South European Society and Politics

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Ministers in : Notables, Party Men, Technocrats and Media Men

Maurizio Cotta & Luca Verzichelli

To cite this article: Maurizio Cotta & Luca Verzichelli (2002) Ministers in Italy: Notables, Party Men, Technocrats and Media Men, South European Society and Politics, 7:2, 117-152, DOI: 10.1080/13608740708539627 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13608740708539627

Published online: 02 Dec 2009.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fses20 Ministers in Italy: Notables, Party Men, Technocrats and Media Men

MAURIZIO COTTA and LUCA VERZICHELLI

Ministers are a rather special group within the larger body of the politicians. They are the politicians who have to carry the political responsibility for the specialized policy functions that relatively developed polities such as modern states are expected to perform. Because of this institutional role they are also very close (although the degree of this proximity may vary somewhat) to the centre of the game for power and its legitimate control. In the end they occupy a political space that is defined on the one hand by the functional requirements of the state at a given point in time, and on the other by the pressures of the dominant political power game of that period, and by the interest those involved in this game have in controlling the administrative apparatus of the state. Competence, effectiveness and specialization versus political legitimation and political loyalty are thus the competing criteria that are involved in the selection of ministers. Under different political regimes these two requirements may change in their specific contents, but not in their fundamental nature. In the period covered by our research, very significant changes have taken place on both dimensions in Italy (as in most countries of Europe). On the first dimension, the actual requirements of policy making and administration have changed from the period of the minimal state to the age of the welfare state and then to that of international . On

This research was made possible, thanks to the funds provided by the University of Siena (PAR 2001 funds) and the Italian National Research Council (1998 and 2000 funds). The research was conducted in connection with the European Science Foundation Eurelite Network (European Political Elites in Comparison: The Long Road to Convergence). The authors acknowledge the help of Francesco Marangoni and Davide Orsini, who collected the data from several biographic sources. Maurizio Cotta is responsible for the first part of the contribution, while Luca Verzichelli is responsible for the section on the Republican age. 118 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? the second, the nature and bases of the political game for deciding who can legitimately seek to control executive power have also changed: monarchic legitimacy has been displaced, first by restricted representation, then by mass representation in the age of the great social cleavages, and finally by mass representation in post-modern politics. Both dimensions of transformation have affected, in a visible way, the government structure and its personnel. The transformation of the political game has had a very significant impact upon the channels of recruitment and the career patterns of the political elites. On the other hand the transformation of the functions and role of the state, vis-a-vis society and its problems, has been visibly reflected in the number of ministers - which has grown steadily over the past century (see Figure 1) - and in the competencies of the executive, which have expanded from the relatively limited functions related to maintenance of internal and external order to the much broader palette of functions connected with the promotion of the economy and social equality (Ferrera 1985) (see Figure 2). It must be added, however, that these transformations, which for the greatest part of the period examined here had followed a fundamentally linear trend of growth, have probably entered into a phase of slow-down or even reversal during recent decades. A sign of this could be the decline in the number of ministers and the growing transfer of functions away from national government to independent authorities, local governments, or supranational bodies. It is reasonable to expect that the combined effects of these changes should have had a significant impact upon the features of the ministerial elite. In order to explore this relationship we have identified six main periods of Italian political history which we will use to discuss how much the features of the ministers have changed from one to the other. These periods are as follows:

• The early years of the parliamentary Monarchy (1848-61; 1861-76) • The developed parliamentary system (1876-1913) • The first age of mass suffrage (1913-24) • Mass after (1946-92) • The crisis of party democracy (1992-96) • Majoritarian democracy (1996-) MINISTERS IN ITALY 119

FIGURE 1 POOL OF MINISTERIAL POSITIONS: MINISTERS AND JUNIOR SECRETARIES (1861-1922 AND 1945-2001) FIGURE 2a TIMELINE OF THE ITALIAN MINISTRIES (1861-1922)

1861 1866 1871 1876 1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 1906 1911 1916 1921

Foreign Affairs XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X Internal Affairs XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X War XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X Justice XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X Finance XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X Education XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X Commercial Navy XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X Public works XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X Agriculture, Industry XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX and Commerce Treasury XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X Post and Communications XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX X X Colonies XXXXXXXXX Weapons and Ammunition X X Sea and Rail Transportations XXX Agriculture X X X X X X Industry, Commerce X X X X X X and Employment Food Supplies X Military Assistance and X X Veterans Redeemed Lands X X X X X Employment and Pensions X X X FIGURE 2b TIMELINE OF THE ITALIAN MINISTRIES (1945-2001)

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Foreign Affairs X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Internal Affairs X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Justice X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Finance X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Education X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Commercial Navy X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxx Public Works X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Treasury X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Post and X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Communications Transport X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Agriculture X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Industry, Commerce X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Employment and X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Pensions Budget X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Defence X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Foreign Trade X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx State Industries X X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxx Health X X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Tourism X X X X X X X xxxxxxxxxxxxxx Cultural Affairs xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Environment xxxxxxxxx University XX X XX X X Economy (Finance, Treasury, Budget) X Education, University X and Research Infrastructures X Production X 122 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? THE EARLY YEARS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY MONARCHY (1848-60; 1861-76) This was the period during which a previously absolute monarchy was transformed into a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy. For Italy, this was also the period of national unification under the leadership of one of the regional states. Italian parliamentary democracy was in fact the offspring of the constitutional monarchy that had developed in the Kingdom of Sardinia between 1848 and 1860,1 after King Charles Albert of Savoy decided, in the wake of the great European upheavals of 1848, to grant to his state a liberal constitution. As a result of the 1859 War of Independence and the subsequent process of Italian unification (1861), the Savoys became the reigning dynasty of the Italian state with the constitution of this regional state becoming that of the new national state. The Italian political system therefore inherited some crucial elements of an older political tradition. It must be said that while the Statuto Albertino (that is to say, the Piedmontese constitution of 1848, which lasted until the new republican one of 1948) did not clearly define a parliamentary regime (and in fact did not formally spell out the principle of the political responsibilities of the government toward parliament) its implementation very soon took on some of the characteristics of that regime. More specifically, Prime Ministers and their cabinets had to have a majority in the elected chamber (Romeo 1984). At the same time, it was quite clear that the monarchy was not yet confined to a purely symbolic role, and was yet able and willing to play a political role in the formation and dismissal of cabinets (and in the selection of ministers). This period was also characterized by a very restricted franchise (Ballini 1989), the clear predominance of a parliamentary class of notables (Farneti 1971; Cotta, Mastropaolo and Verzichelli 2000) and a lack of organized political parties. Parliamentary life was organized on the basis of two broad political groupings: the Destra Storica (historic right) and the Sinistra Storica (historic left).2 Attitudes towards the monarchy and the process of Italian unification marked the original divisions between these two groups, with the Destra being monarchist and in favour of a more prudent unification - guided from above by the Piedmontese state - while the Sinistra was republican and supportive of ‘democratic’ action from below by the patriotic movements that rose against the former rulers of the regional states (Mack Smith 1997). Neither of the two groupings could be considered cohesive parliamentary parties; they were, MINISTERS IN ITALY 123 rather, loosely connected ‘political areas’ within which members of parliament formed smaller groups and cliques, often with personalistic or regional bases. If we consider only the Italian Kingdom, this period saw 13 cabinets (with eight different prime ministers) and 86 ministers (see Table 1).3 The average duration of a cabinet was approximately 14 months (23 months for prime ministers). Governmental instability, one of the lasting features of Italian politics, manifested itself from the beginning. The average tenure for ministers was, at 2.4 years, longer than that of cabinets, however (see Table 2). The political background of the ministers was, to a large extent, a parliamentary one, but a significant number of them had served only in the Senate (see Table 3). If we consider the fact that the Senate was not based on electoral representation, but rather on nomination by the King (upon proposal from the government), it is easily seen that nearly one-quarter of the ministers obtained their office without having played any representative role. The social profile of this group of politicians is fairly clear. A very large proportion of them had an aristocratic background and three main categories, landowners, high military officers, and senior public officials, counted for more than half of the ministers (but nearly two-thirds in the Kingdom of Sardinia) (see Table 4). A closer analysis of the cases would show that a good number of officers and high public administrators with an aristocratic background were also landowners (the same in fact could be said for a significant proportion of ministers coming from the free professions). The traditional social establishment made up of aristocracy and upper bourgeoisie linked to landownership and service to the state (army and bureaucracy) thus played a dominant role in the selection of the ministerial elite. These data also confirm that loyalty and connections to the monarchy were an important element in the selection of ministers during this period.4 It must be kept in mind that the monarchy was for many good

