Human Rights in the Shadow of Nationalism - Serbia 2002 7 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF NATIONALISM Introduction Serbia 2002 PUBLISHER: The year 2002 is regarded by many as a year lost because Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia nearly all of the political capital gained on 5 October 2000 was squandered: the coalition which had brought about the downfall of FOR PUBLISHER: Slobodan Milošević bogged down in futile infighting and was Sonja Biserko becoming its own chief obstacle. Having been established for the specific purpose of ousting Milošević, the Democratic Opposition of * * * Serbia (DOS) nevertheless went on to shoulder the formidable task of transition, a burden its heterogeneous political makeup proved TRANSLATED BY: ill-equipped to bear. For all the enthusiasm which characterized Ivana Damjanović the political situation in 2001, it became clear that the prevailing Dragan Novaković concept of democracy as a multi-party system devoid of proper Ivan Obradović institutions and the rule of law alone could not change the general political atmosphere in the country weighed down by the Milošević LAYOUT BY: legacy, institutions mired in old attitudes and methods, and Nebojša Tasić resistance to reform. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – now Serbia and Montenegro – was not admitted to the Council of COVER DESIGNE: Europe, nor did the DOS leaders’ promises of an association Ivan Hrašovec agreement with the EU materialize. Consequently, there was no appreciable headway in the domain of human rights. PRINTED BY: The intrinsic limitations of the DOS surfaced in 2002, and "Zagorac", Belgrade 2003 the general credibility and influence of political parties suffered as a result of numerous affairs, scandals and indiscretions. The NUMBER OF COPIES: 500 political parties’ aversion to transparency was adopted as a model of behaviour in other spheres. The failure of two rounds of ISBN - 86-7208-073-4 presidential elections through voter abstention indicated a determination on the part of the citizens to punish the politicians for their conduct, as well as that a political pattern which had This book was published thanks to the support dominated the whole of the last century had come to an end. At of the Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights the same time, it was disturbing to see no alternative political model to re-formulate the interests of the citizens and generate reforms accordingly. The political environment was unfavourable and discouraging, particularly for private enterprise for want of political encouragement. The region’s long isolation, high unemployment, 8 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Human Rights in the Shadow of Nationalism - Serbia 2002 9 and absence of economic progress were conducive to a resurgence (including 23 from the DSS) who had been obstructing the of populism hostile to reforms. The forces behind this, which could adoption of major laws by ‘jeopardizing the work of the Assembly easily prevail at the next elections, were spearheaded by the of Serbia by their irresponsible absence’. The frequent clashes Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the between the two blocs met with strong public disapproval and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), and some smaller political further damaged their legitimacy, which was later borne out by the parties. With regard to the direction and speed of reforms, a ‘pro- election results. reform’ and a ‘legalist’ bloc became firmly entrenched in 2002. The Serbia and Montenegro signed their agreement on the differences of the two blocs personified by Zoran Đinđić and initial steps for establishing their state-union in Belgrade on 14 Vojislav Koštunica first came to public notice through the media March. Already the first reactions to the ‘Belgrade agreement’ bore and then divided society as a whole. out the fundamentally different visions of the new state-union: The republican parliament went through a stormy period while Belgrade strove to project it as a modern federation, marked by numerous scandals, a chronic absence of quorum Podgorica saw it as two sovereign states. These differences (notably during the 2003 budget vote at the end of the year), and inevitably slowed work on the Constitutional Charter and affected obstruction by deputies and especially political parties such as the its content. In spite of enormous pressure from many European DSS, SRS, and SPS, all of which made it necessary to amend the governments, members of the Venice Commission and Xavier rules of procedure in the first half of the year. In spite of the Solana himself, who acted as mediator, Montenegro managed to obstruction, the parliament succeeded in adopting 47 news laws defend its case. The victory of Milo Đukanović at the October 2002 and 17 decisions and other enactments; this, however, was only a extraordinary parliamentary elections strengthened his hand vis-à- small quota of legislation required for accession to the Council of vis Belgrade