[“Yellow Rain” US Information Agency, 1983]

“Over the past five years, and perhaps longer, weapons outlawed by mankind, weapons successfully banned from the battlefields of the industrialized world for five decades, have been used against unsophisticated and defenseless people...” Sample from containing toxins.

....These words of an American official, in testimony before the U.S. Congress, are not based on conjecture, guesswork or the allegations of unidentified sources. They are the culmination of years of painstaking investigation, by individuals and organizations of many countries, in an effort to identify the sources, agents and extent of in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, The story uncovered by these investigations is one of suffering, terror, death, and the systematic violation of international covenants, It is the story of toxin and chemical warfare, of what the world has come to call... “Yellow Rain”

A lthough much remains to be learned, The linkage of these attacks to the Soviet The the world now knows the identities of the Union is inescapable. As the evidence victims of Yellow Rain and their attackers, shows, the Soviets developed these Findings as well as some of the types of chemical chemicals and toxins, transferred them to and toxin agents used. Laotian and Vietnamese military forces, “The The accumulated evidence, available to and supervised their deployment. In and its allies are individuals and nations everywhere, leads Afghanistan, Soviet forces have used these violating to one inevitable conclusion: The Soviet chemical weapons directly. Union and its allies are violating These conclusions are by no means international law international law systematically by using those of the alone, but are systematically by chemical and toxin weapons that have shared by many government officials and killed thousands of Asians and Afghans. representatives of international organiza- using chemical More specifically, experts have concluded tions throughout the world. After lengthy, and toxin weapons that: independent examination of the American –Laotian and Vietnamese forces, operat- evidence, for example, British authorities that have killed ing under Soviet supervision, have em- announced that they had concluded that thousands....” ployed lethal chemical and toxin weapons chemical weapons, including toxins, had in Laos since 1975; been used in Southeast Asia. At the –Vietnamese forces, armed and support- request of the Canadian Department of ed by the Soviet Union, have, since the External Affairs, the University of Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in Saskatchewan conducted an exhaustive 1978, used lethal chemical and toxin study of chemical warfare in Laos and agents in Kampuchea; and Kampuchea–and concluded that at least –Soviet forces have used a variety of three different types of agents were being lethal chemical warfare agents in employed, one of them the toxin identified Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion in as Yellow Rain. The Lawasia Society, an December 1979. organiz-ation of lawyers from South and Further evidence shows that they have Southeast Asia, also found conclusive employed Yellow Rain toxins since at evidence of chemical-agent attacks after

least 1980. an independent investigation. 0

The Y ellow Rain began as a mystery. Ini- heast Asia. After 1979, similar reports Mystery tially, facts were elusive, physical evidence emerged from Afghanistan. lacking, eyewitness testimony uncorrob- The lack of conclusive evidence was “Yet they reported orated, and tests on samples for known not surprising. These incidents were occur- one terrible, chemical warfare agents consistently ring in some of the most inaccessible re- negative. Yet beginning in the late 70s, gions of the world. It often took the victims bizarre symptom most investigators who talked with and eyewitnesses of chemical attacks in that was without H’Mong villagers from Laos, or later to Laos six weeks to reach haven in Thailand precedent: massive Kampuchean refugees, became con- and tell their stories to refugee workers, vinced that something extraordinary was doctors and journalists. Physical evidence internal bleeding.” happening in the remote jungles of Sout- was almost impossible for the refugees to

1 bring with them. Surrounded by the dead same details of the deadly aftermath of and dying, the survivors could not be the alleged chemical attacks. Those expected to gather evidence during the directly exposed to the attacks experienced attack or risk contamination to gather any severe blistering of the skin, vomiting, Yellow Rain samples. Those who were not dizziness and distorted vision. Individuals killed immediately after the attacks often on the fringe of the affected area, or those died on the march to refuge in Thailand. who consumed contaminated food and The symptoms of those least affected by water, developed many of the same the toxic agents frequently cleared up symptoms within a few weeks; some of before they reached Thailand. them died as well. After the Soviet invasion As the testimony accumulated, however, of Afghanistan in December 1979, Afghan certain facts became evident. First, the freedom fighters related the same stories varied methods of dispersal-from bombs of attacks with lethal and incapacitating and rockets to sprays-and the wide range gases. of symptoms experienced by the victims, Chemical warfare offers a choice of indicated that the attackers were using deaths. First-generation gases such as more than one chemical agent. The chlorine and phosgene, used in World War chemical attacks also followed a distinct I, are asphyxiating agents that attack the pattern. Usually a single plane appeared, lungs; mustard gas is a burning or and either released a spray or fired rockets blistering agent. Second-generation that exploded in midair; refugees often agents, nerve gases such as soman- one described the results as consisting of a of the chief chemical agents in the Soviet “red gas” or “yellow cloud.” The H’Mong arsenal-represent an enormous jump in tribesmen from Laos also reported that the toxicity; a drop on exposed skin, or inhaled particles in these clouds sounded like into the lungs, can cause convulsions and “rain” when hitting the roofs of their homes. death within hours or even minutes. After these attacks, the attackers Descriptions from Asian and Afghan sometimes returned with napalm bombs victims and eyewitnesses were consistent in an apparent effort to destroy the Yellow with the use of such gases and nerve Rain residue. In later accounts of chemical agents. Yet they reported one terrible, warfare attacks in the Thai border region of bizarre symptom that was without preced- Kampuchea, Khmer resistance forces ent: massive internal bleeding. No reported that Vietnamese forces, in chemical agent known to the West could addition to using aircraft, fired artillery and cause such intense bleeding. Still, victims mortar rounds containing chemical agents. of chemical attacks all gave similar The accounts from Asians in isolated accounts of profuse hemorrhaging. One regions of both countries were strikingly fact seemed clear: wherever Yellow Rain similar. Though separated by geography attacks occurred, they left behind a trail of