TABLE 1 NUMBER OF CABINETS AND MINISTERS, 1861-1922 AND 1946-2001

1861-76 1876-1913 1913–22 1946-92 1992-96 1996-2001

Cabinets 13 32 11 48 4 5 Prime ministers 8 11 8 18 4 4 Ministers 85 151 107 275 80 54

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. 124 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE?

TABLE 2 TENURE, DURATION AND TURNOVER

1861-76 1876-1913 1913-22 1946-92 1992-96 1996-2001

Tenure of ministers 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.7 1.6 2.3 (average number of offices)1 Duration of 2.5 3.0 2.2 3.5 1.6 2.6 ministerial career (average years) Average turnover 49.4 38.3 40.9 55.0 54.0 54.3 of ministers (%)2 N 85 151 107 275 80 54

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set.

Notes: 1 Same as well as different jobs. 2 Percentage of new ministers in each cabinet.

TABLE 3 PARLIAMENTARY EXPERIENCE BEFORE FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT

1861-76 1876-1913 1913–22 1946-92 1992-96 1996-2001

No previous 8.2 12.6 13.1 10.6 42.5 31.5 experience (%) Member of non 15.3 7.9 8.4 - - - elective Senate only (%) Member of elective1 - - - 12.5 11.3 9.3 Senate only (%) Member of lower 76.5 79.5 78.5 76.9 46.3 59.3 chamber only or of both chambers (%) Average duration of 5.4 11.8 11.4 9.2 8.3 8.0 previous parliamentary experience (years) N 85 151 107 275 80 54

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set.

Note: 1 Since 1948. MINISTERS IN ITALY 125 reasons (one among them its role in uniting the country) still a significant actor in the power game and that the links of the monarchy with the upper social classes and state bureaucracy (in particular its upper strata and the military sector) remained very strong for a long time. The fact that a good proportion of ministers came from this social milieu meant that they had in this period a sort of double allegiance, to their political faction and to the voters because of the political process of selection, to the monarchy because of their social and professional background.5 The next important group of ministers was that characterized by a middle class background. Approximately 40 per cent of the ministers came from the liberal professions (mainly lawyers, but also a few engineers, doctors, architects) and from different sectors of cultural life (journalists, university teachers, etc.) (see Table 4). The smaller size of this group indicates that while the process of electoral representation was indeed opening access to the ministerial elite for new social strata, the grip of the traditional establishment was still rather firm. Given the special features of the history of Italian political life, and in particular the fact that the ‘parliamentarization’ of politics (and specifically of the executive) took place more or less at the same time as the process of national unification, special attention should be paid to the territorial aspect of its origin when analysing the ministerial elite. Given the mode of national unification adopted - incorporation of the new territories into the existing Piedmontese state - it is not surprising that the core of the ministerial class was originally dominated by ministers coming from that region of Italy (see Table 5). Yet already during this time the first process of territorial extension of the political elite and the incorporation of politicians from the other regions was taking place.6 Active participation in the Risorgimento, the movement for the independence and unification of Italy, was a further important component of the recruitment profile of government members (Farneti 1971). A rather significant number of ministers had, at some time during the previous years, experienced political imprisonment or exile because of their opposition to the absolutist regimes of the regional states and their support for the unification movement (Table 4). An even larger group had taken part, in some form or another, in the military activities of the wars of independence. The picture provided by these data become even more distinctive when we consider only the top ranks of the cabinet (Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs, War). Under the Kingdom of Sardinia these positions had been occupied mainly by Piedmontese aristocrats and a few senior state 126 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE?

TABLE 4 MINISTERS IN LIBERAL ITALY. PROFESSIONS, PATRIOTIC BACKGROUND AND NOBILITY (%)

Kingdom Historic Historic Giolitti Left Age of of Sardinia Right Left Age dominance mass 1848-61 dominance dominance 1900-13 + Giolitti suffrage 1861-76 1876-1900 Age 1913-22 1876-1913

Military 24.6 22.6 23.8 12.7 20.7 13.1 Public 26.2 11.9 16.2 14.2 17.3 16.8 Administration Landowners 11.4 15.5 8.0 8.5 8.3 3.6 Lawyers 26.3 25.0 18.1 29.6 20.2 23.5 Other Professions 1.6 - 3.0 4.2 3.3 3.7 Academics 1.6 13.1 17.0 19.7 17.3 19.6 Other Intellectuals 4.9 7.1 7.9 7.0 7.5 14.0 Businessmen 1.6 4.8 5.0 4.2 4.7 5.6 Others 1.6 - 1.0 - 0.7 -

Political 14.5 28.2 16.7 5.6 12.0 3.7 Imprisonment or Exile Members of 54.8 37.6 28.5 28.2 28.5 14.0 Nobility N 61 85 100 71 151 102

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set.

TABLE 5 REGIONAL ORIGINS OF MINISTERS: GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS (%)

1861-76 1876-1913 1913-22 1946-92 1992-96 1996-2001

North-west 47.1 40.7 33.0 27.2 30.5 22.2 North-east 2.4 4.0 7.5 10.4 15.1 6.7 Centre 22.2 16.0 23.6 23.0 29.0 33.3 South 19.1 23.3 22.6 26.8 15.3 24.4 Isles 8.2 12.0 11.3 11.3 10.2 13.3 N 85 151 107 275 80 54

Note: Because of a small number of Ministers born abroad, totals will not necessarily add to 100.

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. MINISTERS IN ITALY 127 bureaucrats. The only non-aristocratic premier had been Gioberti, a priest and famous political thinker who advocated a confederate solution for the unification of Italy. After unification and during the governments of the Destra, we begin to see the mixing of different regional elites as a few aristocrats from central Italy and some more senior civil servants come to join the Piedmontese ministerial elite. To sum up, it can be said that the first period of representative politics in the history of the Italian state did not signal a complete break at the executive level with the pre-representative past. High social origin, a career in senior position within the state apparatus and proximity to royal power - all elements that had characterized governmental elites in the past - did not disappear once electoral processes and representative institutions were introduced (with, it should be remembered, the consent of the king). To a great extent, these elements were transfused in the new politics of parliamentary representation and combined with it. There was, of course, also an infusion of new elements that were more distinctly products of electoral and parliamentary politics. However, their weight remained limited for some time. This period was also crucial because it was when the shaping of a national political elite took place. The incorporation into the original Piedmontese elite of other regional components succeeded, but did not yet produce a geographically balanced group of politicians. The process of opening involved, in a more pronounced manner, the regions of central Italy that had played a more active role in the movement for unification, while the south and the islands lagged behind.

