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University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA St. John's Road, Tyler's Green High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR 77-319866 FLYNN, John Francis, 1943- THE 1923 RUHR CRISIS AS A TWO-FRONT WAR: INTRA-GERMAN AND GERMAN-FRENCH CONFRONTATIONS. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1977 History, modern

University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48ioe , THE 1923 RUHR CRISIS AS A TWO-FRONT WAR; INTRA-GERMAN AND GERMAN-FRENCH CONFRONTATIONS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By John F. Flynn, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University 1977

Reading Committee: Approved By Andreas Dorpalen R. Clayton Roberts John C. Rule // Jl 4/0 oJ(JU^^ Adviser Department of History PREFACE On 11 January 1923, three years almost to the day after the Versailles Peace Treaty went into effect, French and Belgian troops marched into the Ruhr in an effort to collect forcefully the reparations which Germany had pledged in the treaty but failed to deliver. This study examines both the German reaction to the occupation as well as the conflicts within Germany which followed the occupation. In the end, the outcome of these internal conflicts shaped the final agreement with the French which ended the year of crisis. I wish to express my gratitude to all thoso who assisted me in the completion of this project. In 1973, at a critical moment during the research, the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst graciously granted me a second year of support. Among those who facilitated the research were the staffs of the Stadtarchiv Essen, the Hauptstaatsarchiv Duesseldorf/Kalkum, and the Bundes- archiv Koblenz as well as the staff of the Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek/Stadtbibliothek Essen, The staff of the library of the University of Duesseldorf lent special help in securing materials on inter-library loan, I am also grateful to Bodo Herzog at the Firmenarchiv of the Gute- hoffnungshuette for aiding me in my research while there ii and to Graf von Zedwitz-rArnim for permitting me to visit the Friedrich. Krupp Archiv/Villa Kuegel, Ess,en, I wish also to acknowledge a special debt of grat­ itude to my adviser, Professor Andreas Dorpalen, with-r out whose encouragement, constructive criticism, and abiding patience this dissertation would never have been finished. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Beth, who shared my Odyssey and who too is a quester.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Preface ii List of Tables v CHAPTER I. THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS 1 II. DIVISIONS IN THE ANTI-FRENCH FRONT 35 III. PASSIVE RESISTANCE AT ITS HEIGHT 100 IV. THE END OF THE STRUGGLE 148 V. CONCLUSIONS 185 BIBLIOGRAPHY 192

IV LIST OF TABLES Table 1 Cost of living index in Essen 125

v CHAPTER ONE THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS

During the despair-filled days of October 1918 Ger­ many's rulers decided upon a 'revolution from above' with the hope of channeling democracy onto an acceptable path and achieving peace on the basis of President Wilson's 1 Fourteen-Points proposals. However, owing to the slow­ ness of the peace negotiations and the fear that the war would not end, exhausted and demoralized German workers overthrew the monarchy and established a Republic. The popular German revolution of November 1918 was, in turn, disarmed by the alliance struck between Fri'edrich Ebert, the leader of the Majority Socialists, and Field Marshal von Hindenburg, who remained at the head of the army even after the abdication of Emperor William II. In this way the fabric of the old state was saved against the onslaught of leftist radicalism. The new government of Social Dem­ ocrats and Independent Socialists pursued an essentially conservative policy that repressed the worker's movement 2 in the name of law and order. In effect Germany accepted democracy only as an addendum to military defeat. Behind a veneer of democracy, her economic and social structure, 1 2 though challenged, remained essentially unchanged. In terms of central European Realpolitik, the war of 1914-1918 had ended in stalemate. Only the entry of the United States had checked Germany—temporarily, as it turn­ ed out. Following the conclusion of hostilities, France, having failed to secure American and British guarantees ensuring her national security, hoped to contain her dy­ namic German neighbor, in part, through a strict interpre­ tation of the Treaty of Versailles. Occupation of German territory and reparations in cash and kind were viewed by the French as promising national security: they would safe­ guard her economic predominance on the continent. Occupa­ tion of German territory, the Saar Basin for example, would limit German access to raw materials, coal in this case, while reparations would limit profits, denying Germany investment capital and curbing her potential for ecomomic 3 expansion and arms production. Given the internal struct­ ure of the new Reich, however, French dreams for security were tenuous. Those individuals who had provided the ideo­ logical basis for Germany's far-reaching, expropriative economic war aims remained the arbiters of economic power in Germany, shaping its institutions and influencing, if at times only negatively, the direction of public policy. Both the German revolution and the Treaty of Versailles were direct attacks upon the German industrial oligarchy. Although it is true- that the supporters of a socialist 3 revolution in Germany had been unable to put their ideas into practice in 1918, the disappearance of the Obrigkeits- staat threw open to question all authority relations which the monarchy had protected. It was on this system, along with unlimited control of private property, that German business interests had based their claim to authority and leadership. The revolution juxtaposed to this ideology the claims of workers and their representative organizations that labor should share in the political, social and eco­ nomic decision-making process. Ultimately it thus laid claim to the right to dispose of private property. Among the most militant agitators for such claims were the labor 4 unions in the mining and steel industries of the Ruhr. The effects of the lost war proved no less a threat to German industrial interests than did the German revolution. As the Treaty of Versailles proved, hidden behind the rhet­ oric of Allied propaganda was the intent to shackle the German industrial Prometheus, an intent not greeted with equanimity east of the Rhine. Germany had been stripped of her colonies and merchant fleet, she had lost six and a half million of her population along with 13 per cent of her pre-war territory, 15.7 per cent of her coal producing area, 48.2 per cent of her iron ore, and 19 per cent of her iron and steel producing capacity. Also, nearly all of her overseas investments, amounting to approximately 6.5 billion dollars, had been seized or liquidated. Other provisions 4 of the treaty imposed many controls and limitations upon 5 German industry. Its position jeopardized at home by the rising expecta­ tions of the working classes and abroad by the demands of the victorious Allies, German industry hoped nonetheless to use to political advantage the economic leverage salvaged from defeat and revolution. While the revision of the Treaty of Versailles was championed by all Germans, regardless of their position on the political spectrum, a portion of German industry, primarily concentrated among and led by Ruhr industrialists, was particularly active, in alliance with other anti-republican forces, in efforts to secure both a revision of the treaty and" a reversal of the new political order in Germany.