and culture, eyewitnesses reported the blood. 0

and heavy bleeding, The U.S. team con- I n late 1979, the U.S. State Department cluded that the attackers were using at and other American agencies began a co- least two and possibly three chemical ordinated effort to gather and analyze info- agents, including mustard gas, which rmation on alleged chemical warfare caused burns; nerve gas, a lethal agent attacks in Southeast Asia, seeking to verify that caused con-vulsions; and some un- the use of lethal agents, the types of known agent responsible for massive agents and what parties were carrying on hemorrhaging. The U.S. a method of warfare outlawed by inter- Intelligence information on Communist Investigation national conventions. The United States military activities, and defectors from also began discussing these reports with military forces in Laos and Kampuchea other governments. confirmed many reports of attacks. At the A team of U.S. Army medical special- same time, the United States sought to “The U.S. team ists and investigators traveled to refugee obtain samples of the blood and tissue of concluded that the camps in Thailand to verify reports of victims, as well as samples of soil, veg- chemical warfare in neighboring Laos and etation and yellow powder residue from attackers were Kampuchea. They conducted ex-tensive attack sites. using at least two interviews of eyewitnesses and survivors of During their investigations, U.S. officials and possibly three attacks, as well as of phy-sicians and found no evidence of any systematic pro- refugee workers who had treated and paganda campaign by H’Mong tribesmen chemical agents ...” cared for them. Based on these interviews, or Afghan freedom fighters to promote the the American experts identified three basic allegations that chemical agents were sets of symptoms: burns to the skin, eyes, being used against them, When early nose and throat; spasms and convulsions; indications surfaced that Pol Pot’s

2 Kampuchean resistance forces (Khmer evidence existed to warrant an impartial Rouge) did engage in such an organized investigation to determine campaign, U.S. officials made the facts. American officials indicated that a particular effort to confirm allegations of they were prepared to cooperate fully in gas attacks from sources of information such an investigation, and pointed out that not linked to the , since 1978, the United States repeatedly The U.S. State Department released its had brought reports of chemical warfare first compilation and analysis of evidence against Asians to the attention of on August 7, 1980. Based on interviews competent authorities in Laos, with eyewitnesses and victims of poison and the Soviet Union. As one official stated: gas attacks in the three nations, the “We believe the international community as Department concluded that enough a whole should attempt to establish the

facts.” 0

I n December 1980, the U.N. General As- thorities in Laos and Kampuchea denied sembly, at the urging of the United States them permission to travel to alleged The U.N. and other nations, authorized a commis- chemical warfare sites. As a result, the sion of experts to investigate allegations commission reported that it was unable to Investigation of chernical warfare in Southeast Asia by reach a final conclusion as to whether or a vote of 78 to 17, with 36 abstentions. not chemical agents had been used. In Commission members included repre- December 1981, the General Assembly, ... authorities sentatives from Egypt, the Philippines, against Soviet objections, voted by an even Kenya and Peru. greater margin than the previous year to in Laos and In September 1981, the United States extend the chemical warfare investigation. Kampuchea presented preliminary evidence to the The U.N. commission issued its second denied the commission, and urged its members to report in December 1 982 with a qualified visit refugee camps, and sites of reported finding that circumstantial evidence commission chemical use, to confirm U.S, findings that suggested “the possible use of some sort permission to lethal chemical attacks had occurred. of toxic substance in some instances.” Based on interviews with refugees in Despite the failure to be more definitive, a travel to alleged Thailand, the U.N. team did conclude that senior U.S. official at the U.N. observed: chemical the symptoms in some cases suggested “Their report supports our finding that “possible use of some sort of chemical trichothecene toxins have been identified in warfare sites.” warfare agents.” The group asked to samples. Furthermore, the team notes investigate “territories where chemical evidence that these toxin agents have been attacks have allegedly occurred,” and to used.” The commission found the interview alleged victims and eyewitnes- possibility of natural contamination highly ses there. To reach a definitive conclusion, unlikely, the official added. The tentative the experts said, “would require timely ac- of the conclusions is not surprising cess to the areas of alleged use of chem- since the commission faced severe ical warfare agents in order to establish restrictions of time and resources, the facts. Such an exercise has so far not including long delays in delivering toxin been possible.” samples, which are biodegradable, to

