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Home , Diplomatic recognition, Government in exile, The Voice of Poland

GREAT BRITAIN, THE AND THE POLISH IN (1939-1945) Studies in Contemporary History

Volume 3

I. Rupieper, Hermann J. The Cuno Government and Reparations, 1922-1923: Politics and Economics. 1979, viii + 289. ISBN 90-247-2114-8. 2. Hirshfield, Claire. The of Partition: Britain, and the Creation of 1890-1898. 1979, viii + 234. ISBN 90-247-209<)-0. 3. Kacewicz, George V. Great Britain, the Soviet Vnion and the Polish 193~1945. 1979, xv + 252. ISBN 90-247-2096--6. G REA T BRITAIN, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE (1939-1945)

by

GEORGE V. KACEWICZ

. ~ '.

•. ~ . I979 MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS / BOSTON/ The distribution of this book is handled by the following team of publisbers: for Ihe United Stoles "lid Kluwer Boston, Inc. 160 Old Derby Street Hingbam, MA 0204) USA far 0/1 alher co ulllrit~ Kluwer Academic Publishers Group Di stribution Center P.O. Box)2l 3300 AH Dordrocht The

Libr ~ r y of Congress C~ l a l og in g in Publication D ata

Kacewicz. George V Great Britain. the Soviet Union. and Ihe Polish Government in Exile (t939-1945)

Bibliography: p. Includes index. I, World War, 1939-1945 - Go\'ernments in exile. 2. World War, 1939-1945 - . 3. Poland -History - Occupation, 1939-1945. 4. Great Britain - Foreign re lations -. 5. Russia _ Foreign relations - Great Britain. 6. World War. 1939-1945 - Diplomatic Hi story. I. Title. D81 0.G6K3l 1979 940.53'438 78- 31832

ISBN-13: 978-94-009-9274-0 c-ISBN-13 : 978-94-009-9272-6 001 : 10.1007/978-94-009-9272-6

Copyright 1979 by Mor linus Nijhoff Publishers br, The Hogue. Sof/eOlu reprint of Iht hUrdeOl"l'r Is/ edilion 1979

All righl$ reur.-ed. No pari of this publication may be reproduced. slOred in (1 relrieval syslem, ar IrollSmilled in any form or byony means, mechollicol,phol

Preface VII

INTRODUCTION IX

I. HISTORICAL SETTING

II. THE NEW GOVERNMENT-IN-ExILE 29

III. POLISH FORCES IN BRITAIN: LEGAL STATUS 52

IV. DIPWMACY: POLISH V. BRITISH OBJECTIVES 71

V. NEGOTIATING THE POLISH-SOVIET

VI. AFTERMATH OF THE POLISH-SOVIET TREATY III

VII. THE RUPTURE IN POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

VIII. TEHERAN: DECISION ON FRONTIERS

IX. THE DECLINE OF THE LONDON GOVERNMENT

EPILOGUE

CONCLUSION 21 5

Appendices 226 A. Anglo-Polish Agreement 1939 226 B. Allied Forces Act 228 C. Treaty of Riga 1921 229 D. German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty 1939 230 E. Polish-Soviet Agreement 1941 231 F. Yalta Communique on Poland and Declaration on Liberated Europe 232 G. German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty 1939 234