Joseph Wirth, upon becoming Chancellor in May 19 21, pledged his government to fulfill German reparation obliga­ tions fixed at 13 2 billion gold marks. This amount was re­ garded in Germany as exorbitant, and Wirth hoped to prove, through an attempt at partial fulfillment, that the demands were actually unfulfillable. Whatever success resulted from such a policy would of course accrue to the Republic. The Wirth government argued that reparations, if pushed to the extreme, would destroy not merely German economic life but also international financial and commercial relations. The ultimate result would be the utter impoverishment of the 5 German people, revolutionizing the German masses and lead­ ing to a European-wide threat to the capitalist system. Wirth's fulfillment policy gave rise at once to a serious domestic conflict. It soon became obvious that a tax program of sufficient breadth would be necessary to convince the Allies of the German government's intent to fulfill reparation demands. The thought, of course, was never entertained that the entire burden of the rep­ arations could be met through taxes. Social Democrats, represented in the cabinet by Minister of Economics Robert Schmidt, and backed by the labor unions, demanded not merely an increase in excise and personal income taxes but a partial seizure of the Reich's economic substance by the government ("Eingriff in die Substanz der deutschen Wirtschaft"). They also called for government ownership of the coal mines and the immediate collection of direct 7 taxes. German industry opposed these demands. Chancellor Wirth, a member of the left-wing of the Catholic Center Party, was not unwilling to consider the proposed social­ ist and labor tax policies but, failing to secure a major­ ity in the Reichstag, he shifted to a more moderate policy. The wrangle over the tax program continued unresolved until the end of 1921. In the meantime the government had to meet the rep­ aration payments as they came due. The August 1921 payment was met only with great difficulty after which it became 6 apparent that the next payment, due in November, could not be met without a line of credit. The credit of the German government abroad, due to the inflation and its inability to balance the budget, was nonexistent. The only alterna­ tive was to try to raise the loans at home among German nationals. German industry alone had sufficient financial power to guarantee the size of the credit needed. Industry, however-, was unwilling to guarantee loans until there was some assurance that the Wirth government would balance the budget. At a meeting of the Association of the German In­ dustries in November 1921 it was decided to insist upon strict economy in the entire budget of the Reich, on the removal of all restraints placed upon German business since the revolution and on the immediate transfer of all public utilities then in government hands to private hands before 8 business would consider loans. The demand for the trans­ fer of the German railways to private enterprise provoked an outcry from labor and Social Democrats. These groups then renewed their demands for the socialization of the coal industry. Unsuccessful in carrying through its tax plans or engaging business in guaranteeing loans, the Wirth cabinet was forced to make its first request to the Allies for a moratorium on cash reparations. The attempted fulfillment of Allied reparations demands by the Wirth government, either through increased taxes or 7 forced loans, would have been in keeping with the objective of the Treaty of Versailles, of limiting the capital avail­ able in Germany for investment and expansion. Industrial opposition, on the other hand, willing to risk the threat­ ened occupation of further German territory by the Allies, amounted to what became known as Katastrophenpolitik. These policies of "fulfillment" and "catastrophe" symbolized the peculiar position of Germany in the post­ war period. Politically weak and powerless in relation to the victorious Allies, German industry, despite losses, remained a significant economic power in central Europe and the world. This power rested on two factors: the high degree of monopolization and cartelization of German in­ dustry and its control of the Ruhr, the largest and most 9 important of Europe's industrial sectors. Should France, for example, control both its own resources plus the Ruhr she would certainly be capable of exercising economic hegemony over Europe, a possibility not desired by the British. This perhaps partially explains why German in­ dustrialists remained in control of the Ruhr following Germany's defeat in 1918. As a result they came to play a key role in the post-war conflicts between Germany and her former enemies. Industrial Europe hungered after coal following the war. Whether or not this hunger would be satisfied or frustrated depended entirely on the mine owners 8 of the Ruhr. Without controlling the Ruhr industries and their unlimited access to coal and coke, none of the vic­ torious powers, and from the perspective of national secu­ rity most importantly France, could assure its economic hegemony in Europe. There were two alternatives available, either attempt to cooperate with the Ruhr industrialists or risk the failure of controlling the Ruhr forcefully. In either case the Germans would be dealing from a position 10 of strength. Of the numerous confrontations between Germany and the Allies since the Treaty of Versailles went into effect on 10 January 1920, none was of more pressing concern to France than the question of coal deliveries. French national security was to be based upon two interdependent factors, a standing army and a Herculean iron and steel industry. Before 1914 France had depended upon imports for approximately one-third of her coal and more than half of her coke. The situation became even more critical