Secession, Recognition & the International Politics Of
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SECESSION, RECOGNITION & THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF STATEHOOD DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Bridget L. Coggins, B.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2006 Doctoral Examination Committee: Approved by Dr. Richard K. Herrmann, Adviser Dr. Theodore Hopf _______________________________ Dr. Alexander Thompson Adviser Political Science Graduate Program ABSTRACT Secessionist regimes universally seek other States' formal recognition. Indeed, a ‘critical mass’ of external recognition must be achieved before any secessionist actor is considered a full member of international society. Yet Statesmen often disagree about what distinguishes a legitimate from an illegitimate claim to sovereign independence. The contest among States over the appropriate response to Yugoslavia’s secessionists provides but one recent example. While the motives for seeking other States' recognition are easily understood, the reasons established members of the system choose to recognize some and ignore other recognition-seeking actors are not. There is no obvious pattern to the external recognition of Statehood. Slovenia quickly won a secessionist war against its Yugoslav Home State to gain its independence, but Croatia was in the midst of its war when it was recognized. On the other hand, Somaliland has governed itself over a decade since it successfully broke from Somalia, yet has received no formal recognition from the international community. There is a wide variation in domestic capacity at the point of recognition; many secessionist regimes with de facto independence remain unrecognized while regimes with shaky claims to sovereignty are sometimes embraced as States. ii Common wisdom within the IR literature asserts States will act on their own political motives rather than normative standards of capacity when questions of sovereignty arise. Such interest-based explanations raise more questions than they answer. Which self-interests guide States' recognition decisions? What happens when domestic motives conflict with geo- strategic imperatives? Do all States confer recognition based upon similar criteria or do different States use different criteria? What, if any, influence do international norms have upon States’ decisions? Generally, what accounts for the variance between the few actors that are formally recognized and deemed sovereign independent States and the many that receive little or no formal recognition and are not allowed equivalent participation in the interstate system? I tackle these questions using an original data set of secessionist movements and Great Power recognition decisions between 1931 and 2002. I conceive of Statehood as the result of a threshold model in which Great Power recognition is the most influential determinant of success or failure. I utilize event history analysis and case studies to test explanations derived from the literature, as well as my own hypotheses, regarding whether and when Great Powers will recognize secessionist regimes. I argue that the manifest pattern of new States belies the international legal standards for recognition. And additionally, that individual States’ political motives insufficiently explain why potential members are accepted or rejected by the international community. Instead, the strategic interactions among States must also be considered. States do not make their recognition decisions in a vacuum, they are interdependent and they rarely recognize unilaterally. Though the Great Powers are generally reticent to recognize secessionists’ legitimacy, there are a number of conditions under which recognition becomes an attractive choice. iii Dedicated to my parents, who always told me I could be anything I wanted to be and still loved me when I told them it was a political scientist. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I was especially lucky to find a supportive and intellectually challenging group of professors and colleagues at Ohio State. Among them, I am particularly indebted to my committee members Richard Herrmann, Ted Hopf and Alex Thompson. A girl couldn’t have hoped for a more engaged or thoughtful group of advisers. In addition, Tim Frye, Harwood McClerking, Randy Schweller, Allan Silverman and Alex Wendt provided kind words, keen insights and friendship during pivotal moments of the project. I would also like to thank David Welch and Tom Christensen for helping me to secure my final year of graduate funding. And additional thanks go to the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and the Ohio State Graduate School for their financial support. Next, I owe a great deal of gratitude to my drunken friends and pious companions, without whom I may still have finished my dissertation, but not in nearly as good of spirits. Ray Block, Eileen Braman, Jong Choi, Ja Ian Chong, Ellie Church, Ted Coggins, Paul Fritz, Yoav Gortzak, Natalie Kistner, Greg Miller, Kevin Sweeney, Nathan Toronto, Cindy Tranby and Srdjan Vucetic all deserve special mention. Finally, and most importantly, I would not have survived graduate school without Brent and Peanut, who made abject poverty, grueling hours and central Ohio drivers surprisingly bearable. One day, I might even look back on this fondly… v VITA November 20, 1977……………………… Born – Rochester, Minnesota 1999………………………………………. B.A. International Relations, University of Minnesota 2000 – 2002………………………………. Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University 2002 – 2003……………………………….. Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) - Chinese Fellow, Ohio State University 2003 – 2004……………………………….. Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University 2004 – 2005……………………………….. Dissertation Fellow, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Ohio State University 2005 – 2006……………………………….. Presidential Fellow, Graduate School, Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science Minor Field: International Relations vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract……………………………………………………………………………. ii Dedication…………………………………………………………………………. iv Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………….. v Vita………………………………………………………………………………….vi List of Tables……………………………………………………………………… xi List of Figures…………………………………………………………………….. xii Chapters: 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 1 1.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….. 1 1.2 An Empirical Question………………………………………….... 7 1.3 The Argument…………………………………………………….. 9 1.4 Outline & Organization…………………………………………... 14 2. Theory……………………………………………………………………... 16 2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….. 16 2.2 International Relations and States……………………………….. 24 2.3 Westphalia and the State………………………………………….. 26 2.4 Social Determinants of State Emergence………………………... 30 2.5 Recognition and State Emergence………………………………. 35 2.6 International Law, the State and Recognition…………………... 38 2.7 Recognition in Practice…………………………………………… 44 2.8 Toward a Social Theory of Recognition and Statehood………… 49 2.9 Core Concepts and Definitions…………………………………... 50 2.10 Theoretical Review………………………………………………... 56 2.11 The Research Design……………………………………………... 60 2.12 Hypotheses, Concepts and Definitions………………………….. 62 2.13 Material Interests………………………………………………….. 62 2.13.1 Geo-Strategic/External Security…………………………. 62 2.13.2 Domestic Security………………………………………… 64 2.14 Ideational Interests……………………………………………….. 65 2.14.1 International Norms………………………………………. 66 2.14.2 Identity Relations…………………………………………. 71 vii 2.15 Controls……………………………………………………………. 73 2.15.1 Sub-State & Pan-Movements…………………………….. 74 2.16 Research Plan and Analysis………………………………………. 76 3. Quantitative Analysis……………………………………………………... 78 3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….. 78 3.2 Quantitative Research Design……………………………………. 80 3.3 Empirical Beginnings…………………………………………….. 87 3.4 Data Collection and Resources…………………………………... 89 3.5 Conceptual Definitions and Operational Indicators……………. 93 3.6 Primary Hypotheses and Indicators……………………………... 97 3.6.1 Geo-Strategic/External Security…………………………. 97 3.6.2 Domestic Security………………………………………… 98 3.6.3 International Norms………………………………………. 99 3.6.4 Colonies & Mandates……………………………………... 100 3.6.5 Identity Relations…………………………………………. 101 3.6.6 Unit Type………………………………………………….. 104 3.7 Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………… 106 3.7.1 Conflict Characteristics…………………………………… 106 3.7.2 External Factors…………………………………………... 109 3.8 Data Analysis……………………………………………………… 110 3.8.1 Pooled Cox Model………………………………………… 111 3.8.2 Great Power Cox Models…………………………………. 113 3.9 Case Study Reorientation…………………………………………. 115 3.10 Case Selection……………………………………………………... 116 3.11 Operational Definitions & Sources………………………………. 119 3.12 Case Study Structure……………………………………………… 127 4. International Responses to Secession in Yugoslavia, 1989-2002……….. 137 4.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….. 137 4.2 Historical Background……………………………………………. 142 4.3 Precipitating Events………………………………………………. 150 4.4 The International Environment………………………………….. 153 4.5 Domestic Sovereignty…………………………………………….. 156 4.6 Domestic Sovereignty in Slovenia………………………………... 157 4.6.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority………………... 158 4.6.2 Popular Legitimacy……………………………………….. 161 4.6.3 Projected Viability………………………………………… 162 4.7 Domestic Sovereignty in Croatia…………………………………. 163 4.7.1 Territorial Control & Effective Authority………………... 164 4.7.2 Popular Legitimacy……………………………………….. 168 4.7.3 Projected Viability………………………………………… 169 4.8 Domestic Sovereignty in Kosovo………………………………….