DOCSLIB.ORG

The Naturalistic Epistemology of Hume and Wittgenstein

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Naturalistic Epistemology of Hume and Wittgenstein Macalester Journal of Philosophy Volume 19 Article 8 Issue 1 Spring 2010 10-7-2010 The aN turalistic Epistemology of Hume and Wittgenstein Dawit Dame Macalester College Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/philo Recommended Citation Dame, Dawit (2010) "The aN turalistic Epistemology of Hume and Wittgenstein," Macalester Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 19: Iss. 1, Article 8. Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/philo/vol19/iss1/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Macalester Journal of Philosophy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 115 The Naturalistic Epistemology of Hume and Wittgenstein Dawit Dame Introduction David Hume is well known for his skepticism on a wide range of topics, such as causation, the existence of a world external to the mind and the existence of an enduring self. As a result of this, the negative aspect of Hume’s philosophy often clouds the extent to which he wants to ground his epistemology in positive natural facts about humans. Wittgenstein never read Hume and nowhere is it evident that Hume had any influence on Wittgenstein’s works. Perhaps the only influence Hume had on Wittgenstein is simply being a philosopher of a certain tradition that Wittgenstein primarily sought to question. Wittgenstein like Hume, however, is committed the view that human knowledge, philosophical or otherwise, is ultimately grounded in natural facts about human beings. In this paper I will identify and discuss Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s naturalism and argue that both Wittgenstein and Hume seek to ground human knowledge on empirical natural facts about humans. In drawing the parallel between them, I will begin by discussing their respective negative views on knowledge and then focus on those positive views that in each case point towards a naturalism in their philosophy. Since both Wittgenstein and Hume wrote on a wide range of topics, I will only focus on certain important aspects of their philosophy to serve as a tool for understanding their naturalistic philosophical projects. I will particularly focus on Hume’s writing on causation and Wittgenstein’s view on understanding and rule following. 116 1. The Negative View 1.1 Determine? I use the term “negative” primarily to serve as a general term to an aspect of Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophy to what some might refer to as skepticism.1 The views discussed below are negative in a sense that they emphasize what is not rather than what is. Since the purpose of this paper is to discuss Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s naturalism, I will briefly discuss some of their negative views only in so far as it serves to illuminate their naturalistic views. To a large extent, very few consider Wittgenstein a skeptic, but skepticism is a term that is often associated with Hume’s writing on causality. I will briefly underline how Hume is not essentially a skeptic and how his naturalism is distinct from skepticism for Hume later on. An aspect of Hume’s philosophy that is considered negative is his view on causality, particularly, the inference from the observed to the unobserved.2 Hume in An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding classifies “all object of human reason or inquiry” into two kinds: relation of ideas and matters of fact (E, 25). He explains that relations of ideas are the kind that are demonstrative. Demonstrative in 1 Wittgensteinian scholarship since the publication of Saul Kripke’s “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language”, has been divided into pre-Kripke and post Kripke analysis. It is fair to say that Kripke is the first to make an explicit analogy between Hume and Wittgenstein. However, his analogy that compares Hume’s skepticism along with his skeptical solution to Wittgenstein, has received wide array of criticism. My goal in this paper is to discuss Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s naturalism with respect to their “negative” views, and I do not intend to address the finer points of a Kripkean comparison of the two. 2 Barry Stroud, Hume (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1977), 42. 117 the sense that their negation implies a contradiction. These, as Hume points out, are the type that we find in “sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic”. For instance, the proposition “[t]hat the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the two sides…” (E, 25) is a form demonstrative reasoning. According to Hume, “the certainty and evidence of” the relation of ideas holds “ though there never were a circle or triangle in nature”. (E, 25). Matters of fact, on the other hand are propositions whose negation does not lead to a contradiction. A proposition that claims “[t]hat the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation that it will rise.” (E, 25-26). Hume asserts that “all reasoning concerning matter of fact seems to be founded on the relation of cause and effect”—after observing events of type A and type B, we infer B to follow from a single event A. Essentially, multiple constant conjunctions between events form the basis of inference from an observed single event A to the unobserved event B. Hume points out that matters of fact reasoning by their very nature take the form of a chain of justifications. Within the realm of posteriori reasoning, a reason given for a certain event C is based on a fact B and the reason for the fact B is followed by a fact A. A present event C is justified by a chain of inter-temporal reasoning that extends backward into the past. A reasoning of this nature, therefore, relies on “the relation of cause and effect and that this relation is near or remote, direct or collateral.”