THE DEVELOPED PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM (1876-1913) In 1876 the domination of the conservative political elite that had led the process of national unification was broken and the Left conquered executive power (Cotta 1992). The political change was favoured, on the one hand, by the internal exhaustion of the Destra storica after the completion of national unity, and on the other by the increasing moderation of the Sinistra storica, which had watered down its ‘democratic’ and republican ideals and had come to accept the role of the monarchy. With the passage of time, the traditional division between Destra and Sinistra was bound to fade away, and the main divide became that between these increasingly similar groups on one side and the new extreme left on the other. The end of the age of the Destra storica marked a discontinuity of some importance in the recruitment of ministers, however. Only 14 128 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? ministers of that period (approximately 16 per cent of the total) entered the cabinets of the subsequent period, and some significant changes in the qualitative profile of ministers took place. In the governments of the new period, the weight of the aristocracy declined as did that of the two occupations that traditionally had a close association with it, that is, the landowners and military officers. The occupations typically associated with a middle-class background - the legal and other liberal professions, academics and a variety of intellectual positions - now became the recruiting ground for more than half of the ministers (see Table 4). The average educational level also rose during this period (see Table 6). This transformation is also evident when we look at the central position of the cabinet - Prime Ministers with middle-class backgrounds now prevail. If we break this period of about 40 years down into two sub-periods (1876-1900 and 1901-13), the main noticeable changes between them are the significant growth in the number of liberal professions and academics and the increasing civilianization of cabinets (see Table 4). With regard to the more political aspects of ministers’ career paths, we can detect a growing importance of parliamentary careers. A somewhat larger number of ministers came from the elected chamber (see Table 3), and they typically entered the cabinet after an extended period of parliamentary service. The length of service in the cabinet, as well as the continuity between one cabinet and the next, also became greater (see Tables 2 and 7). From the aspect of territorial representation, the geographical spread of the ministerial elite became more balanced during this period. The number of ministers from north-western and central Italy, the two areas that during the first years of unification had the lion’s share of ministers, declined just as the number of ministers from the south and the islands increased (see Table 5). Politicians from these areas even began to be promoted to the highest cabinet ranks.

TABLE 6 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MINISTERS (%)

1861-76 1876-1913 1913-22 1946-92 1992-96 1996-2001

Non Graduate 16.7 6.0 3.7 8.8 2.5 16.7 Graduate 61.9 72.7 83.2 90.8 97.5 83.3 Military 21.4 21.3 13.1 0.4 - - Education N 85 151 107 275 80 54

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. MINISTERS IN ITALY 129

TABLE 7 MOBILITY OF MINISTERS THROUGH PORTFOLIOS (%)

1861-76 1876-1913 1913-22 1946-92 1992-96 1996-2001

One post only 69.4 55.0 56.1 44.0 75.0 61.1 Two different 14.1 2.8 24.3 23.8 16.3 29.6 posts Three different 9.4 9.9 9.3 13.9 6.3 3.7 posts Four + different 7.1 9.3 10.2 18.3 2.5 5.5 posts N 85 151 107 275 80 54

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set.

Taken as a whole, these data suggest that the game of representative politics was becoming more firmly entrenched, and that it was having a stronger impact upon the governmental processes. A new class of politicians were making their way into government, politicians who did not derive their legitimacy and political strength from their relationship to royal power or from their upper-class origins, but rather obtained their position as a result of their success in taking part in the (restricted) electoral competition and parliamentary game. However, it would be a mistake to overemphasize the extent of change. The data presented here suggest that the balance between the members of the traditional establishment and the new breed of middle- class politicians within ministerial ranks did not change dramatically as much as it did incrementally (Mastropaolo 1986; Rogari 1998). The old elite did not disappear completely, and although reduced in size, it retained an important role in the political game. A very clear sign of this can be observed by looking at two of the most important cabinet positions, Foreign Affairs and War, where an aristocratic background and links to the crown continued to have great importance. It must be remembered that, despite the ongoing ‘parliamentarization’ of the executive, the role of the king in the process of government formation, as well as during its life and in the events leading to its termination, remained significant (Fabri 1991). A further element deserving attention is the fact that the weight of a career in public administration (in its civil component) continued to increase - confirming the proximity between the political role of the minister and bureaucratic experience. 130 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE?

THE SHORT AGE OF MASS SUFFRAGE PRIOR TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF FASCISM (1913-24) Universal male suffrage was granted in 1912 and implemented for the first time in the elections of 1913. The real impact of this innovation, which increased the electorate from 2,930,473 (8.3 per cent of the population) to 8,443,205 (23.2 per cent) (Ballini 1989), was only felt after the war, however, when the elections of 1919 shattered the long domination of the liberal elites. Following the rapid growth of the Socialist Party, and the birth and immediate success of the Partito Popolare (the newly formed Christian democratic party), the party system was profoundly reshaped (Farneti 1978). The new mass parties managed to win control of a majority of seats in parliament, yet, because of the ideological differences between them, they remained unable to build a political majority, leaving the leadership of the governmental process in the hands of the seriously weakened Liberals. The main political theme of this short age (by 1922 Mussolini’s government, had begun the gradual transformation of Italy’s into a quasi-totalitarian regime - which was more or less complete a few months after the semi-competitive elections of 1924) was the encounter between the traditional parliamentary notables and the new breed of party men. It soon became apparent that the two types of politicians could not work easily together, with the formation of cabinets taking on a distinctly new character. Instead of freely picking his ministers from within rather loose parliamentary factions and groups, the designated prime minister was now confronted with parties and their leaders who sought to choose the ministers they believed were entitled to be included in the new cabinet. Even more shocking for some of the old liberal parliamentary leaders was the fact that Don , the head of the new Partito Popolare, was a priest and not even a member of parliament. It is not surprising, therefore, that the formation of governments became ever more problematic and their stability declined quite markedly. Due to the brevity of this period, which was brought to an end by the breakdown of democracy (Farneti 1978), the new mass parties were unable to wrest control of the government-making process from the old liberal elite. With the exception of Bonomi - a reformist socialist who had left his party before the war after he had failed to convince it to adopt a more co-operative attitude towards the existing regime - all of the prime ministers of this period were recruited from the traditional groups of the centre and of . All attempts by the Partito Popolare MINISTERS IN ITALY 131 to win the premiership for one of its leading figures failed. The Popolari and the managed to obtain some cabinet positions, yet, despite the changed parliamentary equilibrium, the liberal elite maintained a disproportionate weight in cabinet. The mainstream socialists were left completely in the cold. Out of a total of 107 ministers during this period, only nine came from the Partito Popolare - a party with 20 per cent of the parliamentary seats and accounting for approximately 40 per cent of the governing coalition - and five from the reformist socialists. All the others were traditional Liberals. Despite these serious limitations to the renewal of governmental elites, the qualitative outlook of ministers demonstrated some significant changes. Of all the ministers of this period, only 26 (approximately 25 per cent) had served during the previous period. The entire group displayed a rather more distinctly middle-class outlook than in the past, as the percentage of ministers with an aristocratic background almost halved. Unsurprisingly, the number of ministers who were landowners or military officials also declined as the number of liberal professionals and public administrators remained stable. Interestingly enough, the professional group with the highest growth was the intellectuals; and if we add those with an academic background, then about one-third of all ministers were ‘experts in ideas’ (see Table 4). It is amongst them that some of the new politicians of the age of mass politics can be found. Some of the signs pointing to a certain degree of de-structuring of the ministerial elite that are noticeable during this period are probably linked to the difficult transition to the age of mass politics. Along with increased cabinet instability (the duration of cabinets was significantly lower than in the previous period, and the length of service of prime ministers also fell dramatically), there was also an increase in the rate of ministerial turnover, with the result that the average length of ministerial tenure declined (see Table 2). Finally, during this period there was also an increase in the number of ministers without a parliamentary background (see Table 3). The failed consolidation of the Italian political system as a parliamentary democracy with universal suffrage interrupted the transformation of the ministerial elite into one that was based on the typical recruiting mechanisms of that type of regime, that is, mass organized parties. The 1913-22 period was, thus, a brief spring that did not produce the fruit that could reasonably be expected. 132 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? FROM LIBERALISM TO DEMOCRACY: A SYNTHETIC ASSESSMENT The 60 years from Italian unification to the breakdown of democracy was undoubtedly a time of significant change:

(1) If we consider both the increase in the number of ministers and the creation of the sottosegretari, the size of the government almost tripled (see Figure 1); (2) The social background of the ministerial elite changed significantly - the traditional upper classes (aristocrats, landowners, senior military officers) increasingly gave way to the middle classes (lawyers and intellectuals) (see Table 4) - together with this, the educational level of ministers increased (see Table 6); (3) The geographical origins of ministers became more balanced as a result of the nationalization of political life (see Table 5); (4) The extent of the ‘parliamentarization’ of the executive elite, as measured by the percentage of ministers with a background in the elected chamber, increased slowly, although the length of that experience also became more substantial (see Table 3); (5) If we compare the features of the ministerial elite with those of the parliamentary class of the same period (Cotta, Mastropaolo and Verzichelli 2000: 231-42, various tables), some important differences can be detected. In the first decades in particular, the proportion of aristocratic ministers was higher than the proportion of aristocratic deputies. Even more noticeable was the larger number of military officers, senior civil servants and university professors. On the other hand, the proportion of ministers with a background in the legal profession was significantly lower than the number of lawyers in parliament. These data suggest that links with the monarchy, the state apparatus, technical qualifications and social privilege continued to play a significant role in the recruitment of the executive and delayed the rise of professional or semi- professional politicians whose status was based on popular mandates.

The interruption of the democratization of Italian politics caused by the rise of Fascism halted the transformation of the ministerial elite. Many of the implications of mass democracy were to come into effect only with the return to democracy following the Second World War. MINISTERS IN ITALY 133 MASS DEMOCRACY AFTER FASCISM (1946-92) The Development of Party Government in the Republican Age Fascism and its subsequent collapse resulted in an unequivocal break in the ministerial class. The liberal elite, which had - to a limited extent - been co-opted into the first Fascist cabinets,7 disappeared from the scene altogether. This new period was, right from the outset, dominated by the mass parties that had led the resistance to the German occupation. As a consequence of this, the development of the new democratic regime was based on the dominance of a strong system of party government (or partitocracy) whose first and most distinctive character was the presence of ‘party-men’, both in parliament and the cabinet.8 The data presented in our tables do not cover the cabinets of the transition and instauration period that occurred between the end of the Mussolini’s regime on 25 July 1943 and the elections to the Constituent Assembly of 2 June 1946. Nevertheless, a cursory examination of the composition of the six cabinets of these difficult times,9 is enough to note the rapid disappearance of those purely parliamentary politicians who had been connected to liberal Italy, and the rise of the party politicians linked to the new mass parties, who were rapidly to establish themselves as the country’s political elite. The elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1946 signalled the return to representative politics and parliamentary government. The principle that a cabinet must have the support of the parliamentary majority was implemented de facto - before it was formalized by the 1948 Constitution. At first, the grand coalition of anti-Fascist parties (that had been formed during the transition and excluded only some small right-wing parties) provided the political basis of cabinets. This arrangement was not to last, however. A crucial watershed came with the controversial Atlanticist policy promoted by the then Prime Minister, De Gasperi, and which was supported by the DC (Christian Democrats) and its centrist allies. This resulted in the exit of the Communist - and most of the Socialist - ministers from the cabinet in May 1947 (only the recently formed Social Democratic Party, which was loyal to the Western alliance, remained in government). This policy was confirmed by the electorate on 18 April 1948 when the first republican parliament was elected and the ‘long cycle’ (Cotta 1996: 36ff.) of Italian democracy was inaugurated. From then until 1992, the cabinet remained the reserve of the centrist parties (DC, Liberal Party, Republican Party and the Social Democratic Party) and from 1963 - following its break from the Communists, - the Socialist Party. 134 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? The two points that have to be addressed here are: (1) to what extent did the features of the ministers of the ‘long cycle’ differ from those of the previous periods; and (2) what, if any, changes took place during this extended period of continuous development? Some features of the ministerial elite are extremely clear: the ministers were, generally, university educated; they were middle-aged when they entered in office; and they were, in their overwhelming majority, male (see Tables 6, 8 and 9). In these respects at least, they were not very different from their predecessors. The exclusion of women from ministerial office stands out, given the fact that women had been enfranchised in 1946. Women did not make their way into cabinet until the 1970s, when such portfolios as education and family were (occasionally) made available to them. A limited presence of women ministers only became a commonplace during the 1990s. This feature should not come as much of a surprise, particularly when we consider that Italy has one of the lowest levels of female parliamentary representation in Western Europe, and that the majority of cabinet ministers are themselves recruited from parliament (Cotta, Mastropaolo and Verzichelli 2000; Best and Cotta 2000). With respect to the educational background of ministers, the most important difference from the past is the almost complete disappearance of ministers with a military education - a feature that had been present in a significant portion of the pre-Fascist ministerial elite (see Table 6). One of the clearest effects of the Fascist interlude and the dramatic military defeat that brought it to an end, has been the ‘demilitarization’ of government. Since the war, ministers with military backgrounds have become a rarity: there were some during the first transitional governments and one officer held a ministerial portfolio in one of the technical cabinets of the 1990s. When we consider the professional experience of the ministers during this period, the importance of the legal and academic professions is quite clear. On a somewhat lower level, we also find school teachers, civil servants, journalists and businessmen (see Table 10). Compared to the past, the most significant change is the decline in the number of ministers with experience in public administration (both civil and military), and the appearance of a substantial group of politicians emerging from full time positions within the party or trade union bureaucracies. These numbers become even larger if we consider that some of the professional categories listed here (in particular the law profession and journalism) admit different levels of professional engagement. In fact, closer scrutiny MINISTERS IN ITALY 135 shows that many of the lawyers were never active professionals and that some of the journalists - who were officially registered in their professional association - had worked exclusively for their own party newspapers and were, in fact, simply career party political functionaries. If this is the global picture, significant variations in the proportion of different backgrounds also emerge with the passing of time. The most visible noteworthy change is the decline in the proportion of lawyers, where the downward trend - dating from the 1950s to the 1990s - is striking. Only to a very limited extent is this decline compensated by the growth in the number of ministers with other liberal professional backgrounds. More significant during the 1970s is the challenge coming from full time party or union officials. During the 1980s and 1990s it is senior civil servants, judges, university professors, journalists and media professionals who take over, while full time professional politicians start declining. By looking at the occupational background of ministers (which obviously is only one element defining their profile), we already see some indications that two waves of transformation took place during the ‘long political cycle’ of the second half of the twentieth century. During the earlier and longer part of this phase, we observe the rise of professional party politicians at the expense of an older breed of relatively independent parliamentary politicians. However, this process appears to have reached its zenith towards the end of this sub-period, culminating in the decline of that type of politician. A new type then appears for whom the resources of specialized knowledge or a role in the media are more important than resources derived from mass organizations. The evidence provided by this type of data remains, however, relatively limited, because it does not inform us as to what extent the occupation reported was a real activity or simply nominal. In order to obtain a more sound evaluation of the background of ministers it is useful to look into other aspects of their career, and in particular to assess the

TABLE 8 AGE AT TIME OF FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT

1861-76 1876-1913 1913–22 1946-92 1992-96 1996-2001

Mean age in years 48 53 52 54 57 51 N 85 151 107 275 80 54

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. 136 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE?