Bibliography 235

Index 249 PREFACE

In this book I have attempted to analyze the dilemmas confronting the Polish government-in-exile in London during the Second World War. My main objective has beeen to investigate the actual operation of the Polish govern• ment and the overall policies of the British government vis-a-vis the Soviet Union insofar as they had a direct bearing on Anglo-Polish relations. Since the outstanding conflicts over territorial claims, and, ultimately, , were between Poland and the Soviet Union, considerable attention has been devoted to the relationship between the Polish and Soviet during a most trying and difficult period of inter-Allied diplomacy. This work covers the period of operation of the Polish government on British soil until the resignation of Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk in November 1944. Although Great Britain did not withdraw from the Polish government until July 1945, the Arciszewski government, formed after Mikolajczyk's resignation, was generally ignored by Great Britain. As with all subsequent governments, including that which exists today, Arciszewski's government functioned primarily as of Poland in the West - a government of protest. Although basically a case study of one of the wartime governments-in• exile, it might well represent a microcosm of any number of Allied govern• ments, such as the Belgian, Dutch or Norwegian, which found friendly shelter in the British Isles during the war. Minus the Polish-Soviet conflict, the issues might have been the same: the constitutional questions involved in the transfer of sovereign authority to British soil; the legal status of the govern• ment as a subject of ; the legal status and jurisdiction of the armed forces located in Great Britain; and the political relationship between the exiled and British governments. At best, the operation of an exiled government, even on friendly soil, is immensely complicated and frustrating in that it is not unlike the host-guest relationship in which the guest, although made to feel at home, is never quite free of his inhibitions or a need to respect the rights of his host. In these circumstances, and especially in the case of Poland, the British government could and often did exert pressure beyond a VlII PREFACE point that could be termed normal in its relationship to other governments. As an immediate consequence, such pressure affected the ability of the Polish government, as a sovereign power, to make independent decisions in several vital areas. Though I shall mention only a few, many people have made valuable contributions to this book for which I am deeply grateful: Count Edward Raczynski, the wartime Polish Ambassador to Great Britain, and the late Generals Wladyslaw Anders and Marian Kukiel all of whom at different times clarified issues and explained subtle aspects of the policies of the Polish government; Dr. Mieczyslaw Sas-Skowrowski, current Minister of Infor• mation of the Polish government-in-exile, who explained postwar changes in the structure, operation and objectives of the exiled government; the late Pawel Jankowski, former Head of the Civil Chancery of the President, who provided valuable documents and information on the postwar London government and emigre factions; Mrs. Regina Oppman who in her capacity as archivist at the General Sikorski Historical Institute in London was both patient and unsparing in providing me with information and help at various times throughout my research; the late Arthur R. Bottaro for suggestions on style; Mrs. Maureen Hutchins and Mrs. Dolores Bender for typing; my colleagues at State University for granting me a sabbatical which made it possible to complete my research in London; and lastly, my wife, Laura, for assistance in editing and preparing the final manuscript. INTRODUCTION

Unreasonable Poles, preserve traditions. In just two centuries, you must allow You've thrice enjoyed benevolent partitions For Heaven's sake, why start to argue now? A.P. Herbert London, 1944

Britain's unilateral guarantee of Poland's and territorial in• tegrity in March 1939 made reciprocal in April was the beginning of the end for Poland. The guarantee, meant to deter Hitler from committing further acts of aggression, instead, opened the door to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 which gave Hitler a free hand to attack Poland. Once Hitler made his move, Poland in fulfillment of the Pact was partitioned for the fourth time. The Warsaw government escaped, reformed in France and later established itself as a de jure government-in-exile in Britain. Britain's guarantee, despite good intentions, backfired for by herself she could do little to deter Hitler. On the one hand, in light of previous Anglo-French concessions, British resolve appeared less than categorical to , while on the other, if the guarantee was indeed backed by a determination to fight, the prospect of war with a weak and unprepared Britain was hardly a deterrent. Only a combined Soviet-British guarantee to Poland would have stopped Hitler for despite Berlin's equally low opinion of the Soviet Union's fighting capability, Hitler did not want a two-front war. In essence, the missing link in Britain's calcu• lations was the Soviet Union. Read from the guarantee raised the prospect of war among the "imperialist powers" in the West. Weakened by the purges of 1936-1938 and unprepared in 1939, Stalin's main objective was to stay clear of any entanglement which would force him to do battle. Britain's guarantee clarified the options to Stalin as well as to Hitler. The re• sult was a non-aggression pact permitting Stalin to remain free from involve• ment while at the same time sparing Hitler the prospect of a two-front war. Despite Stalin's determination to avoid an agreement that might pull him into a war, Britain could have forced his hand had she approached the Soviet Union with an 'if you won't guarantee Poland, neither will we' proposition instead of unilaterally guaranteeing Poland. Stalin, a realist, would have been quick to see the consequences of a refusal - defeat of Poland and German x INTRODUCTION armies on his doorstep with Britain in splendid isolation. As it was, seeking Soviet cooperation after, rather than before, offering a guarantee was for all practical purposes a futile exercise. Stalin at that point was holding out for non-involvement via an arrangement with Hitler. His only interest in London and was to keep them on the back burner in case Hitler interpreted Britain's guarantee as a bluff. In other words, Britain's unilateral guarantee set the stage for the NaZi-Soviet Pact. While most agree that the arrangement between the two dictators constituted a disaster for Poland, a fairly recent Polish source offers an interpretation with a unique twist. Accordingly, it is suggested that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was a positive development in the course of events in that it 'hastened the signing of the Anglo-Polish Treaty of August 25' thus precluding localization of the war. 1 A rather specious argument in view of the fact that Britain had unilaterally guaranteed Poland in March and in April followed up with a reciprocal agreement that was a treaty in all but name only. It is one thing to suggest a novel interpretation of events and quite another to ignore historical facts. If the Kremlin is to be absolved for its contribution to the outbreak of the war, the search for a credible rationale must go on bearing in mind one obvious question: Why would Hitler need a pact with the Soviet Union in the absence of a British guarantee? Until Hitler double-crossed his ally in the east and attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Anglo-Polish relations remained equitable with no outstanding differences between the two. The status of the armed forces was regulated by an Allied Forces Act which legalized its presence on British soil and subsequent agreements which granted to the service courts full jurisdic• tion over the save for crimes committed against the British public. The Polish forces fought alongside the British in the Battle of Britain, in Norway, and later in Italy, Holland, France and . Members of the government were granted traditional diplomatic immunities. While these arrangements remained in force throughout the war, from June 194 I on it was no longer appropriate to speak in terms ofcordial relations. The British host being in a stronger position used its power and influence to badger its Polish guest into far-reaching concessions to the Soviet Union. The unique problems confronting Poland under the circumstances stem• med from the fact that the interests of the Soviet Union posed the antithesis to Polish interests in the relationship between the Polish and British govern• ments. For the Poles, winning the war was pnly half the battle. Preserving Poland's independence and most, if not all, of her prewar eastern territories made up the other half. Stalin was anxious to win the war but like the Poles

