1St Quarter-2009.Pdf

Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009 JFQ coming next in... Global Strategic Outlook

. . . and more in issue 53, 2d Quarter 2009 of JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Focus on Land Warfare

4Reconstructing Iraq’s Provinces

4Irregular Warfare Is Warfare 4EBO: Point >< Counterpoint ISSUE fifty -TWO, 1

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY st Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff quarter 2009 by National Defense University Press Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, Washington, DC 1070-0692(200931)52;1-Q

Joint Force Quarterly Inside Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009 NEW JFQ Dialogue from NDU Press 2 The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) By Robert M. Gates [email protected] From the Chairman Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. 8 Managing Editor, NDU Press 10 Open Letter Strategic Forum 235 LTC Robert E. Henstrand, USA Strategic Forum 233 The Absence of Europe: Implications for International Security? George C. Maerz Letter to the Editor Defense Transformation à la française and Supervisory Editor 11 U.S. Interests Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Forum Facing a worsening economy and a war in Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Under President Nicolas Sarkozy, France has Iraq that will be difficult to end, the next U.S. Executive Summary Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick 13 embarked on major changes in its national administration may well seek a more multi- security strategy, structure, capabilities, and lateral foreign policy and closer cooperation Design Chris Dunham and Jeremy Swanston, 15 An Interview with General George W. Casey, Jr. relationships with Allies. Leo Michel ana- with Europe. But, as Steven Kramer argues, U.S. Government Printing Office Let’s Win the Wars We’re In By John A. Nagl lyzes this transformation as presented in the Europe may be unwilling or unable to play a Printed in St. Louis, Missouri 20 French White Book of Defense and National larger role in global security. European uni- by 27 Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars By Gian P. Gentile Security, the official blueprint approved in fication and NATO expansion have stalled, June 2008. Michel notes that much more is at economic and social issues continue, and key 34 Hybrid Warfare and Challenges By Frank G. Hoffman stake in this ambitious plan than the shape of leaders disagree on how to proceed. In short, NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare By Milan N. Vego France’s defense establishment. French poli- Europe’s inability to work with the United cross-component, professional military and 40 cies and capabilities have implications for its States may be a logical consequence of its academic publishing house. It publishes books, Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat By Marvin Baker Schaffer European Allies, the United States, and re- political structure and worldview, forcing Strategic Forum 237 policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and 49 and Ike Chang gions beyond Europe such as parts of Africa. America to turn to Asia for support. Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: How special reports on national security strategy, defense Should the United States Respond? policy, national military strategy, regional security Special Feature affairs, and global strategic problems. NDU Press is part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a 56 Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century By Gabriel Marcella Persian Gulf security will increasingly pose policy research and strategic gaming organization. and Stephen O. Fought difficult choices for the next administration. Judith Yaphe perceives the United States “Military-Political” Relations: The Need for Officer Education This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department 61 facing three challenges. The toughest by far of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions By Derek S. Reveron and Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris is whether to engage Iran and, if so, how. The of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted A Strategic Asset for Engagement: Enhancing the Role of second delicate issue is what posture to take without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint 67 Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever National Defense University By Keith D. Dickson on reform within the Gulf states. A heavy- material is quoted from or based on its content. handed approach can trigger cynicism about Commentary U.S. motives and charges of double standards. The third is how to build cooperation COMMUNICATIONS Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned: Reforming the Afghan 70 between the Gulf states and Iraq. Lingering Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly National Police By Lewis G. Irwin online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming suspicions will be hard to overcome. The Gulf issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and Effects-based Operations: Combat Proven By Paul M. Carpenter states may well seek expanded security guar- 78 Strategic Forum 234 Strategic Forum 236 access to many other useful NDU Press publications. and William F. Andrews antees from the United States even as they Constructive comments and contributions Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for NATO’s Uncertain Future: Is Demography Civil-Military Relations remain wary of formal ties. are important to us. Please direct editorial EBO: There Was No Baby in the Bathwater By Paul K. Van Riper Destiny? communications to the link on the NDU Press Web 82 Patrick Cronin argues that irregular site or write to: Victory—From the Prism of Jihadi Culture By Jeffrey B. Cozzens The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 86 warfare—highly political and ambiguous (NATO) is increasingly stressed by popula- and intensely local by nature—is likely to Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Features tion trends in its member countries. For National Defense University Press dominate the global security environment example, the gap between U.S. and European 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2505) 92 Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach in the coming decades. Success in this type military-age segments is widening, with Fort Lesley J. McNair By Jeffrey Buchanan, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight of conflict will require a framework that bal- the U.S. cohort increasing while Europe’s Washington, DC 20319 ances the relationships between civilian and shrinks; a young, growing U.S. popula- 97 Irregular Warfare Is Warfare By Kenneth C. Coons, Jr., and Glenn M. Harned military leaders and effectively uses their dif- tion will contribute to its enhanced global Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 ferent strengths. Irregular warfare challenges Wired for War? Robots and Military Doctrine By P.W. Singer economic profile in 2050, while Europe’s FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 104 traditional understandings of how civilian aging and shrinking productive population Email: [email protected] Chinese Disaster Relief Operations: Identifying Critical Capability Gaps and military leaders should work together. will help diminish its presence. Jeffrey Simon Visit the NDU Press Web site JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu 111 By Nirav Patel Specifically, Cronin examines issues such as argues that these trends will hamper the for more information on measuring progress, choosing the best lead- Alliance’s ability to deploy operational forces, st publications at 1st Quarter, January 2009 118 China-Africa Relations in the 21 Century By Jennifer L. Parenti ers, and forging integrated strategies. and thus should be consciously weighed in ISSN 1070-0692 ndupress.ndu.edu 125 Shoulder to Shoulder: The Marine Corps and Air Force in Combat NATO’s future strategic plans. By Daniel J. Darnell and George J. Trautman III Force of Law PUBLISHER 129 Inside the Detention Camps: A New Campaign in Iraq ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN By Mason Brooks and Drew Miller DIRECTOR, INSS 134 “Operationalizing” Legal Requirements for Unconventional Warfare Dr. Patrick M. Cronin By James P. Terry Advisory Committee

Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC The Joint Staff Interagency Dialogue BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman MG Byron S. Bagby, USA Joint Forces Staff College Reconstructing Iraq’s Provinces, One by One By Henry L. Clarke 140 Col Michael Belcher, USMC Marine Corps War College BG Edward C. Cardon, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Why USAFRICOM? By Edward Marks 148 A. Denis Clift National Defense Intelligence College Col Raymond C. Damm, USMC Marine Corps Command 152 U.S. Africa Command: Value Added By Mary C. Yates and Staff College Col Thomas Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Institute for Defense Analyses Recall RADM Garry E. Hall, USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces Brig Gen Jimmie C. Jackson, Jr., USAF Air Command and Staff College 156 A General Airman: Millard Harmon and the South Pacific in World War II Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) The Joint Staff By Thomas Alexander Hughes Maj Gen Stephen J. Miller, USAF Air War College GEN Walter L. Sharp, USA The Joint Staff Book Reviews Col David A. Smarsh, USAF Naval Postgraduate School Maj Gen Robert P. Steel, USAF National War College 163 Off the Shelf By Robert E. Henstrand MG Robert M. Williams, USA U.S. Army War College LtGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC National Defense University 164 Strategic Defense in the Nuclear Age: A Reference Handbook RADM James Wisecup, USN Naval War College Reviewed by Jeffrey L. Caton Editorial Board 164 The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War Reviewed by Bryon E. Greenwald Richard K. Betts Columbia University Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies 165 China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force Reviewed by John D. Becker Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University Joint Doctrine Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces Douglas N. Hime Naval War College 166 Gaming the 21st Century Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College 168 Joint Doctrine Update Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College John J. Mearsheimer The University of Chicago CORRECTION Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College In JFQ 51 (4th Quarter, 2008), two photographs were incorrectly credited. On page 57, James A. Schear National Defense University proper credit goes to Julius Delos Reyes. On page 59, proper credit goes to M. Erik Reynolds. COL Robert E. Smith, USA (Ret.) U.S. Army War College LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)

CONTRIBUTIONS

Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians About the covers from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected] Front cover shows Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reviewing a speech enroute to “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information, Williamsburg, Virginia, aboard UH–60 (DOD/Cherie A. Thurlby). Table of contents see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. (left to right): U.S. Army Chief of Staff greets recruit during th35 anniversary celebration of all-volunteer force (U.S. Army/D. Myles Cullen); Soldiers patrol in Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Ninawa Province, Iraq (3d Armored Combat Regiment/Donald Spar); Iraqi detainees Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the attend civics class at Camp Bucca (U.S. Army/Amie J. McMillen); and Marine and Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal South Korean officers review range operations during bombing exercise in Djibouti designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and (U.S. Navy/Michael R. McCormick). Back cover features (top to bottom): then–U.S. other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; Presidential candidate Barack Obama views Sadr City district of Baghdad with and developments in training and joint professional military General David Petraeus from UH–60 (U.S. Army/Lorie Jewell); USS Chancellorsville education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to and USS Decatur moored in Hong Kong Harbor (U.S. Navy/Spike Call); Afghan meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. officer uses sand table to prepare soldiers for mission in Nangahar Province, Afghanistan (55th Combat Camera Company/Johnny R. Aragon); and tanker trucks bring fuel for USS Kearsarge pierside in Santa Marta, Colombia, during Operation Continuing Promise (U.S. Navy/Erik C. Barker). The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

ndupress.ndu.edu The National Defense Strategy Striking the Right Balance

By Robert M. Gates

he defining principle driving as well as helping partners build capacity, and our strategy is balance. Balance maintaining our traditional edge—above all, is not the same as treating all the technological edge—against the military challenges as having equal forces of other nation-states T n priority. We cannot expect to eliminate retaining those cultural traits that risk through higher defense budgets—in have made the U.S. Armed Forces success- effect, “to do everything, buy everything.” ful by inspiring and motivating the people Resources are scarce, yet we still must set within them, and shedding those cultural priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs elements that are barriers to doing what and opportunity costs. needs to be done. We currently strive for balance between: As we have seen in recent years, in so n doing everything we can to prevail in many ways, the basic nature of humanity the conflicts we are in, and being prepared for and the iron realities of nations have not other contingencies that might arise elsewhere, changed, despite the fondest hopes of so or in the future many for so long, especially after the end n institutionalizing capabilities such as of the Cold War. What has changed is that

counterinsurgency and stability operations, the international environment today is DOD

Top: New National Defense Strategy, published June 2008 Bottom: USS Ronald Reagan pulls into Agana Harbor, Guam U.S. Navy (Jennifer S. Kimball)

2 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu GATES more complex and unpredictable than it has and of the kinds of missions we are most likely ourselves. The most likely catastrophic perhaps ever been. to undertake in the future. threats to our homeland—for example, What is dubbed the “war on terror” is, in an American city poisoned or reduced to The Wars We Are In grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular rubble by a terrorist attack—are more likely As we think about the security chal- campaign—a struggle between the forces of to emanate from failing states than from lenges on the horizon, we must establish violent extremism and of moderation. In the aggressor states. up front that America’s ability to deal long-term effort against terrorist networks The kind of capabilities needed to deal with threats for years to come will depend and other extremists, we know that direct with these scenarios cannot be considered importantly on our performance in today’s military force will continue to have a role. But exotic distractions or temporary diversions. conflicts. To be blunt, to fail—or to be seen we also understand that over the long term, We do not have the luxury of opting out to fail—in either Iraq or Afghanistan would we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. because they do not conform to preferred be a disastrous blow to our credibility, both Where possible, kinetic operations should be notions of the American way of war. among our friends and allies and among our subordinate to measures that promote better Furthermore, even the largest wars potential adversaries. governance, economic programs to spur will require so-called small wars capabili- In Iraq, the number of U.S. combat units development, and efforts to address the griev- ties. Ever since General Winfield Scott led in-country will decline over time. The debate ances among the discontented from which the Army into Mexico in the 1840s, nearly now is about the pacing of the drawdown as the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient every major deployment of American forces there will continue to be some kind of Ameri- accumulation of quiet successes over a long has led to subsequently longer military pres- can advisory and counterterrorism effort in time to discredit and defeat extremist move- ence to maintain stability. General Dwight Iraq for years to come. ments and their ideologies. As the National Eisenhower, when tasked with administering In Afghanistan, as President Bush Defense Strategy puts it, success will require North Africa in 1942, wrote, “The sooner I announced in September 2008, U.S. troop us to “tap the full strength of America and its can get rid of these questions that are outside levels are rising, with the likelihood of more people”—civilian and military, public sector the military in scope, the happier I will increases in 2009. Given its terrain, poverty, and private. be! Sometimes, I think I live 10 years each neighborhood, and tragic history, the We are unlikely to repeat another Iraq week, of which at least nine are absorbed in country in many ways poses an even more or Afghanistan any time soon—that is, forced political and economic matters.” And yet, in complex and difficult long-term challenge regime change followed by nationbuilding Eisenhower, General George Marshall knew than Iraq—one that, despite a large inter- under fire. But that does not mean that we he had the “almost perfect model of a modern national effort, will require a significant may not face similar challenges in a variety commander: part soldier, part diplomat, part American military and economic commit- of locales. Where possible, our strategy is administrator.” This model is as important ment for some time. to employ indirect approaches—primarily and real today as it was 70 years ago. In the past, I have expressed frus- through building the capacity of partner tration over the defense bureaucracy’s governments and their security forces—to priorities and lack of urgency when it prevent festering problems from turning into over the long term, we cannot comes to current conflicts—that for too crises that require costly and controversial kill or capture our way to many in the Pentagon it has been business American military intervention. In this kind victory as usual, as opposed to a wartime footing of effort, the capabilities of our allies and and a wartime mentality. When referring partners may be as important as our own, to “Next-War-itis,” I was not expressing and building their capacity is arguably as Whether in the midst or aftermath of opposition to thinking about and preparing important if not more so than the fighting we any major conflict, the requirement for the for the future. It would be irresponsible not do ourselves. U.S. military to maintain security, provide aid to do so—and the overwhelming majority That these kinds of missions are and comfort, begin reconstruction, and stand of people in the Pentagon, Services, and more frequent does not necessarily mean, up local government and public services will defense industry do just that. My point is for risk assessment purposes, that they not go away. Even with a better funded State simply that we must not be so preoccupied automatically should have a higher prior- Department and U.S. Agency for with preparing for future conventional ity for the purposes of military readiness. International Development, future military and strategic conflicts that we neglect to And it is true that many past interventions commanders will no more be able to rid provide, both short and long term, all the have had significant humanitarian consid- themselves of these tasks than Eisenhower capabilities necessary to fight and win con- erations. However, the recent past vividly was. To paraphrase what a former United flicts such as those we face today. demonstrated the consequences of failing Nations Secretary-General said about peace- Support for conventional moderniza- to address adequately the dangers posed keeping, it is not a soldier’s job, but sometimes tion programs is deeply embedded in our by insurgencies and failing states. Terror- only a soldier can do it. To truly achieve budget, our bureaucracy, the defense industry, ist networks can find a sanctuary within victory as Clausewitz defined it—attaining a and Congress. My fundamental concern is the borders of a weak nation and strength political objective—the U.S. military’s ability that there is not commensurate institutional within the chaos of social breakdown. A to kick down the door must be matched by its support—including in the Pentagon—for the nuclear-armed state could collapse into ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild capabilities needed to win the wars we are in, chaos and criminality. Let’s be honest with the house afterward. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 3 DIALOGUE | Striking the Right Balance

Signs of Progress for shortcomings in policy or execution. As in the Army, and amphibious operations in Given these realities, the military has Admiral Mullen has noted, in the broader the Marine Corps. We must remedy this situ- made some impressive strides in recent years: battle for hearts and minds abroad, we have ation as soon as we can through growing the to be as good at listening to others as we are ground forces, and increasing dwell time and n Special operations have received steep at telling them our story. And when it comes opportunities for full-spectrum training. increases in funding and personnel. to perceptions at home, when all is said and But in making the risk assessment asso- n The Air Force has created a new air advi- done, the best way to convince the American ciated with near-peer competitors, in judging sory program, and recently, General Norton people that we are winning a war is through where we can make tradeoffs, it is important Schwartz announced a new career track for credible and demonstrable results, as we have to keep some perspective. It is generally unmanned aerial operations. done in Iraq. agreed, for example, that the Navy has shrunk n The Navy stood up a new expeditionary too much since the end of the Cold War—a combat command and brought back its river- Don’t Forget the Nation-state view I share. But it is also true that in terms ine units. Even as we hone and institutionalize of tonnage, the battle fleet of the Navy, by n New counterinsurgency and Army oper- new and unconventional skills, the United one estimate, is larger than the next 13 navies ations manuals, plus a new maritime strategy, States still has to contend with the security combined—and 11 of those 13 navies are have incorporated the lessons of recent years challenges posed by the military forces of allies or partners. No other navy has anything into Service doctrine. To the traditional prin- other countries—from those actively hostile comparable to the reach or combat power of a ciples of war have been added perseverance, to those at strategic crossroads. single American carrier strike group. restraint, and legitimacy. The images of Russian tanks rolling Russian tanks and artillery may have n Train and equip authorities and pro- into the Republic of Georgia last August crushed Georgia’s tiny military. But before grams allow us to move more quickly to build were a reminder that nation-states and their we begin rearming for another Cold War, the security capacity of partner nations. militaries do still matter. Both Russia and remember that what is driving Russia is a n A variety of initiatives are under way that China have increased their defense spending desire to exorcise past humiliation and domi- better integrate and coordinate U.S. military and modernization programs, to include air nate their near abroad—not an ideologically efforts with civilian agencies as well as engage defense and fighter capabilities that in some driven campaign to dominate the globe. As the expertise of the private sector, including cases approach our own. someone who used to prepare estimates of nongovernmental organizations and academia. In addition, there is the potentially Soviet military strength for several Presidents, toxic mix of rogue nations, terrorist groups, I can say that the Russian conventional mili- Retired Marine colonel T.X. Hammes and nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. tary, though vastly improved since its nadir in has noted that whereas past insurgencies North Korea has built several bombs, and Iran the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet consisted of military campaigns supported seeks to join the nuclear club. North Korea predecessor. And Russian demographics will by information operations, they now often is impoverished and literally starving, while likely impede its numbers getting much larger. consist of strategic communications cam- Iran sits on a sea of oil. Both have primitive Though Russia’s recent air and naval forays paigns supported by military operations. In ground offensive capabilities and ballistic into this hemisphere have grabbed headlines, Iraq and Afghanistan, extremists have made missile programs of increasing range. Both it is worth noting that in the last 15 years the deft use of the Internet and propaganda to have a record of proliferation and ties to Russian navy has launched just two new major misinform and intimidate local populations— criminal groups or terrorist networks. warships. Russia does present serious chal- the swing voters, if you will, in these struggles. What all these potential adversaries lenges, but ones very different from the past. Many defense leaders—including myself— have in common—from terrorist cells to All told, this year’s [2008] National have bemoaned the U.S. Government’s rogue nations to rising powers—is that they Defense Strategy concluded that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium a variety of initiatives are under way that better integrate term, given current trends. It is true that the and coordinate military efforts with civilian agencies United States would be hard pressed to fight a as well as engage the private sector major conventional ground war elsewhere on short notice, but where on Earth would we do that? We have ample, untapped striking power limitations in this area. Our troops have made have learned over time that it is not wise to in our air and sea forces should the need arise some ingenious adaptations, such as in Iraq, confront the United States directly or on con- to deter or punish aggression—whether on for example, where they set up the “Voice ventional military terms. the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, of Ramadi” broadcast to counter what was Nonetheless, we cannot take this tra- or across the Taiwan Strait. So while we are spewing forth from extremist mosques. ditional dominance for granted. Many of knowingly assuming some additional risk in The Quadrennial Defense Review high- America’s refueling tankers and some fighters this area, that risk is, I believe, a prudent and lighted the importance of strategic commu- are now older than the pilots who fly them. As manageable one. nications as a vital capability, and good work a result of the demands of Afghanistan and Other nations may be unwilling to chal- has been done since. However, we cannot Iraq, ground forces have not been able to stay lenge the United States fighter to fighter, ship lapse into using communications as a crutch proficient in specialties such as field artillery to ship, or tank to tank. But they are develop-

4 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu GATES ing the disruptive means to blunt the impact rockets and missiles now dwarfs the inventory of units we field, the weapons we buy, and the of American power, narrow our military of many nation-states. Furthermore, Russian training we do. options, and deny us freedom of movement and Chinese arms sales are putting advanced and action. capabilities—both offensive and defensive—in Sensible and Responsive Procurement In the case of China, investments in the hands of more countries and groups. When it comes to procurement, for the cyber and antisatellite warfare, anti-air and As defense scholars have noted, these better part of 5 decades, the trend has gone anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic hybrid scenarios combine the “lethality of toward lower numbers as technology gains missiles could threaten America’s primary state conflict with the fanatical and protracted made each system more capable. In recent means to project power and help allies in the fervor of irregular warfare.”1 Here, “Microsoft years, these platforms have grown ever more Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the coexists with machetes, and stealth is met by baroque and costly, are taking longer to networks that support them. This will put a suicide bombers.”2 build, and are being fielded in ever dwindling premium on America’s ability to strike from As we can expect a blended, high-low quantities. over the horizon and employ missile defenses; mix of adversaries and types of conflict, so too Given that resources are not unlim- and it will require shifts from short-range to should America seek a better balance in the ited, the dynamic of exchanging numbers longer range systems such as the next genera- portfolio of capabilities we have—the types for capability is perhaps reaching a point tion bomber. And even though the days of hair-trigger superpower confrontation are over, as long as other nations are developing the disruptive means to blunt the other nations possess the bomb and the means impact of American power, narrow our military options, and deny to deliver it, the United States must maintain us freedom of movement and action a credible strategic deterrent. Toward this end, the Department of Defense and Air Force have taken firm steps to return excellence and U.S. Marine convoy of up-armored Humvees in Helmand Province, Afghanistan accountability to our nuclear stewardship. We also need Congress to fund the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program—for safety, for security, and for a more reliable deterrent.

Blurring Boxes and Hybrid War As we think about this range of threats, it is common to define and divide the so- called high end from the low end, the conventional from the irregular—armored divisions on one side and guerrillas toting AK–47s on the other. In reality, as Colin Gray has noted, the categories of warfare are blurring and do not fit into tidy boxes. We can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction— from the sophisticated to the simple—being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare. Russia’s relatively crude—though brutally effective—conventional offensive in Georgia was augmented with a sophisticated cyber attack and well-coordinated propaganda campaign. We saw a different version during the invasion of Iraq, where Saddam Hussein dispatched his swarming paramilitary Fedayeen along with the T–72s of the Republican Guard. Conversely, militias, insurgent groups, other nonstate actors, and Third World militaries are increasingly acquiring more technology, lethality, and sophistication—as illustrated by the losses and propaganda victory that Hizballah was able to inflict on Israel 2 years ago. Hizballah’s restocked arsenal of U.S. Marine Corps (Randall A. Clinton) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 5 DIALOGUE | Striking the Right Balance of diminishing returns. A given ship or partners. This is already happening in the future colonels, captains, and sergeants will aircraft—no matter how capable or well- field with Task Force Odin in Iraq, where not have to be quite so heroic or resourceful. equipped—can only be in one place at one advanced sensors were mated with turboprop One of the enduring issues our military time—and, to state the obvious, when one is aircraft to produce a massive increase in the struggles with is whether personnel and sunk or shot down, there is one fewer of them. amount of surveillance and reconnaissance promotions systems designed to reward In addition, the prevailing view for coverage. The issue then becomes how we command of American troops will be able to decades was that weapons and units designed build this kind of innovative thinking and reflect the importance of advising, training, for the so-called high end could also be used for the low. And it has worked to some extent: strategic bombers designed to obliterate given the situations we are likely to face, it begs the question cities have been used as close air support for of whether specialized, often relatively low-tech equipment for riflemen on horseback. M–1 tanks designed stability and counterinsurgency missions is also needed to plug the Fulda Gap routed insurgents in Fallujah and Najaf. Billion-dollar ships are employed to track pirates and deliver humani- flexibility into our rigid procurement pro- and equipping foreign troops—which is still tarian aid. And the Army is spinning out cesses here at home. The key is to make sure not considered a career-enhancing path for parts of the Future Combat Systems—as they that the strategy and risk assessment drive our best and brightest officers. Or whether move from drawing board to reality—so they the procurement, rather than the other way formations and units organized, trained, and can be available and usable for our troops in around. equipped to destroy enemies can be adapted Afghanistan and Iraq. well enough, and fast enough, to dissuade or The need for the state-of-the-art sys- A Full-spectrum Force coopt them—or, more significantly, to build tems—particularly longer range capabilities— I believe we must do this. The two the capacity of local security forces to do the will never go away, as we strive to offset the models can—and do—coexist. Being able dissuading and destroying. countermeasures being developed by other to fight and adapt to a diverse range of nations. But at a certain point, given the types conflicts—sometimes all at once—lands Institutional Culture and Incentives of situations that we are likely to face—and squarely in the long history and finest tradi- I have spent much of the last year given, for example, the struggles to field up- tions of the American practice of arms. In the making the argument in favor of institutional- armored Humvees, Mine Resistant Ambush Revolutionary War, tight formations drilled izing counterinsurgency skills and our ability Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and intelligence, by Baron von Steuben fought Redcoats in the to conduct stability and support operations. surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in north, while guerrillas led by Francis Marion This begs a fair question: If balance between Iraq—it begs the question of whether special- harassed them in the south. During the 1920s high- and low-end capabilities is so impor- ized, often relatively low-tech equipment for and 1930s, the Marine Corps conducted what tant, and we cannot lose our conventional stability and counterinsurgency missions is we would now call stability operations in the edge, why spend so much time talking about also needed. Caribbean, wrote the Small Wars Manual, irregular or asymmetric warfare? The reality And how do we institutionalize procure- and at the same time developed the amphibi- is that conventional and strategic force mod- ment of such capabilities—and the ability to ous landing techniques that would help liber- ernization programs are strongly supported in get them fielded quickly? Why did we have to ate Europe and the Pacific in the following the Services, in Congress, and by the defense go outside the normal bureaucratic process to decade. industry. For reasons laid out today, I also develop counter–improvised explosive device And then consider General “Black Jack” support them. For example, this year’s base technologies, to build MRAPs, and to quickly Pershing, behind whose desk I sit. Before budget for fiscal year 2009 contains more than expand our ISR capability? In short, why did commanding the American Expeditionary $180 billion in procurement, research, and we have to bypass existing institutions and Force in Europe, Pershing led a platoon of development, the overwhelming preponder- procedures to get the capabilities we need to Sioux Indian scouts, rode with Buffalo Sol- ance of which is for conventional systems. protect our troops and pursue the wars we diers up San Juan Hill, won the respect of the However, apart from the Special Forces are in? Moros in the Philippines, and chased Pancho community and some dissident colonels, Our conventional modernization pro- Villa in Mexico. for decades there has been no strong, deeply grams seek a 99-percent solution in years. Sta- In Iraq, we have seen how an army that rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or bility and counterinsurgency missions—the was basically a smaller version of the Cold elsewhere for institutionalizing our capabili- wars we are in—require 75-percent solutions War force can become an effective instru- ties to wage asymmetric or irregular con- in months. The challenge is whether in our ment of counterinsurgency over time. But flict—and to quickly meet the ever-changing bureaucracy and in our minds these two dif- that came at a frightful human, financial, and needs of our forces engaged in these conflicts. ferent paradigms can be made to coexist. political cost. For every heroic and resourceful Think of where our forces have been At the Air War College earlier this year, innovation by troops and commanders on the sent and have been engaged over the last I asked whether it made sense in situations battlefield, there was some institutional short- 40-plus years: Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, where we have total air dominance to employ coming at the Pentagon they had to overcome. Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, lower cost, lower tech aircraft that can be The task facing military officers today is to Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and employed in large quantities and used by our support the institutional changes necessary so more. In fact, the first Gulf War stands alone

6 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu GATES in over two generations of constant military hierarchical organization, and we must con- sions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, engagement as a more or less traditional consistently strive to overcome them. inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of ventional conflict from beginning to end. As systems analysis, computer models, game then–Marine Commandant Charles Krulak Humility and Limits theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise. predicted just over 10 years ago, instead of From these personal lessons that I have Look askance at idealized, triumphalist, or the beloved “son of Desert Storm,” Western learned from 42 years of service in this arena, ethnocentric notions of future conflict that militaries are confronted with the unwanted I hope that national security professionals aspire to upend the immutable principles of “stepchild of Chechnya.” take away two things: a sense of humility and war, scenarios where the enemy is killed but There is no doubt in my mind that an appreciation of limits. our troops and innocent civilians are spared, conventional modernization programs will First, limits about what the United where adversaries can be cowed, shocked, or continue to have—and deserve—strong States—still the strongest and greatest nation awed into submission instead of being tracked institutional and congressional support. I just on Earth—can do. The power of our mili- down, hilltop by hilltop, house by house, and want to make sure the capabilities we need for tary’s global reach has been an indispensable block by bloody block. As General William the complex conflicts we are actually in and contributor to world peace and must remain Sherman said, “Every attempt to make war are most likely to face in the foreseeable future so. But not every outrage, every act of aggres- easy and safe will result in humiliation and also have strong institutional support and are sion, or every crisis can or should elicit an disaster.” Or, as General Joseph “Vinegar Joe” sustained in the long term. And I want to see American military response, and we should Stilwell said, “No matter how a war starts, it an institution that can make and implement acknowledge such. ends in mud. It has to be slugged out—there decisions quickly in support of those on the Be modest about what military force are no trick solutions or cheap shortcuts.” battlefield. can accomplish, and what technology can In conclusion, for the reasons outlined In the end, the military capabilities we accomplish. The advances in precision, sensor, in this presentation, I believe our National need cannot be separated from the cultural information, and satellite technology have Defense Strategy provides a balanced and traits and reward structure of the institu- led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. realistic approach to protecting America’s tions we have: the signals sent by what gets military can do: freedom, prosperity, and security in the years funded, who gets promoted, what is taught in ahead. JFQ the academies and staff colleges, and how we n the Taliban is dispatched within 3 train. months Thirty-six years ago, my old Central n Saddam’s regime is toppled in 3 weeks Notes Intelligence Agency colleague Bob Komer, n a button is pushed in Nevada, and 1 st who led the pacification campaign in seconds later a pickup truck explodes in Mosul Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21 Vietnam, published his classic study of orga- n a bomb destroys the targeted house on Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December nizational behavior entitled Bureaucracy Does the right, but leaves intact the one on the left. 2007), 28. Its Thing. Looking at the performance of the 2 Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: U.S. national security apparatus during that But also never neglect the psychologi- Military Theory and the Future of War,” Naval War conflict—military and civilian—he identified cal, cultural, political, and human dimen- College Review 56, no. 3 (Summer 2003), 132–150. a number of tendencies that prevented institutions from adapting long after problems had Soldiers fire mortar at Taliban insurgents near Firebase Martello, Afghanistan been identified and solutions were proposed:

n the reluctance to change preferred ways of functioning, and when faced with lack of results, to do more of the same n trying to run a war with a peacetime management structure and practices n belief that the current set of problems was either an aberration or would soon be over n where because a certain problem—in that case counterinsurgency—did not fit the inherited structure and preferences of organizations, it simultaneously became everybody’s business and no one’s business.

I cite that study not to relitigate that war, or to suggest that the institutional military has not made enormous strides in recent years. It is instead a cautionary reminder that these tendencies are always present in any large, U.S. Army (Michael Zuk) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 7 From the Chairman What I Have Learned about the Army

ur Army is the center of gravity Go stand atop one of those hills in the The second thing I have learned is that for the U.S. military—and this Korengal Valley in Afghanistan, where I was our Army has become a world-class counter- center includes the Guard and last February and July, with paratroopers insurgency force in an extraordinarily short O Reserves. It is the best and assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat time. In Iraq, I walked down the streets of most combat-hardened Army that the Nation Team. Look around at the utter desolation of Sadr City, and visited an outpost in Mosul. has ever known—indeed, the world has ever the place and the spartan conditions that these These were places where, just a few weeks known. And we must do all we can to make young people are living in. You cannot help before, we could not have visited at all. Al sure it stays that way. but come back a little thick in the throat. Qaeda is clearly on the run in Iraq, and Let me take you through some of the I awarded a Silver Star to a young officer the surge and Anbar Awakening and even things I have learned about our Army, which there, Captain Greg Ambrosia, who placed Muqtada al Sadr’s ceasefire all helped to make we all serve. Some of these things might himself in the line of fire to direct his men to that happen. But what really turned it around surprise you, most probably will not, but I safety. I pinned on some Bronze Stars, Com- was the counterinsurgency tactics that our thought you might be interested in how this mendation Medals, and Purple Hearts as well. troops embraced and perfected. Sailor has come to see it. These troops had been out there 14 months Think about it: As late as the winter of The first thing I learned about the and seen a lot of tough fighting. They lost a lot 2007, when President Bush announced the Army is hooah. of good Soldiers. We often forget the impact surge, attacks were averaging nearly 180 a day, There are 1,000 or 10,000 or 100,000 of war on those who were alongside our fallen. the highest level since major combat operations different ways to say hooah. But I learned That loss impacts them for the rest of their lives. ended. A new national intelligence estimate that it is more than just a battle cry; it is a way When those Soldiers yelled “Hooah!” predicted that Iraqi leaders would be hard of life. It says that you will never quit, never after the ceremony, I understood that it was pressed to reconcile over the next year and a surrender, never leave your buddy. It says not because they were proud of their new half. But look where we are now. Our commit- that you are proud of the hardships you have medals; it was because they were proud of ment to counterinsurgency warfare worked. endured because there is deep meaning in the difference they knew they were making That meant sharing risk with the Iraqis, which every one of them. together, as a team—as an Army. in turn meant a whole lot of courage on the part of our Soldiers. Yet they prevailed because DOD (Chad J. McNeeley) they learned, adapted, and most of all believed. Third, I learned that it is irresponsible to neglect the continual improvement of our conventional capabilities. I was struck during one of my first visits as Chairman to an Army base—Fort Sill—by how few young artillery officers had earned their basic qualifications because they had so often deployed outside their skill set. Now, as the Chief of Naval Operations who deployed upwards of 12,000 Sailors to work on the ground in the U.S. Central Command theater, I understand the benefit for people to develop themselves. We need more balance in the way we think, train, and resource ourselves. Very real threats still exist from regional powers who possess robust conventional and, in some cases, nuclear capabilities. We must restore ADM Mullen awards Silver Star to CPT Gregory some of the more conventional and expedi- Ambrosia, Korengal Outpost, Afghanistan, July 2008 tionary expertise that we will require in the uncertain years ahead.

8 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu It is difficult to modernize while fight- Many are understandably wary of the assumptions or old ways. Our midgrade non- ing a war. But there is also an argument that stigma attached to mental health issues— commissioned officers and young captains a combat footing generates the energy and a problem we can alleviate by making love what they do. They have led in combat. sense of urgency that allow us to meet the everyone undergo screening, so no one They are remarkably resilient, and they do us pace of change. The essential truth is that we has to raise his or her hand. I recently had all proud. Junior officers and enlisted men are at war—and it is a war that is moving at the chance to visit the VA hospital in Palo and women need to know that it is right to lightning speed. Alto, California, and talked with about 30 question the direction of their Service and And that brings me to my fourth mostly Active duty PTS patients from every seniors. In fact, they should be rewarded for observation: our peacetime processes are not Service. It bothered me to see what they it. That sort of feedback is healthy, and it adapted to a wartime reality. We simply have had to go through just to get help—essen- foments the kind of change we need. not kept pace with the demands that this war tially bottoming out, like they were in an As General George Marshall once requires of our wounded, fallen, and their alcohol or a drug rehabilitation program. quipped, “Soldiers are intelligent. Give them families. Some wounded Servicemembers are The families of the fallen and the the bare tree; let them supply the leaves.” I waiting too long to receive disability ratings wounded never lost the American dream. have certainly seen the forest for the trees and transition out of the military, leaving They still want to work; they want to send here, and have learned a lot about the Army. them and their families in limbo. Indeed, Ser- their kids to school; they want to get an edu- Most importantly, I have learned from vicemembers tell me that their most precious cation; they want to own a piece of the rock. the Army. resource is time. They want their lives back. Indeed, they have earned it. And it is up to us They want to move on. to ensure that they get the chance. I know that we have launched a pilot Finally, I have learned that the Army, MICHAEL G. MULLEN program with the Department of Veterans above all, is a learning organization. From Admiral, U.S. Navy Affairs designed to streamline the transition rapid development and adaptation of doc- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff process, but we are still not moving quickly trine, to command organization, to move- enough. And I hope that we are able to ment of brigade combat teams and modular expand it as rapidly as possible. headquarters, to the way people are pro- Recent studies suggest that as many moted, the Army is constantly changing and as 20 percent of today’s troops may suffer adapting to meet the challenges of the day. from post-traumatic stress (PTS) brought We are seeing people succeed, grow, and lead. on by combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are seeing people unafraid to challenge DOD (Chad J. McNeeley)

Success of counterinsurgency tactics permits ADM Mullen to walk through Sadr City, Iraq, July 2008

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 9 DEADLINE Open Letter to JFQ Readers Approaching JFQ seeks the assistance of its readership in exploring the ethical for JFQ Issue 54 and legal lessons that have been revealed or relearned during the course of a protracted, irregular conflict in which insurgents employ terror as an asymmetric tool. As General George Casey points out in this issue, the U.S. military is now populated with a seasoned, professional force that compares favorably with any throughout history in its ability to address the widest panorama of challenges. Your experiences in modern counterinsurgency and irregular warfare are informed by legal and ethical restraints, constraints, and conundrums that can benefit all national security professionals, military and civilian. Please submit your essays, short or long, outlining your lessons by the deadline presented below.

JFQ encourages you to submit manuscripts that speak to your unique professional strengths and interests. Boldly challenge traditional thought and practices in the joint, interagency, national security community, and propose a new school solution! FEATURING JFQ would also like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas in concert with future thematic focuses. The following Military Force and topics are tied to submission deadlines for upcoming issues: Ethics March 1, 2009 September 1, 2009 Legal Challenges in (Issue 54, 3d quarter 2009): (Issue 56, 1st quarter 2010): Limited War Military Force and Ethics Irregular Warfare Legal Challenges in Limited War U.S. Special Operations Command

Submissions Due by June 1, 2009 December 1, 2009 (Issue 55, 4th quarter 2009): (Issue 57, 2d quarter 2010): March 1, Force Modernization, Technology, The Expeditionary Interagency and Innovation 2009

JFQ readers are typically subject matter experts who can take an issue or Issue 55 JFQ debate to the next level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money and lives. When framing your argument, please Featuring focus on the So what? question. That is, how does your research, experi- Force Modernization, ence, or critical analysis improve the reader’s professional understanding or Technology, and Innovation performance? Speak to the implications from the operational to the strategic level of influence and tailor the message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even Submissions Due by the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be interesting if presented with care! June 1, 2009 Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our NDU Press Submission Guidelines. Share your professional insights and improve national security.

Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Guide for Contributors. Share your professional insights and improve national security. [email protected]

10 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu LETTER

To the Editor—General James Mattis, completely correct. Suffice to say, however, If nothing else, effects-based opera- USMC, commander of U.S. Joint Forces that targeting and intelligence are more tions argue for economy of force as an Command, recently proclaimed effects- important to Airmen than infantrymen, alternative to attrition in formulating strat- based operations (EBO) unsuitable as a who can usually gather their own intel- egy and prosecuting war. Attrition and its planning philosophy for warfare. His memo- ligence on the spot. Airmen, on the other older cousin annihilation are the defaults randum and article in Joint Force Quarterly hand, need an almost exact sense of targets in strategic thinking. In fact, some have (Issue 51, 4th Quarter 2008) have caused a before they take off—nay, before they arm argued that attrition is the substitute for bit of a stir among Airmen, who identify and fuel their craft. This sense of targets strategy, but these thoughts were lost on the more closely with the notion of EBO than he begs the question of effects. likes of Erich von Falkenhayn, the architect does. And well they should because, at heart, Thus, most theories of airpower are of Verdun, and William Westmoreland, the this disagreement highlights a difference effects-based. Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitch- broker of body counts in Vietnam. Even the in vision that is fundamental to American ell, Hugh Trenchard, and the Air Corps brilliant Harvard professor Stephen Peter security and power projection. Tactical School (ACTS) bunch all argued Rosen, in Winning the Next War, erred in General Mattis thinks like an infantry- both implicitly and explicitly for effects. praising a change in the Allies’ “strategic man. For the infantry, the basis of military Douhet aimed to intimidate the enemy measures of merit” on the Western Front power is taking and holding ground. If one population through punishment attacks of World War I from taking land to killing wishes to dismantle the government of a using gas to extort a favorable conclusion Germans. Most practiced in the business nation, the formula is simple: invade the from the opposing government. ACTS of strategy might recognize attrition as a country, occupy it, enforce the changes that espoused high-altitude precision bombard- measure, but not one with merit, and hardly seem appropriate by controlling the distri- ment of industrial capability to paralyze a one with strategic merit. bution of resources, and leave nation’s warmaking capacity. No wonder Enter effects-based operations, a when. . . . Well, we’re better at invading, many of the old heads at Air University theoretical amalgam with enough flanks occupying, and controlling than we are such as David Mets reacted to effects-based to render it well nigh indefensible. The leaving. At least Germany, Japan, and South operations as little more than “old wine in chief EBO proponent in recent literature is Korea seem to suggest as much. Targeting, new skins.” David Deptula, a “ward” of the Checkmate in the strict sense of the word, is foreign to But to understand the real founda- strategy cell in the Pentagon run by John the infantryman. While his combined-arms tion of effects-based theory, and almost all Warden and the Black Hole planning cell compatriots in the artillery have a notion of airpower theory for that matter, one needs for Operation Desert Storm, as well as the the word, the infantryman worries primarily to visit the ossuary at Verdun or the World joint air operations director for Operation about taking ground and killing or captur- War I battlefields on the Somme and Izonso Enduring Freedom. Deptula published ing enemy soldiers. The artillery branch in Rivers in France and Italy, respectively. The “Firing for Effect” in 1995 and “Effects support of the infantry concerns itself pri- cradle of airpower and effects-based opera- Based Operations” in 2001. Both articles marily with targets that stand in the way of tions lies in these grinding battles of attri- claimed in their titles to document a taking ground. While the range of artillery tion, where infantry contested the ground “Change in the Nature of Warfare.” Both has increased over the past 200 years, the and artillery did most of the killing. The conflated three or four distinct theories. big guns seldom fire farther than a man can flower of European manhood, as well as The first is the indirect approach espoused walk in a day—hence the tactical symbiosis what F. Scott Fitzgerald called “tremendous by Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart in 1929 in of artillery and infantry and their aversion sureties and the exact relations that existed a book titled simply Strategy. Liddell for targeting at the operational and strategic among the classes,” perished in these Hart was shocked by the carnage on the levels of war. Adaptive Planning makes more battles. Douhet, his theoretical progeny Western Front and sought to interpret sense than targeting in this business. As in ACTS, and more modern proponents all of military history in terms of direct Napoleon put it succinctly, “First I engage, of effects-based air operations were all or indirect approaches to strategic and then I wait and see.” The aphorism “A plan looking for a different way. The Americans operational objectives. The dichotomy, as seldom survives the first encounter with the interpreted airpower in the context of labor- most socially constructed choices between enemy” supports the notion of adaptation as saving machinery, so vital to the expansive black and white or zero and one, is false. the touchstone of the infantryman. frontiers of the new nation. “Send a bullet, The phenomenon of military operations Similarly, targeting is the touchstone not a man” translated easily to “send a is spectral. It does have extremes, one of the Airman. As Philip Meilinger once bomber, not a bullet” for those prone to represented by annihilation and the other put it, “Airpower is targeting, and targeting view military aviation as a labor-saving by what we will term the “silver bullet.” is intelligence.” While the logical syllogism and lifesaving approach to warfare. From But most military operations lie in the “Airpower then is intelligence” may be its beginning, this sense of “economy” was gray area between these two boundary seductive, it is not true. Nor is Meilinger present in airpower theory. conditions. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 11 And John Frederick Charles Fuller, in condition of hopelessness and fear induced surface forces hold limited potential to do his 1926 The Foundations of the Science of by air attack. the same thing somewhere else. And that War, would instruct Soldiers, Sailors, and Critics, Mattis among them, argue that is when people typically start misbehav- Marines how to operate between the poles. Warden assumed a closed system and that ing. Air forces, and to a similar degree sea Fuller elevated one principle of war to the governments and the societies they lead are forces, are much more elastic and retain status of law, and that was economy of force. more aptly characterized as open and adap- more potential for redeployment. Hence, He claimed a cost, immediate and lasting, tive systems—and much less susceptible to we should seek to influence our adversaries for every expenditure of blood, sweat, and shock and paralysis than the airpower theo- through airpower and seapower first and treasure in war, and he urged military plan- rists are willing to admit. As J.C. Wylie put husband our ground forces because of their ners and practitioners to consider efficien- it in Military Strategy, “The ultimate arbiter great potential as a coercive element before cies to be every bit as important as results of force is a man with a gun.” Unless the deployment. In use of air and sea forces, in their grim work. Here Fuller and Liddell man with a gun goes to Verdun. Then what effects-based operations appears to be a Hart can be viewed as complementary does he become? reasonable philosophy, perhaps applied best because the indirect approach is often more Robert Pape, once of the School of to the enemy’s military. When attacking the efficient in the application of means. Advanced Airpower Studies and cur- enemy’s fielded forces with an effects-based Here was John Warden’s inspiration. rently at the University of Chicago, threw philosophy, we might expect a smaller mess, In considering the Cold War problem a slightly different twist into the theory of less press, and perhaps even a modicum of of stopping Soviet tanks in Germany’s coercive airpower. He claimed that when success. Fulda Gap, he focused on their dramatic military forces are denied the means to fight EBO is an incomplete theory neither fuel requirements and realized that tanks through destruction of their weapons and clearly articulated nor well defined. It was without fuel would soon cease to be a systems, they usually carry on in predict- more a reaction to “attritional” thinking threat. He further realized that he needed able fashion and either surrender or flee. than anything else. Sometimes it is useful to to destroy neither the tanks nor their fuel, Pape used this simple fact to underwrite view EBO as a “spectral” phenomenon. At only the means of fueling the tanks. Hence, Bombing to Win and concluded that fielded one end of the spectrum is the silver bullet: the sump pumps that conveyed fuel from forces were indeed the most lucrative Saddam Hussein is killed in a precision storage containers to thirsty tanks led to his target for air attack. In Mattis’ parlance, attack on the first night of Iraqi Freedom, or epiphany on effects-based operations and fielded forces come much closer to a “closed Hitler dies in 1939. At the other end of the inspired him to write The Air Campaign. system” than do an enemy’s population spectrum is annihilation: we kill everyone But Warden did not stop there. He and government—or society in general. In in the enemy country with nuclear weapons. went on to formulate a systems-engineering a sense, General Mattis is picking at the Attrition of enemy forces lies between these approach to air warfare by characterizing perpetual scab of airpower—or what Peter two extremes and is usually the default the enemy, any enemy, as a “fractalized” Faber called its “Holy Grail,” this connec- when one fails to produce a better strategy system of systems. Each fractal was com- tion of physical means to psychological for getting the enemy to yield. It seems posed of five “rings”: leadership, organic ends. While first-, second-, and even third- commonsensical that we would attempt to essentials, infrastructure, population, and order physical effects are within reach of achieve effects that exhibit the one principle military forces. Warden advocated paralyz- predictive analysis, even first-order psycho- of war that J.F.C. Fuller elevated to the ing the enemy system through simultaneous logical effects remain elusive at best. status of law—and that was economy of or “parallel” attack of systemically critical Yet in all of this theoretical mish- force—by using our labor-saving air and sea targets in all five rings. While the ultimate mash, there appears a compromise that forces as precisely and wisely as possible to target was enemy leadership, it was not to makes strange bedfellows of Pape, Deptula, preserve the great potential that inheres in be destroyed or influenced by decapita- Warden, and even Mattis. That is the appli- our uncommitted ground forces. tion, but rather by systemic paralysis. And cation of effects-based air operations to the So let’s not throw out the baby with stealthy airplanes dropping precision- enemy’s fielded forces. Herein lies a formula the bathwater and return to attritional guided munitions were the perfect means to for joint warfare. Surface forces cause the models of thinking. To do so would obviate this end. Here Warden and his theoretical enemy to concentrate and move, increas- the positive aspects of EBO. And there cer- protégé Deptula joined Douhet in seeking ing his vulnerability to air operations. Air tainly are many. the essence of airpower and effects-based forces cause the enemy to consider the price operations: the connection between physi- of movement, while surface forces pose —Stephen D. Chiabotti cal means and psychological ends in the the continual threat of invasion, occupa- School of Advanced Air and Space influence of enemy leadership. Douhet tion, and regime change. These threats are Studies assumed that pressed hard and punished strategically more important than their enough, a bombed population would pres- execution. Once exercised, surface forces sure its government to meet the air aggres- display limited potential for escalation in sor’s demands. Warden and Deptula went stakes. They can only do a limited number at it through systemic paralysis, but the of things once committed: take ground, implied assumption was still present—that hold it, and attempt to secure the enemy ultimately a government would yield to a population. Once engaged in that task,

12 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Executive Summary

We’ve converted from a conventional ur Forum’s long-planned focus on land warfare coincides force to focus on counterinsurgency. That with a number of contextual said, I think we’ve got to broaden our Odevelopments that influenced training and readiness with respect to and altered its content. In August 2008, Sec- full spectrum conflicts, put in balance the retary of Defense Robert Gates released the National Defense Strategy, which is a deriva- counterinsurgency requirement, which tive of the 2006 National Security Strategy is very much in evidence in Iraq and and Quadrennial Defense Review, incor- Afghanistan, and preserve the capability porating lessons from irregular warfare in to prosecute a conventional war. Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terror. As Secretary Gates has written in —Admiral Michael G. Mullen this issue’s first installment, his strategy for September 23, 2008 supporting the President’s national security objectives includes the goal of mastering irregular warfare to a degree of prowess that If you think about what landpower is in compares with U.S. military competence the 21st century, you realize it’s the ability in large-scale conventional conflicts. It is to generate decisive results on land. And well known that Army Field Manual 3–24/ who does that? It’s not just the Army, it’s Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–33.5, Counterinsurgency, has played an the Marine Corps, it’s Special Forces, it’s important role in the success of operations our allied forces, it’s indigenous forces, in Iraq, but perhaps more interesting is the and also, it’s all the interagency forces. fact that this manual and the success of U.S. And all those elements have to come land forces in extrapolating from it have also informed subsequent strategic planning together to generate the decisive results guidance. Marines aboard USS perform weapons we are seeking. Admiral Michael Mullen is crafting Boxer training a National Military Strategy (NMS) that is U.S. Navy (Daniel A. Barker) —General George W. Casey, Jr. guided by the preceding National Defense October 21, 2008 Strategy (NDS) and tempered by the reality “War’s conduct and outcome depend in large of a worldwide financial crisis that emerged measure on subjective factors such as the shortly after the NDS release. The NMS will of the people, the wisdom of political delineates how the Armed Forces shall strike objectives, and consistency between those a better balance between a force structure objectives and military strategy.” In the optimized for low frequency, large-scale face of dwindling resources and long-term conventional military operations and one demand, our Forum explores the train- optimized for higher frequency irregular ing, equipping, and future employment of warfare. The critical expectation is that land forces in support of the 2008 National nonmilitary Federal agencies shall improve Defense Strategy. their expeditionary capabilities and bring The Forum begins with the Chief their unique core competencies to bear of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George on national security challenges, thereby Casey, whose recent experience as com- improving the legitimacy and effectiveness mander, Multi-National Force–Iraq, and of U.S. power. Yet the devil is always in current Title X responsibilities for recruit- the details, as H.R. McMaster has noted: ing, training, and equipping the U.S. Army ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 13 FORUM | Executive Summary make him an ideal candidate to outline Colonel Gentile’s counterpoint begins flawed and that most efforts and resources today’s challenges and the future of U.S. with a startling assertion that land force devoted to them have been wasted. Begin- land forces. We began our interview with officers have not seriously debated the ning with the Air Corps Tactical School and force generation and personnel management content and implications of recent field strategic bombing, Vego surveys industrial issues against the backdrop of protracted manuals addressing conventional military web theory, Colonel John Warden’s Five conflict, changing public attitudes, and operations, counterinsurgency, or stability Ring Model, effects-based operations, and demographics. General Casey walked JFQ and support operations. He fears that the systemic operational design. The author through current operational strategies, then Army is placing primacy on nationbuild- argues that a systems approach to warfare is future combat systems, and finally his vision ing over armed combat and that this trend not much different than the “geometrical” or for the Army 20 years from now. General exposes the United States to strategic peril. “mathematical” school that dominated mili- Casey believes that future land forces must He doubts the capability of the military to tary thinking in the late 18th century and to be versatile, expeditionary, agile, lethal, reshape foreign cultures and governmental which Clausewitz was vehemently opposed. sustainable, and interoperable. He concludes institutions, asserting that the Army should The strength of Professor Vego’s article is his with his assessment of progress in the engage in such endeavors only for brief description of how military leaders develop ongoing effort to improve jointness in the periods. In the face of limited resources, the operational thinking, which is “far more U.S. military. training and organization of forces should comprehensive . . . realistic, dynamic, and The second and third Forum entries focus on the core competency that is not flexible than systems thinking.” Excellence were invited to catalyze thought regarding resident anywhere else: fighting. The Army’s in the art of war, as in other art, cannot be the proper balance of training and equip- emphasis on insurgency and foreign popula- reduced to paint-by-numbers. ment between low- and high-intensity con- tions as the default center of gravity has Our concluding Forum entry explores flict. To achieve this objective, we introduce become dogmatic and subtly shapes Ameri- innovative proposals to support land forces two accomplished Army officers well known can foreign policy by improving military facing the dual challenges of long-range to land warfare professionals who debate readiness for foreign interventions in pursuit precision weapons and the logistic burden of this and other compelling limited war issues of global stability. The current intellectual dependence upon fossil fuels. The authors, on military-oriented Web sites such as the climate in the Army appears to emphasize Marvin Schaffer and Ike Chang, examine Small Wars Journal. Honest military profes- short-term expedience, rather than longer the requirements to support alternative sionals can examine historic and contempo- term strategic goals. propulsion systems for vehicles, and then rary facts and nevertheless arrive at opposite In our fourth installment, Lieutenant associated fuel production options, most conclusions, as Colonels John Nagl and Gian Colonel Frank Hoffman hypothesizes that prominently hydrogen. In the category of Gentile demonstrate in this informative new environmental conditions are changing electrical power generation, four nuclear point-counterpoint. both the frequency and character of conflict. reactor concepts are reviewed with an eye to In the opening salvo, Dr. Nagl notes The character changes that he outlines boil mobility and safety. The authors conclude that many U.S. defense analysts are voicing down to the blending of war forms, resulting that the Army should develop a fleet of vehi- concerns over an emerging atrophy of in increased lethality and aimed at per- cles powered by a combination of electricity conventional warfighting skills among U.S. ceived U.S. vulnerabilities. This construct, and hydrogen and fueled by theater-mobile land forces. He argues that anticipating described as hybrid warfare, is distinguished nuclear reactors and hydrogen manufactur- future conflicts is important, but it is much by the simultaneous application of various ing facilities. These technologies already more important to organize for and win forms of conflict, including criminal activ- exist and may become practical in a decade. the conflicts in which the United States ity and terror. The author notes that hybrid In the face of a predictable rise in the cost is presently engaged in Iraq and Afghani- wars are not new, but different and more of fossil fuel, planning for theater-mobile stan. He surveys the legacy of lessons complicated than compound wars, which alternatives must begin now. JFQ inferred from the Vietnam conflict and the describe operationally separate forces under —D.H. Gurney complementary effect of the Cold War on unified direction. This article features a doctrine development. Operation Desert hybrid warfare case study exploring Hizbal- Storm seemed to validate the U.S. bias lah’s operations in the second Lebanon war toward conventional state-on-state warfare, of 2006. Hoffman warns that a bifurcated and the Army consequently neglected to focus on war forms, as presented by Nagl adapt to a changing global context that was and Gentile, tends to overlook the most evident in places such as Somalia, Haiti, likely and dangerous of combinations: and the Balkans. Dr. Nagl argues that the hybrid war. Army has not taken today’s wars seri- The fifth essay is a denunciation of ously enough and is too slow to recognize the trend toward a systems approach to evident trends that should be shaping the war and an argument for a return to the forces that the United States will need traditional reductionist methods of military tomorrow. The continuing inclination of operational art. Professor Milan Vego points defense institutions to devalue irregular to recent conflicts and notes that scientific warfare is irresponsible. approaches to human competition are badly

14 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu General George W. Casey, Jr., is Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. An Interview with George W. Casey, Jr.

JFQ: The Army traditionally recruits the American Revolution. That said, all the not; there’s got to be something different that recent high school graduates. Today, however, things you stated in the question are true: the we can do.” We’re trying a range of things— fewer younger people meet minimum stan- number of high school graduates is down, the one of them is the Army Experience Center in dards for service, and more are going on to number with the propensity to serve is down. Philadelphia—to bring technology to bear in higher education. There is a declining pool But last year, fiscal year 2008, almost 290,000 a way that relates more to the folks that we’re of candidates, and, frankly, the possibility of men and women enlisted or reenlisted in the trying to attract. And I’ve made a note to military service does not even enter the minds Army, Guard, and Reserve. When they signed myself to swing by and see it myself. I’ve only of many. What initiatives are under way to up, they all knew that they were going to war. heard about it, but it’s probably a little too deal with this? That speaks highly of the men and women early to tell how it’s going to work out. of the United States of America. Now, as One of the other things we’re doing is General Casey: This gets right to the you can imagine, we are looking at that and a forum we’re participating in called Invest- heart of the issue about how we recruit and saying, “Are the recruiting procedures and ment in America. It’s a group of business, sustain an all-volunteer force at war, and it’s skills that we’ve used since the early 1980s not-for-profit, and Army leaders, and we something that we’re breaking new ground still sufficient to serve us in this current envi- meet every year and talk about ways that on every day. The last time we did it was ronment?” And intuitively, we say, “Probably we can work together to do things that will help the country. Last summer, for example, the discussion turned to how we build an Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.), and Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman of Joint Force educated population for both the business Quarterly interviewed General Casey at his Pentagon office. community and the military. The business community faces the exact same challenges ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 15 FORUM | Interview that we do. The folks that they’re getting out find ourselves in now, and that certainly So I think the force generation model of the high schools don’t have the intellec- didn’t impact anywhere near the percentage is exactly where we need to be. Frankly, tual skills, the writing skills, the communi- of the Army that these current deployments we’re the last Service to come on to this. The cation skills, and frankly, they don’t have the have. So we say that we need to be expedition- Marines and Navy have been doing it for ethical and moral skills that business leaders ary, which is one of the key characteristics of years; the Air Force had their expeditionary are looking for. And so we’ve had several the Army in the 21st century. To do that, we rotational forces, and this is something that I sessions since then, and we’re working to put have to put ourselves on a rotational model. think we need to do, and we’re doing it now. together a group where we can go into a city ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] is The Governors and homeland and say, “Here’s a group of business, not-for- that rotational model. It allows us, one, to defense—I think this model actually helps profit, and military folks who want to work give predictability to the Soldiers and their the Governors because it gives them vis- with you to improve secondary education in families because they know where they are ibility of when their forces will be deployed, your city.” Obviously, business brings money in the cycle; two, to continually generate and it allows them to work the interstate and the promise of jobs; we bring Junior forces to sustain the long-term commitments; compacts to hedge against problems that may ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Corps] and three, to have forces in readiness that arise when the forces are gone. Steve Blum and other things. And I expect to have a are trained, equipped, manned, that can [Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, plan that we might offer a couple of target go anywhere on short notice. If you look at National Guard Bureau] promised the Gover- cities. Mayor [Richard] Daley in Chicago the different phases of the cycle, I think it’s nors several years ago that he’d ensure they’d has already done some amazing things with exactly the model that we need for an era always have 50 percent of their capabilities, Junior ROTC, and when I was there for the of persistent conflict. I believe that’s where and he’s been able to do that. So actually, I Memorial Day parade, he invited me to be we are. We’re at war, we’ve been at war for 7 think the ARFORGEN helps the Governors the grand marshal. The mayor had these years, and all the emerging global trends will and the homeland security needs. marching units of Junior ROTC cadets probably exacerbate rather than ameliorate representing the high schools, and he knew those conditions. And so I believe we, the JFQ: The National Guard has an infor- about every one of the schools. When you ground forces, and the air and naval forces mal social compact with the U.S. population look at these formations walking down the to a lesser extent, are going to be committed regarding the use of the Reserve Component. street, almost all in step, you could see the either in engagements or other activities for The National Guard must have forces ready power that Junior ROTC brings and the the foreseeable future, and we need to have a and available for domestic disasters and discipline that allows them to finish school, force generation model that allows us to con- threats, while at the same time they are heavily to get more out of the school that they’re tinually prepare our forces for that. engaged overseas. What steps have you taken in, and achieve better test scores and better to ensure that there is no negative impact on completion rates. our strategic reserve? So this is a long way of saying we need we’re at war, we’ve been to focus not only on changing how we recruit at war for 7 years, and all General Casey: That’s a great ques- but also how we think we could work with the emerging global trends tion, and it’s one that we’re going to have to folks on improving the level of secondary will probably exacerbate continue to wrestle with in the coming years. education in the country. We think it’s some- rather than ameliorate those We say that we need to adapt our Guard and thing that we could do to help the country conditions Reserve forces from their role as strictly a and also help us on the side. strategic reserve to an operational force that can augment the Active forces in sustaining JFQ: The Army Force Generation model I mentioned that before September commitments abroad. That’s caused major was created to optimize your personnel/train- 11, we were a garrison-based Army that change in how we deal with the Guard and ing/equipment investments. Do you have any lived to train. As a result, all our systems of Reserve because all of the policies, proce- concerns that the Force Generation model personnel, education, family support, train- dures, and laws governing the Guard and short-changes the broader national security ing—they’re all designed to support a pre– Reserve were developed after the Korean War. needs of the country, particularly those of the September 11 Army. But on a force generation As with anything else in Washington that’s Governors and homeland defense needs? model, you have different requirements. For 60 years old, there are deep roots. And the example, we are trying to move this model policies aren’t necessarily designed to support General Casey: Short answer: no. But so that when a unit is in the deployment the way we use the Guard and Reserve right in fact, I think it’s even more important for us window, it can deploy without stop-loss. Our now. We have told the Guard and Reserve to put ourselves on a cyclical readiness model personnel systems aren’t designed to do that that we want to work toward a rotational where we can both generate forces to sustain now, and you can imagine what it takes to scheme where they deploy for a year and long-term commitments and have forces get everybody in a unit lined up so they don’t are home for 4 or 5 years. They tell us that’s ready to do other things. Before September have a DEROS [date eligible to return from sustainable. I believe it is sustainable, but 11, 2001, we were basically a garrison-based overseas] date in the middle of the deploy- we’re not there yet. Right now the Guard and Army that lived to train, and we were very ment. So that’s where we have to get to. And if Reserve are deploying about once every 3½ good at it. The rotations into the Balkans you think about training, everything else has years, but their recruiting and their retention were the closest we had to the situation we an aspect like that. are still good. So we’re wrestling with finding

16 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CASEY the right role for the Guard and Reserve, and “Good news, general, we have a course of It’s always hard to change the culture. I think that a new administration is prob- action we all agree on,” I sometimes think, And frankly, it took almost a year for my ably going to want to look at whether we are “Uh-oh, this might be a half-baked course of own personnel guys to change the policy to prepared to sustain a commitment of 60,000 action because it’s all about compromise.” make transition team leaders a command to 70,000 mobilized Reserve Soldiers and select position for the brigade and battalion Guardsmen for the indefinite future. It’s a JFQ: On September 30, 2008, Secretary transition team leaders. But we’re doing that. question that we’ve discussed, and the Guard of Defense Gates said, “One of the enduring A board met this past fall that actually picked and Reserves say it’s sustainable, but it’s not issues our military struggles with is whether folks off the central selection list to lead these necessarily our call. Right now, we have about personnel and promotions systems designed efforts. It is that important. 68,000 mobilized Guardsmen and Reserve to reward command of American troops will Now, there are some folks who say Soldiers on Active duty, and obviously if we be able to reflect the importance of advising, we need an advisor corps. I’d say we have don’t have access to them, then that speaks to training, and equipping foreign troops—which an advisor corps; it’s called Special Forces. what we need to do with the size of the Active is still not considered a career-enhancing path The question is how large of an effort do force. So that’s an important consideration as for our best and brightest officers.” The Army we need for training foreign armies. I got we go forward. is investing in the development and training together with Jim Mattis [General James N. With respect to the strategic reserve of large numbers of advisors to serve in Iraq Mattis, USMC, commander, U.S. Joint Forces part of this, the Guard and Reserve are about and Afghanistan. Will the Army continue and Command], Jim Conway [General James T. half our force. We’re much more reliant on expand this program? If so, will it become a Conway, commandant, U.S. Marine Corps], the Guard and Reserve than are the other career track? and Eric Olson [Admiral Eric T. Olson, Services. And so we always have some USN, commander, U.S. Special Operations portion of them not committed. There are General Casey: I don’t think it will Command]. We all sat down and said, “Okay, about half a million Guardsmen and Reserv- become a career track, but let me give you what do we really need here?” First, we all ists, and we’ve had about 60,000 or 70,000 some background. We started the transition thought we needed to set ourselves up in Iraq deployed on a given day, so we still have a team program when I was in Iraq, and I and Afghanistan for the long haul because strategic reserve, even though we are deploy- talked to every group that came in and told we’re going to be training the militaries and ing the bulk of them as an operational force. them that the success of the mission in Iraq, the police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and also in Afghanistan, was dependent on for a while. Then we thought that we could JFQ: A number of academics assert the security forces of the other countries probably do the rest of the engagement with that the time-honored code of loyal opposi- being able to provide domestic order and other militaries with Special Forces, and tion behind closed doors is in decline and that deny their countries as a safe haven for terror. we’re growing a battalion each year over the private dissent is neither encouraged nor well So we weren’t going to succeed in either Iraq next 5 years. There may be times when we tolerated within the Army. What is your view or Afghanistan until the local security forces need to have Special Forces teams augmented of this charge? succeeded, and so they were a critical enabler with conventional forces. For example, we to the overall success of the mission. can send a 10-man team out of a brigade General Casey: I think it’s outdated. When you have an organization this size, about a million people, I’m sure there are some people who feel like dissent isn’t tolerated. But by and large, this is a combat- seasoned force. The leaders have all known combat, and in combat, things don’t always U.S. Army (Courtney Wittmann) go exactly how you planned. What you want is people asking hard questions before an operation. I can remember as a captain getting the operations order brief from the battalion S3 [commander’s principal staff officer for matters concerning operations, plans, organization, and training], and at the end of every brief, he said, “Are there any questions?” And you’d be sitting there thinking, “This is the dumbest thing I ever heard,” but everybody said, “No,” and you all charged out the door. Well, that doesn’t happen any more today, because people’s lives are at stake. You’d say, “Wait a minute, colonel, time out! I don’t get it.” So I don’t entirely dispute the GEN Casey and Chicago Mayor Richard Daley participate in Memorial Day celebration conventional wisdom. In fact, when I hear, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 17 FORUM | Interview headquarters, lash them up with an A-team, it’s all the interagency forces. And all those thing I did, that these are the capabilities we and they can assist in training with foreign elements have to come together to generate have to have right now. brigades. But more and more, the people who the decisive results we are seeking. Indig- We were originally going to put all that need our help are not going to be in a position enous forces are a huge part of that, and our in the heavy force, which is already the best where they can be openly seen with Ameri- guys are recognizing that more and more. heavy force in the world. And so we said, why can Soldiers running around the country. So When I started in Iraq, it was our nature to don’t we take these capabilities and put them we’re looking more toward the majority of say, “Let me do it.” And I did this myself in in the light forces, who need them right now. this work being done by Special Forces, aug- Bosnia. And over time, we’ve come to realize So we’re doing that, and we’ll have it in the mented, when they need to be, by regionally that the key to long-term success is indig- hands of the light Soldiers in 2011. The first oriented conventional forces, which is some- enous forces. It’s artful; it takes more art to brigade, which means probably the last of the thing else the ARFORGEN model allows us train somebody else to do missions than to do “Grow the Army” brigades that we build, will to do. them yourself, but I think we’re getting more be outfitted with the FCS systems and the first We also asked ourselves if we really and more sophisticated in our abilities. increment of the network, and we’ll continue think we’re going to build another country’s to build the rest of the systems over time. army and police forces and ministries from JFQ: How might the need to address So we have to build the Future Combat the ground up any time soon. And the answer hybrid threats impact the Future Combat System as a full-spectrum combat system. was, probably not. We’ve got several chal- Systems [FCS] program, which is founded on a I think we’re moving in the right direction, lenges: we’ve got to set ourselves up to do Iraq more conventionally oriented type of threat? Is and what we’re going to see now is not just 15 and Afghanistan for the long haul, and then the FCS program well balanced in the overall FCS brigades that come out of this, but we’re figure out how we augment Special Forces conflict spectrum? going to have an FCS-enabled Army, and it to do the other engagement that we need. will start with the infantry guys, and that will That’s kind of the direction we’re going. In General Casey: To be fair, when we be a fundamentally different Army. What the interim, we have a training center for started down the FCS road in the late 1990s, you’re going to see also is the FCS capabili- transition teams that we’re going to continue it was designed to fight conventional war as ties overlaid on modular organizations, and to run, it’s going to move down to Fort Polk, we thought it would be in the 21st century, that’s what the Army of the 21st century will out of Fort Riley, and we’re going to have a and that’s where we started. Over time, our ultimately look like. We’re still refining that, brigade dedicated to doing nothing but train- understanding of irregular warfare has but simplistically said, that’s what’s going to ing transition teams. So we’ll continue to do matured and evolved, and frankly I came happen. It will be a full-spectrum Army. that for a while. back from Iraq and I took one look at the I just came back from Afghanistan, and FCS capabilities we had and said, “This is JFQ: The United States persistently fails more and more I’m hearing Soldiers on the the stuff we need in Iraq and Afghanistan to learn from past mistakes by taking “peace ground say that the partnerships—matching today.” We went through a big review of the dividends” and downsizing or neglecting the an Afghani battalion up with a coalition program and announced in May that we have Armed Forces in the aftermath of significant battalion or a coalition company—is having these five capabilities that were developed conflict. In the face of adverse economic condi- a greater impact on the indigenous forces for the FCS program that are out now in the tions, how concerned are you about the pos- than the transition teams. We may not need hands of Soldiers who are testing them: the sibility of yet another shortsighted readiness as many transition teams; just aligning them unmanned aerial vehicle, the robot, the unat- calamity? with the coalition forces may be a better way tended ground sensors, the non–line-of-sight to go. In Iraq we had both; we had transition cannon, which is basically a 40-kilometer General Casey: Any reader of our teams and partnership, and that seemed to cruise missile that will fly in the window of history has to be concerned. After every war, work. So I think you may see how transi- a house, and the land warrior system that we we have been drawn down drastically. When tion teams are evolving a little bit in Iraq cancelled, but someone was smart enough to I had a transition team help me prepare to and Afghanistan, and we’re working with keep one battalion’s worth of it, and we put come into this job, I had one group focus the theater to see what the best way to go is. it on a battalion that went to Iraq. I visited on the future and one group focus on the But at least in Iraq, and to some extent in them there, and they said that they would present. The future group was looking at Afghanistan, the proficiency of indigenous rather leave the compound without their about 2020 to determine the kind of Army forces is getting to where they don’t need to weapons than without their land warrior we’re going to need then, and the current have somebody with them every day; they system. It basically gives them an eyepiece group was looking at the current force, but can operate side by side. So I think it’s going where they can view a computer screen, and I also said, “You guys, go back 13 years in to evolve a little bit, but I’m not exactly sure they have a military BlackBerry, so they the other direction, go back to 1993 and tell how it’s going to go. can stay connected when they’re out there. us what we were doing back then.” Think If you think about what landpower is They know where everybody in their squad about it. We were basking in the glow of in the 21st century, you realize it’s the ability is—they know where everybody is, so their Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we were patting to generate decisive results on land. And situational awareness is huge. So you put all ourselves on the back for winning the Cold who does that? It’s not just the Army, it’s the that together, and we put it in the hands of War, we were spending the peace dividend as Marine Corps, it’s Special Forces, it’s our Soldiers out at Fort Bliss who had just come fast as we could write the checks, and we were allied forces, it’s indigenous forces, and also, back from Iraq, and they all said the same drawing the Army down by 300,000—from

18 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CASEY

780,000 to 480,000. We were cutting the you have a nonstate actor, Hizballah, operat- surveillance, and reconnaissance] over to Iraq CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], we were ing inside a state, Lebanon, fighting another or Afghanistan. We need to be better, and we cutting USAID [U.S. Agency for Interna- state, Israel, [and] supported by yet another need to have institutions that, when we get put tional Development]. I tell folks, “Now we’re state, Iran. And Hizballah starts the war with in a new situation, can rapidly evaluate it and at war, we’re facing a future of persistent 13,000 rockets: The tools of power are no give the Soldiers the tools and the equipment conflict, you ought not to be thinking about longer exclusively in the hands of states, and needed to get the job done. taking the peace dividend right now.” All that nonstate actors are a bit harder to deter than Fourth, they have to be lethal. That is said, I don’t think anybody knows the impact state actors. So we looked at that—we looked our core competency, and we can’t forget of the financial crisis, but none of us think it’s at the need to operate with indigenous forces, that. We can’t get diverted by all these other going to be positive, so I think there’s going the need to operate with other agencies of the things that we have to do. Lethality is our to be real tension on this. We just have to be government, the need to sustain ourselves in core competency, and it’s got to be precision careful, we have to keep reminding ourselves austere environments over the long haul. lethality. That goes with the kind of systems that we’re at war, we’ve got over 150,000 And we believe that land forces for the we’re developing. Soldiers deployed in combat, we’ve got to be future need to have six characteristics. First Fifth, they have to be sustainable, and really careful with that; they need to be sus- of all, they need to be versatile. I gave you my not just sustainable in austere environments. tained. And I think they will. thoughts about the future knowing full well that We’ve got to have a reduced logistical footprint the best we’re going to do is get it about right. because the more equipment you expose on JFQ: General James Conway says that And so we have to design and equip forces the roads, the greater your challenges are it is vital to extract the Marine Corps from with a doctrine that allows them to be rapidly going to be. The other piece of sustainability is land fighting and return it to its expeditionary, tailored to the future as it presents itself. The having this force generation model that allows maritime-based roots because the world 20 modular organizations that we’ve gone forward you to sustain missions over the long duration. years from now will be drastically different. with here are a good example of that. Lastly, we have to be interoperable. How will the Army recalibrate for the chal- Second, they’ve got to be expedition- Interoperability goes well beyond joint and lenges anticipated two decades from now? ary. With the exception of domestic support combined forces. We have to be able to bring to civil authorities, we’re going to be doing in all the effects that the interagency and the General Casey: [General Conway] things abroad, and we have to be able to local governments bring to bear. I have come talks about this all the time, and he’s right. get there quickly, we have to sustain the to think that the planning and organizational We have done an awful lot of thinking about fight, and we have to build leaders with an skills of our land forces are a national asset what the future looks like. Pete Schoomaker and ought to be treated as a national asset. [General Peter Schoomaker, 35th Chief of Staff We understand how to plan, organize, and of the Army] had us on a great track with the the future will be one of integrate. I watched it in Iraq. We’re doing it conversion to these modular organizations— persistent conflict where we’re in Iraq, and we’re doing it in Afghanistan. We we’re 80-plus percent done—and rebalancing dealing with state and nonstate understand how to bring different elements skills to ones that are more relevant in the 21st actors who are increasingly of power together to generate that decisive century. We’re transforming. And our knowl- willing to use violence to result. We don’t have to be in charge; other edge is increasingly enhanced by what we’re accomplish their objectives elements of the government ought to leverage learning daily in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that potential and that capability. So interop- we’ve been looking hard at what we think the erability goes well beyond the same size strategic environment is going to look like. expeditionary mindset that are uncowed by ammunition and the same radio frequency. I believe the future will be one of persistent going into a strange environment. I just saw We’re at a whole new level now, and we have conflict where we’re dealing with state and that up in New York. I went up to visit the to be able to bring all those elements of power nonstate actors who are increasingly willing 3/10 Mountain [3d Brigade Combat Team, together. So those are the six characteristics to use violence to accomplish their objectives. 10th Mountain Division], whose mission was that we’re designing our forces around. That doesn’t mean we’re going to be engaged just changed from Iraq to Afghanistan. And We have come a long way with joint- at the same level as Iraq and Afghanistan, what you’ve got there is not a bunch of guys ness. I’ve watched us get better and better. We but we have to prepare ourselves to deal with thinking they’re going to go out there and do have a growing generation of officers at the that eventuality. The future is not going to be something new, but seasoned veterans who company and battalion level who understand peaceful. understood the challenges they were getting jointness. We’ve had infantry platoons with The second part is that we’ve asked into and weren’t cowed by it. They were con- Marine battalions calling in naval air in Fal- ourselves, how has the character of conflict fident. They had that expeditionary mindset. lujah, so these guys understand how to apply changed? The nature of war doesn’t change, Third, they need to be agile. Leaders, joint power in combat. And we have to figure but the character of conflict can change, and units, and institutions need to be agile. Our out how to continue to build on that and then as I look back at the character of the wars institutions aren’t very agile right now because to bring in the interagency and really expand that I’ve prepared to fight in my career, it’s we haven’t had to be agile in the past. Secretary the notion of jointness to work in interoper- fundamentally different now for young folks. Gates asks why the heck it takes so long to get ability with all the other elements of govern- They’re dealing with nonstate actors. I look at an MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected ment. I think that’s something that all the the Lebanon conflict in December 2006. Here vehicle] and additional ISR [intelligence, Services can work on in the years ahead. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 19 POINT>

Your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars. By John A. Nagl —General Douglas MacArthur1

stunning if predictable development in the military community over the past 2 years A has been the backlash against the promulgation of counterinsurgency learning in the midst of the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. These wars have spurred long-overdue changes in the way the U.S. military prepares for and prioritizes irregular warfare. These changes are hard- won: they have been achieved only after years of wartime trials and tribulations that have cost the United States dearly in money, materiel, and the lives of its courageous Servicemembers. Yet despite the relatively tentative nature of such changes, there are already those who predict grim strategic outcomes for America if its military, particularly the Army, continues the process of adaptation. Gian Gentile, the vocal Army critic of counterinsurgency adaptation, has written that a “hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency puts the American Army in a perilous condition. Its ability to fight wars consisting of head-on battles using tanks and mechanized infantry is in danger of atrophy.”2 He is not alone in his views. Three brigade commanders in the Iraq War wrote a white paper warning about the degradation of seldom used field artillery, declaring that the Army is “mortgaging [its] ability to fight the next war” by neglecting the requirements for combined arms operations.3 The Army Sec- retary, Pete Geren, and Chief of Staff, General Infantry Rgt (Samuel Bendet) th George Casey, both assert that the Army is BN, 27 d Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, USA (Ret.), is a Elements of 25th Infantry Division conduct combat Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American operations with Iraqi army amid burning oil fields

C Company, 2 C Company, Security.

20 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu NAGL

“out of balance” in part because of “a focus on controversial conflict. As Gentile sees it, those reasons to renew its emphasis on conventional training for counterinsurgency operations to seeking to improve the Army’s counterinsur- combat. The threat of a Soviet invasion of the exclusion of other capabilities.”4 Promi- gency capabilities are “busy fighting Vietnam Europe was a clear and present danger at the nent civilian thinkers in the academic com- all over again in Iraq.”8 This implies that the time. The post-Vietnam Army was a demoral- munity have presented similar arguments.5 Army has nothing to learn from the Vietnam ized “hollow force” wracked by desertion and With such dire warnings, one might forget counterinsurgency experience. drug abuse. It badly needed to be infused with that there’s a war on right now. Interestingly, that was precisely the a new sense of mission, which was achieved Let’s Win the Wars We’re In The mission of the U.S. Army is to fight Army’s view at the time. In the wake of that through doctrinal revisions and a massive and win the Nation’s wars. When bullets are war, the Army opted to focus on large-scale conventional force buildup from the late 1970s flying, Soldiers are in harm’s way, and the conventional combat and “forget” counter- through the 1980s. national interest is at stake, the Army must insurgency. Studies criticizing the Army’s devote the last full measure of its devotion approach to the Vietnam War were largely to winning the wars it is in. Future conflicts ignored. The standard narrative was promul- studies criticizing the Army’s are important, but the present conflicts are gated by Colonel Harry Summers in his 1982 approach to the Vietnam War critical: the United States is not winning a book On Strategy: “Instead of orienting on were largely ignored counterinsurgency campaign in Afghani- North Vietnam—the source of the war—we stan and, at great cost, just managed to turn turned our attention to the symptom—the around another in Iraq that was on the verge of catastrophic collapse only 2 years ago. A continued American commitment to both campaigns is likely necessary for some years to come. America’s enemies in the Long

War—the al Qaeda terrorist organization U.S. Army (D. Myles Cullen) and its associated movements infesting other states around the world—remain determined to strike. A host of trends from globalization to population growth to weapons proliferation, which the Army has recognized in its latest posture statement, suggests that the “era of persistent conflict” against lethal nonstate irregular foes will not end any time soon.6 For all these reasons, the security of the Nation and its interests demand that the Army continue to learn and adapt to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare and that it institutionalize these adaptations so they are not forgotten again.

