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Home , Allan Little, Battle for Height 776, Chechen diaspora, Diplomatic recognition, Expansionist nationalism, Independence referendum

, RECOGNITION & THE INTERNATIONAL OF STATEHOOD

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of the Ohio University

By

Bridget L. Coggins, B.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University 2006

Doctoral Examination Committee: Approved by

Dr. Richard K. Herrmann, Adviser

Dr. Theodore Hopf ______

Dr. Alexander Thompson Adviser Graduate Program

ABSTRACT

Secessionist regimes universally seek other States' formal recognition. Indeed, a

‘critical mass’ of external recognition must be achieved before any secessionist actor is considered a full member of international society. Yet Statesmen often disagree about what

distinguishes a legitimate from an illegitimate claim to sovereign . The contest

among States over the appropriate response to ’s secessionists provides but one recent example.

While the motives for seeking other States' recognition are easily understood, the reasons established members of the system choose to recognize some and ignore other recognition-seeking actors are not. There is no obvious pattern to the external recognition of

Statehood. quickly won a secessionist war against its Yugoslav Home State to gain its independence, but was in the midst of its war when it was recognized. On the other hand, has governed itself over a decade since it successfully broke from

Somalia, yet has received no formal recognition from the international community. There is a wide variation in domestic capacity at the point of recognition; many secessionist regimes with independence remain unrecognized while regimes with shaky claims to are sometimes embraced as States.

ii Common wisdom within the IR literature asserts States will act on their own political motives rather than normative standards of capacity when questions of sovereignty arise.

Such interest-based explanations raise more questions than they answer. Which self-interests guide States' recognition decisions? What happens when domestic motives conflict with geo-

strategic imperatives? Do all States confer recognition based upon similar criteria or do

different States use different criteria? What, if any, influence do international norms have

upon States’ decisions? Generally, what accounts for the variance between the few actors that are formally recognized and deemed sovereign independent States and the many that receive little or no formal recognition and are not allowed equivalent participation in the interstate system?

I tackle these questions using an original data set of secessionist movements and

Great Power recognition decisions between 1931 and 2002. I conceive of Statehood as the result of a threshold model in which recognition is the most influential determinant of success or failure. I utilize event history analysis and case studies to test explanations derived from the literature, as well as my own hypotheses, regarding whether and when Great Powers will recognize secessionist regimes. I argue that the manifest pattern of new States belies the international legal standards for recognition. And additionally, that individual States’ political motives insufficiently explain why potential members are accepted or rejected by the international community. Instead, the strategic interactions among States must also be considered. States do not make their recognition decisions in a vacuum, they are interdependent and they rarely recognize unilaterally. Though the Great Powers are generally reticent to recognize secessionists’ , there are a number of conditions under which recognition becomes an attractive choice.

iii

Dedicated to my parents,

who always told me I could be anything I wanted to be and still loved me when I told them it was a political scientist.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I was especially lucky to find a supportive and intellectually challenging group of professors and colleagues at Ohio State. Among them, I am particularly indebted to my committee members Richard Herrmann, Ted Hopf and Alex Thompson. A girl couldn’t have hoped for a more engaged or thoughtful group of advisers. In addition, Tim Frye,

Harwood McClerking, Randy Schweller, Allan Silverman and Alex Wendt provided kind words, keen insights and friendship during pivotal moments of the project. I would also like to thank David Welch and Tom Christensen for helping me to secure my final year of graduate funding. And additional thanks go to the Mershon Center for International Security

Studies and the Ohio State Graduate School for their financial support.

Next, I owe a great deal of gratitude to my drunken friends and pious companions, without whom I may still have finished my dissertation, but not in nearly as good of spirits.

Ray Block, Eileen Braman, Jong Choi, Ja Ian Chong, Ellie Church, Ted Coggins, Paul Fritz,

Yoav Gortzak, Natalie Kistner, Greg Miller, Kevin Sweeney, Nathan , Cindy Tranby and Srdjan Vucetic all deserve special mention.

Finally, and most importantly, I would not have survived graduate school without

Brent and Peanut, who made abject poverty, grueling hours and central Ohio drivers surprisingly bearable. One day, I might even look back on this fondly…

v

VITA

November 20, 1977……………………… Born – Rochester, Minnesota

1999………………………………………. B.A. , University of Minnesota

2000 – 2002………………………………. Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University

2002 – 2003……………………………….. Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) - Chinese Fellow, Ohio State University

2003 – 2004……………………………….. Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University

2004 – 2005……………………………….. Dissertation Fellow, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Ohio State University

2005 – 2006……………………………….. Presidential Fellow, Graduate School, Ohio State University

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science

Minor Field: International Relations

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Abstract……………………………………………………………………………. ii Dedication…………………………………………………………………………. iv Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………….. v Vita………………………………………………………………………………….vi List of Tables……………………………………………………………………… xi List of Figures…………………………………………………………………….. xii

Chapters:

1. Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 1

1.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….. 1 1.2 An Empirical Question………………………………………….... 7 1.3 The Argument…………………………………………………….. 9 1.4 Outline & Organization…………………………………………... 14

2. Theory……………………………………………………………………... 16

2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….. 16 2.2 International Relations and States……………………………….. 24 2.3 Westphalia and the State………………………………………….. 26 2.4 Social Determinants of State Emergence………………………... 30 2.5 Recognition and State Emergence………………………………. 35 2.6 , the State and Recognition…………………... 38 2.7 Recognition in Practice…………………………………………… 44 2.8 Toward a Social Theory of Recognition and Statehood………… 49 2.9 Core Concepts and Definitions…………………………………... 50 2.10 Theoretical Review………………………………………………... 56 2.11 The Research Design……………………………………………... 60 2.12 Hypotheses, Concepts and Definitions………………………….. 62 2.13 Material Interests………………………………………………….. 62 2.13.1 Geo-Strategic/External Security…………………………. 62 2.13.2 Domestic Security………………………………………… 64 2.14 Ideational Interests……………………………………………….. 65 2.14.1 International Norms………………………………………. 66 2.14.2 Identity Relations…………………………………………. 71

vii 2.15 Controls……………………………………………………………. 73 2.15.1 Sub-State & Pan-Movements…………………………….. 74 2.16 Research Plan and Analysis………………………………………. 76

3. Quantitative Analysis……………………………………………………... 78

3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….. 78 3.2 Quantitative Research Design……………………………………. 80 3.3 Empirical Beginnings…………………………………………….. 87 3.4 Data Collection and Resources…………………………………... 89 3.5 Conceptual Definitions and Operational Indicators……………. 93 3.6 Primary Hypotheses and Indicators……………………………... 97 3.6.1 Geo-Strategic/External Security…………………………. 97 3.6.2 Domestic Security………………………………………… 98 3.6.3 International Norms………………………………………. 99 3.6.4 & Mandates……………………………………... 100 3.6.5 Identity Relations…………………………………………. 101 3.6.6 Unit Type………………………………………………….. 104 3.7 Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………… 106 3.7.1 Conflict Characteristics…………………………………… 106 3.7.2 External Factors…………………………………………... 109 3.8 Data Analysis……………………………………………………… 110 3.8.1 Pooled Cox Model………………………………………… 111 3.8.2 Great Power Cox Models…………………………………. 113 3.9 Case Study Reorientation…………………………………………. 115 3.10 Case Selection……………………………………………………... 116 3.11 Operational Definitions & Sources………………………………. 119 3.12 Case Study Structure……………………………………………… 127

4. International Responses to Secession in Yugoslavia, 1989-2002……….. 137

4.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….. 137 4.2 Historical Background……………………………………………. 142 4.3 Precipitating Events………………………………………………. 150 4.4 The International Environment………………………………….. 153 4.5 Domestic Sovereignty…………………………………………….. 156 4.6 Domestic Sovereignty in Slovenia………………………………... 157 4.6.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority………………... 158 4.6.2 Popular Legitimacy……………………………………….. 161 4.6.3 Projected Viability………………………………………… 162 4.7 Domestic Sovereignty in Croatia…………………………………. 163 4.7.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority………………... 164 4.7.2 Popular Legitimacy……………………………………….. 168 4.7.3 Projected Viability………………………………………… 169 4.8 Domestic Sovereignty in …………………………………. 171 4.8.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority………………... 172

viii 4.8.2 Popular Legitimacy……………………………………….. 174 4.8.3 Projected Viability………………………………………… 175 4.9 A Diplomatic Prelude……………………………………………... 177 4.10 The European Community……………………………………….. 179 4.10.1 Britain……………………………………………………… 184 4.10.2 ……………………………………………………… 187 4.10.3 …………………………………………………… 189 4.11 The Absent …………………………………………. 194 4.11.1 The …………………………………………. 194 4.11.2 /……………………………………… 197 4.12 The Asian Powers…………………………………………………. 201 4.13 Recognition & Non-Recognition………………………………… 204 4.14 Post Mortem………………………………………………………. 208 4.15 Developments in Kosovo…………………………………………. 209 4.16 Recognition Prospects……………………………………………. 213 4.17 Conclusion………………………………………………………… 216

5. International Responses to the Wars of Soviet Succession……………... 233

5.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….. 233 5.2 Historical Background………………………………………….... 240 5.3 ’s History and Background……………………………. 245 5.4 Precipitating Events: Chechnya………………………………….. 247 5.5 and South , History & Background…………... 253 5.6 Precipitating Events: Abkhazia and ……………... 256 5.7 Nagorno-Karabakh History & Background……………………... 259 5.8 Precipitating Events: Nagorno-Karabakh……………………….. 262 5.9 The International Environment………………………………….. 264 5.10 & Stalemate in the Post-Soviet States………………… 266 5.11 Internal Sovereignty in the Post-Soviet Proto-States……………. 271 5.12 Domestic Sovereignty in Chechnya, 1996-1999………………….. 272 5.12.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority………………... 274 5.12.2 Popular Legitimacy……………………………………….. 276 5.12.3 Projected Viability………………………………………… 278 5.13 Domestic Sovereignty in Abkhazia, 1994-2002…………………... 281 5.13.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority………………... 282 5.13.2 Popular Legitimacy……………………………………….. 286 5.13.3 Projected Viability………………………………………… 286 5.14 Domestic Sovereignty in South Ossetia, 1992-2002……………… 287 5.14.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority………………... 288 5.14.2 Popular Legitimacy……………………………………….. 289 5.14.3 Projected Viability………………………………………… 290 5.15 Domestic Sovereignty in Nagorno-Karabakh, 1994-2002……….. 290 5.15.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority………………... 291 5.15.2 Popular Legitimacy……………………………………….. 292 5.15.3 Projected Viability………………………………………… 293

ix 5.16 External Influence and Indifference……………………………... 293 5.17 Russia……………………………………………………………… 295 5.17.1 South Ossetia & Abkhazia………………………………... 296 5.17.2 Nagorno-Karabakh……………………………………….. 301 5.18 The United States…………………………………………………. 302 5.18.1 Chechnya………………………………………………….. 303 5.18.2 South Ossetia & Abkhazia………………………………... 305 5.18.3 Nagorno-Karabakh……………………………………….. 307 5.19 ……………………………………………………………... 309 5.19.1 The Caucasian ………………………………... 310 5.20 & …………………………………………………….. 312 5.21 Developments in Chechnya, 1999-2005…………………………... 313 5.21.1 Domestic Developments in Chechnya, 1996-1999……….. 314 5.21.2 The Second Russo-Chechen War, 1999-2005…………….. 316 5.22 Exhausted Conflicts, Changed Circumstances………………….. 318 5.22.1 Chechnya………………………………………………….. 319 5.22.2 Abkhazia & South Ossetia………………………………... 322 5.22.3 Nagorno-Karabakh……………………………………….. 325 5.23 Conclusion: Post-Soviet Haste…………………………………… 326

6. Conclusion………………………………………………………………… 337

6.1 Political Recognition’s Effects…………………………………… 350 6.1.1 Direct Effects……………………………………………… 351 6.1.2 Diffuse Effects…………………………………………….. 354 6.2 General Implications……………………………………………… 355 6.3 Avenues of Future Research……………………………………… 356

Appendices………………………………………………………………………... 358

Appendix A: Coding Rules……………………………………………….. 358 Appendix B: Unique Case I.D. ………………………………………….. 367 Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics……………………………………….. 374

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………. 378

x LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

3.1 State Emergence (1931-2002)……………………………………………... 129

3.2 Chi-Square………………………………………………………... 131

3.3 Region Chi-Square………………………………………………………... 132

3.4 Violent/Non-Violent Secession Chi-Square……………….……………. 133

3.5 War Outcomes Chi-Square……………………………………………….. 134

3.6 Cox Models for Great Power Recognition……………………………….. 135

3.7 Variation in Domestic Sovereignty by Case Cluster…………………….. 136

4.1 Great Power Recognition…………………………………………………. 222

4.2 Independence Demands & Plebiscites………………………………….. 223

4.3 Yugoslavia Conflict Statistics…………………………………………….. 224

4.4 Yugoslav Ethnic Demographics (1991)………………………………….. 225

4.5 The Former Yugoslavia: Quantitative Indicators (1985-1991)………….. 226

4.6 Kosovo: Quantitative Indicators (1995-2002)…………………………….. 227

4.7 Selected Yugoslav Timeline (1989-2006)…………………………………. 228

5.1 Post-Soviet States: Quantitative Indicators (1991-2002)………………… 329

5.2 Soviet Succession Ethnic Demographics (1989)………………………… 330

5.3 Post-Soviet Conflict Statistics…………………………………………….. 331

5.4 Post-Soviet Timeline (1989-1996)………………………………………… 332

xi LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

3.1 Modern State Emergence 2 x 2…………………………………………… 130

3.2 Number of Great Powers (1931-2002)……………………………………..130

xii

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Though most States in the international community are multi-national, most are also unlikely to face the prospect of national .1 The world has many , perhaps so many that the international system could not accommodate them all if they demanded independent States of their own.2 If each potential national group became a State, there might be thousands of States rather than the 194 or so in the system today.3 Fortunately, it is unlikely that the world will have to confront such a problem. Most national movements’ demands fall short of formal separation from their Home States, instead preferring expanded

1 For the purpose of clarity, State with a capital “S” will refer to who are members of the interstate system while state with a lower case “s” refers to any sub-State territorial unit (e.g. Ohio and Minnesota in the U.S. case). Where a cited author uses a lower case “s” it has been replaced with a capital “S” for consistency.

2 Gellner (1983), p.2, 44-5; Hobsbawm (1977), p.12-3 Others, like Kaplan (1994); Huntington (1993); Lake and Rothschild (Eds.)(1998); and Ayres (1998) also note the rampant instability that might accompany new waves of national separatism and ethnic (or ‘civilizational’) conflict.

3 Scholars agree that there are thousands of possible nations that might arise out of racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, economic, ideological and territorial identifications among the peoples of the world. Indeed, it is difficult to overestimate the potential number of nationalist combinations among people. Gellner (1993) points out that perhaps 8,000 distinct languages are spoken in the modern world as a potential estimate of national identities (p.74), while Hannum (1990)suggests there might be 5,000 States if ethno-national self-determination was fully exercised, (p.454-55). Secretary of State Warren Christopher offered at his Senate confirmation hearings that, left unchecked ethnic conflicts would lead to “5,000 rather than the hundred plus we have now” (cited in Binder and Crossette 1993). It is less clear however, just how many of the possible States are also probable ones. There were 191 State Members of the in 2004.

1 civil rights or greater on their group’s behalf. 4 Even among the States that do experience secessionist challenges, the chances are still quite small (about 1/3 overall) that the group will ever achieve full independence and Statehood. 5 Home States often have a number of material advantages relative to secessionists including professional militaries and superior funding. In addition, they have external legitimacy and the status quo on their side.

Home States are both the subjects and beneficiaries of international law. They are recognized as the sole arbiters of affairs within their boundaries and other States have agreed not to interfere in their domestic affairs. In separatist conflicts, the odds are stacked in favor of incumbent States.

That said, since the end of World War II civil, not international, conflicts have been the most common and destructive form of war.6 And within the set of civil wars, secessionist wars are not only the most common, but are additionally among the longest and bloodiest types of warfare.7 Secessionist conflicts are also notoriously difficult to end or resolve, often

4 Home States are the governmental actors recognized as having legitimate authority over a given secessionist population and . See definitions in Chapter 2 and Appendix A: Coding Rules for additional details.

5 In any given year of a secession attempt, the chance that it will succeed is much less (~2.5%). See Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics. It is a common observation by authors interested in secession like Ayoob (1995); Ayres (1999); Horowitz (1985)(1998); and Saideman in Lake and Rothschild (Eds.)(1998) that successful secession is rare, (though their definitions of secession differ slightly from the definition of secession employed by this project). Most authors cite the secession of East Bengal from to form as the only successful secession since WWII (e.g. Horowitz in Moore (Ed.)(1998), p.185. In the post- era this is no longer the case, but successful secession is still relatively rare given the number of secessionist movements seeking independent Statehood. The observation that successful secession is unlikely is supported by the data for this project. See note 4.

6 Singer and Small Correlates of War Inter-State War Data 3.0 and Correlates of War Civil War Data 1816-1988. This claim is based upon a simple comparison of frequency and cumulative war deaths for each type of war between 1945 and 1988. Fearon (2004) also notes that “the number of ongoing civil wars had been steadily, almost linearly increasing from 1945 up to 1991.” (p.1) Fearon, James D. (2004)

7 On frequency see Licklider (1995), Gurr (2000) and Fearon and Laitin (2001). On duration and death see Fearon (2004).

2 relapsing into after formal resolution.8 These conflicts frequently involve

complicating factors such as or mass expulsions, gross violations of human

rights, domestic , guerilla war and extensive counterinsurgency measures by State

governments. Secession is often a deadly serious matter.

Secessionism’s low probability of success has not dissuaded many of its aspirants,

nor has the fear of its potential dissipated among Statesmen. Over the past seventy-some

years, there have been literally hundreds of unique demands for separation, many of which

resulted in violence between secessionists and their Home States. Today there are at least 50

ongoing secessionist conflicts around the world. Some attempts will last only months (as in

the case of Slovenia’s recent separation from Yugoslavia), while others will go on for

decades (as in the case of ’s separation from ).9

The value of independent Statehood is obvious for separatist communities. In many

cases religious, ethnic, geographic and ideological groups are repressed and persecuted by

their governments and fellow citizens. They are stigmatized as backward by the majority (or

the powerful) and are not afforded full civil and political rights. Independence offers a

potential respite from oppressive social circumstances and the possibility of an independent

voice in international affairs.10 Secession is also attractive for the nationalist elite, lured by the

opportunity to become “big fish in a small pond” following independence.11 Finally, and

8 Walter (1997)(2001) and Posen (1993)

9 See Appendix B: Secessionist Movements 1931-2002

10 Relative depravation is not the only justification for secessionist demands though most secessionism is grievance-based in some respect. In some cases, secessionist groups are economically advantaged and seek to separate from other groups they feel are hindering their success. Horowitz provides an excellent discussion of socio-economic secessionist archetypes (1985), p.230-62.

11 Horowitz in Moore (Ed.)(1998), p.185.

3 perhaps most compelling, independence seems to offer the possibility for the nationalist ideal, a -State where political jurisdiction and national community perfectly overlap.12

Unfortunately for secessionists, Home States also prize their sovereignty. Statesmen jealously guard their authority and often regard their territory as indivisible.13 To maintain one’s domestic sovereignty is a matter of national pride and historical prestige, and permitting separation involves the surrender of significant natural resources, manpower, geographic advantage and material power in general. Consequently, there is little support among the world’s Statesmen for a “right of secession” to accompany the principle of self- determination embraced by the United Nations charter.14

12 Scholars frequently note that this “ideal” match between nation and state can never truly be achieved. Instead, successful separatist minorities become governing majorities with new minority communities of their own. Emerson (1960), p.105. There is no “clean break” where secessionism is concerned. Horowitz in Moore (Ed.)(1998), p.190-2.

13 Toft (2003); Walter (2003)

14 Support for the self-determination of peoples is outlined in Chapter I, Article I and in Chapter 9, Article 55 of the United Nations Charter available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/. Though not codified international law until the creation of the UN in 1945, self-determination was also a principle advocated by Wilson toward the end of WWI. His “Fourteen Points” Speech (1918) illustrates his plans for territorial order at the end of the war. In it he argued for a settlement, “based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the whose title is to be determined” (www.ourdocuments.gov ). Evidence of the recent divisiveness of a “right of secession” can be found within the Third Committee Meetings (2001) UN 56th Session of the GA/SHC. Though a “right of secession” has found little support among Statesmen, some States do have domestic constitutional provisions that (at least theoretically) allow legal secession. According to a recent survey of 89 (contemporary and historical) (Monahan, 1996), there are or have been seven States with constitutional provisions for legal secession: , Ethiopia, France (for overseas only), , St. Christopher and , the former USSR, and the former federated of Czech and . Many also include because a Statute now outlines the standards for legal secession from the as a result of the Quebecois’ attempted secession. It is generally agreed that the provision for legal secession from the USSR was instituted for ideological reasons and that secession would not have been allowed.

4 Statesmen also tend to believe in a ‘domino theory’ of sorts in which allowing a single secession necessarily breeds further secessionism.15 Even though empirical support for this concern is dubious, recent events in the Former Soviet Union and the Former

Yugoslavia have done little to dissuade its adherents. Leaders feel that granting permission for one group to secede will send a signal of weakness to their domestic population, in turn fomenting additional separatism. Many Statesmen believe that supporting secession is as unwise as “showing blood in a lion’s cage” due to its potential demonstration effects.16 While strong States can probably manage some domestic dissent, the prospect of spillover or contagion might seem especially dangerous for a State or region where the internal security dilemma is more severe than the external dilemma.17 States with a tenuous hold on domestic authority could be especially sensitive about setting unwanted precedents.18 On the whole it seems that States have compelling reasons for their overwhelming to secessionist demands.

15 Concern about the proliferation of secessionist demands is thought to be well-founded by some scholars as well, “The domino effects of secessions within states are considerable, which is one major reason central governments almost universally fight them” Horowitz in Moore (1998)(Ed.), p.188 and Horowitz (1985), p.278-281. Horowitz further specifies however, that “the example of one movement cannot create separatist sentiment where it does not exist; [it is] not a question of contagion” (Ibid, p.279). Consequently, only those States with multiple nationalist discontents are thought vulnerable to demonstration effects. Lake and Rothschild (1998) make the same argument with respect to the spread of across international borders, p.341-2.

16 Bucheit, Lee (1978) p.102

17 The concept “internal security dilemma” is not a security dilemma in the traditional sense. Instead, it is meant to imply that the State’s domestic security concerns are at least as threatening as its international security concerns. This situation is thought to characterize the security situation of many States (Ayoob, 1995; Sorensen, 2001).

18 Ayoob (1995) Chapter 8, Keller (1998) in Lake and Rothschild (Eds.) p.292. Though this claim is logically compelling, Saideman (1997)(1998) and others note that weak States (neighboring States in particular) are in fact more likely to support secession than are strong States.

5 Although Statesmen are loath to permit the secession of people and territory, they

are sometimes compelled to do so. When new States do enter the system, it is often the result

of secession or similar separatist demands. East Bengal’s separation from Pakistan in 1971 to

form Bangladesh is probably the most well known instance of secession, but anti-colonial

wars of secession were also common during the 1960s and 70s.19 Tens of today’s Asian and

African States separated from their colonial governors, including , Pakistan, ,

Nigeria, and . Many “newer” States are also the fruits of secessionism,

particularly since the end of the Cold War. Just prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, a

number of states seceded from the .20 Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Macedonia all seceded, in one form or another, from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

Eritrea too, recently regained its independence from Ethiopia after three decades of civil

war. Finally, overwhelmingly voted for independence from in 1999

and became a full member of the United Nations in 2001. While secession is rarely

successful, few contemporary States are immune to its potential, secessionist challenges are

common and destructive, and former secessionists constitute the overwhelming majority of

new State members in international society.

19 is often treated as a category of separatist war unto itself. As a result, many analysts do not consider it secession. I argue that the similarity of nationalist demands in both “” secession attempts and anti-colonialist separatism warrant both of their inclusion within the concept ‘secession’. I will address this distinction further in Chapter 2.

20 The independent States that were formerly part of the Soviet Union are: , , , , , , , , , , , , and . Not all, but many can be considered secessionist. And, though it is often considered a successor State, Russia also seceded from the USSR. Chapter 5 discusses the remaining post-Soviet secessions in Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

6 1.2 An Empirical Question

Secessionism is certainly a difficult domestic issue for those States and Statesmen who encounter it, but most believe it is of peripheral importance to international politics.21

In most theories of international relations, States are exogenous and the process by which actors gain their Statehood is assumed to be theoretically uninteresting.22 Following the

European (or Western) experience of State consolidation, we expect that most new States enter international society when they are able to function independently of others and assert control over their territory and population.23 It may be a very deadly and prolonged conflict for both the Home State and the secessionists, but the final outcomes of secessionist wars are thought decisive. If the secessionists defeat their Home State, they will have a State of their own. If the Home State defeats its secessionists, they must remain subject to its rule.24

If the separation is consensual, then the new State’s emergence is similarly palpable. This account of secession and Statehood, while intuitively pleasing, is incorrect.

21 Some notable exceptions are works on contagion effects in civil war like Lake and Rothschild (Eds.) (1998); Sambanis (2001); Gleditsch (2002) and on intervention, peacekeeping and civil war termination like Betts (1994); Kaufmann (1996); Regan (2000); Sambanis (2003); and Walter (2003). Each of these literatures, however, focuses either on the international effects of secession/civil war or upon international responses to secession/civil war. They do not take the position that secession is an inherently international problem.

22 Many note that the of States as agents in international relations has been overlooked. State creation and consolidation is considered by many to be the domain of comparative theory. Wendt makes this point explicitly (1999), p.195

23 In the European context, post-colonial States are considered a special case of State emergence, where the European model of Statehood was not required for recognition or independence. Emblematic is Philpott’s assessment of in Sovereignty (1995). In addition, though I will discuss it later, it is worth noting now that the causal story of European Statehood that most scholars have come to accept also departs significantly from the evolution of European Statehood in practice (Krasner 2000).

24 New States, of course, may also secede non-violently when the opportunity arises. The opportunity to do so, however, rarely presents itself. Some lawyers and Statesmen suggest that forcible attempts to change boundaries are inherently illegal acts (though it is not clear international law would govern the behavior of non- State actors). If this interpretation is taken to be correct, secessionist movements within States without legal means of separation would have no recourse for achieving independence.

7 The determinants of successful Statehood and membership in international society

are rarely the result of decisive combat between secessionists and their Home States. A

survey of recent secessionist conflicts shows little tangible difference between proto-States

that succeed and those that fail to achieve full membership in the international community.

While Slovenia decisively defeated the Yugoslav in order to earn its

independence, there was no such decisive victory for Croatia. Indeed, Croatia was in the

midst of its war with Yugoslavia when Germany first recognized its Statehood. Kosovo, on

the other hand, is not considered a State and remains in a sort of international limbo. A

United Nations mission upholds its independence, but formal recognition has been

withheld. Though Eritrea is now a full member of the international community since

concluding a decisive separatist war against Ethiopia, Somaliland, an independent and

competent authority since 1991, is not recognized as a State by any other State. Ironically,

there is no longer even a functioning national government of for Somaliland to

secede from, yet Somalia is still regarded as a State by nearly every system member.25 Post-

colonial States in have also been surprisingly immune to successful secession even

where their sovereignty is suspect.26 Many former Soviet republics easily seceded from the

USSR, but Russia refuses to let go of Chechnya without a fight. East Timor was not de facto sovereign when it voted for independence in 1999, but is functionally independent

25 Most recently this maintenance of Somali recognition is evidenced in the international community’s stubborn insistence at peace talks focused on “maintaining” a unitary Somali State under the auspices of the UN. Somaliland is not a party to these talks. On the other hand many States did break diplomatic relations with Somalia as a result of the war.

26 Jackson (1982), Ayres (1998), Ayoob (1995)

8 and geographically separate from China yet formally remains part of the ROC.27 Finally,

South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh control their territories and populations to

only a slightly lesser degree than their Home States (former secessionists themselves), but

have gained no widespread acceptance of the independence they claim.

There are no steadfast criteria for Statehood.28 Looking at the variety of former

secessionists that are now fully independent States begs the question, “What is a state?” If

intuitive material measures of de facto sovereignty like territorial control and governmental authority do not explain why some actors become States and others do not, what is the difference between States and the variety of other non-State actors?

1.3 The Argument

I argue that one important, if not the important, distinction between successful and failed secession is external acceptance. In other words, new States enter into the system largely as a result of their acknowledgment by its existing membership. By paying attention

only to domestic control and authority, a fundamental dimension of Statehood is ignored

and our understanding of secessionism incomplete. As the Westphalian order demands, the

interstate system depends upon mutual sovereign recognition among States.

27 It is for this reason that China refuses to maintain diplomatic relations with any government that recognizes Taiwanese authorities as the legitimate government of China. Around 35 States recognize Taiwan rather than , usually because Taiwan offers economic incentives in exchange for its recognition.

28 The wide distribution of capabilities and institutional capacities among recognized States (in part) leads Krasner to argue that sovereignty is nothing more than “organized hypocrisy”, an opiate for the masses of weak States used to further advantage the strong (1999), pp. 15-16, 70-1. See also Kurtulus (2002) Review of International Studies.

9 The mere existence of a territorial entity which is also constitutionally independent is one thing…the extent to which it participates in international life is another matter….It depends on the number of other states which are wanting and willing to enter into relations with the state concerned.29

Recognition by other States then, rather than (and sometimes in spite of) simple de facto control and authority, is an important initial distinction between States and non-State ‘others’ in the international system.

The contemporary dynamics of secession and Statehood might be one of the most dramatic examples of the second image reversed; the international system and its members determine not only the form and function of institutions within States but potentially, who those States are to begin with.30 It is both theoretically and practically misleading to disregard the important social component of Statehood in favor of purely objectivist definitions.

There are very few cases in recent history where new State members unambiguously met the theoretical or legal standards for Statehood, yet States have proliferated. The vagaries of the legal standards are partially responsible for the gap between law and practice, but it is also due to the fact that recognition was intended, and continues to be, a practice of mutual self- interest among States.

It probably comes as no surprise that recognition, like myriad other decisions

Statesmen make, might be politically motivated rather than based upon absolute standards of governmental capacity. Indeed, with rare exception political scientists expect that self- interests guide the decisions of Statesmen, even where standards of appropriate behavior

29 James (1986), p.147

30 Gourevitch, Peter (1978) “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics” International Organization

10 exist.31 Similarly, international lawyers bemoan the overtly political nature of recognition in

practice and often attempt to rectify it through greater legal specificity.32 But what does self-

interest mean in the context of recognition? Do Statesmen pursue geostrategic goals via

recognition? Or might they be attempting to bolster their domestic political support instead?

Perhaps Statesmen use the lure of system membership in order to gain economic or political favors from the new State. Maybe secessionist claims seem more justified when the group is persecuted and repressed by its Home State, when their plea for independence is based upon grievance rather than greed. Perhaps a historical kinship with a particular secessionist group engenders sympathy and acceptance. Or maybe certain systemic conditions within the international system predispose its members to greater and lesser support for recognition.

There are a number of potentially complementary explanations for States’ behavior, each corresponding to different instantiations of interest.

Though there is little room for political motive within the current legal requirements for recognition in theory, there is little question that politics matter in practice. Self-interest has the potential to explain quite a bit about the determinants of Statehood, but not in the ad hoc

(and often post hoc) manner that it is most commonly employed.

Individual State motives still only provide half of the story, however. Just as there is an important external and social quality to Statehood (i.e. recognition), there is also an important social dynamic to States’ recognition decisions. Statesmen do not make their

31 An enduring debate within International Relations centers on whether international law “matters” in more than an epiphenomenal way. Realists suggest international laws and norms do not affect State behavior consistently while Liberals and, to a lesser extent, Neo-Liberals are more optimistic about the strength and consistency of their influence.

32 According to the most current and widely held interpretations of international law, recognition of a new State prior to the achievement of certain objective criteria (identifiable territory and population, effective government, and the capacity to enter into international relations) constitutes premature recognition and carries no legal force; it is itself an illegal act. Von Glahn (1992), p.87, 92

11 choices in a vacuum. They must consider other States’ actions and reactions to their .

While recognition is theoretically a bilateral contract between two States, many States must recognize a new State before it secures full membership in international society. In international relations, the dynamics of recognition can be thought of as a threshold model of sorts.33 Unanimous recognition is not necessary, but a “critical mass” of acceptance must be reached prior to full participation as a State within the international community.34 Once past the tipping point, Statehood is almost never revoked.35

Each State’s recognition is juridically equivalent, but the most important players constituting this “critical mass” are the Great Powers. Though all States are both members and progenitors of international society, the Great Powers constitute an extremely powerful

33 Initial articulations of threshold models can be found in Schelling, Thomas (1971) “Dynamic Models of Segregation” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1:143-86 and Schelling (1971) “On the Ecology of Micromotives” 25:61-98. The tipping model conceptualized in Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” International Organization 52:4 887-917 is much like the one I envision for Statehood. One could argue, in fact, that secessionist movements are norm entrepeneurs, attempting to shift sovereign norms to include their particular nation/State. A lay version of a threshold model also underlies Malcolm Gladwell’s 2000 book The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference.

34 “[U]niversal recognition is not necessary either in theory or in practice…nevertheless a “critical mass” of recognition could said to be necessary” (Fawn and Mayall, p.209). For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a State recognized by only two other State members to gain membership as a State within the United Nations or receive a loan from the or IMF.

35 Waltz (1979), p.95 notes this tendency. The “stickiness” of recognition is also part of Jackson’s explanation for why so-called quasi-states endure even with little domestic legitimacy. It is also noteworthy to point out that while coordinated self-interested behavior might cause State emergence initially, the threshold model implies that the same constellation of interests need not be maintained in order for Statehood to endure. The legitimacy of suspending a State’s sovereignty, on the other hand, is not without proponents. The most recent example of suspended sovereignty can be seen in the U.S.-led war to overthrow the government of . Similarly, Jeffery Herbst argues that the international community should decertify failed States and discontinue their juridical external sovereignty (1996-7, 142). The New York Times Magazine too, in its 3rd Annual “The Year in Ideas” issue, declared “suspended nationhood” one of the most influential ideas of 2003. Cain, Kenneth L. “Suspended Nationhood” The New York Times Magazine December 14, 2003, Section 6; Column 1; Magazine Desk, p.93

12 sub-group within that population. In fact, some argue successful secession is impossible without the support of a powerful patron State.36 The Great Powers act as the gatekeepers of

Statehood. Their decisions play a decisive role in recognition and, consequently, in defining

‘Statehood’s’ meaning for its aspirants. This is true even if Statesmen are not conscious of the precedents themselves. When acting in concert, Great Power recognition decisions are not easily overruled.

When there is a harmony of opinion over recognition or a lack thereof, the international politics of Statehood will be uncontroversial and the Great Powers will make decisions consistent with the group consensus. States with support will be elevated into the international community and those without it will remain subject to the jurisdiction of other

States. In other cases, recognition is more contested. The Great Powers often have competing motives and therefore differ over what constitutes a legitimate claim to

Statehood. When there is a lack of consensus among the Great Powers, the most important determinant of recognition will be the extent of domestic control and authority exercised by the secessionist regime. In other words, recognition will be stalled indefinitely and only granted once domestic sovereignty is definitively and irreversibly established. It is only under these circumstances that the international legal criteria, however ambiguous, rather accurately determine secessionist success (though recognition’s timing will remain uncertain).

In sum, the international politics of recognition are essential to understanding which actors among the scores of potential new members will be accepted into the international community of States. To an important extent, nascent states are either elevated to State membership or excluded from it by powerful, existing members. The process of State

36 Ayoob (1995), Krasner (1999), Mayall (1999) “Sovereignty, , and Self-Determination” in Robert Jackson (Ed.) Sovereignty at the Millenium Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, p.60 13 emergence is not exclusively bottom-up, but also top-down. Attending only to the situation

between secessionists and their Home States misses an essential component of Statehood,

namely external sovereignty.

1.4 Outline & Organization

In the project that follows, I begin by reviewing the literature within international

relations and international law regarding State emergence, secession and recognition. I derive

two primary conceptions of State emergence based upon the extant literature, one objective and apolitical and the other subjective and political. I argue that objective measures of control and authority are often insufficient to explain the pattern of new Statehood. For actors on the precipice, external legitimacy has an important positive effect upon Statehood.

Understanding the international politics of secession is essential to understanding the dynamics of Statehood in the international system. Chapter two also lays out the research design for the project.

Chapter three first provides empirical evidence that recognition is an important cause of Statehood, rather than a consequence of a State’s de facto existence by surveying the

pattern of new State entry in the modern era. I then explore whether or not a variety of

political motives help to explain recognition decisions during the period 1931 through 2002.

I do so with an original dataset of every secessionist movement and Great Power recognition

decision within that time period. These data are analyzed using time series techniques. I also

preliminarily explore the potential interdependence of decisions among the Great Powers.

14 The next two chapters use clusters of case studies from Yugoslavia and the Former

Soviet Union to investigate support for the causal motives underlying recognition and the hypothesized recognition dynamic among the Great Powers. I select my cases based on variation in the exercise of control and authority in the secessionist states. In the Yugoslav case for example, Slovenia had high internal sovereignty, Croatia had moderate internal sovereignty and Kosovo had/has a low degree of internal sovereignty. The cases allow me to study the relative weight of internal control and external recognition. They afford a greater depth of knowledge and permit investigation of the causal mechanism. They also act as a check on the quantitative measures’ construct validity.

In the final chapter I summarize my findings, interpret their greater significance to

IR theory and the contemporary politics of secession, and conclude with recommendations for and further research.

15

CHAPTER 2

STATEHOOD IN THEORY & PRACTICE

2.1 Introduction

International Relations (IR) is consumed with States.37 Scholars study their actions and interactions with each other; how they are influenced by and in turn affect the system, supra- and sub-State actors; their manners of trade, war and ; and how they organize their internal and external affairs. We do not often, however, contemplate the means or processes by which States themselves enter the international system. The birth of the Westphalian order and the State’s emergence as the dominant structure of governance are well established, but the selection mechanism for new States is not.

Yet, system membership is not static. Since the end of , the number of

States ballooned from just 50 to nearly 200.38 At the same time, conflicts over demands for

new States resulted in millions of injuries and deaths, mass expulsions and refugee flows,

civil and international wars, and -- far less frequently -- the emergence of new States. Many more actors seek independent Statehood than those that eventually acquire it. And ethno-

37 Consistent with common practice, I define International Relations as the study of interrelations among States and State interactions with other non-State actors. In contrast, World Politics implies a much more inclusive field of study, not limited to States but including studies of other political actors and phenomena.

38 COW System Membership Data (2002), Fazal (2004) also notes that a number of States have met violent deaths since 1816; she counts 50 out of 202 (p.312). This effectively makes the number of new entrants even larger than it first appears as new States also replaced those that exited the system.

16 national separatist conflicts are among the most troubling modern conflicts. Still, system membership is exogenous to most theories of international politics, held constant to instead elucidate the dynamics among States.

While it is difficult to understand scholars’ disregard for State emergence, it is easy to understand why States are taken for granted by others. On any given day, distinguishing between States and other non-State actors is straightforward. States have professional militaries, their own currencies, and governing regimes with authority and popular legitimacy. They are members of intergovernmental organizations, make , and confer national citizenship. China is clearly a State while the Republic of Ichkeria, which most have never even heard of, is clearly not. It seems the distinction between States and non-State actors is obvious and tangible requiring no additional investigation. Unfortunately, the common wisdom is misleading. The distinction between States and non-States is often unobvious and controversial, particularly during transitions between the two.

Little scholarship addresses State emergence directly, but an implicit model of the

State pervades the IR literature. Most grand theories suggest nascent States first establish domestic control and authority, and then assert themselves as independent sovereigns in their interactions with others. Acknowledging the new State’s achievement, its peers then formally recognize its sovereignty over a given population and territory, and a new State is ushered into international society. The normative prescriptions of international law imply a similar process. A regime establishes “effective control” first and is only afterward eligible

17 for external recognition of the accomplishment. Any prior recognition is considered

premature and lacks legal effect.39 So while the internal politics of State emergence are thought to be quite important, externally there ought to be little contest over which actors are and should be members of international society. The distinction between actors that achieve Statehood and those that fail to should be palpable.40 Only regimes with internal

control and exclusive, legitimate authority should be granted the privileges and held

accountable for the obligations of State membership.

In modern practice, State emergence is typically less linear and causally ‘bottom-up’

than our theories would suggest. Though a select few regimes successfully establish and

defend their sovereign authority, in turn demanding the recognition and respect of others,

the vast majority of actors vying for independent States do not. Still, some of them will

become full State members in the eyes of the international community, the ultimate arbiters of external Statehood. While domestic control and authority are usually sufficient to cause external recognition then, they are not necessary.41 Instead, external recognition itself

provides pivotal legitimacy from the top-down, cementing a nascent State’s claim to

sovereign authority in the outside world. Conversely, by withholding recognition,

international society can stymie a burgeoning regime’s efforts thereby extending, if not

ensuring, its subjugation to another State. Contemporary State emergence is more accurately

characterized as both top-down and bottom-up. External recognition is not a mere

39 Von Glahn (1992), p.91-3

40 It should be similarly palpable if a once-viable State has “failed”. Though this does not preclude a non-State actor achieving Statehood in the future or re-establishing it after it has been lost.

41 For an alternative view, which argues that internal sovereignty is necessary, but not sufficient to secure external sovereignty, see James (1999) “The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society” Political Studies, XLVII, 47:3, p.457-473 (466-68 in particular).

18 consequence of securing Statehood; it constitutes external Statehood, often in turn causing more consolidated internal sovereignty (legitimate authority and control) for actors found lacking.

It is essential.

If external recognition consecrates Statehood, and is not bestowed according to the strictures of international law, how do existing States decide which proto-States should be accorded recognition and system membership? Their decisions belie bottom-up, legal effective authority rules, so the impetus to recognize must come (at least in part) from some other source. In the pages that follow, I argue external political factors best explain the gap between theoretical work on State emergence and the manifest pattern of new States entering international society. Existing States recognize new States in order to advance their own interests. Each actor seeking external Statehood presents an opportunity for members to select their own peers, perhaps ultimately changing both the balance of power and ideas within the international system.42 At the same time, States must temper their self-interested,

parochial motives with the imperative to coordinate their recognition with others’, cognizant

of their interdependence. Widespread consensus over State membership is essential to

maintaining and reproducing the State-centric system.

I argue existing members are likely affected by four general categories of self-interest

vis-à-vis recognition. First, they might recognize according to their geo-strategic situation, according to the logic of amity and enmity. New States expected to make an existing State more secure will be more readily recognized by that State. Second, States might recognize

42 To cite but a few familiar examples, were Taiwan’s independence to be recognized, it would be the 25th largest economy in the world. Similarly, post-independence the United States became one of the most enduringly powerful States in the history of the international system. Finally, one of the most pivotal events of the , the of the Soviet Union, began with the secession and subsequent external recognition of the Baltic States.

19 according to their domestic political circumstances. A nascent State supported by an important domestic constituency within the recognizing State may have a higher probability of its receiving recognition. Conversely, recognition might enrage a domestic constituency or embolden domestic discontents, therefore presenting an unattractive choice to a potential recognizer. Next, States may recognize according to universal norms of appropriateness in order to bolster their own external legitimacy and prestige among peers or to advance coincident domestic beliefs. Finally, States could recognize newcomers according to more limited understandings of appropriateness dependent on inter-group identity relations.

Democracies might support nascent for example, or States dedicated to economic might extend recognition to proto-States espousing principles of free trade. Foreign Diasporas might support ethnic kin with nationalist ambitions.

States’ individual incentives to recognize new members are not enough to fully explain the pattern of State emergence, however. A critical mass of recognition must occur before the benefits of external sovereignty are realized for any new State. Many, if not most members must formally acknowledge the newcomer. Unilateral recognition is ineffectual and risky for any State, so coordinated recognition is preferred.

The Great Powers wield substantial influence over other States by virtue of their material power and authority when it comes to recognition. Their decisions serve both as focal points for less powerful States and establish global precedents. As a result, coordination efforts among the Great Powers matter most. When they agree to grant or withhold recognition, their position often determines a proto-State’s fate. Sometimes this means elevating actors without effective sovereignty and subjugating others that more

20 convincingly do.43 Only when the Great Powers cannot reach a mutually acceptable decision,

are a nascent State’s endurance and eventual system membership a function of capacity and

control as intended by international law.

If Statehood is often subjective and determined by international politics, rather than

objective governmental capacity, a number of important consequences follow. First,

powerful States in the international system at time (t-1) are explicitly selecting the set of

States that will inhabit the system at time (t). How have these anointed States fared relative

to others? Do they populate the ranks of so-called “failed” or “quasi” States, unable to

competently function in the inter-State system? Or instead, are these States relatively

advantaged due to the extensive external support and legitimacy they receive? Would an

alternative set from the pool of potential States have fared better (or worse) according to our

best estimates forecasting State viability? Answers to each of these questions are

fundamental to understanding the evolution of the international system.

43 For example the Great Powers’ refusal to recognize Somaliland even though its Home State (Somalia) functionally ceases to exist.

21 Next, the external political dynamics of recognition undoubtedly influence domestic conflict dynamics, but have not typically been accounted for in studies of self-determination, ethnic conflict or civil war.44 Perhaps the prospect of politically motivated recognition emboldens proto-States with an otherwise slim chance of securing independence, thereby rendering difficult conflicts intractable. What kinds of nascent States are likely to garner external recognition? Under what circumstances are States likely to collude in a proto-State’s favor? In order to prevent and resolve conflicts over sovereignty and mitigate the potentially deleterious effects of recognition, we must be cognizant of the full range of costs and benefits facing nascent States.

Finally, normative consequences follow powerful States’ divergence from international law. How does their “law breaking” affect the character of the international system? Are the foreseeable effects of political recognition more or less desirable than those generated by adherence to the legal standards for recognition? Lastly, can our laws be modified to induce greater compliance, or are they necessarily ineffective when it comes to the practice of recognition? Each of these questions aims to comprehend the extent to which international law can and should have a role to play in the admission of new States.

In the chapter that follows, I construct a theory of external Statehood and State emergence and describe how it will be tested. Drawing on the extant IR literature, I argue against objectivist notions of the State implicit to most IR theories. The pattern of newly independent States is unintelligible without considering the causal role of external politics.

States emerge as a result of top-down and bottom-up processes. For nascent States, social acceptance is no mere trifle. New States do not usually receive recognition as a function of

44 External intervention and material assistance are analyzed, but diplomatic legitimacy in addition to or as an alternative to those factors is not. 22 domestic authority and capacity alone. Instead, States accept some new members in spite of shortcomings in capable governance. Powerful States’ political motives are an important determinant of many nascent States’ success.

In the second half of this chapter, I lay out the research design for the balance of the study. The remaining project consists of two tests of my theoretical propositions, one quantitative and one qualitative. The empirics begin in Chapter 3 with a quantitative study of the determinants of recognition. In it, I investigate self-interests’ influence on Great Power recognition decisions. Do States recognize consistent with objective instantiations of their interests? If so, which articulations of interest seem to matter most, and when? I test my hypotheses using an original dataset of all secessionist movements and Great Power recognition between 1931 and 2002. I utilize time series analysis to explore the relationship between State interest and recognition.

The qualitative portion of the project employs clusters of case studies from

Yugoslavia and the Former Soviet Union to investigate the causal mechanism between interest and recognition and to ensure the quantitative measures’ construct validity. Do the

Great Powers understand their interests in the manner the literature suggests they will? Do other, unhypothesized factors intervene? What are the dynamics among the Great Powers with respect to recognition decisions? And finally, though somewhat preliminarily, do the

Great Powers attempt to coordinate with one another, or is recognition primarily unilateral?

23 2.2 International Relations and States

States are the ultimate units through which politics are contested. Because no authority is capable of creating and enforcing rules of international conduct, States hold the greatest aggregate political authority.45 Some question whether or not States will continue their dominance, predicting their popularity will diminish the way and -states did before them46, but few scholars or diplomats would disagree that States are and have been the primary global political actors for at least three hundred years.47 Certainly much has

changed during that time, States’ capacities and governmental functions now exceed those of

their ancestors, and the scope and range of States’ external affairs have shifted over time, but

the State’s dominance and the anarchic external organization among States have remained

relatively constant.48 Even if it is true that the State’s absolute sovereignty is eroding, States should not be discounted; the number and scale of nationalist conflicts around the world

suggest the lure of Statehood and the structural organization it reproduces remain powerful.

45 Though, under certain circumstances supra-national institutions have usurped the authority of State governments. The ECJ has been particularly successful in its autonomous and binding decisions over its European member States.

46 There has been a good deal of hand wringing and investigation into the potential demise of the State. Recently the fall of the State has been attributed to the influence of . Some argue that “virtual States” will replace traditional States as territory loses significance for highly developed service economies (Rosecrance, 1999). Others see State erosion as a consequence of domestic deterioration and ethnic strife (Kaplan, 1994, 1997), (Huntington 1993, 1996). Still others envision supranational authorities usurping the State’s monopoly on authority (Falk, 1975; Matthews, 1997; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Further inquiries into the durability of the State include, Paul, Ikenberry and Hall (Eds.) (2003), Biersteker and Weber (Eds.)(1996), and in international law Christoph Schreuer (1993) “The Waning of the : Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?” European Journal of International Law 4, p.447-71.

47 Most credit the initiation of the interstate system to the of Westphalia of 1648. Wight (1977) argues that sovereignty was established beginning in the 15th century and codified during the 17th century at Westphalia (p.110). Krasner notes, however that Westphalian norms were not fully accepted within the international system until much later (around the 18th century) (1999) p.20-22.

48 Waltz (1979) p.88-99

24 Taking their cue from the practice of international politics, scholarly studies of IR

focus almost exclusively on States.49 International Relations’ devotion to the interactions

among units however, ultimately leads scholars to take States themselves for granted. In

most theories, but especially grand theories, States are taken to be exogenous or prior. They

are theoretical constructs that tend not to be scrutinized. The genesis of States (in general

and particular) and the development and maintenance of the interstate system are left to

scholars of and history.50 Distinguishing between State and non-State actors is presumed unambiguous and the processes by which States come to be, considered routine. 51 Theorists differ vehemently over the nature of interactions among States but find

broad consensus in the belief that States fulfill a relatively homogenous and distinguishable

set of functional roles.52 Every theory rests upon a set of assumptions. In most theories of

International Relations, the State is assumed-in so the system and interactions among its

units can be explored. Unfortunately, this omission is to the detriment of IR theory and our

understanding of many of the world’s most contentious conflicts.

49 Though there are certainly deviations from the State-centric model as well.

50 For emblematic cases see Gellner (1983) in comparative politics and Emerson (1960), Watson (1992), and Willoughby (1896) in comparative history.

51 Though Wendt notes that it is most accurate to consider the components of Statehood a “fuzzy set”, not every typical characteristic is necessary and there are some “borderline cases” (1999), p.202.

52 To cite but a few influential examples of this tendency: Waltz (1979), p.79-101 “Political Structures”; Bull (1977), p.8; Walt (1987); and Wendt (1999), p.202-214 and 246-312 “Three Cultures of ”.

25 2.3 Westphalia and the State

According to the IR literature, the States system began with the collection of

negotiated treaties resolving the Thirty and Eighty Years Wars known as the Westphalian

Peace (1648).53 Though not fully realized or widely institutionalized at the time, the principles inherited from Westphalia, domestic authority and non-interference, have come to define the modern States system. Westphalia is also significant because scholars derive their implicit

models of State emergence from two opposed understandings of this early European

experience with State consolidation and sovereignty. Their assumptions about the birth of

the modern State drive their intuitive understandings of contemporary State emergence

dynamics.

Westphalia’s primary legacy is the establishment of two enduring principles of global

politics. The first, domestic authority implies that one unique government is deemed sovereign

over the territory and population of each unit. That authority has exclusive jurisdiction over

the conduct and content of governance within its borders. Non-interference conditions external

conduct among sovereigns, requiring they not interfere in the domestic affairs of their peers.

The exclusivity of authority rests upon universal mutual recognition of domestic authority

among system members. Beyond these principles of organization, there is no hierarchy

structuring relations, States co-exist in anarchy. The extent of domestic hierarchy and control

is often referred to as internal sovereignty while acknowledgement of exclusive legitimate

authority by a State’s peers is termed external sovereignty. Together Westphalia’s twin principles

53 Again Krasner (1999) argues that Westphalian principles were not fully articulated until the end of the 18th Century, well after the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, p.20-1. Also see Murphy in Biersteker and Weber (Eds.) (1996), p.84-93. For more on the Westphalian transition see Hendrik Spruyt (1994) The Sovereign State and its Competitors and Watson (1992) The Evolution of International Society.

26 constitute sovereignty, the fundamental institution of the modern international system.54 Put

succinctly, Westphalia reorganized the world into political units whose internal affairs are each hierarchical under a sovereign, who accept one another as independent and juridically

equal, and who interact under conditions of anarchy.55

The basic historical details of Westphalia are not contested. In retrospect the letter

and intent of its treaties convincingly mark the end of the age of and the emergence of the sovereign States system.56 What has been left uncertain in the centuries following

Westphalia is the causal relationship between the units and the system in which they interact.

Did internally sovereign de facto States precede the system or did the mutual exchange of

external recognition, foundational to the Westphalian agreements, instead create the States?

Scholars are of two minds when it comes to interpreting Westphalia’s significance

for the international system and its States. One take on Westphalia sees States as preceding

the system institutionalized in1648. These scholars view the Weberian ideal of the State, exclusive control and legitimate authority, as primary and the recognition exchanged among

States as a secondary, if not trivial consequence of its achievement. According to this way of

thinking, States existed prior to the agreements at Westphalia. The Peace simply established a

necessary means for interaction among them. It is in this vein, focused on capacity, that

Watson recounts Westphalia’s participants, “[t]he electors and all the princes and imperial

54 Bull (1977), p.8. In this project I will use the terms internal sovereignty and internal Statehood; external sovereignty and external Statehood; and sovereignty and Statehood interchangeably.

55 Waltz (1979), p.88-9 is the most prominent though not exclusive proponent of this idea.

56 Boucher (1998), p.289; Morgenthau (1985), p.294; and Philpott (2001), p.82-9

27 of the Holy who were capable of conducting independent foreign

policy were represented at the negotiations.”57

The representatives at Westphalia had fought seemingly interminable and costly

wars, so the reasoning goes. Their only viable alternative was a negotiated, and hopefully

durable, peace among the belligerents. Which governments would be represented was an

issue of little contest as each was a participant in a devastating war. The “facts on the

ground” prior to the peace negotiations then, determined the emerging system’s membership

rather than the negotiations themselves. Internal sovereignty was foundational; States came

first and then they acknowledged one another.

The most common articulation of the State in international relations derives from

this interpretation of Westphalia. Implicitly, the creation of new States is thought to follow

an uncomplicated, linear causal path. New States first consolidate their domestic authority,

and then assert themselves as sovereign independents in their interactions with other States.

States’ effective similarity, or likeness to other State units, forms the basis for mutual

recognition and treating one another as equals. States have little choice but to acknowledge

one another, if they hope to peacefully interact. The achievement of external sovereignty and

Statehood is mostly a bottom-up, rather than a top-down process vis-à-vis the international

community. Acceptance by other States does not cause Statehood and sovereignty from the

top-down; it merely reaffirms an achieved fact.58 Distinguishing between States and non-

States is easy because States are uniquely able to present themselves as such, much in the

same way that the participants at Westphalia are thought to have. The Peace of Westphalia

57 Watson (1992) p.186.

58 See for example, James (1986) Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society , UK: Allen & Unwin, p.203.

28 only became possible because its victors desired an anti-hegemonial order, domestic populations were exceedingly war weary or leaders did not wish to continue fighting.59

Political units without the capacity to assert and defend their autonomy and territory, it is thought by many, will fall by the wayside as they are annexed by the strong and reincorporated into other States.60

The model of State emergence derived from the history of Westphalia and a

Hobbesian logic of survival provides one potential explanation for the success and failure of

nascent States. According to Weber’s ubiquitous definition, a State is “a human community

that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate forces within a given territory”.61

Only those groups controlling both the people and the territory they claim should achieve full Statehood. Proto-States without the capability to assert and defend their authority to begin with will not be elevated into the community of States. The structure of the system instituted at Westphalia first produced, and now consistently reproduces this pattern of State emergence. Superficial empirical evidence though, does not convincingly support this interpretation’s claims.

If only those States able to independently assure their own survival remained solvent, we should see a high rate of predation of the weak on behalf of the strong, including a high rate of State failure among so-called quasi- and micro-States. Again, these States never should

59 Indeed, as Parker outlines, a number of prior attempts at negotiated peace had fallen though (2001), p.202-7.

60 Kaufman (1997) makes this point explicitly (p.117-23). This dynamic, however, is also in the spirit of most prominent Hobbesian conceptions of the international system. Each State’s desire for security, compel it to continually seek the power to achieve that end. States unable to compete will fail (resulting in Waltz’ expectation that States will be “like units”). For examples see Jervis (1978), Waltz (1979), Keohane (1984) and Glaser (1997). It might also be the case that States seek power, but that they seek more than security seeking would dictate Schweller (1996), Mearsheimer (2001).

61 Weber (1919) (2004) The Vocation Lectures: Science as a Vocation, Politics as a Vocation , IN:Hackett Publishers.

29 have entered the system to begin with. Between 1816 and 1997 though, only 48 States exited

the system while 212 new States entered.62 It is not difficult for States to survive. In actuality,

they almost never “die”.63 With regard to new States in particular, we cannot explain the end of empire and the entry of post-colonial States with bottom-up logics of self-assertion

alone.64 If self-assertion was our only standard for Statehood, then , Algeria, Croatia,

and East Timor, to name but a few, would not be States today. In a seeming paradox of the

common wisdom, many of the most viable self-asserting anti-colonial regimes faced the least

acceptance from member States; Katanga, , Southern and Algeria all waged fierce anti-colonial wars against their Home States, winning little to no external support in

return. Although the relative importance of de facto control and authority is certainly worthy of further investigation, additional explanatory factors must be brought to bear in order to understand States’ emergence and endurance in the contemporary world. The second, less common interpretation of the Wepstphalian Peace is potentially insightful.

2.4 Social Determinants of State Emergence

Though States are not often questioned or “problematized” all the way down, an alternative understanding of the Westphalian Peace suggests different bases for Statehood and State emergence. 65 This explanation attributes greater causal importance to the social

milieu at Westphalia. In this retelling, States did not pre-date Westphalia, instead its treaties

simultaneously created both system and States. Establishing juridical equality consecrated

62 Singer and Small (1997) Correlates of War: System Membership

63 Waltz (1979), p.95; McKeown (1986), p.53.

64 Emerson (1960); Indeed, many note the special exception made for post-colonial States.

65 Ashley (1984)

30 external Statehood for Westphalia’s negotiating parties. As a consequence, its adherents also see international society as having a greater independent effect on modern State emergence.

For these scholars, “recognition of and by States operationalizes sovereignty on both

sides.”66 Societal acceptance is an important cause, rather than a consequence, of Statehood.

States cannot be separated from the system; they are mutually and socially constituted.

According to the alternative interpretation of Westphalia, establishing a legal, anti-

hegemonic order at Westphalia created both States and system. The 212 negotiators

endowed with external sovereignty at Westphalia were actually a motley crew in terms of

governmental capacity. Many of them could not and did not achieve what we now call

internal sovereignty. It is an anachronism to assert that each delegate represented was

sovereign prior to the negotiations.67 Territories within the Roman Empire still had

obligations to the Empire, but were nevertheless granted equivalent participation as

. While governmental structures certainly preceded The Peace, those

governments’ positions and roles vis-à-vis the external environment and the populations they governed were fundamentally altered upon their mutual Europe-wide acceptance as

States.

66 Onuf (1994), p.17

67 Osiander (2001) “Sovereignty, International Relation and the Westphalian Myth” International Organization 55:2 (Spring), p.251-287

31 At Westphalia States, to the exclusion of other units, became the “people” of the

international system.68 The State’s personhood was determined both by pre-existing features

and external social acceptance. Units not acknowledged as States, non-European

governments would come to discover during colonial expansion, were not afforded an

equivalent standard of treatment by the community.69 Non-States inhabited a far more

dangerous external environment than did States.70

A number of prominent theories of international relations argue that international society affects the character of international politics through institutions, regimes, systemic cultures and/or norms.71 So while States themselves are conceived of as objective units of

political authority by nearly all, the social world, constructed by States themselves, is also

thought to influence States’ characters, actions and interactions with each other.72 States are

obvious, physical realities, but they are not impenetrable or unaffected by their external

environment. According to Wendt, States are “self-organizing” for the most part, but this

“does not mean they are not [socially] constructed… to a significant extent.”73

These alternative conceptions of the international system’s dynamics seem to provide

a more descriptively accurate account of State emergence. Statehood is partially determined

by external social influences and the requisites for recognition set by pre-existing States.

68 Wendt (2004) “The State as Person in International Theory” Review of International Studies 30:2, p.289-316

69 Recognition by actors other than those within the European system also did not imply Statehood.

70 Strang (1994)

71 Krasner (1982), Krasner (Ed.)(1982), Onuf (1994), Giddens (1994), Rittberger (Ed.)(1993), Wendt (1999), Finnemore (1998), Finnemore and Sikkink (1995), Bull (1977), Buzan (1993), Jackson (1990), Wight (1991)

72 The classic articulation of this idea is Gourevitch’s (1978) “The Second Image Reversed”. In it, systemic conditions affect the character of States just as the States themselves constitute the system.

73 Wendt (1999), p.73-74 Social construction occurs domestically within the State and externally vis-à-vis other States.

32 According to Onuf, “in constructivist terms, the international system must be a society

insofar as it is constituted by the deeds of many individuals, themselves constituted as

agents.”74

Social constructivists take social acceptance to be an important determinant of

Statehood. Philpott, for example, posits that “revolutions in sovereignty” have changed the

character of the international system and its members over time.75 Of particular interest to

this project, he says the criteria for [State] membership in international society (which he

terms the second face of sovereignty) have changed along with each . He argues that

revolutionary ideas initiated systemic changes during Westphalia, , the rise of

minority protections, and through the creation of the EU. Each set of understandings

significantly altered the qualities required for system membership and consequently, the new

members embraced as States during their dominance. Unfortunately, Philpott provides little

systematic evidence that the pattern of new State members complied with the changing

standards he outlines.76 Nor does the author provide evidence that most existing members of

international society embraced the standards he describes. Nevertheless, his suggestion

better conforms to the pattern of modern State emergence than the alternative, bottom-up

domestic sovereignty model.

74 Onuf (1994) p.8

75 Philpott (1995) (2001)

76 Indeed, the author’s standards for membership post-Westphalia “a viable government, control within their territory, the ability to make and carry out treaties… [and] a Christian culture” (p.160) are nowhere to be found within the treaty, nor do they appear (save the Christianity requirement) in any definition of the State agreed to before 1933’s on the Rights and Duties of States. As Browlie (1990) contends, “The question of the types and number of the units comprising the States system was faced in diplomatic and political practice but not as a question of principle [before the 20th century].” This is a large temporal gap. In addition, the set of all potential States must be surveyed, not only the set of States that secured sovereign independence. The sample is biased. In order to adequately test the author’s proposition, we must also ask “Why not Biafra or Rhodesia?” The potential bias resulting from selection on the dependent variable will be discussed at length later in this chapter regarding research design.

33 According to Wendt’s constructivist articulation of systemic theory, State identities are shaped and reshaped by systemic cultures via imitation and social learning in their interactions with other States.77 Identities and interests are not “given”. Instead, interests and patterns of interaction vary based upon the way in which States define both themselves and others. Different dominant understandings of the social environment will produce different patterns of relations among States. Wendt does not assume that systemic culture is perfectly and fully internalized by system members, however. Instead, different States may exhibit different degrees of internalization. These varied internalizations, in turn cause States’ behaviors to differ, even in seemingly identical circumstances.

Members of the English School also propose an important social component to the interstate system. Bull argues that, while not fully formed, elements of an international society exist within the anarchical international environment. Expanding upon the Grotian internationalist position, he contends that

States…are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form….they are not only bound by prudence, but also by imperatives of morality and law….at no point can it be said that the conception of common interests of States, of common rules accepted and common institutions worked by them, has ceased to exert an influence.78

77 Wendt (1999)

78 Bull (1977), p.25, 40.

34 We can infer from each of the three previous socially-oriented conceptions of the

external environment that the normative prescriptions and proscriptions of international

society will influence which proto-states succeed to become States and which fail. According

to this conception, international society’s acceptance is a fundamental component of any

actor’s realizing full Statehood. The mechanism of society’s influence on nascent States

however, remains unspecified. Similarly unclear are the norms by which international society

operates.

2.5 Recognition and State Emergence

Institutionalists’ understanding of Statehood provides a mechanism of social

influence in the form of external recognition. According to the institutionalists,

States are not individually empowered sovereign actors… who then establish relations with each other. Rather, notions of sovereignty imply a State society founded on mutual recognition. The status of each State is thus tied up with that of the others in a continuing process of mutual legitimation.79

Mutual recognition is an essential component of group membership according to both social

theory and sociology. In order to function as a complete member of any social group, one needs not only identify with a group, one must also be recognized as a member of that group by other group members. While mutual recognition may be less important in some social groups, for instance those in which anyone and everyone is welcome, it is especially important in high status groups where admission is exclusive and accorded to only a select percentage of the many who desire membership.

79 Strang (1990) p.148.

35 Think of Greek fraternities as one possible analogy. Once an individual is a member

of one of these social/academic clubs, it is quite easy to distinguish members from non- members. Only fraternity members attend their organization’s functions, they sometimes live in houses, they wear clothing with their fraternity’s Greek letters on it, etc. More difficult however, is attempting to identify who will or will not be a fraternity member by assessing a given college’s entire freshman class. Some have characteristics that may predispose them to the desire to participate in fraternal life: a sibling or parent has done so, they have a charismatic or outgoing personality, or perhaps the fraternity’s professional association will create networking opportunities for certain individuals. Once the students have actually demonstrated their intent to become associated with the organization, the odds of correctly predicting whether or not they will be permitted to join goes up, but it is still not fully determined. Some pledges will have a leg-up on the others: they may be legacy admits, they may have special talents that make them more attractive to the existing brothers like academic or athletic prestige, or they might have impressive endurance throughout the hazing period.

Whatever the attractive or unattractive inherent qualities of the various pledges, whether or not a pledge in fact becomes a fraternity member rests solely upon the judgments of existing fraternity members. Indeed, the qualities judged attractive are subject to individual members’ tastes as well. Pledges cannot be fraternity members based upon self- identification alone, nor can their talents or personal attributes alone secure their admission.

Their brothers must recognize them. And once individuals become members of the fraternity they too, in years following, will make decisions about which new pledges will be accepted into the group.

36 So it is with States in the international system. We first come to know external actors

as States because they are recognized as such by established governments. Actors may embody a number of qualities indicating characteristics of internal sovereignty, militaries, popular authority, a system of taxation, , heads of government and other officials.

Without recognition, those actors may be many things: secessionists, liberation movements,

insurgents, anti-colonialists, terrorists, ethnic rebels, or autonomous regions, but they may

not be States. All secessionist regimes believe they warrant recognition as rightful members

of the community of States, but they lack the necessary external component. Without

recognition, even the most internally sovereign actor cannot fully function as a State outside

its borders.

In this vein Strang finds, consistent with the institutionalist conception of

sovereignty, unrecognized actors are much more likely to be preyed upon and made

subordinate to States than their recognized counterparts. He observes that, “in over five

centuries of Western expansion, only 11 non-European polities recognized as sovereign have

been formally subordinated as dependencies… [they] have merged or dissolved only 15

times.”80 Among those not recognized by the Western States, international instability

(, merger, and secession) was rampant. Based on the available evidence, Strang concludes international society mitigates the effects of Hobbesian anarchy for its members.

Given the author’s research design though, it remains unclear why recognized actors

are more stable than their unrecognized counterparts. It may be that recognition and

membership within the international society of States provides stability and legitimacy, as

Strang suggests. On the other hand, it could also be the case that only internally viable actors

80 Ibid, p.154 It should be noted that Strang observes instability only within non-European actors from 1415 through 1987.

37 (those capable of exercising domestic sovereignty) are recognized as States to begin with, as

the bottom-up model of Statehood implies. If sovereignty and viability were the primary

considerations underlying recognition, the common wisdom regarding State emergence

would hold; recognition would merely be a consequence of stable domestic governance. The

exchange of mutual recognition between existing States and nascent States is nevertheless a

useful indicator of societal acceptance. And the precise causal relationship between internal

and external sovereignty can be investigated further.

2.6 International Law, the State and Recognition

Though largely disregarded by political scientists, external recognition is taken to have

special significance in international law. Its theoretical significance for Statehood and

appropriate use are hotly contested among international jurists.81 The legal debate over

recognition, like that in IR, again consists of two opposed views of Statehood. On one side

are those who argue for a declaratory conception of recognition and on the other, those who

support a constitutive understanding.82

Advocates of the declaratory theory believe States exist independent of their

recognition as such by other States. In this sense, recognition is simply a declaration or

formal acknowledgement of what already objectively is (hence declaratory). The other side,

favoring a constitutive conception of recognition, has a more constructivist or institutionalist

81 For an excellent synopsis of the debate see Grant (1999) “The Once Great Debate and its Rivals” Chapter 1. For direct contributions to the debate see Brownlie (1983), Crawford (1976-7)(1979), Lauterpacht (1948), Oppenheim (1955), and Peterson (1982). In addition see the citations remaining in this section.

82 Additional, more detailed discussions of the two schools of thought are Grant, Thomas D. (1999) The Recognition of States, p.1-45; Crawford, James R. (1979) The Creation of States in International Law p.16-23; Brownlie, Ian (1990) Principles of Public International Law, 4th Edition, p.87-88; Lauterpacht (1947) Recognition in International Law.

38 articulation of the State in mind. These scholars argue recognition itself is a vital component

of Statehood, “the [State is] viewed as having its genesis in recognition.”83 Without external recognition, there is no State. The theoretical differences over recognition’s meaning and significance for the constitution of States inform each side’s opinion about how recognition is most appropriately practiced.

Proponents of the constitutive conception of Statehood see recognition as the primary demarcation between States and other, non-State actors in international affairs.

Constitutive theorists do not argue issues of State capacity and popular legitimacy should be ignored, but they do argue that without recognition, these domestic factors are wielded to little effect in international relations. External sovereignty is a prerequisite for conducting much of the fundamental business of international affairs. Furthermore, constitutive theories suggest recognition should be the unique discretion of the recognizing State. It may choose to decide unilaterally, without reference to its peers or to the new State’s capacity. On the other hand, it may choose to recognize only in consultation with other States and only once a certain level of competent authority has been achieved within the new State. In any case, the decision to recognize is solely that of each sovereign State.

Many legal scholars find the constitutivists’ prescription for recognition inherently problematic. They see little room for the constitutive theory of recognition within international law because it ascribes a “political” rather than a “legal” character to recognition. If it is appropriate for each State to determine its own unique practice of recognition, then there is no room for external jurisdiction or oversight regarding those decisions.