1 Maria Turlejska, Rok Przed Kleska (The Year Before Disaster) (Warsaw: Wiedza Pow• szechna, 1960), p. 372. INTRODUCTION XI never lost sight of his political objectives. He wanted no less than what he received in his arrangement with Hitler or what he acquired on his own in 1939-194° in Latvia, , Estonia, and Northern . Beyond territorial acquisitions was his greater ambition - a series of 'friendly' states to serve as a buffer between east and west. Based on historical experience in dealing with the Russians, the Poles were always of the opinion that Stalin's territorial demands amounted to no more than another partition and warned that a 'friendly' Holland or meant one thing to London while a 'friendly' Poland meant something entirely different to Moscow. The Soviets no doubt were afforded a hardy laugh each time the West ignored the warning and took Stalin's lead in substituting the term 'friendly' for 'client' as if the issue were one of semantics. Faced with compet• ing interests, Britain, and later the , tipped the scale in favor of the ally that could provide the greatest assistance in achieving the West's only objective - to win the war at all costs. Labeling the Poles unreasonable troublemakers was a shoddy disguise to conceal the fact that the perceived power of the Soviet Union was the overriding consideration in deciding whose interests to support. Even before the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, the Poles were exposed to attacks in the British press. Especially in left-oriented circles, the Poles were pictured as reactionaries for their determination to preserve the prewar political system and the territorial status quo. It was argued that the Polish government blindly adhered to its prewar borders which included within its confines large Ukrainian and Byelorussian minorities and that Polish hatred of the Soviet Union and its system was at the base of the Polish-Soviet 'dispute.' When what the Soviet Union called the 'imperialistic war' changed overnight into the 'great patriotic war; the war of words was stepped up. Great Britain fighting almost alone gladly welcomed the new ally and when the Red Army showed both resolve and the ability to resist, the prestige of the Soviet government increased in the eyes of the British public which in turn produced a general attitude more sympathetic toward Soviet revisionist claims. Criticism and indiscriminate charges turned into applied pressure when for the sake of Allied unity, relations between Poland and the Soviet Union had to be re-established. Without resolving any of the outstanding issues, this difficult task was accomplished on June 30, 1941 with Britain acting as a moderator in the negotiations. What followed could easily have served as a yardstick with which to measure the prospects of postwar col• laboration with the Soviet Union. That it was not is one of the great mistakes of the war. The attempt of the Polish Prime Minister Wladyslaw Sikorski to achieve a modus vivendi with the Kremlin was doomed from the outset for XII INTRODUCTION while the Poles argued that frontier revisions should be discussed within the context of a postwar settlement, Stalin unequivocally ruled out the possibility of a return to the frontiers of August 1939. Whether Sikorski would have eventually worked around constitutional limitations preventing him from entering an agreement during the war that would result in the diminution of Polish territory and accepted minor corrections is impossible to say. The British position regarding the "feud over boundaries" was flexible. Officially, Britain was committed to non-recognition of territorial acquisitions acquired by force and the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter. Unofficially, London supported the Soviet claim and pressured the Polish government to comply. Though during the discussions over the re-establishment of relations between the Soviet and Polish governments Britain viewed the matter as unimportant and even detrimental to Allied unity at that critical time in the war, she had already compromised in principle when in an attempt to achieve a political understanding with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940 and the spring of 1941 she was prepared to recognize Soviet control of the areas secured by the Kremlin through agreements with Germany and through force. In early 1942 and especially after the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 1942 Britain assumed the role of an active participil.nt on the side of the Soviet Union. The most far-reaching demands on the Polish government were made after the recently re-established relations were broken off by the Soviet government in April 1943. The immediate reason which led to the break was the German disclosure of the mass burial site of Polish officers at Katyn and the untimely Polish request for an international investigation which might have implied Soviet duplicity. A convenient excuse for the Kremlin to terminate the troublesome relationship had been found. At the Teheran Conference seven months later, Britain proposed the so-called Curzon Line as the future boundary between Poland and the Soviet Union. All that remained to be done was to convince the Poles to "accept" it thereby allowing Britain to remain faithful to her official position on territorial acquisitions. Stanislaw Mikolaj• czyk, who succeeded Sikorski as Prime Minister when the latter died in the summer of 1943, never solved the Polish dilemma. During his tenure he faced not only Soviet demands for frontier revision and reorganization ofthe Polish government as preconditions for the resumption of diplomatic relations, but he had also to deal with the Soviet-created and controlled Lublin Committee - a rival government the nucleus of which existed in the Soviet Union as early as 1942. Unable to persuade his colleagues to make concessions, he ultimately failed both to re-establish relations with the Soviet Union and to effect a