january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 in the West is all the more important to there has not been a successful attack The Pakistan Military’s their reputation because challenging against a target in the West since 2005. the United States in the Middle East Criticism of their passivity presents a Adaptation to has failed so far, although al-Zawahiri challenge for al-Qa`ida loyalists. Counterinsurgency in 2009 boasts that al-Qa`ida has won in every conflict. The al-Qa`ida challenge to Is there Muslim opposition to the al- By Sameer Lalwani Saudi Arabia also collapsed, and Egypt Qa`ida worldview? Some prominent is a lost cause. The outcomes of the Muslim clerics have taken a strong faced with a rising and emboldened conflicts in Yemen and Somalia remain stand against al-Qa`ida’s doctrine insurgency in its tribal belt, Pakistan’s to be determined. (particularly in Saudi Arabia and military has come under fire in recent Egypt), but their critiques are unlikely years for failure to adapt its military Decentralization is also a practical to moderate the views of major al-Qa`ida doctrine, which is based around response to pressure. Following the logic leaders. Delegitimizing the jihadist conventional warfare, to tackle that most terrorism is local, instigating message might discourage potential the internal threats of insurgency local cells to attack the enemy at home recruits who have not yet moved to and terrorism.1 Not adapting to is the most effective way of reaching violence, but it is almost impossible unconventional warfare has been used Western territory. Mounting an attack to know. Al-Qa`ida and the Taliban to explain Pakistan’s failures to quell from abroad is logistically difficult. typically deflect internal criticism of insurgency in the tribal areas, high Al-Suri explicitly acknowledged that bomb attacks that kill Muslim civilians civilian and soldier casualties, rising dispersion into small units is the by evoking conspiracy theories: the true levels of resentment and militancy, most effective way of maintaining perpetrators are invariably the Central three major operational failures in the organization and continuing the Intelligence Agency, the Mossad, South Waziristan, and its overall poor struggle in the face of the effectiveness Pakistani intelligence, or other shadowy battlefield performance.2 Underscoring of post-9/11 counterterrorism. agents of the enemy. this concern is the mounting evidence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) rapid It is instructive to look at al-Qa`ida’s Conclusion learning and adaptation that poses a and its sympathizers’ reactions to Al-Qa`ida is declining, but it is serious threat to the state of Pakistan.3 President Barack Obama’s speech still a dangerous organization. It is in Cairo in June 2009 calling for a not a mass popular movement, but The Pakistan military’s failure new beginning as expressed in online rather a complex, transnational, and has been attributed to a number of forums. In general, the initiative was multilayered organization with both poor tactical choices since 2002, interpreted as a threat. Al-Zawahiri clandestine and above-ground elements. including: 1) excessive focus on enemy was scornful of Muslims who were It has proved durable and persistent. targeting and “high-value targets”; 2) deceived into welcoming a dialogue or The determination of its leaders to attack overdependence on large-scale multi- partnership with the West. Al-Zawahiri the United States is undiminished and unit forces (mostly brigade level) rather appealed to nationalism in both Egypt might strengthen as the organization is than smaller units dispersed among the and Pakistan (interestingly, speaking threatened, but another attack on the population; 3) frequent deployment of in English to a Pakistani audience and scale of 9/11 is unlikely. forces to static garrisons or defensive referring frequently to the honor of the positions inhibiting proactive actions; military). Jihadist online circles also Dr. Martha Crenshaw is a Senior Fellow at 4) inadequate resources for flexible seemed alarmed by Muslims’ positive the Center for International Security and responses to contingencies such as reception of the Obama message. One Cooperation (CISAC) and the Freeman Spogli quick reaction forces; 5) over-reliance theme of jihadist discourse is that Institute for International Studies, as well as on kinetic “direct-action” operations Obama’s deceptive “sweet-talk” and Professor of Political Science, by courtesy, at and heavy firepower; and finally 6) an cajoling cannot be permitted to weaken Stanford University. She is also Professor of Muslim hatred for the United States. Government Emerita at Wesleyan University, 1 This critique has been advanced by a number of promi- Another is that U.S. policy will not where she taught from 1974 to 2007. She is a nent security analysts