Access was not possible because au- laboratories for analysis. 0

The Mycotoxin O n September 14,1981, the United organisms, but also can be manufactured States announced preliminary test results synthetically.) Discovery of a vegetation sample taken from a The level of these found reported attack site in Kampuchea. Walter in the Kampuchea sample, even after Stoessel, then U.S. Under Secretary of dilution by the background material “The level of these State for Political Affairs, said the findings collected with them, was still 20 times “clearly demonstrated that American greater than occur in nature, In addition, trichothecenes concerns about chemical warfare in U.S. officials pointed out, the three toxins- found in the Southeast Asia were entirely justified.” and others identified since then-do not He stated that a leaf-and-stem sample occur as natural products of those fungi Kampuchea from Kampuchea revealed evidence of found in the hot climate of Kampuchea and sample ... was 20 three mycotoxins of the trichothecene Laos. The officials noted further that the group. The mycotoxins were identified as symptoms associated with the three times greater than nivalenol, deoxynivalenol and T2 toxin. toxins-severe itching, blistering, vomiting occur in nature .” (A toxin is a chemical poison which is and hemorrhaging-match those of alleged usually produced in nature by living victims in Southeast Asia. 3 Scientific O n November 17,1981, the United were found in at least four of the nine States announced the results of tests on victims. Analysis three more samples from Kampuchea and On May 13,1982, the State Department Laos. U.S. officials said these new results- released results of blood-sample tests together with those of previous tests- from two more Kampucheans who were “The /blood/ wholly supported the judgment that tricho- victims of an apparent gas attack on samples were... thecenes have been used as chemical February 13. The samples were flown to warfare agents in those two nations. the United States, tested by Mirocha, and found to contain Experts examined the new samples found to contain levels of T2 toxins as high levels of T2 toxin carefully to obtain accurate results, as 22 parts per thousand million and Investigators collected vegetation and soil levels of 10 parts per thousand million for as high as 22 parts samples from the sites of alleged a T2 derivative. By comparison, Mirocha per thousand chemical attacks, as well as samples from explained, doses of one to five parts per million ...” nearby areas outside the target zone. A thousand million can kill animals. leading mycotoxin scientist, Chester According to Prak Reth, one of the Mirocha of the University of Minnesota, Kampuchean guerrillas tested, tested them on a “blind” basis. Officials Vietnamese troops were shelling his unit provided no information concerning the with artillery near the village of Tuol Chrey history or origin of the samples; Mirocha when they fired one or more chemical was requested only to examine the coded rounds, All the Kampuchean troops shortly samples for the presence of tricho- began suffering from severe toxic thecenes. The samples included veget- poisoning: eye irritation, bloody vomiting ation known not to contain mycotoxins and and diarrhea, trembling and painful samples where trichothecenes were breathing. Within a day, Reth and other added. Although the samples from the members of the unit sought medical attack areas showed the presence of treatment. Amos Townsend, a physician trichothecenes, the materials from outside with the International Rescue Committee, the attack areas were found free of these was called in to take blood samples from mycotoxins. These results further con- Reth and another guerrilla. firmed the U.S. contention that these toxins According to a November 1982 State do not occur naturally in Southeast Asia. Department report, experts have continued The State Department presented more to collect additional physical evidence, and findings on January 29, 1982, based on to test the blood and tissue of the latest blood and urine samples of survivors of a victims arriving at Thai refugee camps. chemical attack in Kampuchea during the These rigorously analytical tests confirm fall of 1981 that killed several persons. allegations of unceasing chemical and

Traces of the T2 toxin or its derivatives toxin attacks through the fall of 1982. 0

Soviet T he fungus which produces iated with chemical and these mycotoxins thrives on grains ex- research. Connection I: posed to cold, wet climates. Although The facilities for producing and storing outbreaks of these deadly toxins have been mycotoxins are similar to those needed for Toxins reported in Japan, Europe and the United pharmaceutical-grade antibiotics. No such States, it is the Soviet Union that historically facilities exist in Southeast Asia to re- has experienced repeated outbreaks of search, test, produce and deploy in “The Soviet Union what Russians called “staggering munitions the quantities of Yellow Rain has been studying sickness,” which is characterized by agents present there. The Soviet Union, profuse internal bleeding. however, does have this capability. A trichothecene Outbreaks of these mycotoxins through number of these Soviet facilities, according mycotoxins since contamination of stored grains have to the U.S. experts, are under military occurred in the , Soviet Central control and heavy military guard. the 1930’s, and is Asia, the Urals and Siberia. In 1944, some A survey of Soviet scientific literature considered the world 30 percent of the population of the during the past 50 years shows a strong Orenburg district in Siberia were stricken interest in producing large quantities of leader in this by the mycotoxins. An estimated 30,000 mycotoxin, amounts far beyond ordinary research.” people-10 percent of the population- research requirements. Of the 50 articles reportedly died, on trichothecenes in unclassified Soviet The Soviet Union has been studying literature, some 22 discussed the opt- trichothecene mycotoxins since the 1930’s, imum conditions for biosynthesis of the and is considered the world leader in this toxins. research. According to Western experts, The testimony of foreign military officiers mycotoxins are an important subject of who have attended the Military Academy of study at Warsaw Pact institutes assoc- Chemical Defense in Moscow supports

4 Right, Soviet soldier in chemical-war exercise during Warsaw Pact manuevers. Soviet military maintains largest chemical- warfare establishment in the world; they also are leaders in mycotoxin (Yellow Rain) research. Below, individual chemical detection kit taken from Soviet soldier in Afghanistan. Blowup from kit at bottom lists two standard chemicals in Soviet arsenal, soman and sarin. Since Afghan resistance fighters have no chemical-war capability, kit serves exclusively to detect contamination from Soviets’ own use of chemical agents. Top, Soviet military the conclusion that the Soviets consider among chemical warfare agents. personnel undergo chemical decontamination during chemical weapons an effective and Another indication of Soviet activity in Warsaw Pact exercise. To acceptable means of warfare. Soviet biological warfare research was the April decontaminate tanks and instructors outlined the use of three types 1979 explosion at a military laboratory other military vehicles operating in chemical-war of chemical agents: harassing agents near Sverdlovsk. That blast released a zones, Soviets employ such as CS or ; incapacitants and cloud of anthrax spores that killed modified jet engines (photos herbicides; and during the “decisive phase, approximately 1,000 persons in the area. above) that spray lethal agents can be employed under Soviet officials insisted that the anthrax decontarninants at high deaths were due to eating contaminated temperatures and speeds. certain circumstances .... Chemical Chemical decontamination weapons can be used to spoil enemy meat. Experts, however, have pointed out systems for individuals and efforts to initiate operations, even if the that anthrax spores are killed by thorough vehicles, such as those enemy has not used them first.” cooking. In addition, according to some shown here, have been deployed in a number of The 1977 East German military manual, reports, autopsies of victims showed that forward combat areas Textbook of Military Chemistry, matter-of- death was caused by inhaling the anthrax throughout Afghanistan. factly discusses the development of toxic spores. Experts also noted that the quant- agents, and points out that since toxins ity of spores released by the explosion are not living substances and can be pro- was far too great for research purposes

