VOLUMEVOL. 9 ISSUE 14 ISSUE 4 | FALL 4 | 2015 FALL 2020

ininFOCUSFOCUSQUARTERLY Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies

James Jay Carafano on U.S. Military Challenges | Jeremiah Rozman on Chinese Competition | Frederico tktk on tktk | Bartels, Patty-Jane Geller, Thomas Spoehr, John Venable, and Dakota Wood on the U.S. Defense Budget | Jeffrey Green on Rare Earths Production | Stephen D. Bryen and Shoshana Bryen on COVID-19’s Military Impact | Daniel Gouré on Japanese Missile Defense | Zak Doffman on Israel’s Connected Military | Gary Anderson on NATO Strategy in the Baltics | Michael Sullivan and Jarvis D. Lynch, Jr. on Modernizing the Marines | Steven Metz on Changes to the Army | J. Roy Robinson on the National Guard | Shoshana Bryen reviews Young Patriots

ALLIANCES:Featuring AMERICAN an Interview INTERESTS with Senator IN A CHANGING Tom Cotton WORLD LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

he Chinese government withheld is still lying in wait for a chance to inFOCUS information about the origin, na- make trouble, even as Putin finds Chal- VOLUME 14 | ISSUE 4 ture, spread, and volatility of CO- lenges in his “near abroad.” VID-19 and arrested and “disap- The defense budget will drive our Publisher T Matthew Brooks peared” brave Chinese people who tried future capabilities. The combined skills to tell the truth. Many Americans now see of Frederico Bartels, Patty-Jane Geller, Editor the Chinese government as an adversary Thomas Spoehr, John Venable, and Da- Shoshana Bryen of the Free World. They are right. The Fall kota Wood make the budget under- Associate Editors 2020 issue of inFOCUS is about meeting standable. Changes to the Marine Corps, Michael Johnson the new challenge. Army and National Guard Eric Rozenman Don’t miss our in- are addressed by Jarvis Copy Editor terview with the extraor- Lynch and Michael Sulli- Shari Hillman

dinary Sen. Tom Cotton. van, Steven Metz, and Roy Published by: In his inimitable way, his Robinson, respectively. Jewish Policy Center thoughts travel around Finally, Shoshana Bryen 50 F Street NW, Suite 100 the world, not only point- reviews Young Patriots Washington, DC 20001 ing out pitfalls, but offering perspective by Charles Cerami. As American cities (202) 638-2411 and solutions. and institutions are attacked by violent Follow us: But first, a question. Was the virus a gangs intent on their destructive version Chinese bio-weapon? Former defense of- of “revolution,” remember that America’s JewishPolicyCenter ficial Stephen Bryen and JPC Senior Di- Founders were, in fact, constructive revo- @theJPC rector Shoshana Bryen posit that if it was, lutionaries – building, not destroying, and it wasn’t very effective. But it gave a vesting power in the people. The opinions expressed in inFOCUS do not necessarily reflect those of the Jewish Policy remarkable look at our ability to cope un- If you appreciate what you’ve Center, its board, or its officers. der duress – and that picture isn’t pretty. read, I encourage you to make a con- On the other hand, we learned things too. tribution to the Jewish Policy Center. To begin or renew your subscription, please contact us: [email protected] James Carafano and Jeremiah Ro- As always, you can use our secure site: zman address the new and http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/donate Cover Photo: U.S. Army/Master Sgt. Ryan America’s use of power abroad. Jeffrey Matson

Green has good news on the Rare Earth Sincerely, © 2020 Jewish Policy Center Elements front. The role of our allies Japan and Israel are covered by Daniel www.JewishPolicyCenter.org Gouré and Zak Doffman. And Gary An- Matthew Brooks, derson reminds us that we can’t forget Publisher

JAMES JAY CARAFANO is Vice President of the Kathryn and Senator TOM COTTON represents the state of Arkansas. (22) Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and For- eign Policy at the Heritage Foundation. (3) ZAK DOFFMAN is CEO of Digital Barriers. (28) Col. GARY ANDERSON USMC, (Ret.) is an adjunct faculty

Featuring JEREMIAH ROZMAN, Ph.D., is a national security analyst at the Association of the Army. (6) member at the Elliot School of International Relations at George Washington University. (31) FREDERICO BARTELS is Senior Policy Analyst, Defense Bud- geting; Patty-Jane Geller is Policy Analyst, Nuclear Deterrence Maj. Gen. MICHAEL SULLIVAN, USMC (Ret.) and Maj. Gen. and Missile Defense; THOMAS SPOEHR is Director, Center for JARVIS D. LYNCH, JR., USMC (Ret.) (34) National Defense; JOHN VENABLE Is Senior Research Fellow STEVEN METZ, Ph.D., is Professor of National Security and for Defense Policy; and DAKOTA WOOD Is Senior Research Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. (37) Fellow, Defense Programs at the Heritage Foundation. (9) Brig. Gen. J. ROY ROBINSON, USA (Ret.), is President of the JEFFREY GREEN is president of J.A. Green & Company. (13) National Guard Association of the United States. (40) STEPHEN D. BRYEN, Ph,D., s a former senior Defense De- SHOSHANA BRYEN is Senior Director of the Jewish Policy partment official. (15) Center and Editor of inFOCUS Quarterly. (15 and 41) DANIEL GOURÉ, Ph.D., is Senior Vice President with the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia. (19) The Military Risks in America’s Future by JAMES JAY CARAFANO

f there are wars in the near term, they there are three parts of the world that are Russia, another trade deal with China, will be wars of choice. They will be in crucial to the U.S. – Europe, the Greater or the denuclearization of North Korea, places we weren’t looking for wars. Middle East, and Asia. don’t expect the underlying antipathies IThey won’t be easy wars to win. They They are three giant lily-pads that and distrust to dissipate overnight. Ab- will make the world more dangerous. connect America to the rest of the world. sent massive political change, the com- Great power competition is more In addition, the great “global commons” petitive space looks set for a while. than just a bumper sticker everybody is that allow the U.S. to traverse the world In terms of national security and slapping on everything at present. This (sea, air, space, and cyberspace) are an- armed conflict, what is notable about framework accurately enough describes chored in these lands. In short, regional America’s competitors is the one goal the geo-political struggle going on in the peace and stability in Europe, the Mid- they all share. Each wants to win without world today. States trying to expand their dle East, and Asia is important to the fighting. None of them desire or foresee spheres of influence bump into the inter- United States. These parts of the world a direct debilitating war with the United ests of other states. Those confrontations either facilitate America’s persistent States anytime soon. Rather each seeks ways to distract, diminish or disperse In managing and globally shifting U.S. military American power without risking an esca- lating confrontation that leads to a direct power, expect alliances and strategic partnerships to test of arms. become more, not less, relevant to America. Further, these powers have limited interest and capacity to cooperate in the pursuit of their goal. True, they do find create friction and conflict threatening to presence or provide the means to get to opportunities to make common cause. undermine global institutions, destabilize the places Americans need to go to pro- There is, for example, coordinated ac- regional blocs and hazard global peace. tect U.S. vital interests. tion in circumnavigating sanctions, To be accurate, not every country In this competition, the great threats leveraging , and taking involved in the competition is “great.” to regional peace and stability, from the joint action in international forums, China is still short of superpower sta- U.S. perspective, are Russia, China, Iran, such as the Security tus. Countries such as Iran, , Japan, and North Korea. This isn’t new. Despite Council. But there are limits to this and Russia are regional forces. Europe their many differences presidents Bush, collaboration in part because in some bobbles along. Nations like North Korea Obama, and Trump all had the same bad spheres the powers are competing with don’t have much more strength than the guy list. Granted each had different ways each other as well. In part, because they capacity to disrupt the peace of others. of addressing these competitors. Each lack capacity to do much to assist each Arguably, the United States is the only also had other enemies on their list. Still, other. And because they are averse to player with unquestioned persistent sus- the fact that they had a common core of taking on additional risk. tainable global reach. That said, “great concern is noteworthy. America, and in- Yet, each individually represents a real power competition” is the term of art for deed most of the free world, has not had a threat to American interests. Additionally, our times. So, rather than quibble, let’s consistent threat perception since the end in total they comprise a global rivalry that just go with it. of the Cold War. cannot be ignored or wished away. From the U.S. perspective, how we Further, the antagonisms that sepa- In terms of armed fighting, surrogate thrive amongst our rivals remains a chal- rate the U.S. and these other powers aren’t and indirect action remain the weapon lenge. America is a global power with likely to change in the foreseeable future. choice for undermining American pow- global interests and responsibilities. Ig- Our interests are antithetical. Even if in er. Thus, if the U.S. does get engaged in noring the competitive pressures from the future ways are found to ameliorate a conflict in the near term, it is less likely others is not an option. In particular, competition, such as with that it will be against other great powers.

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 3 Rather, America would find itself im- Robust American armed forces are an strategic partnerships to become more mersed in wars either instigated directly important element of conventional de- not less relevant to America. In addition or supported indirectly by an adversarial terrence. With the capacity to fight in to NATO, the United States will likely power. These wars could be intentionally two places at once, the U.S. could dis- develop security frameworks for both engineered to entrap the U.S. in armed courage adversarial powers from trying the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. No conflict or adversaries might seek to ex- to take advantage of an American en- doubt these frameworks will be anything ploit an on-going confrontation in which gagement in one theater to move against but carbon copies of the trans-Atlantic al- the U.S. has become embroiled. U.S. interests in another. liance. The theaters are very different, and In addition, these struggles would The U.S. military, however, is under- the U.S. will have to develop security ar- likely be conflicts of choice. They would sourced to simultaneously protect all of chitectures appropriate for each. Never- not be wars in which the U.S. felt com- America’s vital interests. Further, the theless, America’s strategic partnerships are likely to mature in the next decade. It is not just security needs that will American forward presence, however, is going to foster stronger alliances in the long term. require equitable burden-sharing making political- The dividing line between the free and the not-free world is going to become military affairs, diplomacy and coalition relations as starker. Nations that share a commit- critical as bases and operational exercises. ment to freely elected governments, free enterprise and human rights will have to bind themselves more closely together in their own self-interest. Countries that pelled to act to protect itself. Rather, these American military globally sources for don’t necessarily share all these values, would be conflicts in which America all major deployments. In other words, but seek the umbrella of security that the opted to intervene to further policy goals the Pentagon could well draw forces from free world can offer, will join their side that did not directly impact vital inter- any theater in time of conflict to support as well. The upshot is the U.S. could well ests. In other words, in any likely scenar- operations in another theater. As a result, have more security partners – not fewer. io, the U.S. would have the option of not the U.S. potentially faces creating new Nurturing alliances will actually re- intervening – or adopting means other risks when the Pentagon moves forces to quire the U.S. to deploy and sustain more than armed conflict to respond to the cri- address other dangers. military power abroad not less. Partners sis or threat. Even though military readiness and will seek physical guarantees including Further, since America is a global modernization have improved over the the forward basing of U.S. forces for con- power, the conflict could potentially be last four years, there is scant likelihood ventional deterrence and joint operations. anywhere in the world. Additionally, the character of the warfare could be any- thing from a confrontation at sea with In the end, military power will be an essential but maritime militias, to squaring off in the insufficient instrument for the U.S. to survive and Arctic, to battling insurgents, hunting terrorists, or fighting in jungles, moun- thrive in an era of great power competition. tains, cities, or deserts. Though these might be lesser wars, they might well not be easy ones. Ameri- that the American military will be able to American forward presence, how- ca’s competitors will work to make them establish a demonstrably stronger mili- ever, is going to require equitable burden- harder for us to prevail. In addition, the tary balance against its potential collect- sharing, making political-military affairs, U.S. might find itself fighting in places ed adversaries in the near term. diplomacy, and coalition relations as criti- where winning just isn’t easy. If the U.S. is going to maintain con- cal as bases and operational exercises. In any future major conflict, the U.S. ventional deterrence in this phase of the Strategic arms competition will also would likely have to worry about becom- great power competition, Washington is be an important part of this future. An un- ing overcommitted. Ideally, the Ameri- going have to demonstrate restraint and constrained arms race is less likely. More can military ought to have the capac- prudence in deciding where it accepts ac- likely is that the U.S., Russia and China ity and capability to sustain two major tive military engagements. will continue to view strategic arms as a armed conflicts, as well as to ensure con- In managing and globally shifting safety net to keep extreme competition tinued freedom of the global commons. U.S. military power, expect alliances and in check. Nuclear modernization, missile

4 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 JAMES JAY CARAFANO: The Military Risks in America’s Future

The aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan transits the Pacific Ocean with ships assigned to Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). (Photo: U.S. Navy) defense, and hypervelocity weapons will an essential but insufficient instrument all the potential domains of conflict – sea, certainly be seen by all sides as part of for the U.S. to survive and thrive in an undersea, space, cyberspace, on the land, maintaining a healthy, credible deterrent. era of great power competition. Recog- and in the air. Further, it is virtually certain that nizing that the competition is going to At the same time, the United States competition will spill into every domain be intense, long-term, and multifaceted must be able to grow and strengthen its of potential conflict. Armed conflict requires America to adopt strategies and economy, sustaining free and open mar- might not even be the most prominent. policies appropriate to the of the kets which promote prosperity and in- International organizations and agree- competition it faces. novation, while making the market more ments, for example, have emerged as Prevailing in long-term struggles de- resistant to malicious competition from means not for harmonizing internation- mands that the competitors spend equal adversarial powers. al norms, but as another battleground effort in protecting the sources of power Finally, the freedom and openness of great power competition. The con- that allow them to successfully compete, of American society is a relative strength frontations between powers seeking to as they do trying to diminish and defeat in global competition and must be pre- use global institutions and treaties as a their competitors. This will require the served. Strong, prosperous, free societies means to advance their interests will U.S. not only to refrain from taking of- are more resilient and more likely to per- certainly intensify in the years ahead. fensive measures that undermine Ameri- severe over the long term. The war over control of international can competitiveness, but also make de- Strategies and policies aimed to keep organizations may become more intense liberate efforts to nurture and advance its America free, safe, and prosperous will than actual wars. competitive advantages. provide the armed forces needed to meet Additionally, economic and techno- The U.S. will have to maintain ro- the demands of great power competition. logical competition have already emerged bust military capability, not only to de- In addition, they will ensure America’s as a significant factor that will affect the ter regional conflict and keep the global hard power is employed in an integrated future balance of power. This area, not commons open, but also to fight the wars and complementary manner to address physical wars, could well be the decisive of choice it may elect to undertake. This the long-term challenges the United States field of conflict in the near future. Without will require sufficient resources to pay for will confront in the trying times ahead. question, key areas of rivalry will include current operations, maintain trained and the race to develop and exploit 5G tele- ready forces, and continue to modernize JAMES JAY CARAFANO is vice presi- communications, quantum computing, for the future all at the same time. Addi- dent of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom bio-technology, and artificial intelligence. tionally, the U.S. will have to have suffi- Davis Institute for National Security and In the end, military power will be cient capacity and capability to operate in Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation.

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 5 Winning the New Cold War by JEREMIAH ROZMAN

hina’s rise is the greatest threat to like quantum computing, hypersonic match. Not so for China. U.S. security, interests, and values weapons, and artificial intelligence. Unlike currently with China, during since the Cold War. Its aggressions As China rises, the international pow- the Cold War there was minimal intercon- Cinclude breaching international er structure mirrors historical moments of nectivity between the U.S. and its rival. law to tighten control over Hong Kong, dis- violent transition. The belief that interna- The U.S. did not rely on the USSR for in- putes with Japan, , India, , tional institutions can forestall conflict puts critical to its defense and healthcare. the Philippines, and other coun- has dominated American foreign policy Allied communications were not con- tries, and terraforming and militarization discourse in recent decades. In reality, il- ducted over Soviet telecommunications in disputed waters in the South China Sea. liberal regimes have captured and used infrastructure. Hundreds of thousands of China’s leadership sees the U.S. as institutions to advance their own agendas Soviets were not studying physics, chem- an enemy to be overcome on the path to and accrue power, none more adeptly than istry, biology, and engineering in U.S. uni- global domination. Chinese military doc- China. The devastating impact of China’s versities. The USSR lacked the leverage to uments suggest a primary strategic goal to capture of the WHO in the wake of CO- coerce American businesses and news and capture Taiwan. A high-ranking Chinese VID-19, exposes the folly of outsized reli- entertainment media to self-censor. Mos- general warned that China will militarily ance on international bodies. cow did not hold vast quantities of U.S. conquer Taiwan if it cannot dominate it by As the U.S. deliberates a more con- sovereign debt. Finally, the “Iron Curtain” other means. frontational policy towards China, it that separated the U.S. from the Soviet China spends four times more than should answer three questions: Union is more like a one-way mirror for Russia on its military. U.S. allies in Asia • Is China poised to overtake the U.S. in China. China can access U.S. institutions, spend half of what its European allies spend economic and military power? while selectively closing its population to on their defense. The military threat from • Will China use its superiority to ex- American influence. China to its region is much greater than the pand at the expense of the U.S.? Post-Cold War triumphalism par- sizable threat that Russia poses in Europe, • Is PRC global leadership something tially explains the failure to compete. while China’s economic ability to carry out that the U.S. can abide, comparable to American political scientist Francis Fu- sustained action far outpaces Russia’s. Great Britain peacefully ceding global kayama referred to the U.S.-led post-Cold China is conducting the largest mili- preeminence to the U.S. during and after War order as “the end of history,” capped tary expansion and modernization in its World War II? by the global spread of capitalism and de- history. Its defense spending rose by 85 The answers to the first two ques- mocracy. But China, led by its Commu- percent from 2010-2019 while U.S. defense tions are clearly yes. China’s power is ris- nist Party, rose with astonishing speed. In spending fell by 15 percent in the same ing faster than American power, although 2000, its GDP was less than 12.5 percent of period. Adjusting for labor costs, China’s the rate depends on complex factors, in- America’s. By 2014, China had overtaken defense budget in 2017 was $467.4 billion. cluding how the U.S. chooses to compete. the U.S. as the world’s largest economy on Considering its less logistically demanding China intends to abrogate long-standing a Purchasing Power Parity basis. mission and lower personnel costs, China’s treaties, by force if need be. Regarding the The U.S. recognized the USSR as a defense spending closely rivals the U.S. third question, U.S. security and the global strategic rival early on, even as it allied order that undergirds the American way with it against Nazi . In 1946, ❚ Why Compete? of life depend upon U.S. power. Because U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated China is the only country with the China is rising, intends to overturn the this in his “long telegram” from Moscow economic and technological base to build world order, and this threatens vital U.S. to the State Department. Kennan’s views, a military capable of competing with the interests, the U.S. faces a Cold War with summarized as “containment” of the So- U.S. globally. Its leader wants a military China and it must compete to win. viet Union, became the cornerstone of capable of defeating the U.S. by 2050. It is U.S. foreign policy for the next five de- already stronger than Russia in virtually ❚ America is Unprepared cades. It dominated diplomacy, defense, every respect other than its nuclear arse- The Cold War was ultimately de- economic competition, and even popular nal. Through espionage, it has achieved cided by greatly superior U.S. economic culture. There is no parallel for China. parity and beyond on critical capabilities strength which the USSR. could not There is no anti-PRC equivalent to the