83 Grant (1999), p.xx.

39 The constitutive doctrine, casting recognition as a device of statecraft, a tool of Realpolitik, available to forge States out of communities at the will of the recognizing State, provides no apparent means to regulate State conduct and, in any event, no apparent code of conduct.84

According to many international legalists, constitutive scholars’ conceptualization of

recognition is both “unprincipled” and “morally unsatisfying.”85

In contrast to the constitutive model’s inherent politics, the declaratory model argues

for a moral and legal doctrine of recognition based in State capacity. Advocates of a

declaratory understanding see recognition as a reaction by States acknowledging another

State’s (already achieved) internal sovereignty and Statehood. Where the constitutive model

leaves little role for structures of supra-national authority and international law, the

declaratory doctrine attempts to make recognition wholly legalistic and nearly automatic

upon an actor’s achievement of a certain standard of domestic authority and control.

Because declaratory theorists see recognition as a response to the objective character of

other actors, these scholars’ project includes articulating a set of universal legal conditions

under which recognition is appropriate or even required of the international community. The

idea behind the standards being that a list of criteria for recognition would allow

international law to discriminate between appropriate (objective and legal) and inappropriate

(subjective, political and illegal) uses of recognition.

Consequently, the onus for creating a widely acceptable, unambiguous operational definition of the rightful State has fallen on declaratory advocates. This task has proven

difficult. Today, the most widely accepted articulation of Statehood among declaratory

84 Ibid, p.3

85 Ibid, p.3-4

40 proponents is found within the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.86 The

Montevideo criteria suggest that States are those actors who 1) have a permanent population,

2) occupy a permanently defined territory, 3) have an effective government and 4) demonstrate the ability to engage in international relations with other States.87 Additional

characteristics have also been proposed, but have not received as much support. Some

potential “addenda” to Montevideo include a commitment and ability to abide by international

laws, independence, , “good” governance and special protections for minorities.88

Though the definition of Statehood provided by Montevideo is not unreasonable, its standards are too operationally ambiguous and therefore easily manipulated to serve States’ ulterior political motives.89 Indeed, even Statesmen attempting to abide by the Montevideo standards

might reasonably disagree about whether or not an actor had surpassed its requirements.90

Even if the efforts of declaratory theorists are not found wanting and a satisfactory definition of the State could be articulated, legal theories are largely normative and prescriptive rather than positive and descriptive. The most pressing difficulty for declaratory theorists comes from States’ own objections to the declaratory interpretation of recognition.

Most Statesmen do not see the criteria outlined in Montevideo as the definitive definition of

86 “Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Inter-American)” December 26, 1933. In Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949 Compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans LL.B. Assistant Legal Advisor Department of State Volume 3 Multilateral 1931-1945 Department of State Publication 8484 Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969

87 Ibid.

88 Crawford (1979), Duursma (1996), Fawcett (1968), Lehning (Ed)(1998).

89 Recently, Goldsmith and Posner (2005) argue that even State behavior consistent with the dictates of international law is often predicated upon self-interest rather than normative internalization, habit or concern for morality where the predicted outcomes are equifinal (225).

90 Kurtulus (2002), in “Sovereign Rights in International Relations: A Futile Search for Regulated or Regular State Behavior” demonstrates exactly this ambiguity in his discussion of James. Review of International Studies 28, p.759-777, p.760-2.

41 Statehood, nor do they agree that recognition should be anything other than a political

decision. Leaders tend to see recognition as the unique purview of the recognizing State,

rather than a legal obligation.91 The recognition standards States set are applied inconsistently and not enforced.92 Even among the American States of the OAS, legally bound to the

standards of Statehood in Montevideo, there is still support for political discretion in recognition.93 In practice, Statesmen are hesitant to submit to the idealistic legalism of the

declaratory school.

The normative debate over recognition among legal scholars dovetails nicely with

discussions of Statehood in International Relations. Both legal articulations of the State

acknowledge a social component to Statehood, manifest in recognition, but disagree about its relative importance. A declaratory theorist sees States as mostly self-organizing, undeniable political facts while a constitutive theorist would see Statehood in general, but especially external sovereignty, as a product of recognition. The argument supported by declaratory theorists is similar to bottom-up conceptualizations of the State in IR theory (e.g.

States are recognized because of they meet the Weberian ideal). The constitutive conception, on the other hand, is more akin to socially oriented IR theories. Widespread external recognition constitutes external sovereignty, which is fundamental to Statehood.

91 Grant (1999), p.22-3

92 Halperin, Schaffer and Small (Eds.)(1992) Self-Determination in the New World Order Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (p.46)

93 Ibid. p.24

42 The argument I advance in this project is not a challenge to legal theories of

Statehood or the conception of the State common to IR theory. I am agnostic with respect

to the “proper” use of recognition among States.94 Similarly, a static, objectivist definition of the State is useful and often necessary for IR theory. On any given day, there are very few actors in the international system whose Statehood is uncertain once achieved. The State members of the United Nations are not up for debate; their Statehood is an undeniable

material and social fact. I do argue, however, that shifting focus to the period just prior to

State emergence challenges our intuitive understanding of how and why new States enter the international system. As Österud argues, “recognition by practical interchange was constitutive in nineteenth century Europe, and the empirical qualities of recognized States

were extremely variable and often precarious, as indeed they remain for any old State

today”.95 The external legitimacy accorded to proto-States through recognition can have a

pivotal effect upon their eventual Statehood, elevating the status of some while encouraging

the subjugation of others. While authoritative domestic control is usually sufficient cause for

an actor to realize external sovereignty, it is not necessary. Recognition’s greatest effects will

be realized by actors who might be States, but whose fates are not yet determined.

94 Though in practice the different understandings have important consequences for the character of States and the international system.

95 Österud, Öyvind (1997) “The Narrow Gate: Entry to the Club of Sovereign States” Review of International Studies 23, p.167-184, p.182

43 2.7 Recognition in Practice

Statesmen and international lawyers agree that the practice of recognition is

motivated, at least in part, by political considerations rather than international law.96 Most

political scientists do not ascribe much importance to recognition though, because it is

thought to carry little practical weight. Whether or not a State exists is obvious. The United

States’ non-recognition of the PRC until 1978 did not vitiate China’s domestic authority.

Nor did ’s isolated recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern secure its

position as a State. By the same logic, if a secessionist group achieves internal Statehood, it will be unambiguous and recognition, though perhaps political, will not significantly influence the actor’s Statehood. According to Krasner, sovereignty itself is hypocrisy and in

practice affords few of the protections that it promises in principle.97

International law generally assigns more practical importance to recognition, but

politically motivated recognition is both prohibited by law and not legally binding when

granted. In theory, premature recognition has no legal effect and non-recognition is merely a

matter of diplomatic relations among States; it does not determine Statehood. According to

the most popular, declarative interpretation in international law, a State exists apart from its

recognition as such by other States.

The contemporary dynamics of State emergence belie the superficial and subsidiary

roles attributed to the politics of external recognition in both IR and IL, “…in practice,

unrecognized communities are exposed to ravages seldom visited upon the recognized.”98

96 Though whether or not it should be political is contested.

97 Krasner (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy.

98 Grant (1999), p.26 This also echoes Strang’s analysis discussed earlier.

44 Perhaps the declaratory theory of Statehood is technically correct and normatively right, external recognition does not and should not legally determine Statehood. Recognition does,

however, determine whether or not Statehood can be exercised in any practical sense within the international community. Without recognition, actors lack even the access to forums like international courts, where they might be able to vindicate their rights due to their lack of diplomatic relations.99

To cite but one example, the de facto independent republic of Somaliland is overwhelmed with problems due to its unrecognized status. Somaliland has been independent since the ouster of former president and the onset of Somalia’s civil war in 1991. It conducts independently monitored local and national elections, recently enacted a new constitution, has a functioning police force and governs itself in a far more functional manner than its Somali Home State.100 Secessionist Somaliland meets the legal criteria for Statehood in virtually every respect, but not recognized by any other State.

The problems of unrecognized proto-States like Somaliland range from mundane to high politics. Even seemingly small bureaucratic arrangements between States can have large effects on the unrecognized. In a particularly telling instance, Somaliland’s government revenues collapsed in 1998 (from $45 to $27 million USD) because banned

Somaliland’s livestock; the health certificates its government issued were “not internationally recognized.”101

99 Witness, for example the cases of the Baltic States, annexed illegally but nevertheless not able to assert independence due to their lack of recognized authority.

100 Herbst (2004)

101 Schoiswohl (2004) p.184.

45 To some, the lack of recognition of a nation might imply the absence of a diplomatic corps, of embassies, of VIP rooms and limousines. To the average Somalilander, however, the lack of recognition of the Republic of Somaliland means no classrooms for children, no health care facilities to ward off avoidable illnesses and pregnancy-related deaths, no street lighting and no technical assistance to de-mine the feeder roads.102

Though the Republic of Somaliland unambiguously meets the legal standards for

Statehood, so long as most of the States in international society are not willing to recognize

its independence, Somaliland’s internal sovereignty means little for its external affairs. It

cannot assert itself as a State from the bottom-up any further than it already has. And yet it is not a full member of international society. It may be able to defend itself against outside invaders (like those from neighboring ), but it has no legal standing upon which to do so under international law. For outsiders, Somaliland is simply one of many “tribal factions” in Somalia’s chaotic civil war. Finally, even maintaining Somaliland’s internal sovereignty is fraught with peril without external recognition. It will not be afforded the resources, exclusively reserved for States, which might ensure its survival.

Alternatively, recognition has many positive consequences for its recipients.

Recognized States benefit from assets unavailable to unrecognized actors. These can take the form of both tangible goods and political influence. Only recognized States may make treaties with other States, military, economic or otherwise.103 Only recognized States can be

full members of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations, the IMF

and the World Bank. 104 Recognized States are also uniquely able to bring grievances against

102 Daar, cited in Ibid. (2004), p.184

103 Though signing a treaty with a previously unrecognized State constitutes implicit recognition according to international law, it does not occur often (Von Glahn, 89-90). In addition, many States object to any inference of recognition where it has not been expressly granted de jure.

104 There are a number of non-State members of the United Nations including The (Vatican City), Palestine and Malta. http://www.un.org/Overview/missions.htm#nperm These members are only credited with however, and may not vote. In addition, some States (India, Philippines, Belarus, and Ukraine among them) were permitted entry into the UN and LN prior to independence. These were exceptions 46 other States for believed transgressions of international law at the International Court of

Justice (ICJ). Similarly, only recognized States may receive loans from organizations like the

IMF and World Bank. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is almost exclusively limited to recognized States; and international trade flows and foreign aid tend to be filtered though recognized governments and States as well. All States benefit from their peers’ recognition.

Even Krasner, usually a skeptic of sovereignty, agrees States secure a number of benefits from recognition.

Rulers have almost universally sought…recognition. Recognition has provided them with resources and opportunities that can enhance their chances of remaining in power. Recognition can pave the way for membership within international organizations, some of which provide financial aid; can facilitate the conclusion of treaties; can increase the chances that their initiatives will not be challenged in other countries’ courts because of the act of state doctrine and the principle of sovereign immunity; and can increase domestic political support. Rarely does recognition carry costs.105

Recognition’s practical import has also recently gained prominence regarding African States.

Jackson suggests external recognition and the opportunities that come along with it allow

new, weak States to consolidate their domestic power base where little existed before.106

These States did not enter into the system fully established. Instead, new States entered only partially formed in terms of capability and governance, but through the external legitimacy and substantive benefits provided by membership, those States become increasingly similar to the Weberian ideal.107 Thus in Africa, where independent Statehood is a relatively new

to the norm. In some cases, like those of so-called micro-States, membership in IOs provides a clout far greater than territory and population would dictate (for example Luxembourg and Vanuatu).

105 Krasner (1999) p.223

106 Jackson (1990)

107 This model also fits the pattern of new Statehood (or reconstituted Statehood) following the World Wars. A top-down process of legitimacy preceded domestic authority and control. Orentlicher (1998) discusses this process at length as does Emerson (1960) in Chapter 2, “The Era of the Two World Wars”, p.22-36.

47 phenomenon, borders have been highly resistant to change and new States have not

emerged due to the powerful effects of legitimacy accorded existing States by widespread

external recognition.

Herbst, another Africanist, agrees with Jackson’s portrayal of African Statehood,

propped-up by external sovereignty and internally lacking. In many cases he does not foresee

domestic consolidation and effective sovereignty however. He simply predicts these States

will continue to ‘fail’.108 Herbst argues that Africa’s relative stability has been disastrous for

many of its peoples. This is because strict adherence to the territorial status quo has not

allowed less corrupt, more competent and smaller States the opportunity to emerge. As a

remedy, he suggests decertification or de-recognition of States found unwilling or incapable

of functional governance. He argues for recognition only in the cases of stable, internally

legitimate proto-States like Somaliland.109

Still others argue that Jackson and Herbst’s dualist understanding of Statehood, old

sovereignty premised upon ‘effective control’ and new sovereignty based upon ‘external

legitimacy’, mistakes consistency for change. Again Österud is emblematic, “Recognition by

practical interchange was constitutive in nineteenth-century Europe, and the empirical

qualities of recognized States were extremely variable and often precarious, as indeed they

remain for many old States today.”110 So perhaps external acceptance is, and has been, a

108 Herbst (2000) States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Herbst argues that the European model of Statehood is at odds with patterns of traditional authority in Africa; patterns more suited to Africa’s population geography and natural resource availability. While some African States can successfully conform to the European ideal, others face seemingly insurmountable obstacles.

109 Herbst (1996-7) (2004)

110 (1997) “The Narrow Gate: entry to the club of sovereign states” Review of International Studies 23, p.167-84 British International Studies Association. p.182

48 fundamental attribute of sovereignty for all States, not just the weak and post-colonial. He continues, “There is definitely a split between ‘empirical Statehood’ at one end of the scale, and ‘States by courtesy’ at the other. But there is, as always, a fairly contingent relationship between position on this scale and admission to the State system.”111

2.8 Toward a Social Theory of Secession and Statehood

After reviewing the literature on Statehood in international relations and international law it is clear both lack a full appreciation of the dynamics and determinants of

State emergence. In international relations, near exclusive use of a bottom-up model of

Statehood can be traced to a singular interest in politics among States and the need for theoretical simplicity. Though many strands of scholarship argue that international society has important, top-down effects, none articulates a theory of State emergence incorporating that dynamic. And, as previously discussed, some promising theories in this vein do not sufficiently test their claims. In international law, political determinants of Statehood are dismissed due to a normative desire to advance legal efficacy. There is a strand of legal theory articulating a constitutive, political conception of Statehood and recognition, but jurists have largely discredited this approach because the resulting practice of recognition would not fall under the purview of international law.

In this project, I argue ignorance of top-down social influences on State emergence is to the detriment of IR theory and the contemporary politics of nationalism. New States emerge as a result of both internal self-assertion and external acceptance. New States can and do become members of the international system that could not and did not effectively

111 Ibid., p.182.

49 control and govern their territories beforehand. The causal model implicit to most conceptions of Statehood is overly simplistic and misleading. Most States do not consolidate their authority first and then assert themselves as States on the international stage. Instead, the relationship between internal control and external sovereignty is more complex. External recognition is no mere token; it constitutes external Statehood. In every case of State emergence, the subjective understandings and political motivations of existing States significantly determine whether or not the new actor will become a full member of the international system.

2.9 Core Concepts and Definitions

Before delving into the specifics of my theory, its core concepts and objects of explanation require definitions. For instance, what is recognition? How do we observe it?

Why study secessionism for a project on State emergence? And finally, how much recognition is necessary to become a State?

50 In a general sense, recognition is an acknowledgement of or perception of a

phenomenon or condition. Oftentimes we equate recognition with simple perception. We recognize an acquaintance at our high school reunion (facial recognition) or the Farmer’s

Almanac helps us to track weather conditions across time (pattern recognition). Other times,

recognition has a more positive, status connotation. Individuals, for instance, receive

communal prestige for achievement, special recognition. Unfortunately, States and ‘the system’,

indeed many of the most important concepts in IR, are not so easily seen and recognized in

the traditional sense.112 In the case of Statehood then, recognition should be equated with

status.113 Mutual recognition is a communication between at least two individuals indicating

acknowledgement of each other’s status; it is social.

The recognition exchanged between States can take both implicit and explicit forms.

By using the conduct of normal diplomacy, Statesmen might implicitly acknowledge others’

status. These practices include the extension of diplomatic privileges, like exemption from

prosecution, the signing of treaties, and the direct provision of aid according to international

law.114 In a more mundane sense they might also include laissez faire behaviors like the non- violation of territorial integrity or a lack of interference in domestic affairs. Most Statesmen however, disagree that the extension of diplomatic privileges implies recognition when none has been formally granted. Indeed, Statesmen often explicitly reaffirm that recognition has not been extended when their behavior seems to imply otherwise. When for example,

Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui visited his US alma mater in 1995, then President Clinton

112 Wendt (1999), p.5

113 Recall too the inherent ambiguity in the legal standards for Statehood.

114 For an example see Grant (1999) p.47-9, specifically the case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.

51 made certain that his informal visit was not misunderstood to be a diplomatic affair.115 Lee received no reception at the White House upon arrival and was not even permitted to meet with the President. The United States did not want the Chinese government to suspect it was supporting “creeping independence.” Taiwan had not and would not receive recognition from the US.

Explicit formal recognition then, rather than implicit recognition, presents the most incontrovertible evidence of external recognition and international acceptance. Formal recognition can be granted by means of formal public statement or through formal documentation transmitted to the government of a new State. This method of recognition also activates a number of observable legal consequences, embassies are often established, members of diplomatic corps exchanged, etc. It is therefore also easily discernable when it has or has not occurred. In most cases, recognition is the unique purview of the and a State’s leader will publicly declare that recognition has been granted.

Deciding on a population of potential new States was complicated. None of the readily available pools of actors offered as conceptually accurate and politically timely a proxy as did secessionist movements. A project on State emergence could use ethnic groups as a population of proto-States. Unfortunately, there are thousands of ethnic groups, many of which are without political aspirations or even a developed sense of ethnic consciousness.

Additionally, many nationalist movements center upon communal allegiances other than ethnicity like ( or democracy) or geography (north vs. south). Since the project aims to uncover “why States recognize”, the request or demand for recognition seems a necessary prerequisite. A more select group of ethnic identities might alleviate this

115 The , June 9, 1995 “Clinton Assures China Ties Unchanged by Taiwan President’s Visit” Friday, AM cycle, Washington Dateline, 298 words, Washington.

52 problem, perhaps only looking at “at-risk” minority communities, but this population

includes some of the same difficulties. 116 Not all minority groups desire their own independent States; many prefer greater civil rights and/or expanded autonomy. In addition, many proto-States would not fall within either the ‘minority’ or the ‘at-risk’ category.117 Even separatist groups do not universally desire their own independent States. Existing States cannot recognize State actors that do not themselves seek Statehood; this would effectively exclude variation on the dependent variable for many cases within the dataset.

As a result of these limitations, I survey all movements, ethnic minority or otherwise, demanding independent Statehood. This population prioritizes national self-identification

(consciousness) and the demand for Statehood and external recognition. Ethnographic delineations are not synonymous with . According to Gellner,

A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes…which separate that category from non- members.”118

Put more succinctly by Emerson, “The simplest statement that can be made about a nation

is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it may be that when all the

fine-spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as well.”119

116 Gurr (2002) Minorities at Risk

117 East Bengal (Bangladesh) for example, did not meet the criteria established by MAR as a minority-at-risk within Pakistan.

118 (1983), p.7.

119 Emerson (1960), p.102.

53 Though some States enter the system without prior nationalist demands for

independence, these States-to-be could not have been identified a priori. In most cases, these

States were the result of unilateral decolonization by an imperial power or reflected changes in territory negotiated by treaties following the World Wars. For these States, external recognition came prior to domestic control of any kind. This often meant that the State preceded national identity entirely. As d’Azeglio famously exclaimed, “We have made , now we must make !”120 Not every new State enters the system through secessionist

demands, but most in the contemporary world do. And secessionist proto-States are the only

set of States that can be identified a priori.

Finally, a study of secessionism is timely given the recent spate of deadly and highly

politicized conflicts over independent Statehood. Conflicts in Yugoslavia, the post-Soviet

States, Somalia, China, Canada, India, Indonesia, and have drawn

international attention to the political dynamics of secession and State emergence.

Secession occurs when a nationalist movement seeks to wholly separate from the

State of which it is formally a part (its Home State), to form a newly independent State.

Secessionism is distinct from other forms of civil conflict because of the group’s stated goal.

Groups that seek special status, increased autonomy, or additional civil rights short of formal

governmental separation are not secessionist even if their message is nationalist. Similarly,

movements that seek to join with other States (irredentists) or to overthrow the existing

social structure or governing regime within a State (like revolutionaries and putschists) are

also not secessionist. Finally, movements seeking independent Statehood that lack either a

population (platform islands) or a claim to territory (pirate States) are also not considered

120 Cited in Emerson (1960), p.95.

54 secessionist.121 The movements can be violent or non-violent, large or small, ethnic,

geographic, or otherwise. All that they share in common is a desire for independent States of

their own.

Thus far, the definition of secession follows its common language understanding. In

one respect however, this project’s conception departs significantly from common usage.

This is because anti-colonial conflicts over independence also fall within the

operationalization of secessionism.122 The project is concerned with the dynamics of new

Statehood. Tens of new States recently entered the international system following national

separatist conflicts with their colonial governors, so colonial secessions were included. Some

former colonial territories gained their independence through relatively peaceful negotiations

with their governors and received external recognition with little trouble, while other bids for

independence met resistance from both their Home States and the international

community.123 In many cases, multiple national separatist movements emerged from within a

single colony, but only one group was granted authority upon independence. Similarly,

colonies were split into independent States or merged together upon independence based

upon varied domestic circumstances. For the purpose of completeness in the study of new

Statehood, all colonial bids for independence have been deemed secessions.124

121 For additional information on these exclusions, see Appendix A.

122 I include a dummy variable (COLONY) to capture whether or not colonial secessions are significantly different from secessions in general when it comes to external recognition.

123 Kahler (1984) provides a provocative domestic explanation for the variation in decolonization practices in Britain and France. Also see Emerson (1967).

124 Colonies without nationalist movements prior to independence were not included in the study. The colonies excluded were primarily the new States of the former British West Indies. Britain initiated the move toward independence in the colonies omitted.

55 This project employs Great Power recognition as a proxy for widespread external

sovereignty. The Great Powers are the set of States with the greatest material capabilities

relative to most others in the system.125 Because of these extensive capabilities, they are also presumed to have the most power or potential to get others to do what they would not do

otherwise.126 The Great Powers’ recognition decisions therefore probably most influence

other States’ recognition decisions whose interests are not as extensive or global.

Additionally, because unilateral recognition is often risky and potentially costly, especially for

small or weak States, most will be hesitant to recognize without Great Power endorsement.

In theory, Great Power recognition also serves as a focal point around which other States can coordinate their recognition.127 Finally, time, resources and availability simply prohibit a more extensive survey of States’ recognition decisions. To review, Great Power recognition is taken to be indicative of both the direction and timing of recognition for most other States in the system.

2.10 Theoretical Review

International relations’ preoccupation with States causes a relative neglect of system dynamics like State emergence and death within the field. Consequently, our intuitive models of these processes are incomplete and descriptively inaccurate. State emergence occurs as a result of top-down and bottom-up dynamics while most IR scholarship focuses exclusively

125 Operationally I define the Great Powers as outlined by the Correlates of War Project, see Appendix A.

126 Dahl (1957) “The Concept of Power” Behavioral Science 2, p.201-218.

127 I conceive of external Statehood as the result of a tipping model. Each State’s recognition of a secessionist regime increases the probability that that movement will become a State. While each State’s recognition means little in isolation, together they accord external sovereignty. Once a certain threshold of external recognition has been reached, the actor is endowed with the full rights and responsibilities of a State. The Great Powers’ recognition decisions are the most heavily weighted within the interstate community.

56 on bottom-up dynamics of self-assertion. In this project, I propose top-down dynamics, manifest in external recognition, are essential to understanding and predicting which secessionist regimes will succeed to become States in the international system. Though achieving the legal standards for Statehood is usually sufficient to cause widespread recognition and external sovereignty, it is not necessary. Recognition can elevate regimes on the precipice of sovereignty into the international community of States. Without recognition, the pattern of modern State emergence is unintelligible.

What remain unclear are the motives and behind States’ recognition decisions. Do they attempt to abide by the Weberian and legal conceptions of Statehood, prioritizing de facto control and authority over all else? Or do Statesmen attempt to forward their parochial political interests? I argue recognizing States do not totally disregard governmental capacity and territorial control, but they are additionally motivated by their own self-interests. In contrast to previous theories employing self-interest, I will test a number of potential instantiations of interest (identifiable a priori), “logics” of recognition, to explore the precise influence interest has on States’ decisions.

The dynamics of recognition among States are also underdeveloped. Statesmen overwhelmingly agree recognition is their sovereign right, rather than a subject of international law. However, there is reason to suspect recognition might not be wholly unilateral in practice. Besides their parochial political incentives and considerations of State capacity, States are also compelled to coordinate recognition in order to maintain their social standing, security, international stability and to reproduce the State-centric international order.

57 Isolated recognition is risky and potentially costly. A State that unilaterally recognizes

a secessionist proto-State does so in violation of its Home State’s external sovereignty. This

is not only intervention and a breach of international law, but potentially a cause for war.

Indeed, the United States threatened just that when confronted with possible French or

British recognition of the Southern Confederacy.128 At the very least, unilateral recognition is

cause for the Home State to sever diplomatic relations with the recognizer. At worst, the

Home State will seek further retribution.

Second, unilateral recognition is largely ineffective. The legal consequences of

recognition will likely only follow for the single State that has conferred recognition. All

other States will instead continue to recognize the Home State’s jurisdiction over the

secessionists’ affairs. Any recognizing State truly desiring the nascent State’s success would

not do so without the expectation that others would follow.129 Next, unilateral recognition flies in the face of international consensus, potentially causing diplomatic turmoil with more

States than just the Home State. For Germany, the mere impression it recognized Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally lead to rocky relations vis-à-vis the European Community (EC).130

Finally, though perhaps not a conscious consideration of Statesmen, the system’s

organization should make States wary of contested and overlapping sovereignty. And this

reticence should encourage coordination over unilateralism. Because the Westphalian order

128 Lincoln’s Foreign Secretary, W.H. Seward, was more bellicose than Lincoln himself. Goebel (1915) Recognition Policy of the United States New York, NY: Columbia University. p.180, 185-6

129 Unless perhaps, as India did with the nascent Bangladesh, the patron is willing to take more drastic measures to realize that State’s independence; in that case, waging a full-scale war against the Home State. It is also worth mentioning that in some cases States do recognize without the expectation that others will follow, for example Turkish recognition of , Albanian recognition of Kosovo, and perhaps ’s recognition of Somaliland. In these cases however, recognition was granted in protest or as a sign of , without the expectation that other States would follow and without the expectation that the secessionist movement would be treated as a State.

130 Libal (1997), preface

58 relies on the twin principles of exclusive territorial control and non-intervention, States

recognizing different authorities’ jurisdiction over the same territory destabilizes that order.

Cases of multiple sovereignty, , Taiwan, and among them, constitute many of

the world’s most treacherous conflicts. States should resist destabilizing the Westphalian

order, not only because it is potentially destructive for the States and non-State actors

involved, but also because recognizing States derive their power and authority from the

dominance and stability of the Westphalian order.

In sum, States have competing impulses regarding recognition; one is toward

unilateral, competitive recognition and the other toward multilateral coordinated recognition.

When States’ parochial interests all point toward the same preference for or against

recognition, the outcome is straightforward; States will recognize consistent with the

international consensus. Those proto-States winning external favor will be elevated into the

international community of States. Those without acceptance will remain subject to their

Home States. When the Great Powers disagree about whether or not recognition should be granted, the outcome is less certain. In instances like these, the most likely outcome is inaction. Recognition and State membership, if it does occur, will be delayed indefinitely and only be granted once the nascent State unambiguously meets the established legal criteria. In the less likely alternative, States might break into two groups. One of the groups would grant the secessionists recognition and the other group would maintain relations with the Home

State. This end result is extremely dangerous and historically led, for example, to the waging of proxy wars between the Great Powers (e.g. Vietnam, Korea, and ). It has not however, occurred since the end of the Cold War.

59 2.11 The Research Design131

This project employs a multi-methodological, ‘nested’ research framework in order

to develop and test its theoretical propositions.132 The project has two major parts, one

quantitative and the other qualitative.133 The quantitative, large N analysis establishes a broad relationship between the explanatory (interest) variables and the dependent (recognition)

variable. Do Statesmen simply make recognition decisions consistent with their State’s

objective political motives? And if so, which motives seem to be the most influential for

each State? Are there temporal dynamics influencing the pattern of recognition? According to a nested approach, the quantitative analysis eliminates unsupported hypotheses and indicates other, supported hypotheses deserving further study. Using insights from the quantitative analysis, more finely tuned, small N case studies then investigate the casual process. In particular, the cases investigate the process by which recognition is ascribed and the mechanism by which State interests affect recognition. These process dynamics in turn suggest the character of the international system and help to identify probable new members of international society.

There are a number of potential motives behind recognition and a dearth of scholarly attention thus far directed to the topic. In this study, I explore four broad categories or “logics” that might explain Great Power preferences. First, States might recognize due to geo-strategic or external security considerations. Another possibility is that

131 Operationalizations for all variables can be found in Appendix A: Coding Rules. A summary of cases within the data set can be found in Appendix B: Secessionist Movements, 1931-2002.

132 In a nested design, Large N, quantitative analyses act as a guide to case selection for small N case study research exploring the mechanism of independent variables’ effects upon the dependent variable(s). More information on the specific parameters of nested analysis can be found in Evan S. Lieberman (2005) “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research” American Political Science Review 99:3, pp.435-52.

133 See King, Keohane and Verba (1994) on the merits of multi-methodological research designs, p.5-6.

60 States recognize based upon considerations of their own domestic political situation. Third,

Statesmen might base their decisions upon considerations of systemic norms. And finally,

States might be guided by their identity relationships with secessionists and their Home

States.

The Great Powers need not be motivated by identical interests, nor are the different types of interests mutually exclusive in most cases. Instead, a number of important political considerations might play a part in forming States’ preferences for and against recognition.

The Great Powers, are not a corporate actor, they are a “they” not an “it” and may make identical recognition decisions based upon very different circumstances and considerations.134 In addition, States’ interests might be complementary to one another.

Granting recognition to a nascent State might simultaneously make the recognizer more externally secure and advance deeply held normative beliefs. Different motives may also dominate during different historical eras.

134 Shepsle (1992) coined this phrase in describing Congressional behavior.

61

2.12 Hypotheses, Concepts and Definitions

Though extensive coding rules are detailed in Appendix A: Coding Rules, the

quantitative test’s principal hypotheses and concepts warrant supplementary explanation.

There are a number of potential motives, derived from the IR literature, behind the Great

Powers’ recognition decisions. Even if we assume the Great Powers act in their own self-

interests, this singular motive can take on a number of material and ideational forms. The

potential motives for recognition are divided into four categories: geo-strategic/external

security, domestic security, international norms and identity relations. These “logics” (and

their operational indicators) are not exhaustive; they simply represent a range of potential

interest motives behind States’ preferences.

2.13 Material Interests

2.13.1 Geo-Strategic/External Security

One group of factors thought to influence recognition decisions is geo-strategic or

based upon concerns for external security. The core of this set of influences is a logic of

strategy, and enmity. States’ decisions whether to recognize secessionist states are based upon considerations of the international security environment and the effect that the new international participant is anticipated to have upon the status quo. In general, States are thought to use recognition in order to weaken their competitors and increase their own security situation vis-à-vis the international community. Daniel Byman, for example, suggests a number of reasons why States might lend support for insurgency movements within other

States. Logically, the determinants should also be applicable to recognition decisions with

62 respect to secession.135 Byman cites a desire to destabilize unfriendly neighbors, a desire to

inculcate regime change and the prospect of gaining favor with potentially powerful

insurgents among the motivations for States’ support of other States’ domestic challengers.136

Security concerns predominate.

Though hard core security scholars may see recognition as mere ‘cheap talk’ when compared to costly actions like military intervention and/or material assistance, Horowitz rightly cautions that material support is rarely sufficient to decisively tip the scales in favor of secessionists. In most cases, external aid is superficial and fleeting. There are a number of reasons for this: States “have more limited motives for supporting separatists that the separatists themselves have for fighting”, they have “multiple international objectives” and they have their own domestic constituencies to satisfy.137 The practice of States contradicts the contention that recognition is simply cheap talk. Heraclides compellingly argues, “If words are ‘cheaper’ than deeds…then political-diplomatic or moral support would be more readily available and at a higher level and extent than tangible support.” Though diplomatic support is more frequently granted, extensive high-level support is comparatively rare. It seems that “States do not generally find the utterance of such words to be ‘cheap’.”138

Via the logic of international security and strategy, we can deduce two related hypotheses about recognition. First, it is usually to a State’s advantage to weaken its enemies

(or increase its own relative advantage). Similarly, the uncertainties of potential relations with

135 Indeed, Saideman (2001) posits (via Walt’s logic of internal balancing) that States will be more likely to support secessionism (material or ideological support) if they have a conflictual relationship with the Home State.

136 Byman et.al (2001), p.23-40.

137 Horowitz (1985), p.272-3 Fearon (2004) also notes (in “Why do some civil wars last so long?”) that military intervention seems to prolong conflict rather than hasten its decisive end.

138 Heraclides (1990), p.341, 369-70 63 a new State actor are likely to be preferred over the certainty of continued conflictual

relations with a Home State. The status quo is undesirable, especially in comparison to the

prospect of more amicable relations with the newly emergent State. All other things equal,

for example, the United States would prefer stable profitable relations with an independent

Taiwan to their current relations, precarious and filtered through the complexity of Sino-US

diplomacy. The geo-strategic logic hypothesizes States in conflictual relationships with a given secessionist movement’s Home State will more likely recognize that movement’s independence. In the alternative, the more congenial a State’s relationship with a Home

State, the less likely that State is to violate the territorial integrity of the Home State through formal recognition of its challengers. Simply put, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” and

“the enemy of my friend is my enemy”.

H1: Great Powers with a conflictual relationship with a Home State will be more likely to recognize its secessionists.

H2: Great Powers with a positive relationship with a Home State will be less likely to recognize its secessionists.

2.13.2 Domestic Security

Other potential influences upon State recognition are the recognizing State’s domestic

security concerns. According to this logic, sometimes referred to as vulnerability, States view

the recognition of secessionist movements abroad as a potentially destabilizing act vis-à-vis

their domestic constituency.139 A government conferring legitimacy upon a secessionist

movement in a foreign State potentially sends a signal supporting secessionism’s legitimacy

at home; or at least might be concerned that domestic challengers would interpret it as such.

This concern might be particularly acute for vulnerable States whose security concerns are

139 Vulnerability is the term that Saideman (2001) uses.

64 more internal than international.140 One scholar asserts that the leaders of some weak States fear “even the slightest recognition of secession…would be as unwise as showing blood in the lion’s cage”.141

The potential domestic consequences of foreign policy behavior are, nonetheless,

important for relatively secure States with ethnic discontent as well. China and Russia’s responses to separatists in , Taiwan and Chechnya are cases in point. Embattled States

in general then, should refuse to recognize secessionists as a matter of domestic reputation

whereas States without much domestic acrimony should confer recognition more freely. The

greater the challenge, the greater the reticence.

H3: Great Powers with secessionist challengers of their own will be less likely to recognize secessionists in other States.

2.14 Ideational Interests

Security concerns, both internal and external, are oft cited material explanations for

State behavior. But State interests are not necessarily material. Ideational motives, like

normative beliefs and matters of identity, might similarly underlie recognition. Indeed, ideas might even dictate which material factors are seen as significant to begin with. While many ideational motives may be seen as ‘other regarding’, they are not necessarily so. A State’s ideals and understandings about the world are frequently bound up with its own interests.

Considerations of in State decision-making, for example, could be interpreted as an interest in the well-being of others, to the exclusion of self-regard. At the same time, human rights could be interpreted as an interest in advancing a particular set of normative

140 Ayoob, Mohammed (1995), Chapter 8 “The Internal Dimension” The Third World Security Predicament Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers p.165-184; Saideman (1997).

141 Bucheit (1978) p.103.

65 ideas, judged most righteous by its advocates. According to this interpretation, altruism and

ideology are indistinguishable. The following section details a number of potential ideational

interests behind recognition.

2.14.1 International Norms

Other factors thought to affect recognition are normative concerns and ideals.

According to this line of reasoning, States’ recognition behavior is based upon systemic or

State beliefs about what constitutes an ideal State actor or about what constitutes a legitimate

demand for independence. In general, this logic argues States are guided to recognize based

upon the moral and political character of the secessionist state, its relationship to its Home

State, and philosophical support for secession in general. Three intriguing hypotheses

emerge from this manner of thinking about recognition.

First, Barkin and Cronin argue that various normative eras since the inception of the

Westphalian system have engendered a waxing and waning of system-wide support for

secessionism.142 According to their theory, during periods when the ideational climate favors

the integrity of States at the expense of the self-determination of nations, secessionists will

receive minimal support. During periods where the legitimacy of self-determination is valued more highly than State integrity, there will tend to be more support for secession within the international community. According to the authors, these system-wide changes in beliefs have coincided with major events in world history. In particular, they argue that Wilson’s

Fourteen Points Address and the presence of non-State participants at Versailles signaled the beginning of a nation over State period following WWI. The era following WWII however, was less supportive of separatism as expansionist national ambitions were seen as

142 Barkin and Cronin (1994)

66 responsible for the outbreak of the war itself. Barkin and Cronin assert that the post-WWII

era was an era of State over nation, except where the withering away of colonial empires was

concerned. Finally, in the period following the end of the Cold War, the authors argue

nationalism has experienced a resurgent legitimacy. In the most recent historical era then,

national self-determination is thought to be valued more highly than the territorial

sovereignty of existing States.143

H4: During an Era of Nations over States, Great Power recognition of secessionists is more likely. During an Era of State over Nation, Great Power recognition of secessionists is less likely.

The second line of reasoning about the ideological/normative determinants of recognition argues States are more likely to support national self-determination for secessionist movements if those groups are mistreated by their Home State. In other words, the direr the humanitarian situations of the secessionists themselves, the more likely States will be to support their independence from the abusive authority. This support is thought to stem from the proliferation of human rights norms, especially since 1945. Although there is certainly no right to secession, the UN Charter does recognize a right to the self- determination of peoples. International human rights have also become widely accepted. In cases where State power is wielded to the detriment of minority communities, where those communities are summarily disenfranchised, and where physical and psychological coercion are commonplace, we might expect States to attempt ameliorate the situation of repressed secessionist minorities through recognition and independence.

H5: Great Powers that support human rights will be more likely to recognize secessionists suffering human rights abuses within their Home State.

143 Exact dates outlined in Appendix A: Coding Rules.

67 A final line of normative argument, yielding two hypotheses, posits that the type of

unit attempting secession, and its relationship to its Home State, influences the likelihood of

external recognition. The first hypothesis suggests that as international disfavor for

proliferated, anti-colonial secessionist movements were greeted more favorably by the international community. Anti-colonial nationalist movements then, will more easily achieve recognition than will secessionist movements without a colonial experience. The rationale behind this hypothesis is two-fold. First, colonial governors may have a more difficult time mobilizing the instruments of control over territories that are detached from the Home State, and often separated by an ocean. If this is the case, then colonial secessionist movements should more easily defeat their Home States in anti-colonial wars.

This explanation is material, rather than ideational.

The second argument for the relative success of anti-colonial movements is an increase in support for self-determination among Statesmen. As one expert explains,

“…national self-determination is what the contemporary world expects; anti-colonial movements are automatically assigned to the familiar rubric of nationalism and are assumed to be serving as the agents of nations.”144 An assumption that anti-colonial secessionist

movements spring from a popular nationalism, and that all nations deserve self-

determination and government, in turn compels Statesmen to support their claims to

Statehood. This explanation is unrelated to the movements’ military successes and should

affect colonial secessions from two directions. First, imperial governments should not fight

144 Emerson (1960), p.127-8

68 as hard to hold on to their colonies as the practice becomes discredited internationally.145

Second, the Great Powers should recognize anti-colonial secessionists at a higher rate, and more quickly, than they do movements without a colonial grievance with their Home States.

H6: Great Powers will be more likely to recognize secessionists that were former colonies than other secessionist movements.

What I will term the Colonial explanation however, is not without significant counter argument. Many studies of the end of colonialism do not take into account the numerous nationalist movements that did not succeed; evidence of independence at all is evidence enough of self-determination’s triumph. Oftentimes though, more than one group aspired to govern a particular territory and population. Even if there was a systematic tendency for

States to recognize colonial secessionists more often than other types, we still lack an explanation for the variation in success among them. For example, why did the Kashmiris or

Sikhs or Malayalis not receive a separate independence from India in 1947?

145 By the same token, we might expect that colonies without secessionist movements (and therefore presumed to be without repressed national communities) will remain under colonial rule longer than their separatist counterparts.

69 Many scholars have also noted that post-colonial boundaries have been virtually

unchallengeable following initial independence. In this instance then, even though

colonizers, rather than the colonized, largely determined the colonial units that achieved independence, the units were not permitted to reorganize or separate further. Eritrea’s

connection to Ethiopia provides a good example of this dynamic. As the British mandate

over Eritrea ended, the United Nations decided, against the will of the Eritrean people, to

federate Eritrea with Ethiopia.146 Why did the Biafra movement fail rather than the artificial

joining of the northern and southern by the British in the early 20th Century?

Why did the Kingdom of Buganda not reclaim its independence following colonialism and

instead become a part of the newly independent Ugandan State?

A second prediction, again the result of normative ideas related to unit type,

hypothesizes that secessionist movements within mandate or trust territories will more likely receive recognition than will other secessionists. The mandate system, established under

Article 22 of the League of Nations, took territories formerly controlled by the defeated powers during World War I and transferred their jurisdiction to Allied powers. Under the

League, most of these territories were de facto colonies. Each mandate was assigned a class, indicating its development. Those mandates with a high level of development were often granted independence. With the League’s failure, authority for the remaining mandates passed to the United Nations. Under UN jurisdiction, mandates became trusts and a new set of guidelines, requiring that all trusts begin transitions toward full independence, was instituted. Because the trust system was designed explicitly to prepare oppressed peoples for independence, external recognition should be forthcoming to those regimes.

146 In 1952, under the auspices of the UN mandate system, Eritrea was joined under a federated government with Ethiopia. 70 H7: Great Powers will be more likely to recognize secessionists whose territories are mandate/trust territories.

2.14.2 Identity Relations

A final argument about States’ ideational motives for recognition posits that identity

relationships between States and secessionists will explain the pattern of recognition. This

rationale argues that when States are seen as being more “self-like” they will be treated more amicably than will States categorized as “others”. Consequently, secessionists viewed as more “self-like” (vis-à-vis the recognizer) than the Home State will more likely receive support than will groups that are perceived to be “others” or more different.

A common argument in this vein is that recognizing States with ethnic ties to a secessionist group or a Home State will favor that side, attempting to play to their domestic constituencies.147 One way in which this support might manifest itself is through recognition.

Turkey’s recognition of Northern Cyprus or ’s recognition of Kosovo might be examples of this argument in practice. But identity relationships are both more variegated and more powerful determinants of behavior than this argument suggests. An ethnic theory of recognition is necessarily limited to explaining the decisions of States ethnically tied to either the secessionists or the Home State. The theory is unduly limited as it requires first, that the behavior involve ethnically similar States, but further only applies to triads in which said ethnic linkages are politically significant for the recognizing State. Finally, the mechanism behind recognition is not so much a matter of identity as it is one of domestic politicking.

147 Saideman (2001) 71 According to a more expansive identity hypothesis, the recognizing State’s behavior is determined by an interaction between its relationship to the Home State and the secessionist movement. In this case, a State more likely recognizes not all secessionist states that it sees as self-like, but only those that are seceding from a Home State that it sees as more dissimilar to itself. It is not enough that a secessionist movement is judged “self-like” if the Home State is also regarded as “self-like”; the motives for and against recognition would cancel each other out.

The mechanism of influence for this hypothesis is uniquely the identity relationships between different peoples and States. It is self-interested, but interest is more broadly defined. A democratic, predominantly Protestant State might support predominantly

Protestant secessionists espousing democratic ideals (seceding from a dissimilar Home State) out of sympathy and perceived likeness. The proto-State is seen as an extension of itself. The

State might not be similarly sympathetic to secessionists with whom it shares little in common. If this hypothesis is correct, States need not have a clear materialist motive behind their decisions.

The source of the triadic identity relationship (Recognizer-Home State, Recognizer-

Secessionists) might result from a number of dimensions of identification including, but not limited to ethnic kinships, religious ties or ideological affinities like joint democracy.

H10: Great Powers will be more likely to recognize secessionists that are judged more like themselves than the Home States from which secessionists are attempting to secede.

H11: Great Powers will be less likely to recognize secessionists that are judged less like themselves than the Home States from which secessionists are attempting to secede.

72 2.15 Controls

The most obvious control for a top-down argument of State emergence, based on external politics, is a bottom-up apolitical alternative model like that codified in international law. Unfortunately, the legal theory does not lend itself to quantitative analysis or operationalization. As discussed earlier in the chapter, Montevideo does not outline the standards necessary to fulfill its requirements of ‘people, territory, effective government, and the ability to conduct international affairs’.

The difficulty inherent to the legal criteria is evident contemplating just one of the requirements, territory. When can we be certain that a government has control over a defined territory? The standard can not be so high as to require undisputed control over all of the territory claimed; many States have unresolved territorial conflicts with their neighbors.148 But how much is enough physical control, 50, 80 or even 99%? Next, how is territorial control determined? Must a secessionist regime militarily occupy the territories it claims? Is control necessarily established via military means? Or perhaps it is enough that the residents of the territory agree to submit to the new regime’s governance. What indicators evidence their submission? Must the population support the regime in a plebiscite or pay taxes that the new regime levies? Then again, what conclusion should be drawn if only 60% or 70% of the population in an area favor the new State while the others remain loyal to the

Home State? Each potential indicator of territorial control is highly limited and whether it captures the underlying concept at all, suspect.

148 India and Pakistan dispute their shared border and the territory of Kashmir, for example but their Statehood is not called into question as a consequence.

73 Even disregarding the complexity involved in arriving at reasonable operational indicators, the data necessary to construct measures of control and authority are largely unavailable. Cross-national data is notoriously unavailable, but cross-national sub-State level data is even more elusive. Secession is also a sensitive topic. Home States do not want to disclose their domestic struggles to the international community, much less chart their progress. No international databanks are dedicated to this task.149 As a result of these two difficulties, ambiguous standards and data availability, bottom-up factors’ relative influence on Statehood and recognition are explored in the case study chapters. Case studies are better suited to charting changes in control and authority that would be untenable in a large N, quantitative study.

2.15.1 Sub-State & Pan-Movements

Two hypotheses, somewhat related to control and authority, were less elusive and could be tested in the quantitative analysis. This final set of hypotheses, once again related to unit type, but not directly attributable to States’ interests, argues proto-States claiming territories corresponding to existing jurisdictional boundaries are more likely to be recognized than other units. Secessionist territories that traverse boundaries on the other hand, pan-movements, have lesser chances.

Sub-State units are thought to be more readily accepted than units claiming smaller, larger, or irregular territories for a number of reasons. First, populations within sub-State jurisdictional boundaries already seem to ‘belong’ together. They often share a common history vis-à-vis the Home State and they often share ethnic, religious and other dimensions of identity. These pre-existing perceived similarities within borders make external acknowledgement more likely. Next, carving a new State from a Home State has the

149 Halperin, Schaffer and Small (Eds.)(1992) 74 potential to cause incredible instability, both within the Home State and potentially within its

neighbors. If a nascent State claims a population and territory corresponding to existing

internal boundaries, the potential for disruption elsewhere is minimized. Efforts to redraw

boundaries to create ethnic homogeneity are not required, nor are the extension or retraction

of existing governmental services. These conflicts might be seen as permitting a relatively

clean break between the secessionists and their Home State by outsiders. Lastly, it should be

easier for sub-State units to achieve functional independence from their Home States as they

are often already endowed with many of the trappings of domestic sovereignty. Many sub-

States have their own local governments, police, and educational systems. These units are

therefore more likely to ‘look’ like viable new States.

In contrast, movements claiming jurisdiction over territories traversing internal or international boundaries should face more reticence to recognition from the international community. Pan-movements face greater challenges in securing recognition because they must establish a united territory and population when none existed previously. Their borders and populations are often not clearly defined, especially from the perspective of outsiders.

Who, for example, are the citizens of and what is the precise territory they claim?

Additionally, and again well-illustrated by Kurdistan, a secessionist movement seceding from two States faces twice the challenge of one; and one seceding from three, thrice.

H8: Great Powers will be more likely to recognize secessionists that claim organized sub-State jurisdictions.

H9: Great Powers will be less likely to recognize secessionist movements who claim pan-territories that span internal or international boundaries.

75

2.16 Research Plan and Analysis

For the quantitative section of the project, I employ a variety of analytic techniques. I

use a Cox proportional hazards regression model to explore the determinants of Great

Power recognition. The first test is a pooled model for all of the Great Powers. This test

explores whether or not the hypotheses are generally supported by the Great Powers’ recognition decisions. Next, I run individual models for each of the Great Powers within the data set. This tests the determinants of recognition for each of the Great Powers separately.

The intuition behind the individual models is that perhaps China’s decisions are highly related to its domestic security situation while Britain offers recognition based upon normative considerations. There is good reason to suspect powerful States’ interests diverge.

Case studies form the second major potion of the project and were selected based

upon two criteria. First, clusters of cases within the same geographic and temporal area were

selected in order to control for factors other than those under study. In the Yugoslav cluster,

all of the secessionists were parts of the former Yugoslavia. In the post-Soviet cluster, each

of the Home States is a remnant of the USSR. The secessionist movements emerged just as

their Home States (Russia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) were asserting their own independence.

Selecting cases that are very similar except for the variables of interest, in this case domestic

control and authority and external politics, permits greater certainty that hypothesized

variables are in fact those influencing the dependent variable. The second criterion for case

selection was variation on the independent variable left unexplored in the Large N analyses,

domestic control and authority (internal sovereignty). In the Yugoslav cluster for example,

Slovenia convincingly controlled its territory and population upon recognition, Croatia’s

76 control was uncertain, and Kosovo’s slight. Because investigating the effects of domestic sovereignty was untenable in the Large N analysis, the cases will offer some insight into its weight relative to external political considerations.

77

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

3.1 Introduction

Widely accepted theories in international relations and international law suggest a

secessionist regime’s status as a State should depend on its achievement of a particular set of

standards of capacity. Existing States should admit only actors with unambiguous internal

sovereignty into their highly exclusive fraternity. The pattern of contemporary State emergence shows however, that more States enter international society than convincingly meet the legal criteria. This pattern suggests recognition is motivated, at least in part, by other considerations. Contrary to the presumptive model, but more consistent with the observed pattern of State emergence, I argue existing States’ self-interests motivate recognition, mediated only by their collective interest in preserving international order.

The preceding chapter outlined several broad hypotheses about States’ motives for and pattern of recognition. In the first portion of this chapter, I develop operational definitions of the concepts discussed in Chapter 2, provide specific details about how I will test my hypotheses, and discuss my quantitative findings.

78 In the initial phase of the empirical investigation, the quantitative analysis, I begin by

offering evidence that the pattern of State emergence is unintelligible using indices of

internal control and authority alone. While cross-national data on control are not widely available and the legal requirements for Statehood ambiguous, a survey of new States reveals an important political dimension to recognition. Recognition is not wholly dependent upon capacity. Taking this observation as a starting point, the chapter’s next step is to explore the relationship between Great Power interests (both material and ideational) and recognition.

Toward that end, I describe the character of the dataset, I use event history techniques to test my hypotheses, and I conclude with substantive interpretations of the data.

I find broad general support for my argument that States’ political interests motivate recognition, either in addition to or in spite of the dictates of international law. Each of the four primary categories of hypotheses, and therefore the four instantiations of interest I test, are statistically significant and in the predicted direction. The hypothesized interests, however, had significant differences in their substantive effects on recognition. While systemic norms and identity relations had large, positive substantive effects, the negative effect of domestic insecurity on recognition was less pronounced. In addition, and somewhat surprisingly, the Great Powers seem to be differentially influenced by each instantiation of interest. While the United States and appear importantly motivated by geo- strategic/external security concerns for example, China and France were less so and instead appeared more affected by international norms.

There are also important periodic effects on recognition. For instance, secessionist movements were markedly less successful during the Cold War than they were during other periods. My theoretical orientation toward recognition’s political considerations suggests this

79 pattern may be due to the Great Powers’ inability to reach consensus (coordinate) on the

granting of Statehood. Given this intuition, we might expect coordination would be

particularly difficult to achieve during the Cold War, when the superpowers’ interests were often diametrically opposed. Indeed, in some cases Great Power disputes over State legitimacy erupted into wars in the periphery. This hypothesis can not be thoroughly tested using quantitative analysis alone, but offers an opportunity for more fine grained, small N methods to do so.

My quantitative findings and lingering questions regarding process provoke the content and character of the case studies that follow in chapters 4 and 5. Following a nested approach to the research design, the quantitative results will eliminate unsupported hypotheses and limit further analysis to hypotheses receiving initial support.150 The

justification and plan for the case studies follow Chapter 3.

3.2 Quantitative Research Design

Large N analysis presents a number of advantages for the initial portion of this

project. Quantitative analysis is beneficial as a first cut because it allows us to discern broad

patterns among the independent and dependent variables that would be untenable using

more time-intensive methods.151 By organizing the data into panels, measuring the same

group of actors (the Great Powers) over a broad swath of time, I am also able to discern the

150 Lieberman, Evan S. (2005) “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research” American Political Science Review 99:3 (August), p.435-452.

151 King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) Designing Social Inquiry Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Especially Chapter 3, “Causality and Causal Inference”. Though the value of quantitative methods relative to qualitative methods is perhaps overstated. See especially Part II of Brady, Henry E. and David Collier (2004) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

80 long-term and dynamic effects of various Great Power motives on recognition. 152 Next, the

use of panel data and event history analysis satisfies two of the three criteria necessary to

establish causality: first, the hypothesized cause is temporally before effect and second,

correlation between that cause and effect is definitively established.153 Lastly, another benefit

of large N analysis lies in its ability to eliminate unviable hypotheses, thus affording greater

focus and structure to the case studies that follow.

To date, no systematic study of secession and recognition exists. Instead, folk

wisdom often substitutes for careful analysis. Some scholars for example, contend Statesmen

act according to self-interest when issues of others’ sovereignty arise, rather than according

to normative standards of appropriate behavior.154 But most studies only identify State

interests ex post. Others argue to the contrary that norms are quite compelling, as opposed to interest, but again self-interest is rarely specified a priori. 155 There is also great controversy

surrounding the relationship between norms and interest. For example, are norms and

interest distinct and analytically separable in every circumstance? Finally, what are States’

foreseeable interests vis-à-vis recognition? Under what circumstances should we expect

particular norms and particular interests to influence State behavior?

152 Longitudinal data is a synonym for panel data.

153 The only remaining criterion for establishing causality is that all other potential causes be ruled out. This criterion cannot be fully satisfied in quasi-experimental research. The most a researcher can hope for is that other prominent explanations are falsified or proven less credible.

154 The most well known advocate of this position is Stephen Krasner in his 1999 book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. In the specific case of recognition, however, legal scholars routinely comment that Statesmen pursue their own interests rather than according to the “facts on the ground” in terms of governmental capacity.

155 Arguments put forward by Richard Price, Nina Tannenwald, Audie Klotz, Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink and Margaret Keck all contend norms powerfully affect State behavior.

81 Quantitative analysis allows us to specify the conditions under which submission to

self-interest is supported or falsified in the case of recognition. Generally, do States appear to

abide by the legal standards for recognition or are their parochial political interests more

closely correlated to their behavior?156 Or perhaps the multiple dimensions of interest

complement each other. Behaving according to norms might further a State’s interest in

international prestige, but might simultaneously be consistent with more security-oriented

interests. In a practical sense, State interests are rarely mutually exclusive and often complementary.

Given the data available, event history analysis is the most appropriate methodological tool available to test the hypotheses posed in this portion of the study.157

Because I argue that Great Power recognition serves as a focal point, initiating a cascade of recognition among the weaker States in the international system, the dependent variable for the pooled model is the year in which all of the Great Powers recognize the new State.158 In

the models run for individual Great Powers, each Power’s grant of recognition is evaluated.

In both models, the hazard rate for the secessionist state (usually referred to as ‘death’) is indicative of new life or Statehood through a grant of external sovereignty (either individual

or cumulatively by GP State(s)).

156 It is worth noting again that quantitative analysis distinguishing in favor of normative or self-interested motives is only possible where their predictions point in opposite directions; where they are not equifinal.

157 Other statistical approaches have also been suggested. See for example Beck,Nathaniel, Johnathan Katz and Richard Tucker (1998) “Taking Time Seriously: Time Series Cross-Sectional Analysis with Binary Dependent Varible” American Journal of Political Science 42:4, p.1260-88. Also see King, Gary and Langche Zeng (2001) “Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data” Political Analysis 9:2, p.137-63.

158 Any number of recognitions assigned short of the full set of Great Powers is coded 0. Only in the year in which all of the Great Powers have granted recognition is the variable coded 1. The numbers of Great Powers over the course of the dataset are outlined in Figure 3.2.

82 In other words, it measures the probability that a secessionist will be recognized in a given year conditional upon its not having already been recognized externally as a State.

My analysis of secession and recognition expands upon the existing quantitative literature in a number of ways. First, as I discussed in the theoretical chapter, quantitative studies of secessionist conflicts tend not to focus upon secession per se. Instead, secession is treated as a subset of a greater phenomenon like ethnic conflict or civil war. Secessionist conflicts are not though, essentially ethnic, as the cases of Southern Sudan and French

Indochina illustrate. Nor are they inevitably wars or even violent contests between secessionists and their Home States. A number of European political parties are explicitly dedicated to secessionist ends, but work within the government to affect change.159 Tens of cases of secession never reach the traditional thresholds of violence associated with full-scale war.160 In Slovenia’s war of secession against the JNA in 1991 for example, less than 50 combat fatalities were recorded.161 Secessionist conflicts also sometimes remain peaceful (i.e. without fatalities entirely) and would go virtually unnoticed in studies of sub-State violence.162

159 Examples of independence parties include in (Flanders), the Independence Party in (), Batasuna in France (Basque), Nazione in France (Corsica), in Italy (), and Sinn Fein in the UK (N.Ireland). Many secession attempts have also been characterized by significant periods of peace, for example in , , Cyprus, Somaliland and many of the post-Soviet secessions.

160 The dominant operational indicator of war in international relations comes from the Correlates of War (Singer and Small, 1994), which defines war as a formally declared war with at least 1,000 combatant battle deaths during each calendar year. Some alternative measures have been created more specific to civil war (Gleditsch et al., 2001; Licklider, 1995; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Sambanis, 2001). The 1,000 death threshold is generally consistent across studies, but they differ over which deaths (only combatants or non-combatants as well) should be counted, over what time period should be used (1,000 deaths each year or 1,000 as a cumulative count), and over absolute or relative measures (e.g. per capita deaths)(Sambanis, 2001).

161 Nine Slovenian soldiers and approximately 36 Yugoslav were killed during the 2 week civil war.

162 In the former Soviet Union for example, many states seceded with little contest. The dissolution of was also peaceful and many secessionist movements have formal, fully peaceful political parties (e.g. Lega Nord in Italy, Vlaams Blok in Belgium, Bloc Quebecois in Canada, etc.). 83

Concentrating on the ends of conflict, in this case complete independence from the

Home State, alters the common typology established for quantitative analyses of civil conflict. Because the project’s larger aim is to explore the dynamics underlying State emergence, studying the entire universe of groups who self-identify as deserving of and aspiring to Statehood is nearly ideal. In the contemporary world, the majority of new States emerge as a result of separatist, secessionist demands. The only other forms of State emergence are unilateral decolonization, wherein a foreign authority unilaterally devolves authority to a local one; dissolution, wherein a State (typically a federation) dissolves into its constituent parts; and union, wherein two or more States join to become one new State. In each of these instances, new Statehood is uncontroversial as the new government inherits a veritable power vacuum.163

A larger set of cases, of all ethnic minorities for example, would contain far too many groups that never aspire to self-government. Experts estimate between 4,000 and 10,000 ethnic groups worldwide.164 A quite small percentage of these groups will ever seek States of their own. Individuals within these groups might not even identify themselves on the basis of their ethnicity, they may not have an ethnic consciousness or ethnicity might simply lack political salience. They might identify more strongly with religious or regional identities instead. Additionally, too many decidedly secessionist states would be excluded from the set using ethnicity alone. In the language of research design, selecting a wider sample of cases

163 In other words, while these means of State emergence concern succession of authority, they are relatively straightforward because no alternative authoritative claim exists. The previous authority has revoked its claim.

164 Again, Gellner (1993)(Ed.), p.74 estimates there are 8,000 distinct languages in the modern world. Hannum (1990), p.454-5 argues there might be 5,000 States in the system if ethno-national self-determination was fully exercised.

84 would strain the ‘possibility principle.’ We would not reasonably expect most ethnic groups

might experience recognition because many will not even make an initial demand for

independence.165

As a result of the above limitations, this project considers secession a unique demand

and observes the factors associated with the successful achievement of that end.166 This

alternative perspective on sub-State conflict will yield new insights into both civil war and

ethnic conflict, perhaps. More importantly, it will help to shed light on the system dynamics

at work in secessionist conflicts. If widespread external acceptance is definitional of State

membership in international society, and a necessary component of successful secession,

then the determinants of recognition promise novel insights into the dynamics of the most

common form of modern State emergence. The approach should uncover the conditions

under which new States are accepted as members of international society by its most

influential members.

Second, previous studies of State emergence (of which there are very few) tend to

select on the dependent variable (realized independence), rather than looking at a wider

range of potential States. In this instance, selection on the dependent variable can yield misleading conclusions. A number of studies suggest for example, that as colonial rule came to be seen as illegitimate, Statesmen were more likely to accept claims of self-determination as a basis for Statehood. They infer this increased probability by observing the large number of post-colonial States entering the international system post-1945. Yet we know the

165 Goertz, Gary (2005) Social Science Concepts: A Users Guide Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Mahoney, Jim and Gary Goertz (2004) “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research” American Political Science Review

166 As opposed to other demands or ends such as autonomy, civil rights, regime change, revolution, etc.

85 international community also rejected many post-colonial claims to Statehood. The

Banganda preferred restoration of the Bugandan Kingdom to incorporation within the new

Ugandan State, which they saw as an arbitrary colonial relic. Pan-African movements like

Katanga attempted to establish large multi-ethnic States, but similarly failed to secure

support. And finally, it was often the case that multiple anti-colonial regimes vied for control

over the same territory. In Ghana, (formerly the Gold Coast colony) independence was

secured, at least in part, because colonial leaders did not anticipate Nkrumah’s Convention

People’s Party would prevail in independent elections. For many colonial peoples demanding

independence then, the eventual form and fate of their secessionist efforts was not assured.

So even if one accepts scholars’ conclusion that the international community more readily

accepted post-colonial States, significant variation remains unexplained by selecting on the

dependent variable.

Two prominent examples of theories whose evidence might be complemented by

large N, quasi-experimental research designs are noteworthy. Philpott argues on the topic of

norms and external Statehood, that entering States’ characters differ as a function of changes

in system-wide ideas about sovereignty. States accept different kinds of proto-States given

the prevailing systemic norms of the era. Unfortunately, only case study research is presented

to support this hypothesis. Without Large N evidence of the pattern of new States entering

the system, it is difficult to generalize to the universe of all potential States; the influence of

normative considerations might be epiphenomenal or specific to a select sample of cases.167

167 One ‘select sample’ that Cronin and Barkin (1994) observe in their research is that nascent States based upon a were more successful than their ethnically nationalist counterparts, for example.

86 In a similar vein, Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin contend ideas about sovereignty

oscillate between support for the integrity of States and support for the self-determination of

nations. Consequently, they hypothesize support for secession will vary based upon the

dominant view of sovereignty in each era. In their analysis, the authors observe State

emergence (using UN membership as an operational indicator) and infer a greater rate of

successful State-seeking. They fail to consider whether or not the universe of State-seeking

actors also increased during that period, however. Without knowing the number and variety

of State-seeking actors, it may just as likely be the case that the rate of success for proto-

States or colonial independence remained unchanged or even decreased when the authors

observe an increase. As a remedy to selection on the dependent variable and case-study only

designs, I sample all of the actors demanding independent Statehood between 1931 and

2002.

Finally, the tests I utilize permit greater insight into the determinants and timing of

State emergence than previous studies have allowed. Duration analysis permits the use of time-varying covariates. In plain language, this allows us to trace individual secessionist movements, say Tibet or Kosovo, over time and aggregate all of the relevant observations for that particular movement. Additionally, because the method utilized is a Cox proportional hazard model, we are not forced to make any assumption about the distribution of errors.

3.3 Empirical Beginnings

The manifest pattern of States entering international society cannot be explained using a ‘bottom-up’ model of self-assertion alone. Though a few States have entered the

87 modern system primarily as a function of control and authority, most new States have not.

Nor did these new States enter as a result of unilateral decolonization, via the of

authority from an imperial power to a local one. Instead, most new States entered the system

as a function of some domestic control and authority and extensive external legitimacy.

Over the course of the last century (since 1905), one hundred seventy-nine new

States entered the system. Over the same period, only thirty-one States exited.168 State exits

were primarily attributable to new unions, as in the cases of Germany, , and ;

and to war and reconstitution following the World Wars.169 When modern States enter the

system, they do so as a result of unilateral decolonization, State dissolution, union or as a

result of secessionist demands for independence.170

Among the States entering purely as a result of decolonization, it is well established

that control and authority standards were not adhered to. Rather, replacing the colonial

systems with more egalitarian forms of government was given priority. Some efforts were

made to ensure that colonies’ transitions to independence were successful, but most colonies

lacked functional governance in some respect at the point of independence.171 The pattern of

colonial independence, however, is portrayed as an exception to the normal course of State

emergence. In most cases, we expect that State emergence follows a ‘bottom-up’ causal path.

168 Fazal, Tanisha (2004) “State Death in the International System” International Security 58 (Spring), p.312. Finds that 50 States have violently existed the system since 1816.

169 As in the cases of Germany, Japan, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, , Greece, Yugoslavia and a number of other States following World War II.

170 The line between State dissolution and secession is sometimes a fuzzy one. For example, while it is clear that Slovenia and Croatia seceded from the FRY, it is less clear that Macedonia did. Similarly, while Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania clearly seceded from the USSR prior to its collapse, States like Kazakhstan perhaps did not and emerged as a function of Soviet dissolution.

171 The Mandate and Trust systems were designed with this intent in mind.

88 Patterns of secession and Statehood do not bear this expectation out. Instead, many new, secessionist States enter the international system prior to achieving domestic control and authority. In fact, the only new States entering the system between 1931 and 2002 that

convincingly met the legal standards for recognition prior to recognition were Bangladesh,

Eritrea, Slovenia and Somaliland.172 Interestingly, so far Somaliland has not received

recognition from any other State (See Table 3.1, successful secessions are in bold type).

Figure 3.1 shows the recent mismatch between de facto independence (domestic sovereignty) and de jure recognition (external sovereignty) among a number of contemporary secessionist proto-States. While the movements falling within the upper-left and lower-right hand categories are consistent with the ‘‘bottom-up’’ model in international law, the lower-left and upper-right hand categories are unintelligible using an exclusively ‘‘bottom-up’’ model. De facto control and de jure recognition should be perfectly correlated.

3.4 Data Collection and Resources

Much of the data in the dataset is unique to this project, or at least unique in this

format. This section outlines the source material referenced in order to create the dataset.

Specific syntax outlining data manipulations and variable construction as described in the

following sections are available in Appendix A: Coding Rules. Appendix A also includes

more precise, case by case inclusions and exclusions (i.e. Do you consider Russia the USSR’s

successor or are they two unique States within the dataset?).

172 That is, according to the Leg_high operationalization for this project and to the best knowledge of this researcher.

89 Information regarding recognition comes directly from the foreign ministries of each of the Great Powers where available.173 Because recognition is bilateral in nature, there is no international repository of recognition data. The Correlates of War (COW) dataset purports to have recognition data predating the League of Nations and United Nations, but in fact only reflects the diplomatic missions established by France and Britain from 1816-1920.174

During later periods, including the period of this study, COW uses League and/or UN membership as an indicator of Statehood.175 While League or UN membership act as useful proxies of achieved Statehood in most cases, this project is concerned with how that external sovereignty comes to be ascribed in the first place.176 A more finely tuned measure, indicating progress toward full external Statehood, is required. Once embassies are built, a proto-State’s progress toward Statehood is largely complete.177 Consequently, individual

States’ initial attributions of recognition are the most appropriate indicators of external legitimacy. In addition, it is noteworthy that League/UN membership and widespread

173 In some instances, recognition dates were not available directly from the ministries, so secondary sources were consulted. Where this is the case, the secondary source(s) are noted within the dataset (available upon request).

174 Singer and Small (1980). In addition, the State must have a population of at least 500,000 in order to be considered a State.

175 The initial impetus behind the ‘system entry’ variable explains this choice. Singer and Small’s primary investigation sought to understand and systematize various levels of status within the international system. They were not interested in the consecration of Statehood per se. Instead, they hoped to delineate the strong, influential members from the weak and insignificant. This also explains their choice to exclude States with populations under 500,000. (Ibid.)

176 India was a member of the League and UN before its independence from Britain. The Philippines was also a member of the League before independence. Finally, Belarus and the Ukraine were accepted as full members of the UN prior to independence as well. A number of States were also excluded from UN membership due to Cold War politics between the US and Soviet Union; neither League nor UN membership is perfectly correlated with Statehood.

177 In many cases embassies are established years after has been ascribed.

90 recognition are not theoretically interchangeable. In fact, the UN is explicit that a State’s

membership in the organization does not imply recognition by its members.178

Data regarding secessionist movements come from a variety of sources. Like many

datasets, this dataset is almost certainly incomplete due to a lack of governmental

transparency. Home States often attempt to hide domestic challenges away from

international, and even domestic, scrutiny. Secrecy is desirable for a number of reasons.

First, States do not want to appear weak; this is both to stave-off additional challenges and

to maintain legitimacy within the rest of the population. Second, secrecy allows governments

to crack down on secessionists without attracting negative publicity. Finally, any publicity for

the secessionists is also free publicity for their cause. No Home State wants to be complicit

in the success of its challengers. Luckily, global news services and internet resources have

made maintaining secrecy very difficult.

The following sources contributed the bulk of information regarding secessionist

movements: Minahan’s Nations Without States, Gurr’s Minorities at Risk Dataset, Halperin,

Scheffer and Small’s Self-Determination in the New World Order, Emerson’s From Empire to

Nation, and Ayres’ Violent Intra-National Conflict.179 In on-going cases the movements’ own

Web sites were often consulted (if and when one existed). Web sites were particularly useful

178 In order to become a State member of the UN, an actor must secure the support of a majority of Security Council members (without a permanent member’s veto) and receive the favorable votes of two-thirds of the General Assembly (present and ). Additionally, a favorable vote does not necessarily imply that a member has granted recognition to the applicant. Given these standards, a sizeable number of States might still not recognize a new State that is nonetheless a member of the United Nations. The UN too shies away from conflating membership with Statehood. On one of the United Nations Frequently Asked Questions, publicity Web pages for example, the organization refuses to equate UN membership with Statehood. “Q: How many countries are in the world? A: We are not an authority on this topic. We suggest you visit a public library in your area, consult an encyclopedia or a world almanac. The United Nations, however, has 191 Member Countries” (UN, 2005) http://www.un.org/geninfo/faq/faq/faq.html. Whether or not recognition and UN membership are equivalent (highly correlated) in practice remains an empirical question.