fusion with the Lublin Committee which was imperative if some members of INTRODUCTION XIII the Polish government intended to return to Poland. Those who later re• turned to Poland, including Mikolajczyk himself, did so as private citizens. Charging the Poles with idealism and romanticism over and over again carries with it the express danger that the charges, if repeated often enough, will result in a widely accepted characterization indiscriminately applied. At the risk of contributing to a process well underway, it must be pointed out that in certain instances the description is unquestionably fitting. The expectation in the early years of the war that Poland supported by the West would playa greater role in postwar Eastern Europe was completely unfounded in view of traditional Western disinterest in the area and the Soviet Union which had only to put its economy in order and begin drawing on its vast resources to insure that Poland's role in the affairs of Eastern Europe would be a limited one. Moreover, a literal interpretation of the Atlantic Charter and a firm belief in Western assurances regarding non-recognition of teritorial changes effected by force once Poland's eastern territories became a subject of negotiations during the war persisted when a heavy dose of skepticism was in order. In principle, the Poles could not be faulted but as is often the case with docu• ments permeated with idealistic statements, the Atlantic Charter's only last• ing value was its well-timed impact on Western public opinion. Outweighing any or all examples of the Poles' lack of realism was the unmitigated faith in the resolve of the Western powers to safeguard Poland's interests. In any conflict, the ability of a minor power to make any stand at all is ultimately related to the willingness of its allies to secure its vital interests. At what point will the interests of the two allies cease to coincide? Will a subsequent re• evaluation by the major power of its position vis-a-vis other powers force compromises with third parties at the expense of the lesser power? What compromises will be required of the lesser power to induce continued pat• ronage? These were the questions that made up the silent debate among the Poles, the Soviets and the Western powers. For every point the Poles scored, the Soviets scored two for the Polish government consistently miscalculated the limit beyond which the West would go to secure Poland's independence and integrity. The bitter irony is that the Poles for all their unrealism vis-a-vis the West were undeniably realistic when it came to diagnosing Soviet designs on Eastern Europe and aggressive intentions toward the West. Soviet entry into Poland in September 1939 on the grounds of protecting kinsmen due to the alleged collapse of the Polish state was utterly transparent to the Poles if not to the West. Likewise subsequent Soviet claims on Poland's eastern territories justified in terms of uniting kinsmen was to the Poles another bold example of Soviet duplicity and a situation analogous to Danzig. The dis• puted territories were not to become independent Ukrainian or Byelorussian XIV INTRODUCTION states on the basis of self-determination but ceded outright to the Soviet Union thereby expanding the Soviet . Throughout, the Poles main• tained that the frontier issue was little more than a convenient pretext in order to achieve traditional political objectives. Washington's and London's self• proclaimed realism in urging the Poles to make concessions to the Soviets on this and other issues if Polish-Soviet relations were to be re-established for the second time and if the government ever intended to return to Poland con• tained its own aura of unreality. Irrespective of what the Polish government might have done, the outcome of events would not have been any different. The outcome was determined not by any error ofjudgement on the part of the few individuals who guided the Polish government-in-exile but instead by the inevitabilities of a power struggle between a major power, the Soviet Union, and a minor power, Poland. Small powers seldom, if ever, manipulate events or shape history and especially if it is their unlucky fate to find themselves on a collision course with a major power. The London Poles, much to the irri• tation of Churchill and the annoyance of Roosevelt, recognized that they had nothing to gain by concessions. In the eyes of the majority the Soviet Union was determined to communize Poland and what the Kremlin sought from the London Poles was complicity to facilitate its task. Only when the task was completed was it clear to the Allies that the Poles were right ~ a 'friendly' Poland meant a communist satellite. Paradoxically when the Poles vehe• mently reiterated their prediction that a buffer of 'friendly' states between east and west meant the loss of all of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, they did so to a deaf audience. As artillery fire in the Sino-Soviet war of words, the Chinese once charged: "The Soviet revisionist new Czars have completely taken over the old Czars' expansionist tradition, branding their faces with the indelible stigma of the Romanov dynasty."2 The Poles said as much more than twenty-five years earlier. If the Second World War is to make sense at all then securing a lasting peace and freedom not only for the nations of but the whole of Europe must rank as the ultimate objective. Set against this larger picture, the significance offailing to honor guarantees to Poland is greatly diminished. The real tragedy was the overall result ~ the division of Europe, the enslave• ment of Eastern Europe, and the immeasurable frustrations of the Cold War and its legacy. To be sure sympathy for the Poles can be found when the atmosphere in which the Polish government functioned is conjured up: the uncertainties of operating from exile; the deep sense of insecurity when the Soviet Union appeared on the scene as an unsolicited ally in 1941; Polish

