Monetary Union in West Africa (ECOWAS) Is It Desirable and How Could It Be Achieved?
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OCCASIONAL PAPER 204 Monetary Union in West Africa (ECOWAS) Is It Desirable and How Could It Be Achieved? Paul Masson and Catherine Pattillo INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND Washington DC 2001 ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution © 2001 International Monetary Fund Production: IMF Graphics Section Typesetting & Figures: Choon Lee Cataloging-in-Publication Data Masson, Paul R. Monetary union in West Africa (ECOWAS): is it desirable and how could it be achieved? / Paul Masson, Catherine Pattillo. — Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001. p. cm. — (Occasional paper, ISSN 0251-6365 ; no. 204) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-58906-014-8 1. Economic Community of West African States.— 2. Union economique et monetaire Ouest africaine.— 3. Monetary unions — Africa, West. 4. Africa, West — Economic integration. 5. Monetary pol- icy — Africa, West. I. Pattillo, Catherine A. (Catherine Anne). II. International Monetary Fund. III. Occasional paper (International Monetary Fund); no. 204. HC1000.M27 2001 Price: US$20.00 (US$17.50 to full-time faculty members and students at universities and colleges) Please send orders to: International Monetary Fund, Publication Services 700 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A. Tel.: (202) 623-7430 Telefax: (202) 623-7201 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.imf.org recycled paper ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution Contents Page Preface v I Introduction 1 II The Proposed Monetary Union 4 III Historical Experience and the Current Situation in West Africa 8 WAEMU 8 Other Countries in West Africa 9 Performance of WAEMU and Non-WAEMU ECOWAS Countries 10 Assessment 10 IV What Is a Monetary Union? 14 V Lessons from the Experience of Currency Unions 16 VI The Benefits and Costs of a Common Currency for West Africa 19 Benefits of a Fixed Exchange Rate Relationship 19 Conditions for Monetary Stability of the Currency Union 22 Can a Common Currency Stimulate Other Forms of Integration? 25 VII Options for Implementing Monetary Union in West Africa 26 The "Second Monetary Union" 26 The Second Stage: Full Monetary Union in ECOWAS 29 VIII Conclusions: The Perspective of Regional Integration 30 Appendices I Economic Policies in Non-WAEMU Countries 32 II Existing and Failed Currency Unions 36 III Comparative Performance of the CFA Franc Zone 40 References 42 Tables 2.1. ECOWAS Members: Basic Indicators 4 2.2. ECOWAS: Position of Non-WAEMU Members vis-a-vis the Convergence Criteria 5 2.3. WAEMU: Position of Members vis-a-vis the WAEMU Convergence Criteria 6 iii ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution CONTENTS 3.1. ECOWAS: Selected Indicators 10 3.2. ECOWAS Members: Exchange Arrangements 12 5.1. Characteristics of Monetary Unions 17 6.1. ECOWAS: Patterns of Trade 20 6.2. ECOWAS Members: Correlation of Changes in Terms of Trade 22 6.3. ECOWAS Members: Production Structure 23 Figures 2.1. Membership of the CFA Franc Zone and ECOWAS 5 3.1. WAEMU versus Non-WAEMU Countries: Selected Indicators 11 6.1. ECOWAS Members: Terms of Trade 21 The following symbols have been used throughout this paper: ... to indicate that data are not available; n.a. to indicate not applicable; — to indicate that the figure is zero or less than half the final digit shown, or that the item does not exist; - between years or months (i.e., 1997-98 or January-June) to indicate the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; / between years or months (i.e., 1997/98) to indicate a crop or fiscal (financial) year. "Billion" means a thousand million; "trillion" means a thousand billion. Minor discrepancies between constituent figures and totals are due to rounding. The term "country," as used in this paper, does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice; the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states, but for which statistical data are maintained and provided interna- tionally on a separate and independent basis. iv ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution Preface The authors are especially grateful to Christian Francois and Ernesto Hernandez- Cata for encouraging them to undertake this study, for valuable suggestions, and for obtaining the support of the African Department, and to Ousmane Dore for sup- plying data and participating in discussions with officials. The authors are grateful as well to a number of their colleagues at the IMF and the World Bank, in particular Trevor Alleyne, David Andrews, Luis de Azcarate, Girma Begashaw, Eduardo Borensztein, Vincent Caupin, Dominique Guillaume, Anne-Marie Guide, Elliott Harris, Hiroyuki Hino, Charles Humphreys, Robin Kibuka, Alexander