( E. 27). A reasoning of this kind is posteriori because one cannot establish the connection between cause and effect without necessarily having had an experience where a series of events A are followed by events B. It follows logically that cause and effects could not be “discovered by a priori 118 arguments.” Therefore, “every effect is a distinct event from its cause” and any “conception” of its cause through a priori argument “must be entirely arbitrary.” (E, 29). What is at stake here is the idea of necessary connection between events A and B. Hume wants to say that there is nothing to be discovered, even with the employment of demonstrative reasoning, that from an observed event A the unobserved event B necessarily follows. There is no necessary connection between a cause and its effect; it is impossible to infer any specific effect from just a single instance of the cause. Only through repeated observations of events A being followed by events B can we infer B having observed A. Wittgenstein’s negative view could be illustrated based on instances of his views on understanding. The idea of rule following is embedded in what is considered human understanding. Our notion of understanding entails grasping a certain rule or direction and properly following it in all circumstances considered. But what does it really mean to understand, to follow a rule, Wittgenstein asks? Wittgenstein imagines a scenario where A is writing a series of numbers and B tries to guess what comes next by coming up with a formula: But are the processes which I have just described here understanding? “B understands the principle of the series” surely doesn’t mean simply: the formula “an=…” occurs to B. For it is perfectly imaginable that the formula should occur to him and that he should nevertheless not understand. “He understands” must have more in it than: the formula occurs to him. And equally, more than any of those 119 more or less characteristic accompaniments or manifestations of understanding. (PI 152). Here Wittgenstein points to an important aspect of what we take to be understanding. The use of the word “occur” is supposed to signify that understanding might be thought of as a form of mental picture that comes to mind. However, this is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for understanding since it is imaginable that the formula could appear in his mind but he may not understand in the sense that the subject still might not be able to continue with the series. In short, the picture fails to determine his future use. Wittgenstein therefore considers the possibility that understanding must be more than the apparent “manifestations” or “accompaniments” of understanding, such as the occurrence of a formula in the head. The latter point is fleshed out in another passage: Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series is a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule. (PI 218). This picture of rules as rails is a metaphor that captures our ordinary conception of understanding of a rule. When we understand a rule, it is assumed that future applications of it could be read off, so to say, from it, the rails serving as future applications of the rule. Thus, we would be inclined to say that we can use a concept at any point in time tn in the future. But how does a rule contain its application? Wittgenstein presents this perplexity in a rather ‘absurd” situation where “a person naturally reacted to the 120 gesture of pointing “by looking in the direction of the line from the finger-tip to the wrist, not from the wrist to finger- tip.”.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Sociology of Religion, Lundscow, Chapter 7, Cults
    Sociology of Religion , Sociology 3440-090 Summer 2014, University of Utah Dr. Frank J. Page Office Room 429 Beh. Sci., Office Hours: Thursday - Friday, Noon – 4:00-pm Office Phone: (801) 531-3075 Home Phone: (801) 278-6413 Email: [email protected] I. Goals: The primary goal of this class is to give students a sociological understanding of religion as a powerful, important, and influential social institution that is associated with many social processes and phenomena that motivate and influence how people act and see the world around them. The class will rely on a variety of methods that include comparative analysis, theoretical explanations, ethnographic studies, and empirical studies designed to help students better understand religion and its impact upon societies, global-international events, and personal well-being. This overview of the nature, functioning, and diversity of religious institutions should help students make more discerning decisions regarding cultural, political, and moral issues that are often influenced by religion. II. Topics To Be Covered: The course is laid out in two parts. The first section begins with a review of conventional and theoretical conceptions of religion and an overview of the importance and centrality of religion to human societies. It emphasizes the diversity and nature of "religious experience" in terms of different denominations, cultures, classes, and individuals. This is followed by overview of sociological assumptions and theories and their application to religion. A variety of theoretical schools including, functionalism, conflict theory, exchange theory, sociology of knowledge, sociobiology, feminist theory, symbolic interactionism, postmodern and critical theory will be addressed and applied to religion.
