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4 May 2012 No.1

Guinea-bissau

Expected Council Action sanctions fail to force the military junta leaders and demanded their immedi- On 7 May, the Council will hold con- to relinquish power and re-establish ate release. sultations on the Secretary-General’s constitutional order. report on -Bissau of 30 April On 19 April, the Council discussed (S/2012/280), submitted in line Guinea-Bissau has hosted Guinea-Bissau (S/PV.6754) with three with a presidential statement (S/ UNIOGBIS since 2009 and its pre- Foreign Ministers briefing: Mamadú PRST/2012/15) adopted on 21 April. decessor UNOGBIS since April Saliu Djalo Pires of Guinea-Bissau The Council will likely be briefed by 1999. Its mandate expires on 28 (who was out of the country when Joseph Mutaboba, the Secretary- February 2013. Guinea-Bissau has the military seized power on 12 General’s Special Representative in also been on the agenda of the April); Georges Chikoti of Angola (in Guinea-Bissau and head of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) his capacity as chair of the CPLP); Integrated Peacebuilding Office in since 19 December 2007, with Brazil and Paulo Portas of Portugal. The Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS); a repre- currently chairing the country-specific Permanent Representative of Côte sentative of Guinea-Bissau’s ousted configuration. d’Ivoire, which chairs ECOWAS, de- government; and representatives of livered a statement on behalf of the the AU, the Economic Community regional body, while Mutaboba briefed of West African States (ECOWAS), via video-conference from Bissau on and the Community of Portuguese Key recent Developments the latest developments. Speaking Countries (CPLP). On 12 April, the armed forces seized power and imprisoned interim On 21 April, the Council is- The Secretary-General’s report sets President Raimundo Pereira, former sued a presidential statement (S/ out four options that the Council could Prime Minister and presidential can- PRST/2012/15) strongly condemning consider in addressing the Guinea- didate Carlos Gomes Junior and sev- the coup and calling for the “imme- Bissau situation: mediation in support eral other senior officials, aborting diate restoration of the constitutional of that already initiated by ECOWAS; preparations for run-off presidential order as well as the reinstatement the imposition of targeted sanctions elections slated for 22 April. of the legitimate government”. The on the military leaders who spear- statement also demanded the “im- headed the 12 April coup; the possible The following day, 13 April, Council mediate and unconditional release” of deployment of “training and protection members were briefed in consultations the detained Guinea-Bissau leaders units”; and the deployment of a peace- on the situation in the country by Tayé- “in order to enable the completion of keeping or stabilisation force. Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary- the presidential and legislative elec- General for Political Affairs. The tions.” The statement welcomed the At press time, it appeared that some Council later that day issued a press AU’s suspension of Guinea-Bissau. members were discussing a draft res- statement condemning the “forcible It took note of a decision by the AU olution prepared by Portugal—prob- seizure of power from the legitimate to hold consultations with ECOWAS, ably to be co-sponsored by South Government of Guinea-Bissau by CPLP and other partners for “possible Africa and and to be circulated some elements of its armed forces”. additional means necessary for the after the 7 May consultations—impos- The statement also denounced the stabilization of the country, in consul- ing targeted sanctions on the coup military’s incursion into politics and tation with the legitimate government leaders and holding out the possi- called on those responsible to ensure of Guinea-Bissau.” It also noted the bility of further action should those the safety and security of the detained underlying issues involved in Guinea