duced synthetically, they can be included alone. 0

6 Soviet The evidence from Laos and Kampu- reported frequently that Soviet-backed Connection II: chea indicates that select Laotian and Vietnamese forces have delivered chem- Vietnamese forces, under direct Soviet ical agents in artillery shells, mortar and Southeast Asia supervision, have used lethal trichothe- grenade rounds, and in rockets fired by cene toxins and other combinations of aircraft. Often, the Kampuchean troops chemical agents against H’Mong resis- describe the gas from these munitions as “... Pathet Lao and tance forces and villages in Laos since at white or yellow, causing chest pain, least 1976, and against Kampuchean vomiting, disorientation and profuse Vietnamese troops, guerrilla forces since 1978. bleeding. According to numerous accounts assisted by Soviet In Kampuchea, Vietnamese forces by refugees and soldiers, Vietnamese chemical war have used lethal trichothecenes and other forces in Kampuchea also have undert- chemical agents primarily against Khmer aken a systematic campaign to poison specialists, are Rouge troops. The United States estim- water sources and food supplies with a using lethal agents ates that at least 1,000 have died in more variety of chemical agents, including toxins. than 130 documented attacks from 1978 In Laos, H’Mong hill tribesmen and against H’Mong through the fall of 1982. Most have oc- lowland cultures have traditionally been in populations in an curred in Battambang and other provinces conflict. Many H’Mong tribesmen sided with bordering Thailand. France and later with the United States in effort to exterminate In one operation, a Vietnamese soldier fighting Communist forces in Indochina. a difficult foe.” who later defected reported that in March Now Lao and Vietnamese government 1979, Soviet advisers accompanying his troops, assisted by Soviet chemical war unit employed chemical weapons in a specialists, are using lethal agents battle with Khmer Rouge forces. He test- against H’Mong populations, apparently in ified that after his regiment donned gas an effort to subdue or possibly exterminate masks, two Soviets fired a hand-held a difficult foe. weapon whose shell gave off clouds of U.S. officials report, for example, that gray and white smoke upon impact, killing Soviet experts oversee a number of chem- more than 300 Khmer Rouge troops, as ical weapons storage facilities in South- well as a Vietnamese border-defense east Asia. As one U.S. official stated: “Both contingent which did not have gas masks. lethal and nonlethal chemicals are bel- This was not an isolated incident. ieved to be stored at these sites and are Kampuchea: Kampuchean resistance forces have transported between storage facilities and Chemical Warfare Zones ordinance camps or field use areas as Provinces where chemical needed.” attacks have occurred The H’Mong frequently have witnessed Soviets directing air and ground chemical Area of concentrated chemical attacks war attacks. The Laotian Air Force, for example, is for all practical purposes run Adopted from U.S. State Department map by more than 500 Soviet advisers who provide the equipment, technical and logistical support, and give training in conventional and chemical warfare. Other eyewitnesses have testified that Soviets routinely supervise the handling, storage and loading of chemical weapons in Laos. Teams of Soviet chemical warfare specialists also have conducted frequent inspection tours in Laos and Vietnam. One of the most detailed accounts of chemical warfare comes from a Laotian pilot who defected in 1979. For two years, from 1976 to 1978, he flew combat mis-

7 sions in light aircraft, armed with rockets missions with ordinary explosives. A modified to carry chemical warheads. His senior Vietnamese or Lao officer always targets were H’Mong villages, often in the accompanied him, instructing him to at- mountainous Phou Bia region that was a tack at an unusually high altitude, and to center of H’Mong resistance to the Pathet return to base immediately after firing his Lao regime. His account is valuable rockets without making a normal second Tests on leaf sample (below), because it helps verify accounts of Laotian run to assess the damage. During this collected from site of chemical at- tack in Laos, reveal concentration refugees who were the victims of such period, he received additional pay, extra of trichothecene mycotoxins. Be- attacks. food, and regular physical checkups and low left, field testing of vegetation According to his testimony, flight injections. The pilot observed that his and water samples in Southeast Asia for the presence of toxins or procedures for these chemical attacks, red-tipped rockets exploded above the other chemicals. According to which employed distinctive rockets with ground, releasing large amounts of H’Mong observers in Laos, cow at loose-fitting red tips, differed sharply from smoke that appeared light red and yellow bottom right died after exposure to chemicals from aerial attack.

8 in color. This description corroborates weight of the evidence is clear and H’Mong testimony describing Yellow Rain unambiguous: The Soviet role in the attacks as a colored cloud or mist. manufacture, supply and deployment of U.S. officials estimate the number of chemical munitions to their client states in Asians killed in this campaign- Southeast Asia is massive and continuing. directed mainly against non-combatants-at Experts agree that it is impossible to The overwhelming majority about 6,000, although other observers contend that Vietnamese and Laotian of victims of chemical and toxin attacks are civilians, not soldiers. place the fatality count much higher, forces could manufacture and deploy such The H’Mong children below and between 15,000 and 20,000. a large and varied arsenal of chemical at right, interviewed at refugee Is it possible that Vietnam and Laos munitions against largely defenseless camps in Thailand, are suffering from skin outbreaks that experts could be using chemical agents Asian peoples without active Soviet believe were caused by aerial independent of the Soviet Union? The involvement and logistical support. 0 chemical attacks.

