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Yellow Rain” US Information Agency, 1983] [Yellow Rain US Information Agency, 1983] Over the past five years, and perhaps longer, weapons outlawed by mankind, weapons successfully banned from the battlefields of the industrialized world for five decades, have been used against unsophisticated and defenseless people... Sample from Laos containing trichothecene toxins. ....These words of an American official, in testimony before the U.S. Congress, are not based on conjecture, guesswork or the allegations of unidentified sources. They are the culmination of years of painstaking investigation, by individuals and organizations of many countries, in an effort to identify the sources, agents and extent of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, The story uncovered by these investigations is one of suffering, terror, death, deception and the systematic violation of international covenants, It is the story of toxin and chemical warfare, of what the world has come to call... Yellow Rain A lthough much remains to be learned, The linkage of these attacks to the Soviet The the world now knows the identities of the Union is inescapable. As the evidence victims of Yellow Rain and their attackers, shows, the Soviets developed these Findings as well as some of the types of chemical chemicals and toxins, transferred them to and toxin agents used. Laotian and Vietnamese military forces, The Soviet Union The accumulated evidence, available to and supervised their deployment. In and its allies are individuals and nations everywhere, leads Afghanistan, Soviet forces have used these violating to one inevitable conclusion: The Soviet chemical weapons directly. Union and its allies are violating These conclusions are by no means international law international law systematically by using those of the United States alone, but are systematically by chemical and toxin weapons that have shared by many government officials and killed thousands of Asians and Afghans. representatives of international organiza- using chemical More specifically, experts have concluded tions throughout the world. After lengthy, and toxin weapons that: independent examination of the American Laotian and Vietnamese forces, operat- evidence, for example, British authorities that have killed ing under Soviet supervision, have em- announced that they had concluded that thousands.... ployed lethal chemical and toxin weapons chemical weapons, including toxins, had in Laos since 1975; been used in Southeast Asia. At the Vietnamese forces, armed and support- request of the Canadian Department of ed by the Soviet Union, have, since the External Affairs, the University of Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in Saskatchewan conducted an exhaustive 1978, used lethal chemical and toxin study of chemical warfare in Laos and agents in Kampuchea; and Kampucheaand concluded that at least Soviet forces have used a variety of three different types of agents were being lethal chemical warfare agents in employed, one of them the toxin identified Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion in as Yellow Rain. The Lawasia Society, an December 1979. organiz-ation of lawyers from South and Further evidence shows that they have Southeast Asia, also found conclusive employed Yellow Rain toxins since at evidence of chemical-agent attacks after least 1980. an independent investigation. 0 The Y ellow Rain began as a mystery. Ini- heast Asia. After 1979, similar reports Mystery tially, facts were elusive, physical evidence emerged from Afghanistan. lacking, eyewitness testimony uncorrob- The lack of conclusive evidence was Yet they reported orated, and tests on samples for known not surprising. These incidents were occur- one terrible, chemical warfare agents consistently ring in some of the most inaccessible re- negative. Yet beginning in the late 70s, gions of the world. It often took the victims bizarre symptom most investigators who talked with and eyewitnesses of chemical attacks in that was without HMong villagers from Laos, or later to Laos six weeks to reach haven in Thailand precedent: massive Kampuchean refugees, became con- and tell their stories to refugee workers, vinced that something extraordinary was doctors and journalists. Physical evidence internal bleeding. happening in the remote jungles of Sout- was almost impossible for the refugees to 1 bring with them. Surrounded by the dead same details of the deadly aftermath of and dying, the survivors could not be the alleged chemical attacks. Those expected to gather evidence during the directly exposed to the attacks experienced attack or risk contamination to gather any severe blistering of the skin, vomiting, Yellow Rain samples. Those who were not dizziness and distorted vision. Individuals killed immediately after the attacks often on the fringe of the affected area, or those died on the march to refuge in Thailand. who consumed contaminated food and The symptoms of those least affected by water, developed many of the same the toxic agents frequently cleared up symptoms within a few weeks; some of before they reached Thailand. them died as well. After the Soviet