6 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 JEREMIAH ROZMAN: anti-Soviet series U.S. television cartoon U.S. personnel were to be wounded in an Kingdom banned Huawei from its 5G comedy “Rocky and Bullwinkle,” for ex- altercation with China, their treatment networks following U.S. pressure. ample. Indeed, many Hollywood produc- might depend upon ingredients made in The European Commission voiced ers, corporations and even sports leagues, China. This mirrors the absurdity that U.S. concerns but estimated that a ban would bow to Chinese censorship demands. military hardware requires materials from add $62 billion to the cost of 5G in Europe The U.S. leads the world in innovation China. U.S. policymakers also fear that and delay it by 18 months. Poland is con-

and growth. Yet, it faces difficulty trans- China could curb exports in the midst of sidering excluding Huawei. The Czech Winning the New Cold War forming economic might into military a pandemic. The U.S. should increase im- Republic is considering bans or cuts. power because budgetary stability, needed ports from friendly nations as it rebuilds its France and Italy took steps to exclude for long-term modernization and readi- domestic industry. Huawei. Germany is leaning toward al- ness, is subject to constant internal political President Trump signed an executive lowing Huawei to build part of its 5G competition. China pushes sustained mili- order in 2020 to boost domestic medical network, despite U.S. warnings that this tary aggrandizement and investment in production. Congress should pass tax and could harm intelligence sharing. China’s critical emerging technologies by executive regulatory laws to make U.S. manufacturing ambassador threatened retaliation if Ger- fiat. It relies on espionage to offset its inno- more competitive. Restoring tax exemptions many excludes Huawei, noting the mil- vation disadvantages. for Puerto Rico, with its relatively low labor lions of vehicles German automakers sell Chinese espionage, rampant for de- costs and existing medical industry infra- in China. cades, has greatly increased in the cyber era. In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the China Initiative to protect ...illiberal regimes have captured and used against espionage and warned of China’s institutions to advance their own agendas and accrue political influence campaign. The Defense power, none more adeptly than China. Department’s Protecting Critical Technol- ogy Task Force has uncovered thousands of cases of data theft since its establishment structure, could increase domestic sourcing Japan banned Huawei from govern- in 2018. Its director stated that the U.S. has and rebuild its once flourishing medical sup- ment contracts in 2018. India’s reluctance unwittingly become China’s research and plies industry. Continuous manufacturing to block Huawei is a major setback, but development base. and 3D printing could also help U.S. phar- the U.S. might be able to leverage India’s Earlier this year, the U.S. shuttered the maceutical manufacturing competitiveness. rising tensions with China following re- Chinese consulate in Houston, accusing it Some drug makers are already moving in cent border skirmishes. of espionage, and cut the number of Chi- this direction with FDA support. In the Middle East, the United Arab nese diplomats to reduce the counterintel- Emirates announced that it would deploy ligence burden. The FBI opens a new Chi- ❚ Chinese 5G Proliferation a 5G network built by Huawei. Another nese-related case on average every 10 hours. Many U.S. allies and partners have 5G U.S. partner, Israel, has never had China in China also exploits the openness of U.S. telecommunications networks being built its high-speed communications network. universities. Harvard University’s chemis- at least partially by the Chinese communi- Since 2018, the U.S. government has try chair was arrested for failing to disclose cations giant Huawei. Security risks include introduced export controls, bills restrict- Chinese funding, a UCLA professor was vulnerability to hacking and a backdoor ing federal government contracts, and convicted over a plot to illegally obtain dual for data-gathering on behalf of the Chinese warned allies and partners over reduced use microchips. The Trump administration government. The U.S. has warned allies that defense interoperability. These warnings cancelled the visas of approximately 3,000 it would be more difficult to partner with carry weight since the U.S. is the mili- Chinese graduate students tied to universi- countries that use Huawei. tary backbone of European, Asian, and ties affiliated with China’s army. The “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing Middle Eastern collective defense. allies – the , , Pressure and restriction are not ❚ Made in China Health Care Australia, and New Zealand, with the enough, however. Huawei is currently the Several decades ago, most U.S. United States – generally appreciate the best provider of 5G capability per cost. medical products were manufactured risks that Huawei poses for allied interop- The Swedish company Ericsson is a dis- domestically. China now produces about erability. Australia shut out Huawei. New tant second, and Nokia is third. The U.S. 90 percent of the chemicals used in ge- Zealand originally rejected a request from should work with partners to develop a neric American drugs, and dominates its largest telecom carrier to use Huawei viable alternative to Huawei. To this end, protective personal equipment export. equipment, but has since reversed course. the Trump administration established a Reliance on an adversary is risky. If Canada’s stance is uncertain. The United 5G strategy in March 2020.

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 7 ❚ Cutting Reliance on China The oil shocks of 1973 exposed U.S. vulnerability to international economic threats and diplomatic blackmail. Their silver lining was that they forced Western companies to diversify petroleum sources. China’s actions during the COVID-19 pan- demic might have a similar effect. Democratic governments can cre- ate incentives for companies to withdraw from China. Japan’s COVID-19 recovery package requires companies receiving aid to withdraw manufacturing from China. The U.S. could enact similar policies. President Trump’s second term agen- da, should he be reelected, has among its goals; tax credits for companies that Chinese soldiers marching in front of Tiananmen, Beijing, China. (Photo: Songquan Deng) bring back jobs from China, expensing mishandling of COVID-19. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command submitted a deductions for essential industries such Compounded with China’s increas- $20 billion request to deter, and if needed, as pharmaceuticals that return manufac- ing aggression and human rights abuse, repel any preemptive actions. In a show of turing to the U.S. and banning compa- the COVID-19 pandemic could foster a bipartisan concern, Democrat and Repub- nies that outsource to China from federal global consensus on the need to compete lican representatives proposed the Indo- contracts. The U.S. should also increase with China. This requires the U.S. to coun- Pacific Deterrence Initiative bill. The Sen- bilateral trade worldwide and promote a ter , condemn abuses (includ- ate Armed Services Committee approved multilateral trade structure that replaces ing the forced sterilization of members of it in June 2020, bringing it closer to frui- the scrapped Trans Pacific Partnership. the Turkic Muslim Uyghur minority), and tion. The U.S. should also lift restrictions A new version should adequately protect unwaveringly support liberty and partners on cooperating with Taiwan and integrate U.S. manufacturing. under threat. Senator Ted Cruz’s (R-TX) it into its regional defense network. bill to bar companies benefiting from slave ❚ Competing for the Narrative labor is a good start, as is the State Depart- ❚ Leading and Deterring The U.S. government unhesitatingly ment’s groundbreaking articulation of the The U.S. is slowly awakening to the blamed Soviet incompetence and perfidy illegality of China’s claims in the South need to compete with China as it did with for the Chernobyl disaster. This shook faith China Seas. Australia has since followed the USSR. Yet, even now, powerful voices in the USSR. and hastened its collapse. CO- suit in rejecting China’s territorial claims. dismiss warnings of China as a threat. VID-19 could be the PRC’s “Chernobyl,” Finally, for the U.S. to lead the free Nonetheless, CCP malfeasance with CO- but domestic politics have kept America world as it did during the Cold War, VID-19 has cost the world dearly. China’s from publicly placing comparable blame thought leaders must rekindle dwindling bellicose statements, military aggran- on China. Meanwhile, the European patriotism. This requires reckoning with dizement, economic warfare, aggressive Union remains reluctant to confront it. America’s past and present failings while actions against neighbors, human rights PRC leadership understands the im- reaffirming its triumphs and virtues. abuses, and promotion of conspiracy theo- portance of the information sphere. An ries reveal it to be an adversary. The U.S. internal Chinese report warned that in ❚ Military Competition must cut reliance on China and lead inter- the pandemic’s wake, Beijing faces hos- U.S. security depends upon its pros- national competition through all elements tility comparable to the aftermath of the perity, and its prosperity depends upon of national power. Failure to compete will Tiananmen Square massacre. Global the global order that the United States accelerate the global decline of liberal de- backlash includes calls for inquiries and undergirds through strength. China seeks mocracy. In 1989, Francis Fukayama may reparations and growing mistrust of Chi- to upend this order through regional mili- have declared victory too early, and for the na in Europe and Africa. British ministers tary preponderance that would allow it to wrong side. publicly blamed China for its cover up. attack its neighbors while denying access Germany’s largest newspaper sent Beijing to a responding U.S-backed coalition. To JEREMIAH ROZMAN, Ph.D., is a an itemized bill for damages, and Aus- prevent this, America must boost its mili- National Security Analyst at the As- tralia called for an inquiry into China’s tary power in the Indo-Pacific. In 2020, sociation of the United States Army.

8 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Defense Budgeting: Readiness and Research by FREDERICO BARTELS, PATTY-JANE GELLER, THOMAS SPOEHR, JOHN VENABLE, and DAKOTA WOOD

resident Donald Trump’s Budget Each of the services’ budget re- adjusted for inflation, from FY 2016 to Request for defense was released quests and the defense-wide budget re- FY 2020, there was a substantial increase on Feb. 10, 2020, under the tag- quest raise issues that should be consid- of more than 20 percent in the defense Pline of seeking to achieve “irre- ered. This article will hit only a very few. budget, from $624 billion to $757 billion. versible implementation of the National Ultimately, the only way the country can However, that growth is set to slow Defense Strategy.” This is a great senti- reach an irreversible implementation of in FY 2021. The defense budget is ex- ment that reflects the Department of a policy is if there is broad bipartisan pected to increase by only 0.3 percent Defense’s (DOD) commitment to move consensus for that policy in Congress. from FY 2020 to FY 2021. The increase toward the great power competition out- Absent that consensus, the policy will is determined by the Bipartisan Budget lined in the National Defense Strategy be washed away in the natural political Act of 2019, which set the defense caps (NDS) and de-emphasize counterterror- waves in Washington. at $740.5 billion; of that, $69 billion was ism missions. under the Overseas Contingency Opera- There has been substantive support ❚ Defense-Wide Issues tions (OCO) account. in Washington, D.C. for the shift to great The fiscal year (FY) 2021 budget The cap for FY 2020 was $738 bil- power competition, with its particular request is marked by trade-offs of con- lion; of that $71.5 billion was under emphasis on long-term rivalry with the temporary capabilities for research OCO. The current projections of the Of- People’s Republic of China (PRC). programs and increased investments fice of Management and Budget show In its budget request, DOD largely in readiness. It is a theme that echoes that the White House intends to raise emphasized readiness in the present and through all the services budget requests. the defense budget by an average of 2.2 research for future capabilities, in lieu DOD is also trying to do more with re- percent until 2025, and then freeze it from 2025 to 2030. Those budget limits fall short of the 3 percent to 5 percent real growth DOD largely emphasized readiness in the present and recommended by then-Secretary of De- fense James Mattis, and current Secre- research for future capabilities, in lieu of increasing tary Mark Esper, and reinforced by the contemporary capabilities. National Defense Strategy Commission as necessary to implement the strategy. Each has assessed that DOD will need more resources. It is critical for lawmakers to ac- of increasing contemporary capabili- sources by generating savings within the knowledge the real budgetary trade-offs ties. DOD leadership will have to make a defense-wide accounts; however, base required to implement the defense strat- case in Congress why that is the correct realignment and closures (BRACs) – a egy. The “parity” strategy, which marked path. However, it will be up to Congress major savings generator – are nowhere the decade of the Budget Control Act, of to examine whether the choices made to be found. raising defense and non-defense funds by the department are best suited for Since the Trump administration is both poor budgeting and dangerous, the United States in the current world of took office, there has been a concerted and it jeopardizes the levels of defense great power competition and sustained effort to prioritize resources for defense spending that are required over the next counterterrorism operations. within the discretionary budget. Not several years.

inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 9 Furthermore, Congress must ad- is largely being dedicated to classified current force structure and investing in dress non-defense mandatory programs programs, accounting for $1.615 billion future technologies at the expense of ex- that contribute to the budget’s long-run of new resources. panding contemporary capabilities. unsustainability. Every service’s RDTE account is set If ignored, overspending on domes- to grow at some level; the Army, at 1.8 ❚ Small Strength Increases tic programs will cause significant chal- percent, is slated to expand the least; the The president’s budget request calls lenges for national security in the future. Navy is receiving a 6.3 percent increase. for modest end-strength changes across all The increased level of funding is Military personnel accounts are slated to the services (with the Navy receiving the necessary for the military services to experience the largest increase, growing largest) and the Space Force, which is ask- better balance their competing priorities by 5.7 percent across DOD. ing for its first substantive end strength. – current levels of readiness and mod- The Army’s military personnel ac- The Space Force is asking to in- ernizing and preparing for deterrence count is the one set to grow the least, by crease from 38 personnel to 6,400 in its – in the context of great power competi- 4.6 percent, while the Navy and the Air active-duty component, accompanied tion. Every service is going through that challenge, and the increased funding will provide a better margin and context in which to make those decisions. ...there will always be a balance in how to prioritize ❚ R&D Versus Personnel In broad terms, there will always be defense readiness (today), procurement (tomorrow), a balance in how to prioritize defense and research and development (the future). readiness (today), procurement (tomor- row), and research and development (the future). The FY 2021 defense bud- get request generally favors improving current readiness levels, supporting the current force structure, and investing in Force would be increasing by 6.4 percent by a corresponding decline in the Air research and development over increas- and 6.3 percent, respectively. Force active component, which is de- ing the current numbers of equipment The accounts that are slated to de- creasing by 6,600. The Marine Corps’ and personnel. By and large, the services crease (in order to pay for the above in- active component is also slated to de- outlined a reduction in their procure- creases) are the procurement accounts. crease by 600. Meanwhile, the Army is ment of contemporary military assets, In the whole department, procurement asking to increase by 900 and the Navy such as the F-35, or the anti-submarine is set to decrease by 4.8 percent. by 5,300. The focus of the Navy is on in- creasing the manning levels to augment its capacity to staff the current ships in the fleet. In the aggregate, DOD wants its active component to increase by If ignored, overspending on domestic programs will 5,500 personnel. cause significant challenges for national security in It is modest growth that does not meet the needs that multiple service the future. chiefs have testified as necessary over the years, nor the force construct that would be necessary for two simultane- ous major regional contingencies. Congress ought to investigate and aircraft P-8, to fund research and devel- The Navy will experience the largest assess the implications of DOD’s modest opment projects. decline, having its procurement budget planned growth. In the department as a whole, the reduced by 7.1 percent, while the Army Research and Development, Testing, and will reduce its procurement by 1.8 per- ❚ Defense-wide Review Results Evaluation (RDTE) account is slated to cent and the Air Force by two percent. The Department of Defense was able grow by two percent, from $104.4 billion These choices reflect the bias that this to alleviate some of the budgetary pressure to $106.5 billion in FY 2021. The increase budget request has toward supporting the through its defense-wide budget review.

10 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 FREDERICO BARTELS, PATTY-JANE JOHN VENABLE THOMAS SPOEHR, GELLER, and

The Pentagon, headquarters of the U.S. military. DAKOTA WOOD:

In the review, based on Secretary 19 percent excess capacity in DOD. and decreased projected growth in the Esper’s similar efforts in the Army, the The newer report was supposed to size of the Army. [Ed. Note: For a deeper Department was able to save more than re-assess excess capacity and start the look at Army issues, see Steven Metz in $5 billion and reinvest those resources process of identifying the locations that this issue.] in higher priority areas. The process is have surplus or deficits. • The Navy’s budget request reflects a Defense Budgeting: Readiness and Research planned to continue in all areas of the Additionally, the evaluation could service in transition. Its force structure department, from the military services serve DOD by helping make its case assessment that will determine require- to the combatant commands and other for new base closures and realignments ments for the future has been delayed, organizations under the control of the (BRAC). A new round of BRAC is need- and the budget request reflects the un- secretary. ed both to generate savings, estimated certainty of this transitional period. A review of this type is laudable, at $2 billion annually, and to advance In 2019, the Navy began a new as- and it should indeed continue. However, the implementation of the National De- sessment of its fleet and the various de- the effort is bound to hit a point of di- fense Strategy. mands placed upon it to either validate minishing returns, a point the Army has It is a missed opportunity by the its 2016 force structure assessment (FSA) likely already reached. administration that Congress can and or to modify it as necessary to account should revisit. for changes in technology, U.S. national ❚ BRAC: Lost in the Shuffle security interests, and advances made The Department of Defense was ❚ The Services by likely competitors during the past supposed to deliver a report assessing • The Army is focusing on maintain- four years. As with the other services, the force structure and infrastructure ing its current readiness gains and pre- the Navy is mindful of the National De- capabilities, outlining the current excess paring to invest in future capabilities. fense Strategy and its emphasis on major capacity in the department. The most re- However, doing so means reducing pro- power competition between the United cent study, from October 2017, outlined curement of contemporary capability States, China, and Russia.