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgenstein, Routledge
    CRITICAL NOTICE Wittgenstein Routledge Philosophers William Child, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2011, pp. 288, £ 16.99 ISBN: 13: 978-0-415-31206 (paperback) Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall Routledge’s current Wittgenstein list is certainly comprehensive. Quite apart from its considerable number of collections of essays, recent additions include Blind Obedience: The Structure and Content of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy from Meredith Williams in 2009, and the two volumes in their Routledge Philosophy Guidebook series, one on the Tractatus by Michael Morris from 2008, and the eagerly awaited (circa 2011) revised verson of Marie McGinn’s 1997 book on the Philosophical Investigations, not to mention a third from Andy Hamilton about On Certainty (due 2012). Now in yet another series comes William Child, adding his name to the extensive list of commentators who have been invited to have their say on what Wittgenstein’s work is all about. In addition to its coverage of the Tractatus, the Investigations, and the transitional period, the book has three extra chapters, each of over twenty pages on Wittgenstein’s Life and Works (Chapter 1), Knowledge and Certainty (Chapter 7) and Religion and Anthropology (Chapter 8.) The book ends with a slightly shorter chapter on Legacy and Influence. It is also attractively priced in a paperback version unusually published simultaneously with the hardback and e-book editions. The book inevitably invites comparison with other recent offerings on the entire philosophy from Chon Tejedor (Starting With Wittgenstein, Continuum 2011), from Severin Schroeder (Wittgenstein: The Way Out of The Flybottle, Polity 2006), from Anthony Kenny (Wittgenstein, Blackwell, revised ed.
    [Show full text]
  • Emergentism As an Option in the Philosophy of Religion: Between Materialist Atheism and Pantheism
    SURI 7 (2) 2019: 1-22 Emergentism as an Option in the Philosophy of Religion: Between Materialist Atheism and Pantheism James Franklin University of New South Wales Abstract: Among worldviews, in addition to the options of materialist atheism, pantheism and personal theism, there exists a fourth, “local emergentism”. It holds that there are no gods, nor does the universe overall have divine aspects or any purpose. But locally, in our region of space and time, the properties of matter have given rise to entities which are completely different from matter in kind and to a degree god-like: consciousnesses with rational powers and intrinsic worth. The emergentist option is compared with the standard alternatives and the arguments for and against it are laid out. It is argued that, among options in the philosophy of religion, it involves the minimal reworking of the manifest image of common sense. Hence it deserves a place at the table in arguments as to the overall nature of the universe. Keywords: Emergence; pantheism; personal theism; naturalism; consciousness 1. INTRODUCTION The main options among world views are normally classifiable as either materialist atheism, pantheism (widely understood) or personal theism. According to materialist atheism, there exists nothing except the material universe as we ordinarily conceive it, and its properties are fully described by science (present or future). According to personal theism, there exists a separate entity (or entities) of a much higher form than those found in the 2019 Philosophical Association of the Philippines 2 Emergentism as an Option in the Philosophy of Religion material universe, a god or gods.
    [Show full text]
  • Hitting on Consciousness: Honderich Versus Mcginn
    J. Andrew Ross Hitting On Consciousness Honderich Versus McGinn Ted Honderich, 74, formerly Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at the University of London, recently published a short book on consciousness (Honderich, 2004). Colin McGinn, 57, his former colleague at University College London and now a profes- sor of philosophy at the University of Miami, Florida, reviewed it (McGinn, 2007a). The review is quite long and detailed, but the first sentences set the tone. McGinn on Honderich: This book runs the full gamut from the mediocre to the ludicrous to the merely bad. It is painful to read, poorly thought out, and uninformed. It is also radically inconsistent. The review elicited a long and pained reply from Honderich, who posted his review of the review on his website (Honderich, 2007). Honderich on McGinn on Honderich: If I were to join McGinn in his habits, the word ‘shoddy’would come to mind about this performance. … McGinn does not make me dream of changing a comma. Other philosophers joined in a chattering chorus of responses, some on either side and much of it recorded in a thread on Brian Leiter’s cel- ebrated philosophy blog (Leiter, 2007). All this prompted McGinn to rally to his own defence (McGinn, 2007b). McGinn on Honderich on McGinn on Honderich: To repeat, I found Honderich’s book to be quite the worst thing I’ve ever read — an insult to the reader, no less — so I was duty-bound to pan it. And I did give my reasons. Correspondence: [email protected] Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, No.