179 Full citations for each source can be found in the Bibliography.

91 for discerning a movement’s claims, the existence of a , and the proposed

ideological and governmental organization of the new State. Data on secessionist

movements includes movement onset, declaration of independence, proto-State name, end

date, duration, ethnic, religious, ideological or geographic composition, movement size,

territorial and population claim, historical experience with Home State (colonial, trust, or

other), violent or non-violent character, flag and occasionally the extent of territorial control.

Conflict data was collected from sources specializing in both intra- and inter-State

violence. Data on War (civil or international) comes from the Correlates of War Dataset.180

This includes onset, end, duration, and in some cases casualty estimates. Data on militarized

conflict short of war comes from the Militarized Interstate Dispute III (MID III) Project,

the Violent Intra-National Conflict (VINC) Dataset constructed by Bill Ayers, and occasionally the Minorities at Risk Dataset (MAR). These data include conflict onset, end and duration, intensity of violence (war or not war), third party intervention, and militarized casualty counts.

Finally, the remaining necessary data were culled from the Home State. In most cases this meant consulting the foreign ministry or its representation within the United States. This information includes population estimates, sub-State jurisdictional boundaries, and the

Home State’s ethnic, religious, ideological and geographic composition.

180 Each code is also consistent with that employed in the Correlates of War Dataset.

92 3.5 Conceptual Definitions and Operational Indicators181

In this section, I provide definitions and operationalizations for each major

hypothesis evaluated and concepts employed therein.

First, I define a secessionist movement as a nationalist group dedicated to formal

separation from its Home State in order to form a newly independent State.182 Groups that

seek to separate from their Home States in order to join another pre-existing State are

classified as irredentist and excluded from the category.183 Groups that do not seek Statehood,

but instead seek forms of autonomy short of complete independence, including civil rights

or regional self-governance, are also excluded from the set of secessionist movements.

Finally, groups that seek to overthrow the government of an established State (as in the case

of revolution or coup d’etat) are also not considered to be secessionist.

Secession is also distinct from, though not unrelated to, decolonization. The process

of decolonization is characterized by the devolution of authority from an imperial

government to a local one. In some cases, as in the British West Indies recent

independences, the devolution of authority is driven by the imperial regime rather than by

nationalist demands on behalf of the colonial peoples themselves. In this instance, the

colonies were not secessionist because they did not demand self-rule; they were unilaterally

181 Appendix A: Coding Rules provides a summary of the definitions discussed in this section. Terms in bold type appear in Appendix A.

182 A note on alternative data sources: 136 of the 275 secessionist movements since 1931 do not fall within the coding scheme of the Minorities at Risk data. In many cases, groups were colonial, the group did not surpass the established population threshold or the national communities were not considered either to have suffered disadvantages or received advantages do to their group affiliation. Examples of cases that do not qualify are: Puerto Ricans in the United States, East Bengalis (now Bangladesh) in Pakistan, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and Macedonians in Yugoslavia.

183 If the State the irredentists hope to join does not make an equal and opposite claim to control the secessionists’ population and territory, then the group is secessionist. See the discussion regarding Nagorno- Karabakh and South Ossetia’s inclusion in Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion on irredentist versus secessionist claims.

93 granted or forced into it. Other cases of decolonization were however, preceded by demands

of independence and self-government on behalf of the colonized. Often characterized as conflicts of national liberation or extra-systemic wars, conflicts involving movements like these fit well within the conceptual definition of secession outlined above. It is on this basis that anti-colonial secessions were included in the dataset. Nevertheless, I also included a colonial dummy variable (Colony) to uncover any potential differential success on behalf of the two forms of secessionism.184 Indeed, it is common wisdom that anti-colonial

movements were generally more successful in their claims for self-determination than were

their non-colonial peers.

Operationally, four characteristics indicate whether or not a group is coded as a

secessionist movement. First, the group must formally declare independence from its Home

State at some point during its operation. In most cases, a declaration of independence is a

unilateral declaration of independence or UDI according to international law. The word

“unilateral” indicates that the Home State does not recognize the group’s independence.

Second, the group must have a flag. This requirement acts as an indicator of national

consciousness.185 Third, the group must make a claim to both a population and territory over

which it presides, the declared State. This qualification is meant to exclude two types of

independence movements that do not constitute secession attempts, 1) so-called pirate states

where a claim to population is made without a claim to territory and 2) platform islands, a

popular idea to evade US taxes in the 1960’s, where a claim to territory is made without a

184 My focus upon secession is, in part, because the topic is timely. This focus does not however, preclude my expanding the project to an analysis of recognition of new States in general (including all colonies). My sense at this point, as I mentioned in the theoretical chapter, is that the relationship between decolonization and recognition and eventual Statehood is straightforward. For secessionists recognition is less straightforward.

185 Other indicators in a similar vein might have been a national , coats of arms, shared political icons or common history. Each indicates the trappings of national consciousness.

94 population.186 Finally, the movement must last at least one week, must involve at least 1,000 people and must claim at least 100 square kilometers (km²) of territory. This requirement was created purely for research efficiency. It is unlikely that a very small or very short-lived movement would capture the attention of the media. Data regarding such movements would not be readily available. Each unique instance of secession within the set is assigned a unique

Name. A Roman numeral indicating each additional occurrence follows movements that recur.

For each secessionist movement identified, Start and End indicate the beginning and end dates of each attempt. Region is specified for both the secessionist movement

(Actor II) and for the Home State (Actor I). The regions of the world are coded as follows:

1-Western Europe and the , 2-Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 3-

Remaining Asia, 4-Middle East, and 5-Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania.

The historical relationships between secessionists and their Home States are also thought to influence the probability of Great Power recognition. If secessionists are attempting to separate from a colonial governor (Colony), they have a greater probability of recognition as colonialism came to be discredited in the modern era. Additionally, there is thought to be a positive relationship between claims to previously organized sub-State territories (states, regions, or republics) and successful secession. Organized jurisdictional units more easily transition to independent Statehood because the rudimentary organs of government are established prior to independence; they need not create institutions from scratch. Conversely, pan movements, those that claim people and territory covering more

186 The platform island idea has also been attempted off the African coast. In these cases, groups have attempted to claim offshore oil facilities.

95 than one internal jurisdictional boundary and/or traversing more than one international boundary, should have a more difficult time achieving independence.

Conflict characteristics between the secessionist movement and the Home State were also captured. Actor Violence indicates whether or not the secessionist movement

(Actor I) or the Home State (Actor II) employed violence as a tactic at any time during the life of the conflict. Violence, a dummy variable, captures whether either party to the conflict employed violence as a tactic at any time during the conflict. Viol_I and Viol_II indicate which parties to the conflict employed violence.187 If the actors employed violence sufficient enough to be considered a War by the Correlates of War, 1,000+ casualties, then a dummy variable captures that fact. In addition, Violence Duration (ViolDur: B and ViolDur: E) captures the duration of that war. Where casualty counts were available, they were included within the data (Casualty), but were not available in sufficient numbers to include in the

Large N analyses.

Great Power actors were coded according to their appearance and duration within the Correlates of War Datasets. Great Powers are the most materially capable States within the system during a given period. Because they are the strongest States, they are thought to be influential and to have global, rather than localized, interests. According to the COW operationalization, Great Power States during the lifetime of this study were: ,

United States and Russia: 1931-present; China: 1950-present; France: 1931-1940, 1945-present;

Germany: 1931-1945, 1991-present; Italy: 1931-1943; and Japan: 1931-1945, 1991-present.

During every year of a secession attempt, there is an observation for each Great Power State that might have recognized it. Each opportunity for recognition has an observation. The

187 Viol_I and Viol_II do not capture directional or temporal dynamics, however.

96 summed recognitions accorded by all of the Great Powers comprise Rec_Pool.

Rec_Success indicates the number of Great Powers recognizing a secessionist movement in any given secession year divided by the number of Great Powers total during that year, expressed as a percentage. As a proxy for successful Statehood, there is also a measure capturing whether or not a movement achieves membership within the League of Nations

(LN) or United Nations (UN), Success. In addition, each Great Power had a dependent variable of its summed opportunities to recognize, Rec_COW#.

3.6 Primary Hypotheses and Indicators

To review, there are a number of potential political interests that might motivate

States’ recognition decisions. I argue four motives should be particularly influential: geo- strategic/external security, domestic security, international norms, and identity relations.

Each major hypothesis is derived from one of the four logics. The hypotheses do not exhaust the possible instantiations of the underlying interest motives, but should serve as useful indicators of whether or not a State is affected by that type of consideration in recognition. Operationalizations for each of the four major hypotheses follow.

3.6.1 Geo-strategic/External Security

H1: Great Powers with a conflictual relationship with a Home State will be more likely to recognize its secessionist states.

In order to capture the conflictual relationships outlined in the geo-strategic/external security (GEO) hypothesis, an index of recent militarized conflict, based upon information in the Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset, was created. For every year in which a Great

Power’s recognition is possible, the previous five years of conflict history between the Home

State and the Great Power are recorded and summed. The intensity of violence is coded

97 according to the levels outlined in the HostLev, (hostility level) variable in the Militarized

Interstate Dispute Dataset. The lowest category of interstate dispute involved no militarized action (1). Level 2 captures the threat to use force. Level 3 identifies a display of force and 4 captures the use of force short of war. The highest level of dispute is war (5). Hostility levels for any and all conflicts are summed for each year, then added together for the five year total. For example, if a Home State and a Great Power had two disputes in the preceding five years, one of which involved a threat to use force and the other a display of force, GEO would be coded 5 (2+3+0+0+0). According to the hypothesis, the higher the level of conflict within the dyad, the more likely the Great Power will recognize secessionist challengers from within that Home State. GEO will be identical for any two movements within a single Home State occurring at the same time.

The resulting variable, GEO has a range from 0 to 25. The most common five-year conflict relationship was without conflict entirely and coded 0. The average five-year conflict relationship was just under 1 (.874) or a conflict short of a threat to use force every five years.

3.6.2 Domestic Security

H3: Great Powers with secessionist challengers of their own will be less likely to recognize secessionist states elsewhere.

According to the domestic security hypothesis (DOM), the more insecure a Great

Power vis-à-vis its own domestic challengers, the less likely will be to recognize secessionists within other States. The measure employed to capture secessionist challenges within a given

Great Power State is derived directly from the dataset for this project. In order to identify the State’s recent experience, or current level, of domestic insecurity, a variable summarizing the previous five years of secessionist activity was created. For each year in which a Great

98 Power has an ongoing secessionist movement, a 1 was assigned. One domestic secessionist

movement enduring five years is coded as 5; two movements enduring five years each are

coded as 10, etc. The higher the level of domestic insecurity, manifest in recent, durable

secessionist challenges, for any Great Power, the less likely that Power will be to recognize

other States’ secessionists.

The domestic insecurity measure ranges from 0 through 75. Germany and Japan

were without variation entirely for this variable. Neither State had a secessionist challenge

over the course of the study. Italy had the next most challenges and DOM ranged from 0

through 6 during its last year as a Great Power in 1943. China’s domestic challenges range

from 0 up to 10 during the 1990’s. Russia (post-USSR) ranges from 1 to 13 (in 1999-2002).

For the US, DOM ranged from 1 to a height of 15 during the mid-1980s. France, the United

Kingdom and the Soviet Union, all major imperial powers, had many more demands for exit

than the other Great Powers. Not a single year passed without at least one ongoing challenge

in each of these States. France had a high of 75 from 1957 through 1960, when many of its

African colonies received independence. Great Britain reached a high of 62 and the USSR

reached a high of 35 in 1990 and 1991, on the eve of its dissolution.

3.6.3 International Norms188

H4: During an Era of Nations over States, Great Power recognition of secessionists is more likely. During an Era of State over Nation, Great Power recognition of secessionists is less likely.

According to a variety of theories, international norms regarding self-determination and secession have shifted as ideas have changed from era to era (ERA). One of the most

188 Hypothesis 5, regarding the influence of humanitarian/human rights norms, remains in the data collection phase as available information varies widely from group to group and Home State to Home States. The hypothesis will however, reappear in the qualitative portion of the project because information for each case was plentiful.

99 straightforward manifestations of this type of theory is that offered by Samuel Barkin and

Bruce Cronin.189 According to their theory, 1931-1944 was an era in which the sovereignty of the State was valued less than the self-determination of nations. From 1945 through 1989, the sovereignty of States was more highly valued. Finally, from 1990 through 2002 (though

Barkin and Cronin’s operationalization only extends through 1994), the self-determination of

nations was again valued more highly than maintaining the integrity of States.190 To recap,

when State integrity is normatively more valuable, recognition is less likely. When self-

determination is normatively less valuable, Great Power recognition will be more

forthcoming. This hypothesis should apply equally to all Great Power recognition decisions

during the hypothesized eras because the norms are thought to be system-wide.

The variable capturing normative eras is a dummy variable (0, 1). Coding was taken directly from the operationalization provided by Barkin and Cronin. A zero indicates an era of State over nation and a one indicates and era of nation over State.

3.6.4 Colonies & Mandates

H6: Great Powers will be more likely to recognize secessionists that were former colonies than other secessionist movements.

H7: Great Powers will be more likely to recognize secessionists whose territories are mandate/trust territories.

Anti-colonial movements are thought to have a greater chance of gaining recognition for at least two reasons. First, as colonialism came to be seen as an illegitimate form of governance, the Great Powers should have become more sympathetic to anti-colonial

189 Cronin and Barkin (1994)

190 Nation over State from 1931-1944. State over nation when year =>1945 < 1989. Nation over State when year =>1990 < 2002 (end of dataset). I assume that no great normative shift has occurred between 1994, the end of Barkin and Cronin’s temporal scope, and 2002, the end of my dataset.

100 secessionists’ plights and therefore more predisposed to recognize. Second, as colonialism

came to be seen as illegitimate by outsiders, Home States should have been subject to social

pressure to let anti-colonial secessionists secede.

The colony variable is a dummy variable coded 0 if the secessionist movement claims

a territory and population that is not a colony of its Home State. The variable is coded 1 if

the secessionist movement is anti-colonial. A colony is operationally defined as a jurisdiction

(people and territory) governed by a State or agents of a State which is neither geographically

contiguous nor within 100 miles of the home State’s shoreline. If a movement has a colonial

history, but is not attempting to secede from its colonial governor, then it is not considered

anti-colonial. 91 of the 275 secessionist movements within the dataset were identified as

colonial. 6 of those 91 anti-colonial movements were also mandate or trust territories.

Related to the colonial hypothesis but not identical, mandate and trust territories,

identified by the United Nations and League of Nations as en route to independence, should

more easily secure independence and recognition from the outside world. Many colonies

became subjects of the mandate or trust systems following the World Wars. Indeed, the

impetus behind the trust system was to ease the transition to self-government under the eye

of a Home State dedicated to that end.191

3.6.5 Identity Relations

H10: Great Powers will be more likely to recognize secessionists judged more like themselves than are the Home States from which secessionists are attempting to secede.

191 Unfortunately, the systems were often better in theory than they were in practice. ’s mandate over (formerly ) went particularly awry when South Africa refused to relinquish control over the territory. In 1966, the UN revoked South Africa’s mandate authority. It was not until 1990, 70 years after South Africa took control of South West Africa and 24 years after SWAPO began its rebellion, that the mandate finally gained independence.

101 H11: Great Powers will be less likely to recognize secessionists judged less like themselves than are the Home States from which secessionists are attempting to secede.

The final major hypothesis, based upon identity relationships (ID) between Great

Powers, secessionist movements and their Home States, argues that the relative strength of an identity relationship will influence whether Great Power recognition will be forthcoming.

When a Great Power sees secessionists as more like itself than their Home State, the Great

Power is more likely to recognize the secessionists. When the Home State is instead seen as more “self-like”, secessionists are less likely to be recognized. When the Great Power determines both the secessionists and Home State are equally “self-like”, the triadic identity relationship will result in a wash; it is no more or less likely that secessionists will be recognized by that Power.

Operationalizing this hypothesis proved more complicated than the previous three.

Few identity-based hypotheses are or can be adequately tested using large N, quantitative analysis. Though the explanatory power of identity relations will certainly require further study in the case clusters, the ID variable is a suitable test of their initial significance.

Capturing the many potential dimensions of inter-group identity relations required a multifaceted measure. But no quantitative indicator can adequately capture (a priori) the range or possible combinations of identity relationships that might potentially affect recognition.

Three common dimensions of identity were used to create an index: ethnicity, religion and ideology. By selecting three dimensions of identity commonly politicized in practice, this measure should capture some of the variation in recognition that might be attributable to the identity relations among States and proto-States.

102 The identity index measures similarity and difference between two dyads, (1) Great

Power-Home State and (2) Great Power-Secessionist Movement. For each of the three

dimensions of identity, the dyad is judged to be either similar (1) or dissimilar (0) according

to the majority community in that unit. The summed scores for the two dyads were then

compared to each other. The dyad with the higher score, out of a possible total of 3 (if they

are not equivalent), was judged more “self-like” while the dyad with the lower score less so.

The final, IDSUM variable was coded 1 when the Great Power-Secessionist dyad was more

similar. IDSUM was coded 0 when the Great Power-Home State dyad was more similar and was coded as missing (9999) when neither dyad was more similar than the other.

Data regarding the three dimensions of identity came from a variety of resources.

The ethnicity dimension for Great Powers and Home States came primarily from the

International Data Bank, part of the United States Census. This resource did not span the full

temporal period under study however (1950-2002), so the first 19 years of the study were

culled from other sources. For specific details on 1931-1950, see Appendix A: Coding Rules.

Information on religious identity was similarly taken from the IDB, and similarly

supplemented with other sources for the period 1931 through 1950. Neither majority

ethnicity nor majority religion varied significantly over the lapsed time within States, so the

IDB data limitations should not introduce bias into the measure. For secessionist movements

claiming sub-State territories, Home States were often consulted for ethnicity and religious

identity. Where no information was available, the movements’ own descriptions of ethnic

and religious make-up were consulted.

103 The final dimension of identity, governmental ideology, was taken from the Polity IV

Dataset for Great Powers and Home States. Secessionists’ ideological persuasions came from the secessionist movements themselves in most cases (Web sites, public pronouncements, etc) and from secondary sources in the remaining cases.

The IDSUM variable’s three potential outcomes (0, 1, 9999) are distributed in the following way. Out of a total 17,233 observations for this variable, it was most often the case

(9,784) that neither the secessionists nor the Home State were more similar to the Great

Power than the other. Secessionists shared more in common with Great Powers in 5, 213 instances. And Home States were more similar to Great Powers in the remaining 2,236 observations. Within the dyads, the most common cause of identity variation was regime change within Home States.

3.6.6 Unit Type

H8: Great Powers will be more likely to recognize secessionists that claim organized sub-State jurisdictions.

H9: Great Powers will be less likely to recognize secessionist movements who claim pan-territories that span internal or international boundaries.

A secessionist’s unit-type might also influence recognition. Sub-State jurisdictions should be more likely to gain recognition while pan-movements should be less likely to. Pre- existing units are already endowed with stable internal boundaries and populations; they often already have the trappings of governmental authority (police, emergency services, local elections, schools, etc.); and are often presumed to have internal homogeneity. Because

States’ choices of administrative divisions are wide-ranging, only the largest internal divisions were coded. This definition of sub-State included states, republics, provinces, autonomous territories, and . It excluded smaller organizational units like cities, , and

104 their analogs. The resulting dummy variable, SUBST was coded 0 for non-sub-State units and 1 for sub-State units. 177 of the secessionist movements within the dataset claimed organized, sub-State units. 44 of those movements were Sub-colonial administrative divisions.

Finally, secessionist movements whose proto-States span boundaries (either internal or external) should be less likely to be recognized. Pan-movements face greater obstacles to success because they must create a united territory and population where there was none previously. A secessionist movement spanning an international boundary faces twice the opposition because it must successfully separate from two Home States. A proto-State traversing internal boundaries faces the additional task of uniting sub-State governmental organs. A pan-movement spanning international boundaries should face the greatest challenge while a secessionist movement spanning an internal boundary, slightly less. Indeed, it is noteworthy even before discussing the results that no international pan-movement has ever succeeded in achieving Statehood.

The PAN variable was coded using two indicators. First, secessions were coded as pan if the same proto-State was claimed within two or more established States. Second, a given secession was considered pan if it claimed territory in at least two units identified as sub-State. Pan-movements represented 60 of the 275 cases under study, but none of them have succeeded in securing independence.

105 3.7 Descriptive Statistics192

3.7.1 Conflict Characteristics

The dataset details 275 secessionist movements over a total of 3,767 secession

years.193 The shortest secession attempt lasted just over one month while the longest endured

the entire 71 years under study. The longest 20% of the secessions lasted between 24 and 71

years while the shortest 20% lasted just between 0 and 2 years. The average secession (mean)

lasted roughly 13.7 years. The most common duration was 2 years (mode). Movements

enduring 24-71 years had the lowest rate of success (16.36%) among the quintiles.194 The

second 20% had a 54.5% success rate, the next 38.18%, the next 23.6%, and movements

enduring the shortest period of time had a 52.7% success rate. 65 of the 275 (23.63%) movements remained ongoing through 2002, the remaining 108 coded as unsuccessful were defeated, negotiated a settlement short of independence with their Home States, or disbanded.

Most attempts at secession were located in Asia and Africa (Regions 3 and 5 respectively). Each constituted approximately 30% of the total number of secessions.

Around 13% of secessions were within the Americas and Western Europe, 17.5% in the

Former USSR and Eastern Europe while only 10.2% originated in the Middle East. In contrast Home States, those States secessionists were attempting to separate from, were overwhelmingly within the West (US and Western Europe (44%)). Next in descending order

192 Additional descriptive statistics (as well as those described in this section) are available in Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics.

193 That is, any year in which a Great Power has an opportunity to recognize an ‘ongoing’ secessionist movement.

194 Success is measured as the year in which all of the Great Powers cumulatively recognize unless otherwise specified.

106 was Asia with 21.45%, followed by the USSR and Eastern Europe (17.09%), Africa and

Oceania (10.9%) and then the Middle East (6.18%). Somewhat surprisingly, only one

secessionist movement, the movement of Cambas in for an independent Santa Cruz, was based in America.195 So while secessionism at first seems a worldwide phenomenon, it is conspicuously absent in contemporary Central and South America. A chi- square analysis (Table 3.3) of secessionists’ geographic locations (Region_II) and eventual outcomes (Success) shows a statistically significant relationship between the two variables at the .001 level. The results of the Chi-square also show that Region explains 7.5% of the variation in secessionist movements’ success. While this analysis is a preliminary indication of the variable’s statistical relationship to the dependent variable, the theoretical relationship and substantive impact of region on success remain unexplored and uncertain.

The geographic locations of secessionists and Home States imply that a number of secession attempts had an anti-colonial character. Indeed, 91 secessions, approximately 33%

of the total number within the dataset, were anti-colonial. Additionally, around 5.5% were

Mandate or Trust territories as identified by the League of Nations or United Nations. Some

movements were both anti-colonial and mandates (6/275 or around 2.2%). Two-thirds of

the movements (177) claimed jurisdiction over sub-State territorial units already organized

within the Home State. Sixty movements (nearly 22%) claimed territories that traversed sub-

State or inter-State boundaries and were therefore identified as pan-movements. Movements

for Kurdistan or Biafra exemplify inter-State pan-movements while movements for Greater

Balochistan and traverse organizational boundaries internal to States.

195 The Zapatista (EZLN) movement in Chiapas, is not secessionist. Although much of the Zapatistas’ conflict with the government is related to indigenous autonomy, their primary aim has not been independence. Instead, the EZLN’s stated motive is revolution (and perhaps anti-globalization). For more information, see the Zapatistas’ official website at http://www.ezln.org.

107 As anticipated, former colonies were more likely to garner widespread recognition

than were their non-colonial counterparts. Near 75% of all anti-colonial movements

eventually gained external sovereignty, while only 25% did not. Non-colonial movements

had more limited success. Only about 20% of non-colonial secessions succeeded (18.48%).

Over 80% of them failed. Again employing chi-square analysis (Table 3.2), we can say with

95% confidence that there is a significant relationship between colonial history and

secessionist outcomes. Indeed, colonialism explains approximately 29% of the variance in

success. Interestingly, violent and non-violent anti-colonial movements had very similar rates

of success 74 and 75.6% respectively. Non-violent non-colonial movements were markedly

more successful however (34.6%) than were their violent counterparts (12.1%). Of course,

these success rates mean little without also considering the means employed by the Home

States attempting to thwart separation.

Over 70% (195/275) of the secessionist-Home State conflicts were characterized by

violence on behalf of at least one side. When both sides employed violence as a tactic,

secessionists’ had a 30% success rate. When only the Home State employed violence, no

secessionist movements achieved independence (this occurred in 13 cases). Where only the

secessionists employed violence, 16.67% prevailed while 83.33% did not. Finally, in conflicts where both secessionists and their Home States did not resort to violence, around 60% of secessionists gained recognition and 40% failed. Nearly 15% of all secessionist conflicts reached the threshold for civil or interstate war (41); 56% involved violence short of war

(154).

108 Though the data on violence are not detailed enough to suggest whether violent or

non-violent strategies yield more successful results for secessionists, they are suggestive.196

When a Home State employs violent countermeasures against decidedly non-violent secessionists, it seems there is no chance that the secession will succeed (0/13). When the secessionists employ violence against the Home State as well, their chance of success increases to 30%. However, when only the secessionists employed violent tactics, their success rate was only around 17%. Finally, in the best case scenario, and also the second most common (80/275), where neither party employs violence, secessionism had the highest rate of success (61%). Still, given the information available within this dataset, it is unclear why some conflicts become violent while others remain pacific or how that characteristic might be related to a movement’s ultimate success. In addition, these data provide little insight into the conflict processes involved in the dynamics of secession.

3.7.2 External Factors

Since 1931, 8 Great Powers populated the international system. The smallest number of potential recognizers during any year was 4, from 1946-49 following World War II. The greatest number of recognizers was 7 (1931-40 and 1991-2002).197 There are 17,233 dyadic

secession years in the dataset. In any given year, the rate of successful secession (where all

Great Powers have recognized) is just over 2.5%. The United States, the United Kingdom,

and the Soviet Union were Great Powers throughout the 71 year period under study; each

had over 3,000 opportunities to recognize a new State (each on-going secession year presents

196 Inferences about the more successful tactic would require data on violence dynamics, for example which side initiated violence, what was the scale of violence and perhaps, the type of violence employed (defensive, terrorism, insurgency, etc.).

197 Figure 3.2 displays the number of Great Powers in the international system over the duration of the study.

109 one opportunity). France and China were Great Powers nearly as long, 66 and 52 years

respectively. Both Germany and Japan were Great Powers during two non-contiguous

periods 1931-1945 and 1991 through 2002 for a total of 25 years. Finally, Italy was the

shortest-lived Great Power, only classified as such from 1931-1943 (12 years).

212 of the 275 secessionist movements in the dataset operated during at least one

year of the Cold War (1947-1990) conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

85 of the 212 ‘Cold War secessions’, or around 40%, eventually gained independence. Only

69 of the 212 (32.5%) however, gained independence during the Cold War. This is below the

overall rate of success for secession (37.45%).

3.8 Data Analysis

To review, I argue that the four categories of Great Power interests I identify will

make secessionist movements more and less likely to experience recognition. Conflict with

the Home State; relatively strong identity relations; norms favoring self-determination,

colonial, mandate or trust status; and sub-State unit claims should all increase the hazard

ratio for secessionist movements. In other words, secessions with these characteristics will

have a higher “risk” (greater than 1) of Great Power recognition than other secessions.

When a Great Power is plagued by its own domestic security concerns; a movement claims a

pan-region; or occurs during the Cold War, secessionists will have a lower “risk” (less than 1)

of Great Power recognition. The set of former hypotheses predicts that the hazard ratio will be greater than 1 whereas the latter set predicts the hazard ratio will be less than 1.198

198 Note in the table reporting the analytical results that a plus sign (+) indicates a predicted hazard ratio greater than 1 and a minus sign (-) indicates a predicted hazard ratio less than 1.

110 I employ a Cox model to study secession duration. The quantitative results in Table

3.6 show broad support for my argument that interests influence external recognition.

Hazard ratios greater than 1 are indicative of an increased risk of recognition while hazard

ratios less than 1 indicate a decreased risk of recognition. As anticipated, Great Power

recognition decisions are not uniquely dependent upon the objective capabilities of nascent

States. Great Power interests explain at least some of the variance in recognition. In the pooled analysis, the indictors for each conceptualization of interest are significantly related to recognition in the predicted direction. Interestingly, when the Great Powers’ recognition decisions are disaggregated and considered separately, the results suggest they are differentially influenced by the different instantiations of interest. Some Powers seem importantly motivated by normative considerations (ERA) while others are more attuned to considerations of external security (GEO). Finally, the simulated results show that the substantive influence of each interest on recognition also varies dramatically.199 In particular,

domestic security (DOM) has a relatively small negative effect on the predicted probability

of recognition while normative eras (ERA) and identity relations (ID) have pronounced

effects.

3.8.1 Pooled Cox Model

In the pooled model, there is statistically significant support for each of the four

‘logics’ of interest. The hazard ratios reported in Table 3.6 should be interpreted in the

following manner. The first column in the pooled model shows that GEO’s hazard ratio is

1.405, this means that when a Home State and a Great Power have a conflictual relationship,

the probability that a secessionist movement will be recognized (conditional on its not

199 It should be noted though, that some of the effect is attributable to the variables’ scales.

111 having been recognized before) is 40.5% higher than secessionists with Home States and

Great Powers with pacific inter-State relations. DOM, or domestic insecurity, was predicted

to have a negative effect on the probability of recognition; it does. The hazard ratio for

DOM is .334. This indicates that, for Great Powers with high levels of domestic insecurity,

the chance of a secessionist movement receiving recognition is 76.6% less. Both ID and

ERA had strong positive effects on the likelihood of recognition. When international

systemic norms favor the self-determination of nations over the sovereignty of States (ERA),

secessionists are nearly 30% (29%) more likely to be recognized and admitted into the

international system. When a secessionist movement and a Great Power shared strong

identity relations, the hazard ratio (1.50) indicates that there is a 50% greater chance of that movement being recognized conditional on its not having been recognized previously.

The minor hypotheses also received substantial support in the pooled model. The hazard ratio for Cold War (.22) shows that a secessionist movement is 88% more likely to be recognized during the non-Cold War era. In addition, Colonies, Mandates, and Trust territories all had a much greater chance of success than did secessionist movements in other circumstances. In order of greatest effect to least, Mandate and Trust territories were 192% more likely to be recognized than non-mandate or trust movements. Colonies were 172% more likely to be recognized than non-colonial movements conditional on their not having received recognition before. Finally, secessionist movements that claimed territories that were previously organized as sub-State units also had a greater rate of success. Sub-State secessions were 44% more likely to receive recognition than were other secessionists.

112 Both material security motives (external and domestic) were significant at the .10 level. The systemic norm hypothesis (ERA) was significant at the .05 level. Finally, the identity (ID) hypothesis was supported at the .01 level. As anticipated, there were strong positive relationships between colonial status (Colony) and mandate or trust status

(Mandate) and each was statistically significant at the .01 level. Additionally, the common wisdom that sub-State (SUBST) units more likely receive recognition was supported at the

.05 level. Finally, the proposition that secessionist movements would less likely receive recognition during the Cold War Era (COLD) was supported at the .1 level.

3.8.2 Great Power Cox Models

Interestingly, when the Great Powers are considered independent of one another, the models show varying support for the primary interest hypotheses. The strength and support for each of the primary hypotheses is less certain and more certain depending upon the Great Power analyzed. Each of the other major hypotheses received varied support from one Power to the next.

The individual models can be found in Table 3.6, just to the right of the pooled model. I will not review the results of each hypothesis for each Great Power here, but I will point out some of the intriguing findings and discontinuities with the pooled model. The hazard ratios presented for each of the Great Powers should be interpreted in the same manner as the pooled model. Support for the material interest hypotheses was especially volatile. For Italy and the Soviet Union, the geo-strategic hypothesis no longer reached statistical significance. This means that, for these two States, geo-strategic or security concerns vis-à-vis the Home State are unrelated to their ultimate recognition decisions.200

200 In other words, we can not be certain that the coefficients are not zero.

113 While Italy’s decisions were still in the predicted direction (positive), the analysis shows that

the Soviet Union’s was not. Italy and the Soviet Union aside, support for the Geo-strategic hypothesis among the other Great Powers was strong. In every other case, secessionists whose Home States had conflictual relationships with a Great Power were more likely to receive that Great Power’s recognition. The hazard ratios were especially high for the United

States and United Kingdom, where GEO increased the chance of recognition by 86% and

73% respectively.

Domestic security concerns were only relevant or statistically significant for a few of the Powers. Germany and Japan had no secessionist challengers of their own over the course of the study. And domestic insecurity (DOM) was not related, in a statistically significant negative way, to CHN, ITA, USA, or USR’s recognition decisions (though the effect was negative for each). The domestic insecurity hypothesis was, however, supported at the .10 level for France and the United Kingdom. This result may be a function of both France and the UK being major colonial powers and therefore outliers among the Great Power set in terms of the level of domestic insecurity.

The ideational interest hypotheses had less variance in statistical support. As anticipated, due to the systemic nature of the hypothesis, ERA is statistically significant at at least the .10 level for every one of the Great Powers in the study. The largest positive effect of ERA occurs within the German model. During an era when self-determination is valued over the integrity of States, secessionists are 83% more likely in a given year to receive

German recognition than they are during another era. This finding is especially interesting given that Germany is one of the shortest-lived Great Powers. While statistically significant and in the predicted direction, the United Kingdom’s response to normative era was muted

114 relative to the other powers. For the UK, a secessionist movement only has a 3% greater

chance of recognition in a given year where the normative era is favorable than they did

during other years.

The identity relationship hypothesis (ID) no longer achieved statistical significance in

the cases of China and Russia; that is, we can not be certain that the coefficients on shared

Identity are not zero. Regarding China’s recognition decisions, not only was the hypothesis

not statistically significant, it was in the wrong direction. Among the remaining Great

Powers, a secessionist movement had between a 5% and 40% greater chance in any given

year of being recognized by a Great Power with whom it shared a strong identity

relationship than a movement not sharing the same characteristics.201

The following section outlines the research design for the clusters of case studies in

Chapters 4 and 5.

3.9 Case Study Reorientation

The quantitative analysis indicates that external political interests clearly influence the

granting and timing of Great Power recognition and State emergence. Unfortunately, data

scarcity precluded exploration of the relative importance of external politics and domestic sovereignty in the large N analysis. Perhaps political considerations have a relatively small substantive influence on recognition when compared to considerations of domestic authority and sustainability. Or perhaps external politics’ influence on recognition is conditioned upon external politics among the Great Powers themselves. Similarly, correlational analysis

precludes exploration of the mechanism through which external political considerations

201 Strong relative to the ID relationship between the Great Power and the Home State, that is.

115 affect Great Power recognition. For instance, are State interests overtly or covertly pursued?

Do States act unilaterally; do they coordinate; or perhaps might they cooperate in the

granting and timing of their recognition?

Fortunately, the limitations of quantitative, frequentist research create an opportunity to employ small N, comparative case analysis to increase our understanding of recognition dynamics. Case studies are better suited to investigate the mechanism of influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable. This in turn promises a more reliable estimation of causal process. In addition, case selection on the extent of domestic sovereignty exercised by the secessionist movements provides greater insight into this project’s primary null hypothesis. Namely, that recognition is merely a consequence of successfully consolidated domestic sovereignty. Finally, the case studies also serve to check

the construct validity of the quantitative indicators employed in the large N study. In brief,

through well-designed case studies we can better articulate how it is that external political

impetuses might be ultimately translated into recognition behavior.

The following section outlines the plan for the case study clusters in Chapters 4 and

5. In particular, I outline the case selection criteria, operational definitions of the key

variables, and the process tracing method employed.

3.10 Case Selection

The criteria guiding case selection should depend upon the ends sought for the case

analysis. As alluded to above, the case studies for this project seek to uncover the relative

importance of domestic sovereignty considerations and the process by which powerful

States make their recognition decisions. As a result, two primary considerations guided case

selection for the qualitative study. First, the cases needed to exhibit wide variation on the as 116 yet unexplored explanatory variable (domestic sovereignty) and needed to demonstrate

significant variation in the Great Power interest variables articulated in the quantitative

portion of the project.202 Second, variables other than the primary explanatory variables

needed to be as similar as possible so as to induce a modicum of control.

The cases selected for this portion of the project are geographically and temporally

clustered, one within the former Yugoslavia and the other within the post-Soviet States.

Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo all shared the same Yugoslav Home State. Abkhazia,

Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia have different Home States (though

Abkhazia and South Ossetia are both Georgian). These cases share a common lineage

however, because each Home State was formerly a part of the Soviet Union and became

independent at similar points in time. Studying cases with similar geographic locations and

historical trajectories ensures that they are “most similar” cases on the many characteristics

other than those under consideration.

Within the pool of potential clustered cases (near 70 cases in all), most of those not

selected did not afford a high degree of leverage on the relative weight of the explanatory

variables. In the remaining excluded cases, where there was substantial variation on the

independent variables, the dependent variable did not vary. Single, non-geographically

clustered cases were not considered.

Cases selected from within the clusters are not exhaustive, but do cover the full

range of variation in domestic sovereignty (high-med-low). For example, there are at least three other cases of secession from the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Hezegovina, Macedonia,

202 Variation on the Great Power interest variables guiding case selection was judged according to the indicators employed in the quantitative analysis. See Appendix A: Coding Rules for additional details. Lieberman (2005) suggests this technique.

117 and Serbian Krajina) that could have been analyzed. However, these excluded cases were

judged either to 1) not afford much additional leverage on the questions under study or 2)

were not as data rich as the alternative case. Similarly, in the post-Soviet cluster the

Transniestria movement would have induced redundant variation.

Finally, the logic of case selection guiding this portion of the project has a couple of distinct implications for what inferences can be drawn. Trade-offs are inherent to every research design. In this case, selecting cases in clusters violates independence, but also induces control on a number of potentially problematic sources of variation associated with region or time period. The potential non-independence of cases implies that a Great Power’s

recognition decision with respect to one secessionist state might influence the likelihood of recognition for the other secessionists in the case cluster. So Kosovo’s recognition may be

dependent upon the choices that were made in Slovenia and Croatia or Abkhazia’s

recognition might influence that of Chechnya. Indeed, even if the case studies had been

selected in another manner, an assumption of independence would remain untenable. As a

partial fix to the issue of non-independence among the cases, the possibility of contingent

decisions and the influence of prior decisions will be explicitly addressed. By explicitly

considering the possibility for dependence among the cases, we can estimate the weight of

its influence on recognition if not rule it out entirely. The advantages of clustered cases

outweigh the costs. Many of the unhypothesized sources of potential variation are controlled

for through this selection method.

118 3.11 Operational Definitions & Sources

Case study research requires rearticulating and expanding the main concepts’

operational definitions.203 Domestic sovereignty, according to Krasner’s well-known

typology, “refers to the formal organization of political authority within the State and the

ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own

polity.” For the purposes of this study, Krasner’s , “the exclusion of

external actors from authority structures within a given territory” also fits within the

domestic sovereignty concept. 204 Regimes with domestic control and authority are able,

through physical force, to exclude external actors from their territory. They are also

empowered however, to compromise that sovereignty if they so choose. The Westphalian

myth is the source from which most modern conceptions of the State in IR derive.

If the Great Powers use the requirements set by international law when deciding

whether or not to recognize secessionists, only secessionists that meet the criteria will be

recognized; those that do not will not be recognized. There are a number of possible interpretations of the legal standard, so indices were constructed according to both high and low interpretations of the requirements. Leg_low identifies secessionists with no authority

up to a very minimal standard consistent with the legal requirements for recognition.

Leg_high is an index that sets a high standard consistent with the legal requirements for recognition. And Leg_med indicates that an actor scores a mix of high and low on the legal indicators. In other words, the actor is significantly lacking on at least one of the legal

dimensions. The legal requirements for recognition are 1) permanent population 2) defined

203 Conceptual definitions remain consistent throughout. For ease of understanding, concepts are reiterated along with the case study operationalizations.

204 2000, p.3

119 territory 3) government and 4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.205 Data was too spare to test the legal argument in the large N analysis, so cases were selected on this explanatory variable in the small N. In the Yugoslav case cluster, Slovenia is Leg_high,

Croatia is Leg_med and Kosovo is Leg_low. In the post-Soviet cluster, Chechnya fits both

Leg_high and Leg_low over the course of the conflict. Abkhazia, South Ossetia and

Nagorno-Karabakh fall within the Leg_med category (See Table 3.7). In the cases themselves, if a Great Power Statesman explicitly considers the merits of a secessionist state’s claim vis-à-vis the legal requirements or according to estimates of long-term post- independence viability, then it is considered to be evidence of domestic sovereignty influencing recognition.206

205 “Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Inter-American)” December 26, 1933. In Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949 Compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans LL.B. Assistant Legal Advisor Department of State Volume 3 Multilateral 1931-1945 Department of State Publication 8484 Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969.

206 This is a check on the mechanism underlying the domestic sovereignty variable. If Statesmen are making recognition decisions based upon considerations of domestic sovereignty, but deviate from the legal standards due to conflict dynamics (subsequent events alter the situation on the ground), lack of information (simple uncertainty about facts on the ground), or some other bias, the effects of interest motives may be inflated.

120 Measures of domestic control and authority come principally from two sources, newspaper articles chronicling the progress of secessionist efforts and pre-conflict estimates of post-independence viability. Cases falling within Leg_low have control over between 0 and 50% of the territory they claim, support from between 0 and 50% of the population they claim to represent, and a nominal governance structure. Cases in Leg_high have control over more than 50% of the territory they claim, support from over 50% of the population they claim to represent, and a formal governance structure. Finally, cases falling within Leg_med have some mixture of the low and high qualities. A secessionist regime with widespread public support with little physical control of territory for example, would fit within this category.

Capturing the degree of governmental control exercised, its territorial control & effective authority is not straightforward. There are a number of potential indicators of control, but many seem to lack validity in the selected cases. One potential indicator of governmental control is the ability to extract taxes from the population. Taxation was part and parcel to governmental status within each of Yugoslavia’s republics however, so payment to local authorities did not necessarily indicate independent control by that authority rather than the central government. Indeed, if taxation was employed as an indicator, both Slovenia and Croatia became fully independent the day they stopped relaying their local taxes to the central government. This assertion lacks prima facia validity.

Another possible measure of governmental authority is the penetration of government services like roads, schools, and military throughout a territory. Once again though, the measure is not well-suited to the Yugoslav or post-Soviet secessions. Each had fully developed systems of roads, schooling and policing prior to their attempted secessions.

121 That locals controlled those institutions was by constitutional design and did not necessarily indicate a lack of control on behalf of the central authorities. Nor would the measure prove a robust indicator in the Post-Soviet cases. Measuring governmental penetration into the hinterlands would be more a more compelling indicator of control in cases where no modern State was previously established. As Herbst argues, in many African States governmental control does not extend to the State’s juridical borders but reaches only slightly beyond the capitol city. In those cases it might be reasonable to gauge governmental authority according to how far the central government can physically extend its power.

Where roads and the other trappings of governance are firmly established, the task is attributing which, rather than whether an actor holds ultimate authority.

122 The aforementioned difficulties aside, a number of factors are suggestive of the extent of control exercised by nascent States. Where secessionist conflicts took the form of formal war, we can observe the literal surrender and taking of territory and the wars’ ultimate resolutions. Where there was no conflict or, as in the cases of Kosovo and most of the post-

Soviet states, there is no longer conflict, the task is more complex. Because Kosovo is an international trust, reliable measures of control are widely available. In many other cases of

‘cold’ secessionist conflict, this information is not readily available (or highly skewed to reflect the Home State’s preferred view) and therefore control is more difficult to estimate.

The Post-Soviet cases demonstrate just how variable estimates of control can be when conflicts are stalemated post-war. In these instances a regime’s control was estimated by observing whether or not the actor administered independent schools, trade, and provided governmental services such as those ensuring law and order; whether the regime collected taxes and conducted independent elections; and whether the government put forward an independent constitution.

In addition to physical control, the results of plebiscites, constitutional referenda and public opinion polls are reasonable indicators of support for secession, or a particular governing regime, within a population. Other evidence of governmental popularity might include the establishment of cultural institutions, holidays and even immigration of formerly displaced or diaspora communities. When available, these will serve as measures of a secessionist state’s popular legitimacy.

Lastly, beyond military control or voter support, domestic sovereignty was also estimated using professional external forecasts of post-secession viability conducted by

Deutsche Bank, the World Bank and the US State Department. These estimates suggest whether

123 or not experts believe the secessionist states will be able to survive economically, politically

and security-wise into the foreseeable future. If a state’s domestic sovereignty is fleeting or otherwise unsustainable, then the Great Powers might reasonably reject its request for recognition. These three dimensions of domestic sovereignty, 1) territorial control & effective authority 2) popular legitimacy and 3) projected viability will be detailed for each case in the two secessionist case clusters.

The political interest variables explored in this analysis are of two types. The first type is a material interest variable and the second type is an ideational interest variable. In the quantitative analysis, these variables were narrowly restricted to two material security motives

(external and internal security) and two ideational motives (self-determination norms and identity relations) on the part of the Great Powers. In the qualitative analysis, the variables can be more inclusive. Material interests are self-regarding motives. A Great Power actor behaving according to material interests is attempting to achieve a tangible reward through recognition. This motive can take a number of forms including concerns for internal and external security, but also extending to the influence of domestic lobbying or economic incentives for recognition.

Ideational interests are motives based upon intangible considerations of moral or normative behavior.207 These motives might derive from two different sources, at two

different levels. First, recognition may be influenced by considerations of appropriate or

moral behavior at the systemic level (systemic norms). Commonly cited systemic norms

within this category include, but are not limited to, self-determination, universal human

207 Morally righteous and normatively appropriate are not one in the same.

124 rights and the prohibition of genocide.208 Second, recognition might be influenced by sub-

systemic affinities and affiliations (identity). In other words, Statesmen may judge the

righteousness of a nascent State’s claim based upon their own domestic ideal. Those

secessionists seen as more self-like will be deemed more deserving of recognition and

external sovereignty. To cite but two examples, identity might motivate democracy

promotion by the United States abroad and may explain external support for ethnic kin in

Northern Ireland by Irish abroad.209

The explanatory variables (material and ideational) are identified according to the

expressed considerations of Statesmen. Self-referential considerations of the tangible effects that recognition will have on the Great Power’s own behalf are indicative of material interest. Ideational interests are in evidence when Statesmen explicitly consider the moral righteousness and/or normative appropriateness of recognition toward any particular new

State. While some insight into the relative importance of material and ideational interests in recognition might be afforded, for the purposes of this research they should not be seen as competing explanations. Instead, they are complementary political explanations as opposed to the objectivist legal standards (domestic sovereignty).

One potential difficulty for this research design is the possibility that Statesmen have the incentive to obscure their true intentions behind recognition. Perhaps domestic constituencies would oppose recognition for the sake of geo-strategic ends, but would enthusiastically support recognition to stall genocide. This in turn provokes leaders to

208 Recall Hypothesis 5, “Great Powers that support human rights will be more likely to recognize secessionists suffering human rights abuses within their Home States,” will be analyzed in the qualitative analysis in lieu of consistent, available quantitative data.

209 Material and Ideational interests as conceived in this project are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are often complementary and/or one may condition behavior upon another.

125 portray their decision as a humanitarian response. In this example, expressed purposes may

not match actual motives. While it is difficult to guard against this possibility in any research,

triangulating information sources ensures that the explanatory variables are in fact

influencing Statesmen’s recognition decisions; the mechanism of influence is specified.

Whenever possible, public pronouncements were checked and compared with private

deliberations, multiple memoirs, etc.

Data for the case study portion of the project comes from a variety of sources

including transcripts, news articles, interviews, memoirs, secondary scholarly texts, and

public debates.

There are many potential signals indicating that a new State has been acknowledged

as a State by others in the system. Existing States might send diplomatic missions and begin

to engage in diplomacy; they might choose to make treaties; they might vote in favor of

membership in international organizations like the United Nations; or they might begin to

engage in trade or send aid to the new State. 210 Unfortunately, each of these indicators is

limited.211 Operationally, the dependent variable for this portion of the project will again be

formal recognition by any Great/Major Power State. Great Power recognition acts as a

proxy for widespread acceptance.212 Formal recognition is typically granted through public

pronouncement by a or announced by a foreign secretary. This indicator is an

210 The establishment of diplomatic missions in at least two major power States is sufficient to warrant inclusion as a State within the Correlates of War System Membership Dataset.

211 In particular, diplomatic missions are typically established well after a proto-State is accepted by the international community; there is significant debate over whether treaties should be taken to be implicit acknowledgement of new Statehood; a vote for UN membership is explicitly not a form of recognition (though in practice they might be highly correlated); and both trade and aid routinely flow to both States and non- States.

212 I argue that Great Power recognition acts as a focal point, catalyzing normal States to recognize. Heuristically this process takes the form of a tipping model. Great Power recognition alters the incentives for recognition among States that have not yet recognized.

126 uncontroversial sign of external acceptance, it is readily available, and it is explicit. Because

the Great Powers are the most powerful actors within the international system, their

recognition decisions are also the most influential. The set of Great Powers over the

duration of this project are as follows: Great Britain, United States and Russia: 1931-present;

China: 1950-present; France: 1931-1940, 1945-present; Germany: 1931-1945, 1991-present; Italy:

1931-1943; and Japan: 1931-45, 1991-present.

3.12 Case Study Structure

Case studies can take a number of forms, from strictly structured to narrative prose.

The case studies for this project follow a loose, but structured, focused comparison as

outlined by George and Bennett.213 Each cluster of case studies will address the same set of

questions, imposing an order to the structure of the cases in addition to the temporal order

essential to any case study.

Each case will discuss the following questions:

1) To what extent does the secessionist state have domestic sovereignty (across time)? Domestic sovereignty includes three components: territorial control and effective authority within its borders, popular legitimacy among its people and projected viability as a future State member.

2) To what extent are the Great Powers of the extent of domestic sovereignty exercised? And is domestic sovereignty an explicit consideration with respect to recognition?

3) How do the Great Powers define their interests in general and vis-à-vis the secessionist conflicts? Do those interests coincide with the “objective interests” as outlined in the quantitative portion of the project?

213 As initially articulated in George, A.L. (1979) “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison” in Paul Gordon Lauren (Ed.) Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy New York, NY: Free Press

127 4) How much weight do the Great Powers assign to their own interests relative to a secessionist state’s domestic sovereignty when considering recognition?

5) Is recognition principally a unilateral decision? Or do the Great Powers explicitly coordinate, cooperate, or otherwise consider each other’s preferences in granting recognition?

6) Are any considerations, other than those discussed above, entertained in discussions of possible recognition?

128 1931 1968 – SWA, MAS, EQ. 1932 – IRAQ 1969 1933 1970 – FIJI 1934 – HAITI 1971 - BAH, QTR, UAE, OMN, BHUTAN 1935 1972 – BANGLADESH 1936 1973 – BAHAMAS 1937 – 1974 – GRN, GNB 1938 1975 – SUR, CAP, STP, ANG, MZM, 1939 COM, PNG 1940 1976 – SEY, WESTERN 1941 – ETHIOPIA 1977 – DJIBOUTI 1942 1978 – DMA, SOL 1943 1979 – SLU, SVG 1944 – LUX, FRA, ALB, YUG, GRC, ICE 1980 1945 – NTH, BEL, POL, CZE, NOR, DEN 1981 – AAB, BLZ, VAN 1946 – SYR, LIB, JOR, PHI 1982 1947 – INDIA, PAKISTAN 1983 – SKN 1948 – SRI, ISR, MYA, PRK 1984 – BRU 1949 – ROK, INS 1985 1950 1986 1951 – 1987 1952 – JAPAN 1988 1953 – , LAOS 1989 1954 – RVN, DRV, GDR 1990 – LIE, GMY, NAM, YEM 1955 – GFR, AUS 1991 - MLD, EST, LAT, LIT, UKR, BLR, 1956 – SUDAN, , ARM, GRG, AZE, TKM, TAJ, KYR, UZB, 1957 – GHANA, MAL KZK, MSI, FSM 1958 – GUINEA 1992 – SLV, BOS, CRO, SNM 1959 1993 – MNC, AND, SLO, MAC, 1960– CYP, MLI, SEN, BEN, MAA, NIR, ERITREA CDI, BFO, TOG, CAR, NIG, GAB, CHA, 1994 – PAL CON, DRC, DOM, MAG, SOM 1995 1961 – SIE, SYR, TAZ, KUW 1996 1962 – JAM, TRI, UGA, BUR, RWA, ALG 1997 1963 – KEN, ZAN 1998 1964 – MAL, MAW, ZAM 1999 – NAU, TON, KIR 1965 – GAM, ZIM, MAD, SIN 2000 – TUV 1966 – GUY, BAR, LES, BOT 2001 1967 – YPR 2002 – ETM

______

Table 3.1 State Emergence (1931-2002)214

214 State emergence dates according to the Correlates of War (COW) System Membership Data. These entry dates are suggestive, though not perfectly correlated with the SUCCESS variable for this study.

129

Little de facto Widespread de facto

Authority Authority

No Kashmir, Kurdistan, Somaliland, Abkhazia, de jure Hawaii, Tibet , Chechnya Recognition

Widespread Croatia, Bosnia- Bangladesh, Slovenia, de jure Herzegovina, East Eritrea Recognition Timor

Figure 3.1 Modern State Emergence 2 x 2

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 YEAR

Figure 3.2 Number of Great Powers (1931-2002) 130

FAILURE SUCCESS TOTAL (0) (1)

Non- 114 70 Colonial 184 (148) (36) (0)

Anti- 57 34 Colonial 91 (23) (68) (1)

TOTAL 171 104 275

Expected Frequencies (Observed): Chi² Calculations: ((68-34)²/34) = 34 Anti-Colonial Success – 34.4145 (68) ((23-56)²/56) = 19.45 Anti-Colonial Failure - 56.585 (23) ((36-69)²/69) = 15.78 Non-Colonial Success – 69.585 (36) ((148-114)²/114) = 10.14 Non-Colonial Failure – 114.4145 (148) ______Total 79.37

D.F. =1 99% Confidence - x² .001 = 10.8 < 79.37 Passes

We are 99% confident that colonial and non-colonial secessionist movements have statistically significant, differential rates of success. We do not know the nature of the relationship however, nor do we know the substantive influence of colonial history upon successful secession.

Phi=.537 Pearson’s r² = (.537)² = .2886 = 28.9%

Indicates the amount of variation explained by the colonial/non-colonial variable is nearly 29%. This means 61% of the variation in success is attributable to at least one other variable.

Table 3.2 Colony Chi-Square

131 Americas/ USSR/ Asia Middle Africa & W.Europe E.Europe East Oceania TOTAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Failure 22 30 50 17 52 171 (0) (28) (28) (61) (18) (38)

Success 13 18 31 11 31 104 (1) (7) (20) (20) (10) (45)

TOTAL 35 48 81 28 83 275

Expected Frequencies (Observed): Chi² Calculations:

Region 1 Failure – 21.76 (28) ((28-21.76)²/21.76) = 1.789 Region 1 Success – 13.23 (7) ((7-13.23)²/13.23) = 2.933 Region 2 Failure – 29.85 (28) ((28-29.85)²/29.85) = .114 Region 2 Success – 18.15 (20) ((20-18.15)²/18.15) = .188 Region 3 Failure – 50.36 (61) ((61-50.36)²/50.36) = 2.248 Region 3 Success – 30.63 (20) ((20-30.63)²/30.63) = 3.689 Region 4 Failure – 17.41 (18) ((18-17.41)²/17.41) = .020 Region 4 Success – 10.59 (10) ((10-10.59)²/10.59) = .032 Region 5 Failure – 51.61 (38) ((38-51.61)²/51.61) = 3.589 Region 5 Success – 31.39 (45) ((45-31.39)²/31.39) = 5.90 ______Total 20.502

D.F. = 4 99% Confidence - x² .001 =18.5 < 20.502 Passes

We are 99% confident that secessionists’ region of origin has a statistically significant, differential effect on their success. We do not know the nature of the relationship however, nor do we know the substantive influence of region upon successful secession.

Cramer’s phi = .273 Pearson’s r² = (.273)² = .0745 = 7.45%

Indicates the amount of variation explained by region is around 7.5%. This leaves 92.5% of the variation to be explained by at least one other variable.

Table 3.3 Region Chi-Square

132

FAILURE SUCCESS TOTAL (0) (1)

Non- 59 34 Violent 93 (44) (49) (0)

Violent 114 68 182 (1) (129) (53)

TOTAL 173 102 275

Expected Frequencies (Observed): Chi² Calculations: Non-Violent Failure – 58.51 (44) ((44-58.51)²/58.51) = 3.598 Non-Violent Success – 34.49 (49) ((49-34.49)²/34.49) = 6.104 Violent Failure – 114.49 (129) ((129-114.49)²/114.49) = 1.839 Violent Success – 67.51 (53) ((53-67.51)²/67.51) = 3.119 ______Total 14.6

D.F. = 1 99% Confidence - x² .001 = 10.8 < 14.66 Passes

We are 99% confident that violent and non-violent movements have statistically significant, differential rates of success. We do not know the nature of the relationship however, nor do we know the substantive influence of violence upon successful secession.

Cramer’s phi = .230 Pearson’s r² = (.230)² = .0533 = 5.33%

Indicates the amount of variation explained by violent/non-violent means of secession is 5.33%. This leaves 94.66% of the variance to be explained by at least one other variable.

Table 3.4 Violent/Non-Violent Secession Chi-Square

133

FAILURE SUCCESS TOTAL (0) (1)

War Defeat/ 16 11 No Victor 27 (23) (4) (0)

War Victory 8 6 14 (1) (1) (13)

TOTAL 24 17 41

Expected Frequencies (Observed): Chi² Calculations:

War Defeat/No Victor Failure – 15.8 (23) ((23-15.8)²/15.8) = 3.281 War Defeat/No Victor Success – 11.2 (4) ((4-11.2)²/11.2) = 4.629 War Victory Failure – 8.2 (1) ((1-8.2)²/8.2) = 6.322 War Victory Success – 5.8 (13) ((13-5.8)²/5.8) = 8.938 ______Total 23.17

D.F. = 1 99% Confidence - x² .001 = 10.8 <23.17 Passes

We are 99% confident that secessionist movements that defeat their Home States in War have different rates of success than do movements that are either defeated in war or fight to indecisive conclusions. We do not know the nature of the relationship however, nor do we know the substantive influence of war victory upon successful secession.

Cramer’s phi = .7517 Pearson’s r² = (.7517)² = .565

The Pearson’s r² statistic indicates that the amount of variation explained by war victory (only within the set of secessionist wars) is near 57%. This leaves 43% of the variance to be explained by at least one other variable.

Table 3.5 War Outcomes Chi-Square

134 Var. Pooled CHN FRA GMY ITA JPN UKG USA USR _____ External 1.405 1.571 1.560 1.13 1.62 1.305 1.736 1.862 .823 Security (+)

Domestic .334 .305 .725 NV .673 NV .755 .567 .360 Security (-)

Normative 1.29 1.54 1.58 1.83 1.2 1.14 1.03 1.22 1.01 Eras (+)

Identity 1.50 .97 1.23 1.31 1.12 1.2 1.05 1.4 1.21 Relat.(+)

Colony (+) 2.72

Mandate/ 2.92 Trust (+)

Sub-St. (+) 1.44

Pan- NV Mvmnt. (-)

Cold War (-) .22

N 17233 2646 2647 735 333 732 3131 3588 3421

Note: Coefficient (Robust Standard Error) Bold p<.10, Light Gray p<.05, Dark Gray p<.001. N indicates country years. There are 275 secessionist movements in the dataset. Number of successes: 102. Number of failures: 173. DV is hazard rate, the probability that a secessionist movement will receive Great Power recognition in a given year, conditional on it’s not having been recognized already. All tests of significance are two-tailed. The results presented are hazard ratios (the exponentiated form of the coefficient).

Table 3.6 Cox Models for Great Power Recognition

135

Territorial Secessionist Domestic Control & Popular Projected

Actor Sovereign. Effective Legitimacy Viability Authority Former Slovenia High High High High Yugoslavia Croatia Medium Medium High Medium

Kosovo Low Low High Low Post-Soviet Chechnya I High High High High States Abkhazia Medium High Medium Medium Nagorno- Medium Medium High Medium Karabakh South Medium High Medium Low Ossetia Chechnya II Low Low High Low

Table 3.7 Variation in Domestic Sovereignty by Case Cluster

136

CHAPTER 4

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO SECESSION IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1989-2002

4.1 Introduction

With the death of Marshall (Josip Broz) Tito, the Socialist of

Yugoslavia (SFRY) first showed signs of problems that would ultimately destroy it.215

Throughout the 1980s Yugoslavia faced constitutional crises, domestic unrest and teetered

on the verge of dissolution. Somehow though, in each instance the troubled republic

persevered. It was not until 1991 that expectations of Yugoslavia’s fall were finally realized.

Rising expansionist nationalism among Serbs and Croats in the 80s provoked separatist

challenges in minority regions. Some of those areas later secessions left the federation

beyond repair.

As Yugoslavia unraveled, it descended into violent civil, and then international wars.

Most experts agree that Slobodan Milosevic’s virulent brand of was the

persistent cause behind Yugoslavia’s many conflicts.216 But the causes behind Yugoslavia’s

destruction were neither exclusively internal nor deterministic.

215 Marshall Tito died on May 4, 1980.

216 Though there are, of course, many other responsible parties and permissive causes underlying Yugoslavia’s civil wars. These include , ethnic thugs (Mueller, 2005), federal governmental structure and international lack of will (Gow, 1997). 137 External actors were pivotal in the death of the State and Yugoslavia’s collapse was not

predestined. Without a number of specific choices made by powerful external actors,

Yugoslavia’s conflicts could not have played out as they did.

Scholars and Statesmen alike are divided over what or who bears responsibility for

Yugoslavia’s collapse. Many argue the Slovenian and Croatian conflicts could have been

contained and need not have destroyed the State.217 They fault external actors for their

negative influence upon the situation, leaving republics like Bosnia and Macedonia with no

choice but to secede. Others argue the international community’s ‘lack of will’ allowed

virulent nationalism to take control of the country.218 Once powerful States were sufficiently

motivated, it was already too late. Still others argue external intervention, rather than indifference, doomed the embattled State. Finally, some believe Yugoslavia’s bad marriage of and would have condemned any effort to keep the republic together; it was simply a matter of time. According to this interpretation, the dictates of contemporary international law, specifically the extension of uti possidetis to include internal boundaries by the Badinter Commission, necessitated Yugoslavia’s disintegration.219 If taken

as established precedent, many federal States are vulnerable to a similar fate.

217 Eyal (1997), p.49

218 Gow (1997) Triumph of the Lack of Will New York, NY: Columbia University Press; Ullman (Ed)(1996) The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations

219 For discussions of the nature of uti possidetis and its extension beyond colonial independence in Yugoslavia, see Caplan, Richard (2005), Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p.68-71; Radan, Peter (1999) “Yugoslavia’s Internal Borders as International Borders: A Question of Appropriateness” East European Quarterly 33:2, pp.137-155; Lalonde, Suzanne (2002) Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: the role of uti possidetis Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen’s University Press.; Ratner, Steven R. (1996) “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States” American Journal of International Law 90:4, pp.590-624.

138 External recognition also figures prominently in the controversy surrounding

Yugoslavia’s collapse. 220 As 1991 drew to a close, German officials became convinced that

Yugoslavia’s conflict was stalemated and further, that was responsible for the impasse.

German Statesmen believed the only way to avoid further Serb aggression was to formally

recognize the secessionists (at that point Slovenia and Croatia), thereby internationalizing

conflict. Only then could the defenseless republics seek the recourse afforded exclusively to

States under international law. Faced with certain loss, Serbs would be forced to give up

their demands for an unaltered Yugoslavia or ‘’.

Much of Europe disagreed with the Germans at first, but as the others grew

frustrated with Milosevic and came to share Germany’s point of view, Chancellor Kohl

became impatient and unilaterally recognized the two. Germany’s decision is thought by

some to have provoked further Serb aggression and the subsequent war in Bosnia.221 Seen in

this manner, the decision to defect from the European Community’s ‘comprehensive settlement’ agenda dashed any hope of salvaging Yugoslavia.222 Slovenia and Croatia’s

secessions were perhaps unavoidable, but Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s departures

could have been prevented, as could the war in Bosnia. Finally, Germany’s unilateral

precedents have the potential to cause even further conflict as Kosovo, , and

220 Bearce (2002) “Institutional Breakdown and International Cooperation: The European Agreement to Recognize Croatia and Slovenia” European Journal of International Relations 8:4, pp.471-497; Crawford (1996) “Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia” World Politics 48, p.482-521.

221 Carrington, Lord Peter cited in Silber and Little (1996), p.199-200; Silber and Little suggest the same themselves on p.205. Gow (1997) argues to the contrary that war preparations for Bosnia were made well in advance of EC recognition. This fact suggests that war would have come to Bosnia regardless of the international community’s recognition decisions. (p.34)

222 European Community (EC) and (EU) will be used interchangeably throughout the project. The European Union formally succeeded the European Community when the Treaty of the European Union came into force on November 1st, 1993. 139 Transniestria (Moldova) grapple with their own possible independence. The international

community should have reigned in German sympathies in favor of European stability.

Recognition’s greater role in Yugoslavia’s wars is certainly worthy of comment, but

this chapter takes an alternative approach to the question of recognition. Whether or not

Germany’s decision in particular catalyzed the war over Bosnia-Herzegovina, recognition did

play a decisive role in the international landscape left in Yugoslavia’s wake. Why was there so

much controversy surrounding Germany’s choice? If Slovenia and Croatia were not yet

States, why would Germany, and then the European Union, recognize them as such?

Specifically, why would the EU follow Germany’s rash and unilateral example? On the other

hand, if Slovenia and Croatia were indeed States, why would mere recognition of an achieved

fact, a fait accompli, cause such a fracture in European relations? How do we know that a new

State has entered the international system? And in this case, why didn’t the Great Powers agree?

Yugoslavia’s collapse has been thoroughly studied, but a reevaluation of its demise is both theoretically useful and politically timely. International relations has not adequately evaluated external politics’ influence on the emergence of new States in the post-Cold War

era. While many scholars and diplomats expected State emergence to slow (if not stop

completely) with the demise of colonialism, it has not.223 Instead, it seems the interstate

system has no natural equilibrium; the desire for sovereign independence remains strong and

State emergence continues unabated. What are the causes and consequences of this

223 As evidence that formal colonialism is no longer practiced, the United Nations Trusteeship Council, one of the major international instruments dedicated to trust and non-self governing territories’ independence, suspended its regular meetings with the independence of in 1994. Since then Secretary General Kofi Annan has recommended that the Council disband entirely.

140 counterintuitive trend? When and why does the international community accept new

members without colonial grievances like those in the Former Yugoslavia?

The politics of recognition are also of renewed relevance to contemporary politics

within the Former Yugoslavia as talks on Kosovo’s final status are currently underway

(Spring 2006). Kosovo is afforded de facto independence under the auspices of the United

Nations, but it would likely not be able to maintain that independence without external backing. Serb authorities have no intention of revoking their claim to authority over the territory and have pledged to take it back by force if necessary.224 At the same time, Kosovo

Albanians will not willingly surrender the autonomy they have enjoyed since 1999. Kosovo’s

final status will also undoubtedly influence future majority-minority relations within the

region.225 Many Eastern European States, including those of the Former Yugoslavia,

continue to struggle with separatism and the accommodation of national minorities.

Understanding the politics of recognition surrounding Yugoslavia’s initial dissolution may

shed light on Kosovo’s independence prospects and on the future of regional politics.

Unfortunately, even with the benefit of hindsight the “most important” cause of

Yugoslavia’s wars will remain uncertain. As with most international conflicts, Yugoslavia’s

demise was the result of numerous inherent pathologies and avoidable missteps, ranging

from ancient ethnic hatreds to Slobodan Milosevic’s insidious nationalism to democratic

transition to international meddling. This chapter will undoubtedly not do justice to every

224 Though Serbian demands for Kosovo have recently become more moderate with Milosevic’s ouster, Serbs still seek a special relationship, possibly formal, with Kosovo’s Serb minority.

225 For example, authorities in Transniestria declared that they would hold a on independence in the event of Kosovo independence. , speaker of the parliament in the self-proclaimed republic, argued Kosovo independence would set a precedent for other States in the post-Soviet space including Transniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. “Dniester Region to Hold Referendum if Kosovo Gains Independence” February 27, 2006 ITAR-TASS in English World News Connection.

141 factor contributing to Yugoslavia’s collapse. Instead, it concentrates its efforts toward

understanding the external or international forces contributing to Yugoslav dissolution and

the emergence of new States. Specifically, when, why and how did the Great Powers determine that Yugoslavia was no longer one State, but many?

In the chapter that follows, I examine the international politics surrounding three very different secessionist states within the former Yugoslavia: Slovenia, Croatia and

Kosovo.226 The case cluster first describes the domestic and international contexts in which

the secessions arose. Then, measurements of the level of internal sovereignty exercised by

each proto-State are taken. Next, I explore the bilateral and multilateral politics surrounding

each secession attempt, examining the Great Powers’ initial preferences regarding

recognition as well as their evolution over time. I also check whether Great Powers’ self-

identified interests are consistent with those outlined in the quantitative portion of the study?

I conclude with estimates of external politics’ and domestic sovereignty’s relative influences upon Great Power recognition decisions.

4.2 Historical Background

Yugoslavia confronted the same difficulties many Eastern European States did as they adjusted to the post-Cold War era. Economic transition, long latent ethnic , and political volatility made the period particularly uncertain for Eastern Europe. Rapid change, high inflation and political unrest were commonplace. Remarkably, most States in

226 Not all of Yugoslavia’s constituent units will be considered in this chapter. While the conflict in Bosnia is certainly integral to Yugoslavia’s collapse, too many dynamics were simultaneously at play in that republic. As Bosnia sought independence, Croats and Serbs within Bosnia sought to join Croatia and Greater Serbia. These dynamics limited the potential insight for a case study. Macedonia was not included simply because its variation on the independent variable (authority and control) was redundant.

142 the region emerged from their post-War transitions relatively unscathed, though

fundamentally altered from their Cold War selves. Yugoslavia was not so fortunate.

Yugoslavs’ responses to the pressures of the new world order were unique in the extent of

their destruction and the brutality of their violence.

Josip Tito had ruled Yugoslavia for nearly the entire post-World War II period

(1953-1980). Though devoutly socialist, Tito’s Yugoslavia was often at odds with the Soviet

Union. First, Tito advocated domestic profit sharing for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)

which, though not well thought of in the USSR, left Yugoslavia economically somewhat

better-off. Second, Tito was fiercely independent. Under his leadership Yugoslavia became

one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement; he would not join the

Warsaw Pact States. Tito’s uneasy relationship with the Soviet Union made him a Western

darling, as did what was then seen as his deft handling of Yugoslavia’s difficult minority

situation. Charismatic and strong-willed, Tito insisted Communist ideology and Yugoslav

identity alone were sufficient to unite the republic. Consequently, his regime repressed ethnic

nationalisms in favor of socialist unity.