Forgetting Lessons—On Purpose Army Chief of Staff GEN Casey and Army Secretary Pete Geren brief congressional staffers We put an army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. The truth of the guerrilla war in the South.”9 Summers argued The dark side of this rebirth, however, matter is: It doesn’t have any doctrine, nor that the focus of American strategy should was the rejection of irregular warfare as a was it educated and trained, to deal with an have been to defeat North Vietnam through significant component of future conflict. insurgency. . . . After the Vietnam War, we conventional operations; the insurgency Rather than rethinking and improving its purged ourselves of everything that dealt with itself was inconsequential. General William counterinsurgency doctrine after Vietnam, irregular warfare or insurgency, because it Westmoreland and many others concurred the Army sought to bury it, largely banishing had to do with how we lost that war. In hind- with this assessment: “the United States failed it from its key field manuals and the curricu- sight, that was a bad decision. . . . We have in Vietnam because it did not use its military lum of its schoolhouses. Doctrine for “coun- responsibility. power to maximum advantage,” largely due terguerrilla” or “low-intensity” operations did —General John Keane7 to restrictive micromanagement by civilian make a comeback in the 1980s, but the Army policymakers in Washington.10 The solution regarded such missions as the exclusive prov- Critics charge that by adapting more was to rebuild an Army focused exclusively on ince of special operations forces. Worse, these fully to the unique demands of counterinsur- achieving decisive operational victories on the revamped doctrinal publications prescribed gency, the Army is preparing to fight the last battlefield. the same enemy-centric conventional opera- war. In this accusation, “the last war” refers The Army certainly did need to be tions and tactics that had been developed in not only to Iraq but also to an even earlier rebuilt after Vietnam, and there were good the early 1960s, again giving short shrift to the

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 21 FORUM | Let’s Win the Wars We’re In importance of securing the population and College] students honed their planning skills to apply its power more intelligently, more countering political subversion.11 It was as if on a scenario predicated on a reconstituted economically, and above all, more relevantly. the Vietnam War had never happened. Soviet Union launching vast mechanized —Brian Jenkins15 The Army’s superlative performance in armies at NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Operation Desert Storm in 1991 provided vali- Organization].”13 The overriding emphasis The Army’s lack of preparedness was dation for its reforms but further entrenched on conventional operations left the Army exacerbated by its failure to adapt fully and the mindset that conventional state-on-state unable to deal effectively with the wars rapidly to the demands of counterinsur- warfare was the future, while counterinsur- it ultimately had to fight, as Secretary of gency in Iraq and Afghanistan. By early gency and irregular warfare were but lesser Defense Robert Gates has observed: 2002, the Taliban appeared defeated and included contingencies. The Army did not Afghanistan firmly under the control of adjust to the fact that its peer competitor had In the years following the Vietnam War, the America’s Afghan allies. The fall of Baghdad collapsed, spending the decade after the end Army relegated unconventional war to the in April 2003 after a 3-week campaign of the Cold War continuing to prepare for war margins of training, doctrine, and budget initially appeared as another confirmation against a Soviet Union that no longer existed. priorities. . . . This approach may have seemed of the superiority of U.S. military capabili- As Brian McAllister Linn writes in his recent validated by ultimate victory in the Cold ties. In both instances, the enemy had other survey of the Army’s history, the Army’s War and the triumph of Desert Storm. But ideas. Inadequate contingency planning post–Cold War leadership believed that “the it left the service unprepared to deal with the by both civilian leaders and military com- army should devote itself to the organiza- operations that followed: Somalia, Haiti, the manders to secure the peace contributed tional ‘imperatives’—doctrine, force mixture, Balkans, and more recently Afghanistan and to the chaotic conditions that enabled recruiting, and, above all, training—at which it Iraq—the consequences and costs of which we insurgent groups to establish themselves. already excelled.”12 are still struggling with today.14 With some notable lower level exceptions, Deployments to Somalia, Haiti, and the institutional Army did not adapt to these the Balkans in the 1990s brought the Army Unprepared is a hard word, but Iraq and conditions until it was perilously close to face to face with different types of missions Afghanistan have presented the Army with losing these wars. that did not adhere to the Desert Storm hard realities that it has fought to overcome. model. Despite the relatively high demand for its forces in unconventional environ- the Army’s lack of ments, the Army continued to emphasize Failure of Adaptation preparedness was exacerbated “rapid, decisive battlefield operations by by its failure to adapt fully and large combat forces” in its doctrine and Our military institution seems to be prevented rapidly to the demands of the professional education. For example, “a by its own doctrinal and organizational rigid- year after the humiliating withdrawal from ity from understanding the nature of this war counterinsurgency in Iraq and Somalia, [Command and General Staff and from making the necessary modifications Afghanistan

U.S. forces faced with insurgencies had no doctrinal or training background in irregular warfare and reacted in an ad hoc fashion to challenges. The Army’s official history of the Iraq War between 2003 and 2005 argues that:

While relatively few American Soldiers in Iraq in 2003 were familiar with counterinsurgency warfare and its theorists, it did not take long before many of the basic concepts of counterinsurgency made their way into U.S. Army planning and operations. This process was indirect and based on immediate requirements rather than experience or doctrine. . . . In the spring and early summer, most Soldiers assessed the situation in their [areas of operations] and designed responses they believed were critical to address the unique political, economic, and military challenges in those areas.16

Soldier scans sector during Operation Raider Harvest, Muqdadiyah, Iraq (John Crosby) Stryker Brigade Combat Team th 4

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The events that transpired in Iraq (as resisted calls for troop increases to provide commanders leading counterinsurgency well as Afghanistan) after the end of major population security.21 U.S. forces in Afghani- operations in Iraq as part of the “surge” in 2007 combat operations belie this rather rosy stan remain undermanned, and to fight the and 2008 still had not read Galula or the other explanation. Many early ad hoc approaches to resurgent Taliban, they have relied heavily essential texts on counterinsurgency.25 Useful counterinsurgency failed to protect the popu- on airstrikes, which have served to kill and tools to secure and control the population, such lation from insurgent attacks and alienated alienate civilians in large numbers. In both as biometric identification measures, remain in the people through the excessive use of force.17 theaters, the mission of training and advising short supply. No institutional doctrine guides Many units, such as the 3d Armored Cavalry allied security forces has been severely under- the still–ad hoc effort to advise the Iraqi and Regiment under Colonel H.R. McMaster, did resourced and is still organized and manned Afghan security forces. And there is still no develop and employ effective population- in makeshift fashion. According to the Gov- systematic attempt to inculcate the hard-won centric counterinsurgency techniques inde- ernment Accountability Office, as of April truths about the wars of today into the next pendently, but such improvements were not 2008, the United States has fielded just 46 generation of Soldiers, as a young second emulated in a coordinated fashion throughout percent (1,019 of 2,215) of the DOD-required lieutenant in the Army’s Basic Officer Leader the force.18 It was not until 2007 that the Army number of embedded trainers for the Afghan Course (BOLC) recently discovered: finally adopted a unified approach that effec- National Army,22 and only about 32 percent tively secured the population and coopted (746 of 2,358) of required military mentors I am through the third week of the course now. reconcilable insurgent fighters in Iraq—but to the Afghan National Police23—despite the During our down time, I have been reading the Army still has not managed to make that fact that victory in this struggle depends on FM 3–24. I have had several of my fellow leap in Afghanistan. America’s ability to develop capable host- [lieutenants] ask me, “What the heck is that?” The brave efforts and sacrifices of nation security forces. They have never heard of it. (Nor have they American Soldiers in both theaters have The most frustrating aspect of these heard of Cobra II, Fiasco, or Assassins’ Gate, added up to less than the sum of their parts problems is that they represent a failure to which I have also had on me.) I asked one of due to institutional resistance to change. Even learn from history. As Major Niel Smith, USA, our platoon cadre if a class on [counterinsur- as counterinsurgency learning percolated rightly laments, “It is embarrassing that it gency] COIN operations is part of our BOLC throughout the ranks, the Army was slow II curriculum, and he asked me, “What is to recognize the need to adapt its doctrine, COIN?”26 organization, training, and procurement the mission of training and priorities to ensure that its forces were prop- advising allied security forces Other DOD schools provide students erly prepared for the wars they were fighting. has been severely under- with far better counterinsurgency educa- Secretary Gates recently told military officers resourced and is still organized tion. The Army could learn from the Marine at the National Defense University, “For every Corps’ Infantry Officer Course, where stu- heroic and resourceful innovation by troops and manned in makeshift dents are required to read FM 3–24 and other and commanders on the battlefield, there was fashion key works by theorists and practitioners such some institutional shortcoming at the Penta- as Galula and T.X. Hammes. gon they had to overcome.”19 The Department of Defense (DOD) as a whole was still operat- took us over three years to develop a compre- ing on a peacetime footing. Its documented hensive approach to counterinsurgency in the Preparing for Future Warfare failure to quickly provide sufficient quantities field when many of the ‘lessons’ were found of up-armored Humvees, Mine Resistant on the bookshelves of the post library.”24 The Correcting the persistent flawed thinking Ambush Protected vehicles, and surveillance key tenets of counterinsurgency—including about future conflict requires overcoming equipment to troops in the field is illustra- the need to secure the population, subor- significant obstacles and acknowledging that tive of an organization practicing business dinate military measures to political ends, adversaries will force real rather than imagi- as usual at a time of crisis. The Army, for its use minimum force, and work through the nary wars upon military forces until those part, calls for the Future Combat System, host nation—are not new. Practitioners from forces demonstrate the ability to defeat them. the “Grow the Force” initiative, and more T.E. Lawrence to David Galula to Sir Robert —Colonel H.R. McMaster27 Brigade Combat Teams as its solution to the Thompson to Robert Komer all expounded problems of insurgencies.20 However laudable cogently on these issues based on extensive These sins of omission indict an Army these long-term plans might be, they do not experience from the Middle East to the Far that has not taken its current wars seriously adequately address the immediate require- East. Although these lessons were freely avail- enough. When the Army is fully engaged, ments of current conflicts. able, the Army failed to begin institutionaliz- with half its combat brigades deployed in Lack of urgency amid rapidly changing counterinsurgency learning until the 2006 two wars for which it was not adequately ing circumstances is a theme that has run development of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) prepared—including one that the Chairman throughout the Army’s handling of Iraq and 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is “not convinced Afghanistan. In Iraq, the Army clung to 3–33.5, Counterinsurgency. that we’re winning”28—it is its clear duty to the failing strategy of rapidly transitioning In many ways, the Army has still not adapt to the demands of the current fights. security responsibility to indigenous forces as institutionalized the lessons of 5 years of fight- The fact that the Secretary of Defense had to Iraq fell into chaos in 2006 and persistently ing in Iraq and 7 years in Afghanistan. Battalion remind the Army that it was “unprepared” ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 23 FORUM | Let’s Win the Wars We’re In for the wars it was required to fight and also Sunni Arab states, becoming a theater for a stability operations, interrupted by distinct warn the entire defense establishment against destabilizing proxy war between the region’s episodes of major combat.”32 Just since the end “Next-War-itis” is illustrative of a pernicious competing powers. Afghanistan, meanwhile, of the Cold War, American troops have been mindset that irregular warfare is a fleeting is the focal point of the war on terror. The deployed to make and keep the peace in such phenomenon of lesser importance than con- Taliban, with its tribal allies, seeks to drive strategic backwaters as Somalia, Bosnia, and ventional conflicts.29 It would indeed be con- out the United States and NATO in order Kosovo. Similar demands will only increase venient if that were the case. Unfortunately, to retake control of the country. The same in a globalized world where local problems the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan threaten insurgency threatens the stability of Pakistan, increasingly do not stay local and where key U.S. interests if left unresolved and repre- a country that possesses nuclear weapons and “the most likely catastrophic threats to our sent a harbinger of wars to come. is currently the base for al Qaeda. Giving the homeland—for example, an American city Talk of overcommitment to the current Taliban any more breathing room would have poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terror- wars suggests there is something more disastrous consequences for the security of the ist attack—are more likely to emanate from pressing on the horizon. Michael Mazarr, entire region and for the United States.31 failing states than from aggressor states.”33 for example, asserts that the military should A close look at the historical record Furthermore, trends such as the youth avoid irregular warfare because large-scale reveals that the United States engages in bulge and urbanization in underdeveloped wars, “were they to occur, would engage ambiguous counterinsurgency and nation- states, as well as the proliferation of more U.S. interests that dwarfed anything at stake building missions far more often than it faces lethal weaponry, point to a future dominated in contingencies such as Somalia or even full-scale war. The Army’s new FM 3–07, Sta- by chaotic local insecurity and conflict rather Afghanistan.”30 Apparently Iraq, sitting at bility Operations, correctly notes that “Con- than confrontations between the armies the heart of the Middle East on top of the trary to popular belief, the military history and navies of nation-states.34 This future of fault line between the two major sects of of the United States is one characterized by persistent low-intensity conflict around the Islam as well as the globe’s second largest proven oil reserves, is not pressing enough. The near–civil war conditions that prevailed the historical record reveals that the United States engages in there in 2005 and 2006 brought in covert ambiguous counterinsurgency and nationbuilding missions far Iranian intervention and could have drawn more than it faces full-scale war involvement from Saudi Arabia and other

U.S. Marine (right) and Estonian soldier during clearing operation of enemy stronghold U.S. Marine Corps (Freddy G. Cantu) U.S. Marine Corps (Freddy

24 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu NAGL globe suggests that American interests are at Interestingly, they sound similar to the insur- tion and advising host-nation security forces, risk not from rising peer competitors but from gencies that the United States is currently require specialized organization, training, what has been called a “global security capac- combating, only more difficult. The learning and preparation for maximum effectiveness. ity deficit.”35 As such, the U.S. military is more curve is not going to get any easier. The advisory effort in particular suffers under likely to be called upon to counter insurgen- the current makeshift transition team system cies, intervene in civil strife and humanitarian Building the Army We Need with inadequate manpower and training, crises, rebuild nations, and wage uncon- and no doctrinal base to speak of. Given the ventional types of warfare than it is to fight [A]part from the special forces community importance of advisors to today’s wars and to mirror-image armed forces. It will not “have and some dissident colonels, for decades there America’s partners in the future, the Army the luxury of opting out [of these missions] has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency must seriously consider developing a perma- because they do not conform to preferred inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institu- nent Advisor Corps. notions of the American way of war.”36 tionalizing our capabilities to wage asymmet- Development of an Advisor Corps and Both state and nonstate enemies will ric or irregular conflict—and to quickly meet other irregular warfare–focused training, seek more asymmetric ways to challenge the the ever-changing needs of our forces engaged education, and career paths must occur against United States and its allies. America’s con- in these conflicts. the backdrop of an overall increase in Army ventional military superiority, which remains —Secretary of Defense Robert Gates39 end-strength that should exceed the addition substantial, will drive many of them to the of 65,000 troops currently anticipated by 2012. same conclusion: When they fight America The Army today is out of balance, but Given the protracted, manpower-intensive conventionally, they lose horribly in days or not just because of a stressful operational nature of counterinsurgency and the need to weeks. When they fight unconventionally by tempo and certainly not because of a long- prepare for other contingencies, the only way to employing guerrilla tactics, terrorism, and overdue increase in counterinsurgency achieve balance in the force is to make it bigger. information operations, they have a better training and education. Rather, it is because An expanded Army would permit more dwell chance of success. It is unclear why even a the Army, along with the broader defense time between deployments for adequate train- powerful enemy would want to risk a costly establishment it is a part of, remains rooted ing across the spectrum of conflict. head-to-head battlefield decision with the in an organizational culture that continues to United States. As Secretary Gates said, “Put prioritize the requirements for a hypothetical The U.S. Army has adapted to the simply, our enemies and potential adversar- future big war over the irregular conflicts the demands of counterinsurgency over the ies—including nation-states—have gone to force is currently fighting. past few years, but too painfully, fitfully, school on us. They saw what America’s tech- It may not be possible to change the and slowly. As the Secretary of Defense has nology and firepower did to Saddam’s army in culture of the Nation’s defense institutions noted, “In Iraq, we’ve seen how an army that 1991 and again in 2003, and they’ve seen what in the near term, but it is certainly possible was basically a smaller version of the Cold [improvised explosive devices] are doing to to address the Army’s traditionally stilted War force can over time become an effective the American military today.”37 priorities by strengthening the internal instrument of counterinsurgency. But that The developing strategic environment constituencies demanding attention for came at a frightful human, financial, and will find state and nonstate adversaries devis- irregular warfare. For example, the effort to political cost.”40 While individual Soldiers and ing innovative strategies to counter American advise host-nation security forces in Iraq and units have much to be proud of, the institu- military power by exploiting widely available Afghanistan would benefit from an Army tional Army’s record of counterinsurgency technology and weapons and integrating Advisor Command that, among other func- adaptation to the current conflicts leaves tactics from across the spectrum of conflict. tions, would be the advocate for all aspects of much to be desired. Thousands of lives were Frank Hoffman terms these adversaries hybrid threats: the Army’s current structures to preserve the lessons of irregular Hybrid threats incorporate a full range warfare are unable to affect the larger institutional mindset in of different modes of warfare, including any meaningful way conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and the advisor mission within the institutional lost while Soldiers and their leaders struggled criminal disorder . . . coordinated within the Army. The Army’s current structures to pre- to learn how to deal with an unfamiliar situ- main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects serve the lessons of irregular warfare, such as ation. At least some of those losses might in the physical and psychological dimensions the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsur- have been avoided had the Army and defense of conflict.38 gency Center in the Combined Arms Center community at large learned from rather than at Fort Leavenworth, are under-resourced and discounted past lessons and experiences. The resulting conflicts will be pro- thus unable to affect the larger institutional The U.S. military’s role in irregular tracted and hinge on the affected populations’ mindset in any meaningful way. warfare cannot be wished or willed away, and (foreign and American) perceptions of truth The Army also needs to recognize that the Army has a responsibility to prepare itself and legitimacy rather than the outcome key functions in counterinsurgency and other to fulfill that role as effectively as possible. It of tactical engagements on the battlefield. irregular operations, such as civil reconstruc- is irresponsible to assume that current and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 25 FORUM | Let’s Win the Wars We’re In future foes will play to America’s strengths 8 Gian P. Gentile, “A (Slightly) Better War: A Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a by fighting conventionally rather than Narrative and Its Defects,” World Affairs (Summer Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan through proven, cost-effective, insurgent-like 2008), available at . available at . asymmetric strategies. It is irresponsible to 9 Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical 23 Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., “Afghanistan think that the United States will always have Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio, Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan a conscious choice of whom it fights and 1982), 88. Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordi- how—for the enemy always gets a vote. And 10 George C. Herring, “American Strategy in nated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” it is irresponsible to devalue irregular warfare Vietnam: The Postwar Debate,” Military Affairs (April testimony before the Subcommittee on National adaptations needed on the battlefield today in 1982), 57–58. Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Over- favor of other capabilities that might be useful 11 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and sight and Government Reform, House of Representa- in a hypothetical conflict later. Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University tives, June 18, 2008, GAO–08–883T, available at In the profession of arms—whether the Press, 1986), 271–273. . 12 24 wars be large or small, of our choosing or not— Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Niel Smith, “Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency,” there is still no substitute for victory. JFQ Army’s Way of War (Cambridge: Harvard University Small Wars Journal, September 17, 2008, 1–2, avail- Press, 2007), 223. able at . 14 Robert M. Gates, remarks before the Associa- 25 James Crider, “‘A Neighborhood Reborn’: A The author thanks Brian M. Burton of the tion of the United States Army, Washington, DC, Look at the Surge, Baghdad, Iraq, FEB 07–MAR Center for a New American Security for his October 10, 2007, available at . Center for a New American Security, Washington, of this article. 15 Brian M. Jenkins, The Unchangeable War, DC, September 12, 2008, slides available at . November 1970), 2, available at . 27, 2008. 16 Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On 27 H.R. McMaster, “On War: Lessons to Be 1 Douglas A. MacArthur, farewell speech before Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Washing- Learned,” Survival (February-March 2008). the West Point Corps of Cadets, West Point, NY, May ton, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2008), 28 Ann Scott Tyson, “Top Military Officer Urges 12, 1962, available at . 17 See Nigel Alwyn-Foster, “Changing the Army ton Post, September 11, 2008. 2 Gian P. Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threat- for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review 29 Gates, October 10, 2007; Robert M. ens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” World (November-December 2005), 2–15; Daniel Marston, Gates, remarks to the Heritage Foundation, Politics Review, March 4, 2008, available at . Afghanistan 2001–2007,” in Counterinsurgency in able at . Snow, “The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Malkasian (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 30 Mazarr, 41. Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneu- 226–232; Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American 31 Robert D. Kaplan, “A Manhunt or a Vital War?” ver Commanders,” U.S. Army White Paper, n.d., Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006), The New York Times, October 4, 2008, available at available at . 18 George Packer, “The Lesson of Tal Afar,” html?pagewanted=all>. 4 Pete Geren and George W. Casey, Jr., 2008 U.S. The New Yorker, April 10, 2006, available at . ington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, able at . 19 Robert M. Gates, remarks at the National 2008). 5 Michael J. Mazarr, “The Folly of ‘Asymmetric Defense University, Washington, DC, September 29, 33 Gates, September 29, 2008. War,’” Washington Quarterly 31, no. 3 (Summer 2008, available at . Paul L. Yingling, “New Rules for New Enemies,” docs/08summer_mazarr.pdf>; Andrew J. Bacevich, 20 Geren and Casey, “Two Critical Challenges: Armed Forces Journal (October 2006), available at “The Petraeus Doctrine,” The Atlantic (October 2008), Restoring Balance and Funding,” available at . available at . For an in-depth examination of challenges.html>. a Security Strategy for the Long Haul (Washington, the ongoing debate, see Peter Katel, “Rise in Coun- 21 See Brian Burton and John A. Nagl, “Learning DC: Center for a New American Security, April terinsurgency,” CQ Researcher, September 5, 2008, as We Go: The US Army Adapts to Counterinsur- 2008), 9, available at . and Insurgencies 19, no. 3 (September 2008), 303–327; April08.pdf>. 6 Geren and Casey, “Strategic Context,” available Michael R. Gordon, “Troop ‘Surge’ Took Place Amid 36 Gates, September 29, 2008. at . 2008; Steve Coll, “The General’s Dilemma,” The New 38 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: 7 John Keane, “Generals’ Revolt,” interview tran- Yorker, September 8, 2008; Bob Woodward, “Outma- The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac script, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, April 18, 2006, neuvered and Outranked, Military Chiefs Become Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007), 8. available at The Washington Post, September 8, 2008. 39 Gates, September 29, 2008. jan-june06/rumsfeld_4-18.html>. 22 U.S. Government Accountability Office 40 Ibid. (GAO), Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional

26 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars

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he U.S. Army officer corps touted “surge” in Iraq was a successful feat of or decline battle.” The recently released current has not seriously debated the arms, an assertion that despite the claims of version of FM 3–0 states that, for the com- content of the many doctrinal punditry supporters in the press has yet to be mander, operational art involves “knowing T field manuals (FM) published proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over. when and if simultaneous combinations [of over the past 2 years (for example, FM 3–24, offense, defense, and stability operations] are Counterinsurgency, FM3–0, Operations, and Fighting Is Not Priority appropriate and feasible.” FM 3–07, Stability Operations and Support The Army’s new and most important The differences between these two state- Operations). Though these manuals have been doctrinal manuals confirm that fighting ments are striking. They illustrate the gulf successfully pushed through the bureaucratic as a core competency has been eclipsed in that separates the organizing principles of lines of the Army’s senior leadership, few other importance and primacy by the function of their respective doctrine. In the 1986 version officers raised questions about the wisdom nationbuilding. This does not mean that in of FM 100–5, the organizing principle is to of employing American military power to these manuals the ability of the Army to fight fight, pure and simple. Yet in the current build nations where none exist or where an is not necessary, only that it is a subordinate version of FM 3–0, the organizing principle American military presence is not wanted. function to the capability to do such things as is not necessarily to fight (although fighting Instead, the Army has been steamrolled by a establish local governance, conduct informa- would clearly be a part of offense, defense, process that proposes its use as an instrument tion operations, build economies and service and possibly even in stability operations) but of nationbuilding in the most unstable parts of infrastructure, and provide security, all of to combine the different types of operations. the world. Nationbuilding, rather than fighting, which are elements of building a nation. Yet by As a concept for higher level Army planners, has become the core function of the U.S. Army. placing nationbuilding as its core competency the notion of “combining” different types of The Army under the Petraeus Doctrine over fighting, our Army is beginning to lose its operations in the field to accomplish objec- “is entering into an era in which armed conflict way, and we court strategic peril as a result. tives might be satisfactory. However, as an will be protracted, ambiguous, and continu- Juxtaposing an older version of the organizing principle for the Army writ large, ous—with the application of force becoming Army’s operational doctrine with its current how does the notion of combining different a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.”1 The doctrine can shed light on this problem. In types of operations guide the force? When I implication of this doctrine is that the Army providing a definition for what command- was a second lieutenant in Germany in 1987, should be transformed into a light infantry– ers should strive for in the application of I read FM 100–5. When I read it, if nothing based constabulary force designed to police the operational art, the Army’s 1986 version of FM world’s endless numbers of unstable areas. The 100–5, Operations, noted that “[o]perational Colonel Gian P. Gentile, USA, is Director of the concept rests on the assumption that the much- art thus involves fundamental decisions about Military History Program at the United States when and where to fight and whether to accept Military Academy.

M1A1 Main Battle Tanks engage targets during Exercise Bright Star, Egypt U.S. Army (Jose M. Hernandez)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 27 FORUM | Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars else I understood how my tank platoon fit aspects of U.S. national security. Worst of on the Western model where they do not cur- into the larger picture of Army operations. all, this approach ignores the requirement to rently exist in the proverbial Third World is But today, with the new doctrine, that singular objectively and accurately answer the questions Nagl’s concept for reorienting the long-term focus is gone and replaced by a fuzzy notion that must drive thinking, organizing, and mod- strategic mission of American ground forces. of combining different types of operations. If a ernizing inside the Army: What is the strategic The real question, in view of America’s rifle company commander sits down and reads purpose for which American ground combat ongoing military experience in Iraq and the Army’s high-profile doctrinal manuals, he forces will be required to deploy and fight? Afghanistan, is whether the Army should learns to be an occupier, a policeman, and an Whom and where do they fight? How should be prepared to conduct stability operations, administrator—but not a fighter. they fight? What are the joint operational nationbuilding, counterinsurgency, and In the Army’s current operational field concepts driving change in the way American related operations for more than very brief manual, there are no maps, no arrows, and no ground forces fight? periods. Experience to date both indicates the symbols representing friend and foe, only a loose collection of blocks, squares, and figures representing fuzzy conceptual notions of differ- if a rifle company commander reads the Army’s high-profile ent types of operations and suggestions of how doctrinal manuals, he learns to be an occupier, a policeman, to combine them. This observation may seem and an administrator—but not a fighter simplistic and trivial to some, but it does point to the larger problem of the Army’s shift away from fighting as its organizing principle. The The Army’s senior officer in charge limitations of American military capability to key assumption that underpins the Petraeus of writing its doctrine, Lieutenant General reshape other people’s societies and govern- Doctrine is that the threat most likely to face William Caldwell, recently noted that “the ments and points to the limits of American American ground forces will be little more future is not one of major battles and engage- military and economic resources in the robust and capable than a lightly armed insur- ments fought by armies on battlefields devoid conduct of these operations. gent on the model seen in Iraq. of population; instead, the course of conflict Currently, the Army is directed by The result is that the Army has con- will be decided by forces operating among the Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England’s structed a concept of the future security people of the world.”2 The newly released Army Department of Defense (DOD) Directive environment that precludes fighting as the doctrine for stability operations, written under 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Secu- Army’s core function and has instead replaced General Caldwell’s supervision, embraces mis- rity, Transition, and Reconstruction Opera- it with nationbuilding. This action is not sions and tasks that can only be described as tions,” which places stability operations on an simply dangerous; it potentially neglects key building a nation. equal level with offense and defense. Naturally Retired Army lieutenant colonel John and rightly we will comply. But the directive GEN Petraeus discusses surge with Iraqi army Nagl, author of Learning to Eat Soup with a does at least present the appearance of a coda general Knife, is so cocksure of the efficacy of Army for the propagated notions of success in Iraq combat power that he believes it will have the and Afghanistan. This directive, again viewed ability not only to dominate land warfare in as coda, also reinforces the perception in some general but also to “change entire societies.” quarters of the Army that the advocates of the Reminiscent of Thomas Barnett’s Pentagon Petraeus Doctrine are a small cluster of true blueprint argument of building new societies believers rather than military intellectuals ready to debate the issues in an objective and open forum.3 Granted, stability missions will come from the President and Secretary of Defense, and we must be prepared to execute, but in a world of limited resources, both strategy and military policy dictate that hard choices must be made in terms of how we train and organize. The choice should be to build an army on the organizing principle of fighting. From there should flow the ability to step in other directions to perform such missions as nationbuilding, as well as irregular and counterinsurgency warfare. Instead, we have our organizing principles inverted. The Army officer corps needs to explore this issue beyond the narrow bureaucratic lines of its doctrinal production process and external

U.S. Army (Lorie Jewell) influences. It needs to have a debate concern-

28 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu GENTILE ing future missions and structures on the scale Mired in Dogma Nagl fabricates this notion of consensus of the debates inside the Army between 1976 A certain group of defense thinkers and synthesis in a recent review essay about and 1982. During those years, there were at dominating the Army’s current intellectual historian Brian Linn’s important new intel- least 110 articles published in Military Review climate appears to be advocating short-term lectual history of the Army, The Echo of Battle. that fundamentally questioned the Service’s expediencies rather than longer term strategic In the review, Nagl takes Linn’s taxonomy operational doctrine that became known as goals. They have published and spoken widely of Army thinking over the years of Heroes, Active Defense. This cutting and wide-ranging over the past 2 years and have been given Managers, and Guardians and laments that the criticism did not just hover around the edges of a leading role in crafting current doctrine. Army has failed to appreciate the need to be the Active Defense doctrine but cut right to its From them one might infer that the Army has able to fight irregular and counterinsurgency core by challenging its assumptions, historical reached a synthesis in a dialectical process that warfare, and that it has cost the Nation greatly. premises, and theories. One emblematic article has produced such manuals as FM 3–24, FM But he ends the review on a positive note, from Military Review criticizing the new doc- 3–0, and FM 3–07. And for these thinkers, suggesting that perhaps the Army has finally trine of the time argued that the U.S. Army “is there is no reason to go back into the dialectic; worked itself through this dialectic and reached currently pursuing a general warfare doctrine there is no reason to inject an antithesis into a synthesis of nationbuilding. How else can which is bankrupt—it will not work in prac- the process because we are at intellectual one square Nagl’s breathtaking statement of the tice.” The value of this widespread criticism of endstate. Nagl has argued as much in a recent Army being able to “change entire societies” if the Active Defense doctrine was that it spurred opinion article where he stated that the Army, he did not see the intellectual dialectic within a reevaluation of the doctrine that ultimately after 5 long and difficult years of “learning” in the Army coming to fruition and reaching its produced the 1986 version of FM 100–5, Iraq, has finally reached a “consensus” on how endstate?6 known as AirLand Battle. Aside from a handful to do counterinsurgency.5 of critical articles by firebrand writers such as Ralph Peters and Edward Luttwak, not much has been written that fundamentally questions aside from a handful of critical articles by firebrand writers, not current Army doctrine and where it is going. It much has been written that fundamentally questions current is time to start.4 Army doctrine and where it is going

17th Fires Brigade Soldiers fire M198 155mm howitzer during combined live fire exercise U.S. Army (Lucas T. Swihart) U.S. Army (Lucas T.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 29 FORUM | Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars

The Army’s problem is more than just large numbers of American combat Soldiers on done the discovering for us, and we are left to an academic debate. The intellectual climate the ground, disperse them throughout the pop- blindly obey. inside the Service bears an uncomfortable ulation to protect them, and from there security Former Marine officer and decorated Iraq similarity to the climate inside the British and will be established and the process of nation- combat veteran Nathaniel Fick, who currently French armies of the interwar period when building can go forward. This concept domi- is an analyst at a think tank in Washington, DC, doctrinal thinking conformed to preconceived nates our Army. The pages of Military Review, noted in an opinion article that “every aspect ideas that sprang from political expediency which reflects the observations and experiences of sound counterinsurgency strategy revolves and misinterpreted military experience. In of the field Army fighting in Afghanistan and around bolstering the government’s legitimacy. most troubling ways, the thinking of those who Iraq, show the dogmatism that the Service has When ordinary people lose their faith in their would commit the Nation’s ground forces to come to. Now when a problem of insurgency government, then they also lose faith in the for- future missions on the Iraq model is producing presents itself, our only option is to send in eigners who prop it up.”9 These two sentences a stultifying effect on the Army to the point combat brigades to “protect the people.” are clear examples of how a certain theory of where officers are mired in yet another form Former combat brigade commander counterinsurgency warfare—developed in the of military dogmatism, unable to think objec- in Afghanistan Colonel Michael Coss, who 1950s and 1960s by such thinkers as the French tively about the present or the future of U.S. recently wrote in Military Review about his army officer David Galula and British officer national security. experience conducting counterinsurgency Sir Robert Thompson and based on govern- FM 3–24 (along with FM 3–0 and FM operations there, betrays the deep-seated ment legitimacy and population security—has 3-07, which derive their organizing principles dogmatism on counterinsurgency that has become the oracle for our current intellectual from it) has transfixed the Army. The manual infiltrated the Army. When discussing the climate on military and foreign policy.10 Why has become the Army’s Svengali. Rather importance of the people in a counterin- do we privilege this theory over others? Do than simple Service doctrine for how to do surgency operation, Coss notes that the we really believe that our world is closer to counterinsurgency, it has morphed into a population is “the center of gravity in any the counter-Maoist worldview of Galula and Weltanschauung of sorts, dictating how the insurgency.”8 Why must this always be the case? Thompson than perhaps to the imperial world- Army should perceive and respond to security From a theoretical and historical standpoint, it view of the British army officer C.E. Callwell problems around the world. The manual certainly does not have to be. Moreover, from of the late 19th century? We have detached this dictates that any instability problem producing a creative operational standpoint, when trying historically contingent theoretical approach to an insurgency must be dealt with by estab- to discover what a center of gravity might be, counterinsurgency from its contextual moor- lishing government legitimacy within that it does not have to be—and should not always ings and plotted it in the present as an action unstable country.7 To establish government be—the people. If it is, then we have already template for the future. We like to imagine that stability, a range of other things must happen predetermined what our response will be: we think historically, but we have become the as well: security for the population, building many boots on the ground marching to the purveyors of ahistoricism. economies, creating essential services infra- exact beats of FM3–24, FM 3–0, FM 3–07, and So our current counterinsurgency, opera- structure, training local security forces, and so their collective organizing principle of nation- tional, and stability doctrines have moved well forth. In short, FM 3–24 has become code for building. Carl von Clausewitz teaches that a beyond simple Army doctrine and become the nationbuilding. center of gravity is something to be discovered. organizing principle for the Army and, more From that basic concept is derived a stan- The Army’s new way of thinking has in effect subtly, the shaper of an American foreign policy dard operational and tactical approach: place premised on intervention into unstable areas

Army Corps of Engineers district commander tours new sewage pumping station in Baghdad

LTG Odierno meets with Ninewa Province governor and local sheikhs in Tal Afar U.S. Army (Curt Cashour) U.S. Army (Brian D. Lehnhardt)

30 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu GENTILE around the world with American ground forces command, but it is not firing its rockets, and necessarily transferrable to another. One may be as the primary engine for bringing about stabil- one can only conclude that those core compe- able to argue that combat platoons and companies ity. The way ahead in Afghanistan seems clear, at tencies have atrophied. can easily shift from counterinsurgency to conven- least as the Army’s intellectual climate dictates: Army combat brigades preparing for tional fighting. However, that same argument does existential nationbuilding. Another Army officer deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan at Fort not hold true for higher level organizations such as who has recently returned from battalion-level Irwin, California, and Fort Polk, Louisiana, divisions and corps, which for the last 6 years have command in Afghanistan, Colonel Christopher only prepare for counterinsurgency opera- been conducting node-based operations. When Kolenda, tells us in a recently published opinion tions. Instead of spending time at battalion and was the last time an Army combat brigade or piece that the “way to win” in Afghanistan is to brigade levels training to fight a like enemy, higher level organization at either of the training essentially build a new Afghanistan nation.11 they instead focus on how to rebuild villages centers or in actual combat conducted a sustained However, sometimes the best approach and talk in culturally sensitive ways to local ground campaign against an enemy organized to dealing with a problem of insurgency is not nationals. Is this kind of training important along military lines and fights?15 necessarily a focus on the people per se, but on for combat outfits preparing to deploy to History shows that when states focus the insurgent enemy. This does not mean, as real world counterinsurgency operations? Of their armies on doing nothing but counterin- many uniformed critics like to assert, that the course it is—and that is what they should be surgency and world constabulary missions to enemy-centric approach means scorching the doing. But the Army should acknowledge what the exclusion of preparing for conventional earth of a country by killing innocent civilians General Casey has been telling us: that we are warfare, strategic failure can result. to get at the insurgents. Yet that is the usual crit- out of balance and at some point need to get In summer 2006 in southern Lebanon, icism when we consider problems of insurgen- back into shape to conduct operations at the the Israeli army suffered a significant battlefield cies in ways other than protraction and focusing higher end of the conflict spectrum. defeat at the hands of Hizballah, who fought on populations, both of which demand the Arguing for rebuilding the Army’s capacity with conventional tactics centered on small substantial involvement of American combat for conventional operations does not mean taking infantry squads using machineguns, mortars, troops. Thus, when problems of insurgencies the Service back to 1986 in order to recreate and antitank missiles. Israeli scholar Avi Kober and other sources of instability present them- the old Soviet Union so we can prepare to fight and Army historian Matt Matthews have selves to American military planners, the only World War II all over again in the Fulda Gap. shown that the Israeli army’s conventional option seemingly available is large numbers of Such accusations have become the standard— fighting skills had atrophied due to many years American combat boots on the ground protect- and wrongheaded—critique that purveyors of doing almost nothing but counterinsurgency operations in the Palestinian territories.16 when trying to discover what a center of gravity might be, it The British army after World War I chose to mostly forget about fighting conventional does not have to be—and should not always be—the people wars and instead concentrated on building an imperial constabulary army to police its ing the people from the insurgents. This is why of counterinsurgency dogma like to throw at empire. In 1940, however, as the German army the Army has become dogmatic. anybody who argues for a renewed focus on raced across France to the English Channel, the conventional capabilities. The Army does need to British army alongside the French was defeated Atrophied Fighting Skills transform from its antiquated Cold War structure by the Germans, who had spent their interwar Not only has the Service’s intellectual toward one that can deal with the security chal- years preparing for large-scale battles. The climate become rigid, but also its operational lenges of the new millennium and one focused British barely missed strategic catastrophe by capability to conduct high-intensity fighting primarily on fighting as its core competency.13 escaping back across the English Channel to operations other than counterinsurgency has Many counterinsurgency experts claim that England through the French port of Dunkirk. atrophied over the past 6 years. Consider an the Army will always be able to do higher intensity And the future of war is not only counter- important white paper written by three Army combat operations because that is, as they say, insurgencies such as Iraq and Afghanistan. One colonels, all former combat brigade command- what the Service has always been good at. For can imagine a range of possibilities that cover ers in Iraq, to Army Chief of Staff General these folks, since the Army has always been good the full spectrum of war and conflict. A move- George Casey. In the paper, entitled “The at conventional operations, it is axiomatic that it ment to gain contact with Iranian forces inside King and I,” these colonels rightly lament the always will be—that conventional warfighting Iran by an American ground combat brigade atrophied capabilities of the Army’s artillery capabilities will remain a constant. Historian and seems plausible. A range of possibilities exist in branch to perform its basic warfighting func- retired Army colonel Pete Mansoor, for example, Korea, from a collapse of North Korea requiring tion: firing its guns en masse against enemy accepts the premise that the Army’s conventional the South’s occupation with American support targets. As the authors point out, 6-plus years capabilities remain “preeminent” in the world. He to a higher level of intensity with some fight- of counterinsurgency operations have forced then argues for a strong focus on counterinsur- ing as the North collapses, possibly drawing in artillery units to carry out missions in Iraq and gency and irregular types of operations.14 Combat American conventional combat forces. These Afghanistan other than their core function.12 experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is often cited are just two examples of possible scenarios For example, Army Lieutenant Colonel Paul to argue that the Army, even though it is focused where the Army will need to be able to fight on Yingling’s rocket artillery battalion is cur- heavily on counterinsurgency, can easily step multiple levels of the conflict spectrum. rently performing detainee operations in Iraq. back into the conventional warfighting mode. The Russian army attack into the break- Granted, it is doing critical missions for the Yet combat experience in one kind of war is not away Georgian province of South Ossetia ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 31 FORUM | Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars should ring like a fire alarm to those who treasure and could have turned out much in counterinsurgency operations. But even believe the future of war and conflict will only differently. good counterinsurgency tactics, practiced by be “decided by forces operating among the An Army that was trained to fight proficient combat outfits, cannot compensate people of the world” and not by armies fight- (potentially against the Soviet Union) in the for flawed strategies and policies.18 ing “major battles and engagements.”17 Images 1980s, and retained in the 1990s, easily and The same argument can be made of Georgian infantry moving under fire and quickly transitioned to counterinsurgency and for the Army’s performance in Vietnam. columns of Russian tanks on the attack show nationbuilding operations in Iraq in summer Contrary to what has become conventional that the days of like armies fighting each other 2003. This goes against current thinking by historical thinking, the Army did not lose on battlefields are far from over. many DOD officials who claim that because the Vietnam War because it did not have a the Service did not prepare for counterin- counterinsurgency doctrine prior to the war Getting the Past Right surgency prior to the Iraq War, it had to be or because it did not understand how to do The U.S. Army must do what it takes to rescued by the surge of troops under General counterinsurgency.19 Army General William win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It must Petraeus in February 2007. Westmoreland understood classic counterin- also be prepared to conduct stability opera- Nagl argues that the Army’s focus on surgency theory in 1965 and practiced it with tions and other forms of irregular warfare. But winning only the “short campaigns” to topple a reasonable strategy to maintain the efficacy in looking toward the future with a close eye Saddam resulted in a triumph “without of the South Vietnamese government. on events in Georgia, the recent past of Israel victory as stubborn insurgents stymied Westmoreland was not, as his critics in southern Lebanon, and history, the Army America’s conventional military power.” For like to argue, trying to fight World War II all must soon refocus itself toward conventional Nagl, because the Army had not prepared for over again in the jungles of Vietnam. Current warfighting skills with the knowledge that, if counterinsurgency operations prior to Iraq, scholarship supports this claim.20 The Army called on, it can more easily shift to nation- it fumbled at it for the first 4 years until the and the Nation lost the war for reasons having building and counterinsurgency as it has done 2007 surge. less to do with tactics than with the will, per- in Iraq. The Army’s conduct of counterinsur- This is not true, at least according to severance, cohesion, indigenous support, and gency and nationbuilding in Iraq, beginning in the recently released Army history of the sheer determination of the other side, coupled the spring of 2003, shows this to be the case. Iraq War, On Point II. In fact, according to with the absence of any of those things on the The Army’s lightning advance to this history, the Army quickly transitioned American side. Baghdad in spring 2003 in only a few weeks out of the conventional fighting mode into happened because it was a conventionally the successful conduct of “full-spectrum” minded army trained for fighting. If it had counterinsurgency and nationbuilding opera- combat experience in Iraq and focused the majority of its time and resources tions by the end of 2003. Only about 6 months Afghanistan is often cited to prior to the Iraq War on counterinsurgency into its counterinsurgency campaign, despite argue that the Army can easily and nationbuilding, it is reasonable to assume the fact that it did not have a formalized that the march to Baghdad would have been counterinsurgency doctrine, the Army across step back into the conventional much more costly in American lives and the board was carrying out “best practices” warfighting mode

Man displays inked finger after voting in Iraq’s first official democratic elections at polling site secured by Iraqi army, December 2005 Yet the counterinsurgency and stability operations experts in the Army continue to bludgeon us with the historical “lessons learned” cudgel. They tell us that we failed in Iraq from 2003 until 2007 (but were rescued by the surge in 2007) because we did not learn the lessons of the past that provide clear templates for victory in counterinsurgencies and irregular war. In a recent interview on National Public Radio, General Caldwell told the story of the Army conducting military occupations over many years and failing to learn and retain lessons each time. His implicit point was that if the Army had paid attention to these lessons learned and formalized them into doctrine, the first 3 years of the war in Iraq might have turned out differently.21 And that same “lessons learned” cudgel is used to beat the Army down the continued path of focusing itself primarily on stability operations,

U.S. Army (Ronald R. Gaete) counterinsurgency, and nationbuilding. Since

32 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu GENTILE synthesis and consensus have been achieved in be able to fight when we get there. If not, then 14 Peter R. Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A the mind of the true believers, any questioning most of the blood and guts will be ours. JFQ Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq (New Haven: Yale and probing of it is met with stiff resistance and University Press, 2008). 15 To see how Army combat brigades only train outright rejection. In this sense, anti-intellectual- Notes on counterinsurgency at the training centers, see ism is alive and well in parts of the Army and the 1 Dennis Steele, “NTC: Between Hollywood and Hell,” American defense establishment. Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Petraeus Doctrine,” The Atlantic, October 2008, available at . 2 William B. Caldwell IV and Steven M. pared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, Long War Good strategy and sound military policy Leonard, “Field Manual 3–07, Stability Operations: Series Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: are premised on making choices and establishing Upshifting the Engine of Change,” Military Review Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008); Avi Kober, priorities. Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey Friedman (July-August 2008). “The Israeli Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon point that simple fact out in an important essay 3 See, for example, Peter R. Mansoor’s dismis- War: Why the Poor Performance,” Journal of Strategic that analyzes the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war.22 sive and somewhat condescending critique of the Studies 31 (February 2008). 17 They argue that the war will be a critical case author’s writings in “Misreading the History of the Caldwell and Leonard. 18 Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, study for the U.S. Army in how it organizes itself Iraq War,” available at . 4 See John Romjue, From Active Defense to United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May Iraq and Afghanistan. For Biddle and Friedman, 2003–January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat hard choices must be made for a future security Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1986 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Studies Institute Press, 2008). environment that they argue will be neither 19 Training and Doctrine Command, Historical For the standard argument that the Army simply one of irregular wars against a stealthy Monograph Series, 1984). For critiques of FM 3–24, could have won in Vietnam if it had learned and guerrilla enemy fought “amongst” the people, see Ralph Peters, “Dishonest Doctrine: A Selective applied classic counterinsurgency techniques, see nor, as they rightly state, one of a Cold War rein- Use of History Taints the Coin Manual,” Armed John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: carnated, involving only higher end conventional Forces Journal (December 2007); Edward Luttwak, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam warfare. “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); and So choice is an important quality in strat- Malpractice,” Harpers (February 2007); and Michael Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Vic- tories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in egy and in military and foreign policies. The Vlahos, “Fighting Identity: Why We Are Losing Our Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999). Also see choice for American foreign policy has already Wars,” Military Review (November-December 2007). 5 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Balti- been made for the country: American military John A. Nagl and Adam Scher, “How to Smooth the Transition in Iraq,” Christian Science more: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). intervention in unstable portions of the world. 20 Monitor, October 6, 2008. The best examples of this corrective scholar- This is a supreme problem for the American 6 John A. Nagl, “Unprepared,” RUSI Journal 153, ship are Andrew Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency polity since the issue has not been debated and no. 2 (April 2008). and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976 decided with involvement by the American 7 Field Manual (FM) 3–24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military people and their elected representatives in (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Decem- History, 2006); Dale Andrade, “Westmoreland 23 Congress. ber 15, 2006). Was Right: Learning the Wrong Lessons from the And down one level within the Army, it 8 Michael A. Coss, “Operation Mountain Lion: Vietnam War,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 2 seems that for now choices have already been CJTF 76 in Afghanistan, Spring 2006,” Military (June 2008); and Andrew Birtle, “PROVN, Westmo- reland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal,” Journal of made for us, too. We are organizing ourselves Review (January-February 2008). Emphasis added. 9 Nathaniel Fick and Vikram J. Singh, “Winning Military History 72 (October 2008). around the principle of nationbuilding rather 21 the Battle, Losing the Faith,” International Herald John A. Nagl and Brian Burton, “Learning as than fighting. For defense thinkers such as We Go: The US Army Adapts to Counterinsurgency Nagl, that principle has turned into a synthetic Tribune, October 6, 2008. 10 For the influence of David Galula and Robert in Iraq, July 2004–December 2006,” Small Wars and consensus. To repeat, how else can one explain Thompson on FM 3–24, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Insurgencies 19, no. 3 (September 2008); Robert his most profound and deeply troubling state- New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on ment that the Army, in the future, will have the Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis,” Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War (Westport, capability to “change entire societies”? In this in Perspective on Politics 6, no. 2 (June 2008). CT: Praeger, 2006); and William B. Caldwell IV, sense, the caricature of Nagl as a “crusader” 11 Christopher Kolenda, “How to Win in “New Army Field Manual Is Road Map to Stabiliza- seems correct.24 Afghanistan,” Weekly Standard, October 13, 2008. tion,” interview by J.J. Sutherland, National Public The world has seen firsthand what 12 Sean McFarland, Michael Shields, and Jeffrey Radio, October 12, 2008, available at . For a happens when American combat power tries to Snow, “The King and I: The Impending Crisis in corrective to the surge-triumph narrative, see Gian P. change societies from the barrel of a gun. Such Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Gentile, “A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its arguments—elegant when conducted in doc- Maneuver Commanders,” U.S. Army White Paper, n.d., available at . Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, The lose their prettiness and instead become mired 13 On Army transformation from its Cold War 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: in the blood and guts of the reality of mean structure to one relevant for future security threats, Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle streets and roads in foreign lands. If the U.S. see Douglas A. MacGregor, Transformation under Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Army is directed to ride down those roads and Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (Westport, Studies Institute, September 2008). 23 streets by the President, then of course we will CT: Praeger Press, 2003). Bacevich. 24 go and do our damndest to win. But we should Ibid. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 33 Hybrid Warfare and Challenges

By Frank G. Hoffman and army for what they hoped would be a decisive battle and a short war.1 The scarlet-clad Spartans learned the first lesson of military history—the enemy gets a vote. The Athenians elected to remain behind their walls and fight a protracted campaign that played to their strengths and worked against their enemies. Thucydides’ ponderous tome on the carnage of the Pelo- ponnesian War is an extended history of the operational adaptation of each side as they strove to gain a sustainable advantage over Matthias Kabel their enemy. These key lessons are, as he Above: Corinthian helmet, circa intended, a valuable “possession for all time.” 500 BCE In the midst of an ongoing inter-Service Left: Colonel John S. Mosby, C.S.A., roles and missions review, and an upcom- “The Gray Ghost” ing defense review, these lessons need to be underlined. As we begin to debate the scale and shape of the Armed Forces, an acute appreciation of history’s hard-earned lessons will remain useful. Tomorrow’s enemies will still get a vote, and they will remain as cunning and elusive as today’s foes. They may be more

Library of Congress (Brady-Handy Photograph Collection) Photograph (Brady-Handy Congress of Library lethal and more implacable. We should plan accordingly. One should normally eschew simplistic metanarratives, especially in dynamic and he U.S. military faces an era In his classic history, Thucydides nonlinear times. However, the evolving char- of enormous complexity. This detailed the savage 27-year conflict between acter of conflict that we currently face is best complexity has been extended by Sparta and Athens. Sparta was the overwhelm- characterized by convergence. This includes the T globalization, the proliferation ing land power of its day, and its hoplites convergence of the physical and psychological, of advanced technology, violent transnational were drilled to perfection. The Athenians, the kinetic and nonkinetic, and combatants extremists, and resurgent powers. America’s led by Pericles, were the supreme maritime and noncombatants. So, too, we see the con- vaunted military might stand atop all others power, supported by a walled capital, a fleet vergence of military force and the interagency but is tested in many ways. Trying to under- of powerful triremes, and tributary allies. community, of states and nonstate actors, and stand the possible perturbations the future The Spartan leader, Archidamius, warned his of the capabilities they are armed with. Of poses to our interests is a daunting challenge. kinsmen about Athens’ relative power, but the greatest relevance are the converging modes But, as usual, a familiarity with history is our Spartans and their supporters would not heed of war. What once might have been distinct best aid to interpretation. In particular, that their king. In 431 BCE, the Spartans marched operational types or categorizations among great and timeless illuminator of conflict, through Attica and ravaged the Athenian terrorism and conventional, criminal, and chance, and human nature—Thucydides—is as country estates and surrounding farms. They irregular warfare have less utility today. relevant and revealing as ever. encamped and awaited the Athenian heralds Current Strategic Thinking Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.), is a Research Fellow in the Center for Emerging Threats The 2005 National Defense Strategy and Opportunities at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (NDS) was noteworthy for its expanded understanding of modern threats. Instead of the his-

34 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HOFFMAN torical emphasis on conventional state-based Subsequent to the strategy’s articulation, of increasing frequency and lethality. This threats, the strategy defined a broadening range a number of U.S. and foreign analysts compli- construct is most frequently described as of challenges including traditional, irregular, mented DOD strategists for moving beyond “hybrid warfare,” in which the adversary will terrorist, and disruptive threats. The strategy a myopic preoccupation with conventional most likely present unique combinational or outlined the relative probability of these threats war. But these analysts have also identified an hybrid threats specifically targeting U.S. vulner- and acknowledged America’s increased vulner- increased blurring of war forms, rather than abilities. Instead of separate challengers with ability to less conventional methods of conflict. the conveniently distinct categorizations found fundamentally different approaches (conven- The strategy even noted that the Department in the NDS. Yet the strategy itself did suggest tional, irregular, or terrorist), we can expect of Defense (DOD) was “over invested” in the that the most complex challengers of the future to face competitors who will employ all forms traditional mode of warfare and needed to shift could seek synergies from the simultaneous of war and tactics, perhaps simultaneously. resources and attention to other challengers. application of multiple modes of war. The NDS Criminal activity may also be considered part While civil and intrastate conflicts have explicitly admitted that the challenger catego- of this problem, as it either further destabilizes always had a higher frequency, their strategic ries could and would overlap and that “recent local government or abets the insurgent or impact and operational effects had little impact experience indicates . . . the most dangerous irregular warrior by providing resources. This on Western military forces, and especially circumstances arise when we face a complex could involve smuggling, narcoterrorism, illicit U.S. forces, which focused on the significantly of challenges. Finally, in the future, the most transfers of advanced munitions or weapons, or more challenging nature of state-based threats capable opponents may seek to combine truly the exploitation of urban gang networks. and high-intensity conventional warfighting. disruptive capacity with traditional, irregular, A number of analysts have highlighted This focus is partly responsible for America’s or catastrophic forms of warfare.”2 this blurring of lines between modes of war. overwhelming military superiority today, This matches the views of many military They suggest that our greatest challenge in the measured in terms of conventional capability analysts, who have suggested that future con- future will not come from a state that selects and its ability to project power globally. This flict will be multi-modal or multi-variant rather one approach but from states or groups that investment priority and American force capa- than a simple black or white characterization of select from the whole menu of tactics and tech- bilities will have to change, however, as new one form of warfare. Thus, many analysts are nologies and blend them in innovative ways environmental conditions influence both the calling for greater attention to more blurring to meet their own strategic culture, geography, frequency and character of conflict. and blending of war forms in combinations and aims. As Michael Evans of the Australian Defence Academy wrote well before the last the 2005 National Defense Strategy was noteworthy for its Quadrennial Defense Review, “The possibil- expanded understanding of modern threats ity of continuous sporadic armed conflict, its engagements blurred together in time and U.S. Army (Curtis G. Hargrave)

101st Airborne Division Soldiers fire missile at building in Mosul, Iraq, in which Uday and Qusay Hussein barricaded themselves, July 2003

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 35 FORUM | Hybrid Warfare and Challenges space, waged on several levels by a large array by the hybrid threat is a further complexity. As force generally induces the adversary to con- of national and sub-national forces, means that one insightful student of war noted: centrate for defense or to achieve critical mass war is likely to transcend neat divisions into for decisive offensive operations. distinct categories.”3 Hybrid forces can effectively incorporate tech- One can see this in the American Revolu- Numerous scholars are now acknowledg- nologically advanced systems into their force tion, when George Washington’s more conven- ing the mixing likely in future conflicts. Colin structure and strategy, and use these systems in tional troops stood as a force in being for much Gray has admitted the one feature that “we can ways that are beyond the intended employment of the war, while the South Carolina campaign predict with confidence is that there is going parameters. Operationally, hybrid military was characterized by militia and some irregular to be a blurring, a further blurring, of warfare forces are superior to Western forces within their combat.11 The Napoleonic era is frequently c at e g or i e s .” 4 British and Australian officers limited operational spectrum.8 viewed in terms of its massive armies marching have moved ahead and begun the hard work of back and forth across Europe. But the French drawing out implications and the desired coun- Hybrid wars are not new, but they are invasion of Spain turned into a quagmire, with tercapabilities required to effectively operate different. In this kind of warfare, forces become British regulars contesting Napoleon’s control against hybrid threats. The British have gone blurred into the same force or are applied in the of the major cities, while the Spanish guerrillas past American doctrine writers and already same battlespace. The combination of irregular successfully harassed his lines of communica- incorporated hybrid threats within their con- and conventional force capabilities, either tion. Here again, strategic coordination was struct for irregular war.5 Australian military operationally or tactically integrated, is quite achieved, but overall in different battlespaces.12 analysts remain on the front lines of inquiry in challenging, but historically it is not necessar- Likewise, the American Civil War is framed by this area.6 ily a unique phenomenon.9 The British faced famous battles at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Theorists responsible for some of the a hybrid threat at the turn of the last century Vicksburg, and Antietam. Yet partisan warfare most cutting edge thinking in alternative when the Boers employed Mauser rifles and and famous units like John Mosby’s 43d Vir- modes of war and associated organizational ginia Cavalry provided less conventional capa- implications continue to explore the blurring bilities as an economy of force operation.13 T.E. of conflict types. John Arquilla, an expert in the compression of the levels Lawrence’s role as an advisor to the Arab revolt irregular warfare, has concluded that “[n]et- of war is complicated by a against the Ottomans is another classic case works have even shown a capacity to wage war simultaneous convergence of of compound war, which materially assisted toe-to-toe against nation-states—with some modes General Edmund Allenby’s thrusts with the success. . . . The range of choices available to British Expeditionary Force against Jerusalem networks thus covers an entire spectrum of and Damascus. But here again, Lawrence’s conflict, posing the prospect of a significant Krupp field guns and outranged their red-clad raiders did not fight alongside the British; they blurring of the lines between insurgency, terror, adversary. Ultimately, the British adapted and were strategically directed by the British and and war.”7 ran down the Boer commandos. The fierce supplied with advisors, arms, and gold only.14 Some research has been done on civil defense of Grozny by the Chechens is another Vietnam is another classic case of the wars as hybrid conflicts. Other research focuses potential hybrid case study. But both were strategic synergy created by compound wars, on the nature of the societies involved. But bloody and protracted conflicts that arguably posing the irregular tactics of the Viet Cong hybrid wars are much more than just conflicts required more military resources and greater with the more conventional capabilities of between states and other armed groups. It is the combat capabilities than classical counterinsur- the North Vietnamese army.15 The ambiguity application of the various forms of conflict that gencies and Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsur- between conventional and unconventional best distinguishes hybrid threats or conflicts. gency, would suggest. approaches vexed military planners for several This is especially true since hybrid wars can years. Even long afterward, Americans debated be conducted by both states and a variety of Compound Wars what kind of war they actually fought and lost.16 nonstate actors. Hybrid threats incorporate Historians have noted that many if not a full range of modes of warfare, including most wars are characterized by both regular Hybrid Wars conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and and irregular operations. When a significant As difficult as compound wars have formations, terrorist acts that include indis- degree of strategic coordination between sepa- been, the operational fusion of conventional criminate violence and coercion, and criminal rate regular and irregular forces in conflicts and irregular capabilities in hybrid conflicts disorder. These multi-modal activities can be occurs, they can be considered “compound may be even more complicated. Compound conducted by separate units, or even by the wars.” Compound wars are those major wars wars offered synergy and combinations at the same unit, but are generally operationally and that had significant regular and irregular com- strategic level, but not the complexity, fusion, tactically directed and coordinated within the ponents fighting simultaneously under unified and simultaneity we anticipate at the opera- main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects direction.10 The complementary effects of com- tional and even tactical levels in wars where in the physical and psychological dimensions of pound warfare are generated by its ability to one or both sides is blending and fusing the conflict. The effects can be gained at all levels of exploit the advantages of each kind of force and full range of methods and modes of conflict war. Thus, the compression of the levels of war increase the nature of the threat posed by each into the battlespace. Irregular forces in cases of is complicated by a simultaneous convergence kind of force. The irregular force attacks weak compound wars operated largely as a distrac- of modes. The novelty of this combination and areas, compelling a conventional opponent to tion or economy of force measure in a separate the innovative adaptations of existing systems disperse his security forces. The conventional theater or adjacent operating area includ-

36 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HOFFMAN ing the rear echelon. Because it is based on operationally separate forces, the compound The Second Lebanon War, 2006 concept did not capture the merger or blurring modes of war identified in past case studies In many details, the amorphous Hizballah is represen- such as Hizballah in the second Lebanon war tative of the rising hybrid threat. The 34-day battle in of 2006 or future projections. southern Lebanon revealed some weaknesses in the Thus, the future does not portend a suite posture of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)—but it has of distinct challengers into separate boxes of implications for American defense planners, too. Mixing a matrix chart. Traditional conflict will still an organized political movement with decentralized pose the most dangerous form of human cells employing adaptive tactics in ungoverned zones, Hizballah showed that it could inflict as well conflict, especially in scale. With increasing as take punishment. Its highly disciplined, well-trained distributed cells contested ground against a modern conventional force using an admixture of guerrilla tactics and technology in densely probability, however, we will face adversaries packed urban centers. Hizballah, like Islamic extremist defenders in the battles in Fallujah in Iraq who blur and blend the different methods or during April and November of 2004, skillfully exploited the urban terrain to create ambushes and modes of warfare. The most distinctive change evade detection and to hold strong defensive fortifications in close proximity to noncombatants.1 in the character of modern war is the blurred In the field, Israeli troops grudgingly admitted that the Hizballah defenders were tenacious or blended nature of combat. We do not face and skilled.2 The organized resistance was several orders of magnitude more difficult than coun- a widening number of distinct challenges but terterrorism operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. More importantly, the degree of training, their convergence into hybrid wars. fire discipline, and lethal technology demonstrated by Hizballah were much higher. These hybrid wars blend the lethality of Tactical combinations and novel applications of technology by the defenders were notewor- state conflict with the fanatical and protracted thy. In particular, the antitank guided missile systems employed by Hizballah against IDF armor and defensive positions, coupled with decentralized tactics, were a surprise. At the battle of Wadi fervor of irregular warfare. In such conflicts, Salouqi, a column of Israeli tanks was stopped in its tracks with telling precision.3 Hizballah’s anti- future adversaries (states, state-sponsored tank weapons include the Russian-made RPG–29, Russian AT–13 Metis, and AT–14 Kornet, which groups, or self-funded actors) will exploit has a range of 3 miles. The IDF found the AT–13 and AT–14 formidable against their first line access to modern military capabilities, includ- Merkava Mark IV tank. A total of 18 Merkavas were damaged, and it is estimated that antitank ing encrypted command systems, man-porta- guided missiles accounted for 40 percent of IDF fatalities. Here we see the blurring of conventional ble air-to-surface missiles, and other modern systems with irregular forces and nontraditional tactics. lethal systems, as well as promote protracted Hizballah even managed to launch a few armed insurgencies that employ ambushes, impro- unmanned aerial vehicles, which required the IDF to vised explosive devices (IEDs), and coercive adapt in order to detect them. These included either the Iranian Mirsad-1 or Ababil-3 Swallow. These concerned assassinations. This could include states blend- Israeli strategists given their global positioning system– ing high-tech capabilities such as antisatellite based navigational system, 450-kilometer range, and weapons with terrorism and cyber warfare 50-kilogram explosive carrying capacity.4 There is evi- directed against financial targets. dence that Hizballah invested in signals intelligence and Hybrid challenges are not limited to non- monitored IDF cell phone calls for some time, as well state actors. States can shift their conventional as unconfirmed reports that they managed to decrypt IDF radio traffic. The defenders also seemed units to irregular formations and adopt new to have advanced surveillance systems and very advanced night vision equipment. Hizballah’s use tactics as Iraq’s fedayeen did in 2003. Evidence of C802 antiship cruise missiles against an Israeli missile ship represents another sample of what from open sources suggests that several powers “hybrid warfare” might look like, which is certainly relevant to naval analysts as well. Perhaps Hizballah’s unique capability is its inventory of 14,000 rockets. Many of these are in the Middle East are modifying their forces relatively inaccurate older models, but thanks to Iranian or Syrian support, they possess a number of to exploit this more complex and diffused missile systems that can reach deep into Israel. They were used both to terrorize the civilian popula- mode of conflict. We may find it increasingly tion and to attack Israel’s military infrastructure. Hizballah managed to fire over 4,100 rockets into perplexing to characterize states as essentially Israel between July 12 and August 13, culminating with 250 rockets on the final day, the highest traditional forces, or nonstate actors as inher- total of the war. Most of these were short range and inaccurate, but they achieved strategic effects ently irregular. Future challenges will present both in the physical domain, by forcing Israel to evacuate tens of thousands of citizens, and in the a more complex array of alternative structures media, by demonstrating their ability to lash back at the region’s most potent military. and strategies as seen in the battle between Ralph Peters, who visited Lebanon during the fighting, observed that Hizballah displayed im- Israel and Hizballah in 2006. The latter effec- pressive flexibility, relying on the ability of cellular units to combine rapidly for specific operations or, when cut off, to operate independently after falling in on prepositioned stockpiles of weapons tively fused militia forces with highly trained and ammunition. Hizballah’s combat cells were a hybrid of guerrillas and regular troops—a form fighters and antitank guided missile teams into of opponent that U.S. forces are apt to encounter with increasing frequency.5 the battle. Hizballah clearly demonstrated the ability of nonstate actors to study and decon- 1 Andrew Exum, Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment, Policy Focus #63 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East struct the vulnerabilities of Western-style mili- Policy, December 2006), 9–11. 2 taries and devise appropriate countermeasures. Matthew Stannard, “Hezbollah wages new generation of warfare,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 6, 2006; Jonathan Finer, “Israeli Soldiers Find a Tenacious Foe in Hezbollah,” The Washington Post, August 8, 2006, 1. The lessons learned from this confronta- 3 Judith Palmer Harik, Transnational Actors in Contemporary Conflicts: Hizbullah and its 2006 War with Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, March 2007), 14; Exum, 9–14. tion are already cross-pollinating with other 4 Exum, 5; see also Harik, 19–20. states and nonstate actors. With or without 5 Ralph Peters, “Lessons from Lebanon: The New Model Terrorist Army,” Armed Forces Journal International (October 2006), 39. state sponsorship, the lethality and capability ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 37 FORUM | Hybrid Warfare and Challenges of organized groups are increasing, while the Fleeting, “Twenty-first century conflict has thus tions of the two. What is the center of gravity incentives for states to exploit nontraditional far been typified by what might be termed as in such conflicts, and does it invalidate our modes of war are on the rise. This will require hybrid wars.” 18 emphasis on whole-of-government approaches that we modify our mindsets with respect to and lines of operations? the relative frequency and threats of future Implications Success in hybrid wars also requires small conflict. Irregular tactics and protracted forms The rise of hybrid warfare does not unit leaders with decisionmaking skills and tac- of conflict are often castigated as tactics of the represent the end of traditional or conventional tical cunning to respond to the unknown—and weak, employed by nonstate actors who do not warfare. But it does present a complicating the equipment sets to react or adapt faster than have the means to do anything else. Instead of factor for defense planning in the 21st century. tomorrow’s foe. Organizational learning and weakness, future opponents may exploit such The implications could be significant. John adaptation would be at a premium, as would means because of their effectiveness, and they Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School has extensive investment in diverse educational may come to be seen as tactics of the smart and noted, “While history provides some useful experiences.21 What institutional mechanisms nimble. The future may find further evidence examples to stimulate strategic thought about do we need to be more adaptive, and what that hybrid threats are truly effective against such problems, coping with networks that impediments does our centralized—if not large, ponderous, and hierarchical organiza- can fight in so many different ways—sparking sclerotic—Defense Department generate that tions that are mentally or doctrinally rigid. myriad, hybrid forms of conflict—is going to must be jettisoned? Some analysts in Israel have all too require some innovative thinking.”19 The greatest implications will involve quickly dismissed the unique character of We are just beginning this thinking. Any force protection, as the proliferation of IEDs Hizballah. These analysts blithely focus inward force prepared to address hybrid threats would suggests. Our enemies will focus on winning on the failings of the political and military have to be built upon a solid professional the mobility-countermobility challenge to limit leadership.17 This is a fatal disease for military our freedom of action and separate us from planners, one that can only benefit future close proximity to the civilian population. Hizballahs. As Winston Churchill so aptly put hybrid wars blend the lethality The ability of hybrid challenges to exploit the it, “However absorbed a commander may be of state conflict with the range and precision of various types of missiles, in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is fanatical and protracted fervor mortar rounds, and mines will increase over sometimes necessary to take the enemy into of irregular warfare time and impede our plans. Our freedom of account.” So, too, must military historians and action and ability to isolate future opponents serious efforts to extract lessons from current from civilian populations are suspect. history. Russell Glenn, a retired U.S. Army military foundation, but it would also place a The exploitation of modern information officer now with RAND, conducted an objec- premium on the cognitive skills needed to rec- technology will also enhance the learning cycle tive evaluation and concluded that the second ognize or quickly adapt to the unknown.20 We of potential irregular enemies, improving their Lebanon conflict was inherently heterogeneous may have to redouble our efforts to revise our ability to transfer lessons learned and techniques and that attempts to focus on purely con- operational art. We have mastered operational from one theater to another. This accelerated ventional solutions were futile. Moreover, as design for conventional warfare, and recently learning cycle has already been seen in Iraq and both Ralph Peters and I concluded earlier, this reinvigorated our understanding of counter- Afghanistan, as insurgents appeared to acquire conflict is not an anomaly, but a harbinger of insurgency campaigns. It is not clear how we and effectively employ tactical techniques or the future. As Glenn summed up in All Glory Is adapt our campaign planning to combina- adapt novel detonation devices found on the Internet or observed from a different source. Marines aid displaced Iraqi These opponents will remain elusive, operate in civilians near An Nasiriyah an extremely distributed manner, and reflect a during Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 2003 high degree of opportunistic learning. The U.S. military and indeed the armed forces of the West must adapt as well. As one Australian officer put it, unless we adapt to today’s protean adversary and the merging modes of human conflict, “we are destined to maintain and upgrade our high-end, industrial age square pegs and be condemned for trying to force them into contemporary and increasingly complex round holes.”22 DOD recognizes the need for fresh thinking and has begun exploring the nature of this mixed challenge. An ongoing research project, including a series of joint wargaming exercises, has been initiated by the Office of the Secre- tary of Defense. U.S. Joint Forces Command

U.S. Marine Corps (Mace M. Gratz) is exploring the implications as well, and the

38 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HOFFMAN

Marines are doing the same. But the challenge bifurcation of war forms, and this orientation General: Nathanael Green and the Triumph of the affects all the Services, not just ground forces. overlooks the most likely and potentially the American Revolution (New York: Henry Holt, 2005). 12 Hizballah’s use of long-range missiles, armed most dangerous of combinations. One pair Charles J. Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon, Guer- rillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain 1808–1814 unmanned aerial vehicles, and antiship cruise of respected strategists has concluded that (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 154–155. missiles should be a warning to the whole joint “hybrid warfare will be a defining feature of 13 Jeffrey D. Wert, Mosby’s Rangers (New York: 27 community. The maritime Services under- the future security environment.” If true, Simon & Schuster, 1991). stand this and reflected the new challenge in we face a wider and more difficult range of 14 B.H. Liddell Hart, Lawrence of Arabia (New the national maritime strategy: “Conflicts are threats than many in the Pentagon are think- York: De Capo, 1989). increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of ing about. As today’s Spartans, we will have to 15 Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized take the enemy’s plans into consideration and Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The planning and execution, and non-state actors, adapt into a more multidimensional or joint Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam (New York: using both simple and sophisticated technolo- force as Sparta ultimately did. Random House, 1992). 16 gies in innovative ways.”23 Today’s strategists need to remember The best source on the war is Andrew F. the frustrated Spartans outside Athens’ long Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Tomorrow’s conflicts will not be easily wall and remember the bloody success of the 17 Avi Kober, “The Israel Defense Forces in the categorized into conventional or irregular. British, Russians, and Israelis in their long wars Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance,” The emerging character of conflict is more against hybrid threats—and prepare Journal of Strategic Studies (February 2008), 3–40. complicated than that. A binary choice of big accordingly. JFQ 18 Russell W. Glenn, All Glory Is Fleeting: Insights and conventional versus small or irregular from the Second Lebanon War (Santa Monica, CA: is too simplistic. The United States cannot RAND, 2008), 73. imagine all future threats as state-based and Notes 19 Arquilla, 369. completely conventional, nor should it assume 20 David C. Gompert, Heads We Win: The Cogni- 1 that state-based conflict has passed into his- Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucy- tive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Santa Monica, tory’s dustbin. Many have made that mistake dides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian CA: RAND, Counterinsurgency Study Occasional War (New York: Free Press, 1996). before. State-based conflict is less likely, but it Paper 1, 2007). 2 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: 21 Michael Evans, From the Long Peace to the Long is not extinct. But neither should we assume U.S. Department of Defense, 2005), 4. War (Canberra: Australian Defence College, 2007). that all state-based warfare will be entirely 3 Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: See also David Betz, “A Real Revolution in Military conventional. As this article suggests, the future Military Theory and the Future of War,” Naval War Affairs,” paper delivered at the Marine Corps Training poses combinations and mergers of the various College Review (Summer 2003), 136. and Education Command Conference, “Pedogology methods available to our antagonists. 4 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future for the Long War,” October 29–31, 2007, Quantico, Numerous security analysts have Warfare (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006). VA. acknowledged the blurring of lines between 5 Countering Irregular Activity Within a Compre- 22 Krause, v; David Betz, “Redesigning Land modes of war.24 Hybrid challengers have passed hensive Approach, Joint Doctrine Note 2/07, United Forces for Wars Amongst the People,” Contemporary from a concept to a reality, thanks to Hizballah. Kingdom, March 2007, 1–15. Security Policy 28, no. 2 (August 2007), 221–243. 6 23 A growing number of analysts in Washington Michael G. Krause, “Square Pegs for Round General James T. Conway, USMC, Admiral Holes?” Australian Army, Australian Land Warfare realize that the debate about preparing for Gary Roughead, USN, and Admiral Thad W. Allen, Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 132, June 2007. USCG, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Sea- counterinsurgency or stability operations 7 John Arquilla, “The End of War As We Knew power (Washington, DC: October 2007). versus big wars is a false argument. Such a It ,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (March 2007), 24 Thomas G. Mahnken, “Modern War,” in The debate leads to erroneous conclusions about 369. Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern future demands for the joint warfighting com- 8 William. J. Nemeth, USMC, Future War and Warfare and Strategic Surprise, ed. Patrick M. Cronin munity. Scholars at the Naval War College in Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare (Monterey, CA: (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), Newport, Rhode Island, and at King’s College, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002). 15–24. London, endorsed the concept.25 Max Boot 9 James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman, “Future 25 Mackubin T. Owens, “Reflections on Future concluded his lengthy study of war and tech- Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare,” U.S. Naval War,” Naval War College Review (Winter 2007); nology with the observation that Institute Proceedings (November 2005), 30–32; F.G. Colonel John J. McCuen, “Hybrid Wars,” Military Hoffman, “How the Marines Are Preparing for Review (April-May 2008), 107–113. Hybrid Wars,” Armed Forces Journal International 26 The boundaries between “regular” and “irregu- Max Boot, War Made New: Technology, (April 2006); and F.G. Hoffman, “Preparing for Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today lar” warfare are blurring. Even non-state groups Hybrid Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2007; (New York: Random House, 2006), 472. are increasingly gaining access to the kinds of st Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21 Century: The Rise 27 Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, weapons that were once the exclusive preserve of of Hybrid Warfare (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute “The Defense Inheritance: Challenges and Choices states. And even states will increasingly turn to for Policy Studies, December 2007). for the Next Pentagon Team,” Washington Quarterly unconventional strategies to blunt the impact of 10 Thomas Huber, Compound Wars: The Fatal (Autumn 2008), 63. For additional background, see American power.26 Knot (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Greg Grant, “Hybrid Wars,” Government Executive Staff College, 1996). (May 2008); and Matthew Rusling, “For the Military, This should widen our lens about the 11 John Grenier, First Way of War: American A Future of Hybrid Wars,” National Defense (Septem- future joint operating environment. Yet our War Making on the Frontier (New York: Cambridge ber 2008). focus remains on an outmoded and dated University Press, 2005); Terry Golway, Washington’s ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 39 Systems versus Classical Approach to U.S. Air Force (Scott T. Sturkol) (Scott T. U.S. Air Force WARFARE U.S. and Australian officers helping to shape By Milan N. Vego strategic planning in Global Mobility Wargame 2008

ince the mid-1990s, a systems (or operations (EBO), and most recently a systemic nature of war were ignored. Yet U.S. and NATO systemic) approach to warfare operational design (SOD). Yet little if any atten- experiences in the recent conflicts in Afghani- emerged gradually as the domi- tion was given to some rather serious flaws in stan and Iraq, and the Israeli experience in the S nant school of thought in the U.S. the theoretical foundations of various systems second Lebanon war in 2006, have revealed not military, most other Western militaries, and the approaches to warfare. Classical military thought only serious limitations but also important flaws North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). was declared unable to satisfy the requirements in the practical application of the systems view This was exemplified by the wide and almost of the new environment that emerged in the of war. These conflicts have shown the timeless uncritical acceptance, not only in the United aftermath of the Cold War and the advent of value of the Clausewitzian view of warfare. The States but also in other militaries, of the claims advanced information technologies and increas- future might well show that most efforts and by numerous proponents of the need to adopt ingly lethal and precise long-range weapons. resources spent on adopting a systems view of network-centric warfare (NCW), effects-based Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780–1831) ideas on the warfare were essentially wasted.

Never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise.