and includes: David Kilcullen, change—the new approach renouncing lead investigator with the National Center for “Terrain, Tribes, and Terrorists: Pakistan, 2006-2008,” the war on terrorism is mere rhetoric, the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Brookings Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Se- and the United States will continue to Terrorism (NC-START) at the University of ries, No. 3, September 10, 2009; Ahmed Rashid, “Paki- kill Muslims and support Israel. These Maryland. Dr. Crenshaw is a former President of stan’s Continued Failure to Adopt a Counterinsurgency views will be reinforced by the new the International Society of Political Psychology Strategy,” CTC Sentinel 2:3 (2009); Seth G. Jones, “Paki- strategy in Afghanistan; no matter how (ISPP) and was a Guggenheim Fellow in stan’s Dangerous Game,” Survival 49:1 (2007). careful U.S. forces try to be, civilian 2005-2006. Her current research focuses on 2 One anonymous Western analyst quoted by the Econo- casualties are inevitable. why the United States is a target of terrorism mist estimated that Pakistan had lost 70% of its battles and the effectiveness of countermeasures with the Taliban. See “Pakistan and the Taliban: A Real A common view in these discussions is against terrorism. She recently edited The Offensive or a Phony War?” Economist, April 30, 2009. that jihadists must act because of the Consequences of Counterterrorism, 3 Some examples of analysts underscoring the role of ad- cowardice of leaders in Muslim countries forthcoming from the Russell Sage Foundation. aptation by both insurgent and counterinsurgent parties (Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular), includes Ejaz Haider, “Agency to GHQ,” Indian Express, including the ulama or clergy. Online October 13, 2009; Shaukat Qadir, “The Taliban Diaries,” comments also remind audiences that Daily Times, June 20, 2009.

9 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 underuse of local forces’ capacity and Bajaur: Operation Sherdil (Lion Heart) previous Pakistani military forays in knowledge.4 These choices generally After a series of tactical and strategic the tribal region. defy counterinsurgency doctrine—now disasters in the tribal areas,7 the military ascendant in U.S. and Western political achieved a reversal in fortunes through The patient, methodical clearing of discourse—which calls for political over tactical shifts in Bajaur Agency. The the Taliban from Bajaur strayed from military solutions, population security objective of Operation Sherdil, which conventional operations and made over enemy targeting, ground forces occurred from August 2008 through significant use of new tactics and human over airpower, and small rather than February 2009, was more ambitious intelligence.10 Militants in Bajaur large force deployments for missions than previous punitive efforts, seeking to were deeply entrenched, requiring the (such as patrols, intelligence gathering, target and dismantle the nerve center of military to move out the remaining and development assistance). In the TTP’s northern operations. General villagers to utilize airpower and heavy essence, these practices expose troops Tariq Khan, the former commander artillery for combined arms maneuvers to greater vulnerability to achieve more of the 14th Infantry Division who took that drew militants out of their discriminatory use of force.5 command of the North-West Frontier positions.11 Airstrikes and artillery fire Province Frontier Corps (FC), stated, were quickly followed by ground forces While the characterization of Pakistan’s that took advantage of suppressive fire to doctrinal focus on conventional warfare If we dismantle the training better target militants, and used mobile is correct—an unsurprising feature camps here, the headquarters, forces and helicopters for transport given the country’s high external the communication centres, the and intimate air support.12 By the same threat environment6—and unlikely to roots which come in, stop the token, the more discriminate use of change, the past year has witnessed interagency movement and destroy force that reduced civilian casualties substantial improvement in the conduct the leadership…we feel that about increased troop vulnerability resulting 65 per cent or so of militancy [in in higher Pakistani military casualties.13 “Rather than replicating the five northern Agencies] will Despite criticisms of their capabilities have been controlled.8 and loyalties,14 the FC evolved into a the mistakes of past more competent and useful localized assaults that had simply After months of failed brute suppression force spearheading the gradual erosion and coercive assaults, the field reports of of insurgent power over many months displaced the Taliban to many junior officers led General Khan to along the central arterial roadways of neighboring districts, the