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A Ctors W Ithout S Ociety Twenty years after the epoch-making change in 1989, which the “real socialism” in the East, the relation between state and affected the post-Yugoslavian space in a way entirely different society substantially differed from this relation in free capitalist from other former “real-socialist” European countries, this study societies. This difference in the relation between state and soci- is an effort toward an analytical view on the past two decades of ety, as the author of this study Srd¯an Dvornik points out, had a development of civil society in the western Balkans. The develop- decisive impact on the emerging civil societies. The study shows: ment there does not correspond to the theoretical outlines of the Without civic engagement, there will be no changes, and the enga- democratic transition or transformation. The primary reason lies gement of seemingly marginal actors achieves more than would be in the fact that in socialist Yugoslavia, like in other societies of expected on the basis of their “systemic” place. Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Schumannstr. 8, 10117 Berlin The green political foundation P 030-285340 F 030-28534109 E [email protected] I www.boell.de ISBN 978-3-86928-016-5 DEMOCRACY VOLUME 15 Actors without Society VOLUME 15 Actors without Society The role of civil actors in the postcommunist transformation A study by Srd¯an Dvornik ACTORS WITHOUT SOCIETY PUBLICATION SERIES ON DEMOCRACY VOLUME 15 Actors without Society The role of civil actors in the postcommunist transformation A study by Srd¯an Dvornik Edited by the Heinrich Böll Foundation About the author Srd¯an Dvornik, born in 1953, is freelance researcher, consultant and translator from Zagreb, Croatia. He took active part in various civic organisations, taught in high schools and at the Zagreb University, and worked as editor in social sciences and humanities in the “Naprijed” publishing house. The most recent position was the executive director of the Croatian Helsinki Committee. Dvornik regularly publishes political commentaries and analyses for the Novi list newspaper, the Identitet magazine and the ZaMirZine.net and the Pescanik.net e-news portals. Actors without Society The role of civil actors in the postcommunist transformation Study by Srd¯an Dvornik Vol. 15 in the publication series on democracy Edited by the Heinrich Böll Foundation © Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 2009 All rights reserved Translator: Hana Dvornik Reviewers: Zarko Puhovski, Jaroslav Pecnik Language Editor: Robert Furlong Graphic design: graphic syndicat, Michael Pickardt (according to designs by blotto Design) Title photo: Hrvoje Polan/AFP/Getty Images Printing: agit-druck ISBN 978-3-86928-016-5 This publication can be ordered from: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Schumannstr. 8, D-10117 Berlin P +49 30 28534-0 F +49 30 28534-109 E [email protected] W www.boell.de CONTENTS Preface 7 Introductory note 11 Part 1 Postcommunist “revolutions”: making their own foundation 1.1 What was the change about? 14 The end of postcommunism? 14 Delimiting areas and a comparative view 15 The source of change – revolution? 17 “Revolution” and implosion 21 1.2 We have democracy, we (still) don’t have society 25 The retroactive creation of one’s own foundation 25 Together in the “third” pot: the incomparable destruction of society in the communist regime 27 Transition and democracy as ideology 31 The communist (de)construction of society 32 Democratic potentials? 37 Democratic defects 40 1.3 Projections and reality 43 The “natural” necessity of democracy 43 The “problem” of the sequence and coordination of reforms 45 The “Western” optics and the “Eastern” transformation 52 The meaning of social rights: society under a constitutional umbrella or society in action 55 Privatization and around it 59 Part 2 The new communities 2.1 The subaltern, politically passive society 64 What was left from the society? 64 The internalized domination 65 The deficit of civilization 73 2.2 Post-Yugoslav states and nationalist revolutions 76 The two faces of power “withering away” 76 The politics go ethnic 78 Decentralization instead of democratization 81 “Narod” instead of demos 84 (Re)active nationalism 86 Democratic nationalism? 89 Defective democracies with nationalist legitimacy 91 Part 3 Civil society and the self-established actors 3.1 Civic/civil society – from autonomy to political activism 100 The late-communist “awakening” and the postcommunist “disappearance” of civil society 100 A genesis, rather than a definition 103 The new social responses 106 Two approaches to civil society 108 A “definition,” anyway 112 3.2 The space for civil attitude in the post-Yugoslav countries 119 Out of a swamp by their own hair 120 The social reality of civil society 123 3.3 Actors without society 133 Instead of a conclusion 143 Literature 144 PREfaCE Twenty years after the epoch-making change in 1989, which affected the post- Yugoslavian space in a way entirely different from other former “real-socialist” European countries, this study is an