CLIMATE POLICY CENTER

Energy and Climate Change Research and the “DARPA Model”

Dr. Richard Van Atta Institute for Defense Analyses

Presentation to the Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy National Press Club November 3, 2005 DARPA’s Key Role Fostering the “emergence” of technology breakthroughs for the benefit of US security – What is the “DARPA Model”…. Which DARPA? – What was the origins of DARPA and how did it evolve? – DARPA “success”—why is it so well regarded? – What is the basic “motif” of DARPA success and what are key factors in achieving success? – What is relevance of DARPA model for other policy areas—particularly energy and climate research? DARPA’s origins: Strategic Challenges ~1958

CHALLENGES INITIAL RESPONSES

• Soviet nuclear weapons— • DDR&E—DoD “chief technologist” established – H-bomb in 1952 just after US • Korean War distracts • ARPA established based on resources for R&D and new three “Presidential Initiatives” tech systems – Space focus—becomes NASA • “Missile Gap” issue – Nuclear test detection – Missile Defense concerning Soviet ICBMs • Soviet Union launches • ARPA begins small info tech SPUTNIK satellite and materials science programs – Demonstrates global reach • Project AGILE focuses on – US tech leadership Vietnam in early 60s— ARPA’s challenged first foray into tactical technology What is DARPA? • Agency established under SECDEF (Office of the Secretary of Defense) – “assure that the US maintains a lead in applying state-of-the-art technology for military capabilities” – “prevent technological surprise from her adversaries” • Independent from Service R&D organizations • Agile organization with risk-taking culture – “High risk; high payoff” research—tolerant of failure and open to learning – Not driven by defined mil requirements • DARPA does not maintain any of its own labs • Idea-driven and outcome-oriented – Funds researchers within US defense contractors, private companies and universities – Honest broker among competing approaches DARPA created to be DoD’s “innovation hub” Which DARPA? • DARPA is intrinsically malleable and adaptive • DARPA has morphed several times • DARPA has “re-grouped” iteratively—often after its greatest “successes” • There is not and should not be a singular answer on “what is DARPA”—and if someone tells you that—they don’t understand DARPA

DARPA’s unique focus: High risk—high payoff

But… this has not been the ONLY focus… DARPA cannot succeed on its own

White House Agencies SECDEF OSD DOD DSB DARPA DDR&E USG Indep. US advisories Services World CIA, DOE... Congress

academia Primes “concept suppliers Commercial houses” allies industry adversaries

DARPA success depends on its relationships with other organizations and its understanding of the current and projected security context DARPA roles • Basic science emerging technologies • “Disruptive” military capabilities – integration – demonstration • Technology strategy Defense strategy • Foster RMAs?

By 1970 there were two DARPA’s— • One focused on breakthrough mil applications and systems (Tactical Technology, Strategic Programs) • Another focused on broad, generic emerging technologies (Information Processing, Microsystems, Advanced Materials) • Both these elements have had “transformational” effects—but they are fundamentally different in their focus and approach. DARPA Refocused—Early 70s • By 1970 ARPA had succeeded in its inaugural assignments—Its “Presidential Initiatives” had “matured”— –SpaceÆ NASA – Missile Defense (Defender)Æ Army – Nuclear Test DetectionÆ Operational activity • John S. Foster (DDR&E) concerned about what ARPA’s focus should be – Concern—“ARPA becoming DoD’s NSF” – Emphasis on military application—including Viet Nam—and transition vice general science (Mansfield Amendment ) – Enhanced linkages with operating commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff • DARPA/DNA “Long Range R&D Planning Program” (LR2DP2) articulates options to address Soviet threat – “New Alternatives Panel” links strategies, tactics & technologies – Advanced Technology Panel emphasized the value of precision in variety of scenarios Long Range Planning and Precision Strike • Key idea: There is an alternative to primarily nuclear response to Soviet threat • Precision strike involves – “integration of a wide range of technologies: target detection, recognition and location; delivery vehicles and munitions; and weapon navigation and guidance. – “A unified approach to development...and the establishment of operational procedures for effective integration and employment...” • Ideas promoted throughout DOD by well- connected defense analysts – Albert Wholstetter, Andrew Marshall, Henry Rowen, Donald Hicks, Fred Wikner, Joseph Braddock... DARPA Refocused—Mid-70s • DDR&E Malcolm Currie emphasized need for “technological initiative” to address Soviets – “Basic research and big projects that could make a difference” – Emphasized technology pull with links to real customers – Sought to counter Soviet conventional buildup with US technology • Dr. George Heilmeier appointed DARPA Director with imprimatur to: – Lay out a 10-year investment strategy – Employed “new” management model – Develop focused DARPA efforts to demonstrate “game changing” concepts These were major departures from prior approach and caused dissonance in research community Push for Implementation: Late 1970s The Offset Strategy: • SECDEF Brown and DDR&E Perry elevate selected DARPA thrusts to overall defense strategy: – Apply the US advantage in technology to make up for the Soviets' advantage in weapons and men – Synergistic application of improved technologies for C4I, defense suppression (stealth), and precision guided munitions to overcome Soviet defenses and destroy Soviet tank legions • Perry actively enlists Service leadership and personally involved in oversight of key programs • 1980s—Continued scale up of thrusts • 1990s—Maturation and implementation Summary: Challenges & responses Technology strategy Strategic elevated to defense problem strategy & broad recognized support built

