Populism in Europe and Its Russian Love Affair

DALIBOR ROHAC, EDIT ZGUT, AND LÓRÁNT GYŐRI JANUARY 2017

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary

opulists are increasingly dominating politics in channel subversive Russian propaganda and help PEurope. This paper provides an overview of the erode Europeans’ trust in the EU, NATO, and liberal populist landscape in Europe, including its history, democratic politics at large. Some of them even have its ideological underpinnings on both the political financial ties to the Kremlin. left and right, and the factors that have contributed To rise to the populist challenge, Europe’s politi- to its resurgence. cal elites need to do more than just pursue their tradi- Although populism often responds to real griev- tional strategy of isolating and delegitimizing populists. ances, it rarely offers credible policy solutions. Instead, they have to offer policy solutions that reso- Instead, as the examples of Poland and Hungary nate with their electorates and address the grievances suggest, when populists accede to power, they can that are currently driving voters into the open arms of succumb to authoritarian tendencies, weakening populist charlatans. The United States can help, too— institutional constraints on that power, including the most importantly by holding its European friends and traditional checks of the judiciary and civil society. allies to high standards of democracy and rule of law, The rise of populism is of immediate practical inter- helping them combat Russian disinformation, and fos- est to US policymakers. Europe’s populists routinely tering greater economic openness and dynamism.

1 Populism in Europe and Its Russian Love Affair

DALIBOR ROHAC, EDIT ZGUT, AND LÓRÁNT GYŐRI

n 2016, Western politics were shaken by two events that associates the EU with an unqualified endorse- Iof potentially historic importance: the Brexit cam- ment of open borders. paign’s success in the United Kingdom and Donald Populists often contrast ineffective policies of Trump’s victory in the US presidential election. Both European leaders, the cumbersome functioning of appear to be symptoms of a dramatic political realign- EU institutions, and the woes facing the European ment transforming Western politics beyond recog- project with Vladimir Putin’s strong and decisive nition. Instead of the traditional divide between the leadership and his embrace of traditional values. political left and right, a new cleavage has emerged Worse yet, they oppose policies aimed at curbing between centrist establishment forces and those who Russia’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe. are challenging the status quo from populist positions. Populism’s simultaneous resurgence across Europe For example, Trump has attracted the support of and the Kremlin’s efforts to assert its dominance in many disenchanted voters who previously supported the post-Soviet space belie any illusions that may Democratic presidential candidates. On matters of have once existed about the inevitable triumph of economic and trade policy, his rhetoric often mim- democratic capitalism in Europe or about Europe icked that of Sen. Bernie Sanders, the far-left candidate “whole and free.” who lost the Democratic nomination to Hillary Clin- In response, mainstream politicians might be ton. In the UK, the campaign to leave the EU united tempted to counter populism by embracing some the populist right and the antiestablishment segments elements of populist agendas, such as tighter immi- of the Labour Party.1 While its conservative and liber- gration restrictions or government control of the tarian critics saw the EU as synonymous with over- economy aimed at protecting domestic jobs.2 To regulation, redistribution, and socialism, its left-wing some extent, that reaction is understandable. The enemies saw it as a vehicle for neoliberal reforms lack- grievances driving today’s populist revolt are real and ing democratic accountability or transparency. cannot be ignored. However, it would be a mistake European electorates, traditionally apathetic to use those grievances to justify policies that would toward the EU, are growing more receptive to the damage economic performance further, undermining implicit or explicit rejection of the European project the sense that existing political and economic institu- integration at heart of the current antiestablishment tions are able to deliver widely shared prosperity. backlash. The common European currency and Euro- Before any strategy can be devised to counter pop- pean institutions at large are blamed for Europe’s ulism, it is necessary to understand it. The term “pop- poor economic performance since the 2008 global ulism” is vague and refers to both political strategies economic downturn. The 2015 refugee crisis, together and styles, as well as to policy platforms. In the for- with the wave of terror attacks that struck Paris, Brus- mer sense, populism is a matter of degree—all politi- sels, and Nice, has amplified the existing anxieties cal messages, wherever they come from, “are adapted over immigration and has given birth to a narrative to what one assumes voters want to hear.”3

2 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

Populist narratives can be found on the left and However, once in office, they secured political con- the right. Their narratives overlap significantly: both trol of all branches of government—including those left- and right-wing populists stress the silent major- that had traditionally been independent of politi- ity’s anger that has been betrayed or left behind by a cal pressures, such as the constitutional court, cen- self-serving, out-of-touch elite.4 The specifics differ tral bank, and public broadcasting organizations. To across countries and include the capture of politics justify these steps, both parties have emphasized the by the financial industry or big business, austerity substantial popular mandate they received in the policies, stagnating incomes and loss of employ- elections. In Greece, the current government domi- ment, too much political correctness and inabil- nated by the far-left Syriza has attracted controversy, ity to respond to security threats, or immigration partly by trying to limit the number of private televi- in general. sion broadcasters.

Populism and Authoritarianism In cases when populists It is possible to view populism as a helpful corrective to the excesses of establishment politics. Mainstream have arrived in influential politicians are by no means immune to compla- cency and stasis, unless they are challenged by polit- positions, they have ical competitors. The main reason why the current wave of populism can become a problem for Euro- pushed the formal and pean democracies lies in the authoritarian leanings displayed by populist political forces after they have informal boundaries of arrived in power in several European countries. Authoritarian populism’s distinguishing mark is democratic governance. rejecting constraints that are placed on political deci- sion making. In a small number of cases of openly communist and neo-Nazi parties that are allowed to Another illustration of the authoritarian leanings operate in Europe, such rejection is explicit. More of some of the political groups under consideration is frequently, however, European populists’ authori- their embrace of referenda in representative democ- tarian proclivities reflect their belief that the major- racies. In the UK, proponents of Leave see the Brexit ity’s will should trump the institutional constraints referendum as the final word on the UK’s EU mem- placed on politics. As Andrzej Lepper, the late leader bership, despite a constitutional system in which of Poland’s populist authoritarian party Samoobrona sovereignty remains with Parliament, not with pop- (Self-Defense), put it, “if the law works against people ular majorities. and generally accepted notions of legality then it isn’t In other EU member states, populist parties have law. The only thing to do is to break it for the sake of initiated referenda on subjects that are typically the majority.”5 decided by elected representatives of the people, not In cases when populists have arrived in influential by a volonté générale. Recent examples include the ref- positions, they have pushed the formal and infor- erendum held in Greece in July 2015 over the bailout mal boundaries of democratic governance. Neither conditions proposed by the Troika; the Dutch refer- of the two authoritarian populist parties controlling endum on the association agreement between the EU Poland (Law and Justice Party) or Hungary (Fidesz) and Ukraine, also held in April 2016; or the referen- arrived in power by advocating that their respective dum on the EU-organized refugee relocation mecha- countries abandon liberal democracy. nism held in Hungary in October 2016.