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 11 The FSA was to have been released This boost is critical for nuclear mod- preferences and give way to priorities in January 2020, but had been delayed ernization because it comes in time for the that focus on the threats posed by Russia “until Spring” due to the Marine Corps’ NNSA to move forward with a number of and the People’s Republic of China. parallel effort to redesign its forces based programs that would revamp the nuclear • Appropriate and authorize the de- on new operational concepts for distrib- security enterprise. In particular, the fense budget on time. Continuing reso- uted naval power and the Corps’ con- NNSA is planning to resume its ability to lutions, unfortunately, have been the tributions to projecting naval power in produce plutonium pits at both the Los Al- hallmark of recent budgetary history. highly contested environments. amos National Laboratory and the repur- This year, there are already top lim- • The Marine Corps, like the Navy, posed Savannah River Site, continue the its defined for defense that are unlikely has been deeply engaged in a compre- B61-12 life-extension program, develop to be renegotiated in the current politi- hensive review of its forces, capabilities, the W87-1 warhead, and refurbish decay- cal environment. Congress should use and geographic posture to ensure it can ing Cold War–era infrastructure that has this certainty to accelerate the process do its part in meeting the demands of been neglected for the past two decades. and have both authorizations and ap- great power competition, as directed in propriations acts signed before the start the National Defense Strategy. ❚ Recommendations of the new fiscal year. The Commandant of the Marine Congress must play its role in better Corps, General David Berger, has point- aligning the budget with the National ❚ Conclusion ed the service toward the Indo–Pacific Defense Strategy. In order to achieve The fiscal year 2021 defense budget region – with China as the pacing chal- this, Congress should: requires decisions and priorities that will lenge – and made force design his top • Assess the trade-offs that the DOD determine how the country will imple- priority. [Ed Note: For another look at has carried in the budget request. The ment the National Defense Strategy and Marine Corps issues, see Maj. Gen. Jarvis budget request emphasizes the present adapt to the challenges of great power Lynch, USMC (Ret.) and Maj. Gen. Mi- and the long-term in lieu of developing competition. The president’s budget re- chael Sullivan, USMC (Ret.) in this issue.] contemporary capabilities. Congress quest outlined the department’s trade- • The Air Force has described a force that needs to increase by more than 20 per- cent to meet the challenges of great power competition. However, the budget request National Defense Strategy ... will require Congress to retires aircraft and reduces the level of pro- move away from some of its parochial preferences curement of new aircraft. This misalign- ment must be addressed by Congress. and give way to priorities that focus on the threats The Air Force procurement budget, posed by Russia and the People’s Republic of China. which the Air Force has stated is too small for the missions the nation expects of it fell by $1.4 billion. In order to sustain current capac- ity and stop the aging of its fighter force, needs to understand why the services offs for the coming fiscal year. However, the service needs to buy 72 fighters per made those choices as well as the risks it will be up to Congress to decide on year. In 2018, the Secretary of the Air that these choices bring. The department these trade-offs and determine if the Force backed up that statement with a has not done a good job defining risk – proposed investment and divestments study called “The Air Force We Need,” and Congress needs to continue pressing are the adequate path forward. which found the service needs to grow on that question. After all, if there is no by 25 percent in order to meet the 2018 precise definition of the downsides of FREDERICO BARTELS is Senior Policy National Defense Strategy. each choice, it is not possible to make an Analyst, Defense Budgeting; PATTY- And yet, the service has reduced its informed decision. JANE GELLER is Policy Analyst, Nu- procurement budget in each of the two • Evaluate how great power competi- clear Deterrence and Missile Defense; years since that study was released. tion is reflected in the defense budget. THOMAS SPOEHR is Director, Cen- • National Nuclear Security Adminis- The changes required by the National ter for National Defense; JOHN VEN- tration’s budget includes $19.8 billion for Defense Strategy are not trivial and ABLE is Senior Research Fellow for the National Nuclear Security Adminis- should have lasting impact on the shape Defense Policy; and DAKOTA WOOD tration (NNSA), which is an 18.3 percent of our forces. It will require Congress to is Senior Research Fellow, Defense Pro- increase from last year’s enacted level. move away from some of its parochial grams at the Heritage Foundation.

12 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Lessons from the Collapse of U.S. Rare Earths Production by JEFFREY A. GREEN

[Ed. Note – an update: The Pentagon has environmental damage was safely out earth exports to Japan over a diplomatic proposed legislation that aims to end re- of sight. China happily obliged, allow- dispute in 2010, leading prices to spike. liance on China for rare earth minerals ing environmental harm to proliferate Molycorp’s stock would later soar. The by enabling the government to spend up so long as the costs of rare earth mining cash-rich company announced several to $1.75 billion on rare earth elements in were kept down. acquisitions – processing plants in Ari- munitions and missiles and $350 million In 2008, a group of investors formed zona and Estonia as well as a Canadian for microelectronics; it would eliminate Molycorp and convinced Wall Street to rare earth technology group named Neo caps in relation to hypersonic weapons. resurrect Mountain Pass under an au- Materials that had extensive operations Author Jeffrey Green said, “To me, this dacious plan dubbed “Project Phoenix.” in China. is the biggest thing that has happened With the promise of wealth to be gener- But in actuality, Molycorp was to rare earths in a decade. These pro- ated from new (but untested) technolo- struggling to stay solvent. Those new in- cesses can be expensive, and the process for separating rare earth oxides can cost hundreds of millions of dollars, but the policy shift is the government realizing they have to put serious bucks into this.”] ...the hard business of extracting useful minerals was exported to other countries, where ut in the Mojave Desert in Cali- fornia lies the Mountain Pass environmental damage was safely out of sight. mine, once the world’s foremost China happily obliged... Osupplier of valuable rare earth minerals – 17 elements deemed criti- cal to modern society. In an age when China controls 80 percent of the global output of these minerals, it is strange to gies, Molycorp bullishly claimed that it novative technologies? They didn’t gen- believe that a once-dominant source sits could compete with (or even underprice) erate significant revenue or work as de- within the United States. Stranger still is China’s near-monopoly. Molycorp’s crit- signed. By 2013, the company’s revenues the tale of how this mine came to supply ics weren’t convinced, pointing to the were in free fall. The president and CEO the Chinese rare earths industry. immaturity of the company’s mineral stepped down amid an investigation by Mountain Pass opened in 1952. First separation technology, the high barriers the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com- explored as a uranium deposit, it soon to entry and the lingering threat of the mission into the accuracy of the com- supplied rare earths for the electronic Chinese monopoly to manipulate prices pany’s public disclosures (though he was needs of the Cold War economy. Until at will. never charged with any wrongdoing). the 1990s, it stood alone as the only ma- Despite these reservations, Wall As the company’s fortunes dwin- jor source of rare earths worldwide. Street and the Pentagon supported the dled, its new CEO oversaw the transfer By 2002, however, the mine was de- project. For the Pentagon, and for an of many of Molycorp’s most profitable funct. In the eyes of the U.S. government administration often indifferent to min- assets to Chinese-linked Neo Materials, and major manufacturers, it no longer ing interests, it was a dream come true: where he formerly served as CEO. Mo- made sense to acquire rare earths from Private investors would deliver a secure lycorp’s final remaining husk declared a U.S. source subject to stringent envi- supply chain without the U.S. govern- bankruptcy in 2014. Unsurprisingly, ronmental regulations. Instead, the hard ment’s help. the majority of Neo Materials’ revenue- business of extracting useful minerals At first the situation looked promis- producing operations are now in China. was exported to other countries, where ing. Chinese companies restricted rare To make matters worse, the Mountain

inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 13 A truck transports rare earth elements for export in Lianyungang, China.

Pass mine was purchased out of bank- belligerent Chinese threats to cut rare military systems. Instead of funding ruptcy by a consortium that included a earth exports. American companies, substitution technologies to reduce de- Chinese-owned firm. too, are realizing how dependent they are mand for rare earths, the U.S. should By 2017, it was obvious that in the on this single supplier, a country that is invest in production technologies to in- showdown between Molycorp and Chi- becoming more expensive to work with crease their supply. na, the Chinese had won. Mountain Pass as trade tensions rise. However, those in The Department of Defense has was now sending U.S.-mined rare earth the private sector know all too well how taken note, having recently solicited concentrate to China for processing. difficult it is for companies to initiate industry for options on rare earth sepa- The dream of a one-stop American rare supply chain improvement. Therefore, it ration capability, which could result in earths solution was over, and the private is the government’s responsibility to set direct investment. These fixes, properly sector had little appetite for reviving it. the stage for increased American rare executed, represent the best chance the The history of Molycorp is littered earth production. U.S. has at revitalizing a crippled indus- with “what ifs.” What if the Pentagon’s There are a number of steps the try essential to our national security. mid-2010s industrial policy determined U.S. government can take to establish Now, political leaders must act so that rare earths were critical to national a more certain future for domestic rare that industry can follow. If the story of security, as it does now? And, most im- earth production. Reducing red tape our nation is of any indication, Ameri- portantly, what if American customers, and bureaucratic inertia will lower can innovation will rise to the occasion including those in the U.S. government, costs and reduce risk – there is no rea- and deliver us solutions for our rare had decided that diversifying their rare son that permitting a mine in the Unit- earth needs. earth supplies with an American source ed States should take five times longer had been worthwhile? than it does in Canada or Australia. JEFFREY GREEN is president of J.A. Recently there have been stirrings The government can also protect Green & Company. He founded and cur- of interest in repatriating rare earth pro- the market, at little cost, from Chinese rently serves on the Strategic Materials duction to the United States. The U.S. manipulation by agreeing to purchase Advisory Council, and previously served military has become acutely aware of rare earths from American producers as staff director to the House Armed its dependence on China, due in part to when such materials are intended for Services Subcommittee on Readiness.

14 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 COVID-19: China’s Lies and Lessons for the Pentagon by STEPHEN BRYEN and SHOSHANA BRYEN

he idea of has “of types and in quantities that have no engaged in bio-defense research, all of the been with us over the centu- justification for prophylactic, protective, facilities can be used in bio-warfare. ries. You can start with bits of or other peaceful purposes,” as well as Iraq under Saddam created both TThucydides’ vividly ugly descrip- weapons, equipment, and delivery vehi- anthrax and smallpox among other bio- tion of the Plague of Athens in 430 BCE: cles “designed to use such agents or toxins agents. U.N. inspection reports produced for hostile purposes or in armed conflict,” between October 1995 and October 1997 Strong fevers in the head and a burn- and “the transfer of or assistance with noted that Iraq started researching an- ing redness in the eyes of those who acquiring the agents, toxins, weapons, thrax warfare in 1985, at its Muthana had previously been healthy, and for equipment, and delivery vehicles.” chemical weapons center, and large-scale no apparent reason… breathing took Unfortunately, the convention has fermenters were used to produce anthrax on a foul and unpleasant smell… no inspection or enforcement mecha- spores in bulk at a pilot plant, Al Salman, pain descended to the chest…settled nisms, according to the Nuclear Threat after field trials on monkeys and sheep. into stomach and caused it to release Initiative that tracks weapons of mass de- In its 1999 final report to the U.N. secretions of bile…tiny blisters and struction. It is widely believed that many Security Council, United Nations Special ulcers…unquenchable thirst…pro- states are conducting bio-weapons re- Commission for Iraqi compliance (UN- gressed to the intestines…attacked search and development in secret, includ- SCOM) called Iraq’s biological warfare the genitals… ing Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. program “among the most secretive of Russia is a treaty signatory but even after its programs of weapons of mass destruc- Mycotoxins, biological agents that Moscow ratified the treaty the Federation tion.” It said that Iraq “took active steps” can occur in nature from rotting or of American Scientists reported that Rus- to conceal the program, including “in- spoiled food or grain, would produce that sia supported through an organization adequate disclosures, unilateral destruc- sort of horrible death. Thucydides briefly called Biopreparat 18 research centers tion, and concealment activities.” considered the possibility that the en- working on pathogenic bio-weapons. According to Paul Rogers, professor emies of Athens mixed toxin-laden grain On Sept. 16, 2019 in Novosibirsk, of peace studies at Bradford University in shipments to the city. Over centuries, armies have thrown dead infected animals over castle walls. Neither the U.S. Navy nor the Pentagon were Japan dropped bio-bombs in World War prepared for a pandemic and their decisions resulted II, and Saddam planned to do it to Israel. “Yellow Rain” was spread in , in the withdrawal of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore and Afghanistan by plane, artillery Roosevelt from the region. shell, booby-traps, and handheld weap- ons. Anthrax was sent through the mail.

❚ The Bad Guys Russia, a gas canister exploded at a re- in the United Kingdom, drawing on UN- The U.N.-backed Biological Weap- inforced concrete laboratory called the SCOM’s reports, Iraq possessed an esti- ons Convention, entered into force in State Research Center of Virology and mated 50 anthrax-filled bombs ready for 1975, currently has 109 signatories. This Biotechnology. The lab, formerly the Vec- use at the time of the First Gulf War. Sad- convention, as cited by the Arms Con- tor Facility, is an old Soviet bio-weapons dam also had prepared 10 missiles dis- trol Association, bans the development, lab that now allegedly researches (and persed to separate locations, loaded with stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and houses) Ebola, smallpox, and anthrax. anthrax warheads. “The assessment was production of biological agents and toxins Although Russia claims this facility is that the Iraqis were likely to use weapons inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 15 of mass destruction if the survival of the China probably has the most ad- China is collaborating with many of the regime was threatened.” Aircraft were vanced bio-warfare program in the world. world’s leading virologists and geneticists readied with special tanks that could As noted by the US-China Economic and under the cover of peaceful research on be filled with liquid anthrax and other Security Commission in its 2006 Report viruses and vaccines, no doubt feeding its biological agents during the Second Gulf to Congress, two facilities in China have bio war program. War. The United States destroyed these links to China’s offensive biological weap- There is no consensus on the origins aircraft in bombing raids. ons program: the Chinese Ministry of of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Chinese Iran got significant help from both Defense’s Academy of Military Medical government insists the virus originated China and Russia for its chemical and Sciences (AMMS) Institute of Microbiol- in part from horseshoe bats and became biological weapons programs, although ogy and Epidemiology (IME) in Beijing, zoonotic, that is, it jumped from bats to Iran also is a signatory to the Biological and the Lanzhou Institute of Biological humans with some intermediate stop. Warfare Convention. As reported by Alan Products (LIBP). There is also suspicion that laboratories Goldsmith, a former congressional staff In addition to these two central labo- in Wuhan, and perhaps elsewhere, that expert, “Iranian military controlled facili- ratories, it is estimated that there are at were engaged in advanced coronavirus ties, Imam Hossein University (IHU) and least 50 other laboratories and hospitals research, were the source. And there ex- Malek Ashtar University (MAU), have re- being used as biological weapons re- ists the possibility of actual biological searched incapacitating chemical agents.” search facilities. The head of the AMMS weapons research. Published Iranian articles (for example has now been put in charge of the Wuhan by Peter Books at the Heritage Founda- Virology Laboratory. Chen Wei, a major ❚ What We Know tion) have cited weaponizing applications general of the People’s Liberation Army, Some things are clear about the coro- of pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs), was flown into Wuhan by the central gov- navirus pandemic. including the powerful opioid fentanyl. ernment before officially taking the helm The outbreak was hidden by the The report added that “IHU’s chemistry of Wuhan Institute of Virology. She was Chinese government for months and department had sought kilograms of me- given responsibility to clean up the mess information from doctors and nurses detomidine – an incapacitating sedative it in Wuhan during the COVID-19 pan- was suppressed. In some cases, experts has researched – from Chinese sellers.” demic and specifically at the laboratory. simply disappeared. In one of the most important early cases, Li Wenliang, a doctor who was severely reprimanded for criticizing the government, was pro- COVID-19 has been a bonanza for states and terrorists nounced dead from coronavirus even before he actually died. In other cases, who now know a lot more about critical vulnerabilities false or misleading information was of big powers including the United States... aired, including by the World Health Organization (WHO) at the behest of the Chinese government. To complicate matters further, in November 2018, a scientist from Wuhan North Korea has an aggressive bio- China is also advanced in what is was detained in Detroit with what the logical and program, called CRISPR-Cas9 technology which Weapons of Mass Destruction Director- according to the Middlebury Institute of the Index Project says is “a unique tech- ate of the FBI later reported “may be vi- International Studies at Monterey, and nology that enables geneticist and medi- able Middle East Respiratory Syndrome is reported to have worked on plague, cal researchers to edit parts of the ge- (MERS) and Severe Acute Respiratory anthrax, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and nome by removing, adding, or altering Syndrome (SARS) materials.” A related smallpox among other bio-war agents, sections of DNA sequence.” American of- investigation was carried out late last and has recruited foreign technicians to ficials now see CRISPR gene editing as a year in Canada involving a Winnipeg help it advance its program. Andrew C. serious threat to national security. As Na- Bio-Level 4 lab, does research with the Weber, a Pentagon official in charge of -nu tional Defense Magazine reports, it can deadliest pathogens, and a researcher clear proliferation, said that North Korea lead to precisely targeted bio-weapons who made multiple visits to Wuhan do- is far more likely to use biological weap- that might attack a single racial or ethnic ing “third party funded” work in Chinese ons than nuclear weapons. “The program group or could be used in combination labs. Canadian authorities deny any link is advanced, underestimated and highly with vaccines to carry out a bio-warfare to COVID-19. lethal,” he told The Times. operation while protecting its own forces. But while there is no consensus