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates1

Pilots attending Red Flag Mission Debriefing System session receive instant feedback on training

U.S. Air Force (Don Sutherland)

40 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO

The Roots of the effects-based approach was the political to reduce it to some extent in order to reach The military application of a systems2 and social pressure to reduce the costs of mili- inner operational or strategic rings.13 The Air approach to planning can be traced to the tary operations and wage war with the fewest Force gradually embraced Warden’s model.14 1930s when U.S. Army Air Corps planners losses of human lives for the friendly (and at the Air Corps Tactical School in Langley, often the enemy) side.6 Such beliefs gained Systems View of the Military Situation Virginia, developed the theory of strategic increasing influence, not only within the Air EBO advocates have a radically differ- bombing. U.S. airpower theorists believed that Force but also among the highest U.S. political ent view of analyzing the military situation the main threads of the enemy economy could and military leadership. from proponents of the traditional approach be identified and evaluated prior to the out- The theoretical foundation of effects- based on the commander’s estimate (or break of hostilities. This so-called industrial based warfare was provided in 1993 in the appreciation) of the situation. Proponents of web theory focused on those critical indus- writings of Colonel John Warden III, USAF, EBO insist that the best way to visualize the tries upon which significant portions of an and his theory of strategic paralysis. Warden military situation is to evaluate what they enemy war economy relied.3 The intent was to depicted the enemy as a system of systems.7 call a “system of systems.” The latter is, in its use a systems approach to generate cascading He also pointed out the relative nature of essence, a variation of the Five Ring Model. In effects that would lead to the collapse of the effects within the enemy system.8 In Warden’s an oddly worded construct, they define system enemy’s economy. The ultimate aim was to view, to think strategically was to view the of systems as “a grouping of organized assem- reduce the enemy’s will to resist and force him enemy as a “system” composed of numerous blies of resources, methods, and procedures to cease fighting. According to this view, the subsystems.9 He contended that all systems regulated by interaction or interdependence to proper application of industrial web theory are similarly organized, need information to accomplish a set of specific functions.”15 Both would ensure rapid and decisive victory.4 function, are resistant to change, and do not Joint Publication (JP) 3–0, Joint Operations Industrial web theory was applied on a instantly react to the force applied against (2006), and JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning large scale during World War II in the strategic them (the hysteresis effect).10 (2006), embraced the system perspective in bombing of Germany, German-occupied The essence of Warden’s systems analyzing situations. A system of systems is Europe, and Japan. However, the actual results approach is the Five Ring Model. He argued an integral part of what EBO proponents call were far below expectations in terms of mate- that any modern state, business organization, the “operational environment.” The latter, in riel and time expended. Germany’s industrial military, terrorist organization, or criminal turn, is composed of “air, land, sea, space, and infrastructure proved resilient and extremely gang can be seen as consisting of a system of adaptable, and civilian morale did not collapse, five interrelated rings that enable it to perform as widely anticipated by airpower proponents. its intended function.11 All systems are the Air Force firmly believed Some 5 years of strategic bombing destroyed arranged in the same way: that its targeteering approach entire cities, killed hundreds of thousands to warfare could be applied at of civilians, curtailed industrial output, and n “leadership” elements provide general all levels of war crippled transportation nodes. Yet despite the direction enormous effect, such effects-based operations n “processes” (formerly called “organic failed to render a strategic decision.5 essentials”) elements convert energy from one associated adversary, friendly, and neutral The impetus toward adopting an effects- ring to another systems, which are relevant for specific joint based approach came in the aftermath of the n “physical infrastructure” elements operations.”16 Vietnam War (1965–1975). Then, the U.S. n “population” elements A system of systems analysis (SoSA) military emphasized the need to link objec- n “agents” (formerly called “fielded forces”) is used as the bedrock for EBO planning. It tives at all levels of war—from the national elements, consisting of demographic groups.12 is divided into six major systems: political, political level to the tactical—in a logical and military, economic, social, infrastructure, and causal chain. In their interpretation, this Warden also applied his model to the information.17 Each of these systems, in turn, outcome-based or strategy-to-task approach operational level of war. The only difference is broken down and reduced to two primary became the basis for joint planning. The is that each of the rings pertains directly to sets of elements: nodes (actually decisive Air Force firmly believed that its targeteer- military sources of power. For example, the points) and links. Nodes are tangible elements ing approach to warfare could somehow be leadership ring consists of the enemy’s com- (persons, places, or physical things) within a applied at all levels of war. The most vocal mander plus the command, control, and com- system that can be “targeted.” Links, in con- proponents of airpower claimed that advances munications systems. The processes ring also trast, are the physical, functional, or behav- in information technologies and the precision includes military logistics. The infrastructure ioral relationships between nodes.18 SoSA and lethality of weapons allowed the use of ring includes roads, rails, communications identifies the relationships between nodes those weapons against complex systems and lines, and pipelines. The fifth ring is the within individual systems and across systems. in a way that was more sophisticated than pre- enemy’s forces—troops, ships, and aircraft— Analysts also link nodes to each other with viously. Another reason for the reemergence and is the hardest to reduce. Warden asserted sufficient detail and then determine key that any campaign focused on the fifth ring nodes—defined as those “related to strategic Dr. Milan N. Vego is Professor of Operations in the would be the longest and bloodiest for both or operational effect or a center of gravity.” Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval sides. Yet he acknowledged that sometimes it Some nodes may become decisive points for War College. is necessary to concentrate on the fifth ring military operations when acted upon.19 EBO ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 41 FORUM | Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare proponents confuse the true meanings of dubious proposition. They mistakenly believe design, also looks at the situation from the effects, centers of gravity, and decisive points. that by linking cause and effect, something as systems perspective. This concept originated SoSA produces a nodal analysis that, complex as human activity can be reduced to in the Israel Defense Forces Operational together with effects development, forms the an essentially passive and lifeless domain. In Theory Research Institute in the mid-1990s. basis for coupling nodes to effects, actions fact, the reality depicted by EBO proponents The genesis for SOD theory was found within (called tasks in the traditional military deci- does not exist—nor can it be created.22 In short, Soviet operational thought.24 Another major sionmaking and planning process) to nodes, human activity is so complex that it operates influence on the development of this concept and resources to establish effects-nodes-action outside the physical domain. For instance, the was the thinking of several (mostly left-lean- linkages. The nodes and associated links are Israelis adopted the U.S. effects-based approach ing) French postmodern philosophers, espe- then targeted for diplomatic, informational, to warfare with a great deal of enthusiasm and cially Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and Felix military, and economic (DIME) actions to apparently without a healthy dose of skepti- Guattari (1930–1992). Proponents explain that influence or change system behavior and cism. Among other things, they neglected the systemic operational design was developed capabilities and thereby accomplish desired importance of the concept of center of gravity. as an alternative to the Western teleological objectives. Lethal or nonlethal power and other Instead of issuing clear and succinct orders, approach, while operational design is based instruments of national power are employed to advocates relied on the highly ambiguous and on epistemology. affect links in order to attain operational and unclear vocabulary of EBO in articulating the In contrast to EBO advocates, SOD strategic effects.20 The aim is to create effects missions for subordinate units. For example, advocates acknowledge that uncertainty is within the enemy’s system such as blindness, the orders issued to the Israeli 91st Division an attribute of complex adaptive systems, decapitation, and the sense of pursuit, thereby during the second Lebanon war in 2006 such as war. They addressed that problem by bringing about a state of strategic paralysis, (Operation Change of Direction) directed them employing what they call continuous systems collapse, and ultimately accomplishing the to carry out “swarmed, multi-dimensional, reframing—an awkward term—which tradi-

EBO enthusiasts do not make clear who has the authority and responsibility to plan and execute DIME actions

tionalists simply call the “running estimate of the situation.” SOD enthusiasts insist that while the EBO approach focuses on disrupting nodes and relationships, systemic operational design centers on transforming relationships and interactions between the entities within a system.25 Like the effects-based approach, systemic operational design also analyzes a complex situation from what they call a “holistic” (that is, emphasizing the importance of the whole and interdependence of its parts) perspective.26 SOD enthusiasts claim that modern Army Chief of Staff GEN Casey tours Anniston Army Depot military operations are too complicated for U.S. Army (D. Myles Cullen) applying a linear approach because the enemy war’s strategic objective.21 However, EBO and simultaneous attacks” instead of stating and environment form a complex adaptive enthusiasts do not make clear who has the clearly what the mission was. Already in 2004, system. However, they mistakenly argue that authority and responsibility to plan and execute the Israelis found out that in order to stop such systems cannot be destroyed but must be DIME actions. Some of them even imply the launching of rockets into Israeli territory, pushed into disequilibrium—that is, into chaos. that these actions are the responsibility of the it was necessary to affect enemy capabilities Yet the Israeli failure to decisively defeat the operational commanders—but they are not. rather than consciousness. During the second Hizballah forces in the second Lebanon war Only the highest political-strategic leadership Lebanon war, so-called leverage and effects illustrates the hollowness of both the EBO and of a country or alliance/coalition can plan for against Hizballah proved dismally ineffective to SOD approaches to warfare.27 and execute synchronized employment of both bring the organization “to acknowledge its bad SOD proponents falsely claim that nonmilitary and military instruments of power. condition” within a few days after the conflict intelligence preparation of the battlefield EBO advocates are confident that by started.23 (IPB) is most suitable for the tactical but not acting against a physical part of the enemy Another variant of the systems approach higher levels of war. In their view, IPB deals system, desired effects in the domain of human that unfortunately got some traction in the only with physical reality. Its mechanistic and activity can be achieved. Yet this is a highly U.S. Army, so-called systemic operational reductionist processes are more appropriate

42 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO in hierarchical organizations and in situations The systems perspective in analyzing war, the more complex the interplay is among where compliance is more important than a military situation is actually reductionist various intangible elements. Both the tangible time-consuming discourse. In their view, IPB and overly simplistic. Systems do not behave and intangible elements of the situation is insufficient for operational planning in the exactly as individual components, or even include military and nonmilitary sources of contemporary operational environment. SOD as a quantitative sum of individuals; the power. The tangible elements are for the most proponents argue that the operational level general performance and function of a system part measurable in some way. Despite the deals with more than just the physical enemy; usually produce results considerably different widely held belief that tangible elements can it draws on concepts and abstractions.28 from that of the arithmetical-linear summa- be quantified, this is not always the case. The However, IPB properly understood and tion of results of the individual ingredients tangible and intangible elements are usually applied is not what systems proponents claim that compose it.31 Advocates of the systems mixed and cannot be neatly separated. This is it to be; in fact, it is just the opposite. IPB approach seek scientific certainties and ratio- especially true in the case of forces employed encompasses a comprehensive analysis of the nality where uncertainty, chaos, and irrational- at operational and strategic levels. Tangible situation regardless of the level of war. Prop- ity abound. They assume that all elements factors can be properly or improperly evalu- erly understood, it includes the evaluation of of the situation can somehow be precisely ated, they can change over time, and they can neither military nor nonmilitary aspects of determined and no mistakes will be made. The be intentionally or inadvertently reported the situation. enemy is essentially passive and will behave erroneously. They can be wrongly understood

Systems vs. Operational Thinking Systems thinking has been developed systems do not behave exactly as individual components, or to provide techniques for studying systems in even as a quantitative sum of individuals a holistic way to supplement the traditional reductionist method. The principle of analytical reduction characterizing the Western Predator UAV at forward operating base during Operation Enduring Freedom intellectual tradition came from René Des- cartes (1596–1650). This type of analysis is the process of identifying the simple nature in complex phenomena and dividing each problem into as many parts as possible to best solve it. Experience has shown that reductive analysis is the most successful explanatory technique ever used in science.29 Systems thinking approaches a system in a holistic manner. The system is understood by examining the linkages and interactions between the elements that compose the entirety of the system. Systems thinking attempts to illustrate that events are separated by distance and time and that small catalytic events can cause large changes in complex systems. Supposedly, it contrasts traditional analysis, which studies systems by breaking them down into separate elements. Systems MARCENT, MCAT (William D. Crow) MCAT MARCENT, thinking provides a framework where mental models can be built, relationships between in a way that will ensure friendly success. This because of fear, hate, lack of confidence, systems components can be uncovered, and view of warfare is overly simplistic because fatigue, and stress. patterns of behavior can be determined. Both it does not accommodate the Clausewitzian Tangible elements can also be falsely the relationships within the system and the factors of the friction and fog of war and the evaluated. For example, the number or size of factors that influence them enable the con- role of psychological factors in warfare. enemy forces or weapons/equipment might struction and understating of the underlying A more serious problem is that pro- be accurately observed but falsely reported system logic. Proponents claim that systems ponents of the systems approach ignore the or evaluated without a context. Information thinking views a system from the broad per- fact that the tangible and intangible elements received might be accurate but wrongly inter- spective that includes seeing its structure, pat- of the situation cannot simply be reduced preted by commanders and staffs. This can terns, and cycles rather than seeing individual to nodes and links. The human factor is the occur intentionally or unintentionally. It can events. The component parts of a system can key element in analyzing the situation at any be caused by incompetence, lack of operations best be understood in the context of relation- level of war, but especially at the strategic and security, or treason. The commander can falsely ships with each other and with other systems, operational levels, that is, those levels at which evaluate the enemy’s capabilities or intentions. rather than in isolation.30 a war is won or lost. The higher the level of Misunderstandings between commanders ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 43 FORUM | Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare and subordinates are frequent occurrences in than systems thinking. It avoids all the pit- requirement to think operationally has been combat; they cannot be predicted or quanti- falls associated with viewing a war through recognized by many theorists and practitio- fied. The breakdown of weapons or technical systems-of-systems prisms. One of the principal ners of operational warfare. For example, the equipment can occur at any time. The effects requirements for success at the operational and Prussian general Gerhard Johann David von of atmospheric influences cannot usually be strategic levels of command is to think broadly Scharnhorst (1755–1813) observed that “one measured precisely. Except in rare cases, natural and have a panoramic vision.33 Operational has to see the whole before seeing its parts. events cannot be predicted in a timely fashion. thinking is not identical to what information This is really the first rule, and its correctness Hence, the unreliability of humans and technol- warfare advocates call situational awareness—a can be learned from a study of history.”34 ogy considerably affects performance on both term used in training pilots; strictly defined, Clausewitz wrote that “small things always sides in a conflict. The boundaries between situational awareness refers to the degree of depend on great ones—the unimportant on tangible and intangible factors are in the realm accuracy with which one’s perception of the the important, and accidentals on essentials; of chance and are fluid.32 current environment mirrors reality. Situational this must guide our approach.”35 Helmuth In contrast to tangibles, intangibles awareness does not necessarily mean an under- von Moltke, Sr. (1800–1891), the Prussian and are hard or even impossible to quantify with standing; it is purely a tactical, not operational German Chief of General Staff (1857–1888), precision. Intangibles pertain for the most or strategic, term. The extensive use of the term wrote, “All individual successes achieved part to human elements. Some of these, such situational awareness in the U.S. and other mili- through the courage of our [German] troops as cohesion of an alliance/coalition, public on the battlefield are useless if not guided by support for war, morale and discipline, and great thoughts and directed by the purpose of unit cohesion, can be evaluated in very broad although operational thinking the campaign and the war as a whole.”36 He terms: low, medium, high, or excellent. Other is one of the most critical believed that “it is far more important that the intangible elements—such as leadership, factors for success, many high commander retain a clear perspective of will to fight, small-unit cohesion, combat operational commanders have the entire state of affairs than that any detail is 37 motivation, and doctrine—are extremely remained captives of their carried out in a particular way.” difficult to quantify with any degree of preci- Operational thinking is a result of con- sion or confidence. At the strategic level, the tactical perspective siderable conscious effort on the part of the quality of the enemy’s highest political and commander, in both peacetime and combat. military leadership and its future intentions taries is perhaps one of the best proofs of the Although operational thinking is one of the and reactions are difficult, if not impossible, predominance of a narrow tactical perspective most critical factors for success, whether in to evaluate and even less so to predict with among information warfare advocates. peacetime or time of war, many operational confidence. The enemy’s leadership can make The commander’s ability to think opera- commanders have remained essentially cap- decisions that are perceived as slightly or tionally, or what the Germans call operational tives of their narrow tactical perspective. To grossly irrational. thinking (operatives Denken), is usually not think tactically is easy; it is an area in which The traditional way of military think- an innate trait but is acquired and nurtured all commanders feel comfortable because this ing is not only far more comprehensive but for many years prior to assuming a position is what they have done for most of their pro- also far more realistic, dynamic, and flexible of responsibility at the operational level. The fessional careers. History provides numerous examples in which a commander’s inability or USS La Jolla returns to Naval Station Pearl Harbor unwillingness to think broadly and far ahead from 6-month Pacific deployment resulted in major setbacks, or even in the failure of a campaign or major operation. A commander thinks operationally when he possesses an operational rather than tactical perspective in exercising his numerous responsibilities, both in peacetime and in war. In purely spatial terms, the operational perspective encompasses the (formally declared or undeclared) theater of operations plus an arbitrarily defined area of interest. The perspective of a tactical commander is much smaller because he is focused on planning and executing actions aimed at accomplishing tactical objectives in a given combat zone or area of operations. The broadest perspective is required at the military and theater-strategic levels of command. Among other things, the strategic perspective requires the commander’s ability to translate objectives of national policy

U.S. Navy (Luciano Marano) and strategy into achievable military or theater-

44 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO strategic objectives and then to orchestrate actions and then make decisions to respond to to make another decision to respond to the the use of military and nonmilitary sources the enemy’s actions. enemy’s counteraction. The key to success is of power to achieve them. The tactical com- In contrast to a tactical commander, an to operate within the enemy’s decision cycle. mander is normally not concerned with using operational commander needs to evaluate the Without this ability, the operational com- nonmilitary sources of power, but operational features of the physical environment in opera- mander cannot seize and maintain the initia- and strategic commanders are. However, the tional rather than tactical terms. This means, tive—and without the initiative, his freedom of exception to this is operations short of war, among other things, assessing characteristics action will be restricted by the opponent. such as the posthostilities phase of a campaign of geography, hydrography, and oceanography The operational commander should and low-intensity conflicts, where nonmilitary in terms of their effect on the course and also have the ability to evaluate the impact of aspects of the situation play an important role outcome of a major operation and campaign, new and future technologies on the conduct at all levels of war. not on battles and engagements or some other of operational warfare. He must not focus on Operational commanders cannot be tactical actions. The operational commander specific weapons or weapon platforms and highly successful without having full knowl- is also far more concerned with the effects of sensors but should anticipate the influence edge and understanding of the mutual interre- climate, rather than weather, on the employ- these will have on the conduct of campaigns lationships and linkage between strategy and ment of multiservice/multinational forces in a or major operations when used in large policy on one hand, and strategy, operational given part of the theater. numbers. Moltke was one such rare indi- art, and tactics on the other. They should fully Thinking operationally means that the vidual who understood the impact that the understand the distinctions among the levels operational commander clearly sees how technological advances of his era, specifically of war and how decisions and actions at one each of his decisions contributes to the ulti- the railroad and telegraph, would have on the level affect events at others. In sequencing and mate strategic or operational objective. All conduct of war and campaigns. He empha- synchronizing the use of military and non- the actions of the operational commander sized the importance of railways in the move- military sources of power, operational com- should be made within the given operational ment of troops, especially in the mobilization manders must have the ability to focus on the or strategic framework; otherwise, they will and deployment phase of a campaign. He big picture and not be sidetracked by minor or not contribute to ultimate success and might directed the drafting of the first mobilization unrelated events. actually undermine it. As in a game of chess, plan and movement tables in 1859. He also An operational commander should also the player who views the board as a single paid attention to the analysis of military tech- possess extensive knowledge and understand- interrelated plane of action, with each move as nical advances.42 Field Marshal Alfred von ing of nonmilitary aspects of the situation in a prelude to a series of further moves, is more Schlieffen (1833–1913) showed great enthusi- his theater. In contrast to the tactical com- likely to be successful than an opponent who asm for adopting new technologies. However, mander, the operational commander has thinks only a single move at a time. The opera- in contrast to Moltke, he lacked proper vision to properly sequence and synchronize the tional commander should think how to create where future technical developments were employment of all sources of power in the opportunities for employing his forces while concerned.43 conduct of a campaign or major operation. Sound operational decisions must be made, although the knowledge and understanding of thinking operationally means the operational commander sees some essential elements of the situation are far how each of his decisions contributes to the ultimate strategic from satisfactory and uncertainties abound. or operational objective There is greater uncertainty for the operational commander than for a tactical commander in terms of space, time, and forces. at the same time reducing the enemy’s future Closely linked to operational thinking is Generally, a commander can more accurately options.39 One of the most important attributes the commander’s operational vision—that is, measure the risks of an action or nonaction at of a higher commander is the ability to see the ability to correctly envision the military the tactical than at the operational level.38 the situation through the enemy’s eyes—what conditions that will exist after the mission The operational commander has to Napoleon I called “seeing the other side of the is accomplished. Operational vision is the properly balance the factors of space, time, and hill.” Largely, this ability is intuitive. Napoleon I practical application of operational thinking forces against a given strategic or operational and some other successful military leaders had in planning, preparing, and executing a cam- objective; otherwise, he might fail in accom- an extraordinary ability to visualize what the paign or major operation. Hence, it is inher- plishing the ultimate objective of a campaign enemy’s commander would do in countering ently narrower in its scope than operational or major operation. Because of the greater scale the movements of their own forces.40 thinking. In terms of time, it is also limited of the objectives, this process is much more A commander thinks operationally to the anticipated duration of a campaign or difficult and time consuming than at the tacti- when he looks beyond the domain of physi- major operation. The commander’s opera- cal level of command. In general, the larger the cal combat and into the future. The greater tional vision is expressed in his intent trans- scope of the military objective is, the more the one’s sphere of command, the further ahead mitted to subordinate tactical commanders. It uncertainties that fall within the commander’s one should think.41 By correctly anticipating is critical for success that the operational com- estimate of the situation. The operational the enemy’s reaction to his own actions, the mander imparts his personal vision of victory commander must have an uncanny ability operational commander can make a sound and and the conditions and methods for obtaining to anticipate the enemy’s reaction to his own timely decision, counteract, and then prepare it to all subordinates. The commander’s vision ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 45 FORUM | Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare is a combination of his personality traits, link can be established between cause and self-confidence on the other, the greater the education and training, and experience. In effect. Small causes lead to minor results, while margin left for accidents.53 general, the higher the level of command, the decisive outcomes require massive inputs. The Clausewitz wrote that war is not the further into the future the commander must proportional connection can be established action of a living force upon a lifeless mass look to achieve and consolidate the desired between each cause and effect.47 War is con- but the collision of two living forces.54 The combat success. And the larger the scope of sidered a one-sided problem rather than an enemy has his own will and can thus react the military objective, the more complex the interaction between two animate forces. The unpredictably and even irrationally. Systems situation and more difficult it is to correctly enemy’s actions or reactions can essentially be approach enthusiasts seem unaware that the envision the military endstate and the unfold- disregarded. In fact, because the enemy cannot timing and scope of irrationality cannot be ing of events leading to it. be controlled, he is not considered a factor at predicted or measured. It is simply unknow- all.48 The neo-Newtonians acknowledge that able. Yet irrational decisions on either side Systems vs. Clausewitzian View of War uncertainties and friction existed in past wars. can have significant consequences on both a All the proponents of the systems However, they contend that fog of war and course and an outcome. In general, one can approach, regardless of their differences, essen- friction in combat were caused by the inability presume that rational actors in a war make tially share the mechanistic or Newtonian view to acquire and transmit information in real rational and proper choices when confronted of warfare. They believe that the information or near-real time.49 Friction can be reduced to with competing alternatives, each having a age is so different that the classical theory of manageable levels by deploying a vast array of cost and payoff that are known or available war as explained by Clausewitz has become sensors and computers netted together. to the actors.55 However, the pervasive uncer- irrelevant. They clearly confuse the distinctions A systems approach to warfare is not tainty in any war, the role of chance and pure between the nature of war and character of much different from the failed “geometrical” or luck, and the enemy’s independent will and war. Nature of war refers to constant, universal, “mathematical” school that dominated military actions make rationality in the conduct of war and inherent qualities that ultimately define thinking in Europe in the late 18th century, a highly unrealistic expectation. A rational war throughout the ages, such as violence, which Clausewitz vehemently opposed. Con- calculus, after all, is based on the notion chance, luck, friction, and uncertainty. Hence, trary to the views of many EBO proponents, that nations fight wars in pursuit of postwar the nature of war is timeless regardless of the objectives whose benefits exceed their cost. changes in the political environment, the cause Benefits and costs are weighed throughout of a war, or technological advances.44 Character the Newtonian view of the the war, and once the expenditures of effort of war refers to those transitory, circumstantial, world is that everything exceed the scale of the political objective, the and adaptive features that account for the dif- runs smoothly, precisely, and objective must be renounced and peace will ferent periods of warfare. They are primarily predictably follow.56 The rationality of decisionmaking determined by sociopolitical and historical presupposes each side knows exactly what the conditions in a certain era as well as techno- changing objectives of the other side are and logical advances. Systems approach advocates the Prussian did not embrace the systems view what those objectives are worth in effort and firmly believe that technology is the most of warfare. In fact, he ridiculed thinkers such sacrifice. They each also have all the neces- important factor affecting both the nature and as Dietrich Heinrich von Buelow (1757–1807), sary information to evaluate the other side’s character of war. They view war as an open, one of the leaders of the mathematical school, intent to continue or cease fighting. Thus, one distributed, nonlinear, and dynamic system. who took all moral values out of the theory and side or the other can precisely calculate the It is highly sensitive to initial conditions. It is dealt only with materiel, reducing all warfare enemy’s relative current and future strengths. characterized by complex hierarchical systems to a pair of mathematical equations of balance Also, one or both sides can identify and of feedback loops. Some of the loops are and superiority in time and space, and a pair compare the anticipated costs of all avail- designed but others are not. Feedback results of angles and lines.50 Clausewitz was against able options.57 Systems approach proponents are invariably nonlinear.45 any dogmatic way of thinking. Among other acknowledge that war is rarely at equilibrium The Newtonian view of the world is that things, he commented that efforts were made because of the combined influences from the of a giant machine. Everything runs smoothly, to equip in order to conduct war with prin- physical environment and such intangible precisely, and predictably. Everything is ciples, rules, or even systems. The conduct of factors as politics, leadership, and informa- measurable.46 Systems approach proponents war in his view branches out in all directions tion. They also acknowledge the effect of suggest that all problems in warfare can be and has no definite limits. Thus, “an irreconcil- friction, fatigue, loss of morale, and poor lead- easily resolved and that military operations able conflict exists between this type of theory ership.58 Yet they seemingly do not realize that are immune to perturbations from their wider and actual practice.”51 the systems approach cannot predict, much environment. All that is needed is for one’s Clausewitz insisted that the outcome of less correctly measure, combined effects of military machine to operate at peak efficiency; any war cannot be predicted with certainty friction, uncertainty, danger, fear, chance, and then victory is ensured. The neo-Newtonians because so many intangible elements come luck in the conduct of war. Clausewitz wrote believe the outcome of a war can be predicted. into play.52 The art of war deals with living that friction is the only concept that “more or Hence, they put an extraordinary emphasis and moral forces. Thus, it cannot attain the less corresponds to the factors that distinguish on quantifiable methods in measuring the absolute and must always leave a margin for real war from war on the paper.”59 In his view, progress and outcome of combat. They offer a uncertainty. The greater the gap between “Actions in a war are like movement in a resis- clean concept of warfare, believing that a direct uncertainty on one hand, and courage and tant element; in war it is difficult for normal

46 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO efforts to achieve even moderate results.”60 views on warfare. They are neo-Newtonians 5 Gary H. Cheek, “Effects-Based Operations: Friction consists of the infinite number of because they view warfare as a machine. For The End of Dominant Maneuver,” in Transformation st unforeseen things, large and small, that inter- them, the outcome of a war is quite predictable. Concepts for National Security in the 21 Century (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. fere with all activities in war.61 It encompasses Hence, they try to quantify both tangible and Army War College, September 2002), 82. uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical dif- intangible elements in war. Systems advocates 6 J.P. Hunerwadel, “The Effects-Based Approach ficulties, and the unforeseen, and their effects generally overemphasize the role and impor- to Operations: Questions and Answers,” Air & Space 62 on decisions, morale, and actions. tance of technology. They also believe that Power Journal (Spring 2006), 3, available at . to manage. Yet it is composed of many parts, factor of friction can be mastered. One can 7 Cheek, 74. and each part is composed of individuals. Each easily agree that systems theories can be suc- 8 Steven M. Leonard, “The Elusive Silver Bullet: of these has the potential to generate friction. cessfully applied in analyzing many aspects of Effects in Army Operations,” unpublished manu- The ever-present factor of danger, combined human activities—for example, the economy, script, March 27, 2007, 3–4. 9 with the physical exertions that war demands, business, organizations, and political system. Christopher Bence, “Warden vs. Pape,” Air & Space Power Chronicles, February 28, 2000, 2. compounds the problem. Friction is the However, it is a quite a stretch to apply such 10 John A. Warden III, “Thinking and Acting factor that makes the apparently easy things theory to warfare. War is not economic activity, Strategically in Peace and War,” in Strategische Studien 63 and it is not a business (as it is widely believed in warfare so difficult. Clausewitz wrote that I: Strategische Denken in 21, Jahrhundert, MILAK the most serious source of friction in war is to be in the U.S. military and elsewhere). No Schrift, no. 3 (Zurich: Militaerakademie an der ETH, the difficulty of accurate recognition. This, in other human activity even distantly approaches 2006), 25. turn, makes things appear entirely different war in complexity and unpredictability. 11 Dale C. Eikmeier, The Center of Gravity from what one expected. He also emphasized One can disagree with many ideas Debate Resolved (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army that friction in war cannot be reduced to a few espoused by Clausewitz 180 years ago. Yet Command and General Staff College, December 16, points, as in mechanics. Friction is everywhere despite the passage of the time, his views on 1998), 27. 12 in contact with chance. It brings about “effects the nature of war, the relationship between Warden uses this term now because he sub- that cannot be measured—just because they are policy and strategy, and the importance of sequently applied his model to the business world; the term agent, in his view, has a broader meaning largely due to chance.”64 moral and psychological factors in warfare and is somewhat preferable to fielded forces. See John Because combat is a clash of opposing are as valid today as they were then. Warfare A. Warden III, “Strategy and System Thinking,” Air has remained a domain full of uncertain- wills, uncertainties and unknowns abound. Power Revue der Schweizer Armee, no. 3, addendum This fog of war, when combined with friction, ties, friction, chance, luck, fear, danger, and to AllgemeineSchweizerische Militaerische Zeitschrift, creates numerous ambiguities about which a irrationality. No advances in technology will December 12, 2004, 19–20. commander must make decisions. The higher ever change that. Finally, any new or emerg- 13 John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” the level of war, the more uncertainties the ing military theory, including the systems Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 11–12, avail- situation encompasses. Chances of achieving approach to warfare, must fully meet the test able at . 14 war increases. Clausewitz wrote that the only reality, then it must be modified, radically David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: situation the commander knows fully is his changed, or abandoned. JFQ Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education Foundation, 2001), 18. own. He knows the enemy’s situation only from 15 Lewis Ware, “Some Observations of the Enemy unreliable information. Also, it is human nature Notes as a System,” Airpower Journal (Winter 1995), 2, avail- either to underestimate or overestimate enemy able at . Defense University, Washington, DC, September 29, is reduced when decisions are made, as they 16 Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operation Planning 2008, available at . or even false information. The fog of war is 2006), xv. 2 Steven M. Rinaldi, Beyond the Industrial Web: 17 Joint Warfighting Center, Operational Implica- the main factor that makes some commanders Economic Synergies and Targeting Methodologies tions, 2. willing to take high (but prudent) risks and (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 18 Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Hand- others extremely cautious or deliberative in 1995), 7–8, 10. The U.S. military defines a system as a book for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations making decisions. The uncertainties and imper- functionally, physically, or behaviorally related group (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, February fections in the knowledge of the situation on of elements that interact together as a whole. See Joint 24, 2006), II–14. which the commander bases his decisions and Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 19 Ibid., II–3. 7, Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations actions can never be fully mastered, regardless 20 Ibid. (EBO) (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, of one’s advances in information technologies. 21 Ron Tira, The Limitations of Standoff November 17, 2004), 2. Uncertainty in war is not only a result of a lack Firepower-Based Operations: On Standoff Warfare, 3 Cited in Rinaldi, 1. of information, but also often caused by what Maneuver, and Decision (Tel Aviv: Institute for 4 Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in one does not comprehend in a given situation. National Strategic Studies, March 2007), 11–12. Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American 22 Tim Challans, “Emerging Doctrine and the Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton: Ethics of Warfare,” presentation to the Joint Services Despite some differences in emphasis, all Princeton University Press, 2002), 163. systems enthusiasts share essentially the same ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 47 FORUM | Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare

Conference on Professional Ethics, 2006, School of 41 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Novato, Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS. CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 409. 23 Cited in Avi Kober, “The Israel Defense Forces 42 Lothar Burchardt, “Helmuth von Moltke, in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Perfor- Wilhelm I und der Aufstieg des preussischen Gener- mance?” The Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 1 alstabes,” in Generalfeldmarschall von Moltke. Bedeu- (February 2008), 32–33. tung und Wirkung, ed. Roland G. Foerster (Munich: 24 Cited in Joseph A. DiPasquale, Discourse in R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), 24. Systemic Operational Design (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 43 Guenter Roth, “Operatives Denken bei Schlief- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, fen und Manstein,” in Ausgewaehlte Operationen und 2007), 5–6. ihre militaerhistorischen Grundlagen, ed. Hans-Martin 25 Ketti C. Davison, Systemic Operational Design Ottmer and Heiger Ostertag (Bonn/Herford: Verlag (SOD): Gaining and Maintaining the Cognitive Initia- E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1993), 283. tive (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command 44 Michael Sheehan, “The Changing Character and General Staff College, 2006), 31. of War,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An 26 Cited in William G. Cummings, Operational Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis, Design Doctrine: Hamstrung or Footloose in the Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 4th ed. (Oxford: Contemporary Operating Environment (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007), 216. Canadian Forces College, April 30, 2007), 74. 45 John F. Schmitt, “Command and (Out of) 27 Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unpre- Control: The Military Implications of Complexity pared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, The Long War Theory,” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Series Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwin- Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Combined Arms ski (Washington, DC: National Defense University Center, 2008), 23–24. Press, 1997), 219–246. 28 Davison, 51 46 Ibid. 29 Ibid., 11. 47 Ibid., 223–224, 228. 30 Cited in Victor J. Delacruz, Systemic Opera- 48 Ibid. tional Design: Enhancing the Joint Operation Planning 49 Ibid., 224; David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, Process (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Frederick P. Stein, Network-Centric Warfare: and General Staff College, 2007), 27. Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, Direct 31 d Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excel- 2 ed. (Washington, DC: DOD C4ISR Cooperative lence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London: Research Program, August 1999), 71. To You! Frank Cass, 1997), 79. 50 Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 137, 244–245. 32 August Winter, “Waegbares und Unwaegbares 51 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. ndupress.ndu.edu bei der Entstehung von Fuehrungsentschluessen” (I) Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Knopf, Wehrkunde 3 (March 1965), 117. 1993), 154–155. 33 David Jablonsky, “Strategy and the Operational 52 Paul K. Van Riper and Robert H. Scales, Jr., Distribution: JFQ is distributed to the Level of War: Part I,” Parameters (Spring 1987), 71. “Preparing for War in the 21st Century,” Parameters field and fleet through Service publications 34 General Johann von Kielmansegg, cited in (Autumn 1997), 2, 5. distribution centers. Active, Reserve, National 53 Guard units, individuals, and organizations Norbert Hanisch, Untersuchen Sie die operativen Ideen Clausewitz, On War, 97. 54 supported by the Services can order JFQ Manstein hinsdichtlich Schwerpunkt-bildung, Ueber- Cheek, 88. through the appropriate activity: raschung, Initiative und Handlungsfreiheit an den 55 Michael Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence Army: Publications Control Officers sub- Beispielen Westfeldzug 1940 (Sichelschnitt-Plan) und (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1989), 471. mit requests for official subscriptions Operation Zitadelle (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie 56 Clausewitz, On War, 92. through www.usapa.army.mil (click der Bundeswehr, January 15, 1988), 4. 57 Michael Handel, War Termination—A Critical “ordering” link on left side of page) 35 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, ed. Werner Survey (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1978), 29. (use IDN: 050042 and PIN: 071781; cite Hahlweg, 16th ed. (Bonn: Ferdinand Duemmler 58 Schmitt. Misc. Pub 71-1) Verlag, 1952), 874. 59 Clausewitz, On War, 138. Navy: Defense Distribution Depot 36 Hanisch, “Motto.” 60 Ibid., 139. Susquehanna, New Cumberland, Penn- 37 61 sylvania 17070; call (717) 770-5872, Daniel J. Hughes, ed., Moltke on the Art of War: Charles D. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at DSN 771-5827, FAX (717) 770-4360 Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993), 184. the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics of the Air Force: www.e-Publishing.af.mil or 38 Christian Leggemann, Die taktisch/operativen Culminating Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army email [email protected] Ideen Mansteins hinsichtlich Schwerpunktbildung, Command and General Staff College, April 28, 1988), Marine Corps: Headquarters U.S. Marine Ueberraschung, Initiative und Handlungsfreiheit 9. Corps (Code ARDE), Federal Building (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 62 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Modern No. 2 (room 1302), Navy Annex, Wash- January 4, 1989), 2. Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. ington, DC 20380; FAX (703) 614-2951, 39 Robert W. RisCassi, “Doctrine for Joint Opera- Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, DSN 224-2951 tions in a Combined Environment: A Necessity,” 1986), 202. Military Review (June 1993), 24. 63 Ibid., 202–203. Subscriptions for individuals 40 Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, 64 Clausewitz, On War, 137, 139. and nonmilitary organizations: Masters of the Art of Command (Boston: Houghton 65 Ibid., 95. http://bookstore.gpo.gov/subscriptions Mifflin, 1975), 3.

48 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat

By Marvin Baker Schaffer and Ike Chang

n this article, we introduce the concept for expeditionary U.S. Army and Marine of survivable, non–fossil fuel power- Corps forces as opposed to sea and air because plants that can be transported to remote the Navy is already largely nuclear and because Itheaters of operation. Our rationale substantial Air Force fuel improvements face arises from a sense of urgency for countering unresolved technology issues. two emerging threats facing land forces today: Our notion of land force energy surviv- the increasing cost and vulnerability of fossil ability derives from mobility and stealth. fuel extraction, refining, and distribution Mobility is key in that it permits evasion of Marvin Baker Schaffer is an Adjunct Staff systems; and worldwide proliferation of highly attack by coordinate-guiding weapons. Mobil- Member at the RAND Corporation. Ike Chang is an accurate weapons launched at long standoff ity also allows serving widely dispersed forces Independent Consultant. ranges. Our vision spotlights nuclear energy without reliance on extended power grids, Expeditionary Communications Squadron (Bradley A. Lail) Expeditionary Communications Squadron th 506

Bladder farm at Kirkuk Regional Air Base, Iraq, provides fuel for operations

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 49 FORUM | Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat fixed storage facilities, and processing plants. tions. Energy is consumed as fuel for a variety dwindling reserves of reliable, inexpensive To complement mobile energy, we focus on of vehicles and as electricity for illumination, oil and competing worldwide demand, fuel land vehicles that use hydrogen fuel and elec- communication, computing, food process- costs have already begun to skyrocket, and tricity for power. ing, and environmental heating and cooling. responsible economists and geologists predict Transportable, mobile powerplants Modern military forces also are more often that they will go significantly higher. More- permit manufacture of hydrogen in theater called upon to provide humanitarian relief over, proliferation of guided bombs and mis- and recharging of vehicular batteries in the in the form of electricity for civilian popula- siles threatens to make stationary refineries, field. We envision transportability by ship, tions. Taken together, these energy demands powerplants, storage vessels, generators, and barge, cargo aircraft, or airship, and theater argue for affordable, reliable, and survivable power grids prime targets with low expected mobility by tractor trailer truck, railroad power under combat stress and emergency survivability in future regional conflicts. flatcar, cargo aircraft, or airship. conditions. Overwhelming reliance on foreign Modern armies require copious The outlook, however, is not promis- oil poses an additional dilemma. The entire amounts of energy to conduct their opera- ing regarding any of these issues. Due to national security system, including the political leadership, military forces, and Intelligence Soldiers hook fuel blivets Community, relies on fossil fuel to operate. to C–47 Chinook for With 95 percent of proven oil reserves con- transport to forward trolled outside of North America,1 this poses a elements national risk that is monotonically increasing. To an alarming extent, then, the future has already arrived. Intensive study, planning, and early action to resolve this dilemma are warranted.

in its latest budget request, the White House added a $2 billion surcharge for rising fuel costs

Motivation The debilitating economic impact of $100+ per barrel for oil and $4+ per gallon for gasoline on the U.S. civilian population is well known. Such prices undermine military operations as well. U.S. forces currently consume 340,000 barrels of oil daily, 1.5 percent of all the oil used in the country.2 In 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) energy bill was $13.6 billion, 25 percent higher than the year before. Petroleum costs have subsequently increased more than 50 percent. In its latest budget request, the White House added a $2 billion surcharge for rising fuel costs. It is con- ceivable that in coming decades, petroleum and natural gas will be so expensive that fuel will impinge on vehicular-intensive training exercises and on the acquisition of advanced equipment. The U.S. military must find a viable substitute for fossil fuel. Fuel abundance is critical on the battlefield since it enables maneuver- ability. It is well recognized that lack of fuel can impose severe limitations on operations. There are numerous historical examples:

n George Patton’s 1944 drive for Germany

U.S. Army (M.W. Woods) U.S. Army (M.W. stalled because Dwight Eisenhower had to

50 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu SCHAFFER and CHANG divert fuel to British forces under Bernard (wheeled) variety. These missiles later rained tice has already begun, but at best it is an act Montgomery. on Tel Aviv and Saudi Arabia. of expedience that reduces reliance on foreign n As a consequence of interdiction in the n A 1991 study by Air Force Chief of Staff sources. Blended fuels are not significantly Mediterranean Sea, German forces under General Merrill McPeak revealed the challenge less expensive than petroleum, and they emit Erwin Rommel literally ran out of gas in their of targeting mobile targets: “Efforts to suppress similar kinds and amounts of pollutants. 1943 North Africa campaign. Iraqi launches of Scud missiles during Desert Blends and synthetics also suffer from the n The 1944 drive by U.S. forces up the Storm ran into problems. Mobile launchers same vulnerabilities as fossil fuels in their Rhone Valley in France was slowed by fuel proved remarkably elusive and survivable. dependence on fixed refining and distribution shortages. Objects targeted were impossible to discrimi- infrastructure. n The Luftwaffe was grounded late in nate from decoys (and clutter) with radar and World War II due to lack of fuel. infrared sensors.”5 n Because of fuel scarcity, German pilots n In the 2006 war in Lebanon, the Israeli over the longer term, military were sent into combat in the last 9 months of air force could not stop more than 1,000 land fleets will consist of World War II with only a third of the training Hizballah truck-mobile rockets from striking mixtures of electric vehicles, hours actually required. Israeli urban areas. fuel-cell vehicles, hydrogen vehicles, and hybrids Wartime survivability of infrastruc- Abundance of fuel is critical for success ture for fuel extraction, manufacturing, in big and small wars. U.S. forces in Iraq and distribution has reached a critical state consume 1,680,000 gallons daily. The famous Over the longer term, military land with the worldwide proliferation of satellite- flanking maneuver during Operation Desert fleets will consist of mixtures of electric guided standoff missiles and bombs. As a Storm burned 4.5 million gallons of fuel per vehicles, fuel-cell vehicles, hydrogen vehicles, case in point, Russia recently introduced the Kh-38MK air-to-surface missile. It Figure 1. DamageDamage Probability Probability of Mobile of Reactor uses GLONASS (Global Navigation Satel- Mobile Reactor lite System) satellite navigation, equivalent 1 to global positioning system (GPS) with accuracy of better than 35 feet, and has a standoff range of 25 miles.3 More ominously, threats with longer range also exist, typically 7,500 square feet 5,000 to 8,000 miles for intercontinental and warhead submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 700 0.1 miles for cruise missiles, and 400 miles for 5,000 square feet short-range ballistic missiles.4 Currently, most warhead of these systems employ comparatively inaccurate inertial guidance, but many are being upgraded to satellite navigation with perfor- PROBABILITY 0.01 mance equivalent to the Kh-38MK. Since attack missile warheads have 0 200 400 600 800 damage areas of 5,000 to 7,500 square feet, we can estimate the benefits of random movement for a mobile reactor. Calculations are summarized in figure 1, in which damage 0.001 probability is plotted against displacement. MOBILITY DISPLACEMENT When the displacement is 0, the damage probability is more than 0.9. However, when the displacement is 600 feet or more, the damage day. After 5 days of combat, the maneuver and hybrids. All require energy rechargers or probability is less than 0.009 for either required 70,000 tons of fuel.6 hydrogen fueling. We propose to provide both warhead extreme. Prudence dictates development of abun- with theater-based mobile nuclear facilities. Clearly, mobility acts as a powerful dant military power sources that are surviv- Most of the research and innovation in countermeasure against coordinate-guiding able, independent of petroleum, and require vehicular fuel technology is funded by major munitions. Recent history reinforces the little fixed infrastructure to serve dispersed automobile manufacturers. To gain insight premise: forces. into the options for military vehicles, we briefly survey the approaches taken by the n During the first Gulf War (Operation Candidates for Vehicular Fleet civilian automotive industry. Desert Storm), the only Iraqi Scud missiles that In the near term, it is likely that military Battery-powered Electric Vehicles. survived the U.S. air assault were of the mobile land vehicles will be powered by blends of Battery-powered all-electric vehicles are conventional and synthetic fuels. This prac- currently available commercially but are ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 51 FORUM | Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat notoriously expensive, underpowered, and tion that improves road mileage. They do 134 horsepower, all respectively.7 By 2015– marginal in practicality. Their batteries not reduce costs and only marginally reduce 2020, there should be many more of higher require substantial improvement for military dependence on foreign fuel sources. performance and lower price.8 use. Typical vehicle ranges without recharging Fuel Cell–Powered Vehicles. In fuel Reformer-fed Fuel Cells. Most fuel are 50 to 100 miles, and speeds are low (less cell vehicles, hydrogen is chemically reacted cell vehicles use gaseous hydrogen stored than 50 mph under good road conditions). with airborne oxygen to produce electricity in high-pressure tanks. However, it is also Intensive research is being undertaken to and water. The hydrogen is channeled as ions possible to use liquid fuels such as methanol improve that situation, but solutions appear to through membranes, called Proton Exchange stored in conventional tanks. The latter need be 10 years away. Current battery candidates Membranes (PEM), and then combined with reformers—processors that release hydrogen. include lithium-ion (many variants), zinc-air, ionized oxygen. The electrons created when The reformer catalytically converts fuel into iron-nanophosphate, and titanium dioxide– the hydrogen is ionized are directed through a hydrogen and carbon dioxide. Hydrogen barium titanate. circuit, enabling electricity to drive a motor. drives the fuel cell; carbon dioxide and Hybrid Electric–Internal Combustion Fuel cells are of relatively low potential. water vapor are released to the atmosphere. Vehicles. Hybrids are the near-term imple- To be useful in powering vehicles, they must Reformer-fed fuel cells achieve 300 to 400 mentation of electric vehicles. They combine be assembled in stacks. However, fuel cell miles per tank. However, they are complex, battery-powered electric motors for low-speed stacks are costly. The Department of Energy costly, and require additional maintenance. It operation and hydrocarbon-fueled internal goal for large-scale fuel cell production is $30 is not clear which method, pure hydrogen or combustion engines for higher speeds. The per kilowatt (kW). A 100–kW stack equivalent reformer-produced hydrogen, will prevail. result is a fuel-efficient vehicle, often deliver- to 134 horsepower would cost $3,000. Hydrogen Internal Combustion ing 35 to 45 mpg but requiring recharging Currently, there are only a small number Engine Vehicles. It is also possible to fuel every few hundred miles. Dozens of commer- of fuel cell vehicles on the road. The 2001 internal combustion engines with gaseous cial models exist. Mercedes-Benz F-Cell had a PEM-driven or liquid hydrogen. One technique is to store Military Services are pressuring devel- 65–kW induction motor. With a range of 110 the gaseous form in onboard tanks at 5,000 opers to provide near-term hybrid vehicles miles, it got 26 miles per pound of hydrogen. pounds per square inch and at room tem- suitable for combat operations. The technol- More recently, Honda fielded the FCX/FCX- perature in quantities sufficient for about 200 ogy appears sufficiently mature to expect Clarity and Chevrolet fielded the Equinox. miles. Research is under way to extend this to implementation as early as 2010. However, They have ranges of 180 to 270 miles and higher pressures and even more mileage, as hybrids are again only an expedient solu- achieve speeds of 90 to 100 mph with 107 to well as to other methods of storage.

Ohio Army National Guard Soldiers operate Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS refueling point during training Pecos during underway resupply Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (Zachary R. Fehrman) Mobile Public Affairs th U.S. Navy (Dustin Kelling) 196

52 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu SCHAFFER and CHANG

In 2001, BMW unveiled a cryogenically tion has not been achieved, however, because mobility, low pollution, and availability to over- cooled liquid-hydrogen sedan, the 750hL. This materials capable of long-term exposure to ride efficiency and low cost. prototype had a 330-cubic-inch, 12-cylinder strong acids at high temperature have not been Assuming 5 megawatts (MW) of elec- engine, and a 36-gallon fuel tank. Since then, demonstrated. tricity is available for powering electrolysis BMW has fielded several dozen experimental n Continuous steam-iron process (1,470oF). and heating water, enough hydrogen can be sedans in the Hydrogen 7 Series. Two versions The basic reaction is the decomposition of manufactured to fuel more than 400 vehicles are available: a monofuel system with an engine steam by iron oxide to yield hydrogen and a per day.10 This involves production of 20,000 tuned for only hydrogen, and a bifuel configu- higher oxidation state of iron. The process gallons of liquid hydrogen daily. The elec- ration with gasoline as the other fuel. Volume takes place in the presence of producer gas trolysis unit can conceptually be mounted on production of liquid hydrogen–fueled vehicles, obtained from coal. However, long-term utility a flatbed truck with dimensions 50 feet long however, has not been undertaken to date. of the process is questionable due to extensive by 8 feet wide by 10 feet high (see figure 2). Alternative Methods for Storing air pollution. Hydrogen. Over and beyond onboard tanks, n Coal gasification. Finely ground coal is Candidates for Mobile Reactors there are a variety of additional techniques reacted with steam and oxygen at high tem- The requirement to be transportable for storing hydrogen and subsequently using perature, the reaction producing hydrogen and imposes severe design restrictions. The reac- it as fuel. The most thoroughly researched carbon dioxide. The process is similar to meth- tors must be relatively small to fit into a mili- involves the use of metal hydrides that have ane-steam reforming but is substantially more tary transport aircraft. The weight constraint the ability to adsorb hydrogen under pres- polluting and less efficient. Impurities include of the C–5A/B Galaxy is 90 to 140 tons and sure and reversibly release it upon heating. sulfur-containing ash and hydrogen sulfide. the size limitation is 19 feet by 13.5 feet by 100 Typical hydrides are magnesium-, lithium-, or feet. As an alternative, the proposed Defense aluminum-based, and they require hydrogen The most practical option with potential Advanced Research Projects Agency Walrus compression to 3 to 30 times the air pressure for in-theater mobility is electrolysis of ionized Hybrid Ultra Large Aircraft–type airship had at sea level. Overall, hydride storage of hydro- water. The inefficiency of electrolysis can be a conceptual capacity of 500 to 1,000 tons of gen has not yet proved practical. Hydrides are alleviated somewhat by conducting the process cargo.11 Transportability also implies a degree toxic and volatile, and their storage containers at high temperature (1,000–1,400oF) and of modularity so the reactor can be loaded as are heavy and expensive. high pressure (450 pounds per square inch).9 an integral unit. Another storage technique exploits Methane-steam reforming is also feasible, but Mobile reactors impose an even more the use of ammonia. It releases hydrogen in the long-term scarcity of methane weakens extensive set of constraints. Mobile nuclear a catalytic reformer with no harmful waste the option. Thermo-chemical decomposition reactors would preferably have:

n volume production of liquid hydrogen–fueled vehicles has not closed cooling and moderating systems n nonhazardous and desirably inert been undertaken to date n helium, carbon dioxide, heavy water, liquid metals acceptable; liquid salts deemed discharge. Ammonia is conveniently storable of water is considered too hazardous, and the not suitable due to hazard potential at room temperature and atmospheric pres- two processes extracting hydrogen from coal n self-contained operations with minimal sure when dissolved in water. Under pressure, are not conducive to mobility and are highly heat or waste effluents it is suitable as liquid or gaseous fuel in modi- polluting. In selecting high-temperature water n largely robotic operation fied internal combustion engines. electrolysis, we therefore choose to allow n inherently safe operation

Manufacturing Hydrogen Figure 2. Schematic Mobile Electrolysis Unit Alternative commercial methods for manufacturing hydrogen include:

HYDROGEN OXYGEN n Room temperature electrolysis of water. Electrolysis is used to separate hydrogen and oxygen, the efficiency being about 70 percent. CONTROL ROOM n Methane-steam reforming (1,650oF). Steam reforming of natural gas is the method 200 anodes 200 cathodes most commonly used commercially. A waste product is carbon dioxide. This high-temper- N ature process lends itself to the extreme heat + ELECTROLYTE available with gas-cooled nuclear reactors. n Thermo-chemical decomposition of water (930–1,470oF) catalyzed by sulfurous - acid. A potential thermo-chemical process is the sulfur trioxide cycle. Commercializa- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 53 FORUM | Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat

n negative void coefficient (that is, the fuel in batch operation and has most of the The Small, Sealed, Transportable, power reduces when the reactor core tempera- desirable characteristics of a mobile reactor. Autonomous Reactor (SSTAR) is a fast ture goes up) It is passively safe, secure from fuel theft and breeder reactor concept that is passively safe, n passive cooling (that is, loss of coolant waste pollution, and resistant to terrorist and has helium as coolant in one version, and is will not damage the fuel; the core tempera- explosive attacks. Two reactors have been tamper-resistant. In principle, it would over- ture eventually cools due to radiation and investigated by General Atomics, rated at 10 come U.S. policy prohibiting breeder reactors. convection); these characteristics preclude and 25 megawatts electric. The system has a 30-year lifetime, and all the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island–type The Multi-mobile Reactor (MMR) waste products are sealed inside. Livermore nuclear accidents concept involves an array of self-contained, Laboratories has designed a 10–MW version n resistance to terrorist attack. Tristruc- factory-built, transportable gas-cooled weighing 200 tons. That would be transport- tural-Isotropic (TRISO)–fueled reactors are modules proposed by Sandia National Labo- able in a scaled-down Walrus or on a truck, attractive in this respect12 ratories. Although many details are lacking, but it should also be possible to design a n resistance to nuclear weapon prolifera- each module is appropriate for mobility, and smaller system. A version scaled to 90 to 100 tion possibilities the power is compatible with the requirements tons would have estimated dimensions of 38 n breeder reactors produce plutonium and needed to fuel field army vehicles. feet in length by 7.5 feet in diameter and a violate U.S. policy power of 4.5 to 5 MW. n breeder reactor safeguards to prevent fuel pilfering, however, are possible and have been the requirement to be Operational Concept employed in other countries13 transportable imposes severe We propose to support a Stryker n a convincing waste disposal design restrictions Brigade (nominally 3,600 Soldiers) with one configuration mobile power reactor and a mobile hydrogen n resistance to explosive attack. electrolysis unit. Each brigade has about The High Temperature Test Reactor 400 vehicles, 350 of which are light-assault We have identified four reactor con- (HTTR) is similar in concept to the RS–MHR vehicles. The 4.5– to 5–MW reactor could cepts14 considered appropriate for a field army, but somewhat larger (30 MW). It is described provide enough hydrogen and electricity to although further refinements are needed for separately because it has been operational fuel 400 vehicles daily. added mobility. As we will later observe, these in Japan since 1998 whereas the RS–MHR is Since there are currently 33 combat specific designs would have to be scaled down conceptual. The HTTR is specifically config- infantry and armor/cavalry brigades, we to conform to theater mobility constraints. ured to couple to a steam-methane hydrogen propose to field 100 reactors and 100 elec- The Remote-site Modular Helium reforming plant. It would have to be scaled trolysis units including spares. These mobile Reactor (RS–MHR) is a gas-cooled reactor down to achieve mobility in anything signifi- facilities would replace traditional Forward proposed by General Atomics. It uses TRISO cantly smaller than a Walrus airship. Area Refueling Points (FARPs). Descriptively, we call them “nuclear FARPs.” The mobility All Army Future Combat System manned ground concept is to move the nuclear FARP every vehicles are hybrid electric day or so under battlefield conditions. These will be movements of hundreds of feet by road. Movement between FARPs, however, would be by C–5A/B or by airship.15 Such procedures, admittedly needing refinement, underlie the survivability of a nuclear FARP. We assume air and space superiority conditions that preclude the use of enemy manned aircraft and unmanned combat air vehicles. That leaves only long-range satellite- and terrain-guided missiles as viable methods of standoff attack.16 Mobility ensures survivability against such fixed-coordinate missiles. Note that it will be necessary to shield the heat signature produced by the reactors; otherwise, they will be vulnerable to heat-seeking guidance. Thermal shielding can be achieved with overhead canvas and blowers to disperse heat peripherally. Overhead canvas would also enable a degree of camouflage. The U.S. Army has had extensive experience with transportable reactor technology.

U.S. Army TARDEC (Paul Tremblay) U.S. Army TARDEC From 1968 to 1976, a 45–MW nuclear reactor

54 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu SCHAFFER and CHANG on the barge Sturgis provided power for the terms of survivability, affordability, and inde- Russian Tactical Missile Program,” Aviation Week Panama Canal community.17 Other portable pendence of fuel sources. & Space Technology, June 16, 2008. 4 nuclear reactors were operated in Wyoming, Mobile nuclear reactors in several Arms Control Association, “Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories,” fact sheet, September Greenland, and Antarctica. varieties can be postulated. They weigh 90 to 2007, available at . wide monitoring of the reactors and electroly- transport aircraft or a Walrus-type airship 5 Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War sis units by satellite to permit cost-saving, derivative and locally on a flatbed truck. They for Kuwait (Annapolis: The Naval Institute Press, manpower-efficient troubleshooting. produce power of 4.5 to 5 MW, sufficient to 1991). provide hydrogen and electricity to fuel about 6 William G. Pagonis and Jeffrey L. Cruik- Strategic Implications 400 vehicles daily. One appropriate type of shank, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership Strategic implications of a mobile and hydrogen manufacturing facility is a high- and Logistics from the Gulf War (Cambridge: survivable fleet of vehicles independent of temperature electrolysis unit. It also can be Harvard University Press, 1992); John Dumond, fossil fuels would be profound. They include: made mobile and can be powered by a mobile Velocity Management: The Business Paradigm nuclear reactor. that has Transformed U.S. Army Logistics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). n fielding combat vehicles with affordable, The general benefits of the mobile 7 Dawn Chmielewski and Ken Bensinger, “Test self-sufficient sources of abundant fuel that do fueling system postulated are profound and the Waters for Hydrogen Cars,” Los Angeles Times, revolutionary. They provide for: not contribute to atmospheric pollution June 15, 2008. n providing fuel to a dispersed fleet in a 8 “How They Work: PEM Fuel Cells,” available survivable, sustainable manner n a lighter, more mobile military at . n eliminating vulnerable in-theater, single- n streamlined logistics 9 “Electrolysis: The Electrolysis Process,” avail- point, fixed-location sources of fuel manufac- n more ammunition resulting from able at . n diminishing the logistic footprint associ- n minimized energy supply chain 10 Matthew L. Wald, “Hydrogen Production ated with hauling fuel tonnages over thou- n energy with national self-sufficiency Method Could Bolster Fuel Supplies,” The New sands of miles to supply an operating theater n reduced energy infrastructure York Times, November 28, 2004. 11 The Walrus Hybrid Ultra Large Aircraft military force n sustainability was terminated in 2007. A smaller scale version n developing a mobile testbed for modular n increased survivability is planned. Note that Walrus in principle offers n nuclear-powered electricity to provide alterna- increased affordability 12,000-mile transportability in less than 7 days, n tives for the fossil fuel crisis now gripping the greater tactical efficiency. comparing favorably with sealift (approximately 30 world economy days) but unfavorably with the C–5A/B (1–2 days). n providing a means to supply low-cost Detailed planning for the new land 1 2 Tristructural-Isotropic (TRISO) fuel is used power in support of humanitarian missions vehicle fleet is needed. It should include speci- in a number of high-temperature gas reactors. around the world. fications for land vehicles, mobile reactors, Compared to the fuel in pressurized water reac- mobile hydrogen manufacturing facilities, tors, TRISO is proliferation resistant and offers a The cost of fossil fuels combined with and transport aircraft, airships, and trucks. A self-contained waste storage configuration. It is also the low survivability of fixed extraction, concept of operations needs to be developed robust to explosive attack; exposure of radioactive materials to the environment would be minimal refining, and distribution systems puts the in accordance with military standards. and difficult to exploit in a dirty bomb. Army’s land-based fleet of combat vehicles Mobile, affordable, and reliable power 1 3 Breeders are legally producing electricity in in jeopardy for future conflicts. The Army sources based on nuclear power have the France, Britain, Japan, China, and Russia. should define a new fleet of vehicles powered potential to permit viable operations of the 14 For an entry-level discussion of reactor con- by a combination of electricity and hydrogen. Army for the foreseeable future. The concept cepts, see Marvin Baker Schaffer, “Nuclear Power Preferably, this fleet would be energized by warrants extensive study by the Department for Clean, Safe and Secure Energy Independence,” theater-mobile nuclear reactors and theater- of Defense and the Department of the Army. Foresight 9, no. 6 (2007). mobile hydrogen manufacturing facilities. JFQ 1 5 The C–5 Galaxy with modernization Appropriate technology for these vehicles, improvements is expected to be operational well st reactors, and manufacturing facilities is just Notes into the 21 century. See “C–5 Galaxy,” available at beginning to become available commercially. . 1 16 To a lesser extent, the same mobility argu- Electrically powered vehicles with Energy Information Administration, “World ment applies to survivability against short-range military potential are not currently avail- Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Most Recent Estimates,” January 9, 2007, available at mortar and rocket attack. Because of their relative able but may become practical in a decade . ently low effectiveness. hydrogen-powered vehicles, and hybrids are 2 Yochi J. Dreazen, “U.S. Military Launches 17 Robert A. Pfeffer and William A. Macon, Jr., all approaching commercial viability. Military Alternative-Fuel Push,” The Wall Street Journal, Nuclear Power: An Option for the Army’s Future, versions can be expected in the 2010–2020 May 21, 2008. available at . requirements and plan for the future fleet in Information Emerges on Crucial Next-Generation

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 55 Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century

By Gabriel Marcella and Stephen O. Fought

ith a good strategy, even scion national security strategy) is artful and tion by political science or military history the weak can succeed; the purview of kings and Presidents; military scholars without forcing the two disciplines to with a weak strategy, even strategy, while subservient and linked to integrate their research, results, or teaching. W the strong will struggle. grand strategy, is more mechanical and has This approach is nicely suited for teach- Strategy is, and will continue to be, the its roots in military science; tactics, which ing about strategy. However, it is not reflective linchpin to military success. Unfortunately, also stem from military science, are quite of the real world and may be a dysfunctional, professional military education (PME) does prescribed and situation-specific and belong self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, by partition- not develop strategists very well.1 This long- to the military—in particular, the company ing the definition so carefully into levels to standing deficiency needs to be corrected. grade ranks.3 Somewhere along the line we serve theoretical or academic purposes, we The war colleges are the proper institutions get theater and/or campaign strategy, which come to believe that strategy is actually parti- to take on the task, even though their current we attribute to the generals and, eventually, tioned in that manner in the real world—and approaches are more descriptive than pre- operational art.4 thus treat grand strategy, military strategy, scriptive in teaching strategy. We need to This partitioning is comfortable, perhaps theater strategy, campaign strategy, and even reverse that emphasis. because it is attuned to modern Western ideal- tactics as separate and distinct when they The first step is to remove self-generated istic portrayals of the division of labor between actually are similar and can be researched and obstacles, beginning with the concept and civilian political and military leadership, and taught by way of their similarities rather than definition of strategy.2 Strategy is stratified even between domestic and foreign policy. By against a backdrop of assumed divisions. roughly according to the major participants the same token, it is academically appealing After all, in the real world of war and within each partition: grand strategy (and its because it encourages independent examina- peace, generals are heavily involved, along with

Marine Corps officers attend Command and Staff College at Marine Corps University U.S. Marine Corps (James R. Richardson)

56 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu MARCELLA and FOUGHT senior statesmen of the national security team, comprise the challenge of developing strategy strategy is essentially the same—one has to in what we have labeled grand strategy. Politi- are not. In the arena where company-grade meld political purpose with means, within the cal leaders are similarly engaged in military officers are likely to be involved in developing boundaries of the situation. strategy—one does not need a dissertation and executing strategy, the variables are fewer The bottom line is that, much like other on Vietnam, Operation Desert One, Lebanon, and quite likely to be known with a reasonable human behaviors, the fundamental behavior or even the Gulf Wars to appreciate that amount of fidelity and accuracy, especially of developing strategy is similar in all situa- conclusion. In the field, those lieutenants and in terms of objectives, available means, and tions, but the situations differ in terms of the captains who are said to be engaged in tactics policy limits. At this level, the variables on variables. Thus, teaching strategy is parallel firmly believe that they are developing strategy the “means” side of the process will probably to teaching leadership—the fundamentals of (albeit with a limited horizon)—and, if asked, be under the control of the group that must leadership are the same, no matter where one might say they believe their platoons, flights, develop and execute strategy. By the same is in the organization or the situations faced. or department members are executing tactics. token, the duration or horizon (or both) of the One can, and perhaps must, build on prior Indeed, in practice, every level believes (and, strategy is more likely to be short. skills as one rises in the organization and we think, accurately believes) that it is involved in creating strategy, subject to limits to their horizon imposed from above (and beyond).5 In a similar manner, the term policy has been malpartitioned, and along the same lines

as the partitioning of strategy. The current U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley) use of the term eventually establishes a difference between policymakers and operators that divides, roughly, the politicians from the generals.6 Yet in reality, “operators” do a lot of policymaking and policymakers get their hands deep into the well of operations—and each shapes the other to a great degree. One can clear away all of the afore- mentioned dirt, debris, and confusion about strategy, and policy, with the following universal definition: Strategy is the art of applying power to achieve objectives, within the limits imposed by policy. President Bush greets Secretary Gates and ADM Mullen at Pentagon Strategy exists and is developed at every level. It is developed with the purpose As one ascends the organizational takes on more challenging leadership tasks. of connecting political purpose with means, ladder or engages in more expanded or pro- Teaching strategy should be no more difficult which are always constrained. Absent contracted conflicts, more variables enter the or complicated than teaching any of the other straints, there is no need for strategy. Limits process—in terms of goals, means, and policy. subjects addressed by the war colleges or, in to freedom of action exist at every level and For the same reason, these variables are less fact, across all of PME. must be accounted for by those who develop strategy. These limitations are, collectively, strategy is the art of applying power to achieve objectives, called policy. When one develops strategy, one develops limits (hence policy) on other within the limits imposed by policy levels—certainly on levels below, quite often on collateral levels, and at times on levels likely to be well understood, the means are Strategy at All Levels above. Sometimes these limits are imposed less likely to be under the control of those At the company-grade schools, strategy purposefully and sometimes they are gener- who would develop/execute strategy, and the ought to be taught and practiced around ated quite by accident—the latter being what time dimension is likely to be longer (either in scenarios that are fairly well defined. Ends Carl von Clausewitz might have called the terms of the time period in which the strategy ought to be spelled out in reasonable detail “fog of strategy.” must be executed, or the likely period where (and probably focused on a specific battlefield Perhaps the most important aspect of the strategy might have an effect on other and the well-defined time horizon). Means the proposed definition is that strategy is areas). The limits are also likely to be more (resources such as manpower, offensive and common to every level of the organization and more complicated, and in some cases defensive capability, command relation- (and activity). However, the variables that even contradictory. But the process of forming ships, intelligence, and so forth) should be reasonably well bounded. Policies (limita- Dr. Gabriel Marcella was a Professor of Third World Studies at the U.S. Army War College and International tions) should be spelled out and reasonably Affairs Advisor at U.S. Southern Command. Dr. Stephen O. Fought is Professor Emeritus and former Dean of consistent and understood. The physical situ- the Air War College. ation (terrain) should be well described and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 57 SPECIAL FEATURE | Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century

ADM Mullen addresses 2008 graduates of U.S. Army War College U.S. Air Force (Adam M. Stump) U.S. Air Force

probably limited, as should the political vari- “Political” intervention would be introduced be taught at every level. What differs is the ables (alliances, coalitions). The enemy should (for instance, “military” decisions in overseas number of variables, the characteristics of be defined and the intelligence should be conflicts driven by domestic politics). Moral those variables, and the internal/external rela- rather pristine. Students should be expected hazard and ambiguity should be introduced to tionships among them. to generate in-the-court solutions, but given challenge decisionmaking. Ends might change opportunities to innovate—to push the limits, as time and events move ahead. Freedom of Case Studies Approach use resources in creative ways, and/or define action, and consequent innovation, would be The second step in teaching strategy is ends as appropriate. There should be freedom not only encouraged, but also expected. to shape the curriculum. Students in PME of action within well-described scenarios. At are mature and accomplished. They are con- the company grade and subsequent levels, moral hazard and ambiguity fident, capable, impatient with theory, and the scenarios would include all of the instru- distrustful of history. They learn best by being ments of national power and a complexity and should be introduced to given problems to solve, being allowed to flail uncertainty appropriate to the scenario. challenge decisionmaking against those problems, and absorbing profes- Intermediate Service schools should sorial and other scholarly wisdom when they introduce uncertainty into each dimension War colleges (and beyond) should are convinced they need it, and not before. A as well as increase the number of dimensions. expand the number of variables and confound strategy for teaching strategy begs for a case The mid-rank schools should challenge stu- the existing variables. For instance, consider study approach around a current and relevant dents to develop strategy in situations where situations where the chain of command is curriculum that is prepared and executed by the means are not entirely under their control obscure, overlapping, and contradictory, a multidisciplinary faculty steeped in practi- (such as needing resources from coalition where resources are transitory and objectives cal experience. Neither the curriculum nor partners in exchange for changes in the rules either vague or in motion, and where intel- the faculty comes out of thin air nor, for the of engagement or beyond). Purpose, means, ligence is yet to be gathered, at best. The point most part, out of conventional academia; and policies might be mildly contradictory is that the problem is essentially the same at they almost certainly have to be created out (for example, take the military objective every level: forging the many variables into a of whole cloth. The following points seem but minimize casualties). There should be a coherent plan of action with the available set axiomatic to a successful strategy for teaching challenge to contain the battlefield (keep the of resources, mitigating risks where possible, strategy. conflict from expanding). The enemy might and connecting political purpose with means 1. Case studies should dominate the not be well described, or even known, at the within the boundaries set by policy. Strategy curriculum. Case studies force students into outset. Intelligence should not be pristine. is the common process, and it can and should the problem; they put a face on history and

58 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu MARCELLA and FOUGHT bring life to theory. Case studies should pace egy may not lend itself to a group approach with practice and understand the boundaries the curriculum, not simply be appended here because strategy formulation requires deep, that policy places on means or, as is common, and there. Historical case studies abound, as often prolonged considerations of sometimes the mismatch between policy and means do examples from business and law schools. narrowly focused topics—an approach that caused in either direction. They will also But in the long run, the best case studies will does not sit well in a seminar environment. gain a respect for the plenitude of human and be developed internally and involve contem- The war colleges should rebalance seminar- institutional variables that constitute the fog porary issues in national security. They will be based pedagogy with scheduled time for indi- of making strategy. written around the military commanders, not vidual study and one-on-one, or very small 2. Develop a senior mentor program. a chief executive officer, not a trial attorney, group, interaction with professors, scholars, Invite creative strategists to make presenta- and not a social service organization. and mentors. tions to students on the intellectual process 2. The organizing principle should be for making strategy in given historical cir- regional studies, not military or diplomatic Importance of Faculty cumstances. Currently, such presentations history, not political science, not great power These proposed curriculum changes by senior military officials address more the politics, and most certainly not a loose col- are major. Part and parcel with changes in “what” (often a PowerPoint briefing on opera- lection of electives whose primary reason the curriculum come changes in the faculty, tions) than the “how” of strategy. An effective for existence is faculty interest rather than which translate into faculty development. initiative is to establish senior mentors from student needs. By using regional studies as a The faculty development initiatives that we the retired and perhaps even Active-duty framework, the curriculum can easily incor- propose spill over into major changes on the ranks, as well as civilians (both U.S. and porate various aspects of strategy, diplomacy, academic schedule to allow faculty time to foreign), who would provide wisdom on how economics, the military, and so forth, as well develop the curriculum and create/maintain to make strategy. For senior leaders, the occa- as all elements of the interagency process. their own expertise as well as prepare for the sional immersion in a war college seminar Strategies can be developed and tested against immediacies of teaching. Implementing these would provide the opportunity to influence the real world, measured against existing initiatives will require a different form of the successor generation of officers. Each engagement strategies and circumstances, and faculty preparation because the pedagogical seminar should be assigned a civilian and be immediately useful. emphasis would be on analyzing problems military senior mentor. 3. Within this case study/regional study and developing strategy while maintaining framework, the pace and content of courses a sufficient foundation in theory. Such an the pedagogical emphasis need to be adjusted to emphasize problem- approach to teaching would be demanding on would be on analyzing solving to include the writing of strategy. the faculty’s creativity because it is a different This will require more time for students to way of imparting learning. problems and developing research, analyze, and write. Of all the forms Accordingly, it would require moving strategy while maintaining a of learning, writing is second only to actual away from a curriculum sequence that is sufficient foundation in theory experience. Problemsolving tasking should be heavy in continuous seminar instruction and introduced early in the curriculum and com- student recitation. Because of the 10-month 3. Create a Ph.D. program in strategy. pleted at logical intervals along the way. For accelerated master’s program at the war col- Despite the excellence of American graduate example, students could be tasked to develop leges, the faculty maintains a relentless pace education and various distinguished doctoral strategy for conflict termination and post- more in keeping with the training culture of programs in history, political science, and conflict reconstruction or for dealing with the military than with the educational culture international relations with emphasis on secu- the challenge of failing states. The intellectual needed for strategic pedagogy. The pace is rity studies, few deal with strategy. Strategy is challenge will have them evaluate and apply hard to sustain, notably for new instructors many disciplines fused into art and science, the gamut of strategic principles from realism who must master a vast amount of multidis- with emphasis on the former. The Royal Mili- to idealism, center of gravity, just war, policy ciplinary material and the Socratic method tary College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario, by other means, the integration of the instru- of pedagogy to be effective. These consider- has a superb Ph.D. in War Studies, which has ments of national power, and so forth. ations reinforce our point of departure that produced high-quality practitioners and schol- 4. The lecture/seminar-centric model the faculty owns the curriculum. To build ars in matters strategic.7 The war colleges have for teaching should yield its dominant grip on a faculty capable of executing a strategy for the mandate, resources (such as faculty and the curriculum. Lectures are an efficient way teaching strategy, war colleges should: library), and potential market to put together to impart significant amounts of common 1. Send faculty to periodic professional a small, quality doctoral-level program in information to a broad audience. Seminars development tours in the policy and strategy strategy, which would capture the principal promote bonding and mutual learning— communities to gain experience and confi- disciplines the curriculum deals with. Such a qualities essential to cohesive military dence in strategizing—in making the link program would engender a level of academic organizations. Interactive learning can bring between policy, strategy, and operations. Such excellence that the faculty would aspire to, as out the best among seminar mates. But these tours would also benefit the agency, bureau, well as attract scholars of high quality to the methods are not the end-all, be-all to teach- or office in which the tours take place, thereby faculty. Because 3 years are normally required ing methods—other methods exist and the projecting the prestige of the colleges. The to complete the Ph.D., which is difficult war colleges should be open to considering payoffs in development are extraordinary; for military careerists to accommodate, the them. In particular, the task of teaching strat- faculty will learn how to link strategic theory program could recruit civilian students on a ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 59 SPECIAL FEATURE | Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century tuition basis. The program would fill a serious potentially dysfunctional to teaching and the PME architecture in order to focus on produc- void in American graduate education. Finally, developing future strategy. This position is ing strategists. 2 because the various war colleges have unique similar to the great schools of administration Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated resources and similar mandates, they could of the 18th and 19th centuries, formed to relieve Terms (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, creatively combine efforts into a consortium to royals of the tedium of everyday governance September 2006), defines strategy as “a prudent support the Ph.D. program. by building a corps of professional adminis- idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments trators. The overarching assumption of these of national power in a synchronized and integrated The Path and Payoff schools was that politicians (in particular the fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multi- These are broad-based changes in both royals) did politics and administrators did national objectives.” This definition is bureaucrati- the curriculum and the faculty. Organiza- administration, and never the twain should cally appealing, politically correct, and relatively tional change is difficult, particularly in large, meet. But by the early 20th century, it became useless. The definition makes no mention of strate- mature, bureaucratic organizations, and obvious that successful politicians did a lot of gy’s conjoined twin, policy. The definition suggests especially when those organizations believe administrating, and successful administrators that a prudent set of ideas not synchronized and that they are already successful. Changes such did a lot of politicking. The great schools of integrated is something other than strategy. Finally, it portrays strategy as an idea, which is elevated to as those proposed here usually come as the business changed—bringing the study of poli- the status of strategy on the basis of its prudence result of abject failures, acknowledged within tics into the education of any administrator, alone—not its boldness or its necessity, but its pru- the organization, and around which a power- and adding administration/implementation dence. “Prudent,” “synchronized,” and “integrated” ful consensus can be built or from a powerful into the education of any senior executive. are scarcely more than semantic lubricants to aid outside force (for example, a hostile takeover The parallel in our arena is to bring the the aged and dry joint publication coordination in the business world, or a new commander instruments of power into the education of all process. with a task order to “fix the problem” in the levels and to develop a definition of strategy 3 Doctrine is not strategy. Doctrine, which military). Neither of those impetuses exists in that spans all of the levels of PME—around exists in the military community and among the case of the war colleges; they are fine, well- and through which we can build a coherent, the world’s great religions, stands apart from all functioning organizations. But they need to current, and relevant curriculum. other aspects of strategy, except to serve as a sort change from teaching about strategy to teach- The major change proposed through this of memorandum of agreement between the most ing it—for the purpose of producing graduates article is to reaggregate the various partitions contentious factions—the Service chiefs, combatant commanders, and the joint world. To be sure, and who are strategists. So, where to begin? of strategy. Strategy exists at all levels. And all not unlike disputes among monastic orders and Lacking the necessary driving forces aspects of strategy and all elements of power Western and Eastern Christianity, there have also for simultaneous major change, it is prudent are similarly present—in different degrees and been great schisms among and within the Services, to seek incremental change, through which a forms, to be sure, but they exist and should combatant commands, and joint community at learning curve can be created and a momen- be taught. This aggregated approach offers large over doctrine that had to be resolved by higher tum of success can be built. The faculty comes a more workable framework for teaching authority. first, and then from the faculty comes the strategy. It also requires some changes in cur- 4 Somehow all of this is hinged together by curriculum. The faculty owns the curriculum riculum and makes demands on war college operational art—a term born of necessity. The and is the custodian of academic rigor and faculties—demands that will have to be met necessity was that the division of activities into institutional accreditation. Within the faculty, with resources. The key is a common thread— strategic, operational, and tactical was becoming begin with the senior mentor and Ph.D. in the definition of strategy—around which a increasingly frustrating to all concerned. 5 There is a broad section of our professional strategy programs. Every warrior tribe asks curriculum can be created and executed by a literature that would support the contention that its elders to teach those who would follow faculty that is tailored to the mission. JFQ the partitions of strategy, and differentiations and lead in battle; the senior mentor program between strategy and tactics, are out of date. If fits that mold. Every serious profession has tactical situations can have strategic consequences, a Ph.D. level within academia; the doctorate The authors thank General Frederick F. then what is the difference between tactical and in strategy fits that mold. The senior mentor Woerner, USA (Ret.), Lieutenant General strategic? If Charles Krulak’s “strategic corporal” and Ph.D. programs are both modest expen- David W. Barno, USA (Ret.), Major General in a three-block war is an accurate portrayal of the ditures. From these programs curriculum David H. Huntoon, Jr., USA, Michael modern battlefield, then does the strategic, opera- changes could flow, including, at a minimum, Matheny, Antulio J. Echevarria II, Douglas tional, tactical partition make any sense? 6 a wealth of case studies focused on integrating Johnson, Tami Biddle, Nathan Freier, Clair Of note, JP 1–02 does not even define the the elements of national power in the service Gilk, and Michael George. term policy. 7 The Royal Military College has a master’s of strategy. The remainder of the suggested level program and a Ph.D. program. It includes curriculum changes would follow naturally, Notes such fields as international relations, war, defense part and parcel with case study development, economics, diplomatic history, strategic planning, and as they prove their worth (or not). 1 Stephen D. Chiabotti makes this point in intelligence, ethics, civil-military relations, World “A Deeper Shade of Blue: The School of Advanced War II and total war, armed forces and society, The war colleges are at an interesting Air and Space Studies,” Joint Force Quarterly 49 interagency process, modern warfare, insur- juncture where their traditional approach to (2d Quarter 2008), as he relates that the Air Force’s gency and terrorism, conflict termination, and the definition of strategy, which has served School of Advanced Air and Space Studies had to be reconstruction. reasonably well for years, is out of date and carved out of, and held separate and distinct from,

60 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu “Military-Political” Relations: The Need for Officer Education

By Derek S. Reveron and kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris

The Provincial Reconstruction Team experience in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates that, where inadequate civilian capacity to deploy for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations exists, military and Department of Defense civilian personnel will be employed to carry out stability operations, regardless of whether they possess the requisite skills, technical expertise, or training.1

Iraqi contractors review displays and sign up for projects at Ramadi Reconstruction Conference o underscore the diversity of missions now being carried out by the U.S. military, consider T the following examples. First Marine Expeditionary Force sent 15 Marines to Foreign Service Institute courses and conducted 2-day “economic reconstruction roundtables.” Third Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division Soldiers have been conducting a comprehensive assessment to revitalize Iraq’s aquaculture industry. The Navy’s amphibious dock landing ship, the USS Fort McHenry, hosted nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on board to facilitate fisheries conservation. And Army and Marine Corps commanders are serving as de facto town mayors. While Civil Affairs units have always conducted such missions, in the current environment they are no longer alone. Today, all Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen participate in what was formerly the domain of the specialist. As the House Armed Services Committee notes in the epigraph above, where inadequate civilian capacity exists (in and out of combat zones), military personnel will be employed whether they are prepared or not.2 While deploying units continue to give their personnel the basic technical skills to excel, there is a definite lack of preparation and expertise within the officer corps to serve in such widely varying stability operations capacities as de facto town mayors, coordinators of economic development, build- ers of judicial and law enforcement institu-

U.S. Marine Corps (Andrew D. Pendracki) U.S. Marine Corps (Andrew tions, and promoters of social harmony. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 61 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Need for Officer Education

Yet Department of Defense (DOD) fact was highlighted by Secretary of Defense institutions to help produce officers who were Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Sta- Robert Gates, who predicted that asymmetric more innovative critical thinkers and leaders, bility, Security, Transition, and Reconstruc- warfare would predominate in the near future, able to respond to the complex challenges of tion Operations” (November 2005), requires pointing out that “these conflicts will be fun- a dangerous future.4 We still need that type the U.S. military to move beyond just fighting damentally political in nature, and require the of thinker and leader, but today we also need and winning the Nation’s wars to the equally application of all elements of national power. to provide them with more nuanced habits important military mission of supporting Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s of thought to deal with the political-military, efforts to stabilize areas and rebuild institu- will and more a function of shaping behavior— socioeconomic, and complex cultural and tions in order to develop a lasting peace. of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, regional issues that concern the United States. While there is no quick solution to provide the people in between.” The Secretary went on Unfortunately, without a mandate to military officers with the diverse skills neces- to state that “how well we enable and empower consider this essential area, military-political sary for conducting these stability operations, our partners to defend and govern themselves” relations may well be slighted because of the the realities of future nonwarfighting missions is perhaps “the most important military compo- continuous need to stretch curricula at the PME require professional military education (PME) nent in the War on Terror.”3 schools to accommodate all the subjects consid- institutions to create officers able to excel in Secretary Gates’ view underscores our ered necessary for today’s professional officer. military-political environments around the contention that U.S. military officers require world. This goes beyond teaching about the an expanded understanding of, and education field-grade officers need to interagency process and knowing what other on, military-political relations—defined gen- be better educated on how U.S. Government institutions bring to the erally as the relationship between the military table. Rather, this requires military officers to and U.S. foreign policy. Field-grade officers best to shape the security embrace their expanded roles in the geopoliti- in particular need to be better educated on environment cal space as they increasingly serve as impor- how best to shape the security environment, tant political actors, fulfilling development, whether they are operating at the global Additionally, the tendency for officers to diplomatic, and educational roles. national level or within a geographic combat- dismiss the military’s role in nonwarfighting ant commander’s area of responsibility. PME missions as a function for the “interagency” Expanding PME institutions should devote sustained attention community—that is, not the military, but the It seems self-evident that this field of “mil- to developing officers’ breadth and depth in Department of State, U.S. Agency for Inter- itary-political relations” is bound to expand, this military-political relations arena. national Development (USAID), or another abetted by an ever-increasing role for the U.S. Some 10 years ago, contributors to Joint Federal agency—further complicates any military in the foreign policy realm. The latter Force Quarterly were advocating for PME attempts to prepare the military better for its broader roles in promoting security. Yet while Dr. Derek S. Reveron is Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War the State Department is America’s lead foreign College. Dr. Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris is Professor of National Security Studies at the Air Command and policy organization, in reality U.S. military Staff College. commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are warfighters, and they increasingly Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan fulfill important diplomatic roles. In fact, commander speaks with Iraqi women about their DOD has a distinct advantage over the State role in business world Department in both size and resources, with its operating budget many times greater than State’s. U.S. military commands, with their forward presence, large planning staffs, and various engagement tools, are well equipped for those roles and increasingly welcome them.5 Today, these commands routinely pursue regional level engagement by playing host to international security conferences, promoting military-to-military contacts, and providing American military presence, training, and equipment to improve regional security. Still, involvement in foreign affairs has been criticized for being in tension with the military’s warfighting ethos. Some analysts also wonder whether officers can reasonably be expected to acquire the linguistic skills, political acumen, and cultural knowledge to operate effectively as surrogate diplomats, and

U.S. Marine Corps (Jeremy M. Giacomino) U.S. Marine Corps (Jeremy whether having officers in such roles tends to