shift tactics to a more population-centric the tribal agency.15 approach by early 2009, making greater military combined assets use of patrols, lashkars (militias), and Only toward the conclusion of successful from the army and air tribal councils.9 This within-operation operations and the establishment of adaptation that utilized battlefield credible force in March 2009 did the force in joint operations to reports and substantial junior officer military negotiate with the Mamood ‘corner, choke, contain.’” input proved a unique “lessons learned” tribe to dismantle and surrender Taliban process and signaled a departure from militants.16 By negotiating from a position of strength and employing local 7 The Pakistani military exhibited a series of disastrous forces to carry out demobilization, the and outcomes of Pakistani military operations from 2004-2007 that resulted in cycles of military was able to establish a system operations. The sustainability of recent offensives, defeats, and three sets of negotiations and of local security that neither appeased gains remains contingent on future concessions with the Taliban (in 2004, 2005 and 2006), militants nor galvanized resistance to a political choices, civilian capacity, and providing the insurgency strength and legitimacy. This military occupation. successive operational phases. This stemmed from underestimating the enemy, a firepower article, however, contends that the intensive approach, and overreliance on the Frontier Although militant activity in Bajaur Pakistan military’s efforts in Bajaur Corps, which at the time was under-equipped and Agency is reported to have flared up Agency, the Swat Valley, and South under-trained. The capstone of this humiliation was an in November 2009, with an FC convoy Waziristan Agency have already ambush in which more than 200 Pakistani soldiers were showcased a diligent institutional captured without a fight. One Western analyst estimated learning process that has produced that the military had lost 70% of its battles with the Tali- 10 Personal interview, General (Ret.) Mahmud Durrani, significant tactical adaptations yielding ban. For details on the ambush, see BBC News, October former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, De- increasing tactical success. 9, 2007. For the battle estimate, see Economist, April 30, cember 17, 2009. 2009. For more details on prior campaign failures, see 11 Witness: Pakistan’s War: On the Front Line, al-Jazira, Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, “Pakistan’s War With- January 4, 2009. in,” Survival 51:6 (2009): p. 168. 12 Durrani. 4 Kilcullen. 8 Brian Cloughley, “Insurrection, Terrorism, and the 13 Cloughley, p. 17. 5 Stephen Biddle, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Pakistan Army,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief, 14 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and December 10, 2009, p. 17. Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Af- Political Praxis,” Perspectives on Politics 6:2 (2008). 9 Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “Helping Pakistan Defeat ghanistan Frontier,” International Security 32:4 (2008): p. 6 Sameer Lalwani, Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterin- the Taliban: A Joint Action Agenda for the United States 76. surgency Campaign: A Net Assessment (Washington, D.C.: & Pakistan,” Institute for Social Policy and Understand- 15 Witness: Pakistan’s War: On the Front Line. New America Foundation, 2009). ing, August 2009, p. 19. 16 Cloughley.

10 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 being ambushed,17 this is due in large the military combined assets from the military relations,28 cycles of political part to strained resources being utilized army and air force in joint operations instability,29 and calcified, regressive for the South Waziristan campaign that to “corner, choke, contain”—making economic institutions.30 will test the enduring nature of tactical greater efforts to block escape routes innovations. and drive the Taliban out of mountain South Waziristan: hideouts.21 Pakistan’s Special Service Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Salvation) Swat Valley: Operation Rah-e-Rast (Path to Group (SSG)—basically Pakistan’s After suffering three humiliating Righteousness) special forces—was also deployed to defeats in South Waziristan since Building on successes in Bajaur, the secure areas for helicopter assaults 2004, the military approached its latest military turned its attention to a north of Swat’s largest city, Mingora.22 operation in the agency better equipped deteriorating situation in the Swat Moreover, rather than moving on to and with an estimated 30,000-60,000 Valley and its surroundings from the the next target after clearing areas, the troops.31 Although officially launched end of April to mid-June 2009. Aside military retained an