Nevertheless, local governmental control within Yugoslavia often coincided with the

republics’ majority ethnicities (See Table 4.4). Slovenia was approximately 90% Slovene

(pop. 2 million). Serbia was two-thirds Serb (including Kosovo and Vojvodina), Montenegro

was two-thirds , and Macedonia was two-thirds Macedonian. Croatia, with a

population around 4.7 million, was 85% Croat and around 12% Serb. Within Croatia

however, Serbs were local majorities in 14 of its 102 administrative .227 Finally,

Bosnia-Herzegovina had the most ethnically diverse population where “some 40 percent

227 Weller, Marc (1992) “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” The American Journal of International Law 86:3 (July), p.569

143 [were] , 32 percent Serbs and 18 percent Croats.”228 Functionally this meant many of

the republics (Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia) had ethnic majorities

that were politically dominant as well.

At the same time, most Yugoslav states had significant minority populations. There

were Serb enclaves in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Both Bosnia and Slovenia

had Croat minorities. Kosovo also had a small Macedonian population. Serbia had

Albanians, Bosnians, , and Macedonians. Montenegro had Albanians,

Bosnians, Croats and Serbs. Finally, in Macedonia there were Albanian, Montenegrin and

Serb minorities. So while majority populations were politically dominant, state borders did

not neatly coincide with ethnicity. Even Yugoslavia’s constituent parts were decidedly multi-

ethnic.

Though it had not always been the case, Yugoslav authority became significantly

more diffuse and federal in the 1970’s. Under the 1974 constitution, each republic essentially

governed itself. Schools, police, and even territorial armies were organized under local, rather

than national, authority. The diffuse governmental structure had mostly encouraged internal

stability under Tito.

[T]he country lived under a relatively mild party that guaranteed freedom of movement, the basic forms of private ownership, an effective and services, and a changeable tolerance of the informal political opposition within and outside the . A relatively high degree of cultural and administrative autonomy for the various federal units made it possible for a period of greater restrictions on the freedom of the press and speech in one republic to be mitigated by a more liberal attitude on these matters adopted in another republic. In that way the effects of one-party exclusivity were to some extent neutralized.229

228 Ibid.

229 Pusić, Vesna (1992) “A Country by Any Other Name: Transition and Stability in Croatia and Yugoslavia” East European Politics and Societies 6:3, p.244

144 Unfortunately, it was also Yugoslavia’s federal organization (along principally ethnic lines)

that encouraged tensions between the republics to manifest themselves in interethnic

hostilities throughout the 1980s.

When Tito died, so did his idea that Yugoslavia’s nations were indivisible and their

internal boundaries, arbitrary. Almost immediately, Kosovo Albanians demanded Kosovo be elevated from the status of an autonomous region to that of a constituent republic.230 Serbian authorities responded badly. The Albanian protestors were brutally repressed by Serbs who dubbed them “hostile and counterrevolutionary.”231 Kosovar officials were purged from

government, rioters were jailed, Pristina University was closed, and a state of emergency was

declared. Serbian nationalism resurfaced. Threatened by the activist turn in Kosovo, and

justifiably concerned for their own security, Kosovo Serbs demanded that Serbia intervene.

Serbs throughout Yugoslavia advocated that Kosovo and Vojvodina have their autonomy

revoked. But unrest only spread as Serb authorities placed more restrictions on the

autonomous regions. Violence had proliferated throughout Kosovo by 1989.

It was in this tendentious ethnic and economic environment that Slobodan Milosevic

ascended to power in Serbia. Milosevic politically manipulated Kosovo’s unrest to stoke

fears of ethnic subordination among Kosovo Serbs and Serbs in Serbia proper (though there

was little evidence of systematic Serb repression in Kosovo).232 Until then thought of as a

bland technocrat, Milosevic defied expectations. He used nationalist propaganda, emotional

230 Kosovo Albanians first rioted for autonomy in April and May of 1981.

231 Pond, Elizabeth August 5, 1981 “Nationalism that surfaced in Kosovo protests ripples across Yugoslavia The Christian Science Monitor, p.14

232 Though Kosovo Serbs were the targets of violence during the Albanian riots in Kosovo, Serbs were not systematically discriminated against in the region.

145 public rhetoric and scripted public protests to consolidate his political power. Milosevic

became the leader of Serbian Communists in 1987 and proceeded on to the Serbian

presidency on May 8, 1989 after ousting his mentor, Ivan Stambolic.233 Once in power,

Milosevic set to “protecting” Serbs in Kosovo by restricting local power and asserting

federal control. Time would show however, that Milosevic’s political ambitions did not end

with protecting Serbs in the autonomous provinces.

Around the same time, Slovenia and Croatia began pushing for greater autonomy.

Mounting Serb nationalism undoubtedly strengthened the desire to decentralize authority,

but economic incentives figured more prominently at first.234 Yugoslavia’s six republics faced

starkly different economic circumstances as they transitioned to an open market economy.

Each state’s preference for the character and pace of Yugoslavia’s reforms mirrored its

economic incentives. Slovenia and Croatia were relatively advantaged in

markets and felt stifled by the other republics. Net contributors to the central government,

they wanted to decrease their burdens and become more integrated with Europe. The

difficulties of economic transition, the worldwide recession in the 1980s, Yugoslavia’s huge

foreign debt and relative dependence among the republics all strained Slovenia and Croatia’s

relationships with the union. Though the two were economically strong, they did not want to

remain bound to the struggling southern republics. To continue to live as permanent

minorities within that system, under aggressive Serb , was even less attractive. In

233 Judah, Tim (1997) notes that the formal ceremony was scheduled for June 28th in order to coincide with the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, thus heightening the nationalist sentiment behind the occasion. (p.164)

234 Vodopivec (1992) argues to the contrary that “calls for repressive measures against opposition intellectuals and for centralization in the fields of education, science and culture did more to mobilize public opinion than did the economic problems.” (p.237)

146 contrast, Kosovo was relatively underdeveloped and benefited significantly from the

contributions of other states.235 Not eager to forego the benefits of membership, Kosovars

initially preferred greater internal autonomy and political prestige.

Yugoslavia’s republics differed in their domestic political characters as well. Again,

Slovenia and Croatia established Western-style systems while the other republics followed

Serbia’s example more closely. Slovenia’s first independent elections were held in April of

1990. The major Slovenian parties campaigned on human rights, democratic governance and

economic liberalism. Milan Kučan, of the League of Communists of Slovenia (LDC), was elected president. Though Slovenia elected a Communist president and the Communists

(under Milosevic) were similarly in power in Serbia, superficial continuity masked important

differences.236 As one observer noted, “the difference between the League of Communists of

Slovenia and the League of Communists of Serbia corresponded roughly with the difference

between Franz Vranitsky’s Austrian Socialists and the Supreme Soviet in Azerbaijan.”237

Serbs centralizing aspirations threatened Slovenians and they found Serbs nationalistic fervor anachronistic. Even so, were initially willing to pursue internal reforms along the lines of a of independent States like that of the British Commonwealth.

235 As one author observed, “Slovenia, with only 8.2 percent of the [Yugoslav] population produced between 17 percent and 18 percent of Yugoslavia’s GDP, 25 percent of Yugoslavia’s total exports, and 33 percent of Yugoslavia’s exports to hard currency markets [in the 1980s]” (Prunck, 1997 p.27). Slovenia paid “20 percent” of the federation’s income in the form of taxes and “special funds for the underdeveloped regions” (Ibid. p.28). Serbia proper and Croatia provided the greatest percentage of funds to support Yugoslavia’s federal institutions (Zarkovic-Bookman, 1992 p.78) (Zarkovic-Bookman also notes that Croatia provided more if Kosovo and Vojvodina are considered a part of Serbia). Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia contributed the next greatest proportions, followed by Vojvodina. Kosovo and Montenegro, the least developed regions, also contributed the least to central authorities. Pedro Ramet notes that even in Slovenia economic uncertainties provoked anti- migrant sentiments directed at guest workers from the southern republics. (Rezun, 1995 p.178)

236 In January 1990, Slovenes and Croats left the Yugoslav Communist Party to form their own national Communist parties.

237 Pusić, Vesna (1992) “A Country by Any Other Name: Transition and Stability in Croatia and Yugoslavia” East European Politics and Societies 6:3, p.242

147 Slovenia only came to embrace secession as constitutional negotiations broke down. It

became evident that the two systems, one liberal and democratic, the other centralized and

nationalistic, were fundamentally incompatible.

Croatians, Western-oriented in their economic affairs, adopted a distinct political

character from that of their Slovene neighbors. Like Slovenians, Croatians contributed

substantial support to the less developed republics. Also like Slovenia, in the years following

Tito’s death the Croatian Communist Party had ruled Croatia. And finally, it was widely held

that Croatia’s first free elections, in May, would similarly yield a Communist Party victory.

However, outsiders underestimated Croats’ antipathy for Titoism and the Croatian

Communist party. And they incorrectly gauged the extent of Croats’ insecurity and the

ferocity of their newfound nationalism. The Communists lost and were replaced with the

right wing HDZ (Christian Democratic Union).

Whereas Slovenia had transformed the Communist party from within, Croatians

transferred power to a regime they believed would lead their republic away from both

Milosevic and their Communist past. Popular opinion saw the Croatian Communists as

ineffectual and too moderate in their stance toward Milosevic. Unlike Slovenia, Croatia had a

significant, discontented Serbian minority. Ethnic mobilization and expansionist rhetoric among Serbian Serbs was potentially destabilizing in Croatia; especially in territories with

local Serb majorities. The Croatian population felt threatened. Dr. Franjo Tudjman’s HDZ

presented a more assertive, more palpable alternative to being bullied by the Serbs.

148 The HDZ delivered. One of the new government’s first acts in office was a

constitutional change affirming Croatia was ‘the national state of the Croatian people’,

eliminating the special place formerly reserved for Croatia’s Serb minority.238 Though the

constitutional change was perhaps only a gesture, the HDZ’s historical association with

Nazism did little to allay Serbs’ fears. The new government touched-off a spiral of insecurity between Croats and Croatian Serbs. Judah notes, “Milosevic’s Serbian nationalism was the greatest boost to Tudjman’s Croatian nationalism, but now that the Pandora’s box had been opened, there was no shutting it” the two nationalisms would feed off of each other’s hostility.239

Controversial in his own right, as president Tudjman advocated a Catholic (possibly

anti-Semitic) Croatian nationalism, Croatian independence and a potentially irredentist

agenda in Bosnia.240 His rallying cry was effective among Croats. By one count, seven political movements within Croatia were dedicated to secession by 1989.241 In response,

Croatia’s significant Serb minority threatened to join Serbia in the event of Croatian independence. The domestic political situation was incredibly unstable. Though Croatia took its queues from Slovenia when it came to the future relationship among Yugoslavia’s states, independence became Croats’ primary goal.

238 Caplan (2005), p.115 and n.80

239 Judah (1997), p.165

240 He, for example, had been known to say that Bosnia and Croatia formed a “ natural political and economic unit” and that Bosnia was historically “a Catholic kingdom, linked to Croatia” Tanner (1997) p.228, 242

241 Rezun, Miron (1995) cites the Central Committee of the Croatian League of Communists, the Croatian Catholic Community, the Croatian Liberation Movement, the Croatian National Committee, The Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, and Otpor “a Croatian terrorist group”, p.122. (Elsewhere Otpor is described as a Serbian pro-democracy youth group turned . It was widely discredited within Serbia due to its strong ties to the US government. Otpor was subject to a number of human rights abuses at the hands of Serb authorities leading up to the 2000 elections according to the Human Rights Watch World Report for 2001. It is unclear whether these two groups are associated with one another.)

149 4.3 Precipitating Events

Yugoslavia’s union was in peril as the 1980’s came to a close. Still, none of republics

or autonomous regions had demanded independence. Slovenia and Croatia both ostensibly

sought a confederation of states, maintaining some degree of Yugoslav unity. Kosovo merely

demanded higher status within the existing union. Finally, Yugoslavia’s remaining republics

were satisfied with continued unity (contingent upon the other republics remaining within

the State as well). In the spring of 1991, the constituent republics made their final attempt to

negotiate structural reforms and salvage the union. The negotiations were unsuccessful. A

mutually agreeable solution was impossible given Milosevic’s rigid insistence on centralized authority and Slovenia and Croatia’s refusal to submit to his, or continued Serbian, authority.

In 1989, under pressure from federal authorities, Vojvodina and Kosovo lost their autonomous statuses and their leaders were replaced with Milosevic allies. Later,

Montenegro’s leaders were similarly replaced. On July 2, Kosovo’s provincial assembly formally demanded its status within the Yugoslav federation be elevated to that of a constituent republic. Its population had been demanding the same thing for years. Serb authorities reacted by dissolving Kosovo’s legislative assembly. They then proceeded to formally incorporate both autonomous provinces under Serbian authority. Effectively, this meant the Serbs were now in control of four votes within the Yugoslav Federation: Kosovo,

Montenegro, Serbia and Vojvodina. Once in control, Serbs eliminated over 100,000

Albanian jobs within Kosovo. A general strike was called in the province to protest the new policies. In response, Serbs subjected the Kosovo Albanians to a virtual police state. Within

Slovenia and Croatia, Milosevic’s treatment of Kosovo and the other provinces was taken as a harbinger of things to come. Independence became a more attractive option.

150 On December 23, 1990, Slovenes held a referendum on independence. 93% of the

electorate participated in the vote and approximately 89% of voters supported secession in

the event that negotiations with the other republics failed. (See Table 4.2) Just a day earlier,

Croatia promulgated a new constitution nullifying federal law within the province.242 The

Yugoslav Supreme Court quickly declared both states’ nullifications illegal. Neither Tudjman nor Kucan, however, demanded independence outright. Both held fast to the proposed loose confederation among Yugoslavia’s states. But both also publicly reiterated that the

1974 Constitution granted a right of secession to Yugoslavia’s constituent nations, leaving open the possibility for their eventual departures.243

Throughout the spring, the presidents of Yugoslavia’s states participated in a series

of negotiations in an attempt to maintain their union and create workable formal

relationships between the republics. Little, if anything, was accomplished. As Silber and

Little recount, the representatives simply used the occasion to reiterate their already

recalcitrant positions. There was, in fact, no negotiation at all. Milosevic granted Slovenia

and Croatia’s contention that they had a constitutional right to secede, but countered that

Croatia’s Serbian population was entitled to the same right. Tudjman dubbed the sessions

“conversations of the deaf.”244 Behind the scenes, Slovenia and Croatia quietly began preparations to secure their independence.

242 The had declared sovereignty on July 2nd and declared federal law null on July 27th.

243 Interestingly, the constitution also stipulated that secession could only occur upon the consensus of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations. This technicality was not raised by either.

244 Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation TV Books, Distributed by Penguin, USA, p.147 151 Early in May (1991), according to established precedent, the Yugoslav federal

presidency was supposed to rotate to Stipe Mesic, a Croat. But the Serbian-controlled block prevented Mesic from assuming the position. Instead, Borisav Jovic, a Serb, was installed at the post. It proved to be the straw that broke the ’s back. Slovenia and Croatia both moved for complete, formal independence and sovereign Statehood. In Croatia, a referendum held on May 19th yielded overwhelming support (93.24%) for independence.

Predictably, Croatian Serbs boycotted the . They had conducted their own, “illegal”

referendum earlier that month yielding a vote of 90% in favor of remaining within

Yugoslavia. (See Table 4.2) With only around 12% of the total population though, even a

unanimous Serb vote against independence in the republic-wide referendum would not have

affected the outcome. In contrast, Slovenia’s independence mandate had been clear since it

conducted its plebiscite (in December 1990).

Slovenia and Croatia’s secessionist aspirations were now undeterrable. Central

government threats that declarations of independence would be forcefully opposed would

not stop them. Nor would a last minute visit by US Secretary of State, James Baker

reiterating that the international community resolutely opposed any unilateral moves toward secession. Kucan and Tudjman’s decisions were not rash or impulsive, however; they had been coordinating their possible independence for many months. On June 15th the two met

to make final preparations for their formal declarations of independence. It was clear to the

Slovenians at least, that Croatia was far less prepared for independence, but Tudjman pressed forward nonetheless.245 Both republics declared independence on June 25, 1991.246

245 For a first hand recounting of the final meeting see Silber, Laura and Allan Little (1996) Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation TV Books, Distributed by Penguin, USA, p.149-50

152 Their demands were dubbed unconstitutional and illegal by Yugoslav authorities; first by the

Presidency and then by the Constitutional Court. The JNA moved quickly to suppress the

rebellions. In October, Kosovo declared independence as well.

4.4 The International Environment

Outside Yugoslavia, the international system was undergoing a number of important political transitions in the late 80s and early 90s. In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev had barely survived a coup attempt brought about by the institution of dramatic internal reforms. Politics and economics within the USSR were changing rapidly and the ’s future was uncertain. For the Yugoslav government, the Soviet Union’s decline signaled the end of its geo-strategic influence and disproportionate leverage with the West.

For Yugoslavia’s discontented minorities, the Soviet Union’s decline was viewed as an opportunity. Yugoslavia’s subordinated minorities knew the central government’s hand had been weakened with the demise of bipolar antagonisms. The superpowers would not be so quick to involve themselves in Yugoslavia’s internal affairs; the stakes in the region were not as high as they once were. The conditions were ripe for their independence.

Around the same time, discontented minorities in the USSR began secession attempts of their own. Sensing the central authorities’ weakness, the Baltic States (Latvia,

Lithuania and Estonia) demanded independence from the Soviet Union. Many other Soviet

246 On September 17th (1991), Macedonia declared independence. Kosovo came next on October 11th, 1991. Finally, declared independence on April 5th, 1992. Almost immediately upon word of the secessionist ambitions, minority populations in those republics declared themselves independent as well. Serbs and Croats declared themselves independent of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 (in July and October respectively). Then, Serbs in Croatia declared themselves independent on March 1st, 1992. All of the secondary secessions sought reunification with some part of the former Yugoslavia; Serbs wanted to remain within Greater Serbia and Croats sought union with the new Croatian State. The declarations of and Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia were irredentist movements as their primary aim was to reunite all of Yugoslavia’s predominantly Serb regions within a single independent State.

153 states would soon follow. The coincidence of the two countries’ secessionist movements would not bode well for Yugoslavia’s secessionists. Great Power Statesmen were uniquely aware of Yugoslavia’s potential influence on the secession attempts in the USSR. And

Statesmen were far more concerned with the implications of the Soviet secessions than they were with Yugoslavia’s. They were loath to set a precedent that might usher in worldwide instability.

Elsewhere in Europe, important changes were also underway. In Eastern Europe,

Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were undergoing economic and political transitions in what have come to be called refolutions, (a combination of reform and revolution). The

Eastern European States’ peaceful transitions away from toward democracy demonstrated for the first time that revolutionary change could occur through reform rather than violent upheaval. In these countries, where rapid reforms similar to those in Yugoslavia were occurring, violence was almost entirely averted. A peaceful transition was occurring in

Western Europe as well. East and formally reunited on October 3. The new government was ushered in on a wave of euphoric satisfaction with self-determination and

Western-style governance. Germany quickly stabilized and became an important player in regional politics. Neither German reunification nor the Eastern European refolutions inspired violence. Their successes, even in the face of dramatic change, made the Yugoslav conflict seem all the more brutal, illegitimate and unnecessary from the outside.

On the opposite side of the Atlantic, the United States was involved in a war of its own. Gulf War I aimed to compel Iraq to withdraw from , which it occupied, and abandon its irredentist claims therein. Until the US intervened in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, it was unclear whether the United States would assert itself as a global hegemon or whether,

154 instead, the Soviet Union’s fall would usher in a multipolar era. The war was significant for

Yugoslavia’s conflicts because it meant much of the world, certainly the West, was

preoccupied with the forces and finances they had committed in the Middle East. Most of

the world was hesitant involve themselves militarily in Yugoslavia’s civil war.

As the Soviet Bloc was struggling through a transitional period and the US was

occupied elsewhere, Western Europe was laying the groundwork for its economic and

political integration. Among their more ambitious aims, Europeans hoped to create a unified

European foreign policy. When conflict broke out in Yugoslavia, it was understood to be a

European problem and thus, an unprecedented opportunity for Europe to test its new

initiative. Since the Superpowers were otherwise engaged, they were content to oblige the

Europeans a trial run at collective diplomacy. Still, European policy collaboration had not

been tested. And Europe was no more eager than the United States to make a military

commitment to Yugoslavia, so the means at the EC’s disposal were limited.

As a result of the rapid changes in the international system, not all of the Great

Powers were similarly interested or involved in Yugoslavia’s conflicts. Initially, Europeans

played the most significant role. The Soviet Union largely opted out of diplomatic

intervention in the early 1990s due to rampant political instability and its own dissolution

management problems. When Russia was engaged, it was limited to its role as a permanent

member of the UN Security Council and member of the CSCE (Commission on Security

and Cooperation in Europe).247 The United States was not directly active in Yugoslavia until

asked by Europe to intervene in the mid-90s. Finally, Yugoslavia was outside of the Asian

247 Though the Soviet Union was not directly involved, it was certainly the 800 pound guerilla in the room. Concern for precedent made the Soviet Union’s disintegration a prominent consideration in the Great Powers’ actions toward Yugoslavia. This was especially the case within the EC.

155 powers’ spheres of influence. China, a staunch defender of domestic sovereignty and non-

intervention, played an active role in Great Power debates within the Security Council, but

was not otherwise active in the conflict. Japan, just reemerging as a global power, was even less engaged because it had no equivalent institutional position within the United Nations,

nor was it particularly interested in the course of events in Yugoslavia.248

4.5 Domestic Sovereignty

Yugoslavia’s secessionists exercised various degrees of physical control within the

territories they claimed; they had different levels of governmental legitimacy within their

respective populations; and experts saw varied potential for each to become a viable State.

Of course, any pre-independence viability estimates are subject to the perhaps unreasonable

assumption that the status quo is maintained.249 Nevertheless, according to the null

hypothesis, material capacity and de facto control should uniquely determine external recognition. Part of that estimation includes not only whether a regime is temporarily in control of its population and borders, but whether it can reasonably be expected to maintain

that control. Expert forecasts are the best, albeit imprecise, indicator of the secessionist

states’ potential viability.

248 This is consistent with the expectations generated by the quantitative indicators (See Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Japan had no security interests in Yugoslavia (geo-strategic or domestic), the normative environment favored the State for the most part and Japan shared few identity traits with either the Serbs or their secessionists (democratic ideology alone was shared with the secessionists).

249 One difficulty in judging viability prior to independence is that a state’s move for independence itself often provokes conflict (as it did in each of Yugoslavia’s conflicts). While some of the costs associated with formal separation from a Home State are estimable, others depend upon the force brought to bear to resist the secession. As we will see, Slovenia’s chances of winning its war against Yugoslav authorities did not look good ahead of time. Once the war began however, and it was clear that Yugoslavia would not fight hard; its chances became much better. So, potential viability is often overtaken by the progress of events on the ground.

156 As discussed earlier, there can be no incontrovertible evidence that a proto-State

meets the established threshold for Statehood. The criteria with the greatest consensus, the

Montevideo standards, are inherently ambiguous and efforts to further clarify them have been unsuccessful.250 Because the legal requirements are so unspecific, I created an index of

control to guide this project’s case selection. The lowest level of control, in this cluster

manifest in the Kosovo case, indicates a secessionist regime clearly does not reach the

standards for independence. At the medium level of control, the secessionist state arguably

meets the minimum level of capacity required by law in most respects, but falls short on at

least one of the four required dimensions. Croatia fits within this category in the Yugoslav

cluster. Finally, movements within the highest category unambiguously meet or exceed the

legal standards. In this cluster, Slovenia’s domestic sovereignty was beyond reproach.251

4.6 Domestic Sovereignty in Slovenia

Slovenia exercised the greatest degree of domestic sovereignty coincident with its declaration of independence. Though the central government mobilized JNA forces to combat Slovenia’s secession, the resulting civil war lasted only ten days. While it is true little force was brought to bear to maintain control over Slovenia, Slovenia’s armed forces were also surprisingly competent.252 Slovenian authorities had a strong foundation for effective

250 See Grant (1999) on additional criteria like “good governance”, democracy, “civilizational level” and willingness and ability to observe international law. p.30-32

251 Consult the case study design at the end of Chapter three for the precise criteria in the Domestic Sovereignty index.

252 For example, many JNA forces moved into Slovenia only to find themselves surrounded by the Slovenian defense forces and cut-off from their supply lines. The central government’s war plans did not anticipate the Slovenians would be so strategic.

157 governance, partially due to Yugoslavia’s loose federal structure, but additionally because

Slovenes made extensive preparations for independence. Most Slovenians also strongly

favored independence. There was perhaps some ambiguity in the language of Slovenia’s

plebiscite, but popular support for independence from Serbia was undisputed.253 As a

consequence of all these factors, there was little doubt Slovenia would remain viable if

granted formal membership within the community of States. Slovenia had one of the most

developed and open economies in Eastern Europe. And, beyond its potential conflict with

Yugoslav authorities, Slovenia had no enemies or standing extraterritorial disputes.

It was plainly evident, even before its war against the JNA, that Slovenia would

flourish as a State. The Great Powers did not grant Slovenia recognition immediately,

however. Giving Slovenia external sovereignty implied important consequences for Great

Power interests and for Yugoslavia’s remaining conflicts. Circumstances on the ground were

not compelling enough to overwhelm the Great Powers’ other concerns in the region.

4.6.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority

Slovenia’s June 25th declaration of independence was met with swift force, just as

Serb authorities had promised only days before. The relative power balance favored the

federal authorities. At the time, Slovenia’s armed forces were estimated at 20,000 troops.254

The JNA had 38,000 troops stationed in Slovenia alone.255 Somewhat surprisingly, Slovenia’s

state security forces overwhelmed the JNA in only ten days. Estimates show that only 37

253 Some argued at the time that Slovenia’s referendum had not shown support for independence outright, but only support for independence in the event that negotiations among the republics failed.

254 estimated that Slovenia had a reserve force of some 68,000 men, but only enough arms for 40,000 of them. “Slovenia’s Self-Defense” July 6, 1991 The Economist 320:7714, p.46; Tanner (1997) suggests Slovenia had 40,000 troops in their . p.252

255 The JNA was estimated to have near 138,000 troops total on active duty. Tanner (1997) notes however, that Yugoslav troops active the Slovenian war might have numbered as few as 2,000. p.252

158 JNA soldiers and 9 Slovene defenders died in the conflict; a casualty estimate much lower

than typically warrants the label war.256 Nevertheless, the victory was decisively in Slovenia’s

favor.

Slovenia’s dramatic battlefield success was due, at least in part, to the fact that

Milosevic was not particularly interested in keeping Slovenia within Yugoslavia.257 There

were not enough Serbs there to make a fierce defense worthwhile. He reasoned that federal

resources were better spent in Croatia and Bosnia. Also detracting from the JNA’s success,

JNA forces had low morale and were uncertain about their mandate in Slovenia.258 The

experience was demoralizing for the JNA. Adding further insult to injury, Slovenian

authorities confiscated retreating Serbs’ weapons as they withdrew. Slovenia’s Minister of

Defense explained they were “war reparations.”259 Though the full-force of the federal

government was not brought to bear in Slovenia, Slovenes were well-prepared for the

conflict. They performed well in combat and convincingly established control over their

territory afterward.

Slovenia began preparing for independence well before its formal declaration. In the

spring of 1991, Slovenian authorities began withholding payments to the federal

government, recalled their numbers from the JNA, established foreign policy institutions,

created quasi-diplomatic offices abroad, and made plans for a Slovenian army and

256 The Economist reported in July 6th that the conflict left “dozens of dead and scores of wounded” but precise figures were not given. “The Road to War” July 6, 1991 The Economist 320:7714, p.2

257 In fact, Serb authorities viewed the conflict as a policing action, not a war. They told the Slovenians when they were coming to reassert control and even disclosed the roads by which they would arrive. There was another, more aggressive war plan, but it was not implemented. (Silber and Little 1996, p.156)

258 Gow (1997) notes that the JNA miscalculated, believing a mere show of force would compel the Slovenians to capitulate. (p.32)

259 “Slovenia’s Self-Defense” July 6, 1991 The Economist 320:7714, p.46

159 independent currency.260 When Slovenia nationalized federal territorial defense forces, federal authorities had abolished the Yugoslav common market in retaliation. Consequently, many economic ties between Slovenia and the federal government had already been severed.

Once independence was declared, the domestic transition to functional independence was smooth.

[Slovenians] had backed their independence legislation with executive orders, creating and staffing the independent bodies that would…assume control of the borders, the air traffic, and the port authorities. At the frontiers with Italy, Austria and Hungary, they removed the Yugoslav symbols, flags and notice boards, and replaced them with the heraldry of the new independent Republic of Slovenia. They ordered federal police and customs officials off the premises. They also began to place border posts along the 600-kilometer frontier border with neighboring Croatia…261

The war for Slovenia ended with the Brioni Agreement, signed on July 7, 1991.

Brokered by Europe, Brioni formally resolved the military conflict between Yugoslavia and

Slovenia and arranged for the JNA’s withdrawal from Slovenian territory. It also stipulated however, that the secessionists (both Slovenia and Croatia) would rescind their declarations of independence for three months pending negotiations on a comprehensive settlement.

Finally, under European pressure, the Serbs agreed to allow Stipe Mesic to assume his rightful place as the president of the federation. Slovenia’s domestic sovereignty only became more secure during the mandated moratorium.

Slovenia’s went forward establishing its domestic authority, even during the three-month stay of independence. Slovenian authorities, for example, set to creating for their citizenry. They made 150,000 during the moratorium period alone and planned to produce 100,000 more before the end of 1991. “[Slovenes also] took

260 Ramet, Sabrina Petra (1993) “Slovenia’s Road to Democracy” Europe-Asia Studies 45:5, p.873

261 Silber and Little (1996), p.154

160 advantage of the cease fire to strengthen their barricades. In Ljubljana, the buses and trucks

that had acted as makeshift defenses were replaced by tank traps made from crisscrossed

iron girders, and surrounded by barbed wire.”262 Though Slovenes acquiesced to the

international community’s appeal for patience in theory, they also realized their negotiations

with Milosevic had reached an insurmountable stalemate. In early October, as the

moratorium period expired, Slovenes closed the southern frontiers connecting Slovenia with

the rest of Yugoslavia.263 From that point forward, at 34 frontier posts, Yugoslavs were

considered foreign guests and not permitted to enter without passports.264

4.6.2 Popular Legitimacy

Slovenia’s domestic political authority was as apparent as its physical control. The

Slovene Communist party split from the federal party in 1989 and pro-secessionists won

decisive political victories in the April 1990 elections. Slovenia’s local governmental authority

did not derive from its association with the central authorities in Belgrade or the Yugoslav

Communist Party. Furthermore, Slovenia’s December 1990 referendum demonstrated

popular support for independence. The results, 89% in favor of independence of the 94%

participating, gave the government an overwhelming mandate. Finally, Slovenia even had the

blessing of Milosevic, whose party announced its recognition of Slovenia’s right of peaceful secession on the 4th of July.265

262 Silber and Little (1996), p.164

263 Slovenia formally re-declared independence on October 8, 1991.

264 October 1, 1991 Agence France Presse “Yugoslavia’s rebel republics prepare to got it alone”

265 Silber and Little (1996), p.164

161 4.6.3 Projected Viability

To look at the balance of power between Slovenia and Federal Yugoslav authorities

prior to the 10 Day War, Slovenia’s prospects for forcefully asserting independence were not

favorable. But retaining Slovenia was not Milosevic’s priority, so physical independence was

secure by October 1991.266 Possible contagion from conflicts then underway in neighboring republics presented the only potential disruption of Slovenia’s territorial control. Even that was unlikely though, because of Slovenia’s geographic position in the northwestern corner of

Yugoslavia and because of its homogenous ethnic make-up.267 The only likely difficulty

would stem from an influx of refugees fleeing the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, seeking

respite in Slovenia.

Slovenia’s economy was strong relative to the other Yugoslav states, but it would be

less strong relative to the universe of sovereign States. Still, Slovenia’s Western orientation in

the years since Tito’s death had prepared it for exposure to competitive international

markets. Slovenia’s economic stability was most vulnerable when the international

community imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia. Many note that the UN’s sanctions locked the

power balance among the republics in place, effectively benefiting Serbian forces (who had

secured the federal army) while disadvantaging others. This was certainly true for the more

protracted conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. But for Slovenia, the sanctions’ economic effects

were more important than the scarcity of arms.

266 Though Slovenia was probably physically independent before October, the war was over in mid-July, it did not formally reassert its independence until the Brioni moratorium had passed on October 8th.

267 Recall Slovenia only shared a border with Croatia within Yugoslavia and its population was over 90% Slovene.

162 The period between December 1990 and December 1992 saw a 30% decline in Slovenian

living standards.268 Once the sanctions had been lifted, the economy recovered.

Illustrative of the Slovenian economy’s strength, Slovenia’s trade deficit became a trade surplus by the end of 1992. In its first full year of (partially) recognized sovereignty,

Slovenia reported a Gross National Product (GNP) of $6,700 per capita, similar to those of

Argentina and Greece and over double that of Estonia, Latvia and Hungary.269 Finally,

Slovenian unemployment was on par with Poland and only slightly higher than that in

Hungary. Of course, measures from 1992 are post-hoc, but they are also suggestive of

Slovenia’s pre-independence trajectory.

4.7 Domestic Sovereignty in Croatia

Croatia had the second-most domestic sovereignty relative to Yugoslavia’s other secessionists. It did not meet the legal standard for territorial control, but it did satisfy popular authority and effective government. Croatia steadily lost its Serb-majority territories to Serbs as its dragged on.270 By the time a cease fire that actually held

was arranged, Croatian authorities retained only two-thirds of the territory they claimed.

Croatia’s population was also more diverse and decidedly less supportive of the new regime.

Serb populations within the Krajina and on the eastern border with Serbia were steadfastly

opposed to Tudjman’s/Croatian authority. Croats were, however, a decisive majority in the

268 Of course, Slovenia’s independence was secure and widely recognized for most of 1992. This period covers more time than the duration of the sanctions. “Daily Report: Eastern Europe” August 27, 1992 Tanjug World News Connection

269 Data reported in nominal US dollars. World Data Analyst (2006) Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. http://www.britannica.com

270 Even some Serb minority areas like Baranja, where Serbs only constituted 25% of the population, were lost.

163 state (near 80%). Finally, Croatia’s potential viability hinged on a number of factors: the end

of its war with Serb authorities; the extent of its involvement in the ; and its

relations with its own domestic minorities. A bright spot was that, like Slovenia, Croatia was

economically advantaged and had been exposed to liberal markets.

4.7.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority

Croatia’s war began just after Slovenia’s.271 Though the two states had signed a

mutual defense treaty prior to their declarations of independence, Croatia did not come to

Slovenia’s aid. Nor did Croatians even attempt to impede the JNA’s progress as it traveled

through Croatia toward Slovenia. Had Croatia defended Slovenia as it had promised,

Slovenians likely would have supported Croatia. Instead, Tudjman’s decision left Croatia

isolated. It was an important strategic mistake. Unlike Slovenia, in Milosevic’s mind much of

Croatia was worth fighting for and he had ample resources at his disposal. Local Croatian-

Serb afforded the Serbian effort plausible deniability for its violence as well as a

significant volunteer force.272 Moreover, Slovenia’s quick success left defeated JNA forces

newly available for the Croatian offensive. When the Brioni Agreement came into effect,

JNA troops and hardware simply withdrew from Slovenia eastward into Croatia (and

Bosnia). As soon as a month after its declaration of independence, Serbs controlled

approximately one-third of Croatia. Serbs contested Croatia’s territorial control in the east

along the border with Serbia and in the so-called Serbian Krajina (RSK) in the south.

271 Croatia experienced sporadic violence in its conflict with its Serbian provinces prior to the war as well.

272 In the beginning of the war, Milosevic maintained that Croatia’s violence was wholly attributable to Croatian Serbs rising-up against Croatian independence, desiring instead to rejoin Serbia or maintain their place within the Yugoslav republic. The international community’s uncertainty over who was perpetrating the violence delayed intervention.

164 Serbian forces were more numerous and better armed than the Croatian military. Just

before the war, Croatia had a force estimated at 60,000 men. Serbs could count as many as

138,000 military personnel and thousands Croatian-Serb irregulars. In Croatia, the UN arms

embargo had a perverse effect relative to its mandate, locking in Serbs’ material advantage in

terms of heavy artillery and light weapons. Again, the balance of forces was clearly in favor

of the central government. Finally, Serbs pursued their territorial ambitions with especially

violent tactics in Croatia, further destabilizing political and territorial control.

Throughout the late summer and fall, a combination of military conquest and ethnic

cleansing left much of Croatia’s territory under Serb authority, depleted of its former

Croatian inhabitants.273 When Serbs would take a city, or village, they would force its

population out with only what they could carry on their backs. This practice created a

dramatic refugee problem. Captured men and Croatian military personnel were often simply

murdered. Estimates show that in the five months between August and December of 1991,

80,000 Croats and Muslims were either displaced or killed.274 Croatians suffered their worst

defeats in the east. Purges of cities like Vukovar and Dubrovnik were especially brutal. As

winter began, Serb forces held and controlled virtually all the Croatian territory Milosevic

desired. Only then did Serbia finally acquiesce to a lasting cease fire; and only then because

Milosevic anticipated it would freeze Croatia’s contested map in place. Croatian Serbs, he

expected, would henceforth be governed by Serbia.

273 Though the majority of the refugees were Croats, Croatia’s other minority populations were also victimized by the Serbs.

274 Tanner recounts, “Officially 6,651 deaths were accounted for [in total]. But another 13,700 were ‘missing’, the majority of which [were dead].” (1997), p.278

165 In addition to the unfavorable balance of forces and the unanticipated brutality of

Serbian tactics, some of Croatia’s territorial losses were attributable to Croats’ faith in

international diplomacy. Virtually all of Croatia’s losses occurred during the Brioni

moratorium. Croats initially attempted to avoid direct confrontation with Serbian forces in

the hope that the EC process would ultimately yield a satisfactory agreement. For example,

Croatian authorities waited until September, well after the war in Croatia had begun in

earnest, to have the National Guard surround and attempt to capture the JNA’s barracks.

Luca Bebic, the Croatian Defense Minister remarked at the time, “bit by bit we are losing control over our territory, waiting for the results of the EC peace initiative. Now we have no illusions about getting help and are undertaking an offensive.”275 Unfortunately, Croatia had

already lost much of its territory.

Croatia was unable to reclaim its losses until well after its sovereign authority had

been recognized by the Great Powers.276 Even at that point Croatian forces could not have regained the territories without the support of powerful advocates. Croatia’s territorial defense forces had been disarmed under the Brioni agreement. Within the Croatian police

“[a]t least half were Serbs and hostile to the HDZ.”277 Croatia’s newfound military

capabilities were a function of illegal imports and clandestine military training. Military

equipment was imported in violation of the still-standing UN arms embargo, while tactical

military training was conducted by a private, American security company with ties to the

275 “Europe may use force in Yugoslavia” Independent September 17, 1991. Cited in Tanner (1997), p.256

276 In 1993 & 1995 Croatia took back most, but not all, of its pre-war territory. Some areas along the Croatian border with Serbia remained in dispute.

277 Tanner (1997), p.231

166 Defense Department. American officials were rumored to be complicit in both the arms transfers and the training.278

Croatia’s governmental authority was similarly less established than Slovenia’s. Aside

from the regime’s unpopularity in Serb majority regions, Croatia had not made extensive

preparations for independence. In fact, by the summer of 1991, Croatia had done little

beyond holding its referendum and nationalizing some services and industries.279 In their final meeting before their declarations of independence (on June 15th), even the Slovenians

noted Croatia was unprepared. As one participant recalled, “There was almost a conflict

between Tudjman and one of his ministers, Franjo Greguric, because Tudjman said ‘we have everything ready too, all the laws, everything [customs, police, airports, boundaries] is prepared.’ And Greguric said ‘No Mr. President, this is not true.’”280 Nevertheless, Tudjman

insisted Croatia declare independence at the same time as Slovenia. Tudjman encouraged

Croatia’s association with Slovenia, believing it would bolster his claim. Slovenians however,

actively discouraged “packaging” the two secessions together, sometimes pointing to

Croatia’s weakness in order to support a Slovenia-first argument for independence.

On the other hand, Croatia did have substantial autonomy as a function of its status

as a constitutive republic. The Croatian government ran its own schools, police force, and

territorial defense. Also like the Slovenians, the Croatian Communists had severed their

relationship with the Yugoslav Communists (even though the Croatian Communists were no

278 Cowell cited in Ullman (Ed.)(1996) “The Wars in Yugoslavia and the International System after the Cold War” p.16 at n.11; Silber and Little (1996), p.349, 352

279 For example, upon becoming president, Tudjman nationalized radio, television, and the local news agency. He also created an airline to rival Yugoslavia’s and began rewriting the Croatian constitution. Tanner (1997), p.229

280 Bavčar, Igor cited in Silber and Little (1996), p.148-9

167 longer in power). Similarly, when Serbia abolished the Yugoslav common market, Croatia’s trade became quasi-independent. Croatia also introduced its own currency, the Croatian dinar, asserting a certain amount of financial control over the economy. So while Croatia’s domestic authority was less than Slovenia’s, it was still mostly independent. Only its territorial control was severely compromised.

4.7.2 Popular Legitimacy

Internal opposition from Croatia’s Serbs complicated issues of sovereign authority on the ground, but the new regime’s legitimacy was generally strong. In Serb majority areas, the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) was declared in opposition to Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia. Rather than seeking an independent State of their own, Croatia’s Serbs demanded they remain within Yugoslavia. Genuine opposition within Croatia’s Serbian population was also effectively exploited by Yugoslav authorities who militarily and financially supported them. As a result, what began as a minimally armed local resistance became a well-armed force that defied international attempts to broker cease fires.

Nevertheless, Serbs only constituted a small minority within Croatia. Solid support from

Croatians alone would provide a popular mandate.

In Croatian majority territories, support for independence and the new regime was less contentious but still somewhat unconsolidated. Croatia’s April referendum yielded overwhelming support for independence (over 90%). Support for independence was stronger and more consistently supported than favor for Tudjman, however. Tudjman’s authority was solid before the war, but declined with time. As the conflict progressed, strategic missteps and unpopular domestic policies eroded much of his popularity.

168 Some Croatians displayed their dissatisfaction with Tudjman with radical tactics. A right-wing paramilitary organization, Hos, raised a significant challenge to the HDZ’s authority; at one point raising the possibility that civil war would erupt among Croatians themselves.281 Hos’ popular support did not rival Tudjman’s, but their extreme tactics and fascistic ideology did appeal to a violent fraction of the Croatian populace. Tudjman remedied the Hos challenge by jailing the participants and confiscating their property.

Despite its sometimes contentious politics, the new regime’s popular authority was generally solid. It was certainly greater than support for remaining within Yugoslavia.

4.7.3 Projected Viability

Before the war began, Croatia’s prospects for enduring, independent governance were fairly good. Croatia’s economic potential was on par with most Eastern European

States, and support for the regime was generally strong. Even after much of the war was fought and the Carrington cease fire arranged, the Croatian economy remained viable. What made Croatia’s future prospects uncertain was the possibility that Croatian nationalism would interact badly with nationalisms in neighboring states and/or the minority populations within them. In particular, the war with Serbia and the Croatian Serbs was stalemated but unresolved; a war in Bosnia, with a significant Croat population, had just begun; and the

HDZ’s policies had the potential to further aggravate hostilities with Serbs in and around

Croatia.

Croatians were said to have paid the ‘highest price’ among Yugoslavia’s states for their potential independence. Croatia’s economy remained strong, though damaged, throughout the war. In August, the government introduced the Croatian dinar. “[I]n spite of

281 Tanner (1997), p.267-8 Hos, an acronym for Hrvatske Obrambene Snage, translates to Croat Defense Forces.

169 the dramatic expense of the war, [its new currency] turned out to be less inflationary than the old Yugoslav dinar.”282 Croatia’s war did have very negative effects upon the economy, however. According to one estimate, over 10% of Croatia’s housing stock had been ruined,

“30% of its industrial infrastructure had been destroyed or lost”, and 37% of the railway was damaged or in Serb hands. Croatia also had near 330,000 internally displaced refugees. The

Croatian economy would take much longer to rebound than Slovenia’s. Croatia’s pre-war economic strength and relatively open economy were its saving grace.

Croatia’s ethnic relations presented the greatest potential problem for its continued stability. The future of Croatia’s conflict with its rebel Serb population, though stalemated, had the potential to disrupt Croatian governance again. The Croatian government did not revoke its claim to its lost territory. As a consequence, violence would likely recur within the southern and eastern territories. Indeed, just that occurred when the Croatian military retook the areas in 1993 and 1995. Second, a significant population of Croats (~17% of the total population) lay just across the border in Bosnia, where violence had just broken out.

Nationalism and popular sympathies made the Bosnian Croats’ plight difficult for Croatia to ignore. Military involvement and/or funding of the Bosnian effort would put further strain on an already weakened Croatian government and economy. Finally, even if there was no further military confrontation with the Croatian Serbs, Tudjman’s policies inspired a great deal of consternation in the Serbian community. Like they had after Tito’s death, poor minority relations, antagonized by a chauvinistic regime, had the potential to be disruptive for Croatia’s future domestic minority relations. Croatia’s minorities needed assurances that, should they be brought back under Croatian authority, they would be safe.

282 Ibid., p.253

170

4.8 Domestic Sovereignty in Kosovo

On October 11th, 1991, three days after Slovenia and Croatia reiterated their

demands for sovereignty, Kosovo Albanians finally declared their independence from Serbia.

Kosovars had been pushing for formal autonomy the longest, but were slow to declare

independence. This was due in part to Serbs’ restrictive policies in the region, leaving few

political opportunities available to exploit. It was also however, because Kosovars’ demands

were moderate, their pursuit of those demands was peaceful, and their potential for

functional independence was remote. Besides Rugova’s , Kosovo was landlocked

and could not accrue the weaponry necessary to take on the State. By 1991, Serbs had

extensive experience repressing the Kosovo Albanians, and the Albanians recognized their

own weakness.283

Kosovo had the lowest degree of control over its territory, and the least potential for

viable independent governance, though it rivaled Slovenia in its popular legitimacy. Kosovo’s

governmental authority was moderate, but not strong, because much of Kosovo’s formal

governmental power had been stripped away in the 1980s. Serb reactions to Albanian

activism left Kosovo’s infrastructure weakened and under Serbian control. Albanian

authorities established a parallel, shadow government to counter the “legitimate”

government in response. Ibrahim Rugova became president of the shadow regime in 1992

with a convincing mandate among Albanians. His support declined with the dissolution of

283 Judah notes that the Albanians were torn over the earlier . While they yearned for the Serbs to suffer defeats in Slovenia and Croatia, they also hoped that the RSK separatists would find success in their conflict with Croatian authorities. They believed RSK independence would set a precedent for Kosovo independence or unification with Albania. (1997), p.306 171 the SFRY and the rise of Albanian militarism in the late 1990s. Support for violent

secessionism, led by the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), eclipsed Rugova’s support by the

time Serb forces invaded in February of 1998.

4.8.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority

Albanians did not convincingly control much of Kosovo’s territory if military and

police control alone is taken to be decisive evidence. Before Yugoslavia’s conflicts began,

Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo were not so different in terms of the authority they exercised.

Within Yugoslavia, the statuses of the republics and the autonomous regions were essentially

similar, though perhaps endowed with differential prestige as a consequence of the

constitutional order. Kosovo and Vojvodina had votes equivalent to those of the republics

within the collective presidency. They also had their own constitutions and court systems.

And, just like the republics, they had authority over their own territorial defense forces,

police and schools. Both autonomous regions were nominally under Serbian control but had

many of the trappings of independent Statehood.

When Milosevic assumed the presidency in 1989, he revoked Kosovo’s de facto

independence. Milosevic replaced indigenous authorities with his own supporters and

abolished the region’s autonomy. Kosovo became a virtual police state for Albanians.284

Albanians could not buy property without the authorities’ permission; tens of thousands lost

their jobs; students could not enter Pristina University; the remaining students could only

receive education in Serbian; and arbitrary arrest and police violence were commonplace.285

As recounted at the time by a Kosovar in Judah:

284 The imposition of martial law in Kosovo began as the suppression of a mining strike in February 1989.

285 Caplan (2005), p.141

172 The pressure is continuous. Police expeditions, raids on villages, armed civilians parading around. They always use weapon searches as excuses. They harass families and beat parents in front of their children….They use fiscal controls to break the Albanian shop owners. They surround one part of the town and search everyone to collect hard currency. No one dares react. There is no contact between the citizens and the government.286

Rugova, president of the underground government, pursued Albanian independence quietly,

somehow without raising the ire of Serbian authorities.287

In 1995-6, the KLA clandestinely formed and began a violent campaign against Serb

authorities and moderate Albanian “co-conspirators” in the province. By 1998, KLA

paramilitaries claimed they held approximately 25% of the province, principally in the

Drenica region. The KLA was not conventionally strong, but rather an opportunistic guerilla

force. Like the shadow government, the KLA was subject to Kosovo’s difficult geography, landlocked with few means of acquiring sufficient weaponry to compel the Serbs to leave.288

Numbering probably 10,000 to 20,000, armed with light weapons and disorganized, the KLA was no match for the force of the Serbian government and the JNA. On February 28, 1998,

Serbia began a major military offensive against the Kosovo Albanians. The campaign’s ostensible purpose was suppression of the KLA. It turned out to include ethnic cleansing and indiscriminate violence against Albanian civilians. In March 1999, NATO began bombing Serb targets in the region. Months later, Milosevic conceded defeat. Kosovo

286 Human Rights Watch “Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo” cited in Judah (1997), p.305

287 Judah (1999) implies Rugova was tolerated by Serbian authorities because they feared driving popular support to the KLA. (p.11) Judah, Tim (1999) “Kosovo’s Road to War” Survival (Summer) 41:2, pp.5-18

288 Though, with the collapse of the Albanian State in 1998, weapons did become more readily available. Indeed, rising violence on the part of the KLA was the proximate cause of the 1998 Serbian offensives in Kosovo.

173 became an international under the auspices of the United Nations shortly

thereafter.289

4.8.2 Popular Legitimacy

Both independence and the Rugova government enjoyed overwhelming support

within the Albanian population. Kosovo’s illegal referendum on independence yielded a

99.7% favorable vote. Kosovo’s 200,000 Serbs did not participate (See Table 4.2). The

Rugova government, which had been in power in Kosovo since Tito’s death, was immensely

popular among Albanians. Like Slovenia, Kosovo’s population was relatively homogenous,

approximately 90% Albanian. As a result, the government and its drive for independence

had a strong popular mandate, even without the support of Kosovo Serbs.

Under Rugova’s leadership, the shadow government provided social services, schools

and hospitals to the Albanian population. The Albanian government also successfully

collected taxes within the province and from the Kosovo .290 The shadow

government was so legitimate - and the Serbs so illegitimate - in the eyes of Kosovo

Albanians, that there was very little interaction between Albanians and the official Serb-led

government. All essential governmental services were provided by Albanians themselves. Of course, the level of service provided by the Albanian government was also lower than the official government’s had been before its authority was taken away.

289 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)

290 See Judah, Tim (1997) The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia New Haven, CT: Press p.305 on domestic taxation in Kosovo and Judah, Tim (1999) “Kosovo’s Road to War” Survival (Summer) 41:2, p.11-2 on the 3% income tax collected from Kosovo Albanians abroad.

174 Events in Yugoslavia overtook Rugova’s quiet diplomatic efforts in the latter half of

the decade. When the Dayton Peace accords were signed (1995), and Milosevic conceded to

the international community’s demands in Croatia and Bosnia, it confirmed that Kosovo’s

pacifist means to independence had failed. As a reward for Kosovo’s patience and respect

for international law, the international community would recognize the FRY (Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia) as the rightful successor to Yugoslavia and Kosovo Albanians

would remain subject to Serb rule. Support for violent resistance exploded. Thousands of

Albanian émigrés flocked to join the KLA with the collapse of Albania’s government in

1997. The KLA was suddenly better organized, better armed and better funded than it ever

had been. By the time the Rambouillet negotiations to end the Kosovo war began in

February 1999, the KLA, not Rugova represented the province in its external affairs.

4.8.3 Projected Viability

Kosovo had the lowest potential for stable economic and political life post-secession.

It was the least developed of all Yugoslavia’s provinces and had minimal potential to support

its own independent economy, even before the conflict with Serb authorities.291 Among

Kosovo Albanians, domestic governance would undoubtedly remain stable. But the

challenge to Kosovo’s authority would not be internal, it would come from Serbia. Kosovo’s

special place within Serbian national mythology made its significance disproportional to the population of Serbs therein. The plight of Kosovo’s Serbs was central to Milosevic’s rhetoric and he would not be easily dissuaded. After months of NATO bombing, Milosevic still refused to grant Kosovo even the autonomy it lost in 1990 or international administrators to protect and rebuild the province.

291 Ding, Wei (2002) “Yugoslavia: Costs and Benefits of Union and Interdependence of Regional Economies” Eastern Europe Department, The World Bank; Bookman, Milica Z. (1993), The Economics of Secession New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press p.155-6 175 Kosovo was heavily dependent upon the contributions of the other Yugoslav republics for its economic security. Kosovo Albanians argued Serbs purposefully retarded their efforts to develop while they were a part of Yugoslavia. Under Serb jurisdiction,

Kosovo’s natural resources were overexploited while investments in infrastructure and education were curbed. Throughout the 1990s most Albanians did not have work. They were forced into subsistence or black market trade. Albanians claimed Kosovo’s independent economy would be stronger. The industriousness demonstrated in Albanians’ shadow government and parallel economy proved their potential to form a stable, viable

State. Serbs argued contrarily that Albanians had mismanaged the province in the 1980s.

They were ungrateful to the republics that had supported them, backward, and responsible for their own unfortunate circumstances within the federation.

After the KLA’s 1998-99 conflict with Serbian authorities, Kosovo’s potential for a viable economy and successful governance were decimated. Following NATO’s intervention, over half of Kosovo’s population was displaced. Conservative estimates suggested 25,000 Albanians had been displaced outside of Kosovo while some estimated as many as 300,000 refugees had fled Serb authorities and the war. Most production activities within the region had either been disrupted or stopped entirely; sometimes for as much as a year. Finally, much of Kosovo’s housing stock had been destroyed.

Many Kosovo Albanians initially hoped that they might join Albania proper post- independence. But that aspiration’s realization was unlikely. The Albanian Diaspora certainly supported their ethnic kin in Kosovo, but the Albanian government harbored no irredentist ambitions toward the province. With the collapse of the Albanian State, even the prospect of a “special relationship” between Kosovo and Albania post-independence would not promise

176 much by way of material resources or increased political legitimacy. Albania, Kosovo’s

greatest patron, formally recognized Kosovo’s independence in October 1991, but no other

States have followed.292

4.9 A Diplomatic Prelude

None of the Great Powers initially supported the secessionists. Just prior to the

declarations of independence, the international community actively lobbied against both

Slovenia and Croatia’s demands. The European Community and the United States took

special care to convey to Slovenia and Croatia’s leaders that external support and recognition would not be forthcoming. There would be no reward for unilateralism or for the use violent tactics. James Baker, then US Secretary of State, visited on June 21st, met with each of the

Yugoslav presidents, and assured them the US did not condone secession. The EU similarly

sent a representative, who argued that Slovenia and Croatia were too small and too weak to

survive as independent States. The European Union could not support them, nor would its

members recognize their Statehood should they decide to follow through with their

independence claims.293 Privately some European diplomats expressed their support for the

secessionist regimes, notably the Germans and Italians. Nevertheless, their support was

conditioned on the higher priority that European unity be maintained. The Maastricht

Summit, to be held in December, would formally create the European Union and initiate

292 Some observers characterize Kosovo’s relationship with Albania as irredentist. Albania’s recognition of Kosovo demonstrates convincingly that, while deeply interested in the fates of their kin in Yugoslavia, Albanians do not hope to acquire the territory. See Rezun (1995) p.118 for a discussion of Hoxha’s reservations about Kosovo and its Albanian population. Similarly, Judah (2001) argues, “there is considerably less to Greater than meets the eye.”(p.8) Also see Judah (1997), p.307-8.

293 Ironically, the European dispatched to counsel Slovenians and Croatians they were too small and too weak was the representative from Luxembourg, one of the smallest, weakest States in the world. (Population:~450,000, Territory: ~1000mi²)

177 economic and foreign policy coordination among Europe’s States. None of the important

players were prepared to unilaterally recognize Slovenia or Croatia’s independence.

Within the international community, some were concerned that a Slovenian or

Croatian secession attempt would spillover, creating violence throughout the region. In the

EC, Yugoslavia’s neighbors were especially sensitive to potential violence or fleeing refugees.

Similarly, the Great Powers foresaw the potential for demonstration effects among the

Yugoslav republics themselves. If Slovenia and Croatia were to secede, what would become

of Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo? If there were conflicts in Macedonia or Kosovo would

Greece, Turkey or Albania feel obliged to intervene? No one could predict the secessions’

effects on the remainder of Yugoslavia or its immediate neighbors, though none of the

possible contingencies were good.

On the other hand, the Powers saw little potential for Yugoslavia’s conflict to extend

far beyond its immediate borders. Yugoslavia was known to be a hotbed for international

war, but Great Power interests in the Balkans shifted dramatically at the end of the Cold

War. The United States and the Soviet Union were no longer inclined to contest every ideological battle in the periphery. None of the important players felt that their interests were so imperiled that military intervention was immediately necessary.294

At the same time, the Great Powers were not wholly disinterested in Yugoslavia.

They had significant political interests in the outcome of Yugoslavia’s wars. The SFRY was within the European sphere of influence. Russia had strong ties of identity with Serbs and strong secessionist challengers at home. France wanted US influence in Europe to diminish as Europeans reasserted control on the continent. China and Russia wanted to forestall the

294 Ullman (Ed.)(1996), p.3

178 erosion of sovereignty. Britain saw its quagmire in in Yugoslavia’s wars,

and preferred remain on the sidelines. Both France and Britain however, wanted to temper

Germany’s new assertive demeanor. Finally, Germany had domestic political and ideological

reasons for supporting self-determination. Each Great Power had material and ideational

interests that might have influenced their preferences regarding recognition.

4.10 The European Community

The EC was eager to try its hand at collective diplomacy. Its first initiative was

dispatching a task force to negotiate a peaceful, low cost solution to the secessionist

hostilities. The CSCE offered to send a mission and called for a cease fire as well. But

European Statesmen were divided over their policy toward Yugoslavia’s secessionists from

the start. For months, as the Europeans tried to negotiate a Yugoslav peace, they also tried

to find a mutually agreeable solution amongst themselves. And for months Germany

acquiesced to French and British demands that any settlement be comprehensive and acceptable to all of Yugoslavia’s states. Unfortunately, there was no diplomatic middle ground to be had. Either the secessionists would be recognized and enter international society, or they would be reincorporated by force into a Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia.

The Europeans realized this too late.

As Europe grappled with maintaining a united front, events on the ground were rendering preventive diplomacy useless. As soon as Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on June 25th, the Yugoslav wars were underway. Europe tried to establish

cease fires between Serbian authorities and the secessionists, but Slovenians won their war

almost as soon as it began. Somewhat surprisingly, in September Milosevic agreed to

179 participate in European-backed negotiations regarding Croatia, where conflict was still

underway.295 Unfortunately, the offer was disingenuous. The negotiations accomplished nothing. Milosevic planned to earn goodwill in Europe by appearing to negotiate, in turn buying time for Serb forces to gain control of Western and the Krajina. In much of

Europe and the United States, the strategy worked and contributed to the fog of war. For

most of the summer and early fall, the Powers were uncertain that culpability for the

violence lay with Milosevic. Croatia’s war intensified.

As the Brioni moratorium went on, and the negotiations made no progress, it slowly

became clear to the Europeans that their initial impression of the Yugoslav conflict was

incorrect. Milosevic was not an embattled, somewhat objectionable leader struggling to hold

on to a multi-ethnic State. Not all of the parties were equally responsible for the conflict.

Instead, Milosevic was a staunch Serbian nationalist attempting to create a Serb at

any cost. At first, Serbia’s political domination of Yugoslavia seemed the best means to

achieve that end. But as time went on and Slovenia and Croatia refused to submit to

Milosevic’s will he altered his vision; a smaller Serbian homeland (Greater Serbia) would have to be carved out of the Yugoslav republics. Once Milosevic suppressed the secessionists with force and began targeting civilians, Europeans finally started to see the

Serbians as aggressors. However, by the time the Europeans changed their view, Serbo-

Croatian paramilitaries and the JNA had already altered the lines of control on the ground to suit their preferences.

295 Led by Carrington, the first negotiations occurred on September 7, 1991 at The Hague. Afterward there was a precipitous increase in the level of violence within Croatia. 180 The EC was in a difficult position. By fall they recognized the Former Yugoslavia

would not survive intact, but they disagreed about the future form it should take. Three

different strategies of conflict resolution were advocated by three sets of European States.

Each State’s strategy corresponded not necessarily with the extent of domestic sovereignty

exercised or the secessionists’ potential for successful Statehood, but with their own political

interests. Britain and the United States preferred a comprehensive settlement. France

preferred military intervention followed by negotiation. And Germany wanted the EC to

consider recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Potential fractures in European unity appeared.

In an attempt to maintain consensus following a string of diplomatic failures, the EC

convened the Arbitration Commission for Yugoslavia. Often referred to after its head,

Robert Badinter, the commission’s mandate was to advise the EC on two issues related to

Yugoslavia. First, in the commission’s expert opinion, was Yugoslavia in the process of

dissolution? On November 29th, Badinter replied that, “yes,” Yugoslavia “was in the process

of dissolution.”296 As a result, the Carrington initiative, convened under the auspices of the

EC and focused on negotiating a comprehensive settlement, was abandoned.297 There would

be no mutually agreeable solutions for Yugoslavia’s states; Yugoslavia functionally ceased to

exist. Instead, the Europeans would consider recognition for any of Yugoslav state desiring

independence. At their ministerial on December 16th, the European Community announced

its conditions for recognition.

296 Opinion No.1, November 29, 1991

297 The Carrington negotiations were held under the auspices of the EC, led by Lord Peter Carrington, and involved Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian leaders.

181 Banditer’s second task was to evaluate whether the states requesting European

recognition met the slate of EC standards.298 Badinter’s recommendations would then form

the basis upon which it was expected the Community would act. Though they could not

successfully avert the secessions, the Europeans could salvage their attempt at a unified

foreign policy.

What was remarkable about the EC standards was their complete disregard for the

legal requisites of Statehood. International law suggests each State is free to impose additional

standards or contingencies for recognition. However, physical control, authority and the

ability to engage in international affairs are recognition’s legal prerequisites. The EC did not

demand any of the Montevideo standards be met. Badinter’s requirements read that, in order

to receive European recognition, a state would have to accept the ‘Helsinki norms’. First and

foremost, the states had to be constituted on a democratic basis. They also had to accept the

principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of (of the CSCE),

which included human rights standards and norms including the rule of law, democratic

governance and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. Finally, the prospective states would

have to formally demonstrate provisions for the protection of minorities and renounce any

territorial claims on neighboring states.299 Perhaps the legal standards were implied.

298 Not every republic desired recognition. First, Serbia objected that the secessions were illegal and the arbitration commission illegitimate. Later Serbia & Montenegro argued it was the legitimate successor to the SFRY and therefore required no new recognition from the international community.

299 “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union” and “Declaration on Yugoslavia” EPC - European Community December 16, 1991. The “denouncing of territorial claims” applied specifically to Macedonia. Greece believed Macedonia would attempt to annex some of its territory because its name implied a greater territory than it occupied. Macedonian leaders assured the EU that it had no irredentist ambitions, but Greece could not be dissuaded.

182 The Commission’s recommendations were similarly not based upon whether or not the

Yugoslav republics met the Montevideo criteria though, so this possibility is not well

supported by the evidence.300

Even though Slovenia was fully independent by December of 1991, Slovenian

leaders harbored no illusions that external recognition would come easily. They abided by

Europe’s rules. Slovenia and Croatia requested EC recognition on December 19th and

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia requested recognition on the 20th. It was Bosnia’s first

formal declaration of independence.301 Kosovo, which applied for recognition on the 21st, was not even considered.302

When Badinter’s conclusions were finally handed down on January 11th, the

Commission supported EC recognition for Slovenia and Macedonia alone. Croatia’s

recognition was not recommended. The Commission cited the Croatian constitution’s

insufficient individual and minority protections as their rationale for withholding support.

Bosnia-Herzegovina received an unfavorable recommendation as well. No plebiscite demonstrating the will of its people accompanied its application.

In addition to its recognition advice, Badinter recommended that Yugoslavia’s former internal administrative borders serve as the borders of the newly independent

States.303 This border delimitation would stand unless negotiated otherwise by the new

300 Though it is noteworthy that Badinter’s recommendations would have conformed to a Montevideo-based analysis, i.e. Slovenia and Macedonia met the standards for Statehood while the other Yugoslav republics did not.

301 Bosnia would again declare independence following its on April 5, 1992.

302 Letter dated December 21, 1991 from the government of the Republic of Kosovo cited in Caplan (2005), p.139 at n.184

303 Decision 1, November 29, 1991

183 governments themselves, thereby extending the notion of uti posseditis beyond its traditional

application to post-colonial States. The decision provided official justification for the

Commission’s rejection of Kosovo’s application. Because it was only an autonomous region,

rather than a constitutive republic, Kosovo was not eligible for recognition. Albanian

Kosovars would have to remain under Serbia’s jurisdiction.

4.10.1 Britain

Europe’s most powerful State did not look favorably upon recognition for Slovenia

and Croatia. Indeed, Britain’s Foreign Minister was among the first to reaffirm support for

Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity following the declarations of independence. The British did not want to intervene militarily in Yugoslavia nor did they support independence for the secessionists. It was important that European stability and unity be maintained, however.

Britain saw its role as that of a moderator, reigning in rash or aggressive policies like those favored by Germany and France. Even though British Statesmen “vehemently opposed recognition,” they did not want to prioritize Yugoslavia’s conflicts over achieving European unity.304 Consequently, Britain would acquiesce reluctantly to whatever European consensus might be reached.

The British saw their own domestic quagmire in Yugoslavia’s conflict and did not want to be bogged down with another State’s insurgents. Early on, Britain quashed French efforts to send a WEU interposition force to Croatia for just that reason. Like the Russians, domestic political strife loomed large in the British imagination. British Statesmen invoked the Northern Irish analogy on multiple occasions.305 Unlike their Russian colleagues though,

304 Silber and Little (1996), p.199

305 Hurd, Douglas quoted in David Usborne (1991) “EC Pulls Back from Sending Troops to Yugoslavia” The Independent September 20, 1991. 184 the British were not concerned about setting a precedent at home. Their own domestic

challenge was manageable. Instead, the British were concerned that any involvement in

Yugoslavia would require an international commitment of manpower and money analogous

to their own in Northern Ireland. That possibility was to be avoided at all costs. Salvaging

the Yugoslav State was not worth the potential cost.

The British shared little in common with Yugoslavia’s states in terms of ethnic or

religious affinity. No strong ties of identity had been forged between their peoples. Slovenia,

Croatia and Kosovo voiced support for democratic principles and free trade. But those

ideals were not as important in the post-Cold War era as they might have been to Britain

only a few years earlier, when every potentially non-Communist regime received support. If

identity considerations played any role, it was again by analogy to Northern Ireland. Among

the British, Yugoslavia’s conflicts were seen through the prism of Protestants’ own conflict

with Catholics. Namely, that the conflicts were ethnic, historically-based and intractable.

British affinities did not lay with one side or the other.306 Rather, their own experience with

ethnic conflict, and what they understood to be the root cause of the violence in Yugoslavia,

led them to conclude intervention would be fruitless.

When the British did entertain intervention in Yugoslavia, it was security driven,

rather than moralistic. As reports of widespread human rights violations proliferated, and

calls for Britain to stop the indiscriminate violence began, British Statesmen were

306 Tanner (1997) suggests to the contrary that Britons had an “almost instinctive Protestant fear of Catholicism.” He argues the English favored Serbs because they were English-speaking, represented a greater portion of the English population, and were better politically organized than the Croats. (p.273). Other authors cite no evidence of these motives within Britain.

185 unmoved.307 Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind agreed with critics of British policy that

Britain had a ‘special’ interest in Yugoslavia. But he argued that special interest was a self-

interest in security. It was not an interest in advancing a moral code. Indeed, if Britain was to

intervene in Yugoslavia on the basis of self-determination or human rights, it might be

expected to support those mores in other cases too. 308 He argued that to advance

intervention in Yugoslavia on a universal, moral basis via the UN would require Britain to

support UN intervention in every case. The British did not reject a system-wide norm of self-

determination per se, but they were concerned that, through practice, they might inadvertently

create the mistaken expectation that Britain would consistently enforce that norm. British

Statesmen preferred to enforce self-determination on a discretionary, case by case basis.

British policy preferences were informed by Lord Carrington’s warning that

recognition without a comprehensive settlement would bring chaos to Yugoslavia. This

belief led Britain to drag its feet when other States were seen to be making rash or unilateral

moves which Britain believed imperiled the Carrington peace talks.309 This explains why

Britain opposed the French proposal to send a peacemaking force to Croatia and why

Britain did not support German moves toward recognition. Though Britain had little interest in Yugoslavia other than an extended security interest in European stability, maintaining consensus within the EC was a high priority.

307 One striking departure from that consensus was Margaret Thatcher, who advocated intervention.

308 Simms (2002), p.23

309 Recall the Carrington talks began on September 7, 1991 and aimed to find a comprehensive settlement for Yugoslavia among the six republics. The talks were sponsored by the EC.

186 4.10.2 France

French diplomats were the most pro-European among the European powers. France

was determined that Europe had a chance, independent of the United States, to successfully

resolve Yugoslavia’s conflicts. By working through their differences in Yugoslavia, the

French thought the European Community would forge a strong foundation for their nascent

economic and . At the same time, it was French and German differences over

policy that constituted the primary obstacle to European unity. French Statesmen did not concede to Yugoslavia’s dissolution until much later than many of their European

colleagues. But French opposition was not based on principle or fact so much as a reticence

to concede to German preferences or its renewed strength in European affairs.

The French were alone in their support for military intervention in Yugoslavia. Early

on, France proposed that the WEU () send an interposition force

to ensure that Croatia’s cease-fires would, in fact, hold. Many had already failed. Britain disagreed with the policy. The WEU was not invited to intervene by Serbia, so the idea was a non-starter.310 French diplomats’ effort to send military support under the auspices of the

WEU was seen by many as an attempt to consolidate nascent security cooperation in

Europe. Unfortunately, their proposal was premature. Europe was not yet capable of

pursuing collaborative military action.

As a result of its failure in the EC, France turned to the Security Council; another

venue in which they wielded substantial influence. French decision-makers hoped that, by

corralling diplomatic efforts into the EC and UN, France would have a significant voice in

the policy process. French Statesmen did not support what they saw as unnecessary

310 Hoffmann, Stanley (1996) “Yugoslavia: Implications for Europe and European Institutions” in Richard H. Ullman (Ed.) The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, p.108

187 involvement by the US in an exclusively European affair. NATO, an institution the French considered US-dominated, should be invited to participate only as a last resort. The longer the US-led alliance remained a prominent figure in European diplomacy, the longer its power would persist in Europe.311

France opposed the Slovenian and Croatian secessions. According to some, French diplomats prioritized maintenance of the Yugoslav State over self-determination due to their own historical experience with Statehood. Because the French State was created through conquest, prior to the consolidation of the French nation, the French simply would not accept the Yugoslav secessions or the concept of secession in general. Nationalism was always secondary to State integrity and national consensus was not required to justify

Statehood. The Slovenian and Croatian justifications for independence were therefore considered ill-conceived.