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Bissau’s instability as “the recurrence for 22 April. However, the opposition in Guinea-Bissau. The Council of of illegal interference of the military in candidate, Kumba Yalá Embaló, who Ministers of the CPLP held an emer- politics” and a “culture of impunity” that came in second with 23 percent, an- gency session on 14 April in Lisbon “hampers efforts towards consolida- nounced that he would boycott the and adopted a resolution which was tion of the rule of law, implementation run-off polls, claiming the ruling party transmitted to the Security Council of Security Sector Reform, promotion had rigged the elections. The March on 16 April. Among the decisions ad- of development and entrenchment of polls were accompanied by the assas- opted by the CPLP was to take the a democratic culture.” The statement sination of the former head of military initiative in the framework of the UN, requested the Secretary General to intelligence, Col. Samba Djalo. On 2 together with ECOWAS, the AU, the submit a report by 30 April setting out April, ECOWAS appointed President EU and taking into account the ex- options for dealing with the situation in Alpha Condé of Guinea to mediate the perience of MISSANG, to establish the country. electoral dispute in Guinea-Bissau.) a UN-mandated force of interposition in Guinea-Bissau. The AU Peace and Like most of the UN system, the Ouedraogo’s letter noted the elec- Security Council (PSC), meeting on Security Council appears to have tion boycott threat, as well as the Guinea-Bissau on 17 April, decided to been surprised by the coup in Guinea- “mounting suspicion and tension” initiate consultations with ECOWAS, Bissau. On 28 March, the Council was between Guinea-Bissau’s military the CPLP, the UN and other partners briefed by Mutaboba and Ambassador and the Angolan Technical Military on the possible deployment of an in- Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil), Assistance Mission in Guinea-Bissau ternational stabilisation operation. It Chair of the Guinea-Bissau country- (MISSANG). It noted that General also suspended with immediate effect specific configuration of the PBC (S/ Antonio Indjai, the Army Chief of Staff, Guinea-Bissau as a member state of PV.6743). Mutaboba mentioned the had ordered MISSANG out. The let- the AU until the effective restoration failed coup attempt of 26 December ter raised the possibility of ECOWAS of constitutional order. On 24 April, 2011 in passing, saying that it was deploying a “military contingent [in the AU PSC issued a report on the “symptomatic of a military leadership Guinea-Bissau] in the run-up to the situation in Guinea-Bissau, and divided and lacking a uniform com- [run-off] poll to protect candidates Sudan and South Sudan, noting that mitment to republican values.” But he and institutions.” Not mentioned in events in Guinea-Bissau constituted otherwise gave no hint of the simmer- the letter was that Angola agreed in “a serious setback for the democrat- ing tensions that led to the 12 April principle to the suggestion that it with- ic process initiated since the 1990s, coup. For her part, Viotti hailed the draw MISSANG ahead of the run-off while also highlighting the need to “important strides towards sustain- election. further enhance the deterrence po- able peace” made in Guinea-Bissau, tential of the instruments adopted by noting that during the past months, On 9 April, Gomes Junior, alleg- the AU on unconstitutional changes of the country had “been able to main- edly acting in his capacity as Prime government.” tain political stability and sustain eco- Minister of Guinea-Bissau, also nomic growth.” wrote a letter (S/2012/254) to the On 29 April, ECOWAS imposed dip- Secretary-General raising alarm that lomatic, economic and financial sanc- Other observers of Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau “could come to face tions on Guinea-Bissau after talks were less sanguine. On 5 April, a new cycle of internal political insta- it had initiated with the coup leaders Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo, President bility, owing to the non-acceptance in Banjul, , failed on the of the ECOWAS Commission, of the electoral results” by his rivals. crucial point of the return of deposed wrote a letter (S/2012/254) to the The letter favourably characterised interim President Pereira to Bissau to UN Secretary-General drawing at- MISSANG as “a factor assisting with take over the reins of the government tention to “disturbing developments political and military stabilisation from the junta. The sanctions regime that could jeopardise the holding” of in the country.” But it called on the targeted members of the junta and run-off presidential elections sched- Security Council to consider the “dis- their associates. uled for 22 April. Ouedraogo had, patch of a peacekeeping force…to be on 31 March, led a joint high-level charged with extensive powers aimed On 3 May, the EU imposed sanc- ECOWAS-AU-UN fact-finding mis- at the maintenance of political stability tions on six of the coup leaders in sion to Guinea-Bissau. (This was as a in the country and at defence of the Guinea-Bissau, banning them from result of serious controversies arising democratic gains…obtained at great entering the EU and freezing their from presidential elections held on 18 sacrifice.” (The Secretary-General assets. The EU said in a statement March. Gomes Júnior, who contested apparently only transmitted these let- that the list of individuals subject to the polls as head of the ruling Partido ters to the Council on 23 April.) its sanctions would be published on 4 Africano para a Independência da May. Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), failed to Following the 12 April coup, a num- win outright victory with 49 percent of ber of regional and multilateral ac- the votes, and a run-off was scheduled tors quickly addressed the situation