New approaches Implementation articulated & of disruptive organizations capabilities refocused

1970 1975 1980

This took well over a decade to achieve—what are lessons from this? DARPA’s Role in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

Final Report Presentation to Dr. Anthony J. Tether Director DARPA December 4, 2002 Dr. Richard Van Atta ([email protected]) Dr. Michael J. Lippitz ([email protected]) Institute for Defense Analyses What is the emerging RMA(s)? • Desert Storm demonstrated standoff interrelated, synergistic stealth precision capabilities (“system of strike systems”) that undermine warfighting approaches built real-time around large platforms tactical ISR – DARPA’s key roles were inventing capabilities, demonstrating integrated concepts (system of systems), and working with OSD leadership on transition • Today, RMA is encompassing IT revolution – DARPA played key early role in interactive computing and internet as overall enabling technologies — which now are being integrated into defense capabilities • Tomorrow: Nanotechnology? Biotechnology? Counter terrorism? Homeland Defense? Case studies

standoff stealth precision strike

real-time tactical ISR Stealth origins and development • Strategic challenge: Soviet anti-aircraft systems (Vietnam and Yom Kippur War) • 1974-6: “Harvey” concept (Chuck Meyers) leads to contractor studies (Robert Moore) leads to HAVE BLUE – Quarter-scale demonstration – Design for stealth, then aerodynamics • Currie used “handshakes and strong arms” to persuade Air Force leadership to help fund and participate in HAVE BLUE – Slow, unmaneuverable plane that only flies at night – Perceived threat to existing and planned AF programs Stealth implementation

• 1979: Based on HAVE BLUE success, Perry decides to build F-117A with 4-year IOC – No prototype – “Technology limited, not funding limited” – Executive reviews chaired by Perry • 1983: Air Force set up secret F-117A wing • DARPA funds stealth on several platforms – Umbrella program office under AF Colonel Kaminski – TACIT BLUE keeps Northrop in stealth business, leading to the B-2 and other airborne stealth – SEA SHADOW applies stealth to surface navy – Counter-stealth research Case studies

standoff stealth precision strike

real-time tactical ISR Development of precision strike

Braddock DNA Warsaw Pact AirLand Follow-on Threat Analyses Battle Forces Attack DSB ’76 PUSDRE Wade “J Programs” Memo •Martin Marietta Fossum/Perry Concept on Study approve Assault Breaker Standoff Strike JSTARS DNA / DARPA— Precision ASSAULT Strike ITASS Concepts BREAKER ATACMS • LPI radar •Grumman / Radar Norden •Pave Mover BAT—Brilliant Anti-Tank Monition Radar •MTI radar Guided Sensor Fuzed Weapon CBU-97/B) JTACMS Weapon Precision Submunitions Concept •CLGP TSSAM •TLGP Service Missile Programs •TGSM Patriot (T-16) •SKEET JASSAM LANCE (T-22) Navy missile (classified) SLAM-ER 1975 1978 1982 ASSAULT BREAKER concept

Missile with bus PAVE MOVER Terminally guided submunitions

Multiple enemy tanks

Data processing and fusion center Surface launcher In one of the most complex and integrated DARPA demonstrations ever attempted, a radar-guided missile dispensed five terminally-guided submunitions above a field with five tanks. Result: five direct hits. Implementation of precision strike: A continuing story • Precision strike is now a core military idea, intrinsic to most tactical concepts • Important individual systems fielded • USSR reacted to ASSAULT BREAKER demo – impending ”reconnaissance-strike complex” • Despite DARPA demonstrations & operational concept development, Services focus development on their particular platforms – Air Force: air-delivered munitions – Army: ground and helicopter delivery • Truly “smart” weapons still seeking acceptance Case studies