    [Show full text]
  • A Critical Reflection on W.V.O. Quine's Naturalized Epistemology
    © 2019 IJRAR May 2019, Volume 6, Issue 2 www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138) A Critical Reflection on W.V.O. Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology Abraham Tsehay Jemberie Debre Berhan University, Debre Berhan, Ethiopia Abstract: W. V. O. Quine is the prominent advocate of naturalized epistemology, collection of philosophical views that employs scientific methods, results and practices to solve epistemological problems. In this paper, I explore whether Quine’s argument to replace epistemology by science is convincing. In naturalized epistemology, Quine totally rejects the normative aspect of epistemology; he focuses on the descriptive part of epistemology. Other thinkers such as Kim, Stroud, Almedir, Rorty argues that epistemology without norm is epistemology in name only. Furthermore, all philosophical questions cannot be answered by applying scientific methods, because philosophy’s scope is broader than science. Thus, Quine’s attempt to scientized philosophy in general and epistemology in particular is unattainable. Key Words: W. V. O. Quine, Naturalized Epistemology, Replacement Naturalism 1. Introduction W. V. O. Quine is the prominent proponent of naturalized epistemology. He thought that traditional epistemology has to be replaced by naturalized epistemology. According to Quine, traditional epistemology has two projects: doctrinal project and conceptual project. He held that these two projects of traditional epistemology have failed. Quine argued that the failure of these projects indicates that traditional epistemology is unattainable. So, he concluded, traditional epistemology has to be replaced by naturalized epistemology. In this paper, I am going to explore whether Quine’s argument used to replace traditional epistemology by naturalized epistemology is convincing.
    [Show full text]
  • Legal Research Paper Series
    Legal Research Paper Series NON HUMAN ANIMALS AND THE LAW: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ANIMAL LAW RESOURCES AT THE STANFORD LAW LIBRARY By Rita K. Lomio and J. Paul Lomio Research Paper No. 6 October 2005 Robert Crown Law Library Crown Quadrangle Stanford, California 94305-8612 NON HUMAN ANIMALS AND THE LAW: A BIBLIOGRPAHY OF ANIMAL LAW RESOURCES AT THE STANFORD LAW LIBRARY I. Books II. Reports III. Law Review Articles IV. Newspaper Articles (including legal newspapers) V. Sound Recordings and Films VI. Web Resources I. Books RESEARCH GUIDES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES Hoffman, Piper, and the Harvard Student Animal Legal Defense Fund The Guide to Animal Law Resources Hollis, New Hampshire: Puritan Press, 1999 Reference KF 3841 G85 “As law students, we have found that although more resources are available and more people are involved that the case just a few years ago, locating the resource or the person we need in a particular situation remains difficult. The Guide to Animal Law Resources represents our attempt to collect in one place some of the resources a legal professional, law professor or law student might want and have a hard time finding.” Guide includes citations to organizations and internships, animal law court cases, a bibliography, law schools where animal law courses are taught, Internet resources, conferences and lawyers devoted to the cause. The International Institute for Animal Law A Bibliography of Animal Law Resources Chicago, Illinois: The International Institute for Animal Law, 2001 KF 3841 A1 B53 Kistler, John M. Animal Rights: A Subject Guide, Bibliography, and Internet Companion Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000 HV 4708 K57 Bibliography divided into six subject areas: Animal Rights: General Works, Animal Natures, Fatal Uses of Animals, Nonfatal Uses of Animals, Animal Populations, and Animal Speculations.
