Partisan Accountability and the Perversion of Local Democracy: Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina
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PARTISAN ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE PERVERSION OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY: EVIDENCE FROM BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Kiran Rose Auerbach A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science. Chapel Hill 2018 Approved by: Graeme Robertson Florian Bieber Evelyne Huber Mathew McCubbins Milada Vachudova © 2018 Kiran Rose Auerbach ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Kiran Rose Auerbach; Partisan Accountability and the Perversion of Local Democracy: Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) How do politicians in emerging democracies undermine democratic performance despite adopting reforms that enhance responsiveness to citizens on paper? Looking at patron-client relations within political parties, this dissertation presents a mechanism, partisan accountability, by which resource-rich parties subvert accountability to citizens. Parties use organizational and electoral resources to build patronage networks in which resources are distributed to co-opt politicians into being accountable to central party elites rather than to constituents. Using original subnational data from Bosnia and Herzegovina that includes party organization, party finance, electoral representation, party discipline, and recalls initiated against mayors, I demonstrate how parties with extensive resources concentrate power by using patronage to undermine local democratic institutions. In emerging, unconsolidated democracies, parties are often weakly or non-programmatic, which incentivizes central party leaders to maximize their control over political and economic resources and to provide minimum benefits to citizens. As a result, variations in government performance may reflect political favors or retribution that are consequences of intra-party patronage rather than policy effort. Unpacking how the resources of political parties affect elite strategies to concentrate power over subnational units therefore contributes to our understanding of why many young democracies display uneven and substandard performance within their territories, lagging far behind their institutional reforms. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to my dissertation committee for their unwavering support and guidance: Graeme Robertson (chair), Florian Bieber, Evelyne Huber, Mathew McCubbins, and Milada Vachudova. I thank the following sources of funding which supported my research: Fulbright- Hays Doctoral Dissertation Abroad Fellowship, Title VIII Research and Language Fellowship from American Councils, and the European Research Council Fellowship on the Causes and Consequences of Multi-level Governance from Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks. At UNC Chapel Hill: Dissertation Completion Fellowship, the Druscilla French Graduate Student Excellence Fund, and the Richard J. Richardson Summer Fellowship. I am thankful to the four mayors whose stories are featured in my dissertation: Bego Birparić, Zdravko Krsmanović, Muhamed Ramović, and Milovan Topolović. I also thank the other mayors, political party representatives, politicians, and political experts in BiH who shared their experiences and insights about Bosnian politics with me. I am grateful for the mentorship from Professors Suad Arnautović and Zdravko Grebo at the University of Sarajevo, and I thank Mariana Hadžijusufović at the Center for Postgraduate Studies for helping me to become a legal resident in BiH despite my ineptitude with fingerprinting. I thank Bojan Bilić, my research assistant and confidant who traversed many far-flung corners of Bosnia and Herzegovina with me and never grew tired of discussing my hare-brained ideas. To my parents, Nirmala and Leslie, and my brother, Sol: Thank you for being my greatest supporters of all. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ vii LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................ ix INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 12 1. ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM? HOW STRONG PARTIES UNDERMINE LOCAL DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE.............................................................................................. 14 1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 15 1.2. Political Parties in Developing Democracies ................................................................. 18 1.3. Partisan Accountability: Theoretical Framework .......................................................... 21 1.4. Case Selection and Background ..................................................................................... 24 1.5. Operationalizing Local Democratic Performance and Party Strength ........................... 28 1.6. Results ............................................................................................................................ 37 1.7. Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 48 1.8. REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 50 2. HOW STRONG PARTIES UNDERMINE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ......................... 54 2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 55 2.2. Participation and Manipulation in Democratic Elections .............................................. 58 2.3. How Partisan Accountability affects Elections ................................................................. 61 2.4. Local Elections and Recall Referenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina ............................... 63 2.5. Data and Empirical Strategy .......................................................................................... 68 v 2.6. Results ............................................................................................................................ 73 2.7. Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 78 2.8. REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 80 3. VARIETIES OF PUNISHMENTS: PARTISAN ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRACTICE ....... 83 3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 83 3.2. Case Selection and Operationalization of Concepts .......................................................... 85 3.3. Banovići ............................................................................................................................. 88 3.4. Goražde .............................................................................................................................. 93 3.5. Foča .................................................................................................................................... 96 3.6. Laktaši .............................................................................................................................. 101 3.7. Discussion ........................................................................................................................ 105 3.8. REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 109 APPENDIX 1: MUNICIPALITIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ............................... 110 APPENDIX 2: ADDITIONAL REFERENCES AND DATA SOURCES ................................ 111 Banovići .................................................................................................................................. 111 Goražde ................................................................................................................................... 111 Foča….. ................................................................................................................................... 112 Laktaši ..................................................................................................................................... 113 Qualitative Sources Consulted ................................................................................................ 114 Quantitative Data Sources ...................................................................................................... 115 Interviews ................................................................................................................................ 116 APPENDIX 3: RECALL DATA ................................................................................................ 117 APPENDIX 4: CODING OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES ......................................... 119 vi LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Mayors Punished by their Parties (RS) 2004-2016 .......................................................... 8 Table 2: Mayors Punished by their Parties (FBiH) 2004-2016