after the return of Alsace-Lorraine since the recovered provinces consumed three times as much coal as they produced. Post- Versailles France controlled 48 per cent of all iron ore reserves on the continent, compared to 33 per cent in 1913, which meant that the total aggregate demand of French in- 11 dustry for coke and coal increased after 1918. Thus., France's newly acquired capacity for iron and steel production, resulting from seized German factories, rep­ resented only a potential, unrealizable without a guaran­ teed supply of high-quality coke. The demand side of the French equation was further complicated by the fact that additional fuel was needed fcrgeneral domestic purposes as well as those finished-product industries which would consume the increased turnout of iron and steel. The only source that could meet these needs was the Ruhr. At the Spa Conference (5-16 July 1920), convened to deal with German disarmament as well as the delivery of reparation coal, there was open discussion of a possible Allied move against the Ruhr since Germany had fallen be­ hind in her coal deliveries. Hugo Stinnes, head of one of the largest of Ruhr trusts, and present at the conference as a coal expert, declared French demands for coal deliv- 12 eries of 2.4 million tons per month as impossible. Aware of the complexity of coal production and transportation, Stinnes also warned that any action against the Ruhr would serve no real purpose since the Allies would get little coal. In private talks with the German delegates to the conference Stinnes made clear his preference for a policy of confrontation. Supported by part of the accompanying German committee of industrial experts, among them Otto Wiedfeldt, a Krupp director, Stinnes favored "letting things come to the occupation of the Ruhr." He believed that after a few months at the most the Allies would be 10 forced to withdraw without having obtained any significant 13 results. At the conclusion of the conference Germany pledged to deliver to the Allies 2,000,000 tons of coal monthly for a period of six months, beginning in August 1920. The deliveries agreed upon at Spa were, however, far less than the French had demanded and 20 per cent less than they needed. Shipments of coal did increase following the signing of the Spa Protocol, but by January 1921 they had again fallen behind the agreed levels. Furthermore, as a result of the separation of a portion of Upper Silesia with its coal deposits from Germany in October 1921, coal 14 deliveries from the Ruhr fell to even lower levels. A thrust towards the Ruhr was made by the Allies in March 1921 when they occupied the three right-bank cities of Duesseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort. However, owing to British reluctance and the timely acceptance of the London Ultimatum by the Wirth government, the occupation of the heart of the Ruhr was averted. By the closing weeks of 1921 French patience was exhausted. Reparations in cash and kind had been far less than expected and the failure of the innumerable post-Versailles conferences to improve the situation was interpreted in France as proof of the bankruptcy of Allied cooperation, the cornerstone of French 15 foreign policy since the conclusion of hostilities in 1918. In January 1922 Raymond Poincare', a man closely asso­ ciated with French heavy industry and determined to proceed 11 against Germany, unilaterally if need be, became Premier of France. Erich Eyck, in his History of the Weimar Republic, paraphrases Poincare's argument as follows: It may be true that your Wirths ... are honest when they talk today about trying to comply with Versailles; but they do not speak for the real Germany which only lets them talk that way because, given the political situation, it is expedient to do so. No, the true voice of Germany sounds from the mouths of the Stinnes and the Helfferichs /sic^/who call this policy of compliance (Erfuellungspolitik) "suicidal mania." Mark my words: once Germany has recovered from the catastrophe of 1918, these men will lead her again, and once more Germany will threaten the peace of Europe. For this reason the Germans must be kept down as long as their victors have the strength. (Poincare' was convinced that the period of France's superiority would be short and, thus, that these few allotted years would have to be put to good use if the victory were to_bring any lasting ad­ vantage at all.) /sic_/16 His inaugaural address before the French Chamber reflected both French anxiety over the growing strength of Germany 17 and frustration ov- Germany's claims of indigence. On the face of it his observations were sound. By 1922 it had become clear that, despite the losses of productive capacity, population and raw materials in­ flicted on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the country once again was emerging as a strong economic force and her 18 potential in many industries exceeded prewar levels. In­ creases in German production between 1919-22 were due pri­ marily to an inflation level of 200 to 300 marks to the 12 dollar which proved advantageous in terms of the wage- cost-price mix and allowed Germany to compete success- 19 fully for foreign markets. In every major European country, other than Germany, production declined sig­ nificantly in 19 21 "... and in most cases had not fully recovered by the end of 1922, Germany not only did not share in the general slump in 19 21, but raised its pro­ duction by 23 per cent in that year and by an additional 20 12 per cent in 1922." This remarkable increase in German production in 1921-22 was due to the fact that Germany did not share in the deflationary crisis of world commerce following the mid-1920 collapse of gold prices. As a result Germany's share of world trade in­ creased due to the low exchange value of the mark relative to its internal purchasing power. The resultant