According to medical interviewers, H’Mong refugee (right) was blinded and sickened by a chemical attack on his home near Laos: Chemical Warfare Zones the Phou Bia region of Laos. Provinces where chemical attacks have occurred Area of concentrated chemical attacks Military headquarters with chemical unit Refugee Camp

Adopted from U.S. State Department map

9 One Victim’s Story

This is Lor Xiong, clothes. Approximately 10 village died, as did some of a 15-year-old H’Mong boy minutes later, he became the vegetation in the area. who lived in the Phu He area very sick-with chest pain, When Canadian officials of Laos, which contains a difficulty breathing, interviewed Xiong at a number of small H’Mong drowsiness and impaired refugee camp, he still was villages. In the spring of hearing. Throughout the suffering from the effects of 1982 he was working in the night, he vomited and the attack. He continued to fields when he heard a jet suffered from bloody experience chest pains, and aircraft pass overhead. diarrhea. Xiong said that a to breathe with difficulty Shortly thereafter, a wet, number of other villagers when walking. Most of his yellowish substance fell from became ill, and he saw one body, including his face, the sky, soaking his shirt person die after eating remained covered with and pants. Xiong went home, contaminated food, possibly severe skin lesions that washed and changed his tapioca. Chickens in the were itchy and painful. Soviet Connection III: I n assessing the evidence from Afghan military defectors have Afghanistan, observers have concluded identified many of the chemical agents Afghanistan that Soviet and Soviet-backed Afghan brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets, forces have conducted chemical attacks and detailed where they have been with irritants, a variety of nerve agents, stockpiled, and how and when they have “As in Southeast mustard gas, toxic smoke and incap- been used. Some of these defectors, U.S. acitating agents, including one previously experts state, are Afghan officers trained in Asia, the Soviets unknown in the West, which is termed chemical warfare by the Soviet Union. employed Blue-X for the color of the cloud it produces. The invading Soviet army carried incapacitating and It apparently renders its victims un- Soviet chemical-war equipment with them conscious for six to eight hours, allowing into Afghanistan, including modified jet lethal chemicals them to be disarmed or captured. engines that spray detergents over tanks in varying Recently, experts have received and and other vehicles at high temperatures tested samples that verify frequent and speeds to remove contaminants in combinations and eyewitness reports of the Soviet use of minutes. They also deployed AGV-3 amounts ...” Yellow Rain toxins. The special State personnel decontamination chambers. Department report published in November These facilities consist of three tents in 1982, for example, documents the analysis which soldiers decontaminate, strip and of two contaminated Soviet gas masks that change into fresh uniforms. revealed the presence of trichothecene Such equipment is standard for the mycotoxins. Soviet Army, and its presence in Afghani-

At left, Soviet truck equipped for operations in chemical-war zones drives through a main street in Kabul. Truck has filtration and ventilation unit installed behind cab (close-up above) that cleanses air pumped inside vehicle. Interior air pressure is kept higher than outside pressure, insuring that chemical-laden air cannot seep into truck through windows, doors or other openings.

Afghanistan: Chemical Warfare Zones Afghan in refugee camp Provinces where chemical attacks have ccurred displays lesions that he Area of concentrated chemical attacks claims resulted from Soviet chemical attack. Military headquarters with chemical unit Refugee Camp

Adopted from U.S. State Department map

11 According to eyewitnesses, which in- stan was not unusual, even though the section of the country; by the spring and cluded Dutch journalist Bernd surnmer of 1980, eyewitnesses and de Bruin, photograph at top shows Afghan freedom fighters do not pose a actual Soviet chemical attack near chemical-war threat. Rather than being refugees reported attacks in all areas of the village of Faizabad in Afghanistan. kept in storage or rear areas, however, this resistance to the Soviet-installed regime. Helicopter gunship has just As in Southeast Asia, the Soviets dropped canisters that are exploding equipment has been spotted in forward into yellowish cloud. Within hours, combat zones. Further, Afghans have employed incapacitating and lethal victims of this and later attacks in the witnessed both vehicle and personnel chemicals in varying combinations and area began suffering from itching, decontamination units in use, and seen amounts; eyewitness reports indicate that facial swelling and other symptoms. the Soviets have tended to use irritants and Body of Afghan (above), photo- Soviet soldiers wearing protective clothing. graphed shortly after these attacks, is The deployment of such Soviet incapacitating agents in populated areas blackened by internal bleeding-not decontamination equipment, observers easily accessible to outside observers, burns-since hair remains. Experts and lethal chemicals, including Yellow speculate that this individual may have stated, “suggests that chemical have been killed by a chemical such battalions have supported offensive Rain toxins, in battles against mujahidin as phosgene oxime. chemical use.” forces in more remote mountain regions. In the first months of the invasion, Still the reports accumulate. Mujahidin Afghan observers reported 10 separate eyewitnesses in Lowgard Province, for chemical attacks in the northeastern example, report that on two occasions in

12 September 1982, Soviet forces contam- the information available, experts estimate inated underground water supplies by that chemical attacks killed at least 3,000 using an armored vehicle to pump a yellow Afghans by 1982. Officials indicate that the gas through hoses into waterways. actual casualty figure might be twice that