3 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

The view of politics as completely subordinated populists have an accommodating view of individual to the majority’s will is at odds with an understand- and civil liberties. ing of liberal democracy as a system that constrains Furthermore, mainstream political parties are not political decision making in a framework of consti- completely immune to authoritarian tendencies. The tutional rules. To the extent in which populism and question of placing political parties in one category or authoritarianism are connected, the current populist another thus becomes necessarily a question of degree. wave opens questions about the future of politics in All the parties considered in this paper are repre- countries that rank among the oldest and most stable sented in national parliaments, except Alternative for democracies in the world. Germany (AfD), which in our view deserves interest That question, as Trump’s electoral triumph despite its absence from the Bundestag. There is, of shows, is not completely irrelevant in the US context course, a much richer infrastructure of other fringe either. Trump’s signature policy proposals, includ- parties, groups, and movements outside national par- ing shutting down mosques and using a deportation liaments that we do not study in this paper. Table A1 in force, have been identified by his critics as incompat- the appendix provides an overview of the leading pop- ible with the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Four- ulist parties in EU countries represented in national teenth Amendments to the US Constitution.6 parliaments. Whenever represented in the European If current trends continue, populists will likely Parliament, these parties are typically part of the fol- end up governing an increasing number of European lowing parliamentary groups: Europe of Nations and countries. Whatever that means for the future of their Freedom (ENF, nationalists), Europe of Freedom and political institutions, it raises challenges for US for- Direct Democracy (EFDD, hard euroskeptics), and eign policy and engagement with Europe. Ameri- European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL, can policymakers have to be aware of the corrosive far left).7 effects that authoritarian populism can have on the In some cases, the opposition to the EU and Muslim commitment of European countries to a Western- immigration is an extension of traditional nationalism. led liberal order. Nor should America take it for The nationalist segments of the populist landscape in granted that liberal democracy will survive in coun- Europe are relatively old. Their political influence has tries where the current populist wave is amplified by been growing slowly but steadily, as their campaigns underlying political institutions’ weaknesses, subver- and messages have become increasingly effective. sive Russian propaganda, and the Kremlin’s co-opting For example, the foundation of France’s National of political elites. Front (FN) dates back to 1972, although the party struggled as a political force for the first decade of its existence. During the leadership of its founder, Meet the Discontents: An Overview of Jean-Marie Le Pen, its appeal was self-limiting, per- Populist Parties in the EU haps because of Le Pen’s recurrent controversies, including his statements about the Vichy regime8 Classifying political parties as populist or authori- and the Holocaust.9 His daughter, who took con- tarian is not without controversy. Few would openly trol of the party in 2011, extended its appeal and advertise their populist, much less authoritarian, rebranded the party as a more modern force with character. Similar to other political groups, such par- wider appeal.10 ties are not homogeneous or impervious to change. Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) was founded in 1956, Instead, they encompass a variety of views, some of initially as a classical liberal alternative to Austria’s them friendlier to ideas of liberal democracy and lim- two dominant political parties, the center-right Peo- ited government than others. Some on the political ple’s Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democrats (SPÖ), right advocate a relatively modest role for the gov- both of which controlled Austria’s government ernment in the economy. Conversely, many left-wing throughout its postwar history. The FPÖ’s embrace

4 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

of nationalism and electoral success began under Jörg party first entered Swedish Riksdag, and again follow- Haider’s leadership starting in 1986. ing the 2014 election when it became the third-largest Haider led the party into the 1999 election, after party in the Riksdag, after the SPÖs and the Moder- which the FPÖ joined the coalition government, ates. Like its counterparts elsewhere, the SD advocate much to the EU’s dismay, which responded by impos- immigration restrictions, reject multiculturalism, and ing diplomatic sanctions against Austria. Although want to renegotiate Sweden’s place in the EU. only a junior coalition partner, the FPÖ initiated a The Finns Party, initially known as True Finns, was number of new bills that were rushed through the founded in 1995. Unlike their counterparts in other legislative process and later struck down by Austria’s Nordic countries, the Finns’ economic platform is Supreme Court. The FPÖ’s most recent resurgence in explicitly left wing, advocating a strong economic role the polls, which led to the narrow defeat of its candi- for the government, including a redistributive state, date, Norbert Hofer, in the second round of the pres- in line with the status quo existing in Finland. idential election on December 4, 2016, was driven A small number of populist parties in European largely by the public reaction to the refugee crisis that countries are rooted in regionalist movements. The hit Europe in 2015.11 most prominent ones include the Flemish Interest The Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, (VB) in Belgium and the North League in Italy. The founded by Geert Wilders, has conservative roots. VB is the Flemish Bloc’s successor, which dates back Wilders started his political career working for Frits to the 1970s and was disbanded after a court ruling Bolkestein, an eminent classical liberal who led the in 2004. The VB advocates for Belgium’s dissolution, People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) citing as models the peaceful separations of Czecho- and later became an influential EU commissioner. slovakia and the dissolution of Sweden and Norway’s Wilders left VVD over its support for Turkey joining union. Furthermore, it opposes immigration, particu- the EU. His platform married economic liberalism larly from Muslim-majority countries. with a critical attitude toward Islam and immigration. The North League’s ideology has been fluid because The firmanti-immigration and anti-Islam agenda the organization has served mainly as a catchall party gradually eclipsed all other elements of the PVV’s pro- for Northern Italian separatism. The party favors a gram. Besides advocating a prohibition of halal slaugh- socially conservative, anti-immigration government ter, restrictions on Islamic headscarves, and a program that takes an active role in the economy. Following its of repatriating criminals of foreign and dual citizen- electoral success in 2008, the party became a part of ships, the PVV wants the Netherlands to leave the EU Silvio Berlusconi’s government. The Croatian Demo- and return to using the guilder instead of the euro.12 cratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB) falls The Danish People’s Party (DF) was founded in into the same regionalist category, drawing support in 1995 and resembles its Austrian and Dutch counter- the northeast of the country thought to be neglected parts in combining pro-market rhetoric with a rejec- by the central government. tion of Muslim immigration and multiculturalism. A different category of parties derive their ideolog- While not formally a part of the government coali- ical basis from conservative and libertarian euroskep- tion, the DF is providing parliamentary support to the ticism. The AfD was founded in 2013 by a group of current government. German academics opposed to EU bailouts for ailing The Sweden Democrats (SD) date back to 1988 economies on eurozone’s periphery. Over time, the and started as an extremist movement with docu- AfD has grown into a formidable political force, in part mented ties to white supremacists and neo-Nazis.13 by embracing the anti-immigration and anti-Islam Over time, the party has emulated the more success- agenda that was initially associated with the Move- ful nationalist parties in Western Europe such as the ment against Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA). FPÖ and the FN, garnering political influence and a AfD’s voters are also concerned about the “Islam- broad following. The effort paid off in 2010 when the ization” of the West and support PEGIDA’s mass

5 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

demonstrations.14 Thilo Sarrazin, a former Bundes- of Slovakia’s wartime fascist regime. At the time of its bank board member and author of the bestselling book founding in 2003, the Movement for a Better Hungary Germany Is Abolishing Itself,15 has been a frequent guest (Jobbik) belonged in this category, too. In 2007, Job- speaker at AfD events. While critical of the euro, his bik started to operate a paramilitary wing, the Hun- main concern is the allegedly corrosive effect of immi- garian Guards, which the government later disbanded. gration from Muslim-majority countries on West- With its rise in the polls, Jobbik has reinvented itself ern societies. Although AfD is not represented in the by scrapping the fascist imagery and instead embrac- Bundestag, it is expected to gain a substantial number ing a more polished, professional look.17 of seats in the federal election in 2017. However, Jobbik is not the most significant author- Likewise, Alan Sked, a noted conservative histo- itarian populist party operating in Hungary. Since its rian at the London School of Economics, founded creation in the early days of Hungary’s transition from the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in communism, Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, 1991 as a single-issue anti-EU party steeped in ideas of meaning Alliance of Young Democrats) has mor- free-market capitalism. To some extent, the UKIP has phed from an anticommunist, libertarian-minded remained true to its foundational principles and has youth group, through a center-right, reformist, and provided a home to free enterprise advocates critical staunchly Atlanticist party at the turn of the century, of EU overregulation. to a populist nationalist party that seeks to move Hun- At the same time, the gradual broadening of its gary toward illiberal democracy. Under Viktor Orbán’s support (the party received 3.8 million votes in the leadership, Fidesz first formed a coalition government 2015 general election) has come at the price of craft- in 1998. The government, credited with being reform- ing messages that are more explicitly directed against ist and pro-Western, oversaw Hungary’s accession to immigration and against corrupt political elites. NATO in 1999 and also provided support to NATO’s Research into UKIP’s support reveals that UKIP’s intervention in Serbia and Kosovo later that year. core loyalists were largely politically disaffected vot- In 2010, Fidesz gained enough seats to form a ers animated by xenophobic impulses, including one-party government, followed by gaining a short- women who otherwise reject far-right groups such as lived constitutional majority in the 2014 election. the fascist British National Party. Another large group Fidesz’s two current terms in office can provide a of UKIP voters are strategic defectors who aim to glimpse into what to expect from populists who gain punish mainstream politicians but do not necessarily power. Consistent with the distrust of liberal demo- harbor any deep-seated disdain for the EU.16 cratic institutions, which is characteristic of authori- A relatively small number of political parties rep- tarians, Orbán has spearheaded a political takeover of resented in national parliaments in Europe can be all elements of the state. 18 classified safely as neo-Nazi: Greece’s Golden Dawn, “The executive and legislative branches are no lon- Bulgaria’s Attack, and Slovakia’s Kotleba—People’s ger separate,” writes economist Janos Kornai, adding Party Our Slovakia. Like the German Nazis and Ital- that the “parliament itself has turned into a law fac- ian fascists, Golden Dawn uses the Roman salute, and tory, and the production line is sometimes made to the party’s banner features a Greek meander whose operate at unbelievable speed: between 2010 and 2014 design and color scheme echo the German Nazi par- no less [sic] than 88 bills made it from being intro- ty’s swastika. Attack in Bulgaria uses the solar cross duced to being voted on within a week; in 13 cases it all in its imagery, a symbol appropriated by neo-Nazis happened on the same or the following day.” Further- worldwide. Its manifesto advocates the introduction more, “reliable people close to the center of power of national betrayal as a crime and the prosecution of occupy decision-making positions even in organiza- national traitors. tions which are not legally under the control of the In Slovakia, the uniforms Kotleba party members executive branch . . . in the constitutional court, the wore imitated the style used by the Hlinka’s Guards state audit office, the fiscal council, the competition