TABLE 9 WOMEN AND GRADUATE MINISTERS (%) AND MEAN AGE OF MINISTERS BY DECADE

1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1992-96 1996-2001 Total

Women (%) – – – 1.0 2.8 5.0 13.0 4.2 University 87.8 94.4 93.9 93.8 89.0 97.5 83.3 90.7 degree (%) Mean age 56.1 53.2 51.1 51.2 52.0 57.0 51.2 54.3 when first ministers (years) N 41 72 82 97 109 80 54 380

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set.

TABLE 10 MAIN OCCUPATION OF MINISTERS, BY DECADES (%)

1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1992-96 1996-2001 Total

Farmers 2.4 1.0 0.5 Business 12.2 6.9 6.1 9.3 6.4 6.3 3.2 6.6 Other professionals - 1.4 3.7 3.1 4.6 7.5 1.9 4.5 Legal profession 36.6 43.1 34.1 22.7 14.7 12.5 7.6 22.6 Judges - - 1.2 1.0 2.8 6.3 9.3 2.9 Teachers - 5.6 8.5 8.2 7.3 2.5 3.7 5.8 University professors 21.9 20.6 19.5 18.6 25.7 42.5 35.2 25.6 Senior civil servants - - - 4.1 7.3 5.0 9.3 5.2 Military - - 1.2 - - 1.3 - 0.5 Journalists and media 4.9 4.2 2.4 7.2 8.3 6.3 7.4 6.1 Engineers, technicians 7.3 1.4 3.7 1.0 1.8 - - 1.8 White-collar employees - - - - 2.8 2.5 1.9 1.3 Blue-collar employees - 2.8 3.7 2.1 - 3.8 - 1.1 Full-time politicians/ 9.8 8.3 15.8 20.6 16.6 1.0 13.0 13.4 union officials Economists 2.4 - - - 0.9 2.5 1.9 0.3 Other 2.4 1.4 - 1.0 0.9 - 5.6 0.8 N 41 72 82 97 109 80 54 380

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. MINISTERS IN ITALY 137 length and level of their political involvement prior to achieving ministerial rank. The first aspect to be underlined is that during this period, a background in electoral politics has almost become a sine qua non for access to the cabinet (see Table 3). Given that the Senate (the upper house) is also elected, and considered the electoral equivalent of the lower chamber: and since approximately 90 per cent of all cabinet ministers have been recruited from one or other parliamentary chamber - or from both (a position which they kept during their ministerial service) - ministers without a parliamentary background have become the exception. Furthermore, the data suggests that, in most cases, parliamentary experience does not simply mean being elected to parliament, but signifies extended parliamentary service - an average of almost two terms for new ministers (see Table 3). Given the high degree of electoral competition in the Italian system - both within and between political parties - this is not an inconsiderable factor.10 It is possible, during the first decades of the Republic, to document the emergence of a pattern of intra-institutional career paths, which begins with parliamentary selection and develops into articulated institutional training. This pattern is mainly based on the acquisition of political skills and resources via a three-step process. First, a significantly long parliamentary tenure that, particularly in the extremely competitive environment of the Christian Democratic Party, could be interpreted as a test of the personal degree of consensus of the potential minister. Second, experience as a parliamentary leader in the presidential office of a legislative committee (often in the policy sector corresponding to that of the future ministerial office).11 Finally, a period of ‘socialization’ within the executive, but outside the inner circle of strongest ministerial positions, thereby ensuring a sufficient degree of institutional skills. Past studies focusing on the problem of the transformation of governmental elites have often defined the above characteristics as typical requirements of a Christian Democratic model of ministerial recruitment (Zuckerman 1979; Calise and Mannheimer 1982; Dogan 1989). Considering that the ministers emerging from that party always accounted for at least 50 per cent of all cabinet members, and that uncertainties within the parliamentary majority were often conducive to the formation of minority cabinets composed entirely of Christian Democrats (Marradi 1982), we can easily subscribe to such an interpretation. We should add, however, that non-DC ministers did not show a markedly different pattern of recruitment and circulation. 138 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? In any event, a national parliamentary career was not the only important political asset for ministers - an active involvement in local politics has also represented a significant resource. In fact, more than half of all cabinet members have either been elected councillors or members of local executives at either city, provincial, or regional levels12 prior to being elected to parliament (see Table 11). From a developmental perspective, one also notes that from the 1940s until the 1970s this proportion has continuously increased. It was not until the 1980s that this trend changed and an increasing detachment from local politics seemed to set in. It would appear, then, that during the so-called ‘First Republic’, a large number of ministers have been nurtured through an extended career in electoral politics, which begins at the local before moving on to the national level. If we add the data relating to party political background (see Table 12) the picture becomes more complete. Between 1945 and the mid-1970s, the overwhelming majority of Italian ministers had not just been party members before their first nomination to cabinet rank, they had also occupied positions of responsibility within their party organizations. Moreover, in the majority of cases these were senior national positions (often following periods at more junior, local level, offices). Their political career, moving from the periphery to the executive centre of the national political system, has usually been paralleled with advancement within the party organization. Taken as a whole, these data suggest that labelling members of the ministerial elite solely on the basis of their ‘private’ occupations can offer only a limited understanding of the factors determining their selection and career trajectories. For most of the ministers, their private occupations were merely an early point of departure, which was then followed by a long and articulated period of political activity that, in most cases, had either interrupted their original profession or, at least, had limited its importance. For a great many of them, politics - in its party-organizational and electoral aspects - had become the primary centre of interest. This type of political background should not come as a surprise given what we know about the way ministers were (and to some extent still are) selected. The process was rather precisely (even if informally) defined throughout the period 1946-92. The leaders of the governmental coalition - that is to say, the chairmen of the parties involved - decided, on the basis of size, how many ministries (and which ones) each party would get. After that it was left to each party to select its own ministers. When a party MINISTERS IN ITALY 139 became factionalized (as happened to the DC and, to a lesser extent, the Socialist Party), an internal party decision defined how many ministers each faction should have, leaving it up to the individual factions to select their cabinet representatives (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000; Verzichelli 2001; Mershon 2001). Given the manner in which the selection and nomination game was organized, it is easy to understand why a successful party and electoral background became the crucial factor in obtaining a ministerial appointment (Calise and Mannheimer 1982). Technical competence was, on the contrary, a much less significant element. Even without other specific variables to measure this, the high level of homogeneity in terms of educational and professional backgrounds and, above all, the relatively strong pattern of consequentiality from party to parliament and then to government can be taken as a proxy for the high degree of generalism of First Republican ministers. The problem of party control over the recruitment of the national group of rulers has always been a crucial theme in the interpretation of the Italian case. The political class, as expressed by the governing parties, was undoubtedly the product of a representative process in which elected positions (both local and national) and a party career (again both local and national) were strictly interconnected, and in which the ordering of positions was not random, but rather followed a precise career pathway - albeit with some differences between the individual parties (Cotta 1979). Very clearly, ministers - who constitute the top stratum of this political class - followed this trajectory. Votes and preferences counted, as did links to the factions within the party.