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 21st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 2 Guinea-Bissau

Background Reform of Guinea Bissau’s armed Key Issues Guinea-Bissau gained independence forces—as part of a broader Security The key issues for the Council are the from Portugal after a prolonged armed Sector Reform (SSR)—remains the restoration of the constitutional order struggle in 1974. But the anti-colonial most contentious issue in the coun- and the completion of the electoral war was so destructive that the new try. In 2010, the EU withdrew its SSR process begun in March. A related state was bereft of functioning insti- advisers and suspended its non-allo- issue is to coordinate the efforts of tutions and an economic base. Ever cated aid to the country amounting to the AU, ECOWAS and CPLP to make since, the country has been prone to 120 million . This was in protest sure that maximum pressure, possibly serious political upheavals. Guinea- against the appointment of Indjai, a pe- including sanctions, can be brought to Bissau has experienced five military rennial coup maker as well as a prime bear on the military junta to yield pow- coups in the past ten years, and no suspect in the international cocaine er without recourse to force. elected President has served out a full trafficking ring, as Army Chief of Staff, term. This instability has in part been which the EU called “another setback A persistent underlying issue is the fuelled by massive illicit drug traffick- to democratic consolidation”. The EU absence of a comprehensive SSR ing by the officers corps of the army SSR mission had been in the country programme to trim the size of the and other officials, and in part by un- since June 2008, but it disagreed with Guinea-Bissau armed forces and resolved issues relating to the war for the UN on the rollout of a retirement make them more amenable to civilian independence: so bitter was the lib- plan for army officers. The UN appar- democratic oversight. This would re- eration struggle that the newly inde- ently favoured a gradual process with quire the presence of a sizable exter- pendent government, controlled by a a large pension package for around nal military force, possibly comprising revolutionary council, executed many 400 officers—the army is about 4,000 of troops from ECOWAS and CPLP. African soldiers who had fought for strong—while the EU wanted a faster the colonial administration. revamp. Another underlying issue is the stranglehold that drug trafficking and Barely six years after indepen- On 21 March 2011, MISSANG took organised crime has over a number of dence, in 1980, Prime Minister João over from the EU, and it jointly an- key actors in Guinea-Bissau. Bernardo Vieira, one of the indepen- nounced with ECOWAS a pledge of dence leaders, led a military coup $95 million towards Guinea Bissau’s A broader issue is for the Council that ousted President Luis de Almeida army pension fund The relationship to improve its ability to read warning Cabral. Vieira governed the coun- between MISSANG and the local signs of possible crises and to be able try for the next 19 years, winning the army broke down after Angola foiled to take preventive steps. In this regard, first free presidential election held in an attempted coup, organised by the UN system, and most particularly Guinea-Bissau in 1994. In 1999, a mil- Indjai, on 26 December while Sanhá UNIOGBIS, the PBC Guinea-Bissau itary coup led by General Ansumane was convalescing in a hospital in configuration, and the UN Office for Mané, whom Vieira had dismissed Paris. MISSANG was accused of act- , apparently failed to op- earlier, triggered a civil war and the ing as the personal guard of Gomes portunely and correctly read develop- installation of a transitional military Júnior and interim President Pereira, ments on the ground. junta. A presidential election was held while Angola was targeted for alleg- in 2000 and was won by Yalá Embaló, edly agreeing to a secret pact with the who was in turn forced from office in government to take over the defence 2003 in another coup led by General apparatuses of Guinea Bissau. Options Veríssimo Correia Seabra. Soon af- Main options for the Council include: ter, military forces and political lead- Sanhá died on 9 January 2012. • adopting a resolution imposing tar- ers signed a charter that installed an On 10 April, Angola announced it geted sanctions against the military interim civilian government and called was withdrawing MISSANG because junta and threatening more mea- for new parliamentary and presiden- “some people” in Guinea-Bissau “are sures, including military interven- tial elections. Parliamentary elections not satisfied with the cooperation be- tion, should the sanctions fail to were held in March 2004, but violence tween Angola and Guinea-Bissau”. have their desired impact; or flared up in October 2004, when a mil- Two days later, and just ten days be- • issuing a presidential statement itary mutiny resulted in the assassina- fore the second round of the presi- supporting ECOWAS’s sanctions tion of Correia Seabra. In July 2005, dential elections, the military mounted regime, and calling for a coordinat- former President Vieira won the presi- a successful coup against interim ed approach to pressuring the junta dential elections, defeating former President Pereira and the caretaker to relinquish power. acting President Malam Bacai Sanhá government. in a runoff. In March 2009, Vieira was assassinated by the army, leading Council Dynamics to new presidential elections in July A number of somewhat extrane- 2009 won by Sanhá. ous factors have come to bear on the