stimulus to German economic growth increased demand for instruments of production which then converged on the market for iron and steel and ultimately for coal. The increased demand for iron and steel had a ripple effect on the German in­ dustrial sector, leading first to a continuous expansion of productive capacity in 1920-22, which stimulated demand even further, iron and steel producers themselves consuming a great part of the increased production. Taking the boundaries of post-Versailles Germany, steel production in 1913 was 12 million tons. This capacity rose during 21 the 192 0-22 inflation period to 15 millions. The figures 13 are more remarkable when it is kept in mind that this in­ crease was achieved without German ownership of Lorraine iron ore or Saar coal. In addition, these quantitative changes in the German economy reinforced the tendency toward qualitative changes in the corporate structure of German heavy industry. Ex­ pansion of capacity facilitated further cartelization. By the end of the inflation in 19 23 six groups monopolized the production of coal in Germany. According to 1924 data 18.9 per cent of the total production of the Westphalia coal syndicate belonged to the Stinnes group, 6,9 per cent to the Krupp and Haniel groups respectively, 5.4 per cent to the Phoenix group, the Hoesch group participating to 22 the extent of 5.1 per cent and Thyssen 4.6 per cent. French fears grew proportional to German industrial rationalization, concentration and expansion. In the spring of 1922 Adrian Dariac, President of the Finance Commission of the French Chamber of Deputies, was sent by Poincare'to report on the economic and industrial situation in the Rhine-Ruhr area. In reporting his findings Dariac argued that although the German government might have been unable to pay its debts, German industrialists were well able to do so, and could be made to do so with sufficient pressure. Dariac reported that the Ruhr constituted the principal element of German wealth which was based ",,, entirely on 14 coal and iron, ... and their derivatives," It was the conviction of Dariac, shared by Poincare and others, that "... ten or twelve Ruhr industrialists rule directly or indirectly, but absolutely, the economic destinies of 23 Germany." French economic and political leaders agreed with Dariac's conclusion that the concentration of economic power in Germany carried with it enormous political power and that Germany's ineffective fulfillment policy was a result of the obstructions of German industrialists. This view was shared, interestingly enough, by German socialists and labor leaders who wished to attach the real value of German industry, socialize the coal mines and control the monopolies. In this way they hoped to meet the Allied de­ mands and at the same time carry out their own domestic 24 plans. Two paths were open to Poincare'; he could either reach some type of agreement with the Ruhr industrialists concern­ ing Ruhr coal and coke or resort to a military occupation. In keeping with the French perception of the dual nature of German political power, Poincare* pursued a public policy of intransigence while allowing the conduct of private negotiations between French and German industrialists. At the London Conference held in August 19 22 to discuss the difficulties arising out of the Treaty of Versailles, Poincare opposed any concessions to the German government. He declared himself, in principle, against the approval 15 of the moratorium on reparation payments, as the Germans requested. He would agree to such an arrangement only if Germany would give the Allies "productive pledges" as 25 security. At the same time, however, private negotiations were opened between French and German industrialists. On August 14, while the London Conference was in session, Hugo Stinnes, representing German industry, and Marquis de Lubersac, Pres­ ident of the Confederation generale des Cooperatives de Reconstruction des Regions devastees, member of the French Senate and confidant of Poincare,met at Stinnes' estate in the Rhineland. The Stinnes-Lubersac Agreement which result­ ed was limited to the question of German industrial coop­ eration in the reconstruction of the devastated regions of France. The agreement, overtaken by events, never be­ came effective. Nonetheless it revealed the shape of Franco- German industrial cooperation. In return for the participa­ tion of German industry in French reconstruction, de Luber­ sac indicated that the French government might agree to a 26 reduction of coal deliveries. It was not until 29 August, during the course of a meeting between the Wirth cabinet and leading members of the Ruhr industry including Peter Kloeckner, Albert Voegler, Paul Silverberg, Emil Kirdorf and Hermann Buecher, that Stinnes, cautiously and vaguely, alluded to his negotiations with de Lubersac and the intended foreign and domestic 16 implications of the agreement. With the backing of the other industrialists present, Stinnes told the cabinet that the arrangement on coal deliveries the government was then attempting to negotiate with the Allies would be absolutely intolerable unless the coal miners were forced to work more than eight hours without additional pay. In addition,Stinnes demanded that if private in­ dustry was to be drawn into the fulfillment policy through economic cooperation, industry would have to have a say also in domestic economic reforms, With these prleiminaries set forth, Stinnes went on to say that, in connection with industrial partci- pation in the reparations question, highly confidential discussions had taken place between himself and French rep­ resentatives . He described the negotiations as having pro­ ceeded on two levels, with representatives of French in­ dustry and with a French senator. In the negotiations with the senator two conditions had been set by the Ruhr industrialists