62 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu REVERON and MAHONEY-NORRIS cast international affairs as military problems. shape the international environment.”7 A military missions also gave rise to a “superpow- Yet military forces have always had important major goal of engagement or shaping was to ers don’t do windows” argument, particularly roles other than fighting wars, and the gap reduce the engines of conflict. In addition, within the military. Defense analysts such between senior military officers and senior the U.S. military’s experiences in Somalia, as John Hillen identified 1990s diplomatic diplomats is not that wide. What is changing Haiti, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the engagement by the regional commanders— is that these roles and responsibilities are 1990s forced it to recognize that it is far more General Wesley Clark, General Anthony becoming permanent fixtures at the tactical effective in preventing state failure than in Zinni, and General Charles Wilhelm—or and operational levels of war, demanding new responding to its aftermath.8 Yet to date, civil- state-building missions in Haiti, Bosnia, and habits of thinking from younger officers. ian leaders have not been able to resist calls for Kosovo, as inappropriate and distracting for U.S. intervention—even after state failure— an organization that is supposed to fight and How We Got Here and the U.S. military has been involved in win the Nation’s wars. Experiences in Iraq and Since multilateral military operations are these operations, albeit reluctantly. Afghanistan have started to renew this argu- the norm today (at least 35 countries are mili- At the same time, the 1990s “shape- ment, but clearly the U.S. military will be con- tarily active in Afghanistan), U.S. forces clearly respond-prepare” strategy and expansion of ducting stability and reconstruction operations need regular interactions with their international partners. Those activities make up what being forward deployed during the Cold War taught Washington has come to be known as Phase Zero opera- that countries protected by American security guarantees could tions and are the softer side of military power. Through global military engagement, these focus on their own political and economic development activities build trust and cooperation between the United States and key foreign elites. This Marine Corps officer discusses operations with is no longer the exclusive operating area for Afghan National Army officers diplomats; it is also a challenge to midgrade officers to move beyond their warfighting pro- ficiencies. Thus, we believe that it is important to recognize this reality and actively teach our officers the necessary military-political competencies to excel in this environment, especially as this phenomenon of increased military activities dates back at least 15 years. To substantiate the need to educate officers in this area, and to flesh out what specific competencies should be considered to accomplish that education, it is worth exploring how the U.S. military got to the point of being so heavily involved in the foreign policy arena. Contrary to what one might suppose, contemporary involvement actually has its roots prior to September 11, 2001, in the 1990s. President Bill Clinton’s 1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement directed the military to engage with international partners and to provide a credible overseas presence.6 Being forward deployed during the Cold War had taught Washington that by providing for other countries’ security, the United States could advance its trade agenda, and countries protected by American security guarantees could focus on their own political and economic development. Taking its cue from the 1996 strategy, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review posited a new foundation of “shape-respond-prepare,” which not only emphasized the capability to fight and win wars but also placed “greater emphasis on the continuing need to maintain continuous overseas presence in order to Jr.) Valdespino, U.S. Marine Corps (Luis P. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 63 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Need for Officer Education for the foreseeable future. Other observers have vention, the George W. Bush administration states “at risk.” Security assistance is meant expressed fears of a postmodern imperialism, found it necessary to embrace state-building, to help fledgling democracies consolidate, a failure in civilian control of the military, or a too. President Bush could not escape from the fragile states avoid failure, and authoritarian major problem with the interagency process. reality that there is a global demand for U.S. states liberalize, which recent studies credit Since 1989, this line of reasoning goes, the engagement programs and that the military with some success.12 It also fulfills important United States has been overly prone to military is most readily available to do the engaging. training, basing, and operational requirements (humanitarian) intervention while the military By strengthening foreign militaries, states for American forces stationed in some 40 should be focused on war proper. Andrew become less vulnerable to transnational crime countries. Those U.S. forces help build part- Bacevich, a professor of international relations or state failure and can respond to natural or ners’ security capabilities, influence potential at Boston University, connected that tendency manmade disasters. By increasing the capacity adversaries, mitigate the underlying causes of for the military to do it all with a disturbing of foreign military forces that can respond to conflict, and enable rapid action when military trend within American politics that links the their internal problems, the U.S. military can intervention is required. military tool and utopian political ends. That, reduce its own commitment to conflict zones. Equally important to building partners’ Secretary Gates underscored this reality when security capabilities is the Foreign Military he recently declared that “from the standpoint Financing (FMF) program. Through this as the U.S. military manages the Foreign Military Financing program on a daily basis, politically knowledgeable officers are required to administer it in turn, Bacevich argues, leads to an increased propensity to use force.9 Other critics such as Mitchell Thompson have contended that if only the State Department were on an equal budgetary footing with DOD (thus creating true interagency cooperation), the United States would have a more balanced, less bel- ligerent foreign policy.10 Yet in spite of calls for budgetary reform to increase social and economic assistance provided through the State Department, Congress simply finds defense issues more Nangarhar Provincial Reconstruction Team compelling. Politicians have an interest in members and local officials discuss electricity associating themselves with patriotism and output from dam U.S. Air Force (Joshua T. Jasper) (Joshua T. U.S. Air Force strength, so it is much easier to find advocates for counterterrorism training than for women’s of America’s national security, the most program, partners receive grants and loans to empowerment programs. The conventional important assignment in your military career purchase American military equipment. As the wisdom on Capitol Hill is that while defense may not necessarily be commanding U.S. sol- U.S. military manages the FMF program on a spending is understood by American voters to diers, but advising or mentoring the troops of daily basis, politically knowledgeable officers be a matter of national security, international other nations as they battle the forces of terror are required to administer it. To ensure the assistance sounds unnecessary. Thus, while and instability within their own borders.”11 U.S. military does not arm regimes completely some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Thus, “graduates” of U.S. security assistance divorced from U.S. foreign policy, the State Committee would like to place all security programs can be found alongside American Department provides oversight. Last year, the assistance under the authority of the Secretary forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. FMF budget was the largest program in the of State, or even break up the current military In Afghanistan, for instance, U.S. troops State Department’s international assistance command structure, such efforts have failed. make up only about 50 percent of the force; account, consuming more than $4.5 billion, It is important for our field-grade officers to in the Balkans, U.S. forces have always been a which is 50 percent more than the Economic understand the pros and cons of these types minority. Indeed, the current focus on transna- Support Fund and 60 percent more than the of arguments—and the politics involved—as tional threats has been an additional impetus global HIV/AIDS initiative.13 Yet in April 2008, they will inevitably be affected by them as they for building such partnerships. For example, Secretary Gates asked Congress to give DOD take on higher level positions, no matter what the United States largely trained and supported permanent authority, as the lead agency, for administration is in power. African Union forces in Darfur, Sudan. This the Global Train and Equip program, which This conclusion is reinforced by the fact represents just one instance of continuing U.S. trains and equips foreign militaries on a rapid that, despite its early impulses against inter- interest in promoting security assistance for assistance basis. In fact, DOD asked Congress

64 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu REVERON and MAHONEY-NORRIS to raise the program’s annual budget to $750 role models for advancing human rights and sibility. At the same time, students are taught million, representing a 250 percent increase.14 civil-military relations in the region. The chang- organizational dynamics, interagency compe- Regardless of who actually owns or manages ing military roles required to serve U.S. foreign tencies, and interpersonal skills and engage in the program, it is important for military offi- policy goals in USAFRICOM underscore a 3-week project to assess the region’s security cers to understand the bigger foreign policy the fact that the longstanding operations in environment, develop a theater strategy, outline picture and how security assistance programs USSOUTHCOM represent more and more the an implementation and assurance plan, and fit into the U.S. policy context. rule rather than the exception. As USSOUTH- develop necessary capabilities to execute the With control over so many resources, COM commander Admiral James Stavridis engagement strategy over an 8-year period. it should not be surprising that some critics noted in a recent interview, the “most signifi- This exercise places a seminar of 15 students worry that the United States has inadvertently cant change to our organization is a change in in the shoes of a combatant command’s senior created a new class of overly powerful and our cultural mindset. . . . This new thinking will staff to understand how the military contributes independent military officials—particularly take us from a culture of war to a culture of war to U.S. foreign policy outside of fighting wars. It the geographic combatant commanders— and peace, from a culture of moving people and challenges students to understand how military along the lines of the proconsuls of ancient materiel to one of moving ideas.”17 activities fit within the activities of the State Rome or the viceroys of British India.15 We While Secretary Gates has made it clear find it difficult to take such concerns too seri- that the State Department needs to play the to prepare officers to carry ously, though a case can certainly be made lead role in overseeing U.S. foreign policy— for strengthening the civilian presence in including his strong support for a funding out civilian instruments of foreign policy, including related matters that increase for the State Department18 to do more national security with their fall within the geographic combatant com- of this “nonmilitary” work—clearly the mili- counterparts, our officers mander’s area of concern.16 Yet while there tary will continue to play an outsized role in need relevant education, are inevitable frictions, generally American the stability operations, asymmetric warfare which can be done most Ambassadors and military commanders context. This is impossible to avoid consider- effectively at PME institutions understand that they need each other’s ing the size, resources, and capabilities of the cooperation. Coercive diplomacy works only U.S. military. Yet to do this effectively, as Sec- if there is military force behind it; military retary Gates argues, we need “new institutions Department, USAID, and other U.S. Govern- engagement works only if it supports larger . . . for the 21st century, new organizations with ment agencies. While some officers initially national security objectives. In essence, then, a 21st century mind-set.”19 At the same time we resist the nonwarfighting roles combatant com- these are interagency activities, but they are need to focus on what the Secretary terms “the mands undertake, by the course’s end they fully different from what midlevel officers have civilian instruments of national security— understand the importance of the engagement experienced or learned about to date. In fact, diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign mission. Furthermore, they have a better under- these types of activities turn the normal sup- assistance, civic action, and economic recon- standing of the overlapping nature of defense, ported/supporting agencies relationship on struction and development.”20 development, and diplomacy, which they use to its head for field-grade officers, as even fairly design security cooperation activities. junior grade officers have routinely found How to Proceed To ensure that this type of broadening themselves serving as de facto mayors, police We contend that in order to prepare education takes place at all PME institutions chiefs, and economic advisors in Iraq and U.S. military officers appropriately to carry at appropriate levels, the Chairman of the Afghanistan. This again requires that we out these civilian instruments of national Joint Chiefs of Staff must include military- provide officers with the necessary military- security with their counterparts, our officers political relations competencies as part of the political competencies to succeed. need relevant education, which can be done requirements established under an updated Clearly, the new U.S. Africa Command most effectively at PME institutions. As one Officer Professional Military Education Policy (USAFRICOM) will test the effective use of example, consider the following curriculum (OPMEP). It is critical that this becomes part of military-political competencies even further. that we believe encompasses the type of the OPMEP, and thus mandated through PME, The already existing Combined Joint Task considerations necessary for the intermediate in order to carry out the Chairman’s stated Force–Horn of Africa can serve as a model to level of officer PME. “PME vision [that] entails ensuring that offi- illustrate how Civil Affairs activities can fulfill At the Naval War College, the National cers are properly prepared for their leadership the commander’s intent to achieve military Security Decision Making Department has roles at every level of activity and employment, objectives. It is also useful to recall that this specifically structured its intermediate course and through this, ensure that the . . . Armed focus on other than combat/conventional skills around combatant commands so students Forces remain capable of defeating today’s is not new to U.S. officers who have served can understand the military’s nonwarfighting threat and tomorrow’s.”21 A wider understand- tours in U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTH- roles and their dynamics. Student seminars are ing of the military role in foreign policy is COM). For many years, USSOUTHCOM has designated as one of five geographic combat- an absolute necessity not only for defeating demonstrated the necessity and utility of U.S. ant commands (U.S. Northern Command is threats, but also for ameliorating the conditions military officers serving to further foreign excluded to emphasize regional studies outside that help engender them. The 2008 National policy goals in the nontraditional areas of coun- of North America) and are immersed in the Defense Strategy notes that the military “will tering narcotrafficking, providing humanitarian political-military, socioeconomic, and security help build the internal capacities of countries relief and disaster assistance, and serving as challenges of the corresponding area of respon- at risk. We will work with and through like- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 65 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Need for Officer Education

minded states to help shrink the ungoverned 4 For example, Leonard D. Holder, Jr., and Wil- NEW areas of the world.” We propose that the fol- liamson Murray, “Prospects for Military Education,” from NDU Press lowing represents the type of learning area and Joint Force Quarterly 18 (Spring 1998), 81–90; and associated objectives that should be considered Ervin J. Rokke, “Military Education for the New Ag e ,” Joint Force Quarterly 9 (Autumn 1995), 18–23. for inclusion in the OPMEP. Officers should be 5 While largely directed to Iraq and Afghani- able to comprehend and analyze: stan, the Defense Department accounts for 20 percent of official development assistance. See n the capabilities and roles that U.S. mili- Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, “The Pentagon tary forces employ to conduct theater security and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s cooperation activities Expanding Role,” Center for Global Development, n the importance of strategic communica- Working Paper 131, November 2007. tion in conducting theater security coopera- 6 A National Security Strategy of Engagement tion activities and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The White n the purpose, roles, functions, and rela- House, February 1996), 17. 7 tionships of combatant commanders and joint Department of Defense, 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Depart- force commanders with U.S. Ambassadors and ment of Defense, May 1997), v. their staffs, NGOs, and international partners 8 Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, n the achievement of unity of effort in the “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign Affairs (July- absence of unity of command in the areas of August 2005), 153. defense, diplomacy, and development 9 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Mili- n how the U.S. military is trained to plan, tarism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). execute, and sustain security cooperation 10 Mitchell J. Thompson, “Breaking the Procon- activities. sulate: A New Design for National Power,” Param- eters 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005/2006), 62–75. 11 In sum, much more can and should be Robert M. Gates, “Evening Lecture at West done to increase the military-political acumen Point,” April 21, 2008, accessed at . of military officers and their corresponding 12 Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications capability to operate effectively in today’s Defense Horizons 64 of Material Power: Military Engagement and the complex environment. There is no reason to Socialization of States, 1972–2000,” International Lessons of Abu Ghraib: Understanding believe that security cooperation and stability Studies Quarterly 50 (2006), 509–537. and Preventing Prisoner Abuse in Military and reconstruction operations are likely to 13 Operations Department of State, “Foreign Military end any time soon. Presidents and policymak- Financing Account Tables,” available at . Military Ghraib had broad strategic consequences, an irresistibly ready tool in the military, and assistance for Iraq and Afghanistan is not included leading many around the world to question many find it convenient to make use of this in this account data. Also, of that $4.5 billion, 80 the legitimacy of U.S. goals and activities tool in ways that may ultimately weaken the percent goes to two countries, Israel ($2.3 billion) in Iraq. In this paper, Paul Bartone draws military. Nevertheless, the U.S. military needs and Egypt ($1.3 billion). 14 Thom Shanker, “Pentagon Seeks Authority to on extensive unclassified reports from to be prepared to support likely missions for Train and Equip Foreign Militaries,” The New York multiple investigations of the abuses, and the near term and beyond. The question here applies psychological and social-situational Times, April 17, 2008. is not whether the military should be engaged 15 perspectives to develop a better grasp of the Thompson, 63. in nonwarfighting activities, but how to best 16 causative factors. He finds that most young We take more seriously concerns that con- adults are powerfully inclined to behave educate our midlevel officers to interact appro- ducting humanitarian assistance operations can in accord with the social conventions and priately with myriad other actors to produce undermine the military’s warfighting orientation or pressures around them. Thus the lessons for optimal results for U.S. national security. JFQ inadvertently arm repressive regimes or future adver- military leaders at all levels and especially saries. See Bacevich, 3. in ambiguous circumstances: ensure that 17 “An Interview with Admiral James G. Stavr- standards of behavior are clear and explicit Notes idis,” Joint Force Quarterly 50 (3d Quarter, 2008), 128. throughout all phases of an operation, and 18 Nicholas Kraley, “Gates Seen Reversing Rivalry 1 personally represent and reinforce those U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on with State,” The Washington Times, April 17, 2008. standards. Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and 19 Gates, “Beyond Guns,” 7. Investigations, Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: 20 Ibid., 8. Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruc- 21 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), tion Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, April 2008, 51. Officer Professional Military Education Policy, CJCS 2 Ibid. Instruction 1800.01C, December 22, 2005, 1. Until 3 Robert M. Gates, “Beyond Guns and Steel: the OPMEP is updated, we urge that the competen- Visit the NDU Press Web site Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American cies considered here be included as one of the annu- for more information on publications Pow e r,” Military Review (January-February 2008), 6. at ndupress.ndu.edu ally updated “Special Areas of Emphasis.”

66 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu A Strategic Asset for Engagement Enhancing the Role of National Defense University

By Keith D. Dickson

he recently published National limited number of professional military edu- a number of states to develop joint education Defense Strategy lists promot- cational positions per year can be reserved for programs for military officers and to reorganize ing security as one of the five international officers. current military structures into joint organiza- T objectives of the Department In addition to IMET, training exercises, tions. Unfortunately, while the demand for joint of Defense (DOD). Certainly one way the partnerships, and exchanges are effective secu- professional military education is growing, the United States pursues its national interests is by rity assistance activities, but like IMET, they are United States lacks the structure to identify promoting security within cooperative relation- limited in scale and scope and cannot have the requirements or to develop, coordinate, and ships. In developing these relationships, DOD broader influence required to meet our strategic support programs. Combatant commanders, helps build the capacities of a broad spectrum goals. The National Defense Strategy’s objective who are responsible for identifying key states of partners through security cooperation. The of promoting security involves the requirement and prioritizing efforts to build partner capaci- geographic combatant commands are respon- to educate professional military officers of ties through training or education, have few sible for developing these cooperative relation- partner states who can function as command- resources to support and sustain such activities. ships and building security capacities in their ers, staff members, and liaison officers in a joint To meet the growing need for these educational campaign plans. environment as part of a coalition force. These requirements, combatant commanders need Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff officers would be fully able to plan and conduct to be able to tap into other resources through Admiral Michael Mullen has stressed the value effective joint operations and contribute to a the Joint Staff and be able to integrate joint of education as a means of enhancing coop- coalition planning effort. To meet this strategic professional military education capabilities into erative relationships and building capacities. objective, professional military education must their long-term planning. One such resource, Traditionally, one of the most effective security be capable of reaching a larger audience through the National Defense University (NDU), exists assistance activities is the International Military educational activities that go beyond IMET. under the direction of the Chairman. Education and Training (IMET) program, Professional military education is a The National Defense University is the funded by the Department of State as part of powerful draw and represents a singularly center for joint professional military education. its international affairs budget. The program important engagement opportunity. The No other institution has greater expertise in this provides both professional military education concept of jointness has attracted the interest type of education. NDU has a threefold mission and technical training to students from allied of many national and military leaders of key of education, research, and outreach, which is and friendly nations. Given the continuing high partner states. The demonstrated effectiveness well suited to supporting a joint educational demand for joint qualified U.S. officers, only a of the U.S. joint force has led to a desire among engagement strategy. It has the resident knowledge and expertise in national security strategy and policy, national resource management, and joint and multinational campaign planning and warfighting to support international partners in initiating, developing, and sustaining their own joint educational programs. Moreover, NDU explicitly promotes cultivating national and

OASD Public Affairs (Jerry Morrison) OASD Public Affairs international relationships through national security education programs and by investing in faculty and staff to promote excellence in education and outreach. The university already has a strong outreach program, which includes course participation of about 200 international officers a year, as well as faculty and student exchanges.

Dr. Keith D. Dickson is Professor of Military Studies Secretary Gates addresses international students at National Defense University in the Joint Forces Staff College at the National Defense University. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 67 SPECIAL FEATURE | A Strategic Asset for Engagement

These activities, while useful and important, As part of providing strategic direction These seminars could be developed for a have inherent constraints. Physical capacity to NDU, educational engagement activities number of targeted audiences and be held and class size limit the number of international should be divided into three levels. Level I sequentially or simultaneously. Seminars could officers who can attend in residence. Exchanges activities, some of which are already occurring, be held for military and civilian senior leaders are often ad hoc and dependent on limited are programs for mutual exchange of ideas and as workshops or tabletop exercises in inter- funding. What is missing is the strategic focus processes. They serve as a means for senior agency coordination. Other seminars could of NDU efforts in international engagement field-grade officers to engage peers in discus- assist host nation faculty members in develop- activities as part of its outreach mission require- sions on planning methods and to participate ing a joint operations curriculum for a staff or ment. The Chairman, through the Joint Staff, in a practice staff exercise to develop means and war college or in preparing to teach courses can provide the strategic focus necessary by methods for effective cooperation. These week- in joint operations or developing curricula identifying priority combatant command long programs currently run once a year. For related to joint operations. Seminars on strategy requirements for professional military educa- key engagement states, these programs would and operational planning could be directed at tion programs and providing direction to NDU be sufficient to maintain professional contacts midgrade officers identified for future high- level positions. These seminars could be held in National Defense University has the resident knowledge either the United States (at the National Defense University in Washington, the Joint Forces Staff and expertise to support international partners in initiating, College [JFSC] in Norfolk, or the combatant developing, and sustaining their own joint educational programs command headquarters) or in the host country. Level III activities would assist a host for supporting these activities. NDU, in return, and build mutual knowledge and understand- nation in developing its own joint professional could provide a tailored curriculum for partner ing. For other states, this program format can military education system. This could involve states and conduct courses at various levels to serve as an introductory course in joint opera- long-term support for curriculum development, assist in the development of military leaders tions and planning in preparation for more faculty preparation, long- and short-term resi- who understand and appreciate joint warfare formal and detailed instruction. Depending on dencies, seminars and workshops, library and and can plan and conduct joint operations. demand, these programs could be held as often administrative operations, instruction by NDU Exportable educational modules ranging from as desired and as NDU resources permit. faculty, and other activities. This would involve basic joint operations orientation to strategy Level II activities would involve a more a 1- to 3-year commitment involving exchanges formulation could be developed and presented. formal educational setting, using the seminar and visits between NDU and the host country’s In addition, NDU could support activities for model for detailed instruction in joint opera- staff or war college or defense university, with establishing joint staff institutions, including tions and warfighting. These seminars would be the goal of developing a long-term partnership. joint operations instructor training and curricu- held once a year or every 6 months and last 1 to The U.S.–Russia Colonels Program and lum development, which could provide regional 3 weeks to provide military officers and civilian U.S.–Pakistani Colonels Program are models expertise, language skills, and educational government leaders with an appreciation for for employing NDU resources and capabilities expertise in both curriculum design and subject the operational level of war, joint operational with which to meet both national and theater matter knowledge. planning, and joint perspectives and attributes. security cooperation goals. These programs, hosted at JFSC, have served to promote cooperation and understanding among senior officers who will play a role in future decisionmaking and policy, while also serving as a unique learning opportunity to test and practice different methods for forming effective coalition staffs. The cooperation among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. OCJCS Public Affairs (Adam M. Stump) OCJCS Public Affairs Embassies, combatant command staffs, and NDU in conducting these programs is also a model for identifying combatant commands’ requirements and coordinating a long-term and comprehensive program of educational support from NDU to meet those requirements. At present, NDU supports two Level I activities a year. These exist as the Russian and Pakistani colonels programs and can be held in the United States or in the host country. These activities are accomplished as an additional School for National Security Executive Education international duty within JFSC and the Institute for National students graduate from National Defense University, 2007 Strategic Studies, and program expenses are funded almost entirely outside of NDU. In the

68 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu DICKSON short term, other Level I programs could be coordinating with the Defense Security Coop- means for transforming their military organiza- initiated through the combatant command- eration Agency, NDU could tap into the resi- tions and making them more compatible with ers contacting NDU directly and requesting dent regional center affiliates (the Africa Center the United States and other partner nations. Level I support. Funding could be provided by for Strategic Studies, Center for Hemispheric Educating officers in developing plans through the combatant command, the host nation, or Defense Studies, and Near East South Asia the joint operational planning process would both. NDU faculty volunteers would be tasked Center for Strategic Studies) to supply theater create a cohort of experts able to work effectively to develop the curriculum, coordinate with expertise. NDU could develop procedures to set in a coalition as liaison officers or as members the appropriate agency within the combatant schedules, establish outcomes, manage funding, of a combined staff, drawing on the same prin- command, and deliver the tailored program. and develop a plan of action to support the ciples and processes found in U.S. military staffs With some lead time, Level II activities could activity requested, scheduling and executing the and interagency organizations. In this way the also be developed and initiated. missions based on the 3- to 5-year goals listed United States can contribute directly to creating A longer term solution is to ensure that in combatant commands’ campaign plans. It strategic partners capable of deploying military NDU’s support of engagement is included as also could identify faculty and staff throughout and perhaps interagency organizations and part of the Guidance for Employment of the the university who are willing to support these working effectively with other states to address a wide range of contingencies and crises.

there are a number of states that are already important security partners and would potentially support a long-term educational partnership

More importantly, these educational Secretary Gates speaks with civilian defense programs build personal relationships between experts at National Defense University, September 2008 faculty and students over the years, creating DOD (Cherie A. Cullen) opportunities for improved working relation- Force. The combatant commands would begin program activities. Additional staff and faculty ships between the partnering nation and the to identify the professional military educational would be needed to provide administrative United States. Engagement through joint profes- goals and requirements of key states in their support and develop the necessary instruction sional military education has the opportunity areas of responsibility as part of their security materials and lessons derived from existing to influence a generation of officers in partner cooperation activities. A number of states, such curricula and specifically tailored to support a nations immediately by providing them with as Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Georgia, India, Mexico, combatant commander’s requirement. new perspectives and approaches to problem- Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and Once initiated, Level I and II events most solving, while fostering joint approaches and Ukraine, are already important security part- likely would become standing yearly require- building a common strategic perspective that ners and would potentially support a long-term ments. A Level III event may become a multi- allows states to address their own security. These educational partnership. It is not unreasonable year activity, with faculty and staff remaining in- programs also would directly benefit NDU by to expect that Afghanistan and Iraq could be country for weeks or months. In the initial stages extending its reputation internationally and pro- included in a future list. The combatant com- of the program, volunteers from the faculty and viding more opportunities for faculty, staff, and mands would submit their campaign plans staff should be sufficient, and they should be student dialogue with foreign counterparts. to the Joint Staff, identifying Level I, II, and recognized and compensated for this additional It will take vision, dedication, and imagi- III engagement activities and request NDU duty. But in all likelihood, there would be an nation for the United States to meet its strategic support. The Joint Staff would prioritize the increasing demand for a full-time faculty and goals in the 21st century. The National Defense activities and provide funding arrangements. staff. NDU would need to be prepared to make University already has a model for educational NDU would have to be appropriately the administrative and budgetary changes neces- engagement activities as part of a coordi- resourced and structured to meet the expanded sary to sustain this program as it matures. nated and integrated effort in support of the requirement of supporting the educational campaign plans of the geographic combatant needs of priority partner states. Within NDU, Joint professional military education commanders. This model could be expanded, the newly established Office of University Out- should be seen as a strategic resource for the organized, and funded as a major component reach could provide university-wide oversight United States. Educating both military officers of the NDU outreach mission. The potential of its international cooperative relationships. and strategic leaders from partner states in strategic benefits of this program for the United The university could assess how it would plan, the concepts and principles of strategy and States are significant. Already an indispensable organize, and support these expanded activities operational planning supports long-term U.S. strategic asset, the National Defense University and coordinate with the combatant commands, objectives in several ways. By developing an has the opportunity to play a more significant drawing on the strengths of its various colleges, appreciation for joint perspectives and attributes, role as part of the Nation’s military instrument research centers, and other components. By partner states would have an institutionalized of power. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 69 Afghan National Security Forces lead patrol with coalition mentors in Ghowrmach district

U.S. Navy (Brian P. Seymour)

he Afghan barber cutting my hair at an American installation in Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned Kabul had a good life by Afghan Tstandards. So when I asked what he thought of the post-Taliban era, I had every reason to expect a favorable review. But as he pondered his response, I could tell that he was choosing his words carefully. Finally, he Reforming answered, “I don’t approve of what the Taliban did to the people, but it is now very difficult to move around the country . . . and there is a the Afghan lot of corruption in the government.” The first part of his response was ironic, as it was the Taliban’s insurgent activities that had created National Police the need for the heightened transportation security that made travel slow. But the second part of his response was telling. For him, it would be the success or failure of our nontra- By Lewis G. Irwin ditional, nonmilitary stability and reconstruction operations that would ultimately shape his decision whether to support the popularly Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and elected government of Afghanistan. non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. . . . [T]hese campaigns will fail if waged by military Colonel Lewis G. Irwin, USAR, returned from Afghanistan in February 2008, where he led Focused 1 means alone. District Development, a nationwide effort to reform the Afghan National Police. He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University.

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My interest in his response was as much The Mission other elements of the civil justice system and professional as personal, since my mission Arriving in Kabul in August of 2007, Afghan society, in order to enable the Afghans in Afghanistan was to lead the team charged I had no idea that I would be handed the to manage their own security. The North with designing and implementing a nation- mission of a lifetime: in a few short weeks, Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) identi- wide reform of the Afghan National Police I was assigned to the Force Integration and fied these elements as vital steps toward the (ANP). While most Afghan governing institu- Training section of the Combined Secu- ultimate goal of creating a stable, secure, and tions had long been viewed with suspicion by rity Transition Command–Afghanistan self-sustaining Afghanistan.5 the people, the Afghan police were especially (CSTC–A). Our mission was to oversee the Put into a broader context, this undertak- distrusted as a result of their lengthy history design, fielding, and development of the ing would be a daunting one. The local Afghan of corruption, cronyism, and incompetence. Afghan National Army and ANP, as well as police are organized into almost 400 police Furthermore, these same police officers the Afghan government agencies administer- districts outside of Kabul, as well as dozens of served as the real face of the Afghan governing those security forces. My arrival coincided police precincts in the capital itself. Numbering ment for average citizens, as they were the representatives of the government most likely to interact with the local people on a routine political leaders will expect the military to take a leading basis.2 So in keeping with the basic tenets of role in these missions, given our comparative advantages in our counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and organizational structure, resources, and sustainability the irregular warfare (IW) joint operating concept, we would have to fix the Afghan police—and the government agencies admin- with the conclusion of a multilateral confer- about 82,000 altogether, the police are often istering them—as a critical step toward con- ence aimed at considering plans to reform called upon to fight as frontline first respond- vincing the people to support the popularly the ANP, as the Afghan government and the ers in the counterinsurgency in addition to elected government instead of the Taliban international community had come to recog- carrying out their basic law enforcement and alternative. This article describes the scope nize both the criticality of the police force to criminal investigative responsibilities. This and challenges of these major stability opera- the COIN effort as well as the ANP’s glaring reform process would be made even more tions missions, while highlighting relevant lack of success to date. The major product of difficult by the fractious nature of internal elements of our new COIN doctrine—central the conference was a set of PowerPoint slides Afghan politics, as well as the remnants of to the IW concept—as they relate to opera- that generally described a district-by-district Soviet organizational culture that persist in tionalization, or using the COIN doctrine as approach to police reform, dubbed “Focused the basis for specific action plans. District Development” (FDD).3 As is often A few comments are appropriate at the case, the Afghans and their international Afghan National Army and the outset. While some of what follows may community partners—except for the Amer- Police assume responsibility sound like criticism, the exact opposite is icans—had hedged their bets by expressing for Bak district after training true. In my experience, our leaders and tentative support for the police reform by U.S. Army Military Police troops are working extremely hard to realize concept in principle while simultaneously success in these missions. As an institution, avoiding any firm commitments of assistance however, we have not gotten our planning or resources. and operating mechanisms right just yet. At Typical of any stability or reconstruc- the same time, it is likely that our military tion mission, reforming the ANP would be will be called upon to carry out many more a multilayered, complex undertaking. In of these missions, given the nature of IW Afghanistan, the police forces consist of seven operations and the “long wars” currently different public safety and security organiza- under way. One only has to look at the struc- tions, with basic missions and organization ture of U.S. Africa Command to see more outlined in the Afghan government’s Strategic evidence of our military’s likely future role Capabilities Plan.4 National civil order police, in the application of soft power instruments border patrolmen, district police, the coun- of American influence. Furthermore, it is ternarcotics force, the counterterrorism force, likely that our political leaders will continue criminal investigators, and even the Afghan to expect the military to take a leading role fire departments all fall under the Ministry of among the other U.S. Government agencies the Interior (MOI) umbrella. But while each participating in these missions, given our of these agencies has its own distinct set of comparative advantages in organizational issues and challenges, the leadership decided structure, resources, and sustainability. to reform the traditional district-level police Accordingly, this article outlines some poten- first, given their direct interactions with tial pitfalls and challenges facing the leaders the people. At the same time, reforming the who will plan and execute these stability mis- police would require further developing the sions in the years to come. MOI’s administrative capabilities, as well as U.S. Army (Casey Ware) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 71 COMMENTARY | Reforming the Afghan National Police

Afghan National Police on patrol return fire on spear in crafting and executing the plan—and combined (allied), joint, interagency, and mul- fleeing Taliban members getting the warfighters’ “buy-in” as a precon- ticomponent headquarters organization, one dition for participation. Unlike conventional ultimately working through the interagency military operations, which derive their unity process while sharing key decisions with the of command through a hierarchical chain, sovereign Afghan government. CSTC–A stability and reconstruction operations by also depends heavily on contracted civilian their nature require negotiation, compromise, police mentors for the Afghan police training and the inclusion of a wide variety of actors effort, though ironically those contractors in the decisionmaking process, each bring- are employed by the State Department and ing to the table different resources, concerns, ultimately accountable to that agency rather and areas of authority. Our COIN doctrine than the military. Conversely, CSTC–A con- speaks to this challenge in its section on trols the massive funds associated with the “unity of effort.” 7 Without question, achieving development of the Afghan forces, and as such consensus around a plan of action is often the can wield disproportionate influence over that most difficult aspect of successful stability aspect of the process. operations. Nevertheless, both our international In the ANP case, the relevant U.S. agen- partners and the Afghan leaders would not cies and actors included the U.S. Ambassador hesitate to let us know when they disagreed and Embassy; U.S. Central Command and with us, or when their interests did not its subordinate CSTC–A; the U.S. national coincide with ours. For example, a senior command element and subordinate brigade representative from an allied embassy stated combat teams; the Department of State’s bluntly to me on one occasion, “If you Ameri- Justice Sector Support Program, U.S. Agency cans succeed, then we are with you. If you

U.S. Marine Corps (Jason T. Guiliano) for International Development, and Bureau fail, you are on your own . . . and we think of International Narcotics and Law Enforce- you will fail.” At another juncture, the U.S. ment Affairs; and numerous others. The Afghan government agencies.6 Added to this long list of relevant international entities and challenging mix was the fact that corruption is nongovernmental organizations included without question, achieving an entrenched feature of Afghan culture, where the European Union Police, United Nations “one-fisted” corruption—or theft perpetrated Assistance Mission–Afghanistan, Interna- consensus around a plan to feed one’s family or tribe—is viewed as just tional Police Coordinating Board, NATO’s of action is often the most another routine feature of life. Any effort at International Security Assistance Force difficult aspect of successful professionalizing the police would have to take (ISAF), and an extensive array of embassies, stability operations place within a context of abject poverty, wide- international organizations, and other actors spread illiteracy, a thriving and well-connected with widely varying interests, resources, and drug trade, porous borders, and an almost agendas. Representative of the convoluted Ambassador directed me not to consult with total absence of the basic elements of rule of decisionmaking structures in these types of one very senior Afghan official because he law, ranging from criminal investigators to operations, CSTC–A answers directly to U.S. felt that U.S. interests were a mismatch with lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and jails. Without Central Command but must consult with the that official’s political goals. Privately, some doubt, we had our work cut out for us, and this Ambassador and Embassy while working in leaders believed that there were governments problem would not be solved in a matter of parallel with the U.S. warfighters, themselves operating with us in Afghanistan that wanted months, but rather years. at least nominally subordinate to the NATO to see the Afghans succeed while the United ISAF commander. It was not unusual to find States failed. But in any event, the decision- The Operational Environment our allies’ military commands disagreeing making authority and jurisdictional centers of Armed then with about 60 PowerPoint with their own embassies regarding the gravity routinely shifted along with changes slides and a rough idea of how this nationwide shape and direction of their countries’ poli- in key leaders, allied government agendas, reform ought to look, our team set to the tasks cies and preferences. Afghan preferences, and various elements of of fleshing out a specific structure for the Similarly, it was commonly under- U.S. policy. Leaders cannot underestimate the FDD program and pitching the concept to stood within NATO, the European Union challenges associated with this tough opera- the numerous players who would have to be Police, and other multinational organizational environment or the amount of effort it brought on board for the initiative to achieve tions that the constituent members were far takes to build and maintain consensus around legitimacy and success. Ultimately, this effort more concerned about the reactions of their any major new initiative. would involve interacting with the highest home governments to their decisions and levels of NATO, U.S., international commu- actions than they were to the reactions of Key Lessons Learned nity, and Afghan leadership, but the nature of the appointed leaders of the organizations in What follows are 10 key lessons I learned the operations would also require involving Afghanistan. Likewise, CSTC–A has to deal from the experience of designing and setting key leaders all the way out to the point of the with its own internal array of interests, as a in motion one of these major stability opera-

72 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu IRWIN tions, offered as food for thought for the rising vincial Reconstruction Teams to the police number of police mentor teams falls far short leaders who will carry out similar missions, reform effort, as he believed that they would of the number needed to provide district-level as well as those charged with refining our continue to pursue their own governments’ coverage throughout the country, resulting in emerging IW doctrine. visions of Afghan redevelopment, regard- some districts only being visited sporadically Fragmented Decisionmaking Author- less of what vision was put forth by the ISAF or not at all.9 At the same time, the civilian ity and Incoherence of Vision. One of the leadership. police mentors hired by the State Department key challenges of the operations in Afghani- While a certain amount of this fragmen- to provide civilian law enforcement expertise stan and in other IW environments is the tation and incoherence of vision is unavoid- to the developing Afghan police forces do not fragmented nature of decisionmaking, with able, there are steps mission leaders can take have the flexibility to deploy into the areas numerous actors bringing their own agendas, to mitigate challenges. Keeping in mind that where they are needed the most, for reasons interests, resources, and areas of authority to “unity of intent” is the goal, constant com- of force protection and nonpermissive threat the table on most decisions of consequence. munication and negotiation are both critical conditions. Nor do they typically bring a Sol- This situation can be frustrating for U.S. to success. Typical mechanisms for bringing dier’s mindset to the tasks at hand. As a result, leaders, as they see the United States pro- about this communication are standing work there is a real mismatch between the force viding the preponderance of the resources groups, joint planning groups, civil-military structure needed to carry out the Afghan earmarked for Afghan development but then operations centers, joint interagency coor- police development mission and the resources having to accommodate various international dinating groups, and other ad hoc steering available on the ground. players who insist on having input into key groups.8 Wherever possible, it is important to In terms of potential corrective courses decisions on the commitment of those funds. get leaders with real decisionmaking author- of action, John Nagl has suggested the cre- The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghani- ity, both host nation and coalition, to partici- ation of a “combat advisory corps,” consist- stan (LOTFA), an international panel charged pate routinely in these groups. By definition, ing of professional Soldiers organized and with setting Afghan police salaries, is a good the decentralized and fluid nature of stability trained to meet these specific needs as their example of this convoluted organizational operations requires leaders at all levels and primary mission.10 At the very least, however, structure. LOTFA is an international body, in all interested organizations to understand there are three corrective courses of action with United Nations and allied representation, the broader goals and specific objectives at that leaders can take to mitigate the effects although the United States provides the great the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of of force structure/mission mismatches. First, majority of the funds used to pay Afghan the effort. Leaders cannot underestimate the we should choose our best leaders to interact police. Thus, the United States often has to amount of effort it will take to get everyone on with the indigenous leaders, essentially negotiate with LOTFA before spending its the same page. placing the “A team” in those positions of own money. Similarly convoluted interagency Force Structure Mismatches with responsibility. Second, we can collocate our decisionmaking occurs between CSTC–A and Mission Requirements. Stability and recon- mentors, supporting staff operations, and the State Department. struction operations usually require a variety the developing indigenous leaders and their With all of these players active in the of skills and resources that do not routinely staffs. Too often, U.S. staffs work so hard to decisionmaking process, the different govern- reside within the U.S. military. Furthermore, meet current mission requirements that they ments and nongovernmental organizations involved often advocate competing visions for Afghanistan’s future, and too often they with all of these players active in the decisionmaking process, pursue these visions regardless of decisions the different governments and nongovernmental organizations or agreements to the contrary. With no one player having enough leverage or authority involved often advocate competing visions for Afghanistan’s future to direct otherwise, this fragmentation leads to incoherence in the collective international redevelopment effort in Afghanistan, by definition these missions, with their lose sight of the longer term objective of the resulting in a great deal of wasted effort and emphasis on mentoring and coaching, place effort—training the host nation forces and generally ineffective results. Not surprisingly, a premium on senior-level leaders with the agencies to sustain themselves and their own the Afghans often play one international talent, experience, temperament, and cred- operations. Collocating the two parts of the actor off against the other until they find ibility to interact effectively with indigenous team would force that development to occur. the answer that they want. The internal U.S. leaders. Put another way, these operations Finally, strip all nonessential staff personnel organizational structure, with its interagency, require augmentation with subject matter from the supporting staff functions and place combined, and joint flavor, adds to this chal- experts from various fields relevant to the them into positions where they can make the lenge, as each of the key agencies operating in tasks at hand, as well as enough senior leaders most significant and direct contribution to the Afghanistan experiences frequent turnover to build the developing agencies and organiza- mentoring effort. and shifting internal visions, providing the tions. Unfortunately, our force structure—in Weak Interagency Coordinating Mech- Afghans additional opportunities to exploit Afghanistan at least—falls well short of this anisms and Execution. The prevailing model seams. In one telling example, a high-ranking standard, in terms of both the required skill of interagency coordination in Afghanistan NATO ISAF leader felt that he could not sets on the ground and the adequacy of the could be described as the “bubble up” method. pledge the support of his subordinate Pro- mentor coverage. For example, the basic Periodic direct coordination among the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 73 COMMENTARY | Reforming the Afghan National Police highest level leaders occasionally generated Afghan National Police officer stands guard at broad policy compromises, but those meetings checkpoint while Soldiers provide overwatch did not provide the specific terms needed to implement the agreements reached. Instead, routine interagency coordination took place in lower level work groups that identified and attempted to resolve problems at the lowest level possible. Theoretically, then, problems that could not be resolved at the lower level would bubble up to successive levels until they reached a level at which the participants had the authority to make a decision. While this system offers advantages in terms of managing senior-level work load, it also brings with it some major disadvantages. For example, this model assumes that the lower level participants in the process remain engaged, informed, and responsive, and it

assumes away the stovepiping of information U.S. Army (Michael L. Casteel) typical within most agencies, as well as the frequent turnover and absences of agency representatives from the working groups that with our coalition and international com- organization. In a real sense, we are creating occur for all manner of reasons. Given that munity partners is that each player brings dif- and bringing together an ad hoc version of these optimistic assumptions never held up ferent interests, visions, and resources to the what Hugh Heclo called an “issue network,” over time, the bubble-up system tended to table. Furthermore, the NATO and European consisting of all of the players with an interest exacerbate the fragmented and incoherent Union agencies operating within Afghanistan in a desired outcome.11 nature of policymaking and implementation, are not unitary actors, as the various leaders of Challenges of Host Nation’s Politics, too often thwarting the unity of effort that we those organizations ultimately answer to their Leadership, and Society. As military officers, aim to achieve. Likewise, this decentralized, home governments before yielding on policy we are by nature action-oriented people; that bottom-up process too often delayed collec- questions. As a result, it can be difficult to is, give us a mission and get out of the way. tive action because key decisionmakers were gain approval for significant new initiatives, By definition, however, stability operations not engaged until late in the process. Viewed or to steer an existing program in a different take place within a political context, subject comprehensively, the interagency process was direction. to the influences and vagaries of host-nation weak and largely ad hoc in nature. Moreover, it is important to understand politics and economics. In the case of the There are several ways that mission that while all aim to achieve “progress in Afghan police reforms, the impact of Afghan leaders can improve this process, however. Afghanistan,” each country and each partici- politics, leadership, and operating context The first potential corrective for systemic pating organization has different interests that added another—and ultimate—layer to the interagency problems involves seeking senior- they are protecting and different definitions of process of securing approval for the direction leader command emphasis, not only from the that end. Our effort may require overcoming and shape of the nationwide reform. That military side of the interagency process, but outright opposition or resentment, or major is, it was necessary not only to negotiate the also from the senior and midlevel leaders of constraints on resources. Along these lines, shape of the program with the international the other participating agencies. It is also criti- one allied ambassador, for domestic political community, but also to seek guidance and cal to identify key leaders of real ability, with reasons, was quite open about his country’s approval from the Afghan leaders at the outset resources of organizational political capital inability to deliver on its major commit- of the enterprise, as well as final approval once and sharing like-minded visions for the ments to the police reform effort. Another a rough consensus was achieved among the desired endstate, in each of the participating international coordinating body was wholly international community players. Likewise, agencies. Another related and complementary incapable of performing the basic functions the fact that this country is one with no con- approach is to develop ad hoc, agile informa- for which it was created, but it was neverthe- nectivity, no electricity, limited public infra- tion-sharing and decisionmaking structures, less important to include that agency in every structure, no legitimate economy, and a gov- consisting of participants with the ability to deliberation to maintain the legitimacy of ernment with only limited influence across establish priorities, make resource decisions, the process in the eyes of the international the country makes the simplest activities, and pull together the systems, products, community. Therefore, as is the case with the including paying the police or providing uni- consensus, and resources needed to move the interagency process, in dealing with these forms and training, extremely difficult.12 It is mission forward. various players, it is critical to share as much critical to identify the right indigenous “go-to” Allied Relationships. While we like to information as possible, while negotiating leaders and to develop their staffs to set the think that we are all members of the same openly and in good faith with the talented conditions for success. In the case of Afghan team, the basic reality of U.S. relationships and like-minded leaders identified in each police reform, Deputy Minister for Security

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Mohammad Munir Mangal was that critical functions, deadlines, or other benchmarks both Dari and English and involving mission leader in the MOI, though we spent a great and metrics for measuring progress holisti- planning with the U.S., allied, international deal of time with other key Afghan leaders cally. The solution for this challenge involves community, and Afghan leaders who would as well in order to navigate through compet- establishing both the basic doctrine for the actually carry out the reform tasks within the ing Afghan interests and factions. It was also forces as well as creating and implementing districts. This training and mission prepara- necessary to train the midlevel Afghan staff any necessary accountability mechanisms and tion covered a full spectrum of topics and officers needed to support the operations performance measures. Both of these efforts tasks relevant to the reformers, from police within MOI, as those staff capabilities did not are under way now in Afghanistan. Section operations to administration to Afghan yet exist within the Afghan government. 6–64 of the COIN doctrine makes mention of culture to local intelligence, and was taught Lack of Doctrine and Accountability. this challenge, but it is notably thin in terms of by subject matter experts from throughout As members of an action-oriented organiza- proposing particular standards or evaluation the international community and the Afghan tion, another of our tendencies as military techniques.14 As such, the mission leader will government. It is vitally important to listen to officers is to want simply to “get something have to consult with the various players to the indigenous leaders and local citizens on done.” Partly as a result of this tendency, define the standards and implement the cor- the ground in the reforming areas, and there the police force’s basic doctrine lagged well responding assessment mechanisms. is no substitute for the leader’s own consis- behind the actual fielding of personnel, Preparing Junior Leaders for Chal- tent interaction with the personnel actually equipment, and facilities, with many adverse lenging Missions. As a young company executing the mission. consequences. The Army uses the DOTMLPF commander in the 1st Armored Division in Decentralized Execution. IW missions (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, the early 1990s, my professional challenges require leaders who can move easily between leadership and education, personnel, and were fairly straightforward, and the Army had the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of prepared me well for them. Like other young planning and execution. So while my interac- leaders, I fit comfortably into a structured tions with senior U.S., Afghan, and interna- this decentralized, bottom- and hierarchical environment that reinforced tional leaders were vital steps, the truth was up process too often delayed success while self-correcting any problems that these leaders’ agreements and directives collective action because that emerged. Conversely, modern operations would not go far without buy-in and vigorous provide few if any similar opportunities for execution by a wide variety of subordinate key decisionmakers were our junior leaders, in spite of the fact that it leaders spread throughout the operational not engaged until late in the is they who have the most profound impact theater. Furthermore, the ultimate success or process upon the success or failure of these decen- failure of these operations would depend upon tralized operations. Our junior officers and the mission preparation, comprehension of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are the intent, and commitment to the mission by the facilities) model of force development cap- key executive agents, but they typically lack captains, lieutenants, NCOs, and Soldiers car- tured in Field Manual 100–11, Force Integra- the basic frame of reference and experience rying out reform and training missions. Since tion, as the guide for creating and modifying needed for interacting with the local power- U.S. force structure.13 There is good reason brokers, indigenous trainees, local citizens, that the D—doctrine—comes first in that international players, and others who will the police force’s basic acronym. However, in Afghanistan it has been determine the success or failure of the broader doctrine lagged well behind necessary to get as much force structure into effort. the actual fielding of the field as fast as possible due to the ongoing Furthermore, awareness of other cul- insurgency. As a result, there are major gaps tures is not a strong suit in the U.S. military’s personnel, equipment, and in the base doctrine covering police force own organizational culture. So instead of facilities, with many adverse structure, roles, and missions. Likewise, the tapping into the intelligence resources avail- consequences CSTC–A leaders who validate the force struc- able to us through indigenous partners, too ture decisions and the training, equipping, often we draw our own conclusions about and fielding priorities largely do so on the the “good guys and bad guys,” in some cases we were using four different regional training basis of their perception of the current situ- equating speaking English with being a “good facilities spread across Afghanistan for police ation, rather than basing those decisions on guy.” We also tend to impose Western models overhaul, this decentralization meant working some coherent, commonly understood vision where they do not necessarily fit, setting up hard to ensure that all of the players had a of the force’s endstate. the new host nation organizations for failure common operating picture of the standards, Not surprisingly, then, the development and arousing resistance from our partners. procedures, and expectations of the FDD of the Afghan army is well ahead of the devel- A strength of the COIN manual is that it program. opment of the Afghan police, as we are much defines this problem while taking the first Decentralized execution of these mis- more comfortable building an army than a steps forward in changing the military’s basic sions also means that we cannot expect police force, most often applying our own mindset.15 In the case of the Afghan police cookie-cutter results, as variability in local doctrinal template in building their army. The reforms, we sought to overcome this institu- circumstances, resources, and leadership challenges of this process are exacerbated by tional bias through intensive NATO-Afghan will lead to a variety of outcomes. Accord- a lack of accountability mechanisms, forcing combined reform team training, conducted in ingly, it is critical to achieve clear lines of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 75 COMMENTARY | Reforming the Afghan National Police

communication; common training and ate and poor while the society has a history German model and Afghan circumstances, as reform standards clearly articulated in a of government incompetence and corrup- well as the low rate of production of trained mission order; and centralized mission tion. Leaders need to guard against focusing personnel. Upon taking responsibility for preparation and training. It is important to exclusively on the training of the individual police development, the United States ini- share lessons learned and tactics, techniques, police officers, or the lower level units of tially replaced this focus on quality with an and procedures as the process unfolds. the particular security forces. Additionally, emphasis on quantity. That approach, while This goal involves setting up a robust com- it is important to build a force appropriate fielding individual police at a far higher rate, munications network, securing vertical to that society’s culture and circumstances, did nothing to address the ineffectiveness of and lateral coordinating authority across rather than trying to impose an inappropriate the police leadership at the district level, or in commands, and conducting recurring and Western model or process. In Afghanistan, the administration of the police forces at the widely distributed after-action reviews. the German government had the original national or provincial levels. Instead, leaders Lastly, it is important to create and maintain responsibility for developing the police forces, must take a holistic approach—or systems knowledge centers—secure and nonsecure and it attempted to create a highly profes- perspective on the operational environment share points—where the most current imple- sional Western-style police force comparable approach—if there is to be any chance of mentation documents, such as inspection to ones found in Europe. The approach overcoming the wholesale political, organi- checklists, points of contact, and operations fell short for a variety of reasons, but chief zational, and societal challenges of creating a orders, are available as appropriate. In these among them was the mismatch between the functioning and professional institution. The IW environments, published documents scope of the problem includes economics, cul- tend to be out of date by the time they are tural norms, family issues, pay, basic means of approved and published. In the case of the the ultimate success or failure identification, illiteracy, and a range of other ANP, the Afghanistan National Police Smart- major challenges. book was published just prior to my arrival in of these operations would Impact of the Nonpermissive Security theater, but it was far out of date by the end depend upon the captains, Environment. As our COIN doctrine states, of my assignment 6 months later.16 lieutenants, NCOs, and insurgents understand that the essential Challenges of Training Indigenous Soldiers carrying out reform objective is to undermine the people’s confi- Forces. Training host-nation forces is hard and training missions dence in existing governing institutions. They work, particularly when the people are illiter- use terror as a means to this end, and these nonpermissive security environments have a profound impact upon a leader’s ability to reach out to the people and indigenous leaders who are partners in the enterprise. Given our usual force protection posture, it is common for U.S. forces to rush from one secured site to another, thus limiting their interaction with U.S. Army (Johnny R. Aragon) the average citizens and reducing the sense of actually living with their Afghan partners. The enemy understands the costs and other effects of their asymmetric threats, and they aim to create a “bunker mentality” within the security forces that further separates the people from their government and their protectors. Mission leaders must seek every opportunity to overcome this institutional bias, enhancing the interaction among the people, the indigenous government, its security forces, and our own troops. Ideally, we will find a way to work side by side with our counterparts so that eventually we can “leave quietly,” having helped them to develop procedures, infrastructure, and relationships needed to enable their government and their security forces to function effectively. In the complex world of IW operations, that seam- less transition represents the ultimate success. Afghan National Army soldiers and Border Police confiscate weapons and ammunition found during search

76 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu IRWIN

Implications challenge and to succeed in these soft power Notes Much like Sun Tzu’s Art of War, our missions. Put another way, now is the time to COIN doctrine and the broader IW joint work smarter, rather than harder, and to equip 1 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare operating concept offer key guiding principles our force with the skills and tools needed to (IW) Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0 (Wash- that help to inform the stability mission leader enable success in these complex, challenging, ington, DC: Department of Defense, September 11, about the challenges of the IW operating envi- and vital tasks—while developing the specific, 2007), 1. 2 See Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The ronment and the planning and preparation dedicated subject matter expertise within the Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, needed for success in these critical endeavors. force that will enable us to fall in effectively Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit Issues Paper In some instances, the doctrine offers particu- with the various theaters in which we will Series (Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghan Research and lar techniques that can be used to craft spe- likely operate. Evaluation Unit, July 2007). cific action plans, providing our leaders with 3 Police Mentor Synchronization Conference a means to operationalize those key guiding As a joint force we have made great briefing slides, an unpublished and unclassified principles to accomplish their mission. But in strides in the last several years in this “change PowerPoint presentation from the Combined Secu- many more cases, the doctrine and operating of mission,” and it is likely that our military rity Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A), concept merely redefine the nature of the will be called upon to conduct many more July 8, 2007; and Focused District Development problem at hand, as our leaders are challenged stability missions in the future, applying Workshop, also an unpublished and unclassified to figure out for themselves how to go about American soft power using the military’s presentation from the same command, August 27–28, 2007. solving complex problems for which they organizational capabilities as the coordinating 4 Zarar Hamad, Strategic Capabilities Plan may have little relevant training, experience, delivery mechanism. So there is no question (Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghan Ministry of the Inte- or background. Without question, the COIN about the importance and relevance of these rior, August 13, 2007), 6–13. doctrine and IW joint operating concept missions, but it is also clear that we have not 5 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Progress make important contributions to our joint quite gotten the model right just yet. The in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit 2–4 April 2008 force through their respective calls to leaders counterinsurgency manual and irregular (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, April 2008), 10. to rethink the basic approach to stability warfare joint operating concept are fine first 6 Wilder. missions. However, we still have much work steps, and they outline the basic core prin- 7 The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsur- to do in preparing our leaders to provide the ciples that are central to mission success. But gency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago innovative, creative, and nuanced thinking these documents are no substitute for innova- Press, 2007), sections I–121 and I–122. 8 that is required for mission success—thinking tive, enlightened, and informed leadership— Ibid. See section 2 for a discussion of these groups. that goes far beyond the traditional mission leadership that must fully understand the 9 Candace Rondeaux, “A Ragtag Pursuit of the preparation that has dominated our institu- cultural, political, and economic parameters Taliban: U.S. Effort to Train Afghans as Counter- tional training and leader development in the of the particular IW environments in which insurgency Force Is Far from Finished,” The Wash- past. Accordingly, the next step forward for they will serve. We simply cannot afford to ington Post, August 6, 2008, A1. Rondeaux quotes our joint force is to redevelop the institutional continue to take an ad hoc approach to mis- CSTC–A commander MG Robert Cone as saying training base, and to identify and dissemi- sions that will be increasingly central to U.S. that the police mentoring effort falls short by 2,300 nate the tactics, techniques, and procedures national security interests in the 21st century. mentors. needed to achieve success, thus enabling our JFQ 10 John A. Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation: leaders to appreciate the magnitude of the It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2007). 11 Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Execu- tive Establishment,” in The New American Political System, ed. Anthony King (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 87–124. 12 These challenges are outlined in Interna- tional Crisis Group, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police (Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 30, 2007). 13 Field Manual (FM) 100–11, Force Integration (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, January 1998). 14 U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 220. 15 FM 100–11. 16 Task Force Phoenix–Police Advisory Cell, Afghanistan National Police Smartbook (Kabul, Afghanistan: Task Force Phoenix Headquarters, June 30, 2007). Marines provide marksmanship training to Afghan National Police recruits DOD (Gene Allen Ainsworth III)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 77 POINT>

By P. Mason Carpenter and William F. Andrews

n issue 51 of Joint Force Quarterly, in our training, doctrine development, and effects-based is fundamentally flawed . . . and the commander of U.S. Joint Forces support of JPME.”2 goes against the very nature of war.”3 Command (USJFCOM), General The USJFCOM directive to “turn off” We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it I James Mattis, USMC, published an EBO concepts is not well advised. Although was the basis for the success of the Operation article indicating that the “ideas reflected in the command has vigorously pursued develop- Desert Storm air campaign and Operation EBO [effects-based operations], ONA [opera- ment of EBO concepts, over time efforts have Allied Force. A very successful wartime tional net assessment], and SoSA [system- rendered a valuable joint concept unusable concept is sound and remains an effective tool of-systems analysis] have not delivered on by promising unattainable predictability for commanders. It is valuable for command- their advertised benefits and that a clear and by linking it to the highly deterministic ers to better understand cause and effect—to understanding of these concepts has proven computer-based modeling of ONA and SoSA. better relate objectives to the tasks that forces problematic and elusive for U.S. and multi- Instead of pursuing a constructive approach by perform in the operational environment. national personnel.”1 The commander then separating useful and proven aspects of EBO While there are problems associated with directed, “Effective immediately, USJFCOM and recommending improvements, USJFCOM how EBO has been implemented by some will no longer use, sponsor, or export the terms has prescribed the consumption of a fatal organizations, they can be easily adjusted. As and concepts related to EBO, ONA and SoSA poison. General Mattis declares that “the term a military, we must understand the value of

Colonel P. Mason Carpenter, USAF, is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University. Colonel William F. Andrews, USAF, is Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force Chair in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University.

U.S. Air Force (Michael Best)

Airman measures crater to assess achievement of intended effects

78 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CARPENTER and ANDREWS

EBO, address concerns in its implementation, effects can be direct or indirect, intended or emphasizing uncertainty and unpredictabil- POINT>

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 79 COMMENTARY | Effects-based Operations: Combat Proven

EBO in all planning and assessment processes are embarking.”10 He goes further to state, to higher levels. Not “walking the talk” does for the defense of the Korean Peninsula. This “No one starts a war—or rather no one in his not emanate from EBO; it more often springs incorporation was supported by senior offi- senses ought to do so—without first being from the irresistible temptation created by cers of multiple Services. clear in his mind what he intends to achieve ever-increasing connectivity, as well as the When EBO has been misunderstood, by that war and how he intends to conduct it. commander’s intolerance of risk for negative overextended, or misapplied in exercises, it The former is its political purpose; the latter strategic consequences, that might result from has primarily been through misapplication or its military objective.”11 This is exactly the first ill-advised or inexpertly executed tactical over-engineering, not because of EBO prin- step of EBO. actions. This dilemma points toward a new ciples themselves. Specifically, the bundling Practically made for mission-type discipline for information-age decisionmakers of ONA and SoSA with EBO weighed down a orders, EBO is not locked to any specific level rather than discarding EBO. useful concept with an unworkable software of conflict and may be used by commanders General Mattis’ critique argues that we engineering approach to war. ONA and SoSA at any level. Similar to the ideas of “auf- will need a balance of regular and irregular tragstaktik” and mission-type orders, EBO warfare competencies and we must better provides an outline for understanding the leverage nonmilitary capabilities and strive the shortcomings of the environment and planning operations while to better understand the different operating allowing individual commanders to apply it variables that make up today’s more complex engineering approach should to their unique context and determine their operating environments. We agree. EBO pro- not be grounds to terminate own strategy and tactics. Mission-type orders vides an appropriate tool for the commander working EBO concepts are essentially an application of EBO at the to understand potential contributions of the reflected in Service, joint, and tactical level. EBO can become a detriment widest array of military and nonmilitary capa- allied doctrines to timely or decentralized decisionmaking if bilities. By explicitly considering the effects it can only be applied when tied to massive created by humanitarian, information, security, staff- or software-driven analytical tools. kinetic, or any other type of operations, space Commanders will always have to find the is created for the selection and integration of may offer important contributions, but the balance between time available and the risks these diverse capabilities. EBO can be used as a predictive outcomes promised run contrary of uncertainty and make decisions based on template for best understanding a problem and to the uncertainty inherent to many conflicts. the best information available at the time. All is not predisposed to any given theater, situa- The Services objected to USJFCOM’s com- four Services praise decentralized action in tion, or solution set. If we are in error to think bination of these three efforts and had some their doctrine, but commanders at all levels “what works (or does not work) in one theater effect with dampening some of the extreme (and in all uniforms) routinely pull decisions is universally applicable to all theaters,” then claims and added disclaimers, but the three have been too closely linked for some.9 The shortcomings of the engineering approach should not be grounds to terminate working EBO concepts reflected in Service, joint, and allied doctrines. Instead, we would do better if we communicated the depth to which effects- based thinking can be realistically applied, the pitfalls of over-engineering the idea, and the limitations to avoid overextension. Ministry of Defence–Royal Air Force (Gareth Davies) (Gareth Ministry of Defence–Royal Air Force General Mattis’ critique implies that EBO is incompatible with the principles of war, mission-type orders, and decentralization. Although the U.S. military may have substantial problems adhering to some of these time-tested concepts, the root of the problem is not EBO. Our first principle of war is the “objective.” But over the years, we have at times failed to understand and adhere to this principle. EBO promotes clear and detailed understanding of objectives. Only with clear understanding can a leader properly consider appropriate courses of action. As Clausewitz noted, the “first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the Combined Air Operations Center on Arabian Peninsula acted as statesman and commander have to make is nerve center for air operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom to establish . . . the kind of war on which they

80 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CARPENTER and ANDREWS why would a joint force commander intention- not as a panacea for all important decisions. ally foreclose on a concept such as EBO that while no one is suggesting Leaders should understand the times, levels might illuminate alternative approaches? certainty or absolute of conflict, and context in which EBO is best A troubling aspect of General Mattis’ determinism, EBO is a tool used. critique appears to be pointing at the oppo- that serves as a way to think Effects-based operations will not go site by limiting options. The argument away; its efficacy and utility will ensure that “effects-based operations tend to be of possible and likely effects in continued application. Discarding effects- ineffective when used exclusive of ground many areas based operations from our lexicon will not maneuver”12 and the revisionist “slap” at the help bring our joint military community value of precision aerial attack is oddly out of together. U.S. Joint Forces Command will place in a cease-and-desist order regarding those valuable aspects, reconciling the continue to lead much of the development USJFCOM’s approach to EBO if the directive differences in terminology, and perhaps most of our joint forces. But while its com- is only out to eliminate conceptual confu- importantly managing expectations. Over- mander has the authority to do so within sion. If “precision fires alone” are judged promising and under-delivering is a sure way his own command, he should not unilater- by USJFCOM to have been “ineffective” in to undermine a concept. Promising certainty ally discard proven joint concepts without 1991, 1999, and 2003, we must wonder what in an inherently uncertain environment was further discussion and coordination outside standard is used to make this provocative a fatal flaw for one strain of EBO thinking. So his command. U.S. Joint Forces Command judgment.13 No instrument of U.S. power is where do we go to reform EBO development? plays too important a role in joint integra- used in isolation, and no military operation These six steps are in order: tion to make such a one-sided decision is conducted exclusively in one domain, so ■■ Establish a common lexicon that unites without additional discourse. Further devel- the standard of judging any action “alone” the joint and allied understandings and use opment and improvement of effects-based is pointless. American Airmen might be of EBO. Work toward a joint doctrine that operations will help prevent our military excused for contemplating whether the gen- provides common definitions but allows for from throwing our combat-proven baby out eral’s edict is indirectly aimed at excluding leading-edge concept development to “plug in” with the bathwater. JFQ the strategic use of airpower in order to drive and does not foreclose on any capability set. an exclusive focus on “the three-block war” as ■■ As NATO has done and as the the only future American way of war. USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center advocates Notes General Mattis’ emphasis on adding in the Commander’s Handbook for an Effects- 1 General James N. Mattis, USMC, friction to the enemy’s problems and Based Approach to Joint Operations (February “USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects- reducing friendly friction is well advised. 26, 2006), adjust the term effects-based opera- based Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 51 (4th However, operations other than ground tions to effects-based approaches to operations Quarter, 2008), 106. maneuver (for example, aerial attack, cyber- across the joint community. This better reflects 2 Ibid., 108. Emphasis in original. space attack, nonmilitary actions) have the the concept of EBO and helps disassociate it 3 Ibid., 107. potential to do much more than simply add from concepts that have been attached to EBO 4 Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: or reduce friction. Strategic effects can be but are not really integral to it. Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines generated by countless combinations of ■■ Refine and incorporate the principles of Magazine, January 1999. 5 our instruments of power—some includ- EBO within joint doctrine as a starting point Joint Publication (JP) 3–0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, February 13, ing ground maneuver, some not. While for defining what EBO can and cannot do, 2008), iv. no one is suggesting certainty or absolute and how it must mesh with the nature of war. 6 JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning (Washing- ■■ determinism, EBO is a tool that serves as a In preparation for further doctrinal dis- ton, DC: The Joint Staff, December 26, 2006), III–12. way to think of possible and likely effects in cussion, compare the differing interpretations 7 Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Opera- many areas. Because the enemy is smart and of EBO and identify best practices to embrace tions and Organization (Washington, DC: Head- adaptive, an effort to limit joint concepts and shortcomings to avoid. Propagate these quarters U.S. Air Force, April 3, 2007), 16–20. or approaches to war takes an arrow out of throughout concept and doctrine communi- 8 Mattis, 105. our quiver and makes us more predictable. ties for wider incorporation. 9 See, for example, the now-withdrawn Joint A U.S. joint command should accommodate ■■ Disassociate EBO, ONA, and SoSA. Each Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pam- diverse approaches to war developed by the must sink or swim on its own merits. Shortcom- phlet 4, Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Services. The diversity of our ideas is a great ings in one concept should not bring down the Assessment (ONA), February 14, 2004; Pamphlet 7, Operational Implications of Effects-Based Opera- American strength; it gives us more options others. Develop an appropriate level of analytical tions, November 17, 2004; and the Commander’s and creates more problems for the enemy. capability to support EBO with an improved Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint understanding on the temporal and objective Operations, February 24, 2006. Addressing Concerns limits of analysis developed to support it. 10 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. General Mattis’ directive will certainly ■■ Educate leaders and staffs on the benefits Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: correct any excesses in USJFCOM’s work on of using an effects-based approach, its limita- Knopf, 1976), 102. effects-based operations, but it will also harm tions, how to mitigate shortfalls, and avoid 11 Ibid., 579. the valuable aspects of a working concept. potential pitfalls. EBO should be used as an 12 Mattis, 106. 13 Clearly, there is work to be done in embracing element of the commander and staff toolkit, Ibid. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 81 POINT>

EBO By Paul K. Van Riper

e should not be surprised tenant Colonel David Deptula. In the early that one of our most days of Operation Desert Shield, both combat-seasoned and officers pushed planners to move beyond W professionally informed the narrow focus of “joint munitions leaders, General James Mattis, USMC, who effectiveness manuals” (JMEMs) that commands U.S. Joint Forces Command describe only the effects expected from a U.S. Marine Corps (James A. Harbour) (USJFCOM), recently issued a memorandum particular weapon against a particular that calls for an end to the effects-based type of target. Warden and Deptula operations (EBO) nonsense that has perme- quite correctly demanded that target- ated much of the American defense coming officers expand their horizons munity for the past 6 years. Nor should we and determine how best to attack be surprised that other leaders with similar systems rather than single targets.2 operational experience promptly applauded For instance, they might have asked General Mattis’ actions. They all saw effects- a targeting officer to ascertain the based operations as a vacuous concept that best way to knock out a surface- has slowly but surely undermined professional to-air-missile battery without military thought and operational planning. destroying every launcher or to One can only hope that the general’s action, degrade an electrical power grid coupled with a similar effort by U.S. Army without putting it out of action Training and Doctrine Command in 2007, for years. To secure the results will halt the U.S. military’s decade-and-a-half sought, Warden and Deptula LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.) decline in conceptual thinking.1 focused the effect they desired on a system rather than simply Which EBO? listing targets for pilots to destroy.3 To understand the EBO mania that has This is a logical and productive way distracted our defense establishment for far to develop targeting plans, an approach too long, we first must understand the differ- we should applaud. Warden and Deptula, ences between three varieties. The first variety however, could have just as easily used other of effects-based operations stems directly words to express the same idea. As examples, Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), is from the efforts of two exceptional Air Force they might have labeled it as outcome-based, the Bren Chair of Innovation and Transformation at officers, Colonel John Warden and then Lieu- result-based, impact-based, purpose-based, Marine Corps University.

82 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu VAN RIPER or intent-based operations without losing has been part of doctrine since the Korean were conducted so easily. Experienced officers any of the value inherent in the approach. If War.7 Every competent operations officer must wonder if the authors of these words are the two officers had used either of the latter and fire support coordinator recognizes his unaware of the hubris of such a declaration. two terms, they would have acknowledged responsibility to orchestrate all means and In actuality, SoSA relies on the techniques that they understood the essence of mission- methods effectively and efficiently. Regret- of formal systems analysis. Vietnam War oriented command.4 Though any observer tably, many joint forces soon picked up on veterans quickly recognized SoSA as virtually reviewing recent conceptual thought in the the new name, and effects coordination cells identical to the analytical methods that Sec- U.S. defense community would hardly know became the prevalent term. Things became retary of Defense Robert McNamara foisted it, there is nothing magical or unique about even more muddled when the expanded upon the U.S. military in the 1960s with so the word effect. Fundamentally, Warden and and flawed version of Warden and Deptula’s many disastrous results. Deptula were working to ensure that everyone effects-based operations found its way into the USJFCOM proponents of effects-based involved in planning and executing an opera- effects coordination cells of operational units. operations appeared oblivious to the reali- tion understood why they sought to achieve Eventually, the Army recognized more was ties of interactively complex systems. These certain ends. lost than gained by its renaming effort, and in nonlinear systems are not ones in which the Despite its utility, this variety of early 2007, the Army directed a return to the cause and effect are straightforward, but effects-based operations is only effective with original terms of fire support coordination ones in which effects cascade throughout the manmade systems that have an identifiable center and fire support coordinator.8 We can system in unpredictable ways, causing the and tightly coupled structure, such as inte- only hope that the joint community makes the emergence of wholly unanticipated additional grated air defenses, distribution networks, and same decision soon. phenomena. Efforts to modify ecological transportation complexes. The method has The third variety of effects-based opera- systems have made scientists fully aware of little utility against dynamic systems such as tions originated in the USJFCOM J9 director- the folly of attempting to affect such non- economies and social groups whose elements ate in late 2000. It is the most egregious of linear systems through discrete actions. The are only loosely coupled and with relation- the three varieties and the one that has most nearly limitless ways that an action might ships that are frequently unclear. Nonetheless, damaged operational thinking within the ricochet through an interactively complex or some proponents went on to claim that what U.S. military. In essence, concept developers nonlinear system mean that for all practical began as an effects-based targeting method in the J9 asserted that through detailed study purposes, the interactions within the system should extend to operations as a whole and of an enemy’s systems—identified as political, exceed the calculative capacities of any com- even to war.5 That this suggestion survived military, economic, social, infrastructure, puter to follow, at least in any meaningful and was widely promulgated is sad testimony and information (PMESII)—planners could way. The numbers are so large that even the to the fact that many military officers have determine what effects they might achieve by most advanced computers would take billions taking various actions against specific links of years to process them.12 Yet within the J9, and nodes in those systems. Furthermore, developers were undeterred as they built ever some proponents went on they claimed that the practice would allow more elaborate procedures to carry out the to claim that what began as planners to determine how the effects of so-called system-of-systems analysis. We an effects-based targeting actions on one system would affect one or might suspect that the contractors who wrote more of the other systems. They argued that the software programs to support this funda- method should extend to the United States could use diplomatic, infor- mentally flawed idea were motivated more by operations as a whole and mational, military, and economic (DIME) the bottom line than the actual value of the even to war tools to carry out these actions; hence, the capabilities delivered. In short, supporters of often-heard grating and acronym-laded ONA and SoSA argue for a pseudoscientific statement that we would “employ our DIME approach to operational planning. little understanding of how interactively against an enemy’s PMESII to achieve desired As the opponents of the USJFCOM complex systems work.6 effects.” This claim supposedly was supported version of effects-based operations marshaled The second variety of effects-based by a technique known as operational net their evidence, in particular the commanding operations stems from the U.S. Army’s assessment (ONA), “the tool that identifies generals and staffs of the U.S. Army Training renaming of the fire support coordination the correct targets, links, and nodes that will and Doctrine Command and U.S. Marine center as the effects coordination cell and fire create the desired effect.”9 Concept writers Corps Combat Development Command, the support coordinator as the effects coordinator. went on to state, “ONA aims to provide a J9 concept writers began to lower their sights, The Army wanted to stress that beyond coor- thorough understanding of the total effect backing away from unsupportable claims. dinating the maneuver of units with support- [on an adversary] and how to achieve it.”10 Rebuffed, they labored to salvage something ing fires, operations officers and fire support Operational net assessment itself pur- officers needed to consider other means and portedly was accomplished through a proce- methods such as psychological operations, dure called system-of-systems analysis (SoSA), J9 concept writers began to deception operations, electronic warfare, which “enables us to set environmental condi- lower their sights, backing and so forth, and to coordinate them with tions to force the target to adapt and to choose away from unsupportable maneuver and fires. This was not a new idea; only options that we make available.”11 If only claims the requirement for this type of coordination military planning and combat operations ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 83 COMMENTARY | EBO: No Baby in the Bathwater from the concept.13 To the dismay of many consequences, or perhaps impacts of actions objectives are nested under higher objec- military professionals, promoters of cocka- undertaken by the joint force. Seldom in recent tives as the expression of desired ends filters mamie EBO concepts prevailed on writers years have careful listeners heard any of these down through the chain of command. At of joint doctrine to include several of its key synonyms used in professional discussions— some point, a leader assigns a military unit a components in Joint Publication (JP) 3–0, the effects nomenclature has become a mantra. mission designed to accomplish an objective. Joint Operations, and JP 5–0, Joint Operation Sadly, as a result, defense leaders in their There appears to be no hard and fast rule as Planning. Most significant among the materi- writing and speech have voluntarily given up to when it is time to convert an objective to als included are a distorted description of the nuances possible with various other terms. a mission, but most operational and tactical system theory, the flawed PMESII construct, All but forgotten is the fact that all these terms commanders expect to receive missions. and a new and puzzling description of the simply identify the ends desired. As described in the previous paragraph, association of effects to objectives, missions, Operational concepts existing prior to with no worthy explanation as to the reason, and tasks. the EBO craze were founded on Clausewitz- the authors of JP 3–0 and JP 5–0 have added The description of systems in JP 3–0 and ian thought, especially the master theorist’s effects to the long-standing ends naming JP 5–0 is incoherent, as it mixes the attributes recognition of the need to clearly identify convention. Even more perplexing, missions, of structurally complex (linear) and interac- desired ends and to tie them to available which have always consisted of tasks with tively complex (nonlinear) systems, ascribing means. Clausewitz repeatedly called atten- associated intents, now include objectives and to both the notion of nodes that the joint tion to the absolute necessity of connecting effects, while intents—the very heart of mis- force can “target,” and links (“the behavioral strategic and tactical ends to the higher aim sion-type orders—are eliminated (see figure or functional relationships between nodes”) or purpose. Over the past half-century or so, 2). The creators of this new and confusing that the joint force can “cut.”14 In structurally notable military thinkers such as B.H. Liddell naming convention never reveal its supposed complex systems, nodes and links exist and Hart, J.C. Wylie, and Colin Gray have pointed advantage over the traditional one. Even are relatively static; thus, forces can target and repeatedly to the importance of the ends- more baffling, when these inventors provide cut those that are identifiable. In interactively means paradigm. examples of effects, they merely use the past complex systems, the relationships between Ends are ends, plain and simple! tense of a verb that traditionally would be the elements are constantly in flux, and links—as What we title them may help or hinder task. For instance, an effect is “defeated Red’s conceived of by EBO advocates—are often their meaning and our understanding, but attack,” which of course is completion of the not apparent and are frequently transitory. ultimately they remain ends. The longstand- task “to defeat Red’s attack.” Justifiably, any Finding nodes to destroy and links to cut in ing naming convention for ends in the U.S. American taxpayer would cringe knowing a meaningful way in these kinds of systems national security community has extended that the U.S. military spent tens of millions of is usually a fruitless undertaking. Moreover, from goals to objectives to missions, with the dollars between 2000 and 2007 to conclude even if a node is destroyed or a link cut, these latter’s inherent tasks and associated intents that using the past tense of a verb in some systems are self-healing, allowing them to (see figure 1). At the national level, ends are mysterious way improves U.S. military plan- continue functioning with no apparent degra- expressed most often as goals. To accomplish ning and operations. Is there any doubt why dation. A cursory review of the vast literature these goals, national leaders assign objec- so many skeptics rose to challenge this mean- on systems theory and nonlinear dynamics tives to various organizations. Subordinate ingless change to existing methods? would have made the J9 concept writers aware of the invalid basis for their effects-based Figure 1. Traditional Naming Convention Figure 2. Effects-based Naming Convention operations concept. Figure IV–2 in JP 3–0 and figure III–2 in JP 5–0, both titled “The Interconnected Oper- ational Environment,” depict a Venn diagram with six overlapping circles labeled political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure with a web of links and nodes within and among them.15 This is the same diagram that EBO advocates used to illustrate SoSA, giving lie to the claim that this methodology is no longer part of the approach. JP 3–0 and JP 5–0 promulgate the EBO advocates’ ill-conceived ideas minus only the names: ONA and SoSA. Even more confusing is the use of the term effects in these two doctrinal manuals, defined as “a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.”16 In plainer English, effects are the results, outcomes, products,

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What Have We Lost? professional thought in the U.S. military and 7 Jonathan B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Fire- The intellectual renaissance spurred the wider defense community.17 They deserve power (London: The Military Press, 1989), 270–271. 8 by the failures in the Vietnam War and led our thanks! Combined Arms Directorate. 9 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Concept Primer: by Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, General With the effects-based operations Operational Net Assessment (ONA) (Norfolk: U.S. Donn Starry, USA, and General Al Gray, distraction now behind them, U.S. military Joint Forces Command, October 2003), 1. USMC, during the mid-1970s into the late officers can turn their attention to resolving 10 Ibid. 1980s produced a solid body of doctrine and real conceptual and operational challenges 11 Ibid. a powerful but concise professional lexicon. rather than miring themselves in unsound 12 We can use the game of chess to explain This renaissance was built on a deep apprecia- premises aimed at manufactured problems. the scope of the problem: A chess board has only tion of history and a thorough understanding More importantly, they can once again effec- 64 squares and 32 pieces. Players are limited by of war’s fundamental nature. The operational tively employ the simple elegance of mission- the rules of the game in the ways they can move concepts created during this period were oriented command as they face our nation’s the various pieces. Therefore, since the “system” founded on Clausewitzian thought, especially enemies. JFQ is bounded, it seems possible, though perhaps dif- the master theorist’s recognition of the need ficult, to understand the many ways a game might unfold when one play is different in every game. to clearly identify desired ends and to tie them Mathematicians estimate the number is 10128. This to available means. Central to these concepts is an extraordinarily large number, but how large is was the notion that telling a commander Notes best illustrated by the following lesser number, 1080, the reason—or why he was to accomplish an 1 Combined Arms Directorate, U.S. Army which is the number of atoms in the universe. By assigned task—was imperative if he was to Combined Arms Center, “Army Doctrine Update,” many orders of magnitude, there are more potential take the initiative when circumstances at the memorandum, February 24, 2007. discrete games of chess than there are atoms in scene of action changed. Foremost, he was 2 Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian the universe. Consider then the challenge of deter- Gulf (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publish- mining how the effect created by an action might ing Company of America, 1995), 16. cascade through an economic system. any taxpayer would cringe 3 There is anecdotal evidence that Colonel 13 Proponents began to draw back from the knowing that the military Warden may have borrowed the idea of focusing extremes of EBO formally when they renamed spent millions to conclude on individual targets from the Warfare Analysis the concept the effects-based approach, disas- that using the past tense of a Department, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahl- sociated the concept from ONA, and made other gren Division, which was a predecessor of the Joint adjustments in the Commander’s Handbook for an verb improves planning and Warfare Analysis Center. Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, dated operations 4 Mission-oriented command and mission-type February 24, 2006. The handbook introduced new orders were rediscovered by concept developers organizations and procedures designed to allow and doctrine writers in the 1980s and soon became for implementation of an effects-based approach. a staple of Service and joint operational planning. These procedures added steps and products to the to understand that the purpose or intent of a I say rediscovered because we can easily trace this planning process, making it overly cumbersome. task is always more important than the task approach back to the 19th century and Helmuth 14 Joint Publication (JP) 5–0, Joint Operation itself. In essence, the achievements at the von Moltke (“the Elder”). The central feature of Planning (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, many points of contact with an enemy are mission-type orders is the requirement to relate December 26, 2006), III–18. 15 the culmination of ends that have traveled each task in a mission statement to an overarching JP 3–0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 17, 2006), IV–5; and from national goals through several echelons purpose or intent. For example, if a task contained in a mission statement is to “seize a bridge over a JP 5–0, III–17. of command objectives to a hierarchy of unit river,” the intent might be “to prevent the enemy 16 JP 5–0, III–12. missions with their integral tasks and intents. 17 from moving south.” The latter informs the com- At the center of the EBO faction were far Again, see figure 1. mander assigned the task of seizing the bridge that too many contract concept developers. Many he needs to be alert to other ways the enemy might had never experienced combat. More than a few The USJFCOM version of effects-based cross the river—perhaps a nearby ford or barges— had never worn the uniform. In a sense, the U.S. operations is a “non-idea” that survived far and to deny this use. Similarly, a commander military—USJFCOM in particular—outsourced too long. Not only did it undermine well- tasked to capture an airfield would benefit if he much of its intellectual activity for the good part of founded conceptual ideas based on mission- knew that the purpose of that task was to enable the a decade with dire consequences. oriented command, but it also confused the air-landing of additional forces, forewarning him U.S. military’s officer corps and diverted to the necessity of avoiding excessive damage to scarce resources and intellectual energies runways and the control tower. 5 As an example, see David A. Deptula, Effects- away from truly important issues, the most Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare critical of which is studying insurgencies. The (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education Foundation, actual costs were significant; the opportunity 2001). costs were enormous. General Mattis and 6 For an excellent discussion of interactively the many senior officers in his corner—all complex systems, see Robert Jervis, System Effects: tested in the crucible of battle—have done our Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: nation a great service, righting an intellectual Princeton University Press, 1997). vessel that was on its way to drowning real ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 85 Victory From the Prism of Jihadi Culture

By Jeffrey B. Cozzens

ictory in warfare, classically defined by Carl von Clausewitz, can be reduced to a simple formula: one protagonist forced to fulfill another’s will. Though a straightforward maxim on the surface, when applied to the West’s struggle with the global V jihadi movement—the religio-social movement that gave rise to the al Qaeda strategy of attacking enemies “far” and “near”—the construct of victory begs demanding, complex, even soul-searching questions about metrics: How does the West know when it is winning? What does winning mean to our multi-echeloned, atomized foe? Addressing these queries holistically mandates excavating the layers of jihadi strategic theory and giving militant Islam’s primary sources their due. In so doing, we find that the “will” of the global jihadi movement—insofar as one can speak of it in the singular—has not only strategic, instrumental components, but also a noninstrumental cultural or “expressive” side. Victory for the global jihadi movement is more complex and multifaceted than we might suppose.