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 21st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 3 Guinea-Bissau dynamics respecting Guinea-Bissau. The first is the position of ECOWAS 2012) was on the coup since President in Guinea-Bissau. Other Relevant Facts of Côte d’Ivoire became its Chairman on 17 February. Largely because Secretary-General’s Special Representative Angola supported former President Reports of the Secretary- Laurent Gbagbo during the Côte General and Head of d’Ivoire crisis, ECOWAS has not been • S/2012/280 (30 April 2012) UNIOGBIS enthusiastic about Angola’s continu- • S/2011/655 (21 October 2011) ing role in Guinea-Bissau. The 19 • S/2011/370 (17 June 2011)  Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda) April ECOWAS statement before the • S/2011/73 (15 February 2011) Council was critical of MISSANG and Duration called for its replacement. Secondly, Press Statements Portugal, the former colonial power in  1 January 2010 to pres- Guinea-Bissau, is currently a member • SC/10607 (13 April 2012) ent; mandate expires of the Council and has been active on condemned the coup and 28 February 2013 this issue. Guinea-Bissau, however, called for immediate release remains of interest to most Council of interim President Raimundo Chair of the Guinea- members especially in light of the re- Pereira, Prime Minister Carlos Bissau Configuration of cent coup, which underlies key anxiet- Gomes Junior and all senior the PBC ies: the resurgence of coups in West officials currently detained. Africa; international narcotics traf- • SC/10521 (13 January 2012)  Brazil ficking and organised crime; and is- was issued after a briefing sues relating to impunity and the rule by Pascoe on 10 January. of law. There is a broad consensus • SC/10301 (28 June 2011) in the Council that the 12 April coup was issued after a briefing Useful Additional Source should be reversed, and that constitu- by Mutaboba and Viotti. tional order should be re-established • SC/10184 (25 February 2011) in short order. was issued after a briefing AU, Report of the Chairperson of by Mutaboba and Viotti. the Commission on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau, Mali and between Meeting Records the Sudan and South Sudan (24 April 2012) UN Documents • S/PV.6755 (21 April 2012) • S/PV.6754 (19 April 2012) Security Council • S/PV.6743 (28 March 2012) Resolutions • S/PV.6648 (3 November 2011) • S/PV.6569 (28 June 2011) • S/RES/2030 (21 December • S/PV.6489 (25 February 2011) 2011) renewed the man- date of UNIOGBIS un- Letter til 28 February 2013. • S/RES/1949 (23 November • S/2012/254 (23 April 2012) 2010) renewed the man- transmitted two letters, one date of UNIOGBIS until from former Prime Minister 31 December 2011. Carlos Gomes Júnior and • S/RES/1876 (26 June one from Kadré Désiré 2009) extended the man- Ouedraogo, President of date of UNOGBIS until 31 ECOWAS Commission. December and requested the Secretary-General to estab- lish UNIOGBIS to succeed UNOGBIS for an initial period of 12 months after that.

Presidential Statements

• S/PRST/2012/15 (21 April

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