before they would agree to further negoti­ ations. First, the occupation forces would have to be withdrawn from the Rhine region and second, reparations would have to be reduced to a bearable level. Stinnes told the cabinet that these conditions had been presented to Poincare7 by the senator and that the latter had been asked by Poincare7 to continue the discussions, Stinnes 17 added that if these negotiations were to yield any results, they would have to be carried on by the industrialists. He demanded that the German government authorize heavy industry to carry on such negotiations and that major economic re­ forms be undertaken in Germany in consultation with in­ dustry. Chancellor Wirth did not at once accept the Stinnes proposals on the grounds that they affected basic aspects of government policy. Negotiations would also have 27 to be undertaken with representatives of German labor. The Stinnes proposals were of enormous significance. They indicated that heavy industry intended, as in the case of the 1921 loan guarantee, to use the emergency which the government faced "to win significant influence, not merely 28 in domestic economic policies, but also in foreign policy." Following the collapse of the London Conference on 14 August, and in an effort to arrive at some type of in­ terim agreement for the 1922 reparations payments, the Reparation Commission sent Sir John Bradbury and M. Mauclere, the British and French co-chairmen of the Committee of Guarantees, a sub-committee of the Reparations Commission set up at the 1921 London Conference, to Berlin on August 18. On 30 August Wirth proposed to them "to guarantee the deliveries of coal, the most important part of the deliveries in kind, by direct contracts, running provision­ ally until 31 December, between the German coal industry 18 and the Allied consumers, and thus to supplement the ob­ ligations of the German government by a direct obligation 29 of the German sellers," It is unclear how Wirth in­ tended to force the Ruhr industrialists to cooperate in coal deliveries. What does seem clear, however, is that Wirth hoped, through guaranteed coal deliveries, to avoid both the threatened occupation of the Ruhr and concessions to German heavy industry on domestic policy. Stinnes saw the Wirth initiative for what it was, a direct threat to industry's plans, both domestic and foreign. In an article titled "Keine Illusionen" published on September 1, 1922 in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (PAZ), a Stinnes-owned newspaper and a voice of the nationalist opposition, Stinnes attacked the Wirth government for speak­ ing only of the obligations of German industry but not of the obligations of the German working class, Stinnes warn­ ed also that foreign observers could only conclude from the Wirth proposals that German industry was willing tu serve solely or primarily the interests of the government. That, however, would be a false impression. The fate of the government was not to be equated with the fate of the nation. Quite the opposite was true; everything depended upon the fate of the nation, nothing depended upon the fate of the present government. Stinnes concluded that the Wirth government had never enjoyed any confidence outside 19 of Germany and had long ago lost what confidence it com- 30 manded within Germany. Stinnes' outburst expressed the deep and inveterate opposition of the business community to Wirth and his govern­ ment coalition which extended from the Catholic Center Party to the Social Democratic Party. Industry, as well as other propertied interests, considered Wirth a servant of the Allied powers who was kept waiting in ante-chambers while the Allies reached decisions and dictated terms. Domestically Wirth's support was viewed as resting entirely on the left. Krupp Director Otto Wiedfeldt, soon to be­ come ambassador to the United States, in his March 1922 discussions with British Prime Minister Lloyd George, ex- pressedquite openly the antipathy felt by the industrial oligarchy towards Wirth and his coalition government, Wirth, Wiedfeldt told Lloyd George, had the left-wing of the Center behind him along with the lesser clergy, who have always been anti-capitalist and socialist. The Majority Socialists stand behind him and even the Independent Socialists and Communists vote for him. In short all those circles who believe in Marxism as the new economic religion and want to make it real. These groups want to socialize the coal mines and take away private property. They have so structured the tax laws as to make socialism inevitable. ... Against all this those who own something must defend themselves. ... They are hamper­ ing all the forces of free economic development. Against all this we must defend ourselves in our ov.\. interest and in the interest of the future of our country.^1 20 Industry needed, however, the sanction of the German government in order to carry on its far-reaching negoti­ ations with the French, Wirth, in turn, needed the co­ operation of industry to guarantee coal deliveries and a still hoped-for international loan that would enable the government to balance the budget and control the inflation spiral. The German Finance Minister, Andreas Hermes, re­ ported to the cabinet on September 6 that a meeting between Bemelmans, the Belgian representative to the Reparations Commission, and Stinnes was scheduled for the following day. He (Hermes) believed that the government needed certain guarantees to be given by industry and that "if we can get Herr Stinnes to agree, we would then be much 32 further along." Thus the initiative still lay with Stinnes and the industrial groups which he represented. Wirth was forced to prepare an opening to the right. With Wirth's assurance to de Lubersac that the German government supported Stinnes' efforts to reach an agreement 33 with the French, Stinnes carried his