Kyei, Celestin Monga, Gonzalo Pastor, Mark Plant, Papa Ousmane Sakho, Jesus Seade, Reinold van Til, Luisa Zanforlin, and Alessandro Zanello. The authors also would like to thank Agnes Benassy-Quere, Daniel Cohen, Max Corden, Patrick Guillaumont, Sylviane Guillaumont-Jeanneney, Charles Soludo, and George Tavlas for comments and dis- cussion; Grace Juhn, Manzoor Gill, and Jungyong Shin for research assistance; Jacqueline Irving for excellent editorial and substantive input; and Celia Burns for typing the manuscript. This paper has also benefited from discussions with officials in Abuja, Accra, Brussels, Dakar, and Paris. In particular, valuable suggestions and comments were re- ceived at the ECOWAS Secretariat, the European Commission, the BCEAO, and at central banks and government ministries in France, Ghana, and Nigeria. The views expressed here are those of the authors, however, and do not represent the official views of those institutions or of the International Monetary Fund. v ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution This page intentionally left blank ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution I Introduction n April 20, 2000, in Accra, Ghana, the leaders litical problems and other economic priorities in sev- Oof six West African countries1 declared their eral of the region's countries have to date inhibited intention to proceed to monetary union among the progress. Although some problems remain, the re- non-CFA2 franc countries of the region by January cent initiative has been bolstered by the election in 2003, as a first step toward a wider monetary union 1999 of a democratic government and a leader who including all the ECOWAS3 countries in 2004. The is committed to regional integration in Nigeria, the six countries committed themselves to reducing cen- largest economy of the region, raising hopes that the tral bank financing of budget deficits to 10 percent long-delayed project can be revived. of the previous year's government revenue; reducing The plan to create a second monetary union (in budget deficits to 4 percent of GDP by 2003; creat- addition to that constituted by the West African Eco- ing a Convergence Council to help coordinate nomic and Monetary Union, or WAEMU),5 as well macroeconomic policies; and setting up a common as a full ECOWAS monetary union, raises a number central bank. Their declaration states that, "Member of questions about the advantages and disadvantages States recognize the need for strong political com- of various alternative arrangements and strategies. mitment and undertake to pursue all such national There is clearly an important political dimension be- policies as would facilitate the regional monetary in- hind the recent initiative, but it is nevertheless im- tegration process." portant to carefully examine the economic benefits The goal of a monetary union in ECOWAS has and costs. The institutional design of the non- long been an objective of the organization, going WAEMU monetary union could take a number of back to its formation in 1975, and is intended to ac- different forms, including the creation of a new cur- company a broader integration process that would rency or the adoption of an existing one, the forma- include enhanced regional trade and common insti- tion of a single central bank or its coexistence with tutions. In the colonial period, currency boards national central banks, and a peg (e.g., to the euro or linked sets of countries in the region. On indepen- a currency basket) or a flexible exchange rate for the dence, however, these currency boards were dis- external exchange rate policy of the common cur- solved, with the exception of the CFA franc zone, rency. The second stage, involving the merger of the which included the francophone countries of the re- two currency unions, raises some of the same issues. gion.4 Although there have been attempts to advance The second stage also raises additional issues, such the agenda of ECOWAS monetary cooperation, po- as whether the French Treasury's guarantee of con- vertibility of the CFA franc to the euro, at a fixed parity, would continue. lThe meeting was attended by three heads of state, Presidents The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether a Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, and monetary union makes economic sense, to discuss Lansana Conte of Guinea, as well as representatives from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia. Cape Verde, the remaining non-CFA the institutional requirements for a successful mone- ECOWAS member, has a currency peg to the euro with the support tary union, and to consider how best the political of Portugal, and was not a signatory of the "Accra Declaration on a Second Monetary Zone." Mauritania, a founding ECOWAS mem- ber, recently withdrew from the regional organization. 2CFA