enduring presence on October 17, 2009, preliminary efforts from properly resourcing the Swat with small bases and detachments to shape the operation began as early as operation with much higher levels of troops to conduct local patrols, the spring of 2009, preparing the way of troops (roughly 52,000) along enforce curfews, and prevent TTP re- for the ground assault. Intelligence with intelligence and air assets,18 infiltration.23 assets embedded in the area enabled interception of TTP communications32 In contrast to strategic assessments and assisted with targeting TTP ground “While the military discounting Pakistani military establishments for Pakistani airstrikes has demonstrated its innovation,24 the Swat operation and the highly controversial U.S. drone revealed a surprising degree of junior attacks.33 The military established a increasing proficiency officer creativity on the battlefield blockade around the target area for two in phase one ‘clear’ including the combined use of human, months prior to the ground assault to signal, and imagery intelligence as well cut-off movement and supply routes operations, the ‘hold’ phase as conventional weaponry employed while airstrikes and shelling softened will test Pakistani adaptive in unconventional ways.25 More enemy targets.34 After the military importantly, these lessons learned recognized the value of blocking forces capabilities as well as the were quickly shared and disseminated in Bajaur and Swat, they were heavily sustainability of its divide- to inculcate the practice of bottom-up emphasized and utilized during the innovation.26 South Waziristan assault,35 although and-rule approach as it their efficacy has been disputed by seeks to rebuild dilapidated Consolidating the military’s tactical outside assessments.36 tribal structures to restore success in Swat depends upon subsequent phases. The reincorporation 28 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of stability.” of two million IDPs will prove Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defense (Cambridge: Cam- challenging alongside maintaining bridge University Press, 1990); Ayesha Siddiqa, Military security and rebuilding decaying Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto economic and governance institutions Press, 2007). 27 the distinguishing innovation of the that had allowed for Taliban takeover. 29 Paul Staniland, “The Poisoned Chalice: Military Cul- operation was the deliberate mass Further constraints will be posed by ture, Contentious Politics, and Cycles of Regime Change evacuation of the population to better limited resources and systemic problems in Pakistan,” MIT working paper, 2009. target insurgents and reduce collateral including historically poor civil- 30 Omar Noman, Economic and Social Progress in Asia: 19 damage. After clearing out militants, Why Pakistan Did Not Become a Tiger (Oxford: Oxford the military merged with some civilian University Press, 1997); John R. Schmidt, “The Unravel- efforts to shift to a more population- 21 Mullick, p. 21. ing of Pakistan,” Survival 51:3 (2009). centric approach by working to resettle 22 “Pakistan Raids Taleban Stronghold,” BBC, May 12, 31 This included at least two regular infantry divisions. the internally displaced persons (IDPs), 2009; Cloughley, p. 14. See Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Assessing the Progress of re-establish the writ of governance, and 23 Mullick, p. 21. Pakistan’s South Waziristan Offensive,” CTC Sentinel rebuild the local economy, although 24 Daniel Byman, “Friends Like These,” International Se- 2:12 (2009). this process is ongoing and remains in curity 31:2 (2006). 32 Bukhari. 20 the balance. 25 Mullick described how commanders bucked field 33 Haider. For more on the drone strikes, see Jane May- manuals by using soldiers to help refugees escape before er, “The Predator War,” New Yorker, October 26, 2009. Rather than replicating the mistakes of the use of heavy artillery, combining intelligence sources 34 Haider; Cloughley; Frederick Kagan, Reza Jan and past assaults that had simply displaced to improve targeting, and deploying tanks in urban areas Charlie Szrom, “The War in Waziristan: Operation Rah- the Taliban to neighboring districts, to target snipers. See Mullick, p. 22. e-Nijat - Phase 1 Analysis,” www.criticalthreats.org, No- 26 Ibid. vember 18, 2009. 17 Ibid. 27 Due to a severe economic crunch, reconstruction 35 Personal interview, Shuja Nawaz, December 2009. 18 Shuja Nawaz, “Pakistan’s Summer of Chaos,” Foreign has not yet begun in Swat. See Syed Adnan Ali Shah Also see Durrani. Policy, June 18, 2009. Bukhari, “New Strategies in Pakistan’s Counter-Insur- 36 Imtiaz Ali, “Military Victory in South Waziristan or 19 Durrani. gency Operation in South Waziristan,” Terrorism Moni- the Beginning of a Long War?” Terrorism Monitor 7:38 20 Ibid. tor 7:37 (2009). (2009). Also see Yusufzai.