negotiations to Poincare'. The execution of the 1922 Stinnes plan depended upon radical changes in German domestic policies as well as radical revision of the Treaty of Versailles. With the hope of engaging the aid of the United States, Stinnes explained his plan to U.S. Ambassador Houghton at the end of October. He expressed the view that the economic pro­ visions of the Versailles treaty were unfulfillable; they 21 ruined Germany and left her unable to produce efficiently. There was only one way, according to Stinnes, in which Germany and Europe could regain their economic health: Germany must regain her independence which meant the evacuation of all Allied troops from German territory as well as the return of the Saar by April 1923. In addition all sanctions, res­ torations, liquidations, commissions, compulsory deliveries and interference with the internal administration of Germany would have to be abandoned. In an effort to give Germany a favorable balance of trade and guarantee the interest on a gold loan with which to reconstruct France, the eight- hour workday in Germany would have to be abolished. Workers would be required to work at least two hours overtime each day without additional pay for a period of ten to fifteen years. Government regulations of private business would have to be abolished. The mark would be stabilized when the following conditions for such stabilization had been created: labor strikes were to be outlawed for a period of five years; administration of government enterprise was to be reorganized and put on an economically sound basis so as to yield a profit to the German national economy; the German tax laws were to be changed so as to encourage savings and promote the formation of capital; respect for private property was to be restored and crimes rgainst 34 property were to be punished severely. 22 Wholly unrealistic, the Stinnes plan had little hope of success. Even had Poincare7 been willing, French public opinion would never have tolerated such a radical revision of the Treaty of Versailles. Besides, the plan was a di­ rect affront to the special-interest groups Poincare per­ sonally represented in France, particularly the steel in­ terests organized in the Comite des Forges. Moreover, it was far from clear whether French steel producers were actually interested in a resolution of the reparations question. Charles Laurent, French Ambassador in Berlin and closely associated with the Comite/ des Forges, con­ fided to U.S. Ambassador Houghton on October 30 that the Stinnes-Lubersac Agreement would benefit German industry more than its French counterpart since the Germans would furnish the material and work. Laurent left Houghton with the impression "that his own group in France looked upon reparations only as a purely secondary matter, and aimed primarily at the greatest possible destruction of Germany's productive forces." Laurent also told Houghton that the withdrawal of French troops from the Rhineland 35 was unacceptable to his country. German oppostion to the Stinnes plan came from Social­ ists, Communists, and labor groups. At the heart of the opposition were the questions of the eight-hour workday, a symbol of the success of the 1918 revolution, and 23 industry's demand for government decontrol of business. Yet industry was convinced that even moderate reparations could be paid only if an active balance of payments was achieved, and this, it maintained, depended on increased production and the abolition of the eight-hour day. Such reforms, it argued, would also put an end to inflation. Socialists and worker's representatives agreed on the necessity of increasing productivity if Germany was to meet her obligations, but they insisted that doing away with the eight-hour day was not the answer. In their view increased productivity depended on the stabilization of the mark. The arguments of labor rested on the following as­ sumptions. In real terms the inflation in Germany was a giant liquidation sale of goods since money had value only in terms of its momentary purchasing power. Thus, "as costs of replacement continuously exceeded selling prices, stocks dwindled and plants were worn down. At the same time, in view of the prevailing 'sellers market' at home 36 and abroad, incentives for technical progress disappeared." Labor's argument that productivity could be increased only through the modernization of plants and equipment, i.e., by controlling inflation, was therefore correct. Employers, on the other hand, were unwilling to see inflation brought under control until the long-term questions of reparations 24 and access to international markets were solved, and the 37 threat of socialism at home removed. In a cabinet session of 23 October Chancellor Wirth announced that Germany could bear up under French pressures and the expected new anti-German orientation of the British cabinet under Bonar Law if she pulled all her economic and 38 political forces together. A few days later the chan­ cellor made known the particulars of his program. From the Allies the German government required a moratorium on reparations and withdrawal of occupation forces from Germany. From the German people the government asked for an increase of production and pledged reform of public administration, unemployment insurance, and the tax system. If the new program was to be carried through, the government coalition would have to be widened to include the business-orientated German People's Party. Wirth's efforts failed, however, because the Social Democrats refused to participate in a coalition with the People's Party. Wirth resigned on 22 November. In the hope that a government of 'experts' could solve Germany's domestic and foreign difficulties President Ebert asked Wilhelm Cuno, head of the Hamburg-American Lines, to form a cabinet. Although certainly not a 'Stinnes cabinet,' the Cuno government was the first in short history of the Republic which held some promise for industrial interests. 