effort toward an analytical view on the past two decades of development of civil society in the western Balkans. The author, Srd¯an Dvornik from Croatia, is among those who know the subject well. There- fore, I am proud that I also played a part in motivating him and, with support from the Heinrich Böll Foundation, can make possible the realization of the study. My connection with Srd¯an Dvornik comes from 10 years of professional cooperation and friendship during my work as the director of the Regional Office of the Heinrich Böll Foundation for southeastern Europe and after. For the Heinrich Böll Foundation, a German political foundation, relations with civil society are of particular importance. Owing to its close ties with the Alliance 90 / Green Party, the Foundation has deep roots in the area of civil society; the attitude of active and responsible citizenship is also the cornerstone of its self- understanding. The cooperation with civil actors and support for civil society are central to the Foundation’s activities all over the world, where we cooperate in political education and development. My work in the Foundation’s office for southeastern Europe is aimed at achieving a harmony between the concerns and approaches of a German foundation and the involvement in local relations, in order to create a fruitful relationship that would contribute to a stable peace and democratization of the region. Srd¯an Dvornik represented the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Croatia from 1999 to 2004 as the head of its office there; he was an ideal, so to speak natural partner for that venture. In his person he connected knowledge of theory and practice of civil society, including internal and external factors of its emergence and development in the last two decades, both in Croatia and in the wider region of southern Europe. He is a sociologist and activist from the earliest days of civil society in Croatia, continuously concerned with reflection of society and politics, as well as sociopolitical position and meaning of one’s own activism. In the late 1980s he took part in the early steps of the civil political commit- ment; he was among the founders of the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI). When the war broke out in the early 1990s, he took part in founding the Anti-War Campaign in Croatia. He followed the transformation of organizations of civil society from civil activism to professionalization. He Preface worked for the Soros Foundation in Croatia, where he also ran the activities of 7 the Heinrich Böll Foundation in his country. After that he returned to the “civil- society” side, this time as the director of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for human rights. Throughout this period, he was also active as a translator of litera- ture in philosophy and social science. Therefore, it is not an accident that theory and practice – together with the internal and external relations of the development of civil society – are inter- mingled throughout the content and structure of this publication. From the standpoint of activities of the civil society actors and their effects, the principal question is that of the social context wherein those activities have been unfolding in the last twenty years. As Dvornik argues in the first part of the study, this is the first question that needs to be answered. The development here, as a consequence of the Balkan wars that befell the post-Yugoslav region in the 1990s, does not correspond to the theoretical outlines of the democratic transition or transformation. The primary reason lies in the fact that in socialist Yugoslavia, like in other societies of the “real socialism” in the East, the relation between state and society substantially differed from this relation in capitalist societies, where the theories of transition originated. Secondly, the reasons lie in the specific authoritarian-nationalist “transforma- tion” of the relations in the countries that succeeded Yugoslavia. This difference in the relation between state and society, as Dvornik points out, had a decisive impact on the emerging civil societies; the impact was twofold: Firstly, it had a strong impact on self-understanding of the great number of activ- ists and their activities in their own social environment. Secondly, the difference determines a negative impact of international donors on activities of civil society, as presented by the author’s disillusioning analysis. Many among the “democra- tizers,” with their programs, orientation on projects, approaches to “empower- ment” or “capacity-building,” and other steps in training and education brought also their own normative understanding of civil society from an entirely different, Western social context, including a wrong understanding of – and misguided involvement in – the local relations. That had an indirect impact on the local civil actors. Taking over the external (Western) ways of comprehension and the corre- sponding mental patterns led, however, to a loss of touch with their own society, which Dvornik shows on several cases.
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