GREAT BRITAIN, the SOVIET UNION and the POLISH GOVERNMENT in EXILE (1939-1945) Studies in Contemporary History
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GREAT BRITAIN, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE (1939-1945) Studies in Contemporary History Volume 3 I. Rupieper, Hermann J. The Cuno Government and Reparations, 1922-1923: Politics and Economics. 1979, viii + 289. ISBN 90-247-2114-8. 2. Hirshfield, Claire. The Diplomacy of Partition: Britain, France and the Creation of Nigeria 1890-1898. 1979, viii + 234. ISBN 90-247-209<)-0. 3. Kacewicz, George V. Great Britain, the Soviet Vnion and the Polish Government in Exile 193~1945. 1979, xv + 252. ISBN 90-247-2096--6. G REA T BRITAIN, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE (1939-1945) by GEORGE V. KACEWICZ . ~ '. •. ~ . I979 MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS THE HAGUE/ BOSTON/LONDON The distribution of this book is handled by the following team of publisbers: for Ihe United Stoles "lid Canada Kluwer Boston, Inc. 160 Old Derby Street Hingbam, MA 0204) USA far 0/1 alher co ulllrit~ Kluwer Academic Publishers Group Di stribution Center P.O. Box)2l 3300 AH Dordrocht The Netherlands Libr ~ r y of Congress C~ l a l og in g in Publication D ata Kacewicz. George V Great Britain. the Soviet Union. and Ihe Polish Government in Exile (t939-1945) Bibliography: p. Includes index. I, World War, 1939-1945 - Go\'ernments in exile. 2. World War, 1939-1945 - Poland. 3. Poland -History - Occupation, 1939-1945. 4. Great Britain - Foreign re lations -Russia. 5. Russia _ Foreign relations - Great Britain. 6. World War. 1939-1945 - Diplomatic Hi story. I. Title. D81 0.G6K3l 1979 940.53'438 78- 31832 ISBN-13: 978-94-009-9274-0 c-ISBN-13 : 978-94-009-9272-6 001 : 10.1007/978-94-009-9272-6 Copyright 1979 by Mor linus Nijhoff Publishers br, The Hogue. Sof/eOlu reprint of Iht hUrdeOl"l'r Is/ edilion 1979 All righl$ reur.-ed. No pari of this publication may be reproduced. slOred in (1 relrieval syslem, ar IrollSmilled in any form or byony means, mechollicol,phol<Jcopying. recording. or olherh'ire, wilhoUl the prior wrillm ~rmis$ion oflhe publisher. Martillus Nijhoff Publishers b,'. P.D. Box 566, 250 I eN The Hagll£, The Netherlands. TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface VII INTRODUCTION IX I. HISTORICAL SETTING II. THE NEW GOVERNMENT-IN-ExILE 29 III. POLISH FORCES IN BRITAIN: LEGAL STATUS 52 IV. DIPWMACY: POLISH V. BRITISH OBJECTIVES 71 V. NEGOTIATING THE POLISH-SOVIET TREATY VI. AFTERMATH OF THE POLISH-SOVIET TREATY III VII. THE RUPTURE IN POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS VIII. TEHERAN: DECISION ON FRONTIERS IX. THE DECLINE OF THE LONDON GOVERNMENT EPILOGUE CONCLUSION 21 5 Appendices 226 A. Anglo-Polish Agreement 1939 226 B. Allied Forces Act 228 C. Treaty of Riga 1921 229 D. German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty 1939 230 E. Polish-Soviet Agreement 1941 231 F. Yalta Communique on Poland and Declaration on Liberated Europe 232 G. German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty 1939 234 Bibliography 235 Index 249 PREFACE In this book I have attempted to analyze the dilemmas confronting the Polish government-in-exile in London during the Second World War. My main objective has beeen to investigate the actual operation of the Polish govern ment and the overall policies of the British government vis-a-vis the Soviet Union insofar as they had a direct bearing on Anglo-Polish relations. Since the outstanding conflicts over territorial claims, and, ultimately, sovereignty, were between Poland and the Soviet Union, considerable attention has been devoted to the relationship between the Polish and Soviet governments during a most trying and difficult period of inter-Allied diplomacy. This work covers the period of operation of the Polish government on British soil until the resignation of Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk in November 1944. Although Great Britain did not withdraw diplomatic recognition from the Polish government until July 1945, the Arciszewski government, formed after Mikolajczyk's resignation, was generally ignored by Great Britain. As with all subsequent governments, including that which exists today, Arciszewski's government functioned primarily as the voice of Poland in the West - a government of protest. Although basically a case study of one of the wartime governments-in exile, it might well represent a microcosm of any number of Allied govern ments, such as the Belgian, Dutch or Norwegian, which found friendly shelter in the British Isles during the war. Minus the Polish-Soviet conflict, the issues might have been the same: the constitutional questions involved in the transfer of sovereign authority to British soil; the legal status of the govern ment as a subject of international law; the legal status and jurisdiction of the armed forces located in Great Britain; and the political relationship between the exiled and British governments. At