16 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 STEPHEN BRYEN on the origins of COVID-19, there is • Hostile states can use to China took advantage of the absence no doubt that it has been a bonanza for hide responsibility while at the same of the Roosevelt by stepping up operations states and terrorists who now know a time seeking significant political, eco- in the South China Sea and there is a risk lot more about critical vulnerabilities of nomic and military advantages in the that Chinese military leaders may push big powers including the United States midst of a crisis. for action against more significant tar-

and NATO, as well as Russia and China. gets, including Taiwan. and These vulnerabilities include: ❚ Strategies for the Future The Pentagon and military services SHOSHANA BRYEN: • The spread of biological toxins, in- While many experts focused on the must find a better way to secure effective cluding viruses, can be extremely broad, coronavirus lockdowns and their liftings, fighting forces under pandemic condi- even global. less attention has been given to the deg- tions. Part of the answer would seem to be • Manufacturing and distribution sys- radation of the U.S. military and weak- in prepositioning testing kits, protective tems can be significantly harmed. ening of America’s strategic deterrence, masks, and decontamination equipment • First responder and hospital systems especially in East Asia. Moreover, con- in safe zones located on or near important

lack surge capacity and can be over- comitant with a loss of deterrence is a rise U.S. military bases. Clearly the Pentagon COVID-19: China’s Lies and Lessons for the Pentagon whelmed by a sudden pandemic. in the risk of general war. There are two has been scrambling for answers, includ- • There can be shortages or lack of surge keys to preparing for a future biological ing having many of its personnel telework capacity of medical supplies during pan- disaster: a strategy that keeps the military (although DOD has come nowhere near demics, including simple facial masks and critical industries operating, and solving the security issues). The situa- and hand disinfectants as well as critical providing far better intelligence on “bad” tion for troops, including sailors, abroad equipment such as ventilators and phar- actors, especially Russia and China. Both should be a top priority. macological supplies. the strategy and intelligence need mas- A similar strategy is needed for criti- • Military operations can be delayed, sive improvement. cal industries. If specialized plants reduce re-purposed, or simply halted. China, for example, has increased military opera- tions in the South China Sea. • Economic activity can be severely re- duced and markets in capitalist countries During the Gulf War and , Israel set an can be stressed and lose value at depres- important civil defense example by providing kits to all sion levels. As the Brookings Institution its citizens that included gas masks and antibiotics... noted, the United States saw one of the sharpest economic contractions in its history in March, continuing through the second quarter of 2020. • Producing vaccines and effective Neither the U.S. Navy nor the Pen- output, or cease working altogether, the treatments is time consuming and uncer- tagon were prepared for a pandemic and damage to our capabilities could be enor- tain, with most projections assuming a their decisions resulted in the withdrawal mous. A civil strategy to keep businesses, year before vaccines are widely available. of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roo- including small businesses, operating Moncef Slaoui, a former pharmaceutical sevelt from the region. In early March could significantly reduce the need for executive the White House, chosen to 2020, the Navy persisted in “normal” port lockdown or quarantine measures. lead a crash development program, ac- calls to areas with rising coronavirus in- During the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 knowledged that the 12-18 month time- fection rates – the Roosevelt went to Viet- Iraq War, Israel set an important civil de- line cited by Dr. Anthony Fauci of the nam and the crew was on the ground for fense example by providing kits to all its Centers for Disease Control and Preven- five days. Ships were then “quarantined” citizens that included gas masks and anti- tion, was already “very aggressive.” at sea for 14 days. The Navy had to know biotics to be used in case of a biological at- • Response measures can, over weeks, by then that the quarantine of cruise tack. The distribution of kits ended in 2014, “flatten the curve” of infection to avoid ship passengers and crew together at sea but Israel stands as an excellent example of overwhelming medical facilities but may meant the virus would spread widely what the United States and other nations not stop the spread of novel pathogens. among those on board. At the same time, could do to protect against pandemics • An irresponsible press and media can while the Pentagon cancelled all travel, caused by viruses. A properly designed kit spread unrest and panic, undermining military exercises, and deployments, it for every citizen (Israel had baby kits and trust in a government’s ability to cope did not countermand the Navy decision kits adjusting for men with long beards) with a bio-war crisis. to “quarantine” 5,000 people together. would go a long way to protect lives and

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 17 keep the country working, meaning that viruses, being moved in and out of the a condition of any future U.S. funding lockdowns and other measures could be United States, and U.S. Customs seized of the organization. As an alternative, confined to hot spot locations and only some of this material. Likewise, the CIA Washington should consider a “democ- when absolutely needed. evidenced serious concern about certain racies group” of international health or- Kits might include high quality face biological warfare dangers, particularly ganization that includes Taiwan. masks, synthetic rubber gloves, and most from terrorists. U.S. intelligence may have 8. Strengthen U.S. defenses in the Pa- importantly, general purpose antiviral offered guesses as to biological weapons- cific including on Guam, Japan, and Oki- compounds. The last is not yet avail- related research by China, but likely had nawa. Instead of withdrawing U.S. bomb- able but their development would help no hard evidence about this program. er forces from Guam, the White House reduce fear in the public, stop hoarding should bolster the force there and add air practices that harm social trust, and keep ❚ Specific Steps defenses to protect both the airfields and transportation systems operating. It also The United States needs a broad the harbor used by the U.S. Navy. would reduce pressure on doctors, nurs- range of specific changes and/or im- 9. Consider basing sophisticated air es, and hospitals. provements in the management of pro- defense systems on Taiwan (perhaps us- Another critical need is vastly im- active bio-warfare responses and main- ing Israel’s Arrow III system, which is proved intelligence, so that dangers can tenance of the U.S. deterrent abroad. available now) run by the United States be avoided or mitigated. A great deal is These should include: and partnered with Taiwan. known about China’s biological research 1. Suspend U.S.-sponsored biologi- 10. Demand that Japan move quickly operations because of extensive contacts cal research with China for Class A Bio- to strengthen its air defense systems, es- and cooperation between Chinese and terrorism Agents, which are defined as pecially around ports and harbors and to foreign scientists, and projects shared “organisms that pose a risk to national restore the recently cancelled missile de- between Chinese, American, French, security.” Such agents can easily be dis- fense sites in Akita Prefecture, planned to Australian and other laboratories. For a seminated or transmitted from person to host two AEGIS Ashore missile defense brief three years (2014-17) the U.S. Gov- person; can result in high mortality rates; bases capable of operating Standard Mis- ernment recognized the risk in certain have the potential for major public health sile 3 Block IIA interceptor missiles as types of viral research and urged Chi- impact; might cause public panic and so- well as Standard Missile 6 interceptors. nese, U.S. and other scientists to stop cial disruption; and could require special doing it, going so far as to halt funding action for public health preparedness. ❚ Conclusion from the National Institute of Health 2. Expand the CDC Class A Bioter- As the world emerges from pan- (NIH) and other organizations. As the rorism Agents and Diseases list to in- demic, major flaws in the “Chinese journal Science reported, this included clude all coronavirus types without ex- model” have appeared: numerous coun- “all federal funding for so-called gain- ception including coronavirus variants, tries have junked defective coronavirus of-function (GOF) studies that alter a mutations, and experimentation in zoo- test kits from China, while others have pathogen to make it more transmissible notic transfer of virus agents, variations recalled tens of thousands of defective or deadly so that experts can work out a and mutations. Chinese-origin N-95 face masks. Coun- U.S. government-wide policy for weigh- 3. Strongly urge American scientists tries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative ing the risks.” Federal officials are also not to cooperate in any Class A Bioter- are complaining about the heavy eco- asking the handful of researchers doing rorism Agent research with Chinese nomic burden of mandatory Chinese ongoing work in this area to agree to a counterparts by withholding U.S. gov- “loans.” If China is not reaping the ben- voluntary moratorium.” ernment funding. efits it sought to claim during the early But in 2017, the ban was dropped. 4. Cancel visas to Chinese research- confusion of the West, an opportunity No system was worked out as promised ers who are in the United States or com- for the United States to reassert leader- in 2014. While no public explanation has ing to America to work on Class A Bioter- ship may appear. The country must be been given, it seems that the MIH felt the rorism Agents. ready to step up. ban was impeding work on virus vaccines. 5. Require compensation from Chi- After 2017, the U.S. scientific estab- na for the coronavirus epidemic and use STEPHEN D. BRYEN, Ph.D., is a for- lishment returned to business as usual, the International Court of Justice to bring mer senior DoD official. SHOSHANA cooperating with China on biological a case against China. BRYEN is Senior Director of the Jewish research with no strategic assessment 6. Ask the WHO or an independent Policy Center and Editor of inFOCUS of the risks involved, although there inspection of China’s virology laboratories. Quarterly. A version of this article ap- were warnings. The FBI was concerned 7. Demand that Taiwan be includ- peared in Defending Against Bio-Threats about biological agents, including SARs ed in WHO, at least as an observer, as by The Center for Security Policy.

18 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Why Japan Must Reconsider Its Aegis Deployments by DANIEL GOURÉ

he security environment in the advanced missile forces are intended to overall goal is to distribute units more Western Pacific is becoming erode the ability of the United States to widely throughout the region, make each more challenging for the U.S., its operate freely in the region in the event of formation and platform more lethal and Tfriends, and allies. China seeks to a conflict and be capable of holding U.S. agile, and enable joint force commanders dominate the region and project power forces in the region at risk. to employ capabilities across all the war- globally. North Korea is expanding its China’s continued focus on develop- fare domains. The Marine Corps’ concept arsenal of ballistic missiles and nuclear ing counter space capabilities indicates for Expeditionary Advanced Base Op- warheads. To successfully deter Beijing Beijing seeks to hold U.S. intelligence, sur- erations, which focuses on smaller, agile and Pyongyang, and counter their ability veillance, and reconnaissance satellites at formations that are constantly moving to use military coercion, the U.S. is im- risk in the event of conflict. in proximity to hostile forces while con- proving its defense posture in the region In particular, the PLA is rapidly ex- ducting long-range fires, exemplifies the both qualitatively and quantitatively. U.S. panding its capabilities to conduct massed, change in how the U.S. plans to conduct allies in the region, chief among them Ja- long-range strikes against both fixed facili- future high-end warfare. pan, need to do the same. But will Japan ties and mobile forces. The PLA Air Force The U.S. military is investing in new make the appropriate investments? is now operating its own version of a fifth- and expanded capabilities to support The balance of powers in the West- generation stealth fighter and will soon in- these forces. One of the most important ern Pacific is changing rapidly. China is troduce a new long-range strategic bomb- areas for modernization is in long-range, seeking to build a “great power” military er. The PLA has deployed a large number precision strike systems such as the Long- that could outmatch that of the U.S. It is of long-range precision-guided ballistic Range Air-to-Surface Missile, the Toma- investing in a wide range of high-tech ca- and cruise missiles, one of which, the DF- hawk cruise missile Block V, and the pabilities. Many of these are designed ex- 21, is believed to be specifically designed to Army’s Precision Strike Missile. Another plicitly to counter areas of U.S. advantage attack large surface warships such as U.S. area is missile defense, using land-based or exploit clear vulnerabilities. In a recent aircraft carriers. Conventionally-armed systems such as Aegis Ashore and the Ter- report to Congress, the U.S.-China Eco- missiles will be employed in massed at- minal High Altitude Area Defense System, nomic and Security Review Commission tacks, intended to cripple opposing forces and the sea-based Aegis Ballistic Missile identified a number of specific capabili- at the outset of hostilities. The PLA Navy Defense System with the new SPY-6 radar. ties the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is developing for the purposes of target- ing U.S. military forces and countering its advanced capabilities. Japan plays a unique role in the security of the Indo- The weapons and systems under de- Pacific region due to its location, economic power and velopment and those that are being fielded by China’s military—such as intermedi- close ties to the United States. ate-range ballistic missiles, bombers with long-range precision strike capabilities, and guided missile nuclear attack subma- rines—are intended to provide China the is rapidly expanding with new attack sub- U.S. allies share Washington’s view on capability to strike targets further from marines, aircraft carriers, missile destroy- the growing security threat posed by Chi- shore, such as Guam, and potentially com- ers and large amphibious warfare ships. na. In response, they are increasing defense plicate U.S. responses to crises involving In response, the U.S. military is expenditures and spending more on mod- China in the Indo-Pacific. making significant changes to its force ernization. A major initiative in this is the China’s increasingly accurate and posture and concepts of operation. The acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 19 anti-submarine warfare planes, KC-46A aerial refueling tankers, AH-64 Apache gunships, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye air- borne early warning aircraft, and Patriot air defense systems from the U.S. Most of the country’s fleet of F-15Js will be up- graded with new electronics and the abil- ity to carry advanced weapons. In addition, Japan is investing in indigenously-produced capabilities, in- tended to expand the reach and flexibility of its military forces. The JSDF has modi- fied two Izumi class destroyers into mini- aircraft carriers capable of handling the short-takeoff/vertical landing F-35B. The country has begun an R&D program for a sixth-generation fighter to replace its aging F-1s. Tokyo participated in the suc- cessful co-development program with the United States for an advanced variant of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), designated the Block IIA, for the anti-ballistic missile mission. Both countries are now deploy- ing this new missile killer. Japan also will collaborate with the United States on de- veloping and deploying an array of small, low-orbiting missile warning satellites. The end of the Abe era is a time to consider Japan’s future role in the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. Frankly, Japan needs to do more if it is to have any hope of deterring China and An Aegis SM-3 Block 1B interceptor launched from the USS Lake Erie during a inter- North Korea. It must build on the efforts ception test off the coast of Kauai, Hawaii. (Photo: U.S. Missile Defense Agency) of the past decade. In essence, Japan needs to be able to deflect and degrade any initial by Japan, Australia, and . end, it is pursuing a national security Chinese or North Korean attack, provid- It is impossible to overestimate the strategy that focuses on improving the ing time for the U.S. and other allies to importance of Japan as a U.S. ally. Japan Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) both respond militarily. With the proper addi- plays a unique role in the security of the qualitatively and quantitatively. The JSDF tional investments in offensive and defen- Indo-Pacific region due to its location, also has begun creating cyber security sive capabilities, it could be an “unsinkable economic power, and close ties to the units as well as developing the capability aircraft carrier,” the role played by many United States. The U.S. bases Air Force, to conduct multi-domain operations as Pacific island bases and even Great Britain Navy and Marine Corps forces in Japan the U.S. plans to do. during much of WWII. precisely because of its unique geographic In recent years, Tokyo has undertak- This means, in part, investing seri- position. Thus, it is highly likely, really a en a significant program of military mod- ously in active and passive defenses to virtual certainty, that Japan will be in- ernization designed not only to improve counter the air and missile threats from volved in any conflict between the United its ability to defend the homeland and China and North Korea. Some observ- States and China. surrounding waters, but also to project ers have gone even farther, proposing The government of outgoing Prime military power to more distant regions. In Japan adopt a strategy of “active denial” Minister Shinzo Abe made deterrence of addition to committing to purchase some designed to make Japan less vulnerable the Chinese and North Korean threats 147 F-35s, Japan has acquired or plans to to attack by expanding both its defen- its number one security priority. To that buy V-22 tilt-rotor transport aircraft, P-8 sive capabilities and simultaneously

20 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 DANIEL GOURÉ: increasing its capability to attrit hostile software and, possibly, hardware to solve launch. The chief of staff of the Japanese offensive forces even at long distances this problem. There was also local oppo- Maritime Self Defense Forces publicly from the Home Islands. sition to the placement of the AN/SPY challenged the decision to cancel Aegis One area that has become problem- radar near populated areas. There are Ashore, arguing that only a land-based atic is missile defense of the homeland. In reports that the Japanese government system can provide year-round, continu- the event of a conflict with China, most Why Japan Must Reconsider Its Aegis Deployments experts believe that the PLA will attempt to employ its vast arsenal of convention- ally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles In light of the growing missile threats posed by China to destroy both U.S. and JSDF targets in Japan. It is critical that Tokyo takes steps and North Korea, Japan needs to field a multi-layer to counter this threat thereby and make missile defense. clear to Beijing that it cannot count on achieving a swift, disarming strike at the outset of hostilities. Japan had begun a program that would have provided it with the basis for had decided to halt the planned deploy- ous, all-weather missile defense. Eight or a credible defense against the growing ment at the site in Akita prefecture in the even 10 Aegis-capable destroyers are sim- Chinese missile threat. It invested in the northwest of Honshu, Japan’s main island ply not sufficient to manage the threat. Patriot terminal air defense system and and to explore alternative locations. The most sensible, and cost-effective acquired eight destroyers equipped with With respect to cost, it is true that solution is to move forward with Aegis the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Sys- the price for completing each of the two Ashore deployments, modified as neces- tem including advanced variants of the sites had increased by some 25 percent sary to meet credible concerns. Standard Missile. to around $900 million. However, it But an improved defensive posture In addition, several years ago, the Abe should be pointed out that the cost of a may not be sufficient to deter China. A government decided to acquire two Aegis single Japanese missile defense-capable credible deterrent requires that Japan be Ashore missile defense systems. This is the destroyer is now approximately $1.5 bil- able to strike critical PLA military tar- same system currently deployed in Eu- lion, exclusive of expendables such as the gets, including those that might be aim at rope. One reason Japan decided to acquire SM-3 Block II missiles. Moreover, the Japan. During World War II, Great Brit- the Aegis Ashore was to reduce the bur- manpower needed to operate additional ain relied on Bomber Command to be the den on its destroyer fleet associated with Aegis-capable destroyers far exceeds that offensive complement to its home defense serving as that country’s primary missile for an equivalent land-based missile de- capabilities. Japanese sources have raised defense capability. A missile defense based fense system. For defense of the Japanese the possibility of developing “enemy base entirely on sea-based capabilities is not homeland, a shore-based system is the attack” capabilities as part of its deterrent always optimally located to protect land cost-effective solution. strategy. In the event of a conflict with areas. In addition, destroyers assigned Japan is now searching for an al- China or even North Korea, those coun- the missile defense mission for the Japa- ternative approach to defending itself tries’ military facilities, ISR capabilities, nese homeland are generally restricted against the PLA’s missile threat. Consid- command centers and forces cannot be to a small ocean area, close to land. As a eration is being given to adding a couple granted immunity from attack. result, ships on missile defense patrols are of additional Aegis-capable destroyers The United States military is look- unavailable for other critical missions. and even massive, offshore missile de- ing at new strategies, forces, and equip- However, a few months ago, the Jap- fense platforms. ment with which to counter the Chinese anese Ministry of Defense announced it The Japanese government needs to military’s growing power in the Western was halting the procurement. According rethink its decision to halt work on the Pacific. Japan must be part of the solu- to the Defense Minister, Taro Kono, the Aegis Ashore program. In light of the tion. But in order to play the role of an suspension decision was based on both growing missile threats posed by China unsinkable aircraft carrier, Japan must technical and cost issues with the pro- and North Korea, Japan needs to field a invest more in advanced offensive and gram. The principal technical concern multi-layer missile defense. Such a de- defensive capabilities. is the danger that from the currently fense is essential to maintaining a cred- planned sites, the SM-3 Block IIA booster ible deterrent. In addition, in the case DANIEL GOURÉ, Ph.D., is a vice might fall into populated areas. Modi- of North Korea, it is a hedge against a president at the public-policy re- fications will be required to the missile’s potential accidental or unauthorized search think tank Lexington Institute.