    [Show full text]
  • Naturalizing Ethics
    2 Naturalizing Ethics OWEN FLANAGAN, HAGOP SARKISSIAN, AND DAVID WONG Introduction In this chapter we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two fallacies – Hume and Moore’s – that it allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic relativism (Flanagan 1995; 2002; Wong 1984; 1996; 2006b). The latter substantive view, supported by a neocompatibilist view of human agency, constitutes the essence of Duke naturalism. It provides a credible substantive alternative to bald or eliminativist Australian ethical natu- ralism, especially one that supports moral skepticism (Mackie), and to the more reticent Pittsburgh naturalism.1 Naturalism in the Broad Sense Ethical naturalism is a variety of a broader philosophical naturalism, so it will be good to say what naturalism in the broad sense is. According to the OED, the original philosophical meaning of the term “naturalism” dates back to the 17th century and meant “a view of the world, and of man’s relation to it, in which only the operation of natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces is admitted or assumed.” 1 McDowell coined the term “bald naturalism” (McDowell 1996) and sometimes characterizes it in a way that engenders or is akin to moral skepticism. In principle, a naturalist might be a moral skeptic, believing that there are no moral properties as ordinarily conceived and thus that moral propositions are literally false (or meaning- less).
    [Show full text]
  • A Critical Examination of Quinean Naturalism______A Closer Look at Quine’S Naturalized Epistemology
    A Critical Examination of Quinean Naturalism_________ A Closer Look at Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology Ashley Spring Florida Atlantic University We always speak from within a theory, a system of the world. There is no neutral or presuppositionless position from which we can make judgments about the world and our theory of it: all of our judgments must be evaluated as being part of a substantive theory of the world. In particular our philosophical remarks are made from within such a theory. —Peter Hylton Introduction The resources of traditional epistemology have been exhausted. The result is the necessary paradigmatic shift from ‘first philosophy’ to a more plausible, and albeit, naturalized enterprise. W.V. Quine’s shift towards naturalizing epistemology serves as a catalyst for epistemic inquiry through the inclusion of the natural sciences in epistemology. In so naturalizing epistemology, Quine does not view epistemology as a prior or foundational discipline that can be justified a priori but rather, as an integral part of our web of beliefs about the world. 1 Such a radical departure from the foundationalist program better captures our epistemic aims by focusing on the resources found in the natural sciences relative to knowledge acquisition. This paper will provide a critical examination of Quiean naturalism through a close examination of Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized.” Indeed, through this critical examination of Quine’s epistemological project, we should see how Quine’s naturalized epistemology serves as a radical yet, practical starting point for epistemic inquiry, along with how such a naturalized shift establishes a more philosophically plausible approach to epistemology.
    [Show full text]
  • Does Epistemic Naturalism Vindicate Semantic Externalism?- an Episto-Semantical Review*
    Ravenshaw Journal of Philosophy, Vol. III December 2017 27-37 ISSN: 2395-3209 Does Epistemic Naturalism vindicate Semantic Externalism?- An Episto-semantical Review* SANJIT CHAKRABORTY Department of Philosophy Jadavpur University, Kolkata-32, W.B. ABSTRACT The paper concentrates how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts Quine to ponder the naturalized epistemology. W.V. Quine was fascinated about the evidential acquisition of scientific knowledge, and language as a vehicle of knowledge takes a significant role in his regimented naturalistic theory that is anchored in the scientific framework. My point is that there is an interesting shift from epistemology to language (semantic externalism). The rejection of the mentalist approach on meaning vindicates external that somehow pave the way for ‘semantic holism’, a thesis where the meaning of a sentence is defined in turns to the totality of nodes and paths of its semantic networks where the meaning of linguistic units depend upon the meaning of the entire language. I would like to relook on Quine’s heart throbbing claim about the co-extensiveness of the sentential relation and the evidential relation that point towards an affirmation of meaning holism and semantic externalism. Besides, the knowledge of acquaintance that relinquishes the singular thought from the account of psychological consideration and self-knowledge hypothesis copes up with the testimonial and warrant knowledge entangling by the claims of social-knowledge as anticipated by Alvin Goldman. My conclusion would be nearer to the stance of semantic externalism inculcated by the social knowledge (in epistemic sense) and semantic holism. 28 SANJIT CHAKRABORTY W.