Jeffrey B. Cozzens is Head of the Terrorism Studies and Analysis Program at Areté Associates.

Boys collect scrap metal in Kabul UN (Eskinder Debebe)

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Following cursory examinations of both To these we could add the related goals of and disappears” 1 in a blatant disregard for Western victory metrics against al Qaeda expelling Western forces from the Muslim battlefield linearity, our understanding of and conflict’s inherent duality, this article world, toppling marginally Islamic regimes, their success or lack thereof is incomplete. refers to primary jihadi sources to develop a and eventually, rebuilding the caliphate Without exploring what winning means from more comprehensive understanding of what from Southeast Asia to Spain. A vast body of their perspective—essential to deconstruct- winning means from the perspective of the Western counterterrorism literature, policy ing the culture of global jihad at its weakest global jihadi movement. There have been few, statements, and al Qaeda pronouncements points—Western bureaucratic, technical, and if any, attempts to approach this issue through highlights many of the same metrics implic- predominantly secular inclinations may give the prism of this adversary’s culture. However, itly and explicitly. rise to tactical victories and strategic failures. since the core of any religio-social movement However, warfare by its nature has comprises attitudes, values, and beliefs (the multiple, often blurred and intangible fronts, Duality of Warfare essence of culture), this methodology appears enemies, and definitions and degrees of Before discussing the global jihad’s alter- logical. In the end, the exponents of global victory. This is even truer when combatants native victory metrics, it is necessary to touch jihad inform us that victory is more than such as al Qaeda are motivated by simultane- upon the idea of duality in conflict—or as simply holding territory or attaining clearly ously global and local grievances, and their Christopher Coker describes, its “expressive” defined political objectives; a parallel and enemies span the spectrum from worldliness, and “instrumental” components.2 If warfare is complementary strategic understanding of to apostate coreligionists, to worldwide con- multidimensional, victory must be as well. victory flows from the culture of global jihad. spiracies. As shall be demonstrated, we learn Defining and winning the “war of ideas” from the global jihadi literature that victory is cannot be disassociated from understanding synonymous with more than simply staying Western bureaucratic, jihadi culture and its notions of victory. alive and free, controlling territories, gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, and technical, and predominantly Our Victory, Jihad’s Defeat? so forth. For the West to effectively develop secular inclinations may give There are multiple potential starting and chart its own metrics of victory against rise to tactical victories and points for an analysis such as this. However, to this existentially asymmetric foe—especially strategic failures evoke the desired contrast between Western when it comes to fighting the war of ideas, security policy and global jihadi culture, which remains ambiguously defined—it distilling key Western counterterrorism poli- needs to further excavate the global jihadi Writing about the nature of future con- cies advanced after 9/11 to illuminate victory movement’s version of winning. Just as al flict in Warrior Politics, Robert Kaplan observes metrics against al Qaeda appears a logical first Qaeda refuses to play by Western rules of that the “ancientness of future wars has three step. In so doing, we find that success is gener- engagement, flaunts traditional just war dimensions: the character of the enemy, the ally measured by: doctrine, and, in the words of jihadi strategist methods used to contain and destroy him, and Abu Ubeid al-Qurashi, “like a ghost, appears the identity of those beating the war drums.”3 ■■ killing or capturing terrorists UN (Yutaka Nagata) ■■ denying safe haven and control of any nation ■■ preventing access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ■■ rendering potential targets less attractive through security ■■ cutting off resources ■■ in the long term, winning “the battle of ideas.”

Few would question these objectives. Yet when turned on their heads, these metrics simultaneously illustrate how Western governments define victory for the global jihadi movement. The terrorists win if:

■■ they remain alive and free to plan operations ■■ their safe havens remain “safe” ■■ they capture a state ■■ they gain access to WMD ■■ they succeed in the war of ideas. Egyptian and Israeli generals discuss disengagement of forces, Egypt, January 1974

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Conflict today—especially that shaped by interpretation of the sacred sources, sees itself At the individual level, a rational deci- socially reinforced notions of “Ultimate as the true, victorious sect that will fight until sion to exchange love for worldly comforts for Concern”—is rarely reducible to politics the end of days. the love of battle and to overcome Satan and instrumentalized by force. Identity, belief, and This idea of victory is also apparent in those who hinder one from fighting represents culture—the building blocks of expressive the Creed of the Global Islamic Media Front, a more than simple obedience: it is a purifying, warfare—contrast the political ends and largely primary outlet of the global jihadi movement: ennobling act. One hour of jihad in Allah’s technical means of Western military cam- path, according to a famous hadith beloved paigns, or instrumental war. As Coker argues We believe that the victorious sect will be by Abdullah Azzam, architect of the Afghan in Waging War without Warriors: the sect of learning and jihad. jihad, is better than 60 years of praying.12 As We believe that jihad will continue until case studies of jihadis in the United Kingdom The problem is that we so want to understand the Day of Judgment, with every pious man or and elsewhere attest, some young Islamists violence primarily in utilitarian, rational wrongdoer, in every time and place, with an also see jihad as a social rite of passage.13 terms, in terms of means and ends, that the imam or without an imam. It will continue Metric 3: The Institutionalization of a question of what violence “signifies,” “says,” or with a single individual or more. No tyrant’s Culture of Martyrdom Is a Victory. Accord- “expresses” seems, at best, to be of secondary injustice or naysayer’s discouragement will ing to exponents of global jihad such as Abu importance. . . . In instrumentalizing war as halt it. Ayman al-Hilali, martyrdom is the greatest much as it has, the West has reached a point at We believe that jihad in God’s way is the victory a mujahid can have. Al-Hilali and which it no longer understands the expressive legitimate and sound way that will enable the others argue that martyrdom operations offer element. . . . But what the warrior is, is no less Ummah to resume an Islamic life and estab- a direct route to Paradise, the most effective important than what he or she does. Expressive lish a well-guided caliphate according to the means to strike adversaries, and the loftiest violence is not only aimed at an enemy but also program of the Prophet.8 form of witness.14 And as illustrated by West affirms a way of life.4 Point’s Sinjar Records, a collection of nearly 700 Metric 2: Victory Is Found in Obeying foreign fighter biographies from Iraq, the idea In other words, the violence of nonstate the Obligation to Fight Islam’s Enemies, Not in that martyrdom is synonymous with victory for combatants such as al Qaeda cannot be dis- the Outcome of Battle. Anwar al-Awlaki—for- many jihadis goes well beyond theory.15 When entangled from their culture—that is, their merly associated with an Islamic center in Falls al Qaeda in Iraq “bureaucrats” queried foreign attitudes, values, and beliefs—even while it Church, Virginia, and a past chaplain at George fighters as to why they came to Iraq, or what also includes strategic political goals. Bruce Washington University9—delivered a lecture duty they hoped to perform, 217 of the 389 who Hoffman and Gordon McCormick touched on al-’Uyayree’s works in which he explained responded (56.3 percent) indicated a desire for on this premise when they described suicide this understanding in poignant terms. In the martyrdom, whereas 166 projected their roles bombings in Iraq as “signaling,”5 and Faisal transcription of his lecture, titled “Constants on as “fighter” (or something similar).16 Devji explored it in his multidisciplinary the Path of Jihad,” al-Awlaki stated: Metric 4: Victory Comes by Pinpointing essay on jihadi culture.6 If these theories are Islam’s Enemies through the Refining Process credible, then we should look not only at the Victory is not what we are accountable for; we of Jihad, and Thus Maintaining Its Identity. instrumental components of the global jihadi are accountable for whether or not we are doing Sayf-ad-Din al-Ansari, another online jihadi movement’s definition of winning, but also what Allah commands. We fight Jihad because strategist, argued this point explicitly in a at its parallel, expressive objectives. To do so, it is fard [obligatory] on us; we are not fighting 2002 essay on the 9/11 attacks: we must assess victory through the prism of to win or loose [sic]. . . . If we broaden our per- jihadi culture. spective, we will come to realize that whoever Our Islamic community has been subjected to rides the peak of Islam (Jihad) [parentheses a dangerous process of narcosis. As a result, it Jihadi Victory Metrics and emphasis in original] can never loose [sic] has lost the vigilance that comes from faith and The following (admittedly incomplete) and will always win but not always win in fallen into a deep slumber. The most dangerous list, distilled from the writings of some of physical victory.10 consequence of this is that most Muslims can the most popular militant writers,7 outlines no longer distinguish between their enemies nine less apparent (though arguably no less This definition has implications for and their friends. The fallout from choosing important) jihadi conceptions of victory. The jihadis at the collective and individual levels. peace and normalization . . . has caused a great movement’s strategic goals mentioned earlier At the collective level, adhering to this duty confusion of ideas. The resultant situation could be seen as tangible expressions of this results in overt obedience to and therefore poses a genuine threat to our very identity. parallel track. guidance by Allah.11 When mujahideen [The 9/11 attacks] came to move this war Metric 1: Victory Can Be Understood (those who believe they are fighting in God’s from the shadows out into the open, to make as the Perpetuity of Fighting. The influential path) embrace this obligation and absorb this the community aware of the enemy. It revealed Saudi militant, the late Yusuf al-’Uyayree, guidance, tangible strategic success for the the perils that surround us in a way that every- elucidates this long-term perspective in his ummah—the global Muslim community—is one can understand. The . . . attacks succeeded works Meanings of Victory and Loss in Jihaad believed to follow. The establishment of the in laying bare the enemy’s soul and . . . talk of a and The Future of Iraq and the Arabian Pen- state of Israel and regional regimes is generally new crusade with all the historical baggage the insula. This understanding is a cultural pillar viewed by jihadis as a byproduct of neglecting phrase entails. It became clear to everyone that of the global jihadi trend, which, based on its this obligation. this is a campaign against Muslims more than

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. . . a war against the mujahidin. . . . Islam itself Al-Qa’ida embodies Islamic unity. Blood Metric 6: Creating a Parity of Suffering is the target. from all the countries of the Islamic community with Islam’s Enemies—Especially the Jews The raid showed just how fragile is has mixed together in the jihad that al-Qa’ida and Crusaders—Is a Victory. According to the supposed coexistence of Muslims and leads with no distinction between Arab and Saudi cleric Nasr al-Fahd and al Qaeda spokes- Crusaders.17 non-Arab. In and of itself, this is a step on the man Suleiman Abu Geith (among others), road to Islamic unity and the destruction of the upholding the shari’a principle of “repayment Fighting, al-Ansari argues, is equivalent . . . colonialist treaties that have torn the body in kind” (al-mu’amala bil-mithl) not only justi- to maintaining the ummah’s identity against of the Islamic community apart. fies but also demands the murder of millions internal and external threats; it is the ultimate [W]ith absolute trust in God, a willing- means to enjoin the good and forbid the evil. ness to die in God’s path, patience, and gener- As the ever-popular jihadi author Muham- osity of spirit . . . these qualities . . . undoubtedly according to exponents of global mad al-Maqdisi contends in The Religion of lead to victory.18 jihad, martyrdom is the greatest Abraham, it is simply not enough to renounce victory a mujahid can have tyrants verbally. While generally a pragmatic author Metric 5: Establishing Pride, Brother- concerned more with “jihadi strategic studies” hood, and Unity in the Face of Threats to the than theology, al-Qirshi’s view of brotherhood Ummah Is a Form of Victory. Abu Ubayd al- and unity echoes the perspectives of many of al Qaeda’s enemies to avenge the millions Qirshi, another popular militant “strategist” salafis, militant or otherwise: preserving the of Muslims killed at their hands.19 Al-Fahd— who wrote a pseudo-scholarly essay complete integrity and purity of Islam in the face of whose well-known fatawa (religious opinions) with notes, “The Impossible Becomes Pos- contemporary intra-Islamic strife (fitnah), concerning the “legitimacy” of the Taliban sible,” advances this point forcefully: syncretistic practices, and external threats is regime and the destruction of the Buddha of paramount importance. None of these can statues in Afghanistan were widely circulated With the New York and Washington raids, al- be confronted apart from a unified and self- online—published on May 21, 2003, a fatwa Qa’ida established a model of a proud Islamic sacrificial methodology (the latter of which justifying the use of nuclear weapons (as well mentality. This outlook does not view anything al-Qirshi and al Qaeda believe to be associated as other weapons of mass destruction) against as impossible. with violence and martyrdom). the “enemies of Islam.”20 Al-Fahd wrote:

Tribal leaders in Iraq are turning away from extremist agendas Combat Camera Company (Abn) (Bronco Suzuki) Combat Camera Company (Abn) (Bronco d 982

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The attack against it by WMD [which al-Fahd an almost industrial scale. Their message is ■■ attacking the historical and normative explicitly defined as “nuclear, chemical, or consistent: Obey Allah as I did, avenge the bases for generating reciprocal suffering biological”] is accepted, since Allah said: “If you ummah, and enter Paradise. ■■ fighting mystical narratives by harness- are attacked you should attack your aggressor by ing the power of belief itself identical force.” Whoever looks at the American Implications ■■ discrediting the “heroes” of global jihad. aggression against the Muslims and their lands Victory, as defined by the global jihadi in recent decades concludes that it is permis- movement, has expressive components that Naturally, many caveats must be inserted sible. . . . They have killed about ten million flow from its culture. Analyses of the move- here, although a robust discussion of the Muslims, and destroyed countless lands. . . . If ment’s trajectory devoid of this recognition means is best left for a different work. they would be bombed in a way that would kill are incomplete and will set the West up for First and foremost, liberal democra- ten millions of them and destroy their lands—it failure in the war of ideas. As Al-’Uyayree, cies are ill equipped to combat beliefs. The is obviously permitted, with no need for evidence. the former leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian combination of domestic political pressures, Peninsula, observed, “Many . . . people squeeze bureaucratic inertia, and foreign policy imper- Terrorism—including that involving the meanings of victory into victory on the atives—let alone the guarantee of freedom of WMD—is seen by authors such as Abu Geith battlefield, and this is an error; for there is no worship—frustrates most Western efforts in and al-Fahd as being among the most expe- doubt that all meanings and types of victory this respect. At worst, these characteristic fea- dient methods for achieving the reciprocal must be understood along with this one.”26 tures of Western democracies create unavoid- suffering (and thus, victory) for which their The following discusses some of the implica- able friction that reinforces the prescience of reading of Islamic law calls. tions of these culturally defined jihadi victory belief-based adversarial narratives when the Metric 7: Victory Is Seen in the Mala- metrics for Western militaries and intelligence former rallies against the latter. Combating dies Afflicting God’s Enemies, Especially communities. militant Islam is an archetypal case study Economic Recession and Natural Disasters. The identification of these metrics illumi- in this regard. Furthermore, because global Al-’Uyayree writes that economic hardships nates many of the very ideas we must counter jihadism is largely an outgrowth of a multi- among Allah’s enemies are sure signs of His in the war of ideas—an epochal proposition faceted battle raging within Sunni Islam, the favor upon the mujahideen and harbingers of worthy of an analysis far exceeding the scope West should accept prima facie that ultimate their impending victory.21 Furthermore, we of this article. Indeed, the West cannot contend solutions must come from within Islam itself. see in the writings of other extremists that effectively in this “war,” let alone define victory Moreover, the West must be prepared to natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina against the global jihadi movement, if it does accept that the above objectives may never be are believed to foreshadow the imminent col- not fully understand (or deem worthy of con- met in their entirety. The challenges associ- lapse of the West and victory for the Islamic sideration) this adversary’s metrics. ated with dislocating jihadi culture from its vanguard over the unbelievers.22 Moreover, not only do the metrics pin- religious moorings (that is, Sunni Islam), Metric 8: The Presence of Miracles in point where Western and non-Western influ- however appealing, are beyond the capabili- Jihad Foretells of Victory for the Mujahideen. ence efforts need to be directed—for example, ties (and arguably the purview) of the state, Abdullah Azzam’s book on miracles in the at jihadi notions of brotherhood, unity, altru- and possibly Islam itself. Managing public Afghan jihad, The Signs of Rahmaan in the ism, selflessness, a love of martyrdom, and so Jihaad of the Afghan—a “most viewed” publica- forth—but they also indicate that the nexus of tion on the extremist-leaning Makhtabah.net global jihadi beliefs, their social reinforcement, terrorism is seen as the online bookseller—illustrates this point, as does and their influence on jihadi strategic thought a mountain of online jihadi writings covering ought to constitute the primary target matrix. most expedient method for the “miraculous events” of the battle of Fal- In other words, this all-encompassing effort achieving reciprocal suffering lujah, and the supernatural in contemporary must extend far beyond pedestrian notions of (and thus, victory) Afghanistan.23 countering “jihadi ideology.” Applying this Metric 9: The Promotion of the Heroic logic reformulates our current understanding Template Is Itself Victory. The jihadi litera- of victory metrics against the global jihadi expectations, balancing operations, choos- ture reminds us ad nauseam that victory does movement in the so-called long war. There- ing clandestine options whenever possible to not depend on individual leaders; those who fore, in addition to the instrumental objectives avoid direct narrative confrontation, working trust in men rather than Allah will eventually noted earlier, securing holistic victory against quietly with a great variety of nonstate actors, suffer moral, if not material, defeat.24 Instead, this adversary will also entail: and perfecting ultimate management of the victory comes by emulating the “heroes” of problem as opposed to seeking ultimate solu- fighting—those who leave everything behind ■■ dissuading individuals of the individual tions may be the West’s best options. to make their blood cheap for the ummah— obligation to fight, or alternatively, refining Second, it is difficult to quantify the and by enduring the temporary and refining and restricting the “zones of jihad” importance of the global jihad’s expressive trial of their absence.25 We are reminded that ■■ deinstitutionalizing the appeal of martyr- definitions of victory. However, we know from jihadi leaders themselves aspire to martyrdom dom operations studies such as West Point’s Militant Ideology when Allah wills it. As a testament to this ■■ revealing alternative identity-upholding Atlas that many of the militant authors cited notion, we see the wills, elegies, and eulo- adversaries—especially Muslims who kill herein are among the most popular within gies of jihadis published and distributed on other Muslims the global jihad’s online milieu. We also have

90 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu COZZENS empirical evidence in the form of martyrs’ note in one of the most lucid assessments of . 15 resonance of these ideas within jihadi circles. reconciling these traditionally countervailing See Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Al- Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at Viewed differently, we see from the recent forces in our assessments of the global jihad.28 the Sinjar Records,” Combating Terrorism Center defensive posturing of global jihadi ideologues If we fail in this respect, we risk seeing al Qaeda at West Point, December 2007, available at . on the cultural fabric of the global jihadi 16 Ibid., 18. movement are beginning to erode its cohe- 17 Sayf-ad-Din al-Ansari, “The raid on New Notes sion.27 Indeed, the very effectiveness of these York and Washington: A generic description,” sources and means illustrates the importance available at . of the movement’s expressive universe, even if 11 and Explains Al-Qaida’s Combat Doctrine,” 18 Abu Ubayd al-Qirshi, “The 11 September assigning a quantitative variable is difficult. The Middle East Media Research Institute Raid: The Impossible Becomes Possible,” available Third, this analysis raises several (MEMRI), Special Dispatch No. 344, February 10, at . For instance, how can we create strategic cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP34402>. 19 See, for example, Suleiman Abu Geith, “In 2 Christopher Coker, Waging War without War- equilibrium between our continued presence the Shadow of Lances,” quoted in MEMRI, “Why riors (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002). in Afghanistan and Iraq and simultaneously We Fight America,” Special Dispatch No. 388 (June 3 Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics (New York: engage some of the most potent weapons avail- 12, 2002). Vintage Books, 2002), 118. able in the fight against al Qaeda—that is, those 20 See Reuven Paz, “Yes to WMD: The first 4 Coker, 6. Islamists and former jihadis who once stood Islamist Fatwah on the use of Weapons of Mass 5 Bruce Hoffman and Gordon McCormick, alongside al Qaeda’s leaders? These strategic Destruction,” Prism Special Dispatches 1, no. 1 “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack,” Studies in (May 2003), available at . movement occupy thankless but critical roles. 6 Faisal Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad (London: 21 Al-’Uyayree. They are caught, on one hand, between a C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2005). 22 This point was raised on the al Qaeda in movement they decidedly rejected and, on the 7 These authors—an admixture of militants, Iraq–linked Sout al-Khilafa (“Voice of the Caliph- other, a perceived crusade against lands histori- theorists, and online strategists—include (among ate”) television broadcast following the U.S. cally associated with their faith. Many viru- others) the late Yusuf al-’Uyayree; Sayyid Imam al- hurricanes in autumn 2005. See “Move over CBS: Sharif (also known as “Dr. Fadl”); Abu Muhammad lently support jihadi activism in places such as Al-Qaeda Moves into the News Business,” Septem- al-Maqdisi; Abu Yahya al-Libi; Ayman al-Zawahiri; Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Occupied Territories, ber 27, 2005, accessed at . Qatada al-Filistini; Muhammad al-Hakaymah; West. Yet another pressure point for those who 23 For example, “Special Reports—Through Sayf-ad-Din al-Ansari; and Nasr al-Fahd. live in the West—invariably a sticking point for the eyes of the mujahideen,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs 8 “Creed” (2004) in author’s possession (URL Analyst (December 1, 2004). their efforts against al Qaeda—is their percep- unavailable). 24 See, for example, As-Sahab, “Al-Zawahiri tion of “oppressive” domestic antiterrorism 9 “Understanding Ramadan: The Muslim Message Pays Tribute to Abu al-Layth al-Libi,” operations and policies. Divining pragmatic Month of Fasting,” The Washington Post Online, Open Source Center video transcript, February 28, pathways between coddling threatening ideolo- November 19, 2001, available at . Organization presents ‘Light and Fire in Eulogizing 10 Anwar al-Awlaki, “Constants on the Path of proverbial tough row to hoe. We must consis- the Martyr’ by Shaykh Abu-Yahya al-Libi,” July 30, Jihad” (audio lecture series based on the works of tently reach out to these individuals without 2006. Yusuf al-’Uyayree), accessed at . Available as a transcript at our mutual interests coincide. ation—a response to the recantation of Sayyid . ogy—and his two laborious question-and-answer for the current instability we see in al Qaeda, 11 Shaykh Yusuf al-’Uyayree, “Meanings of sessions from April 2008 reflect his awareness of a or are Muslim communities and activists doing Victory and Loss in Jihaad,” available at . setbacks, see Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, effectiveness of our many initiatives? And at 12 See Abdullah Azzam, The Defence of Muslim “The Unraveling: the jihadist revolt against bin Lands, available at . and intelligence communities incubate and at . Kingdom bombing cell and the 2006 United humanism and scientific analysis a perspec- 28 See Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl Kalten- Kingdom “airliner plot” cell are instructive, among tive that gives credibility to the rationality of thaler, “The Rationality of Radical Islam,” Politi- many others. cal Science Quarterly 121, no. 2 (Summer 2006), belief and its influence on strategic agendas? 14 Abu Ayman al-Hilali, “The Real Story of the 295–319. As Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl Kaltenthaler Raids on New York and Washington,” available at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 91 Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach

By Jeffrey Buchanan, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight

indsight is often 20/20. We can lems arise from a gap created by a lack of study our efforts in Vietnam, either capacity or integration, or both, below In the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, the national level. This article proposes filling one of the most important lessons H and even the current situations that vacuum with standing, civilian-led inter- in Afghanistan and Iraq and come to some agency organizations, having regional respon- . . . relearned is that military success is fundamental conclusions. One is that our sibility for all aspects of U.S. foreign policy.4 not sufficient. . . . These so-called soft interagency process is broken.2 Why is that? Thomas Ricks posits that the decision capabilities along with military power If it is broken, can we fix it? In this article, we to give the Department of Defense (DOD) are indispensable to any lasting success, explore the problems with our current inter- the lead for postwar Iraq was problematic indeed, to victory itself as Clausewitz agency process,3 suggest a solution, compare and may have doomed the American effort understood it, which is achieving a that with other possible solution sets, and from the start, since the department lacked political objective. discuss consequences of its implementation. the capabilities to oversee a large multiagency The problems with the American civilian mission.5 If so, then why did DOD get —Robert M. Gates, interagency process are complex. We do not the lead for postwar Iraq? A possible answer is Secretary of Defense1 pretend to be experts on the current process that although DOD may not have had all that or historians recounting each incremental it needed at the outset of the war, there was step along our path to the present. We do no other government institution that had the believe, however, that most of today’s prob- budget or manpower to manage the effort.6

U.S., coalition, and NATO forces in Kabul create conditions for new

NATO ISAF (Richard Frigge) ISAF (Richard NATO Afghan government to succeed

92 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BUCHANAN, DAVIS, and WIGHT

While history will judge how well DOD lived up to those postwar Iraq challenges, it Death of the seems evident now that an agency responsible for one of the instruments of power should Combatant Command? not be responsible for integrating the efforts of all the others. At the national level, that integration is supposed to occur from within Toward a Joint the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC advises the President, decisions are made, and Interagency Approach the instruments of power are integrated toward our national interests. In response, the various agencies march forward to do their respective parts. Below the national level, integration is problematic. At the regional or operational level, a coherent blend of the instruments of power is dependent on cooperation.7 It seems logical that if true integration only occurs at the national level, execution at the regional or local levels could be fraught with problems, as the agencies representing President Bush meets Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the instruments of power are organized dif- Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq, September 2007 U.S. Army Central (Cherie A. Thurlby) ferently and there is no directive authority for implementation at the regional level. DOD move to appoint the Administrator of the A prevalent academic argument is that is organized with six geographic combat- U.S. Agency for International Development the flaws in the interagency process can be ant commands responsible for the various (USAID) concurrently as the Director of legislatively remedied by creating additional regions, but the Department of State regional Foreign Assistance (a Deputy Secretary of organizations to coordinate the efforts of organization is different. State also has six State), the change was an attempt to better existing agencies, citing as a prime example regional bureaus, but the boundaries do not integrate efforts at the national level, but no the Goldwater-Nichols Department of match those of DOD. As an example, the U.S. comparable regional level structure exists. Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 as the Central Command (USCENTCOM) com- A further complication is apparent when we fix for poor coordination and communica- mander must coordinate efforts with three consider that much of our national struction among the military Services. Nora Ben- regional State bureaus: African Affairs, Near ture evolved only to consider domestic U.S. sahel and Anne Moisan embrace this legisla- Eastern Affairs, and South and Central Asian problems. Many organizations outside DOD tive premise and propose an accompanying Affairs. The State bureau system is also rela- and State consequently did not develop an organizational construct.8 Their approach tively new, as the traditional approach to coor- expeditionary capacity and are not structured includes shoring up the NSC leadership role dination has been at the Ambassador/Country to meet foreign demands. by establishing a Prevention, Reconstruc- Team level. The result is that the combatant tion, and Stabilization Cell (PRSC) within commander must coordinate efforts with Band-aids on a Sucking Chest Wound the NSC. The PRSC would absorb the State three Assistant Secretaries of State (leaders Spurred by recent experience, gaining Department Office of the Coordinator for of State regional bureaus) and 27 Country unity of effort within the interagency realm Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Teams. Conversely, the Assistant Secretary has galvanized so much debate that possible to create a “flat” organization with 10 to 15 for Near Eastern Affairs must coordinate solutions are blooming from almost every permanent members that would have direc- with three combatant commanders: those of think tank and military academic institu- tive authority over supporting interagency USCENTCOM, U.S. European Command tion. While space prevents addressing each (excluding DOD) departments in policy (USEUCOM), and U.S. Africa Command individually, these proffered solutions fall development, strategic planning, execution (USAFRICOM). into three basic groups, running the gamut of crisis management, and conflict and Integration of the informational and from legislative actions that restructure or add postconflict operations.9 Unfortunately, economic instruments of power is also prob- more agencies outside of DOD, to modifica- this proposal appears to be no more than lematic at the regional level. The U.S. Infor- tions to existing combatant command staffs, a “super” S/CRS and presents many of the mation Agency morphed into the Department to a proposal that recommends completely same issues as the original S/CRS. These of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs as replacing three of the regional command challenges include ambiguous and omitted part of the State Department. Similar to the staffs with hybrid organizations. lines of authority between military and civilian authorities, insufficient capacity to Brigadier General Jeffrey Buchanan, USA, is Deputy Commander for Operations, Multi-National Division– execute its responsibilities (specifically, no Center, Iraq. Captain Maxie Y. Davis, USN, is Deputy, Information Technology and Information Resource expeditionary capability), and possible lack Management for Deputy Chief of Navy Operations, Communication Networks. Colonel Lee T. Wight, USAF, is of political support. Commander, 52d Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany.

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Another legislative solution is the Center these constructs remains that the interagency COM and USEUCOM staffs. Carafano also for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) representatives, whether advisors or staff, does not specify how the InterGroups would model, which creates offices in each of the lack directive authority over their parent relate to the NSC, State, Ambassadors, DOD, key civilian agencies to participate in the organizations. While any of these models or other combatant commands (are they interagency planning process. These offices would undoubtedly improve planning by peers or superiors?). Moreover, he does not would meet quarterly with DOD and other broadening staff expertise, under the crucible specify who would lead such a nontraditional agencies under NSC-chaired summits to of combat or bureaucratic pressures, they organization. While “fluidity of leadership” coordinate their planning efforts. Similarly, cannot compel interagency compliance with may be an asset in operations that transition the Defense Science Board (DSB) would create the resulting plan—no matter how compre- smoothly between phases in a linear fashion, cross-government contingency planning and hensive. Another drawback is that all of these many contemporary stabilization operations integration task forces for countries “ripe and proposals weight the combatant command can suddenly shift between combat and important” under the leadership and direc- inordinately heavily in the regional planning nationbuilding, while some scenarios may tion of the President and NSC.10 Not only process. This unbalanced approach may mili- require simultaneous actions on multiple pri- do these models share the lack of deployable tarize U.S. foreign policy, which, some fear, orities. Any confusion that delays appropriate resources and ambiguous lines of authority risks creating modern-day proconsuls.12 response in such a situation could prove fatal. inherent in the S/CRS and PRSC, but they Significantly, the final alternative, con- Despite its drawbacks, the InterGroup concept also fail to provide continuous and collective ceived by James Carafano, proposes replacing has significant merit. oversight for the complex and global range the existing Unified Command Plan (UCP) of U.S. concerns. Moreover, they do not have with the U.S. Engagement Plan (U.S.-Plan). It Breaking the Rice Bowls directive authority to integrate with military would reduce the number of combatant com- As the review above should illustrate, planning efforts. mands to three and reorganize their boundar- the world has changed since 1947, and indeed, The Marine Forces Pacific Crisis Man- ies and responsibilities. The U.S.-Plan would even since Goldwater-Nichols reorganized agement Group (CMG) model takes a step establish three Joint Interagency Groups the U.S. military Services’ relationships. beyond the limited planning role of the CSIS (InterGroups) responsible for Latin America, The Cold War is long over, nonstate actors and DSB by creating a full-time standing Africa–Middle East, and Central and South dominate international conflict, DOD has organization to support crisis prevention and Asia. Each InterGroup would have a military transformed and become the dominant arm response and provide a cohesive transition staff as the nucleus of a standing joint task of foreign policy, and the Department of State from Defense to State while executing stability force (JTF) in the event of military opera- has withered and atrophied.14 Today’s combat and recovery operations.11 While certainly tions. Also, the InterGroup proposes a flexible environments—often with a significant a step in the right direction, it adds another command structure that defines operational nationbuilding component—are replete with level of bureaucracy between the NSC and leadership—be it civilian or military—by the entities and organizations besides the military. DOD/State (and correspondingly creates a nature of the task performed.13 Unfortunately, our governmental structure competing demand for resources and person- has not concomitantly changed. nel from other agencies) and still lacks direc- The absence of change does not appear tive authority over DOD or State actions. the most far-reaching of to be due to a paucity of ideas, yet all propos- Turning from the “legislatively added” these staff reorganizations als so far appear to share the common flaw of organizations, there is a group of proposals, proposes a fully integrated lacking true directive authority to integrate summarized by Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, military and non-DOD civilian interagency operations.15 This is a task that and Robert Oakley, that aims to restructure interagency staff the military has no authority to perform, yet the current geographic combatant command current practice has effectively made DOD staffs to include elements of the interagency responsible for its success. This flies in the milieu. These include the Full Spectrum Joint This concept has substantial merit. In face of State Department responsibilities and Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) fact, our most significant critique is that it risks militarizing America’s foreign policy.16 Concept, Super Political Advisor (POLAD), does not go far enough. Having only approxi- As noted at the outset, this article J–10, and Defense Advisor proposals. mately a third of U.S. global interests served proposes standing, civilian-led interagency Although the individual details differ, by this multidisciplinary organization begs organizations, with regional responsibility for they all add a number of interagency advi- the question of how crises would be managed all aspects of U.S. foreign policy, reporting sors of varying capabilities to the combatant elsewhere and why risk should be assumed in directly to the President through the NSC.17 command staff. The most far-reaching of those regions lacking InterGroups. In addi- These entities’ formal structure would include these staff reorganizations is that of the tion, one can argue that the regions Carafano representatives from all major Federal Govern- nascent USAFRICOM staff, which proposes offers for combatant commanders and his ment agencies, including DOD, while dissolv- a fully integrated military and non-DOD proposed InterGroups are too vast, and the ing the existing geographic combatant com- civilian interagency staff. These civilian regional issues too varied and complex, for mands.18 These organizations would be led by representatives would not merely advise, but this small grouping to manage. This argu- highly credentialed civilians, potentially with a would be full-fledged members of the staff. ment appears to have been validated by four-star military deputy. Their charter would Despite the appealingly fresh approach to creating USAFRICOM to manage issues that include true directive authority to all agencies staff composition, the Achilles’ heel of all of exceeded the capacities of existing USCENT- below the NSC, as it would relate to activities

94 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BUCHANAN, DAVIS, and WIGHT occurring in the assigned region—to include see the need for change and presidential of responsibility is that we are forced to work U.S. Ambassadors and Country Teams.19 directives are insufficient and ineffective across boundaries at the regional level. If The NSC would be responsible for for this level of reform . . . [which] must be we ensured that all elements of power were integrating policy among these regional enti- driven by Congress, in a manner similar to regionally integrated through the formation ties and proposing solutions to the President that achieved by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of JIACOMs, the burden for strategic level for intractable resource or mission conflicts. in 1986. . . . While Congress is part of the integration at the NSC may increase. In addition to representatives and staffs of solution it is also part of the problem and A second concern is a potential loss of other agencies, these organizations would requires similar reform of its own.21 the balance of power at the regional level. The have assigned joint military forces, tailored Founding Fathers established three branches to the regional missions and augmented as JIACOMs are feasible only through a of government to ensure checks and balances. necessary in times of crisis. This construct new National Security Act and revision to Title One could argue that the healthy tension would change only the authority to integrate 10, the UCP, and various Presidential decision between DOD and State at the regional level the instruments of national power at the directives, among other documents. Funding maintains that balance. Directive authority at operational level. It would not change Title 10 military administrative command responsi- standing, civilian-led interagency organizations would include bility, which would continue to run from the President through the Secretary of Defense to representatives from all major Federal agencies, including DOD, the senior ranking military officer in the new while dissolving the geographic combatant commands organization. Given the joint nature of forces assigned, as well as the inherent interagency would certainly require significant attention. the regional level equates to unity of command structure with both interagency directive and At the minimum, the “non-DOD” portion of rather than merely unity of effort, so we run military command authority, we propose the JIACOMs must be adequately resourced to the risk of poor direction through a lack of naming these organizations Joint Interagency meet regional integration challenges. internal criticism. However, this potential cost Commands (JIACOMs). As with any sea change, the formation could be mitigated through sound leadership. The result would be an operational- of JIACOMs would likely carry both costs and Such is also the case for the final level organization responsible for planning, benefits. Aside from the necessary changes concern: dealing with organizational culture. integrating, and executing all U.S. regional in structure, authorities, and funding, the The various members of the JIACOMs would foreign policy. It would contain or have direct development of JIACOMs could create three each be creatures of their parent organiza- access to and tasking authority over all U.S. new concerns. The first is a potential loss of tions’ culture. The potential for organizational agencies likely to be involved in planning and integration among the regions. One advan- conflict would be high. The JIACOM leader- implementing these policies, up to and includ- tage we currently enjoy with inconsistent ship must find a way to embrace each orga- ing the use of military force. This structure combatant command and State bureau areas nization’s culture and draw out the benefits would exist permanently, whether or not contingency operations were under way. Finally, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (left) leads where the JIACOM interfaces at the strategic interagency team during response to wildfires, July 2008 level through the NSC, it would interface with operational-tactical level activities by standing up joint interagency task forces (JIATFs) that would have the lead for local crisis management, just as combatant commands may currently elect to stand up JTFs.20

Answering the “So What?” The first question one might ask is if the formation of JIACOMs would even be feasible. The answer is a resounding maybe— and it would be hard to bring about. In the first place, the changes necessary to form JIACOMs would require significant cooperation and action from both the executive and legislative branches of government. The need for reform in our interagency process is critical and Congress must play a central role:

It is unrealistic to expect the executive branch to reform itself. Administrations are too busy with day to day operations to DOD (Steven J. Weber) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 95 FEATURES | Death of the Combatant Command? from membership rather than allowing seeds while the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are 8 Bensahel and Moisan. 9 of conflict to foment internal strife. still fresh—it may be time for the death of the Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert B. The formation of JIACOMs would clearly geographic combatant command as we know Oakley, Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations, Defense and Technology Paper 16 generate significant benefits, as well as costs. it. Instead of dissipating our peerless, precious (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and The major potential benefit is a significant national energies through lack of focus, we National Security Policy, August 2005), 7, available increase in unity of effort across all the instru- have the opportunity to harness all elements at . 22 operations. In addition to better geographical Command and truly labor as one. JFQ 10 Ibid. integration, we would also enjoy better chrono- 11 Ibid., 16. Note that the name reflects only logical integration. A second potential benefit the Service sponsoring this research. The Marine is the increased professional development of Notes Corps would not “manage” this group. JIACOM members. In addition to providing an 12 See the extensive critique of the current 1 enhanced career path for our most experienced Robert M. Gates, remarks delivered to the out-of-balance relationship in terms of resources, military and civilian leaders, we would likely Center for Strategic and International Studies, personnel, and authority between DOD and State Washington, DC, January 26, 2008. in Howard D. Belote, “Proconsuls, Pretenders, or see better development of regional expertise 2 Nora Bensahel and Anne M. Moisan, Professionals? The Political Role of Regional Com- in the JIACOM staff. Both DOD and State “Repairing the Interagency Process,” Joint Force batant Commanders,” Essays 2004: Chairman of currently have significant developmental pro- Quarterly 44 (1st Quarter 2007), 106–108, available the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition grams, but JIACOMs would force more robust at . Press, 2004). A third potential benefit is that 3 For purposes of this article, the term inter- 13 James Jay Carafano, “Herding Cats: JIACOMs may facilitate both coalition and agency includes those from the Departments of Understanding Why Government Agencies Don’t alliance-based operations from a political State, Treasury, Justice, Transportation, and all Cooperate and How to Fix the Problem,” Heritage standpoint. It may be more palatable for some others as detailed in Joint Publication (JP) 3–08, Lectures (Washington, DC: The Heritage Founda- nations to accept working with a civilian-led Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, tion, July 2006), 4. 14 organization rather than a purely military and Nongovernmental Coordination During Joint Richard H. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Operations, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs one. Similarly, we may see a significant Control of the Military in the United States Today,” of Staff, March 2006), but will exclude those from Naval War College Review (Summer 2002), 9; and increase in participation of the other non- the Department of Defense (DOD), although the Kenneth R. Dahl, “New Security for New Threats: military ministries of a contributing nation. authors recognize that DOD is itself an agency The Case for Reforming the Interagency Process,” One could also postulate that the civilian-led and would by other definitions be included in that unpublished manuscript, The Brookings Institu- JIACOM would appear less threatening to term. Examples of intergovernmental organizations tion, Washington, DC, July 2007, 15, available at many NGOs and intergovernmental organiza- (IGOs) include the United Nations, World Health . national and private integration. Likewise, few others), while nongovernmental organizations 15 Carafano, 3. could construe a civilian JIACOM leader as a (NGOs) include Doctors Without Borders, CARE, 16 Belote, 1. 17 provocative proconsul. and so forth. JP 1, I–15. This proposal would include the 4 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the entire range of military operations. United States (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 18 Recent experience may be the slap that Note that the functional combatant com- Staff, May 14, 2007), I–15. In addition to the pleth- mands (U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Special refocuses our perception of previous postcon- ora of interagency actions, this proposal includes Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, flict experiences. Regardless of perspective, the entire range of military operations, such as and U.S. Transportation Command) remain in today’s reality should not be ignored. Our force protection—which requires significant coop- this construct, but their assigned forces would interagency process is dangerously dysfunc- eration from agencies external to DOD. be employed by and integrated through our pro- tional. Bipartisan pundits are charging head- 5 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American posed new structure. At some point, however, the long with possible solutions, but all appear Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, responsibilities and indeed the very existence of the fatally flawed from inception. 2006), 78–79. Ricks is citing an unpublished RAND functional combatant commands may similarly Existing proposals either increase Corporation study faxed to the Secretary of Defense be revised. All existing regional boundaries would bureaucratic complexity or fail to proscribe on February 8, 2005. need to be reassessed and standardized among U.S. 6 true directive authority that would force Gates. Government agencies. 7 As noted in JP 3–08, military operations 19 the integration of myriad agencies wielding Authority would be given by either law or must be strategically integrated and operation- Presidential decree. Obviously, this would require national power. Other suggestions merely ally and tactically coordinated with the activities changes to existing U.S. Code, Title 10, the Unified add weight to an already bloated combatant of other agencies of the U.S. Government, IGOs, Command Plan, and a host of joint and Service command staff and risk DOD drowning NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of doctrinal documents. the foreign policy voice of State. Although a foreign forces, and activities of various host nation 20 Note that these joint interagency task forces definite break from traditional thought, the agencies. Sometimes the joint force commander would report to their “parent” Joint Interagency JIACOM concept may address these concerns. (JFC) draws on the capabilities of other organiza- Command, similar to a joint task force reporting to It does require sweeping governmental change tions; sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to a combatant command in the current structure. and a willingness to shatter paradigms, but other organizations; and sometimes the JFC merely 21 Dahl, 4. 22 with a new Presidential administration—and deconflicts his activities with those of others. JP 1, I–8–22.

96 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Warfare Warfare iolent extremism is the most likely and dangerous threat the Nation will face between V now and 2020. U.S. superiority in conventional warfighting has driven our adversaries to avoid direct military confronta- By K e n n e t h C . C o o n s , J r . , tion. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and Glenn M. Harned (QDR) began with the recognition that irregular warfare (IW) has become the “warfare of choice” for our adversaries, who employ a strategy of physical, economic, and psychological subversion, attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and erode the power, influence, and will of the United States and its strategic partners. They fight us among the people in protracted struggles for popular support and legitimacy, limiting the utility of conventional applications of our military power.

Soldiers survey remains of building after firefight U.S. Army (Russell Lee Klika)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 97 FEATURES | Irregular Warfare Is Warfare

Our adversaries are unconventional, Should the United States confront such states, over the definition of IW. Some within DOD and so our approach for defeating them must its military will most likely need robust IW advocated an IW definition based on who be unconventional as well. We cannot defeat capabilities to wage hybrid warfare among a conducts it (the actors) while others advocated them solely by force; we must use a blend of hostile population. a definition based on how it is conducted (the political, informational, military, economic, By the end of the QDR, the Department of methods). In the end, DOD senior leadership and sociocultural approaches, in combination Defense (DOD) senior leadership had come to agreed that the IW definition should be based with foreign governments, security forces, the following assessment with regard to IW:2 on why it is conducted (strategic purpose). and populations. In January 2006, the Deputy Secretary of n U.S. forces were primarily organized, Defense approved a working definition so Potential Struggles trained, educated, and equipped for con- that IW concept and capability development Violent extremism is not the only threat ventional warfighting, and these capabilities could proceed, and this working definition our nation will face in the near future. The remained essential to deter and fight conven- with slight modification became the approved danger of interstate war has not passed. The tional wars. definition on April 17, 2006: United States must maintain its dominance n U.S. forces were not as well organized, in interstate warfighting capabilities in order trained, educated, or equipped for protracted IW is a violent struggle among state and to deter and, if necessary, win such wars. IW on a global scale. non-state actors for legitimacy and influence However, the character of interstate warfare n DOD was underinvested in general over the relevant populations. IW favors is changing. IW and conventional warfare are purpose force (GPF) and special operations indirect and asymmetric approaches, though combining into new forms of hybrid warfare,1 force (SOF) capabilities and capacity for pro- it may employ the full range of military as potential state adversaries are more likely tracted IW. and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.3

some within DOD advocated an irregular warfare definition based on who conducts it while others advocated a definition based on how it is conducted

Execution Roadmap In December 2005, DOD began crafting a QDR IW Execution Roadmap. Its purpose was to facilitate implementation of the IW-related policy decisions of the QDR. The IW Roadmap was a temporary vehicle intended to enable a successful transition from the QDR to execution planning and programming with a near-term focus on the fiscal year 2008–2013 defense Soldier searches for Taliban weapons cache in

Signal Company Combat Camera (Preston E. Cheeks) Signal Company Combat Camera (Preston program. On April 26, 2006, the Deputy Sec- Baghran Valley th 55 retary of Defense directed execution of the IW Roadmap with 28 tasks organized into 5 major to possess chemical, biological, radiological, Senior leadership emerged from the initiatives for developing IW capabilities and and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and delivery QDR not knowing exactly what IW was, but capacity within DOD. The initiatives were: means; sophisticated antiaccess capabilities; knowing that DOD needed dramatically significant irregular capabilities for horizontal greater IW capabilities to wage and win ■ Transform the way DOD manages its escalation; and populations mobilized to resist current and future struggles. military and civilian personnel to meet IW U.S. military intervention. Future interstate operational requirements (first priority), warfare is more likely to be some form of Defining IW which entails changing the way the military hybrid warfare than the conventional warfare The DOD-wide IW effort during the Services identify, access, educate, train, for which the Armed Forces are preparing. QDR generated a year-long disagreement develop, utilize, and retain personnel with IW- associated expertise and increasing opportuni- Colonel Kenneth C. Coons, Jr., USAF, is Chairman of the Warfighting Department at the Air War College. ties for DOD personnel to obtain, maintain, Colonel Glenn M. Harned, USA (Ret.), leads the Booz Allen Hamilton Team that supports irregular warfare and improve language proficiency and under- efforts at U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Marine Corps, and the Office of standing of foreign cultures. the Secretary of Defense.

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■ Rebalance GPF capabilities and capacity IW joint concept. The Multi-Service Concept physically and psychologically from the to conduct long-duration counterinsurgency was approved in August 2006, shortly after relevant populations. At the same time, they (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) opera- the same writing team began work on the IW also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and tions; train, equip, and advise large numbers Joint Operating Concept (JOC). credibility with those same populations.10 of foreign security forces; and foster the The IW JOC identifies the following Popular support, per se, may not be relevant development of civil society and effective joint force problem: “How can Joint Force for certain terrorists and other extremists governance in ungoverned and undergov- Commanders employ conventional and who simply coerce a population into compli- erned areas. nonconventional military capabilities in ance. However, defeating irregular chal- ■ Increase SOF capability and capacity in support of integrated [U.S. Government] lenges usually requires gaining legitimacy two classified mission areas and to meet SOF and multinational partner efforts to gain or and influence over, and securing the support air mobility requirements. maintain control or influence over a relevant of, the relevant populations, not defeating an ■ Increase DOD capability and capacity to population?”5 The central idea of the IW JOC adversary primarily through direct military conduct counter-network operations, which is that the joint force will solve this problem confrontation. entails identifying, locating, characterizing, by conducting “protracted regional and Fourth, IW is ultimately a political perturbing, and disrupting extremist cells, global campaigns using indirect approaches struggle with violent and nonviolent compo- networks, and individuals, and predicting their against state and non-state adversaries to nents. The use of the term violent in the defi- operational behavior. subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adver- nition was a particularly contentious issue. n Redesign joint and Service military and saries rather than defeating them through The term refers to the nature of the struggle, civilian education and individual and unit direct conventional military confrontation.”6 not the prescription of violence as the primary training for the conduct and support of IW. These campaigns will be population-oriented, way to wage it. IW is “politics with guns.” not adversary-oriented, and will emphasize The IW Roadmap also provided an winning the support of the relevant popula- illustrative list of irregular warfare activities. tions, promoting friendly authority, and This list was important because it bound the undermining and eroding adversary power, scope of IW. The roadmap noted that U.S. influence, legitimacy, and support. Below Government agencies do not conduct terrorism and transnational criminal activities as a campaigns will be population- matter of national policy or law. This list has oriented, not adversary- stood the test of time and, with the addition of U.S. Marine Corps (Christopher G. Graham) strategic communication, remains intact:4 oriented, and will emphasize winning support n insurgency and COIN n terrorism and CT are the major propositions of current DOD n unconventional warfare thinking as captured in the IW Joint Operat- n foreign internal defense ing Concept. They have been refined by more n stability operations when conducted than a year of experimentation. within the context of an IW strategy or cam- First, irregular warfare is “a major and paign aimed at gaining or maintaining the pervasive form of warfare”7 that occurs in support of a host population politically unstable environments of per- n transnational criminal activities that sistent conflict among populations. It is not support or sustain IW and the law enforce- an environment or a type of military opera- ment activities to counter them tion. Second, what makes IW “irregular”8 n civil-military operations is the focus of its operations—a relevant n psychological operations population—and its strategic purpose to gain n information operations or maintain legitimacy and influence over, n intelligence and counterintelligence and the support of, that relevant population operations. through political, psychological, informational, military, and economic methods. Marine cares for orphaned Iraqi child Joint Operating Concept Warfare that has the population as its “focus Among other tasks, the IW Roadmap of operations” requires a different mindset The use or threat of political violence as a directed U.S. Special Operations Command and different capabilities than warfare that tool to undermine an adversary’s legitimacy (USSOCOM) to develop a joint concept for focuses on defeating an adversary militarily.9 and influence is one of its defining character- IW. In November 2005, USSOCOM and Third, the foundation for IW is the istics. It is the violent nature of the struggle the Marine Corps Combat Development centrality of the relevant populations to the that separates IW from the normal political Command (MCCDC) agreed to develop a nature of the struggle. All parties seek to process. Because IW is about finding political Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and solutions (or managing intractable political to lay the intellectual foundation for a future credibility and to isolate their adversaries problems), the military should always have a ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 99 FEATURES | Irregular Warfare Is Warfare supporting role, even when it is providing the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. will not be won by the United States alone, but preponderance of resources. The relevant U.S. civilian agencies must rather by, with, and through the combined Fifth, IW extends beyond the military build their capacity to operate in unstable or efforts of our strategic partners. This requires domain. Governments and populations hostile environments.11 the joint force to establish long-term sustained wage IW, not only armed forces. Influencing Sixth, IW depends on not only our mili- presence in numerous countries to build the foreign governments and populations is a tary prowess, but also our understanding of necessary partner capability and capacity to complex and inherently political activity. such social dynamics as tribal politics, social extend U.S. operational reach, multiply forces IW campaigns will fail if waged by military networks, religious influences, and cultural available, and increase options for defeating means alone. The nature of IW requires mores. People, not platforms or advanced our adversaries.13 the U.S. Government to achieve the level technology, are the key to IW success— The IW JOC also identifies four support- of unified action necessary to integrate all patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people ing ideas that contribute directly or indirectly to available instruments of national power to who can build the long-term relationships achieving the central idea of the concept: address irregular threats. The Government essential to executing IW.12 will have to develop whole-of-government Last, waging protracted IW depends on n establish persistent global presence approaches to wage IW at the political, building global capability and capacity. IW for IW n establish and maintain interpersonal Soldiers engage Taliban fighters near Allah Say, Afghanistan relationships to support IW n expand the role of the GPF to support and execute IW missions n create alternative command and control (C2) mechanisms for conducting and supporting IW when a joint task force (JTF) is not required to conduct major combat operations. Three such mechanisms include extending the joint interagency task force (JIATF) concept used today for counterdrug operations to regional subordinate unified commands and JIATFs with IW missions; establishing interagency advisory assistance teams at sub- national levels of government; and expanding the use of U.S. Military Groups (MILGRPs) to conduct and support irregular warfare as integral components of U.S. missions abroad.

Wargames As the sponsor of the irregular warfare JOC, USSOCOM was responsible for experi- menting with the concept during the first year of its life. As part of the experimentation process, USSOCOM cosponsored the Unified Quest 2007 and 2008 (UQ 07 and UQ 08) wargame series with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The IW JOC was tested against complex scenarios without discovering any substantive problems with its logic, description of future operating environments, or fundamental descriptions of operational requirements for the future joint force. No other JOC has been so tested. As the spiral game play evolved, so did partici- pant discussion of the dynamics of IW, with certain areas deserving particular attention discussed below.14 Planning and Preparation. Players recognized the need for a different type of planning, assessment, and preparation period. U.S. Army (Michael L. Casteel)

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Players recognized that IW is a “messy” form least as compelling to the relevant popula- than were the military participants. DOD of warfare that does not lend itself to clean tions. The respective narratives become the preaches unified action but non-DOD senior formulas or predictable outcomes. UQ partici- emotional, intellectual, and spiritual founda- participants argued instead for the more pants struggled to determine the appropriate tions for each party’s policies, strategies, cam- realistic goal of managing diverse institutional approach to the irregular problem set they paigns, and operations. cultures, relationships, and politics. faced. Many civilian participants considered Difficulty with Whole of Government. In 2007, the Office of the Secretary of the military planning process stovepiped The whole-of-government approaches that Defense sponsored a three-part IW wargame and rigid. They stated that the U.S. Agency the IW JOC seeks to implement depend on to inform DOD efforts to develop new opera- for International Development in particular achieving unified action through agreed tional and organizational constructs and has a more dynamic planning process that is interagency processes and procedures that do identify capability and capacity shortfalls. derived from the political and cultural nature not exist. Implementation is unlikely without The game tested the use of GPF and SOF to of the interagency process and, unlike the a collaborative effort between the President stabilize a large, failing country. The IW JOC military planning process, factors in more and Congress. The requirements for U.S. held up well. Significantly, no team recom- ambiguity and longer term objectives (years, Government civilian agencies to conduct IW mended a direct military intervention with not months). do not reflect the reality of interagency bar- GPF ground forces; all wanted to pursue a Ambiguity of IW. The challenges of riers to implementing whole-of-government more indirect approach in support of host building IW campaigns demonstrated the dis- approaches. The senior civilian participants country security forces. All teams agreed comfort and confusion of GPF players when in the 2008 seminar wargame agreed that that the problem was primarily political and forced to wrestle with the ambiguity inherent in IW. While players generally agreed that the ideas introduced in the IW JOC were the U.S. Agency for International Development has a planning valid and central to future warfighting, they process derived from the political and cultural nature of the struggled with the nature of this form of interagency process and, unlike the military planning process, warfare, especially when they were unable factors in more ambiguity and longer term objectives to articulate the risk associated with various indirect approaches. Population as Focus of Operations. UQ implementing the IW concept is about lever- that the Department of State should have the participants overwhelmingly validated the aging relationships within the interagency lead. They also agreed that the problem was idea that IW should be population-oriented community. This process is ad hoc and will regional and asked that MILGRPs be estab- and that conventional approaches to warfare never be as efficient as the military planning lished or reinforced in the threatened country do not fully accommodate this notion. process. Civilian participants generally were and in all neighboring countries. MILGRPs Conducting and Supporting more comfortable with this as an approach Most players did not think Congress IW. The use of MILGRPs as an alternative to the ambiguities of irregular challenges would allow the executive branch to transform C2 mechanism for IW was a recurring theme during UQ 07 and UQ 08. Participants gener- Squad leader directs Marines during firefight ally agreed that MILGRPs with enhanced with Taliban insurgents legal and budget authorities have distinct advantages over JTFs when conducting or supporting IW activities in the absence of major combat operations. Importance of Strategic Communica- tion. These activities depend on early crafting of a compelling narrative that resonates with all relevant populations, legitimizing friendly IW messages and actions while discrediting the messages and actions of adversaries in the minds of the relevant populations. One of the most profound ideas to emerge during UQ 07 was the concept of narrative advanced by Michael Vlahos of The Johns Hopkins Uni- versity. A narrative is a story that a party to an armed struggle uses to justify its messages and actions so they become legitimate and favorable to the relevant populations. Strategic success in IW requires a narrative that not only counters and discredits adversary narratives but also offers an alternative that is at U.S. Marine Corps (Keith A. Milks) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 101 FEATURES | Irregular Warfare Is Warfare for IW and believed that U.S. civilian agencies January 2007 invited the other DOD com- are more focused on the relevant popula- would therefore be unable to build sufficient ponents to join in an effort to identify and tions than on adversaries. IW capacity to fill their shortfalls. Some players prioritize the key capabilities the joint force The teams completed the revised argued that even if the agencies could build needs to conduct global IW operations. Three appendix C in late July 2007, in time for its adequate capacity, it might be more cost-effec- teams applied the ideas in the IW JOC against use during fiscal year 2010–2015 program tive to expand DOD civil affairs, psychological selected steady-state security posture sce- development. USSOCOM and MCCDC are operations, and foreign area officer capabilities narios to write three concepts of operations using it as the starting point for a co-led IW- and detail these resources to the civilian agen- (CONOPS) for waging IW in friendly states, focused Joint Capabilities-based Assessment cies or assign them to MILGRPs to function (CBA) that began in August 2007. The Joint under the direction of Foreign Service Officers, Staff approved its joint capabilities document especially in unstable or hostile operational the Coast Guard and Border in August 2008, and the functional solutions environments where civilian agencies cannot Patrol are the closest analysis is under way. operate effectively. government organizations to a Moreover, the teams could not agree European-style constabulary Current Assessment on how to build up the host country national DOD has made great progress over the police and the associated judicial and penal last 3 years. There is growing consensus on institutions. They saw the problem as mag- hostile states, and nonbelligerent states. the definition, character, and scope of IW. The nitudes more difficult than building up a From these CONOPS, the teams developed a Deputy Secretary of Defense has approved foreign military. DOD does not have a con- framework of key IW capabilities in terms of multiple plans for correcting IW shortfalls. stabulary-like paramilitary force with police tasks, conditions, and effects. The fiscal year 2008–2013 program devoted powers; the Coast Guard and Border Patrol The teams found that many of the tasks significantly more resources to IW. The are the closest government organizations to that joint forces perform in IW are essen- Secretary of Defense approved and signed a European-style constabulary. There is no tially the same as the tasks they perform in the IW JOC on September 11, 2007. The 2007 clear-cut solution to this critical shortfall in conventional warfare. However, the condi- version of Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for capability to conduct COIN and CT missions. tions under which they perform them in the Armed Forces of the United States, incor- IW are fundamentally different from the porates IW concepts into joint doctrine for Capability Assessment conditions under which they perform other the first time, and new joint publications on When USSOCOM completed the final military operations. These different IW counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are draft of the IW JOC in December 2006, it conditions require the joint force to reex- being written. The Joint Staff completed its knew that appendix C (Table of Operational amine how it performs these common tasks assessment of GPF requirements for COIN Effects and Broad Military Capabilities) in IW. The teams also found that many of and CT and presented their options for needed further refinement. Continuing their the desired effects for the tasks are different meeting those requirements to the Deputy collaboration, USSOCOM and MCCDC in when conducted in IW because the effects Secretary of Defense in December 2007. The Services and other DOD components have a greater appreciation for their IW require- Marines maneuver during firefight, Operation Iraqi Freedom ments. An IW-focused CBA is under way, and its products will help drive DOD requirements and programming efforts. USSOCOM and USJFCOM are collaborating on a series of IW workshops and experiments to further refine the IW concept. Other government departments and agencies have not embraced the term irregular warfare but support State Department initiatives to improve the ability of the U.S. Government to plan and conduct State-led “complex operations.” The State Department has issued an interim Counter- insurgency Guide for U.S. Government Policy Makers, is co-sponsoring with DOD an Interagency Consortium for Complex Opera- tions, and has expressed interest in expanded strategy and planning coordination between DOD and State. Nevertheless, much remains to be done. As a whole, DOD institutions remain too oriented on peacetime processes to sustain Marine Division Combat Camera (Kevin R. Reed) st 1 and enhance conventional warfighting

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capabilities, at the expense of modifying those USSOCOM needs to increase its SOF IW-related skills and knowledge. If we do not processes to meet current wartime demands, capabilities and capacity to perform uncon- create new demands that force the Service improve outcomes, and prepare for persistent ventional warfare and other indirect IW activ- personnel management systems to transform, conflict in the future. The correct metrics for ities on a global scale, and particularly outside we cannot hope to identify, access, educate, measuring IW transformation are programs the U.S. Central Command area, where by our train, develop, utilize, and retain adequate funded and capabilities and capacity fielded— absence we have ceded the strategic initiative numbers of the people we need to wage pro- not briefings given, plans written, and pro- to our adversaries. Our nation cannot “kill tracted IW on a global scale. cesses followed. Many in DOD disagree on or capture” its way to victory in this struggle. The 2006 QDR Report states that “to the appropriate balance among conventional At best, our manhunting efforts buy time for achieve global effects across countries, warfighting and IW capacities and the appro- more decisive indirect IW activities to achieve regions, and groups, the United States must priate balance of effort required among U.S. their desired effects. localize and defeat terrorist extremist cells Armed Forces and civilian departments and DOD needs to implement the options with approaches tailored to local conditions agencies. There is widespread institutional identified in the Joint Staff assessment of GPF and differentiated worldwide.”17 Seven years resistance to the concept of transforming IW capabilities and capacity. The general into this struggle as it was redefined on 9/11, DOD to wage persistent and protracted irreg- purpose forces need a new COIN and CT the Department of Defense must do every- ular warfare on a global scale. Some within paradigm; the current paradigm of U.S.-based thing it can to accelerate the fielding of new DOD also see IW as a temporary inconve- joint expeditionary forces organized into capabilities and capacity to wage irregular nience that will go away when U.S. major JTFs is inappropriate for steady-state IW warfare and win this struggle. JFQ combat forces leave Iraq, a belief reinforced by requirements. DOD should embrace a return the fact that DOD has not clearly articulated to the Cold War paradigm of large numbers Notes what the force employment requirements of empowered MILGRPs operating under the 1 are for waging IW globally. Absent a defined direction of U.S. Chiefs of Mission and col- Hybrid warfare is the simultaneous and endstate for IW transformation, the best laborating regionally to defeat transnational intertwined application of conventional and irregular warfare methods to achieve strategic objectives. DOD has been able to achieve are marginal adversaries. The leading advocate of this 2 U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular improvements to existing capabilities. paradigm shift is noted strategist Colonel Warfare Execution Roadmap (IW Roadmap) There are still debates over whether IW Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.), who has written (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 15 and hybrid warfare will replace conventional a study for the Center for a New American 28, 2006), 6. 16 warfare. In some respects, the current combat Security and an article in Army magazine on 3 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan tint the the need to adopt such a paradigm shift. Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, lens of the debate, but the measures of effec- The DOD intelligence components and DC: The Joint Staff, May 14, 2007), I–1. tiveness for IW transformation should not unified commands need to accelerate their 4 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept be improvements to current operations but efforts to improve counter-network opera- (IW JOC), version 1 (Washington, DC: Department rather how well DOD prepares for the broader tions. As the IW Roadmap states, “Vital to of Defense, September 11, 2007), 8. 5 ongoing effort against violent extremists and this effort is increasing the ability of DOD IW JOC, 15. 6 Ibid., 17. their state and nonstate sponsors. to capture and integrate knowledge from 7 JP 1, I–6. DOD continues to struggle with how anthropologists, sociologists, geographers, 8 Some IW advocates would prefer a different to deal with the inability of relevant civilian demographers, and other social scientists into term, such as unconventional, nonconventional, departments and agencies to expand their intelligence and operational analysis at all or traditional warfare, but irregular warfare is the own capacities to perform nonmilitary tasks levels down to the tactical.” term of record at least for the remainder of this (governance, essential services, economic The military departments and Services, administration. development, and so forth) that are vital unified commands, and National Defense 9 JP 1, I–7. to waging IW and conducting complex University need to institutionalize the changes 10 Ibid. operations. they have made to joint and Service education 11 IW JOC, 1. 12 But we must get past these challenges and training for IW. The U.S. military has a Ibid., 1. 13 and seize the momentum of the IW JOC. The century-long history of adopting temporary Ibid. 14 U.S. Southern Command, Unified Quest 07 Armed Forces have been assigned an impor- solutions in response to irregular challenges, Analytical Report (June 4, 2007), 5–8 and 12–23. tant new IW mission and must now adapt only to scrap them when the challenges pass. 15 Robert B. Killebrew, The Left-hand Side of their portfolios, requirements, programmatic This current struggle will not pass in the the Spectrum, Ambassadors and Advisors in Future funding, and conventional mindsets to IW. foreseeable future. Our education and train- U.S. Strategy, The Future of the U.S. Military Series ing base needs permanent solutions to meet (Washington, DC: Center for a New American A Way Ahead the demands from the field that will come Security, June 2007). Transformation efforts of this scale are once the general purpose forces adopt a new 16 Robert B. Killebrew, “The Army and the difficult, but a path does exist. The major paradigm for waging IW. Changing American Strategy,” Army (August initiatives of the IW Roadmap are still valid, Most important of all, the military 2007), 25–34. 17 and DOD should continue to pursue them as departments need to create or improve Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial it moves forward in the fielding of new IW career paths, incentives, and advancement Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Depart- ment of Defense, February 6, 2006), 22. capabilities and capacity. opportunities for DOD personnel with critical ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 103 Wired for War? Robots and Military Doctrine

By P.W. Singer

Marines in Iraq employ remote-controlled robot to detect improvised explosive devices and weapons caches U.S. Marine Corps (William Skelton)

104 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu SINGER

he growth in our use of war. And it is even using the technology in “behind” the technology in how it conceptu- unmanned systems has taken growing quantities (the number of unmanned alizes its use in the field, especially in ignoring place so rapidly that we often ground systems in Iraq today is just above the robots’ growing smarts and autonomy: “They forget how far we have come in number of tanks the British had at the end of still think of robots as RC [remote control] T 4 just a short time. While U.S. forces went into World War I). But the United States does not cars.” Similarly, at Foster-Miller (the team Iraq with only a handful of drones in the air (all yet have an overall doctrine on how to use behind the TALON and SWORDS), execu- of V Corps had just one), by the end of 2008, them or how they fit together. tives point to the lack of an overall plan for there were 5,331 unmanned aircraft systems “There is no guiding pattern, no guiding support structures as evidence of the gap. in the American inventory, from vigilant vision,” is the assessment of Colonel Robert They note that there is “nothing yet on logis- Global Hawks and armed Predators that circle Bateman, an Army officer in the Pentagon’s tics to support or maintain robots. . . . The thousands of feet overhead to tiny Ravens Net Assessment office tasked with this area. Army is just bootstrapping it.”5 that peer over the next city block. A similar A survey of U.S. military officers taken by explosion happened on the ground, where Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency The Mothership Has Landed zero unmanned ground vehicles were used in a (DARPA) researchers backs him up. When the Developing the right doctrine for using tactical sense during the 2003 invasion; by the officers were questioned about robots’ future in unmanned systems is thus essential to the end of 2008, the overall inventory crossed the war, they identified developing a strategy and future of the force. If the U.S. military gets 12,000 mark, with the first generation of armed doctrine as the third least important aspect to it right, it will win the wars of tomorrow. If ground robotics arriving that year as well. figure out (only ahead of solving inter-Service it does not, it might instead be on the way to And notably, these are just the first generation, rivalry and allaying allies’ concerns).1 One building what one Army officer called “the much like the iPod, already outdated by the commentator described how the military’s Maginot Line of the 21st century.”6 time they hit the marketplace and battlespace. process of purchasing systems, despite not Akin to the intense interwar doctrinal In many ways, the most apt historic par- having fully developed operational plans for debates over how to use new technologies such allel to this era may well turn out to be World them, “smacked of attention deficit disorder.”2 as tanks and airplanes, there is not yet agree- War I. Back then, strange, exciting new tech- The issue is not that we are not buying ment on how best to fight with unmanned nologies, which had been science fiction a few these systems or arguing over who controls systems. But the contours are coming to light. years earlier, were introduced and then used them, but rather that we are not dealing Much as early armor proponents argued over in greater numbers on the battlefield. They with the broader question of where and whether tanks should only support infantry did not really change the fundamentals of the war, and in many ways the technology was robot executives complain that the military is “behind” the balky and fighting remained frustrating. But these early models did prove useful enough technology in how it conceptualizes its use in the field, that it was clear that the new technologies especially in ignoring robots’ growing autonomy were not going away and militaries had better figure out how to use them most effectively. It how it all fits together. As an Army sergeant versus being massed together, or the debate also became clear with such new technologies complained, “Every time we turn around over aviation’s strategic versus tactical roles, that their effects would ripple out, reshaping they are putting some new technology in our there appear to be two directions in which areas that range from the experience of the hands.” When his unit in Iraq was given a the doctrines of unmanned systems might soldier at war and how the media reports Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), no shake out, with a degree of tension between war to asking troubling new questions about one instructed them on how, when, or where the operating concepts. The first is the idea of the ethics and laws of war. Much the same is best to use it, or how it integrated into broader the mothership, perhaps best illustrated by the just starting to happen with our unmanned operations. So his unit tried the drone out on tack the U.S. Navy is unconsciously moving systems today. their own, putting a sticker on it that said in toward with unmanned systems at sea. Arabic, “Reward if you return to U.S. base.” The sea is becoming a much more Doctrine, Schmoctrine A few days later, they “lost it somewhere in dangerous place for navies in the 21st century. Beyond these major questions of what Iraq” and never saw the drone again. (In 2008, Drawing comparisons to the problems that happens when the robots of science fiction two U.S.-made Ravens were found hidden in traditional armies are facing with insurgen- become political reality over the next few Iraqi insurgent caches, which not only points cies on the land, Admiral Vern Clerk, former decades, there is a worry that force planners to how our adversaries are exploring these Chief of Naval Operations, believes that “the must start to pay attention to doctrine. A technologies, but also shows that insurgents most significant threat to naval vessels today concern is that the United States is in a posi- operate under a “finders keepers” ethic).3 is the asymmetric threat.”7 The United States tion similar to the British toward the end of The makers of these systems concur. may have the largest blue water fleet in the World War I. It has developed an exciting new iRobot executives (the team behind the world, numbering just under 300 ships, but technology, which may well be the future of Packbot) complain that the military is actually the overall numbers are no longer on its side. Seventy different nations now possess over P.W. Singer is Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution. 75,000 antiship missiles, made all the more This article is derived from his upcoming book Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st deadly through “faster speeds, greater stealth Century (Penguin, 2009). ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 105 FEATURES | Robots and Military Doctrine capabilities, and more accurate, GPS [global prototype ship in the series is only about one- competitor” that followed the mode of fight- positioning system]-enhanced targeting.”8 fourth the size of the previous equivalent ship’s ing an asymmetric war with submarines, The dangers are even greater in the crew. But less important than the automation cruise missiles, and antiship ballistic missiles brown water close to shore. Here, small, fast of the ship itself is the concept of change it rep- (that is, China), Navy planners hit upon a motor boats, like those that attacked the USS resents. Besides the crew on board, there is also novel solution. Because unmanned planes Cole, can hide among regular traffic and dart a crew on shore, sitting at computer cubicles take up less deck space and have far greater in and out. Relatively cheap diesel-powered and providing support from thousands of miles endurance and range than manned planes, submarines can silently hide among water away.10 The LCS has a modular plug-and-play they reversed the ratio, offloading all but currents and thermal layers. More than 300 capacity, allowing various unmanned systems 12 of the manned planes and loading on 84 varieties of undersea mines are available on and the control stations to be swapped in and unmanned planes. Their “spot on, almost the world market today, ranging from those out, depending on the mission. visionary” idea reportedly tripled the strike that detonate by simple contact to a new If the ship is clearing sea lanes of mines, power of the carrier and gave it a reach that a generation of smart mines, stealthy robotic it might pack onboard a set of mine-hunting standard mix of F–35s and F–18s would lack.11 systems equipped with tiny motors that robotic mini-subs. If the ship is patrolling a As UAVs shrink in size, even more drones allow them to shift positions, so as to create a harbor, it might carry mini-motorboats that could fly off such flattops. In 2005, one of moving minefield. would scatter about, inspecting any suspicious the largest aircraft carriers in the world, the As evidenced by the intense work with ships. Or, if it needs to patrol a wider area, it USS Nimitz, tested Wasp Micro Air Vehicles, robotics at the Office of Naval Research, might carry a few UAVs. Each of these drones drones that are only 13 inches long.12 the Navy is increasingly turning toward is controlled by crew sitting at control module The same developments with mother- unmanned systems to face this dangerous stations, who themselves only join the ship ship concepts are starting to take place under environment. Describing the “great promise” for the time needed. The manned ship really the sea. In 2007, a Navy attack sub shot a that unmanned systems hold for naval is a sort of moving mothership, hosting and small robotic sub out of its torpedo tubes, warfare, one report told how “we are just controlling an agile network of unmanned which then carried out a mission. The robotic beginning to understand how to use and build systems that multiply its reach and power. mini-sub drove back to the mother subma- these vehicles. The concepts of operations The mothership concept is not just rine. A robotic arm then extended out of the are in their infancy, as is the technology. The planned for new, specially built ships like the tube and pulled the baby sub back inside, Navy must think about how to exploit the LCS. Older ships all the way up to aircraft unmanned concepts and integrate them into carriers might be converted to this mode. the Navy’s current plan for 9 the manned operations.” Already serving as a sort of mothership for aircraft carriers entails adding One of the early ideas for trying to take manned planes, the aircraft carrier would these technologies out to sea comes in the add up to 12 unmanned planes to each carrier up to 12 unmanned planes to form of the Navy’s littoral combat ship (LCS) under the Navy’s current plan. This number each carrier concept. Much smaller and faster than the should grow if we are interested in actual warships used now, the ships are to be incred- combat effectiveness. In a 2006 wargame, whereupon the crew downloaded its data and ibly automated. For example, the crew on the which simulated a battle with a “near-peer fueled it back up for another launch. It all sounds simple enough, but the test of a robotic underwater launch-and-recovery system represented “a critical next step for the U.S. Navy and opens the door for a whole new set of advanced submarine missions,” according to one report.13 The challenge the Navy is facing in undersea warfare is that potential rivals such as China, Iran, and North Korea have diesel subs that remain absolutely quiet. When these subs hide in littoral waters close to shore, many advantages held by America’s nuclear subs disappear. Unmanned systems, particularly those snuck in by a fellow submarine, “turn the asymmetry around by doing [with unmanned craft] what no human would do.” For example, sonar waves are the traditional way to find foes under the sea. But these active sensors are akin ADM Mullen observes robot used to detect to using a flashlight in the dark. They help us and destroy roadside bombs during visit to exercise Mojave Viper find what we are looking for, but they also let

U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley) everyone nearby know exactly where we are.