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 21 Reenergizing Washington’s Strategic Perspective An inFOCUS interview with Senator TOM COTTON Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) was elected to the United States Senate in 2015 at the age of 37, having previously served one term in the House of Representatives. In 2005, Cotton was commissioned in the United States Army. An infantry officer, he rose to the rank of captain. He served in Afghanistan and Iraq, where he was awarded the Bronze Star and Combat Infantryman Badge, and he remained in the Army Reserve until 2013. He is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; the Special Committee on Aging; and the Select Committee on Intelligence; and the Joint Economic Committee. JPC Senior Director Shoshana Bryen spoke with Sen. Cotton in late August.

inFOCUS: American defense such as the strike against Qasem So- Nations has imposed a conventional rests on the assumption of a leimani or the strikes in Syria, and the arms ban on Iran but China is selling it supportive consensus about willingness to stand up for and assert advanced drones and Russia is selling it our national interests. Do we the interests and the aspirations of the advanced air defense systems. have consensus today on the American people, for ourselves, and for key issues of defense? our allies. iF: How can the U.S. work bet- ter with our allies? Japan, Senator Tom Cotton: There remains iF: Will U.S.-led “snapback” South Korea, Australia, New bipartisan support, maybe to a lesser sanctions on Iran have an im- Zealand, and even Vietnam degree in Washington with the Demo- pact without a UN Security are very concerned about crats today, but across the country that Council vote? China. Can Taiwan be a piece America needs to play an active role in of that? the world. We need to be assertive in Sen. Cotton: I certainly hope that defense of our interests, our allies, and once snapback sanctions are applied, Sen. Cotton: The Trump administra- freedom where we can across the globe. the rest of the Security Council and tion has taken great strides to unite a We took a wrong turn in the Obama the rest of the world will respect the coalition of countries throughout East era, in that we refused to take decisive conventional arms ban on Iran. I find and South Asia to defend our common action against our main rivals. We let it hard to believe that Great Britain interest against China becoming a he- China’s aggression go largely unchal- and France are going to weaken, and gemon that calls the shots in Asia and lenged. We tried to reset relations with perhaps vitiate, their ability in the fu- around the world, as China hopes to a Russia that had no desire to change its ture to veto resolutions at the Security do. These countries are of very different behavior. And of course, we basically Council by pulling some lawyerly, pro- traditions, cultures and political sys- handed over so much influence in the cedural tricks to pretend that we can’t tems, from Korea and Japan, Taiwan, Middle East to Iran. invoke snapback sanctions. the Philippines, Vietnam, India – and That’s on top of the very deep bud- Assuming we do, the question be- very few would want to be a vassal state get cuts that the Obama administration comes do other nations respect those to China. Of course, they are all rela- made to the military, constraining our sanctions? Do Russia and China in tively small compared to China, from ability to operate in multiple theaters particular respect the conventional an economic, demographic, geograph- at one time. The good news is that has arms ban? If they don’t, the United Na- ic standpoint, so they need a strong been largely reversed under the Trump tions has to show that it’s willing to act partner in the United States to support administration, starting with the bud- against those countries and enforce its that coalition through military opera- get, but also ending the retreat from own resolutions. And the United States tions, joint exercises, trade and eco- the world, the willingness to use mili- has to lead in that effort as well. We can- nomic relations. We have growing ties tary force in a targeted, calibrated way, not have a world in which the United with most of the countries on China’s

22 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Senator periphery, and political and diplomatic measures as well. We’ve had them with us in the fight over sovereignty in the TOM COTTON: South China Sea. If America leads, and we have es- pecially strong allies among the demo- cratic nations on China’s periphery, I Reenergizing Washington’s Strategic Perspective think we can effectively lead a coalition that will check Chinese ambitions. Taiwan is obviously a special case because both sides contend that there is one China. United States policy is and should remain that it will ultimately be for the people of mainland China and Taiwan to decide their political futures. But the one thing we will not tolerate is any forcible effort by mainland China to reunite Taiwan. That has to be solely the result of free and open negotiations and diplomacy. It’s ultimately a choice for the Taiwanese people and the people of mainland China. The United States’ role in that is to uphold our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to continue to sell Taiwan the kind of weapons it needs to defend its autonomy from potential at- tack by mainland China. And we must Senator Tom Cotton. defend Taiwan diplomatically around the world. China is once again trying to Sen. Cotton: I certainly favor putting iF: Would the Japanese or South poach the few remaining countries that advanced air defense systems in Tai- Koreans conduct an exercise recognize Taipei as China’s govern- wan. I’m also aware that the Taiwan- with the U.S. Navy and Taiwan? ment, as opposed to Beijing. And they ese military is more than capable, with continue to try to exclude Taiwan from the right training and equipment from Sen. Cotton: I believe they would if the organizations like the World Health U.S. defense contractors, to operate U.S. makes it clear that we think it’s a Organization (WHO) and the Inter- all these systems. I would say that any high priority for our common defense national Civil Aviation Organization consideration of the presence of U.S. posture in the East China Sea and the (ICAO). As we saw earlier this year with forces in Taiwan would be done only South China Sea, especially if it’s at a an outbreak of the virus, it would have in close consultations after careful large multi-lateral annual event, such as been much better if Taiwan had at least deliberation with the Taiwanese gov- RIMPAC exercises near Hawaii. observer status at the WHO. These are ernment. In addition to accelerating Allowing Taiwan to participate in the kinds of things the U.S. can do to and expanding arm sales to Taiwan, something like RIMPAC, or in some of help Taiwan preserve its traditions and we should also invite Taiwanese mili- the less regular, more tailored exercises its autonomy while upholding our com- tary personnel into U.S. military exer- that we conduct in the Western Pacific, mitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan cises. The kinds of naval exercises, for is always condemned by Beijing. The Relations Act. instance, that we conduct in Hawaii Chinese government always threat- every year, or some of our shared ex- ens grave consequences, yet when it iF: In your view, could the Unit- ercises in the Western Pacific and the comes to pass, it seems to issue sternly ed States put U.S.-manned air South China Sea. I think that would be worded communiques and not much defense systems on Taiwan? Not useful both for the United States Navy, more. It reminds me of the decision to sell them, but actually maintain the United States military more broad- finally move our embassy in Israel to the air defense systems there. ly, as well as the Taiwanese military. Jerusalem. That was supposedly going

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 23 to preclude, once and for all, any kind city. Congress has also taken action. administration are as well. It’s not just of peace deals in the Middle East, yet We passed the Hong Kong Autonomy the base in Djibouti. China also views just a couple of years later there was a Act, which mandates further sanc- its soon-to-be-base in Gwadar (Paki- breakthrough agreement to normal- tions against communist officials and stan), and then hopefully, in Beijing’s ize relations between the United Arab financial institutions that aided the eyes, a base in or around the Strait of Emirates and Israel. The “smart” for- crackdown. Going forward, we should Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Aden, to be a way to encircle key choke points in the Middle East. Dji- bouti allows them to have a degree of control over the Red Sea and the Bab al- We cannot have a world in which the United Nations Mandab Strait, which is critical for ac- has imposed a conventional arms ban on Iran but cess to the Suez Canal. And if they get a base somewhere on the Arabian Penin- China is selling it advanced drones and Russia is sula, in the Strait of Hormuz, it will al- selling it advanced air defense systems. low them to secure their energy supply lines coming out of the Middle East, but also allow them to hold at risk the en- ergy supplies of so many other nations. Not so much the United States anymore eign policy set always has reasons not continue to act where we can. The U.S. because of our fracking revolution, but to take actions like bolstering Taiwan- should make Hong Kong less attractive Europe, Japan, and other countries who ese defenses or training together with as a financial hub for investment into depend still on Middle Eastern oil. them. Those reasons often come not to mainland China because we shouldn’t We ought to be very concerned pass when you do it in reality. allow the Chinese Communist Party about the base they already have on and its oligarchs to get rich off of special the Red Sea, but also the potential to iF: That’s a good thought to status if Beijing is no longer recogniz- turn their port at Gwadar into a mili- carry around to lots of dif- ing that special status. tary base. Especially any effort to open ferent places in the world, in- cluding perhaps to Hong Kong.

Sen. Cotton: What has happened in The U.S. should make Hong Kong less attractive as Hong Kong is a tragedy. The regime a financial hub ... we shouldn’t allow the Chinese in Beijing has cracked down on Hong Kong’s centuries-old traditions, its Communist Party and its oligarchs to get rich off of democratic autonomy under their joint special status if Beijing is no longer recognizing that declaration with the UK when they re- sumed sovereignty over Hong Kong. special status. It shows how intent [President] Xi Jin- ping is on consolidating power inside of China for the communist party, conse- iF: The Belt and Road Initia- a military base on the Arabian Penin- quences outside of China be damned. tive for China goes into Cen- sula that could hold the Strait of Hor- He was willing to take the economic, tral Asia and into the Middle muz and the Persian Gulf at risk. The financial, and political hit that came East, and China has its one and administration is following those de- from cracking down on Hong Kong only foreign naval base in Dji- velopments very carefully and working because he didn’t want to have it as a bouti, about eight miles from with our partners in the Middle East to democratic example on Chinese soil. U.S. forces in the Red Sea. Is try to ensure that China doesn’t have The administration has already our government clear on the de facto sea control over some of the taken a number of actions, which I sup- implications? world’s most critical waterways. port, including revoking Hong Kong’s special economic status, imposing Sen. Cotton: I’m clear about China’s in- iF: There are rumors that the sanctions on party officials, and end- tentions in the Middle East, and I know Chinese are going to offer ing our extradition agreement with the that the president and others in the the Lebanese money to rebuild

24 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Senator TOM COTTON: Reenergizing Washington’s Strategic Perspective

Demonstrators in Hong Kong protest their city’s new extradition law with China. (Photo: Studio Incendo) the port of Beirut after that or in the interests of the Arab nations Sen. Cotton: I’m concerned about how explosion and you know what that could partner with Lebanon. What Hezbollah works to co-opt the Leba- they want in exchange for happened in the port of Beirut is a ter- nese Armed Forces as it has done with that. What is the possibility rible tragedy, but it would also be tragic other Lebanese government institu- that we end up with a Chinese to allow that explosion to give the Chi- tions. At the very least, the aid we pro- base in Beirut? nese communist government a foothold vide to the LAF should come with con- in the Mediterranean. ditions that it does not become an arm Sen. Cotton: It’s certainly possible be- of Hezbollah, but also that it would act cause you’ve correctly stated China’s iF: The U.S. has armed and trained against Hezbollah terror cells and mis- ambitions, but we ought not allow it the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) sile depots. The Department of Defense to happen. The United States with its for years. We expected it to pro- needs to continue to monitor our arms partners, especially its Arab partners, tect the country, protect the shipments to prevent them from being ought to work in concert to prevent people, maybe to work against diverted to Hezbollah. The Pentagon China from establishing an additional Hezbollah. But during recent also needs to monitor the actions of the foothold on one of those critical wa- demonstrations, the army actu- Lebanese Armed Forces relative to their terways in the Eastern Mediterranean. ally fired on demonstrators in own citizens, as we do with so many That is in no one’s interest. It’s not in Beirut. Should the U.S. continue other nations to which we supply arms. Israel’s interest. It is not in Lebanon’s to arm and train the LAF? Are That explosion again was a terrible interest to become essentially a debtor they beholden to the Hezbol- tragedy. But if there can be any posi- client to the Chinese Communist Party, lah government? tive developments from the explosion,

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 25 it might be that the Lebanese people are the Obama administration gave them military capability requirements. So beginning to sour on Hezbollah and its pallets of cash, they were flush with a the U.S.-Israel Operations Technology role in the government. Remember the strong and growing economy. Working Group, as we propose to call group has so many of the key govern- President Trump’s decision to with- it, could develop combined plans to mental posts, all the ministers of which draw from the Iran nuclear deal has research and field weapon systems as have now resigned. Hopefully the peo- had positive secondary effects, putting quickly and affordably as possible so we ple of Lebanon, working with our allies aside the implications for Iran getting a can get them out to our troops on the in the region, such as France - which has nuclear weapon. The fact that Iran has a front line, both American and Israeli. long historical interest there - can help weak and deteriorating economy, so it Above all, the legislation will help the United States and Israel through our combined technological capabilities win the military and technology com- petition already underway with Russia U.S.-Israel Operations Technology Working Group and especially with China. ... could develop combined plans to research and iF: We had an interview with field weapon systems as quickly and affordably as an Israeli general who said possible so we can get them out to our troops on the the area of technology con- cern is expanding because of front line... China. Is the U.S. considering more things now to have dual- use military application than we used to and therefore be- ing more restrictive? the new government move in a way that can no longer generously support all of excludes Hezbollah’s influence. More its proxy forces around the region. Its Sen. Cotton: Yes. As military compe- than any time in recent years, there is own people are growing weary of hav- tition has grown more technologically a chance to do so through Lebanon’s ing a government that’s so incompetent advanced, sectors of our economy that government institutions, and that’s es- that it shoots down civilian airliners as used to be primarily civilian, focused pecially true of the armed forces. they did to the Ukrainian airplane back on non-military purposes have military in January. These are all things that flow application. Information technology, iF: Could you talk to us about from the decision to withdraw from the quantum computing, artificial intel- the maximum pressure cam- Iran nuclear deal. ligence. We’re not the only ones that paign and its impact on the recognize that. The Communist Party Iranian economy? iF: You are one of the co-spon- in Beijing has what they call “civil mili- sors of the U.S.-Israel Mili- tary fusion,” which harnesses the power Sen. Cotton: The maximum pressure tary Capability Act of 2020. of their own tech sector for the benefit campaign has yielded great dividends of the People’s Liberation Army. They over the last two years or so. The econ- Sen. Cotton: U.S. defense cooperation have laws that specifically demand that omy has declined by almost 10 percent; with Israel is already very deep and civilian companies cooperate with and and will probably see an even worse very broad, but there are some danger- turn over technology to the military decline this year because of the global ous gaps in our capabilities that would of China. It’s just a fact of modern life. contraction related to the coronavirus. be closed if we collaborated more on Things that were once seen as purely ci- That means that Iran’s coffers are now research and development (R&D). The vilian in use are increasingly dual-use, relatively bare but they have a lot of U.S. already has a bilateral working both civilian and military, and we have mouths to feed all around the Middle group, the Defense Acquisition Adviso- to be mindful of that change. East, from the paramilitary forces in ry Group, but that’s focused more on ac- Iraq, to Hezbollah in Lebanon, to the quisition and sustainment, and less on iF: And is this ongoing coop- Houthis in Yemen, and various prox- research, development, and engineering eration with Israel going to ies in Syria. And they just don’t have (RD&E). We propose a permanent and help define those areas for enough money to go around. That dedicated forum for our countries’ mil- both sides? was not the case five years ago. After itaries to share intelligence-informed

26 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Senator Sen. Cotton: Yes. One of Israel’s great Russia to do because Germany has a Libyan civil war. They’ve been very ag- advantages in the world, both economic strong economy on which Russia is gressively trying to lay claims to oil and and military, is it’s incredibly dynamic very dependent and therefore it would gas in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. TOM COTTON: and innovative people have led to one of fight back. Germany doesn’t want to And they continue, of course, to bank- the world’s truly outstanding high-tech be dependent, though, on the vagaries roll and protect Hamas operatives and sectors. Those high-tech industries will of Eastern European politics and Rus- affiliates and the Muslim Brotherhood increasingly be useful, not just for civil- sian meddling on the Eastern flank of throughout the region. Reenergizing Washington’s Strategic Perspective ian purposes, but for military purposes NATO and the EU. So, they’ve decided We have to draw a firmer line with as well. Same thing with ours. to build a pipeline through the sea. I’ve . For instance, that they’ll have taken action along with a handful of access to Russia’s S-400 air defense sys- iF: How well can NATO work other senators and the administration tem or the U.S. F-35 fighter jet, but they in the Middle East with Tur- to try to prevent that pipeline from be- won’t have both. At the same time, we key on one end, or in the cen- ing completed through very aggressive have to build on areas of common in- ter of Europe with Germany sanctions. Its completion would mean terest as a NATO partner, like contain- being Russia’s biggest client Russia could turn off the gas or take ing Iran and trying to work through, as for energy? any other action against countries east best we can, a lot of these thorny issues. of Germany in the dead of winter, while I hope that we’ll see some improvement Sen. Cotton: It is regrettable that Ger- Germans sit comfortably in their warm in the government of Turkey. I hope many depends so much on Russia for its living rooms, indifferent to the plight of the government of Turkey will become gas. It is entirely unacceptable that Ger- Estonians, Poles, or Ukrainians. This is more responsive to its large and plural- many has gone to the greatest lengths entirely a deliberate decision in Berlin istic people. – to include intimidating, threatening, that they never should have taken. iF: Is it better to have Turkey in NATO than Turkey out of NATO?