6 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

authority . . . the ombudsman’s office, and the central thereby eroding the established political parties’ posi- statistical office.”19 tions. Kukiz, whose music has grown to emphasize Fidesz’s constitutional majority approved the new nationalist themes, sees himself as “a right-winger Hungarian constitution without any attempts to reach with a left-wing heart.”23 a broad societal or political consensus and ignoring The PiS, in turn, has combined radical social con- domestic and international criticisms. The large par- servatism, inspired by Poland’s Catholic traditions, liamentary majority has provided a cachet of legality with a critical view of the EU—although it does not to any government decision, even when providing advocate rejecting Poland’s membership—and an favoritism to specific individuals or groups.20 Fidesz embrace of the authoritarian political traditions of has used the EU’s 2015 refugee crisis as an opportu- prewar Poland. The 2015 refugee crisis enabled the nity to reject any immigration from Muslim-majority PiS to adopt an uncompromising anti-immigration countries and has also led a group of Central Euro- position, notwithstanding the fact that Poland, pean countries into a standoff with the European which is among the most ethnically homogenous Commission over its plan to redistribute asylum seek- countries in the world, has not seen any significant ers across the 28 member states. migration inflows. On October 2, 2016, the country held a referendum with the following question: “Do you want the Euro- pean Union to be able to order the mandatory settle- ment of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without Although populism is parliament’s consent?”21 Leaving aside the deliber- ately suggestive wording of the question, the refer- commonly associated endum could not carry any legal weight because the resettlement scheme was a matter of European, not with the political right, Hungarian, law. The referendum was ultimately void because of a low turnout, yet its goal—to deepen the it has its manifestations divisions between European countries at a time when a united front is required to confront the bloc’s many on the far left as well. challenges22—was largely met. Poland’s experience with populists in power has followed Hungary’s. The country has had a colorful Following PiS’s return to power in October 2015, landscape of populist parties, which have seen signif- the country has seen a standoff between the govern- icant churn over the years. The 2001 parliamentary ment and the country’s constitutional tribunal over election saw the rise of the Self-Defense party, led by the effort to establish political control of govern- Andrzej Lepper, who became known for his disrup- ment institutions, including public-service broad- tive campaigning and colorful conspiracy theories. casters and the judiciary. The crisis prompted the The success was repeated in the 2005 election, when European Commission to launch an inquiry into the Self-Defense received 11.4 percent of the vote and problem to see if there is a “systemic threat to the joined the government coalition, together with the rule of law.”24 In June 2016, the commission issued Law and Justice Party (PiS) led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski an initial opinion concluding that the matter “has and the League of Polish Families. not been resolved.”25 If the situation persists, the In 2015, punk rock musician Paweł Kukiz won EU could hypothetically impose sanctions against 21 percent of the popular vote in the country’s presi- Poland and even suspend Warsaw’s voting rights in dential election. Afterward, he formed a political party, the European Council.26 Kukiz’15, to replace Poland’s system of proportional Although populism is commonly associated with representation with single-member constituencies, the political right, it has its manifestations on the

7 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

far left as well. Some of these emerged as significant (Sweden), Red-Green Alliance (Denmark), Left (Lux- political forces on the eurozone’s periphery in reac- embourg), Left (Germany), People Before Profit Alli- tion to the economic downturn and efforts at fis- ance (Ireland), and the Workers’ Party (Belgium). cal consolidation. These include, most prominently, Additionally, several EU countries also feature Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece. The latter openly communist parties, which could be classified was formed in 2004 as a coalition of small political not just as authoritarian but also totalitarian. Portu- groups on the far left and grew in importance during guese and Spanish Communist parties have existed Greece’s sovereign debt crisis until becoming the since the 1920s, although Spain’s Communist Party largest political force in Greece. So far, Syriza’s record was outlawed and its leadership exiled under the in the office—including its attacks on free media27 Franco regime. The Communist Party in Greece and and using direct democracy as a substitute for dem- the Progressive Party of Working People in Cyprus, ocratic procedures28 constrained by constitutional which date back to 1918 and 1926, respectively, openly rules—confirms the suspicion that in practice, popu- embrace Marxism-Leninism as their ideology’s list policymakers will gravitate toward solutions that foundation. are authoritarian in nature. The Czech Republic’s Communist Party is an out- In turn, Podemos was founded in 2014 by a young lier among Central and Eastern European countries political scientist as an extension of the previously because it is the direct successor of the totalitarian-era existing protest movement directed against the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and has not perceived corruption of the political class, rising undergone major rebranding efforts. Yet in compar- inequality, and fiscal austerity. In the elections held ison to its Greek and Cypriot counterparts, Czech in June 2016, Podemos received 24.5 percent of all Communists’ rhetoric is more moderate, dictated in votes, making it the third-largest political party in part by legal reasons, because political groups openly the country. Croatia also features a small antiglobal- advocating for the restoration of the communist ization protest party, Human Shield, which aims to regime are not allowed to operate in the country.29 fight foreclosures by occupying property. In 2015 it Furthermore, toning down its rhetoric was neces- succeeded in having one of its candidates elected to sary for the party to survive politically through an era the country’s parliament. when the memory of totalitarianism was still alive. Italy’s Five Star Movement (M5S), founded by comedian Beppe Grillo, lacks a clear ideological com- pass. A member of the EFDD group in European Understanding the Rise of Populism Parliament—together with UKIP—M5S champions environmental sustainability, noninterventionist for- Although the rise of populism across Europe is not eign policy, direct democracy, and internet access. a new phenomenon, its current outburst culminates Its growth has been fueled to a large extent by Italy’s from several decades of steady support for both the poor economic performance in the aftermath of the far right and the far left, as numerous political sci- 2008 crisis. entists have documented.30 Existing research has Many other EU countries have parties that are focused on parties of the far right—nationalists, positioned to the left relative to traditional social anti-immigration groups, euroskeptics, and others— democratic or labor parties and that share a populist whose vote share has been growing steadily. outlook that contrasts the perceived self-serving eco- On the far left, the pattern of growth in support nomic and political elites against the struggling cit- has been different. A large number of traditional izenry. Usually broader-tent coalitions of different far-left parties, many of them hardline communist left-wing groups, these parties include the Left Alli- groups adhering strictly to Marxist-Leninist tradi- ance (Finland), Left Front (France), Left Bloc (Por- tions, saw a steady decline in support until the out- tugal), Socialist Party (the Netherlands), Left Party break of the 2008 global financial crisis. Since then,

8 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

Figure 1. Total Share of Votes for Populist Parties

20

18

16

14

12

10

8

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

Source: Andreas Johansson Heinö, Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2016 (Stockholm: Timbro, 2016).

they have regained their momentum, but this time reflect a variety of different grievances, such as poor mostly in more recent and eclectic anticapitalist par- economic outcomes, excessive immigration inflows, ties such as Syriza.31 and concerns about security. Moreover, it has been documented that a signifi- A look at Western history reveals that support cant overlap exists between the voters supporting for populists rises in troubled economic times. Eco- left-wing and right-wing populists, suggesting that nomic historians who studied the Great Depres- studying the phenomena jointly is indeed justified.32 sion concluded that the drastic economic downturn Figure 1 is from a recent study by the Swedish political was associated with rising support for fascist par- scientist Andreas Johansson Heinö,33 which provides ties, especially in cases when the downturn was pro- an aggregate vote-share metric for both left-wing and tracted and led to large cumulative losses of income.34 right-wing populists across Europe. However, the rise in populist support and its politi- There are many explanations for the rise of pop- cal effects were uneven. It was stronger in countries ulists, and discriminating among them on an empir- with a recent history of democracy and low hurdles ical basis can be difficult. The most straightforward to parliamentary representation of new parties, as way to account for these political groups’ existence well as in countries that were on the losing side of is that populist ideas reflectdeep-seated preferences World War I and that therefore experienced a collec- of growing parts of European electorates. Alterna- tive sense of national humiliation. tively, votes for such parties should be interpreted The dynamics that followed the Great Depres- not as an endorsement of their platforms, but rather sion were only one instance of a more general pattern as an expression of protest and disenchantment with observed in Western liberal democracies. Financial mainstream politicians. Such disenchantment might crises between 1870 and 2014 increased the share of