Based on a conservative analysis of number. 0

Soviet E ven after the physical evidence, the chemical agents that can contaminate eyewitness testimony and other pieces of food supplies and water sources, the at- Connection IV: information are assembled, a question tackers can depopulate entire regions, and remains: Why? force the inhabitants to disperse or move Motivations Why would the Soviet Union risk world into refugee camps. condemnation to conduct chemical war The Soviets could be using trichoth- attacks against Asian and Afghan peoples ecene toxins, among other agents, for a “They are weapons who pose no conceivable threat to Soviet variety of reasons. Experts speculate that security interests? toxins are relatively cheap to manufacture, of terror that can An assessment, of the political and and safe to store and transport. They are effectively subdue military situations confronting the Soviets relatively unknown in the West, and there- in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea sug- fore are difficult to locate, collect and ident- entire villages or gests several answers. In all three cases ify. populations... the Soviets and their clients are trying to The evidence also indicates that the attackers can end the resistance of forces operating from the Soviets regard these remote regions relatively inaccessible jungle or as opportunities for field study and exper- depopulate entire mountainous terrain, In many cases, imentation with chemical and toxic agents. regions, and force conventional weapons-artillery, bombs and The number of different agents used, for napalmare not particularly effective, and example, suggests an attempt to evaluate the inhabitants to direct infantry assaults are costly in men which chemical weapons are most effect- disperse or move and materiel. Chemical agents, on the ive under actual battlefield conditions. In other hand, offer a quick, effective means of Laos, survivors of a Yellow Rain attack rep- into refugee destroying forces that have little or no ort that Laotian troops injected them with a camps.” defense against such attacks. “new medicine” and took them to a hos- Chemical weapons offer the Soviets pital for observation. In Afghanistan, eye- several other advantages, They are witnesses have seen Soviet troops in full weapons of terror that can effectively protective gear enter areas subjected to subdue entire villages or populations; chemical attacks and examine the bodies further, by usingpersistent nerve and of the dead. 0

U.S. Chemical Agents T he United States is aware of Soviet used widely in America as weed killers for allegations that the United States engaged 30 years. It was only after U.S. forces had “...In the in chemical warfare activities during the applied large concentrations of these Vietnamese with the use of herbicides- chemicals in Vietnam that reports surfaced notably so-called “.” that heavy exposure might be responsible conflict, the The distinction between U.S. and for birth defects and a high incidence of United States used Soviet chemical operations in Southeast liver cancer, even in American soldiers. herbicides to Asia is a critical one. The chemical agents These still unconfirmed reports caused used by Communist forces in Afghanistan, U.S. officials to stop the use of the herb- deprive enemy Laos and Kampuchea since 1976 include icide in Vietnam and the United States at forces of ambush substances that are intended to kill. In the the same time. Vietnamese conflict, the United States In Vietnam the United States also cover and to used herbicides to deprive enemy forces of used standard riot control agents such as disrupt enemy food ambush cover and to disrupt enemy food CS tear gas that can be found routinely in sources. The chemicals in Agent Orange the inventory of police forces in the United sources.” are by no means exotic; they have been States and many other countries. 0

13 International The use of chemical and toxin agents unconditionally renounced use of all is a violation of two major international biological weapons. In 1970 the U.S. ban Law treaties. The first is the 1925 Geneva on biological weapons was extended to Protocol, one of the few remaining leg- include toxins. acies of the First World War, and among On February 8, 1982, the Reagan the oldest agreements on Administration reaffirmed the U.S. com- “Possession or still in force. Both the United States and mitment against the use of such weap- transfer of toxin the Soviet Union are signatories. ons: “The United States will not use weapons to other The Geneva Protocol bans the use in chemical weapons unless chemical war of asphyxiating, poisonous gas and weapons are first used against us or nations is a clear bacteriological methods of warfare. Some our allies. The United States does not violation of the nations signed this protocol with reserv- and will not possess biological or toxin ations. The United States, for example, weapons.” 1972 Biological and has reserved the right to regard the ac- As State Department official Richard Toxin Weapons cord as non-binding if any enemy state Burt pointed out in March 1982, the Soviet should not abide by the provisions of the Union “has never provided any specific Convention.” Protocol regarding chemical weapons. information to the international commun- President Franklin D. Roosevelt was one ity on what steps it has taken to comply of the first to articulate a U.S. policy that with the 1972 convention’s ban on the has remained consistent for the past 50 production and stockpiling of biological years: “We shall under no circumstances and toxin weapons.” resort to the use of such weapons unless He continued: “In 1980, when the they are first used by our enemies,” United States sought clarification of re- The Soviet Union has similar reser- ports of an outbreak of anthrax in the city vations. It has reserved the right to regard of Sverdlovsk, from causes which did not the protocol as non-binding should any appear natural, the Soviet Union refused enemy fail to observe the Protocol’s to engage in the sort of consultations provisions. prescribed in the 1972 treaty.” The second treaty is the 1972 Bio- A common defect of the Geneva Bio- logical and Toxin Weapons Convention, logical Weapons Convention is that neit- which prohibits the possession or tran- her contains provisions for verification, sfer of toxin weapons to other countries. nor any adequate mechanism for res- The Soviet Union, the United States and olving issues of compliance. Since the most other nations are signatories to this late 1970’s, the United States has made agree-ment as well. a continuous effort to reach agreement Even before the 1972 convention on with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive biological and toxin weapons entered into ban on chem-ical weapons. U.S. officials force, the United States took unilateral state that these talks have been stale- action. In 1969 President Richard Nixon mated because of fundamental disagree- reiterated that the United States unilat- ments on the need for effective verification, erally renounced “first use” of lethal or “part-icularly Soviet intransigence on

incap-acitating chemical weapons, and questions relating to on-site inspection.” 0

The 1972 Convention is an expansion of the In article //, the Convention states: earlier Geneva Protocol. It specifically prohibits Biological the production, stockpiling and transfer of “Each State Party to this Convention Biological biological and toxin weapons. Article I of the undertakes to destroy, or to divert to Weapons convention states: peaceful purposes as soon as possible but not Weapons later than nine months after the entry into “Each State Party to this Convention force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to Convention weapons, equipment and means of delivery develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise specified in article I of the convention...” of 1972 acquire or retain: And article /// reads: “(1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of “ Each State Party to this Convention production, of types and in quantities that undertakes not to transfer to any recipient have no justification for prophylactic, whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in protective or other peaceful purposes; any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international “(2) weapons, equipment or means of organizations to manufacture or otherwise delivery designed to use such agents or acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, toxins for hostile purposes or in armed equipment or means of delivery specified in conflict.” article I of the Convention.”