...we’re more likely to exert the kind of influence we Sen. Cotton: I think we’re more likely to exert the kind of influence we need need over Turkey to play a positive and constructive over Turkey to play a positive and con- role in things - like countering Iran - with Turkey in structive role in things - like counter- ing Iran - with Turkey in NATO than NATO than Turkey out of NATO. Turkey out of NATO. It’s not even clear how you’d go about removing any member nation from NATO. Having them in our multilateral alliance, we ought to work, as best we can, to try to smaller NATO and European Union We should use every possible avenue improve their cooperation with us on partner nations – to try to get the Nord of our national power to stop that from bilateral terms, but also to improve the Stream Two Pipeline built through the happening. It’s still in a pause, but it’s a way they’re operating within NATO. Baltic Sea. This is one of the worst things very close-run thing. They only have five We want to try to minimize the slow that a NATO ally can do to the others, percent left of the pipeline to build. pace of decision-making and delays or to a country like , that’s con- As for Turkey and its role in NATO, that often emanate from Turkey and its stantly being threatened by Russia. They I’m very concerned about the trajectory delegates to NATO. currently get all that gas through a se- of Turkey over the last 20 years and ries of pipelines that run through East- also U.S.-Turkish relations. The Turk- iF: You have covered an amaz- ern Europe into Germany and beyond. ish government under [President Recep ing amount of time and space That means that if Russia wants to exert Tayyip] Erdogan has taken a number here, and I cannot tell you influence through energy politics on of actions hostile to our interests, and how much we appreciate your countries, such as the Baltic nations or our allies, just in recent months, to say answers. This is one terrific Poland or Ukraine, it has to also cut off nothing of the last 20 years. They pur- interview. On behalf of JPC gas to its main client, Germany. chased a Russian air defense system. and our inFOCUS readers, That’s politically very hard for They aggressively are intervening in the thank you, Senator Cotton.

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 27 Israeli Military Launches Radical New Digital Maps by ZAK DOFFMAN

magine a tourist arriving in a headsets overlaying friendlies and like- intent is to root out threats, but also foreign city,” the Israeli intel ly combatants, helping targeting and to keep others safe, to avoid collateral officer tells me. “The first thing the avoidance of blue on blue. Israel’s damage. “We need to make sure we “I they do is open Google Maps new system is different, though. The only target the aggressor and not any and look for a restaurant. Google helps augmented reality comes from the fu- civilians,” LTC “N” tells me. them find a place. Helps them navigate. sion of multiple intel sources, the intent This convergence between real-life Helps them get there on time. We do is not to present ground troops with conflict and ever more realistic gam- the same.” Well, not exactly. The aug- an advanced gaming-style view of the ing-style graphics has been developing mented reality mapping application Lt. battlefield, but to use live data to infer for years now. During the Iraq conflict, Col. “N” is describing is designed to where actual targets are hiding. there was that inference that here’s a find hidden terrorists, not restaurants. “Mistakes can be fatal,” he tells me, “we need to get the right house on the right street.” Welcome to the battlefield of the ...the Internet of Battlefield Things envisages a mix future – artificial intelligence, multi- source data fusion, augmented reality. of human operators and autonomous machines, all Everything edge-based and real-time. powered by fast communication networks... Except this isn’t really a battlefield, as such. “What happened to us,” the offi- cer tells me, “is that our enemies have adopted a technique to merge into ur- ban areas populated with civilians, we need to unveil the enemy, precisely, to Nowhere is this more important generation of young soldiers more in- neutralise them and stop the threat.” than in an urban environment. This isn’t ured to the horrific visuals of a battle- So, now you start to get the pic- just a matter of where the enemy might field than previous generations by the ture. This is counterterrorism powered be hunkered down based on visuals and combat games they’ve played. You can by AI, this is about creating an asym- a map of the terrain. This can fuse data add to this the remote piloting of lethal metry, shifting the balance of power. sources to understand the ownership, drones on kill missions, all from pods Think Google Street View – except it’s history and usage of specific buildings, thousands of miles away. not Google. And an augmented reality the results of prior surveillance activi- Israel’s idea for this “intelligence overlay that comes from the fusion of ties. And the millisecond new data is saturated combat” has been a decade in multiple sources of highly classified in- received and processed, the entire map the making. The new program sits within telligence, not big tech’s cloud servers. updates for everyone involved. Unit 9900, the visual intelligence opera- And if that isn’t enough, there’s also AI Picture this Street View lookalike tion (think of maps, satellite imagery, im- running pattern analytics on prior en- again – no screenshots, I’m afraid, it’s age analysis) within Aman, the country’s emy tactics, techniques and procedures classified. Arrows and graphics explain military intelligence directorate, and sis- to infer what a hidden enemy is likely to to a soldier on the ground why the ter unit to the better known 8200 signals do next, in real time. third-floor apartment with the wrought intelligence unit. Unit 9900 generated This military augmented reality iron balcony is deemed a hostile envi- headlines a few years ago when it was re- is not unique – such systems are al- ronment, why anyone exiting the build- ported that it was recruiting autistic teen- ready under development, gaming-style ing can be considered a combatant. The agers for their unique analytical skillset.

28 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 ZAK DOFFMAN: As LTC “N” describes the work of overcome, I’m told, include distilling “recognizes patterns of enemy behav- his team, “the development of 3D map- this intel, “terabytes every day,” into iour – and can understand where the ping that is as realistic as possible,” he what is useful and relevant. That’s the enemy is and what they’re planning.” continually refers back to the modern- role of the AI, the pattern analytics. The This is overlaid with real-time intel, in-

day explorer’s Google Maps view of the window is short – soldiers are given five cluding open-source data on the terrain Israeli Military Launches Radical New Digital Maps world, that feeling of familiarity. Yes, to ten seconds to decide on any action and the environment. the location might be strange, but the they take. They are trained in the field There has been a lot of talk about viewpoint is well known, understand- with the technology, their feedback the fusion of the cyber and physical able in real-time. “We have to build hones the program itself, “what to de- domain in the last year, not least from something with that user experience,” velop further and what to ditch.” Israel, which became the first country to mount a physical military response to a cyber-attack. A few weeks later, the U.S. did the opposite. This new concept of an “intelligence saturated battlefield” can take the cyber domain and feed it The challenges the new unit has overcome, I’m told, directly to troops on the ground. Those include distilling this intel, “terabytes every day,” into same soldiers are connected with sen- sors, everything feeding back to the what is useful and relevant... central intelligence system. LTC “N” often refers to the “disap- pearing enemy.” He means the urban shadows where combatants and civil- ians blend together, disasters waiting to he says, “our soldiers crossing the bor- And the beauty of AI is that the happen. Yes, this new style of AR com- der for the first time must be familiar more data you have, the larger and bat is intended to sharpen responses, with the environment.” It’s hard not to more diverse your datasets, the more but also to avoid mistakes. The officer conjure images of gaming graphics as powerful your thinking machine be- explains that the AR display provides he says this – that level of familiarity. comes. Currently this is early-stage – enough information to let soldiers This “intelligence saturated” view- fast forward a few years, though, and understand why a location has been point can be presented to the solider on a smartphone or tablet, all off the shelf and “mostly Android,” or streamed di- rectly into their binoculars or weapons sights. “They don’t know where the intel There has been a lot of talk about the fusion of the comes from,” LTC “N” tells me, “but it cyber and physical domain in the last year, not least reaches their sights, their C2 systems in real time.” The officer stresses that all from Israel... targeting decisions are taken by the sol- dier on the ground, not by the system itself, this is an aid, not an automated targeting system. That differentiation is critical. IoBT that asymmetry between the haves and deemed hostile – but the final targeting – the Internet of Battlefield Things – -en the have nots where this level of tech is decision is theirs, and if they don’t un- visages a mix of human operators and au- concerned will be staggering. derstand they won’t act the right way. tonomous machines, all powered by fast But back to the here and now – put- I’m told that this new program communication networks, algorithms ting the complexity to one side, this is a within Unit 9900 has become a devel- that empower rapid decision-making 3D, photo-realistic map, “the backbone opment hotbed, learning its approach based on data and inferences. But the fi- onto which we build our intel – pre- from industry. Inside the “joint lab” nal decision sits with a human operator, liminary and real time – to understand you’ll find intel, combat troops, cy- the world isn’t ready – at least not publicly the area and what the enemy is doing ber and communications, Israel’s De- – to fully pitch man against machine. in real time.” By mining data from fense Advanced Research Projects The challenges the new unit has previous combat experiences, the AI Agency (DARPA) equivalent, defense

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 29 contractors, even start-ups. When something new is envisaged, it’s pro- totyped and given to ground troops to field test. Their feedback hones the -ca pability or consigns it to the bin. The military world has changed, LTC “N” tells me. “We needed to imag- ine new methods of fighting – as much as possible we use tools created outside the defense industry. We take civilian and open-source as much as possible, we access research from all over the world to help us deliver state of the art products.” You can think of this mix of real- reality and augmented reality, of con- verged commercial tech and mil-spec systems, of autonomous machines An IDF soldier working in Unit 9900, a visual intelligence unit that specializes mixing with human operators as in gathering optical information from numerous sources to provide intelligence. Battlefield 2.0. And while today this (Photo: IDF) might seem to be all about augmented overlays, it’s really about painting an dollars piling into mapping and AR No details on any other countries AI-driven picture for the soldier to and AI, repurposing those capabili- using the tech, of course, no specifics empower decision making. ties for this? “We keep the user expe- on intel sources – all highly classified. Imagine a vast array of connected rience as straightforward as possible… “I can tell you this is a real-time bridge sensors linked to a thinking machine Google Maps is a good model – how between intel and soldiers (intel wants that can compare what it’s seeing in you see the world as a tourist, when to keep its secrets), combat operators real time with all the battlefield experi- you know what you see and under- want that intel in real time.” Testing of ence that has gone before. Nothing is a stand where you’re going.” the new capabilities started this year. better predictor of the future than the This new program is now ripe for You can add this IDF program to the multitude of new AI, IoT and AR systems being procured and developed by military customers world-wide. The concept of real-time dissemination of Imagine a vast array of connected sensors linked to a live intel from multiple sources, right to a soldier’s C2 or weapon’s sights is thinking machine that can compare what it’s seeing novel. The challenge is that the soldier in real time with all the battlefield experience that must remain the decision maker. The has gone before. biggest takeaway from any system like this is chilling – If there’s ever any im- plication that targeting has been auto- mated, that a kill switch or trigger has been handed over to the lightning re- flexes of a machine, then the military past. Lower level surveillance monitor- international collaboration. “Our dis- world will have changed and there will ing decisions made autonomously by cussions with various countries fighting be no going back. an AI module – identifying risks and terror around the world show they’re potential hostiles, saving military time, facing the same threat, enemies hiding ZAK DOFFMAN is Chief Execu- resources and potentially lives. in urban environments. This concept tive Officer of Digital Barriers, a I’m told that Israel has accepted brings together quick intel, enhanced provider of advanced surveillance that “mil-spec” is not always best – why by AI and connected to accurate map- technologies to the international home- not plug into the billions of investment ping. That’s its innovation.” land security and defense markets.

30 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 A NATO Urban Delaying Strategy for the Baltic States by Col. GARY ANDERSON, USMC (Ret.)

astern Europe was once the bul- In an article for the The National In- warfare in the open against tank-heavy wark of the old but terest, David Axe quotes an Army Times Russian forces would not provide a real- it has become NATO’s first line of article by Kyle Rempfer noting, “This istic deterrent. This does not mean that Edefense against a resurgent Rus- summer, [troops from] Latvia and Po- such an idea is totally without merit. sia. The NATO alliance now faces the land traveled to West Virginia for the Placing irregular warfare in an urban same problem that the French-British program. Both nations have newly invig- context holds real promise. coalition faced at the dawn of World orated homeland defense forces capable War II. Great Britain and France had of pushing back against an invading force ❚ Urban “Festung” Approach assured Poland that they would come to and opposing a potential occupation.” Any successful Russian thrust into its aid in the event that it was attacked, Rempfer continues: “The units are one or more of the Baltic states depends but when the Germans crossed the Pol- trained to provide response during the on the calculus of speed. Russians need ish border in 1939, there was no way that early stages of a hybrid conflict. Their to make the action a fait accompli be- the allies could move quickly enough tasks could include slowing the advanc- fore NATO reinforcement can arrive. to assist their eastern partner. A 2016 ing units of an aggressor nation by de- The previously mentioned 2016 Rand Rand Corporation war game showed stroying key transportation infrastruc- war game indicated that current NATO that while the situation is better today it ture such as bridges, attacking enemy capabilities cannot properly offset the will be hard to quickly reinforce Eastern forces at chokepoints, and potentially Russian 6-1 armor advantage in the Bal- Europe in time to prevent the Russians serving as forward observers for NATO tics in a timely manner. However, if key from overrunning the Baltic states of aircraft responding with air strikes.” Baltic urban areas can be turned into Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. While this approach might give potential urban fortresses, the equation The game would tend to vindicate NATO some tactical force multipliers, changes radically. critics who believe that NATO’s eastern as a meaningful strategic deterrent it is Hitler’s concept of turning German expansion was ill-advised, but that is now probably a minor stumbling block for cities into fortresses [festungs] at the end water under the bridge. U.S. military plan- the Russians. This is true for two reasons. of World War II has been justifiably de- ners have been trying to come up with First, the Baltics are relatively flat and rided, but the Russian successes at Len- ingrad and Stalingrad were keys to So- viet victory on the Eastern Front in that conflict. The Germans also used urban U.S. military planners have been trying to come up fortress tactics as an operational tool with non-traditional ways to deter Russian adventurism effectively earlier in the war. The differ- ence between the two was that the Sovi- in the Poland and the Baltics for several years. ets always had a viable plan for relieving the cities; by 1945, the Germans did not have that capability. Thefestungs were doomed to defeat in detail. non-traditional ways to deter the Russians do not have the mountains and dense NATO has a plan for relieving the from adventurism in Poland and the Bal- forests that are conducive to guerrilla Baltics, but in its present state it is likely tics for several years. One of their schemes warfare. Second, the brutal Russian ap- that it will be an attempt at liberation has been to turn the Russians’ use of hy- proach to would see rather than relief. However, the credible brid warfare against them in the form of any tactical gains outweighed by the cost threat of a Russian coup de main being non-uniformed and uniformed partisans of reprisals to the civilian population. held up by a series of urban strong points in the event of a Russian invasion. Simply stated, the threat of irregular would give Moscow serious second

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 31 Joint Terminal Attack Controllers from the Latvian National Armed Forces conduct close air support training with U.S. Air Force. (Photo: Master Sgt. Scott Thompson)

thoughts about the viability of a light- Russian strategic and military planners food, ammunition, and medical supplies ning strike into the Baltics. that an adventure in that region would must be stocked down to the neighbor- not be worth the risk. The ease with which hood level. ❚ Strategic Deterrence the Russians retook Crimea may well have Coordinated Fire Support: Urban It is difficult to measure the efficacy created hubris in Moscow. Disabusing areas provide natural choke points that of strategic deterrence except after the the Russians of that mindset is critical in can be exploited by fire and local maneu- fact due to the difficulties of proving the avoiding war by miscalculation. ver with NATO proving precision firing? negative case. But we do have some good and a variety of assets providing the eyes evidence of what basic elements constitute ❚ Operational Readiness on target. But to be effective, local ob- credible deterrence. First, that the nation Using unconventional delaying servers must be trained in how to call-in or alliance can demonstrate the will to means in an urban context will require fire correctly and recognize worthwhile fight if needed. During the Cold War in creating a coherent doctrine for urban targets among the clutter of urban com- both Europe and Korea, a series of sched- defense in the Baltic region and training bat. The plethora of security cameras uled exercises demonstrated that will. and equipping local forces to implement that now dominate the urban landscape Second, a show of credible capabil- that doctrine. This requires the creation can integrate with and augment the hu- ity to back up the will to fight is also nec- of a unified vision for a Baltic urban de- man sensor-to-shooter grid, but it will essary. Capability exercises and techni- laying strategy by the nations in ques- require big data to separate the targeting cal demonstrations can do this although tion as well as creating a consensus that wheat from the proverbial chaff. they always run the risk of giving the that this approach is feasible at the op- Centralized Commander’s Intent- potential enemy information on friendly erational level of war. Each urban area is Decentralized Execution: The Rus- technological developments. One has to unique in culture and outlook, but a suc- sians almost certainly can disrupt any wonder whether clear demonstrations of cessful urban delaying effort must have attempt by a city to exercise centralized the power of French machine guns and key components: command and control in its defense, so rapid firing artillery prior to World War Logistic Feasibility: A successful execution should be decentralized to the I might have shown the Germans that delaying urban action will mean that maximum extent possible, applying pre- the dependence on rapid strategic move- each urban area must be self-sustain- viously determined commander’s intent. ment called for in the Von Schlieffen ing in a situation where it may be sur- One thing the Marine Corps found plan was misplaced. rounded and isolated for up to a month early-on in its 1990s Urban Warrior ex- The reality of deterrence in the Bal- while NATO forces deploy and organize periments was that the Red Teams de- tics would be in creating a mindset among a counterattack. This means that water, fending urban areas were inherently

32 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Col superior to the Blue attackers who were suggest that NATO provide Baltic states training, but it is feasible. . GARY ANDERSON, USMC ( trying to execute predetermined experi- unconventional forces with training and Low Impact Exercises: Coordinat- mental tactics. Having had time to famil- technology to include sniper and sabo- ed defense of an urban area will require iarize themselves with the terrain and tage techniques, night vision equipment, repetitive exercises to get everyone on unconstrained by fixed doctrine, these and drones – presumably both armed the same sheet of music. A Russian at- Red Teams almost always had an innate and unarmed. Recent Army futures war tack will most likely depend on stealth advantage over Blue as they could impro- games have examined this urban ap- and surprise in its initial stages and the vise and use their imagination. NATO proach and found it promising. speed with which the population and its should exploit this advantage and allow Such an approach would also benefit defenders can react will be critical in de- fending against an urban coup de main. Ret Such exercises need not be disruptive. Success will depend on getting key play- .):

To be a credible deterrent, an urban delaying strategy A NATO Urban Delaying Strategy for the Baltic States ers into position to provide overwatch, must demonstrate the will of the populace to accept protect critical infrastructure, and tie the damage and casualties that war will bring if in with NATO. They have the advantage deterrence fails. that they can be conducted quietly dur- ing normal working days and holidays without major disruptions to urban life. These should be augmented by table- neighborhood defense units the latitude from other elements designed to give an top neighborhood level war games that to use maneuver warfare to adapt their asymmetrical advantage to urban irreg- would allow irregular local defense forc- tactics to the unique terrain in their indi- ular troops augmenting regular forces: es to design improvisational tactics to vidual and unique battle space. Teleoperated Tanks: Any vehicle anticipate various Russian approaches. A Neighborhood Watch on Ste- can be rigged for teleoperation. Older, roids: A key tactic in recent Russian op- obsolete tanks can be easily reinforced ❚ The Importance of Will erations in Crimea and the Ukraine has structurally and reconfigured as assault To be a credible deterrent, an urban been the use of Spetsnaz and irregular guns and placed around key infrastruc- delaying strategy must demonstrate the force to seize and/or disrupt key loca- ture and choke points. They do not need will of the populace to accept the damage tions and communications in advance to go far and can be concealed from aer- and casualties that war will bring if deter- of regular forces. Any successful urban ial targeting in parking garages and oth- rence fails. To be sure, not all of the popu- delaying action must defend effectively er structures providing overhead cover. lations of Baltic urban areas will buy in. against such efforts in their early stages. Due to Russian expertise with electronic All three Baltic states have residual Local residents must be trained to im- warfare jamming, they should be fitted Russian ethnic populations which might mediately report suspicious activity, and with both frequency hopping radio and welcome a return of their brethren. The local police and paramilitary forces pre- fiber-optic controls. They would be use- Soviet occupation ended three decades pared to deal quickly with attempts at ful against Russian armor as well as “lit- ago and many citizens – particularly sabotage. The defensive urban campaign tle green men” if configured with both millennials – never knew the thinly- would be a disconnected series of neigh- anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons. disguised weight of oppressive Russian borhood battles that may not be fully co- Integrated Targeting: NATO has domination. ordinated until NATO reinforcements a tremendous capacity for precision tar- However – as in all civil societies – arrive. The Russians are adept at dis- geting that would cause minimal urban 20 percent of the people do most of the rupting urban communications grids. collateral damage. To be most effective, it heavy lifting. It is the determination of The key to success will be creating an requires precision target acquisition. As that element that will be needed to deter atmosphere of decentralized chaos that mentioned earlier, a combination of civil- Russian aggression. impacts the Russian attackers more seri- ian eyes on target and the network of se- ously than the urban defenders. curity cameras now ubiquitous in almost Col. GARY ANDERSON, USMC (Ret.), Tactics, Techniques, and Technol- all of the developed world’s major cities is an adjunct faculty member at the ogy: Weaponizing an urban delaying can give excellent coverage. However, Elliot School of International Relations, strategy in a way that will make it a cred- such targeting sensors must be combined George Washington University. A ible deterrent will not be overly expen- with big data. This will require integra- version of this article originally appeared sive, but it will require a new approach tion with NATO’s fire support system. in the Small Wars Journal and has to tactics and training. Rand analysts This will require much coordination and been updated for inFOCUS Quarterly.

