Populism in Europe and Its Russian Love Affair DALIBOR ROHAC, EDIT ZGUT, AND LÓRÁNT GYŐRI JANUARY 2017 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary opulists are increasingly dominating politics in channel subversive Russian propaganda and help PEurope. This paper provides an overview of the erode Europeans’ trust in the EU, NATO, and liberal populist landscape in Europe, including its history, democratic politics at large. Some of them even have its ideological underpinnings on both the political financial ties to the Kremlin. left and right, and the factors that have contributed To rise to the populist challenge, Europe’s politi- to its resurgence. cal elites need to do more than just pursue their tradi- Although populism often responds to real griev- tional strategy of isolating and delegitimizing populists. ances, it rarely offers credible policy solutions. Instead, they have to offer policy solutions that reso- Instead, as the examples of Poland and Hungary nate with their electorates and address the grievances suggest, when populists accede to power, they can that are currently driving voters into the open arms of succumb to authoritarian tendencies, weakening populist charlatans. The United States can help, too— institutional constraints on that power, including the most importantly by holding its European friends and traditional checks of the judiciary and civil society. allies to high standards of democracy and rule of law, The rise of populism is of immediate practical inter- helping them combat Russian disinformation, and fos- est to US policymakers. Europe’s populists routinely tering greater economic openness and dynamism. 1 Populism in Europe and Its Russian Love Affair DALIBOR ROHAC, EDIT ZGUT, AND LÓRÁNT GYŐRI n 2016, Western politics were shaken by two events that associates the EU with an unqualified endorse- Iof potentially historic importance: the Brexit cam- ment of open borders. paign’s success in the United Kingdom and Donald Populists often contrast ineffective policies of Trump’s victory in the US presidential election. Both European leaders, the cumbersome functioning of appear to be symptoms of a dramatic political realign- EU institutions, and the woes facing the European ment transforming Western politics beyond recog- project with Vladimir Putin’s strong and decisive nition. Instead of the traditional divide between the leadership and his embrace of traditional values. political left and right, a new cleavage has emerged Worse yet, they oppose policies aimed at curbing between centrist establishment forces and those who Russia’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe. are challenging the status quo from populist positions. Populism’s simultaneous resurgence across Europe For example, Trump has attracted the support of and the Kremlin’s efforts to assert its dominance in many disenchanted voters who previously supported the post-Soviet space belie any illusions that may Democratic presidential candidates. On matters of have once existed about the inevitable triumph of economic and trade policy, his rhetoric often mim- democratic capitalism in Europe or about Europe icked that of Sen. Bernie Sanders, the far-left candidate “whole and free.” who lost the Democratic nomination to Hillary Clin- In response, mainstream politicians might be ton. In the UK, the campaign to leave the EU united tempted to counter populism by embracing some the populist right and the antiestablishment segments elements of populist agendas, such as tighter immi- of the Labour Party.1 While its conservative and liber- gration restrictions or government control of the tarian critics saw the EU as synonymous with over- economy aimed at protecting domestic jobs.2 To regulation, redistribution, and socialism, its left-wing some extent, that reaction is understandable. The enemies saw it as a vehicle for neoliberal reforms lack- grievances driving today’s populist revolt are real and ing democratic accountability or transparency. cannot be ignored. However, it would be a mistake European electorates, traditionally apathetic to use those grievances to justify policies that would toward the EU, are growing more receptive to the damage economic performance further, undermining implicit or explicit rejection of the European project the sense that existing political and economic institu- integration at heart of the current antiestablishment tions are able to deliver widely shared prosperity. backlash. The common European currency and Euro- Before any strategy can be devised to counter pop- pean institutions at large are blamed for Europe’s ulism, it is necessary to understand it. The term “pop- poor economic performance since the 2008 global ulism” is vague and refers to both political strategies economic downturn. The 2015 refugee crisis, together and styles, as well as to policy platforms. In the for- with the wave of terror attacks that struck Paris, Brus- mer sense, populism is a matter of degree—all politi- sels, and Nice, has amplified the existing anxieties cal messages, wherever they come from, “are adapted over immigration and has given birth to a narrative to what one assumes voters want to hear.”3 2 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri Populist narratives can be found on the left and However, once in office, they secured political con- the right. Their narratives overlap significantly: both trol of all branches of government—including those left- and right-wing populists stress the silent major- that had traditionally been independent of politi- ity’s anger that has been betrayed or left behind by a cal pressures, such as the constitutional court, cen- self-serving, out-of-touch elite.4 The specifics differ tral bank, and public broadcasting organizations. To across countries and include the capture of politics justify these steps, both parties have emphasized the by the financial industry or big business, austerity substantial popular mandate they received in the policies, stagnating incomes and loss of employ- elections. In Greece, the current government domi- ment, too much political correctness and inabil- nated by the far-left Syriza has attracted controversy, ity to respond to security threats, or immigration partly by trying to limit the number of private televi- in general. sion broadcasters. Populism and Authoritarianism In cases when populists It is possible to view populism as a helpful corrective to the excesses of establishment politics. Mainstream have arrived in influential politicians are by no means immune to compla- cency and stasis, unless they are challenged by polit- positions, they have ical competitors. The main reason why the current wave of populism can become a problem for Euro- pushed the formal and pean democracies lies in the authoritarian leanings displayed by populist political forces after they have informal boundaries of arrived in power in several European countries. Authoritarian populism’s distinguishing mark is democratic governance. rejecting constraints that are placed on political deci- sion making. In a small number of cases of openly communist and neo-Nazi parties that are allowed to Another illustration of the authoritarian leanings operate in Europe, such rejection is explicit. More of some of the political groups under consideration is frequently, however, European populists’ authori- their embrace of referenda in representative democ- tarian proclivities reflect their belief that the major- racies. In the UK, proponents of Leave see the Brexit ity’s will should trump the institutional constraints referendum as the final word on the UK’s EU mem- placed on politics. As Andrzej Lepper, the late leader bership, despite a constitutional system in which of Poland’s populist authoritarian party Samoobrona sovereignty remains with Parliament, not with pop- (Self-Defense), put it, “if the law works against people ular majorities. and generally accepted notions of legality then it isn’t In other EU member states, populist parties have law. The only thing to do is to break it for the sake of initiated referenda on subjects that are typically the majority.”5 decided by elected representatives of the people, not In cases when populists have arrived in influential by a volonté générale. Recent examples include the ref- positions, they have pushed the formal and infor- erendum held in Greece in July 2015 over the bailout mal boundaries of democratic governance. Neither conditions proposed by the Troika; the Dutch refer- of the two authoritarian populist parties controlling endum on the association agreement between the EU Poland (Law and Justice Party) or Hungary (Fidesz) and Ukraine, also held in April 2016; or the referen- arrived in power by advocating that their respective dum on the EU-organized refugee relocation mecha- countries abandon liberal democracy. nism held in Hungary in October 2016. 3 POPULISM IN EUROPE AND ITS RUSSIAN LOVE AFFAIR Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lóránt Győri The view of politics as completely subordinated populists have an accommodating view of individual to the majority’s will is at odds with an understand- and civil liberties. ing of liberal democracy as a system that constrains Furthermore, mainstream political parties are not political decision making in a framework of consti- completely immune to authoritarian tendencies. The tutional rules. To the extent in which populism and question of placing political parties in one category or authoritarianism are connected, the current populist another thus