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During the operation, significant Second, the military experimented and the expansion of operations against airpower was combined with rapid with psychological operations, soft targets beyond their conventional follow-on ground assaults.37 For the distributing leaflets supposedly from theater in recent months—all suggest first time, the Pakistani military religious authorities and local tribes that the Pakistani Taliban have not been purportedly received operational that warned youth of “false jihad” and dismantled but remain organizationally intelligence support from U.S. drones blamed foreign militants for ushering intact.49 to assist with navigation and targeting destruction into the tribal areas.44 Third, in mountainous terrain.38 Learning the military waited for a proximate Conclusion from the 2004 South Waziristan and cause—the insurgent assault on the Leading Pakistani national security the 2008 Bajaur operations, regular army’s headquarters in October—to experts have themselves been divided forces advanced from multiple axes rally popular support and ensure the over the pace of learning and adaptation and seized the high ground to encircle operation was perceived as Pakistan’s within the military. While the military and control valleys. SSG forces were own offensive, not one at the behest of the leadership has expressed confidence in integrated into the operation to mop United States.45 The focus on conducting its capacities and training facilities,50 up insurgents as the army advanced psychological and information and analysts have praised the military’s and to secure the heights and key nodal operations, amassing popular support, swift adaptation and remarkable learning points.39 The military also responded and dividing insurgents to limit the curve under logistical independence,51 to insurgent innovation and tactical scope of operations all factored into the others, such as former Chief Secretary diffusion from Afghanistan that had moderately successful outcome. of the NWFP Khalid Aziz and former introduced anti-aircraft weapons and Inspector General of the Frontier improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to While acknowledging the tactical Corps Major-General Mohammad Alam the Pakistani battlefield.40 Precision- success of the operation, former Khattak, have expressed a significant targeting by Pakistani jets was able to generals have publicly expressed need for Pakistan to adapt faster to the neutralize anti-aircraft weapons, which skepticism over the sustainability of the demands of counterinsurgency.52 could disrupt close air support, and Pakistan military’s gains, predicting effective route clearance limited damage that dispersed militants will regroup A close examination of the 2009 from IEDs.41 and resume hit-and-run operations operations in Bajaur, Swat, and South against the Pakistani Army within Waziristan testify to the Pakistan Politically innovative tactics also months46 (a development that appears military’s learning from previous effectively shaped the environment prior to have already begun47). The military’s tactical blunders of indiscriminate to the operation. The first new tactic was expected presence for three to four violence that produced tremendous narrowing the scope of the mission to months in the region could become a collateral damage and only enflamed target the Mehsud tribe while securing target for resistance and attacks, but an the insurgency.53 The cost of innovation, the neutrality of other powerful tribal early departure could quickly unravel however, has been high casualty rates groups led by Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz the hard-fought gains.48 Moreover, and the creation of new challenges, Gul Bahadur, whose participation in the despite being dislodged from their particularly the hundreds of thousands insurgency had foiled previous regional strongholds, a number of factors— of IDPs created in the 2009 operations. operations.42 Even after they renounced the escape of the TTP leadership, the While the military has demonstrated their neutrality when operations began, relatively few numbers of militants its increasing proficiency in phase one there seems to be little evidence that killed (600 out of an estimated 10,000), “clear” operations, the “hold” phase will fighters from their tribes actually fought test Pakistani adaptive capabilities as with the militants in the Mehsud camp 44 Ibid., p. 20. well as the sustainability of its divide- or attacked Pakistani forces, suggesting 45 Ali. and-rule approach as it seeks to