2 Radio Broadcast on the 100th Anniversary of Lenin's Birth, April 1970 in The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, Alvin Z. Rubenstein, ed. (New York: Random House, 1972) p. 297. INTRODUCTION xv hopes for the future trampled upon throughout the wartime negotiations; the painful knowledge that Poland, a loyal and enthusiastic ally from the be• ginning, was headed for total defeat in victory. For those whose memories have faded, the exiled government still in existence in London serves as a reminder. Nevertheless, the collapse of Europe and its ramifications felt throughout the world cannot take a backseat to the injustices visited upon one group of people. That the outcome could have been otherwise and wasn't makes it all the more regrettable. Had the West shown greater perception in the interwar period, Soviet involvement on the side of the Allies, albeit involuntary involvement, would not have been received with the overwhelm• ing gratitude that led to a policy of accommodation. American isolationism, the appeasement of Hitler, and the absence of military preparedness all rank as primary examples of the short-sightedness that put the West in a desperate position when hostilities began. Later when the tremendous industrial and military power of the United States made it possible for the West to alter its course and Stalin's disruptive antics and grandiose ambitions all but de• manded a change of policy, a sense of indebtedness remained and the West continued to push for collaboration with the Soviet Union. It was a brand• new game by mid-I 944 with one very important exception, the mental habits of the interwar period refused to go away. Any notion of Soviet omnipotence should have been dispelled by the magnitude of the Lend-Lease program if nothing else. Instead the West overestimated the strength of the Soviet Union and approached Stalin as if they, rather than he, negotiated from weakness. For this lack of perception and the absence of any insight into the con• sequences of their many appeasements of Moscow, future generations would pay a heavy price. The current debate over the violations of basic human rights in Eastern Europe ushered in by the Helsinki Declaration of 1975 highlights the West's ill-conceived wartime objectives and serves as a tes• timony to what the West might have but failed to accomplish.