14 Vientiane where he discusses the problem with declassified intelligence information pertaining to various diplomatic missions and the senior U.N. the use of chemical weapons in Laos, representative in Laos. During the visit, he raises Kampuchea and Afghanistan. U.S. concerns about the problem directly with The 40-nation Committee on Disarmament the Lao Foreign Ministry. includes language in its Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly on the need for an September 1979 impartial international investigation of the problem of chemical weapons use. Chronology The United States dispatches a Department of December 1980 of Diplomatic Defense medical team to Thailand to interview and prepare a report on H’Mong refugees having and knowledge of gas attacks in Laos. With the support of the United States and other nations, the U.N. General Assembly adopts a International November 1979 resolution (A/35/144 C) establishing a U.N. investigation, under the auspices of the U.N. Actions on Secretary General and with the assistance of The U.S. makes demarches to the Vietnamese in qualified medical and technical experts, of Chemical Paris and to the Soviets in Moscow expressing reports of chemical weapons use. The vote is concern about reports of poison gas use against 78 in favor, 17 opposed, with 36 abstentions. Warfare Use resistance forces in Laos. Both the Soviets and Vietnamese support the Lao denial of the validity March 1981 of the reports. December 1979 In accordance with General Assembly Resolution A/35/144 C and the request of the October 1978 U.N. Secretary General, the United States offers State and Defense Department officials present detailed information pertaining to reports of the evidence of gas attacks in Laos to the Foreign use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. The U.S. submission consists of a The United States calls the attention of the Lao Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of letter summarizing the U.S. findings, the U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Washington to press Representatives. compendium of reports from August 1980, an reports alleging use of poison gas in Laos. update to that compendium covering the period Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian February 1980 through January and February 1981, the and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke travels to transcripts of U.S. congressional hearings held Vientiane and discusses U.S, concerns over on the subject, and the texts of resolutions H’Mong human rights and other issues with The United States makes a bilateral demarche to condemning the use of chemical weapons Laotian government officials. the Soviets regarding chemical warfare in Laos passed by the U.S. Senate and House of and Kampuchea, and about reports that chemical Representatives. Late 1978 weapons are being used by the Soviets in Afghanistan. The demarche takes place in Geneva during U.S.-Soviet bilateral negotiations July 1981 The Department of State directs U.S. diplomatic on a comprehensive prohibition of chemical missions in the Southeast Asia area to weapons production, development and The United States provides further details and investigate the alleged use of poison gas against stockpiling. written responses to questions from the U.N. the H’Mong. May 1980 Group of Experts concerning the U.S. March January 1979 1981 submission.

The United States dispatches an interagency September 1981 The Department of State again informs the Lao team of U.S. government political technical and Embassy of U.S. concerns about reports of intelligence officers to Europe to brief Western In a September 13th speech in Berlin, Secretary poison gas use in Laos, coupling this with a allies about the Yellow Rain problem, and to of State announces that the similar demarche in Vientiane. The Lao deny the stimulate support for an impartial international United States has obtained physical evidence of validity of the reports. investigation. the use of lethal mycotoxins in Southeast Asia, discovered in the analysis of a leaf-and-stem March 1979 July 1980 sample from the site of a chemical attack in Kampuchea. On September 14, the United States submits a The U.S. Representative to the 35th session of U.S. makes another demarche to the Soviets in report on the new evidence pertaining to the use the U.N. Human Rights Commission expresses the course of U.S.-Soviet bilateral chemical of mycotoxins to the U.N. Group of Experts. On concern about the plight of the H’Mong, warfare negotiations. the same day, Under Secretary of State for specifically raising the issue of poison gas. The Inter-Parliamentary Union adopts a Political Affairs Walter Stoessel holds a press resolution calling for an impartial international conference in Washington and provides a May 1979 investigation of reports of chemical weapons detailed press backgrounder on the new use. evidence. During consultations with Soviet Foreign A U.S. State Department representative goes to August 1980 Minister Andrei Gromyko in New York, Secretary refugee camps in Thailand to ‘interview H’Mong Haig again raises U.S. concerns about the new claiming to be eyewitnesses and/or victims of evidence on the use of lethal mycotoxins in poison gas attacks in Laos. The United States circulates to U.N. member Southeast Asia, and about the 1979 Sverdlovsk A State Department representative visits states a 125-page compendium of reports and anthrax incident.