TABLE 11 LOCAL ELECTED POSITION PRIOR TO FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT, BY DECADES (%)

1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1992-96 1996-2001 Total

None 48.8 44.4 40.2 39.2 47.7 62.5 61.1 46.8 Only local 29.3 44.4 51.2 40.2 31.2 25.0 18.5 33.9 (town, city, province) Only regional 2.4 1.4 - - 1.8 5.0 3.7 2.1 Local and 19.5 9.7 8.5 20.6 19.3 7.5 16.7 17.1 regional N 41 72 82 97 109 80 54 380

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. 140 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE?

TABLE 12 PARTY OFFICES BEFORE FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT, BY DECADES (%)

1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1992-96 1996-2001 Total

None 18.2 12.5 10.0 13.0 26.7 57.5 39.6 29.0 Local office 6.1 4.7 6.3 1.1 3.8 2.5 1.9 3.6 Regional office - 3.1 1.3 2.2 1.9 1.3 3.8 2.2 National office 75.8 79.7 82.5 83.7 67.6 38.8 54.7 65.2 N 41 72 82 97 109 80 54 380

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set.

Traditional interpretations of the opportunity structures available to Christian Democratic politicians have also stressed the importance of connections with the trade unions (the CISL in particular), employers’ associations (Confindustria), and other interest groups (among which the Coldiretti, the association of small farmers, used to be the most important). Given the factional nature of the largest governmental party, there has always been a need to represent this political complexity by projecting personalities with very different backgrounds and linkages, even into the ministerial core. Our data confirm that all these groups have played a significant role in the career of ministers, with over half of all ministers between 1946 and 1992 having had some kind of affiliation to one or more of them (see Table 13). The ministerial elite recruited during the 1950s and 1960s (that is, during the ‘golden age’ of Christian Democratic rule) showed a particularly high level of ‘interconnectedness’ with the main interest organizations. In the end, however, as a complex yet none the less united entity, the party controlled the process - both at the very beginning of the parliamentary- governmental career (as a consequence of its screening parliamentary candidates and its ability to help candidates by placing their names at the top of the preference list), and at the specific moment of cabinet formation - thanks principally to the role of the party’s national leadership during institutional negotiations. The delicate balance between the pressures exercised by individual top leaders and the party’s national apparatus, demonstrates a peculiar feature of party government in Italy. It is a feature that can best be defined as ‘party control from within and from outside’ (Cotta and Verzichelli 1996). ‘From within’, because the majority of ministerial personnel comprised ‘generalist’ party politicians (Blondel 1991) who were accustomed to representing their own parties within the cabinet. MINISTERS IN ITALY 141 ‘From outside’ because the degree of ministerial autonomy was limited (especially among Christian Democrats) by the power of the party’s leaders who remained outside the cabinet, preferring to rule from within the membership party13 The final point to be touched upon is that of the intra-governmental careers of ministers. Duration of ministerial service, progression from junior to senior positions, and degree of specialization are the main variables that must be taken into account. With respect to the first point, in the Italian political system - which is best characterized as suffering acute governmental instability, with conflict-ridden coalitions and internal party factions - we should expect important constraints limiting long and linear ministerial careers. What comparative data there is available indicates that the duration of ministerial careers was, indeed, significantly shorter for Italian ministers than for their European peers (Bakema 1991). The 3.5 years on average that Italian ministers retain their cabinet position is among the shortest averages in any European country. Internal comparisons, however, show that the Italian ‘age of party government’ has resulted in a substantial lengthening of the average occupation of ministerial positions when compared to previous historical periods (see Table 2). To qualify this picture, one should also note that the average length of time served is affected by the existence of a large number of extremely ephemeral ministers, many of whom remain in the cabinet for only a few months. There is, on the contrary, a core of ministers who accumulate substantially longer ministerial service - the average ministerial tenure of the sub-group that includes the Prime Minister and the Treasury, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Justice Ministers during the years 1945-92 is 4.9 ministerial offices. This would suggest that, from the point of view of Italian political history, the second post-war period - in spite of its problems - can be considered a period during which the trend towards a parliamentary based ministerial elite was successfully consolidated. While the position of sottosegretario (junior minister) cannot be considered to be a necessary step on the ministerial career ladder, about half of all the ministers during this period have occupied these positions (see Table 14). Again, we can see from the descriptive tables that the relevant percentages are particularly significant during the 1960s and 1970s - the ages of centrismo () and centro-sinistra (centre-left) (Verzichelli and Cotta 2001). This is indeed the ‘golden age’ of Italian party government, when parties extended their full control over executive appointments and when the stability of the political- parliamentary elite reached its maximum values. 142 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? With respect to the generalist/specialist dimension of ministerial careers, our data indicates the predominance of ‘generalist’ politicians within ministerial ranks. If we use the frequent movement from one ministerial post to another as an indicator of this ‘generalism’ (Blondel 2001), we find that during the First Republic a majority of ministers switched at least once, whilst more than one-third occupied at least three different positions (see Table 7). The majority of ministers who remained in the same post without moving tended to be those with short careers. This result is consistent with the ‘partitocratic’ model of ministerial career that was typical of this period (the ‘Christian Democratic’ or ‘First Republic’ model) and is linked with the attempt to maintain a continuous equilibrium (in terms of factional representation, regional representation and the balance of power between party leaderships and the governmental elite) by means of the rapid circulation of the ministerial elite from a ‘first ring’ of less important ministerial posts to the ‘inner circle’ of top ministries.

TABLE 13 INTEREST GROUP AFFILIATION BEFORE FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT, BY DECADES (%)

1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1992-96 1996-2001 Total

Trade unions 26.8 24.3 29.3 18.4 18.1 21.6 17.0 22.9 Employers - 4.5 12.2 4.3 4.3 1.3 - 1.4 organizations Other interest 22.6 42.4 29.7 14.7 14.7 8.8 13.2 17.5 groups N 41 72 82 97 109 80 54 380

TABLE 14 JUNIOR MINISTERIAL OFFICE BEFORE FIRST MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENT AND AVERAGE DURATION OF JUNIOR MINISTERIAL OFFICE

1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1992-96 1996-2001 Total

Junior minister 24.4 51.4 62.2 59.8 38.4 11.3 11.1 35.6 (%) Average duration 0.3 1.9 4.0 3.5 3.7 4.5 3.1 3.4 (years) N 41 72 82 97 109 80 54 380