9 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

votes going to the far right by 30 percent on average in ideological, cultural, and sociological. But whatever the five years from the beginning of the crisis.35 They those are, their gravity is magnified when politics and also led to higher levels of political fractionalization the economy seem like a zero-sum game. It is more as new political forces entered the scene and raised difficult to agitate voters with such grievances, justi- the risk of gridlock and political dysfunction—typi- fied or not, when they are busy having a career, seiz- cally at times when economic reforms are necessary. ing opportunities, and building a life in a country The historical record therefore suggests that sup- with a healthy economy. port for populists depends on changes in economic performance. At first sight, studies of individual-level data seem to belie the notion that economic hard- ship is driving electorates into the hands of popu- Populism seems to lists. Some instead cite the fear that immigration will undermine domestic culture as a decisive factor have many root causes: driving support for far-right parties.36 Evidence from Flanders and the UK suggests that cultural factors can ideological, cultural, dominate the narrowly economic ones.37 Such findings are echoed by recent research and sociological. on the drivers of support of Donald Trump in the United States.38 Others, too, find systematic ideolog- But whatever those ical differences between Geert Wilders’ PVV voters and other political parties’ supporters.39 A working are, their gravity is paper coauthored by one of the authors of this report found that urbanization is a strong predictor of sup- magnified when politics port for right-wing populist parties. More impor- tantly, corruption is strongly and robustly associated and the economy seem with the vote share of right-wing populists—but not of left-wing populists—and this relationship is not like a zero-sum game. driven only by a small group of countries, such as the post-Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, which suffer from systematically higher rates A fact that is oftentimes cited as being at odds with of corruption.40 a purely economic account of populism is that sup- And while concerns over immigration have been port for populists was rising for years before the finan- central to the rise of the far right, there is no direct cial crisis. Furthermore, some of Europe’s wealthiest relationship between the size of immigration inflows countries, such as Austria, Switzerland (not in the and support for far-right parties.41 However, immi- EU), and the Nordic states have seen support for pop- gration can be a source of concern because of fears ulism rise as much as in countries that experienced that it can change the domestic culture and character much more significant economic hardships in the of the country.42 It can also be a source of political past years. tensions because of the perceived competition over a If this argument is compelling, it only shows how limited amount of resources available for redistribu- dramatically we have recalibrated our understanding tion through the welfare state.43 of economic success. After all, real gross domestic Arguably that problem is exacerbated during product in both Austria and Denmark is at essentially periods of low economic growth, such as the one the same levels as in 2006. However, the slow growth witnessed in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Reces- observed throughout the West is not just a fallout of sion. Populism seems to have many root causes: the Great Recession.

10 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

Instead, as Swedish economists Fredrik Erixon and As a study by the Budapest-based think tank Political Björn Weigel show in their new book The Innovation Capital Institute demonstrated,45 pro-Russian atti- Illusion, over the past 40 years “productivity growth tudes of European far-right and far-left parties first has declined” and “companies increasingly [spent] became visible after Russia’s war against Georgia in less of their revenues on innovation or to invest in 2008 and then again after its annexation of Crimea long-term business building.”44 As a result, whether in 2014.46 you are an average Greek or Dane, the odds are that It is not a conspiracy theory to point out that the the growth of your income, consumption, and wealth Kremlin and Europe’s populists interests are aligned. has been a disappointment—and in the Greek case, Especially in times of diplomatic isolation, Russia feels a drastic one—relative to reasonable expectations a a stronger need to find political allies, whether or not decade ago. Further, if continuous improvements in they are a part of mainstream politics. Geopolitical standards of living are an integral part of the social crises provide populists with opportunities to differ- contract that gives legitimacy to democratic capital- entiate themselves from mainstream center-right and ism, it is hardly surprising that electorates are now center-left politicians by articulating an alternative looking for alternatives. foreign policy agenda, typically critical of the West Once again, this is not to dismiss the alternative and embracing Russia as a benign power.47 In Greece, accounts of populism out of hand. Rather, it is to for example, the euroskeptic Independent Greeks and point out that conflicts, grievances, and insecurities the far-left Syriza not only are parts of one coalition are always magnified by poor economic performance. government but also agree on pro-Kremlin foreign Consider any narrative about the factors of populism: policy positions. immigration, job security, cultural change, or alien- Moscow aims to undermine the Euro-Atlantic ation from politics. In all these cases, the grievance in community’s unity by engaging with small coun- question is much more tolerable in a world of contin- tries in Central and Eastern Europe individually. The ued income growth than in an economy that behaves so-called Europe of Nations resonates in the Kremlin as a zero- or negative-sum game. because Russia can exercise much greater diplomatic, The purely cultural and sociological accounts of economic, and energy-related leverage vis-à-vis indi- populism fail to address the dynamics of support for vidual European countries than when it faces with a these groups. Whatever Europeans’ attitudes toward united European front. immigration or multiculturalism, it is implausible The Kremlin’s Eurasian doctrine promises post- that European societies have become fundamentally Soviet states an escape from the EU’s perceived more xenophobic in recent years. Rather, it appears overregulation and meddling—a return to genuine more likely that open expressions of such attitudes national sovereignty. These points are complemented are acceptable in bad economic times, when the tra- by the portrait painted of a traditionalist, Christian, ditional sources of political and intellectual author- pro-family Russia against a decaying West, weakened ity come under attack for the inability to deliver good by ill-conceived multiculturalism and liberalism. economic outcomes. Putin’s reformulated ideology is built on authori- tarianism, a repressive police state, a substantial role of the state in the economy, and his rhetorical embrace The Russian Connection of “traditional values” against Western multicultural- ism, gay rights, and secularism.48 Peter Pomerantsev The rise of populism is not of interest only because of and Michael Weiss neatly summarize the Kremlin’s its first-order effects on politics in individual European strategy toward far-left and far-right parties: “Unlike countries. Although the rise of populism in Europe in the Cold War, when Soviets largely supported left- reflects domestic political realities, it has also become ist groups, a fluid approach to ideology now allows the a factor in the geopolitical conflicts on the continent. Kremlin to simultaneously back far-left and far-right

11 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

movements, greens, anti-globalists and financial the loans, suggesting that Russia has placed its bets on elites. The aim is to exacerbate divides and create an Fillon rather than Le Pen. echo chamber of Kremlin support.”49 Or, to give another example, provided that Hungary Both left-wing and right-wing populism offers fer- is not a Slavic country, lacks cultural ties to Russia, tile ground for Russian propaganda. Conservative and and cultivates the historic memory the USSR’s violent libertarian euroskeptics, who regard the EU as the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, the single most significant threat to individual freedom Hungarian public has traditionally distrusted Russia. and free markets, can be tricked into believing that However, two of the country’s most significant politi- their enemy’s enemy is their friend. Others on the cal parties, Fidesz and Jobbik, have actively supported populist right easily align with Kremlin nationalism Russian geopolitical interests in the region. and its conspicuous though largely insincere embrace In Jobbik’s case the attachment is an ideological of socially and culturally conservative values, includ- one, shaped by the influence of Russian philosopher ing organized religion. Alexander Dugin and his neofascist doctrine of Eur- France’s FN is the most influential pro-Russian asianism.52 Following the example of Russia, Jobbik party on the nationalist right. Marine Le Pen recom- would generally equate institutions of civil society, mended that Germany develop a trilateral alliance especially LGBT activists, feminists, and others, with system along the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis and called foreign agents. In 2013, Dugin invited Jobbik’s chair- for creating a Pan-European Union with Russian par- man Gábor Vona to give a lecture at Lomonosov ticipation. The FN has long cultivated a relationship Moscow State University. During his visit, Vona met with the Kremlin and other Russian stakeholders on several Duma politicians and delivered a presentation personal, organizational, and financial levels. about Russia and Europe in which he criticized the The party’s connections with Russia yield prof- EU for eroding traditional values.53 its for both sides, a recent example of which is the Jobbik has been fiercely loyal to the Kremlin. In conflict in eastern Ukraine where the FN not only the Hungarian parliament, its legislators proposed endorsed elections in separatist territories but also a Foreign Agents Law, modeled after the Russian acted as a “peace-broker.”50 In return, President example. Béla Kovács, a Jobbik member of Euro- Putin openly praised Le Pen for her electoral suc- pean Parliament (MEP), served as an “independent cess and her commitment to conservative values observer” during the illegal Crimean secession ref- and national sovereignty, instead of having a slavish erendum. In October 2015, the European Parliament devotion to Brussels. Following the FN’s endorse- lifted the parliamentary immunity for Béla Kovács, ment of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the FN who also served as the former president of Jobbik’s received a sequence of loans from the now-defunct foreign affairs cabinet and co-chair of the Russia-EU First Czech-Russian Bank.51 Inter-Parliamentary Working Group, to allow an Russia’s engagement with the far right is flexi- investigation of his alleged spying on EU institutions ble, depending on the circumstances of particular on Russia’s behalf.54 countries and situations. The strong performance A more recent example of the Kremlin’s covert of Austria’s FPÖ in the polls—and in the country’s operations in Europe involves Mateusz Piskorski, presidential election—has led to a formal agreement the leader of the Polish pro-Kremlin Change (Zmi- of cooperation with Vladimir Putin’s United Russia ana) party, and former activists of the Polish Con- party, signed in Moscow in December 2016 . Following gress of the New Right (KNP), who were being the nomination of François Fillon, another defender investigated regarding possible espionage in Rus- of Russia, as the center-right presidential candidate sia’s favor.55 According to the Polish press, interroga- in France, the relationship between the Kremlin and tions of Piskorski revealed that the Kremlin has also the FN seems to have soured, and Russian banking funded Slovakia’s neo-Nazi party Kotleba—People’s authorities are suing the party over the repayment of Party Our Slovakia.56