106 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu SINGER

Manned submarines instead usually quietly Rethinking War with Mother “concentrated” together as Mahan wanted, listen for their foes, waiting for them to make a Such motherships will entail a signifi- but rather would be made up of many tiny noise first. By contrast, unmanned systems can cant doctrinal shift in how militaries fight. constellations of smaller, often unmanned be sent on missions and blast out their sonar, One report explained that its effect at sea systems, linked back to their host mother- actively searching for the diesel subs hiding would be as big a transformation as the shift ships. These ships, in turn, might be much below. An enemy might be able to strike back, to aircraft carriers, projecting that it would smaller than Mahan’s capital ships of the past. but it would only reveal its presence and not be the biggest “fork in the road” for the U.S. kill any Sailors. Navy in the 21st century.18 Having its own fleet of tiny subs also Naval war doctrine, for example, has ships will not be multiplies the reach of a submarine. For long been influenced by the thinking of the “concentrated” together as example, a mother-submarine able to send out American Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan Mahan wanted, but rather just a dozen tiny subs can search a grid the (1840–1914). Mahan did not have a distin- be made up of many tiny size of the Persian Gulf in a little over a day. guished career at sea (he reputedly would get constellations of smaller, often A submarine launching a UAV that can fly in seasick even on a pond), but in 1890 he wrote and out of the water (like Lockheed Martin’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, unmanned systems Cormorant design) extends the mothership’s which soon changed the history of war at sea. reach farther, even ashore. Navies, Mahan argued, were what shaped With Mahan’s vision looking less appli- Such capabilities will lead to new oper- whether a nation became great (an argument cable to modern wars and technology, a new ating concepts. One naval officer talked about likely to appeal to any sailor). In turn, the thinker on 21st-century naval war doctrine how the robotic mini-subs would be like the battles that mattered were the big showdowns may have to come into vogue in planning. The unmanned “whiskers.” He continued, “They of fleets at sea, “cataclysmic clashes of capital only twist is that he was born just 14 years would act as ‘force multipliers,’ taking care of ships concentrated in deep blue water.”19 after Mahan. programmable tasks and freeing up manned Mahan’s prescripts for war quickly became Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (1854–1922) warships to take on more complex ones. And the doctrine of the U.S. Navy, guiding Teddy was a British novelist turned naval historian. they could be sent on the riskiest missions, to Roosevelt to build a “Great White Fleet” of Notably, Corbett was a friend and ally of help keep Sailors and Marines out of harm’s battleships at the turn of the 20th century and naval reformer Admiral John “Jackie” Fisher, way.” 14 For example, the robotic subs could shaping the strategy the Navy used to fight the who introduced such new developments be sent in to clear minefields from below, lurk great battles in the Pacific in World War II, as as dreadnaughts, submarines, and aircraft around enemy harbors, or track enemy subs well as how it planned to fight the Soviets if the carriers into the Royal Navy. While he and as they leave port. Cold War ever turned hot. Mahan lived in the same era, Corbett took a By pushing its robotic whiskers (and The future of war at sea, however, bodes completely different tack toward war at sea. “teeth,” as the systems can also be armed) to look less and less like what Mahan envis- They both saw the sea as a critical chokepoint farther away from the body, the mothership aged. With the new asymmetric threats and to a nation’s survival, but Corbett thought that does not even have to be a warship itself. For unmanned responses, any future confronta- the idea of concentrating all ships together in example, with foreign nations increasingly tions will not merely take place between the hope of one big battle was “a kind of shib- unwilling to host U.S. bases ashore, the Navy two fleets, made up of the biggest ships, boleth” that would do more harm than good. is moving to a doctrinal concept of seabasing. concentrated together into one place. More- The principle of concentration, he declared, These would be large container ships that act over, where ships fight will not simply be the was “a truism—no one would dispute it. As a like a floating harbor. But such ships are slow, blue waters far from shore; these battles are canon of practical strategy, it is untrue.”20 ungainly, and certainly not stealthy; hence, predicted to take place closer to shore. The In his masterwork on naval war doctrine, they are vulnerable to attack. A plan to protect fleet would comprise not a number of ships modestly titled Some Principles of Maritime them is called Sea Sentry.15 The seabase would not only provide a supply station for visiting Technicians observe UH–19XRW Hoverwing during testing ships and troops ashore, but also host its own protective screen of unmanned boats, drones, and mini-subs. Similar plans are being developed for other vulnerable targets at sea, such as civilian merchant ships, oil tankers, and even oil rigs.16 The concept of the mothership is not limited to the sea. For example, one firm in Ohio has fitted out a propeller-powered C–130 cargo plane so it can not only launch UAVs, but also recover them in the air. The drones fly in and out of the cargo bay in the back, turning the plane into an aircraft carrier that is actually airborne.17 U.S. Navy (John Joyce) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 107 FEATURES | Robots and Military Doctrine

Strategy, Corbett opined that the idea of typical scenario that might take place in such then, as more and more U-boats arrived on putting all one’s ships together into one place a model applied to war in the air: “An [enemy] the scene, overwhelm them. And it is a style did not induce all enemies into one big battle. air defense system pops up, and I click on a of fighting that is fairly effective. In a RAND Only the foe that thought it would win such UCAS [unmanned combat air system] icon study of historic battles going back to the time a battle would enter it. Any other sensible foe and drag it over and click. The UCAS throttles of Alexander the Great, the side using swarm would just avoid the big battle and disperse to over and jams it, blows it up, or whatever.”22 tactics won 61 percent of the battles.24 attack the other places where the strong fleet This philosophy of unmanned war is Notably, 40 percent of these wins were was not (a theory that was borne out later by very mechanical, almost Newtonian, and battles that took place in cities. Perhaps because the German strategy in World War II). More- certainly not one in which the robots will have of this historic success of urban swarms, this over, the more a fleet concentrated in one place, much autonomy. It is not, however, the only same style of fighting is increasingly used by the harder it would be to keep its location possible direction that we might see doctrines insurgents in today’s asymmetric wars. From concealed. So the only thing Mahan’s big fleet of war move in, much as there were multiple the “Black Hawk Down” battle in Somalia doctrine accomplishes in an asymmetric war, choices on how to use tanks and airplanes (1993) and the battles of Grozny in Chechnya Corbett felt, is to make the enemy’s job easier. after World War I. Places such as DARPA, (1994, 1996) to the battles of Baghdad (2003, Instead, argued Corbett, the fleet should the Office of Naval Research, and the Marine 2004) and Fallujah (2004), the usual mode is spread out and focus on protecting shipping Corps Warfighting Laboratory are also that insurgents hide out in small, dispersed lanes, blockading supply routes, and generally looking at “biological systems inspiration” for bands until they think they can overwhelm menacing the enemy at as many locales as how robot doctrine might take advantage of some exposed unit. The various bands, each of possible. Concentrations of a few battleships which often has its own commander, then come were not the way to go. Rather, much like how rather than being centrally together from various directions and try to the Royal Navy policed the world’s oceans controlled, swarms are encircle, isolate, and overwhelm the enemy unit. during the 1700 and 1800s, it was better to This echoes T.E. Lawrence’s account of how his have a large number of tiny constellations made up of highly mobile, Arab raiders in World War I used their mobility, of mixed ships, large and small, each able to individually autonomous parts speed, and surprise to become “an influence, a operate independently. In short, it is a doc- thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or trine far more apt for motherships. their growing technologic smarts and auton- back, drifting about like a gas.”25 Even more shocking at the time, Corbett omy. As one analyst pointed out, “If you look Swarms, whether of buzzing bees or emphasized that a navy should think about at nature’s most efficient predators, most of insurgents with AK–47s, are made up of not just operations in the blue waters in the them don’t hunt by themselves. They hunt in independent parts and have no one central middle of the ocean, but also what role it could packs. They hunt in groups. And the military leader or controller. So the self-organization play in supporting operations on land. Offers is hoping their robots can do the same.”23 of these groupings is a key to how the whole one biographer, “Well before it was fashion- The main doctrinal concept that is works. The beauty of the swarm, and why it is able, [Corbett] stressed the interrelationship emerging from these programs is an alternative so appealing for unmanned war, is how it can between navies and armies.”21 This seems much to motherships called swarming. Rather than perform incredibly complex tasks by each part more attuned to the role of the U.S. Navy today, being centrally controlled, swarms are made following incredibly simple rules. which must figure out not merely how to deter up of highly mobile, individually autonomous A good example is a flock of birds. Hun- major state conflict and protect shipping lanes, parts. Like birds in a flock or wolves on a dreds of birds can move together almost as but also how to aid the fight on the land (for hunt, each decides what to do on its own, but if they have a single bird in charge, speeding instance, it carried out over half of the 15,000 somehow still manages to organize into highly in one direction, then turning in unison and airstrikes during the 2003 invasion of Iraq). effective groups. After the hunt, they disperse. flying off in a different direction and at a dif- Mahan won the first round in the 20th Individually, each part is weak, but the overall ferent speed, without any bird bumping into century, but Corbett’s doctrine may well come effect of the swarm can be powerful. the other. They do not just operate this way true through 21st-century technology. Swarming does not only happen in for what one can think of as tactical opera- nature. In war, it is actually akin to how the tions, but also at the strategic level, with flocks Swarming the Future Parthians, Huns, Mongols, and other mass migrating in unison over thousands of miles. The concept of motherships comes with armies of horsemen would fight. They would As one Army colonel asks, “Obviously a certain built-in irony, however. It entails a spread out over vast areas until they found the birds lack published doctrine and are dispersion, rather than concentration, of fire- the foe, and then encircle them, usually not receiving instructions from their flight power. But the power of decision in this doc- wiping them out by firing huge numbers of leader, so how can they accomplish the kind trinal concept is still highly centralized. Like arrows into the foe’s huddled army. Similarly, of self-organization necessary for flocking?”26 the spokes in a wheel, the various unmanned the Germans organized their U-boats into The answer actually comes from a researcher, systems may be far more spread out, but they “wolfpacks” during the Battle of the Atlantic Craig Reynolds, who built a program for what are always linked back to the persons sitting in World War II. Each submarine would he called “boids,” or artificial birds.27 As an inside the mothership. It is a top-down, “point individually scour the ocean for convoys of Army report on the experience described, all and click” model of war, where it is always merchant ships to attack. Once one U-boat the boids needed to do to organize themselves clear who is in charge. General Ronald Keys, found the convoy, all the others would con- together as a flock was for each individual to the Air Force chief of air combat, describes a verge, first pecking away at the defenses, and follow three simple rules: “1. Separation: Don’t

108 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu SINGER get too close to any object, including other While each PRAWN would be very but concentrate firepower, while motherships boids; 2. Alignment: Try to match the speed simple, and almost dumb (indeed, their are centralized but disperse firepower. If we and direction of nearby boids; and 3. Cohe- artificial intelligence would be less than imagine a system of motherships laid out on a sion: Head for the perceived center of mass of the systems already on the market today), big operational map, it would look like a series the boids in your immediate neighborhood.”28 the sum of their swarm would be far more of hubs, each with spokes extending. Like This basic boid system worked so well that it effective than any single system. Why drive a checker pieces, each of these mothership hubs was also used in the movie Batman Returns to single SWORDS or Packbot into a building, could be moved around the map by a human create the realistic bat sequences. room by room, to see if an enemy is hiding commander, much as each of their tiny robotic Just as birds and boids follow simple rules there, when a soldier could let loose a swarm spokes could be pointed and clicked into place to carry out complex operations, so might an of tiny robots that would scramble out and by the operators sitting inside the motherships. unmanned swarm in war. Each system would automatically search on their own? With swarms, the map would instead look like be given a few operating orders and let loose, a meshwork of nodes. It would almost appear each robot acting on its own, but also in col- Mom against the Bees like drawing lines between the stars in the laboration with all the others. The direction of Swarms are thus the conceptual opposite galaxy or a “map” of all the sites in the Internet. the swarm could be roughly guided by giving of motherships, despite both using unmanned Every tiny node would be linked with every the robots a series of objectives ranked in pri- systems. Swarms are decentralized in control other node, either directly or indirectly. Where ority, such as a list of targets given point-value rankings. For instance, much like a bird might have preferences between eating a bug or a robots would be given simple rules, which mimic birds that Saltine cracker, a robot’s operating code might flock or ants that forage for food note that taking out an enemy tank is more useful than taking out an enemy outhouse. The Small unmanned ground vehicle scans range swarm would then follow Napoleon’s simple during training exercise for Army Future Combat Systems credo about what works best in war: “March to the sound of the guns.” The Santa Fe Institute carried out a study on these proliferated autonomous weapons (PRAWNS), which shows how this concept might work in robotic warfare (Lockheed Martin has a similar program on robot swarms funded by DARPA, called the “Wolves of War”).29 Very basic unmanned weapons would use simple sensors to find enemy targets, an automatic targeting recognition algorithm to identify them, and easy communications such as radio and infrared (as the scientists thought the military’s current idea of using the Internet to coordinate operations was flawed because the Internet would be too easy to jam) to pass U.S. Army (Stephen Baack) on information about what the other robots in Airmen carry experimental T–16 UAV to landing the swarm were seeing and doing. The robots spot during exercise Northern Edge 2008 would be given simple rules, which mimic birds that flock or ants that forage for food. As the PRAWNS spread around in an almost random search, they would broadcast to the group any enemy targets they find. Swarms would then form to attack the targets. But each individual robot would have knowledge of how many fellow robots were attacking the same target, so if there were already too many PRAWNS attacking one target, the other systems would move on to search for new targets. In much the same way as ants have different types (soldiers and workers) operating in their swarms, the individual PRAWNS might also carry different

weapons or sensors, allowing them to match Fighter Wing (Jonathan Snyder) Public Affairs th 30 themselves to the needs of the overall swarm. 354 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 109 FEATURES | Robots and Military Doctrine the linkages cluster together is where the action French in the interwar years, America’s Armed 13 “Boeing Achieves First Submerged in battle would be taking place, but these clus- Forces could make choices that seem brilliant at Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Recovery by a ters could rapidly shift and move. the time but later prove utterly wrong. Submarine,” press release, November 26, 2007, available at . advantages and disadvantages. The mother- turned out to be combined arms units, the 14 Carl Posey, “Robot Submarines Go to War. ship style of operations has specific roles choices may also mix and mingle. The con- Part 2: The Navy’s AUVs,” Popular Science, March for specific units, as well as central lines of cepts of swarms and motherships could be 2003, available at . organizing entities such as swarms come with cluster. It would not be the same as the direct 15 Michael Fetsch, Chris Mailey, and Sara built-in redundancies. Swarms are made up control of the mothership’s hub and spoke Wallace, “UV Sentry,” paper presented at the Associa- of a multitude of units, each acting in paral- system, but it would still be a flexible way to tion for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, th lel, so there is no one chain of command, make sure the leader was influencing events at 34 Annual Symposium and Exhibition, Washington, communications link, or supply line to chop. the major point of action. DC, August 6–9, 2007. 16 Lok. Attacking a swarm is akin to going after bees Whatever doctrine prevails, it is clear 17 David Pugliese, “Launch and Recover UAV with a sword. Similarly, swarms are constantly that the American military must begin to think System Tested,” Defense News, February 19, 2007, 14. acting, reacting, and adapting, so they have about the consequences of a 21st -century battle- 18 LaCroix and Blickstein, ix. a feature of perpetual novelty built in. It is field in which it is sending out fewer humans 19 Ibid. hard to predict exactly what they will do next, and more robots. Just as the technologies and 20 See “Julian Corbett,” Wikipedia, available which can be a very good thing in war. modes of wars are changing, so must our con- at . The disadvantages of swarm systems cepts of how to fight and win them. JFQ Quotation from Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker, are almost the inverse. Swarms may not be Reader’s Companion to Military History (Boston: predictable to the enemy, but neither are they Notes Houghton Mifflin, 2004). 21 exactly controllable or predictable for the side Frank G. Hoffman, “The Fleet We Need: A 1 using them, which can lead to unexpected Robert Finkelstein and James Albus, Look at Alternative—and Affordable—Futures for results. Instead of being able to point and “Technology Assessment of Autonomous Intel- the U.S. Navy,” Armed Forces Journal (August 2006), ligent Bipedal and Other Legged Robots,” Defense 49. click and get the immediate action desired, Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2004. 22 David A. Fulghum and Michael J. Fabey, a swarm takes action on its own, which may 2 Bill Sweetman, “UCAVs Offer Fast Track to “F–22: Unseen and Lethal,” Aviation Week & Space not always be exactly where and when the Stealth, Long Range, and Carrier Operations,” Jane’s Technology 166, no. 2 (2007), 46. human commander wants it. International Defence Review 40 (2007), 41. 23 Noah Shachtman, quoted in the Discovery The above is almost like what Gandhi 3 U.S. Army Soldier, interview by author, Military Channel documentary Warbots, which aired said while sitting on the side of the road Washington, DC, November 2, 2006; “American January 26, 2006. as a crowd went by. “There go my people. I Drone Discovered in Baghdad Cache,” June 20, 2008, 24 Sean J.A. Edwards, “Swarming and the Future must get up and follow them, for I am their available at . School, 2005, 83. 4 25 a swarm will be to set the right goals and iRobot executive, interview by author, Novem- Ibid., 64. 26 Thomas K. Adams, “The Real Military Revo- objectives. They may even place a few limits ber 16, 2006. 5 Foster-Miller executive, interview by author, lution,” Parameters 30, no. 3 (2000). on such things as the “radius of coopera- November 17, 2006. 27 Craig W. Reynolds, “An Evolved, Vision-based tion” of the units. Then, other than perhaps 6 John A. Gentry, “Doomed to Fail: America’s Model of Obstacle Avoidance Behavior,” in Proceed- parceling out reserves and updating the Blind Faith in Military Technology,” Parameters 32, ings, ed. C. Langton (Redwood City, CA: Addison- point values on each of the enemy’s target no. 4 (2002), 88. Wesley, 1994). types to reflect changing needs, the human 7 Joris Janssen Lok, “Navies Look for Ways to 28 Adams. commanders would, as Naval Postgraduate Tackle the Ever-changing Close-in Threat,” Jane’s 29 “UCAR—The Next Generation of Unmanned School expert John Arquilla describes it, International Defence Review 37 (2004). Aerial Vehicles,” August 17, 2003, available at . 30 swarm.”32 This type of truly “decentralized o g y,” The New Atlantis 14 (2006), available at . Weapons: An Example of Cooperative Behavior, Docu- 9 mented Briefing (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), 6. “flies in the face of the American way of war. F.W. LaCroix and Irving N. Blickstein, Forks in the Road for the U.S. Navy (Santa Monica, CA: 31 Gregory A. Jackson, “‘Follow the Money’ and . . . But it works.”33 RAND, 2003), ix. Other Unsolicited Advice for CIOs,” Cause and Effect 10 Scott Truver, “Mix and Match,” Jane’s Defence 22, no. 1 (1999). Whether it is motherships, swarms, or Weekly, March 16, 2005, 24. 32 As quoted in Joel Garreau, Radical Evolution: some other concept of organizing for war that 11 Bill Sweetman, “U.S. Finally Looks Beyond the The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our we have not yet seen, it is still unclear what doc- B–2 for Long-Range Strike Capability,” Jane’s Interna- Bodies—And What it Means to Be Human (New trines the U.S. military will ultimately choose tional Defence Review 39 (2006), 44. York: Doubleday, 2005), 217. to organize its robots around. In turn, it is also 12 Christian Lowe, “Itsy-bitsy Drone,” April 33 U.S. Marine Corps general, interview by unclear which doctrine will prove to be the best, 5, 2005, available at .

110 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Chinese Disaster Relief Operations Identifying Critical Capability Gaps

By Nirav Patel he aftermath of the Sichuan earth- response from the Chinese civilian leadership quake relief efforts has uncovered contrasts with the Chinese military’s inefficient significant capability gaps in the execution of the relief efforts. The revelation of Tability of the People’s Liberation these capability gaps pierces through an abun- Army (PLA) to effectively and rapidly respond dance of literature from Chinese news sources to major natural disasters. Exposure of these and leaders on the “total success” of relief opera- shortcomings provides a unique insight into tions to illuminate deficiencies that could affect China’s capability to project power using its Chinese military operations from kinetic to ground forces in large-scale contingency opera- nontraditional to future relief efforts. tions that require expansive logistics, planning, The now-famous pictures of Premier and interservice cooperation. The lack of an Wen Jiabao consoling newly orphaned integrated relief campaign between the PLA Air children and parents who lost their children Force (PLAAF) and PLA hindered the execution of the emergency relief orders issued by Nirav Patel is a Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a President Hu Jintao. This immediate and firm New American Security.

PLA soldiers participate in earthquake recovery effort, May 2008 UN Photo (Evan Schneider)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 111 FEATURES | Chinese Disaster Relief Operations have been instrumental in allaying Sichuan Many of the deficits in PLA relief decade, the Politburo has slowly consolidated, residents’ fears of government neglect and also operations are attributed to a poorly integrated centralized, and made efficient once archaic conferring international praise on Beijing’s command structure, aging equipment, and decisionmaking processes. Even though these communist government. When speaking to personnel who are not trained to deal with reforms will likely take decades to be effec- Chinese strategists on a recent trip to China, humanitarian and disaster relief contingencies tively internalized in the formal policymaking I found that respect and admiration for their on the scale of the Sichuan earthquake. As one process, signs of fledging bureaucratic cultures government were palpable. It was as if China Chinese expert noted, the relief efforts were are evident, particularly in the Ministry of Civil underwent a major political revolution but not the equivalent of responding to a full-scale Affairs, whose response to the earthquake was through the barrel of a gun. For President Hu, war.4 If this is the case, and on a logistical level textbook in nature. The relief efforts exposed the earthquake relief efforts have taken China it seems accurate, there is much to learn from major gaps between the actual political one step closer to becoming a “harmonious China’s disaster relief operations in terms of response and implementation and execution society.” This has also increased Beijing’s PLA capabilities and effectiveness in potential of the formal relief orders—an indication that standing as a “responsible stakeholder” in contingency operations. even though the central government has a the international community. Witness, for Fundamental to discussions of a militar- monopoly on power and influence, the bureau- example, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee ily ascendant China is Beijing’s ability to project cratic system is slow to respond and execute Hsieng Loong’s statement that the “Sichuan power. The earthquake relief efforts have called large-scale military-led campaigns. U.S. Air Force (Chris Vadnais) U.S. Air Force

U.S. defense attaché and Chinese defense officials supervise unloading of U.S. relief supplies

earthquake showed how much China has into question many assumptions about Chinese changed and offered a glimpse of its future: capabilities. This article identifies shortcom- the relief efforts exposed a more open and self-confident nation.”1 ings in the PLA ability to respond to natural major gaps between the Hsieng’s praises were echoed by British Prime disasters, using the earthquake relief operations actual political response and Minister Gordon Brown, who said that the as a guide. The first part analyzes the effective- implementation and execution Chinese leadership’s response to the disaster in ness of China’s decisionmaking authority. The of the formal relief orders Sichuan was “nothing short of magnificent.”2 second part seeks to determine capability gaps There is a growing disconnect between in the PLA’s ability to respond to natural disas- these perceptions about prompt decisions from ters while attempting to correlate these gaps The government’s response to the the central government and the PLA’s relief with its ability to project power. earthquakes displayed a highly integrated and efforts in Sichuan Province. Many of these streamlined response mechanism to natural divergences are attributable to the central gov- Decisionmaking Authority disasters. This response was anchored in ernment’s control over information dissemina- It is important to differentiate the formal a decade-long effort to consolidate formal tion, which has made analysis of the operations decisionmaking process from the PLA’s decisionmaking authorities for disaster relief difficult at best. Government-controlled response to the disaster itself. The Chinese operations. The Law of the People’s Republic of reports in China showcase successful PLA government is highly compartmentalized, with China on Earthquake Prevention and Disaster relief campaigns, while Western media reports the Politburo and the Standing Committee Reduction and The Law of the People’s Republic (though limited in depth) and eyewitness of the Chinese Communist Party being the of China on Flood Prevention are just two accounts are citing tremendous shortcomings.3 most influential components.5 Over the last examples of heightened bureaucratic awareness

112 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu PATEL in dealing with significant natural disasters.6 In driver for quick, high-level responses from the brigades or divisions capable of responding to 2003, the Ministry of Civil Affairs established central government. The PLA has also carefully particular hybrid contingencies, such as disaster the working Rules of the Ministry of Civil Affairs observed and internalized—as evident in the relief, and more broadly to full-spectrum wars in Response to Unexpected Natural Disasters, 2006 PRC Defense White Paper’s description (for example, counterinsurgency campaigns which is meant to guide the central govern- of disaster relief operations as the government and nationbuilding exercises). ment’s response to domestic natural mishaps.7 “loving the people”13—how quick and effec- The military has been instrumental A complex web of authorities guides disaster tive response to disasters can generate positive in relief operations because many roads and relief efforts. China’s response strategy is com- public and international opinions of China.14 bridges leading to the epicenter were destroyed, posed of a unified leadership—headed by Pres- The centrality of effective and integrated which inhibited mobility of heavy vehicles and ident Hu—that controls the overall situation. information operation (IO) campaigns will rescue workers. Airlift capabilities have also At the regional level, various actors implement thus remain a key part of disaster relief efforts. been extremely important for the delivery of disaster relief strategies—in theory the regional “Winning the hearts and minds” of disaffected food, water, and critical relief personnel to the government is considered the primary relief citizens is a lesson the Chinese have learned hardest hit and least accessible areas. However, body, but in practice the PLA and central gov- from American-led tsunami relief operations despite laborious work by hundreds of thou- ernment seem to exercise greater control.8 This in 2004. The leadership in Beijing will also con- sands of Chinese workers and nongovernmen- seems particularly obvious in the aftermath of tinue to take steps to improve its international tal organizations, progress has been limited the Sichuan earthquake. image as a receptive and responsible govern- and anxiety in the region is increasing as relief The creation of disaster relief management. This will ensure that the central govern- assistance gains have slowed and the death toll ment architecture9 is in sharp contrast to the ment efficiently responds to humanitarian continues to soar, now eclipsing 70,000. last major earthquake disaster relief operation disasters. China’s IO campaign and censorship conducted in Tangshan in 1976, where the gov- of stories critical of relief efforts have created ernment’s response was slow, uncoordinated, a one-way stream of information that has in Beijing’s efforts in the and negligent. Signs of improvement in the many ways colored over actual shortcomings. aftermath of the earthquake decisionmaking process were on display prior What is becoming apparent is that provide insight about large- to the May 2008 earthquakes. Immediately after advancement in decisionmaking processes in scale deployments requiring the January 2008 blizzard left over 100 million Beijing is not translating into effective response airlift assets and heavy Chinese stranded, the central government or enforcement in disaster relief operations. equipment for ground quickly allocated the necessary resources and The central government’s response to domestic authority to help thaw out hundreds of thou- disasters has not carried over into an effective transport sands of square miles of land. In both examples, physical demonstration of PLA capabilities. China’s response was effective, but its imple- Actual PLA responses to the 2008 snowstorm Although there has been progress in mentation lacked the same efficient resolve. were woefully inadequate, as Kent Ewing, recovery operations, various news reports and In the immediate aftermath of the earth- professor at Hong Kong’s International School, private conversations reveal significant chal- quake, President Hu quickly and effectively noted: “In the end, the central government lenges that the PLA—and its antiquated ground directed government focus and resources to committed 2.7 billion Yuan (US$376 million) to capabilities—will continue to face in future assist in the implementation of relief operations disaster relief, but the lack of any effective disas- disaster relief or even military operations. Many in Sichuan Province. Premier Wen’s leadership ter management plan was a glaring omission in current failures are attributable to the Chinese was also instrumental in centralizing coordina- central government planning.”15 This criticism perspective that the sheer mass of the work- tion efforts to ensure that citizens in the hardest is becoming prevalent again as relief workers force can supplant modern capabilities such as hit areas were given top priority to receive in Sichuan continue to struggle to provide earthmoving equipment.17 Contrast this with water and food rations.10 The General Staff adequate support to millions of quake victims. national security writings that claim the PLA Headquarters of the PLA also immediately Beijing’s efforts in the aftermath of the is undergoing a major revolution in military issued an instruction calling for the Chengdu May 12 earthquake provide significant insight affairs (RMA) “to transform its military from Military Region, PLAAF, and Armed Police to about the capabilities the PLA is likely to an army based on Mao Zedong’s principles of respond to the disaster.11 Similar processes were pool to deal with future disaster relief opera- mass-oriented, infantry-heavy People’s War, to followed in the aftermath of the January 2008 tions and potentially large-scale deployments what many foreign observers perceive to be an snowstorms that paralyzed over 19 provinces requiring airlift assets and heavy equipment agile, high-technology force.”18 The relief efforts and left hundreds of millions seeking to return for ground transport. It is important to keep in quickly exposed how far China’s ground and air home for the Lunar Spring stuck in the snow.12 mind that the earthquake relief effort has been assets are from successfully modernizing and The government’s effective decisionmak- the broadest deployment of PLA troops since becoming the nimble forces necessary to effec- ing process displayed in both of these situations the 1979 border war with Vietnam. tively project power. Hong Kong–based military is likely to continue as central government More than 140,000 military personnel analyst Andrei Chang noted that emergency relief procedures become more have been mobilized in the aftermath of the refined and consolidated and as leaders seek to Sichuan earthquake. These soldiers are “from the relief mission had exposed weakness in balance their political interests with the needs all sectors of the military—from paratroopers to the PLA. The force was struggling to carry of their people. Preventing a rebellion similar the strategic-missile divisions.”16 Such divergent out operations that would be standard during to the Tiananmen uprising remains a major composition highlights a lack of specialized modern warfare. . . . The disaster areas are ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 113 FEATURES | Chinese Disaster Relief Operations like real battlefields. Good coordination, air-based operations in the future. During from being accomplished or balanced to meet cooperation among different forces is neces- earthquake relief operations, the Chengdu future strategic needs. sary in today’s battlefields. But the PLA just Military Regional Air Force (CMRAF)—the The PLA’s limited airlift capabilities were couldn’t do it. smallest in terms of aircraft number and enhanced in this case by foreign assistance. The assets—was initially in charge of coordinat- decision to accept international support was a Airlift Capability Gaps ing the air-based relief campaign. Its aviation major shift in posture. Prior to the earthquake, The Sichuan earthquake is a quintes- element consists of two fighter divisions and the PLA was hesitant to accept external help, sential example of an airlift-dependent disaster one airlift division.20 Formed in 2005, the 4th but afterward allowed U.S. Pacific Command relief operation. Roads, bridges, and tunnels Airlift is woefully underequipped: it has a few to send two C–17 Globemaster III transport were destroyed, limiting access to almost Mi-17V7 helicopters for search and rescue planes to Chengdu—delivering upward of 40,000 square miles of earthquake-devastated missions, and its proposed upgrade of Il-76MD 200,000 pounds of disaster relief supplies.27 lands. Despite President Hu directing Chinese transport planes and Il-78 aerial tankers has Russia dispatched 15 Il-76 military-use resources to respond to the crisis, significant been seriously delayed by Russia, the maker transport planes to deliver some 350 tons of airlift capability gaps have hindered responses of these platforms.21 The CMRAF is in charge humanitarian aid. A Russian MiG–26 heavy- to relief operations, which require strong of the defense of Sichuan Province and is duty transport helicopter is assisting China’s air-, land-, and seabased assets. Airpower is the first responder to such crises as the 2008 only MiG–26 in transporting heavy digging demonstrated not only by possession of air earthquake. Unfortunately, its inadequate capa- machines to the Tangjiashan quake-lake.28 superiority fighters, but also by a full-spectrum bilities severely undermined initial transport- Pakistan sent two C–130 transport planes, composition of capabilities to respond to any dependent relief operations. The CMRAF is while South Korea and Taiwan also contrib- challenge to a nation’s security. Airlift is a criti- just a microcosm of poor PLAAF heavy-lift uted disaster relief assistance. Even corporate cal element of a nation’s ability to project power capabilities. donors provided airlift. For example, Federal overseas, and China’s shortcomings in this area Chinese military expert Dai Xu noted Express furnished critical heavy lift for ferry- highlight big gaps in its airpower. Many of the that “looking at the PLA’s equipment and rapid ing humanitarian supplies to disaster-stricken capabilities and assets required for large-scale response capabilities from the perspective areas.29 Furthermore, Beijing’s decision to disaster and humanitarian relief operations of modern warfare, there is still a great gap temporarily divert some Air China resources to are also useful for direct action operations. For between the PLA and advanced militaries.”22 ensure the transportation of PLA soldiers and example, strategic airlift and force structures A lack of capable airlift also complicated the resources to Chengdu was vital.30 optimized to deal with postdisaster reconstruc- efforts of relief workers, who arrived via train Defense Industrial Base. Compounding tion have utility in counterinsurgency opera- and commercial flights to Chengdu.23 In many the PLA’s limited airlift capability is a relatively tions that focus on alleviating conditions that instances, these workers were forced to hike weak indigenous development program for make radicalism more likely (such as poverty). through harsh terrain, leaving many in poor transport planes. The PLAAF’s main strategic In these operations, the center of gravity is shape to assist when they reached the quake- transport aircraft, the Il-76, which was used in not kinetic effects but meeting the needs of ravaged villages.24 early responders’ efforts to deliver relief sup- disenfranchised people. Strategic airlift is also useful in troop deployments for large-scale diversion of airlift platforms from all over the country indicates that military operations, as evinced by over 60 years the PLAAF’s ambitious growth plan is far from being accomplished of aviation history from the Berlin airlift to the 2004 tsunami core group efforts. In contemporary terms, ferrying tens of thousands of According to Dennis Blasko, former U.S. plies and personnel to the epicenter, is manu- soldiers into landlocked environments, such as Army Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, factured in Russia. The Y–8 is a Soviet-era, Afghanistan, requires significant heavy lift and “Because the military did not have heavy-lift Ukrainian-designed plane with an airframe rotor lift capabilities. helicopters, vital equipment like excavators and built in the 1960s; however, recent avionics Poor air relief efforts have exposed a sig- cranes had to be brought in on roads obstructed and engine upgrades have enhanced the once nificant crack in the PLAAF ability to respond by landslides, slowing the pace of the rescue handicapped plane.31 The MiG–17 and the to major challenges, both traditional and non- operations.”25 Even though the Chinese deployed MiG–26 transport helicopter with its remote- traditional. There are five main reasons for this air assets, the fleet was limited and was therefore sensing technology are also built in Russia. shortfall: aging aircraft in limited supply, a rela- forced to pool civilian assets for relief operations. Meanwhile, the first helicopter to land in tively young and inefficient defense industrial Assets were diverted from PLA Navy air wings to Wenchuan was a U.S.-made S–70 Black Hawk. base, lack of recognition within the PLAAF of provide environmental reconnaissance assistance Ultimately, Chinese disaster relief efforts were the need to invest in equipment for peacetime to address damage in regions that were too dif- hindered by a lack of capable heavy- and operations, inadequately trained pilots,19 and ficult to navigate by land. More than 100 MiG–17 rotor-lift capabilities. Reliance on foreign airlift lack of clarity between China’s civilian and and Black Hawk helicopters were dispatched assets to bridge PLA shortcomings is not a military leadership. from every national military region, and China’s comfortable path for PLA authorities, but it Aging and Limited Airlift Assets. A Y–8 transport planes provided important assis- highlights a major gap in their capabilities. significant constraint for the PLA is the tance to devastated areas.26 Diversion of airlift The Chinese helicopter industry is one PLAAF’s limited and aging strategic airlift platforms from all over the country indicates that of the nation’s weakest sectors. The earthquake capability, which is likely to constrain major the PLAAF’s rather ambitious growth plan is far relief operations highlighted that additional

114 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu PATEL and improved helicopters will be necessary to China anticipates strategic challenges and also That is why they had to drop material from respond to future contingencies, which will offers a potential explanation for its aging and higher up, and that explains why the landings likely pose tremendous strain on the national limited heavy-lift capability. It is unknown were not accurate.”39 For example, during the economy and government as well as on state whether the earthquake relief operations have immediate aftermath of the quake, poorly security. China is in the process of procuring sufficiently demonstrated that the PLAAF trained pilots tried and failed twice in landing and producing more helicopters, such as the should recapitalize its existing heavy-lift fleet or a helicopter in the ravaged epicenter.40 Airlift Mi-171 (transport airlift),32 and its Aviation else invest in new strategic lift platforms. Industry Corporation II is also in a multiyear Inadequate Training. The lack of a rigor- competition for resources plan to resuscitate Chinese transport-lift capac- ous training regimen will likely undermine has created a perception ity.33 However, without a greater investment in future disaster relief campaigns. According to domestic production of transport planes, it is one Shanghai-based expert, “[b]ecause of an that nontraditional security unlikely that the existing airlift fleet will be able insufficient budget, many pilots can only fly operations compromise efforts to handle future large-scale relief operations. once a year. . . . The mountainous terrain in to deal with a cross-straits A lack of sufficient open-source evidence on Sichuan made an air-drop operation very diffi- contingency procurement of rotor- and heavy-lift assets is a cult. Inexperienced pilots dared not fly too low. major constraint in analyzing the effectiveness of Chinese responses to future contingencies, Chinese military vehicle moves humanitarian but major changes in PLAAF doctrine indicate relief supplies that aviation platform procurement trends are tilting toward so-called next-generation platforms.34 Shift in PLAAF Doctrine. The 10th Com- munist Party of China Congress made a major announcement in 2004, branding the PLAAF a “strategic air-force.” This move not only embraced the development of a more futuristic and independent air force service culture, but also forced a major reorientation in aviation platform acquisition priorities. A more independent service culture has given the PLAAF political space to focus on a large-scale buildup of long-range assets designed to achieve air superiority and dominance.35 This trend is reflected in the 2008 edition of the annual Pen- tagon report on China’s assessment of PLAAF assets and procurement trends.36 Dai Xu believes the Chinese army has the experience to establish an aviation force. The questions are how to “aviationalise” the army based on this experience and whether there is sufficient support for such a transformation.37 The latter issue remains a major concern that is perhaps intractable given the PLAAF’s doctrinal shift. Efforts to modernize and acquire fourth- and fifth-generation air superiority fighters continue to occupy budgetary resources, leaving PLA efforts to rebalance and modernize its existing forces on a relatively poor foundation. Competition for resources has in recent years created a perception that nontraditional security operations—such as peacekeeping and humanitarian-based relief initiatives—compromise efforts to deal with larger traditional security challenges—particularly, a cross-straits contingency.38 Focus on next-generation platforms, a major element of the PLA RMA program, provides some indication of where (Chris Vadnais) U.S. Air Force ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 115 FEATURES | Chinese Disaster Relief Operations operations require constant preparedness and past decade is implemented in PLA operations. larly if missions involve foreign deployments. acclimatizing to conditions that necessitate The number of laws on the book pertaining Leaving soldiers ill equipped and undertrained thorough and regular training exercises. Failure to disaster relief operations will ring hollow if will generate further challenges. of the PLAAF to allocate resources to meet the Central Military Commission is not able to PLA efforts in the Sichuan earthquake these needs will undermine not only disaster mediate interservice disputes. Strong civilian were overwhelmed in many ways by the relief operations but also combined arms cam- control may not have enhanced China’s disaster devastated roads and ground-based access paigns that require joint land and air assets. A relief effort, but it would have provided greater routes. Moreover, earthmoving equipment lack of joint training further highlights signifi- continuity in the implementation of the Stand- and heavy vehicles for transport of debris were cant failures in the PLA ability to implement ing Committee’s relief policies. In terms of inadequate because of the sheer magnitude of its modular force restructuring plan, which future large-scale operations, failure to mediate the disaster.42 The government made public places greater value on interservice cooperation civil-military disputes could endanger the requests for donations of rescue equipment, from the division to battalion level. If the PLA continuity that militaries require to efficiently rubber boats, demolition tools, shovels, and is to be faced with contingencies that require execute and achieve their stated objectives. cranes. With over 4 million homes demolished operational assistance from both the PLA and and roads and bridges destroyed, the PLA has PLAAF, reconciliation of operational roles and Ground-based Relief Efforts been unable to match its assets to the enormity command must be given greater priority. For over three decades, the PLA’s central of the problem. Even after heavy earthmoving Civil-Military Relations. Compound- focus has been preparation for a possible equipment was made available, destroyed roads ing interservice rivalry is the lack of balance Taiwan contingency. Shaping the military prohibited entry into disaster zones. As dams between the civilian leadership and the PLA—a to deal with disaster relief operations as a began to show signs of fatigue, concerns grew balance vital in mediating interservice dis- core competency will meet with tremendous about getting construction equipment on site putes and ensuring joint service cooperation. opposition from PLA leaders, who perceive to fortify the structures. PLA and civil authori- According to David Shambaugh, “Since the non-Taiwan operations as trading off with pre- ties went so far as to solicit assistance from Cat- mid 1990s, there has been an evident, if subter- paredness for a cross-straits operation, particu- erpillar, which specializes in the manufacture ranean, three-way struggle being played out of heavy vehicles and earthmoving equipment. among the army, party, and government—with Land-based efforts, perhaps more than the army seeking greater autonomy. . . . No mobilizing a hundred airlift shortcomings, highlight Chinese per- radical restricting of party-army relations has thousand soldiers to ceptions of the value of mass manual labor been undertaken.”41 Absent the development of manually dig trenches rather over modern equipment such as bulldozers. service cultures that are able to coexist under than spending millions on Reports of soldiers forming human chains and the mantle of civilian leadership, the likely earthmoving equipment digging trenches and water diversion routes direction of PLA efforts will remain largely with shovels indicate both a lack of high-tech divergent from the CCP’s proscriptions. is a gamble the PLA and resources and a friction against implementa- Effective civilian control is important to the government seemed tion of RMA processes. This is in sharp ensure that the slew of disaster relief laws pro- comfortable taking contrast to reports that the “PLA is committed mulgated by the Standing Committee over the to hardening the army with both tracked and wheeled armored vehicles.”43 James Mulvenon, a specialist on the Chinese military at the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, argues that although troops were mobilized, they were basically “a bunch of guys humping through the mountains on foot and digging out people with their hands . . . it was not a stellar example of a modern military.”44 Mobilizing a hundred thousand soldiers to manually dig trenches, move rubble, and support dams rather than spending millions on earthmoving equipment is a gamble the PLA and the Chinese government seemed comfortable taking. Balancing the needs of the RMA process with procurement of more traditional heavy-lift equipment is a challenge that the army seems to have overlooked. Whether it commits resources to replenish and modernize these assets remains an undecided but logical course of action given the deficiencies identi- PLA soldiers construct temporary housing for fied during the relief operations. earthquake survivors, May 2008

UN Photo (Evan Schneider)

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As China becomes further dependent of the relief operations were relatively slow 18 Richard Bitzinger, “China’s Revolution in on foreign sources of energy, it will find itself and unorganized. The PLA and its component Military Affairs: Rhetoric Versus Reality,” Jamestown vulnerable to security threats that require more branches lacked the platforms and capabilities Foundation China Brief 8, no. 5 (February 29, 2008). 19 Guo and Chen. than sheer military force. Its ability to secure to execute the Standing Committee’s orders. 20 “Chengdu Military Region Air Force,” January key pipelines in insurgent strongholds in West The magnitude of the earthquake also demon- 25, 2008, available at . pose tremendous security risks and will require deal with and that will prove particularly useful 21 Ibid. a force structure that is mobile and capable of in determining its ability to respond to future 22 See Zhang Jiaqi and Liu Bin, “Foreign military responding to unconventional challenges. More military-led campaigns, whether humanitarian aircraft participate in Chinese disaster relief,” Global than anything, the Iraq War has impressed or warlike in nature. For the foreseeable future, Times, May 29, 2008. upon the intelligentsia that even China is not procurement priorities will likely trend toward 23 Ibid. immune to terrorist threats. Adapting the force a more robust RMA-driven agenda, leaving 24 Ibid. 25 structure to deal with such challenges should many of the capability gaps identified in this Hooker. 26 be a top priority, but as demonstrated by the article unaddressed. JFQ Ibid. 27 Chris Vadnais, “Airmen deliver 200,000 lbs PLA’s relief efforts, it currently is not. The most of relief to China,” Air Force News Agency, May 18, capable ground forces are able to conduct both Notes 2008. kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Mechanics, 28 Ibid. 1 Zheng Xiaoyi, “Asian security summit focuses engineers, systems planners, and language 29 “FedEx, Heart to Heart to deliver private airlift on int’l co-op in disaster relief,” Xinhua News specialists are vital to reconstructing war-torn to China,” Associated Press, May 30, 2008. Agency, June 2, 2008. insurgent strongholds and ensuring security 30 “Air China helps with earthquake relief effort,” 2 Quote appears in Sunday Herald (Glasgow), and stability. The earthquake relief efforts Airline Industry Information, May 16, 2008. “Earthquake relief lifts the foundering reputation of 31 “Y–8 Turboprop Transport Aircraft,” June 13, demonstrated a rather monochromatic and the ‘people’s premier,’” May 31, 2008. 2008, available at . 2008. 32 “China starts producing Russian Mi-171 There is a silver lining to China’s relief 4 Briefing with Chinese Institute of Contempo- helicopters,” RIA Novosti, May 12, 2008, available efforts. Regardless of major shortcomings, the rary International Relations, June 19, 2008. at . tify capability gaps that should be addressed— China,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 33 “China to Expand Helicopter Manufacturing October 12, 2007. and successful units that should be expanded— Industry,” AsiaPulse News, November 19, 2002. 6 Ministry of Civil Affairs, International Civil to enhance its capacity to deal with the growing 34 See Carlo Kopp, Backfires and the PLA-AF’s Defense Directory (Beijing: Department of Foreign threat of natural disasters. New Strategic Air Force, International Assessment Affairs, n.d.), 1, available at . 35 Ibid. has failed in its earthquake response—on the 7 Ibid., 3. 36 See Department of Defense, Military Power of contrary, it identifies successes in the decision- 8 Ibid., 2. the People’s Republic of China 2008, Annual Report to making process. However, the relief operations 9 Disaster relief architecture is defined as the Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary revealed many deficiencies in the PLA ability to “mechanism to deal with disaster response, relief, of Defense, 2008), 5. implement and execute the Standing Commit- and rehabilitation.” See Eng Seng Chia, “Engineering 37 Ibid. tee’s edicts. It is hard to draw direct operational Disaster Relief,” IEEE Technology and Society Maga- 38 Thompson. lessons from these shortcomings, but absent zine (Fall 2007), 27. 39 Ibid. 10 Sunday Herald (Glasgow). greater investment in strategic airlift, the PLA 40 Ibid. 11 As reported in “Chinese President Issues is likely to be constrained on a number of 41 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s ‘Important Instruction’ on Sichuan Earthquake,” fronts, both during peacetime and in response Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: Xinhua News Agency, May 13, 2008. to security challenges that require the transport University of California Press, 2002), 11–12. 12 Kent Ewing, “Winter debris exposes China’s 42 Jonathan Watts and Rachel Stevenson, “After- of troops outside of the mainland. woes,” Asia Times, February 21, 2008. shock sparks landslides in earthquake area, says The government response to the 13 China’s National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: a g e n c y,” The Guardian (London), May 16, 2008. earthquake has highlighted many interesting Information Office of the State Council, January 43 Martin Andrew, “The PLA’s Evolving Opera- capacities of both the PLA and Chinese Com- 2006). tional Doctrine: Experiments in Modularity,” Jame- munist Party bureaucracy. In the immediate 14 Drew Thompson, “China’s army looks beyond stown Foundation China Brief 8, no. 5 (February 29, aftermath of the earthquake, the central its shores,” Asia Times, May 29, 2008, available at 2008), 7. . government effectively and efficiently passed 44 15 As quoted in Hooker. national emergency measures and directed Ibid. 16 all necessary resources to devastated regions. Al Guo and Minnie Chen, “Relief Operation Bares Army Weaknesses,” South China Morning Post, This response highlighted a more efficient May 23, 2008. bureaucratic process that seemed to internal- 17 Jake Hooker, “Quake Revealed Deficiencies of ize many laws from decades past governing China’s Military,” The New York Times, July 2, 2008. disaster relief and emergency powers. On the other hand, the implementation and execution ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 117 China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century

ver the past decade, while the United States and other Western powers focused on counterterrorism and traditional aid programs in Africa, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) developed a broad, unified strategy toward Africa. This policy spans O government ministries and uses all four instruments of national power. “China’s African Policy,” announced in January 2006, is a bold step for the PRC as it demonstrates a fundamental foreign policy change for a government that once valued noninterference as its highest standard. Although the policy still espouses China’s historic respect for the sovereignty of other countries, the scope of its activities reveals a clear intent to advance Beijing’s involvement in Africa beyond historical levels and build strategic partnerships on the continent that will substantially increase China’s economic, political, and military presence. With U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) now having full operational capability, it is important for officials to understand the extent of the PRC’s engagement in Africa, where it is going in the future, and the implications for USAFRICOM.

By Jennifer L. Parenti UN Photo (Eric Kanalstein)

Chinese contingent of United Nations mission in Liberia holds ceremony, 2005

118 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu PARENTI

History economy and the desire to take a larger role in the African Union (AU). Although Beijing has China and Africa share a common world affairs underpin nearly all of Beijing’s discussed a partnership with the AU, it has history with respect to colonialism and their activities in Africa. established no formal programs except a few economic and political developments. China’s legislative exchanges that promote cultural 2006 African policy stems from the resulting PRC Policy in Action understanding but do not provide a forum decades of growing formal and informal Sino- China’s African policy categorizes its for discussing specific initiatives. In addition African cooperation since World War II. The interests in Africa into four “fields”—political; to China’s institutional efforts, it increased underlying principles behind this coopera- education, science, culture, health, and social; diplomatic engagement with the nations of tion, documented at the first Asian-African peace and security; and economic2—which Africa by establishing political exchange pro- conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, are comparable to the diplomatic, informa- grams and expanding embassy and consulate declared Beijing’s respect for the sovereignty tion, military, and economic instruments of representation both in Africa and in China. of other nations and pledged to avoid interfer- U.S. national power. The following details To this end, the PRC established national ing in the internal affairs of other countries. many of China’s activities over the past decade bilateral committees, political consultations Yet despite the nature of these principles, in these four areas while making predictions between comparable foreign ministries (that China’s recent actions demonstrate a more about where they might go in the future. is, defense-defense, energy-energy), and sister- proactive involvement on the African conti- Diplomatic. Over the past decade, city programs. These programs were designed nent. Over the past decade, a shift in domestic China set out to improve diplomatic relations to facilitate cooperation and learning among politics made it acceptable and necessary with Africa on two primary fronts: first, lower levels of government.7 to engage in matters external to the PRC. institutionally through official forums; and Behind many of these diplomatic pro- Understanding the roots of this cultural shift second, bilaterally through political exchange grams is the PRC desire to gain international is central to understanding the intent behind programs and an expanded embassy and support for its policy on Taiwan. To this China’s African policy and its interests on the consular presence. In general, these efforts end, China is trading economic and political continent. had three purposes: to help spread China’s support to African nations in exchange for message of mutual benefit and equality to their formal denouncement of Taiwan.8 It has China’s New Outlook African leaders, to create opportunities for applied this policy consistently over the past More than anything, China’s growing Chinese businesses abroad, and to encourage 10 years, reestablishing formal diplomatic ties economy, especially over the past decade, African nations to support the “One China with many African countries after they ended forced a shift in foreign policy in order for the Policy” with respect to Taiwan.3 diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Under these country to maintain its economic growth. The 9.5 percent rate of growth since 1996 neces- China hopes to draw attention and business away from sitated the change by creating an increased demand for energy and raw materials to Africa’s traditional aid and trading partners— support Chinese industries. To compete with the United States and the European Union the United States and the European Union in the African oil market, the PRC had to get China’s premiere institutional venture conditions, China resumed diplomatic rela- more involved in regional and local organiza- in Africa is the Forum on China-Africa Coop- tions with South Africa, the Central African tions and affairs, in contrast to its previous eration (FOCAC). The most recent FOCAC, Republic, and Guinea-Bissau in 1998; Liberia policies of noninterference. held in Beijing in November 2006, had the in 2003; Senegal in 2005; Chad in 2006; and, China’s newfound prosperity also participation of 48 African nations, including most recently, Malawi in December 2007.9 As enabled the change by bolstering its people’s 43 heads of state.4 The resulting action plan a result, only four African nations formally confidence in their nation’s world position. laid out 73 bilateral agreements for the years recognize Taiwan today—Burkina Faso, On the African continent, the effects of this 2007–2009. Swaziland, The Gambia, and Sao Tome and transformation are evident in two key areas: In addition to the FOCAC, China pro- Principe. an ever-increasing presence of Chinese vided substantial support to the New Partner- In general, China’s diplomatic efforts in expatriated civilians and military forces, and ship for African Development (NEPAD). That Africa over the past decade were considered increased economic and political investment. support helped NEPAD further its objectives favorable. However, there are indications that By engaging in this manner, China hopes to eradicate poverty, promote sustainable some of its activities constituted deliberate to draw attention and business away from growth and development, integrate African interference in African domestic politics, Africa’s traditional aid and trading partners— countries into the global economy, and which has weakened its diplomatic standing the United States and the European Union.1 accelerate the empowerment of women.5 This in some areas. These activities provide strong Ultimately, this need to support a growing formula of providing assistance to a preexist- evidence of China’s shift away from its his- ing aid organization proved successful and torical noninterference policy. Most notable contributed to a 5 percent economic growth among these actions are interference in Zim- Major Jennifer L. Parenti, USAF, is Deputy Chief rate on the continent in the 3 years following babwean and Zambian presidential elections. of the Military Personnel Exchange Program, China’s partnership with NEPAD.6 In Zimbabwe, China delivered pro- International Airmen Division, Deputy Under Notably absent from these institutional paganda bearing the insignia of Robert Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs. endeavors is a formal Chinese delegation to Mugabe’s incumbent political party prior to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 119 FEATURES | China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century the 2005 election.10 In addition, the Chinese China. The PRC further intends to increase self-defense of the receiving country, not are reported to have offered Mugabe jamming its attaché presence in Africa, according to the compromising regional and/or international devices to use against pro-opposition radio 2006 FOCAC Action Plan. security, and not interfering with a nation’s stations.11 During the 2006 Zambia elec- In addition, the PRC sponsors numer- internal affairs. tions, China’s ambassador threatened to ous exchanges between the PLA and foreign There is continued and valid debate cut diplomatic relations with the country if militaries. In the past 2 years, senior PLA regarding the sincerity of China’s application voters elected the pro-Taiwanese opposition officials have visited more than 60 countries, of these guiding principles with respect to candidate. Given China’s role as a leading and high-ranking defense officials from more its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. investor in Zambian industries, especially than 90 countries have visited China.15 At a Despite China’s insistence that its weapons copper, the loss would have been a huge blow lower level, the functional military exchanges to the Zambian economy. Despite strong anti- are where real military cooperation occurs. Chinese business sentiment in Zambia prior These exchanges focus on core military capa- the PLA has regular military to the election and popular support for the bilities, such as training, logistics, personnel, interaction with 41 African opposition candidate, the incumbent presi- policy, and force structure. Many exchanges countries and pledges to dent won.12 These actions are clear evidence of are unreported, but China has at least 34 increase current levels of China’s willingness to get involved in foreign active high-level and functional exchanges involvement substantially domestic politics. with African nations. Military. The past decade also saw widespread changes in China’s foreign Chinese soldiers serving under United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur arrive in Sudan, 2008 defense policy. The 2006 White Paper, China’s National Defense in 2006, charges the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with “implementing the military strategy of active defense”13—a term that has grown to provide justification for use of military force outside the PRC’s borders. For the first time, the paper outlines the PLA’s responsibilities to:

n take the initiative to prevent and defuse crises and deter conflicts and wars n take part in international security cooperation, strengthen strategic coordination and consultation with major powers and neighboring countries, and conduct bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises n play an active part in maintaining

global and regional peace and stability. UN (Stuart Price)

Bolstered by the change in policy, the In addition to military exchanges, are not fueling regional conflict or instability, PLA has regular military interaction with China’s participation in United Nations (UN) there is evidence to the contrary. In fact, most 41 African countries and pledges to increase peacekeeping operations in Africa is on the Chinese FMS over the past 15 years are going current levels of involvement substantially rise. In 2006, it provided over 1,600 personnel to some of the least stable areas of Africa, before 2010. Overall, PLA activities in Africa to peacekeeping operations in Africa—about including Zimbabwe, Congo, and Sudan. can be grouped into three major categories: 70 percent of its global peacekeeping efforts.16 Clearly, FMS and Chinese military investment military exchanges, peacekeeping operations, The PRC made pledges at both the 2006 in Africa are on the rise and will continue as and arms sales.14 FOCAC Summit and recent UN Security long as there is a market for these weapons Generally, there are three types of Council meetings to increase support to peace- and the resources to procure them. It is also exchanges in place: formal military atta- keeping operations and provide additional clear that as China continues its bid to become chés, high-level exchanges, and functional training and equipment to African peacekeep- a major world actor, it will need to exercise exchanges. The PLA’s attaché program has ing forces. more judgment to avoid international scrutiny grown extensively in the past 20 years, and Similarly, Chinese arms sales to Africa that could undermine its strategic objectives. not only in Africa. Just in the past 10 years, are increasing. Between 1996 and 2003, China Future PLA operations in Africa are Beijing has more than doubled its worldwide became the world’s second largest exporter expected to include more security operations attaché representation at home and abroad. of weapons to Africa, accounting for over and increased maritime presence. PLA naval Currently, it has attaché representation in 10 percent of total imports.17 According to activity in the waters around Africa is on one-third of African nations, and, in return, PRC policy, all arms sales should meet three the rise, under the guise of joint exercises, 75 percent of these countries have attachés in key objectives: supporting the legitimate antiterrorism activities, and general maritime

120 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu PARENTI security. In addition, threats to Chinese busi- strings attached to most Western offers (for gic information campaign to improve China’s nesses and personnel in Africa, including the political reform, human rights accountability, image on the continent and has opened the kidnapping and murder of Chinese workers or weapons restrictions).19 The formula proved doors for many of its companies to conduct in both Ethiopia and Nigeria, highlight an successful for China in securing several long- business there. Leading this campaign is emerging security threat for the PRC. The term lucrative oil deals. President Hu Jintao, who has made a series PLA is expected to engage in both of these Typical of these transactions was of high-visibility state visits to Africa since areas more openly (directly and indirectly China’s dealings with Angola in 2005–2006. taking office in 2003. Hu’s public engagements through training and equipping local forces) In 2005, China gave a US$2 billion oil-backed generally include announcements of increased to ensure the safety of PRC personnel and loan to Angola to improve its weakened infra- aid or debt relief and, therefore, are viewed business interests. structure. In 2006, it added US$1 billion to favorably by his African counterparts. Economic. Since 2000, the PRC’s that loan.20 During this timeframe, it appears Information. China’s increased pres- economic investment in Africa increased that Chinese companies secured exactly ence in Africa brought with it concerns about substantially. Three major factors facilitated US$3 billion of infrastructure contracts in the true intent of its activities. Many African this growth: increased reliance on natural Angola, with most of the required workforce leaders are still concerned that China will resources, especially oil; relaxed policies to coming from imported Chinese laborers.21 not deliver on promised initiatives from the promote Chinese business activities in Africa; Two months after the signing of the second 2006 FOCAC Summit. In addition, there is a and deliberate courting of high-level African loan, Angola’s state-run oil company relin- perception among many leaders that Beijing is deliberately choosing the most corrupt governments (Angola, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Nigeria) to do business with.23 The most difficult perception China has to overcome, however, is that the money it is earning in Africa will be invested back home, with little long-term benefit to African nations. This perception stems primarily from use of imported Chinese laborers for the majority of its manpower requirements and concerns over the quality of its investments, particularly construction projects, which can vary substantially between companies and regions.24 In addition, because Chinese companies are able to underbid African businesses (primarily due to subsidies from the PRC government), many African companies have been forced out of business by the PLA engineers serve in United Nations mission in new competition.25 Realizing its perception Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2008 problems and sticking to its message of gains UN (Marie Frechon) for all involved, China has embarked on a political and business leaders to protect quished 40 percent of an offshore oil block to multifaceted strategic information campaign Chinese business interests. a Chinese company for a $1.4 billion invest- to improve relations. The primary driver behind the increase ment.22 Angola is repaying the loans with This campaign, which permeates nearly in Chinese economic activity is the need 10,000 barrels of oil per day. every level of African society, has two high- for oil and other natural resources. In 2003, level objectives: to promote a positive image of China became the world’s second largest the PRC’s strategy for securing China and to improve cultural understanding consumer of oil, behind the United States. In between China and African nations. To this anticipation of their growing requirements, petroleum resources has been end, the PRC has sponsored numerous initia- Chinese petroleum companies started inten- to pursue the cooperation tives in both Africa and China that encourage sifying African oil investment in 1995. Today, of oil-rich countries with greater interaction between the peoples and sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 28 percent of nonbinding economic aid, cultures. 18 China’s total oil imports. infrastructure projects, and In the educational forum, Beijing’s ini- The PRC’s general strategy for secur- debt relief tiatives include setting up 100 rural schools; ing petroleum resources has been to pursue providing training for education officials the cooperation of oil-rich countries with and teachers at all levels; building Confucius nonbinding economic aid, infrastructure As part of its focus on promoting invest- Institutes to teach the Chinese language in projects, and debt relief. These programs are ment in oil-rich African nations, Beijing is Africa; establishing government programs attractive to African countries because they paving the way by courting political and busi- to encourage teaching African languages provide benefit to the host nation without the ness leaders. This effort is also part of a strate- in China; and creating a number of student ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 121 FEATURES | China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century exchange programs.26 On the medical side, cooperation that are beneficial to both nations partnership with the African Union. In China pledged to help construct 30 hospitals, and their African partners. contrast, USAFRICOM already has a formal build 30 centers for the prevention and treat- A simple comparison of China’s delegate to the AU.34 ment of malaria,27 and donate US$8 million National Defense in 2006 and the 2006 U.S. To build on the PRC’s previous successes to the World Health Organization to build National Security Strategy reveals several and take advantage of existing relationships, African countries’ ability to respond to public common objectives. To recall, China’s USAFRICOM should establish a formal health emergencies.28 National Defense in 2006 outlined the follow- organization for cooperative foreign security In addition to these and other cultural ing objectives for the PLA: ventures in Africa. This organization could programs, China recently granted Approved be established as part of the AU Peace and Destination Status (ADS) to 26 African n take the initiative to prevent and defuse Security Council (PSC) and would provide nations. This designation indicates that a crises and deter conflicts and wars a forum for foreign countries to coordinate, country is preapproved for Chinese tourists n take part in international security deconflict, and potentially consolidate dis- and expedites the visa process for Chinese cooperation, strengthen strategic coordina- parate security efforts, including protecting citizens wanting to travel abroad. The PRC tion and consultation with major powers and assets and natural resources and training and also promised to extend the special status to neighboring countries, and conduct bilateral equipping African peacekeeping and military more African countries and enacted measures or multilateral joint military exercises personnel. that will make it easier for Africans to vaca- n play an active part in maintaining Working through this kind of forum tion in China.29 global and regional peace and stability. could have many advantages. First, it ensures The effectiveness of the strategic infor- coordination and deconfliction among mation campaign is evident in Chinese cred- Comparing this to the following subset foreign powers. Second, it uses an existing ibility among the African leaders whom the of tasks from the 2006 U.S. National Security institution as the backbone for discussions. PRC is trying to influence. In general, these Strategy, several commonalities are immedi- Next, it promotes cooperation instead of moves are viewed positively, and many aspects ately apparent:33 competition among key investors. Finally, it of the message resonate well with African consolidates efforts within a single forum. leaders, especially the perceived common n strengthen alliances to defeat global ter- This forum would not need to take heritage, the strong focus on the state, and rorism and work to prevent attacks against us ultimate decisionmaking authority out of the principles of noninterference.30 The participa- and our friends hands of its participants. While encouraging tion in the 2006 FOCAC Summit demon- n work with others to defuse regional countries to pursue combined efforts where strated that the majority of African leaders conflicts appropriate, the forum could still be effective are still encouraging Chinese investment in n develop agendas for cooperative action without taking control over a participating their countries to the greatest extent possible. with other main centers of global power. country’s bilateral security agreements with It is too early to tell if Beijing’s newest efforts AU member nations or other security efforts in the strategic information campaign can There are clear overlaps in the areas of on the continent. With the international com- counter the negative perceptions of its busi- defeating global terrorism, defusing regional munity in wide agreement that promoting ness practices on the continent; however, the conflicts, promoting international security security and enabling regional peacekeeping next few years should provide ample evidence cooperation, and developing cooperative and military capability are in the common to determine if the information campaign will agendas with other major powers. These good, this venture seems the natural first improve China’s overall reputation. common interests present multiple opportu- step in establishing any cooperative security nities for cooperative engagement militarily, agenda. Implications politically, and economically. The depth and breadth of China’s activi- Security Cooperation ties in Africa have definite implications for U.S. and Chinese investments in Africa U.S. policy and the mission of USAFRICOM. the majority of African leaders will not be able to expand, even collectively, Some authors think the emergence of the are still encouraging Chinese without adequate security measures to protect command onto the African security landscape investment in their countries the personnel and resources involved. To this will only complicate an already tumultuous to the greatest extent possible end, five of USAFRICOM’s seven goals deal situation.31 Others believe that the United directly with promoting regional security.35 At States and China are already on the path to the same time, China is transforming the PLA conflict over African oil.32 Institutional Framework into a global force and is looking for opportu- Yet many of these same authors also rec- China’s recent experiences demonstrate nities to use it. Both nations and the African ognize that the United States and PRC are at that working through institutions is a formula Union can draw immediate gains from two a culminating point with respect to Africa—a for success in Africa. Its efforts through areas of cooperation: maritime security and point where their interests are converging and NEPAD, FOCAC, and the United Nations peacekeeper training. engagement is at its highest level since World have had not only the most positive impact in Both the United States and China have War II. Given these conditions, USAFRICOM Africa, but also the highest approval ratings a strategic interest in maritime security in is in a unique position to engage the PRC to among African nations. Currently, where its African waters, especially in the protection defuse tensions and explore areas of military institutional approach is weakest is in a formal of international commercial shipping lanes

122 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu PARENTI and oil infrastructure off the Horn of Africa, Both the African Standby Force (the military would further strategic objectives for all three in the Niger Delta, and in the Gulf of Guinea. arm of the PSC designed to be a contingency players are: Currently, both countries are engaged in response force for African crises and peace- separate efforts to protect these regions, but keeping operations) and the military arm of n construction of secure, joint civil- their common interests of protecting access the Economic Community of West African military use airfields with associated support to natural resources, combating piracy and States suffer from severe problems because of facilities (hangars, terminals, fuels storage, and global terrorism, and promoting regional the current infrastructure. These conditions so forth) capable of supporting heavy lift air- stability make African maritime security prevent forces from deploying effectively, limit craft (for example, C–17s and Boeing 777s) a natural part of a U.S.–PRC cooperative logistics support to deployed forces, curtail n modernization of strategic port facili- agenda. By joining forces in maritime secu- training opportunities, and make many mis- ties, especially in the central regions of Africa’s rity, the United States and PRC will benefit sions too costly to undertake.36 east and west coasts. Projects should focus from the additional assets and reduced redun- In his recent posture statement to Con- on increasing reliability and capacity of port dancies inherent in a combined approach. gress, USAFRICOM commander, General operations. Additionally, AU member states benefit from William Ward, acknowledged, “The U.S. n modernization and construction of fewer economic losses and enhanced overall must encourage the improvement of civilian roads and railways leading from port facilities regional security. Finally, as the PLA Navy transportation infrastructure and its security to inland population centers. Efforts should expands its presence in the Pacific and Indian across the African continent, but the near focus not only on material improvement, but Oceans, the opportunity for cooperation on term requires an increase in the quantity also on increasing security along inland high- maritime security in Africa provides mean- and capacity of military air and rapid sealift ways and railways. ingful experience for future cooperative mis- platforms made available to AFRICOM.” At sions between the two navies. the same time, the PRC needs additional air In choosing which infrastructure Similarly, the United States and China and sea routes between Africa and China to projects to support and how, it is important would both gain from joining efforts on encourage more trade and cooperation. to consider the lessons learned from China’s peacekeeping in Africa. Currently, the pre- By jointly encouraging the development efforts. Specifically, the United States and miere peacekeeper-training program is the of dual-use transportation infrastructure China should make every effort to ensure U.S. Department of State’s African Contin- components, the United States and China can that local companies, employing native gency Operations and Training Assistance meet key strategic objectives while simultane- Africans, conduct the majority of the effort, (ACOTA) program. Unfortunately, ACOTA ously supporting a major goal of the African whether for design, construction, or security. does not have consistent funding and may Union.37 Specifically, the types of projects that Where foreign companies are used, African not be able to attain its overall goals. Mean- while, the PLA needs peacekeeper training U.S. and Chinese investments in Africa will not be able to and seeks an expanded role in African peacekeeping operations. expand without security measures to protect the personnel and By inviting PLA forces to join in resources involved ACOTA efforts, the United States satisfies several objectives. First, it increases the pool of qualified peacekeepers to join in UN peacekeeping efforts. Second, it gains valuable experience dealing directly with the

PLA, which will be beneficial in future oper- DOD (Cherie A. Thurlby) ations inside and outside of Africa. Third, it secures an additional funding source for ACOTA efforts. At the same time, the PLA gains the training and experience it requires to expand its role in African peacekeeping operations and benefits from the experience of working with U.S. forces. Ultimately, the AU benefits from having more peacekeepers available to help secure its regions and from working in conjunction with U.S. and PLA forces.

Military Infrastructure Development One of the biggest barriers to African nations’ attempts to sustain their own military and peacekeeping forces is their Secretary Gates meets with Chinese Central Military Commission official in Beijing dilapidated transportation infrastructure. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 123 FEATURES | China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century companies should be trained to operate and benefit to the African nations. Finally, it gives . 13 completed. Overall, the focus needs to be on military experience of working with both China’s National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, January enabling future growth for African countries. Chinese and African counterparts, which 2006). Another area of potential military paves the way for future engagement, inside 14 Susan M. Puska, Resources, Security and infrastructure growth is in space. Africa’s vast and outside of Africa. Influence: The Role of the Military in China’s Africa equatorial regions are prime real estate for These shared interests present multiple Strategy, China Brief VII, issue 7, May 30, 2007, 2. the world’s burgeoning space requirements— opportunities for cooperation between the 15 Ibid. equatorial ground locations are ideal for satel- United States and PRC in Africa. Potential 16 Gill, Huang, and Morrison, China’s Expand- lite tracking and control. In addition, Africa’s areas for cooperation include maritime secu- ing Role in Africa, 21. east central coast is one of only a few places rity, peacekeeper training, and development 17 Ibid. in the world where satellites can be launched of a robust military transportation infra- 18 Eisenman and Kurlantzick, 220. 19 directly into equatorial orbits. This is signifi- structure for use by African forces. However, Gill, Huang, and Morrison, China’s Expand- cant because these orbits provide the best cov- to reap the full benefit, the United States, ing Role in Africa, 6. 20 Ibid. erage for most satellite uses and are the only through USAFRICOM, must take the lead 21 Centre for Chinese Studies, China’s Interest way to achieve a geostationary satellite orbit, in developing this cooperative approach by and Activity in Africa’s Construction and Infra- which provides 24-hour coverage over a single working through the African Union to engage structure Sectors, United Kingdom Department for point on the Earth. Currently, most countries China on the issues of security and develop- International Development Report (Stellenbosch, launch satellites into nonequatorial orbits ment. JFQ South Africa: Stellenbosch University, n.d.), 17–20, and then perform costly orbital transfers to available at . Unfortunately, Africa’s equatorial 22 “Factbox—China-Africa Trade Links,” 1 regions are extremely unstable. An east coast Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Reuters, February 2, 2007, available at . January 2006, available at . of the equatorial ground sites are located in China’s Growing Influence in Africa,” 9. 2 Ibid. 24 Centre for Chinese Studies, 77–78. the faction-controlled regions of the Demo- 3 Bates Gill, Chin-hao Huang, and J. Stephen 25 Ibid., 66. cratic Republic of Congo. Still, with outside Morrison, “Assessing China’s Growing Influence in 26 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. security assistance, this could be an area Africa,” China Security 3, no. 3 (Summer 2007), 9. 27 Ibid. of strong potential economic and military 4 Bates Gill, Chin-hao Huang, and J. Stephen 28 Gill, Huang, and Morrison, “Assessing growth for the nations of the AU and should Morrison, China’s Expanding Role in Africa: Impli- China’s Growing Influence in Africa,” 9. remain in the sights of the United States and cations for the United States, Center for Strategic 29 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. PRC for long-term security and assistance and International Studies (CSIS) Report (Washing- 30 Gill, Huang, and Morrison, China’s Expand- projects (at least 10–20 years out). ton, DC: CSIS, January 2007), v. ing Role in Africa, v–ix. 5 New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 31 Wenran Jiang, Hu’s Safari: China’s Emerging “NEPAD in Brief,” available at . it has significant influence in many regions Issue 4, February 21, 2007, 7. 6 “NEPAD Flags Importance of Chinese 32 Peter Hatemi and Andrew Wedeman, “Oil and that it is poised to increase this influence Investment for Africa,” March 18, 2007, accessed at and Conflict in Sino-American Relations,” China over the coming years. These activities should . Security 3, no. 3 (Summer 2007), 95–119. be a significant concern to the United States 7 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing 33 The National Security Strategy of the United and U.S. Africa Command because of the Action Plan (2007–2009), available at . House, March 2006), 1. U.S. interests. Yet despite the perception that 8 Gill, Huang, and Morrison, China’s Expand- 34 Colonel Roy Osborn, USA, interview by the the United States and People’s Republic of ing Role in Africa, 6; and Joshua Eisenman and author, February 12, 2008. China have polarized political and economic Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy,” 35 House Armed Services Committee, state- approaches, the two powers share many Current History (May 2006), 220. ment of General William “Kip” Ward, Commander, 9 Forum on China-African Cooperation, common interests in Africa. U.S. Africa Command, March 13, 2008, 3. “Beijing Summit & Third Ministerial Conference of 36 A cooperative approach to stability and Theo Neethling, “Shaping the African FOCAC,” available at (see member states individual links). Prospects,” Military Review (May-June 2005), African Union, offers significant benefit to 10 Abraham McLaughlin, “A Rising China 69–70. all parties. First, a cooperative approach helps Counters Clout in Africa,” Christian Science 37 Commission of the African Union, Strategic ensure Chinese efforts do not undermine U.S. Monitor, March 30, 2005, available at . (2004–2007), Strategic Framework of the Commis- Second, it provides U.S. and Chinese activi- 11 Ibid. sion of the African Union, May 2004, 6. ties the legitimacy and support of the African 12 Josh Kurlantzick, “Manchurian Candidate,” Union. Third, it leverages the combined The New Republic, October 5, 2006, available at efforts of two major world powers for more

124 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Shoulder to Shoulder The Marine Corps and Air Force in Combat

By Daniel J. Darnell and George J. Trautman III

n the spring of 2009, the U.S. Air Force will host the next Marine Corps–Air Force Warfighter Talks, Ithe third in an annual series of high- level discussions between the two Services. Last year, 31 general officers of three- and four-star rank, including commanders serving in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), attended the 2-day session held in Washington, DC. These talks provided a forum for senior leaders of the Marine Corps and Air Force to meet face to face to discuss and resolve key inter-Service warfighting issues, many of which impact the ability to think and fight as a joint team.

History The 2007 and 2008 Warfighter Talks grew from a series of discussions, over several years, between general officers of the two Services. A February 2006 memorandum from the chief of staff of the Air Force was the impetus for more formal guided talks between Marine Corps and Air Force leadership. The commandant of the Marine Corps and chief of staff of the Air Force determined that whether serving in combat overseas or in the halls of the Pentagon, the two Services must be fully integrated, synergistic joint partners. To that end, they directed annual formal talks, which formalize a review process designed to examine in

Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell is Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, Space, and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Lieutenant General George J. Trautman III is X–35 approaches KC–135 for midair refueling

Lockheed Martin Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 125 FEATURES | Shoulder to Shoulder: The Marine Corps and Air Force in Combat depth the ways in which the two Services II. The seams created between the Marine The second tiger team, led by a general combine, share information, plan, and fight. and Air Force airspace were a constant officer from each Service, spent 2 weeks Over the past 3 years, senior leaders at source of command and control friction. in January 2008 traveling throughout the talks have engaged in robust discussions Additionally, command relationships were the USCENTCOM AOR. It conducted a about such issues as supporting/supported sometimes unclear. This was especially comprehensive review of current policies command relationships, air command and evident in the special considerations and issues while talking with commanders control, gaps and seams in systems and afforded Marine Corps aviation and how and operators at all levels and from both processes, and the difficulties inherent in these assets properly fit into the JFC theater- Services, including all major Air Force and overcoming the friction and fog of active wide aviation requirements and priorities. Marine aviation command and control combat. As a result, the Service chiefs stood Marine Corps aviation is an integral com- nodes. The team briefed Service leadership, up tiger teams to look for ways to improve ponent of the MAGTF, and efforts to split it and the trip report informed the Warfighter the level of coordination and cooperation apart from other task force elements fail to Talks held in April 2008. These talks pro- between the two Services to fulfill obliga- recognize this synergy. Finally, the absence vided direction to Service commands and tions to the joint force. of sister Service liaison personnel in some staffs to resolve bilateral issues and fostered The first tiger team was formed in critical command nodes such as the Marine a mutual respect and greater trust and 2007. The commandant and chief of staff Corps Tactical Air Command Center were understanding between the two Services. directed members to focus on improving found to hamper operational transparency The team report gave answers to the tough dialogue between the Services and creat- and mutual understanding between the questions these officers had asked of those ing a common understanding of the use of Marine Corps and Air Force aviation forces in the AOR. Their findings were the basis for aviation assets to enhance joint warfighting operating throughout the USCENTCOM many of the tasks that came out of the talks. capabilities. The team was also charged AOR. These factors, among others, were The issues discussed at the talks fell to assess whether current command and the basis for the establishment of a follow- into four categories, two broad and deep, control procedures were fully supporting the on tiger team with a more focused charter and two specific and doctrinal. The two joint force commander (JFC) mission. In the aimed at finding specific solution sets to broad, higher level issues were: end, the team discovered numerous systemic these identified issues. factors hampering Service command and n integration of air forces and air control systems contributions. support to and for ground forces, their Among the command and control among the command and schemes of maneuver, and the differences obstacles was an extremely complicated in the way Marine Corps and Army ground Operation Iraqi Freedom airspace construct, control obstacles was an units request, plan for, and execute the use resulting somewhat from numerous revi- extremely complicated of aviation sions and modifications required to facilitate Operation Iraqi Freedom n difficulties inherent for all compo- the reintroduction of a Marine Air-Ground airspace construct nents of a joint force when shifting from Task Force (MAGTF) during Iraqi Freedom major combat operations to an irregular/ counterinsurgency fight. F/A–18A Hornet from VMFA–232 “Red Devils” lands aboard USS Nimitz These issues led into two specific areas:

n integration of the Air Force Theater Air Control System (TACS) and the Marine Corps Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) to create a truly integrated, joint theater-wide air command and control system n relationships between and among the components of a joint task force in combat, need for exchange officers, and necessity to train jointly in peacetime as we will fight together in war.