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 33 The Marine Corps: A New Beginning or the End? by Maj. Gen. MICHAEL SULLIVAN, USMC (Ret.) and Maj. Gen. JARVIS D. LYNCH, JR., USMC (Ret.)

ommandant of the Marine Corps be notified of the targeted ship and its container accounting and handling sys- General David Berger’s “Force location. The Marines would then move tem that includes customs inspections. Design 2030” has caused quite the missile from its hiding place to its The commercial container opera- Ca stir. The document envisages launching location, activate the target- tion is complicated, involving among a shifting of the Marine Corps from a ing and launching systems, and sink the other details, a customs inspection at the “Second Land Army” force to a “com- Chinese target. receiving port or beach. The container mando-like infantry force with nimbler system is vulnerable to security leaks weapons: drone squadrons will double ❚ What China Knows and inevitable exposure. and rocket batteries will triple.” There Chinese activity in the informa- is more, much more. Force Design 2030 tion collection business has been the ❚ The Economic Context has its supporters, including Secretary topic of many news reports. China has a Money counts, but no published of Defense Mark Esper, and there is cer- finger in every pie, including, of course, writings examining FD 2030 within the tainly support in the active duty Marine the U.S. military. There is no rational context of Chinese and American eco- Corps, an organization noted for its his- reason to assume that Chinese are not nomic situations have been found. toric loyalty to the Commandant. There now, or will not soon be, quite familiar China today is using economic are, however, skeptics within active duty with Force Design 2030 and its stealth power to acquire control of, among oth- ranks and the large population of former mode of operation, including shipping er things, world supply chains, manufac- Marines, retired and otherwise. container involvement. turing, businesses, distant seaports, and All things considered, it is a subject We have learned that shipping con- merchant shipping lanes. And if those definitely worth discussion. tainer operations are much more com- are not enough, we have been too placid The underlying purpose is to draw plex than one might think. Locals must about the obvious copying of American closer to the Navy by assisting in gain- be involved, especially if the containers military and naval equipment, including ing control of the South and East China are to be brought to small islands by aircraft and ships. Seas in the event of war against China. smaller container ships. Arrangements China had been running amok until The heavily wargamed FD 2030 Con- must be made for discharging and de- her progress was slowed during the past cept of Operations envisages the change livering the containers and needless to few years by the imposition of tariffs and of infantry regiments to “Littoral Regi- say, there is the required inspection of other measures to stop economic outrag- ments.” Simply stated, the Littoral Regi- the container contents. The system is es such as theft of American intellectual ments would be organized, trained, and fraught with security loopholes. property. Prior to the coronavirus pan- equipped to infiltrate small units (50 to Information surrounding the even- demic, there were signs that America’s 100) Marines ashore on any of the mul- tual introduction of two Light Amphibi- actions were having an effect. Predic- titude of islands available in both seas. ous Warfare Ships implies that these tions that China’s economy was headed Also to be smuggled ashore would ships would be used to load, transport for trouble had become commonplace. be long range anti-ship missiles. The and offload missile containers. What is China’s pandemic behavior has caused missiles, located in commercial shipping not addressed is how this could be done itself even more problems. For example, containers, would be transported to hid- without Chinese knowledge of the ships’ The Voice of Europe publication recently ing places by rented civilian trucks. The ownership and the cargo. Considering noted that Britain, the European Union, Marines and their equipment would the Chinese interest in controlling the the U.S. and Japan are taking measures remain separate from the population. China Sea islands, it would be interest- to break the stranglehold Communist When needed by the Navy, the Marines ing to learn how the wargames work China has on the world’s supply chains located on the appropriate island would around the loopholes in a vulnerable by bringing home businesses from

34 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 M G

China, “… unelected Communist Party And given America’s dangerously Considering the organizational changes MICHAEL SULLIVAN, USMC (R bigwigs are said to be in a state of panic.” large and mounting debt, the nation’s and the mission requiring stealth, the Should that exodus of businesses political class must eventually start “Littoral Regiments” are commando occur, China’s power would be greatly looking for new money sources. Prime forces or, in American terms, “Special diminished and the need for focus on targets will be the national defense in Operations Forces” organized, equipped the China seas dramatically reduced. general and a Marine Corps organized and trained to perform a special opera- Meanwhile, America has spent and trained to fulfill something other tions stealth mission. years helping the Communist Chinese than the force in readiness mission so become a dominant world economic useful to the nation in particular. ❚ Marine Aviation Published descriptions of the FD 2030 mission do not include Marine aviation. An official FD 2030 document of et. )

Force Design 2030 ... is to draw closer to the Navy March 2020 does state that there will and be “… some carefully constrained tests by assisting in gaining control of the South and East M

of the ability of the F-35B (a VSTOL air- G China Seas in the event of war against China. craft) to operate from austere, undevel- JARVIS D. LYNCH, USMC ( JR., oped landing sites.” As stealth aircraft, the F-35B and C models are the ideal weapons systems to close within mis- power. During that process and others, In brief, the two major powers com- sile range of warships and successfully the American national debt became as- peting for world economic leadership attack. Unfortunately, the F-35B needs a tronomical and is growing. It is now are now each facing a harsh economic reinforced pad for vertical landings and somewhere north of $25 trillion and des- situation. It is in that context that the a short runway for takeoff. The F-35C, tined to grow to even greater levels as the changes should be examined. designed for aircraft carrier operations, government spends trillions more fight- needs a minimum 4000-foot runway ❚ ing the economic effects of the coronavi- A Product of Wargames for take-offs and a mid-runway arrest- Ret rus pandemic shutdown and the need to FD 2030 is the product of a series of ing gear for landings. Use of either F-35 .):

help finance the return of companies to wargames. Nothing has been reported model in a FD 2030 deployment role The Marine Corps: A New Beginning or the End? the United States. about the wargames themselves, but seems impractical. Adding more gloom to that finan- much has been reported about changes The Marine Corps, as the nation’s cial situation is the fact that there are to be made in the Fleet Marine Force 911 force in readiness, is prepared to those in Washington eager to spend (FMF), a force that purportedly will still deploy lethal forces on short notice. trillions more on such socialist dreams be able to serve as the nation’s rapid reac- These contingencies, not war with as the Green New Deal, government- tion “force in readiness,” even though it is China, are the most common types of controlled health care, free college tu- organized, trained and equipped to serve emergency deployments. For decades, ition for all, reparations for slavery, and as a “commando-like” sea control force. the Marine Corps’ response has been of course, the ever present “need” to bail In addition to losing its tanks, the provided by Marine Air Ground Task out states that have been mismanaging FMF’s infantry loses an entire regiment Forces (MAGTF’s) of the size and com- funds, budgets, and retirement benefits plus 200 Marines from each of the 21 position required. One of the prices of for state employees for years. Not satis- remaining infantry battalions. The rifle FD 2030 is the loss of the MAGTF ca- fied with those fiscal adventures, Wash- companies gain many more Staff NCOs, pability. An organization structured, ington is also considering as much as a (common in commando structures); trained and equipped to conduct com- $3 trillion second round of post-corona- company weapons platoons will no lon- mando stealth operations cannot be virus financial programs. ger exist; the machine guns and Mk-19 converted into a MAGTF warfighting Recently, a group of legislators grenade launchers will be unmanned machine on short notice. wrote that government spending dur- but located in an armory for use at the The FD 2030’s 26 percent Marine ing the coronavirus must stop because it battalion commander’s discretion; and aviation loss includes losses of all types is closing in on $10 trillion. They noted the rifle company’s 60mm mortars will of aircraft except KC-130 refuelers, a that, adjusted for inflation, $10 trillion is become a thing of the past. Cannon much-needed aircraft even today. Marine more money than was spent on the Rev- artillery is reduced to only 5 batteries aviation is the MAGTF’s Close Air Sup- olutionary War, Civil War, World War I, in the entire FMF. Cannons will be re- port hammer and source of ground force and WWII combined. placed by rockets, missiles, and drones. battlefield mobility. FD 2030 Marine

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 35 U.S. Marines conduct a simulated amphibious assault in exercise Talisman Sabre 19 in Bowen, Australia, July 22, 2019. (Photo: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command/Lance Cpl. Tanner Lambert)

aviation lacks the pile driver punch and Greer posited three questions for the de- capabilities not available in light of the mobility assets required by MAGTF’s. velopers of FD 2030: required reorganizing, re-equipping and For example, current plans call for the • Was this plan developed in consulta- training involved in converting from a 18 active duty Marine F-35B squadrons tion with America’s Indo-Pacific allies defensive to offensive role. to each have 16 aircraft. FD2030 reduces or with the other branches of the U.S. America is a maritime nation and in that number to 10 aircraft per squadron – military, all of whose cooperation is order to protect her maritime interests, a total planned decrease from 288 aircraft needed for its success? must have the ability to project power to 180 aircraft. • Is the Marine Corps optimizing it- from the sea. Sadly, that power has been The F-35B and C model stealth air- self for the range of possible conflicts permitted to atrophy. A concerted Navy- craft are expensive, ideal anti-ship weap- with China, or just the one it most Marine Corps effort of value to the na- ons systems. They are the best and most wants to fight? tion would be the modernizing of am- efficient weapons system in the Corps • What if the Marine Corps’s predic- phibious warfare doctrine, equipment, today. Both can perform the FD 2030 tions for the future are wrong? shipping and training. These are neces- mission without having 50-100 man We suspect none of those were asked sary actions that must be taken, even detachments deployed to China Sea is- or answered. The FD 2030 mission is ac- though money counts. lands. The C model planes operate from tually a special operations mission. The Otherwise, we are not dealing with a carriers. The challenge would be to find nation has a Special Operations Com- new beginning of the Fleet Marine Force. safe bases and tanker support for the B mand. It does not need the overhead at- We are likely seeing the beginning of the models or F-35C’s not carrier-deployed. tendant to a second Special Operations end of the United States Marine Corps. There is no need to deploy small groups Command; Money counts. First, Marine Air: then the rest. of Marines to China Sea islands. The FD 2030 force is not organized, trained or equipped to perform the most Maj. Gen. MICHAEL SULLIVAN, ❚ Conclusion likely types of force in readiness com- USMC (Ret.) and Maj. Gen. JAR- Writing in Foreign Policy, Tanner bat missions. These require MAGTF VIS D. LYNCH, JR., USMC (Ret.)

36 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 U.S. Army: Long-Term Implications of COVID-19 by STEVEN METZ

year ago, the U.S. Army was busy is a big job. As a recent report from the possible, as British journalist John Gray retooling from counterinsur- U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies predicted, that: gency to long term competition Institute put it, “the United States is out Awith China and Russia. Its focus of position for multi-domain competi- The era of peak globalisation is over. was on what it called “multi-domain op- tion and multi-domain conflict” so the An economic system that relied on erations” particularly in the Indo-Pacific Army’s priority should be adopting four worldwide production and long sup- region, and on modernizing to fight large “transformational roles” to address Chi- ply chains is morphing into one that conventional operations. Then came the na’s regional and global assertiveness. will be less interconnected. A way of COVID-19 pandemic. For the U.S. Army – as for every element of American soci- ety and government – much changed in a The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to lead to matter of months. The Army’s initial response was ex- diminished Army involvement in support to security actly as it should have been. Using mostly partners, particularly if it causes diminished or the National Guard, the Army rushed to help overwhelmed civilian authorities, collapsed order in the poorer parts of the world. constructing emergency field hospitals and, in some states, helping operate el- derly care homes and prisons. Once civil- For “bump in the road” thinkers, the life driven by unceasing mobility is ian authorities began to get a handle on goal is moving past the temporary distrac- shuddering to a stop. Our lives are go- the medical crisis, they needed less direct tion created by the pandemic and tran- ing to be more physically constrained support from the military. Then – again scending or offsetting its effects, particu- and more virtual than they were. A exactly as it should – the Army began larly on defense spending. The worst that more fragmented world is coming thinking about what the COVID-19 pan- many analysts consider likely is a return to into being that in some ways may be demic might mean for it over the long the “austere” sequestration budgets seen at more resilient. term. This has only just begun – no one the end of the Obama administration. This knows the precise extent or direction of might require modest Army force reduc- The result, according to American change that the pandemic will produce. tions and cuts or delays in modernization science journalist Laurie Garrett, “could plans, but it would be an adjustment, not a be a dramatic new stage in global capital- ❚ “Bump in the Road” revolutionary transformation. The Army’s ism, in which supply chains are brought Most security experts and Depart- strategic role and its basic organization closer to home and filled with redundan- ment of Defense officials expect the pan- would remain the same. cies to protect against future disruption.” demic to represent a temporary “bump Some regions and areas will benefit, us- in the road” rather than the beginning ❚ The Revolutionary ing robotics, artificial intelligence, and of a revolution. Thinkers in this camp Transformation additive manufacturing to partially de- believe that once a vaccine appears and There is, though, a very different link from the globalized economy. This the pandemic ends, the United States alternative. Rather than a temporary would give advanced regions the option and its Army must return to the busi- bump in the road, the COVID-19 pan- to disengage from poorer ones, relying on ness at hand: managing the competition demic may be a catalyst for revolu- technology to replace the low-cost labor with Russia and especially China. China tionary change in the global security that previously came from abroad. In the will be the focus of American strategy system and in American security strat- broad sense nations could practice the for years to come so the Army must be egy, amplifying and speeding macro- strategic equivalent of “social distancing.” optimized to deter and defeat it. This level shifts that had already begun. It is This would have immense effects

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 37 on American strategy, undercutting the as the richer nations struggle to pay for and non-adversary threats. From this longstanding assumption that the United pandemic recovery, and the mounting perspective, homeland security rather States must be concerned with security challenge of climate change. Intermina- than security abroad – power projection everywhere because in an interconnected ble conflicts and humanitarian disasters and expeditionary military capability – world, instability and insecurity in even like Syria or Yemen may become tragi- would be the priority in resource alloca- faraway places resonates in the home- cally common. But as the United States tion, national resiliency more important land. Jobs in Indiana, the old argument struggles with the costs of the COVID-19 than defeating or deterring external en- went, depend on stability in the Middle crisis and the post-pandemic challenge of emies. The military would be an impor- East. For decades, this thinking justified building national resilience, it would be tant component of an integrated, home- an expansive strategy and an expedition- unlikely to intervene in collapsed states, land-focused security organization but ary military, including an Army capable at least outside the Western Hemisphere. more in a supporting role, its value as- of global power projection. But if the All of this may speed an ongoing – sessed by its contribution to national pandemic leads to partial deglobalization and historic – shift in the way that Ameri- resiliency rather the ability to defeat en- as Gray and others predict, the United cans think about security. Traditionally, emies on the battlefield. States could resist the urge to attempt managing stability far from the home- land. And if promoting security around the world was not a vital U.S. interest, it Today it makes sense for the Army to plan for some would be hard to justify an increasingly budget and force structure cuts, and to continue to expensive, expeditionary military. Hence at the same time that the United States focus on multi-domain operations, particularly in the faces immense costs from pandemic re- Indo-Pacific regions. covery and the need to build national resiliency against future disasters, the strategic rationale for keeping a powerful expeditionary military would fade. national security meant defense against The COVID-19 pandemic did not Some defense experts might contend identifiable adversaries, mostly foreign. create these trends but may accelerate that if the United States de-emphasized Enemies had to be contained, deterred and amplify them, pushing the United global power projection, Russia and and, if necessary, defeated. This was del- States toward a revolutionary transfor- China would simply step in as America egated to security professionals whether mation in the way it thinks about and disengaged from parts of the world and civilian or military. Most of the public organizes for security. become hegemonic. This seems improb- was only involved in security by paying able. If anything, deglobalization will taxes and electing officials who support- ❚ Changes for the U.S. Army affect China, with its export focused ed it. This conceptualization reflected Clearly the “bump in the road” sce- economy, impending demographic chal- the conditions of the 20th century but nario would mean business as usual for lenges caused by decades of a “one child” now is dated. Today’s security environ- the Army while the “revolutionary trans- policy, and mounting climate change is- ment is characterized by a blurred dis- formation” one would require a wholesale sues, more than the United States. In all tinction between foreign and domestic redesign. The economic costs of pandemic likelihood Chinese and Russian security threats; informational saturation which recovery and the ensuing shift to holistic, strategy also will change dramatically in fuels partisanship and makes the United homeland-focused security with a robust the coming decade. States vulnerable to manipulation; the public health component will cut deeply Deglobalization is only one com- ability of nonstate adversaries to attack into Army acquisitions and moderniza- ponent of the revolutionary change that the United States; the “weaponization of tion. This will be particularly true of sys- COVID-19 is unleashing. The pandemic everything”; and the growing salience of tems designed for warfighting against ad- also may reshape the global security sys- non-adversary threats like pandemics, versary armed forces. Rather than being tem by causing widespread state collapse environmental disasters, climate change, optimized to fight identifiable enemies, as weak governments are hammered by and economic crises. the “revolutionary transformation” Army the immediate cost of recovery from the Even before COVID-19, the United would need to fight identifiable enemies, pandemic, the loss of remittances and States was slowly moving toward a “tri- confront clandestine adversaries, and trade as the world undergoes partial de- angular” conceptualization of security support civilian authorities as they build globalization, the localization of manu- simultaneously focused on identifiable national resiliency against non-adversary facturing, the loss of foreign assistance adversaries, clandestine adversaries, threats – all at the same time.