standoff stealth precision strike

real-time tactical ISR DARPA & UAVs • DARPA experimental programs in Vietnam for ISR, communications and strike • Heilmeier to Congress (1977): “We are successfully completing and transitioning these technologies to the Services” • UAV development and deployment would prove long and difficult – Army Aquila killed by mission creep and bureaucratic infighting (Knox: Of Gladiators and Spectators) – 1984-90: Amber undermined by DARPA-NAVY impasse (but eventually became Predator) – Pioneer bought from Israel • DARPA focus shifts to next generation High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) OSD Leadership Took on UAV Implementation and Deployment • Gulf War highlighted serious deficiencies in airborne ISR, particularly wide-area coverage • DSB and OSD/Intelligence reviews – Lack of transition—UAV development requires central leadership (DARO) – Push medium-altitude endurance UAVs (Predator) – Initiate high-altitude endurance UAV program with $10 million flyaway cost (Global Hawk) • Predator delivered in 6 months using ACTD process • DARPA develops Global Hawk • Air Force forms operational UAV squadron – Deployed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan 3rd Generation Info Tech—From computers to Interactive Information

• DARPA and Info Tech—“Toward Man-machine Symbiosis” • Making computers interactive • Internetted computing • Virtual reality • Intelligent systems

J. C. R. Licklider and the Revolution that Made Computing Personal JCR Licklider and DARPA’s IPTO

• The revolution that made computers personal… – ARPA “got into computer research backward….” • White elephant surplus Q-32s from SAGE • SDC—spin-off from RAND • Command and Control research – Outside ARPA study—Take on computer research rather than just what industry offers – ’62- Licklider’s “name came up”…. Computers and behavior… • Command and control were essentially problems of man-computer interaction… • Interactive computing had potential to transform human life… • 1962—Lick named Director of Information Processing Techniques Office • ARPA Director Ruina: “I stumbled on a visionary by accident…” JCR Licklider: “…Man-Computer Symbiosis” – From augmented human to Artificial Intelligence? – Bring computers to formulative parts of problems…. – “Real-time” computing… to support real-time thinking • Too much time spent doing housekeeping.. • What does man do well; what could computers do well for him? – Prerequisites—focused on the underpinnings • Data-processing equipment…and programs… • Speed mismatch… .. Computer must divide its time • Thinking center … Network of libraries and info storage connected by wideband communications…to individual users • Memory and memory organization… search and retrieval • Language—goal oriented? • I/O—least advanced aspect… Displays and controls.. • Speech recognition Licklider-Taylor: Computer as a Communications Device

– Computer as collaborative tool—cooperative modeling for creative intellectual activity • Problem—because we can’t communicate interactively effectively • Computer as “dynamic, moldable medium that can revolutionize the art of modeling…” not just a switch—an interaction facilitator – Distributed intellectual resources – Computer networks—interactive multiaccess computer communities – Processing hardware—nodes to process multiple users access to remote computers – On-line interactive communities—will “to be on-line” be a privilege or a right? DARPA’s IT Thrusts • Networking—Building the “Intergalactic Network” – Lick memos—establishing the Intergalactic Network of researchers • To net the researcher requires building the computer network • Need basic tools to net computers – Interactive time shared computers—DEC’s PDP-8 – Need to use something other than telephone lines – Packet switching—Communications and processing methods and protocols – Concept of Interface Message Processor (IMPs) • ARPANET – Bob Taylor—new IPTO director—suggest network concerns to Charles Herzfeld (Director of DARPA)--$1M in 25 minutes! – Larry Roberts—asked to leave MIT to head project – First nodes at universities – Explosion of university linkages DARPA’s IT Thrusts

• Artificial Intelligence •VLSI • “Strategic Computing” – Fostering larger scale investment to bring tech to fruition Making computers personal…. DARPA’s legacy was implementing a change-state vision… …which had fundamental impact in fostering a transformational concept and the creation of an entire industry Two aspects of success: Vision and Leadership

Successful use LEADERSHIP (OSD focus) Deployment - Top-down interest and involvement crucial for Production implementing disruptive capabilities Product/system realization VISION (DARPA focus) Technology - Risk-taking, committed PMs Science - Seeking and developing disruptive concepts - Fighting against internal & external resistance

If transformational capabilities are the objective, and thenit is insufficient rely upon thefor ordinaDARPA to create an example

ry Service acquisition system Create surprise, don’t just seek to avoid it VISION

• Pursue technologies with potential to create disruptive capabilities

• Make sustained investments, building from initial science into progressively more integrated systems