Toward Common Ground Senior leaders discussed these issues in depth throughout the last Warfighter Talks, with each engendering lively debate. More important, each Service vowed to work through their differences and overcome

U.S. Navy (David Mercil) obstacles to finding common ground and

126 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu DARNELL and TRAUTMAN workable solutions. At the end of the talks, dence and enhance theater-wide operational MH–53 aircraft, and one Marine officer is the commandant and chief of staff directed transparency. The Marine Corps has instructing forward air control procedures. their respective staffs to investigate five spe- expressed continued interest in receiving a Air Force officers are flying Marine Corps cific tasks. The first three involve command small Air Force element to provide liaison F/A–18, UH–1N, and F–5 aircraft. The two and control relationships and enablers, and within the TACC at Al Asad Air Base in Services have agreed to explore expanded the other two focus on exchange and infor- Iraq. An experienced Marine colonel with opportunities for F–35A and F–35B, mation-sharing structures. All of these tasks a dedicated staff will continue to serve in KC–130J, AC–130, EC–130, EA–6B, MV–22, should improve our ability to think, plan, the Air Force’s USCENTCOM CAOC as the and CV–22 aircraft, as well as unmanned and fight more effectively as a joint team. Marine liaison officer. systems officer exchanges. 1. Formalize an Air Force–Marine 4. Expand the Number and Scope of The Air Force and Marine Corps Corps Battle Command Training Initiative. Marine–Air Force Exchange Billets (as dif- also plan to double the size of the aviation The objective of this initiative is to incorpo- ferentiated from liaison officers). One of the command and control exchange program. rate Air Force liaison elements and TACS best ways to learn from each Service’s “best They have agreed to send one Marine air functionality into Marine Corps combat exer- practices” and to understand how to leverage traffic control expert and one Marine air cises, major mission rehearsal exercises, and respective unique contributions to the joint defense control expert to serve in a like battle command training programs. Air Force fight is to exchange personnel—that is, giving capacity with Air Force units, while the officers and enlisted personnel will partici- highly qualified officers and enlisted personnel Air Force sends two of their officers with pate in training venues such as the Weapons the opportunity to learn from and share ideas similar skills to serve with the Corps. Next, and Tactics Instructor course, MAGTF while actively serving as part of an operational exchange officers from the CAOC and Air Staff Training program, Desert Talon, and unit or advanced tactics schoolhouse. Support Operations Center will serve in the predeployment mission rehearsal exercises. To this end, Marine and Air Force Marine Advanced Tactical Schoolhouse as Marine Corps personnel will participate in leaders are conducting a thorough review of instructors, and two Marine like-qualified the Air Force Operational Command Train- existing exchange billets in order to propose experts from the Direct Air Support Center ing program, U.S. Air Force Weapons School modifications and possible additions to and TACC will serve on exchange in the U.S. exercises, Blue Flags, and other applicable make the program more robust. The Marine Air Force Weapons School as instructors. venues. Through this initiative, the Marine Corps and Air Force currently have nine 5. Build a Full-spectrum Overview of Corps and Air Force will seek new ways to officers in exchange billets. Marine aviators Current and Future Electronic Warfare and integrate people and aviation command and are flying Air Force F–15C, F–22, F–16, and Attack Systems. Electronic warfare (EW) as control capabilities into their respective training exercises and advanced schoolhouses. 2. Broaden and Deepen the Combined the Marine Corps and Air Force will seek new ways to integrate Air Operations Center (CAOC)–Tactical people and aviation command and control capabilities in their Air Command Center (TACC) Relationship. respective training exercises The two Services explored and assessed the Marine Corps TACC ability to assume an “in extremis” temporary role as the CAOC. The Services trained to this role in major upcoming exercises. The MACCS is fully compatible with other joint command and control systems, including the CAOC, and the capabilities organic to the MACCS (such as the TPS–59 radar and air controllers) will be leveraged to improve visibility and situational awareness of airspace that existing sensors cannot observe in order to improve the overall theater-wide common operating picture. Both Services believe that by practicing this capability they will improve understanding of Marine capabilities and limitations and improve Marine interoperability in the joint command and control environment. 3. Explore Opportunities to Enhance TACS and MACCS Understanding in the USCENTCOM AOR through a More Robust Liaison Officer Program. The Services will seek to add liaison officers between the Marine pilot guides CH–53E Super Stallion helicopter while taking on fuel from Air Force HC–130 TACS and MACCS to improve interdepen- U.S. Air Force (Veronica Pierce) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 127 FEATURES | Shoulder to Shoulder: The Marine Corps and Air Force in Combat a warfighting discipline must evolve from capabilities of forces to deliver the right such, this forum provides senior leaders the its historic contexts of counter–integrated mix of technology, systems, and concept of opportunity to address issues and agree to air defenses, aviation survivability, or operations to the joint battlespace. Nowhere collaborative courses of action that maxi- intelligence-gathering functions. In current is this more apparent than with the F–35, mize Service investment while delivering the operational environments, we see asymmet- a very capable EW platform in its baseline most appropriate capabilities to warfighters. ric applications of tactical EW in support of configuration. With Service cooperation, ground maneuver. Due to the understand- the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) block upgrade Moving Forward Together ably tight focus on current threats, however, rubric provides for technology and capabil- The Marine Corps–Air Force cooperative Service efforts to develop ity insertion on a regular basis. The Marine Warfighter Talks are an effective means next-generation EW capabilities have Corps and Air Force are dedicated to for senior leaders from these Services to languished. All four Services have indepen- enhancing EW capabilities (attack, support, engage on myriad topics, and they have dently pursued unique capabilities without and protection) through this improvement provided a guidepost to which Airmen significant coordination to synergize effects, process. Expectations include adding the and Marines can anchor themselves in the address new concepts of operations that Navy’s Next Generation Jammer system execution of joint warfare. Through candid leverage advanced technologies, and fully to the JSF, as well as expanding the radar, and professional dialogue, the talks yield a and effectively integrate nonlethal fires into EW, and communication, navigation, and greater appreciation for the best practices the JFC command and control toolkit. identification subsystems to increase the and unique contributions that each Service While the EW environment tends to tremendous capabilities of the platform. brings to the joint fight as well as a better be highly classified, opportunities and pro- There are boundless opportunities not only understanding of each other’s perspective grams exist within each Service that provide to expand JSF mission capabilities, but also on current challenges. Upcoming talks significant enhancement to the operational to develop cooperative EW systems. As promise to increase the understanding between the Air Force and Marine Corps, ultimately creating a more effective, agile, there are boundless opportunities not only to expand JSF and interdependent joint force. JFQ mission capabilities, but also to develop cooperative EW systems

F–35B short takeoff and vertical landing variant at takeoff Lockheed Martin

128 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Inside the Detention Camps A New Campaign in Iraq

By Mason Brooks and Drew Miller

he United States invaded Iraq in 2003 without a detailed plan for handling large numbers of T detainees in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. One consequence of this sit-

U.S. Air Force (WilliamU.S. Air Force Greer) uation was the debacle at Abu Ghraib prison that surfaced in 2004. Since then, the United States has struggled to regain the moral “high ground” and the trust of the Iraqi people. After the Abu Ghraib scandal, the U.S. military mainly concentrated on enforcing conventional “care and treatment” standards for the humane handling of detainees.1 Insur- gents, on the other hand, challenged coalition force (CF) authority in the camps and worked to recruit and train insurgents inside U.S. detention facilities. But in the past year, the handling of detainees has undergone a transformation. The new approach encourages detainees to embrace a more moderate view of Islam, reject violence, and support the government of Iraq. While the jury remains out on the reorientation effort’s long-term effect (curbing recidivism or cramping insurgent recruitment, for example), it provides a useful case study of adaptation in war. Today, the detention situation in Iraq is improved over a year ago. A calmed situation in the camps, coupled with a belief that faster release could yield political advantages, sparked a proposal to accelerate detainees’ release. Polls, interviews, and other sources showed that Iraqis (especially Sunnis) overwhelmingly see CF detention and detainee treatment as unfair. Former Iraqi Minister of Defense and Finance Ali Allawi noted, “Heavy-handed security measures . . . played a large part in crystallizing anti-Coalition

Colonel Mason Brooks, USAF (Ret.), and Colonel Drew Miller, USAFR, are Staff Researchers in the Institute for Defense Analyses. They were assigned to Multi-National Force–Iraq, Strategy, Plans, and Guards check Iraqi detainee’s name off list upon release Assessment Directorate, in Baghdad’s International from custody Zone from September 2007 to May 2008. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 129 FORCE OF LAW | Inside the Detention Camps feelings in the Sunni areas.”2 Anger stem- detention of thousands of Iraqis captured Using local imams to teach and discuss ming from perceptions of unfair detention by by U.S. forces. He brought to the job a new moderate interpretations of Islam exposes “occupiers” provides support for insurgents approach—something he credits to his experi- detainees to nonviolent thinking. While and fertile ground for recruiting. Accelerated ence as a successful businessman and entre- voluntary, these sessions are well attended, release of detainees can reduce this alienation preneur. Stone stresses practical problemsolv- and many participants say that this is their effect and meet political demands to free ing and initiative, along with listening to first exposure to moderate religious views. Iraqis, but it also risks having them rejoin detainees to understand their motivations. He Job training and education classes target basic the insurgency and could jeopardize fragile speaks Arabic and routinely studies the Koran learning and labor skills to enhance employ- security gains. to enhance his grasp of Iraqi culture. ment possibilities—a leading cause of recidi- Pressed to inform General David General Stone began by separating vism. Detention facilities now offer classes on Petraeus of complicated decision aspects, the insurgent agitators from other detainees, sewing, masonry, and carpentry.3 Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) staff giving moderates in the camps the freedom to directed an assessment of the proposal’s risks choose a path other than violence. The result and benefits. This article describes the new convinced the general that at least a third of all screening and resulting detainee policies, summarizes the effort to detainees could be influenced to reject insur- isolation of extremists improve assess benefits and risks, highlights the reac- gency within the camps’ controlled detention camp security by giving tion to that assessment, and explains early setting. A new goal emerged: turning detainees moderates the freedom to (and expected) campaign impacts. into cooperative moderates. A multilayered avoid and reject extremist process aimed at attaining that goal is summa- views and activities New Detainee Policies rized in figure 1 and elaborated below. Major General Douglas Stone, USMCR, Separation of Moderates from Irrec- assumed command of Task Force 134 oncilables. TF–134 uses information from Exploiting Tribal Influences. Iraqi (TF–134) in 2007, with responsibility for the detainee entrance screening at a transition tribes form a societal hierarchy accommodat- barracks to identify moderates and extrem- ing the political, security, and social needs Figure 1. Summary of Key TF–134 ists. While resource-intensive, this screening of members. Tribes help shape individual Programs and resulting isolation of extremists improve behavior and are therefore essential to reinte- camp security by giving moderates the grating released detainees back into society.4 n Transition Barracks In: Initially assesses freedom to avoid and reject extremist views (TF–134-sponsored studies show stronger motivation for joining the insurgency, and activities. It also enables detainees to societal bonds afford even a single detained criminal history, religious status, education/job skills volunteer for education programs, cooperate Iraqi the potential to influence over 100 other n Religious Discussion Program: Voluntary, with guards, and transform their outlook and Iraqis.) To exploit this effect, the task force but used to determine extent of religion in behavior. works closely with Iraqi imams and others to detainees’ lives and to develop a moderate Opportunity for Religious, Academic, apply Iraqi cultural operating codes, such as view of Islam and Vocational Education. Programs address shame and honor and patronage,5 to develop n Dar al-Hikmah (Basic Education): Chance the lack of education and training in Iraq. programs that further objectives. to get a minimum 5th-grade education n Vocational Education: Job skills training ADM Mullen views Camp Bucca detention n Work Program: Compensated for voluntary center from observation tower work activities (for example, sewing center, mud brick facility, working parties) n Individual Assessments: Occurs before their Multi-National Force Review Committee hearing to consider mental health, religious ideology, education, work program performance, guard force input n Family Advocacy and Outreach: Includes family in the rehabilitation process and grants greater access based on progress n Lion’s Spirit: Continuing moderate religious education and training for those desiring to become an imam n Transition Barracks Out: May spend up to a week in this program that includes courses on civics, public health, and reintegration into Iraqi society and with the family

Source: MNF–I TF–300 Theater Internment Facility Regional Center, brief, n.d. DOD (Chad J. McNeeley)

130 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BROOKS and MILLER

Family Advocacy. Capitalizing on the operational units, recommend release based TF–134 proposed increasing the number closest of Iraqi societal bonds, family advo- on whether a detainee poses a security risk. In of moderate CF detainees released in the cacy offers visitation as a privilege to detain- making these determinations, boards conduct interim, while still stressing a general policy of ees who follow facility rules. Closer family face-to-face interviews with detainees and no general mass releases and no release of any interaction for cooperative detainees provides review evidence from internment facility high-risk, irreconcilable detainee. greater moral support and involves families in guards, counselors, teachers, and evaluations, The proposal met strong opposition their transformation and reintegration efforts. along with that from arresting units and other from some commanders, who were convinced This program consists of frequent on-site vis- sources. MNFRC boards and other TF–134 Iraqis would feign moderation and resume itation—on average, about 300 families visit processes align with the local Islamic custom attacking CF troops as soon as they were detention facilities each day, and this number of conducting communal, nonjudicial hear- released. With deeply divided opinions and is steadily increasing.6 ings for accused persons to air grievances and pressed to inform the commanding general’s Pledge and Guarantor Program. publicly present evidence. decision, the MNF–I staff called for a formal Having detainees sign a pledge prior to release TF–134 saw detainees’ potential influence look to sort through all the issues. The impact is another new practice. Some with troubled over friends and tribal members outside the on political reconciliation and insurgent ranks backgrounds must also secure a guarantor, camps as a way to extend the positive effects of had to be assessed in only a few weeks. often a tribal leader, to assume responsibility its program to the Iraqi population. This think- for their post-release conduct. Iraqi judges for- ing produced a more aggressive policy, with Assessing Risks and Benefits mally administer this pledge, and violators of an expanded goal of “establish[ing] an alliance The assessment began by looking at how its provisions can be charged in Iraqi courts. with and empower[ing] moderate Iraqis to well the TF–134 approach to handling detain- Pledges are frequently part of TF–134 release effectively marginalize the violent extremists.”8 ees aligned with the overall joint campaign ceremonies, under its Lion’s Dawn program, This policy promotes political reconciliation plan for Iraq. COIN doctrine and literature in which Iraqi leaders recognize detainee by extending positive moderate influences to agree that it is essential to drive a “wedge” achievements and reinforce the significance of more Iraqis with the aim of reducing support between the hardened insurgent cadre and being given a new start.7 These actions, lever- for insurgents and bolstering the government those less committed or motivated to support aging Iraqis’ sense of honor and patronage, of Iraq. the insurgency.10 TF–134 seeks to do this are also aimed at curbing recidivism. In fall 2007, as Iraqi politicians renewed inside the camps. But the dramatic change Multilayered Release Policies. Multi- their call to grant amnesty to selected detain- in policy entails two other distinctive facets: National Force Review Committee (MNFRC) ees, TF–134 proposed even more sweeping leveraging detainees’ influence over Iraqis boards are the cornerstone of a paradigm shift expansions.9 If United Nations authority for outside the detention camps, and using the away from warehousing detainees and generic U.S. detention of Iraqis was not renewed at the expanded release policy as a wedge to influ- release policies to a multilayered risk assess- end of 2008, there could be a mass turnover ence political dynamics. While both support ment for each detainee. To achieve the goal of of tens of thousands of U.S.-held detainees— COIN tenets of reducing insurgent forces releasing only those detainees assessed as very potentially overwhelming Iraq’s prison and bolstering the government, implement- low risk, these boards, manned by military capacity and creating another problem for the ing them is a bold and complicated step into members from in-theater headquarters and Iraqi government. As a less risky alternative, uncharted territory.

the key question is whether insurgents get more recruits either from detainees who

U.S. Army (Jason Adolphson) were released or from other Iraqis who join because of resentment over the detainee alienation effect

The key question is whether insurgents get more recruits either from detainees who were released or from other Iraqis who join because of resentment over the detainee alienation effect (see figure 2). A recent Joint Force Quarterly article on detaining Iraqis noted that “many examples of arrests and internment [are creating] more insurgents than the arrests neutralize.”11 For Iraqi perspectives on Navy Judge Advocate General meets with Task Force 134 the likely impacts, the study used in-theater attorneys and paralegals at Camp Victory, Iraq Iraqi-American cultural advisors and native ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 131 FORCE OF LAW | Inside the Detention Camps

Iraqis living in Baghdad who work for the a range of actions to take advantage of detainee 2007, declaring the authors’ assessment “very United States.12 The assessment used official releases, including their return to localities and useful” and matching his own impressions. MNF–I insurgent troop strength estimates, followup stories. A worst-case assumption was With the decision made, controversy over historical recidivism data, focus groups, and tested—reversing weightings for security and accelerated detainee release policy persists, nationwide polls, as well as special surveys, political criteria. The results still showed accel- with early results still inconclusive. The new working groups, and other subject matter erated release as the best option for achieving TF–134 view that detainees not only can expert inputs.13 This research helped establish joint campaign plan objectives. be moderated, but also can become a force a plausible range of release rates, recidivism These analyses pointed to an aggressive for spreading moderate beliefs across Iraqi rates, and detainee alienation effects. ICP and low recidivism as particularly impor- society, still faces opposition from some who Rough estimates based on analyzing a tant to achieving campaign goals. Lower believe it is best to keep detainees locked up number of cases with varying combinations recidivism seems dependent on training and as long as possible. Some commanders report of release, recidivism, and detainee alienation education programs in detention facilities opposition to detainee releases from locals effect rates show that detainee alienation has as well as effective reintegration of releasees who characterize detainees as criminals or the greater impact on insurgent force levels. In back into society, including securing a job or fear their return to the insurgency. While most cases examined, the number of released job training, an education, and so forth. New some of those concerns are no doubt legiti- detainees who return to the insurgency is less policies being implemented, which might free mate, they sometimes mask another problem. than the number of insurgents created due at least half of the 23,000 detainees currently It is not uncommon for someone to steal to detainee alienation, even where there are held, seem to be producing lower recidivism another’s home or property and provide bogus high numbers of released detainees. Thus, the rates. In the months since the program’s information to authorities, spurring a false benefits from lower detainee alienation offset implementation, recidivism rates are less than arrest and detention. Fear of revenge therefore the risks of released detainees rejoining the 1 percent, substantially below historical rates motivates some of the release program’s most insurgency—producing lower overall insur- of 6 to 9 percent.17 The rate of change sug- ardent opponents. gent force levels. In addition, lower recidivism gests recidivism will probably not return to increases the probability and scope of these previous higher levels, but more time (up to positive impacts. These results are consistent 18 months) is needed to see if these rates will some commanders report with other COIN studies and are reinforced hold. Interestingly, these factors indicate that opposition to detainee by new COIN doctrine.14 while TF–134 efforts are vital, ultimate results releases from locals who To consider broader political, security, may well depend on how other MNF–I subele- characterize detainees as and other impacts, the analysis team adapted a ments follow through on and synchronize the criminals or fear their return method that visually framed key decision cri- broader ICP and releasee reintegration imple- to the insurgency teria (see figure 3).15 This flexible, multicriteria mentation aspects. decision support approach allowed dynamic weighting of rating factors.16 Starting from a Senior Reaction Results The program is still experiencing pre–change-of-policy base case and incremen- General Petraeus approved the TF–134 growing pains, partly because no single entity tally adding more detainee engagement steps moderation and early release program with has end-to-end responsibility for implementa- and an aggressive information campaign plan the addition of a strong ICP to maximize tion or the result. As of August 2008, release (ICP) yielded positive results. The ICP included political reconciliation benefits in December rates were still lower than TF–134 initially Insurgent Recruitment and Growth Model proposed. ICP efforts to help spread the news Figure 2. Insurgent Recruitment and Growth Model of faster release and assist in transmitting moderate messages have only partially been Possible Detainee Practices Impacts on Anti-Iraqi Forces Recruitment Removed developed. Local reintegration efforts, critical Insurgents to curbing recidivism, are also fragmented. “DETAINEE ALIENATION EFFECT” Some early disparities are to be expected, Supporters and Population Insurgents especially in a dynamic and uneven security Sympathizers environment. Despite the challenges, progress Detainees is being made to set up effectively coordi-

Figure 3. MNF–I Assessment Detainee Policies and Priorities Scorecard Defeating Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) 3 Political Reconciliation 5 Implementation Implementa- feasibility 1 tion costs 1 Free up Coalition Interrogation/ Iraqi Detainee GOI Support 3 Other SCIO Reduce # AIF 5 Force assets 3 Intelligence 1 turnover enlightenment 1 Potential 1 (does not impact Detaining Recapture Not provok- Fewer Other Willing- AIF Fair Fair include pos- 1 AIF 1 recidi- ing new AIF guards military ness to opposi- treat- treat- sible improved vism 1 (Detainee 1 assets 1 support tion 1 ment by ment by post-release Alienation GOI 1 GOI– GOI– intelligence) Effect) 2 Sunni 1 Shia 1 Key: GOI = Government of Iraq; SCIO = Strategic Communications Information Operations

132 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BROOKS and MILLER nated, accelerated detainee evaluation and expert works by David Galula, James S. Corum, Brian Reed, John F. Hussey, and the 1968 RAND U.S. Army release processes. Important successes resulted from Vietnam Hamlet Evaluation System Study. 11 Kyle B. Teamey, “Arresting Insurgency,” Joint working with tribal chiefs outside the formal Force Quarterly 47 (4th Quarter, 2007), 117. government and employing Iraqis, many of War College 12 Efforts to incorporate Iraqi perspectives them former insurgents, as Concerned Local include closely interacting with Iraqi-Americans Citizens (also known as Sons of Iraq) to working in Iraq who collect information and Strategic Landpower Essay Contest 2009 provide security. That sort of boldness opened maintain a dialogue with a large network of Iraqis doors of opportunity. It is still too early to across the country and interacting with other Iraqis assess whether the TF–134 initiatives will living in Baghdad and working in the International The U.S. Army War College and U.S. Army War Zone for MNF–I open-source intelligence as media effectively complement the awakening to con- College Foundation are pleased to announce the vince more Iraqis to reject extremist views. By translators. 13 annual Strategic Landpower Essay Contest. itself, the task force’s detention policy changes Due to current instabilities in Iraq, coali- will not turn the insurgency around, but they tion force (CF) recidivism is generally reported in terms of a person, detained in a theater internment do represent a new patch in the larger quilt of The topic of this year’s entries must relate to facility as a threat to security, who is released and counterinsurgency studies. JFQ Perspectives on Stability Operations and Their again becomes an insurgent. The main way of mea- Role in U.S. Landpower. suring recidivism is when recaptured detainees’ Notes identifying numbers are reactivated when they pass through the magistrate’s cell at Camp Cropper. Anyone is eligible to enter and win except those 1 As used here, the term care and treatment Detainee recidivists who are killed or those involved in judging. The U.S. Army War College refers to humane handling of detainees and detained by Iraqi Security Forces whose identity Foundation will award a prize of $3,000 to the conduct of detention personnel as established by is confirmed by biometric data from previous CF the Geneva Convention and promulgated by U.S. author of the best essay, a prize of $1,500 to the detention are also included in this measurement Government guidance documents. For example, second place winner, and $500 to the third place when the information is made available. Department of Defense Directive 2310.01E, Enclo- 14 Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency winner. sure 3, contains the verbatim text of Common (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of Article 3 to the Geneva Convention of 1949. Enclo- the Army, December 2006), table 1–1. For more information or a copy of the essay contest sure 4 contains other requirements of the law of war 15 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command essential to ensure humane care and treatment of rules, contact: draft pamphlet 525–FW–X, version 3.0, Com- all detainees. mander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, is 2 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: new doctrine (drawing systemic operational design Dr. Michael R. Matheny Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: and effects-based operations) that calls for better Yale University Press, 2007), 187. U.S. Army War College framing of the problem and conceptual approach 3 Ibid. by senior commanders. Department of Military Strategy 4 William S. McCallister, “COIN and Irregular 16 Campaign Assessment Methodology (CAM), Planning and Operations Warfare in a Tribal Society,” Applied Knowledge developed by the authors for MNF–I, rates how International pamphlet, 2007, 24, available at 122 Forbes Avenue selected factors affect Iraqi views and support for ; Elizabeth A. Nathan and objectives as criteria to weigh the desirability of Kevin M. Woods, “Saddam and the Tribes: How tel: (717) 245–3459, DSN 242–3459 actions based on how each promotes “tipping” Captured Documents Explain Regime Adaptation email: [email protected] Iraqis toward the government. Adapting it into a to Internal Challenges (1979–2003),” Iraqi Perspec- multicriteria decision support system (DSS) made it tive Project Series Phase II, Institute for Defense easier to reapply public opinion and “atmospherics” Analyses, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program data from CAM into the Iraqi detention DSS situa- Paper P–4263, August 2007, 37. tion. Both CAM and DSS use RAND’s DynaRank 5 McCallister, 14. multicriteria DSS. See Richard Hillestad and Paul 6 MNF–I TF–300 Theater Internment Facility K. Davis, Resource Allocation for the New Defense Regional Center, brief, n.d. Strategy: The DynaRank Decision Support System 7 MNF–I Battle Update Assessment briefing, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998). February 14, 2007, slide 28. 17 Yochi J. Dreazen, “U.S. Begins Freeing 8 TF–134 document describing moderation Thousands of Captives in Iraq: Detention Policies programs and mission. Have Been Source of Public Anger,” The Wall Street 9 Joshua Partlow and Amit R. Paley, “Maliki Journal, April 18, 2008, 3. Renews Call to Give Some Insurgents Amnesty,” The Washington Post, November 12, 2007, A16. 10 Besides other experts and sources specifically cited (including U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency), this review included many U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Military Review Counterinsurgency Reader sources and other

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 133 he war on terror was clearly not contemplated when the four Geneva Conventions, addressing wars between national T 1 entities, were signed in 1949. The violence U.S. Army (Kieran Cuddihy) in Iraq currently perpetrated by al Qaeda and dissident elements of the former regime is being spearheaded by individuals under no known national authority, with no command structure that enforces the laws and customs of warfare, with no recognizable, distin- guishing military insignia, and who do not carry arms openly. More importantly, they represent no identifiable national minority in Iraq, but rather largely draw their support from sponsors outside Iraq. Their attacks have injured and killed civilians of all ethnic groups, as well as more than 3,740 U.S. military personnel attempting to help the fledgling, democratic government in Baghdad to succeed. The terrorists’ use of young people Soldier guards suspected insurgents detained during patrol, Mosul, Iraq and women as human couriers for explosive “Operationalizing” Legal Requirements for Unconventional Warfare By James P. Terry devices is reminiscent of our experience in Legal Status The 1977 Geneva Protocols had their Vietnam and raises serious questions about It is important to understand that ter- roots in the wars of national liberation follow- the status of those individuals when they are rorist violence provides no legal gloss for its ing World War II. Colonial powers, to include acting on behalf of terrorist elements in Iraq.2 perpetrators. The critical international law the United States, Great Britain, and the Neth- The lack of legal status of the terrorists and principles applicable to the violence in Iraq erlands, had engaged these liberation move- their surrogates as other than common crimi- are found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions in ments militarily, often with little regard for the nals is seldom, if ever, acknowledged publicly Common Article 3 relating to internal armed law of armed conflict. In the 1974 conference by unbiased news services, and this raises conflicts and the principles enunciated in the hosted by the Swiss government in Geneva, serious concerns for the military in their two Additional Protocols to these conventions the need to address conflicts of a noninterna- efforts to assure the public of their adherence negotiated in 1977.3 The minimal protections tional character was addressed in Article 96, to the law of war. afforded by Common Article 3, for example, paragraph 3, of Protocol I and in Protocol II. At The U.S. military participation on the include prohibitions on inhumane treatment the conference, the Swiss government invited ground in Iraq is dictated by approved rules of noncombatants, including members of the members of national liberation organizations of engagement (ROEs), which are a direct armed forces who have laid down their arms. to participate, but not vote. reflection of the law of war in its application Specifically forbidden are “murder of all kinds, The participation of nonstate actors to this specific conflict. This article addresses mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking helped shape the drafting of Article 96, para- the legal considerations that must be part of of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, graph 3, of Protocol I. This section provides that our thinking when developing the ROEs that in particular, humiliating and degrading treat- a party to a conflict against a state army can uni- will both protect those lawful participants ment,” and extrajudicial executions. Provision laterally declare that it wants the 1949 Geneva (U.S., coalition, and Iraqi) in the conflict must also be made for collecting and caring for Conventions and the 1977 Protocols to apply. and those who are innocent civilians, while the sick and wounded. This would offer, of course, greater protection denying any but required minimal legal pro- for members of national liberation movements. tections accorded common criminals for the unlawful belligerents represented by al Qaeda and their outside sponsors. Colonel James P. Terry, USMC (Ret.), is the Chairman of the Board of Veterans Appeals in the Department of Veterans Affairs. He previously served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department of State and as Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

134 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu TERRY

Under Article 96, however, parties authorized cognizance by the international body. Thus, in aggression through surrogates violates interna- to make such a declaration had to establish that drafting Article 2, paragraph 4, the term war was tional law as embodied in the UN Charter.12 they were involved in “armed conflicts in which replaced by the phrase threat or use of force. The The actions of states supporting ter- people are fighting against colonial domination wording was interpreted as prohibiting a broad rorist activities, such as Iran and Syria, when and alien occupation and against racist regimes range of hostile activities including not only interpreted in light of these resolutions, clearly in the exercise of their right of self-determi- “war” and equally destructive conflicts, but also fall within the scope of Article 2, paragraph 4. n at i on .” 4 In Iraq, however, terrorists are trying applications of force of a lesser intensity or mag- The illegality of aid to terrorist groups has been to unseat the government that has been over- nitude such as those observed in Iraq today.8 well established by the UN General Assembly. whelmingly approved by the people. Moreover, The UN General Assembly has clari- Both resolutions specifically prohibit the “orga- al Qaeda has made no statement that it desires fied the scope of Article 2 in two important nizing,” “assisting,” or “financing” of “armed the Geneva Conventions to apply in Iraq. resolutions, adopted unanimously.9 Resolution bands” or “terrorists” for the purpose of aggres- These terrorists, or unlawful combatants, 2625, the Declaration on Friendly Relations, sion against another state. however described, have no juridical existence describes behavior that constitutes the unlaw- With respect to the terrorists themselves, other than as common criminals. Protocol I, ful “threat or use of force” and enumerates they seek on the one hand to achieve ad hoc Article I conflicts, or those between a nation and standards of conduct by which states and their protected status by blending in with the civilian a recognized insurgency seeking a legal status, surrogates must abide. Contravention of any of populace, while on the other hand violating the differ from the present terrorist violence in these standards of conduct is declared to be in law of war in terms of those they target (civil- that participants in Article I conflicts opposing violation of Article 2, paragraph 4.10 ians and other noncombatants). In wars involv- government forces are required to meet certain Resolution 3314, the Definition of ing nation-states, all lawful combatants can be minimum requirements. The participants must: Aggression, provided a detailed statement targeted (to include those sleeping, unarmed, on the meaning of aggression, defining it as and so forth) until or unless they achieve n operate under responsible command “the use of armed force by a state against the Protected Status as prisoners of war (POWs) and are subject to internal military discipline n carry their arms openly n otherwise distinguish themselves in Iraq, terrorists are trying to unseat the government that has clearly from the civilian population.5 been overwhelmingly approved by the people

In return, they are accorded certain protec- sovereignty, territorial integrity, or politi- or are sick or wounded under the Geneva tions when captured. Those perpetuating vio- cal independence of another state, or in any Conventions. Similarly, lawful belligerents have lence in Iraq today do not meet these criteria, manner inconsistent with the Charter of the immunity under the criminal law for warlike and they are viciously exploiting every ethnic United Nations.”11 This resolution contains a acts that do not violate the law of war. Terror- group for their own ends, without regard for list of acts that, regardless of a declaration of ists, on the other hand, want it both ways. They these requirements. war, qualify as acts of aggression. The resolu- seek the protection of civilians until they attack, tion provides that a state committing an act of then seek to be treated as combatants with all Terrorism and International Law The basic provision restricting the threat or use of force in the Middle East and South- west Asia, including restrictions on support for terrorist violence, is Article 2, paragraph

4, of the United Nations (UN) Charter. That U.S. Army (Sarah De Boise) provision states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”6 The underlying purpose of Article 2, paragraph 4—to regulate aggressive behavior in international relations—is identical to that of its precursor in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 12 of the covenant stated that league members were obligated not “to resort to war.”7 This terminology, however, did not mention hostilities that, although violent, could not be considered war. The drafters of the UN Charter wished to ensure that the legal charac- Iraqi woman shows picture of relative killed by terrorists terization of a conflict’s status did not preclude ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 135 FORCE OF LAW | “Operationalizing” Legal Requirements the protections of POWs when captured. For- included exception to the prohibition of the use from the effects of terrorist violence, interna- tunately, the recent Jose Padilla case and others of force. Customary international law had pre- tional law has long recognized the need for are carefully differentiating terrorists’ status as viously accepted reprisal, retaliation, and retri- flexible application. Former Secretary of State unlawful combatants based on their actions. bution as legitimate responses as well. Reprisal George Shultz emphasized this point when allows a state to commit an act that is otherwise he stated, “The U.N. Charter is not a suicide Law of Self-Defense illegal to counter the illegal act of another state pact. The law is a weapon on our side and it Historically, rules on the lawful use of or its surrogate. Retaliation is the infliction is up to us to use it to its maximum extent. . . . force have developed within a framework of upon the delinquent state of the same injury There should be no confusion about the status state-to-state relationships. Little doubt exists, that it or its surrogate has caused the victim. of nations that sponsor terrorism.”17 The final however, concerning their applicability in the Retribution is a criminal law concept, implying clause of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the charter terrorist arena where actors are surrogates vengeance, which is sometimes used loosely in supports this interpretation and forbids the or agents of state sponsors. The Long Com- the international law context as a synonym for threat or use of force “in any manner inconsis- mission, for example, in commenting on the retaliation. While debate continues as to the tent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”18 devastating 1983 terrorist attack on the U.S. present status of these responses with respect Myres McDougal of Yale University Marine Headquarters in Beirut, concluded: placed the relationship between Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 51 in clearer perspective: [S]tate sponsored terrorism is an important part terrorists seek the protection of the spectrum of warfare and . . . adequate of civilians until they attack, Article 2(4) refers to both the threat and the use response to this increasing threat requires an then seek to be treated as of force and commits the Members to refrain active national policy which seeks to deter combatants with all the from the “threat or use of force against the ter- attack or reduce its effectiveness. The Commis- protections of POWs when ritorial integrity or political independence of any sion further concludes that this policy needs to state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Pur- be supported by political and diplomatic actions captured poses of the United Nations;” the customary right and by a wide range of timely military response of self-defense, as limited by the requirements capabilities.13 to terrorist violence, the American position has of necessity and proportionality, can scarcely be always been that actions protective of U.S. and regarded as inconsistent with the purpose of the When the UN Charter was drafted in Iraqi interests, rather than punitive in nature, United Nations, and a decent respect for balance 1945, the right of self-defense was the only offer the greatest hope for securing a lasting, and effectiveness would suggest that a conception peaceful resolution of the crisis in Iraq.14 of impermissible coercion, which includes threats The right of self-defense was codified in of force, should be countered with an equally Article 51 of the charter. That article provides comprehensive and adequate conception of per- that “Nothing in the present Charter shall missible or defensive coercion.19 impair the inherent right of individual or col-

United Nations (Fred Noy) United Nations (Fred lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs Significant in Professor McDougal’s against a Member of the United Nations.”15 The interpretation is the recognition of the right use of the word inherent in the text of Article to counter the imminent threat of unlawful 51 suggests that self-defense is broader than coercion as well as an actual attack. This com- the immediate charter parameters. During the prehensive conception of permissible or defen- drafting of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty in 1928, sive coercion, honoring appropriate response for example, the United States expressed its to threats of an imminent nature, is merely views thus: reflective of the customary international law. It is precisely this anticipatory element of lawful There is nothing in the American draft of an self-defense that is critical to an effective policy anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in to counter terrorist violence in Iraq. any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit Presidential Initiatives in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times Early in 1984, President Ronald Reagan and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its issued the seminal modern “preemption” territory from attack or invasion and it alone doctrine addressing legal response to terrorist is competent to decide whether circumstances violence. President Reagan’s National Security require recourse to war in self-defense.16 Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, issued April 3, 1984, “represent[ed] a quantum leap in Because self-defense is an inherent right, countering terrorism, from the reactive mode its contours have been shaped by custom to recognition that pro-active steps [were] Young Sudanese Liberation Army combatants do 20 not conform to Geneva Convention uniform and and are subject to customary interpretation. needed.” Although NSDD 138 remains clas- insignia rules Although the drafters of Article 51 may not sified to this day, National Security Advisor have anticipated its use in protecting states Robert McFarlane suggested at the Defense

136 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu TERRY

Strategy Forum on March 25, 1985, that it and included the points made earlier in the protective, defensive, nonmilitary, and military includes the following key elements: National Security Strategy announced for his measures. The Bush Doctrine attempts, as did first term in 2002. the Reagan initiative, to define acts designed The practice of terrorism under all circum- The language in the 2006 version clearly to destabilize our national interests in terms stances is a threat to the national security of relates the doctrine to events in Iraq and other of “aggression,” with the concomitant right of the United States; the practice of international areas currently experiencing terrorist violence. self-defense available as a lawful and effective terrorism must be resisted by all legal means; For example, one section is entitled “Prevent response. The use of international law, and the United States has the responsibility to take attacks by terrorist networks before they more specifically, the Law of Armed Conflict, protective measures whenever there is evidence o c c u r.” 23 In another section, the text claims, has not only complemented the prior criminal that terrorism is about to be committed; and “We are committed to keeping the world’s most law approach, but also should give pause to the threat of terrorism constitutes a form of dangerous weapons out of the hands of the those who would target vital U.S. and allied aggression and justifies acts in self-defense.21 world’s most dangerous people.”24 A further interests in the future. section states, “We do not rule out the use of Similarly, in 1998, the Clinton admin- force before attack occurs, even if uncertainty the Bush Doctrine attempts istration determined that the existing legal remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s to define acts designed to framework was inadequate to deal with threats att a c k .” 25 The Doctrine of Preemption, or of terrorism to critical infrastructure. On May Anticipatory Self-Defense as it is otherwise destabilize our national interests 22, 1998, the President signed Presidential known, was clarified in terms of its use by the in terms of “aggression,” with Decision Directives (PDD) 62 and 63 in imple- Bush administration, just as it had been by the concomitant right of self- mentation of his new counterterrorism policy the Reagan Presidency, which was the first to defense available as a lawful framework. PDD 62, Combating Terrorism, was formally adopt this venerable legal principle as response the successor to NSDD 138, which determined an administration policy. that the threat of terrorism constitutes a form These policies required that we make the of aggression and justifies acts in self-defense.22 fullest use of all the weapons in our arsenal. ROEs in the Terrorist Environment PDD 62 was more expansive in its coverage These include not only those defensive and Operational planning, while classified for than NSDD 138 and addressed a broad range protective measures that reduce U.S. systems each military operation, provides the legal and of unconventional threats, to include attacks vulnerability, but also new legal tools and agree- operational roadmap for our military’s response on critical infrastructure, terrorist acts, and the ments on international sanctions, as well as the to an attack by terrorists and/or their surrogates. threat of the use of weapons of mass destruc- collaboration of other concerned governments. The operational planning cycle in each of our tion. The aim of the directive was to establish a We should use our military power only as a last unified commands first addresses legal and more pragmatic and systems-based approach to resort and where lesser means are not available, international considerations. That is, the opera- protection of critical infrastructure and coun- such as in those instances where the use of force tional planners must consider whether: terterrorism, with preparedness being the key is the only way to eliminate the threat to critical to effective consequence management. PDD civil or military infrastructure. The response to n the operation is UN-sanctioned 62 created the position of National Coordina- al Qaeda poses such a requirement. n it has been approved by the relevant tor for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Full implementation of the Bush National regional organization Counter-terrorism, which would coordinate Security Strategy, as in that articulated by n a strong legal rationale can be articu- program management through the Office of the President Reagan, should lead to increased lated publicly National Security Advisor. planning for protective and defensive measures n there is allied political support PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protec- to address this challenge to our national secu- n the operation can be justified under tion, mandated that the National Coordinator rity, and where deterrence fails, to respond in the customary international law principles of established by PDD 62 initiate immediate a manner that eliminates the threat—rather necessity and proportionality. action between the public and private sectors than, as prior to the articulation of NSDD 138 to assure the continuity and viability of our by President Reagan, treating each incident Geography is also a critical element of political infrastructures. The goal established after the fact as a singular crisis provoked by an operation’s development, with topography, within PDD 63 was to significantly increase international criminals. By treating terrorists avenues of approach, delimiting mountain security for government systems and a reliable and others attempting to destroy our critical ranges and rivers, and legally prohibited and interconnected and secure information system. infrastructure as participants in international politically sensitive areas accounted for (for To counter the worldwide al Qaeda coercion where clear linkage can be tied to a example, dams, dikes, powerplants, and so threat, President George W. Bush implemented state actor or its surrogates, the right of self- forth). The civilian populace must be addressed the proactive policies in 2002 later incorpo- defense against their sponsor is triggered, and in terms of location, involvement, and commit- rated in the critically important 2006 National responding coercion (political, economic, ment to the opposing forces. The selection of Security Strategy. When President Bush or military) may be the only proportional weapons systems is dictated by the capability released the National Security Strategy for his response to the threat. of the opposing force and the force’s size and second term on March 16, 2006, his adminis- This proactive strategy to the threat makeup, as well as the political impact the tration continued the emphasis on preemption posed by attacks on our critical national use of certain weapons may have on nations articulated in his 2003 speech at West Point security interests embraces the use of legal, supporting the terrorist force. In this regard, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 137 FORCE OF LAW | “Operationalizing” Legal Requirements we must consider the use of available special guidance for handling crisis responses to ter- tion, and is designed to limit the scope and weapons, laser-guided munitions, and conven- rorist violence and other threats is provided, intensity of the conflict, discourage escalation, tional weapons. Targeting considerations are through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), to and achieve political and military objectives. a key element in operational planning, with deployed forces during armed conflict. The inherent right of self-defense, as in prior authorized military targets, targets requiring ROEs reflect domestic law requirements national ROEs, establishes the policy frame- prior approval, high-value targets, economic and U.S. commitments to international law. work for the SROE. These SROEs—which targets, and intelligence-related targets. They are impacted by political and operational remain in effect, although with certain amend- In addition, operational consider- considerations. J. Ashley Roach has noted that ments to accommodate specific new threats— ations include tactical concerns, intelligence ROEs “should never substitute for a strategy are intended to provide general guidelines on matters, and opposing force information. As governing the use of deployed forces, in a self-defense and are applicable worldwide to an example, planners must address choice peacetime crisis or in wartime.”26 For the mili- all echelons of command, and provide guid- and mix of forces, allied participation, avia- tary commander concerned with responding to ance governing the use of force consistent with tion/ground relationships and deconfliction, a terrorist threat, ROEs represent limitations or mission accomplishment. They are to be used weapons restrictions for political reasons, avail- upper bounds on the disposition of forces and in operations representing the spectrum of ability of lift, fuel, food, ammunition concerns, the designation of weapons systems, without conflict—that is, operations other than war, and resupply planning. Tactical considerations diminishing the commander’s authority to during transition from peacetime to armed include determining whether the ingress will effectively protect his own forces from attack. conflict or war, and during armed conflict, to involve clandestine or open entry, force sizing, Terrorist violence against U.S. and allied include response to terrorist violence—in the access to critical targets, transportation require- forces in Iraq and Afghanistan represents absence of superseding guidance.30 ments, time constraints, and weapons selection. hostile acts that trigger applicable standing The expanded national guidance rep- Intelligence considerations address overhead ROEs. The first standing rules applicable resented in the SROEs has greatly assisted in requirements and capabilities, available human worldwide were promulgated in 1980, as a providing both clarity and flexibility for our intelligence assets, ability to monitor enemy result of a commander, U.S. Pacific Command, combatant commanders. The approval of communications, security of friendly com- initiative under Admiral Robert Long, and were amendments by the Secretary of Defense and munications, and ability to neutralize enemy denominated the “JCS Peacetime ROEs for U.S. promulgation by the Chairman of the Joint computer systems. Opposing force consider- Seaborne Forces.”27 These rules, which served as Chiefs of Staff have ensured consistency in ations include size, capability, support of popu- the bases for all commands’ subsequent stand- the way all military commanders, wherever lace, available weaponry, delivery capability, ing ROEs, were designed exclusively for the assigned, address unconventional threats such as those posed by terrorist elements in Iraq, supported clandestinely by regional adversaries. the use of force directed by President Reagan in 1986 was preceded by conclusive evidence of Libyan responsibility for Observations and Conclusions other acts of terrorism against the United States, with clear The United States was jolted into an evidence that more were planned awareness of the changing character of aggression when its Embassy in Tehran was seized on November 4, 1979, by Iranian militants who communications, will and training, intelligence maritime environment. More comprehensive enjoyed the support of Ayatollah Ruhollah capability, aviation assets, artillery, hardened national ROEs for land, sea, and air operations Khomeini’s revolutionary government. The transportation capability, communications were promulgated by Secretary of Defense 1983 terrorist attack on the Marine battalion jamming capacity, logistics, and weapons of Caspar Weinberger in June 1986.28 on the green line at the Beirut International mass destruction. Finally, every planning evo- The 1986 ROEs were designated the “JCS Airport was followed in March 1986 by the lution addresses an exit strategy. Peacetime ROEs for U.S. Forces.” These pro- bombing of a discotheque by Libyan terrorists ROEs, a subset of the planning process, vided the on-scene commander with the flex- acting on Muammar Qadhafi’s orders in Berlin. effectively operationalize the national security ibility to respond to the hostile intent of terror- The United States responded to the Libyan directives executed by our recent Presidents ists with minimum necessary force and to limit attack by launching defensive strikes on mili- within the parameters of international law for the scope and intensity of the terrorist threat. tary targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. The use each military campaign. The customary inter- The strategy underlying the 1986 rules sought of force directed by President Reagan in 1986 national law requirements of necessity of mili- to terminate violence quickly and decisively, was preceded by conclusive evidence of Libyan tary action and proportionality in response to and on terms favorable to the United States. responsibility for other acts of terrorism against enemy attack are given operational significance In October 1, 1994, President Clinton’s the United States, with clear evidence that more in the terrorist scenario through ROEs, which, first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, approved were planned. in simplest terms, are directives that a govern- the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROEs) for In August 1998, al Qaeda terrorists ment has established to define the circum- U.S. Forces, which significantly broadened the bombed the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar stances and limitations under which its forces scope of our national ROEs.29 As established in es Salaam, with significant loss of life. This was will initiate and continue engagement with the SROEs, U.S. policy, should deterrence fail, followed in October 2000 with a terrorist attack terrorist forces. In the U.S. context, this ensures provides flexibility to respond to crises with on the USS Cole in Yemeni waters. Finally, in that the President and Secretary of Defense’s options that are proportional to the provoca- September 2001, al Qaeda began a campaign

138 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu TERRY against the United States with attacks in New ROEs. Within that framework, the concept of interpretation of the obligations of the Charter.” See York and Washington, DC, with spillover in “necessity” in the counterterrorism context has Robert Rosenstock, “The Declaration of Principles Afghanistan and Iraq. always required that a hostile act occur or that of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey,” American Journal of International Law 65 An examination of authorized responses a terrorist unit demonstrate hostile intent. The (1971), 713, 715. to terrorist violence requires an understanding implementation of national guidance through 11 “Definition of Aggression,” 142. that terrorism is a strategy that does not adhere promulgation of the 1980, 1986, and the current 12 A fundamental purpose of the UN Charter to any of the military or legal norms reflected in 1994 ROEs, frequently amended since, has is to “maintain international peace and security.” the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 or greatly assisted in providing both clarity and See UN Charter, Article 1, paragraph 1. Article 5, The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. In flexibility of action for our theater command- paragraph 2, of the Definition of Aggression provides: fact, the fundamental characteristic of terrorism ers. The approval in each instance by the sitting “A war of aggression is a crime against international is reflected in its violation of the principles of Secretary of Defense has ensured consistency peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsi- discrimination, necessity, and proportional- in the way all military commanders, wherever bility.” See “Definition of Aggression,” 144. 13 ity. The only norm for terrorist violence is assigned, have addressed terrorist threat situ- “Report of Department of Defense Commis- effectiveness. While traditional international ations while providing the mechanism for the sion on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act of 23 October 1983,” 129 (December 20, 1983), reprinted law requires clear discrimination among those automatic amending of ROEs or the issuance in American Foreign Policy Document 122 (1983), affected by an attack and proportion in an of supplemental measures on the occurrence of 349. attack’s intensity, the nature of terrorism is specified conditions or events. JFQ 14 See, for example, Arthur W. Rovine, “Con- such that success is measured by the extent and temporary Practice of the United States Relating to duration of destructiveness, with no concern for Notes International Law,” American Journal of International those affected. In the contemporary language Law 68 (1974), 720, 736 (statement of then–Acting 1 of defense economics, terrorists wage counter- Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977. Addi- Secretary of State Dean Rusk). value rather than counterforce warfare. tional Protocols are reproduced in John N. Moore, 15 UN Charter, Article 51. Guy B. Roberts, and Robert F. Turner, eds., National 16 A clear understanding of the terrorist Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Security Law Documents (Durham, NC: Carolina mindset is important because the only cred- Law Volume I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Academic Press, 1995). Printing Office, 1963), sec. 25, 971–972. ible response to terrorism is deterrence. There 2 All major news outlets reported on February 17 must be, as in the case of our response against George P. Shultz, “Low Intensity Warfare: The 1, 2008, that two women with mental disabilities Challenge of Ambiguity,” U.S. Department of State al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and currently with were used as bomb couriers in a Baghdad pet market Current Policy No. 783, January 1986, 1. the surge in Baghdad, an assured, effective bombing, resulting in significant loss of Iraqi lives. 18 UN Charter, Article 2, paragraph 4. 3 response that imposes unacceptable costs on Moore, Roberts, and Turner, Common Article 19 Myres S. McDougal, “The Soviet-Cuban perpetrators and those who make their activi- 3, 185. Quarantine and Self-Defense,” American Journal of 4 ties possible. For domestic intruders such as See Waldemar Solf and E. Cummings, “A International Law 57 (1963), 697, 600. Jose Padilla, criminal law may suffice. For those Survey of Penal Sanctions Under Protocol I to the 20 U.S. Defense official Noel Koch, quoted in operating outside the United States, the Ameri- Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,” Case “Preemptive Anti-Terrorism Raids Allowed,” The Western Reserve Journal of International Law (Spring can reaction must counter the terrorists’ strat- Washington Post, April 16, 1984, A19. 1977), 205. 21 Robert C. McFarlane, “Terrorism and the egy within the parameters of international law, 5 Article 1(2) of Protocol I states that “civilians Future of Free Society,” speech delivered at the and more specifically, the law of armed con- and combatants remain under the protection and flict. Those who suggest otherwise understand National Strategic Information Center, Defense Strat- authority of the principles of international law derived egy Forum, Washington, DC, March 25, 1985. neither the inherent flexibility of international from established custom, from the principles of 22 Classified document described by McFarlane. law nor the cost of violating that law. humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.” See James P. Terry, “An Appraisal of Lawful Military 6 The thrust of the U.S. strategy in United Nations (UN) Charter, Article 2, para- Response to State-Sponsored Terrorism,” Naval War response to international terrorism, beginning graph 4, available at . College Review (May-June 1986), 58. 7 with President Reagan’s articulation of NSDD See League of Nations Covenant, Article 12, 23 The National Security Strategy of the United 138 in April 1984, has been to reclaim the available at . House, March 16, 2006), 12. 8 Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feli- 24 reactive policy toward unconventional threats Ibid., 19. ciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (New 25 such as terrorist violence. With the signing of Ibid., 23. Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 142–143. 26 J. Ashley Roach, “Rules of Engagement,” Naval NSDD 138, followed by President Clinton’s 9 See “Definition of Aggression,” G.A. Res. 3314, issuing of PDD 62, and President Bush’s dec- War College Review (January-February 1983), 46. 29 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, UN Doc. A/9631 27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Peacetime Rules of laration of the Bush Doctrine in the 2002 and (1974); “Declaration on Principles of International Engagement for U.S. Seaborne Forces” (May 1980). 2006 National Security Strategies, preemptive Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Peacetime Rules of self-defense measures have been authorized Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the Engagement for U.S. Forces” (June 1986). through carefully drawn national rules of United Nations,” G.A. Res. 2625, 25 UN GAOR Supp. 29 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruc- engagement that ensure that our forces do not (No. 28) at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter tion (CJCSI) 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engage- absorb the first hit where clear indicators of cited as Declaration on Friendly Relations]. ment for U.S. Forces,” October 1, 1994, as amended 10 enemy attack are detected. “By accepting the respective texts [of the December 22, 1994, and thereafter. The most recent Declaration on Friendly Relations], states have The inherent right of self-defense has amendment is CJCSI 3121.01B, June 13, 2005. acknowledged that the principles represent their 30 provided the policy framework for all U.S. Ibid. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 139 Reconstructing Iraq’s Provinces,

he Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq have a common purpose: to bring about, within each province, the coalition’s overall T goals for Iraq—a peaceful, prosperous society, One able to sustain and defend its political and economic system without major foreign involvement. The PRTs must enable by each provincial and local government to achieve these goals with or without coherent leadership from the center. After years of suspicion and violent conflict among Iraq’s three major populations (Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shia Arabs), it can be no surprise that a centralized democratic government in Baghdad One will often be fractured among the national parties and will not always create the kind of stability, cohesion, and leadership the By Henry L. Clarke country needs. Why should we expect anything different in the provinces? Simply because the provinces are all very different, and few mirror Iraq as a whole. Some provinces are composed of a single ethnic/religious group, such as the three provinces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Anbar Province (overwhelmingly Sunni Arab), and several provinces in the south that are overwhelmingly Shia, with different internal divisions within each group. Other provinces have two main groups in various proportions, and a few, such as Salah ad Din, are divided three

Army Corps of Engineers personnel discuss construction of wastewater treatment facility

U.S. Army (Jim Gordon)

140 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CLARKE ways and have no single majority. Yet even become the main platform for implement- than the real goals of qualitative political and the most demographically divided provinces ing many U.S. programs in Iraq, including economic change in the provinces. have the potential to make local accommoda- those of the U.S. Agency for International The Special Inspector General for Iraqi tions for specific purposes—for example, Development (USAID) and the rule of law. Reconstruction (SIGIR) recommended creating to improve infrastructure or services—that Without centralization, those PRTs that have a system of goals and benchmarks for the PRTs, remain more difficult to achieve at the established close working relations with Iraqi and in July 2007 accepted the Embassy’s view national level. Provincial reconstruction is no longer about physical construction, although PRTs our system generates continuous pressure to centralize have supported a lot of construction. It is Provincial Reconstruction Team policies and operations, about reconstructing Iraqi life in the prov- oversimplify their tasks, and interfere in the most critical inces from Saddam’s centralized dictatorship contributions to coalition goals to decentralized governments that people accept as legitimate, from the rule of violence to the rule of law, from ethnic/religious officials have effectively promoted political that such goals and benchmarks would have antagonism to accommodation, from govern- and economic accommodations and institu- to be established and tracked for each team ment-run business to private sector growth, tional development and have great potential to individually.2 Yet in October 2007, noting that from rampant corruption to accountability, do more. Unfortunately, despite the diversity, the recommendation had not been fulfilled, and so on. It is about fundamental, qualitative complexity, and decentralization of our own SIGIR recommended that the U.S. Ambassador change. American political system, our system gener- and Commanding General jointly undertake Moreover, the diversity among Iraq’s ates continuous pressure to centralize PRT and approve a “comprehensive plan for the provinces is so great, and the opportuni- policies and operations, oversimplify their PRTs (including ePRTs [embedded PRTs]), with ties for effective foreign engagement vary tasks, and interfere in the most critical and elements tailored for each,” with objectives, so much among the provinces, that PRTs creative contributions PRTs are making to performance measures, milestones, funding cannot deliver a single set of policies and coalition goals in Iraq. requirements, and agencies accountable for the programs as instructed from Baghdad. Each plan’s implementation.3 SIGIR thus managed PRT must draw up province-specific plans, How Not to Reconstruct to convert individual team planning into a priorities, and levels of resources to achieve Aware of Washington’s pressure for massive top-down bureaucratic effort, involv- its goals. While the general principles of “metrics” of the results of PRT operations ing dozens of military and civilian agencies and counterinsurgency, economic development, in the provinces, the National Coordination untold hours from hundreds of staff officers. and institutional reform do apply throughout Team (NCT), predecessor of the Office of Such a comprehensive plan can hardly be flex- Iraq, they involve policy choices, and each Provincial Affairs (OPA) at the U.S. Embassy ible enough to help individual PRTs to accom- PRT must adapt them to address the unique in Baghdad, developed a whole series of “stop- plish their mission and invites micromanage- circumstances prevailing in each province. light” objectives for the provinces, and NCT ment of the teams, which can only distract the Efforts to create a single “provincial doctrine” and OPA dutifully briefed the outcomes on a bureaucracy in Baghdad from thinking about for Iraqi PRTs tend either to be inapplicable regular basis. The results were too simplistic strategic issues. to some parts of Iraq or hopelessly vague.1 to prove anything about the effectiveness of A current congressional study seems Likewise, efforts to contrive a single set of the PRTs, and briefing officers would have based on the unstated, unquestioned, and measurements to compare the performance of to describe actual changes in each province implausible assumption that knowledge all the teams can only occasionally be useful separately. The exercise showed mainly what and judgments about how to implement because the provinces in which they serve will we already knew: the provinces were all differ- American goals in each province of Iraq (and progress or regress at different rates, and the ent, and any shift from red to yellow, or yellow Afghanistan, too) can best come from higher PRTs’ performance will usually not be as deci- to green, would take a long and undetermined authorities: sive as the Iraqi efforts. Moreover, many of the time. changes we want are not readily measurable. The danger of requiring quantita- The bottom line . . . is that until PRTs receive Provincial diversity and decentralization tive metrics for the performance of PRTs consistent and clear direction from higher complicate control and direction by senior in bringing about qualitative change is that headquarters, they will not be able to maxi- Iraqi and American officials preoccupied inventive people will produce them, and they mize their efforts or judge their success. In with the needs of the country as seen from will measure the wrong things. Such metrics this environment, resources cannot be pro- the center, but given the diversity, decentral- can avoid qualitative judgments by measur- grammed or applied effectively. The heroic ization offers the best chances for success. ing inputs—dollars spent, hours of training, tactical work being done by PRTs will go for Without centralization, PRTs have already numbers of Iraqis trained, meetings or naught without more coherent strategic and conferences held, and so forth, but these data operational level guidance and oversight. In measure effort, not success, and the outcomes the absence of such guidance and oversight, Retired Ambassador Henry L. Clarke was Head can still be failures. The even greater danger is resources, instead of supporting strategic of the Office of Provincial Affairs, U.S. Embassy that false indicators quickly become the objec- agility, may be poorly prioritized and coor- Baghdad, from May to August 2007. tives because they are so much easier to fulfill dinated, and, in some cases, squandered.4 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 141 INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE | Reconstructing Iraq’s Provinces

Coalition forces and PRT members survey canals for future construction of potable water pipelines

U.S. Army (Daniel Herrera)

This is precisely the wrong “bottom must assess what is possible and what might one of the 2007 congressional benchmarks for line.” More lives, time, and billions of dollars work best in their province, and from that Iraq, and it was clearly measurable. The Iraqi have been squandered in Iraq due to poor develop a specific plan for PRT operations, constitution provides for the distribution of planning and decisionmaking in Washington, including key judgments on timing and pri- substantial amounts of Iraqi revenue to all the U.S. Central Command, and Baghdad than by orities for human and other resources. The provinces on the basis of population, and after anyone dealing with provincial Iraqi counter- plan should be coordinated with agencies modest success in 2006, the allocation system parts on a daily basis. If one team leader mis- providing resources and then approved, prob- was fully functional in 2007. The previous judges the best approach for his province, it ably with modifications, at the U.S. Embassy. regime had no similar system, so most PRTs will not handicap all the other provinces and The team’s progress can then be judged on the were providing provincial authorities with is much more easily corrected. Yet operational basis of its own plan. The various plans and both general and expert advice on develop- guidance from higher headquarters—which is their fulfillment can be shared and discussed ing their budgets and managing these funds. inappropriate in some or in many provinces— without judging PRTs against one another. Once the central Ministry of Finance released could take months or years to correct. Even the funds, PRTs were generally also able to someone with extensive field experience report exact amounts received and spent. cannot sit in Washington, Tampa, or even team leaders must assess Local leaders learned to lobby and reconcile Baghdad and prescribe how a given program differences on priorities for projects, and should be prioritized in Ramadi, Irbil, Basra, what might work best in provincial authorities became eager to show and Kut better than the teams working in their province, and from that results. The provinces even committed capital those places; in each locale, the needs and develop a specific plan for PRT expenditures quite promptly by international opportunities, and therefore the priorities, operations standards. While performance was uneven will differ. The study overlooks entirely among the provinces, and PRTs had only that the PRTs can succeed only through the limited access in some provinces, the political success of each team’s specific counterparts and economic incentives for achievement of and that supposedly all-knowing higher However, skill in planning and progress good results were comparable among all the authorities must usually rely on PRT reports toward fulfillment of individual PRT plans provinces. The benchmark was met. to assess what counterparts can do. can also be taken into account privately in Especially in the field of economic individual performance evaluations of the development, there may be other measures of Planning and Measuring Success team leaders.5 success that provide quantitative indicators— Even though there may be few yard- Some specific objectives can be similar though not necessarily nationwide bench- sticks or deadlines applicable to all the PRTs, in all the provinces, if they can be clearly and marks. Numbers of new small businesses province-specific yardsticks, benchmarks, quantitatively defined and are not greatly formed can show evidence of the business and timelines can be useful if they are part of affected by geographic differences. For climate, including the removal of obstacles to each team’s planning process. Team leaders example, provincial budgetary execution was business. The growth of small-business credit

142 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu CLARKE programs (including repayment rates) can like- Political engagement—that is, the influ- the policies, programs, and reforms that we wise be a measurable indicator. Of course, such ence a team leader or other team members think will strengthen them. The idea that numbers will be influenced by differing factors can have on provincial and local leaders—is projects and programs can be implemented in different provinces—notably the levels of rarely mentioned as a PRT goal, and the scope solely by foreigners was always risky, and security, corruption, and economic potential. for such engagement varies throughout Iraq. the time for that is now long gone. Nothing The most important objectives of the Given the breadth of coalition goals, political the PRTs introduce will be sustainable, or PRTs are neither quantifiable nor easily com- engagement may be the most important PRT will bring about Iraqi self-sufficiency, unless parable. In terms of economic work, the most subgoal for the team leader himself. Whether the Iraqis are themselves willing and able to critical path to development in most provinces subtle or blunt, persuasion cannot be objec- implement the changes. The programs and is likely to require economic reform—that tively measured, nor does influence automati- resources available throughout Iraq are well is, a fundamental shift to a decentralized cally determine success. For example, our established now, but only each PRT can decide private economy. Iraq’s “socialist” command team in the Kurdistan region has long under- how best to persuade the counterparts in its economy remains far behind the progress achieved its potential for political engagement in economic reform achieved in Eastern there, in part due to inappropriate staffing the idea that programs can Europe, and much of it remains locked into and security restrictions imposed by Embassy be implemented solely by centralized legislation, which is unlikely to Baghdad, but there is no way to objectively foreigners was always risky, change soon. Privatization is badly needed, compare its impact with other teams in other and some provincial leaders have asked for provinces. It can be argued that the potential and the time for that is now it, but neither the Iraqis nor the Americans for overall American impact is greater in that long gone in Baghdad are ready to address the issue. region than elsewhere, but there is no way of Several PRTs are assisting in the revitaliza- measuring what might have been achieved area to adopt them, what priorities to set, and tion of state-owned enterprises, to promote without subjective assumptions about what whether local or provincial offices have the employment and production at whatever the Kurdistan Regional Government would capacity to carry out a given activity if it is cost. Ideally, provinces would each conduct or could have changed. The only sensible turned over to them completely. The effective- their own privatization according to uniform approach is to use a unique assessment and ness of a particular program in a province standards and procedures set at the center. planning process for the regional team in may be affected by whether the governor has Since this is not happening, the PRTs need to Iraqi Kurdistan, and also for each of the other a third-grade education or a master’s degree, look at private sector development creatively, PRTs, whether at the provincial or local level, whether he is a Kurd or Arab, and whether both as a means of replacing defunct state- and judge the results qualitatively, province by a different religious group is dominant in owned enterprises and to generate attitudes province. one part of his province. It matters whether among the provincial leadership to create The critical difference that PRTs bring the province is intensely agricultural, largely opportunities to stimulate private rather than to our involvement in Iraq is their capacity urban, or a desert, and what kinds of activity public initiatives in commercial development. to help their Iraqi counterparts to implement the level of violence will permit. Economic policy success for a PRT may lie in promoting imaginative local initiatives using provincial resources, which is not a readily measurable process. Corruption remains a huge obstacle to political and economic development in Iraq, as in most countries. The presence of PRTs, U.S. Air Force (Matthew Plew) U.S. Air Force working closely with provincial and local leadership on budgets and projects, often with experienced rule-of-law advisors on the team, cannot prevent corruption and favoritism, but it can help deter them. There is no way to quantify undiscovered illegal activity, or the absence of it, so we will not easily measure how much the PRTs have or will contribute to this aspect of the rule of law. Other rule-of-law developments suffer from the same handicap in measurement (how intimidated does a judge feel?), yet the results of reforms to establish the effective rule of law can be among the most decisive in establishing the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments and courts to Army Corps of Engineers contractor inspects new water become self-sustaining and to be viewed by treatment plant in Diwaniyah that will serve 10,000 residents the population as legitimate. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 143 INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE | Reconstructing Iraq’s Provinces

A decentralized concept for organizing leaders. State decisions on security are based move at all into their provinces to meet coun- and assessing PRTs requires that the team on a model developed for other countries, terparts, while in the Kurdistan region, where leaders be real leaders—able to lead and which has often worked badly for PRTs in there were no attacks on U.S. personnel, U.S. manage multifaceted teams, yet also effec- Iraq in both permissive and extremely hostile contractors repeatedly fired on approaching tive in advising their Iraqi counterparts. By circumstances. vehicles, causing noncombatant casualties. drawing on relatively senior Foreign Service The worldwide State concept is that Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General Officers for the team leader positions, the foreign host governments are responsible for David Petraeus attempted to deal with some State Department has been able to provide perimeter security of diplomatic and consular of these longstanding inconsistencies in team leaders with years of experience working posts, and that if this cannot be guaranteed, mid-2007 by shifting more responsibility for with foreign counterparts, and others with the post must be restricted in staffing, evacu- PRT movement protection to military units, years of administrative management experi- ated, or closed—a standard clearly opposite to but in the Kurdistan region and in several ence, but it has not always found team leaders the mission of PRTs in Iraq, where the coali- provinces in the south there were no available who have strong backgrounds in both nego- tion established and increased the number of U.S. military units to move the PRTs. Even tiating and management, plus the creativity PRTs in combat zones, and some teams have in Baghdad, an incident in September 2007 to work out novel solutions in a totally new come under almost continuous attack. So received worldwide attention when it illus- situation. There is no obvious “career path” State persuaded the U.S. military to accom- trated that contractors providing movement to becoming a team leader, yet many senior modate most of the PRTs on its bases. security were sometimes too aggressive to be Foreign Service Officers have done remark- State’s Diplomatic Security Service consistent with either the counterinsurgency ably well. There are surely potential team contracts with private companies wherever or broader U.S. goals. leaders from other career paths who should be hired, if they can be identified, but since State persuaded the U.S. military to accommodate most of the mix of talent required is not easy to find, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams on its bases it would be a mistake to radically change the recruitment process for Iraq at this late stage. Team leaders now receive PRT training it must provide movement security. These During 2007, the United States created together with other team members, and that is contracts, originally designed to protect 14 new PRTs embedded with military bri- not sufficient. The leaders should also receive Ambassadors in unsettled countries, place gades in Anbar Province and in and around a high-level, 2-week course—comparable to the highest priority on protecting the lives of Baghdad Province (including parts of neigh- the courses now given to first-time Ambas- the passengers. If the threats against a move- boring provinces), so that both movement sadors and to Deputy Chiefs of Mission, but ment are too great, it does not take place. In and perimeter security depended on the with more military, USAID, and rule-of-law Iraq, in the event of apparent threats against brigade. Although exposed to the same risks input. The course should use case studies of a movement already under way, the contract as combat troops, these ePRTs brought two best practices, and of management and policy guards are free to take aggressive action to huge advantages to the U.S. effort in Iraq: failures, and should meet with former team deter it without waiting to be attacked. These providing greater access to district and other leaders. The goal would be to go beyond spe- concepts have not worked well in Iraq: several local counterparts, and avoiding the problems cific training, to reorienting team leaders to nonresident PRTs in southern Iraq could not of State’s security structure. arrive in the field knowing the ways in which they might get useful guidance if they need it. U.S. Army (Dustin Weidman) More importantly, they need to understand their personal responsibility for planning their work, leading their team, and for initiative and imagination in implementing established U.S. goals in their area.

Security vs. Working with Counterparts Security is critical to the success of PRTs in Iraq, and lack of it is often one of their major obstacles. There are two main components: protection of the team’s living and office accommodations, and protection of movements by team members to meet with their counterparts. Unlike the military, in which security is a responsibility of command at various levels, the State Department and Families return to homes in Abu Ghraib after other civilian agencies in Iraq do not delegate fleeing from violence several years ago basic decisions on PRT security to team

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This embedded structure did not, their level. Now that the ePRTs have been longer term counterinsurgency and recon- however, solve the problems of excessive secu- operating for many months, if the provincial struction goals will remain unfinished, and rity measures in the Kurdistan region. There team leaders take advantage of the ePRTs’ perhaps unsustainable—or at least seriously are minimum standards for protection against separate roles and allow the subordinate interrupted, while new American personnel terrorist attack anywhere, but the Embassy team leaders to manage their smaller teams, try to reestablish the relationship. Since team seriously curtailed the effectiveness of the the latter may be able to maintain their members do not all rotate at once, but are regional team by requiring it to move out of effectiveness. replaced individually, there is no excuse for a the city to the isolated Camp Zaytun. The Embedded teams created another, more break in continuity with counterparts. problem of aggressive driving and shooting basic challenge: where does the ePRT go if Who then takes responsibility for secu- by contractors was blamed on their contract the brigade moves or returns to the United rity of the once-embedded PRT? Ideally, some and vehicles, although the same State contrac- States? If the primary purpose of the ePRT is nearby coalition forces do. If they are too thin tor (DynCorp) operated the same vehicles to engage Iraqi counterparts, how can a team to provide movement security, that job will differently in Bosnia, when the threat level break off the contacts, programs, and projects probably revert to civilian contractors. For resembled that of the Kurdistan region.6 they are working on? Brigades and regiments perimeter security, State should consider reli- In the south, where initially there were are maneuver elements, very mobile and ance on Iraqi forces, just as the U.S. military is insufficient U.S. troops to replace the contrac- easily subdivided by smaller units. But Iraqi increasingly doing. tors, a solution reportedly has been found civilian counterparts are not, and PRTs can by establishing small U.S. military outposts and should maintain continuous contact with A Longer View near Karbala and Najaf that could support them. Some PRTs in Iraq were subdivided— The year 2007 was one of huge growth the PRTs and their movement security for in Salah ad Din some team members were in the PRT effort in Iraq, with 14 new ePRTs, those influential provinces, and by moving accommodated at other bases. Some embed- adding new personnel and skills to the exist- the Qadisiya PRT to Camp Echo, near ded brigade team members in Baghdad were ing provincial-level teams, and then increas- Diwaniyah.7 located with battalion headquarters when this ing staff for teams south of Baghdad that had improved their access to their counterparts. not been able to function fully until the secu- Withdrawal of Brigades Thus, the PRTs are flexible, but there must be rity climate became more permissive. Manag- Creating embedded PRTs at the local a basing and movement plan to maintain their ing all this growth left no time to consider level created a new challenge: how to coordi- access to counterparts when brigades plan reducing the teams or their functions. The nate with the provincial-level teams already to redeploy to another area or to withdraw teams were popular with the U.S. Congress functioning, especially in Anbar and Baghdad altogether. Such plans need to be joint civil- (which provided new funding specifically Provinces. To some Marine and Army com- ian/military efforts by higher authority, with for PRT use), with the military and civilian manders, it seemed these new teams should input from PRT leaders. bureaucracies, and with Iraqi counterparts. be subordinate to the provincial-level teams, With the departure of the “surge” bri- The potential of the teams had not been fully paralleling their military chain of command. gades of 2007, in which the new PRTs were explored, and from my perspective at the I resisted that, arguing that the new teams embedded, some of their forward operating Embassy it seemed they should try anything had their own missions and that they should bases used by ePRTs will be employed by reasonable that might serve our overall goals remain decentralized and focused on their fewer troops, closed, or turned over to Iraqi in Iraq. counterparts, while of course coordinating units. Thinning out U.S. combat forces also It is already time to reconsider how with the provincial level whenever necessary. means fewer military units to move the PRTs much U.S. civilian presence is really needed. I did not want to develop another layer in around safely. We cannot reasonably declare There is still a huge job to assist the Iraqis in the civilian bureaucracy in Iraq, and I did the civilian mission of an ePRT automatically creating sustainable institutions after such not want to distract provincial-level team bitter conflicts, but the resources we now leaders from their responsibility to engage expend may not be fully effective or justified. fully with counterparts at the provincial level. if the PRT moves with the Planning for the future of PRTs requires a few The Embassy has reportedly since decided brigade, continuity with assumptions, such as: otherwise, so the local, embedded teams now its counterparts will be 1. The great diversity of Iraqi provinces report to the provincial team leaders, sharply lost, and its longer term will remain, so sweeping generalizations reducing the number of team leaders report- counterinsurgency and about what should be done with the PRTs ing directly to the Embassy. If the provincial reconstruction goals will on a country-wide basis will likely be wrong. leaders decide to manage these embedded Decentralization will remain essential for local teams, rather than use a decentralized remain unfinished each team’s operations, but that does not structure, they—and especially the Baghdad relieve higher authorities from oversight, PRT—will find it a full-time job. It may “completed” when the level of violence or reviewing strategy, and adjusting resources. become more difficult to recruit experienced other priorities allows its brigade to depart; 2. Apart from temporary setbacks, the officers to lead the subordinate teams. On indeed, the ePRT should be able to accomplish more permissive security climate will not get the other hand, the ePRTs do share the same more in a more permissive environment. If worse in most parts of Iraq. This means that province with the provincial team, and thus the PRT moves with the brigade, continu- while there will be a continuing threat of ter- geographic diversity is less of a problem at ity with its counterparts will be lost, and its rorist attacks on PRTs and their movements, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 145 INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE | Reconstructing Iraq’s Provinces

U.S. Marine Corps (Joseph A. Lambach) Embedded PRT members inspect textile factory in al Ikaa

most teams will be able to travel often to meet PRTs that are least welcome or least able to be substantially fewer U.S. and British military with counterparts, and they can continue effective with their counterparts. We must also units, it is reasonable to assume that there to occupy their living and office quarters. A be prepared to eliminate those PRT functions will not be enough coalition combat troops collapse of security throughout most of the that have largely, if not perfectly, achieved to sustain the number of bases now used by country would require a reassessment of both their objectives; if they remain useful, they PRTs or to provide present levels of movement our civilian and military roles in Iraq, prob- should be transferred to Iraqi institutions. The security, even though such a residual military ably including security-driven cutbacks for public diplomacy function of each team will responsibility would be welcomed by the the PRTs. The present relative peace not only be essential in promoting a favorable image for teams. A combination of Iraqi perimeter secu- enlarges what our teams can do, but it is also the PRT, and for gauging realistically how it is rity and contractor movement security may be even more important to what the Iraqis can perceived by the public and the media. the most workable solution for many teams. do, together with us and for themselves. To 5. As of mid-2008, it is not plausible to take full advantage of the present environ- assume that either the Iraqi or the American ment in our planning, we need to assume that people will sustain current levels of military with fewer U.S. and British it will continue for most teams. forces in Iraq, including the massive logistical military units, there will not 3. Attacks on unarmed civilians, their system that supports them. Even the most be enough coalition combat automobiles, or Iraqi security forces by armed desirable scenario, a gradual withdrawal of troops to sustain the number contractors will be completely unacceptable. combat and some support units, will be a of bases now used by PRTs The rules of engagement and accountabil- major military undertaking, and there is a risk ity for poor judgment must be completely that small civilian organizations such as PRTs, revised—or new contractors must be found. now dependent on the military, will get lost in Based on these assumptions, the 4. As Iraqis become more confident in the planning shuffle. Embassy and higher authorities have some their own security and capacity to act, they 6. Since the process of shifting power immediate and substantial responsibilities will feel less comfortable with an overbearing and responsibility to the provinces is far for restructuring the PRT program, including U.S. civilian presence. We should therefore from complete, and PRT programs remain its security, throughout Iraq—getting ideas reduce nonessential functions and staff welcome, teams will most likely remain an from the individual teams, but without trying wherever we can. Attitudes toward us will not important part of the U.S. relationship even to manage ongoing PRT operations. Here are be the same in all provinces; we should trim if most U.S. military units depart. With some suggestions to start the process.

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1. End new funding and approvals for closer to provincial officials. In cases where under USAID, such as rule of law, public medium and large construction projects at there are few alternative routes, the distance to affairs, and political and economic reporting. provincial and local levels. This should not be a safe base makes each movement more dan- a big shock; in several provinces, the United gerous. The larger PRTs may require multiple Provincial Reconstruction Teams States has reduced the number of new con- daily movements in a more permissive envi- remain the best, most flexible format for civil- struction projects supported by the PRTs and ronment. Fewer troops for movement security ian engagement at the provincial and local the Army Corps of Engineers. But millions of could become a significant constraint on PRT levels in Iraq. There is no need to create a dollars’ worth of new funding was approved effectiveness. single pattern for their further evolution. For in 2007, and completion of the projects will 5. Each team should examine the effec- maximum effectiveness, the teams and their vary from months to years. It is time to stop tiveness of all its programs under way and successors should remain a decentralized filling this pipeline with new projects; the rank their importance, taking into account structure, pursuing coalition and U.S. goals in PRTs and Corps should focus on winding overall goals and the realistically expected Iraq according to the particular opportunities up existing projects. PRTs have increasingly effectiveness of each program in contributing and challenges in each province. JFQ advised the provinces on Iraqi provincial to them. Those functions that have largely funding and should continue their expert achieved their purpose should be transferred assistance to provincial budgeting and project to Iraqi authorities, while others that have management to the extent it is still needed. proved ineffective should be retired. The Notes 2. PRTs will mainly engage politically, U.S. Mission in Baghdad will have to review 1 For example, one tenet of counterinsurgency promote reform, and deliver various kinds of each team’s rankings individually as well doctrine says we should not extend economic technical assistance to provincial and local as nationwide—but unlike normal budget- benefits to those in the population who support the governmental institutions and to the private cutting exercises, this more careful pruning insurgency. Another equally valid concept says that sector, including agriculture. Teams will would produce healthier technical assistance we should make the benefits of economic programs continue to need funds they can commit for programs and more effective teams. available as broadly as possible, to encourage those small-scale projects to support these goals, 6. The future status of each PRT should who tacitly support the insurgency to shift their with minimal higher level interference. depend on what it does. Although perhaps the support to Iraqi institutions and the counterin- 3. Instead of isolating and restricting its least important strategic issue, the question of surgency. This is not a purely tactical decision, as functioning, our Kurdistan Regional Recon- whether PRTs should evolve into consulates, neither choice will work unless it is implemented consistently over time. The decision depends struction Team in Camp Zaytun, outside USAID teams, or Embassy offices has been greatly on local circumstances, including how Irbil, should be given new facilities in the city, discussed for years. The answer can only be much we know about the population. with secure public access for commercial and given for one province at a time, even though 2 Special Inspector General for Iraqi Recon- consular services, with external perimeter the decision must be taken at higher levels. struction (SIGIR) 07–014, Status of the Provincial protection supplied by the Kurdistan Regional Except for Irbil, where the United States has Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq, Government and movement security provided needed the consular and commercial func- July 25, 2007, 12. by contractors with new tactical instructions. tions of a Consulate General for years, and the 3 SIGIR 07–015, Review of the Effectiveness These measures are long overdue and imple- security situation would permit it, the status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in mentation should begin now. The United of “PRT” is understood and would seem suf- Iraq, October 18, 2007, x. 4 States will need an effective presence in the ficient. In Basra, where the British head the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Kurdistan region probably for as long as we PRT and their own Consulate General, and Oversight and Investigations, Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn have an Embassy in Iraq. Whether or not the we refer to our part of the team as an Embassy from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and team’s new facility is given the title of Consul- Office, there would seem to be little need Afghanistan, April 2008, 28. ate General, it should function as one, without to change the status quickly. If the security 5 Each embedded PRT, after arrival in Iraq in giving up the team’s broad role in technical climate permits us much greater access to 2007, was required by the Corps commander (with assistance in developing the economy and provincial and city officials and enables us Embassy concurrence) to prepare a plan jointly rule of law. Since the team has been officially to provide consular and commercial services with the brigade or regiment with which it was headed by Korea, and the Korean reconstruc- appropriate for a city the size of Basra, we embedded. The Office of Provincial Affairs also tion projects are largely completed, it might should also have a Consulate General, but began requiring team leaders’ plans from the other, be reasonable to rename the team as a U.S. both of these conditions were inconceivable provincial-level PRTs in the summer of 2007. 6 Consulate General with the departure of the before 2008. The Embassy Office in al-Hillah The author worked with a DynCorp team in Korean units. is an excellent platform for supporting the Bosnia every day for 2½ years, 2001–2003. 7 SIGIR 07–015, x. 4. Similarly, basing arrangements for Babil PRT and a variety of other U.S. Govern- other teams should be reviewed jointly (by ment functions housed there; if consular the Embassy and appropriate military staff) services are not necessary or feasible, it should to determine whether the bases and their remain an Embassy Office. While USAID security are appropriate for a reduced-conflict deserves credit for much of the work done so Iraq. Some PRTs on large military bases, far far by PRTs, the teams should not be renamed from their counterparts, have already tried to “USAID teams” as long as their leaders are adjust by dividing the team so key officers are responsible for functions that do not fall ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 147 Chinese engineers working for UN–African Union Mission in Darfur arrive in Nyala, Sudan, July 2008

By Edward Marks

UN (Stuart Price) Why USAFRICOM?

he new geographic military Africa today, but it is questionable if the con- diers and training and equipment rather than command for Africa—U.S. Africa temporary problems in Africa are primarily pursuing a political settlement (albeit one Command (USAFRICOM)—is security related in the Department of Defense based on exhaustion). an attempt to provide a solution (DOD) sense. This is not the Africa of the While power may come out of the barrel T of a gun, security comes from competent and to a felt problem. With laudable intentions, “Winds of Change” era where U.S. Govern- its creators are attempting to improve U.S. ment policy interests included Cold War legitimate governance. The Human Security Government efforts in Africa by coordinating concerns and where there was a great similar- Brief 2007 by the Simon Fraser University military activities with the Department of State ity of challenges facing the newly independent Human Security Center explains that the and other agencies. Unfortunately, it is an idea African governments taking over reins from sub-Saharan African security situation was deformed at birth, as it cannot produce the their former colonial masters. Security in transformed between 1999 and 2006 with result desired but instead will only exacerbate Africa today is not a military problem but a the number of armed conflicts and people the problem of over-militarization of U.S. symptom of lack of effective governance. It killed dropping dramatically. This result was policy and programs. It is a case of the cure cannot be resolved by more military training produced by a significant improvement in being worse than the disease. and equipment. Trying to use the military tool the form of governments and a number of Why are we doing this to ourselves? would be equivalent to resolving the Thirty conflict prevention initiatives (humanitarian There appear to be a number of doubtful Years’ War in Europe by injecting more sol- missions, peacekeeping, and peace-building assumptions underlying this decision. That Security Comes Out of the Barrel Ambassador Edward Marks is a Senior Fellow with the School of Public Policy, Program on Peacekeeping of a Gun. Security is clearly a problem in Policy, at George Mason University

148 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu MARKS operations, largely pursued by diplomacy and American perspective on the military. Ameri- politics, nationbuilding, and economic international organizations). Little if any of cans view their Servicepeople as fellow citi- development). this change was due to military engagement zens and feel a strong bond with them—and Many of these challenges, of course, and institution-building. quite rightfully so, as this has been the Ameri- manifest themselves in geographic areas Military engagement and institution- can experience. However, this history and this below globalization and above individual building are, of course, useful and often neces- attitude are not shared by many in the world countries, hence the interest in regional- sary. However, they should be consciously and regarding their own militaries, much less ism. There are also political, economic, and carefully integrated into our overall policy and foreign soldiers. That our hearts are pure cuts cultural areas or regions, for instance, that programs, not the other way around. Argu- no ice, and putting a uniform face on what compose the European Union. But many if ably, armies and police forces in Africa today should be largely a civilian relationship will not most of these characterizations are either are a significant part of the security problem hinder if not destroy the possibility of success subsections (for example, Korea) of the tradi- because they do not belong to competent and in fostering that relationship. tional geographic classification (Asia) or, as responsible governments. Therefore, military- That New Organizations Will Provide in the case of North Africa, are more closely to-military programs in Africa will be coun- Greater Effectiveness. Presumably there is an tied to other regions (Mediterranean, Middle terproductive unless firmly subordinated to underlying assumption of greater efficiency East). Also, many of these regions of U.S. broader political and economic developments. in the USAFRICOM proposal. However, Government interest cross traditional geo- It is difficult to see how this can be done when USAFRICOM as the primary organizational graphic boundaries, such as India-Pakistan- a military organization is put in charge. interlocutor with African countries will Afghanistan. In other words, policy concerns obviously introduce a new stovepipe into rarely coexist with the traditional geographic government operations. By the iron law of names, or, as the old military saying has it, we should be looking for bureaucracy and the influence of professional battles often take place on the edges of maps. a whole-of-government deformation, the command will inevitably Therefore, no matter how you organize the approach, not the tweaking pursue its own cultural policy perspective U.S. Government, many if not most of the of a military model designed and will create a new organizational claim on problems to be dealt with will require cross- primarily for warfighting resources. Led by a very senior military officer, ing organizational boundaries. This is espe- it will inevitably encourage an emphasis on cially true with respect to what are classified military perspectives and programs in internal as nontraditional transnational threats. That a “Whole-of-Government” government deliberations and processes. In other words, it is not clear that Approach Requires a Uniform. While secu- Yet this new organization is being “regional,” however defined, is a sufficiently rity concerns are given as one justification for installed just as the longstanding concern discrete classification to require a formal creating USAFRICOM, much of the justifica- about the complexity and rigidity of the bureaucratic structure to manage policy and tion focuses on political, economic, and social national security structure in a rapidly chang- programs. Whatever boundaries are adopted, programs requiring planning and implemen- ing world is producing spirited discussion they will only introduce new seams and tation in a “whole-of-government” or inte- about the need to transcend bureaucratic grated agency approach. This justification for stovepipes and create a more flexible bureau- USAFRICOM argues that there is a need for cracy. The phrase whole of government is new and innovative organization for dealing intended to encapsulate that approach. with Africa—and there may be—in which Numerous studies and commissions, such as case we should be looking for a whole-of-gov- the high-powered Project on National Secu- ernment approach, not the tweaking of a mili- rity Reform, are currently in the process tary model designed primarily for warfighting of plotting new paths for a redesigned and (compare the Goldwater-Nichols reform of more effective national security structure. the combatant command system). How can That Regionalism Is the Default we adopt a whole-of-government approach Geopolitical Perspective. Regional names by putting it in uniform? Adding a few civil- such as Africa and Asia are historical ian officials to a military command will not legacies. Large government bureaucracies meaningfully change the military character have taken them on as sensible bureau- of the organization, which will have a staff cratic organizational constructs. There of 1,300 people (according to USAFRICOM is nothing intrinsically wrong with that. deputy commander Vice Admiral Robert However, the most striking aspect of Moeller in a briefing at the Brookings Institu- the contemporary geopolitical environ- tion on May 28, 2008) and be headed by a ment is that it is not driven so much four-star general. No matter how we dress it by geographic regionalism—however up, a hammer is a hammer and should not be defined—but rather by globaliza- used to perform other tasks. tion (political, economic, social, and Apparently those designing USAFRI- technological) and localism (identity COM have fallen victim to an ethnocentric Ambassador Edward Marks ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 149 INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE | Why USAFRICOM? overlaps that can only act as obstacles in our The geographic combatant commands threat. Given this decision, why are we now attempts to deal with a world where regional are intended to do what the military calls adopting the geographic combatant command is only a variable set of points on a continuum the operational art of war, whereby strategy model for Africa, given the increasing glo- from local to global. is processed into tactics. Implementing the balization and localization of the geostrategic That Africans Will Consider US- operational art has led the military to create environment? AFRICOM a Compliment. Whether or not the geographic combatant commands that These engagement tasks for USAFRI- Africans wish greater American involvement are large bureaucracies located between the COM are largely justified on two grounds: in their affairs is an open question, but in a strategic headquarters (the Pentagon and the fighting terrorism and nationbuilding. As region where the most toxic charge one can President) and the actual deployed military noted above, the Pentagon itself has decided lay on someone is “neocolonist,” it is difficult forces. These forces are then responsible for that the geographic combatant commands are to understand why anyone in Washington concrete actions within a defined geographi- not the appropriate organizational mecha- would believe that creating a military U.S. cal area in a stipulated timeframe, all in accor- nism for the war on terror. In addition, it Africa Command would be welcome. Do dance with the military deliberate planning might be useful to remember former Secretary people not understand the history of colonial- process and procedure. of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s almost esprit ism? That the proponents of USAFRICOM However, there is no theory or doctrine de l’escalier query: “Are we creating more ter- have found a handful of African personalities or demonstrated need for a civilian equivalent rorists than we are killing?” I doubt if the we to support the idea proves nothing, if one to the “operational art.” In fact, even the he was referring to is the State Department, is aware that a handful of Africans can still military has moved away from it. Following U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), or the Peace Corps. But there is the argument that US- that the proponents of USAFRICOM have found a handful of AFRICOM will be a new innovation in African personalities to support the idea proves nothing bureaucracy, heavily “civilian” in character, and will pursue largely civilian, nationbuilding types of programs. This is wishful think- be found who wish that colonial days would 9/11, the U.S. Government decided that the ing, as very large bureaucratic organizations return and one remembers that individual primary security threat to the United States do not assume the character of their smaller public figures in every country can be found was violent radical Islamic terrorism. After partners. In fact, according to a Washington who respond favorably to perceived personal making that decision, the Pentagon decided Post article of July 18, 2008, a Government or organizational advantage. that the geographic combatant commands Accountability Office report noted that US- That Geographic Combatant were not the appropriate organizational AFRICOM, which is to have 1,300 employees, Command and USAFRICOM are instrument and accordingly designated U.S. is having difficulty integrating a mere 13 staff Consumer-friendly Terms. By the way, who Special Operations Command (a global members from the State Department and thought up the name Africa Command or organization) as the lead military organiza- other agencies. Even without an “integration USAFRICOM? USAFRICOM will seriously tion responsible for managing the terrorist problem,” it is hard to understand how 13 handicap American public diplomacy and strategic communication as long as it exists; it U.S. Marine Corps (Rocco DeFilippis) will be used forever as a stick to beat us with. That the Geographic Combatant Command Is a Useful Organizational Model. Even if the desirability of a new regional bureaucratic structure is accepted, the military geographic combatant command is not the obvious choice for a model. Geographic combatant commands are a refined version of World War II combat commands designed for the Cold War. In that confrontation, where we mainly avoided actual combat, the combatant commands expanded beyond their primary war planning and warfighting role into what are called engagement activities. The military tasks mentioned (briefly and vaguely) for USAFRICOM are of this engagement character with an “emphasis on capacity building,” with a careful statement that no warfighting duties are envisaged. (In which case, who is Marines deliver humanitarian relief supplies in Monrovia, Liberia, to do the warfighting in Africa if the need as part of West African Training Cruise 2008 should arise?)

