. Moreover, television is designed to echo our mentality. Tis is a distinguishing feature of this agency as a prominent story- teller. If television becomes little more than a propaganda machine, people will trust it completely.

If television becomes li"le more than a propaganda machine, people will trust it completely.

On Emotionality of Russia’s TV

Russia has experienced the emergence of two kinds of television. The informa- tional one is strictly controlled by the government whereas the non-information- al one characterized by entertainment and sloppy programs, especially for young people, is regulated by managers. The latter considerably differs, for example, from French, German or English television. It is possible to state that our non-in- formational TV suffers from the illness of newness from the emotional, rather than ideological viewpoint. All our TV series follow the same pattern: if they PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 197 are tearjerkers, almost 50% of the population will be in floods of tears, if they deal with bandits, everybody will be scared. It was closely related to the fact that young people were pioneers of this television.

On Causes of Negative A!itudes Towards TV

Since 2000 we have been conducting the study “Television through the Eyes of the TV Viewer” (at frst we joined the Russian Public Opinion Research Center –VCIOM – to make this analysis). At an early stage, people portrayed TV as an information source, but the mid-2000s witnessed tectonic changes in this sphere. In other words, Russian citizens started to think that TV was a tool for entertainment, rather than a recorder and molder of facts. In my opinion, the reason for this transformation was that various mass media, namely printed newspapers and magazines, radio and TV, began to convince people that the primary purpose of television was to entertain. In the end, they succeeded in doing this. Te mass media, which persuade us to believe that there is too much violence on TV, also lower the television’s profle. Generally, it is quite commonplace and nat- ural to highlight that TV has an adverse efect on society. Moreover, while carrying out our research we tend to ask how television afects people and respondents’ lives. It turns out that any Russian believes that TV has a negative infuence on society but fails to somehow impact upon him or her. Tis proves the fact that the mass media ascribe negative features to television and such an image does not result from personal perceptions.

On Conservative Potential of Television

Regardless of diferent methods employed by television, under normal conditions it will never undermine social cohesion and society as a whole. All communication channels are aimed at preserving the current socio-political order. Terefore, tele- vision is a conservative instrument as it tries to uphold all social trends. And it just cannot perform another role. 198 SURPRISING RUSSIA

ILYA PERESEDOV, Journalist, Director General of the Interrobang company

On the Nature of Trust in TV

have a strong impression that Russians’ trust in TV is heavily conditional upon I the fact that through watching it one can abdicate his or her responsibility for decisions and the poor state of afairs. For instance, in daily life a person lacks co- operation with his or her neighbors, co-workers or residents from his or her district. In this case, TV makes a compensation for this communication through broadcast- ing information about our unity as a nation or our friendship. It is necessary to men- tion that the audience is distinguished by a rigid adherence to certain preferences. Once every six months each mass medium seeks to launch a project, which does not conform to traditional values and beliefs. Signifcantly, these shows are unpopular among residents.

The Web provides people with infinite resources for reckless consuming news or reports.

On Failed Expectations about the Internet

In Russia the Internet began to take root among educated people typifed by higher cultural levels, close internal communication and cohesion. Tey were very opti- mistic about the fact that the Internet penetration would foster a culture of con- suming information and contribute to the new Enlightenment era. Today the myths about the Enlightenment epoch still pervade Russian society. It is even possible to hear that on the Web everybody tries to fnd a reasonable viewpoint through comparing diferent approaches and checking them. It has little to do with the reality. Over the recent years the Internet has trans- formed into a truly mass information source and hijacked a part of the TV audi- ence because it has proved to be very convenient. PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 199

If somebody is inclined to endorse radical leanings or conspiracy theories, the In- ternet will enable him or her to obtain such information to a greater extent than television. Te Web provides people with infnite resources for reckless consuming news or reports. While TV broadcasts information about the bad United States for half an hour, on the Internet you may get familiar with it around the clock. Nowadays the attitude towards information and its quality are shaped by educa- tion, upbringing or people, rather than by information sources. 200 SURPRISING RUSSIA

IVAN ZASSOURSKY, Head of the Department of New Media and Communications Theory Studies in the School of Journalism at the Moscow State University (MSU)

On Involvement and Trust

considerable part of the population started to entirely trust Russia’s TV because A of the involvement phenomenon. Te Olympic Games in Sochi, the Crimean crisis, the war in Eastern Ukraine and the hostilities in Syria aroused strong public feelings similar to the excitement among fans. It is common knowledge that in com- parison with observers groups involved in certain processes have a substantial level of trust. In the United States this is called the rally around the fag efect to explain increased popular support for the state. Under such circumstances, when the major- ity feel its cohesion, it undermines the minorities’ trust which earlier did not believe in ofcial sources of information but now exactly have taken their position.