– Some investments are impossible to justify in purely accounting terms Build communities of change-state advocates VISION • DARPA is at its best when it instigates cooperation among forward-looking researchers, operational experts, and industry

White – Research communities, House AgenciesSECDEFOSD once established, can DOD DSB DARPA DDR&E USG Indep. US draw on industry advisories Services World CIA, and Service funds DOE... Congress Defense – DARPA’s success academia contractors “concept suppliers Commercialhouses” depends on it allies industry adversaries being a leader and catalyst Define challenges, develop solution concepts, and demonstrate them VISION • Define strategic challenges in detail across multiple scenarios – DARPA research priorities have been informed by studies (both internal and independent) that provided specific, well-articulated challenges and guidance • Develop disruptive concepts for assessment – Support development of integrated concepts — not just individual capabilities — beyond purview of a single service – Facilitates a “critical mass” of research effort • Test promising concepts in large-scale, integrated “proof of concept” demonstrations – Maintain a scientific process—open, analytic, competitive (not acquisition programs) Tension between DARPA roles

VISION Pursuer of new Developer of concept breakthrough prototypes and technologies independent demonstrations that of defined needs address needs (but not defined requirements) Process of discovery: Process of open, wide-ranging integration: exploring search for novel, possible application potentially change-state solutions to prove a capabilities disruptive concept

DARPA Director needs to mediate these missions and bridge these communities Pursuit of integrating concepts can be as “high risk” as technology development OSD and DARPA leadership needed to launch disruptive concept programs LEADERSHIP • Broker deals with Service Leadership – Entails “firm handshakes and strong arms” – OSD may have to “create” a customer • Create an independent capability either within the Service or in an outside agency – Need an organizational home for acquisition – External organization particularly helpful for joint capabilities that no single Service feels they own • Work with Congress to protect funding – Always an uphill battle if disruptive capabilities compete with a large platform or program • Provide high-level imprimatur for implementing priority programs SUMMARY: Roles DARPA has played (and should continue to play) • Searched out and supported development of emerging technologies with the potential to create new defense capabilities • Defined and addressed strategic challenges • Built communities of change-state advocates • Supported development of integrated concepts beyond purview of a single service • Took on large-scale, proof-of-concept demos with a scientific process — willing to fail • Worked with OSD leadership in brokering Service commitment “The best way to predict the future

is to help create it” establishment defense broader of the participation

integration and technology Increasing based on is not disruptive per se DARPA Roles in Transformation Disruptive capabilities operational, organizational, and cultural adaptation – Technology – capabilities into defense strategies Translate – capabilities into application Transition – advanced technologies “disruptive” capabilities • Instigate radically • & demonstrate Conceive RMAs •Foster Energy and Climate Change—DARPA Model? • What is the imperative—DARPA’s is national security – Is energy security a comparable motif? • Who provides the leadership—DARPA has had the imprimatur of the SECDEF • How will its results be brought to fruition? – DARPA established a network of implementation paths that varied by technology and application • DARPA began as relatively small and highly focused—it morphed and adapted – Don’t try to invent a full-blown full scale operation based on DARPA after 30 years…. – Can a civilian organization maintain independence of its technology program from the “vested interests”? Energy-Climate Research Planning and Strategy—Can Innovation be Managed? • Setting an emerging tech agenda on energy & climate – What are the government’s interests in identifying and promoting emerging energy-climate technologies? – How to invest • What should be the governments role? • How does government “make its bets”? • How has the tech innovation environment changed and how does this affect government’s role and effect? • Overseeing the emerging energy-climate tech process • How can government influence results? • Who does the government support and how? • How does government evaluate its efforts? Some Challenges Facing Energy-Climate Research “ARPA” • Strategy ambiguity – What are the goals—for whom? – Can “national” research programs appropriately address global problems—How? – Who should receive the research support and how should they be selected? • Globalization and commercialization – How to maintain technological superiority in an open, networked, global marketplace? – Should the research aim at fostering industrial base competitiveness for realizing the product of research? Do approaches that led to DARPA’s successes pertain to the tech & economic environment concerning energy & climate? A Broader Perspective….. • How do emerging technologies impact on our definition of security? – Nation-state in a global context—especially in addressing a “global” problem such as energy and climate – Security and global competition—whose equities are we championing? – Security dimensions affected by energy-climate technology • Economic security vs. global imperatives – What are main factors impinging on future of economies? – Global issues related to technology – Health – Environment – Climate – Energy • Culture and technology—How does US approach for addressing emerging technologies relate to those of other countries?