15 October 1981 presents evidence of Yellow Rain attacks, blood samples from two Khmer Rouge soldiers including an analysis of a sample obtained by subjected to a February 1982 chemical-war ABC that contained the presence of three attack show extremely high levels of the Following up the Haig/Gromyko discussions, mycotoxins in addition to a man-made chemical mycotoxin T2 and its derivatives. Robert Grey, consultant to the Arms Control and substance used in aerosols. Disarmament Agency, makes detailed bilateral The U.N. Secretary General submits the June 1982 demarches to the Soviets in Washington; at the Report of the U.N. Group of Experts investigating same time, the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission reports of chemical weapons use. The report is initiates similar discussions in Moscow. Both inconclusive and states that the group had been The states that, “Careful and raise the general subject of Soviet compliance unable to carry out all the actions it had intended independent study of information released to us with the Biological Warfare Convention, as well (e.g., onsite visits to Afghanistan, Laos and by the United States Government has now led as specific U.S. concerns regarding the 1979 Kampuchea) due to the refusals to cooperate of us to believe that chemical weapons, probably Sverdlovsk anthrax incident and the evidence of the countries concerned, and that it had been including mycotoxins, have been used in the use of trichothecerie mycotoxins in unable to complete some of the actions it had Southeast Asia.... Southeast Asia. In their formal response, made planned (e.g., on-site visits to Pakistan, analysis “The use of chemical weapons is a flagrant in November, the Soviets reject U.S. concerns of the samples obtained in Thailand) in the time contradiction of the civilized standards reflected once again. available. in the 1925 Protocol. Moreover, the use of toxins The U.S. sends another interagency team of With the full support of the United States and in Southeast Asia would represent a breach of political, technical and intelligence officers to other nations, the U.N. General Assembly adopts the 1972 convention banning biological and toxin Europe to brief the allies about the new a resolution (A/36/96 C) extending the mandate weapons.” evidence of the use of lethal mycotoxins in of the U.N. Group of Experts investigating A study conducted by ’s University of Southeast Asia. chemical weapons use for another year. The Saskatchewan concludes that at least three A delegation of U.S. government political, vote on the resolution is 86 in favor, 20 opposed, different types of chemical agents have been technical and medical experts appears before and 32 abstentions. employed in Southeast Asia, one of them being the U.N. Group of Experts, where they respond trichothecene mycotoxins. to questions pertaining to the U.S. submission on January 1982 Following an independent investigation September 14 of new evidence concerning use sponsored by an organization of lawyers called of lethal mycotoxins in Southeast Asia. Lawasia, a distinguished group of jurists and The United States releases the results of tests academics from five Asian nations report that November 1981 on survivors of a fall 1981 chemical attack in they are “morally certain” that chemical Kampuchea in which traces of T2 toxin or its weapons have been used in Kampuchea and derivatives were found in blood and urine Laos. The U.N. Group of Experts investigating use of samples of four of nine victims. chemical weapons travels to Thailand to visit September 1982 refugee camps and interview and examine March 1982 survivors and eyewitnesses of chemical attacks in Laos and Kampuchea. While there, the Soviet soldier, captured by Afghan resistance experts obtain samples from alleged chemical Secretary of State Haig submits a forces after defecting, testifies that he has seen attacks and samples of vegetation and blood comprehensive report to the U.S. Congress three different types of Soviet chemical from refugees exposed to chemical attacks. entitled “Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and weapons stored at an air base in Afghanistan. In testimony before the U.S. Congress, Afghanistan.” The report is based on a special He further states that he has witnessed Soviets Richard Burt, Director of the Bureau of Politico- U.S. National Intelligence Estimate which returning from combat who had been Military Affairs, announces that analyses of concludes that: 1) Lao and Vietnamese forces, contaminated by their own gases, and talked to samples from areas subject to chemical warfare under Soviet supervision, have used lethal a crewman from a helicopter gunship just after a reveal high levels of mycotoxins, while analyses chemical and toxin agents in Laos since 1975; 2) mission during which his unit fired chemical of control samples from noncombat areas in Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea have rockets at mujahidin forces. Southeast Asia contain no mycotoxins. employed lethal chemical and toxin agents since The United States submits a report to the U.N. 1978; and 3) Soviet forces have used a variety November 1982 Group of Experts on its analyses of chemical of lethal and nonlethal chemical and nerve warfare samples from Kampuchea and Laos, agents in Afghanistan since the 1979 Soviet which were found to contain high levels of invasion. The U.S. State Department issues a speI cial mycotoxins. report entitled “Chemical Warfare in Southeast The United States makes demarches to the April 1982 Asia and Afghanistan: An Update.” The report Vietnamese in New York and to the Lao in describes conclusive physical evidence of Vientiane regarding the evidence of the use of trichothecene mycotoxin use by Soviet forces in lethal mycotoxins in the conflicts in Kampuchea The United States dispatches an interagency Afghanistan, and presents additional evidence and Laos. Both the Vietnamese and the Lao team of U.S. government political, technical and and testimony that supports claims that chemical reject the evidence and deny the validity of U.S. intelligence officers to Europe and Asia to brief and toxin attacks are continuing unabated in all concerns. governments and the public on the three countries. overwhelming evidence of the use of lethal December 1981 chemicals and toxins in Southeast Asia and December 1982 Afghanistan.

The American Broadcasting Company (ABC) May 1982 A U.N. investigating team issues a qualified broadcasts a special television documentary on report stating that “it could not disregard the chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and circumstantial evidence suggestive of the Afghanistan entitled “Rain of Terror,” which U.S. State Department announces that additional possible use of some sort of toxic chemical in some instances.”

16 A World Challenge As this document is printed, the weapons of chemical war are being used against Asians and Afghans precisely for the reasons that nations have sought to outlaw them: because they are weapons of mass terror, suffering and death. The evidence of systematic Yellow Rain attacks and their con- nection to the Soviet Union can no longer be ignored or dismissed by the international community. With- out strong, concerted action by the community of nations, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the oldest arms control agreement still in force, and the 1972 Biological Weapons Con- vention, are in danger of becoming meaningless pieces of paper that Credits afford security to no one. Writer: Edmund Scherr Editors: Howard Cincotta, As one official stated: “What is Adrienne Price Art Director: Robert Banks going on today in Afghanistan and Editorial Assistant: Diane Lewis

Southeast Asia is not an East-West Photos: Cover, U.S. Department of State Inside Front Cover, U.S. issue, It is an issue of universal Department of Defense. 5-6, U.S. Defense Department. import with particular conse- 8-10, Photos provided by U.S. State Department. quences for those countries least 11, Top, U.S. Defense Department (2); U.S. State prepared to defend against the use Department. 12, Bernd de Bruin (2). of chemical and biological agents. “It is the responsibility of the world community which will, in the end, determine whether these attacks continue and proliferate or halted forever.” UnitedStates Information Agency 83-134(56) Washington, D.C.