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file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm THE CHARACTER OF MIND -i- [This page intentionally left blank.] -ii- THE CHARACTER OF MIND An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind COLIN McGINN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS -iii- OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris São Paulo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (1 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm with associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Colin McGinn 1982, 1996 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published in hardback and paperback 1996 Reprinted in paperback 1998, 1999 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data McGinn, Colin, 1950-. The character of mind: an introduction to the philosophy of mind / Colin McGinn.--[New ed.] Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Psychology--Philosophy. I. Title. BF38.M39 1997 128'.2--dc20 96-35172 ISBN 0-19-875209-1 file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%...ion%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (2 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm thus presented. This makes the case of self-acquaintance essentially different from both perceptual and introspective acquaintance. Whether anything further can be said to characterise the relation of acquaintance as it holds between a given self and that same self remains moot. But on this indecisive note we shall leave the topic of acquaintance with the self. We have made a point, in this chapter, of discussing several varieties of acquaintance, with a view to determining whether they are susceptible of a uniform account. We have found that there are some significant parallels between the different varieties, especially as regards their abstract structure. But we have also been led to conclude that there are equally significant dissimilarities, notably as to the nature of the relational aspect. The moral to be drawn is that any adequate theory of acquaintance must address itself to the different species of acquaintance, and be prepared to discover that no perfectly general theory is to be had. There seems to be no one way in which the mind gets directed on to reality. -72- 5 CONTENT T HE previous chapter hints at a range of issues that have assumed increasing prominence in recent discussions. Broadly speaking, the question is how much of the mind is constituted by states of affairs that exist independently of the mind. When I have a belief about things outside me, to what extent do those things determine the state of mind I am in? Is it that my mental state stays constant no matter how things stand in the external world, or does the external world actually reach into my mind and shape its very contours? Is the mind logically world-dependent or is it a separate autonomous realm? And what are the consequences of the answer we give to this question? As stated, the question is somewhat vague; it can be made more precise by considering what have come to be called twin earth cases. The classic example runs as follows. Consider human beliefs about water: the belief that water is wet, the belief that water dissolves salt, etc. These beliefs have content, specified by the 'that'- clause; in this content we find the concept water. In the English language we express this concept by means of the word 'water', which then refers to water--that stuff in lakes, seas, aquariums, etc. Water, the stuff, is made up of H 2 O, a certain chemical file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-...on%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (76 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm combination. So when we refer to water we refer also to H 2 O--just as when we refer to the evening star we refer to the morning star, these being one and the same star. The terms 'water' and 'H 2 O' have the same reference, though they are not synonyms, since you can believe that water is wet without believing that H 2 O is wet-- you might not know that water is H 2 O. Now consider a remote planet, twin earth, in which things are eerily ____________________ This chapter is new to the 1996 edition. -73- similar to earth except for a certain small detail. People on twin earth speak a language in which the sound 'water' occurs, and they express their beliefs by means of this word. By massive coincidence this word refers to a liquid that exists in lakes and so on and which looks and tastes remarkably like the liquid that exists on earth. By an even greater coincidence the twin earthians have the same physiology as us, and indeed are exactly synchronised with us in all their actions; they are, if the truth be known, precise physical duplicates of us, right down to the minute details of their brain states. When I utter the words 'I'd like a drink of water' my twin earth counterpart also utters the words 'I'd like a drink of water'. When he utters these words he also has the same sensation of thirst that I have, and his brain states precisely mirror my own. You could not tell us apart by examining our internal make- up and behavioural dispositions. But there is one crucial fact that differentiates earth and twin earth: the stuff in the lakes on twin earth isn't water. It is another type of liquid, made of XYZ instead of H 2 O, and in certain experimental circumstances the difference would show up; but these circumstances are not part of the scientific knowledge of the two communities. Their liquid just looks and tastes like water, but it is no more real water than a fake diamond is a diamond. So what twin earthians refer to with their word 'water' is not water but a water-like liquid we can call (in our language) retaw. XYZ isn't H 2 O, but H 2 O is water, so XYZ isn't water. Now here is the big question: what is the content of the beliefs twin earthians express when they use their word 'water'? Clearly, the mere fact that this word has the same sound as our word does not ensure that it means the same and expresses the same concept. Clearly, too, their word refers to something different from our word--XYZ and H 2 O, respectively. Consequently, what their beliefs are about is different from what our beliefs are about: our beliefs refer to the stuff that locally surrounds us, theirs file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-...on%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm (77 of 175) [11.07.2007 13:54:08] file:///D|/The%20Character%20of%20Mind%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Philosophy%20of%20Mind.htm refer to what locally surrounds them. Now let's see what happens if we try to characterise the conceptual content of their beliefs by using our word 'water': we say of my counterpart that he believes that water is wet. But this is false! He doesn't believe that water is wet at all, he believes that retaw is wet--for these are not synonymous terms. He no more believes that water is wet than I believe that retaw is wet--we just happen to use the same sound to express two different belief contents. The case is essentially the same as the following: on twin earth there is a man -74- called ' Hilary Putnam' who exactly resembles the man on earth of that name (and who actually invented twin earth cases), though these are distinct individuals. When a twin earthian says ' Hilary Putnam is a philosopher' he cannot be taken to be expressing the belief (expressed in our language) that Hilary Putnam is a philosopher, since he knows nothing of the man on earth of that name; what he believes is that that other man is a philosopher. If we want to say what he believes we have to introduce a term that refers to the Putnam lookalike on twin earth--say, ' Mantup': then we can truly say that the twin earthian believes that Mantup is a philosopher.