12 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

Despite Fidesz’s Euro-Atlanticist origins, in recent campaign’s success in leaving the EU has strength- years the party has become an effective vehicle of Rus- ened the point Russian propaganda made, namely sia’s geopolitical agenda, too. Orbán himself has been that the EU is a failed historical experiment that among the most vocal critics of the EU’s sanctions on European nation-states need to abandon. As a result, Russia after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some of this there are already 34 anti-EU or anti-immigration ref- rapprochement might be driven by political and eco- erenda set in motion by political players largely sym- nomic pragmatism. pathetic to Russia.58 The referendum in Hungary on Hungary is dependent on Russian energy imports, mandatory quotas for refugees is only one illustra- and in 2014, the Fidesz government also decided to tion of such initiatives. award the contract to complete the Paks II nuclear plant to Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy monop- oly, Rosatom. Yet the ties likely run deeper: as early as 2010, Orbán told a group of foreign ambassadors Brexit has provided that Christian values were the main binding factor between Russia and Hungary, as opposed to the secu- Russia with new larism of Western Europe. Far-left populist parties are charmed by the opportunities because promise of a state-controlled economy and the Kremlin’s rhetoric directed against “Western impe- the UK is a major rialism,” which has manifested itself most recently in Ukraine and throughout the Middle East. Far-left military power, is one parties are attracted by reinvigorated “comrade net- works” inherited from the USSR in the form of the of the most influential Kremlin-controlled Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which is a weak opposition party but an countries in Europe, important international hub in the far-left European political network. and has a political There is also a significant disinformation cam- paign about Nazi and Western imperialist inter- tradition that rejects ventions against oppressed people in Ukraine and Crimea, which lures European far-left parties into authoritarianism. endorsing the Kremlin’s geopolitical agenda. Some examples include the Left in Germany and the Czech Since the Crimean crisis erupted, the Kremlin has Republic’s Communists, a long-term antiestablish- created a giant propaganda machine in Europe by cre- ment party with stable support of around 15 percent ating scores of foreign language websites and social of the popular vote, both of which have consistently media pages that have been extensively exploited defended Russia’s political and military actions in the during the Brexit campaign and the migrant crisis, media and public appearances. Czech Communists which hit Europe in 2015. One of the well-known even share with the Kremlin a substantial degree of fake news cases about migration is the Lisa-affair,59 in social conservatism on issues including LGBT rights, which the Kremlin tried to undermine Angela Merkel in sharp contrast to other left-wing political groups.57 during the series of regional elections taking place Brexit has provided Russia with new opportunities in Germany through a carefully planned disinfor- because the UK is a major military power, is one of mation campaign. According to Russian propaganda the most influential countries in Europe, and has a websites’ portrayals, migration is part of the master political tradition that rejects authoritarianism. The plan to Islamize Europe, where the “nihilistic” and

13 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

“decadent” West is unable to defend its traditional, Kremlin-friendly caucuses—the far-left GUE-NGL Christian-conservative values. and the anti-EU EFDD—to keep them loyal, including This is in line with Orbán’s and the European far diplomatic support and financial and political carrots. right’s rhetoric. According to Orbán, the prevalence These groups’ pro-Russian positions might be driven of political correctness in the EU prevents a crucial by ideology, integral to their rejection of the European debate about immigration, which in his view threat- status quo. However, their support in crisis situations ens to destroy the Christian nature of Europe, as well such as in Crimea or Syria provided a tangible boost as the ethnic makeup of European states.60 Inciden- for the Kremlin’s agenda. They can be labeled as the tally, Orbán’s narrative is aligned with the conspiracy “parties of no” that vote against the mainstream and theory spread by Russian state-funded Russia Today the establishment.64 about George Soros “driving the invasion.”61 Another Relatively little attention has been paid to the con- Kremlin mouthpiece, Sputnik, ran a series of articles nections between the populist left and the Kremlin. about the Jobbik-party mayor of a small Hungarian Yet, considering the far left’s resurgence in the after- border town who accused the US of promoting “ille- math of the 2008 financial crisis, these factions have gal migration” to Hungary.62 become as important in European politics as the far With this self-serving reinterpretation of the right. Whereas in 2009 the radical left GUE-NGL migrant crisis, Russia’s main goal is to create an alter- group included only 4.6 percent of MEPs in 2009, in native reality in which Moscow appears as a respon- 2014 this proportion rose to 6.9 percent.65 sible global stakeholder—serving, for example and in Although the GUE-NGL originally denounced spite of all available evidence, as a peacekeeper and Russian military aggression in Crimea, the faction stabilizing force in Syria. Pro-Russian narratives also followed a clear pro-Russian line after the Crimean deflect attention from the war in eastern Ukraine, referendum in March 2014. Its MEPs rejected undermine the unity of European integration, and the parliament’s resolution calling for a military depict Western leadership as unable to act. Moreover, de-escalation in Syria on the eve of the Russian by supporting the Central and Eastern Europe region’s intervention last year.66 In June 2016, a Peace and separatist ambitions, the far right helps Russia further Anti-NATO conference organized by the faction increase the tension between the EU’s center and accused NATO of posing a nuclear threat to Russia periphery by exploiting the existing divisions.63 and the Middle East.67 The main difference between How influential arepro-Russian political voices on the ENF and the GUE-NGL is rhetoric: both the far the populist left and right? To investigate this ques- right and the far left strongly support Putin’s geopo- tion, one may study the share of pro-Kremlin votes on litical agenda, but the latter does so less openly. Russia-related motions in the European Parliament as Germany’s the Left, the Polish Democratic Left presented in Figure 2. The leading pro-Kremlin group Alliance (itself not a member of GUE-NGL), and the of the European Parliament is the ENF, led by Le Pen. Communist Party of Greece (KKE) were all named Although it accounts for only 5 percent of all MEPs independent observers to the internationally unrec- (751), by having more than 25 members, the faction ognized referendum on Crimean independence, is entitled to certain rights in the parliament and to alongside their notional political opponents from a substantial budget. While the group in the European Europe’s far-right parties, including the FN, Jobbik, Parliament has not been a game changer in European and the FPÖ.68 While their joint evaluation that the politics, it is a valuable asset for the Kremlin. Accord- referendum was legitimate was striking enough, some ing to our data, the current ENF members’ votes were went even further in providing assistance to their aligned with the Kremlin 91 percent of the time. comrades. The Left, in particular, famously delivered The Russian government and its cronies apply humanitarian aid to the self-styled authorities of the a broad range of pull factors on ENF and two other Donetsk People’s Republic in February 2015.69

14 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

Figure 2. Share of Pro-Kremlin Votes in Selected European Parliament Decisions Related to Russia

Current Members of ENF 91%

GUE-NGL 78%

EFDD 67%

Greens/EFA 15%

ECR 5%

S&D 3%

ALDE 3%

EPP 1%

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from http://www.votewatch.eu/.