38 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 STEVEN METZ: U.S. Army: Long-Term Implications of COVID-19

U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade prepare to board an aircraft prior to an airborne operation in Aviano Air Base, Italy, June 24, 2020. (Photo: U.S. Army / Spc. Ryan Lucas)

While it is impossible to predict how scenarios are the outer boundaries of multi-domain operations, particularly much the Army would shrink in the revo- the effects that the COVID-19 pandemic in the Indo-Pacific regions. But it also lutionary transformation” scenario, there may have on the Army. In reality the Ar- should be thinking about revolutionary would be significant force structure cuts. my’s future probably lies somewhere in transformation, assessing how it would Given the vital role of the National Guard between the two. But America’s national remain effective if ordered to take sig- in support of civil authorities, the cuts are leaders, rather than the Army itself, nificant force cuts and play a supporting likely to fall heavily on the active compo- will determine the service’s future. Na- role in the building of national resiliency nent. Eventually the U.S. Army might be tional leaders must decide whether the rather than a leading role in defeating composed mostly of the National Guard. COVID-19 pandemic requires thinking foreign enemies. As the Army’s priority shifted from war- differently about security or simply is a At this point it may be too soon to fighting to support and participation in temporary distraction from the normal begin revolutionary transformation but an integrated, homeland-focused secu- state of affairs. Is the future of American the Army should undertake a wide rang- rity system and organization, support to security deterring and possibly defeating ing program of analysis and research to civil authorities would increase in impor- foreign adversaries the way it has been develop some idea of how to do it if re- tance. The possibility – even probability for more than a century, or is it building quired. The Army has undertaken revo- – of future pandemics will increase the holistic national resiliency against the lutionary change before, most recently emphasis on networked autonomous triad of challenges? How this question is in the 1940s. Now it may have to do so operations in the Army. The COVID-19 answered will determine not only what again but this time it will be a very dif- pandemic is likely to diminish Army in- the future U.S. Army will look but also ferent sort of revolution. volvement in working directly with se- what, in the broadest sense, it will do to curity partners, shifting toward virtual promote national security. STEVEN METZ, Ph.D., is Professor of training and advice. Today it makes sense for the Army National Security and Strategy in the The “bump in the road” and to plan for some budget and force struc- Department of National Security and the “revolutionary transformation” ture cuts, and to continue to focus on Strategy at the U.S. Army War College.

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 39 The National Guard: Protect Those Protecting Us by Brig. Gen. J. ROY ROBINSON, USA (RET.)

here would many Americans active-component troops, but not Unfortunately, Guardsman have be this year without their routinely to members of the National grown accustomed to something less National Guard? Certainly Guard unless they are serving overseas. than the full support of our nation. Win even more dire straits. A provision in law does provide Do you think Army and Air National Guard soldiers and airmen have helped coverage to Guardsmen mobilized for Guard units deploy overseas, often to feed millions nationwide who suddenly duty on U.S. soil, but only if they are harm’s way, with the best equipment found themselves out of work due to the on federal orders in increments of more our nation has to officer? Some do, but COVID-19 outbreak. than 30 days. This gave peace of mind many do not. They’ve also tested hundreds of to some Guardsmen on the front lines The 278th Armed Cavalry Regi- thousands for the virus, disinfected of the worst public health crisis in more ment from Tennessee recently spent many nursing homes, and kept hospi- than a century. But many others didn’t time in Poland as a tripwire, the first tals nationwide supplied with personal qualify. They were either in a different line of deterrence and defense against protective equipment. Guardsmen also status or did not meet a rather arbitrary Russian adventurism. They did so us- helped restore a measure of order in time requirement. ing old, analog tanks that are no longer American cities when many protests And none of them are covered after advanced enough for active-component spiraled out of control. they leave COVID-19 duty. Our nation Army units. At one point in early June, nearly provides Guardsmen with six months This example is hardly an excep- 100,000 Guard soldiers and airmen of transitional coverage after an over- tion. Most Air National Guard pilots were on duty across every state, Guam, seas mission to cover any lingering ef- are younger than the planes they fly. Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, fects, but not one day after helping fight The same goes for many Army National and the District of Columbia. That’s al- what has turned out to be a very tricky Guard aviators and their helicopters. most double the number that respond- virus at home. And ditto for many of the Guards- ed to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. I have one word for this: men who roll up to a disaster scene in Most Americans know this. The unconscionable. a Humvee. Good thing that Guard me- Guard’s response to these trying times But such coverage is not required chanics are so good. They have to be to has been one of the few good news sto- by law, so the Pentagon won’t provide it. keep this old equipment in the fight. ries lately. Citizen-soldiers and airmen Congress recognizes the need to fix It’s time for our nation to treat came out to help when other citizens this. There are bills in both the House the National Guard as the go-to force heeded the advice to stay in. and Senate to provide Guardsmen with that it has become and the nation re- Many may not know that the Guard six months of transitional healthcare quires. Active-component members also continued to provide thousands after a domestic mission. The legislation have front-line equipment and benefits. of soldiers and airmen to missions will likely pass, but not soon enough to Guard soldiers and airmen deserve and overseas in places including Afghani- help those now heading back to their need the same. stan, Kuwait and Syria. The days of the families. If not now, when? Guardsmen have Guard as strictly a strategic reserve are A simple solution would be to pro- proven they have America’s back. It’s history. In any future fight, the Guard vide Guard soldiers and airmen with time for all of us to have theirs. will be among the first in. no-cost medical coverage for the dura- What most probably don’t know tion of their service in uniform, and not Brig. Gen. J. ROY ROBINSON, is that while this force has become in- just during some missions. Increased USA (Ret.) is President of the Na- dispensable, it struggles with some- medical readiness and better recruiting tional Guard Association of the thing as essential as medical cover- and retention would likely more than United States in Washington, D.C. age. Our nation offers health care to cover the costs.

40 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 Ruled or Governed? review by SHOSHANA BRYEN

re Americans ruled or governed? the government. The operative words are Before you get to the excellent “represent” and “serve.” Young Patriots by Charles Ce- The great genius of the United States Arami (published in 2005 and is that the Founders believed two things: still definitely a book for 2020), read that governing was better than ruling the fictional, but very real,A Thousand and that the nature of the American Splendid Suns (2007) by Khalid Hos- people and their government would seini. Readers follow the (mis)fortunes evolve toward better. They did not be- of two Afghan women from the time of lieve in perfection. King Zahir Shah through his overthrow The question of who knows best by the communist Doud Khan through what others should do is the setup for the bloody Soviet occupation through Young Patriots, the story of James Madi- the bloody mujahidin (holy warriors) son, Alexander Hamilton, and the cre- through the bloody Taliban and into ation of the United States Constitution. the Americans. Always ruled, never Benjamin Franklin said as he signed the governed. Each time the government document, “I expect no better and I am changed, some people were sure it would not sure it is not the best.” Never missing be better, and others were sure not. The an opportunity to tweak the pompous, “sure nots” were mostly correct; but no Franklin told the delegates to “overlook one ever asked their or anyone else’s their own infallibility.” opinion. When the Americans came, Cerami, an economist and former Young Patriots: things looked pretty good for the people. editor at Kiplinger Washington Pub- The Remarkable Story of Two For a while. Then the war started again, lications, was the editor of A Marshall Men, Their Impossible Plan and and the Americans mostly left, and the Plan for the 1990s: An International the Revolution That Created the people of Afghanistan are pawns again – Roundtable on World Economic Devel- Constitution or always were. opment. But his avocation, it seems, and Therein lies the difference between his great love is American history. His by Charles Cerami ruled and governed. books include Benjamin Banneker: Sur- Ruled is when someone tells you veyor, Astronomer, Publisher, Patriot; what to do because they think they Jefferson’s Great Gamble: The Remark- know better or God tells them or they able Story of Jefferson, Napoleon, and have more money or the right color skin the Men Behind the Louisiana Purchase, or more weapons or less compunction and Dinner at Mr. Jefferson’s: Three about stealing, beating, or killing peo- Men, Five Great Wines, and the Evening ple who don’t conform. [Slaves of any that Changed America. color in any country in any historical Although the book is nominally or present-day context; Jews; Uighurs; about Madison and Hamilton, Cerami Tutsis; Armenians; women and others creates a full picture of a great many del- have experience with this.] Governed is egates with their foibles, fears, and bril- when people are periodically vested by liance, as well as compelling and thor- the voters with the authority to repre- ough treatment of the issues with which sent the needs and wishes of their con- they struggled. stituents in the laws they pass. Governed The Declaration of Independence well is when the laws they pass protect was signed in 1776 and the war with the people they serve – including from Britain officially ended in 1783. By 1787,

Defense: Rising Challenges and Changing Strategies | inFOCUS 41 the Articles of Confederation were fail- more important people. the seat to an heir. George Washington – ing to hold the young country together. James Madison – the brainy but who in any event, had no heir – deeply States took on the attributes of countries, less-attractive hero of the book, who disagreed, but he was already irritated with people who didn’t agree with him and didn’t actually plan on attending the The great genius of the United States is that the Convention. He wrote to Henry Knox, “It is not my business to embark again Founders believed two things: that governing was better on a sea of troubles; nor do I suppose I than ruling; and that the nature of the American people would not have much influence with my countrymen, who know my sentiments and their government would evolve toward better. and have neglected them.” Happily, he was prevailed upon. Cerami delves deeply into the argu- ments about representation and the Elec- including being individually courted by far outpaces the handsome, Broadway toral College, differentiating the House England and France, and no one was musical-worthy Alexander Hamilton of Representatives from the Senate, and paying taxes owed to Congress. Shay’s – was a revolutionary. If the Articles of both from the Executive and the Judicia- Rebellion made some states question the Confederation aren’t working, get rid of ry, as well as arguments about the power ability of other states to manage their them. Oust the government! Power to the of the national government to override business – including slavery. And even People! decisions and laws made in the States. the determination that the new country Thomas Jefferson believed in power And the size and shape of the capital city would be a republic wasn’t certain. A to more of the people – promoting uni- – should one be needed. Jefferson’s reac- British observer noted: versal education and the vote for people tion to the draft (he was Ambassador to other than landowners. To those who France and thus not present), The Fed- They can never be united into one worried that creating more voters risked eralist Papers, European Romanticism, compact empire under any species mob rule, Madison responded that the and “The Truth about Rhode Island” get of government whatever; a disunited more people who became Americans chapters of their own. Some of these put people till the end of time, suspicious and were educated and could vote, the you back in high school history class, al- and distrustful of each other, they will less likely a ruler could claim despotic beit with an excellent teacher. be divided and subdivided into little commonwealths or principalities, ac- cording to natural boundaries. If the Articles of Confederation aren’t working, get rid And he was a friend! He wrote as well: of them. Oust the government! Power to the People! As to the future grandeur of America, and its being a rising empire under one hand, whether republican or mo- powers. Madison and Jefferson feared The discussions about slavery will narchical, is one of the idlest [Ed. in despotism above all. Interestingly, while satisfy no one. Every “compromise” the sense of impractical] and most the question of slaves and slavery was was made on the (literal) backs of Af- visionary notions that was ever con- very much on the table, the question of rican and Caribbean people even if no ceived even by writers of romance. women voting was never considered. one defended slavery as an institution. Hamilton was an elitist or maybe George Mason didn’t sign the Consti- Was it? Is it? Cerami takes the read- actually a royalist. He agreed that the tution out of his opposition to com- er deep into the minds of the delegates – Articles of Confederation weren’t work- promises on slavery. But the prescient those you have heard of and those whose ing, and that a stronger central govern- Madison foresaw the horror of the Civil names are less familiar. Gouverneur ment was necessary, particularly for fis- War to come. “Every master of a slave Morris, Robert Morris, William Liv- cal reasons. But he also believed in an is born a petty tyrant. They bring the ingston, Charles Cottsworth Pinkney, upper crust ruling the common man. In judgment of heaven on a country. As John Routledge, William Samuel John- fact, Hamilton agreed to a president, but nations cannot be rewarded or pun- son, and Roger Sherman share space thought a life tenure might be good – or ished in the next world, they must be in with better known, but not necessarily even that a president could be able to pass this.” He believed that if the southern

42 inFOCUS | Fall 2020 SHOSHANA BRYEN: states refused to join the union, their Let us look to our national charac- People began to assemble for the pur- new, independent country would be a ter and to things beyond the present pose of debating in Boston, New York, slave-based country forever. Only with period. No morn ever dawned more Richmond, Baltimore, and even in the a union could the end of slavery even favorably than ours did; and no day smaller towns – too loudly and raucous- be imagined. Oddly, South Carolina’s was ever more clouded than the pres- ly in many cases – but talking or shout- Charles Pinckney agreed, as did sev- ent! Wisdom and good examples are ing, not fighting. This was heartening. It appeared at first that people were show- Book Review ing enough maturity to realize that this document, after all, must be supported Interestingly, while the question of slaves and slavery or attacked only after studying what it said, not in blind anger. was very much on the table, the question of women voting was never considered. Americans today would do well to read Young Patriots and decide to study the issues that confront us in the 21st cen- tury with “talking or shouting, not fight- ing” and “not in blind anger.” Cerami eral other southern delegates. And so, necessary at this time to rescue the might well have added “without CNN, or the south stayed long enough for aboli- political machine from the impend- , et. al.,” which in our tionists and anti-secessionists to build ing storm…Without some altera- day have taken on the role of ruler – pre- enough support to go to war in 1861. tion… we are fast verging to anarchy digesting and telling viewers and read- As I said, the discussion will satisfy and confusion!” ers what those august bodies believe the no one – but this book is for understand- people need to know. And with minimal ing the Founders, so understanding the In Philadelphia in that sweltering input from those – politicians or media arguments matters greatly. And it is summer of 1787, the Founders did, in- members – who have forgotten how to worth considering the seriousness with deed, create a Constitution to “rescue the “overlook their own infallibility.” which the delegates took the possibility political machine.” But that was only step of losing the country they had only so one. The ratification of the document was SHOSHANA BRYEN is editor of recently established. Washington, as he left to the States and the people. And “We inFOCUS Quarterly and Senior often did, captured a moment: the People” rose to the occasion. Director of the Jewish Policy Center.

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❚ A Final Thought ...

The❚ A Final Wall Thought ...Crumbles History (high school students to the contrary) is not a There was predictable moaning from Palestinian leader- seriestk of dates; they are points in a process. A country, politi- ship and American foreign policy “experts” decrying the loss of cian, or terrorist can block history for a time, but ultimately, their beloved “two state solution.” A major “land for peace” ad- perceivedtk national interest and threats to those interests will vocate wrote, the Middle East just doesn’t matter as much any undermine a roadblock that has lost its relevance. President longer. “American leadership and exceptionalism cannot fix a Donald Trump’s policy successes in the Middle East consist broken Middle East or play a major role in leading it to a better primarily of opening artificial floodgates and allowing the future.” Shot down and out of business, his response is, “Meh.” passage of political currents already moving. He is wrong. That is not a small thing. The Abraham Accord is a major breakthrough, aided by The establishment of Israel was accompanied by a American leadership and exceptionalism. unanimous wall of rejection and military action by the Arab As Arab states put their national priorities first, wider States, but it lasted only until 1977, when Egypt found its na- swaths of cooperative activity are emerging. One has only tional requirements in conflict with the wall. Another crack to see the Abu Dhabi Department of Culture and Tourism appeared when Jordan, made peace with Israel in 1994. For mandating that “all hotel establishments are advised to in- a time, the Arab states postured as the guardians of the Pal- clude Kosher food options…” There are terrific videos of estinians, but while the Arabs were posturing, the Iranian children in the UAE singing and dancing with an Israeli flag Revolution of 1979 was having an effect on the region, i.e., on the wall – contrast with Palestinian children taught by on their national interests. Hamas that Israel has to be destroyed. El Al can overfly Sau- The destructive power of Shiite Iran has crossed the Arabi- di Arabia and Bahrain, and The Saudi Gazette carried a col- an Peninsula, decimated Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and poured umn entitled, “When Will the Palestinian Man Wake Up? “ arms and money even into Sunni Hamas. The Gulf States need Not yet apparently. The Palestinian Authority demand- the Abraham Accord as much as or more than Israel does – but ed an Arab League vote to condemn the UAE. all of them need it more than they need to cling to outmoded The Arab League declined, and the wall further crumbles. models of politics. Over the past several years, quiet but mean- ingful exchanges have taken place between Israel and several – Shoshana Bryen Arab countries and 72 years of rejection are crumbling. Senior Director, Jewish Policy Center