rebuild this was more of a face-saving political 46 Retired General Talat Masood is quoted as saying, dilapidated tribal structures to restore 54 gesture rather than a defection from “The militants have the capacity to regroup and come stability. As this process moves from their original agreement with the back…South Waziristan has been a tactical success of 43 military. sorts, but by no means is it a victory.” See Alex Rodriguez, 49 Ali; Yusufzai. Based on off-the-record conversations, “Pakistan Taliban Regrouping Outside Waziristan,” Los this appears to be corroborated by Pakistani military as- 37 Bukhari. One analyst in close contact with Pakistani Angeles Times, November 26, 2009. Retired General Jav- sessments as well. military headquarters estimated there were initially ed Hussein is quoted as stating, “Three or four months 50 This is evidenced by General Kayani’s rejection of more than 140 targets slated for airstrikes. from now, they (the Taliban) are going to bounce back. counterinsurgency training. See “Counter-Insurgency 38 Julian E. Barnes and Greg Miller, “U.S. Aiding Paki- When the army is deployed to hold the area, the gueril- Training Facilities Developed: Kayani,” Daily Times, May stani Military Offensive,” Los Angeles Times, October 23, las will start their hit-and-run attacks against the army’s 17, 2009. 2009; Bukhari. lines of communication, and all over the tribal area.” See 51 Mullick; Shaukat Qadir, “Guerilla Warfare,” Daily 39 Haider; Frederick Kagan, Reza Jan and Charlie Sz- Saeed Shah, “Big Pakistan Offensive has Failed to Nab Times, September 26, 2009. rom, “The War in Waziristan: Week 1 Analysis of Op- Any Taliban Leaders,” McClatchy Newspapers, Novem- 52 Khalid Aziz, “Need for a Counterinsurgency Strat- eration Rah-e-Nijat,” www.criticalthreats.org, October ber 24, 2009. egy,” The News International, June 15, 2008. On Khattack, 26, 2009. 47 Yusufzai. see Muhammad Khurshid Khan, “Analyzing Domestic 40 Johnson and Mason, p. 67. 48 Kagan et al. indicate that the military will continue to Terrorism as a Threat to Pakistan’s Security and the 41 Kagan et al., October 26, 2009. stay for a period of time, but Johnson and Mason predict Policy Response,” IPRI Journal 9:2 (2009): p. 61. 42 Durrani; Cloughley, p. 19. fierce resistance by Pashtun tribal groups toward any 53 Johnson and Mason, p. 74. 43 Cloughley, p. 19. centralizing efforts. 54 Yusufzai. Durrani confirmed the military and stra-

12 january 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 1 tactical to strategic shifts, greater October and early November 2009, resistance will be encountered. Karachi Becoming a Karachi police arrested more than Taliban Safe Haven? 450 illegal foreign residents, mostly The Pakistan military’s learning and Afghan and Uzbek citizens suspected of adaptation has been characterized by By Imtiaz Ali having ties to militants.6 Moreover, 70 many analysts inside and outside of militants with access to suicide jackets, Pakistan as a cumulative “learning karachi is the backbone of Pakistan’s rocket launchers and other explosives by doing” process,55 suggesting that economy and the country’s largest city were arrested in the closing months of there will be gradual adjustments of 18 million people.1 The city has a 2009.7 over time within Pakistan’s approach history of ethnic and sectarian violence, to counterinsurgency rather than a yet in the last few years it has managed This article will provide background on dramatic doctrinal shift56 or wholesale to maintain relative peace. Since 2009, the city of Karachi, including how it is adoption of Western militaries’ “best however, there has been an uptick in home to jihadist and sectarian groups, as practices” by way of U.S. Army Field violent activity in Karachi, culminating well as explaining why Taliban fighters Manual 3-24. This seemingly languid pace with the December 28, 2009 bombing are increasingly moving to the city. of Pakistani adaptation will continue to of a Shi`a Ashura religious procession be the result of finite and overstretched that left more than 30 people dead.2 Brief Demography of Karachi resources,57 the inherently difficult The attack was not only followed by Karachi is Pakistan’s financial hub pace of organizational adaptation,58 and an unprecedented level of looting, but and its most populated city. It was the the divergence of Pakistani strategic it plunged Karachi into a fresh wave of country’s first capital after it achieved interests in the region from the United targeted killings.3 independence in 1947, until it was States and NATO.59 moved to Rawalpindi in 1958 and then These