best, the operation of an exiled government, even on friendly soil, is immensely complicated and frustrating in that it is not unlike the host-guest relationship in which the guest, although made to feel at home, is never quite free of his inhibitions or a need to respect the rights of his host. In these circumstances, and especially in the case of Poland, the British government could and often did exert pressure beyond a VlII PREFACE point that could be termed normal in its relationship to other governments. As an immediate consequence, such pressure affected the ability of the Polish government, as a sovereign power, to make independent decisions in several vital areas. Though I shall mention only a few, many people have made valuable contributions to this book for which I am deeply grateful: Count Edward Raczynski, the wartime Polish Ambassador to Great Britain, and the late Generals Wladyslaw Anders and Marian Kukiel all of whom at different times clarified issues and explained subtle aspects of the policies of the Polish government; Dr. Mieczyslaw Sas-Skowrowski, current Minister of Infor mation of the Polish government-in-exile, who explained postwar changes in the structure, operation and objectives of the exiled government; the late Pawel Jankowski, former Head of the Civil Chancery of the President, who provided valuable documents and information on the postwar London government and emigre factions; Mrs. Regina Oppman who in her capacity as archivist at the General Sikorski Historical Institute in London was both patient and unsparing in providing me with information and help at various times throughout my research; the late Arthur R. Bottaro for suggestions on style; Mrs. Maureen Hutchins and Mrs. Dolores Bender for typing; my colleagues at California State University for granting me a sabbatical which made it possible to complete my research in London; and lastly, my wife, Laura, for assistance in editing and preparing the final manuscript. INTRODUCTION Unreasonable Poles, preserve traditions. In just two centuries, you must allow You've thrice enjoyed benevolent partitions For Heaven's sake, why start to argue now? A.P. Herbert London, 1944 Britain's unilateral guarantee of Poland's independence and territorial in tegrity in March 1939 made reciprocal in April was the beginning of the end for Poland. The guarantee, meant to deter Hitler from committing further acts of aggression, instead, opened the door to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 which gave Hitler a free hand to attack Poland. Once Hitler made his move, Poland in fulfillment of the Pact was partitioned for the fourth time. The Warsaw government escaped, reformed in France and later established itself as a de jure government-in-exile in Britain. Britain's guarantee, despite good intentions, backfired for by herself she could do little to deter Hitler. On the one hand, in light of previous Anglo-French concessions, British resolve appeared less than categorical to Berlin, while on the other, if the guarantee was indeed backed by a determination to fight, the prospect of war with a weak and unprepared Britain was hardly a deterrent. Only a combined Soviet-British guarantee to Poland would have stopped Hitler for despite Berlin's equally low opinion of the Soviet Union's fighting capability, Hitler did not want a two-front war. In essence, the missing link in Britain's calcu lations was the Soviet Union. Read from Moscow the guarantee raised the prospect of war among the "imperialist powers" in the West. Weakened by the purges of 1936-1938 and unprepared in 1939, Stalin's main objective was to stay clear of any entanglement which would force him to do battle. Britain's guarantee clarified the options to Stalin as well as to Hitler. The re sult was a non-aggression pact permitting Stalin to remain free from involve ment while at the same time sparing Hitler the prospect of a two-front war. Despite Stalin's determination to avoid an agreement that might pull him into a war, Britain could have forced his hand had she approached the Soviet Union with an 'if you won't guarantee Poland, neither will we' proposition instead of unilaterally guaranteeing Poland. Stalin, a realist, would have been quick to see the consequences of a refusal - defeat of Poland and German x INTRODUCTION armies on his doorstep with Britain in splendid isolation. As it was, seeking Soviet cooperation after, rather than before, offering a guarantee was for all practical purposes a futile exercise. Stalin at that point was holding out for non-involvement via an arrangement with Hitler. His only interest in London and Paris was to keep them on the back burner in case Hitler interpreted Britain's guarantee as a bluff. In other words, Britain's unilateral guarantee set the stage for the NaZi-Soviet Pact. While most agree that the arrangement between the two dictators constituted a disaster for Poland, a fairly recent Polish source offers an interpretation with a unique twist.