25 Two members of the new cabinet, Dr, Johannes Becker and Dr. Rudolf Heinze, came from the Stinnes wing of the People's Party. Not without reason the Social Democratic Party attacked the appointment of Cuno, who was not a member of the Reichstag, as a step away from democratic government. On 9 December Cuno dispatched a note on reparations to British Prime Minister Bonar Law who was then acting as chairman of the Allied conference in London, The Cuno note differed only slightly from the Wirth note of 14 No­ vember 1922. In that note Wirth had stressed the necessity of stabilizing the mark. Such stabilization was dependent upon the influx of foreign loans and the cooperation of German industry and the Reichsbank. Industry, however, persisted in its position that stabilization of the mark would be possible only if Germany could compete on equal terms in the world market. Without that guarantee any stabilization of the mark could be only temporary. The Wirth government had gone far towards meeting the indus­ trialists' demands, but the French, mindful of national security, rejected them. Because of this setback Hugo Stinnes concluded that "the time for stabilization of the 39 mark had not yet come." The Cuno plan was rejected in London on 10 December. The German reparations expert at the London Conference, 26 Dr, Carl Bergmann, telegraphed Cuno, "Local situation critical. Even if the plan should be rejected /sic/, by all means attempt must be made to avoid that German, 40 particulary industrial press, treat plan unfavorably." The 11 December evening edition of the DAZ flayed the Cuno proposal because the plan offered no permanent solution to the reparations problem or to Germany's economic problems. On the following day Cuno delivered a speech to the Reichswirtschaftsrat (Reich Economic Council) in which he attempted to smooth over the obvious cleavage between heavy industry and government. He warned, however, that business must accept the fact "that government leads and business (Wirtschaft) supports." Cuno went on to say that there was no power center within the Wirtschaft strong 41 enough to take the leadership away from the government. In a newspaper interview for the American press Cuno de­ nied as entirely erroneous the assumption that the Wirt­ schaft no longer stood behind him. He said that he him­ self belonged to the managerial class and that he had assumed the responsibilities of government only because he knew that leading economic circles would participate to the best of their ability in a solution of the rep- 42 arations problem. Despite Cuno's assurances to the press, heavy in­ dustry dissociated itself from the government's reparations 27 position. For heavy industry a final solution to the rep^- arations question entailed the evacuation of the three cities of Duesseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort on the right bank of the Rhine as well as the left bank of the Rhine. Ruhr industrialists wanted the occupation ended for the very reasons for which the French wanted to remain. Occu­ pation would always pose a potential threat to German pro­ duction. During the course of December 1922, because of their control over the Ruhr, the fate of the nation rested almost exclusively in the hands of German industrialists. It was clear even before the collapse of the London Con­ ference on 21 December that nothing further was to be gained at conferences.After a cabinet meeting on November 27 Poincare' announced that France would take over the Ruhr. Poincare' explained the necessity for occupying the Ruhr, "So that reparations coal due France from Germany and the 43 coke necessary for French industry would be secured." Because of their de facto power of veto over govern­ ment policy, occupation of the Ruhr could only have been avoided by an initiative on the part of German industrial­ ists. In conformity with the reality of the situation, i.e., the real divisions of power within Germany, nego­ tiations between representatives of German industry and the French government took place continually during December 1922. The purpose of the negotiations was to make long-term 28 arrangements for deliveries of fuel, particularly coke, to the French iron industry, in exchange for a moratorium on reparations for Germany. The hope of German industrial­ ists was to lay the basis for general economic agreements between interdependent German and French industries (coal, iron and steel fabrication in Germany; iron ore, pig iron and semi-finished products in France) for the purpose of increasing production on both sides. The major question was one of percentages. Stinnes envisaged a "gigantic 44 trust, a German trust with a French tail," No other arrangement was acceptable to him. Once these inter­ national questions had been settled, German heavy industry could devote its attention to a settlement of troublesome domestic issues. Obviously any such efforts were bound to fail since they conformed neither to French conceptions of national security nor to French industrial interests, German industry was viewed from the French side of the Rhine not merely as a commercial rival but as the basis of a new German military potential. It had been agreed after the rejection of Cuno's reparation note at the London Conference in December 1922 to reconvene in Paris on 2 January 1923. It was, however, a foregone conclusion that the Ruhr would be occupied. As a preliminary step towards occupation the Reparations Commission declared Germany in default on timber deliveries, 29 which included 200,000 telephone poles, on 26 December. Poincare presented this report to the Paris Conference which convened on 2 January 1923. This default by itself did not provide an adequate cause for occupying the Ruhr. The Ruhr district contained no timber and therefore its seizure would not increase the deliveries of timber. After British, French and Italian proposals for expediting German reparations were rejected at the conference, the meeting broke up on January 4. Five days later on 9 January 1923 the Reparations Commissions met in Paris. Louis Barthou, its chairman and French representative, requested that Germany be declared in default on coal deliveries, too, for 1922. The British delegate dissenting, the motion was carried with Italian approval. France now had her pretext for the Ruhr occupation. On 11 January 19 23 French and Belgian forces marched into the Ruhr. NOTES Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967), pp. 613-14, 634-37. 