    [Show full text]
  • A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules Defending Kripke’S Wittgenstein Martin Kusch, Acumen, Chesham, 2006, Pp 320, £ 18.99 ISBN-10: 1-84465-065-0 (Paperback)
    CRITICAL NOTICE A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules Defending Kripke’s Wittgenstein Martin Kusch, Acumen, Chesham, 2006, pp 320, £ 18.99 ISBN-10: 1-84465-065-0 (paperback) Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall When we look at Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, however, it turns out that he is committing himself to something different from, and much stronger than, the claim that there cannot be logically private languages. What the rule-following considerations entail is that language is essentially public. The argument for this, to recapitulate, is that language use is a rule-governed activity, and that rules are constituted by agreement within a language community...But then if language use is a rule-following activity, and such activity is essentially a matter of public agreement, as Wittgenstein argues, it follows that language is essentially, that is logically, public. (1) If A.C. Grayling had said this specifically about Kripke’s Wittgenstein, rather than in the context of his elementary introduction to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it would still have been an equally appropriate thing for him to say, for he goes on to argue that on the view to which he is objecting, there cannot be a ‘Robinson-Crusoe-from-birth’ since this would be a denial of Wittgenstein’s claim that it is only within a linguistic community that an individual could be said to be capable of using a language at all. But since there is on Grayling’s view nothing in this notion of a born-Crusoe with which he would care to disagree, he understandably concludes that there must be something wrong with any claim of Wittgenstein’s that would deny its obvious legitimacy.
    [Show full text]
  • Can Social Constructivism Save Scientific Mysterianism and Nativism from the Charges of Inconsistency?
    Prolegomena 18 (1) 2019: 73–85 doi: 10 .26362/20190104 Can Social Constructivism Save Scientific Mysterianism and Nativism from the Charges of Inconsistency? PameLA Ann J . BoongaLing Department of Philosophy – University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines pamela_ann .jose@upd .edu .ph ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE – RECEIVED: 05/03/19 ACCEPTED: 18/05/19 abstract: In this paper, I argue that Colin McGinn provides an unacceptable ac- count of consciousness due to the inconsistencies between (1) the conjunction of the metaphysical assumptions of his nativism and the epistemic assumptions of his mysterianism and (2) his conception of identity . I also maintain that, although John Searle’s social constructivism may provide the most feasible counter-argument to these charges of inconsistency, Searle’s position cannot save McGinn’s account of consciousness due to the inadequacies of Searle’s version of external realism . As I see it, the only means to address the problems in McGinn’s and Searle’s views is by revising their version of external realism . I demonstrate that this is only possible if they adopt an external realist position that dispenses with direct realism and adopts physicalism . I maintain that this is the only means by which we can prove the ex- istence of consciousness while at the same time accommodating its a priori and a posteriori character . key words: Direct realism, external realism, Nicholas Maxwell, Colin McGinn, na- tivism, physicalism, scientific mysterianism, John Searle, social constructivism . Introduction In the initial part of this paper, I argue that Colin McGinn’s account of con- sciousness is untenable due to the inconsistencies between his mysterianist and nativist views .
    [Show full text]
  • The Medieval Social Epistemologies of Augustine and Aquinas
    Knowing and Trusting: The Medieval Social Epistemologies of Augustine and Aquinas by Matthew Kent Siebert A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2014 © Copyright by Matthew Kent Siebert, 2014 Knowing and Trusting The Medieval Social Epistemologies of Augustine and Aquinas Matthew Kent Siebert Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2014 Abstract This dissertation is an introductory exploration of two influential medieval thinkers, Augustine and Aquinas, on the topic of testimony. I explain how Augustine’s view that testimony is a source of knowledge (notitia) developed through four stages, and argue that on Augustine’s view testimonial belief is justified inferentially. I argue that Aquinas thinks some testimonial belief is justified inferentially, and some is justified by adhering to the speaker as the formal object of one’s belief, on the grounds that the speaker is truthful. I argue that these provide knowledge when they provide cognitio. And I argue that Aquinas’s view can be developed into a plausible account of testimonial trust and trustworthiness. ii Acknowledgments I am extremely grateful for the guidance and support of Peter King, Martin Pickavé, and Jennifer Nagel in the writing of this dissertation. I am also grateful to Deborah Black, Michael Siebert, Simona Vucu, and Ian Drummond, for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of some of these chapters. And I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Government of Ontario, and the University of Toronto for financial support.
    [Show full text]