and the international community; it amounted to a Europe. referendum at which the citizens of Montenegro manifested their In the first half of the parliamentary year two laws were maturity and deprived Serbia of yet another illusion that it could adopted: an ‘omnibus’ law which restored certain powers to the keep Montenegro under its patronage. However, the talks on the Vojvodina provincial parliament and a law on local self-government Prevlaka peninsula dragged on until the year’s end, their uncertain under which municipalities too were given back some powers. The outcome being a major obstacle to reform. Amid all-consuming two laws are designed to facilitate the decentralization of Serbia negotiations on the Constitutional Charter, and in spite of clear and certainly the harmonization of domestic legislation with that of signals from Montenegro, and even from Serbia, that the future the EU. The law on local self-government, passed on 14 February, entity stood slight chance of survival, the nationalistic forces is intended to promote democracy at ‘lower levels of government’ insisted on treating Prevlaka as a priority. This was hardly an and forms part of a project to reform local self-government. The atmosphere conducive to economic activity and it certainly threw programme is to be implemented in 50 municipalities in Serbia doubt on some initial transition successes. over four years with the assistance of experts from East Europe The DSS insisted on, among things, constitutional reform and the USA, i.e. the international consulting firm Development although the conditions for such an undertaking were not ripe Alternatives Incorporated (DAI) and the US Agency for considering the uncertain status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Given International Development. Under the Law on the Security- the position of the DSS and similar parties on regionalization as a Informative Agency, another law adopted by the parliament, the state framework, the insistence on constitutional reform as a key state security department was detached from the Serbian Ministry precondition of overall reform is fraught with pitfalls. The object of of Internal Affairs (MUP) to allow better control of police and state regionalization (whereby Vojvodina itself would consist of three security work. Another step towards European standards was the regions) is to modernize a centralist concept and, basically, to amendment of the Penal Code abolishing the death penalty. prevent the question of Vojvodina’s autonomy from being raised. A In February, the DSS first walked out of the republican constitutional reform would, in the absence of a social consensus, government and then left the DOS. In May, the DOS presidency create a constitutional crisis and thus fuel tension between decided to remove from the republican parliament 50 deputies Belgrade and Novi Sad and, of course, between Belgrade and 10 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Human Rights in the Shadow of Nationalism - Serbia 2002 11 Priština. The Constitutional Charter for Serbia and Montenegro The federal law on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, had already shown that such a process was unstoppable. The passed after much wrangling, was more a sign of political debate on constitutional reform forced in this way, i.e. without a impotence then proof that the matter was now legally regulated, proper explication, confused the public and made it possible to because the FRY and/or Serbia is bound to cooperate on other manipulate the potentials for reform. The fact that the question of accounts, i.e. by virtue of its membership of the UN. The law the state was being kept open indicated that the project which had reflects the balance of forces within the political elite because, by de facto been defeated was still regarded as an option, as well as virtue of its Article 39, it relates only to persons already indicted, that the two principal holders of power, the DSS and the which is at variance with the Hague Tribunal Statute. The law was Democratic Party (DS), were at a deadlock. To break this deadlock strongly criticized by the Serbian academic law community: as and gain supremacy, something the election failed to provide, they many as 51 professors and lecturers of the Belgrade Faculty of were moving towards another poll by espousing ‘elementary Law urged the Federal Constitutional Court not only to declare the constitutionalism’.1 The provisorium in which the state existed and law unconstitutional but to stay the execution of all individual acts the permanent political crisis were creating the conditions for under the law pending the Court’s final ruling. deeper commitment by the international community determined to Throughout 2002 the trial of Slobodan Milošević was a both stabilize and integrate the region. The question of major source of controversy in the country, the reactions showing constitutional reform is imperative for political as well as legal that Serbia had not broken with his policy and was not ready to reasons.