invasion As the testimony accumulated, however, of Afghanistan in December 1979, Afghan certain facts became evident. First, the freedom fighters related the same stories varied methods of dispersal-from bombs of attacks with lethal and incapacitating and rockets to sprays-and the wide range gases. of symptoms experienced by the victims, Chemical warfare offers a choice of indicated that the attackers were using deaths. First-generation gases such as more than one chemical agent. The chlorine and phosgene, used in World War chemical attacks also followed a distinct I, are asphyxiating agents that attack the pattern. Usually a single plane appeared, lungs; mustard gas is a burning or and either released a spray or fired rockets blistering agent. Second-generation that exploded in midair; refugees often agents, nerve gases such as soman- one described the results as consisting of a of the chief chemical agents in the Soviet red gas or yellow cloud. The HMong arsenal-represent an enormous jump in tribesmen from Laos also reported that the toxicity; a drop on exposed skin, or inhaled particles in these clouds sounded like into the lungs, can cause convulsions and rain when hitting the roofs of their homes. death within hours or even minutes. After these attacks, the attackers Descriptions from Asian and Afghan sometimes returned with napalm bombs victims and eyewitnesses were consistent in an apparent effort to destroy the Yellow with the use of such gases and nerve Rain residue. In later accounts of chemical agents. Yet they reported one terrible, warfare attacks in the Thai border region of bizarre symptom that was without preced- Kampuchea, Khmer resistance forces ent: massive internal bleeding. No reported that Vietnamese forces, in chemical agent known to the West could addition to using aircraft, fired artillery and cause such intense bleeding. Still, victims mortar rounds containing chemical agents. of chemical attacks all gave similar The accounts from Asians in isolated accounts of profuse hemorrhaging. One regions of both countries were strikingly fact seemed clear: wherever Yellow Rain similar. Though separated by geography attacks occurred, they left behind a trail of and culture, eyewitnesses reported the blood. 0 and heavy bleeding, The U.S. team con- I n late 1979, the U.S. State Department cluded that the attackers were using at and other American agencies began a co- least two and possibly three chemical ordinated effort to gather and analyze info- agents, including mustard gas, which rmation on alleged chemical warfare caused burns; nerve gas, a lethal agent attacks in Southeast Asia, seeking to verify that caused con-vulsions; and some un- the use of lethal agents, the types of known agent responsible for massive agents and what parties were carrying on hemorrhaging. The U.S. a method of warfare outlawed by inter- Intelligence information on Communist Investigation national conventions. The United States military activities, and defectors from also began discussing these reports with military forces in Laos and Kampuchea other governments. confirmed many reports of attacks. At the A team of U.S. Army medical special- same time, the United States sought to The U.S. team ists and investigators traveled to refugee obtain samples of the blood and tissue of concluded that the camps in Thailand to verify reports of victims, as well as samples of soil, veg- chemical warfare in neighboring Laos and etation and yellow powder residue from attackers were Kampuchea. They conducted ex-tensive attack sites. using at least two interviews of eyewitnesses and survivors of During their investigations, U.S. officials and possibly three attacks, as well as of phy-sicians and found no evidence of any systematic pro- refugee workers who had treated and paganda campaign by HMong tribesmen chemical agents ... cared for them. Based on these interviews, or Afghan freedom fighters to promote the the American experts identified three basic allegations that chemical agents were sets of symptoms: burns to the skin, eyes, being used against them, When early nose and throat; spasms and convulsions; indications surfaced that Pol Pots 2 Kampuchean resistance forces (Khmer evidence existed to warrant an impartial Rouge) did engage in such an organized United Nations investigation to determine propaganda campaign, U.S. officials made the facts. American officials indicated that a particular effort to confirm allegations of they were prepared to cooperate fully in gas attacks from sources of information such an investigation, and pointed out that not linked to the Khmer Rouge, since 1978, the United States repeatedly The U.S. State Department released its had brought reports of chemical warfare first compilation and analysis of evidence against Asians to the attention of on August 7, 1980. Based on interviews competent authorities in Laos, Vietnam with eyewitnesses and victims of poison and the Soviet Union. As one official stated: gas attacks in the three nations, the We believe the international community as Department concluded that enough a whole should attempt to establish the facts. 0 I n December 1980, the U.N.
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