Conclusion and Policy Implications refusing to engage its leaders beyond the mere mini- mum required by European treaties. In domestic pol- Populism is more than a source of research questions itics it has been common for mainstream politicians for political scientists. If the examples of Poland, Hun- not to appear in joint debates with extremists and not gary, and Greece are indicative of the nature of gov- engage directly with their agendas. ernance that can be expected from populists, Europe However, in recent months the pendulum has might brace for new attempts to dismantle checks on swung in the opposite direction, with many main- political power and to weaken free media and insti- stream politicians adopting elements of populist tutions of civil society. Populism is often a vehicle agendas, whether on trade, immigration, or govern- of Russian propaganda and soft power in Europe. ment control of the economy. Larry Summers’ call for Through financial ties, personal connections, and an a “responsible capitalism”70 and UK Prime Minister alignment of interests between the Kremlin and pop- Theresa May’s speech at the Conservative Party Con- ulist politicians, the latter have helped shape public ference in October 201671 are examples of trying to views of Russia and have provided practical political defeat populists using their own tools. assistance to Putin’s regime in the efforts to under- However, such attempts can backfire. Populism mine a more forceful European response to his inva- certainly speaks to real concerns, but the solutions sion of Ukraine and harassment of other countries in populists propose are often economically damaging. the EU’s neighborhood. Worse yet, their implementation might concentrate For many years, the canonical response of politi- political power at the expense of checks and balances cal elites to populist parties was isolation and dele- and institutions of civil society, which normally con- gitimization. Following the FPÖ’s accession to a strain government and public policy. government coalition in Austria in 1999, other EU To the extent to which mainstream politicians in countries formed a cordon sanitaire around Austria by Europe compete with populists for votes, they ought

15 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

to compete by offering real, credible solutions to pub- its traditional agenda of trade liberalization—creat- lic policy problems. For one, the historical record sug- ing an integrated, competitive transatlantic market- gests that support for populists rises after financial place can spur economic dynamism and help turn crises, which typically results in sluggish economic European economies and societies into positive-sum recoveries. Therefore, efforts to restore economic games.73 dynamism, growth, and job creation should be at the There is, of course, no guarantee that economic forefront of mainstream politicians’ efforts if they are liberalization, structural reforms, and stronger Amer- to keep the populists at bay. ican engagement will put an end to the ongoing Such efforts often require doing the opposite of onslaught of populism sweeping across Europe. How- what their instincts might suggest: pursuing poten- ever, it is even less likely that the problem will simply tially unpopular structural reforms instead of caving disappear on its own. in to interest groups, stepping up the efforts to liber- alize trade and investment flows instead of embrac- ing protectionism and economic nationalism, and About the Authors opening up space for innovation and entrepreneur- ship instead of burdening them with new regula- Lóránt Győri is a political analyst at Political Capital tions aimed to appease the discontents (or powerful and a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at Eötvös Loránd vested interests). Because support for both left-wing University in Budapest. He has been coauthoring and right-wing populists is responsive to measures of Political Capital’s flagship reports on the Kremlin’s institutional quality, particularly the presence of cor- influence in Europe and is a regular contributor to ruption, it is imperative that policymakers demon- the Information War Monitor for Central Europe, a strate their commitment to transparent, honest joint publication with the National Endowment for governance and the rule of law.72 Democracy. Nobody, not even America, can solve any of these Dalibor Rohac is a research fellow at the Ameri- problems for Europeans. However, the rise of popu- can Enterprise Institute, where he studies European lism underlines the role that the United States has political and economic trends. He is concurrently a played historically—albeit much less so in the past visiting fellow at the Max Beloff Centre for the Study eight years—especially in holding their friends and of Liberty at the University of Buckingham in the UK allies to high standards of democracy and rule of and a fellow at the Institute of Economic Affairs in law. Membership in NATO and close ties with Amer- London. ica are not based just on cold power politics. More Edit Zgut is a foreign policy analyst at Political importantly, they reflect a commitment to shared Capital, a think tank based in Budapest, where she values. For that reason, US policymakers should be studies European integration, cooperation between the first ones to point to instances of democratic the Visegrád countries, Russian influence in Cen- backsliding, as observed in some Central and East- tral and Eastern Europe, and the rise authoritarian ern European countries. populism in Europe. She is also a visiting lecturer at In practical terms, US government-funded broad- Pázmány Péter Catholic University in Budapest. casting and support for high-quality journalism can play a pivotal role in countering the subversive effects that Russian propaganda, especially when allied with Acknowledgments domestically grown antiestablishment movement, has had on political discourse across European coun- We are grateful to Danielle Pletka, Kirsten Madison, tries. Neither should the United States step back from and Gary Schmitt for helpful comments.

16 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

Appendix A Table A1. Overview of Leading Populist Parties in EU Countries Year Share of Votes Country Party Ideology EP Group Founded (Election Year)

Austria Freedom Party of Austria Nationalism ENF 1956 20.5 percent (2013)

Belgium Flemish Interest Nationalism ENF 2004 3.7 percent (2014) Workers’ Party of Belgium Far left N/A 1979 3.7 percent (2014)

Bulgaria Attack Neo-Nazism N/A 2005 4.5 percent (2014) National Front for the Salvation Nationalism 2011 7.3 percent (2014, of Bulgaria part of a coalition) Bulgarian National Movement Nationalism ECR 1999 7.3 percent (2014, part of a coalition)

Croatia Croatian Democratic Alliance Regionalism N/A 2006 1.4 percent (2015) of Slavonia and Baranja Human Shield Unclear N/A 2011 4.2 percent (2015)

Cyprus National Popular Front Far right N/A 2008 3.7 percent (2016) Progressive Party of Working Marxism- GUE-NGL 1926 25.7 percent (2016) People Leninism

Czech Communist Party of Bohemia Far left GUE-NGL 1989 14.9 percent (2013) Republic and Moravia Dawn–National Coalition Far right N/A 2013 6.9 percent (2013)

Denmark Danish People’s Party Nationalism ECR 1995 21.1 percent (2015) Red-Green Alliance Far left N/A 1989 7.8 percent (2015)

Estonia Conservative People’s Party Nationalism N/A 2012 8.1 percent (2015) of Estonia

Finland Finns Party Nationalism ECR 1995 17.7 percent (2015) Left Alliance Far left GUE-NGL 1990 7.1 percent (2015)

France National Front Nationalism ENF 1972 13.6 percent (2012, first round) Left Front Far left GUE-NGL 2008 6.9 percent (2012, first round)

Germany Alternative for Germany Euroskepticism ENF 2013 4.7 percent (2013 – below threshold) The Left Far left GUE-NGL 2007 8.2 percent (2013)

Greece Syriza Far left GUE-NGL 2004 36.3 percent (2015) Golden Dawn Neo-Nazism N/A 1980 6.3 percent (2015) Communist Party of Greece Marxism- N/A 1918 5.5 percent (2015) Leninism Independent Greeks Euroskepticism N/A 2012 3.7 percent (2015)

17 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

Table A1. Overview of Leading Populist Parties in EU Countries (continued) Year Share of Votes Country Party Ideology EP Group Founded (Election Year)

Hungary Jobbik Far right N/A 2003 20.2 percent (2014) Fidesz Nationalism EPP 1988 44.9 percent (2014)

Ireland Socialist Party/Anti-Austerity Far left GUE-NGL 1996 3.9 percent (2016, Alliance part of a coalition) People Before Profit Alliance Far left N/A 2005 3.9 percent (2016, part of a coalition)

Italy Five Star Movement Unclear EFDD 2009 25.5 percent (2013) North League Regionalism ENF 1989 29.1 percent (2013, Brothers of Italy–National Nationalism N/A 2012 part of a coalition) Alliance

Latvia National Alliance Nationalism ECR 2010 16.6 percent (2014)

Lithuania Order and Justice Nationalism N/A 2002 7.3 percent (2012)

Luxembourg The Left Far left N/A 1999 4.9 percent (2013)

Netherlands Party for Freedom Far right ENF 2005 10.1 percent (2012) Socialist Party Far left GUE-NGL 1971 9.7 percent (2012) Reformed Political Party Theocracy ECR 1918 2.1 percent (2012)

Poland Law and Justice Nationalism ECR 2001 37.6 percent (2015) Kukiz’15 Far right N/A 2015 8.8 percent (2015)

Portugal Left Bloc Far left GUE-NGL 1999 10.2 percent (2015) Portuguese Communist Party Marxist-Leninism GUE-NGL 1921 8.3 percent (2015, part of a coalition)