Source: CIRCaP Italian Ministers data set. MINISTERS IN ITALY 143 Signs of Change or Decline? Ministerial Recruitment During the 1980s In the preceding pages we have tended to use aggregate data for the period 1945-92, data that enable comparisons to be made between this period as a whole and other periods in Italian history. We have articulated our analysis in decades rather than by breaking the time periods down to the duration of coalition cycles (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000).14 The main reason for this is that the overall continuity of this period appears more significant than the discontinuities. An exception should be made for the last ‘short cycle’ (Cotta 1996) of this period, however - the years - which coincides, more or less, with the 1980s. Some of the specific features of this political cycle (which began with the Spadolini government of 1981, and came to an end with Andreotti’s government of 1991) appear to have potential relevance for the recruitment and career paths of the ministerial elites. The first is the rise of a five party coalition model (including Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social-Democrats, Republicans and Liberals), in which the DCs traditional pivotal role gave way to a more balanced relationship between the largest party and its partners, first among which was the Socialist Party. The second is that control over the highest prize (the Premiership) ceased to be the DCs prerogative and became the object of tense competition between the parties. The third is that other important ministries, which had been the domaine reserve of the DC, fell into the hands of the smaller parties. Added to these elements is the increasingly diffuse perception of a mounting crisis affecting parties and their mass organizations, while at the same time the top leaders of the two largest parties (the DC and the Socialist Party) were becoming ever more important. Some of the variables examined so far provide some support for the idea that the 1980s was a unique period. The first point to be noted is that ministerial turnover increased, with more than 60 per cent of all ministers at the beginning of the 1980s being ‘beginners’. This higher than usual rate was a result of the efforts of the new Christian Democratic leadership to promote a transformation in the party, mainly by attempting to obtain greater control over the top ranks of the party elite (that is, the faction leaders and their lieutenants in the executive), and to reduce internal party factionalism.15 However, a large number of the newcomers also came from other parties. In the Socialist Party, which returned to power after seven years during which it offered only external support to the government, Craxi promoted the rise of a new generation of younger politicians (‘i quarantenni’ - the ‘40 year olds’). Similarly, a 144 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? number of novice ministers came to the fore within the Republican, Liberal and Social Democrats. Alongside this greater renewal of the ministerial elite there were also some signs of an incipient destructuring of the career and recruitment patterns of past years. The number of ministers with a purely party bureaucratic background declines (see Table 10), and at the same time there is a rise in the number of ministers with neither a past career within the parties (see Table 12) nor with experience of local elected office (see Table 11). The parliamentary and ‘within-government’ phases of political careers also seem to count less, with average time spent as a deputy prior to ministerial appointment declining, and with a smaller number of ministers having previous experience as junior ministers (see Table 14). The dominant type of minister of the past (the party-man with a well structured electoral career) does not disappear altogether, but it does lose ground. Interestingly enough, we note the appearance of a small, but significant, number of technocratic (or semi-technocratic) ministers occupying key roles, such as the Ministry of Public Administration or the Treasury.16 This change, however limited, is probably linked to the new complexities of the coalition game, and with the political costs involved in some ministerial positions. Giving some posts to independent or semi- independent ministers may have been an answer to the necessity of ‘doing something unpleasant’ in some policy areas, without overloading the parties with too many heavy responsibilities while other parties took the ‘sweeter slices’ of the cake (Verzichelli 2001). The extent of change should not be overestimated, however. No significantly different patterns of ministerial recruitment were established during this period. An indication of this is the fact that, at the end of this period, the office of Prime Minister went to , who, having held several ministerial positions since 1947, and having been Prime Minister on five previous occasions, was obviously not a homo novus. In fact, one could say that his last time as leader of the cabinet - between 1991 and 1992 - coincided with the failed attempts to ‘delay’ the crisis of Italian party government, and was the final test for a generation of ministers who can be connected with the patterns of elite circulation described above (Cotta and Verzichelli 1996). More than representing the beginning of a new pattern, the 1980s can be seen as a time during which limited change signaled the coming of a crisis without overturning established models. Opportunities for more substantial innovations were thus lost. MINISTERS IN ITALY 145 The Crisis of Party Democracy (1992-96) The 1990s saw a the emergence of a sudden and dramatic crisis within the Italian system of party government (Cotta and Isernia 1996). As a result of the unexpected breakdown of the five traditional governing parties and the inability of the opposition parties to present an alternative, there followed a series of ‘technical governments’. The Amato government of 1992, at least in part, and, more fully, the Ciampi and Dini governments of 1993 and 1995, respectively, can be defined thus. These governments were formed on the basis of the highly selective functional needs of the country at that historical moment (facing a currency crisis, reducing the budgetary deficit and the huge state debt, implementing electoral reform, and introducing pension reforms), rather than as a result of party political priorities. It is not the case that two of the Prime Ministers were high officials of the technocratic institution that is the Bank of Italy. During this period, it was only with the first Berlusconi government (1994-95) that a return to a fully political cabinet was attempted; however, this government’s early failure meant that the interruption to the technocratic period was short-lived. Under the technocratic governments, as in other governments during the 1990s, the proportion of ministers without previous parliamentary experience was much higher than in the past (see Table 3). If we define a ‘technocratic minister’ as a person totally lacking in both a parliamentary and party political background and having rather, some specialist background that is related to the ministry he or she occupies, then the Ciampi and Dini governments appear to be full of such people (see Table 15). These ‘technocratic ministers’ also play a significant role in the other two cabinets of this period. This new phenomenon, which indicates a clear break with the ‘long cycle’ of 1946-92, may be linked with a broader European trend apparent during recent years, and which is characterized by a general growth of technically specialized ministers (Blondel 2001). In Italy, however, this trend has clearly been strengthened by other factors: in primis, by the deep organizational decline (and, in some cases, the collapse) of political parties; and secondly, by the appearance of a number of ‘crucial’ ministerial posts within the government where pressing functional requirements favour the recruitment of purely technocratic or mixed (politicians with technical skills) personnel. This development was probably encouraged by Prime Ministers as a means of obtaining greater control over the cabinet, with the help of technical watch-dogs. The Treasury is the best example of such ‘technocratic’ positions. 146 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE?

TABLE 15 TECHNICAL MINISTERS BEFORE AND AFTER 1992 (%)

Cabinets %

Average 1945-1992 7.6 Amato I 8.3 Ciampi 50.0 Berlusconi I 8.0 Dini 100.0

Average 1992-1996 35.0 Prodi 23.8 D’Alema I 7.7 D’Alema II 8.0 Amato II 12.5 Berlusconi II 16.0 Average 1996-2001 20.4

Some other aspects that are related to the profiles of the 80 ministers in charge during the 1992-96 crisis can be observed in our data. The first concerns their educational background, where we note an increase in the number of university graduates, and particularly of graduates from outside the legal field - with a substantial increase in the number of ministers with degrees in economics, engineering, medicine, and social sciences (see Table 16). As for the professional background, we can see an increase in the number of university professors, senior civil servants (and judges) and of representatives of the other liberal professions (with the exception of lawyers). Conversely, we can detect a strong decline in the number of ministers involved in the legal profession, and also in the number of full-time party and trade union officials (see Table 10). As should be expected, there is also a strong decline in the number of ministers who had occupied a full-time party position, or who had been elected to local political office prior to their appointment to cabinet position (see Tables 11 and 12). Combined, these data clearly highlight the crisis experienced by the traditional party and election-centred recruitment model, and, equally clearly, demonstrate that new channels of access to ministerial office were being opened. Some changes can also be seen with respect to ministerial careers. Tenure and duration of ministerial occupancy both decline abruptly (see Table 2). This should not come as a surprise, especially given that the four cabinets of this period did not last long, and that there was no ‘political continuity’ between them. It can also be seen that circulation within ministerial posts is drastically reduced compared with previous periods. MINISTERS IN ITALY 147 It is very rare for any minister to move from one ministry to another during this period. Of course, this data is influenced by the short time- scale involved in analysing this period. However, if we control the rate of mobility by tenure, then the lower degree of ministerial mobility stands out. The fact that many of the ministers had been selected for their specific technical qualifications to occupy a particular position and are, therefore, less suited to lead different ministries, is one of the factors that explains this finding.

MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1996-) After the failed start with Berlusconi’s brief first government in 1994, it is only with the elections of 1996 that we begin to see the emergence of a new pattern of government formation in Italy. With two main coalitions competing in the electoral arena, each of them indicating a candidate for the position of Prime Minister, government formation is radically altered from the processes of the past (Bull and Rhodes 1998; Cotta 2002; Verzichelli 2002). The leader of the government is, de facto, chosen as a consequence of the result of an election and has a much more important role in shaping his cabinet. The coalition nature of cabinets means that the role of the parties has not been completely eliminated, however, and consequently that the Prime Minister’s authority cannot be absolute. The recruitment of ministers is, therefore, a result of two forces - that of the Prime Minister (and coalition leader), and that of the parties within the

TABLE 16 FIELDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION AMONG MINISTERS (%)

1861-76 1876-1913 1913-22 1946-92 1992-96 1996-2001

Agronomy and - 0.7 1.0 1.2 3.8 2.2 Veterinary Economics 4.3 0.7 3.0 11.6 14.1 8.9 Engineering 4.3 6.5 4.0 4.0 6.4 2.2 Humanities 7.1 4.3 7.0 10.4 10.2 6.2 Law 52.9 61.2 64.0 62.8 53.8 66.7 Maths and 4.3 1.4 2.0 3.2 - - Natural Sciences Medicine 1.4 2.9 3.0 3.2 6.4 2.2 Military 25.7 21.6 13.0 0.4 - - Social Sciences - 0.7 3.0 3.2 5.0 11.1 N 70 139 100 251 78 45 148 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? coalition. Any analysis of the new ministers will need to assess the effects of this new situation. What type of features characterize the processes of ministerial recruitment and career, and define the new profile of cabinet members? With just one majoritarian legislature completed, five cabinets (our present data do not include the ministers from the second Berlusconi cabinet of 2001), and only 54 ministers, it is too early to produce a well articulated picture. However, we can attempt a first portrayal on the basis of three general elements. First, the general trend towards a decrease in ministers with a purely party background is confirmed (see Table 12); second, we have an increasing number of people with backgrounds in local elected office following the reductions witnessed during the 1980s and 1990s. The two features that were in the past linked, primarily because of the close interconnections between the party organizations and electoral life, have become increasingly independent from one another. The declining strength of party organizations means that a career within party ranks is a less important source of recruitment to the senior political elite. The opposite is true with respect to a background in local and regional government (see Table 11). The increased strength and importance of these institutions that was gained during the 1990s as a result of successful political reforms (and probably also to the crisis of national parties) are well known.17 Our data indicates that this phenomenon has also had an impact upon the national political elite. With respect to the occupational background of ministers, it should be noted that a significant - even if reduced - representation of ‘technocrats’ persists despite the return to political and party-based cabinets. Principal amongst this ‘technocratic elite’ are university professors, senior civil servants and a few individuals directly co-opted from the top economic elites (see Table 10). We should also note that there has been a limited, but none the less significant growth in the number of women entering the ministerial elite. There is now more a pronounced variety within the general profile of the ministerial elite. The profiles of individual ministers range from the technocrat, selected because of his functional abilities, through the ‘personal loyalist’ directly recruited by the Prime Minister to assist with the implementation of the political agenda, to the more traditional figure of the ‘party watch-dog’, who has to represent his party’s official position within the governing coalition. The results to date are of a provisional nature. The institutionalization of a ‘majoritarian democracy’ is still at its beginnings in Italy, and it will MINISTERS IN ITALY 149 be some time before the new system produces all of its potential effects upon the process of ministerial recruitment and a new ministerial elite is consolidated.

NOTES

1. For those who are not familiar with Italian pre-unification history it should be clarified that the Kingdom of Sardinia, as it was officially denominated, was in fact a state composed of Piedmont (which had become its real core), Savoy (from where the local dynasty originally came, but which was to be given to France in exchange for its support for Italian unification), Liguria (gained after the Napoleonic period) and Sardinia which had brought for the Dukes of Savoy the much desired title of king but had little political weight. 2. The qualification ‘storica’ is commonly used to distinguish, both from the organizational and the ideological point of view, the Right and the Left of this period from the Right and the Left of later stages. 3. For purposes of comparison we have also displayed in Table 1 some data concerning the period 1848-60. 4. The point has already been raised by Farneti (1971) with the support of his quantitative analyses. 5. A few words are required here about the Italian aristocracy (or, better, aristocracies given their roots in the regional states of the country). As in most states with a long absolutist tradition, the aristocracy was a social group with close links to the monarchy. It was not the kind of independent aristocracy of the British type. Although some of the families with older titles often had a more independent background dating back to the middle ages, most of them had fallen under the influence of local monarchies and their courts. This was obviously the case for those who had acquired their titles more recently as a result of service to the monarchical state. To an extent this aristocracy can be seen as the upper stratum of the class of state servants. To nuance this image it must be said that the aristocrats who became prime ministers (starting with Cavour) were also parliamentary leaders. 6. Also for the new regions, members of the aristocracy and landed gentry were predominant. 7. Out of 74 ministers appointed by Mussolini in his governments, five had been ministers in the Liberal age. 8. For a detailed historical account of the instauration of democracy in Italy at the end of the Second World War see Part IV of the classic work by Martin Clark (1984). On the nature of party government in Italy, see Pasquino (1987) and Cotta and Verzichelli (1996). 9. After the fall of Mussolini (25 July 1943) the King appointed as the new prime minister one of his generals, , who formed a bureaucratic-military cabinet with the goal of disengaging Italy from the alliance with Germany and leading the country out of war. After that, the German troops occupied a good part of the country and, having freed Mussolini, created the in the Northern part of the country. The Badoglio government ruled only over the southern part of Italy under Allied occupation. During 1944 a second Badoglio cabinet was formed, which included representatives of the opposition parties. Another couple of cabinets followed during the liberation war, led by the old reformist socialist leader, , who had already been prime minister for a short time before Fascism. After the liberation (June 1945) a fully political cabinet was formed, with the resistance hero and leader of the 150 WHO GOVERNS SOUTHERN EUROPE? , , as Prime Minister. Significantly enough, the next cabinet and the last of this instauration period was guided by , the unquestioned leader of Christian Democracy which was rapidly emerging as the central political force of this period. 10. Until the reform of 1993 the electoral system of the Chamber of Deputies was a PR list system which gave to the voters the possibility of expressing one or more preference votes among the candidates of the same party list. 11. This pattern is rather significant during the first two decades of the ‘First Republic’, when the percentage of ministers coming from the leadership of parliamentary committees was, respectively, of 23 and 37 per cent. 12. The data about regional experience are until the 1970s extremely sparse, because until then elected regional councils existed only in the five regions with a special autonomy status. 13. As is well known, after the first De Gasperi years, the general secretary and other key figures of the DC leadership did not occupy governmental offices. The few attempts to cumulate party and cabinet leadership, promoted by two of the most dynamic leaders of the party (Fanfani at the end of the 1950s and De Mita during the 1980s) failed after short periods of a dual mandate. 14. These phases are the rise and decline of a centrist coalition (1948-60), the two cycles of centre-left governments (1963-75), the short period of national solidarity (1976-79) and the five-party coalition (1981-91). 15. On the impact of change due to the emergence of the third generation of DC leaders and particularly the role of De Mita’s secretary, see Leonardi and Wertman (1989). 16. During the 1980s, we find Professor Massimo Severo Giannini (twice) as Minister of Public administration, Professor Antonio La Pergola (twice) as Minister of European affairs and the former governor of the central bank Guido Carli (twice) as Treasury Minister. During the 1990s the Treasury was continuously in the hands of technicians such as Professor Barucci, Carlo Azelio Ciampi (another former Governor of the central bank) and (a former vice-governor of Banca d’Italia). 17. It should be remembered that mayors and presidents of the provinces have been directly elected since 1993, and heads of regional governments since 1995. Moreover, the devolution process determined by different ordinary laws and by a constitutional amendment at the end of the 1990s, made local government much more powerful and visible than 15 years previously.

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