150 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu MARKS civilian employees would give USAFRICOM coordinating role. This would seem a more a “civilian character.” rational approach, especially as we are told Even if one accepts the need for a that USAFRICOM will not have much in the regional approach to partnership and collabo- way of component forces. ration with African countries, the question The USAFRICOM approach confuses immediately arises as to why that is not done the need for internal bureaucratic organi- with existing organizations that already have zation for management purposes (State’s that mission and, more importantly, have geographic bureaus, DOD’s geographic civilian characters. If these civilian institu- commands, and the equivalents in other tions are not equipped or funded to do these departments) with policy perspectives. This jobs, then the more sensible and obvious is certain to introduce a stovepipe perspective answer is to make them equal to the task. A into a governmental structure that in today’s more useful approach would appear to be to world needs to move the other way—toward a empower, with people and resources, the rele- holistic whole-of-government approach. vant departments and agencies in the Depart- There are other problems with the US- ments of State and Agriculture, USAID, Peace AFRICOM idea, most notably the persistent Corps, and so forth. For example, the Office desire to physically locate the headquarters of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and or a set of subordinate offices in African Stabilization in State is still without mean- countries. Apparently the proponents of the ingful operational funds 3 years after being command have neither noticed that, nor created with a great deal of publicity. Secretary asked why, only U.S. European Command (a of Defense Robert Gates recently noted that unique historical instance) is located outside USAID had 16,000 employees at the height of of American territory. the Cold War, and now has about 3,000. Prop- Most importantly, there should be wide- erly resourced, the relevant African bureaus spread concern about the use of a military and offices around the Federal bureaucracy instrument to manage our continent-wide Direct could be networked to provide the integrated political and economic relations. There is cur- program called for. rently a great deal of concern about the alleged The support to civilian engagement over-militarization of our foreign policy. Our To You! activities promised in USAFRICOM litera- political leadership persists in calling upon ture could certainly be provided by a well- our large but overworked military Services ndupress.ndu.edu staffed (and properly authorized) military to do ever more just because they exist, and coordinating staff. A more modest approach it appears easier to load new jobs on them Distribution: JFQ is distributed to the would appear to be in order. For instance, rather than do the harder work of creating field and fleet through Service publications USAFRICOM could be restructured as more appropriate capabilities elsewhere in the distribution centers. Active, Reserve, National bureaucracy. Guard units, individuals, and organizations supported by the Services can order JFQ The reactions to USAFRICOM coming through the appropriate activity: properly resourced, the out of Africa are only the surface manifesta- Army: Publications Control Officers sub- relevant African bureaus tions of the continuing adverse political mit requests for official subscriptions and offices around the aspects of the widespread U.S. external mili- through www.usapa.army.mil (click tary presence. That presence is seen by many “ordering” link on left side of page) Federal bureaucracy could (use IDN: 050042 and PIN: 071781; cite be networked to provide the as a visible sign of an imperial structure, and Misc. Pub 71-1) integrated program called for no amount of protestation of innocence or Navy: Defense Distribution Depot adding a few civilian staff will change that Susquehanna, New Cumberland, Penn- impression. The widespread deployment of sylvania 17070; call (717) 770-5872, a Washington-based support organiza- the American military is often desirable and DSN 771-5827, FAX (717) 770-4360 Air Force: www.e-Publishing.af.mil or tion responsible for security assistance in often necessary—for others as well as for email [email protected] Africa. After all, its proponents insist that us—but there is no need to rub people’s noses Marine Corps: Headquarters U.S. Marine its primary function is not warfighting and in the fact. Corps (Code ARDE), Federal Building that it will not have component combat The increasing militarization of our No. 2 (room 1302), Navy Annex, Wash- forces. In that case, why the high-visibility foreign relations is already painfully obvious: ington, DC 20380; FAX (703) 614-2951, DSN 224-2951 geographic command structure and leader- why then are we expanding it even further in ship? Renamed something such as the Africa Africa? Creation of U.S. Africa Command is Security Assistance Organization, placed a retrograde move, fulfilling H.L. Mencken’s Subscriptions for individuals and nonmilitary organizations: in a symbiotic relationship with State and observation that there is always a well-known http://bookstore.gpo.gov/subscriptions USAID’s Africa divisions, it could pursue solution to every human problem—neat, plau- a very active and constructive support and sible, and wrong. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 151 Children scavenge for food and clothing in garbage dump, Juba, Sudan

UN (Tim McKulka) U.S. Africa Command

hile working and living in Africa during my service as foreign policy advisor to U.S. European Command Value Added (USEUCOM), I have gained a hands-on apprecia- W tion for how the U.S. military employs geographic combatant commands (GCCs). Contrary to the views of Ambassador Edward Marks, I am convinced these commands are more relevant in the post-9/11 environment than ever before. The manner in which they perform their roles has shifted in response to the new realities of the 21st century and the National Security Strategy, just as the roles of all U.S. Government agencies have shifted. In particular, this shift is reflected in National Security Presidential Directive 44 (which requires broader interagency integration during postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations) and in subsequent trends toward interagency approaches By Mary C. Yates for addressing other complex security challenges. However, because of the visibility of the Department of Defense (DOD) and geographic commands in recent years, there has been a tendency to overstate the intentions of some Defense Department initiatives. Ambassador Marks’ article effectively asserts that the motives behind the establishment of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) extend well beyond that of being simply a DOD reorganization. The truth is that no such ulterior motives ever existed. This command was

152 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu YATES created to address shortfalls in DOD abilities ambassador and the corresponding country Nations leadership. Concurrently as the to support African efforts to build partner team are normally4 in charge of diplomatic- conflict was winding down, peacekeepers security capacity, efforts that were previ- military activities in countries abroad. were needed. I was honored that, despite the ously divided among three GCCs. Its unique When directed by the President or Secretary strain on USEUCOM’s resources and forces organizational structure and designated focus of Defense, the [GUC] employs military from commitments to the Middle East, the areas were designed with the needs of Afri- forces in concert with the other instruments command sent U.S. military advisors to help cans in mind, such that this new command of national power.5 West African militaries plan and deploy will not only continue previous efforts, but peacekeepers to Liberia. The employment of also add value to them. These roles apply to all GUCs. What is the Southern European Task Force as Task different is that their priorities are based on Force Liberia raised morale and lent military The GUC Role the strategic environment in their respective support by deploying peacekeepers into Mon- Words are important. One of Ambassa- AORs, which then feed into their organi- rovia’s air and seaports. I witnessed first-hand dor Marks’ points is that the term geographic zational structure and the programs and the U.S. military’s successful effort to provide combatant command is not “consumer- activities routinely conducted. But all GUCs needed expertise, but USEUCOM was forced friendly.” From my work with African leaders, I tend to agree. Furthermore, as the US- AFRICOM mission is primarily nonkinetic, all geographic unified commands are expected to maintain we avoid using the term ourselves. Instead, we contacts with and address the security needs of every willing refer to our command as a geographic unified nation within their areas of responsibility command (GUC). The purpose and roles of GCCs (that is, GUCs) are described in Joint Publication 1 (JP are expected to maintain contacts with and to prioritize between two ongoing operations 1), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United address the security needs of every willing on different continents. Although a team was States: nation within their AORs. The main focus of ultimately deployed, it would have been more U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) has effective with the presence of a USAFRICOM GCCs [GUCs] develop strategies that trans- been operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but to maintain Africa-specific expertise and a late national and multinational direction the command has maintained full engage- “dedicated” response. into strategic concepts or [courses of action] ment with the nations of the Horn of Africa, to meet strategic and joint operation plan- Central Asia, and the Middle East. ning requirements. [GUCs’] plans provide Those accustomed to the USEUCOM strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, availability of resident forces might assume forces, and resources; designate objectives; that USAFRICOM’s lack of such forces provide authoritative direction; promulgate equates to no military response capability. rules of engagement . . . or rules for the use This is absolutely false. When the Presi- 1 ATC, TSC–HD, Photo Lab of force. dent, through the Secretary of Defense, th

7 directs a military operation, that operation Strategic direction is later described to is implemented with the right capabilities include theater security cooperation activi- to do the job, whether they come from a ties to “build defense relationships that GUC’s own assigned forces (if they have promote specific U.S. security interests, them) or elsewhere. Moreover, assigned develop allied and friendly military capa- forces still belong to the DOD global bilities for self-defense and multinational force pool, and USEUCOM has already operations, and provide U.S. forces with contributed greatly to the deployed peacetime and contingency access to a power employed in the Middle East. region.”2 The greatest value of the GUC is in providing strategic direction and With respect to their relationships with planning missions within its AOR. counterparts from the Department of State Here is where the command’s estab- and U.S. Embassies, JP 1 states that GUCs: lishment was deemed necessary. are responsible for integrating military Still Relevant activities with diplomatic activities in their When I was the U.S. Ambas- areas of responsibility (AOR).3 The U.S. sador to Ghana in the summer of 2003, the Liberian peace talks Ambassador Mary C. Yates is Deputy to the were under way in Accra and making Ambassador Mary C. Yates Commander for Civil-Military Activities, U.S. Africa progress under the Economic Community of Command. West African States (ECOWAS) and United ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 153 INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE | U.S. Africa Command: Value Added

Moreover, the African Union (AU) the GUC to be organizationally bifurcated. The manner in which we built inter- is emerging as an important collective When national security interests become agency coordination into the command shows African organization, and the AU Peace and heightened, prioritizing among the needs that we listened. Rather than establish an Security Commission has not only taken on of European, Middle Eastern, and African interagency task force somewhat divorced significant peacekeeping missions but also is nations—even for military issues alone— from the rest of the headquarters staff, US- working hard on conflict prevention. African should not be undertaken at the GUC level. AFRICOM integrated interagency members nations are collaborating to establish their That type of prioritization should occur at throughout the command and placed them in own standby forces prepared to respond to the highest levels of our government through positions where their subject matter expertise contingencies across the continent. These policy. USEUCOM (like USCENTCOM and could be best used. The rules of engagement forces are being aligned regionally, such as U.S. Pacific Command [USPACOM]) did its are such that no one in USAFRICOM exercises the brigade formed by ECOWAS. While in best to mitigate this concern and became a any authorities over the activities of other U.S. Ghana, I watched this evolve from a concept staunch advocate for military engagement in agencies and that the command’s roles are not to a detailed draft command structure plan Africa as evidenced in its most recent posture expanded beyond that designated in JP 1. for the first regional brigade under the leader- statements. But it was clear the time had ship of the then–chief of defense, a general come for military matters across Africa to be who had been identified decades earlier and addressed as a whole for greater consistency, USAFRICOM integrated schooled and trained in U.S. military institu- efficiency, and effectiveness and to work with interagency members tions. USAFRICOM, as requested, will work those African institutions focused on security. throughout the command closely with the AU, its regional communities, The time for USAFRICOM had come. and placed them where their and allies in developing and training these The parameters under which the subject matter expertise could forces. When U.S. military engagement in command was established were a direct reflec- be best used Africa was divided among multiple GUCs, it tion of the African strategic environment. A was difficult to have one consistent program major distinction between Europe and Africa that holistically addressed what is a continent- related to the fact, to which Ambassador Importance of USAFRICOM wide partner capacity-building requirement. Marks alluded, that security issues in Africa Ambassador Marks’ assertion that the USAFRICOM will be value added. required a holistic approach and that the estab- command is going to be in charge of inter- Ambassador Marks highlights the fact lishment of good governance and development agency coordination or activities in Africa that Africa is not a cohesive whole and should had to occur in concert with efforts to improve is incorrect. The command may ultimately not be treated as a single entity, and the above and professionalize African militaries. This add to the narrative of the application of the experiences showed that lumping most of was hardly a new idea. African civilian and “whole of government” approach, but in fact, Africa with the whole of Europe and Eurasia military leaders have been saying so for many this paradigm was not a consideration as the was not the best solution. The security envi- years, and we listened to these leaders this past plans were being drawn by the command’s ronments were completely different, causing year at two conferences. Implementation Planning Team, nor was it

UN Photo (Eskinder Debebe)

Refugee camp in Chad near border with Sudan

154 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu YATES addressed in the USAFRICOM Implementa- in Pakistan after the earthquake or in Aceh, waters. The program combines several aspects tion Guidance issued by the Secretary of Indonesia, after the tsunami. Moreover, of maritime security that cut across the civil Defense. The command’s structure was USAID has been supportive of USAFRICOM and military domains: counterpiracy, counter- designed to help the military make better from the initial days of the planning team trafficking, and maritime domain awareness, informed decisions on security matters in because that agency sees the great potential in among others. Consequently, it includes not Africa so it could add value to the programs it our working together to advance goals. only U.S. Sailors but also U.S. Coastguards- was responsible for. Regarding the employment of the U.S. men and other agencies and international Ambassador Marks’ assertion that Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) partners working together to present a cohe- USAFRICOM would be the “primary organi- as the lead DOD element for executing the sive and coherent training program tailored to zational interlocutor with African countries” war on terror, I must clarify an important the needs of our partners. Or they could watch is wrong, as is the implication that we would point that Ambassador Marks overlooks. the development of African Endeavor 2009, an create a new stovepipe in governmental opera- Military-to-military relationships belong annual communications interoperability exertions. What occurred on October 1, 2008, to a GUC and fall under chief of mission cise that last year involved 26 nations. These is that instead of African nations calling authority. USSOCOM is not a GUC; it is a programs and others similar to them are what USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, or USPACOM functional unified command that exercises U.S. Africa Command is about, and they dem- for DOD business, they now call USAFRI- global responsibilities for a particular onstrate how we add value to the achievement COM. Meanwhile, everything the command function in support of GUCs. Therefore, of U.S. foreign policy objectives. does is in support of U.S. foreign policy and while USSOCOM (through U.S. Special The command has an extensive out- subordinated to chief of mission authority and Operations Command–Africa) conducts reach program designed to build partnerships the mission campaign plans produced. many capacity-building activities in Opera- and support for its efforts. Information is Ambassador Marks expressed a great tion Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara, the available through the Web site at , and we are always available to to conduct “nationbuilding” or other activities falls under USAFRICOM and is coordinated answer questions and discuss the command, that are of a political or economic nature. This with chiefs of mission. As a former chief its activities, its relationships with other U.S. is a mischaracterization of the types of civil- of mission, I never dealt with USSOCOM Government agencies, and its perspectives on military operations (CMO) that all GUCs are for one thing and the GUC for another. I African military matters. JFQ chartered to perform—activities that I greatly wanted a simple, consistent, single horizon- welcomed during my ambassadorial tours in tal line of communication to address DOD Africa. Joint Publication 3–57, Civil-Military matters. That was the GUC. Notes Operations, describes CMO as a collective Ambassador Marks correctly points 1 Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), Doctrine for the term for efforts to “consolidate and achieve out that the proper framework of a whole-of- Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: operational U.S. objectives through the inte- government approach has yet to be developed The Joint Staff, May 14, 2007), I–14. gration of civil and military actions.” These and adequately resourced. But that is no reason 2 Ibid., I–16. include support to civil administration, popu- to denigrate USAFRICOM’s efforts to add 3 We have also found that the term area of lace and resource control, foreign humanitar- value to the GUC contributing role in the secu- responsibility (AOR) is as consumer-unfriendly ian assistance (FHA), nation assistance, and rity domain. The national approach is being as geographic combatant command. While the civil information management. All CMO is pursued, but it will take time. I highlight the term is defined to explain the area within which a conducted under chief of mission approval. joint statement of Secretary of Defense Robert geographic unified command (GUC) is responsible Most CMO conducted in Africa is Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for DOD programs and activities, there is a perception that it implies responsibility over the affairs foreign humanitarian assistance, which is to Congress early in 2008, calling for increased of the nations themselves. In addition, U.S. Africa Command has requirements to support other the proper framework of a whole-of-government approach has nations (such as Egypt, which we share with U.S. yet to be developed and adequately resourced Central Command) that are not in Africa Com- mand’s AOR. Therefore, we developed a new term, area of activity, that encompasses the land, air, and “conducted to relieve or reduce the results funding and resources to U.S. Government maritime domains in which a GUC conducts its of natural or man-made disasters or other agencies so the mandate for interagency inte- activities. We recommend that this term, along endemic conditions such as human pain, gration at the national level could be fulfilled. with geographic unified command, be formalized disease, hunger, or privation.” But this is done I recognize that there are readers who and considered for entry into joint doctrine. 4 to supplement the activities of the U.S. Agency will share Ambassador Marks’ sentiments The word “normally” implies that there are exceptions, but only in extreme emergencies where for International Development (USAID) or about USAFRICOM. For them, I recommend the diplomatic apparatus is not present or has been other agencies conducting FHA. These activi- watching the ongoing deployment of the incapacitated. Even in such circumstances, the ties do not constitute nationbuilding, but they Africa Partnership Station (APS) in the waters military recognizes the importance of restoring do provide an important stabilizing effect. around West Africa. This year’s at-sea training diplomacy as quickly as possible. None of these activities is led by the Defense platform is the second deployment in the APS 5 JP 1, I–9. Department, but there are times when DOD’s program that helps partner nations to build assets visibly assist USAID missions, such as maritime capacity to manage their territorial ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 155 B–29 bombers operated from bases in Pacific against mainland Japan

By Thomas Alexander Hughes

Millard Harmon and the South Pacific in World War II

U.S. Air Force

ast summer’s forced resigna- commanders. Since the passage of the Gold- the job, not only possessing the expertise of tions of U.S. Air Force Secretary water-Nichols Department of Defense Reor- his Service but also blessed with the compre- Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff ganization Act in 1986, these officers have hensive mind required of a joint force leader. L T. Michael Moseley scratched been the senior military men most responsible Once in the Senate, however, his nomination old scabs produced by decades of contention for fighting the Nation’s wars. From that time, crashed against the shoals of Navy interests. between the Air Force and the Nation’s wider only three Air Force officers have held these Senators with close ties to the Navy seized military establishment. Disputes over the vital positions, a scarcity that extends back to upon Martin’s passing association with the proper role of airpower predate the court- the birth of the Air Force in 1947. In fact, from ill-fated scheme to lease aerial tankers from martial of Billy Mitchell in 1925. In the years that time to now, many dozens of Army, Navy, the Boeing Corporation, dooming his chance since, these arguments have been marked by and Marine Corps officers have occupied for selection. Shortly thereafter, yet another transcendent issues, such as the command these powerful positions while fewer than admiral assumed command in Hawaii, as and control of aircraft, and matters more a handful of these commanders have come they had since before World War II. Martin’s idiosyncratic to time and place, such as the from the ranks of the Air Force.1 stillborn chance was remarkable not for its pattern and practice of Air Force procurement Parochial Service interests might outcome—for the Air Force is often left the programs. Setting aside whatever may be the explain some of this imbalance. One recent odd man out when it comes to these jobs—but relative merits in this most recent flap, the attempt to assign an Air Force officer to a geo- for how close he came to command. Most stewards of the Nation’s air arm and those graphic combatant command illustrates how Airmen never get anywhere near a Presiden- of the Department of Defense have been at Service prerogatives have torpedoed Airmen’s tial nomination for a geographic combatant this debate for a long time, sometimes with chances for these influential posts. In 2004, command. depressing results. President George W. Bush nominated General One indication of the persistent ebb in Gregory Martin, USAF, to lead U.S. Pacific Dr. Thomas Alexander Hughes is a Faculty Member these relations is the dearth of Air Force rep- Command, long a bastion of Navy admirals. in the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at resentation among U.S. geographic combatant General Martin was supremely qualified for Air University.

156 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HUGHES

Becoming an Airman In 1940, he was among a handful of officers adding “surely an air force, like any other If examples of Airmen as true geographic that the air arm chief, General Henry “Hap” force, can be defeated by stopping its supplies combatant commanders are few and far Arnold, sent to England to glean lessons from or replacements.” When the same text claimed between, some flyers have served brilliantly the aerial Battle of Britain. Harmon did this the marvel of modern airplanes had made the in billets requiring expertise in more than air job to such satisfaction that in the summer of men who flew them “inferior in importance,” matters and in jobs where obligations ran well 1941 Arnold promoted him to major general Harmon decried the fanciful “exactitudes” of past narrowly construed Service interests of and tapped him to lead the Army Air Forces’ contemporary air concepts, writing, “A note any color or hue. One such officer was Lieu- Air Combat Command, making Harmon the of caution should be sounded against the too tenant General Millard F. “Miff” Harmon, senior combat airman in the country. For the ardent adoption of peace time theories and the senior Army Air Forces officer serving 6 months after Pearl Harbor, Harmon was hypothesis.”3 in an Army—not an air forces—billet during Arnold’s chief of staff in Washington, putting Harmon championed the integrative World War II, whose service has hidden in the in 18-hour days as airmen strived to bring nature of airpower as an alternative to these shadows for far too long. His younger brother order to chaos, to begin building the air forces views. When in the early 1930s the bomber Hubert, the first superintendent of the Air from perhaps 75,000 men to more than a mafia and its notions of autonomy gained Force Academy and namesake of the school’s million, and to get scarce planes and precious ascendency, he clung to a belief, first articu- Harmon Hall, has garnered most of the fam- pilots to the four corners of the globe. lated in World War I, that success in the air ily’s name recognition. But the older Harmon’s Harmon was by then an airman through war sometimes required “as close a coopera- service was every bit as illuminating. and through, comfortable within the frater- tion with the infantry as possible.” Likewise, Born into an Army family in 1888, nity of pilots and acculturated to the canon his student paper while at the Army War Miff Harmon graduated from West Point in of air doctrine. As early as World War I, he College had argued for the “closest coopera- 1912, entered the Infantry, and served in the believed it essential that air operations be tion and the most efficient coordination of Philippines, which was the proving ground directed by an airman whose authority in the effort between the Army and Navy” if the for so many of the Nation’s bright young air war should override that of the most senior United States should ever confront large-scale Army officers in the early 20th century. In generals responsible for the ground fight. In maritime war. Later, while serving as the 1916, he transferred to the Aviation Section the 1930s, he championed the concept of cen- Assistant Commandant of the Air Corps Tac- of the Signal Corps and was a pilot in the tralized command and decentralized execu- tical School at Maxwell Field, Harmon played Punitive Expedition into Mexico, making tion of air operations, many years before Field a key part in restoring balance among the him among the first few American aviators Manual 100–20, Command and Employment bombing, pursuit, and attack courses, even to serve in combat. During World War I, he of Air Power, made it a central battle cry for orchestrating close air support exercises with was in France as the Assistant Chief of the airmen. While in England during the Battle the Infantry School at nearby Fort Benning. of Britain, he criticized the Royal Air Force’s This last endeavor earned him a rebuke from Harmon was a pilot in the nighttime bombing operations, believing the Arnold, who, from his perch as Chief of the Punitive Expedition into American doctrine of daylight precision raids Air Corps, warned Harmon his curriculum Mexico, making him among would have yielded far better results. And in reforms threatened to transform the tactical an essay laying out an educational scheme course “from an air to a ground school.”4 the first American aviators to for airmen that later became the basis for Despite this chiding, Harmon remained serve in combat an independent Air Force’s entire system of committed to most of the important airpower professional military education, he believed orthodoxies of the day, which saved him the Air Service, in which capacity he certified the Nation’s air arm was destined either to ignominy suffered by iconoclast nonconform- William “Billy” Mitchell as a Junior Military achieve “parity with the Army and Navy in ists such as Claire Chennault. By 1941, he was Aviator. Later, he worked by Mitchell’s side the scheme of National Defense or absorb a Hap Arnold confidant, an Ira Eaker writing planning the seminal American air offensives them one or both.”2 cohort, and a Carl Spaatz poker partner. of 1918 and with Edgar Gorrell on the latter’s But he never became a zealot in the According to Grandison Gardner, Harmon’s famous airpower survey of World War I. interwar years’ heated skirmishes over Harmon filled key air posts in the years airpower, maintaining instead a discriminat- between the world wars. In the mid 1920s, ing advocacy for military aviation. He had Harmon remained committed he was the commanding officer of the Air witnessed how the austere desert had wreaked to the important airpower Corps’ flying school at March Field, where he havoc on the men and machines of the Puni- orthodoxies of the day, which oversaw the flight training of such later lumi- tive Expedition, and forever after trained a saved him from the ignominy naries as Hoyt Vandenberg, Nathan Twining, skeptical eye on some of the more fantastic suffered by nonconformists Haywood Hansell, and Curtis LeMay. In the claims being made for airpower. In the early 1930s, he commanded both a pursuit and 1930s, he mocked the notion that air war had such as Chennault bomb group and served as the inaugural com- mitigated age-old matters such as weather mander of Barksdale Field in Louisiana. Later and logistics. “It is difficult to understand boss at the Air Corps Tactical School in the that decade, he was the Assistant Comman- how adequate bases are to make flying in late 1930s, Harmon was one of two officers dant of the Air Corps Tactical School, where bad weather any less difficult,” he wrote in whom Arnold leaned on the most in those he was the de facto chief curriculum officer. response to one prominent Air Corps treatise, crucial years before World War II; the other ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 157 RECALL | A General Airman: Millard Harmon was Spaatz. When war came to this greatest To meet the continuing crisis on well as the Navy component commander, the generation of airmen, Harmon was among the Guadalcanal, in November Harmon lobbied respective invasion, ground, and air com- handful of senior pilots primed to contribute General Marshall in Washington and manders were often different for each island in the approaching air war.5 Admiral Chester Nimitz in Honolulu for campaign. Because operations on one island the 25th Infantry Division, which was in exerted operational influences on those of Island-hopping in the South Pacific Hawaii and tentatively slated for General another, Halsey needed someone to act as Then the war exercised its own preroga- Douglas MacArthur’s invasion of Papua New his de facto deputy for the air and ground tive. In the summer of 1942, it sent Harmon Guinea. Having won the division’s release operations throughout the theater. As his con- to the far end of the world to be commanding over MacArthur’s objections, Harmon then fidence in Harmon grew, Halsey increasingly general of U.S. Army Forces in the South sent it directly to Guadalcanal, bypassing an looked to the airman to fill this role. Pacific Ocean Areas, working for Admiral intermediate stop in Noumea where Army Although he was serving in an unan- William Halsey. The move made Harmon officers had planned a more orderly introduc- ticipated and wholly unprecedented capacity, the senior air forces officer serving as an tion to combat. Redirecting an entire combat Harmon did not shirk his responsibilities as Army general in a combat zone. His unusual division while at sea was a risk that drew a appointment stemmed from concerns of both sharp cable from Marshall to Harmon. In it, Halsey needed someone to Soldiers and airmen in Washington about the Army chief did not “propose to question act as his de facto deputy for the conduct of operations in an overwhelm- your decision as to the tactical utilization ingly naval theater. When he took up his post of forces under your command,” but he did the air and ground operations in Noumea, New Caledonia, for instance, want to remind Harmon of the peril inher- throughout the theater the South Pacific joint staff of 103 included ent in landing a large force “in an area where just 3 Army or Army Air Forces officers and security is questionable and port facilities a ground forces leader. When in the summer 100 naval and Marine men—all of whom practically non-existent.” Yet the division, of 1943 the fight on New Georgia stalled, were clamoring for Army Air Forces’ B–17s led by Major General Joe Collins, reached Harmon recommended the relief of the to conduct maritime reconnaissance. Army Guadalcanal safely, raising both the morale ground commander, Major General John Chief of Staff George Marshall wanted and the fight of the Americans just as the last Hester of the 43d Division, a move that the Harmon to leaven this staff with Army of the major Japanese reinforcements to the invasion commander, Rear Admiral Kelly acumen, and Hap Arnold agreed to part with island arrived.7 Turner, vigorously opposed. Halsey sided his trusted assistant to ensure a more appro- Impressed by Harmon’s keen judgment, with Harmon, not only replacing Hester priate use than patrol for the powerful and in December Halsey rewarded the airman with Major General Oscar Griswold but also still-too-few B–17s. Technically, Harmon’s with “direct authority over tactical opera- directing Harmon to “assume full charge of orders conferred to him only administrative tions” on Guadalcanal, which in effect placed and responsibility for ground operations in control of all Army and air forces units in the Harmon in operational command of the XIV New Georgia.” Hester’s relief earned Halsey a South Pacific—a command that eventually Corps, comprised of elements of the 25th and hurried note from Nimitz, who worried about numbered over 100,000—but the idiosyncra- 43d Divisions. In the years after World War inter-Service discord, but as Halsey had relied sies of the South Pacific theater offered ample II, much would be made of General George opportunity for forceful commanders to Patton’s rhetorical offer in 1944 of a ground stretch toward tactical and operational control division for his air commander, the redoubt- of combat forces.6 able O.P. Weyland. Two full years before This is just what Harmon did, especially those famous events on the Normandy plain, as that control related to the ground fight. however, another remarkable airman had U.S. Air Force He arrived in theater a week before the battle combat control of an entire Army corps—and for Guadalcanal began on August 7, and he nearly all of the fighting ground forces—in understood earlier than many the meaning of the most crucial offensive then being waged that colossal struggle. Almost immediately he by Americans in any theater of the war.8 pushed for a clear-minded focus on Guadalca- In February 1943, Harmon earned his nal operations. He waged a lonely staff battle third star, relinquished control of the fading to eliminate a supplemental landing planned fight on Guadalcanal to Major General for the small island of Ndeni, a move he Alexander Patch, and commenced plan- argued would free up the 147th Infantry Regi- ning the invasions of the New Georgia and ment for important tasks on Guadalcanal. Bougainville island groups, farther up the When difficult conditions on Guadalcanal Solomons chain and closer to the South persisted well into October, Halsey cancelled Pacific’s ultimate objective of Rabaul. the Ndeni invasion and sent the 147th to the Command arrangements for these opera- main fight on Guadalcanal, where it played tions were muddled, providing yet more LTG Millard F. Harmon, USAAF a decisive role clearing space for a crucial opportunity for Harmon as an Army airfield. general. For instance, although Halsey nearly always served as the overall commander as

158 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu HUGHES on the recommendation of his Army com- All officers, if they become senior how much he worried about naval and Marine mander Miff Harmon, he did not think the enough, confront unfamiliar horizons. This sensibilities regarding aviation.13 Navy open to harsh critique and indeed not was Harmon’s moment, and while in it he Accordingly, Harmon turned to organi- much materialized. Later, in the fall of 1943, displayed an uncanny capacity to know when zational matters, aiming to gain what respon- Harmon’s misgivings about the planning for and to whom he should listen, and to know sibility he could for the conduct of the air war. the invasion of Bougainville led him to again when to accept counsel and when to rely on He convinced Arnold that a numbered air force recommend to Halsey the relief of a ground his own sense. He was blessed with strong in the South Pacific would better align the air commander, this time Marine Major General ground commanders, including Alexander arm’s organization with Navy structures and Charles Barrett, an intention that may have Patch and two future Service chiefs—Archie further airmen’s interests. When in Decem- contributed to Barrett’s probable suicide on Vandegrift of the Marines and Joe Collins of ber 1942 the Thirteenth Air Force stood up, October 7 in Noumea.9 the Army. He wisely deferred to their judg- Harmon placed Twining at its head and pushed ment on many occasions. He also managed to A General in Name and Practice reach difficult decisions about those less able South Pacific air commands These were tough times. The war’s to perform in the Solomons’ harsh environ- outcome was not yet clear, the South Pacific ment. Not once, not twice, but three times were hybrid organizations, fight was brutal, Barrett’s death was tragic, he redirected the movement of divisions or being both joint and and the cruel combat on those remote islands regiments afloat, each time against the advice combined and comprised of would ruin more careers before the war of more experienced ground officers. Army assets from the Navy, Marine moved on to other battlefields. In fact, when historians later characterized these gutsy Corps, and Army, as well as Halsey reflected about the South Pacific calls as “decisive,” “inspired,” and “brilliant,” New Zealand after the war, he recalled that “the smoke of crediting the adjustments with helping turn charred reputations still makes me cough.” the tide on Guadalcanal and assuring success But the Japanese were yet too strong—and in battles on New Georgia and Bougainville. to rotate operational command of the air war the stakes to America far too high—to excuse From nearly his first day in the South Pacific, among the Services. Eventually, Twining took poor performance or tolerate mediocrity. In Harmon recognized that he was a general in his turn in that role, as did Harmon’s younger the end, the Army’s official historians praised both name and practice. The Nation asked no brother, Hubert. These South Pacific air Halsey for his prompt attention to all manner other officer of similar rank to stretch quite commands (first the improvised Cactus Air of challenges in the ground war, which was in as far in quite the same way. In the process, Force and later the more formal Air Solomons their judgment “a mark of the efficiency of the Harmon managed to become South Pacific command.”10 something more than that from It was also a matter of Miff Harmon’s which he had come.12 contributions. Neither Bill Halsey nor any of Curiously, Harmon met with the admirals who ran the South Pacific were less direct success supervising the adept at ground operations, and they relied air war, the task for which he had heavily on the senior Army officer in the area. spent a lifetime in preparation. Nimitz himself once praised Harmon as a When he first arrived in theater, U.S. Army Center of Military History “first-rate selection” for the difficult South seven of his nine staff cadre came Pacific assignment. In this role Harmon was from the air forces, including not perfect, however. He tended to meddle in Frank Everest, Dean Strother, and the fine details of subordinate commands, a Nathan Twining, a future Chief of habit common among the airmen who had Staff of the Air Force and Chair- come from the small prewar Air Corps and man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. who were unaccustomed to the workings of Such a staff was a clear sign that large organizations. Moreover, Harmon’s own Harmon “intended to uphold the staff, initially overpopulated with air officers, interests of the Army Air Forces struggled at first to conceive, plan, and direct in this predominately [sic] naval ground operations. But in the South Pacific’s area.” This proved difficult, partly early months Harmon grew and learned. His because the Navy and Marine incessant preaching about hygiene and health Corps had strong airmen of their in the trenches, something he had learned as own in the South Pacific, such as a young infantryman, earned him credibility John McCain, Marc Mitscher, and with rank-and-file grunts—and his devotion Roy Geiger. Their collective excel- to joint planning, a conviction honed during lence meant less opportunity for an interwar teaching tour at the Army War Harmon to extend his administra- College, purchased for him latitude to dis- tive responsibilities to operational 11 MG Harmon (right) discusses Guadalcanal cover the art of ground warfare. and tactical command, no matter campaign with BG Nathan Twining

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Command and Air Solomons Command than he wished, as the senior Army Air Forces South Pacific, Harmon probably devoted as North) were hybrid organizations, being both officer in the South Pacific he possessed the much time trying to preserve the strategic use joint and combined and comprised of assets rank and position to broker air-ground dif- of bombers as he spent on any issue, and was from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army, as ferences, smooth the way with the Navy, and persistently willing to court the ire of his Navy well as from New Zealand. The potential for create the circumstances whereby subordinate and Army superiors in so doing.14 Service interest to detract these units from airmen of every Service and individual pilots Harmon did not always do the air forces’ their primary task was great, and the rotational in cockpits could do what they did. bidding. George Marshall and Hap Arnold policy of command was one ingredient making Harmon did intervene personally where had sent the airman to the Pacific with differ- possible their dogged attention to the more he was able. Like Arnold in Washington, ent marching orders, and once there Harmon immediate and pressing matter of besting the he disagreed with naval plans to use pre- found himself harnessed to a largely naval Japanese in the air. cious B–17s for maritime patrol in the South command that ran through Halsey to Nimitz In fact, these were among the most suc- Pacific, worried about diverting these power- in Hawaii and on to Admiral Ernest King in cessful air commands in all of World War II. ful weapons from their primary task over Washington. So while Harmon had responsi- Far from home, at the short end of logistical the skies of Germany. So in the fall of 1942, bilities to both airmen and Soldiers subordi- and strategic lines of communication, South Harmon embarked on an aggressive airfield nate to him, he also had sometimes competing Pacific airmen of every branch worked effec- construction program throughout the theater, obligations to superiors—to Halsey and the tively to turn the tide of battle. For months, the aiming to better position shorter legged naval immediate fight in the Solomons, to Marshall fight there pitted relatively equitable ground patrol planes for reconnaissance duties. These and the Army in Washington, and to Arnold and sea forces against each other, leaving airfields, which required scarce resources and the legions of airmen prosecuting the air airpower to arbitrate who would win and who to build, also enabled the offensive use of war around the globe. These were all people of would lose. Time and time again, tight ground bombers up the Solomon Islands chain, a fact goodwill with a common commitment to the fights and close naval encounters hung in the that irked George Marshall, who had sent Nation, but each brought particular interests balance until aviation weighted the outcome. Harmon to conduct a defensive campaign con- and beliefs to bear in his judgment about how, The Solomons air campaign constitutes a sistent with the Nation’s strategic orientation when, and with what resources to prosecute shining example of combined, joint, and effec- toward Europe. But Harmon pressed forward. the war. Successful officers in Harmon’s tive air campaigning, and today remains an The matter of proper bomber employment circumstance reconciled these influences, underappreciated and understudied part of was the subject of dozens of official memo- made them congruent when possible, and the war. Many contributed to this success. If randums, staff studies, personal letters, and balanced them effectively otherwise. Whether Harmon played a less direct role in the air war diary entries. In the 2 years he served in the he appreciated it or not, no other condition of his service indicated better that he had indeed become a senior commander. LTG Harmon (right) confers with (left to right) MG If Harmon’s dogged stewardship of the Richard Sutherland, ADM Chester Nimitz, and South Pacific bombers heartened Arnold, VADM Robert Ghormley during Solomons campaign his pursuit of P–38 fighter planes to replace his commands’ aging P–39s annoyed his air boss. Harmon believed the newer planes were necessary to combat the agile Japanese Zero, while Arnold—who had his own obligations to prioritize the fight in Europe—felt the older planes were “good enough for fighting the Japanese.” Undaunted, Harmon pressed his request within Navy channels, first through Halsey and ultimately via Nimitz, who, in Arnold’s words, then “took up Harmon’s battle cry and shouted to high heaven until every brass hat in Washington heard the echo.” Harmon got his P–38s, but at a cost. “Tell General Arnold it won’t be long now before I am wearing bell bottom trousers,” he wrote to a friend on the Air Staff in an effort to both explain his position and maintain his standing among pilots. “Of course, it’s a bit tough at times not to be operating one’s bombers and to listen to a Navy chap talking about ‘my B–17s,’ but everything goes as long as we lick the Japs.” Arnold, who believed that U.S. Naval Historical Center

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“success in the Pacific Theater will not win of all land-based Navy and Marine planes as war to legitimate matters of postwar defense the war” elsewhere, was not so sure.15 well as portions of the Seventh Air Force. Still, structure and air arm autonomy, making him Arnold and Harmon, friends of 30 direct command of the Air Force’s strategic perhaps less sensitive to matters still festering years’ standing, never quite found the sweet bombers eluded him, and Harmon struggled within the war at hand. As for Harmon, it was spot where their respective obligations might with LeMay, 18 years and one grade in rank his not the first and would not be the last time find equilibrium. As the South Pacific fight junior, over the boundaries of their respective war placed a senior commander between a waned in the summer of 1944, the air chief powers. This was especially true as it related rock and a hard spot.19 reassigned Harmon as the commanding to control of the Twentieth’s escort fighters. How well Arnold, Harmon, and LeMay general of all Army Air Forces units in the Binding the fighters to the sole role of B–29 together might have navigated these com- entire Pacific. This affirmation of confidence escort duty, Harmon feared, would render plexities will never be known. On his way to was more apparent than it was real. The job them “frozen” for the many other tasks in the Washington in February, Harmon’s plane made Harmon, among others things, Curtis Pacific when the bombers were not striking was lost at sea. The largest air-sea rescue and LeMay’s proximal boss in the strategic air Japan. LeMay pushed back, insisting he “must recovery effort of the entire war failed to campaign against Japan, although the posi- have absolute operational control of the fight- find as much as a rivet. Harmon’s body was tion conferred, once again, only administra- ers” for the penultimate strategic air campaign never found. A year later, he was declared tive and logistical authority. Unhappy with of the war. It was a thorny situation, one that dead, along with the others aboard, including the Navy’s stranglehold on the conduct of the Arnold in Washington appeared disinclined to Brigadier General James Andersen, for whom Pacific war, and perhaps wary of Harmon’s resolve, prompting the air forces’ official his- Guam’s Andersen Air Force Base is named. close working ties with Halsey and Nimitz, torians to claim Harmon had “one of the most Arnold had decided to retain operational difficult and complex assignments of the war.”17 control of LeMay’s Twentieth Air Force and its To force a break in this and other juris- after the war, the Army and air war over Japan. dictional problems, Harmon headed to Wash- Navy had their own heroes to This unusual arrangement meant that ington in February 1945. Girding for a fight, memorialize, and Harmon’s LeMay’s planes would operate administra- one air staff colonel encouraged LeMay not to joint Service legacy poorly tively and logistically within Harmon’s area take “bull from anyone, I don’t care who he fit the needs of a newly of responsibility, yet report operationally is,” adding, “You probably know that General independent Air Force to Arnold, sitting in Washington and well Harmon is coming here. We don’t know outside the theater. At the same time, the what all he is going to raise, but [we are] fully Navy would continue to exercise its own prepared.” Arnold’s precise thoughts are not Harmon got considerably less recogni- known—and were likely more nuanced than tion. Despite his contributions in World War a colonel’s convictions—but people on his II, he appears in only the most detailed of perhaps wary of Harmon’s staff surely believed that Harmon and other books and it is his little brother’s name that close ties with Halsey and flyers in the Pacific “have been blinded by graces buildings at the Air Force Academy. Nimitz, Arnold decided to star-dust” and were “probably too old to cure.” Harmon’s untimely death surely accounts for retain operational control of As Harmon saw it, however, in this dispute some of this amnesia; the rush of wartime LeMay’s Twentieth Air Force he was merely advocating a command setup events left little time to commemorate indi- and its air war over Japan that would best enable both the flexibility and viduals. But there is more to the continuing versatility of the Twentieth’s fighter planes. silence that surrounds Miff Harmon’s career. He, and not LeMay, occupied the doctrinal After the war, the Army and Navy had their privilege in the area, as would the ground high ground.18 own heroes to memorialize, and Harmon’s Army, and Harmon would report not only joint Service legacy poorly fit the needs of a to Arnold but also to Nimitz. Arnold knew Legacy Lost in the Shuffle newly independent Air Force. Through much well the straits in which all this promised to It is hard to know who was right and of the Cold War, the Air Force focused on place Harmon. “If you find it beyond your who was wrong in all this. Just as George its important stewardship of an autonomous capacity to reconcile these conflicting loyal- Marshall, Hap Arnold, and Bill Halsey had atomic mission, so when this most forward- ties,” he wrote Harmon in June 1944, “then placed overlapping demands upon Harmon’s looking of the Services remembered World I shall expect you to acquaint me with that loyalties in the South Pacific, elements com- War II at all, it heralded flyers such as Jimmy fact; and if I find that my interests are not pletely within the air arm now competed for Doolittle, Carl Spaatz, and Curtis LeMay. being adequately cared for, I shall not hesitate his allegiance. If it was a difficult circum- These and others were great airmen, worthy to resolve this difficulty by relieving you of stance, Harmon was a seasoned officer whose of enduring emulation. further responsibility as my deputy.”16 rank required that he solve or at least manage Harmon deserves his place in this pan- As the senior air general in the Pacific, these irritants. LeMay surely had the cleaner theon. One of the few reminders of his career Harmon spent many months productively command task: to push with single-minded is a building named for him at Maxwell Air building the massive airstrips the new B–29s intensity the strategic airstrikes against Japan, Force Base. It is there, at Maxwell’s Air Uni- required for their assault on Japan. In Decem- a duty for which he possessed a special talent. versity, home today for all Air Force officer ber 1944, Nimitz greatly expanded Harmon’s For his part, Arnold’s position in Washington education, where Harmon’s service can begin authority, giving him operational command offered a horizon that extended beyond the to teach a new generation of Airmen. Early ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 161 RECALL | A General Airman: Millard Harmon in his career Harmon came to believe that convinced many Airmen that Beltway politics 509; Millard F. Harmon, “The Army in the South air war was an integral part of general war. and Service parochialism have conspired Pacific,” report, June 6, 1944, Millard Harmon Later, his World War II service underscored against them. But this condition might also Papers, 750.04A, HRA; Nimitz to Halsey, and Halsey to Nimitz, August 8 and August 19, 1943, the imperative for airmen to be versed in all be attributable to how the Air Force nurtures William Halsey Papers, Library of Congress. aspects of war if they hoped to command and develops its own. It is time for Airmen to 10 William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III, Admiral JFQ operations beyond the aerial fight. Yet today, examine that possibility as well. Halsey’s Story (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publish- Air University does not champion the inte- ing, 2008), 161; Morton, U.S. Army in World War II, grative nature of airpower. A far better edu- 509. Notes cational institution than its critics acknowl- 11 Nimitz to John McCain, July 27, 1942, edge, its classrooms nonetheless still aim Chester Nimitz Papers, Operational Archives 1 Of the six geographic combatant commands, Branch, Naval Historical Center. to delineate the manner by which airpower only U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 12 Samuel B. Griffith II, The Battle for Gua- changes war—which it certainly does—when is currently led by an Airman, General Victor dalcanal (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, they should strive to teach how airpower has Renuart. Over the past 60 years, only three other 2000), 142, Morton, U.S. Army in World War II, become part of war—which it certainly is. To Air Force officers have led any of these organiza- 509. this day, the inspiration for its curriculum tions or their antecedents: General Lauris Norstad 13 Louis Morton, “Pacific Command: A Study and aspiration for its students remain air war (U.S. European Command, 1956–1963), General in Interservice Relations,” The Harmon Memorial and air component command. In the past 10 Joseph Ralston (U.S. European Command, 2000– Lectures in Military History Number 3, 139, avail- 2003), and General Ralph Eberhart (USNORTH- years, four Air War College commandants able at . filling the functional commands. Of these, Airmen get—or return—the “air” into the college. Air 14 Harmon’s personal papers at the HRA have on single occasions led U.S. Special Forces generals have trumpeted the Air Command contain many examples. Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command, have 15 Henry Arnold, Global Mission (New York: and Staff College as the “Cathedral of Air always led U.S. Transportation Command or Harper & Brothers, 1949), 337, 343; Harmon to Power.” And each school at Air University its antecedents, and nearly always U.S. Strategic Laurence Kuter, September 11, 1942, L/C Box 88, has vied to claim the proud heritage of the Command (USSTRATCOM) or its predecessors. 8.59, Murray Green Collection, U.S. Air Force Air Corps Tactical School as their own, even Recently, however, Airmen’s hold on USSTRAT- Academy Special Collections. though the Tactical School was always more COM, the descendant of General Curtis LeMay’s 16 Arnold to Harmon, June 6, 1944, 750.041–A, concerned with air combat than with general vaunted Strategic Air Command, has weakened. Millard Harmon Papers, HRA. war, and today would be as analogous to the Navy admirals and Marine generals led the organi- 17 Craven and Cate, 525, 530. zation during 1994–1996 and 1998–2007. Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base as 18 2 S.A. Rosenblatt to LeMay, January 10, 1945, 20 Millard F. Harmon, “Preliminary Rough any school at Air University. Curtis LeMay Papers, Library of Congress. Draft on Policy for Future Military Education of 19 Today, the Air Force devotes considerable Air Corps Officers,” 245.04B, Air Force Historical attention to the nuances of authority, relative Air University should—indeed, must— Research Agency (HRA). prerogatives and mutual obligations of administra- advocate air war and teach its associated 3 “Criticism of Air Corps Tactical School tive oversight, operational command, and tactical competencies. But it ought to do so in a tone Text ‘Air Force,’” memorandum, 248.126–4, HRA, control. Although they did not have the benefit of the more befitting the heritage of Miff Harmon, March 14, 1936. subsequent 60 years’ experience with such matters, who once told a friend that the 1930s focus on 4 Millard F. Harmon, “Notes of Trip to the air arm leaders of World War II struggled with the bombardment at the Tactical School “irked French Front in the Region of Chalons sur-Marne, same issues. me to no end,” not because he did not share June 1917,” Millard Harmon Papers, 168.604–6, 20 The author bases this assertion on 12 years HRA, 7–8; Arnold to Harmon, February 1, 1940, a faith in the idea but because it brokered an of teaching experience at Air University schools. Millard Harmon Papers, 168.604–11A, HRA. ignorance of airpower more broadly con- The university policy of nonattribution precludes 5 Grandison Gardner, Life Memories of Gran- sidered and of war more widely understood. naming these officers. Air University is today a far dison Gardner, 160, HRA. Harmon did not see air war and general war more comprehensive institution than was the Air 6 Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., as subtractive elements, where emphasis Corps Tactical School in the interwar years. Still, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. IV, The air war remains its cultural core. on one led to a diminution of the other. If Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan August 1942 to July 21 Harmon to Bart Yount, November 25, 1939, this was a notion of limited appeal to a new 1944 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, cited in Robert Novotny, “Tarmacs to Trenches: Air Force consolidating its independence, 1950), 32, available at . Harmon first reported to thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, to a more mature air arm. Already, an Air Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley, but spent the bulk 2007), 38. For more on the remarkable Miff University student has produced a very fine of his time in the South Pacific working for Halsey. 7 Harmon, see Novotny’s groundbreaking thesis. Master’s thesis extolling Harmon. But the Cable, Marshall to Harmon, December 8, school must do more to educate Airmen in 1942, Millard Harmon Papers, 750.161–1, HRA. 8 the comprehensive relationship between air John Miller, Jr., U.S. Army in World War II: Guadalcanal, The First Offensive (Washington, DC: war and war. Perhaps it might even aspire for Center for Military History, 1995), 174, 232. its students something beyond air component 9 Louis Morton, U.S. Army in World War II: 21 command. Strategy and Command, the First Two Years (Wash- The enduring scarcity of Air Force ington, DC: Center for Military History, 1962), generals in joint or combined command has

162 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu ror campaign of 1968–1983. He This book is not a “Monday Off the writes, “The relevance of this morning quarterback” critique book lies in its transmission from people who have “been of hard-learned lessons of the there and done that” and think Shelf past and present to current and that it would have all turned out future leaders.” better if only they had been in charge. Quite to the contrary, even years into the war on terror, the U.S. Army and Caraccilo and Thompson Marine Corps have more collective counterinsurgency provide an excellent history of experience than any fighting force in the world. Nonethe- Operation Iraqi Freedom and less, the Armed Forces must continue to improve their set the context for where we S find ourselves today in Iraq. capability to fight and win in irregular conflicts as well as conventional They state in the introduction ones. As the United States anticipates a new Presidential administra- that they believe there was and tion, questions abound within the joint and interagency communities is a strategy for Operation Iraqi regarding the future of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, troop deploy- Freedom and that their purpose ments, and force structure. The two volumes below represent some of in writing is to convey how, the best current thinking about how the United States should pursue based on what has worked, to its interests in a “hybrid” world, one not confined to the interests of bring that strategy to a success- nation-states. ful conclusion. Of particular use to military and civilian leaders is their Achieving Victory in Iraq: survey of successful command- 20th-century conflicts that do Countering an Insurgency ers in Iraq and descriptions of not receive much attention in By Dominic J. Caraccilo and how each achieved their success mainstream debate about insur- Andrea L. Thompson in their respective situations. In gencies and asymmetric warfare. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole the final chapter, the authors Manwaring points out that the Books, 2008 wrap up their analysis by attacks of September 11 were a 240 pp. $24.95 recounting the most recent stra- watershed event that signaled ISBN: 978–0–8117–0388–8 tegic guidance and operational wars would no longer be limited imperatives, and even offer a to well-structured conflicts olonel Dominic Carac- set of “kit bag items” based on between nation-states. He cilo, a brigade combat proven tactical experience. If asserts in the introduction that team commander in the busy warfighters and policy- C st “the sociology of war, of war U.S. Army’s famed 101 Air- makers only have time to read making, and of those who are borne Division, and Lieutenant one book on counterinsurgency, able to make it has changed.” Colonel Andrea Thompson, reading this one would be time Whether one agrees with this military assistant to the Chief well spent. Insurgency, Terrorism, and statement, one cannot deny of Staff of the Army, combine Crime: Shadows from the Past Manwaring’s admonition that the experience gained in their Other recent titles and Portents for the Future “the conscious choices made by collective five tours of duty in recommended: By Max G. Manwaring civil-military leadership in the Iraq to produce a timely and n Kagan, Frederick W. and Norman: University of international community and in instructive book described in Thomas Donnelly. Ground Oklahoma Press, 2008 individual nation-states about the foreword as a “handbook” Truth: The Future of U.S. Land 248 pp. $34.95 how to deal with the contem- for how to effectively engage Power. Washington, DC: AEI ISBN: 978–0–8061–3970–8 porary nontraditional security with and prevail alongside Press, 2008. 161 pp. $20.00 environment will define the the Iraqi people. Army and (Paperback) ax Manwaring, a processes of national, regional, Marine Corps employment of professor of military and global security, stability and recently revised U.S. doctrine n Marston, Daniel and Carter Mstrategy at the U.S. well-being far into the future” on how to fight and win in Malkasian, eds. Counterinsur- Army War College’s renowned (p. 4). counterinsurgency warfare gency in Modern Warfare. New Strategic Studies Institute, con- Manwaring not only analyzes is proving effective in both York: Random House, 2008. 204 tinues his decades of research- several national security threats, Iraq and Afghanistan. The pp. $27.95 (Hardcover) ing and writing on insurgencies including contemporary ter- United States, however, must and counterinsurgency strategy rorist and insurgent activities, maintain and hone its ability n West, Bing. The Strongest with this volume. He sets out to but also covers Colombian to fight and win conventional Tribe: War, Politics, and the provide civilian policymakers insurgencies, gangs and crimi- wars, but there is no argument Endgame in Iraq. New York: and military strategists with a nal organizations in Central that its forces must be able to Random House, 2008. 448 pp. set of case studies and lessons America and Mexico, the simultaneously fight and win $28.88 (Hardcover) learned covering security threats insurgencies in Portugal and in irregular and asymmetric —R.E. Henstrand presented by insurgents in some Uruguay, and Italy’s counterter- conflicts as well.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 163 BOOK REVIEWS

operated over the course of more Unfortunately, his writing is tory primer of a highly enduring than 60 years. In his preface, choppy and the selection of tech- geopolitical issue. If the reader is Sanford Lakoff more accurately nical material is inconsistent, thus inspired to delve more deeply into refines his book’s overall scope as distracting from the preceding the technical aspects of missile a review of U.S. efforts to develop chapters. A section on “Problems defense history, the Historical and deploy defenses against attack and Controversies” introduces Office of the U.S. Army Space by ballistic missiles, focusing on several thought-provoking issues and Missile Defense Command events since President Ronald that provide a good segue to the offers the outstanding text Seize Reagan introduced the Strategic concluding chapter, a 31-page the High Ground: The U.S. Army in Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. review of significant strides in U.S. Space and Missile Defense (2003) Given this stipulation, the book active missile defense during the on its Web site at . Age: A Reference Handbook of active ballistic defenses appro- Reagan as well as many technical Although none of these works will by Sanford Lakoff priate for a reader unfamiliar with and policy issues that continue to turn readers into “rocket scien- Westport, CT: Praeger Security this topic. foster debate. This work describes tists,” they will certainly enhance International, 2007 The book’s strengths are its the first Bush and Clinton admin- understanding of the technical 180 pp. $54.95 presentation and analysis of the istrations’ evolution toward a and political intricacies required ISBN–10: 0–275–99324–8 political aspects of ballistic missile limited missile defense goal versus to defend against missiles or, pos- defense pursuits. It provides a the original SDI “impenetrable sibly in the future, space weapons. Reviewed by concise historical sketch of the shield” to render nuclear weapons Jeffrey L. Caton evolution of the post–World War “impotent and obsolete.” It high- Colonel Jeffrey L. Caton, USAF, is II security environment from lights the second Bush administra- a faculty member and Defense ilitary history is replete the emergence of nuclear powers tion’s 2002 withdrawal from the Transformation Chair at the U.S. Army with examples of com- to the Cold War–era deterrence Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that War College. He has over 26 years Mpeting policies empha- theory of mutual assured destruc- enabled the current use of layered of experience in space operations, sizing both offensive and defensive tion. This background sets the defenses incorporating weapons joint operations, and acquisition efforts as the best approach to stage for a discussion of the systems of the U.S. Army, Navy, management. ensure national security. Policies pursuit of active defenses, which and Air Force. Lakoff’s closing pertaining to nuclear-armed bal- centers on Reagan’s tenacious thoughts raise germane concerns listic missiles share this history of quest to provide national options regarding how these defenses con- controversy, which reveals conse- against nuclear missile attack tribute to a shift from the current quences of their development and other than to “push the button or militarization of space to its pos- use—such as significant economic do nothing.” Lakoff contends that sible weaponization. He also raises and political impacts during their Reagan’s public announcement of the questions of how effective development and devastating the SDI program, quickly nick- these defenses can be against ter- destruction in their operation— named “Star Wars,” caught most rorists using nuclear weapons, as that warrant serious consideration. of his advisors by surprise. The well as how to balance their costs Over $115 billion has been spent author provides an analysis of the with those for homeland defense. on U.S. missile defense over the repercussions related to SDI goals The book’s only appendix is The Echo of Battle: The Army’s last 25 years, and an additional as well as an interesting insight the article “Holes in the Missile Way of War $9.3 billion may be spent during into the interactions among Con- Shield,” by physicist Richard L. by Brian McAllister Linn fiscal year 2009. Recent negotia- gress, the Department of State, Garwin, updated slightly from its Cambridge: Harvard University tions to put U.S. ballistic missile Department of Defense, and Joint original publication in 2004. The Press, 2007 defense systems in Poland and Chiefs of Staff. article summarizes many of the 312 pp. $27.95 the Czech Republic contribute Strategic Defense in the Nuclear key technical aspects of the book, ISBN–13: 978–0–674–02651–3 to our strained relations with Age also explores SDI’s effects and it may serve as a good starting Russia. Dramatic hypervelocity on the ongoing Cold War, with point for those deciding whether Reviewed by interceptions of satellites by China particular emphasis on events to read the entire volume. Other Bryon E. Greenwald in January 2007 and the United in Western Europe. The author sources for further research are States in February 2008 demon- weaves together many key influ- included in a bibliography. n The Art of War, Sun Tzu strate the advanced state of tech- ences in his discussion, including Overall, the book contains admonishes would-be political nology related to missile defense. changes in Soviet (and later a number of factual errors and Iand military leaders to “know Strategic Defense in the Nuclear Russian) leadership, implications offers only limited citations and yourself and know your enemy Age provides important histori- to North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tabulated data. Also, its glossary and in one hundred battles you cal context for anyone trying to tion defense planning, effects of is simply a list of the book’s acro- will be victorious.” When it analyze these current events. The ongoing strategic arms reduction nyms and does not explain key comes to conducting postwar title of the book certainly suggests negotiations, and elimination of scientific terms, as promised on analysis and adjusting warfighting an ambitious task, since the term intermediate nuclear forces in the back cover. Unfortunately, this concepts in preparation for the strategic defense has many dimen- Europe. distracts from the work’s value as next war, Brian McAllister Linn sions, and the nuclear age harkens Lakoff provides a technical a reference handbook. Still, Stra- shows how America’s political and back to many Cold War–era overview chapter of SDI architec- tegic Defense in the Nuclear Age military elite have failed over the weapons systems developed and ture and its major components. suffices as an adequate introduc- last two centuries to recognize the

164 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu impact of competing martial tra- for primacy. As such, Linn defines personnel, and facilities aspects ditions on decisions regarding U.S. three American martial philoso- of building, training, and field- Army doctrine and force struc- phies, each espoused by a different ing a mass army and can miss or ture. Our failure to understand group—Guardians, Heroes, and dismiss the complexity of smaller the pervasive influence of these Managers—and maintains that as conflicts, postconflict operations, philosophies on defense policy each group pushes its philosophy, and unconventional missions. demonstrates that we do not know the emerging American way of Like their corporate brethren in ourselves very well and that we are war becomes further confused. the business world, the Manag- often our own worst enemy. The Guardian philosophy ers’ preferred method of problem Linn examines the Army’s his- dominated 19th-century military solving is “reorganization.” Mana- torical efforts to learn the lessons thinking, with narrative threads gerial philosophy focuses more on of its last war and adjust its doc- still visible in today’s defense corporate management than on China’s Future Nuclear trine and materiel to accomplish a debate. Guardians believe that warfighting. Submarine Force perceived set of new missions. In war is both an art and a science Multiple martial traditions or Edited by Andrew S. Erickson et al. doing so, he provides an invalu- and that only those who master philosophies exist within all the Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute able service to civilian and military the science should be allowed to Services. They are separate and Press, 2007 leaders who invariably desire to practice the art. They see war as distinct from various transient 400 pp. $45.00 “reform” the military once the last an engineering problem as evident warfighter “communities,” such as ISBN: 978–1–59114–326–0 cannon sounds. While Sun Tzu in coastal defense, the Strategic the Army’s “Airborne Mafia,” the educated leaders on fighting with Defense Initiative, homeland “black shoe Navy,” or the “fighter Reviewed by swords and crossbows, Linn pro- security, force protection (the jocks” of the Air Force. They also JOHN D. BECKER vides a penetrating discussion of Green Zone), and preemptive influence policy discussions in a the recurrent internal fighting over war. Guardian philosophy is also more fundamental fashion. For trategists now surveying the which weapons and warfighting apparent in catch phrases such as defense professionals, the value in globe for future threats are concepts will dominate the Army’s precision engagement, dominant reading The Echo of Battle comes Slooking beyond the ongoing future way of war. He examines maneuver, and win decisively, in appreciating how these martial U.S. involvement in Iraq and the (often erroneous) defense which suggest success irrespective traditions may emerge during Afghanistan at many other inter- planning assumptions emerging of enemy actions. defense policy discussions. While national security threats, including from the major American wars of Heroes emphasize the “human one philosophy may dominate a terrorist networks, transnational the 19th and 20th centuries and the element and define warfare by debate, all are present in one form criminal organizations, and impact those assumptions had on personal intangibles such as mili- or another and work to confuse failed states. Increasingly, several preparing for the next conflict. tary genius, experience, courage, our thinking. Understanding the regional threats have emerged, Linn contends that one of morale, and discipline.” They strengths and weaknesses of each including the People’s Republic of the problems facing the Services value adaptability and innovation. philosophy may help bring the China (PRC). China’s economic today is that military and defense Of the three groups, Heroes are best out of each and allow senior development has garnered much intellectuals have failed to identify the best at adjusting to different leaders to shepherd the creation attention, but another focal point an appropriate concept of war. situations and can provide both an of a truly unifying and joint vision has been its military growth. A While buzzwords abound— intellectual and practical frame- for the future. major concern in that area has shock and awe, fourth-generation work for a range of military opera- Brian Linn has made a signifi- been China’s nuclear forces, warfare, net-centricity, asymmetric tions. Heroes understand that cant contribution to the history including its nuclear submarine conflict—the military does not “securing the peace” is as impor- of the U.S. Army and to the body fleet. Naval War College profes- have a concept of war that is tant as “winning the war.” They of knowledge on military innova- sors Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle robust enough to permit proper tend, however, to disregard the tion, transformation, and defense J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, prewar preparation. He offers hard thinking and staffwork that policy. A review of the existing lit- and Andrew R. Wilson explore that defining a national way of make their vision achievable (for erature on the subject reveals that that concern in depth in this book, war necessitates going beyond example, General George Patton’s while a small portion discusses the which was drawn together from operational narratives, which tend dismissal of logistics). Overreli- impact of Service culture on mili- the results of a 2005 conference at to focus on the conduct of the last ance on Heroic muddy-boots fun- tary innovation, transformation, which Active duty naval officers, series of battles and engagements, damentalism and anti-intellectual or change, none of the literature academics, and policy experts met and requires recognizing that “the reductionism (“I am a warrior, exposes the intellectual underpin- to discuss this new era in China’s way a military force conducts not a manager”) can cause one to nings of a military Service to the military development. war very much depends on how dismiss the complexity inherent in degree seen in The Echo of Battle. The premise of China’s Future it prepares for war” (p. 3). Most warfare (p. 7). In that respect and many others, Nuclear Submarine Force is that importantly, he observes that a Managers often oppose both Linn has broken new ground. the nuclear submarine fleet is Service’s perception of its past and the Guardians and Heroes. now recognized as the centerpiece the legacy of its martial traditions Epitomized by Generals George Dr. Bryon E. Greenwald is a retired of China’s naval strategy. The greatly influence its peacetime Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. Army Colonel and an Assistant work is divided into five parts, preparation. Linn correctly notes the Managers can provide excel- Professor of Military Theory and including an exploration of the that the military is not rigid, lent broad strategic leadership but Historical Foundation in the Joint wider context for Chinese nuclear hierarchical, and monolithic, but can also become fixated on the Advanced Warfighting School at the submarine development; an rather is very much a plurality doctrine, organization, training, Joint Forces Staff College. examination of the dimensions of with several communities fighting materiel, leader development, the new submarine capabilities; ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 165 BOOK REVIEWS a discussion of current and China’s Future Nuclear Sub- future PRC nuclear submarine marine Force is a followup to operations; an assessment of Cold China’s Strategic Seapower, by John Gaming the War lessons for understanding Lewis and Xue Litai, published the development of the PRC in 1993, which concluded that st nuclear submarine force; and a China had a seabased retalia- 21 Century discussion of the implications for tory capability. While arguably U.S. national security in general a premature conclusion at that and the U.S. Navy in particular. time, China’s Future Nuclear Force, National Strategic Worth noting is that this text is looking at the second generation both more specific and broader of Chinese nuclear submarines, Gaming Center in its scope of conception. It is presents a stronger claim for that more specific in that it looks at conclusion. The Chinese navy, the neglected sector of China’s through its nuclear submarine elcome to a new series on simulation and undersea force—that small pro- fleet, is currently able to project gaming in Joint Force Quarterly. With this portion of Chinese submarines power throughout China’s littoral column, the National Strategic Gaming using nuclear propulsion—and shores, from Taiwan, Honshu, Center (NSGC) at the National Defense broader in that it concerns China’s and Sumatra. Soon, through the W University (NDU) intends to reach out to the community submarine force, navy, and grand pursuit of its offshore defense strategy as a whole. maritime strategy, it will be able of simulation and gaming practitioners, stimulating debate In the opening chapter, Rear to project power throughout all of about best practices in game design and analyses and sharing Admiral Erik McVadon provides East Asia. findings and insights from specific exercises with the wider a detailed summary of current China’s Future Nuclear Subma- national security policy community. developments in the Chinese navy rine Force provides both novices The discipline has long lacked an energized professional and includes a discussion of the and experienced scholars an discourse about how games are best put together and what maturity of the submarine fleet extensive primer on the context consumers can (and cannot) learn from them. This lack of within the People’s Liberation of the Chinese nuclear submarine substantive activity is costly to the wider policy and analyti- Army Navy, the role of the fleet fleet. It is quite readable, well orga- cal community, whose members are left with few reference in terms of the Taiwan “problem,” nized, and extremely well docu- points for evaluating how seriously they should take the find- and the potential threat the fleet mented in all chapters. It provides ings from games and how useful participation in them might poses to the United States. a solid foundation for understand- In a chapter on the context of ing a new global security threat be, and with little awareness of the interesting topics and China’s current maritime strategy, and its key elements. exercises being run throughout the national security com- Bernard Cole argues persuasively Regardless of the political munity. Despite some admirable attempts to stimulate debate that an understanding of that direction that China takes, the and research, even Defense Department university-based strategy must be grounded in an development of its military (and wargaming groups have avoided publishing, lecturing, and understanding of Chinese history, in particular its nuclear submarine generally competitively comparing ideas about why and how particularly since 1949. He also fleet) bears watching. But it is we do what we do. notes that while the Chinese navy important to remember that our A research initiative launched in 2008 seeks to fill this once embraced Soviet ideas about own tendency to want to refight void and to invite colleagues in other gaming shops and the strategy, it has since rejected them the same war again may apply wider policy community to engage with us by participating in order to develop its submarine here, too. That is particularly in events, criticizing, contesting, elaborating, or extending fleet as a flexible, ready instrument true given that many of the new of national security. Chinese nuclear submarines come research ideas. We want to challenge practitioners to reexam- Additional chapters explore from Russia, that the People’s Lib- ine how they write games and draw conclusions. We similarly topics including analysis of avail- eration Army Navy originally used wish to encourage and enable consumers of games to critically able data concerning the capabili- Soviet strategy and tactics, and assess them. Our overarching focus is on gaming 21st-century ties of China’s nuclear submarine; that the U.S. Navy remains very challenges—both identifying issues and trends that could be the implications of this analysis much a force in search of a new well served by gaming and weighing whether and where exer- for China, the United States, and naval rival. That bias can color the cise design needs to adapt in order to reflect these new issues. other major powers; and what, if way we see this new threat and any, lessons from the Cold War cause us to misunderstand it, as What Policy Games Can Do . . . apply to the current situation. well as how to best deal with it. NSGC conducts strategic-level exercises in which The collection also is unique in scenarios concerning broad national or homeland security that five of the chapters draw sub- Lieutenant Colonel John D. Becker, USA stantially upon original Chinese (Ret.), Ph.D., is on the faculties of the crises are described to participants, including executive sources. That reference is helpful University of Denver’s Graduate School branch officials, senior combatant command staffs, NDU, and in that it also shows the develop- of International Studies, Norwich Members of Congress—all of whom are asked to determine ment of Chinese military analysis University’s Diplomacy program, and the best decision for that situation. These types of games go itself, something that has been the University of Maryland University by many names—for instance, political-military exercises, downplayed in the past. College. seminar games, tabletop exercises—but share some common attributes. They are qualitatively specified; that is, game rules

166 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu that shape the space in which participants this? Why are they concluding that this is a creative policy suggestions and conceptual- make choices are described with words and sound recommendation?” Although some izing the problem. Indeed, concept valida- graphics, not mathematical models or a significant exceptions exist, gamers do not tion—weighing what factors are and are not computer program, and usually focus on the as a whole do a good job of clarifying how so important to understanding an issue—is strategic, policy-oriented level of analysis. In and why they underscore certain findings something qualitatively specified exercises NSGC games, there is not usually an auto- as important when reporting on games, or are extremely useful for. matic if-then result to each player’s decision relate those conclusions to structural ele- Qualitative exercises are not perfect for that shows him all possible consequences of ments of the game. Designers and analysts testing and confirming the ideal solution to that choice or a red team of opponents who should be pressed to identify issues such as a problem. They may, however, be valuable respond to those choices; nor is there neces- the number of times an exercise was con- in examining decisionmaking processes sarily even a highly structured problem, ducted, the sampling of participants whose and are an excellent tool for identifying although other gaming groups do effectively choices and observations constitute the and exploring relationships, and weighing use these tools sometimes in qualitative “data,” what suppositions were made about factors that shape a strategic situation. They games. dominant causal factors and the trends or are good at helping define problems for In 2007 and 2008, the NSGC congres- outcomes explained, and which proved learning and analysis. sional division ran two energy security exer- more and less important as the exercise cises that provide a good illustration of our proceeded. Subsequent columns will consider exercises. Participants were introduced to the other major strand of our research the scenario through a series of high-quality Importance endeavor—identifying new, 21st-century video “injects” and asked to make policy The kinds of information this method security challenges and thinking about recommendations. Each move represented of research can generate are varied, but it how to adapt games to learn about them. an advancement of time, and participants is particularly effective to elicit and collate As we do so, the National Strategic Gaming considered issues such as supply-line otherwise disparate expert knowledge on Center will continue to use this space to disruptions and strategic implications of issues. By presenting a complex situation in pose questions about what games can tell the dependence on foreign energy suppliers. The which participants need to take a wide range wider policy audience and what questions exercise promoted dialogue across branches of factors into decisionmaking, the exercises that audience should be asking to challenge of government about pressing issues and can achieve a related goal of pushing par- gamers to produce the best, most salient, explored the complexity of this policy area. ticipants outside of their “lane” to weigh an and most robust insights and findings. JFQ individual office’s or even a department’s . . . And What They Can’t narrower goals against a wider array of Policy games are expensive, time issues and incentives. consuming (certainly to design, sometimes NSGC specializes in qualitative policy to play), seldom repeated many times, games because, for this level of analysis, policy games and executed for sets of participants with where problems are often ill defined, choices varying levels of expertise and equities. unclear, information incomplete, but deci- attempt to represent They attempt to represent complex chal- sions still urgent, these games yield educa- lenges succinctly even though designers tional and analytical benefits. For the lineup do not necessarily know which factors or of topics we’ll tackle this year—Darfur, complex challenges variables are most influential. With few Afghanistan-Pakistan, energy security, and iterations of an exercise, these games have Russia—these games are an excellent way succinctly even what social scientists would call a “small N to frame problems, accessible to audiences problem”—that is, any conclusions reached ranging from Members of Congress to though designers do from analysis are abstracted from a small senior military officers and civil servants. sample and vulnerable to any coincidental More parsimonious, mathematical variations inherent in the particular group games also make tradeoffs, assuming away not necessarily know that played that particular exercise. More- some important factors in exchange for the over, because of the many-variables problem, conciseness needed in order to formalize which factors or they all, always, exhibit some investigator them. Qualitative exercises can retain a bias: when designers write a scenario, they good bit more complexity and do not need variables are most make some guesses as to what factors are the to make as many of these tradeoffs, and, for most important ones that create a strategic some topics, this can be advantageous. In challenge. And they can be wrong. 2007, for example, NSGC conducted a West influential This has some implications for con- Africa exercise, Divided Horizons, which sumers of games: when perusing after-action weighed the impact of various domestic reports or any other compilation of findings variables on a range of strategic interests. from an exercise, wise readers should ask The exercise, which focused on a few key themselves, “How does the author know variables, was an effective means of eliciting ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 167 Joint Doctrine Update Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division

he Joint Staff/J7 (JS/J7), in concert implications for the future of joint doctrine. Operational Contract Support, was signed in with the joint doctrine develop- Appropriately, this task was assigned to the JS/ December 2008, and work has begun on a ment community (JDDC), J7 for coordination and U.S. Strategic Command second draft of JP 4–09, Global Distribution. remains on the leading edge (USSTRATCOM) for action. The objective is to For access to joint publications, go to Joint T Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic of capturing today’s lessons learned and best assess joint doctrine in support of operations in practices in joint doctrine to best equip the joint cyberspace, recommend changes, and develop Information System Web portal at (dot.mil users only). For those force experience and capabilities evolve, doc- Staff/J7 in accordance with Chairman of the Joint without access to dot.mil accounts, go to Joint trine also must be revised accordingly. Recently, Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5120.02A, Electronic Library Web portal at . been highlighted within the joint arena. Additionally, during the last Joint Doc- On May 12, 2008, the Office of the trine Planning Conference (JDPC), the JS/J7 JPs Revised or Under Review Secretary of Defense approved a definition proposed initiation of a comprehensive doc- JP 1–05, Religious Support in Joint Operations of cyberspace for use by the Department of trine assessment regarding cyberspace; begin- JP 1–06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations Defense (DOD): ning with a review of JP 1, Joint Warfare of the JP 2–01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Armed Forces of the United States. Accordingly, Operations A global domain within the information USSTRATCOM has further divided this task JP 2–01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint environment consisting of the interdependent into three phases: JP 1 assessment, JP 1–0 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace network of information technology infrastruc- through JP 6–0 assessments, and development JP 3–02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations tures, including the Internet, telecommunica- of an entirely new cyberspace joint publica- JP 3–04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter Operations tions networks, computer systems, and embed- tion. USSTRATCOM completed the formal JP 3–06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations ded processors and controllers. assessment of JP 1 in August, which is now JP 3–07.1, Foreign Internal Defense under review. Once approved, JP 1 will be JP 3–09.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Laser This definition was then incorporated updated in accordance with CJCSI 5120.02A. Designation Operations into Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, The DOD Dic- In addition to the above cyberspace initiatives, JP 3–09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close tionary of Military and Associated Terms. A defi- the J7 and JDDC workload continues to be Air Support nition of cyberspace operations is being staffed, demanding as JP 3–24, JP 3–26, and 4-series JP 3–11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, as tasked by the Deputy Secretary in the May 12 development progresses. and Chemical (NBC) Environments memorandum, and is expected to be approved JP 3–24, Counterinsurgency Operations, JP 3–14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations in the near future. Once approved, this defini- is currently in the first-draft phase; it has been JP 3–17, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and tion will also be incorporated into JP 1–02. posted to the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations The National Military Strategy for Cyber- Training Electronic Information System and JP 3–18, Doctrine for Joint Forcible Entry Operations space Operations (NMS–CO), published in sent out to the community for action officer JP 3–24, Counterinsurgency Operations September 2007, was developed based on the review and comment. Comments were due JP 3–26, Counterterrorism National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace of 2003. back to the lead agent on October 27, 2008, JP 3–29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance The NMS–CO has three main objectives: for adjudication. It is scheduled for approval in JP 3–30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations June 2009. JP 3–31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations n establish a common understanding of JP 3–26, Counterterrorism, is currently JP 3–40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass cyberspace undergoing first-draft revision with the lead Destruction n set forth a military strategic framework agent following the Joint Working Group, which JP 3–52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone that orients and focuses DOD military, intel- was held on September 1, 2008, at U.S. Southern JP 3–53, Joint Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations ligence, and business operations in and through Command headquarters in Tampa. The matrix JP 3–57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations cyberspace was due back to the Joint Staff/J7 on September JP 3–59, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures n serve as a definitive reference to plan, 19. It is scheduled for approval in April 2009. for Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations execute, and resource cyberspace operations for JP 4–0, Doctrine for Logistic Support JP 3–61, Public Affairs DOD agencies. of Joint Operations, introduces new joint JP 3–63, Detainee Operations logistics doctrine, to include the joint logistics JP 4–0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations In accordance with the NMS–CO, the Joint environment, joint logistics imperatives, U.S. JP 4–01.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Staff developed a 42-task implementation plan Transportation Command as the distribution Transportation Terminal Operations that encompasses three phases with numerous process owner, and U.S. Joint Forces Command JP 4–05, Joint Mobilization Planning tasks per phase. One task, Doctrine 1, has direct as the joint deployment process owner. JP 4–10, JP 4–10, Operational Contract Support

168 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu Inside Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009 NEW JFQ Dialogue from NDU Press 2 The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) By Robert M. Gates [email protected] From the Chairman Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. 8 Managing Editor, NDU Press 10 Open Letter Strategic Forum 235 LTC Robert E. Henstrand, USA Strategic Forum 233 The Absence of Europe: Implications for International Security? George C. Maerz Letter to the Editor Defense Transformation à la française and Supervisory Editor 11 U.S. Interests Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Forum Facing a worsening economy and a war in Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Under President Nicolas Sarkozy, France has Iraq that will be difficult to end, the next U.S. Executive Summary Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick 13 embarked on major changes in its national administration may well seek a more multi- security strategy, structure, capabilities, and lateral foreign policy and closer cooperation Design Chris Dunham and Jeremy Swanston, 15 An Interview with General George W. Casey, Jr. relationships with Allies. Leo Michel ana- with Europe. But, as Steven Kramer argues, U.S. Government Printing Office Let’s Win the Wars We’re In By John A. Nagl lyzes this transformation as presented in the Europe may be unwilling or unable to play a Printed in St. Louis, Missouri 20 French White Book of Defense and National larger role in global security. European uni- by 27 Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars By Gian P. Gentile Security, the official blueprint approved in fication and NATO expansion have stalled, June 2008. Michel notes that much more is at economic and social issues continue, and key 34 Hybrid Warfare and Challenges By Frank G. Hoffman stake in this ambitious plan than the shape of leaders disagree on how to proceed. In short, NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare By Milan N. Vego France’s defense establishment. French poli- Europe’s inability to work with the United cross-component, professional military and 40 cies and capabilities have implications for its States may be a logical consequence of its academic publishing house. It publishes books, Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat By Marvin Baker Schaffer European Allies, the United States, and re- political structure and worldview, forcing Strategic Forum 237 policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and 49 and Ike Chang gions beyond Europe such as parts of Africa. America to turn to Asia for support. Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: How special reports on national security strategy, defense Should the United States Respond? policy, national military strategy, regional security Special Feature affairs, and global strategic problems. NDU Press is part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a 56 Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century By Gabriel Marcella Persian Gulf security will increasingly pose policy research and strategic gaming organization. and Stephen O. Fought difficult choices for the next administration. Judith Yaphe perceives the United States “Military-Political” Relations: The Need for Officer Education This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department 61 facing three challenges. The toughest by far of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions By Derek S. Reveron and Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris is whether to engage Iran and, if so, how. The of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted A Strategic Asset for Engagement: Enhancing the Role of second delicate issue is what posture to take without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint 67 Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever National Defense University By Keith D. Dickson on reform within the Gulf states. A heavy- material is quoted from or based on its content. handed approach can trigger cynicism about Commentary U.S. motives and charges of double standards. The third is how to build cooperation COMMUNICATIONS Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned: Reforming the Afghan 70 between the Gulf states and Iraq. Lingering Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly National Police By Lewis G. Irwin online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming suspicions will be hard to overcome. The Gulf issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and Effects-based Operations: Combat Proven By Paul M. Carpenter states may well seek expanded security guar- 78 Strategic Forum 234 Strategic Forum 236 access to many other useful NDU Press publications. and William F. Andrews antees from the United States even as they Constructive comments and contributions Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for NATO’s Uncertain Future: Is Demography Civil-Military Relations remain wary of formal ties. are important to us. Please direct editorial EBO: There Was No Baby in the Bathwater By Paul K. Van Riper Destiny? communications to the link on the NDU Press Web 82 Patrick Cronin argues that irregular site or write to: Victory—From the Prism of Jihadi Culture By Jeffrey B. Cozzens The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 86 warfare—highly political and ambiguous (NATO) is increasingly stressed by popula- and intensely local by nature—is likely to Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Features tion trends in its member countries. For National Defense University Press dominate the global security environment example, the gap between U.S. and European 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2505) 92 Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach in the coming decades. Success in this type military-age segments is widening, with Fort Lesley J. McNair By Jeffrey Buchanan, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight of conflict will require a framework that bal- the U.S. cohort increasing while Europe’s Washington, DC 20319 ances the relationships between civilian and shrinks; a young, growing U.S. popula- 97 Irregular Warfare Is Warfare By Kenneth C. Coons, Jr., and Glenn M. Harned military leaders and effectively uses their dif- tion will contribute to its enhanced global Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 ferent strengths. Irregular warfare challenges Wired for War? Robots and Military Doctrine By P.W. Singer economic profile in 2050, while Europe’s FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 104 traditional understandings of how civilian aging and shrinking productive population Email: [email protected] Chinese Disaster Relief Operations: Identifying Critical Capability Gaps and military leaders should work together. will help diminish its presence. Jeffrey Simon Visit the NDU Press Web site JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu 111 By Nirav Patel Specifically, Cronin examines issues such as argues that these trends will hamper the for more information on measuring progress, choosing the best lead- Alliance’s ability to deploy operational forces, st publications at 1st Quarter, January 2009 118 China-Africa Relations in the 21 Century By Jennifer L. Parenti ers, and forging integrated strategies. and thus should be consciously weighed in ISSN 1070-0692 ndupress.ndu.edu 125 Shoulder to Shoulder: The Marine Corps and Air Force in Combat NATO’s future strategic plans. By Daniel J. Darnell and George J. Trautman III Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009 JFQ coming next in... Global Strategic Outlook

. . . and more in issue 53, 2d Quarter 2009 of JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Focus on Land Warfare

4Reconstructing Iraq’s Provinces

4Irregular Warfare Is Warfare 4EBO: Point >< Counterpoint ISSUE fifty -TWO, 1

Joint Force Quarterly