Slovakia Slovak National Party Nationalism N/A 1989 8.6 percent (2016) Kotleba—People’s Party Our Neo-Nazism N/A 2010 8.0 percent (2016) Slovakia We Are Family—Boris Kollár Far right N/A 2015 6.6 percent (2016)

Spain We Can (Podemos) Far left GUE-NGL 2014 24.5 percent (2016, part of a coalition) Communist Party of Spain Marxism- GUE-NGL 1921 24.5 percent (2016, Leninism part of a coalition)

Sweden Sweden Democrats Far right EFDD 1988 12.9 percent (2014) Left Party Far left GUE-NGL 1917 5.7 percent (2014)

United United Kingdom Euroskepticism EFDD 1993 12.7 percent (2015) Kingdom Independence Party

18 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

Notes

1. The campaign Labour Leave, led by Kate Hoey, was a part of the Vote Leave campaign ahead of the June referendum. While the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn stated his support of the UK’s continued membership, he refused to campaign openly in favor of Remain. See, for example, Chris Spillane, “Corbyn Hit with Claims of Brexit Sabotage,” Politico, June 26, 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/ corbyn-hit-with-claims-of-brexit-sabotage-labour/. 2. In this spirit, although without mentioning specific policies, former US Secretary of Treasury Lawrence Summers called recently for a new agenda of “responsible nationalism—an approach where it is understood that countries are expected to pursue their citizens’ economic welfare as a primary objective.” See Lawrence Summer, “Voters Deserve Responsible Nationalism Not Reflex Globalism,” Financial Times, July 10, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/15598db8-4456-11e6-9b66-0712b3873ae1. 3. Andreas Johansson Heinö, Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2016 (Stockholm: Timbro, 2016), 8. 4. Nigel Farage famously called the Brexit vote “a victory for real people, a victory for ordinary people, a victory for decent people” against “the multinationals,” “big merchant banks,” “big politics,” and “lies, corruption and deceit.” See Adam Whitnall, “EU Referen- dum: Nigel Farage’s 4am Victory Speech—The Text in Full,” Independent, June 23, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ politics/eu-referendum-nigel-farage-4am-victory-speech-the-text-in-full-a7099156.html. 5. Heinö, Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2016, 10. 6. American Civil Liberties Union, “The Trump Memos: The ACLU’s Constitutional Analysis of the Public Statements and Policy Proposals of Donald Trump,” https://action.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pages/trumpmemos.pdf; and Damon Root, “Donald Trump, Enemy of the Constitution,” Reason, March 3, 2016, http://reason.com/blog/2016/03/03/donald-trump-enemy-of-the-constitution. 7. Exceptions exist—for example, Hungary’s Fidesz belongs to European People’s Party, and Poland’s Law and Justice is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists. 8. L’Express, “Jean-Marie Le Pen Défend le Régime de Vichy,” October 10, 2014, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/fn/ jean-marie-le-pen-defend-le-regime-de-vichy_1613329.html. 9. Midi 2, “Le Pen Sur Chambres à Gaz,” National Audiovisual Institute, September 15, 1987, http://www.ina.fr/video/CAB87032378. 10. See, for example, Rachel Halliburton, “How Marine Le Pen Is Winning France’s Gay Vote,” Spectator, January 25, 2015, http:// www.spectator.co.uk/2015/01/how-marine-le-pen-is-winning-frances-gay-vote/. 11. However, Austria’s net immigration rates have long been low and are declining. 12. EurActiv, “Dutch Far-Right MP to Push ‘Nexit’ Despite Brexit Woes,” July 8, 2016, https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/ news/dutch-far-right-mp-to-push-nexit-despite-brexit-woes/. 13. Anders Widfeldt, “A Fourth Phase of the Extreme Right? Nordic Immigration-Critical Parties in a Comparative Context,” NORDEUROPAforum, 2010, http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/nordeuropaforum/2010-1/widfeldt-anders-7/XML/. 14. According to a 2014 poll, 71 percent of AfD supporters could consider joining a PEGIDA demonstration, compared with a popu- lation average of just 13 percent. See Werner Mathes, “13 Prozent der Deutschen Wurden fur Pegida Marschieren,” Der Stern, January 1, 2015, http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/fuer-pegida-auf-die-strasse--13-prozent-der-deutschen-wuerden-mitmarschieren- 3458070.html. 15. Thilo Sarrazin, Deutschland Schafft Sich Ab, DVA Verlag. 16. Robert Ford, Matthew J. Goodwin, and David Cutts, “Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament Elections,” European Journal of Political Research 51, 204–34. 17. See, for example, James Kirchick, “Meet Europe’s New Fascists,” Tablet, April 12, 2012, http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish- news-and-politics/96716/meet-europes-new-fascists; and Dalibor Rohac, “Hungary’s Hard Right Turn,” Politico, July 27, 2015, http:// www.politico.eu/article/hungarys-rising-right-wing/. 18. András Bozóki, “Occupy the State: The Orban Regime in Hungary,” Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 19, no. 2, 649–63; and Janos Kornai, “Hungary’s U-Turn,” Capitalism and Society 10, no. 1 (2015), http://www.kornai-janos.hu/Kornai_ Hungary’s%20U-Turn.pdf. 19. Kornai, “Hungary’s U-Turn,” 4.

19 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

20. For examples of legal statutes adopted to help specific individuals or corporations, see ibid. 21. Marton Dunai and Krisztina Than, “Hungary to Hold Referendum on Mandatory EU Migrant Quotas on October 2,” Reuters, July 5, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-referendum-idUSKCN0ZL0QW. 22. See Dalibor Rohac, “Hungary’s Referendum Had More to Do with Russia Than Immigration,” CapX, October 20, 2016, http:// capx.co/hungarys-referendum-was-about-geopolitics-not-migration/. 23. Aleksz Szczerbiak, “What Does Paweł Kukiz’s Election Success Mean for Polish Politics?,” LSE EUROPP, May 15, 2015, http:// blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/05/15/what-does-pawel-kukizs-election-success-mean-for-polish-politics/. 24. European Commission, “Commission Opinion on the Rule of Law in Poland and the Rule of Law Framework: Questions & Answers,” June 1, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2017_en.htm. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Kerin Hope and Eleftheria Kourtali, “Greek Court Blocks Syriza Plan to Shut TV Channels,” Financial Times, October 19, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/444421be-960f-11e6-a80e-bcd69f323a8b. 28. Sarantis Michalopoulos, “Syriza Vows to Abolish Lawmakers’ Immunity, Hold More Referendums,” EurActiv, July 26, 2016, https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/syriza-vows-to-abolish-lawmakers-immunity-in-constitutional-reform/. 29. See Article 403 of the Penal Code 40/2009 (Trestní zákoník), http://zakony.centrum.cz/trestni-zakonik/cast-2-hlava-13-dil-1- paragraf-403. 30. See, for example, Cas Mudde, “Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?,” European Journal of Political Research 52, 1–19; and Alina Polyakova, The Dark Side of European Integration: Social Foundation and Cultural Determinants of the Rise of Radical Right Movements in Contemporary Europe (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2015). 31. Heinö, Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2016. 32. Daniel Oesch, “Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland,” International Political Science Review 29. 33. Heinö, Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2016. 34. Alan de Broomhead, Barry Eichengreen, and Kevin O’Rourke, “Right-Wing Political Extremism in the Great Depression,” National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/papers/w17871. 35. Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch, “Going to Extremes: Politics After Financial Crises, 1870–2014,” Cen- tre for Economic Policy Research, http://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10884. 36. Matthew Goodwin, “Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe,” Chatham House, Septem- ber 2011, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/r0911_goodwin.pdf. 37. See, for example, Daniel Oesch, “Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland,” International Political Science Review 29, no. 3, 349–73; and Bram Spruyt, Gil Kep- pens, and Filip Van Droogenbroeck, “Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to It?,” Political Research Quarterly 69, no. 2, 335–46. 38. Jonathan T. Rothwell, “Explaining Nationalist Political Views: The Case of Donald Trump,” Social Science Research Network, November 2, 2016, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2822059. 39. Agnes Akkerman, Cas Mudde, and Andrej Zaslove, “How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters,” Com- parative Political Studies 47, no. 9, 1324–53. 40. See Dalibor Rohac, Andreas Johansson Heinö, and Sahana Kumar, “Corruption and Populism.” 41. Alina Polyakova, “The Backward East? Explaining Differences in Support for Radical Right Parties in Western and Eastern Europe,” Journal of Comparative Politics 8, no. 1, 49–74. 42. Matthew Goodwin, “Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe,” Chatham House, 2011, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/r0911_goodwin.pdf. 43. Timothy J. Hatton, “Immigration, Public Opinion and the Recession in Europe,” Economic Policy 31, no. 86 (2016), 205–46. 44. Fredrik Erixon and Bjorn Weigel, The Innovation Illusion: How So Little Is Created by So Many Working So Hard (New Haven, CT:

20 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

Yale University Press, 2016). 45. Political Capital Institute, “The Russian Connection: The Spread of Pro-Russian Policies on the European Far Right,” Political Capital Institute, http://www.riskandforecast.com/useruploads/files/pc_flash_report_russian_connection.pdf. 46. Péter Krekó et al., “Europe’s New Pro-Putin Coalition: The Parties of ‘No,’” Institute of Modern Russia, August 3, 2015, http:// imrussia.org/en/analysis/world/2368-europes-new-pro-putin-coalition-the-parties-of-no. 47. Rosa Balfour et al., “Europe’s Troublemakers: The Populist Challenge to Foreign Policy,” European Policy Centre, http://www. epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_6377_europe_s_troublemakers.pdf. 48. Hungarian political scientists János Ladányi and Iván Szelényi refer to this ideological doctrine as post-communist neoconserva- tism (with no link to neoconservatism in the conventional sense). See János Ladányi and Iván Szelényi, “Posztkommunista Neokon- zervatizmus,” Irodalom 60, no. 40 (2014), http://www.es.hu/ladanyi_janos8211;szelenyi_ivan;posztkommunista_neokonzervativizmus; 2014-02-19.html. 49. Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money,” Institute of Modern Russia and The Interpreter, http://www.interpretermag.com/the-menace-of-unreality-how-the-kremlin- weaponizes-information-culture-and-money/. 50. EU Reporter, “French MEP Announces International Forum in Donetsk in May 2015,” March 11, 2015, https://www.eureporter.co/ world/2015/03/11/french-mep-announces-international-forum-in-donetsk-in-may-2015/. 51. Marlene Laruelle et al., “From Paris to Vladivostok: The Kremlin Connections of the French Far-Right,” Political Capital, http:// www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/PC_Study_Russian_Influence_France_ENG.pdf. 52. Dalibor Rohac, “Europe’s Neoreaction Is Scarier Than You Think,” Umlaut, August 6, 2014, https://theumlaut.com/2014/08/06/ europes-neoreaction-is-scarier-than-you-think/. 53. Jobbik, “Vona Gábor a Lomonoszov Egyetemen Tartott Előadást,” May 21, 2013, https://jobbik.hu/hireink/vona-gabor-lomonoszov- egyetemen-tartott-eloadast. 54. Eszter Zalan, “MEPs to Lift Immunity of Alleged Russian Spy,” EU Observer, October 12, 2015, https://euobserver.com/ institutional/130648. 55. Agence France-Presse, “Poland Detains Pro-Kremlin Party Leader for ‘Spying,’” Guardian, May 19, 2016, https://www. theguardian.com/world/2016/may/19/poland-detains-pro-kremlin-party-leader-mateusz-piskorski-spying. See also Wojciech Czuch�- nowski, “ABW Szuka Agentów Rosji. Teraz Wśród Skrajnej Prawicy,” Gazeta Wyborcza, June 14, 2016, http://wyborcza.pl/ 1,75398,20235794,abw-szuka-agentow-rosji-teraz-wsrod-skrajnej-prawicy.html. 56. Wojciech Czuchnowski and Michał Wilgocki, “Kulisy Zatrzymania Mateusza Piskorskiego z Prorosyjskiej Partii Zmiana. W Polsce Miał Się Odbyć Szczyt Anty-NATO,” Gazeta Wyborcza, June 3, 2016, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,20175628,kulisy-zatrzymania- mateusza-piskorskiego-z-prorosyjskiej-partii.html. 57. Péter Krekó et al., “The Weaponization of Culture: Kremlin’s Traditional Agenda and the Export of Values to Central Europe,” Political Capital, http://www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/PC_reactionary_values_CEE_20160727.pdf. 58. Susi Dennison and Dina Pardijs, “The World According to Europe’s Insurgent Parties: Putin, Migration and Power,” European Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_world_according_to_europes_insurgent_parties7055. 59. Pro-Russian outlets in Germany alleged that a 13-year-old ethnic Russian girl was raped by immigrants in Berlin in January 2016. The accusation was quickly picked up by Russian media, as well as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who accused German authorities of hushing up the case. Russian diaspora living in Germany even staged multiple protests, one in front of the German Chan- cellery building, against Merkel’s migration policy. The incident now appears to have been somehow provoked or organized by the Kremlin because the German police investigation could not substantiate any claims of the girl or her family. See Arne Delfs and Henry Meyer, “Putin’s Propaganda Machine Is Meddling with European Elections,” Bloomberg, April 20, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2016-04-20/from-rape-claim-to-brexit-putin-machine-tears-at-europe-s-seams. 60. Nyilas Gyergyeli, “Orbán: Nem a Migránsokkal van Bajunk, Hanem a Brüsszeliekkel,” Index.hu, September 11, 2016, http://index. hu/belfold/2016/09/11/orban_nem_a_migransokkal_van_bajunk_hanem_a_brusszeliekkel/. 61. Sam Gerrans, “George Soros: A Psychopath’s Psychopath,” Russia Today, February 13, 2015, https://www.rt.com/op-edge/

21 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri

332387-soros-putin-russia-threat-migrants/. 62. Vasily Rashka, “‘I Would Send All Illegal Immigrants to US’—Hungarian Town Mayor,” Sputnik News, October 12, 2015, https:// sputniknews.com/europe/201510121028404649-asotthalom-mayor-interview/. 63. Patrick Reevell, “Texas, California Separatists Attend Kremlin-Funded Conference,” ABC News, September 27, 2016, http:// abcnews.go.com/International/texas-california-separatists-attend-pro-kremlin-conference/story?id=42395066. 64. “No” in every case means either voting against a resolution critical of Russia (e.g., condemning the murder of Nemtsov), or against a measure that runs counter to Kremlin interests (e.g., the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement). 65. In national elections, far-left parties were able to increase their share of votes to 150 percent of precrisis levels. Luke March, “Beyond Syriza and Podemos: Other Radical Left Parties Are Threatening to Break into the Mainstream of European Politics,” LSE Europp, March 24, 2015, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/03/24/beyond-syriza-and-podemos-other-radical-left-parties-are- threatening-to-break-into-the-mainstream-of-european-politics/. 66. See vote details at VoteWatch Europe, “Security Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa and Prospects for Political Stability,” July 9, 2015, http://www.votewatch.eu/en/term8-security-challenges-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-and-prospects- for-political-stability-motion-6.html#/##vote-tabs-list-2. 67. See speech by Sylvia Tingiridou, president of the Pan-Cyprian Peace Council, to the Peace and anti-NATO Conference organized by the Confederal Group of GUE/NGL in the European Parliament. Sylvia Tingiridou, “European and International NATO Bases and the Threat of Nuclear Weapons,” June 2–3, 2016, https://www.akel.org.cy/en/2016/06/06/european-and-international-nato-bases-and- the-threat-of-nuclear-weapons/#.V9u1_ph96M8. 68. Anton Shekhovtsov, “Pro-Russian Extremists Observe the Illegitimate Crimean ‘Referendum,’” Anton Shekhovtsov’s Blog, March 17, 2014, http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.hu/2014/03/pro-russian-extremists-observe.html. 69. Anton Shekhovtsov, “German Die Linke Delegation Visits Right-Wing Terrorists in Eastern Ukraine,” Anton Shekhovstov’s Blog, February 17, 2015, http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.hu/2015/02/german-die-linke-delegation-visits.html. 70. Summers, “Voters Deserve Responsible Nationalism Not Reflex Globalism.” 71. Theresa May, “Theresa May’s Speech to the Conservative Party Conference—in Full,” Independent, October 6, 2016, http://www. independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-s-speech-to-the-conservative-party-conference-in-full-a6681901.html. 72. Polyakova, The Dark Side of European Integration; and Rohac, et al., “Corruption and Populism.” 73. Dalibor Rohac, “It’s Still the Economy, Stupid,” Foreign Policy, September 16, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/16/its- still-the-economy-stupid-populism-trump-syriza/.

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