developments are alarming Islamabad in 1960. Karachi is located Sameer Lalwani is a Ph.D. student in the because the destabilization of Karachi in a strategic geographic position. It is Department of Political Science at the would have profound effects on on the shores of the Indian Ocean and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Pakistan. Karachi houses Pakistan’s is a major Pakistani port. It is a primary He is an affiliate of the MIT Security central bank and its largest stock entryway for supplies to U.S. and NATO Studies Program and a Research Fellow exchange, and generates 68% of the troops in neighboring Afghanistan. at the New America Foundation studying government’s revenue and 25% of the Its population has grown to more than civil-military relations, civil-conflict, country’s gross domestic product.4 18 million, and it is home to several and national security decision-making different ethnicities and religions.8 with a focus on Middle East and South It is clear that fighters from multiple Although 96% of the city is Muslim, it Asian geopolitics. He recently published Taliban factions are increasingly is estimated that 30% of that number a net assessment on Pakistani military moving to the city. Militants continue ascribes to the minority Shi`a faith; this capabilities for counterinsurgency. to flee U.S. drone strikes and Pakistani has resulted in sectarian violence over military operations in the country’s the years between minority Shi`a and northwest tribal regions. In fact, two majority Sunni Muslims.9 Karachi is months ago news reports speculated home to a sprawling network of madrasas that Taliban supreme leader Mullah (religious schools) and jihadist militant Omar himself shifted his base from groups. 5 tegic leadership was coming to terms with this insight, Quetta to Karachi. Between late made by outside observers including Johnson and Ma- The city is home to the world’s largest son, p. 73. 1 Pamela Constable, “Bombing and Fire Disrupt a Frag- number of Pashtuns. In Karachi, the 10 55 Durrani; Stephen P. Cohen and Shuja Nawaz, “Mas- ile Peace in Karachi, Pakistan,” Washington Post, January more than 3.5 million Pashtuns are tering Counterinsurgency: A Workshop Report,” Brook- 4, 2010. second only to the Urdu-speaking 11 ings Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series, July 2 A faction of the Pakistani Taliban initially took credit Muhajir, who are the biggest ethnic 7, 2009. for the attack, but the government blamed Lashkar-i- 56 Mullick argues this indicates a doctrinal shift (p. 23) Jhangvi. See “Suicide Bombing in Karachi Kills 30,” CBS Karachi,” Newsweek, November 28, 2009. but conversations with other analysts including Shuja News, December 28, 2009; “Taliban Claim Karachi Sui- 6 Farhan Sharif and Naween Mangi, “Karachi Police Nawaz and Moeed Yusuf imply otherwise—that this cide Attack Responsibility,” The Nation, December 30, Hunt Terror Cells as Taliban Flee Army,” Bloomberg, is a more graduated adaptation and that doctrinal shift 2009; Geo TV, December 28, 2009; Amir Wasim, “Ma- November 6, 2009. will not occur without a serious investment in retraining lik Blames LJ for Karachi Ashura Blast,” Dawn, January 7 Ibid. through the establishment of a staff college or local coun- 15, 2010. 8 Aziz and Birsel. terinsurgency training school. 3 Salis bin Perwaiz, “Political Violence Continues on 9 This is according to Pakistan’s 1998 census. For de- 57 Durrani; Lalwani. Fourth Day,” The News, January 11, 2010. tails, see www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/ 58 Austin Long, “Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The 4 Faisal Aziz and Robert Birsel, “Pakistan’s Karachi the pdfs/Karachi.pdf. U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960- Taliban Revenue Engine – Mayor,” Reuters, December 2, 10 “Editorial: Prospects of a ‘Quick Finish’ in Swat,” 1970 and 2003-2006,” RAND Counterinsurgency 2009. Daily Times, May 13, 2009. Study, No. 6, 2008. 5 “Mullah Omar in Karachi: Report,” The Nation, No- 11 Muhajir, politically organized into the Muttahida 59 Moeed Yusuf, “Rational Institutional Design, Per- vember 20, 2009; Eli Lake, Sara A. Carter and Barbara Qaumi Movement (MQM), are the descendents of Urdu- verse Incentives, and the US-Pakistan Partnership in Slavin, “Taliban Chief Hides in Karachi,” Washington speaking Indians who migrated from India after the post-9/11,” Defence Against Terrorism Review 2:1 (2009). Times, November 20, 2009; Ron Moreau, “Sheltered in creation of Pakistan in 1947. They are the biggest com-

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