Another, less primordial explanation for France’s initial support of Serbia was a domestic and regional security concern. The French had secessionists of their own, notably

Corsica, and recognized Europe’s potential vulnerability to self-determination claims. “From the French perspective, there was inherent in the German policy toward self-determination and recognition an almost cavalier disregard for the stability of the European State system.”312

311Gow (1997), p.158-9 To clarify, France believed US influence was unavoidable, but that the proper institutional venue could assure that other, European preferences were also considered; the less US influence the better.

312 Campbell, Edwina S. and Jack M. Seymour, Jr. (1997) “France, Germany, and the Yugoslavian Wars” in Danopoulos and Messas (Eds.)(1997) Crises in the Balkans Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p.306 188 France was also interested in tempering Germany’s resurgence in Europe; their

historical animosities resurfaced over Yugoslav policy. France had become accustomed to its

position as one of only two important powers in Europe while Germany was weak and

divided throughout the Cold War. German assertiveness in Yugoslavia surprised French

decision-makers. They felt German behavior was out of place and threatening. That

Germany in particular was advocating recognition for Slovenia and Croatia only made the

French more resistant to reconsidering their position.

If France was swayed by ideological affinities or ethno-religious considerations, it

was not apparent. France’s initial support for Serbia stemmed from its preference for

European stability and State integrity rather than an identity-based affinity. France is a

Catholic country like Slovenia and Croatia, but there was no outpouring of sympathy from

the or French Catholics similar to that in Germany. Similarly, there was

little public discussion of ideological support for the nascent democracies in Slovenia,

Croatia or Kosovo.

Late in 1991 and early 1992, as French public opinion became mobilized in favor of

humanitarian intervention, the French position became more flexible. It was also

increasingly apparent that France’s decision to support Milosevic and Yugoslav unity was ill-

founded; Milosevic’s regime was perpetrating ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia. Still,

France held fast to its belief in the European character of the conflict and its desire for

European-centered policy.

4.10.3 Germany

German involvement in Yugoslavia’s collapse is notorious. Initially, the German government did not support Slovenia and Croatia’s secessions, though one might not know

189 it from the popular press. German support for recognition came about gradually; once it

became clear that there was no comprehensive agreement to be had. Unfortunately for

European unity, German certitude came about before the rest of the EC was convinced. By

November 1991, no less than 12 cease fires had been “agreed upon” and failed in Croatia.

Only then did German leaders openly advocate recognition as a means to break the

stalemate.313

Germany had vested interests in the resolution of Yugoslavia’s wars. It was the Great

Power most geographically proximate to Yugoslavia; it had the closest ties to Yugoslavia

among the European States; and its population was resolutely sympathetic to the

secessionists’ plight. Most factors suggested Germany would prefer recognition for Slovenia

and Croatia. German action was stayed however, by the desire to maintain European unity in

light of the upcoming Maastricht Summit and the nascent European Union. Germans

believed that if they could persuade the other members of the EC to their way of thinking,

then perhaps European unity could be maintained and Germany could pursue its preferred

policy. Some suggest that German decision-makers went so far as to make quid pro quo demands for European recognition in exchange for Germany’s support of Maastricht, but scant evidence supports this claim.314 Nonetheless, German Statesmen did lobby hard for

European recognition.

Germany was Yugoslavia’s largest trade partner and primary foreign aid donor. At

the time, much was made (especially by Serbia) of the possibility that Germany preferred

independent Slovenia and Croatia to Yugoslav unity for economic reasons. But the evidence

313 Eyal (1993), p.43

314 Tanner (1997) suggests Genscher did demand a quid pro quo, but identifies no source. (p.272)

190 belies a German economic interest in Yugoslav disintegration. Though Germany was

economically important for Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia was not of reciprocal economic

importance to Germany. Germany was the largest investor in much of Eastern Europe

simply due to its economic strength. In fact, Germany actually stood to lose if Yugoslavia

was to fall apart. Yugoslavia had substantial debt with Germany and it was not clear whether

or how the debt would be repaid should the Federation cease to exist.315 Similarly, the

Germans had no standing quarrel with Serbs that might have given them an advantage in the event that Yugoslavia dissolved. In its economic affairs, Germany would have been content to maintain the Yugoslav status quo. There were many other factors pushing Germany to prefer recognition, however.

Germans had a number of important social ties to Slovenia and Croatia. Like

Germany, both Slovenia and Croatia were majority Catholic republics, though Slovenia significantly less so than Croatia.316 German Catholics in , a powerful political block,

lobbied strongly in favor of their co-religionists. Pro-Croatian sentiment was especially

strong because Serbs, in contrast, were understood to be communist and decidedly anti-

religious. The Catholic Church gave support for recognition as well. Tanner recounts that,

“the German and Austrian Catholic bishops had close ties to their Croat counterparts. [And]

Croat Gastarbeiters [guest workers] formed a numerous and influential community in Munich

and Vienna.”317

315 Maull, Hans W. (1995-6) “Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis” Survival 37:4, p.118

316 Croatia’s Roman Catholic majority constituted approximately 80% of the population whereas Slovenia’s Catholic majority was just over 50%.

317 Tanner (1997), p.254

191 At the same time, German guest workers did not vote, so their influence on German

diplomacy should not be overstated.318 But religious identity was not all that the Germans

shared in common with the secessionists.

In truth, popular German support for recognition was widespread from the

beginning, certainly prior to Genscher or Kohl’s diplomatic support. Germans’ defense of

secession was not based upon ethnic or religious affinities though. The average German saw

Slovenia and Croatia’s plights (and later Kosovo’s) as similar to their own. In the post-Cold

War era the two states were throwing-off the yoke of communism, embracing democratic

norms and pursuing their rights of self-determination. Yugoslavia’s situation was not

dissimilar to the reunification of West and . German support was normative,

in that it was resolutely in favor of self-determination. It was ideological, in that the

secessionists were seen as rejecting Communism. And it was sympathetic because Germany

had just successfully achieved what they believed was a goal similar to that of the

secessionists. Ullman explains,

The most persuasive argument in German politics seems to have been that, since the reunification of Germany had come about through the international community’s willingness to take seriously the principle of national self-determinations, the breakaway Yugoslav republics should enjoy no less an opportunity.319

While it was true that Germans had ethno-religious and ideological reasons for supporting

Slovenia and Croatia’s independence, the most influential of the factors was a normative belief in the principle of self-determination.320

318 Caplan (2005), p.46

319 Ullman (1996), p.18

320 Ibid.

192 Political incentives, prompting Kohl and Genscher to favor recognition, arose as a

consequence of the secessionists’ domestic support. Local German politicians consensually

supported recognition for Slovenia and Croatia. All four parties, the CDU, SPD, FDP and

the Greens went so far as to issue a joint statement recommending the national government

push for recognition for those demanding independence.321 Kohl was criticized for

supporting the communist Serbs at the expense of the emerging democracies in Slovenia and

Croatia.322 As the Croatian conflict dragged on without decisive European action, criticism

for Kohl’s policies only grew.

Finally, adding urgency to the German initiative, Germans’ ethno-religious ties to the

secessionists also meant that Germany received the largest share of Croatian refugees once

the war began. It was estimated that 100,000 Croatian refugees had traveled to Germany by

1994.323 The influx of refugees strained the German economy, already occupied with raising

living standards among former East Germans. It also created some anti-immigrant sentiment

within the German population. The desire to stem the tide of Yugoslav refugees might be

the only parochial interest (domestic security) underlying German policy.324

As the summer and fall of 1991 passed and violence in Croatia only intensified,

German decision-makers became vocal and resolute in their support for recognition and independence. They reasoned that, if the international community could not stop the conflict through negotiation, then the Slovenians and Croatians should at least have the

321 Caplan (2005), p.45

322 Gow (1997), p.167-8

323 “Deserters Face Deportation to Croatia” RFE/RL Daily Report () February 4, 1994

324 Ullman (1996), p.18

193 opportunity to defend themselves. Recognition implied the secessionists’ right to legally

defend themselves, so the embargo could be lifted and States could legitimately send aid.

Finally, recognition might convince the Serbs that the international community would never

ratify its conquest of Croatia and prompt them to concede. German Statesmen’s desire to

recognize was stayed only by a sincere desire to maintain European consensus.

4.11 The Absent Superpowers

The United States and the Soviet Union, though initially not deeply involved in

Yugoslavia, would come to play important roles in the later phases of the conflict. In the

early 1990s, both States had more pressing interests that lay elsewhere. Only as the Yugoslav

conflict dragged on and the violence mounted were the US and Russia compelled to involve

themselves. Both States opposed independence. Russian interests were more significantly

engaged than were interests in the United States, however.

4.11.1 United States

The conflict in Yugoslavia did not catch the United States unaware. American

intelligence agencies had been predicting ethnic conflict and disintegration in the Balkans

since Tito’s death.325 Nevertheless, the United States was not eager to become involved.

Many in the Bush administration viewed Yugoslavia as a no win situation for the United

States; there was no obvious aggressor, no clear military solution and no vital US interest at

stake. Further stymieing the initiative, the United States was occupied with Gulf War I and

325 Duncan, W. Raymond (1994) “The ” in Duncan, W Raymond and G. Paul Holman Jr.(Eds.)(1994) Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict: The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p.34; Larrabee, F. Stephen (1997) “US Policy in the Balkans: From Containment to Strategic Reengagement” in Donopoulos, Constantine P. and Kostas G. Messas (Ed)(1997) Crises in the Balkans Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p.280

194 had just emerged from the protracted Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union. With

Europe eager to cut its newly consolidated teeth on the conflict, it was easy for the US to

remain disengaged at first.

There are two primary accounts of the US decision to distance itself from

Yugoslavia’s conflicts. They attribute America’s motives either to 1) a desire to see Europe flounder or to 2) a self-preservationist instinct, informed by the realization that Yugoslavia was a potential quagmire. Some within the Bush administration certainly felt Europe’s “bluff should be called.” The Europeans were so eager to take charge in Yugoslavia and so naïve about the political and material costs of intervention; it was an opportunity to allow the EC’s unitary foreign policy to fail. Lawrence Eagleburger at least, was convinced that the

Europeans would struggle in the Balkans and that only afterward, humbled, would they learn to burden share.326

Some evidence does show that the Bush administration was unsympathetic to the

EC’s situation, but much more evidence points to the United States’ own fears of being

bogged down in Yugoslavia. Brent Scowcroft recalls Secretary Baker arguing the US “didn’t

have a dog in [Yugoslavia’s] fight.”327 Like some of their European colleagues, many in the

Bush administration did not initially see a connection between Milosevic and the Croatian

and Bosnian Serb insurgencies. They thought that perhaps the resistance movements were

indigenous, unaided by Milosevic. So again, the fog of war contributed to difficulties in

326 Simms (2002), p.54 Eagleburger was Deputy Secretary of State at the time and Bush’s primary political advisor regarding Yugoslavia. His expertise in Yugoslav affairs derived from his time as US Ambassador to Yugoslavia during the Carter Administration (1977-80).

327 Silber and Little (1996), p.201; see also Gow (1997), p.203

195 attributing responsibility for the violence.328 With no apparent solution and complex

minority relations, Yugoslavia seemed like an intractable situation. US decision-makers essentially shared the British view of the conflict.

The United States did not want recognition for Slovenia or Croatia. It supported maintaining the status quo. But the US would not go out of its way to stop the secessions either. If recognition was to come for Yugoslavia’s republics, the United States’ primary concern was precedent. The Americans did not want Yugoslav recognition to serve as an exemplar for the USSR. So far as the United States was concerned, recognition of the secessionists would have to wait until a gradual dissolution could be negotiated for the

Soviet Union. If the USSR dissolved violently, there would be worldwide repercussions. US concern for the dissolution of its former rival was more pressing than the plight of the

Yugoslavia’s states, which could wait. On December 25th, 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved

and Yugoslavia’s potential precedent was no longer a concern.

Though the United States had domestic challengers, US policy-makers were

unconcerned that recognition might set precedents for their own secessionists. Minority

demands in the United States would likely not lead to independence for the Hawaiians,

Puerto Ricans or other domestic discontents. Nor were US secessionist claims accompanied by violence or widespread political unrest. Domestic secessionists presented little challenge to US legitimacy on the whole. US secessionists were not powerful enough to influence

American foreign policy.

328 Larrabee (1997), p.35 196 At home there were initially few pressures regarding Yugoslavia. There were small, active ethnic lobbies within the United States, but their influence on policy was debatable.

Direct monetary support for ethnic kin in Yugoslavia was far more influential in the conflicts than political mobilization in the US. The greater American public was not strongly in favor of either intervention or recognition.

Finally, identity concerns did not play an obvious role in US decision-making toward

Yugoslavia’s secessions. It is noteworthy that while both Slovenia and Croatia emphasized their modern, Western orientation when explaining the rationale behind their desire to separate from Yugoslavia, their argument was not persuasive within the Bush administration.

When the 1992 campaign season began, Yugoslavia belatedly became an important topic in US domestic politics. Bill Clinton, Bush’s Presidential challenger, sharply critiqued the administration’s decision to turn a blind eye to Yugoslavia’s human costs. Clinton’s analysis put pressure on the Bush administration to alter its approach and generally raised public awareness regarding Yugoslavia. As a result, US policy toward the Balkans became more assertive, but not until Clinton had replaced Bush and Yugoslavia’s wars had gone on for nearly two years. Recognition was not a priority for the United States until it intervened diplomatically in the Bosnian war, where the United States traded its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia for European recognition of Bosnia.329

4.11.2 Soviet Union/Russia

Domestic instability precluded active Russian participation in Yugoslavia, at first.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was among the most important factors influencing many

States’ recognition decisions. Potential Soviet dissolution loomed large in the American and

329 US-EU recognition of Bosnia was coordinated to occur at the same time, April 7, 1992. 197 European imagination. Minimal though it was, Russian policy toward Yugoslavia favored

Serbs and opposed the secessions. Russians had a special relationship with Yugoslavia’s

Serbs, both in terms of ideological affinity and ethno-religious make-up. And with the Soviet

Union’s domestic unrest came numerous secessionist movements challenging the USSR’s domestic authority. Like their Western counterparts, Russians were concerned Yugoslavia might serve as an unwanted precedent for their own union’s demise. Finally, like China, the

Soviet Union had a long track record of opposition to external intervention into other State’s

sovereign affairs. The secession problem was internal and best left to the Yugoslav

Government. Once Russia’s domestic politics had stabilized though, Russians sought out a

middle ground between maintaining its non-interventionist stance and beginning to engage

the West.

Soviet decision-makers’ concern for their own internal security dilemma would have

been sufficient cause for the Russians to oppose recognition. There were though, other

reasons too. For instance, Russians and Serbs share a Slavic heritage. Many observers argue

Soviet Statesmen’s perceptions and policies toward the conflict were colored by their shared

heritage with the Serbs. Indeed, Russian Statesmen and Western officials reiterated exactly

that on numerous occasions throughout Yugoslavia’s war. Goble submits to the contrary

however, that while ethnic identity is “mentioned most often”, it is the “most overrated” and

“least understood” explanation for Russian behavior toward the Yugoslav wars.330 He

explains that Soviet politicians saw their shared Slavic identity as a double-edged sword.

While Russians were predisposed to be sympathetic to the Serbs, Russians also feared

Western perceptions that the two States were perfect analogs, and that an event in one

330 Goble, Paul A. (1996) “Dangerous Liaisons: Moscow, the Former Yugoslavia and the West” in Richard H. Ullman (Ed.) The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, p.183

198 forecasted things to come in the other.331 Consequently, Soviet pronouncements of Serbian affinity were likely crafted for domestic consumption and not indicative of actual policy influence.

Many Russian citizens did support the Serbian position based upon their shared ethno-religious and ideological identity, however. Individual Russians, corporations and

private citizens, violated the UN embargo in order to lend material support to the Serbian

effort. Support of this kind was common among Russian nationalists for example, who were

decidedly motivated by shared Slavic identity.332 In addition, anti-American sentiment was

still common among Soviet citizens in the early 1990s. Opposition to the West then, rather

than ethnic affinity with the Serbs, may also explain domestic mobilization in favor of

communist Serbia.333 Public support for Serbia among Soviet Russians did not translate into

assertive Soviet Policies toward Yugoslavia though. Soviet leaders did not want to encourage

their association with the Serbs.

If we assume the preceding analysis of US and European decision-making is correct,

Russians had good reason for their concern that the Russo-Serb analogy had been taken too

seriously by the West. Western Statesmen were preoccupied with Yugoslavia’s potential to

influence Soviet dissolution.334 But the Yugoslav-Soviet analogy was imperfect. Ullman

explains that, while there were obvious parallels between the situations Russian Soviets and

Yugoslav Serbs faced, there were important differences as well. On December 24th, when the

331 Ibid.

332 Rezun (1995), p.178

333 Gow (1997), p.189

334 In hindsight, the reverse causal story is more likely true, e.g. that events in the Soviet Union affected events in Yugoslavia.

199 Soviet Union formally dissolved, its Russian population was fragmented into the various

successor States left in its wake; exactly the fate Yugoslavia’s Serbs feared. In addition,

Russians, like the Serbs, were not majorities in any of the USSR’s successor States. So,

important similarities existed between the two cases. Russians pursued a different political

strategy than Serbs did though, due to significant differences between the two situations.

“By virtue of its geographic expanse, the size of its population, the relatively

advanced state of its economy and even its imperial status during the era preceding the

revolutions of 1917, Russia could plausibly aspire to something like a hegemonic role in what

was once its undisputed domain.”335 Russia lost most of its territory at the end of 1991, but

maintained its potential to influence the former republics with significant Russian minorities,

in what came to be known as the Russian near-abroad. The same was not true for Serbs,

whose dominance within Yugoslavia derived largely from political power. The two also

differed because Russia could not play the nationalist card that Serbs did. Russian

nationalism was historically revisionist, “[seeking] to recover something that has been lost,

rather than to glory in what has been achieved.”336 For Russia, blatant nationalism would

have threatened its immediate neighbors. They were its ‘something lost’.

As Russia moved beyond its own political transition, it began seeking a more

constructive relationship with the other Great Powers. Russians therefore wanted to

disassociate themselves from the example set by Yugoslavia’s Serbs.337 Though Cold War

335 Ullman, Richard H. (1996) “The Wars in Yugoslavia and the International System after the Cold War” in Richard H. Ullman (Ed.) The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, p.28

336 Goble, Paul A. (1996) “Dangerous Liaisons” in Richard H. Ullman (Ed.) The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, p.187

337 Goble, Paul A. (1996) “Dangerous Liaisons: Moscow, the Former Yugoslavia and the West” in Richard H. Ullman (Ed.) The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, p.183

200 tensions remained, Russia’s formal diplomatic role in Yugoslavia was described as

“extremely prudent,”

American journalistic reporting tends to play up instances when Russia has cast a vote in the UN Security Council opposed to actions or policies that Washington prefers. Yet in every instance but one (and that one a relatively unimportant instance), the United Kingdom and France have been on the same side as Russia.338

In the early 1990s, Russia did not want to antagonize the US by becoming more active in

Yugoslavia, nor did it want to forfeit the special financial assistance the US provided at the

Cold War’s end. Russian opposition for recognition was over determined. Russia’s own

interests dictated support for the Serbs while intervention on their behalf was ruled out by

Russia’s instability and later desire to engage the West.

4.12 The Asian Powers

Asia’s most powerful States were less involved in Yugoslavia’s conflicts than their

European and American counterparts. The conflict in Europe was outside their sphere of

influence and of little interest except in the abstract. Japan was just beginning to assert itself

as Great Power with global interests. China, with both power and expansive interests, was

involved in Yugoslav diplomacy through its role on the UN Security Council and because of

its vested interest in maintaining a strong norm of sovereignty throughout the system.

China’s interest in Yugoslavia was not specific to its secessionists, but rather based upon

China’s strong belief in maintaining domestic sovereignty.

338 Ullman (1996), p.29-30

201 China was reticent to support independence for Yugoslavia’s secessionists, but even

more wary of setting a precedent for intervention in States’ internal affairs. Both China and

Russia were likely to oppose intervention or force under the auspices of the UN.339

Nevertheless, it was important to Chinese decision-makers that they be involved and consulted by the other Great Powers. When NATO intervened in Kosovo on the Albanians’ behalf in 1999, the Chinese government strenuously objected both to its contravention of domestic sovereignty and to NATO’s thwarting of the Security Council’s authority as the sole guarantor of global legitimacy.340 Earlier in the 1990s though, China was content to follow Europe’s lead, maintaining the option of a Security Council veto when necessary.

China wanted global influence and its role in the Security Council was the best means by which to assert it. China objected to the US-led alliance taking matters into their

own hands because China was not allowed to contribute. China was (and continues to be)

concerned about creeping US imperialism. If the United States was simply allowed to ‘forum shop’ for the international institution most likely to submit to its will, China’s strength and the strength of the Security Council would be weakened. In this way, the Chinese position was strikingly similar to the French position, since it preferred policy coordination through the WEU or UN to NATO.

Additionally, the norm of non-intervention in States’ internal affairs was an important determinant of Chinese policy preferences. China had domestic challengers of its own and did not welcome international meddling in its internal affairs. That sensitivity to

339 China abstained in many instances where Yugoslav policies and declarations were adopted within the Security Council.

340 It did not help matters much when, on May 7th, 1998, the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was accidentally bombed by NATO forces.

202 external intervention was especially acute in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre and

the international criticism it provoked.341 Most of China’s secessionists were unlikely to

succeed. China was still however, a weak State in many ways. Its vast territory, huge

population, uneven development and diverse population made domestic instability an

important concern.

Then again, there were some signs that China’s stance on intervention had moderated. Once steadfastly opposed to intervention in any circumstance, China began participating in UN peacekeeping efforts in 1991.342 Still, its standards were quite restrictive.

China would only participate under two conditions. First, the host country had to acquiesce

to intervention. Second, the Security Council had to approve the mission.343 NATO did not

meet either condition in Kosovo.

As late as December of 1991, Japanese authorities declared that they were not

contemplating recognition for either Slovenia or Croatia and further reiterated their support

for the multilateral talks under Cyrus Vance and John Owen. Like China, Japan had little

interest in Yugoslavia’s wars. But unlike China, Japan had just begun to play an active role in

power politics outside of Asia.

341 The Tiananmen Square, pro-democracy protests occurred between April and June of 1989. Hundreds of non-violent protestors were killed when the Chinese government cracked down and declared martial law on June 3rd and 4th.

342 As of 2000, China participated in the UN missions to Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM 1991), (MINURSO 1991), (ONUMOZ 1993), Cambodia (UNAMIC & UNTAC 1991 & 2), (UNOMIL 1993), (UNAMISL 1999), and East Timor (UNTAET 2000). See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ for additional information.

343 Gill, Bates and James Reilly (2000) “Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing” Survival 42:3, p.46. Gill and Reilly note however, that China refuses to participate in any peacekeeping operation in which the State maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan, “apparently regardless of the broader security issues involved.”

203 Japanese influence was further limited by its lack of a formal role in the primary institutions involved. Japan had no seat on the UN Security Council, nor did it belong to NATO or, obviously, the EC.

4.13 Recognition & Non-Recognition

When the Badinter recommendations were handed down in January, Croatia’s non- recognition was not the Commission’s only controversial decision. It recommended

Macedonia’s recognition, which infuriated Greece. Badinter also demanded that Bosnia-

Herzegovina adhere to a standard higher than that required of the other republics; that it hold a referendum in order to demonstrate its democratic constitution. Though Slovenia and

Croatia had submitted plebiscite results, Badinter’s guidelines did not require them. At the time, one commentator remarked that, “[the] only opinion relative to recognition that was not contentious was the commission’s judgment that Slovenia had satisfied the EC’s requirements.”344 Badinter’s decisions, if uniformly followed, would strain European relations as much as they would create a foundation for a unified foreign policy. Germany strongly favored recognition for both Slovenia and Croatia. And Greece resolutely opposed recognition for Macedonia.

In addition, European Statesmen made plain their plan to deviate from international law. Douglas Hogg, the British , remarked during parliamentary debates over Yugoslavia that, “The traditional criteria that we adopt for the recognition of States probably apply to Slovenia. They do not apply in the case of Croatia in the same way, but…one of the reasons why…is that Croatian territory has been invaded by the JNA and

344 Caplan (2005), p.38

204 Serbian irregulars.”345 Though the inherent uncertainties of war certainly made it difficult to

attribute responsibility for Croatia and Bosnia’s violence, the amount of control exercised by

each secessionist regime was apparent. Slovenia met the legal requirements for domestic

sovereignty and Statehood. Croatia and Kosovo did not. The international community

acknowledged Croatia’s lack of capacity, but clearly prioritized other factors in granting

recognition.

When recognition did come to Yugoslavia’s secessionists, it did not adhere to the

Montevideo criteria. Nor did it follow Badinter’s recommendations.346 Instead, recognition

seemed to adhere to a dual logic of European unity and self-interest. Most European States

held fast to their commitment to European consensus until the very end. But their unity was

a function of bandwagoning rather than a true expression of their preferences. Once the

EC’s comprehensive settlement initiative was abandoned, and one State granted recognition,

the entire EU followed suit. And Europe’s lead was then followed by the Super Powers and

the Asian States.

Within Europe, Germany was alone in its strong preference for Slovenia and

Croatia’s recognition. Some of the European States had softened their opposition to

recognition, specifically what they saw as premature recognition of Croatia, but they consistently favored a united European policy. Outside of Europe, Russia was most opposed to recognition, but its own domestic turmoil precluded an assertive diplomatic role. The

United States, like much of Europe, also did not prefer recognition.

345 Quoted in Caplan (2005), p.65 at n.58

346 Both would have dictated that Slovenia received recognition, and Croatia and Kosovo did not. 205 But unlike its European counterparts, the US had no interest in policy coordination with the

other Powers. Finally, the Asian Powers were mostly disengaged from Yugoslav diplomacy,

though China was concerned that Yugoslavia’s domestic sovereignty not be violated.

Germany announced its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia first, on December 24th.

And, in a move feigning deference to European consensus, Germany decided its recognition would not come into force until January 15th. (See Table 4.1) The rest of the EC granted

recognition on January 15th as planned. German policy adhered to the letter of its agreement with the other European States, but it did not adhere to the spirit.347 German authorities

granted recognition so quickly after the December 16th decision to consider recognition, that

it was impossible Badinter’s advice could have influenced their choice.348 Even so, German

defection from Europe was not as profound as it might seem.

In fact, there was wide consensus within Europe that recognition would eventually

come to Slovenia and Croatia as early as July; once Milosevic began to forcibly oppose the

secessions. Statesmen only disagreed about when and how recognition should occur.349 If

Germany would have withheld its recognition for another three weeks, Europe would have

recognized Slovenia and Croatia in concert. Germany’s lobbying efforts would have been

347 Ironically, Germany (and France) had divined the idea for and standards of conditional recognition in the first place. Caplan (2005), p.23

348 Interestingly, the Germans had some reason to be confident that Croatia would meet the Badinter standards because they had sent a legal scholar to advise them on achieving them. Caplan notes, “At the end of November, the German Foreign Ministry had dispatched the legal scholar Christian Tomuschat to Zagreb….Tomuschat, particularly satisfied with the results of his efforts [on minority protections], declared that the legally anchored protection of minorities in Croatia ‘should serve as a role model for the further development of minority rights in Europe.’” (2005, p.39, n.103)

349 Caplan, Richard (2005) Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p.18

206 partially responsible for the timing of Europe’s choice, but even without German influence recognition would have come eventually. The ultimate outcome would have been the same.

So far as Germany’s unilateralism is concerned, Campbell and Seymour make a persuasive argument that German recognition was not evidence of a new era of German unilateralism, as the French and British had feared. Instead, Germany’s recognition “was evidence of [its] faith in the efficacy of decisions taken and actions sanctioned by multilateral institutions.”350 German decision-makers were convinced that recognition and international legitimacy alone would compel Serbia to concede defeat. The French foreign minister asserted afterward that Germany had pushed the EC into recognition, that it was a mistake, and that maintaining [Yugoslavia] would have been wiser.351 But the evidence does not suggest Europeans thought maintaining Yugoslavia was a viable option after Badinter’s

November 29th decision on dissolution.

The other Great Powers followed the European lead. Russia, Japan, the United

States and China recognized Slovenia and Croatia in the winter and spring of 1992. Russian recognition came just after it recognized its own former republics and the threat of a

Yugoslav precedent had diminished. The United States recognized Slovenia and Croatia in exchange for Europe’s recognition of Bosnia which, along with Kosovo, the United States saw as more pressing concerns for regional security and stability. Finally, China withheld recognition until after the Serbian government recognized the two new States.

350 Campbell, Edwina S. and Jack M. Seymour, Jr. (1997) “France, Germany, and the Yugoslavian Wars” in Danopoulos and Messas (Eds.)(1997) Crises in the Balkans Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p.300

351 Cited in Hoffmann (1996) “Yugoslavia: Implications for Europe and for European Institutions” in Ullman (Ed.) The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, p.105 at n.17

207 Maintaining its insistence that secession was an internal affair and a matter of sovereign discretion, China would not recognize without the consent of Slovenia and Croatia’s Home

State.

4.14 Post mortem

Recognition was not the panacea German authorities imagined it would be. Croatia’s war with Serbia and the RSK did not end. The facts on the ground did not change. On the other hand, widespread support for Croatia’s legitimate authority did bless successive military campaigns to take back its lost territory later in the 1990s. Slovenia’s recognition helped its economy stabilize and paved the way for its membership in the EU. In Kosovo, non-recognition only led to greater problems as Serbia shifted its attention to its internal enemy, the Albanians.

Recognition’s consequences varied based upon the extent of domestic sovereignty the secessionists exercised. Recognition did not much influence domestic sovereignty in

Slovenia, where violence had receded months before and normal governance had set in. It was important for Croatia though, whose territorial control suffered considerably under the weight of sanctions and continued conflict with Serbian insurgents. The political and military advantages that flowed from Croatia’s recognition improved the government’s ability to consolidate political power. Its power was buoyed significantly by US support and arms transfers. Finally Kosovo, which had attempted in vein to garner consideration for its independence alongside the constituent republics, struggled to maintain what authority it had. Its government received no recognition and would face only higher intensity violence and civilian slaughter as the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia continued.

208

4.15 Developments in Kosovo

In 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began a violent campaign in Kosovo.

Frustrated with President Rugova’s moderation and disillusioned by the Dayton Accords

subordination of Kosovo to Serbia, the KLA hoped open conflict would draw the

international community’s attention and military intervention.352 The KLA employed

terrorist tactics against Serbs and moderate Albanians in the hope of provoking a

secessionist war. Initially, the KLA achieved some success. Estimates at the time showed the

KLA controlled approximately 25% of Kosovo’s territory in 1998.353 Though the

organization certainly gained notoriety, the KLA was a mixed blessing for Kosovo’s future

independence. On one hand, the group’s emergence pacified militant Albanians who might

have otherwise defected from Rugova’s parallel government. On the other hand, the KLA

was considered a terrorist organization, not only by Serbia, but also by the US State

Department, the Russsian government and other external actors whose support would be

pivotal to Kosovo’s success.

Throughout the mid-1990s, Kosovo suffered under what Alex Bellamy describes as

‘malign non-engagement’. The international community believed sacrificing Kosovo was

necessary to save Bosnia, where full-scale war had broken out between Serbs, Croats and

Bosnian Muslims. Kosovo’s problems though, continued to fester.354 The Serbian

352 See Vickers, Miranda (1996) Independent July 8, 1996 on Albanian’s disillusionment with Rugova’s strategy. Ironically, the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), which included Kosovo, did not meet the Badinter standards for recognition but was recognized by the EU regardless. Bellamy (2002), p.59

353 Bellamy (2002), p.64

354 Ibid., p.65-6

209 government responded to the KLA with overwhelming force, cracking down with greater

military and police control. Reports of human rights abuses and mass killing were

widespread.

Kosovo’s new violence quickly made it an international priority. Western leaders

realized that unrest in Kosovo, unlike that in Slovenia and Croatia, had real potential to

spillover into neighboring States and create instability throughout Eastern Europe. More

importantly, Greece and Turkey, both NATO members, might be compelled to intervene on

opposite sides.355 Throughout 1998 and early 1999, the international community tried in vein

to negotiate a settlement to end the violence between Serbian authorities and Kosovo

Albanians. Each cooperative move by Milosevic was later amended with recounting and

resistance until March 24th, 1999 when NATO finally initiated air strikes to compel Serbs to

withdraw from the province.

Despite their apparent support for the Albanians, as NATO began bombing the

Great Powers still resolutely opposed Kosovo’s independence. Russian Prime Minister

Yevgeniy Primkov argued in 1998 that Albanians’ violent, independence only stance was the

primary impediment to conflict resolution. It was inevitable that Kosovars accept autonomy

short of independence. He also indicated that China shared a similar perspective on the

situation.356 French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine asserted that, “a of the Serb

province of Kosovo [was] out of the question” but did not rule out international

355 Kaufman, Joyce P. (2002) NATO and the Former Yugoslavia Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p.156-7

356 “Russia: Russian Foreign Minister Opposes Independence for Kosovo” Moscow Interfax June 23, 1998 World News Connection

210 “protection.”357 The British Ambassador to Russia stated simply that, “Great Britian [was] against Kosovo becoming an independent republic.”358 Finally, the United States also reaffirmed Serbian authority over Kosovo, though it disagreed with Serbia’s tactics in asserting that control.

On June 3rd, Milosevic relented to NATO and the contact group’s demands. Serbian troops would withdraw and allow the international community to administer the province.

Serbia would not even consider Kosovo’s independence, however. NATO halted its military operations on June 10th, 1999. The same day, the Security Council authorized the United

Nations to create an interim authority for Kosovo.359 Named UNMIK (United Nations

Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo), the mission’s mandate was to provide functional self-government within the territory. Self-government included the reconstruction of its infrastructure; support of humanitarian relief and the protection of human rights; and facilitation in the determination of Kosovo’s final status.360 The Serbian government no longer had authority within Kosovo, retaining only nominal sovereignty in the region.

Instead, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) was Kosovo’s highest authority. The EU ran the Kosovo economy; KFOR controlled Kosovo’s airspace and borders; and UNMIK issued passports and organized the police force.

357 “Vedrine Rules Out Partition, Independence for Kosovo” Paris, Agence France Presse in French April 12, 1999 World News Connection

358 “Russia: UK Against Kosovo Gaining Independence” Moscow, ITAR-TASS World Service in English April 20, 1999 World News Connection

359 S/RES/1244 (1999) June 10, 1999

360 For more information on the specifics of the mandate and its progress, see http://www.unmikonline.org.

211 After the war, both Serbia and Kosovo were weak. The American CIA estimates that

Serbia and Montenegro’s economy in 1999 was only half of what it was in 1990, before the

UN sanctions and NATO bombings. Kosovo relied principally upon international donors

and the Albanian Diaspora for economic support. The Kosovo economy began transitioning

to a market economy under UN guidance. But it is not yet independently overseen.

Unemployment in Kosovo was estimated to be 50% in 2005.361

Much has changed for Kosovo in the time since Yugoslavia dissolved. It now

plausibly meets a number of the Montevideo criteria for Statehood. According to one expert

account, Kosovo has a permanent territory, a relatively stable population, and capable

diplomatic representation.362 Similarly, Kosovo Albanians overwhelmingly support

independence.363 It is more difficult to ascertain whether Kosovo has effective authority over

its territory. Kosovo’s gained important domestic legitimacy when

both Albanians and Serbs participated in the November 2001 elections. But the

government’s legitimacy was called into question when Serbs boycotted the independent

elections of 2004.364 Much of the government’s legitimacy appears to derive from

international administration.

361 “” (2006) CIA World Factbook Online: 2006 www.odci.gov

362 Redman, Michael (2002) “Should Kosovo Be Entitled to Statehood?” The Political Quarterly p.338-343

363 As of 1997, 89% of Albanians believed independence was the best solution to the conflict with Serb authorities. “Kosovo: Opinion Poll Shows Support for Rugova” Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian February 17, 1997 World News Connection

364 The first elections (2001) were monitored by the CSCE and Rugova’s party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) won 46% of the vote. The second elections were conducted by Kosovars themselves and the LDK garnered 45.4% of the vote. Kosovo’s Serbs however, boycotted the second election; less than 1% participated in the vote. The Rugova government was reelected.

212 Similarly, asserting that the current government has domestic sovereignty relies on the

tenuous counterfactual that Kosovo would remain stable without an international presence.

Experts agree that instability would likely follow if Kosovo gained independence at this

stage.

Kosovo’s status remains unresolved to date. At this writing, Kosovo is an

international protectorate under the auspices of the United Nations. In many ways,

Kosovo’s level of domestic sovereignty has not changed. Institutions reestablished under

UNMIK authority may not have been built to survive beyond its mandate. Kosovo

Albanians still overwhelmingly support independence and Kosovo’s Serbian population still

prefers Serbian association to jurisdiction by Kosovars. Serbs argued, and continue to argue,

that independence would have a destabilizing effect upon the region. Kosovars argue to the

contrary that independence would create lasting stability.365

4.16 Recognition Prospects

Through its creation of UNMIK, the Security Council was entering uncharted

territory. It was effectively creating domestic sovereignty where it could not be sustained

without the force of the international community behind it. Nevertheless, Kosovo’s recognition and eventual Statehood are not assured. The authorities in Serbia and

Montenegro are unyielding in their demand that Kosovo remain within their jurisdiction, even though its population will likely be “difficult if not impossible to govern”.366 On the

other hand, it seems unlikely that seven years of self-government can be easily undone.

365 “Kosovo: Rugova Calls for International Protection, Independence” ATA in English August 5, 1998 World News Connection

366 Posen, Barry (2000) “The War for Kosovo” International Security (Spring) 24:4, p.42

213 Serbian authorities’ massive human rights violations did not bolster the legitimacy of its

claim to authority in Kosovo. And Kosovo Albanians will not give up their newfound

authority willingly. In addition, the final determination on Kosovo’s status will have

implications for others in the region like Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro.

The Great Powers still have significant differences of opinion when it comes to

Kosovo independence. NATO’s war in Yugoslavia and NATO expansion threatened Russia.

Similarly, China did not approve of NATO’s intervention in the sovereign affairs of another

State. Nor did it support NATO’s circumvention of the Security Council. Both Powers

remain opposed to Kosovo independence. Conversely, the US, Britain, France and Germany

seem to support Kosovo’s eventual independence, though they are loath to voice that

expectation in public.367

Unable to engage in Yugoslavia’s initial dissolution, Russia reasserted itself in

Kosovo’s conflict. Russia had a constructive influence because of its close relationship to

Serbia, but its efforts were mediated by concerns over NATO expansion and the later war

for Kosovo. Domestically, there was a consensus among Russians that, “NATO’s war

against Yugoslavia was a greater threat to Russian security than either the U.S. deployment

of ballistic missile defense or the consequences of NATO expansion.”368 Nevertheless,

Russia contributed peacekeeping troops to the NATO-led war. In fact, “ethnonational

Russian identity implied a far more aggressive Russian foreign policy over Kosovo than

367 Indeed, a comment by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw that Kosovo independence was “almost inevitable” initiated a firestorm of opposition from Serbian leaders as well as some fellow members of the EU. “Serbia’s Draskovic Says UK Straw’s Comment on Kosovo Violates International Law” AFP (North European Service March 12, 2006. World News Connection; “EU Downplays Comments on Kosovo Independence” AFP (North European Service) March 1, 2006 World News Connection

368 Hopf, Ted (2002) Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 & 1999 Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p.213

214 actually was chosen by the Yeltsin government.”369 The nationalist account, like that

regarding Slovenia and Croatia, would omit other compelling interests like Russia’s desire to

engage the West.370

Russia remained somewhat uncomfortable with its role in the peacekeeping mission.

In March of 2000, Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov threatened in an interview on German

television that Russia would withdraw from KFOR if Kosovo independence was realized.

He elaborated, perhaps with an implicit slight toward Germany, “Russia does not want to

assume responsibility for a new tragedy in the Balkans.”371 The Chinese Ambassador to the

UN concurred, “the presence of the United Nations is by no means for the purpose of

helping the [Albanians] gain independence” and UNMIK “should get this message across

unmistakably.”372 Chinese authorities were concerned that the UN was sending mixed

messages to Serbs and Albanians. Some problematic moves included the issuing of ID

documents and stamps without Serb consent; allowing the Albanian flag to fly at UN

headquarters; and permitting foreign guests and diplomatic representatives in Kosovo

without FRY permission.373 China does not support independence.

369 Ibid., p.221

370 Another interest that might inspire Russian support for Kosovo independence is the potential for Russian politicians to link it to South Ossetian or Abkhazian independence, which Russia supports. “Kosovo May Set Example for Other Breakaway Territories – Zhirnovsky” ITAR-TASS February 22, 2006 World News Connection

371 “Ivanov: Russia Will Withdraw From Independent Kosovo” Moscow, ITAR-TASS in English March 23, 2000 World News Connection

372 “PRC Envoy: UNMIK’s Aid Not Aimed at Kosovo Independence” Beijing, Xinhua in English May 11, 2000 World News Connection

373 Ibid.

215 In the West, Kosovo independence is viewed more favorably. NATO’s war against

Serbian authorities undoubtedly caused stronger feelings of enmity toward Serbia among the

allies. In the years since Yugoslavia’s dissolution, Albania has also forged strong ties with the

United States.374 Those ties may serve to bolster US support for Kosovo independence.

Another potential motive for US recognition might be its desire to withdraw troops involved

in the UN mission there. According to one administration official, “President Bush has

made clear that having gone in to Kosovo with our allies; we will stay there with them until

the job is done.” He added, “We seek, of course, to hasten the day when peace is self-

sustaining and our troops can come home.”375 Similarly, the EU is scheduled to take over

Kosovo’s administration in 2007 and most of its efforts seem oriented toward viable

independence and closer integration with Europe.376

4.17 Conclusion

This case cluster outlines the structure and process of Great Power recognition in

the Former Yugoslavia. Beginning with the movements’ initial declarations of independence,

it traces decision-making within and among the Great Powers over whether and when

recognition was granted. The analysis clearly demonstrates that considerations other than

domestic sovereignty and viability played an important role in external recognition. For

months, the Great Powers withheld external sovereignty from Slovenia in favor of a

374 Larrabee, F. Stephen (1997) “US Policy in the Balkans: From Containment to Strategic Reengagement” in Donopoulos, Constantine P. and Kostas G. Messas (Ed)(1997) Crises in the Balkans Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p.285

375 Weisman, Stephen “US is Seeking to Speed Up Talks on Kosovo’s Status” New York Times May 20, 2005, A:1, p.7

376 “Kosovo: The Beginning of Negotiations” BETA Week February 23, 2006 World News Connection 216 ‘comprehensive settlement’ that never came to pass. Recognition retroactively adjusted

Croatia’s borders to include territory and people clearly not under its physical control or political authority. Finally, domestic sovereignty was artificially created in Kosovo, but not consecrated due to contentious external politics. Six years later, recognition appears likely, if only because the international community can not roll-back the sovereignty it has created in

Kosovo.

There is little doubt that Slovenia met the highest legal standards for Statehood.

Probably following its decisive ten day war with Serb authorities, but certainly after the

Brioni moratorium had passed, Slovenia was more stable, politically independent, and economically viable than many internationally recognized States. Even before it was recognized, Slovenia met and surpassed the additional recognition standards required by the

EC. By any standard, Slovenia’s domestic sovereignty was beyond reproach.

Recognition was not immediately granted however, because the Great Powers had interests running contrary to Slovene independence. When German decision-makers decided to recognize Slovenia, it was in conjunction with Croatian recognition. The ‘package deal’ that Croatians had encouraged by seceding at the same time as Slovenia helped to legitimate their independence even though Slovenia discouraged the association. Slovenian recognition was stalled for five months while Europe and the Serbs jockeyed over Croatia. In terms of this research, Slovenia exemplifies low Great Power interest and high domestic sovereignty.

Slovenia’s domestic sovereignty alone was sufficient for it to gain recognition as a State eventually, but recognition was withheld until it became a politically attractive alternative for the Great Powers.

217 Ironically, Slovenia’s relative stability and lack of violence made its recognition less pressing

for the international community; it was the wheel that did not squeak.

Croatia had strong governmental authority and popular support, but its control over

the territory it claimed was severely compromised. Many States have a border disputes or

some contested areas of control within their territory, but Croatia’s territorial control was

highly contentious. In addition, the Croatian constitution lacked the personal and minority

protections that the EC demanded before it would grant recognition. The regime fell short

according to at least two criteria, one legal and one political.

In spite of these shortcomings, Croatia received recognition alongside Slovenia.

Germany was overwhelmingly sympathetic to the secessionists’ cause and particularly

motivated to grant Croatia recognition. German recognition stemmed from a belief that

Croatia’s war would subside in the face of external recognition, rather than a belief that

Croatia already met, or would meet, the legal standards. Because Europeans were consumed

with presenting a unified front regarding Yugoslavia, they followed Germany’s lead. In some

cases, States prioritized European unity over their own individual preferences against

recognition. Croatian recognition then is a case in which mid-level sovereignty was translated into external sovereignty through the strong interest of one State. Under typical circumstances, the strong interest of a single State is not enough to compel other States to recognize. But in this particular case, Britain and France’s overriding interest in maintaining

European unity drove them to follow the German lead and paper over the apparent difference regarding timing.

218 Finally, Kosovo had little domestic sovereignty when it first declared independence

in October of 1991. It did not meet the Montevideo standards nor did it meet the standard

for a hearing by Badinter. The Great Powers also had few interests in Kosovo. And, like

Slovenia, Kosovo was not violent in the early 1990s, so there was no motive for the Great

Powers to involve themselves in the Albanians’ struggle. Only once violence exploded in the

province, as the KLA became active and Serbian authorities began to ‘ethnically cleanse’ the

territory, did the international community intervene.

In the Kosovo case, the American-led military intervention in 1999 and the UNMIK

transitional government that followed have had an uncertain effect on Kosovo’s domestic sovereignty. If international forces and administrators were to withdraw from Kosovo, the province would likely revert to instability and violence. The Great Powers’ interests in

Kosovo’s independence are much more certain. The United States, Germany, France and

Britain, despite public pronouncements of their impartiality, support Kosovo’s independence. Indeed, they backed military action to assure Kosovo was not under the control of Serbia. Russia and China, decidedly do not. Kosovo independence is likely, though extensive provisions for the Serb minority must first be in place.

At the time of the Yugoslav secessions, most of the Great Powers had problems with secession and domestic instability. Britain faced secessionists in Northern Ireland and

Scotland; France had separatists in Corsica, the , and the Basque country; and the US faced Hawaiian and Puerto Rican secession movements. None of these movements were as strong or as destabilizing as those faced by Russia or China, however. Russia would fight and lose a war with Chechen rebels in 1994-5 and lost most of its territory during its dissolution in 1991. China faced extensive unrest in Taiwan, Tibet and . Adding to its domestic

219 instability, though not secessionist, China came under intense international scrutiny for its

repression of pro-democracy protestors in 1989. Finally, beginning in 1998, Hong Kong

would also become a potential secessionist threat. Great Power behavior regarding

Yugoslavia suggests that strong States may be better able to manage domestic unrest than

weaker States, and further that their foreign policy will not be influenced by domestic unrest

until the level of unrest is quite high.

Geo-strategically, Yugoslavia had lost its centrality at the end of the Cold War. Russia

and the United States, who might have deemed Yugoslavia’s governmental stability of

central importance only years before, were not eager to intervene. Yugoslav authorities had

no conflicts with the powerful to sour their relations early in the conflict, so the Great

Powers favored maintaining the status quo. As time and the conflicts wore on however,

Serbs were at odds with NATO. There is good reason to believe, even with Milosevic’s

departure in 2000, that Kosovo has better prospects for recognition because Serbia is seen as an enemy within the US, Britain, Germany and France.

Ethno-national concerns and ideology found mixed support in Great Power behavior regarding Yugoslavia. For example, while both Germany and France were majority

Catholic countries, German recognition was motivated by their affinity while French recognition was not. Similarly, in the wake of the Cold War, ideological concerns were less influential than might be expected. Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo all espoused democratic principles, but few of the Great Powers sharing those beliefs were motivated to support their ideological kin. Only Germany, on the heels of its reunification, seemed sympathetic to the secessionists’ plight based upon their ideological affinity.

220 Finally, the Soviet Union had strong ties to Serbs (ethnic, religious, and ideological), but extended limited support due to its own domestic security issues and later, an interest in

Western engagement.

Lastly, the international norm of self-determination was an important, perhaps overriding motive for German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. It did not however, move most of the Great Powers away from their initial preference for the status quo. And when the Great Powers did recognize Slovenia and Croatia, it did not appear that a belief in self-determination was a motive. Indeed, Russia, China and France all favored the norm of

State integrity when it came to Yugoslavia’s secessionists (and secession in general). If the norms are systemic, then neither has been fully internalized by the Great Powers.

221 Slovenia Germany December 24, 1991 (effective 1/15) Britain January 15, 1992 France January 15, 1992 Russia February 17, 1992 Japan March 17, 1992 US April 7, 1992 China May 12, 1992

Croatia Germany December 24, 1991 (effective 1/15) Britain January 15, 1992 France January 15, 1992 Russia February 17, 1992 Japan March 17, 1992 US April 7, 1992 China May 13, 1992

Kosovo N/A

Table 4.1 Great Power Recognition

222 VOTE INDEP UNION OTHER % VOTING TOTAL REG.

Slovenia 88.5% 4.5% 93.2% 1,500,000/ 12/23/90377 1% Invalid Dec. 6/24/91 1,237,230 54,000 1,398,000 POP: 2 mil Croatia 94% 5% Serb Boycott: 86% 3,600,000/ 5/19/91 Dec. 6/25/91 2,910,240 154,800 2.7%,100,000 3,096,000 POP: 5 mil Serbian Krajina378 8/90 99%379 POP: Dec.12/19/91 Kosovo 9/26-30/91 99.87% - - 87% POP: 2 mil Dec.10/18/91380 Kosovo 5/1992 98% - - 80% POP: 2 mil Dec.10/18/91 .25% Invalid Bosnia-Herz.381 99.4% .029% 63.4% 3,200,000/ 3/1/92 Serb Boycott: Dec.12/20/91 2,061,932 6,037 2,073,500 POP: 4.2 mil ~33% Albanian Macedonia382 72.16% 1,300,000/ 9/8/91 95.26% Boycott: Dec.9/17/91 975,000 POP: 2 mil 20%, 400,000 Montenegro 4/2006 42%* 35% n/a n/a POP: 650,575 Montenegro 5/22/06 55.4%383 POP: 650,000

Table 4.2 Independence Demands & Plebiscites

377 Prunck (1997) recounts the results as follows: “…of the 92 percent of the electorate who voted, 88 percent voted for a free and independent Slovenia” (p.29). Weller (1992) notes, “88.5% of the Slovenian voters opted for independence” (p.569). Regardless of the specific count, all sources agree that independence won an overwhelming majority of the vote.

378 Vote not on independence, but on SAD Krajina remaining within Yugoslavia rather than seceding with Croatia. Milosevic cancelled a planned referendum on Krajina independence.

379 Vote for Serb autonomy within Croatia. Referendum exclusively polled the Serbian population and declared illegal by Tudjman and Croatian authorities.

380 On July 2, 1990 Kosovo’s provincial assembly formally declared independence from Serbia contending its status was rightfully that of a constituent republic of the Yugoslav Federation. This declaration was not, however, a declaration of secession from the Yugoslav State.

381 Question: ‘Are you for a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Hercegovina, a state of equal citizens, nations of Bosnia and Hercegovina – Muslims, Serbs, Croats and other nations that live in it?’

382 Question: ‘Are you in favor of a sovereign and autonomous Macedonia with the right to join a future alliance of sovereign states of Yugoslavia?’

*Forecast based upon a poll conducted in September 2005 among Montenegrins. Cagorovic, Ljubinka “Montenegro PM Says No Delaying Independence Vote” 10/14/2005.

383 The referendum on independence required a vote of 55% in favor in order to pass. The Montenegrin diaspora, which accounted for 3% of the electorate, was widely viewed as the decisive factor in the election result. Wood, Nicholas “Montenegrins Elect to End Union with Serbia” The New York Times May 22, 2006

223

Violence Deaths Other Territory Victor Peacekeepers Duration Slovenia 1991 46384 +100% Slovenia -30% RSK/ UNPROFOR385 Croatia (1) 1991-1992 +70% Serbs ENDED: 3/96 UNPROFOR/ UNCRO(6,581)/ +30% Croatia (2) 1995 Croatia UNTAES(5,561)/ (100%) UNPSG (110) ENDED: 10/1998

+100% KFOR/UNMIK 1998- Kosovo NATO international NATO (19,000) 1999 protectorate AS OF: 4/2005 Dayton UNPROFOR/ Bosnia- 1992-5 +100% Accords UNMIBH (2,047) Herz. 1995 ENDED: 12/2002 UNPROFOR/ UNPREDEP Macedonia +100% (1,110) ENDED: 2/28/1999

Table 4.3 Yugoslavia Conflict Statistics

384 Specifically, 9 Slovenians and 37 Yugoslavs according to Spencer, Metta (1998) “The Breakup of Yugoslavia” in Spencer, Metta (1998)(Ed.) Separatism Lanham, MD: Rowan and Litlefield Publishers, Inc., p.175

385 UNPROFOR included 38,599 personnel at its height in March 1995. Though its mandate was initially limited to Croatia, as violence spread throughout Yugoslavia UNPROFOR’s mandate was expanded to include every constituent republic but Slovenia. For further information on the mandate see the mission’s website at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprofor.htm.

224

Territory Bosnian Other/ Albanian Croat Mac. Mont. Serb Slov. population Muslim Yugoslav Bosnia-Herz. 0 43.7% 17.3% 0 0 31.4% 0 2.1%/5.5% 4,364,574 Croatia .3% 1% 77.9% 0 .2% 12.2% .5% ~4%/2.2% 4,760,344 Kosovo (1991) 90% 10% 1,954,744 Kosovo (2006)386 2,000,000+ Macedonia 21% 0 0 64.6% 0 2.2% 0 12.2%387 2,033,964 Montenegro 9.3% 6.6% 14.6% 0 0 61.8% 0 4%/2.7% 615,276 Serbia388 17.2% 2.4% 1.1% .4% 1.4% 65.8% 0 3.2% 9,791,475 Slovenia 4.8%389/ .1% 1.4% 2.7% .2% .2% 2.4% 88% 1,962,606 .6% Vojvodina 56% 44%390 2,012,605 Yugoslavia 6.2%391/ 9.3% 10% 19.2% 5.8% 2.3% 36.2% 7.5% 23,528,230 3%

Table 4.4 Yugoslav Ethnic Demographics (1991)392

386 A Kosovo census scheduled for 2005 has been delayed until at least April 2006. Kosovo has not held a census since 1981, well before international administration began. Albanians remain a majority in Kosovo, but many were displaced and are now refugees. Kosovo’s total population is estimated to be over 2 million as of 2006.

387 Sum of Turks (4.8%), Romanies (2.7%) and ‘Others and unknown’ (4.7%). Yugoslav not reported.

388 Including Kosovo and Vojvodina

389 Summed. See original for details (Ibid), p.9.

390 Sum of Hungarians (21%) and ‘Others’ (23%)

391 Sum of Hungarians (1.6%) and ‘Others and unknown’ (4.6%).

225 Great Power GEO (+) DOM (-) ERA (+) ID (+) 393

China No Low No-Yes394 Slovenia 0, 0, -1 = -1 (0) Croatia 0, 0, -1 = -1 (0) Kosovo 0, 0, -1 = -1 (0)

France No Med No-Yes Slovenia 1, 0, 1 = 2 (1) Croatia 1, 0, 1 = 2 (1) Kosovo 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1)

Germany No None No-Yes Slovenia 1, 0, 1 = 2 (1) Croatia 1, 0, 1 = 2 (1) Kosovo 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1)

Japan No None No-Yes Slovenia 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1) Croatia 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1) Kosovo 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1)

USSR/Russia No High No-Yes Slovenia -1, -1, -1 = -3 (0) Croatia -1, -1, -1 = -3 (0) Kosovo -1, -1, -1 = -3 (0)

United No Med No-Yes Slovenia 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1) Kingdom Croatia 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1) Kosovo 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1)

United States No Low No-Yes Slovenia 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1) Croatia 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1) Kosovo 0, 0, 1 = 1 (1)

Table 4.5 The Former Yugoslavia: Quantitative Indicators (1985-1991)

392 Reproduced from “The National Composition of Yugoslavia’s Population, 1991” Yugoslav Survey 33:1,p. 4- 13. Population for Kosovo and Vojvodina taken from Judah (1997), Appendix 4: Yugoslav Census of 1991 p.316 who in turn cites Statistical Pocket Book: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1993). Ethnic breakdown for Kosovo and Vojvodina taken from Duncan, W. Raymond (1994), p.27. Gray fill indicates the ethnic majority or the most numerous ethnicity within each sub-unit.

393 Reported as component parts, (Religion, Ethnicity, and Ideology) then as the dummy variable (ID) used in quantitative analysis in Chapter 3 for each secessionist movement.

394 Normative Era = 0 (1985-1989) and 1 (1990-1991) 226 Great Power GEO (+) DOM (-) ERA (+) ID (+)

China No Low Yes 0395

France Med-Low Med Yes 1

Germany Med-Low None Yes 1

Japan No None Yes 1

USSR/Russia Low Med-Low Yes 0

United Kingdom Med Med Yes 1

United States Med Low Yes 1

Table 4.6 Kosovo: Quantitative Indicators (1995-2002)

395 See previous Table 4.5 for Identity variable breakdown. 227 Table 4.7 Selected Yugoslav Timeline (1989-2006)

1989 February Constitutional amendments within Serbia began reintegrating Kosovo

July

5 Yugoslavia revokes Kosovo and Vojvodina’s status as ‘Autonomous Provinces’

October

President Bush meets with Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković

November 9 Fall of the Berlin Wall

1990 April Franjo Tudjman’s CDU government comes to power in Croatia Slovenia holds its first democratic elections since WWII (Demos Coalition wins 55% of the vote)

July 2 Slovenian Assembly declares sovereignty and declares federal law null

September Kosovo and Vojvodina formally incorporated into Serbia

27 Slovenia’s parliament declares Yugoslav federal law void within Slovenia

December 22 Croatia declares supremacy of Croatian law over federal Yugoslav law 23 Slovenes vote for independence should accommodation within Yugoslavia prove impossible (88.5% in favor)

1991 January 10 Yugoslav Constitutional Court declares regional nullifications illegal

February US-Russian-led talks between Croatia and Croatian Serbs 228

May 12 Krajina Serbs vote for independence from Croatia, 90% vote to remain in Yugoslavia 15 Croat Stipe Mesic blocked from assuming the Federal Presidency, Serb Borisav Jovic assumes the presidency instead 19 Croatia votes for independence, 93% vote in favor, Serbs boycott 20 US quietly suspends aid to Yugoslavia 24 US aid to Yugoslavia restored

June

19 Meeting of the CSCE declares support for Yugoslavia’s “territorial integrity” 21 US Secretary of State Baker reasserts support for maintaining the “territorial integrity of Yugoslavia” while visiting Belgrade 24 Slovenia formally declares independence 25 Croatia formally declares independence 26 Yugoslavia (JNA) begins a war to secure Slovenia’s borders Croatia formally recognizes Slovenia (though not recognized itself)

July 2 Kosovo Albanians declare independence from Serbia and federal equality (Albanian riots demanding the same began as early as 1981) 4 Slovenia defeats Yugoslavia in its war of independence (10 days) CSO begins negotiating a cease-fire under the auspices of the CSCE 5 EC bans arms exports to Yugoslavia and revokes nearly $1 billion in aid 7 Slovenia, SFRY and EC issue Brioni Declaration. The agreement includes a three-month moratorium on independence claims, Slovene disarmament, withdrawal of JNA, and a mission of 50 international observers.

August 18 Serbs in Croatia hold an unofficial referendum on autonomy for RSK 19 Knin Serbs (within Krajina) declare the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) 22 Coup attempt fails to unseat Gorbachev in USSR 27 EC establishes the Conference on Yugoslavia led by Lord Carrington

September 2 US says it has no plans to recognize Slovenia and Croatia should fighting continue396 Yugoslav Presidency votes 7-1 to approve EC brokered plan to end fighting in Croatia (Montenegro votes No)

396 Bush, George W. (1991) Presidential News Conference 102d Kennebunkport, ME September 2.

229 7 Peace Conference on Yugoslavia opens at The Hague 8 Macedonia votes for independence 17 Macedonia formally declares independence 26 Kosovo Albanians secretly vote for independence

October 8 Slovenia formally re-declares independence (Brioni moratorium expires) 11 Kosovo formally declares independence 18 EC Agreement on Yugoslavia (first to involve US and USSR)

November NATO announces a “new strategic concept” focused on local instabilities in Europe 13 Germany announces it will recognize Slovenia and Croatia by Christmas 29 EC Arbitration Commission (Badinter) concludes SFRY is ‘in the process of dissolution’

December

9-10 Maastricht summit yields draft Treaty on the European Union (signed 12/11) 15 Security Council votes to send an observer mission to Croatia 16 EC ministers decide to extend recognition to those Yugoslav republics desiring independence and meeting specified conditions 19 Serb Krajina formally declares independence 19-20 Four constituent republics and Kosovo request recognition under EC Arbitration Commission guidelines (Serbia & Montenegro do not) 23 Germany announces its formal recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (eff. 1/15) Slovenia proclaims a new constitution 25 Gorbachev resigns, ending the Soviet Union

1992 January 8 Republika Srpska proclaims its independence from Bosnia 11 EC Arbitration Commission (Badinter) delivers its recommendations for recognition: Slovenia and Macedonia are found to meet the EC standards. Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina do not. 15 The (remaining members of the) EC formally recognizes Slovenia and Croatia

February 3 EC “adopts positive measures” toward States of the “Former Yugoslavia” 28 Republika Srpska formally declares independence

230 March 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina votes for independence Montenegro votes for union with Serbia

16 Bush publicly remarks “positive consideration” given to “[formal] recognition of Slovenia and Croatia”397

April 5 Bosnia-Herzegovina formally declares independence (though applied for EC recognition 12/20/91) 7 Bosnia-Herzegovina formally recognized by the United States and EC Slovenia and Croatia formally recognized by the United States US lifts economic sanctions from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia

May 30 US declares national emergency regarding Yugoslavia (initial sanctions)

August 6 US announces intent to establish full diplomatic relations with Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by appointing ambassadors 23 James Baker resigns as Secretary of State, becomes Chief of Staff 25 US normalizes trade relations with Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia opens in London

September 17 US establishes full diplomatic relations with Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina

December 20 Elections held in Serbia-Montenegro

397 Bush, George W. (1992) “Remarks to the Polish National Alliance in Chicago, IL” March 16.

231 1993-2006

January, 1993 Croatian forces take back the straits of Maslenica linking Zagreb to Split and the rest of the Dalmatian Coast

January 20, 1993 US – Bill Clinton enters office, George Bush I exits

March 1, 1994 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina created (Muslims and Croats)

May, 1995 Croatian forces take back western Slavonia

November 21, 1995 Dayton Peace Accord Signed (final version signed Dec.14)

April 9, 1996 The EU formally recognizes the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisting of Serbia and Montenegro

April 1, 2006 Montenegro holds independence referendum on association with Serbia

232

CHAPTER 5

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE WARS OF SOVIET SUCCESSION

5.1 Introduction

When the Soviet Union dissolved, it defied expectations of a violent, conflict-ridden

demise. Instead, Russians negotiated a relatively peaceful conclusion to their empire. But the

process of Soviet succession was not without conflict entirely. Six conflicts in the post-

Soviet space erupted into full-scale civil wars.398 The USSR had maintained a precarious balance of power among its numerous and varied minorities. And with the future of that balance in peril, uncertainty provoked violent contests for survival and among some of its many ethno-national groups as the Union disintegrated. The worst of those conflicts remain unresolved.

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union experienced dramatic internal reforms under Mikhail

Gorbachev’s leadership. His regime initiated processes of economic and political liberalization throughout the USSR with the hope of Westernizing and modernizing the

State. Unfortunately, the reforms strained the staid Soviet system and it began to collapse.

398 The term “full-scale civil war” in this context does not conform to the 1,000 deaths threshold used in the quantitative segment of this project, but rather widespread violence between a governing regime and at least one other non-state corporate actor. According to this definition, five of the six post-Soviet wars were also secessionist: Abkhazia (Georgia), Chechnya (Russia), Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), South Ossetia (Georgia), and (Moldova). Only the war in Tajikistan was a uniquely internal conflict.

233 Economic and political transition was also difficult for the Soviet public, who had not yet grappled with the complex identity issues emerging as the State dissolved. As it turned out, the Soviet people could not be divided into 15 easy pieces (the number of constituent republics in the USSR). Rising chauvinistic nationalism within Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and to a lesser extent Russia, provoked independence demands from their newly disenfranchised minorities. Violent unrest erupted in some even before the union republics’ own independence had been secured.

The international community quickly consecrated the constitutive republics’ independence with formal recognition, in seeming disregard of their tenuous claims to sovereignty within their territories. With their newfound external legitimacy, the post-Soviet

States, extremely weak but nationalistic, determined they would violently suppress their discontents. Rather than restoring order in their peripheries however, each policing action ignited a war of independence; wars that the Home States would ultimately lose. For most, the loss of life, population and resources greatly hampered their own State consolidation as well. In some cases, the recognized post-Soviet States rebounded economically and militarily and today seem poised to retake the secessionist regions should conflict breakout again. In others, there is good reason to question whether the international community’s refusal to grant recognition and embrace the de facto regimes is a help or hindrance to local and regional stability.

Nearly fifteen years after the Soviet Union’s end, five proto-states in the Caucasus maintain secessionist demands for independence made before the fall of the USSR. All fought and defeated their Home States in wars of independence. All have the formal trappings of Statehood, including flags, coats of arms, and national myths. Each has

234 (or previously had) a government meeting basic levels of governmental control and authority as well as their own military or national guard. Finally, in most cases the de facto republics operate fully outside of their Home State’s authority. The balance of power between the

Home States and the secessionist regimes is effectively stalemated in favor of the separatists.399

Still, the secessionists lack other, more functional capacity due to their extended

isolation from the protections and benefits of international society. The regimes often do

not fully provide for their own security; their governments do not support their own

currencies; significant portions of their annual budgets come from foreign aid and

international humanitarian contributions (often diverted to other destinations by antagonistic

Home States); and the regimes struggle to maintain law and order within their borders.

Perhaps surprisingly, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia share many of these shortcomings, but

are nevertheless universally recognized as the legitimate bearers of Statehood within the

Caucasus. Indeed, they also receive extensive diplomatic and material support as a result of

that legitimacy.

The de facto post-Soviet regimes pose an interesting problem for Statehood as

conceived by International Relations theory and International Law. First, why was the Soviet

Union’s initial dissolution so uncontroversial if some of the newly emergent States were so

obviously incapable of effectively governing the territory and population they claimed? In

Georgia this is especially relevant because in addition to its two secessionist wars, it also

went through a civil war and military coup in the early 1990s; the regime in Tiblisi could not

even effectively govern Georgia’s uncontested territory. Second, why has the international

399 Chechnya’s war with Russia is an exception. Hostilities reemerged in 1999 and conditions no longer favor the Chechen separatists. 235 community been so slow to remedy their misplaced recognition over territories that are not

and have not been in the post-Soviet States’ control? We expect the international community

to be conservative, or status quo biased, in their appraisals of secessionist regimes; that there

will be a lag between a nascent regime’s achievement of de facto independence and its de jure

recognition by other system members. But after years of relatively stable de facto

independence, why do the Great Powers still refrain from recognizing the proto-states of the

Caucasus? The international legal standards for Statehood suggest recognition should have

been granted to at least two of the secessionist regimes under study.400 This question is

especially intriguing when one considers that, to this day, some of the secessionists’ Home

States are barely more viable themselves.

Finally, the unresolved wars of Soviet succession remain an important problem for

the international community. Though only the Chechen conflict has recently relapsed into

war, the stalemated conflicts create a variety of ills, some of which may cause additional

regional instability or even international conflict. The republics, though not entirely lawless

internally, have an uncertain legal status both domestically and internationally that makes

them attractive venues for all varieties of illegal behavior. The secessionists and Home States

vying for power operate, for the most part, beyond the purview of international law. And the

populations within the separatist regions, considered Stateless by law, have constructed vast

networks of illegal trade in everything from weapons and drugs to medical supplies and

chicken.401

400 According to the observable, legal standards for recognition articulated for the purposes of this project in Chapter 3 (leg_high, leg_low, etc.) The details supporting this conclusion will be discussed further in the sections on Domestic Sovereignty later in this Chapter.

401 The Moldovan and Ukrainian governments were recently made aware of a frozen chicken smuggling ring involving a de facto state. The chicken arrives legally to the secessionist regime in Transnistria and is then 236 Ironically, the fact that both the secessionists and their Home States claim control over the separatist territories leaves neither responsible. Both the secessionists and the

Caucasian Home States have used, and continue to use, especially brutal tactics in their attempts to gain control in the de facto republics. The States’ policies include assassination,

‘disappearance’, arbitrary imprisonment, embargo and other forms of human rights abuses.402

Similarly, the secessionist regimes have used bombings, kidnappings, crime, forced migration and violence against civilian populations in their efforts to repel their Home States’ claims and ethnically homogenize their territories. Their tactics have led hundreds of thousands people to flee their homes creating a massive refugee problem; they have destroyed economic and social infrastructure; and they have retarded social relations in every case.

Because the international community considers the conflicts internal however, they have little purview over the tactics employed by either side. The international community rarely even sees itself fit to publicly condemn the behavior, much less take legal or military action.

The republics have also become attractive venues for trafficking in weapons, drugs and other valuable goods. In many, the shadow economy’s trade approximates that of the legitimate market. Some of the republics, like Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, which have been under embargo for years, have created extensive black market trade as a matter of survival. In others, illicit trade is simply opportunistic. Aside from the illegal goods passing through the de facto states, the regions also have porous borders that allow permissive

smuggled illegally into Ukraine at a profit of nearly $1,000 per ton. (An estimated 40,000 tons were smuggled during one recent six month period in a six month period.) Myers, Steven Lee (2006) “Ukraine Battles Smugglers As Europe Keeps Close Eye” New York Times 1:4 May 28, 2006

402 Embargo is not necessarily a human rights abuse, but certainly constitutes one when levied in the manner that Georgia has against the South Ossetians; attempting to purposefully starve and freeze the population during the winter. Details follow within the chapter.

237 human traffic. The regimes’ weak border controls are exploited and their territories utilized as safe-havens for international terrorists and/or rebels from the other Caucasian conflicts.

Without formal recognition, the international community loses potential allies, or at least parties whom it may hold culpable, in its efforts against international crime and regional

instability.

This chapter traces the domestic and international political circumstances

surrounding four of the five post-Soviet wars of secession, that of Chechnya in Russia,

Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Republic of Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in

Azerbaijan.403 The case studies first survey the historical background between the secessionist groups and their Home States. They then go on to describe the events leading up to the secessionist demands and the subsequent civil wars in each of the four regions.