On the Trust in Media Notion

People can say that they trust mass media in two cases. Firstly, it happens if they obtain information from the same mass medium, that is, they have already got used to reading a particular newspaper of on-line magazine. Secondly, it is possible when we deal with representatives of the informed audience which is aware of those who control diferent mass media and what forces they are outspoken in their support. Usually an informed consumer thinks as follows, “Of course, I trust this medium due to the fact that I am able to comprehend inaccuracies. I trust it because I can fnd some rational things there”.

On Peculiarities of Discussing Information in Social Networks

One of the peculiarities of new mass media consists in the fact that they function according to the electricity principle, namely as a closed-link chain. Tey encour- age group formation and contribute to its enlargement and mobilization. Tus, when some news is disseminated on the Internet, members of such groups tend to show no interest whether this information is true or false. Teir key objective is to demonstrate the sustainability of their values, they want to display their loy- PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION 201 alty to the group and get rid of threats to their picture of reality. Any information is caught in the cross hairs by people who consider cherishing their values through the prism of “friends or foes”. Niklas Luhmann framed the concept of autopoiesis, which implies the idea that the diferent elements of the system interact in such a way as to produce and re-pro- duce the elements of the system. Tis can also be applied to the groups’ behavior in social networks. When information gets available, people do not want to realize what happens. Tey are in war and their objective is to get the upper hand over the enemy. Obviously, by extolling their values and showing loyalty to their group, people make many stupid mistakes, even though they are clear, but shared and justifed (credo quia absurdum). Deep distrust of social media testifes to the people’s awareness of the fact that real motives of communication participants have nothing in common with inten- tions to understand the truth or gather real evidence. Rather, they are closely relat- ed to desires to engage in gladiator fghts. In Ancient Rome people were deprived of their citizenship if under social and political unrest they remained indiferent. Te modern world is very much like the ancient one, here participation matters. Te salience of outside observers along with the era of printing press appear to be be- coming a thing of the past. Jurgen Habermas’s public sphere gave way to the public scene of TV only to be replaced by the Web public arena.

Any information is caught in the cross hairs by peo- ple who consider cherishing their values through the prism of “friends or foes”.

On Changes in Russians’ A!itude to Television Content

Contemporarily, as opposed to 1989 fewer people believe that television improves standards of morality, broadens the minds or helps to get familiar with the best cultural patterns. As I put it, it is rather a rational behavior and such assessments can be accompanied by rising levels of trust in TV. Tis situation resembles people’s attitudes to unhealthy products, drugs. “You can have a wee drink, but you cannot get drunk” or “I adore sweets but cannot eat them”. CONTENT

INTRODUCTION 3

PART 1. WE AND THE WORLD: COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION FACE TO FACE WITH THE WEST 10 UKRAINE: FAMILY CONFLICT? 30 RUSSIA’S PIVOT TO ASIA: WHAT ARE OUR EXPECTATIONS? 42 MIDDLE EAST HOTSPOTS 52

PART 2. CAN WE RELY ON THE STATE? AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, ITS FOUNDATIONS AND ROLE IN SOCIETY 66 HISTORICAL MEMORY AND STATE SYMBOLS 84 CRIMEA IS OURS: WHEN THERE IS NO ROOM FOR QUESTIONS 94 DEFENSE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: ARMY AND POLICE 104

PART 3. THE YEAR OF CRISIS: STRESS-RESISTANCE TEST DEFENDING OURSELVES. LIFE UNDER SANCTIONS. 116 CRISIS: ADAPTATION STRATEGY 128

PART 4. TRADITIONAL VALUES AND EVERYDAY PREFERENCES RUSSIA’S QUALITY OF LIFE 148 FAMILY AND SOCIETY: TRADITION AND MODERNITY 162 SACRED AND PROFANE: CHANGING BOUNDARIES 172 HOW WE PERCEIVE “CULTURE” 182 INFORMATION SOURCES: POPULARITY AND TRUST 190