Next, measures of domestic sovereignty for the secessionist states are taken and contrasted with the general levels of sovereignty exercised by their Home States. Finally, I explore the bilateral and international politics of recognition for the de facto regimes of the former Soviet

403 Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia are sometimes considered irredentist, rather than secessionist movements. Indeed, their precise demands are often difficult to discern. South Ossetia fits within the working definition for this project because it 1) formally declared independence from its Georgian Home State (on , 1992), claimed both a territory and population (the former AO of South Ossetia and the people residing therein) and has its own flag. Though South Ossetians often assert their desire to be associated with Russia, the regime declared independence; it did not declare itself a part of the Russian Federation. It formally calls for independence with possible future unification with Russia. Similarly, while Russia has called for Osset independence, it has not claimed South Ossetia for Russia. Nagorno-Karabakh’s “true position is ambiguous. While, on the one hand, they have insisted on being granted de jure recognition and on being made a subject of international law, on the other they speak of their ‘unification’ with Armenia.” (Potier 2001), p.86 Of course, the two assertions are not mutually exclusive; independent States are free to relinquish their sovereignty in whole or part and/or to join into federative arrangements with other States. One factor that leads me to conclude the NK movement is secessionist is the Armenian government’s failure thus far, to claim Nagorno- Karabakh as its own. Similar to Kosovo and Albania, a territory cannot join a State without the government’s approval. It remains unclear whether Armenia would absorb NK. According to the operationalization for this project, and the conceptual definition underlying it, the NK case could go either way. I have decided to include it. The reader may make her own determinations as to whether or not the decision is appropriate. Nagorno- Karabakh declared independence on January 6, 1992, it claims the former AO of Nagorno-Karabakh and the largely Armenian population therein, and it has its own flag.

238 Union, estimating the relative impact of domestic sovereignty and external political considerations for each and forecasting its prospects for Great Power recognition.

Unlike the case cluster on the Former Yugoslavia, in which two of the three secessionist movements eventually secured recognition, none of the post-Soviet secessionist states have yet received formal admission into the State system.404 While this fact complicates the scientific analysis somewhat, it also permits predictive analysis without the benefit of hindsight.405 If my theory is accurate, each of the post-Soviet secessionists could yet be

States. Or might have been States rather than, or in addition to, their Home States according to the legal criteria. Each secessionist regime successfully defeated its Home State in a war of independence and experienced years of self-government. The external politics surrounding their demands however, dictate some are more likely to be recognized and actually become full members of international society than are others. In this sense, these are ‘most difficult’ cases for the political theory of recognition, as the legal standards for recognition have already been achieved. I argue international politics will still determine Statehood for all of the secessionists in the post-Soviet Caucasus. Political considerations do not merely color

404 The secessionists have however, received numerous forms of implicit recognition from the international community and even, in some cases, their Home States. Nevertheless, none of the five post-Soviet secessionist movements have received formal recognition, except from one another. A single exception was the government’s recognition of Chechnya on January 16, 2000. Though again, it was not widely recognized itself at the time. For a discussion of the legal implications of Taliban recognition for the Chechen regime see Grant, Thomas D. (2000) “Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya” American University International Law Review 15:869

405 A lack of variation on the dependent variable is often problematic when attempting to draw causal inferences because it creates selection bias (King 1994, p.129-30). In each of these cases the secessionists currently meet (or once met) the legal standards for Statehood, so there is no variation on the alternative explanatory factor. However, the potential for variation on the dependent variable still exists. All of the post- Soviet cases under study should have received recognition if the legal model is descriptively accurate, but none of them has. Van Evera (1997) suggests this constellation of variation (where variation on the dependent variable should have occurred according to legal and IR theory, but has not) is useful for determining unidentified antecedent conditions (p.23). I suggest that Great Power interests and international politics are the as yet unidentified explanatory variable, but we may also identify other ‘candidate causes’ in the investigation of the post-Soviet secessions (Ibid.).

239 States’ interpretations of secessionist regimes’ control and authority in ambiguous cases, as they did in the Croatian case. They can also cause leaders to withhold recognition, and therefore Statehood, from regimes that otherwise clearly meet the legal standards.

5.2 Historical Background

Like its Yugoslav neighbor, the Soviet Union rejected ethno-religious differentiation on an ideological basis. Yet many of its policies effectively intensified and politicized ethno- religious affiliation as the Union faced dissolution. Soviet leaders believed communist ideology would gradually supplant popular ethnic and religious affiliations within the State.

Their plans though, were unevenly realized during the seven decades of Soviet rule. The

Soviet system used ethnic hegemony and dependency as an organizing principal among its constituent parts, effectively maintaining, rather than eroding, the importance of nationality.

The Soviets purposefully created boundaries to divide concentrated ethnic minorities; thereby easing complications associated with their governance for the State. When the ethnic demographic within an administrative unit was unfavorable, officials systematically expelled local minorities and moved ethnic Russians in.

Once Soviet rule had been established, demographic reengineering remained an important political tool.406 As a means to pacify agitated peoples, many of whom had been forcefully annexed to begin with, the Soviets granted autonomy to various minorities within their borders. Some became titular minorities with their own self-titled union republics (like

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia in the Caucasus) while others received more limited autonomy as autonomous oblasts (AOs) or autonomous republics (ASSRs) within the union

406 Accommodation was by no means the only tool utilized to gain demographic advantage; the Stalinist purges of minorities during the were also representative of a Soviet population management tool.

240 republics (for example Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Chechnya and Abkhazia).407 Even

minority populations not granted ‘titular’ status experienced some freedoms, had the

opportunity to attend schools in their native language and had some special protections

within the USSR.408 Consequently, where ethnic groups were not accommodated or faced

discrimination by local authorities, centralized Soviet rule was able to unite minority

populations across administrative boundaries. Internal borders were formal, but largely

ineffectual divisions. The various autonomy arrangements created a somewhat arbitrary and complex, though rather stable union for many years.

Ethnicity and nationalism reemerged as a force in domestic politics as Soviet relaxed. Mikhail Gorbachev’s political and economic reforms (respectively termed glasnost and perestroika), which began in the late 1980s, and the straining of the Soviet system that resulted, provoked two types of succession-related secessionist challenges. Most were union republics, the USSR’s constituent elements, capitalizing on Moscow’s weakness to declare or reclaim independent Statehood as the Soviet Union dissolved.409 While the

remaining secessions emerged due to non-titular minorities’ fears that their local

governments would secure the independence they had demanded.

Each Soviet republic was multiethnic. With the new freedoms of glasnost however,

many aspiring leaders adopted exclusionary nationalism as a tool to rally popular support for

SSR independence. This new rhetoric understandably threatened minorities within the union

407 Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia were Autonomous Oblasts while Abkhazia and Chechnya were ASSRs. The terms union republic and Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) will be used interchangeably throughout the chapter. Autonomous oblast may appear as AO and Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic may appear as ASSR. SSR and ASSR should not be confused; ASSRs were of a lesser status than the union republics.

408 It should be noted however, that self-rule was also universally subject to a local Russian authority.

409 Some of the republics, like the Baltic States, had been forcefully annexed by the Soviet Union whereas others had no prior experience of independence.

241 republics, uncertain about what life within an independent and exclusionary Georgia or

Azerbaijan might hold. For some groups, possible subjugation to their own republic’s titular

nationality became more threatening than the prospect of remaining within the Soviet

Union. For others, who had not come to identify as closely with Soviet ideology, declaring

their own independent State, breaking from both the USSR and their newly independent

Home State, presented the more appealing option.410 When the Soviet Union disbanded, the non-titular minorities’ worst fears were realized; all of the union republics became independent States.

The actual conclusion of the did not match the international community’s expectations. The Great Powers had been preoccupied with the course of the

Soviet demise, but when the union did dissolve, it was accompanied by very little violence between Russia and the union republics.411 U.S. and European decision-makers in particular

were surprised at the relative ease with which such a large and diverse group of peoples and

territories devolved into independent units. The European Union’s guidelines for

recognition, which had been so controversial in Yugoslavia, were largely unnecessary for the

post-Soviet States because, in the end, the republics’ departures were mutual and relatively

amicable. The Great Powers quickly recognized the new States’ formal independence.412

410 So, where the Ossetians’ shared Christianity permitted extensive ‘russification’, the Abkhaz and ’ Islamic heritage separated them from their Home States and encouraged maintenance of their distinctive cultures. These secessions were not unlike that of the RSK in Croatia where the demand for independence emanated from a fear of Croatia’s potential independence from Yugoslavia.

411 Note for example, the Soviet Union’s influence on Great Power intervention and recognition in the Yugoslav conflicts as evidence of their preoccupation. Though there was “little violence”, there was still violence. Soviet forces did militarily intervene in Lithuania (beginning in March 1990).

412 On December 17, 1991 European Statesmen signed the Energy Charter Treaty with former union republics of the Soviet Union, effectively recognizing their independence. It is also noteworthy that the United States recognized the Ukraine before it was clear that Moscow would approve of its independence.

242

The dearth of international controversy over recognition in the Former Soviet Union

obscures the fact that many of the post-Soviet States were, like Kosovo or Bosnia in the

Yugoslav case, quite unable to independently perform most basic functions of governance

upon securing recognition. The non-titular minorities knew their new Home States were

weak however, and took the opportunity to declare independence. Beneath the façades of

national unity in the post-Soviet States lay complex issues of effective governance that the

new regimes had not yet confronted. Most significantly, the States did not have established

militaries or doctrine of their own, they could not secure their own borders, nor could they

afford the expenses associated with large-scale war.

Somewhat regardless of their weakness, the highly nationalist regimes in the new

States were unwilling to part with their newfound authority and violently suppressed the

secessionists. As a result, five secessionist wars of post-Soviet succession emerged. The first

four began in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, and a fifth began later in Russia.

Transnistria (PMR), in the former Soviet Republic of Moldova, declared its Slavic majority

province independent of Romanian Moldova.413 In Georgia, the Abkhaz of Abkhazia and

the Ossets of South Ossetia sought independence. In Azerbaijan, the Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenians attempted to secede. Finally Chechnya, as it had many times before, demanded a

State of its own - independent of Russia - for the people of the .

413 PMR is an acronym for the self-declared republic’s formal name, Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskia Respublica. It is also known as the Trans Dniester Republic. Though Transnistria’s search for recognition is certainly of interest, it will not be formally included in this analysis. See the section on Case Selection in Chapter 3 for an explanation of its omission.

243 The wars following the independence demands, though effectively stalemated in

favor of the secessionists, all continue today. None of the underlying political conflicts have

been resolved. Like the wars in the Former Yugoslavia, and most secessionist wars in

general, the post-Soviet conflicts occurred almost exclusively within the secessionist states’

claimed territory. This fact devastated infrastructure within the separatist regions, halted

economic activities, and forced their populations to relocate. Circumstances within the

secessionist areas were not good.

On the other hand, the secessionists, not their Home States, emerged victorious

from each war. In most cases sovereign authority seems to lie with the de facto governments

rather than the regimes in Baku, Tbilisi or Moscow.414 The kidnapping, crime and illegal

traffic in drugs and weapons so common to the secessionist regions is similarly endemic to

their Home States. And political corruption is rampant in the Home States as well. Since

Azerbaijan’s independence, not one of its elections has been judged either free or fair by

international observers. Lastly, in some cases the secessionist governments now afford a higher standard of living than their Home States.415 Still, external recognition eludes the

Caucasian proto-States.

414 Though this was true for Chechnya following the 1994-6 war, the situation there changed dramatically following the second Russian invasion which began in 1999. A discussion of the recent hostilities follows later in the chapter.

415 King explains that, “for most people life in an unrecognized [Eurasian] state is not significantly different from life in a recognized one.” He continues, “In some cases, it is better. Citizens of Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, have better access to electricity than those of most provincial Georgian cities. Citizens of South Ossetia have easier access to consumer goods…than many other Georgians.” King, Charles (2001) “Eurasia’s Non-State States” East European Constitutional Review 10:4

244 5.3 Chechnya’s History and Background

The Chechens were never easy for Russia to govern. Indeed, Chechen (and

Chechen-Ingush) resistance to Russian authority is an enduring facet of their shared

history.416 Systematically exterminated and expelled by successive governing regimes, the

Chechen people have struggled both to survive and to repel occupying populations from

their territory. Chechens fought for independence from each of three Russian governors.417

Never acquiescing fully to foreign rule, Chechen resistance was characterized by opportunism and arose during times of Russian instability and conflict.418 The most recent

post-Soviet conflict was no exception. Excepting that, in this case, the Chechens experienced

a victory of sorts.

Chechnya, an ASSR slightly larger than Connecticut, is located in southwestern

Russia in the North Caucasus. The republic borders and in Russia and

is near South Ossetia in Georgia. Chechens pride themselves on their ability to persevere

against all odds. The Chechen people consider themselves part of a larger, Caucasian

mountainous people, united with the Ingush, some Georgians and the Chechen diaspora.

Within their republic, Chechens make up a numerical majority, constituting some 66%

percent of the population in 1989.419 The Chechens are a predominantly Muslim people

owing to their history under the authority of the in the 1400s. Another

facet of Chechen social identity, markedly distinct from the other national groups under

416 The first took control of Chechnya in the early 1800s with the retreat of the Ottomans.

417 Imperial Russia, the Bolsheviks and most recently, the Russian Federation

418 For example, rebellions occurred during the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 and again during the .

419 The Chechen majority is certainly greater today as non-Chechen minorities emigrated during the war. The Chechen figure is approximate as Chechnya was united with Ingushetia within the USSR.

245 analysis here, is its ‘-based’ (tiep) structure. This traditional structure is sometimes faulted

for Chechens’ characterization as ‘backward’ or ‘tribal’ among Russians and Western

observers. Chechens social structure also however, permitted a massive and unanticipated popular resistance to Russian military actions during the 1994-96 war.420

Within the Soviet Union, Chechnya was joined with Ingushetia to form the

Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic, a sub-unit of the Russian SSR, in 1937. The

Russians dealt harshly with the Chechens. As a non-titular minority, with no titular republic

elsewhere, the Chechens experienced extensive ‘russification’, which they both resisted and

resented.

Chechens responded to their circumstances by attempting to escape Soviet control

whenever the opportunity arose. During WWII, Chechens appealed to invading Germans to

grant them their own independent State. Stalin responded to the Chechens’ treasonous

behavior by dissolving the republic and deporting nearly 500,000 of its residents. A quarter,

or approximately 125,000, died in route. The Chechens were not allowed to return until

1956, when Khrushchev announced ‘rehabilitation’ of the deported minorities. When

permitted, the Chechens returned en masse (though numerically depleted) to Chechnya with a

new determination not to be forced from their ancestral lands.

Like many non-titular minorities within the Soviet system, the Chechens were again subject to homogenization efforts upon their return. Chechnya was also one of the most underdeveloped and socio-economically depressed regions within Russia.

420 Though Chechnya had no organized, modern military, its clan structure effectively organized local resistance to Russian military tactics throughout the first war. The importance of Chechnya’s clan structure should not be overestimated. Many Chechens had also received training from the Russian military and were therefore quite skilled fighters. 246 Strong central control imposed by Moscow dampened Chechens prospects for reform and

autonomy during the 60s and early 70s. But by the late 1970s and 1980s, the Chechens and

Ingush were again making nationalist demands upon Soviet authorities.

Liberalization in the 1980s presented yet another chance for Chechnya to reach for

the illusive goal of self-government. Protests initially begun to address Chechen

environmental concerns quickly transformed and expanded to include demands for

linguistic, cultural and religious rights. Many local Russian officials were forced to resign due

to popular criticism in the wake of the unrest. In addition, the Ingush, who had been joined

with the Chechens for decades, called for their own ASSR, separate from Chechnya.421 By

1991, Chechens were demanding their status be raised to that of a union republic, a peer rather than a subject of Russia.

5.4 Precipitating Events: Chechnya

The late 1980s and early 1990s brought rampant instability to the Soviet Union and to the Russian republic - its seat of government - in particular. Chechens’ demands and their subsequent revolt appeared neither pressing nor threatening to Russian decision-makers when compared with the prospect of imperial dissolution, economic ruin and revolution.

Indeed, they had confronted and suppressed Chechen unrest before. Russian authorities were not willing to grant Chechnya its preferred status within the Soviet Union. Russia reaped important benefits from its authority over Chechnya; namely, energy resources.

421 Later, upon the Chechen declaration of independence and the formation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Ingushetia decided to remain within the Soviet Union (then Russia).

247 Though Chechnya itself was no longer an important source of oil, its location made it a

strategically important transportation route. In addition, Chechnya processed a significant portion of Russia’s oil.422

Chechnya’s location was also strategically important for Russia in other ways.

Officials saw the region as a potential ‘first domino’ that might cause a cascade of instability

throughout the already restive Caucasus, biting into the territory of Russia proper. Still, these interests would only intervene later in the mid-1990s, once Russia’s more pressing problems

had been resolved. Russia’s initial response to Chechnya’s autonomy demands was virtually

no response at all. Ironically, Russian restraint and isolation might have eventually destroyed

Chechnya’s secessionist ambitions, while its later militancy rallied Chechen support for

independence to previously unseen heights.

When the prospect of Soviet dissolution emerged, Chechnya’s future status was

unclear. The Russian government argued Chechnya should automatically become part of its

new State, the Russian Federation (RF). Chechens argued to the contrary, that in order for

Chechnya to become a part of the Federation, Russians needed Chechens’ explicit

agreement. Chechnya had, after all, declared itself a union republic and was therefore

Russia’s equal. Chechens attempted to negotiate new bilateral relations with the Russian

government in vein. Because Russia insisted their relationship had not changed, Moscow

rebuffed Chechnya’s offers reconsider their future association.423 Chechens were left with

two options, either acquiesce to Moscow’s ‘illegitimate’ rule or seek independence.

422 By the late 80s, Chechnya’s oil production only accounted for about 3% of the USSR’s total production.

423 As a result, Chechen officials refused to sign the 1992 Federal Treaty and the 1993 Constitution (of the Russian Federation).

248 , a staunch Chechen nationalist, was declared president of the

republic on October 27th. Just a few days later, Chechnya’s parliament declared independence

from Russia.424 They dubbed the new republic the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. While the

Russian government weighed its response to Chechnya’s demand, Dudayev got busy

consolidating power within the territory. “[He] took control of the police and their weapons

and [bought, stole or extorted] weapons from Soviet troops.”425 On November 8th, Yeltsin

declared a state of emergency. Dudayev similarly declared a state of emergency and declared

martial law within Chechnya. Yeltsin’s decision however, was quickly reversed. Two days

after Yeltsin declared the state of emergency the Russian Supreme Soviet denounced his

decision. He was forced to revoke the declaration and withdraw Russian troops from the

area, essentially handing control over to the Chechen rebels.

In retrospect, what Dudayev and his parliament meant by ‘Chechen independence’

was debatable. According to at least one expert, the Chechens viewed their territory and

sovereignty as indivisible and were not open to negotiation.426 Others suggest contrarily, that

Dudayev was open to an arrangement with Moscow short of complete independence. And

some evidence does suggest a more moderate Chechen demand. After declaring

independence, for example, Chechnya did not break economic or political ties with Russia.

Nor did it introduce its own currency.427 In fact, Chechnya’s (eventual) substantial monetary

424 Dudayev came to power when his party, the National Congress of Chechen People forced out the Communist, Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet on September 6, 1991. Dudayev was also later reported as having won 85% of an October 1991 vote within Chechnya, (though irregularities were reported). Parliament formally declared Chechen independence on November 1, 1991.

425 Lieven, Anatol (1998), Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power New Haven, CT: Yale University Press p.61

426 Toft, Monica Duffy (2003) The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.86

427 Lapidus (1998), p.26 249 independence was due to a proposal offered to it by the Russian . Chechnya did

not demand it.428 Regardless of Chechens’ true intentions, independence or some sort of autonomy, Moscow interpreted the declaration as attempted secession.

For two years after Chechnya’s declaration of independence, Russia muddled

through its relations with the breakaway republic. Rather than indecision over how to react,

disparate policies emerged because Russia was incapable of functioning as a unitary actor due to its own internal instability.429 Some Russian officials sought to exploit Chechnya’s faltering political and economic situation to assist Dudayev’s pro-Russian rivals. For instance, Moscow imposed an economic and travel blockade on Chechnya, hoping that poor

economic performance would erode support for independence. Its policies were largely

ineffectual however, due to Russia’s inability to enforce the ban. The most influential

sanction levied was Russia’s refusal to pay Chechens’ pensions, which proved a painful

economic punishment.430 Meanwhile, other officials negotiated with the regime. Besides

official contact, criminal ties forged between Moscow and Chechnya also became particularly

strong during the uncertain transitional period. Trafficking oil, weapons and drugs out of the

former Soviet Union became a stable and profitable source of income on both sides.

428 Berger, Mikhail “Bankers Give Recognition to Chechnya” May 20, 1997 Independent Press, The Moscow Times

429 In August 1991, President Gorbachev just survived a three-day coup attempt by members of his government attempting to thwart the signing of the Union Treaty (which transformed the Union into the CIS). By the end of 1991, the Union had disintegrated and Gorbachev had resigned. Though little violence immediately followed, rampant economic and social instability plagued the Russian Federation as a result of Yeltsin’s new economic policies through 1992. In 1993, Yeltsin’s opponents attempted to impeach him, he was ousted as President and he subsequently regained control, in part, by bombing his own parliament.

430 The economic blockade was not effective because it was rarely and unevenly enforced. As Lieven (1998) recounts, between 1991 and 1994, Chechnya exported 20 million tons of Russian oil (most likely much more due to corruption) which was estimated at between $300 million and $1 billion dollars worth of oil. (p.75) Russia’s refusal to pay Chechen pensions, though again unevenly enforced (about half were withheld), was a significant source of income for the republic.

250 Oftentimes, weapons trafficking was facilitated or even encouraged by Russian officials.431

Ingush-Osset clashes in the fall of 1992 drew Russian troops to Chechnya’s border but this was Russia’s only militaristic move toward the rebellious province between 1991 and 1994.432

Russian neglect of Chechnya during the early years effectively eroded popular support for Dudayev among Chechens.433 Dudayev’s own policies and controversial personal

style might have eventually proved to be his undoing. Years of de facto independence and

relative isolation left Chechens dissatisfied with their economic situation and frustrated by

the overtly confrontational style of their new leader. Moscow failed to capitalize on

Dudayev’s weakness though, because Yeltsin’s own struggle for authority consumed its

attention. When Russian officials finally decided to change their hands-off policies and

militarily suppress the republic’s independence, Chechens ‘rallied around the flag’ to support

Dudayev.434

Following a number of bus hijackings in Russia in the summer of 1993, tensions

between Russia and Chechnya increased. Yeltsin had consolidated power and began to step

up pressure on Dudayev’s struggling regime. Now recalcitrant, Dudayev refused to sign the

Union Treaty (on the of the Soviet Union) and was no longer willing to

431 Lapidus, Gail (1998) “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya” International Security 23:1 (Summer), p.17 at n.21

432 Lieven (1998), p.74

433 Lieven (1998) suggests Dudayev was losing Chechen support by April 1993. (p.75)

434 Russia’s change in policy toward Chechnya has been attributed to a number of factors. First, in 1994 Russian authorities concluded an autonomy agreement with Tartarstan, leaving Chechnya as the only remaining internal Russian conflict. Second, Yeltsin and other Russian officials had turned away from the Liberal perspective toward a more hard-line stance. Finally, Russia feared Western encroachment into the Russian ‘‘near abroad’’ and the loss of Chechnya’s substantial oil resources. Lapidus (1998), p.17

251 entertain anything short of complete Chechen independence.435 When Russian authorities traced some of the hijackers to Chechnya, Dudayev would not extradite the men nor would he allow Russian authorities to extricate them from Chechnya. Moscow responded with a botched seizure of a Chechen airport that left one Russian soldier dead and Russian authorities embarrassed. Again on November 26th, 1994, pro-Russian Chechens, with

Russian support, advanced on anticipating pro-Dudayev forces would quickly fold.

Their calculations were incorrect. Dudayev’s forces won a decisive victory, seized a number

of Russian tanks and captured a number of Russian soldiers (who the Russian government

had until then claimed were not involved).436

Rather than staying Russia’s hand, the string of embarrassing incidents had the

opposite effect. Russian leaders, incensed by the loss in Chechnya, turned to overt coercion.

Yeltsin cast the intervention in Chechnya as an arbitration effort to quell hostilities between

Dudayev and the pro-Russian opposition. But this was obviously not Yeltsin’s intention.

Neither the Russian public nor the Russian military supported military action in order to

regain control over Chechnya. Military actions however, had already begun at Yeltsin’s

command. On December 2, Russia began bombing locations within Chechnya and on

December 11th, the first Russian ground troops advanced into Chechen territory. The Russo-

Chechen war had begun.

435 As to Dudayev’s state of mind, when Russia stepped up pressure on Chechnya, Dudayev realized any agreement short of independence would mean continued attacks on his power emanating from Russia and the pro-Russian, Chechen opposition. In an independent Chechnya, the threat to Dudayev’s control would certainly be less. Lieven suggests Dudayev’s decision was subject to his own political longevity rather than consideration of any greater Chechen cause. Lieven, (1998), p.84

436 Ibid., p.19; Toft (2003), p.79

252 5.5 Abkhazia and South Ossetia, History & Background

Georgia was one of the wealthiest, most highly educated and successful union

republics within the USSR. Its economy centered primarily around agriculture, Black Sea tourism and transportation of oil resources therein. But the republic’s relative affluence did not immunize it from the lure of exclusionary nationalism. Glasnost and perestroika’s

decentralizing reforms simultaneously encouraged Georgians to assert themselves against

Soviet control and to subjugate their own minorities to solidify internal control. In a seeming

paradox, Georgians embraced multiparty democracy, free markets and a pro-Western

orientation as well as exclusionary nationalist policies to ‘Georgianize’ the Abkhaz, Ossets

and Ajars within their borders. By the late 1980s, Georgia’s potential independence

threatened its minorities to such an extent that secession and independence were more

desirable than continued submission to Georgian rule.

Georgia experienced independent Statehood once before, beginning in 1918, but its

sovereignty was short-lived.437 After succumbing to the in 1919-21, the former

Transcaucasian Federation, including Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, joined the Soviet

Union on December 30, 1922 and later became the Transcaucasian RSFSR. South Ossetia was made an autonomous oblast within Georgia. The independent Georgian government had trouble asserting control over Abkhazia, which was granted de facto SSR status equivalent to Georgia’s until 1931. Russian forces were stronger. Russia revoked Abkhazia’s status in 1931 and made it an autonomous republic (ASSR) within Georgia. In 1936, the

Soviets granted each of the three former Transcaucasian republics equivalent status as SSRs.

437 Bolshevik forces invaded Georgia only months after Russia (5/2/1920) and the Allies (1/27/1921) had recognized its independence. By 1924 Soviet troops had total control over Georgia’s territory.

253 Though ethnic Georgians were the largest population within their republic, at around

69 percent, Georgians were not an overwhelming majority.438 Georgians were however, highly concentrated within the Georgian SSR. Approximately 95% of ethnic Georgians lived within their titular republic. Various minority populations also resided within the republic, among them the Abkhaz, Ajars, Jews, , Ossets and Russians. Three of the minority populations had their own autonomous regions within Georgia: the Ajars and Abkhaz had their own Soviet Socialist Republics and the South Ossetians had their own Autonomous

Oblast.

South Ossetia is a small territory in the southern Caucasus approximately the size of

Rhode Island. It shares a border with North Ossetia, a territory of Russia whose majority inhabitants are the South Ossets’ ethnic kin. Ossets now make up a majority of the population within the South Ossetian SO, but the population was evenly split between

Georgians and Ossets for most of its time under Soviet authority. Ossets speak a Persian derivative and are mostly Muslim, while Georgians speak Georgian and Russian and are mostly Georgian Orthodox.

The Abkhaz autonomous republic is approximately the size of and lies on the southwest edge of Georgia bordering the Black Sea. The Abkhaz, a tiny minority within

Georgia, numbered approximately 100,000 (of Georgia’s population of 5.5 million) in 1989.

Even within Abkhazia SSR, the Abkhaz are a minority, constituting only around 18 percent of the total population.

438 Russian census 1989 254 The Abkhaz consider themselves ethnically distinct from Georgians.439 According to their

, the Abkhaz are members of the greater Caucasian peoples. Most ethnic

Abkhaz practice .

Within the Soviet Union, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia performed well

economically. Abkhazia was an attractive tourist destination because of its location along the

Black Sea coast. It was also an important producer of hazelnuts and fruit. South Ossetia had

an active mining industry and was a significant producer of wood, beer and fruits. The

Abkhaz and Osset peoples however, were not allowed to thrive under Georgian and Soviet

rule. Georgians resented the Abkhaz and Ossets, feeling they had been unduly advantaged

under the Soviet system. When opportunities arose for the Georgians to assert greater

control over their minorities, Georgians seized them.

Like many repressed minorities before them, the ethnic Georgian majority

responded to its own loss of sovereignty and status by imposing upon its minority

populations. The Abkhaz and Ossets had few advantages within Soviet Georgia; ethnic

Georgians were the republic’s predominant political and economic elite. Georgia’s policies in

Abkhazia included forced immigration, closure of Abkhaz schools and a ban of the Abkhaz

language. Less immigration occurred in South Ossetia because there was little industry.

South Ossetians’ close relationship with Russians across the border also buffered them

somewhat from repressive policies levied elsewhere in the USSR. ‘Georgianization’ policies

resurfaced during the 1980s, including Georgian-only language policies and the exclusion of

non-Georgian speaking students from its universities.

439 A great deal of controversy surrounds this assertion. Georgians argue Abkhazians belong to the Iberian- Caucasian family of which Georgians are a primary lineage. See Arbatov et al (Eds)(1997), p.348 for further discussion on this point. 255 5.6 Precipitating Events: South Ossetia and Abkhazia

During Perestroika, rapid change and mounting calls for Georgian independence

intensified feelings of threat among Georgia’s minority populations. Nationalist political

campaigns championing “Georgia for Georgians” indicated Georgian independence would

not be accommodating to its minority communities. Like the Krajina Serbs in Croatia, the

Abkhaz and Ossets feared becoming isolated within an independent, and increasingly chauvinistic, Georgian State.440 This was especially important for the Ossets, for whom a

majority lived in Georgia but outside of the South Ossetian SO. Georgians viewed the

minorities’ political opposition as traitorous. Consequently, their requests for assured

representation and higher political status were denied.

As a means of remedying their situation, the Abkhaz requested their leave of

Georgia. They hoped to secede from Georgia to join Russia, but remain within the Soviet

Union.441 Georgians again refused the Abkhaz request. As a result, Abkhaz leaders changed

their demands. Rather than join the Russian republic, they would seek their own SSR; a

status equivalent to Georgia’s within the Soviet Union.442 By 1989, the situation in Georgia

had deteriorated to a point where the local government could no longer keep peace between

the minority and majority populations within its borders. The Soviet army intervened on the

Georgian government’s behalf with disastrous consequences. Hundreds were injured when

the Russian army used nerve gas to quell the protests. The intervention’s effects were

440 In addition to the Abkhaz and Ossetians, Azeri and Armenian populations in the south also protested the government’s treatment of their people and suggested they might also secede.

441 Abkhazia’s request to join Russia was first made in an open letter to the 29th Conference of the Soviet Communist Party. It requested subordination to Russia again on July 8, 1989. Toft (2003), p.95

442 Abkhazia had been a Soviet Socialist Republic previously during a ten year period between 1921 and 1931.

256 contrary to its intention. Demands for independence increased on both sides (Georgia’s

from the Soviet Union and Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s from Georgia).

From that point on, Georgia descended into a centrifugal spiral of battling

nationalisms. In 1990, South Ossetia’s regional administration declared itself a republic of

the Soviet Union, equal to Georgia. In response, the Georgian Supreme Soviet revoked

South Ossetia’s autonomous status and declared a state of emergency.443 In Abkhazia, the

Abkhaz Supreme Soviet declared itself an SSR, independent of Georgia, on August 25th.

Again, Georgia revoked Abkhazia’s status and declared it a subject of Georgia. Georgia’s first multi-party elections on October 28, 1990, barred Abkhaz and Osset parties from participating because their platforms intended to “violate the territorial integrity of Georgia.”

Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s SSIR party joined an opposition government that constituted

Georgia’s first non-communist government. The new regime vocally supported Georgian independence. In December 1990, Georgia announced it would boycott the upcoming

Soviet referendum on the Union Treaty. It did not want to remain part of the USSR.

Nevertheless, in March 1991, the Soviet Union held a referendum on whether or not the union would remain intact. Georgia, along with a number of other republics, did not participate.444 Instead, the Georgian government held a referendum on its own

independence. Ninety-one percent of eligible voters participated in the election, and an

overwhelming 98.93% voted in favor of independence.

443 Georgia declared a state of emergency for South Ossetia in December 1990. It was not until late November 1991 that Georgia’s parliament rescinded its declaration, recognizing it was “useless.” Agence France Presse – English “Georgia lifts state of emergency in South Ossetia” November 25, 1991

444 Abkhazia did participate however. Over 60% of those eligible participated and 97.65% of the voters supported preservation of the Soviet Union. Arbatov et al (Eds)(1997), p.376-7

257 The Republic of Georgia formally declared independence from the Soviet Union on April 9,

1991. Georgia was the fourth republic to assert independent Statehood and the first non-

Baltic State to do so. The parliament chose Gamsakhurdia as its first president.

The new President was aggressive toward Georgia’s agitated minorities.

Gamaskhurdia promised property rights would only flow to those who had voted for

Georgia’s independence (recall Ossets and Abkhaz were not allowed to participate) and that

only native Georgians would be granted citizenship in the new republic.445 The President seemed unconscious of the irony in his government’s declaration of independence and demand for recognition while he “routinely [dismissed] Ossetian complaints as ‘lies,’” refusing to recognize their legitimate fear of Georgian independence.446 Gamsakhurdia

regarded the South Ossetian revolt as a foreign Russian plot intended to destabilize Georgia.

Similarly, the Abkhaz were viewed as complicit with Georgia’s “Russian invaders.”

Georgia’s transition to independence was fraught with instability and violence. South

Ossetia declared independence from Georgia on December 21, 1991. A number of States

had already recognized Georgian independence. Only four days later, the Soviet Union

dissolved and Georgia was granted formal independence. In December 1991, President

Gamsakhurdia was deposed in a coup d’etat and the State descended into civil war in South

Ossetia. Military leaders installed Eduard Shevardnadze as the head of State.

445 In particular, citizenship would be restricted to those who could prove Georgian residency prior to Russian of the territory in 1801. Brooke, James (1991) “As Centralized Rule Wanes, Ethnic Tension Rises Anew in Soviet Georgia” The New York Times October 2, 1991 Section A, p.3

446 Ibid.

258 Abkhazia’s parliament declared independence on July 23, 1992. They argued Georgia

and Abkhazia should remain associated, but by a treaty negotiated between equals. On

August 14th a Georgian military unit dispatched to retrieve hostages taken in Abkhazia

ignited tensions between the two. Abkhazia decried Georgia’s violation of its sovereignty.

Georgian officials countered that their sovereign rights extended throughout Abkhazia and

the military could come and go as it pleased. Abkhaz guardsmen fired upon the Georgian

troops. Under Russian pressure, the Abkhaz leadership acquiesced to a cease-fire and

promised to remain under Georgian authority on September 3, 1992. But the agreement did

not take. Abkhazians had no intention of following through on a commitment they felt they

had conceded to under duress. Fighting resumed on October 1st, with an Abkhaz offensive.

5.7 Nagorno-Karabakh History & Background

Armenia and Azerbaijan fought over Nagorno-Karabakh once following WWI and

never fully resolved their competing claims.447 The Soviets granted control over NK to

Azerbaijan even though much of its population was Armenian. The Armenians never

accepted its decision as legitimate. NK Armenians maintained close ties to their kin in

Armenia proper while Moscow maintained strong centralized control over its constituent

parts. When Soviet control relaxed and Azeri nationalism became more vocal during the

1980s however, the NK Armenians determined they would attempt to rejoin Armenia again.

447 At that time the two disputed where the boundary between them should rightly lie when the Bolsheviks took control. In November 1920, the Soviets placed all of the Caucasus republics within the Transcaucasian Republic. When the federation dissolved, the Soviets determined where the borders would be.

259 At the time, it seemed that Gorbachev might fulfill their request, but the dissolution of the

Soviet Union left the NK Armenians stranded under Azeri control, without recourse to a

higher authority.448

Azerbaijan, like Armenia and Georgia, was initially a part of the Transcaucasian

Federated Republic, which quickly disintegrated. When the Soviets took control in the early

1920s, Nagorno-Karabakh and a few other regions statuses were unresolved.449 The Soviets

originally intended for NK to remain within Armenia, but they reversed their decision and

instead made NK an Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan. The decision was formalized in

November 1924. In 1936, when ’s republics became SSRs, the Russians

reaffirmed that NK should remain within Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh’s status remained a

point of contention between Armenia and Azerbaijan from then on.

Nagorno-Karabakh is a largely mountainous, forested region slightly larger than

Rhode Island (at 4,400 km²). Located in western Azerbaijan, NK does not share a border

with Armenia, but is rather fully within Azerbaijan.450 A thin strip of Azerbaijani territory lies

between NK and Armenia proper. Armenians constituted over 75% of the population

within Karabakh in 1989, but the region also had a significant Azeri population and small

Russian and Kurdish minorities. The Karabakh Armenians speak Armenian and belong to

448 In fact, Gorbachev intended to change Nagorno-Karabakh’s status to that of a union republic. This would have given NK independence from Azerbaijan and increased its status within the Soviet system. Cornell, Svante E. (2001) Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus Surrey, UK: Curzon, p.79

449 Zangezur was ceded to Armenia. Nakhchivan, a mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani autonomous republic (ASSR), was eventually ceded to Azerbaijan along with Karabakh.

450 This was most likely the result of specific efforts by the Soviets in order to ‘divide and rule’ the Armenian population in the South Caucasus. In fact, early Soviet maps show Nagorno-Karabakh sharing a border with Armenia, but by 1930, the borders had shifted to the territorial boundaries recognized today. Cornell (2001), p.74

260 the Armenian Apostolic Church, a Christian orthodox religion. In contrast, the Azeri

majority was predominantly ethnic Azeri (nearly 90%), Azerbaijani-speaking, and of the

Islamic faith.451

Armenian leaders frequently attempted to reverse the Soviet decision on NK

through diplomatic means, but to no avail. In the 1930s, when the Transcaucas SFSR

separated into its constituent parts, the NK Armenians petitioned their return to Armenia.

And again in the 1960s, with Azeri nationalism on the rise, Armenians protested to

Krushchev that the Azeris were neglecting Nagorno-Karabakh’s social and economic

development. Strict central control during the 1970s precluded much protest over NK. The

latent contest between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh reemerged in the

late 1980s, however. As had been done in many SSRs during perestroika’s liberalizing

reforms, the Azeri titular nationality in Azerbaijan initiated strong nationalist programs en

route to independence. Sporadic attacks and skirmishes between Armenians and Azeris

during the late 80s foretold the violence to come.

The Karabakh Armenians faced especially brutal circumstances within Azerbaijan

including Soviet-style pogroms meant to intimidate and eliminate the group. Economic and

political control within Azerbaijan was restricted to ethnic Azeris, leaving few opportunities

within the republic for the Armenian minority. The NK Armenians were subject to extensive

“Azerification” beginning in the late 1960s, schools and churches were closed, cultural

institutions abolished, and use of the Armenian language discriminated against. Azeri

authorities systematically replaced Armenians with Azeris in law enforcement and economic

451 Ethnic Azeris are the majority in Azerbaijan and were the majority in the Azerbaijani SSR within the Soviet Union. While Azeris once made up a majority within Karabakh, they no longer do. Population transfers in the late 1980s and early 1990s left most Karabakh Azeris within Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh predominantly Armenian.

261 positions.452 The regime’s policies also included in-migration of Azeris and the attenuation of

Armenian power and influence in Nagorno-Karabakh. Under the greater Soviet umbrella however, the NK Armenians remained strongly connected to Armenians across the border in Armenia. The provided extensive support to their kin, viewing the NK

Armienians’ status as a national injustice. The Soviet system’s flexibility, allowing extensive contact across formal borders, probably forestalled conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh that otherwise might have ignited much earlier. When it became apparent that NK might instead be permanently isolated within an exclusionary, independent Azerbaijan, Armenians rebelled.

5.8 Precipitating Events: Nagorno-Karabakh

The freedoms of glasnost initially raised Armenian hopes that authority over NK would change. By 1987, rumors were widespread that Gorbachev intended to transfer sovereignty for both Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan (another autonomous region) to

Armenia. Though Gorbachev had in fact come to favor raising NK’s status to that of an

SSR, his decision came too late to deter conflict in NK. A skirmish between Azeris and

Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh over environmental concerns initiated the first violence between the two republics under Soviet rule. The situation declined precipitously from then on. Following increasingly violent measures on both sides, the NK Armenians formally declared independence from Azerbaijan.

452 Papazian in Chorbajian (Ed)(2001), p.65 262 Azeri nationalism intensified as Moscow loosened its grip upon the SSRs. The

Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians were justifiably threatened and appealed to Moscow for a

change in their status.453 Extensive Armenian protests in February 1988 prompted Moscow to consider adjusting the authority structure in exchange for a moratorium on the unrest.

Before Gorbachev could respond, Azeri authorities launched a Soviet-style pogrom against

Armenians throughout Azerbaijan.454 In March Gorbachev, under pressure, announced that

there would be no change in Nagorno-Karabakh’s status, it would remain within Azerbaijan.

Armenians were outraged.

Fall brought mass expulsions of Armenians from Azerbaijan and vice versa. And by

November interethnic relations had declined so much so that marshal law had to be declared

in Armenia. In 1989, Armenia’s Supreme Soviet and local representatives in Nagorno-

Karabakh declared the region’s intention to secede from the Azerbaijan SSR to join

Armenia. Azeris instituted new pogroms against the Armenians in January 1990; Moscow

had unambiguously granted Azerbaijani control over NK and Baku was emboldened to use

the most effective tactics at its disposal. Violent protests broke out in response and in early

1990, Moscow dispatched troops to quell the unrest. Russian troops met the violence with

violence of their own and at least 100 were killed. By this time, Moscow had been

thoroughly discredited as an Armenian ally or even an impartial arbiter.

453 February 13, 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh Supreme Soviet requested that Moscow transfer authority for the region to Armenia.

454 Sumgait, a city on the Caspian Sea close to Baku but far from Nagorno-Karabakh, was the scene of an especially brutal campaign against the Armenians. In only a few days time beginning in February 1988, tens of Armenians and Azeris were killed and nearly the entire Armenian population of the city was forced to flee. 263 When the USSR held its March referendum on the Union Treaty, Armenia boycotted

while Azerbaijan voted in favor of maintaining the republic. Armenians declared their

republic’s independence on September 21, 1991, after holding their own referendum on

sovereignty. Around the same time (Dec.10), a referendum on independence in Nagorno-

Karabakh, boycotted by Azeris in the region, yielded overwhelming support for the

establishment of a new State. According to the secessionist regime, 82.2% of eligible voters

participated and 99.9% voted in favor of independence.455 Azerbaijan revoked Nagorno-

Karabakh’s autonomous status on November 21, 1991. On January 6, just two weeks after

the Soviet Union dissolved, Nagorno-Karabakh formally declared its independence from

Azerbaijan.

5.9 The International Environment

The Soviet and Yugoslav secessions emerged during the same historical moment, so

many aspects of the external political environment were similar to both cases. As the Soviet

Union grappled with its own internal transformation, others anticipated the effects Soviet

dissolution might have throughout the international system. The fall of the Soviet empire

and the end of the bipolar order weighed heavily on the minds of Statesmen. Some saw the

potential for democracy and free-markets in the post-Soviet States while others, more

skeptical of wholesale change following decades of authoritarianism, saw the potential for

widespread ethno-political conflict, State failure and economic chaos. Events unfolded so

quickly that no one could be sure what the future would hold.

455 Petrossian, E. “Act on Referendum Conducted in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on December 10, 1991” Office of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in Washington, DC http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/declaration_independence.shtml#two The author notes 108,736 of 132,328 eligible voters participated. An estimated 22,747 Azeris in NK boycotted the vote. 95 ballots (.09%) were declared invalid. 264 Throughout the early 1990s, politics in the former Soviet States remained unsettled;

the new States had not yet consolidated their authority, nor had they determined the future

of their relationships with Moscow. What would become of the former Russian empire? The

international order was in flux. Would the United States emerge as a hegemonic power or

instead, would a new era of multi-polarity emerge, characterized by traditional ‘spheres of

influence’ among the remaining Great Powers? Finally, how would the most powerful States

attempt to influence the course of events in the region?

Events like the 1991 Iraq War and negotiations over the European Union, which

served to distract attention from Yugoslavia’s emerging conflicts, did not have such an effect

on the Great Powers regarding the post-Soviet conflicts. Instead, the Great Powers,

especially the United States, Europe and Russia, were keenly interested in the events in the

new States. The United States was particularly engaged in Georgia and Azerbaijan, which

had adopted a pro-Western orientation. Europeans were actively engaged in peace-making

and humanitarian operations. And, once Russia stabilized, it energetically reasserted itself in

its ‘near abroad.’ The Great Powers’ interests however, did not often tend toward the

secessionists’ ends.

The conflicts in Yugoslavia and the Russian periphery inspired fears of centrifugal

disintegration throughout the international community. Between 1989 and 1994, 30 new

States entered international society. Most of those new States were the fruits of secession.456

The international community readily consecrated the independence of the USSR’s former union republics, but was reticent to accept any additional devolution of sovereign authority.

Upon independence, the post-Soviet States were left with the armaments of a powerful

456 See Correlates of War System Membership Data. In addition to the post-Soviet States, the new States included the former Yugoslav States, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Eritrea and Namibia.

265 military, including nuclear weapons, and their stability was of the utmost importance. The

States also had important strategic resources like oil, which required relative stability for its

extraction and trade.457 Lastly, the former Soviet States lay in an important strategic location.

Even with the international community’s material and moral support however, the new

States were too weak to deter or suppress the secessionist efforts within their borders. War resulted in every case.

5.10 Civil War & Stalemate in the Post-Soviet States

The wars for Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh began

under similar, but distinct circumstances. They would conclude in the same fashion. In some respects, the wars were very much alike. In each instance the separatist regions and their volunteer defense forces defied their Home States’ low expectations, seizing upon the traditional militaries’ weaknesses by using flexible, guerilla tactics and retreating into the civilian population. They were surprisingly well armed and trained and their Home States

were strikingly unprepared for large-scale combat. The separatist forces were on their ‘home

turf’; they had popular support; they were familiar with the terrain; and they were willing to

persevere until their Home States conceded defeat. Finally, each of the secessionist wars

reached similar end points in the early 1990s. They had compelled their Home States to

withdraw and relative peace had set in; they were de facto sovereign; and peacekeepers had

been agreed to in every case but one. The wars were distinct however, in the extent of

violence employed, in the destruction left in each wake and in the character of the new

regimes elevated into authority in each republic.

457 Oil resources and pipelines were an important factor in most of the secessionist conflicts. 266 Separatist hostilities first evolved into war in South Ossetia, where war erupted in

January 1991, eleven full months before the Soviet Union dissolved. (See Table 5.3)

Georgian and Osset violence reached a durable conclusion in the summer of 1992 with the

signing of the Sochi Agreement.458 The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh’s status reemerged in the late 1980s, but did not escalate to full-scale war until January 1992. The Karabakh war, which included both Azerbaijani and Armenian forces, continued until 1994.459 Georgia’s war with the Abkhaz began in August of 1992, shortly after its July declaration of independence and just after the ceasefire in South Ossetia. The Abkhaz war ended with a

May 1994 ceasefire agreement.460 Lastly, the Russo-Chechen war began after the other post-

Soviet wars had already reached enduring stalemates, in December 1994. By summer’s end in

1996, the Chechens compelled Russia’s withdrawal and agreed to resolve Chechnya’s ultimate status in five years.461 Each of the wars lasted approximately two years, but the intensity and scale of violence within each varied significantly.

458 The Sochi Agreement, signed on June 24, 1992, established a ceasefire, a security corridor, a peacekeeping force, and OSCE monitors.

459 A ceasefire among the three parties, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, was established on May 12, 1994 with Russian support. While the ceasefire holds to this day, Nagorno-Karabakh is not entirely without violence. OSCE observers estimate an average of one person a day died between the initiation of the ceasefire and their mission report in 1999, approximately 1,600 individuals.

460 Russian brokered talks in 1994 led to the cessation of major hostilities, a ceasefire agreement and the dispatch of a CIS peacekeeping force. Though the peacekeepers were nominally under the purview of the CIS, they were, in fact, all Russian.

461 The Khasavyurt Agreement, signed on October 30th, 1996, formally ended the war and set a deadline of December 31, 2001 for the resolution of the Russo-Chechen relationship. In particular, the agreement states that the parties would seek a mutually acceptable political solution to the military conflict. And that the negotiations would “[proceed] from the universally recognized right of nations to self-determination, the principles of equality, free will and the freedom of expressing one's will, strengthening interethnic accord and security of nations.” “Text of Peace Agreements, Rebel Leader Comments” September 3, 1996 British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts adapted from Russian Public TV, Moscow, in Russian 4pm GMT September 1, 1996 267 All of the conflicts caused a significant loss of life and property, but the war in

Nagorno-Karabakh had the highest human cost. Experts estimate that, in the course of the

28-month war, over 30,000 individuals were killed and well over a half million people were

displaced by the violence. The conflict over NK was especially disruptive to civilian

populations because both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani governments used mass

expulsions as means to secure demographic security within their borders. The Azeris (and

initially the Soviets) expelled Armenians from their territory while the Armenians expelled

Azeris from Armenia proper, NK, and its neighboring territories. Georgia’s short war against

South Ossetia (Jan. 1991-June 1992) in contrast, likely only resulted in 1,000 deaths and

between 39,000 and 100,000 displaced persons before reaching its conclusion. The first

Russo-Chechen war and the Georgian-Abkhaz war caused around 10,000 military casualties

on both sides and the violence forced approximately 200,000 people to flee from each

conflict zone.

Though the post-Soviet wars may seem small relative to civil wars like the 1994

Rwandan war or the ongoing Sudanese civil war, much of the wars’ destructive impact lay in

their concentration within a single geographic region. Refugees fleeing one conflict often

ended up in a territory where another conflict was underway; there was little respite for the

innocent victims of any of the wars. Relatedly, secessionist combatants in one territory

capitalized on their neighboring States’ lack of control by taking shelter within their borders.

Russian and Georgian authorities frequently clashed over Georgia’s provision of refuge to

Chechen fighters and Russia’s assistance to Georgia’s Ossets and Abkhaz. In many instances,

one conflict could not be isolated from the others; they were significantly intertwined.

268 By the mid-1990s, all of the conflicts were exhausted and the secessionists had prevailed militarily. Each of the separatist regions ended up in very different circumstances however, than when they first demanded independence. Abkhazia and South Ossetia had a relatively advantaged status under Soviet control, but the wars had destroyed much of their infrastructure. Abkhazia for example, which previously had a booming tourist industry, could no longer attract large numbers due to its wartime instability. Post-war the two

Georgian regions looked much like their economically disadvantaged colleagues in Nagorno-

Karabakh and Chechnya. In fact, Abkhazia emerged from the conflict as one of Georgia’s most economically depressed regions.

Post-war, the secessionist republics also had different political characters than when the wars began. In some cases, the republics literally had new leaders. Chechen President

Dudayev for instance, was killed in a Russian attack on April 22nd, 1996 and replaced by

Aslan Maskhadov, a moderate, former Russian Army colonel.462 In other cases, the political

regimes had transformed over the course of the war. In Karabakh, the military began to play

a prominent role in every aspect of political life, playing on Armenians fears by inducing a

permanent siege mentality within the republic.463 Similarly, Chechnya’s war elevated the

status of Wahhabist fighters within Chechen social and political life, infusing religion into

what had been a purely nationalist conflict.

Violence between the secessionists and their Home States had dwindled to almost

nothing in the mid-1990s, but the peace remained uneasy. The de facto regimes, without a

462 Some questioned whether or not the Chechen independence movement would survive the death of its leader, but a massive attack and seizure of Grozny on the eve of Yeltsin’s inauguration ended rumors of a Chechen collapse. Lapidus (1998), p.23

463 Lynch (2002), p.836

269 political settlement, remained highly suspicious of their former Home States. At the behest

of both the Home States and the secessionists, peacekeeping forces were dispatched to three

of the regions.464 In South Ossetia, Russian peacekeepers were dispatched and later came under the supervision of the OSCE. Russian peacekeepers were similarly the first to arrive in

Abkhazia (in October 1993), but with their legitimacy in question, the UN became involved.465 UNOMIG, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, was dispatched in

1993 to verify the Abkhaz ceasefire. In 1994, the UN Security Council expanded

UNOMIG’s mandate to include monitoring and verification of the ceasefire (the first had

been violated and invalidated), investigation of alleged crimes by the combatants and

assistance in the safe return of the conflict’s refugees.466 Peace talks under the auspices of the

United Nations and the OSCE’s Minsk Group initiated in 1992 for Nagorno-Karabakh

made little progress. The OSCE dispatched peacekeepers, one-third of which were Russian,

to Nagorno-Karabakh following the May 12th, 1994 agreement. In practice, the

peacekeepers in each of the republics have served two purposes. First, they have helped to

maintain the peace in each of the three conflict zones. Second, they have preserved the de

facto control of the separatist regimes.

464 Russia refused to permit external intervention in Chechnya.

465 After its requests for unbiased intervention were rebuffed by the OSCE and the United Nations, Georgia was left with few alternatives. In October 1993, Shevardnadze requested Russia intervene to quell the Zviadist (pro-Gamsakhurdia) violence in Abkhazia. Russian brokered talks in 1994 led to the cessation of major hostilities, a ceasefire agreement and the dispatch of a CIS peacekeeping force. Though the peacekeepers were nominally under the purview of the CIS, they were, in fact, all Russian.

466 During the intense fighting of 1993, UNOMIG was suspended save for 15 observers. UNSC Resolution 881, passed on November 4, 1993, established an interim mandate that was later expanded in July 1994 on the recommendation of the Secretary General. For greater detail on UNOMIG’s mission and progress see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig/

270 5.11 Internal Sovereignty in the Post-Soviet Proto-States

The conflicts ended with victories of a sort for the secessionists, but the struggle to

consolidate domestic sovereignty and gain international recognition had just begun. In the post-Soviet cluster, Chechnya falls within both the Leg_high and Leg_low categories. It is considered Leg_high following its successful 1994-1996 war and fits within the Leg_low category as a result of dwindling internal control and renewed hostilities with Russia, which began in 1999. Following the first Russo-Chechen war, the Maskhadov regime provided a relatively high level of domestic control and authority, had extensive popular support, and appeared viable due to Russia’s retreat from Chechen territory. Conversely, in the period following the war the Chechen regime’s domestic sovereignty plummeted. Without the widespread legitimacy afforded by external recognition, Chechnya languished under Russian sanctions. By the time Russian forces invaded Chechnya in 1999, the Maskhadov regime maintained little effective authority within its borders and its viability was in question.

Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh fall within the Leg_med category.

All of the states demonstrate an organized political authority, popular support and provide basic services for their populations. They have all held popular elections and/or referenda on sovereignty and put forward their own independent constitutions. At the same time, the governments have “poorly developed party structures” and “personalistic”, “centralized” presidential systems, perhaps calling into question their long-term viability.467 Each meets the

minimal criteria established by international law, but lacks convincing sovereign authority on

at least one of the three dimensions.

467 Lynch (2002), p.836

271 While each of the de facto authorities is considered Leg_med, the republics vary in

the qualities of domestic sovereignty possessed. Nagorno-Karabakh’s regime, in particular its

military development, is much stronger than Abkhazia’s or South Ossetia’s, for example.

Abkhazia receives a great deal of external humanitarian support from IOs and NGOs while

the other secessionist states receive less. Abkhazia also has greater potential for economic

viability than do Chechnya, Karabakh or South Ossetia. South Ossetia and NK receive

significant support from diaspora communities underwriting their viability, but perhaps

simultaneously calling into question their political independence from Russia and Armenia.

Finally, each of the governments provides qualitatively different types of effective authority over their population and territory. The Karabakh and Chechen regimes are essentially

military regimes, whereas the South Ossetian and Abkhaz governments are civilian.

5.12 Domestic Sovereignty in Chechnya, 1996-1999

Chechnya’s territorial control and effective authority at the end of the 1994-6 war were high by any standard. Though the Chechens’ means of achieving that control – guerrilla war – were less orthodox than one might expect from an established State, Chechen authorities successfully compelled a Russian retreat from their territory. Because the war was tremendously destructive, the de facto regime had a number of obstacles to overcome before normal governance could be established. Chechnya had been less developed before the war and had even less capacity by 1996.

272 Its Russian Home State also made every attempt to undermine Chechen domestic authority through embargoes and strangulation of the local economy. Nevertheless, a number of experts suggest Chechnya had a credible claim to Statehood according to international law.468

Interestingly, many of Chechnya’s difficulties were shared by its Russian Home State, where economic troubles and a breakdown in law and order had also occurred. An attempted coup against Yeltsin in 1993, for instance, was brutally suppressed, signaling domestic instability and discontent. Later, in 1998, Russia experienced a financial crisis that initiated an economic decline worse than that of the Great Depression. Russia consequently saw a tremendous population decline, rapidly decreasing life expectancy, political instability and a precipitous fall in living standards. Indeed, it is worthwhile to ponder whether or not

Russia would have had the ability to maintain its own domestic sovereignty without the substantial support afforded it by the international community. 469 It is certainly true that

Yeltsin’s government would likely not have survived to govern a second term had it not been for unequivocal US support.470

468 Hollis, Duncan B. (1995) “Accountability in Chechnya – Addressing internal matters with legal and political international norms” Boston College Law Review 36; Tappe, Trent N. (1995) “Chechnya and the State of Self- Determination in a Breakaway Region of the Former Soviet Union: Evaluating the Legitimacy of Secessionist Claims” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 34, p.255. Tappe however, includes a number of normative criteria in his analysis of Chehnya’s claim not consistent with this project.

469 At the time, some scholars argued the Russian Federation would meet a fate similar to its Soviet predecessor. See pgs. 54-55, in particular. Stern, Jessica Eve (1994) Moscow Meltdown: Can Russia Survive?” International Security 18:4 (Spring), p.40-65. Lapidus (1998) notes that international financial support for Russia remained strong throughout the Chechen conflict while the Russian government was only able to collect 70% of the taxes owed it domestically. (p.40) The Russian Federation might reasonably have been called a ‘’ in the early to mid-1990s. And it was again during the 1998 financial crisis.

470 Goldgeier, James M. and Michael McFaul (2003) Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

273 5.12.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority

Even considering its relative weakness following Soviet dissolution, the balance of

power between Chechnya and Russia favored Russia prior to the 1994-1996 war. By

December 15th, 1993, an estimated 600 tanks and 40,000 Russian soldiers advanced on

Grozny.471 The number of Chechen combatants, in contrast, was estimated at between 5 and

10,000.472 The Russians were also overwhelmingly better armed. One observer noted that,

“At the peak of the war the Chechen commander-in-chief had no more than 6,000 ‘full-time’

fighters, not because of a lack of volunteers but because of a shortage of weapons.”473

Throughout the war, the Russian government consistently reported that the Chechens were near defeat. And it was true that Russian forces dealt harsh blows upon the Chechen resistance and its civilian population (Russian and Chechen alike). Still, at the war’s end

Chechen forces controlled Grozny and had retaken the formerly Russian occupied portions of Chechnya.

Unlike Afghanistan, Chechnya avoided civil war upon the Russians’ departure. In

September 1997, Chechen authorities, now under Maskhadov, expelled all Russian governmental representatives. The expulsions effectively established Chechnya’s complete independence from Russia. In fact, later that November, Russia, Chechnya and Azerbaijan signed a tripartite agreement on the opening of a pipeline between the Caspian Sea and the

Black Sea. For Chechens (and some others) the agreement signaled Russia’s de jure

471 Though some additional troops were dispatched to Chechnya, the number of troops remained relatively stable throughout the war. Felgenhauer (2002) notes, “The overall strength of Russian forces in Chechnya never exceeded 45,000 during the 20-month campaign.” p.158-9

472 Bennigsen, Marie (1999) “Chechnia: political developments and strategic implications for the North Caucasus” Central Asian Survey 18:4, p.541

473 Ibid.

274 recognition of Chechen independence as well as its ability to ‘engage in international affairs’

as outlined in the Montevideo standards. The Russian government had implicitly

acknowledged the Maskhadov regime’s “ability to keep [the pipeline] well-maintained and

secure” of its own volition.474 Russia sent another mixed signal on independence when it

granted the Grozny airport international status.475

Chechnya won significant financial independence following the war as well. An agreement between the Russian Central Bank and the National Bank of Chechnya signed in

May 1997 stipulated that “cash circulation and non-cash transactions [would] be organized by the Chechen government.” In addition, the Russian Central Bank no longer had offices in

Chechnya nor did it consider the Chechen bank its subsidiary.476 The only remaining

monetary vestige of Russian authority within Chechnya was the , which

remained its official currency.477 Otherwise, the republic was monetarily independent and

recognized as such by Russian authorities. Especially surprising was the fact that the Russian

Central Bank initiated the negotiations, not the Chechens. Said one banker, “We are realists

and we simply put in the agreement what has long arisen in practice.”478

474 Clark, Bruce “Chechen chief takes struggle to Washington” November 14, 1997 The Financial Times Limited (London, )

475 Kalashnikova, Marina “Chechnya Achieves International Status, But Only for its Airport in Grozny” June 17, 1997 Russica Information, Inc. – RusData DiaLine, Russian Press Digest

476 Berger, Mikhail “Bankers Give Recognition to Chechnya” May 20, 1997 Independent Press, The Moscow Times

477 Stern (1994) notes that Chechnya had in fact “demanded the right to float [its] own [currency] and to collect [its] own taxes” (p.57), but other sources contradict this account. Stern cites a Russian Federation, Deputy Premier.

478 Ibid.

275 The Chechen republic however, remained very poor and suffered from a lack of

infrastructure and development. Under the weight of Russian sanctions from 1991 through

1993, Chechnya’s GNP “declined by some 65.3 percent, [and] per capita income fell to one- fourth its 1991 level.”479 Unemployment was also especially high after the war because

Chechens could no longer travel to other countries to work (a once common practice) without internationally recognized passports and documentation. Nevertheless, Chechens’ effective control and authority after the 1994-1996 war were redoubtable.

5.12.2 Popular Legitimacy

Chechnya held its first presidential elections on January 27th, 1997. Observers from

the OSCE and other foreign organizations were present.480 Chechens within Chechnya and

members of the Chechen Diaspora, many displaced because of the war, were invited to

participate.481 All five of the major contenders were active in the resistance and dedicated to

Chechen independence. Maskhadov won the presidency with 59.3% of the vote.482

According to one source, Russians within Chechnya were disinterested in the elections, but

were not barred from participation, nor did they actively boycott.483 Nevertheless, the

elections were far from perfect. At the time the OSCE’s head of mission in Grozny

479 Galeotti cited in Toft (2003), p.76

480 At the time the US State Department heralded the elections as, “an important part of the process of reconciliation and…[a potential] step toward establishing democratic institutions and legitimate government in Chechnya.” Burns, Nicholas (1997) “U.S. Support for Elections in Chechnya” Press Statement: U.S. Department of State January 6, 1997

481 Chechen officials said 513,000 people registered to vote (including refugees). The Chechens did not permit polling outside the borders of the republic for fear of election fraud, but did bus refugees into Chechnya to participate in the election. Smith, Sebastian “Big turnout for Chechnya’s landmark post-war elections” January 27, 1997 Agence France Presse - English

482 Ibid. Other reported vote totals were: Shamil Basaev 23.5% and Zelimkhan Yandarbiev 10.1%. Mowladi Udugov and Ahmad Zakaev received smaller shares of the vote.

483 Bennigsen (1999), p.546

276 remarked that there was no reason why the international community’s position on Chechnya

should change as a result of the elections. He then reiterated that the conflict was of an

internal nature and needed to be settled by Russia and Chechnya alone.484 The position of

external observers however, did not correspond with the will of the Chechen people.

The Chechen population is one of only five titular nationalities among the 21

Russian republics to constitute a majority within its borders.485 At the outset of the war,

approximately 66% of Chechnya’s population was Chechen while 25% was ethnic Russian.486

Chechnya’s Chechen population then was around 720,000. At war’s end, Chechnya’s

absolute population had fallen, but Chechens made up a greater percentage of its remaining

populace. Even though support for Dudayev’s regime eroded within parliament during the

early 1990s, his popular legitimacy remained strong.487 Once the war was over, and Dudayev

had been assassinated, popular support for Maskhadov remained similarly strong.

Finally, the Chechen government quickly went about the task of creating the

domestic trappings of Statehood for its population. In July 1997, Chechens began creating a

formal Chechen military. By October of 1997, the Maskhadov regime was preparing to

distribute over 500,000 domestic and international passports to its people. In addition, over

200 passports were sent to foreign governments so they would be able to authenticate

484 “No foreign backing for Chechen independence bid without Russia’s consent – OSCE” February 1, 1997 British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Interfax News Agency, Moscow

485 The other four republics are , Ingushetia, Tuva and North Ossetia.

486 Smith, Graham (1999) The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition” New York, NY: , p.137

487 Toft (2003), p.76-7

277 Chechen documentation.488 In August 1997, parliament declared Chechen Chechnya’s sole,

official language. Finally, a new, independent Chechen constitution had been put forward in

1992, before the war with Russia had even begun.

Popular support for independence among Chechens remained strong following the

war. Economic difficulties plagued the Chechen proto-state, yet regular elections and

normal, albeit low level, governance set in. Maskhadov’s regime came to be seen as too

moderate by those who favored Islamic government, but his support within the general

population was high. The crime that plagued the region however, called into question the

regime’s ability to maintain law and order. Still, the Maskadov regime did manage to establish

a medium to high level of popular legitimacy among Chechens.

5.12.3 Projected Viability

Challenges to Chechnya’s viability arose as an indirect consequence of the war with

Russia. Chechnya’s population declined following the war, and its economic situation was dire, but these effects could be remedied with the lifting of sanctions and the restoration of peace and security within the republic. Indeed, regular Chechens felt a certain nobility in their struggle against Russia. The most consequential post-war factor for Chechen viability was the rise in throughout the region. Though the Chechens were a predominantly Muslim people, their government and its conflict with Russia had been secular and nationalist. Wahhabi forces had been some of the most successful fighters in the

Russo-Chechen war however and, as a result, became a cause celebre within Chechnya.

488 Isayev, Sayed “Chechnya to issue passports, despite non-recognition” October 8, 1997 ITAR-TASS News Agency

278 Many Chechens were attracted to Wahhabism and the idea of a Chechen Republic governed

by Shari’a Law. The rise in Wahhabism and calls for Islamic government represented a

threatening source of instability for Chechnya, both internally and in its interactions with the

world outside.

The Russo-Chechen war had a number of adverse consequences for the de facto

government and its people. Chechnya experienced a relatively small loss of life among its

combatants, but its civilians suffered greatly during the war. 489 The total number of Russian

and Chechen civilian deaths, “probably exceeded 35,000.”490 Many were also displaced within

Russia or became refugees. Just before the war (Jan. 1994), Chechnya’s population was

approximately 865,000.491 By war’s end, over 200,000 people, or nearly 25% of Chechnya’s

entire population, had been displaced by the violence.

Chechnya’s economic outlook was similarly bleak. The war of independence was

disastrous for the Chechen economy. The republic rebuilt somewhat with profits from oil

sales and monetary support from the Chechen Diaspora. On the whole however, the

economic situation was difficult; most of Chechnya’s infrastructure and its major cities were

destroyed. At war’s end, the Russian government promised Chechnya ‘large-scale

reconstruction aid’, but never followed through. The limited aid that did arrive had little

489 The best casualty estimates for the war suggest 11,500 soldiers were killed during the conflict. Around 7,500 Russian troops died during the war as opposed to about 4,000 Chechen fighters. Dunlop, John B. (2000) “How many soldiers and civilians died during the Russo-Chechen war of 1994-6?” Central Asian Survey 19:3/4, p.329- 339

490 Ibid., p.338

491 Smith, Graham (1999) The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition” New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p.137; Lapidus (1998) suggests the war caused 100,000 casualties and forced nearly 400,000 people to become refugees (p.21)

279 impact upon Chechnya’s economic recovery or the rebuilding of infrastructure.492 As a result of the oppressive economic circumstances, many Chechens emigrated in search of work.

The Chechen people as a whole, having been expelled from their land and left with little to survive upon during previous Soviet purges, had become accustomed to lives of struggle. They remained dedicated to independence no matter what the cost; what they lacked in material comforts, they made up for in resolve. Indeed, some observers saw cause for optimism. Bennigsen noted in 1997,

The roads and bridges have been rebuilt; new ones have been added. Trees have been planted. The carcasses of burnt-out tanks and vehicles have gone. The centre of Grozny has been cleaned up and the most dangerous ruins pulled down. A new garden has been laid in front of the former ….In the suburbs all private houses have been rebuilt. The markets were full…Small businesses were appearing and although unemployment was extremely high, one did not see bands of idle young men…In short, the country gave the impression of great dynamism.493

The war’s most important effect on Chechnya’s viability was the increasing prominence of Wahhabism. Defense of Chechnya became a rallying cry among foreign

Islamists, many of whom traveled to Chechnya to fight alongside the secular nationalist

Chechens during the 1994-1996 war. They had been a powerful force in Chechnya’s war.

“By the end of the war the Wahhabis basked in popularity. Their appeals for an were well received by a majority of Chechens, a deeply religious people. Shari’a law was seen as a means to avoid chaos and impose discipline.”494

Wahhabis’ popular support did not last. Chechens strong nationalism and Sufi tradition, coupled with a realization that the Wahhabists were not interested in Chechnya’s rebuilding or international status, decimated their support and credibility by the end of

492 Kramer (2004/5), p.6

493 Bennigsen (1999), p.553

494 Ibid., p.549

280 1998.495 Nevertheless, the effects of Wahhabi terrorism as a source of domestic and

international instability should not be discounted. The havoc Wahhabi elements wreaked in

Chechnya inhibited Chechnya’s economic revival, slowed foreign aid and NGO assistance,

and fomented violence within the neighboring republics (especially Dagestan).

Chechnya faced difficult economic and political hurdles following its war of

independence, but they were not insurmountable. The primary threat to Chechnya’s viability

lay in Russia’s attempt to ‘wait the Chechens out’, putting-off final status talks until 2001.

Formally, Russia was still unwilling to concede to Chechnya’s independence and might

attempt to retake the territory at a later date. The next greatest threat to Chechen viability

came from the domestic and international disquiet associated with foreign Wahhabis,

Islamist politics, and terrorism. And Chechens perceived association with international

Islamic terrorism only brought further difficulties as international society took notice after

September 11th.

5.13 Domestic Sovereignty in Abkhazia, 1994-2002

At the close of the Abkhaz-Georgian war in 1994, the Abkhaz convincingly

demonstrated territorial control and effective authority within Abkhazia. The republic has

experienced a decade of self-rule since then. Though still economically depressed as a result

of sanctions and its war with Georgia, the Abkhaz economy rebounded somewhat and the

regime established regular, effective government within its borders.496 Abkhazia briefly

495 As I will discuss later, the foreign fighters viewed Chechnya as merely one front in a greater Islamic war against the West. Chechens were simply in the outcome of their own war, however; they were not interested in the global holy war.

496 Sanctions, including a Black Sea blockade and a closure of the Abkhaz-Russian border, were leveled against Abkhazia in 1997 by the CIS. The CIS members blamed Abkhaz authorities for the failure of peace talks with Georgia. Though not well enforced, the sanctions did impose economic costs on the secessionists. Khachican, 281 relapsed into violence in 1998 but unlike Chechnya, the levels of violence experienced in the

early 1990s never returned.497 Abkhazia’s substantial autonomy within the Soviet Union lent

itself to establishing domestic sovereignty, as did its close ties to Russia. The Georgian-

Abkhaz war also attracted much more international attention than did South Ossetia. That

international attention had a stabilizing effect on Abkhazia’s conflict, whether in the form of

humanitarian aid, peacekeepers or economic aid to repair the Abkhazian infrastructure. Still,

were the peacekeepers to withdraw, or the international aid to disappear, it is unclear

whether the Abkhaz regime would be strong enough to survive as a State; it has no

independent currency, it provides few social services to its populace and the repatriation of the Georgian majority may incite future violence.

5.13.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority

Prior to the Georigan-Abkhaz conflict, the balance of forces between the two sides certainly favored Georgia. The Abkhaz, a tiny minority representing less than 3% of the

Georgian populace, should not have been capable of defeating a Home State with a population topping 5 million people and over 2% of its GNP dedicated to military expenditures. International and domestic events however, conspired against the Georgian government in Abkhazia. Abkhazia’s secessionist ambitions garnered outside assistance from both Russia and the Caucasus and the Georgian government was simultaneously internally weakened by civil war. The two circumstances combined to create a capability deficit

Georgia could not recover from.

Arthur “Multilateral Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts: Russia, the United Nations and the War in Abkhazia” in Chorbajian (Ed)(2001), p.22

497 Conflict reignited when tens of thousands of Georgian refugees attempted to return to their residences in the Gali . 282 The final throes of the Abkhaz-Georgian war came in April 1994 when trilateral

negotiations between Georgia, Russia and the Abkhaz yielded an enduring ceasefire.

Georgian troops had already begun to withdraw in August 1993 as a result of Georgia’s

ongoing civil war. Abkhaz forces performed surprisingly well on the battlefield and were

surprisingly well armed given that Georgia had levied an embargo against the republic in

1989. By 1994, Abkhazia had nearly exclusive control over its territory, albeit with the

Russian military’s assistance.498 Russia’s intervention in Abkhazia, while ostensibly non-

partisan, effectively locked-in Abkhaz authority and locked Georgian authority out. 1,600

peacekeepers under the auspices of the CIS, who arrived in June 1994, ensured that the

stalemate would endure.499

Following the war, Abkhaz authorities established an Abkhaz-only national guard

within the former autonomous republic. Abkhazia’s standing army consisted of

approximately 5,000 troops by 2000.500 By 2004, the Abkhaz regime claimed to have an army of approximately 20,000 men organized after the fashion of the Swiss, living at home but

prepared for rapid mobilization to defensive positions. Abkhazia’s Defense Minister,

Vyacheslav Eshba bragged in 2004 that his republic is “always ready for war.” He suggests

498 Moscow supported the Abkhaz rebels during the war itself through troops and military equipment as well. Additional fighters, mostly Russian Cossacks and other Caucasian peoples (including Chechen forces under the authority of and the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC)), helped the rebel army secure the territory. Abkhazia’s forces were backed by Russian fighter bombers in February and March of 1993. And most of the Abkhaz’ armaments came from Russia. Georgian authorities argued the equipment came directly from Moscow, but might just as likely have arrived via the extensive black market trade in weapons from the former USSR. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts “President Shevardnadze defends concept for strengthening state sovereignty” April 17, 1997 NTV Moscow; Facts on File World News Digest “Shevardnadze Elected to Top Post” October 15, 1992 p.776

499 Again, while the peacekeepers were in Abkhazia under the auspices of the OSCE, they were all Russian troops.

500 The Military Balance, 2000-2001 London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p.100 cited in King (2001), p.535

283 that the balance of power between Abkhazia and Georgia was worse in 1990 and that

Abkhazia now has a truly capable military. “We have weapons, armored equipment, aircraft,

troops of every kind…We buy sea-going ships from dealers and refit them ourselves…

Weapons can always be bought some way, including through third countries.”501

New Abkhaz institutions also emerged during the years of Georgian neglect and

blockade. Abkhazia now operates its own internal administrative affairs, its own schools and

its own hospitals. The institutions’ potential sustainability at such a high level, is debatable.

The de facto regime in Abkhazia “maintains the daily operation of legislative, executive and

judicial institutions, but performs very few services for its population.” IGOs and NGOs

provide most social services within the republic.502 In fact, according to one source,

“international aid is several times larger than the budget of the breakaway state,”

(approximately $15 million per year).503 The republic has no postal service, no national

currency and its hospitals are operated by foreign aid.504

In addition to international humanitarian aid, Abkhazia’s economic situation is

significantly dependent upon Russia. Russia provides financial support, subsidizes energy

imports to Abkhazia and Russian military bases (in Abkhazia over the protest of Georgian

authorities) prop up the local economies surrounding them.505 When Tiblisi introduced its

new currency, the Kupon Lari, in 1993, Abkhazia opted to remain within the Ruble zone.

501 August 4, 2004 “We are always ready for war, Abkhaz minister tells Russian newspaper” BBC Monitoring International Reports, Global News Wire – Asia Africa Intelligence Wire

502 Lynch, Dov (2002) “Separatist states and post-Soviet conflicts” International Affairs 78:4, p.836

503 Ibid., p.847; Chivers, C.J. (2004) “Threat of Civil War is Turning the Abkhaz into Russians” New York Times August 15, 2004

504 Ibid.

505 King (2004), p.4 284 Nevertheless, experts deem Abkhazia economically viable. It is self-sufficient in food

and energy and not economically dependent upon Tiblisi.506 More recently, Abkhazia’s

industries have rebounded, especially in agriculture and scrap metal trade. In fact, the

robberies and gang activities now so pervasive throughout Georgia, “[tend] to be seasonal, centered around the attempts by bandits to steal [Abkhaz] hazelnut shipments in the late summer and early autumn.”507 Similarly, Abkhazia’s tourist industry has now rebounded to

absorb nearly 350,000 visitors each year.508 While substantially below the several million that

would travel to its Black Sea beaches prior to the war, the signs of rebuilding are

unmistakable.509

Each of the newfound income streams are aided by Moscow’s liberal visa regime

toward the Abkhaz and Ossetian populations; an advantage not afforded to ethnic

Georgians.510 Since this change took place, Abkhazians have acquired Russian citizenship in droves. It is estimated that some “170,000 of Abkhazia’s [now] 320,000 residents had become citizens of Russia, and 70,000 others had applications pending [by summer 2004].”511

506 Cornell (2002), p.179

507 King (2001), p.537

508 2004 estimate

509 Chivers, C.J. (2004) “Threat of Civil War is Turning the Abkhaz into Russians” New York Times August 15, 2004

510 The new visa regime was highly detrimental to the Georgian economy where “as many as 500,000 Georgians” took home between “$500 million to $1 billion a year” from Russia. Frantz, Douglas (2000) “Russians Send a Message to Georgians: Toe the Line” New York Times December 21, 2000

511 Chivers, C.J. (2004) “Threat of Civil War is Turning the Abkhaz into Russians” New York Times August 15, 2004

285 5.13.2 Popular Legitimacy

Abkhazia’s domestic politics are relatively well developed, with high levels of

democratic freedom, active opposition parties and stable, clan-based political legitimacy.512

Abkhaz politics are also however, somewhat personalistic and very much centered around

President Vladislav Ardzinba, the republic’s first independent leader. In its years of independence, Abkhazia created its own educational and cultural institutions including universities and new national holidays.513 On November 30, 1994, just after the war,

Abkhazia adopted a new, independent constitution reaffirming Abkhaz sovereignty.

5.13.3 Projected Viability

Abkhazia’s economic potential rebounded following the war, but remained fragile.

The war was estimated to have caused over 500 billion rubles of damage to Abkhazia’s

infrastructure and housing stock. With Russian tourists returning, the industry showed signs

that the seaside resorts and beautiful scenery could still draw crowds. Yet Abkhazia receives

a significant amount, as much as four or five million dollars (USD) annually according to

one source, from humanitarian organizations dispatched to the war zone.514 And the de facto

republic is by no means prosperous.

512 Skakov, Alexander (2005) “Abkhazia at a Crossroads: On the domestic political situation in the republic of Abkhazia” and the Caucasus 9:1, p.160

513 King (2001), p.543

514 The income comes from rents, services, and the organizations’ payments to local staff. Interview with anonymous UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) official cited in King (2001), p.549

286 As late as 2004, Sukhumi, Abkhazia’s capital city, is still 60% destroyed from the war.515

Abkhazia is politically and economically viable at a low level, but must also resolve lingering conflicts with Georgia if it is to be sustainable in the long term.

The most important factor regarding Abkhazia’s viability is not its economic or political vitality, but rather its outstanding conflict with Georgia. In 13 months of fighting, the Abkhaz war killed approximately 10,000 people and left hundreds of thousands displaced within Georgia and abroad. Over 100,000 people were forced to flee Abkhazia during the war, most of which were ethnic Georgians who fled to other parts of Georgia. The potential repatriation of ethnic Georgians, once the most populous within the republic, remains a contentious matter between the Abkhaz regime and Georgian authorities. In addition, if Georgia’s sanctions continue, Abkhazia’s economy, once among the most prosperous in Georgia, will remain severely depressed.

5.14 Domestic Sovereignty in South Ossetia, 1992-2002

South Ossetia’s conflict with Georgia was less severe in terms of human and material costs than any of the other post-Soviet secessions. But while South Ossetia was spared some of the destruction visited on the other post-Soviet de facto regimes, it was not able to parlay that advantage into a sustainable economic and governmental regime. The violence of the early 1990s did not return to South Ossetia, but the republic remains heavily dependent upon its association with North Ossetia and has few prospects for sustainable authority due

515 Chivers, C.J. (2004) “Threat of Civil War is Turning the Abkhaz into Russians” New York Times August 15, 2004

287 to its lack of economic potential.516 Nevertheless, the regime remains extraordinarily popular among Ossets on both sides of the Georgian border.

5.14.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority

South Ossetians’ disadvantage before the war was even more severe than the imbalance of capabilities between Abkhazia and Georgia. Just after its declaration of independence, South Ossetia “mobilized all men between the ages of 18 and 60 [among its population of 99,000]” in preparation for a Georgian offensive.517 In contrast, an estimated

17,000 Georgian troops were involved in just the siege of Tskhinvali (the South Ossetian capital).518 Ossetians did not so much win their war against the Georgians as the Georgians lost the war by fighting amongst themselves. Once the Sochi agreement had been signed, and durable peace had set in, the Ossets had uncontested physical, though not political, control over their territory.

South Ossetia created its own national guard in response to Georgia’s decision to form a military in its bid to secede from the Soviet Union in 1991.519 Its standing army had troops that numbered around 2,000 as of 2000.520 The South Ossetian military received significant benefits from its kin across the border in the form of military equipment and armaments.

516 The 1992 Sochi Agreement did eventually break down in early 2004, but occurred outside of the timeframe for this study. A new ceasefire was signed in August 2004.

517 Agence France Presse “South Ossetia Mobilizes” December 23, 1991

518 Agence France Presse “South Ossetia forms national guard” December 1, 1991

519 Ibid.

520 The Military Balance, 2000-2001 London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p.100 cited in King (2001), p.535

288 The de facto government also attempted to form economic and diplomatic relations with

‘friendly regimes’ so as to establish an independent foreign policy as prescribed by international law.521

Georgia’s blockade of South Ossetia was especially disastrous to South Ossetia’s economy. In winter, due to impassable roads, South Ossetia was completely cut-off from

Russia, its major source of both trade and aid. Minorities at Risk reported in August of 1995 that some workers in South Osttia had not been paid for over two years due to poor economic conditions within the republic.522 South Ossetia has no major industry to speak of,

but its location along a major conduit of trade between Georgia and Russia provides an

important source of income to the secessionist regime. The OSCE estimates that, “some

$60-$70 million in goods pass through the tunnel [between North and South Ossetia] each

year, compared with the official South Ossetian budget of roughly $1 million.”523

5.14.2 Popular Legitimacy

In South Ossetia, much like Abkhazia, educational and cultural institutions were

among the first undertakings of the new regime. Popular elections held in South Ossetia

received wide participation within the electorate, but have not been recognized by Georgia

or other outside authorities. Though popular authority seems to reside with the secessionist

regime, it remains unclear whether or not the South Ossetians’ ultimate goal is independent

Statehood or instead, reintegration with their North Ossetian kin in Russia.

521 Potier, Tim (2001) Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: A Legal Appraisal The Hague, The : Kluwer Law International, p.137; On November 9, 1996 for example, the South Ossetian government signed a treaty of “friendship and cooperation” with North Ossetia.

522 (2004) “Chronology for Ossetians (South) in Georgia” Minorities at Risk http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/

523 Ibid.

289 5.14.3 Projected Viability

Of the three post-Soviet conflicts within the Leg_med category, South Ossetia has the least prospective viability due to its economic situation. Even though its conflict with its

Home State was by far the mildest of all the post-Soviet secessions, South Ossetia’s potential for viable economic independence was low at the end of the war and remained low throughout the decade that followed.524 The government, too reliant upon aid and trade from North Ossetia, has no developed industry to speak of, does not have its own currency, and would likely not be able to support a sustainable, independent economy. In addition,

Georgia has never considered granting South Ossetia autonomy equivalent to what it has offered Abkhazia; the government insists South Ossetia remain within Georgia.

5.15 Domestic Sovereignty in Nagorno-Karabakh, 1994-2002

Nagorno-Karabakh’s status with respect to sovereignty is qualitatively different than the other Caucasian separatist states due to its close relationship with its Armenian benefactor. The Karabakh Armenians display a relatively high level of domestic sovereignty but, like the South Ossetians, their desire for independence has not been clearly demonstrated as they have yet to create fully independent institutions. Nevertheless,

Nagorno-Karabakh reasonably meets the international legal standards for Statehood. NK defeated its Home State in a war of independence, it convincingly controls the territory and population it claims and its governing regime has a relatively high degree of legitimacy within its population. Again like South Ossetia however, Karabakh’s economic and political solvency is not guaranteed in the long term. Karabakh’s geographic location, surrounded on

524 Cornell (2002), p.190 290 all sides by Azerbaijan, will make it difficult to maintain territorial sovereignty should NK

return the Azerbaijani territories currently connecting it to Armenia. In addition, and related

to the first problem, hundreds of thousands of Azeris remain displaced due to the Karabakh

Armenians’ on-going occupation of their lands; and this outstanding conflict still has the

potential to be highly disruptive to Armenian control in Karabakh.

5.15.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority

Following the cessation of hostilities between Azerbaijan, the Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenians and the Armenian government in the Spring of 1994, effective control and

authority within Karabakh was uncontested. NK demonstrates greater territorial control

than do any of the other post-Soviet secessionists. The Karabakh Armenians occupy and

controlled approximately 12% of Azerbaijan in addition to the territory they claim for their

new republic, effectively creating a “buffer zone” connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia

proper.525 NK has attempted to use the additional territory as a bargaining chip, offering the territory’s return in exchange for recognition and independence. Second, the de facto regime in Karabakh is a military regime. The level of control and authority it maintains over the population is therefore quite strict.

Though Armenia and NK have a number of functional linkages, they are not politically integrated. Indeed, some suggest that it is the Karabakh Armenians who control

Armenia proper, rather than the other way around. The President of Armenia was a former

President of NK, for example. And Karabakh politics play an important role in Armenian

domestic politics. In the spring of 1995, Karabakh Armenians established redevelopment

and economic reform plans for the republic, strengthening Karabakh’s authority as the

525 By early 1994, Armenian forces controlled approximately 14% of Azerbaijan, only 5% of which was claimed by Nagorno-Karabakh.

291 effective government within its territory, independent of both Azerbaijan and Armenia. In

addition, tensions between Armenia and Karabakh over Armenia’s refusal to assist Karabakh

evolved into a relationship characteristic of equals following the war.526 Still, Karabakh’s

effective governance is called into question as a result of the regime’s failure to create

independent institutions. For instance, rather than implementing its own currency, Karabakh has adopted the Armenian dram as its monetary unit.

5.15.2 Popular Legitimacy

Nagorno-Karabakh’s domestic legitimacy is significantly tied to its relationship with

Armenia. Within Armenia however, popular support for an irredentist claim to Nagorno-

Karabakh is far greater than that among its political leadership. The Armenian government does not claim Nagorno-Karabakh for itself, nor does it recognize Azerbaijan’s authority over the territory.527 Instead, the government insists that the NKR’s declaration of

independence grants it a status equivalent to, but separate from, Azerbaijan. Nevetheless,

Armenian authorities have not formally recognized Nagorno-Karabakh’s Statehood.

Still, the de facto regime’s support is strong among the Karabakh Armenians. In May

1995 for example, open and reportedly fair elections were held for Karabakh’s parliament. 24

of 33 seats were filled in the first round of voting and the remaining 9 seats were filled in the

second round. Voter turnout was 71% and nearly 80% in the two rounds respectively.528

526 “Chronology for Armenians in Azerbaijan” (2000) Minorities at Risk Online http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar

527 The Armenian government agreed as early as September 23, 1991 to renounce territorial claims to Karabakh.

528 As a result, Russian parliamentary figures began to call on Azerbaijan to extend full diplomatic recognition to Nagorno-Karabakh in order to bring the conflict between the two to a resolution. Higher-level Russian authorities did not make the same proposal.

292 This high rate of participation suggests that the Karabakh Armenians support the

secessionist government; at least insofar as they view the Karabakh elections as a legitimate

means of political expression.

5.15.3 Projected Viability

Nagorno-Karabakh's internal stability is likely to be maintained for the foreseeable

future. In that sense, the state is quite viable. On the other hand, the regime is dependent

upon Armenia for a great deal of its monetary support and military control. For example,

Armenia provides an “’interstate loan’ to Karabakh that covers 75-80 percent of its needs

[each year].”529 The Azeri blockade and embargo of Nagorno-Karabakh, which began in

1989, has been devastating to the local economy. The other impediment to Karabakh’s

viability lies in the additional, occupied territories. The situation is now a catch-22 of sorts

where Karabakh’s internal viability is imperiled without a durable, territorial connection to

Armenia and its external viability is imperiled so long as hundreds of thousands of Azeris

remain displaced from their homes within the occupied territories. Karbakh can likely

survive under the current conditions, but those conditions are very unlikely to be sustainable

in the long term.

5.16 External Influence & Indifference

Great Power responses to the secessions in the Soviet Union varied from movement

to movement and Power to Power. Initially, all of the Powers but Russia abstained from

diplomatic and military intervention in the conflicts. The wars were seen as domestic

529 Lynch (2002), p.847

293 conflicts, subject only to the Home State and not under the purview of external actors.530

Indeed, the international community had ample warning that many of the conflicts might

conflagrate into war, but took little preventive action.531 Europe, the US and Russia were

critical of the Home States’ excessively violent responses to the uprisings. However, little

more than vocal opposition was brought to bear.

After the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991, external politics surrounding

the secessions shifted. As the post-Soviet conflicts expanded into full-scale wars, the non-

interventionist stance maintained by the Powers became untenable. The United States and

Europe became suspicious of Russian involvement in the periphery, believing its actions

betrayed neo-imperial ambitions. Russia on the other hand, developed concerns about

European and American encroachment into its traditional sphere of influence. The Great

Powers’ past hands-off approach was replaced with hands-on engagement and intervention.

The United Nations Security Council took primary responsibility for peacekeeping in

Abkhazia while the OSCE played the primary mediating role in Nagorno-Karabakh and

South Ossetia.532 OSCE observers were dispatched to Chechnya as a result of Russia’s

membership within the organization, but were later expelled by the Russian government;

they have not returned. The international organizations entrusted with maintaining the peace

530 Interestingly, when the wars of post-Soviet succession began, many of the Home States themselves were not yet recognized as legitimate members of international society. Still, the courtesy of ‘non-intervention’ was extended regardless.

531 Lapidus notes specifically on the topic of Chechnya that, “The international community had available to them ample early warning that the conflict [in Chechnya] was escalating, as well as a broad array of possible responses, but…timely and appropriate responses were not adopted before the intervention by Russian military forces.” Lapidus (1998), p.24

532 The United Nations became involved in Abkhazia at the behest of the Georgian government. Though Georgia initially requested Russian intervention to quell violence in the province, the Georgians’ decried Russia’s biased intervention. As a result, the UN took a more active role.

294 in each of the conflicts reflected the parties engaged in each conflict. Abkhazia attracted the

most international attention and interest in its resolution. Europe and Russia took the lead in

Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. And, though there was certainly interest in the

Russo-Chechen conflict, Russia limited external involvement. Russia, the United States and

Europe were far more involved in the politics surrounding the post-Soviet secessions than

were China or Japan. Russia and the United States have been far more involved in the

conflicts themselves while Europe primarily pursued multilateral negotiations. China’s role

has been exclusively through its role as a UNSC member.

5.17 Russia

Russia was the single most important Great Power player in each of the post-Soviet

secessions. Its most direct role was that of the Home State in the Chechen conflict. It was

also centrally involved in the initiation and cessation of hostilities in all of the remaining

Caucasus wars.533 Russian interests were importantly intertwined with the fates of the

secessionists and Home States. Once Russian authorities reestablished stability within Russia

proper following Soviet disintegration, they began working to ensure that their priorities in

the ‘near abroad’ were met. Russian policy toward Abkhazia oscillated between support for

the breakaway republic and its Georgian Home State, depending on the perceived

friendliness of the Georgian regime in power at the time. Russia’s support for the South

Ossetians, whom it saw as rightfully Russian, was unequivocal. Finally, Moscow’s position

533 This project takes for granted that the Russian Home State opposed Chechnya’s independence and external recognition by other States. Because Russia’s role within the Chechen conflict is that of a Home State, its anti- recognition stance is left unexplored except in that capacity (though Russia’s status as a Great Power certainly influenced other States’ recognition behavior toward Chechnya). In each of the other secessionist conflicts, Russia’s behavior constituted an important external political influence.

295 on Karabakh was somewhat unclear. Russia wanted Azerbaijan to join the CIS, and so

courted its favor at times by supporting its efforts in Karabakh. At the same time, Russia was

often at loggerheads with Azerbaijan as a result of Caspian oil and its perceived pro-Western

orientation. Though importantly engaged in Karabakh, Russian interests were somewhat less

at stake there than in Georgia.

5.17.1 South Ossetia & Abkhazia

When Russia first intervened in Georgia, it was not a unitary actor itself. Instead,

remnants of Soviet forces in the field determined their own courses of action within the

separatist republics. Even at the highest levels, Yeltsin and Russia’s Supreme Soviet were

making their own independent policies toward the North Caucasus.534 Regardless, Russia was

influential from the start. According to King, “whether prompted by the whim of brigade

commanders or by a policy directive of Moscow, , later to become

Russian Federation troops, were the main suppliers of weaponry (and often soldiers) to [the]

separatist groups.”535 The flows of weapons and military equipment from the Former Soviet

Union were essential to supplying both the secessionists and their Home States during the

wars. Whereas the Home States could have legitimately procured the arms, the secessionists

would have been much weaker without the illicit supplies. Moscow might not have been

responsible for many of its initial violations of Georgian sovereignty due to its own lack of

central control.

534 Ozhiganov, Edward (1997) “The Republic of Georgia: Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia” in Arbatov, Alexi, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes and Lara Olson (Eds.) Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p.391

535 King, Charles (2001) “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States” World Politics 53 (July), p.539

296 By early 1993 however, when the Russian Federation (RF) dispatched peacekeeping troops

to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the State had reconsolidated its power and conducted a

more unified foreign policy.

Russian leaders made no secret of their intention to unilaterally intervene in Georgia,

even without the support of the international community. In fact, Russian peacekeepers

were dispatched before any international peacekeeping missions had been established.

According to one expert at the time, “The UN [found] itself in the delicate situation of

facing requests for international legitimization of decisions taken by others.”536 In fact,

Russian peacekeeping forces became combatants outright in South Ossetia’s conflict after

they were fired upon by Georgian troops. Intervention in the post-Soviet States was not

uniquely under Russia’s purview, as would be aptly demonstrated in Karabakh, but Russia

was the most important and active power in the region. The other Great Powers allowed

Russia disproportionate influence over the conflicts due to its special interest at first.

Consequently, both the Georgian government and the rebels came to calculate their behavior with an eye toward how Russia would respond. And the later, less formative interventions had smaller effects.

Russian policies in Georgia were a mixed blessing for both sides. On one hand,

Russian peacekeepers did help to quell the violence between Georgia and the secessionists.

On the other hand, Russia is not an impartial arbiter and its policies often served to increase hostilities and suspicion between the parties. Yeltsin seemed to support Georgia’s territorial integrity over Abkhaz independence initially.537 He reassured Georgian leaders that Russian

536 McFarlane, Neil S. (1997) “On the front lines in the ‘near abroad’: the CIS and the OSCE in Georgia’s civil wars” Third World Quarterly 18:3 (September), p.511

537 In a September 3 address, Yeltsin called for Georgia’s unity and territorial integrity. 297 troops had been dispatched to Abkhazia in order to maintain the peace, nothing more. As

time wore on though, it became clear that Russia had its own interests at heart, rather than

altruistic concerns for Georgian stability.

Russia had significant interests at stake in the ‘near abroad’. Georgia, in particular,

held not only two restive separatist regions with favorable views of Moscow, but also warm

water ports on the Black Sea. The ports were strategically and economically attractive.

Indeed, Russia only agreed to send peacekeepers to intervene in Georgia conditional upon

Georgia giving Russia permission to establish military bases there. Moscow maintains an overtly strategic posture in the separatist States to date.538

Between Georgia’s two separatist conflicts, Russian support was somewhat stronger

for South Ossetia. The Ossets were ethnically and ideologically more similar to Russia than

Georgia. Ossetians also saw Russia as their potential future Home State. So, not only did

Russia have strong identity relations with the Ossets, it stood to increase its territorial

control, or at least its influence, if the South Ossetians won independence. In contrast, while

Russia was generally supportive of Abkhazia, its support was more opportunistic and

economic rather than due to a consistent interest in Abkhaz independence. Abkhazia and

Russia had friendly relations and Russia routinely violated Georgia’s embargo of the region,

but Moscow supported Georgia too, never wavering from its insistence that its territorial

integrity should be maintained.

538 Russia agreed during a meeting of the OSCE in Istanbul, Turkey in October 1999 to close the Georgian bases, but has not yet followed through.

298 The Georgian government was somewhat antagonistic toward Russia as well, supplying additional reason for Moscow’s support of the secessionists. Georgia’s policies created a dual geo-strategic and domestic security concern for Russia. Georgia complicated

Russia’s conflict with Chechnya by permitting Chechen fighters to enter Georgian territory to evade Russian authorities. Russia also accused Georgian authorities of supplying Chechen fighters with weapons it had procured with the fall of the Soviet Union. Consequently,

Russia’s own weapons were being used against it in Chechnya.539 The Georgian government

was using the ‘external security logic’ against Russia; attempting to weaken Russia from

within by supporting its secessionists. Georgian authorities, for their part, denied aiding and

abetting the Chechens, but because they did not convincingly control their territory, their claims were not credible. By August 2002, tensions between Russia and Georgia flared into violent conflict. Georgia accused Russia of bombing incursions within Georgian territory west of the Pankisi Gorge. Though denied by Russian authorities, OSCE observers later confirmed Russian responsibility for the bombings.540

More recently, the Russian government has openly flouted traditional practices of

international law to the secessionist states’ advantage. In 2000 for example, Russia imposed

harsh visa restrictions on Georgia. But the standards were not enforced at border crossings

with South Ossetia or Abkhazia, affording the secessionists extensive freedom of movement

and economic opportunity.541

539 Myers, Steven Lee (2002) “Russia Recasts Bog in Caucasus as War on Terror” New York Times October 5, 2002

540 Myers, Steven Lee (2002) “Georgia Moves Against Rebels and Accuses Russia of Airstrikes” New York Times August 24, 2002

541 Lynch (2002), p.846; King (2001), p.541

299 Russia also eased restrictions on Georgian minorities becoming Russian citizens. Finally,

Russia’s military bases within Georgia, which it agreed to close, have remained in place.542

The September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks renewed American interest in and the instable, potential terrorist safe-havens, in the Russian periphery. Since then, Russian authorities have become increasingly suspicious of US intentions in Eurasia. In 2002,

American troops arrived in Georgia to train Georgian military personnel in counterterrorism techniques. In addition, American statesmen confessed a special “affection” for Georgian

Presidents Shevardnadze and Saakashvili. Saakashvili, who became president in 2003, was educated in the United States and reform-minded. Shevardnadze, against all evidence to the contrary, was also believed to be a liberalizing force. The seemingly sudden American interest in Georgia made Russia suspect that the US was manipulating Gerogia’s political process. One member of the Russian leadership remarked with suspicion in 2003, “Time will show whose interests will be guiding the new Georgian leadership [under Saakashvili] – the interests of the United States or the Georgian people.”543 US officials assured Russian decision-makers that their presence in Georgia was purely in the interest of maintaining peace and security within the State. And further, that Georgian stability would benefit Russia in its conflict with Chechnya.544 Their assurances rang hollow in Moscow; Russian leaders

had repeated a similar justification for their own policies in Georgia.

542 King (2004), p.3

543 Mydans, Seth (2003) “Secessionists from Georgia Hold Talks with Russia” New York Times December 2, 2003

544 Weisman, Steven R. (2004) “Powell Calms the Russians on U.S. Intent Over Georgia” New York Times January 25, 2004

300 Domestic opinion within Russia favored support and recognition for the separatist

States in both Georgia and Azerbaijan. Russian officers were even known to have defected

in order to support the military efforts in the secessionist states.545 Again as in Yugoslavia,

Russian policy was more moderate than public opinion alone would have suggested.

5.17.2 Nagorno-Karabakh

Like Georgia, the new Azeri government’s pro-Western orientation stymied Russia’s

plans for overwhelming influence in the ‘near abroad’. Moscow was importantly involved in

the Karabakh war on the Azeri side and Russia had brokered the NK ceasefire.

Consequently, Russian decision-makers expected Azerbaijan would join the CIS and

acquiesce to Russian policy preferences in the region. The Azeris chose a more independent

course however, and were often critical of Moscow’s policies. Much of Russian diplomacy

was therefore focused upon bringing Azerbaijan back into the Russian sphere of influence, whether with positive inducements or negative sanctions. Russian preferences toward

Karabakh reflected Moscow’s greater strategy toward Azerbaijan; the specter of Karabakh independence was only sparingly invoked as a tool for Russian influence.

In that vein, Russia consistently preferred an all Russian peacekeeping force for

Karabakh to maintain its primacy, but the OSCE rejected their request. The United States and others countered by allowing Russia (under the guise of the CIS) to supply one-third of the peacekeepers. Unfortunately, Bosnia had deterred any other Great Power interest in the provision of troops. Russia also rejected the West’s counteroffer, so no peacekeepers were deployed at all; the Karabakh Armenians were left with a peacekeeping mission without

peacekeepers.

545 King, Charles (2001) "Eurasia's Nonstate States" East European Constitutional Review 10:4 (Fall)

301 “Russia continues to place considerable pressure on Azerbaijan to join the defense

arrangements of the CIS, thus allowing them to station Russian military forces in Azerbaijan.

President Aliyev has requested assistance from Turkey, the OSCE and the United States in

resisting these pressures.”546 Nevertheless, Azeri reticence to accept Moscow’s preferences

has not translated into strong Russian support of Karabakh.

Russian interests in each of the secessionist conflicts suggested that Russia preferred

recognition over maintenance of the Home States’ sovereignty for at least two of the three

separatist regions. Russian support was especially strong for Georgia’s separatists. Formal

recognition was withheld however, as a function of the unambiguous opposition of Western

governments, whom Moscow was now attempting to productively engage as it transitioned

away from the Cold War and toward more liberal, potentially democratic government. It was

also perhaps, as a result of Russia’s own troubles with Chechnya. Though, by the same

token, Russia continues to offer vocal support for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

5.18 The United States

Unlike Russia, American decision-makers decidedly opposed the post-Soviet

secessions. US relationships with their Home States, or more accurately, potential

relationships with the Home States, were too great a sacrifice in the name of support for

self-determination and democracy. Both Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan emerged

from the Soviet Union with decidedly pro-Western orientations. And those pro-Western

views and policy preferences were important to the US in the wake of Soviet disintegration.

They held the possibility of oil resources, strategic footholds in the Caucasus and allies in the

546 “Chronology for Armenians in Azerbaijan” (2000) Minorities at Risk Online http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar 302 ‘war on terror’. Similarly, American authorities believed Yeltsin to be a staunch reformer. So

while Russia was not yet a democratic, pro-American ally, it was seen as inexorably moving

toward that end. Chechnya, troubling though it was, threatened to destabilize the Russian

Federation and halt Russia’s progress. None of the prospective gains to be made in the Post-

Soviet States suggested the United States would support the secessionists. Self- determination, heralded as the Soviet Union disbanded, went virtually unmentioned in reference to the secessions in Azerbaijan, Georgia or Russia.

5.18.1 Chechnya

The United States supported Russia’s territorial integrity, but objected to Moscow’s

means of reasserting control over Chechnya. Fortunately for Moscow, Chechnya was not at

the top of the list of US interests regarding Russia. Instead, America’s own security interests

and ambitions were primary. NATO expansion was planned, the US needed Russia’s

support for its missile defense system and the Clinton administration hoped the Russians

would ratify the START II treaty.547 US policy sought to maintain amicable relations with

Russia while simultaneously calling for restraint and respect for human rights in Chechnya.

Even diplomatic criticism was muted due to Washington’s friendly attitude toward

Yeltsin and what was perceived to be his democratization project in Russia. Warren

Christopher, then Secretary of State, said Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya was “ill-

conceived and badly executed”, but blamed Yeltsin’s aides rather than Yeltsin for the failure;

they had given him bad advice.548

547 START II aimed to reduce the number of long range warheads on either side to fewer than 3,500.

548 Raum, Tom “Clinton Respects Russian Rule in Chechnya But Wants Bloodshed Stopped” January 13, 1995 The Associated Press

303 Again Christopher supported Yeltsin’s instincts, “It’s best in such matters to leave it to the

judgment of President Yeltsin; it’s a democratic society; it’s not the old Cold War. I’m sure

he thought through what he was doing before he did it…when he felt he had no other

alternative.”549

United States’ criticism of Russian tactics in Chechnya did not indicate support for

Chechen independence. The regime ascending to power in the North Caucasus was no more

desirable than the Russian government it would replace. One American expert remarked at

the time, “Many of the [Chechen] leaders are gangsters. To argue for our [democratic] ideals

would reinforce mob leadership…Thomas Paine produces Al Capone.”550 Other experts

indicated contrarily, that the US’ lack of support for Chechen independence hinged, not on

the regime’s criminality, but on its Islamism and potential to spur additional separatism.551 In either case, the United States saw Russia as much more friendly and self-like than it did the

Chechens.

Perceptions of Russia shifted precipitously after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Secretary Christopher’s statement that Russia was a “democratic society” and this was no longer the “old Cold War” indicates the extent of the change in Washington’s perceived identity relationship with Moscow. Similarly, American leaders drew parallels between the

American Civil War and the Russian war in Chechnya. Again, US decision-makers saw a

Western, democratic leader in Yeltsin; he was trying to hold on to Chechnya like Lincoln had

549 Interview with Secretary of State Warren Christopher, McNeil-Lehrer News Hour aired December 13, 1994

550 Les Gelb cited in Schweid (1995) “Administration Powerless to Stop the Fighting in Chechnya” May 17, 1995 The Associated Press

551 Rumer (2002), p.63

304 held on to the Confederacy during the .552 Interestingly, Gorbachev had

compared his own situation to Lincoln’s in 1990-91 when he opposed Baltic independence,

but Gorbachev’s protest fell on deaf ears.553 Just five years later, Yeltsin was embraced as a

champion for democratic leadership.

It was true that Yeltsin was democratically elected, but Russian democracy was far from consolidated. If these perspectives are taken as evidence of Washington’s view of

Russia, they reflected future aspirations for Russia’s domestic politics rather than the reality in the mid-1990s. For the entire period leading up to the second Russo-Chechen war, US interests in Russia’s future, and the potential material benefits to be gained from that future, kept American criticism of Russia subdued and the prospect of Chechnya’s recognition, highly unlikely. Chechnya did not possess the oil or other valuable commodities that might have made recognition more attractive.

5.18.2 South Ossetia & Abkhazia

At first the United States did not recognize Georgian independence because of the chaos surrounding its civil war and Washington’s uncertainty about Georgia’s democratic aspirations. American decision-makers quickly abandoned their attempt at conditional recognition for the post-Soviet States however, in exchange for the more immediate gains in

US security and economic interests there. Georgia’s decidedly pro-Western orientation promised access to Caspian oil, support for American military initiatives like the expansion of NATO and the Iraq war. More recently, Georgia’s geography made it an important staging location for US counterterrorism efforts in . South Ossetia and Abkhazia

552 Lapidus (1998), p.34-5

553 Ibid.

305 claimed democratic aspirations, which might have drawn US sympathy, but so did Georgia.

Supporting the secessionists would only contribute to further Georgian instability and

offered no potential rewards.

The United States supported Georgia beginning during its secession from the Soviet

Union. US officials first implied that Georgian recognition depended upon Gamaskhurdia’s

regime improving human rights conditions within the republic. But their threat was not

credible.554 At that time Georgia was an attractive ally because of its pro-Western orientation.

Since then, even when Georgia’s democratic bona fides were in question, American support remained strong. Following the civil war, Washington initially supported Shevardnadze, hoping he was a genuine democratic reformer. Corruption however, was endemic. Once it was clear Shevardnadze was not what the US had hoped for it, and many US non- governmental organizations, shifted their support (and bankroll) to the opposition. As noted before, US engagement fueled Russian suspicions.

As of 2004, the United States had donated a billion dollars in aid for the promotion of democracy and development since Georgian independence.555 American troops trained

the Georgian military. And after September 11th, additional American funds flowed to

Georgia to stem the growth of Islamic militarism in the Caucasus. Over the years, Georgian

stability has become vital to US interests in the region. The US has strategic interests in

Central Asia for which Georgia serves as an important entry point. America has energy

interests in the East-West energy corridor. And finally, US decision-makers believe Georgia

554 Associated Press “Russia Condemns Rights Violations in Georgia; Georgia Creates Army” September 10, 1991

555 More precisely, between $1.2 and $1.3 billion. Chivers, C.J. (2004) “Georgia’s New Leader Baffles U.S. and Russia Alike” New York Times August 17, 2004; Mydans, Seth (2003) “Georgia and Its Two Big Brothers” New York Times November 28, 2003

306 is the centerpiece to stability within the Caucasus.556 The United States maintains only a limited military presence in Georgia. However, its role there is not without controversy. One of the US-financed military training facilities is near South Ossetia and has provoked suspicions of US intentions within the Ossetian community.557

Supporters of US policies in Georgia see a triumph in Georgia’s recent peaceful coup

(in 2003) and genuine democratic aspirations. But according to Charles King, Georgia might

also be seen as a cautionary tale. What the United States created in Georgia might be

characterized as a Potemkin democracy. Underneath the veneer of democratic reforms lay a

deeply fractured State and society. Georgia’s borders are not established nor are its sovereign

authorities. Indeed, Georgia is still most appropriately termed a failed State.558 Still, US

interests in Georgia have become entrenched and are unlikely to shift toward the

secessionists.

5.18.3 Nagorno-Karabakh

Like Georgia, the US relationship with Azerbaijan is reasonably amicable, making its

recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh unlikely from the beginning. Upon independence, the

Azeri government became an important political ally of the United States on a variety of

important issues. While US-Azeri relations benefited American interests in the region, their

relationship is one of strange bedfellows. The United States and Azerbaijan share little in

common beyond their policy preferences. Indeed, American Statesmen often seem

556 Smith, David J. “Saakashvili in Washington” The Washington Times August 6, 2004

557 Ostrovsky, Simon “Bush treads sensitive ground with offer to help Georgia’s separatist conflicts” Agence France Presse – English May 10, 2005

558 King, Charles (2004) “A Rose Among Thorns: Georgia Makes Good” Foreign Affairs (March/April), www.foreignaffairs.org

307 uncomfortable with their decision to pursue economic and strategic interests while

sacrificing their supposed dedication to democracy, human rights and self-determination. US

decision-makers have voiced criticism of the manner in which Azerbaijan waged its political

battles against the Armenian civilians of Karabakh and have imposed economic sanctions on

Azerbaijan pending the removal of its sanctions of Karabakh. Still, recognition did not come, nor does it seem more likely for the foreseeable future.

By the mid-1990s, Caspian oil was an important American interest in the Caucasus.

Its interest was shared however, by a number of other States as well, namely Russia, Iran,

Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Greece. The struggle over oil and oil transport took the form of two competing . On one side were the US, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia,

Kazakhstan and Chechnya. On the other were Russia, Iran, Armenia, Greece, Turkmenistan,

Georgia’s secessionists and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.559 So, not only did the US

not have economic or strategic reasons to support the secessionists, it actually stood to lose

oil access if the separatists gained legitimate control over the resource; all of the secessionists

but the Chechens sided with Russia when it came to oil.

Azeri authorities supported the Western alliance regarding oil, but they also lent

additional military support to the US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. “Azerbaijan also

grants overflight rights to the American military and is cooperating with a Pentagon-

sponsored modernization of a former Soviet airfield that could be used by American military

planes.”560

559 “Chronology for Armenians in Azerbaijan” Dec.8, 1995 (2000) Minorities at Risk Online http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar.

560 Chivers, C.J. “Azerbaijan Leader, Under Fire, Hopes U.S. Visit Improves Image” New York Times April 23, 2006 308 Though the Azeri regime is undemocratic, US decision-makers have overlooked the State’s governmental shortcomings in favor of strategic access and energy resources. In any case,

Karabakh is similarly authoritarian, provoking little sympathy from American decision- makers on its behalf.

Domestic politics within the United States were much the same as they were throughout the Yugoslav secessions. Though the US had domestic challengers, they were neither strong nor violent and therefore played no role in the Post-Soviet recognition decisions. An active Armenian lobby rallied some support for Nagorno-Karabakh within

Congress, but its influence was limited essentially to a greater provision of humanitarian aid to Karabakh.

5.19 Europe

Whereas the European States were the primary international influence on the

Yugoslav secessions, Europe took a more moderate diplomatic approach toward the post-

Soviet secessions. In part, this was because European policy was occupied in the Former

Yugoslavia throughout the early and mid-1990s. It was also however, due to the fact that

European interests were much less at stake in the Former Soviet Union. European decision- makers were, like the Americans, preoccupied with the potential instability resulting from

Soviet dissolution, but again Europe preferred the use of multilateral institutions in an attempt to resolve the post-Soviet conflicts. The European States actively involved themselves in humanitarian and conflict resolution efforts.

309 5.19.1 The Caucasian Secessions

Europe’s response to Chechnya’s secession was similar to the Americans’. Russia’s

transition to democracy took precedence over its unfortunate behavior toward the

Chechens. Once Russia was fully democratic, then it would be expected to comply with

international law. Europe was less sanguine about Russian abuses of human rights in

Chechnya. European leaders favored Russia’s political ends, but not its means of securing

them. As the conflict wore on, Europeans grew critical of Russia’s tactics. France and

Germany were particularly vocal. In January 1995, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe,

rotating president of the EU at the time, remarked that, “a clear disproportion [existed]

between Russia’s methods and her objectives” and expressed disappointment that a Russian

promise to end the conflict was not honored.561 Russia, because it was a member of the

OSCE, was obligated to inform the member States of its impending military actions in

Chechnya, but no notice was given. Early in 2000, the European Union halted food aid to

Russia in response to its renewed hostilities with Chechnya.

The OSCE actively involved itself in diplomatic efforts to resolve the Chechen

conflict. Europe conditioned trade and other agreements upon Moscow’s concession to

OSCE observers in Grozny; the assured delivery of humanitarian aid, and serious negotiations with the secessionists. Similarly, the conditioned Russia’s membership on the successful resolution of the conflict in Chechnya.562 Even with the

emergent global interest in terrorism in 2001, the European States maintained both sides’ use

561 Smyth, Patrick “French make ‘neglected’ Mediterranean a priority” January 13, 1995 The Irish Times, City Edition, p.12

562 Lapidus (1998), p.39-40

310 of terrorism was detrimental to the peace. Still, European interests in Chechnya were limited

primarily to conflict resolution; the States upheld Russia’s territorial integrity.

The remaining Caucasian conflicts drew similarly little outright intervention from

Europe. Both French and British leaders opposed intervention alongside Russia in Abkhazia.

And while the United States supported a UN peacekeeping force for Abkhazia, it would not

contribute troops to the mission. Britain and France played the most active diplomatic role

in Nagorno-Karabakh, but again like the United States, Britain had oil interests supported by

the Azeri regime and opposed by NK. Consequently, Britain also supplied arms and training

to Azerbaijan.563 Germany only played a secondary role in NK. None of the European

States’ interests were significantly imperiled or enhanced by the potential independence of

the Caucasian secessionists.

France and Britain had domestic unrest, but their conflicts would have only

contributed to the States’ already over determined support for the Home States’ territorial

integrity. Although German decision-makers evidenced significantly more support for self-

determination than their European counterparts, their concerns for human rights in

Chechnya and the other conflicts did not provoke support for secession.564 Finally, Britain,

France and Germany did not have strong perceived identity relations with the secessionists.

None would consider themselves co-ethnics or co-religionists, though the Abkhaz and South

Ossetians’ protestations of democracy and economic liberalism did represent an ideological

affinity. Again though, Georgia made a similar claim to democratic aspirations.

563 Giragosian, Richard (2001) “Nagorno-Karabakh: International Political Dimensions” in Chorbaijan (Ed)(2001), p.247-8

564 German Chancellor Kohl was the first Great Power leader to publicly criticize Russia’s tactics in Chechnya, for example, on January 5, 1995.

311

5.20 China & Japan

The Asian powers were not involved directly or diplomatically in the Caucasian

conflicts. Japan, just transitioning from its role as a powerful to one of global

influence, had few interests or humanitarian concerns in the Caucasus. Though it had a

lingering conflict with Russia, their anatagonisms were not strong enough to provoke

Japanese support for Chechnya. China was similarly not disposed toward support for the

secessionists, especially not the Chechens. One of China’s secessionist movements, the

Uighurs, shared an Islamic heritage with the Chechens. The Chechens perceived similarity to

China’s own secessionists in Xinjiang, made recognition an unattractive option. According to

one expert,

The millions of Muslims in Xinjiang are restive and dissatisfied with Chinese rule. The prospect of having its own ‘Chechnya’ in the western part of the country (indeed, not merely an enclave, as in Russia, but in a region bordering a vast Muslim world that provides moral and material support for separatist ambitions) is a source of acute concern to the Chinese leadership, already harried by separatism in Tibet.565

The conflicts in the Russian periphery presented a more direct threat to Chinese territorial security than did Yugoslavia’s. Nevertheless, the threat of Chechen independence was not great, as none of the other Powers were poised to recognize Chechnya.

Japanese decision-makers were neither engaged nor, for the most part, interested in the post-Soviet conflicts. Japan did however, send humanitarian aid. At the urging of the

UNHCHR and the ICRC, Japan donated humanitarian aid to those displaced by the violence in the North Caucasus in 2000.566 Japan also sent dedicated humanitarian aid to Chechnya.

565 Rumer, Boris (2002) “The Powers in Central Asia” Survival 44:3 (Autumn), p.62

566 (UNHCHR) United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 312 The Japanese government commented at the time that it believed Chechnya to be a part of

Russia. It was disheartened though, by the high number of casualties emerging from the

second Russo-Chechen conflict; by then a common theme among the Great Powers. Russia

and Japan have an outstanding conflict over the Northern Territories, four disputed islands

between the two States. That conflict does not seem to have influenced Japanese policy

toward the region, however. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA),

the principle issues between Japan, Russia and the Caucasus States are the strengthening of their bilateral security and economic relations. Chechnya and the other secessionist conflicts are only mentioned in passing.567

On the whole, none of the Caucasian secessions drew serious attention from the

Asian Powers. Similar to the positions of the other GP States, interest in Chechnya was greatest, but Russia’s status and resurgent strength deterred a strong response. For China in particular, deference to State sovereignty and the territorial status quo were forgone conclusions.

5.21 Developments in Chechnya, 1999-2005

The second Russo-Chechen war began in 1999 when Chechen-based Islamists staged

incursions into neighboring Dagestan. Russian authorities responded by intervening in early

December, ostensibly to push back the Chechen-led invaders and restore order. The military

action though, became much more extensive encompassing the whole Chechen AO. Within

a month of the invasion, Chechnya and Russia were at war again. The conflict continues at

this writing.

567 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2004) “Diplomatic Bluebook 2004: The Russian Federation, Central Asia and the Caucasus” Online http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/index.html 313 Two powerful factions arose within Chechnya following the first Russo-Chechen

war, in turn affecting the character of the more recent conflict. The first faction was the initial nationalist movement for Chechen independence, whose goal remained unchanged since the first war. The second was an Islamic movement, connected to the Wahhabists, not so much dedicated to Chechen independence as a worldwide Islamic movement. So what had previously been a secular nationalist war of independence became a conflict infused with religious fervor and associated (accurate or not) with international terrorism.

The second major distinction between the first and second conflict is the manner in which the combatants have waged war. Both sides pursued especially violent and unsavory tactics in the most recent conflict. Terrorism has become more frequently employed by the

Chechens, and those fighting in their name, whereas the Russian military has engaged in the extensive targeting of civilians. Extreme measures have not hastened the resolution of the underlying political conflict between the two, however. In fact, the resolution of Chechnya’s status seems further away today than ever. Still, the Russian government seems to have more successfully quashed what remained of the already unstable Chechen separatist regime. Its remaining conflict with the Islamists is probably irreconcilable.

5.21.1 Domestic Developments in Chechnya, 1996-1999

Maskadov’s governmental authority surged following Chechnya’s victory in the

1994-6 war, but languished after years without external recognition or Russian authorities’ resolution of the republic’s ultimate status. The first war ended with the parties’ agreement that negotiations on Chechnya’s final status would be put-off until 2001, five years later.

Chechens concluded at the time that Russians were prolonging Chechnya’s inevitable independence. Russian authorities hoped (and planned) Chechnya’s situation would change

314 in the intervening years. During those years Chechnya’s circumstances did change, as did

Russia’s and as did the international community’s understanding of their war.

The war itself elevated the social status of Islamic fighters, which in turn had

important substantive effects upon Chechnya’s domestic government and how the Chechens

were perceived internationally. Indeed, one source noted that “Chechnya’s period of

independence, when the republic was lawless, appears to have been the peak of the transit of

fighters, cash and ideology from abroad.”568

Chechnya is weaker today than it was in the wake of its victory in 1996. Before the

1999 war, Chechnya’s population rebounded to just over a million. By 2005, the population shrank down to 700,000 and tens of thousands of Chechnya’s citizens (Russians and

Chechens) became internally displaced or became international refugees. Human Rights

Watch estimated between 3,000 and 5,000 people had disappeared between 1999 and 2005.

The disappearances were attributed to both Chechen security forces and the Russian

military. HRW criticized Moscow’s handling of the conflict arguing it “brought suffering to

hundreds of thousands of civilians” and “undermined the goal of fighting terrorism.”569

In the years between the wars, a variety of negotiations held under the auspices of international organizations like the OSCE and UN yielded little effect. “Maskadov was the target of several assassination attempts in 1998-9, and although he still enjoyed broad popular support, he exercised little effective control.”570

568 Chivers, C.J. and Steven Lee Myers (2004) “Chechen Rebels Mainly Driven by Nationalism” New York Times September 12, 2004

569 Myers, Steven Lee (2005) “Rights Group Reports Thousands of Disappearances in Chechnya” New York Times March 22, 2005

570 In contrast, estimates suggest there are only between 1,600 and 1,800 Chechen rebels. Kramer (2004/5), p.7, 12

315 If his control within Chechnya would have consolidated, the incursions into Dagestan, led by the Wahhabists in 1999, could probably not have occurred.

5.21.2 The Second Russo-Chechen War, 1999-2005

In November 1999, Russian forces captured northern Chechnya and by February of

2000, they had occupied Grozny; or at least its remnants.571 The Chechen resistance was then

forced to move further south where mountainous terrain, porous borders, and sympathetic governments precluded Russian forces from gaining control. Rather than stopping the violence in Chechnya and its surrounding areas, Russia’s new “counter-terrorism” efforts have been met with increasing brutality on the part of the Chechen resistance. Chechens adopted the Russian military’s violent behavior as their own with devastating consequences for Russian civilians. In 2002, a siege on a Moscow theater killed 129; 2 Russian passenger planes were downed in 2004 killing 88; and, in the most notorious and controversial

Chechen attack, over 150 school children (300 total victims) were killed in a botched hostage taking in Beslan in 2004. The primary Islamic group within Chechnya also began employing suicide bombing as a tactic, both within Moscow and Chechnya. The Russian government is said to be pursuing ‘Stalinist anti-guerilla tactics’ in the current phase of the Chechen war.572

Russian troops have used torture, rape, kidnapping and graft in prosecuting the war.

571 Kramer (2004/5) notes that by 2000, Grozny was “almost completely leveled by Russian air and artillery forces.” (p.8) Grozny was “almost uninhabitable.” He continues, “Basic services (e.g., running water, electricity, heat, and natural gas) are non-existent or nearly so...” (p.6)

572 Felgenhauer, Pavel (2002) “The Russian Army in Chechnya” Central Asian Survey 21:2, p.157-166

316 Contrary to its practice in the , the Russian government said it had

as many as 93,000 troops in Chechnya as of January 2000.573 Nevertheless, the Russian

military is bogged down in Chechnya and unlikely to achieve victory due to a lack of funds,

trained personnel and equipment. Public support for the war among Russians has also begun

to erode. While the Russian military has achieved greater success in the latest instantiation of the Chechen war, the conflict’s ultimate outcome remains uncertain. According to one

Russian expert,

It is unlikely the Chechen guerillas will be able to mount a counteroffensive similar to the one they carried out in August 1996. Russian soldiers have maintained a tighter hold on Grozny and most other cities that the did at an point during the earlier war, and they have avoided repeating some of their gravest mistakes, especially with regard to urban warfare. Nonetheless, the seemingly endless conflict has also revealed major weaknesses….In a military sense, an end to the conflict appears as elusive as ever.574

Similarly, Russia’s occupation techniques have only fueled Chechens’ hatred of Russians.575

Still, Russia is unlikely to give up on its ambitions in Chechnya. rose

to power on the promise of strong-arm tactics against the terrorists in 1999-2000. And his

reelection in 2004 has been interpreted as an endorsement of his approach by the Russian

people. Russian forces finally succeeded in killing Chechen leader on

March 8, 2005.576 Officials celebrated the operation as a success, but observers on all sides questioned whether and how peace could come to Chechnya without a popular

representative of the Chechen people.

573 Ibid., p.159; Kramer suggests Russian troops “outnumber the rebels by more than fifty to one” (2004/5), p.5. The New York Times estimated in 2002 that Russian soldiers in Chechnya numbered 85,000 (Myers, October 5, 2002)

574 Kramer, Mark (2004/5) “The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia’s War in Chechnya” International Security 29:3 (Winter), p.61

575 Felgenhauer (2002)

576 At the time it was unclear whether Moscow had in fact assassinated Maskhadov or whether, as Russian officials claimed, he had been killed by police in their own self-defense as he violently resisted arrest.

317 Indeed, Moscow is even less likely to negotiate with Shamil Basayev and the Islamists. In comparison, Maskhadov was a reliable and moderate force for peace.

5.22 Exhausted Conflicts, Changed Circumstances

Dov Lynch rightly points out that while the remaining post-Soviet conflicts have not returned to the battlefield, the conflicts are not “frozen”. Indeed, they all continue to evolve;

“the situation on the ground [today] is very different from the context that gave rise to these conflicts in the late 1980s.”577 The secessionist states have experienced such a prolonged period of self-governance, even if it is at a very low level, that it is difficult to imagine how they might be reincorporated into the jurisdiction of their Home States. King notes that de facto independence has endured so long that “distinct societies have emerged in the rebel areas.” He continues that a whole generation of children in the separatist regions of Eurasia has now been schooled in the myths and traditions of the new governments.578 Nevertheless, recognition seems unlikely. And without it, the de facto regimes’ control will continue to deteriorate and illegal activities and black market trade will expand.

In each of the four secessionist states but Chechnya, the governing regimes remained weak but stable during their experience of de facto independence. What has been striking about the secessionist regimes during the decade of non-recognition is that they often provide a level of governance equal to, if not more comfortable, than that afforded citizens in their Home States.579

577 Lynch (2002), p.835

578 King, Charles (2001) "Eurasia's Nonstate States" East European Constitutional Review 10:4 (Fall)

579 King (2001a)

318 During the early 1990s Caucasian international relations were characterized by Russia

and Iran aligning against Turkey in an “anti-Western” alliance. As the United States has

become increasingly involved, a more even balance for regional influence has emerged.580

Eurasian Statesmen made a number of internal reforms in response to international pressures for moderation regarding the secessionist states (though those reforms also cleared the way for their membership in the Council of Europe). They have, for example, amended their constitutions, changed residency and citizenship laws, afforded greater autonomy to the separatist regions, and have introduced civil rights reforms.581 Still, the underlying impasse

between the two sides – secessionists and their Home States - remains.

The secessionist regimes, all of which were successful in their wars, are profoundly

distrustful of their victory. “They are all aware that they have won a battle, not the war. The

example of renewed armed conflict in Chechnya has been edifying in this respect.”582

5.22.1 Chechnya

The US became increasingly critical of Russia’s aggression in Chechnya as their relations strained in the late 1990s, but after September 11th American decision-makers now

saw a hotbed for international terrorism in Chechnya. As a result, they granted Russia an

external reprieve for its violent tactics. Fiona Hill recounted that, “Putin particularly

emphasized that in this war he needed the support of the West. And this support must

primarily mean that: ‘Western leaders should reassure Mr. Putin that they do not expect

Chechen independence to be on the table’. And they should underscore that nobody is

580 Cornell, Svante (2001) Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, p.54

581 King (2001), p.535

582 Lynch (2002), p.839-840

319 pushing him to negotiate or – as he put it – ‘deal with people who kill children’.”583 Russia cast its war in Chechnya as part of the war against international terrorism with the hope that the US would quiet its disapproval of Russian tactics. For the most part, its efforts were successful. It is noteworthy however, that while there are certainly foreign fighters involved in Chechnya’s war, the conflict essentially remains a secular nationalist war rather than a front in a transnational Islamic war.584 In other words, though Islamic militants have certainly taken up the Chechen cause, it is not the case that Chechens have taken up the cause of a global religious war advocated by organizations like Al Qaeda.585

The US has been reticent to take any action other than voicing disapproval at

Russia’s violent handling of the war in Chechnya.586 There are several other interests staying

the Bush administration’s hand. The administration also needs or desires Russian support for

Iraq’s reconstruction and in stemming worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons. Each of

these factors, coupled with the erosion of Chechnya’s domestic sovereignty, makes

Chechnya’s recognition less likely than even the 1996 post-war period.

583 Fiona Hill, “Op-Ed” New York Times September 10, 2004 cited in Cherkasov, Alexander and Tanya Lokshina (2005) “Chechnya: 10 Years of Armed Conflict” Helsinki Monitor 2, p.144

584 Myers, Steven Lee (2002) “Russia Recasts Bog in Caucasus as War on Terror” New York Times October 5, 2002; Chivers, C.J. and Steven Lee Myers (2004) “Chechen Rebels Mainly Driven by Nationalism” New York Times September 12, 2004

585 Indicative of this asymmetric interest between the two causes, no Chechens are (or have been) among the US detainees at Guantanamo Bay in nor have Chechens been verified to be among “Qaeda holdouts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Chivers, C.J. and Steven Lee Myers (2004) “Chechen Rebels Mainly Driven by Nationalism” New York Times September 12, 2004

586 President Bush has not yet openly criticized Russia on the matter, instead using Colin Powell and other officials as the administration’s mouthpiece. This, according to some allowed the two States to “avoid making [Chechnya] a leader-to-leader confrontation.” Weisman, Steven R. “Powell Displays Tough U.S. Stance Toward Russians” New York Times January 27, 2004

320 Asbjørn Eide, a noted human rights expert, argues Chechnya’s recognition is unlikely

for two reasons. First, Russia has consolidated its power in the years since the first war and

now has the strength to hold on to Chechnya by force. The new balance of power dictates

Chechen separatism “can be a nuisance to [Russia], but not a real threat.”587 Second,

Chechnya’s oil resources are too potentially lucrative for Russia to abdicate its authority over

the region.588

In recent months, Russia appears to have moderated its stance toward Chechnya.

Rather than isolating Chechnya and attempting to starve the insurgency, the Russian

government is now working on development projects. Recent news reports cite newly paved roads, construction, working electricity and freshly hung streetlamps. In Grozny, for example, “more than 60 miles of roads have been restored…and the buildings on several main streets are under repair.”589

Though there is reason for optimism, the government’s efforts in Chechnya have

been uneven and limited. Russia “has not yet addressed the difficult and expensive tasks of

restoring sewage lines, gas and flows of potable water.”590 The extent of work yet to be

completed remains daunting. In addition, Chechens remain suspicious of the government’s

intentions. Areas where the greatest amount of redevelopment work has occurred are also

heavily guarded by Russian troops. Many say Russian corruption and theft finances the ‘good

587 Eide, Asbjørn (2001) “Chechnya: In Search of Constructive Accommodation” Leiden Journal of International Law 14, p.442

588 Ibid., p.434

589 Chivers, C.J. (2006) “Signs of Renewal Emerge from Chechna’s Ruins” New York Times Online May 4, 2006 http://www.nytimes.com

590 Ibid.

321 works’ underway in Chechnya. Finally, years of victimization at the hands of Russian military have left deep feelings of resentment within the Chechen population.

5.22.2 Abkhazia & South Ossetia

The American CIA estimates that, as of 2005, 260,000 Abkhaz and Ossetians remain refugees or internally displaced because of the civil wars.591 Years of OSCE and UN

mediated talks yielded little progress. The secessionists’ association with the CMPC had a deleterious effect on their international image after September 11, 2001, though not as

dramatic an effect as the Chechens’ connection with terrorism. The CMPC is now not only

considered a terrorist organization by Georgians, but also considered an arm of international

terrorism by the United States and Britain.

Russian officials began withdrawing troops from Georgia in the late 1990s.592 In

1999, Russia agreed to withdraw its bases from Georgia and Moldova, but it maintains an overtly strategic posture in the separatist States.593 In 2000, Russian peacekeepers in

Abkhazia numbered around 1,500 while peacekeepers in South Ossetia had dwindled to only

500. Still, Russia’s military bases in Georgia remain a tendentious issue between the two.

Georgians resent the foreign, hostile military presence encroaching upon their sovereignty.

Russia protests unconvincingly in reply that their presence is innocuous and focused on

peacekeeping. Unfortunately, there are no easy answers. As discussed, Russian bases prop up

the surrounding local economies in the separatist states. Living standards in those areas

591 “Georgia” (2006) CIA World Factbook (On-line) http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gg.html

592 King (2001) notes however, that the troops withdrawn from Georgia were re-stationed in Armenia, presenting a potential threat to Azerbaijan in its conflict with Nagorno-Karabakh.

593 The agreement came during a meeting of the OSCE in Istanbul, Turkey in October 1999. The Russian bases were established as a precondition for Russian intervention to quell Gerogia’s civil war in October 1993.

322 would likely plummet without comparable investment by Georgian authorities or some other

third party.

In November of 2003, Georgians overthrew Shevardnadze’s regime in a bloodless

popular coup. Dubbed the Rose Revolution because protestors distributed roses to their

departing parliamentarians, the revolution prompted Shevardnadze’s resignation and new

national elections in January 2004. In 2005 the Georgian government, now under the

leadership of President Mikhail Saakashvili, put forward a proposal for ending the war in

South Ossetia. Saakashvili has truly democratic aspirations for Georgia, a novelty among the

former Soviet Republics. But his aspirations will be difficult to realize in what is, essentially, a failed State.

According to at least one expert, “the State known as ‘Georgia’ has largely been a

fiction of recent international diplomacy. Nearly 20 percent of the country’s territory

remains beyond the central government’s control.” He continues,

The central government’s influence begins to wane just a few miles outside Tiblisi. Even in the capital, average citizens often do without electricity or running water. Although the population is highly educated, the economy is in shambles. Georgia’s per capita national income is lower than Swaziland’s, and more than half of the population lives under the poverty line.594

In 2001, Georgia’s per capita GNP was $590.595 Georgia’s trajectory has departed

significantly from the other post-Soviet States, most of whom have rebounded economically

and decreased levels of poverty within their borders.596

594 King (2004), p.2

595 Data reported in nominal US dollars. World Data Analyst (2006) Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. http://www.britannica.com

596 In fact, in Georgia poverty increased during the period between 1998 and 2003. Dugger, Celia (2005) “Poverty and Inequality Decline in Former Soviet Union, Study Finds” New York Times October 13, 2005

323 In contrast, time has helped the secessionist states become more State-like. Though

both South Ossetia and Abkhazia certainly struggle economically because of the Georgian

government’s depravation strategy, the years of neglect and isolation have also strengthened

their resolve for independence. Georgian authorities however, have also increased pressure

on the secessionist regimes, even going so far as to create a regime-in- in Abkhazia.

Since the war, the Georgian government has subsidized structures of government for ‘Abkhazia in exile’. Tiblisi supports an executive council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, which has 25 delegates and a supreme presidium. The ethnically Georgian government-in-exile maintains eleven ministries, thirteen state committees, nine general offices and five inspectorates.597

The government-in-exile serves as just one among many reminders to the Abkhaz that

Georgia has not rescinded its claim to governance over the republic.

The United States has become increasingly critical of Russia’s role in Georgia’s conflicts. It has also begun to press Georgia to temper its aggressive approach toward its domestic discontents; suggesting NATO and EU membership depend upon Saakashvili making genuine efforts to peacefully resolve the wars.598 Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that

the United States will break from the decided position of non-recognition among the Great

Powers. Georgia contributed troops to the Iraq war and remains an important US ally in

Eurasia.

King argues compellingly that the recognized government in Georgia, if not the

Russian government as well, has an interest in perpetuating the status quo in the separatist

regions. Georgia is among the most corrupt governments in the world and its officials reap

597 Lynch (2002), p.844

598 During a visit to Georgia, George W. Bush articulated this view clearly, “Georgia’s leaders know that the peaceful resolution of conflict is essential to your integration into the transatlantic community. At the same time, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia must be respected.” Ostrovsky, Simon “Bush treads sensitive ground with offer to help Georgia’s separatist conflicts” Agence France Presse – English May 10, 2005

324 substantial rewards from the black market trade and rents gathered from the secessionist

regions. Even humanitarian aid is pilfered by the ‘legitimate’ government before it reaches

the people in need.599 Indeed, “the major players have been willing to talk to each other

precisely because the stakes are so low; few people on either side worry that what happens at

the bargaining table will ever be implemented on the ground.”600

Russia has however, very recently indicated that recognition of South Ossetia or

Abkhazia might now be a reasonable policy choice. “We need common principles to find a fair solution to these problems people living in conflict-stricken territories.... If people believe that Kosovo can be granted full independence, why then should we deny it to Abkhazia and South Ossetia?” he said. Putin continued, “I am not speaking about how Russia will act. However, we know that Turkey, for instance, has recognized the Republic of Northern Cyprus.” “I do not want to say that Russia will immediately recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, but such precedent does exist.”601 The comments are likely bluster, but do suggest a more assertive

Russian policy posture toward Georgia; one that would likely face strong opposition from the United States.

5.22.3 Nagorno-Karabakh

The circumstances surrounding Karabakh recognition have changed the least since the war. The de facto authorities maintain a similar level of control today to what they did as the ceasefire took hold in 1994. In addition, the international political circumstances have

599 King (2001), p.545

600 Ibid., p.549

601 “Russia: Putin Calls for ‘Universal Principles’ to Settle Frozen Conflicts” February 1, 2006 Radio Free Europe RFE-RL, Inc. 325 not changed much as regards Karabakh. The Great Powers remain interested in stable reliable governments with whom they can negotiate profitable oil contracts. They also have a renewed interest in counterterrorism that favors the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan.

Again the mediation efforts in Karabakh continue, and again the peace talks have made little progress. The regime in Nagorno-Karabakh is not likely to be recognized given the contemporary international climate.

5.23 Conclusion: Post-Soviet-Haste?

Recognition has not come to the post-Soviet secessionists for a variety of reasons, but a lack of domestic sovereignty does not appear among them. The separatist regimes surpassed the highest standard of territorial control by defeating their Home States militarily and compelling their retreat. The variance in domestic sovereignty from republic to republic however, was not the focus of Great Power attention. Instead, Great Power preferences regarding recognition derived from their own parochial interests in the region.

One could look at the Caucasian de facto regimes and conclude the Great Powers’ hesitance in granting recognition has been vindicated by Chechnya’s fall into anarchy; none of the secessionists could have successfully transitioned to independent Statehood.

Chechnya no longer meets the standards set by international law and the international political environment has become more hostile in the years since the first Russo-Chechen war. The Russian Home State is stronger and more capable of holding on to Chechnya today than it was in the middle 1990s.

326 South Ossetia and Abkhazia, though heavily subsidized by Russia and international

humanitarian organizations, have a powerful opposition in the United States’ unequivocal

support for Georgia. Finally, Nagorno-Karabakh inhabits an unsustainable region fully

surrounded by its aggressive Home State.

We are left only with a counterfactual; did the Great Powers’ decision not to

recognize the secessionists indicate that they could not have been States? Or did the Great

Powers’ decision determine that they would not be States, regardless of their potential? I

contend that the latter case more accurately characterizes the post-Soviet cases presented

here.

What the post-Soviet secessions demonstrate most vividly is that while a battlefield

victory (perhaps the most unambiguous sign of domestic sovereignty) is usually sufficient to compel external recognition, it is not universally so. State interest, rather than the ‘facts on the ground’ determine recognition and, collectively, whether the secessionist actor will be admitted full membership in international society.

Second, the post-Soviet de facto States are failing without the support of the international community. The Soviet Union’s legitimate successor States received important material and psychic benefits from membership in international society. First, they received loans from institutions like the World Bank and IMF as well as directly from other States.

Indeed, Russia was said to have used its international loans to fund its war in Chechnya even while its population was suffering. President Shevardnadze credited international support for the continued viability of Georgia,

327 As regards material factors, I would like to say straightaway, without concealing anything, that if it had not been for the assistance, support and financial participation of the Western countries, and especially the World Bank, the IMF and the European Union, we would not have survived. One third of the revenue of the current budget, that is wages, pensions and other things needed for the State, is formed by means of the participation of the West and especially the IMF.602

Though the secessionists treat one another as the legitimate authorities within their respective territories, without the recognition of the powerful they will likely not fair much better than they have in the last decade.603 As Michael Ignatieff argues, in the Cold War’s aftermath, “huge sections of the world’s population have won the right of self determination on the cruelest possible terms: they have been simply left to fend for themselves. Not surprisingly, their nation-States are collapsing.”604

602 BBC Summary of World News Broadcasts “President Shevardnadze defends concept for strengthening state sovereignty” April 17, 1997 NTV, Moscow

603 King (2001), p.542; King (2001a)

604 Ignatieff, Michael (1994) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the new Nationalism Toronto, CA: Viking Press, p.8

328 GREAT POWER GEO (+) DOM (-) ERA (+) ID (+) 605

China (G) No Low Yes Abkhazia 0, 0, 0 = 0606 (A) No Chechnya 0, 0, 0 = 0 (R) Low S. Ossetia 0, 0, 0 = 0 Karabakh 0, 0, 0 = 0

France (G) No Med Yes Abkhazia 0, 0, 0 = 0 (A) No Chechnya 0, 0, -1 = 0 (R) No-Low607 S. Ossetia 0, 0, 0 = 0 Karabakh 0, 0, 0 = 0

Germany (G) No Low Yes Abkhazia 0, 0, 0 = 0 (A) No Chechnya 0, 0, -1 = 0 (R) No-Low S. Ossetia 0, 0, 0 = 0 Karabakh 0, 0, 0 = 0

Japan (G) No Low Yes Abkhazia 0, 0, 0 = 0 (A) No Chechnya 0, 0, -1 = 0 (R) Med S. Ossetia 0, 0, 0 = 0 Karabakh 0, 0, 0 = 0

USSR/Russia608 (G) Low-Med High-Med609 Yes Abkhazia 0, 0, 0 = 0 (A) Low S. Ossetia 0, 1, 1 = 1 Karabakh 1, 0, 0 = 1

United Kingdom (G) No Med Yes Abkhazia 0, 0, 0 = 0 (A) No Chechnya 0, 0, -1 = 0 (R) No-Low S. Ossetia 0, 0, 0 = 0 Karabakh 0, 0, 0 = 0

United States (G) No Low Yes Abkhazia 0, 0, 0 = 0 (A) No Chechnya 0, 0, -1 = 0 (R) No-Med S. Ossetia 0, 0, 0 = 0 Karabakh 0, 0, 0 = 0

Table 5.1 Post-Soviet States: Quantitative Indicators (1991-2002)

605 Reported as component parts, (Religion, Ethnicity, and Ideology) then as the dummy variable (ID) used in quantitative analysis in Chapter 3 for each secessionist movement.

606 Unlike the ID variables reported in the chapter on Yugoslavia, the individual dummy variables will not sum across. Instead, the final indicator is reported following the equal sign.

607 Both France and Germany exchanged threats with Russia in 1999 and the UK had a slightly higher GEO score beginning in 1999 at 4.

608 USSR/Russia is Chechnya’s Home State, so its recognition decision was not considered.

609 In 1991, the USSR scored a HIGH domestic insecurity (DOM) score of 44, but by 1996 Russia’s DOM score had dropped to 10 and remained around that level through 2002. 329

Other/ Russ. Georg. Chech. Abkhaz Azeri Osset Armen. Unknown Tartar 3.8% Russia Ukrainian 79.8% ------Pop.140 mil610 2% Other 12.1% Chechnya 25% - 66% - - - - Pop.865, 000

Georgia611 5% 6% 70% - 2% 6% 3% 8% Pop.5, 500,000 Unknown

Abkhazia 46% 18% Pop.100, 000

South Ossetia

Pop.99, 000 Dagestani Azerbaijan 3.8% 83% 1.5% 2% Pop.6,800,000 Other 3.9% Nagorno- Karabakh 84% Pop.188, 000

Table 5.2 Soviet Succession Ethnic Demographics (1989)612

610 January 2006 estimate from ”Russia” CIA World Fact book Online http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html

611 King (2001), p.530-531

612 Compiled from Zickel, Raymond (Ed.)(1991) Soviet Union: A Country Study Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress (unless otherwise noted)

330

Deaths Displaced Start Date End Date Peacekeepers 613 614 Abkhazia Aug. 14, 140,000- CIS (RUS)/ May 14, 1994 10,000615 Dec.7/23/92 1992 300,000 UNOMIG Chechnya Dec. 2, 1994 Aug. 31, 1996 11,500616 200,000 OSCE617 Dec.11/2/91 Chechnya Sept. 23, 200,000- Ongoing 16,000618 Dec.11/2/91 1999 400,000 Nagorno- 528,000- UN/OSCE Karabakh Jan. 1, 1992 May 12, 1994 30,000 950,000619 (1/3 RUS) Dec.1/6/92 South Ossetia 39,000- Jan.22, 1991 June 24, 1992 1,000 RUS/OSCE Dec.12/12/90 100,000620

Table 5.3 Post-Soviet Conflict Statistics

613 Estimated combatant deaths were reported when possible. Some estimates may include civilian casualties where they could not be distinguished.

614 Displaced figures reflect the lowest and highest estimates of internally displaced persons and/or refugees during the conflict period.

615 Some reports suggest figures as high as 11,000 for the Georgian National Guard alone, though they are likely inflated.

616 See Dunlop (2000) for an insightful discussion regarding the number of combatants and civilians killed during the first Russo-Chechen War. Civilian deaths for the first war are estimated to be 35,000. Dunlop, John B. (2000) “How many soldiers and civilians died during the Russo-Chechen war of 1994-6?” Central Asian Survey 19:3/4, p.329-339

617 This was an OSCE observer mission, rather than a peacekeeping force.

618 Dunlop “very tentatively” estimated 16,000 casualties (8,000 on each side) for the period between the initiation of hostilities in 1999 and September 2001. He also estimated between 20,000 and 25,000 civilians were killed over the same time period. Dunlop, John B. (2002) “Russia: The Forgotten War” Hoover Digest Online 1(Winter) http://www.hooverdigest.org/

619 High estimate includes IDPs and refugees expelled from both Armenia and Azerbaijan throughout the 1989-1994 violence.

620 A North Ossetian refugee committee estimated that half of Georgia’s Ossetian population (83,000) had fled the province by October of 1991. (Note that this is before Georgian independence from the Soviet Union.) Brooke, James (1991) “As Centralized Rule Wanes, Ethnic Tension Rises Anew in Soviet Georgia” New York Times October 2, 1991, Section A, p.3 331 Table 5.4 Post-Soviet Timeline (1989-1996)

1989 January Moscow imposes over Nagorno-Karabakh, dispatches MVD troops

March 18 Mass Abkhaz demonstrations demanding independence from Georgia

June Georgian SSR nullifies Soviet authority within the republic July 16 First clashes of the Georgian-Abkhaz war begin in Sukhumi

September 1 Azerbaijan initiates blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, Nakhichevan blockade initiated by Armenia in response

October 1 Protests begin in South Ossetia over Georgian language laws

November 10 South Ossetian Popular Front demands SO’s status be upgraded to SSR 20 Georgian SSR restores Georgian independence (of 1921) 23 Violent clashes reported between Georgians and South Ossetians

December 1 Armenia’s Supreme Soviet calls for reunification with Nagorno-Karabakh

1990 April 3 USSR Supreme Soviet rules recognized minorities may remain within the USSR even if their SSR secedes

August 20 Georgian declared the official language of Georgia, Abkhaz and South Ossetian parties banned from Georgian elections 25 Abkhazia’s Supreme Soviet declares sovereignty (remains open to federation), declaration ruled invalid by the Georgian authorities

September South Ossetia declares independence from Georgia

October 28 Georgian elections yield 54% in favor of nationalist parties (first round)

November Chechen-Ingush SSR declares sovereignty and independence 11 Georgian elections yield 62% in favor of nationalist parties (second round) 14 Georgian SSR elects Zviad Gamsakhurdia president 332 16 Georgian SSR sends notification of independence demands to OSCE

December South Ossetia holds independent elections 11 Georgia abolishes the South Ossetian Autonomous Olast, SOE declared

1991 January 7 Gorbachev declares South Ossetia’s sovereignty declaration and Georgia’s state of emergency unconstitutional 22 Heavy fighting breaks out in South Ossetia marking the beginning of the war

March 17 Union Treaty referendum held on to determine the future status of the USSR Abkhazia and South Ossetia hold referenda on the Union Treaty though Georgia Boycotts 30 Georgian reinforcements arrive to quell the South Ossetian uprising 31 Georgia holds a referendum on independence from USSR (90% participate, 97.65% favor independence) Many in Abkhazia & South Ossetia not allowed to vote

April Russian troops expel 10,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan to eliminate Armenian rebels (not NK Armenians) 9 Georgia declares independence from the USSR 14 Gamsakhurdia appointed Georgia’s first independent president

July Ingushetia declares itself an SSR (In Dec. 97% vote for SSR)

August 1 Rallies and strikes demanding Chechen independence begin 30 Azerbaijan’s Supreme Soviet declares independence from the USSR (receives assurances that Soviet troops will stay in NK first)

September 15 Ingush rebels declare Ingushetia an SSR, independent of Chechnya 21 Armenian referendum on secession from USSR (99.3% support independence) 23 Armenia declares independence from the USSR

October 23 Russia bans political groups intending to violate its territorial integrity 27 Presidential and parliamentary elections held in Chechnya (Dudayev wins with 85% of vote, irregularities reported)

November 2 Chechnya’s parliament declares independence from Russia 8 Yeltsin declares a state of emergency in Chechnya 10 Russian parliament denounces Yeltsin’s declaration 26 Azerbaijan revokes NK’s autonomy

333

December 10 Nagorno-Karabakh holds a referendum on independence (99.9% vote in favor of independence, Azeris boycott) 22 Georgian civil war begins between Gamsakhurdia and the opposition 25 Gorbachev resigns, Soviet Union disbands 28 Independent elections held in NK

1992 Major hostilities break out in Nagorno-Karabakh 4 Gamsakhurdia’s opposition, having gained control in Gerogia, appeals for a ceasefire in South Ossetia 6 New Parliament of Nagorno-Karabakh formally declares independence 20 South Ossetia holds a referendum on independence, turnout reported to be 90%, 98.2% vote for independence (Georgians boycott)

March Each autonomous republic signs a union agreement with Russia but Chechnya and Tartarstan 10 Eduard Shevardnadze takes power within Georgia 23 EC & US recognize Republic of Georgia 24 Minsk Group established by the OSCE

May 8 Ceasefire negotiated between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but immediately violated 13 Trilateral talks between North Ossetia, South Ossetia and Georgia begin

June Russia recognizes the division of Chechen-Ingushetia, Ingushteia maintains ties to Russia 8 Heavy fighting breaks out in South Ossetia, part of a massive attack by Shevardnadze’s regime 24 Ceasefire established between Georgia and South Ossetia, the Sochi Agreement (Holds until 2004)

July 3 Russian backed settlement talks begin between South, North Ossetia and Georgia 23 Abkhazia declares independence from Georgia

August 14 Georgian-Abkhaz war begins

September 2 Nagorno-Karabakh declares independence from Azerbaijan 3 Russian backed negotiations between Abkhazia and Georgia yield a ceasefire 13 Russian backed ceasefire between Georgia and Abkhazia collapses 20 NK begins petitioning States for recognition

334

October 11 Shevardnadze popularly elected (95%); much of Abkhazia and South Ossetia not allowed to participate 27 Russian troops become involved in Abkhaz-Georgian violence 31 Azerbaijan parliament votes against membership in the CIS

December 3 OSCE sends mission to South Ossetia

1993 January 20 UN mission to Georgia arrives 26 South Ossetia settlement talks begin under the auspices of the OSCE

February North Ossetia recognizes South Ossetia’s independence

March Chechnya adopts a new constitution

May 14 Georgia and Russia negotiate a ceasefire in Abkhazia 20 Russo-Georgian ceasefire for Abkhazia takes hold

July 12 Russian backed ceasefire and agreement presented for Abkhazia, both parties reject the plan 31 OSCE negotiated peace settlement grudgingly approved by Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK Armenians (NK Armenians later renege on the commitment)

August 26 Georgian troops begin withdrawal from Abkhazia

September 27 Abkhaz forces capture Sukhumi

October 8 Shevardnadze announces Georgia will join the CIS (does so October 23)

November South Ossetia adopts a new constitution

December 1 “Memorandum of Understanding” signed between Georgia and Abkhazia under UN auspices (stipulates ceasefire, observers, refugee return)

1994 January President-in-Exile Gamsakhurdia dies/commits suicide 335

February 3 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Peaceful Coexistence signed between Moscow and Tiblisi

April 4 Ceasefire agreed to between Georgia and Abkhazia

May 9 Bishkek Protocol brokers ceasefire between Azerbaijan, Armenia and NK (violation continue through summer and fall 1994) 14 Second ceasefire agreement signed between Georgian and Abkhaz authorities in Russia

June 16 CIS peacekeeping force deployed to Abkhazia (1,600 troops)

November 30 Abkhazia adopts new constitution reaffirming its sovereignty, Georgia calls for sanctions

December 2 Russian bombardment of Chechnya begins 10 Russian ground troops invade Chechnya 15 US State Department condemns Abkhazia’s declaration of sovereignty

1995 February 17 South Ossetians and ethnic Georgian refugees begin returning to SO

March 6 Abkhazia announces it will consider confederation with Georgia

July 19 Formal negotiations begin between South Ossetia and Georgia

1996 January 24 Russia admitted into the Council of Europe (COE)

August 31 negotiates a peace agreement between Russia and Chechnya, decision on Chechen sovereignty delayed for 5 years

November 9 South Ossetia and North Ossetia sign a treaty of friendship 10 South Ossetia holds Presidential elections

December 31 Russia withdraws its last troops from Chechnya (complete Jan.5) 336

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS & SUBSTANTIVE INTERPRETATIONS

“Non-recognition does not affect Nagorno-Karabakh’s existence, or its status as an independent State…Nagorno-Karabakh is the same as Azerbaijan, but it is just not recognized!”621

In a 2000 interview, Karabakh Defense Minister Anushavan Danielyan remarked that non-recognition did not matter; Nagorno-Karabakh’s status was the same as that of

Azerbaijan, regardless of the international community’s judgment. He was wrong.

International law perpetuates a fiction that external recognition is merely a declaration of

Statehood already achieved. It is not. Instead, mutual recognition is fundamental. It constitutes external sovereignty and international system membership. Without extensive external recognition, State-like actors are not permitted the status or afforded the material advantages reserved exclusively for States. Indeed, Danielyan cannot truly believe his own rhetoric. If he did, the Karabakh Armenians would compromise their demand for recognition and simply accept the very minimal, ‘everything but recognition’ autonomous association that Azerbaijan has offered them. There is something special about Statehood not approximated by domestic sovereignty alone. Non-recognition did not affect NK’s existence or prevent its securing de facto authority, but it has certainly stunted the Karabakh

621 Lynch (2002), p.848 337 Armenians’ capacity to thrive. And, according to every member of the international system,

even its Armenian patron, NK is not “the same” as Azerbaijan; its status is less than. So it is

in Nagorno-Karabakh, so it is and has been for the many de facto unrecognized regimes

outside the post-Soviet space.

This project began with the observation that international law and international

relations theory did not accurately predict or explain the emergence of new States.

International law focused on what ‘should have been’ rather than what ‘was’ because its

purpose was normative, rather than descriptive. International relations theory, on the other

hand, focused principally on the interactions among States by holding the international

system and its members exogenous. In IR, the State was assumed in. Scholars never

dedicated much consideration to how and why States entered the system. Neither theoretical

tradition accurately depicted State emergence dynamics. But this was primarily due to a lack

of attention – a gap in theorization – rather than careful, but mistaken analysis. Both were theoretically underdeveloped. Nevertheless, each maintained State emergence depended upon an actor achieving effective domestic sovereignty within its proclaimed territory.

The pattern of new States entering international society did not evidence such a

strong relationship between domestic sovereignty and Statehood. In practice, some new

States had domestic sovereignty before they were widely recognized as States externally, but

most did not. And this perplexing pattern was not only limited to post-colonial States, who

might have been granted a pass due to normative considerations. Very few new States

seemed to unambiguously meet the criteria prescribed for Statehood by theory. Conversely,

some actors that never in fact became States had greater domestic sovereignty than those

that were recognized.

338 Observing the mismatch between theoretical expectations and empirical reality, I suggested State emergence was usually not a direct consequence of achieving territorial

control and effective authority as suggested by IR and IL. Instead, I argued external

sovereignty, evinced by formal recognition, was dependent upon another important factor,

State interest. The Westphalian order endows existing States with the responsibility to grant

external sovereignty to any and all new members within their ranks. Because of this, I

deduced that States’ interests would undoubtedly intervene to influence the granting of

recognition to any new State. Even if Statesmen were to abide by the normative standards of

international law, their perception or estimation of any recognition-seeking actor could not

help but be colored by the new member’s potential influence on his or her State’s own

interests. The opportunity to select one’s own new neighbors and contemporaries would be

impossible to resist.

I put forward five primary categories of interests that might underlie State

recognition decisions. First, States might simply follow the international legal standards, the

null hypothesis. The mismatch between the theory and practice of recognition could be a result of States’ misperception of actors’ domestic sovereignty, due to the incompleteness of international law, or even due to events on the ground overtaking what was perceived to be the status quo by outsiders. The next four explanations fit into two general categories, one material and one ideational. As concerned material factors, States might recognize based upon a concern for their external security or other geo-strategic ambitions. Recognition could be used as a tool to weaken a State’s enemies or support its friends. Or, Statesmen may be influenced by their own domestic security situation when conferring recognition.

339 If a State is weak due to a separatist conflict of its own, for example, it may be reticent to

recognize separatists elsewhere for fear of legitimating secession.

Ideational motives similarly suggested two hypotheses regarding recognition. First,

States might recognize according to international norms of appropriate behavior; perhaps by

supporting human rights or self-determination through recognition. And finally, States might

be motivated to recognize new States based upon sub-systemic identity relationships. A State

may be more likely to recognize an actor with whom it shares ethnic, religious, ideological or

other affinities. These factors might suggest a similar worldview or common fate among

actors.

State interests alone explained only part of the gap between theory and practice, however. In theory, recognition is a uniquely bilateral matter between the recognizer and the recognized. Practically speaking though, many States must recognize a new member before it is accepted as a full member of international society. Unilateral recognition is risky and potentially destabilizing to international order, so I posited that States would prefer coordinating their recognition. The constellation of State interests then, rather than individual, autonomous State interests, would better explain the gap between internal sovereignty and external recognition. When powerful States agree that an actor should be embraced as a State (or excluded from membership), the international politics surrounding

State emergence should be straightforward and without much controversy. Statesmen will make decisions consistent with the consensus. When States’ preferences diverge, and mutually acceptable coordinated recognition appears unlikely, only then will State emergence more closely conform to the international legal standards.

340 Without external agreement or interest, a new member must unambiguously meet the legal

criteria before it is accepted into international society. Even then, recognition may be

granted only hesitantly.

In order to study interests’ influence on recognition and State emergence, a

population of potential recognizers and potential new States first had to be identified.

Because the Great Powers are the most powerful, and therefore influential, members of the international system, I chose to observe their recognition behavior. I also suggested that

Great Power recognition served as a focal point for ‘normal’ States; thereby solving the

coordination problem for most members of international society. Great Power recognition

was assumed to change the incentives for recognition among normal States, initiating a

cascade of recognition throughout the system. I decided that the most appropriate group of potential States for the study was secessionist movements. Looking at secession offered a number of benefits not common to other possible sets: their desire for independent

Statehood was universal, their Home States universally opposed their independence, and secessionist conflicts cause of some of the most deadly and enduring modern conflicts. As a consequence of this final characteristic, the study’s findings would potentially yield insights into some of the most vexing contemporary policy problems.

The project’s empirical analysis took two forms, one quantitative, large N analysis and the other qualitative, comparative case studies. Each analytical method’s weakness was matched by the other’s equal and opposite strength. The Large N analysis surveyed all of the secessionist movements ongoing between 1931 and 2002 and observed the subsequent pattern of Great Power recognition for every case. Indicators were developed to explore the potential influence of State interest on recognition for every secessionist movement in the

341 set. Four major categories of interest were explored, geo-strategic/international security

(GEO), domestic security (DOM), systemic norms (ERA) and identity relations (ID).622 The case study portion of the project took the form of case-clusters. The first, in the former

Yugoslavia, examined the secessionist movements in Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo. The second case cluster, in the former Soviet Union, considered the secession attempts by

Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Chechnya in Russia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in

Azerbaijan.

The quantitative analysis used event history analysis to test the causal and temporal influence of the four categories of interest on Great Power recognition. All of the principal hypotheses were supported by the initial test, which considered all of the Great Powers’ recognition decisions as a set. The analysis showed that recognition was strongly influenced by identity relations between the secessionists, their Home State and a given Great Power

State. The Great Powers were 50% more likely to recognize a secessionist movement with whom it shared strong identity relations. External security interests significantly influenced recognition as well. During years in which States had military conflict with a Home State, they were over 40% more likely to recognize secessionist movements within that State. It also indicated a 29% increase in the probability of recognition in a year when systemic norms favored self-determination over State integrity. Less influential, but still statistically significant, was the effect of domestic insecurity. Great Power States with secessionist movements of their own were only slightly less likely to recognize secessionists in other

States. Because domestic insecurity had a relatively small impact, I inferred that perhaps the

Great Powers were better able to absorb domestic discontent than were other ‘normal’

622 Recall that there was insufficient data to test the Domestic Sovereignty, null hypothesis in the quantitative portion of the project. 342 States in the system. The hypothesis had, after all, originally been suggested by scholars

interested in African States’ behavior; the degree of internal instability might have to be quite

high to influence Great Power behavior.623

The second set of quantitative tests broke the Great Power set down into its

individual Great Power components. As anticipated, each of the Great Powers had distinct recognition patterns and interests demonstrated to be influential. Support for each hypothesis varied when the Great Powers were considered individually. Whereas the United

States and the United Kingdom were most influenced by the presence of geo-strategic motives to recognize, China and France were equivalently motivated by external security and systemic norms. Identity was an influential factor for every Power but China and Russia, though its substantive influence was relatively small in every case; evidencing between a 5 and 31% increase in the probability of a Great Power’s recognition. France and the UK, two major imperial powers, were around 30% less likely to recognize secessionists when they had domestic security concerns of their own. On the other hand, none of the other Great

Powers decisions showed significant support for the domestic insecurity hypothesis. The variance in support for the domestic security hypothesis from Power to Power seemed to sustain the notion that instability only affects Great Power recognition when it reaches a high level. The domestic instability experienced by France and the UK was far greater than that experienced by the other Powers.

Finally, a number of auxiliary hypotheses received support in the quantitative analysis. Evidence showed that colonies and mandate/trust territories were much more likely to gain Great Power recognition than were entities without similar relationships to their

623 Saideman (1998) 343 Home States. Both unit types were over 150% more likely to be recognized, colonies slightly

less so than mandates or trust territories. Somewhat surprisingly, colonies were not without

failures entirely, just over 25% of colonial secessions failed (See Appendix C). Sub-state units

were also more likely to receive recognition than pan-movements. In fact, no pan-movement

has ever succeeded in securing Great Power recognition. Finally, the Cold War had a

pronounced negative effect on recognition. Between 1947 and 1990, secessionist States had an 88% lesser chance of gaining recognition than during non-Cold War years.

Event history analysis offered a number of benefits not common to most

quantitative analysis for this project. First, the method ensured that the hypothesized causes

were temporally before their anticipated effects. Second, the timing or duration of the

secessionist efforts could be explored. In other words, permitting analysis of when the Great

Powers were more or less likely to recognize a new member. Like all methods however, the

frequentist logic underlying the event history analysis was not without weaknesses. Though

State interests had statistically significant and substantively meaningful effects on

recognition, we could not be sure that the quantitative indicators accurately portrayed what

Statesmen believed their interests to be at the time. Similarly, quantitative analysis cannot

uncover unhypothesized sources of variation. Nor can it explore the string of events or the

pattern of causes and effects leading States to recognize. In contrast, each of these aspects

could be effectively studied through careful case studies.

The quantitative analysis also left other questions, though not due to methodological

limitations. The Large N analysis showed significant support for Great Power interests’

influence on the recognition of new States. External interests’ relative influence remained

unexplored, however, due to the unavailability of data on secessionists’ domestic

344 sovereignty. The small N, case studies presented an opportunity to remedy the inherent

shortcomings of the quantitative analysis and to study the impact of domestic sovereignty on

Great Power decision-making. Two clusters of secessionist movements, one in the Former

Yugoslavia and one in the Post-Soviet States, were selected based upon the degree of

domestic sovereignty each exercised. In this way, domestic sovereignty and external interests’

relative influences on recognition could be isolated.

The Montevideo criteria, established in 1933, set the basic legal standard for

recognized Statehood in the contemporary international system. Each standard comprises

one dimension of domestic sovereignty. Before an actor may be legally recognized by any

other State, it must first secure a territory and population over which it presides; it must have

territorial control and effective authority within its borders; and it must be capable of

entering into relations with other States. Within the case clusters, Slovenia and Chechnya I

met a high standard according to the international legal criteria. Croatia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-

Karabakh and South Ossetia met a moderate legal standard. Finally, Kosovo and Chechnya

II fell short on at least one of the established legal criteria, thereby presenting a low degree of domestic sovereignty. By selecting cases on the legal null hypothesis in clusters, I attempted to control for extraneous sources of variation.

In the Yugoslav case cluster, Great Power interest played a significant role in the recognition decisions of Statesmen. Slovene recognition, which appeared a forgone conclusion according to the legal criteria, was withheld (albeit for a limited time) due to the

Powers interests in maintaining unanimity within Europe and in achieving a comprehensive settlement. Legally speaking, Croatia’s recognition was less certain. In fact, Croatian authorities did not control nearly a third of the territory they claimed when they first

345 received recognition. German decision-makers are often criticized for pushing the rest of

Europe into recognition. According to the case study for this project however, it seems that while the European Powers disagreed about the timing of Croatia’s recognition, the political consensus dictated that Croatia would be recognized. Though Tudjman’s regime did not meet the legal standards, external politics pointed toward recognition. Indeed, in a rare instance of an evidentiary ‘smoking gun’, British Minister of State, Douglas Hogg remarked that Croatia was a ‘special case’ where the rules of international law did not apply.624 Finally,

Kosovo’s non-recognition was unlikely according to both international law and external politics. The Rugova regime had a high level of popular support among Albanians, but lacked control over its territory and had little potential for viable independent government.

Similarly, while the Great Powers supported humanitarian goals in order to protect Kosovo

Albanians from predatory Serbs, whom they now considered their enemy, they did not support the secessionists’ independence. After years as an international protectorate and experience with pseudo-independence, it is difficult to foresee how the Great Powers will be able to peacefully revoke the autonomy that Kosovo Albanians now enjoy. Nevertheless, its external recognition is less likely than Montenegro’s, which Serbia has willingly granted a right to self-determination through referendum (should its population demonstrate a desire for independence).

None of the secessionist regimes in the post-Soviet States have yet received external recognition. Each republic has been functionally independent for the last decade or so, but none has external support sufficient to provoke international acceptance. Ironically, even after a decade of recognized independence and Statehood, the secessionists’ Home States

624 Cited in Caplan (2005), p.65 at n.58 and presented in this analysis on p.204. 346 (excepting Russia) have secured little more domestic sovereignty than the secessionists themselves. In the former Soviet Union however, the Great Powers have dedicated their support to the regimes in Baku, Tiblisi and Moscow, rather than those in Stepanakert,

Sukhumi, Tskhinvali or Grozny. In what I have termed ‘post-Soviet haste’, the international community quickly consecrated the sovereign claims of the Soviet Union’s constituent SSRs without first considering alternative scenarios for dissolution. Though the USSR disbanded with relatively little conflict, concentrated, enduring conflict did occur in four of the new

States. The international community, for its part, knew of the potential for war, instability and contests over sovereignty, but preferred non-intervention and immediate gains in security and trade to long-term solutions. The US in particular, maintains its support for the failed Georgian State and the autocratic Azeri regime to date. And its entrenched position deters Russian recognition, the other, most influential and interested Great Power party.

Although Chechnya demonstrated a high degree of domestic sovereignty when it compelled the Russian army’s retreat in 1996, Great Power recognition was not forthcoming.

The Great Powers were unsympathetic to the Chechens’ plight. The dust had barely settled after the Cold War, but Moscow’s image had already been completely transformed in the

West. The American and European Powers now saw in Russia a democratizing, liberal ally whose territorial integrity was in the interest of global stability. Chechens’ ethno-religious identity and terrorist methods did not help their cause. In the United States at least, officials were convinced support for self-determination would lead to an anti-democratic end.

According to one, “Thomas Paine [would produce] Al Capone.”625 Chechnya’s domestic sovereignty dwindled along with its prospects for recognition as the decade wore on.

625 Les Gelb cited in Schweid (1995) 347 , tied to foreign Wahhabis and international terrorism, dashed what little compassion had arisen due to Russia’s excessively harsh tactics. Chechnya’s lawlessness was no longer considered an internal Russian affair; its domestic chaos was now seen as a potential international threat. Statesmen consequently turned a blind eye to Moscow’s

‘Stalinist era policies’ in the region.

Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh all had moderate levels of domestic sovereignty throughout the period under study. State interests however, implied that

Abkhazia and South Ossetia would receive more support for independence than would the

Karabakh Armenians. Russia strongly preferred recognition for both regimes due to its

external security interests, identity-based affinity and interestingly, due to concern for its own

domestic stability. Nevertheless, the constellation of Great Power interests suggested none

of the regimes would in fact receive recognition. The US and Russia, the Great Powers most

engaged in the post-Soviet conflicts, had divergent preferences with respect to the secessions

in Georgia. The US had an opposite, if not equally strong, interest in Georgia’s economic

and political stability. Similarly, though less hotly contested, the US supported the Azeri regime while Moscow sometimes supported the secessionists. As a result, the Eurasian de facto regimes continue on in unrecognized limbo, unable to procure foreign aid, make treaties, trade on international markets, request international loans or join international governmental organizations. Moscow defies the international consensus by trading with the regimes and providing them direct aid, but has not gone so far as to formally recognize the regimes. Russian leaders do not want to antagonize the Americans and Europeans, with whom they now have productive bilateral relations.

348 Evidence from the case studies showed that the Montevideo criteria rarely played a

significant role in States’ recognition decisions. Great Power leaders made few references to

international law with regard to recognition. And when they did, it was often by way of

explaining why the legal criteria for recognition did not apply or should be discounted

relative to other, more pressing concerns. Yet Statesmen themselves were responsible for the

creation of the standards to begin with. Why do the legal standards for recognition play so

little a role in the practice of States?

The research presented here suggests a number of potential explanations. First, the

standards articulated by Montevideo might not be sufficiently determinant or coherent

enough for Statesmen to follow.626 States attempt to abide by the rules, but reasonably disagree about what the rules imply. There is a great deal of disagreement among experts as to what the international legal criteria mean in practical terms. Ambiguity however, did not seem to be a cause for disagreement among the Great Powers in either the Yugoslav or the post-Soviet cases. Second, States’ parochial interests might simply trump international law.

Statesmen disregard the law in service of alternative ends. In some instances outlined above, this clearly occurred. Germany’s disproportionate interest in recognizing Croatia dictated it would not follow international law. It did not always occur, however. When another Great

Power (or Powers) opposed a State’s political preference for or against recognition, States were less likely to defy international law. Third, and most likely, is some combination of the two previous explanations.

626 Thomas Franck (1990) in The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, suggests this is one reason why States might not comply with international norms and laws. 349 Statesmen believe recognition is a fundamentally political, rather than legal, act. At the same time, for the sake of international order and stability, they also realize that they must coordinate in recognizing any new actor. Because Great Power interests are extensive and system-wide, their recognition preferences will often differ. As a result, some combination of self-interest and legitimacy are sought among the Great Powers themselves.

The Powers can often reach a mutual and therefore legitimate consensus among themselves without reference to international law. In some cases, this means that the Great Powers will agree to elevate an actor with a tenuous claim to domestic sovereignty into the international community of States. This is what occurred in Croatia. In most instances, the Great Powers agree to the contrary that they will not grant recognition and those secessionist regimes will remain subject to their Home States’ authority. When they cannot agree, the status quo prevails when and until the new actor unambiguously meets (or exceeds) the international standards. Though the post-Soviet states meet a moderate standard suggested by IL, each of their capability to survive and thrive as States does not reach the level achieved by Slovenia.

And their lack of recognition may erode what domestic sovereignty they currently have.

6.1 Political Recognition’s Effects

The Great Powers’ use of political, rather than legal recognition has two broad categories of international political consequences. The first and most direct effects of political recognition are on the secessionist actors that either do or do not receive it and their

Home States. The prospect of political recognition changes the incentive structure commonly assumed to underlie secession. Battlefield victories and losses do not determine secession’s ultimate success. The second category of political recognition’s influence is its

350 diffuse consequences on the character of the international system. Over time political recognition populated the international system with a different type of State than international relations theory and international law would suggest.

6.1.1 Direct Effects

It is difficult to discern the effects of States’ non-adherence to the legal model of recognition. Members that entered the international system without surpassing the international legal threshold are easily observable. As outlined in the beginning of Chapter 3 and illustrated in Figure 3.1, many contemporary States, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and

East Timor to name but a few, were recognized as externally legitimate prior to securing domestic sovereignty. It is more difficult to explore the counterfactual cases however, where the legal standards were achieved, but the regimes collapsed or were forced to resubmit to their Home States because the international community did not accept them. We can certainly identify a number of potential States, like Biafra and Chechnya that did not succeed due to external politics, but few additional conclusions can be drawn from this set of non- events. Generalizing only based upon the recognition experiences of the secessionist states in the Yugoslav and the Post-Soviet States may nevertheless yield some insight. In these clusters we have a number of similar cases with different recognition experiences.

Slovenia, which exceeded the domestic sovereignty standards, similarly met and exceeded expectations in terms of stable governance and economic prowess following recognition. Since 1992, Slovenia has not experienced military or economic conflicts with any other State. Slovenia successfully joined the European Union, OSCE, WTO, IMF and a number of other international organizations. Croatia, which met most of the legal standards has faired only slightly less well. Its widespread legitimacy quickly remedied its shortcomings.

351 It is not a failed or failing State, nor has the international community generally ‘propped-up’

Croatian legitimacy, save the initial retaking of its contested territory in 1993 and 1995. Still,

Croatia has faced greater obstacles to membership in international organizations than

Slovenia did. Croatia is not yet a member of the European Union and did not gain

membership into the WTO until 2000.

Though the unrecognized States have not been without successes, they have faired

far worse than their recognized peers. Non-recognition creates a number of obstacles for

proto-states. Without external recognition, the regimes are far more likely to fail because

they have fewer resources at their disposal, fewer opportunities for trade and monetary

exchange, less potential influence in governmental organizations and less legal claim to their

territories and population than their recognized peers. These difficulties were aptly demonstrated in the Somaliland case outlined in Chapter 2 and in the case studies on

Kosovo, Abkhazia, Chechnya, NK and South Ossetia. Recognition and non-recognition

have not necessarily changed the facts on the ground in the secessionist territories, but they

have certainly predisposed the actors toward more and less internal stability, economic

opportunity and domestic legitimacy.

If external recognition is expected to follow a political logic, the incentives for

Statesmen and their secessionist challengers are also directly influenced. The leaders of

secessionist movements unlikely or unable to physically control their populations and

territory might persevere, hoping to secure political recognition instead. Or, if the external political environment is unfriendly to the particular proto-state, secession might not even emerge as an option. For leaders in Home States, political recognition could be a negative or

a positive depending upon the Home State’s relationship with powerful, influential States. If

352 the Home State has antagonistic relations with the Powers or if they are motivated by norms

of self-determination or human rights favoring the secessionists, then that Home State’s territorial integrity is more vulnerable under a political recognition regime than it would be otherwise. On the other hand, if the Home State has collegial relations with its fellow States or if the international environment favors the maintenance of sovereignty and the norms advanced by the Home State, then even a battlefield loss does not necessarily imply the loss

of a secessionist republic.

One potential complication with the current practice of recognition occurs as a result

of the mismatch between theory and practice. If secessionists believe effective domestic

authority and the other international legal criteria determine recognition and external

legitimacy, they will be predisposed to pursue military solutions to what are, in fact, political

problems. If politics determine recognition, the international community might just as likely

recognize an actor without physical control over its territory or population. Under these

circumstances, forced migration and other forms of ethnic cleansing as well as territorial

conquest may be much less efficacious than they are currently believed to be. Indeed, the

stalemated conflicts in the former Soviet States might have evolved quite differently if the

secessionists had known from the beginning that their battlefield victories could not be

reasonably expected to yield external recognition. That the perception of recognition differs from the reality is likely an important source of misperception for secessionists and their

Home States.

353 6.1.2 Diffuse Effects

Political recognition also potentially influences the greater character of the

international system. Over time, the “average” State and the meaning of Statehood would

inevitably change. In fact, if political recognition is and has been the norm (as this analysis

suggests), the contemporary international system empirically demonstrates its effects. One potential effect of political recognition is the decreased significance of territory observed by some, like Rosecrance, within the international community. Perhaps porous borders, the free flow of information, trade and people are partially a result of the strength of politically-based recognition and legitimacy. In other words, perhaps territorial control is less important today because it is not the prerequisite for Statehood and because many Statesmen had not secured domestic sovereignty when their States were accepted into international society.

Expectations then, about what a State is or should be may have changed over time as a result of practice. Or perhaps political recognition has always been the norm and it has only recently been acknowledged as such.

Another diffuse effect might be a cohort effect. If the constellation of Great Power interests importantly determines recognition, and the Powers demonstrate stable patterns of interest vis-à-vis recognition, then new State membership may conform to something akin to a Great Power Era. In other words, States that emerge during a particular era, under the purview of a particular set of Great Powers, will exhibit similar characteristics. States born under different international circumstances will likely look and behave differently.

354 6.2 General Implications

First, the dynamics of State emergence have been ignored for too long. Many of the world’s most violent and enduring conflicts revolve around groups’ desires for independent

States of their own. Better understanding the determinants of success and failure for these groups is essential to preventing violence and resolving these conflicts once they arise.

Clarifying the conditions under which secession is a viable or unviable option for secessionists and their Home States might prevent these conflicts’ emergence or escalation. I argue that Great Power recognition is often a pivotal determinant of state emergence for aspiring secessionists.

Second, the exchange of diplomatic recognition is more than a mere trifle. Perhaps

Krasner is right that sovereignty is routinely violated on behalf of the strong to the detriment of the weak. Nevertheless, widespread recognition cements one’s membership in international society and that legitimacy provides both material and intangible support to nascent States.

Third, Statesmen do not comply with the international legal criteria for recognition in contemporary practice. The effects of their illegal recognition however, are not uniformly negative. While they are prima fascia reasonable, the Montevideo standards do not represent an absolute good. They were not adopted with an eye toward creating effective, just or stable members of international society. Indeed, little to no evidence suggests that adherence to the

Montevideo criteria would create “better” new States than political recognition.

355 6.3 Avenues of Future Research

The research presented in this project is only a first attempt at understanding the

dynamics of State emergence. Many questions and potentially fruitful avenues of inquiry remain. First and foremost, a large N analysis weighing the relative influence of legal and political factors in recognition would yield useful insights. Though the case study evidence presented here is suggestive of a wider pattern of State interest trumping international law, there is still reason to be suspicious of the cases’ generalizability. Quantitative analysis would more unambiguously indicate the causal force of the legal and political factors.

Second, the relationship between premature political recognition and State character is not yet understood. In other words, do secessionist regimes elevated into the system by political recognition faire better or worse than States entering international society that already possess the legal prerequisites? According to one interpretation, prematurely recognized States populate the ranks of so-called quasi-, failed, or States. Still, this link between political recognition and State failure is only posited in the post-colonial context. If political recognition is more widespread than previously believed, the relationship between

‘premature recognition’ and State failure might be called into question.

Next, we have not explored, even theoretically, what effect widespread legal recognition would have on secessionist conflicts or on the character of international society in general. In other words, it would be useful to know if the world would be more just or stable or efficient if Statesmen strictly abided by international law. I have argued that political recognition’s effects are normatively ambiguous; it is not clear that political recognition causes injustice, violence or any other type of deleterious effects more routinely than would the legal standards. The legal criteria may also have adverse consequences that have not been

356 sufficiently explored. Unless Home States become more willing to engage separatists and

negotiate amicable settlements, the legal standards suggest violence is the most viable means

to acquire an independent State. And if GP Statesmen take the territorial control and

effective authority law seriously, we can expect that internal violence will continue to mount

as Home States will have carte blanche in dealing with their domestic challengers. Another

possibility is that the “fog” of the future is simply too thick for Statesmen or experts to

reliably predict which secessionist states will succeed and which will fail in the long run;

political decisions are no better or worse than the letter of the law. In many ways, which

States will succeed is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The regimes that receive tangible and status

benefits from powerful States have the best chance.

The final unexplored avenue of study flowing from this research concerns the

growing policy debate over “suspended sovereignty” or “decertification.” A number of

Statesmen and scholars now argue that some States, particularly those in the post-colonial

world, are not domestically sovereign and should therefore not any longer be granted external legitimacy by the rest of the international community. These governments are dubbed “failed”, “quasi” or “warlord” States. Evidence from this analysis suggests States do not grant recognition based upon considerations of domestic sovereignty. Consequently, it may be quite unrealistic to expect that States would revoke recognition due to a State’s failure in that regard. Regardless, the relationships between recognition and decertification and State emergence and State death, are worthy of further investigation.

357

APPENDIX A

CODING RULES

358 Secessionist Movement (Actor II) – A secessionist movement is operationally defined as any national separatist movement that formally declared independence before 1931 and continued on through 1931 or that began after 1931. In order to be considered a secessionist movement the group must have all of the following characteristics:

1) a formal declaration of full-independence and intended separation from their home State (in many cases these declarations are UDIs, or unilateral declarations of independence, signifying that they do not (yet) have the consent of the former governing State), 2) a national flag, 3) a claim to both territory and population over which the movement presides, and 4) the movement must last at least 5 (24 hour) days, include at least 100 individuals and claim at least 100 square meters of territory.

A movement is not considered to be secessionist if it has any of the following characteristics:

1) it proclaims independence short of national self-government (e.g. autonomy within a State government, independence from other colonial territories short of independence from the colonial government, or other internal civil rights movements). 2) it claims jurisdiction over the entirety of the home State as in the cases of revolution or coup d‘etat.627 3) it attempts to join another pre-existing State (this is ).628 In addition, irredentism is often initiated by the State government hoping to annex a portion of another State, rather than by the individuals within the territory itself.629 4) a federation of which it is a part formally dissolves without any contest. One of the two (or more) parties must desire unity under a governing regime in order for a secession to take place. 5) it does not declare independence, but instead is granted it unilaterally (as in the case of the South African or the Japanese State of Manchuko).630

627 Like Fearon and Laitin (1999) I believe that the important distinction between civil conflicts lies not in the ethno-religious versus ideological dimension that many scholars use, but rather between wars of autonomy and secession versus wars for control of the state apparatus.

628 The two exceptions to this rule are the cases of Cyprus and Northern Ireland’s separation from the UK. Although many within Cyprus (Greek Cypriots) demanded independence in order that a later association with Greece might be achieved, independence was required prior to a voluntary association. In this case the demand was not straightforwardly irredentist, but rather secessionist. Northern Ireland is now classified as a secession because the Irish government has dropped its claim to the territory.

629 Horowitz in Moore (Ed.)(1998)

630 For the purposes of this project, the emergence of a new state agreed to by a colonial government prior to its declaration of independence or demand for independence will be considered post-colonial rather than secessionist in order to remain true to the topic under discussion. Colonial units that unilaterally declare independence will be considered attempts at secession, however.

359 6) a claim to territory is made without a population (e.g. artificial/platform islands in the 1960s) or a claim to population is made without a claim to territory (e.g. pirate States).631

**Abbreviations following in captions correspond to political parties or activist organizations associated with the secessionist movement. Captioned words may also correspond to current place names of States or regions or to particular ethnic or regional groups associated with the movement.

Name – Unique dataset name for the secessionist conflict. Where a conflict between two parties reoccurs or where more than one distinct secessionist movement exists between two parties, roman numerals serve to designate individual conflicts (e.g. China – Tibet I, China – Tibet II) or place names in parentheses (e.g. France – French West Africa (Guinea), France – French West Africa ()).

Secessionist ID – Each secessionist movement is assigned a code number between 100 and 375. See Appendix II for cases and Secessionist ID.

Unique ID (ID) – Coded for each case. ID = (ACTOR I_CCODE x 1000) + Three Digit Secessionist Movement Identifier (ACTORII_ID) See Appendix II for cases and Unique ID.

Start (Start Date: MM/DD/YYYY)632 – An attempt to secede is considered to have begun on the earlier date of either of the following acts:

1) formal declaration of independence (Declaration Date in format MM/DD/YYYY provided as DECLARATION within the dataset.) 2) violent conflict between a group and the home State begins with the stated demand of full independence for the group. A formal declaration of independence must follow. Coding is retroactive in this case. 3) non-violent action is taken on behalf of the secessionists with the stated demand of full independence from the home State. Some examples of this might include the formation of separatist political parties and their participation in elections (e.g. the Quebecois in Canada or Lega Nord in Italy) or peaceful public demonstration (e.g. Tibetans in China). A formal declaration of independence must follow. Coding is retroactive in this case.

631 These criteria are essential to distinguishing legitimate claims to independence from joke claims like those based upon tax and/or legal escapism; for example, the Kingdom of Minerva. Established in 1972, Minerva was envisioned by its libertarian founders as a tax less nation. It was located on a Pacific reef off the coast of Tonga only visible above water at low tide. Its founders built up the state’s landmass, minted approximately 10,500 Republic of Minerva, $35 dollar coins (Dispatch, 6/19/2005), and established a cabinet. Unfortunately, Minerva was invaded and occupied by Tonga, which had claimed the “land” for itself. Beginning in 2003, a group based in South Carolina revived the Minervan independence cause, changed the governmental structure to a (22 year-old law student, Prince Calvin presides over the government-in-exile), and they now sell “Free Minerva” t-shirts and memorabilia on-line. Though the group has an admittedly impressive Web site, Minerva has no population and therefore does not qualify as a secessionist movement. (Additional curiosity may be sated at minervanet.org.)

632 For all variables with dates, if the full date could not be established, then the earliest date that month or the earliest date that year was used. (e.g. a year (1985) without month or date available would be 1/1/1985). 360

**Qualifications 2 and 3 are meant to exclude cases like Taiwan, which would not be classified as an attempted secession because no formal declaration of independence has yet followed the numerous protests and popular calls for independence there.

End (End Date: MM/DD/YYYY) – A secessionist movement is considered to have ended when any of the following occurs:

1) it formally renounces its claim of independence. The date of renouncement is the end date. 2) it agrees to a settlement short of full-independence implying the renouncement of its secessionist ambition. The date of agreement is the end date. 3) five years pass without reported secessionist activity (protests, militarized disputes with the home government, negotiations, external appeals for support, etc.). The date of the last recorded activity is the end date. 4) the home government (or occupying government) formally agrees to grant the secessionists independence or grants a plebiscite to determine independence. The date of the agreement is the end date where independence is granted. The date of the election, if in favor of independence, is the end date. If the vote is not in favor of independence, an end date will not be assigned unless one of the qualities above also obtains.

Ongoing (ONGOING) – A secessionist movement is considered ongoing unless it ends, as above:

1) formally renounces its claim of independence. 2) agrees upon a settlement with its home state short of independence implying the renouncement of its secessionist ambition. 3) goes five years without reported activity. 4) becomes a State member of the United Nations, implying success and full membership in the international system.(Operationalization: 1-Ongoing, 0-Not)

Recurrence (RECUR) – Is the conflict a recurrence of a secessionist conflict between the movement and the home State within the timeframe of the dataset? (1-Recurrence, 0-Not)

Home State (Actor I) (CCODE)633 – The home State is the State from which the secessionist movement is attempting to secede. In some cases a single secessionist movement attempts to secede from a number of home States as in the case of the movement for an independent Kurdistan. Each secessionist-home State dyad is coded as a separate instance of secession (e.g. Iraq – Kurds, Iran – Kurds, etc.) because it is theoretically possible for one group to succeed in its goal of independence while another does not (or fail while the other does not).

633 CCODE corresponds to the Correlates of War Country Code for the Home State where available. For coding rules see Correlates of War 2 Project. (2003) “State System Membership List, v2002.1.” http://cow2.la.psu.edu

361 Great Power – Great Power operationalizations are taken from the Correlates of War.634 Great Powers are the most materially capable States and are therefore thought to be the most influential States in the international system. The set of Great Powers over the duration of this project are as follows: Great Britain, United States and Russia: 1931-present; China: 1950-present; France: 1931-1940, 1945-present; Germany: 1931-1945, 1991-present; Italy: 1931-1943; and Japan: 1931-45, 1991- present.

Region (REG I) (REG II) – Regions in which the home State and secessionist movement reside. Region I= Home State, Region II= Secessionist Movement. (Operationalization: 1- Western Europe and the Americas, 2- Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 3- Remaining Asia, 4- Middle East, 5- Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania)

Actor Violence (VIOL: A1) (VIOL: A2) – Actor I employs violence as a tactic in the conflict. (Operationalization: 1-Yes, 0-No) Actor II employs violence as a tactic in the conflict. (Operationalization: 1-Yes, 0-No)

Duration of Violence (VIOLDUR B) (VIOLDUR E)(MM/DD/YYYY) – If violent, how long does the violent conflict between the actors persist? Violdur B indicates the Beginning of the violence while Violdur E indicates the End of the violence. Only the conflicts that reach and exceed the WAR threshold are recorded at this point. None are recurring. Future iterations of the data will include more detailed violence duration statistics.

War (WAR) – If the violence between the secessionist movement (Actor II) and the home State (Actor I) reaches the standard threshold (1,000 deaths) attributed to war (either civil war or extra-systemic war). Operationalization comes from the Correlates of War Dataset. (Operationalization: 1-Yes, 0-No)

Actor Deaths (DEATHS: A1) (DEATHS: A2) – Cumulative deaths from secessionist conflict for both actors where available. Current totals from COW Civil War Dataset and COW Extra-Systemic War Dataset. COW measure StDeaths (State Deaths) (A1) subtracted from ToDeaths (Total Deaths) in order to calculate death total for secessionist and civilian deaths (A2).

Home State Defeated by Secessionists (VICT: A2) – If a secessionist movement decisively defeats its home State in war, then it is more likely to be recognized by the Great Powers afterward. (Operationalization: 0- No Victory, 1- Secessionist Victory)

Home State Defeats Secessionists (DEF: A2) – If a secessionist movement is decisively defeated by its home State in war, then it is less likely to be recognized by the Great Powers afterward. (Operationalization: 0-No Victory, 1-Home State Victory)

634 Ibid. 362 Cold War (COLD) – Dummy variable to explore whether or not the Cold War’s geo- political dynamics affected the dynamics of recognition. (Operationalization: 0- 1931-1946 and 1991-2004, 1- 1947-1990)

Colony (COLONY) – Secessionist movements from within colonies are more likely to be recognized than are secessionist movements without colonial experiences. A colony is defined as a jurisdiction (people and territory) governed by a State or agents of a State which is neither geographically contiguous nor within 100 miles of the home State’s shoreline. Secondary secessions, i.e. secessionist attempts where the home State is a former colony itself, are not coded as colonies even though they reside within units that once were. (Operationalization: 0- Not Colonial jurisdiction, 1- Colonial Jurisdiction)

Sub-State Jurisdiction (SUBST)(TYPE) – Secessionists that claim sub-State jurisdictional units (for example Hawaii or Texas in the US case or the republics of the Former Yugoslavia) for their new State are more likely to be recognized than are secessionists who claim previously unrecognized or unorganized jurisdictional units (for example the Grand Canyon or the Eastern Seaboard in the US case). Administrative units analogous to states in the United States case were used whenever possible. Cities, counties, and the like were not considered SUBST. The Type of jurisdictional unit is recorded in text where available. (Operationalization: Not sub-State jurisdictional unit – 0, Sub-State jurisdictional unit – 1). 635

Pan (PAN) – Where the secessionist movement claims the territory of more than one sub- State jurisdiction or claims territory that traverses more than one State, it is a pan-movement. (Operationalization: Not pan-movement – 0, Pan-Movement – 1).

Mandate/Trust Territory (MANDATE) – Mandate and Trust territories were dependent territories selected by the League of Nations and United Nations for eventual independence under the guidance of a member State. Territories were identified based upon their identification by the United Nations (successor to the League). (Operationalization: 0- Not Mandate/Trust, 1- League or UN Mandate/Trust)

Home State Relationship (HOMEREL) – Formal relationship between secessionist movement and the home State. (Operationalization: 1- League or UN Mandate, 2- Protectorate/, 3- Colony, 4- Contiguous Territory)

Legal Recognition Standards (LEG_HIGH)(LEG_MED)(LEG_LOW) – Great Powers use the legal requirements set by international law when deciding whether or not to recognize secessionists, those secessionists that meet the criteria will be recognized, those that do not will not be recognized. There are a range of possible interpretations of the legal standard, so I created indices according to both high and low interpretations of the requirements. Leg_low is an index that sets a minimal standard consistent with the legal requirements for recognition. Leg_med is an index that sets a middling standard for recognition. Leg_high is an index that sets a high standard consistent with the legal

635 If the secessionist movement is within a colony, then SUBST indicates whether or not it is an administrative unit of the colony or claims the whole colony.

363 requirements for recognition. The legal requirements for recognition are 1) permanent population 2) defined territory 3) government and 4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.636

Geostrategic Logic (GEO_CCODE) – The more conflictual a great power’s relationship with the home State, the greater the probability that the great power will recognize secessionist challengers to the home State. (Operationalization: Scaled number and intensity of MIDS for great power-home State dyad beginning five years prior to start year and continuing through duration of secession or beginning in 1931 where secession beings prior, >MIDS = >conflict in dyad,

Domestic Security Logic (DOM_CCODE) – Great Powers with their own domestic challengers will be less likely to recognize the independence of secessionists elsewhere for fear of sending a legitimizing signal to challengers at home. (Operationalization: Scaled number and duration of secessionist challenges beginning five years prior to start year or beginning in 1931 where secession begins prior. EX: One secessionist movement lasting five years=5 whereas five secessionist movements lasting five years each =25)

Ideological Eras (ERA) – During certain periods in history, secession is seen as more or less legitimate by the international community. During periods where system-wide sympathies are with secessionists, recognition will be more likely. During periods where sovereignty and non-interference are more prized, recognition will be less likely. (Operationalization: Nation over State from 1931-1944. State over nation when year =>1945 < 1989. Nation over State when year =>1989 < 2002 (end of data set)637 Dummy variable (0- state over nation, 1- nation over State).

Human Rights Violations (HRV) – If a secessionist group is severely repressed and persecuted by its home State, other States will be more likely to recognize it if they support international human rights. (Operationalization (Post-1945 only) Minorities at Risk Data (ATRISK 1) for secessionist group(s) IFF Great Power is (1945-1965 a member of the United Nations, 1966-present a ratified member of the two primary human rights instruments, the ICCPR and ICESCR). The greater the distance between the group and the majority in terms of political and economic power (i.e. The more ‘at risk’, the greater the probability of recognition.)638

Identity Relations (IDETH, IDRELIG, IDGOV, IDSUM) – Secessionist movements that are more racially, religiously or ideologically similar to a Great Power State than the

636 “Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Inter-American)” December 26, 1933. In Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949 Compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans LL.B. Assistant Legal Advisor Department of State Volume 3 Multilateral 1931-1945 Department of State Publication 8484 Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1969.

637 Time periods from Barkin and Cronin (1994). The project assumes there has been no change in normative ERA between 1994, the end of the authors’ analysis, and 2002, the end of this project’s analysis.

638 ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights

364 Great Power is to its home State will have a better chance of being recognized by that Great Power. Coded for each Great Power - home State - secessionist triad. (Operationalization: Majority communities in each home State, Great Power and secessionist state are coded. If majority ethnicities or religions or governmental types match in either dyad, then the pair is coded as “like” for that dimension. If any of the characteristics are different, then the dyad is coded as “different” for that dimension. The operationalization is dichotomous for each pair (secessionist - Great Power) and (home State – Great Power) on each dimension of identity (ethnicity, religion and government-type). The three scores are then added together for each dyad. The aggregate scores for each pair are compared. If 3 to 3 (2-2, 1-1, 0-0), then they are equally similar (or dissimilar). In all other cases, one pair is more “like” than the other. When a Great Power-Secessionist dyad is more similar than the Great Power-Home State dyad, the variable is coded 1. When the Great Power-Home State dyad is instead more similar, the variable is coded 0.

IDETH – (Measures from the IDB of the US census, 1950-present639)

IDRELIG – (Measures from the IDB of the US census, 1950-present)

IDGOV – (Secessionists are coded based upon their stated institutional preference. States are coded based upon their coding for that year within the Polity IV Data Set.)

IDSUM – Dummy variable for similarity and difference between the two dyads, Great Power-Secessionists and Great Power Home State.(If the Great Power is more similar to the secessionist state, then 1. If the Great Power is more similar to the home State, 0.)

Formal Recognition (REC_CCODE: MM/DD/YYYY) – Date of formal recognition, the principal means by which States accept new States into the international community. Coded for each of the Great Powers. (DREC_CCODE) – Recognition Dummy Variable for each great power (Operationalization: 0 - unrecognized, 1 - recognized).

Pooled Recognition (REC_POOL) – Summed Great Power recognitions current to the given year of a secession. (Operationalization: Sum of Great Power recognitions granted for every year of a secessionist movement.)

Successful Recognition (REC_SUCCESS) - Percentage of Great Powers granting recognition. Cumulative grants of recognition by the Great Powers/total number of Great Powers in the system in any given year. (Operationalization: Recognition by # of the Great Powers/Total # of Great Powers).

UN Membership (UNMEM) – UN State membership dummy (Operationalization: 0, 1 - State member). (UNDATE: MM/DD/YYYY) - Date of State membership within the United Nations. This is a proxy measure for successful secession or widespread international recognition of Statehood distinct from formal recognition by the Great Powers. When Statesmen approve new members into the UN, it does not imply formal recognition on

639 International Data Base (1950 – 2002) U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, International Programs Center Washington, D.C. 365 behalf of each UN member. It does, however, imply that the weight of international opinion is in acceptance of the actor’s Statehood.

Minority at Risk (MAR) –Does the secessionist movement constitute a “minority at risk” according to Gurr’s standards? (Operationalization: 1-Yes, 0-No).

366

APPENDIX B

UNIQUE CASE I.D.

367

*Secessionist ID = final 3 digits of Unique ID as initially bolded below

UNIQUE ID NAME 540101 – Cabindans 373102 Azerbaijan - Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenians) 373103 Azerbaijan - Talysh 771104 Bangladesh - Chittagong 211105 Belgium - 211106 Belgium - (Bezi) 211107 Belgium - Flemish 211108 Belgium - 145109 Bolivia - Cambas 346110 Bosnia - Croats (Muslims 1994-5) 346111 Bosnia and Herzegovina - Serbs 775112 Burma - Arakanese I 775113 Burma - Arakanese II 775114 Burma - Kachins I 775115 Burma - Kachins II 775116 Burma - Karenni 775117 Burma - Karens 775118 Burma - Mons 775119 Burma - Shans I 775120 Burma - Shans II 471121 - Southern Cameroon 20122 Canada - Quebec 710123 China - Eastern 710124 China - Hui 710125 China - 710126 China - Southern Mongols 710127 China - Tibet I 710128 China - Tibet II 710129 China - Tibet III 710130 China - Tibet IV 710131 China - Uighurs I 710132 China - Uighurs II 710133 China - Uighurs III (Xinjiang) 581134 - Anjouan 581135 Comoros - Moheli 344136 Croatia - Serbs 352137 Cyprus - Turkish Cypriots 315138 Czechoslovakia - Slovakia 390139 Denmark - Faeroe Islands 390140 Denmark - Iceland 522141 Djibouti - Afar 490142 DRC - 490143 DRC - South Katanga 490144 DRC - Stanleyville 530145 Ethiopia - 530146 Ethiopia - Oromo

368 530147 Ethiopia - Somali I 530148 Ethiopia - Somali II 530149 Ethiopia - Tigray I 530150 Ethiopia - Tigray II 220151 France - Alawites (Hatay) 220152 France - Algeria 220153 France - Andorra 220154 France - Basques 220155 France - 220156 France - Casamance 220157 France - Comoros 220158 France - Corsica 220159 France - Dahomey 220160 France - French Eq. Africa (CAR) 220161 France - French Eq. Africa () 220162 France - French Eq. Africa () 220163 France - French Eq. Africa (M. Congo) 220164 France - French Indochina (Cambodia) 220165 France - French Indochina (Laos) 220166 France - French Indochina (Vietnam) I 220167 France - French Indochina (Vietnam) II 220168 France - French Somaliland I 220169 France - French Somaliland II 220170 France - French Soudan () 220171 France - French West Africa (Cote d'Ivoire) 220172 France - French West Africa (Guinea) 220173 France - French West Africa (Mauritania) 220174 France - French West Africa (RDA) 220175 France - 220176 France - 220177 France - Morocco 220178 France - Mossi () 220179 France - 220180 France - Pathet Lao 220181 France - Savoy 220182 France - 220183 France - 220184 France - Tunisia 372185 Georgia - Abkhazia 372186 Georgia - South Ossetia 750187 India - 750188 India - Boro 750189 India - Hyderabad 750190 India - Kashmir I 750191 India - Kashmir II 750192 India - Malayalis 750193 India - Meitei 750194 India - Mizos 750195 India - Nagas 750196 India - Sikhs I 750197 India - Sikhs II 750198 India - Tripuras 369 850199 Indonesia - Acheh I 850200 Indonesia - Acheh II 850201 Indonesia - Ambonese 850202 Indonesia - East Timor 850203 Indonesia - Papuans 850204 Indonesia - Sulawesis 850205 Indonesia - W.Papua (Iran Jaya) 630206 Iran - Arabistanis 630207 Iran - Azeris 630208 Iran - Kurds I 630209 Iran - Kurds II 645210 Iraq - Kurds I 645211 Iraq - Kurds II 645212 Iraq - Kurds III 645213 Iraq - Kurds IV 666214 Israel - Palestinians I 666215 Israel - Palestinians II 325216 Italy - Giulians 325217 Italy - 325218 Italy - Montenegro 325219 Italy - Padania 325220 Italy - Sanusis 325221 Italy - 325222 Italy - 325223 Italy - 437224 - Anyi 740225 Japan - Shans 820226 - Singapore 227 Mali Federation - Senegal 359228 Moldova - Gagauz 359229 Moldova - Transnistria 600230 Morocco - Saharawis 565231 Namibia - 565232 Namibia - Lozi 210233 Netherlands - Dutch Guiana (Suriname) 210234 Netherlands - Netherlands Indies (Indonesia) I 210235 Netherlands - Netherlands Indies (Indonesia) II 210236 Netherlands - W.Papua (Iran Jaya) 920237 - Maori 920238 New Zealand - Samoa (W.Samoa) 475239 - Edos 475240 Nigeria - Ibos (Igbo) 770241 Pakistan - Baluch 770242 Pakistan - E. Pakistan (Bengalis) 770243 Pakistan - Pashtuns 910244 - Bouganville I 910245 Papua New Guinea - Bouganville II 840246 Philippines - Abu Sayyaf 840247 Philippines - Mindanao I 840248 Philippines - Mindanao II 840249 Philippines - Mindanao III 235250 - Angola 370 235251 Portugal - 235252 Portugal - East Timor 235253 Portugal - Guinea 235254 Portugal - Sao Tome & Principe 235255 Potugal - Mozambique 365256 Russia - Chechnya I 365257 Russia - Chechnya II 365258 Russia - Dagestanis 365259 Russia - Tartars 670260 Saudi Arabia - Asiris 433261 Senegal - Casamance I 433262 Senegal - Casamance II 345263 Serbia and Montenegro - Kosovo Albanians 940264 Solomon Islands - Guadacanal 520265 Somalia - Puntland 520266 Somalia - Somaliland (Issaq) 560267 South Africa - Inkatha (Kwazulu) 560268 South Africa - Namibia 230269 Spain - Andorra 230270 Spain - Basques I 230271 Spain - Basques II 230272 Spain - Basques III 230273 Spain - Catalans I 230274 Spain - Catalans II 230275 Spain - Spanish Guinea 780276 Sri Lanka - 60277 St.Kitts and Nevis - Nevis I 625278 Sudan - Southerners I 625279 Sudan - Southerners II 225280 - Jura 800281 - I 640282 Turkey - Kurds I 640283 Turkey - Kurds II 500284 - Banganda (Buganda) 500285 Uganda - Bankonjo I 500286 Uganda - Bankonjo II 200287 UK - Rhodesia - North - (Lozi) 200288 UK - Bahamas 200289 UK - Baluch 200290 UK - Basuotoland () 200291 UK - 200292 UK - 200293 UK - Brunei 200294 UK - Burma () 200295 UK - Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 200296 UK - Cyprus 200297 UK - Egypt 200298 UK - Fiji 200299 UK - Gambia 200300 UK - Gandas 200301 UK - Gold Coast (Ghana) I 200302 UK - Gold Coast (Ghana) II 371 200303 UK - Guyana 200304 UK - India 200305 UK - Iraq 200306 UK - Karen 200307 UK - Kuwiat 200308 UK - Malaya ()(Malaysia) 200309 UK - Mau Mau () 200310 UK - 200311 UK - 200312 UK - Nigeria 200313 UK - Northern Ireland 200314 UK - Nyasaland () 200315 UK - Pakistan (West & East) 200316 UK - PNG 200317 UK - Rhodesia 200318 UK - Rhodesia - 200319 UK - Rhodesia - 200320 UK - Sanusis 200321 UK - Scotts I 200322 UK - Scotts II 200323 UK - 200324 UK - Sierra Leone 200325 UK - Sudan 200326 UK - Swazi 200327 UK - 200328 UK - Uganda - Buganda 200329 UK - Yemen (FLOSY) 200330 UK - Yemen (NLF) 200331 UK - (inc. w/Tanganyika) 369332 Ukraine - Crimea 333 United Arab Republic - Syria 2334 USA - Hawaiians 2335 USA - 2336 USA - Micronesia 2337 USA - Philippines 2338 USA - 365339 USSR - Abkhaz Rep. 365340 USSR - Adzhar 365341 USSR - Ajars 365342 USSR - Armenia 365343 USSR - Azeris 365344 USSR - Balkars 365345 USSR - Belarus 365346 USSR - Carpatho-Rusyns 365347 USSR - I 365348 USSR - Estonians II 365349 USSR - Georgians 365350 USSR - Kalmyk 365351 USSR - Karachai 365352 USSR - Kazakhstan 365353 USSR - Kyrgystan 365354 USSR - Latvians I 372 365355 USSR - Latvians II 365356 USSR - I 365357 USSR - Lithuanians II 365358 USSR - Lithuanians III 365359 USSR - Moldovans 365375 USSR - Russia∗ 365360 USSR - Tajiks 365361 USSR - Tatars 365362 USSR - Turkomen 365363 USSR - Ukrainians I 365364 USSR - Ukrainians II 365365 USSR - Uzbeks 935366 Vanuatu - Tafea 935367 Vanuatu - Vemeranans 816368 Vietnam - Chams 679369 Yemen - 345370 Yugoslavia - Albanians (Kosovars) 345371 Yugoslavia - Bosnia/Herz 345372 Yugoslavia - Croatians 345373 Yugoslavia - Macedonia 345374 Yugoslavia - Slovenians

∗ Please note that Russia’s Secessionist ID # is out of sequence. 373

APPENDIX C

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

374

Success – 102/275 = 37.09% 103/3767 Secession Years = .027 chance of success in any given year

Failure - 173/275 = 62.91% 3665/3767 Secession Years = 97.29% chance of less than full success

Secessionist Movements’ Locations: Region 1- 35 (12.7%) The Americas and Western Europe 2- 48 (17.45%) The Former USSR and Eastern Europe 3- 81 (29.45%) Asia 4- 28 (10.18%) The Middle East 5- 83 (30.18%) Africa and Oceania ______Total 275 (100%)

Home States’ Locations: Region 1- 122 (44.36%) 2- 47 (17.09%) 3- 59 (21.45%) 4- 17 (6.18%) 5- 30 (10.9%) ______Total 275 (100%)

Secessionist Movements’ Characteristics: Anti-Colonial Movements – 91 (33.09%) Mandate/Trust Movements – 15 (5.45%) Sub-State Jurisdiction – 177 (64.36%) Pan-Movements (state or State) – 60 (21.81%)

Success/Failure Rates: Anti-Colonial Success – 68/91= 74.73% Anti-Colonial Failure – 23/91= 25.27% Non-Colonial Success – 34/184= 18.48% Non-Colonial Failure – 150/184= 81.52% ______Total 275 (100%)

Sub-State Success – 62/177= 35.03% Sub-State Failure – 115/177= 64.97% Non-Sub Success – 42/98= 42.86% Non-Sub Failure – 56/98= 57.14%

375

Violent 195/275 = 70.90% Non-Violent 80/275 = 29.10%

Violence (I)-Violence (II) Success = 53/176 = 30.11% Violence (I) -Violence (II) Failure = 123/176 = 69.89%

Violence (I)-Non-Violence (II) Success = 0/13 = 0% Violence (I) - Non-Violence (II) Failure = 13/13 = 100%

Non-Violence (I)-Violence (II) Success = 1/6 = 16.67% Non-Violence (I) –Violence (II) Failure = 5/6 = 83.33%

Non-Violence (I)-Non-Violence (II) Success = 49/80 = 61.25% Non-Violence (I) – Non-Violence (II) Failure =31/80 = 38.75% ______Total 275 (100%)

Anti-Colonial, Violent Success 37/50 = 74% Anti-Colonial, Violent Failure 13/50 = 26% Anti-Colonial, Non-Violent Success 31/41 = 75.6% Anti-Colonial, Non-Violent Failure 10/41 = 24.4% Non-Colonial, Violent Success 16/132 = 12.1% Non-Colonial, Violent Failure 116/132 = 87.9% Non-Colonial, Non-Violent Success 18/52 = 34.6% Non-Colonial, Non-Violent Failure 34/52 = 65.4%

Wars – 41/275 = 14.9% Violence Short of War – 154/275 = 56% Recurring Conflicts – 39/275 = 14.18% Ongoing Conflicts – 65/275 = 23.63%

Duration Top20% 24-71 Years Success Rate 9/55=16.36% 60-80% 12-23 Years Success Rate 30/55=54.54% 40-60% 5-12 Years Success Rate 21/55=38.18% 20-40% 2-5 Years Success Rate 13/55=23.6% 0-20% 0-2 Years Success Rate 29/55=52.7%

3767 Secession Years 3767/275= 13.698 (~13.7 years average secession)

376

Start Year 1931 30/275 On-going or initiated in 1931 1932-40 11/275 1941-50 62/275 1951-60 32/275 1961-70 41/275 1971-80 30/275 1981-90 31/275 1991-00 38/275

Success/Decade 1931-40 2/103 1941-50 10/103 1951-60 28/103 1961-70 22/103 1971-80 14/103 1981-90 2/103 1991-00 26/103

Cold War Successes 69/212=32.5%

Independent Variable Ranges GEO – 0-25 DOM – 0-75 ERA – 0-1 ID – 0-1 COLONY – 0-1 MANDATE – 0-1 SUBST – 0-1 PAN – 0-1 REGION – 1-5

Number of Great Powers 1931-40 – 7 1941-43 – 6 1944 – 5 1945 – 6 1946-49 – 4 1950-90 – 5 1991-2002 – 7

377

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