2 Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York, 1967), p. 190. Sachwoerterbuch der Geschichte Deutschlands und der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (East Berlin, 1970), II, 371-74. Heinz Hartmann, Authority and Organization in German Management (Princeton, 1959), p. 7, note 10. For a full discussion of German managerial concepts of authority and their ideological relation to private property, see pp. 5-11, p. 244. 5 James W. Angell, The Recovery of Germany (New Haven, 1929), pp. 12-16, 55-57. See also Appendix I, pp. 363-64. g A number of Marxist historians have argued that a division arose within the ranks of German industry over the question of reparations. According to this interpre­ tation those German industries which traditionally had . close Anglo-American business ties supported a fulfillment policy, hoping in this way to prove the impossibility of paying reparations and possibly split the British-French alliance. German industry would then have been free to pursue its dreams of empire once again. Walther Rathenau, because of his dual role as a member of Chancellor Wirth's cabinets and as head of the Allgemeine Elektrizitaets- Gesellschaft (AEG), is seen as heading this group. The Stinnes-led Ruhr coal and steel industries are viewed as opponents of the Rathenau group, wanting a flat repudiation of reparations even at the risk of further occupations of German territory. This interpretation sees a struggle, following the war, within Germany monopoly capitalism be­ tween coal-iron-steel and electro-chemical groups. This struggle extended beyond reparations to include questions of inflation, domestic politics and attitudes towards organized labor. See: Guenther Hortzschansky, Der nationale Verrat der deutschen Monopolherren waehrend des Ruhrkampfes 1923 (East Berlin, 1961), pp. 46-54. Juergen Kuczynski, Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter unter dem Kapitalismus: Darstellung der Lage der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1917/18 bis 1932/33 (East Berlin, 1966), 5, pp. 77-107. Juergen Kuczynski, Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter unter dem 30 31 Kapitalismus: Studien zur Geschichte des staatsmonopolist- ischen Kapitalismus in Deutschland 1918' bis 1945 CEast Berlin, 1963), 16, pp. 37^80; "•Monopolbourgeoisie','"' in; Sachwoerter- buch der Geschichte Deutschlands und der deutschen Arbeiter- bewegung CEast Berlin, 1970), 2; Wolfgang Ruge, Deutschland von 1917 bis 1933 (East Berlin, 1967), p, 180, This view found in the above works is at times too simplistic and is at a loss to explain the unification of the Siemens electrical group with the Stinnes coal and steel group in 1920 to form one of the largest combines in Germany the 'Siemens-Rheinelbe-Schukert Union.' Furthermore Stinnes was willing to become a 'fulfiller' if it was also good business; certainly that was the purpose of the Stinnes- Lubersac Agreement of August-September 1922 as well as his negotiations during December 1922. In addition Stinnes and Rathenau seemed to reconcile their differences on reparations and other questions on the eve of Rathenau's murder, at least according to Stinnes. See: Gurt von Klass, Hugo Stinnes (Tuebingen, 1958), pp. 276-96. For an inter­ pretation taking the above complexities into account see Kurt Gossweiler, Grossbanken, Industriemonopole, Staat; Oekonomie und Politik der staatsmonopolistischen Kapital­ ismus in Deutschland 1914-1932 (East Berlin, 1971), pp. 11, 148, 154, et. al. 7 Ingrid Schulze-Bidlingmaier, ed,, Die Kabinette Wirth I und II: 10. Mai 1921 bis 26. Oktober 1921, 26. Oktober 1921 bis 22. November~T922 (Akten der Reichs- kanzlei: WeimarerRepublik) (Boppard Am Rhein, 1973), I, pp. 6-13, 254-55, 302, 330, and passim, Ernst Laubach, Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth 1921/22 (Lubeck, 1968), pp. 61-66. g Schulze-Bidlingmaier, I, 368-73, 375-78, also, p. 368 note 1. For labor's attitude see, p. 301, note 6, pp. 415-18, 520-22. 9 Gossweiler, pp. 159, 184, For a discussion of the extent of monopolization in Germany during this period see: Julius Hirsch, National and International Monopolies from the Point of View of Labor, the Consuming Public, and Rationalisation (Geneva, 1926), pp. 9-18, Robert Liefmann, "Kartelle," in: Hans-Heinrich Barnikel, Theorie und Praxis der Kartelle (Darmstadt, 1972), pp, 67-108. For the effects of the Rheinisch-Westfaelischen Kohlensyndikat on coal and coke production and distribution see: Juergin Kuczynski Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Imperialismus, I, Monopole und Unternehmer Verbaende (East Berlin, 1948), pp. 108-123. 32 Gossweiler, p, 16Q, L, Zsigmond, Zur deutschen Frage 1913^-1923; Die wirtschaftlichen und internationalen' Faktoren der Wieder- belebung des deutschen Imperia1ismus und Militarismus, trans, P. Felix, (Budapest, 1964), p. 147, 12 Herbert Michaelis and Ernst Schraepler, eds,, Ursachen und Folgen voin deutschen Zussamenbruch 1918 und 1945 bis zur staatlichen Neuordnung Deutschlands in der Gegenwart (8v., Berlin, 1958—), IV, no, 946, "Die Frage der deutschen Kohlenlieferungen auf der Konferenz von Spa, b) Hugo Stinnes zur Kohlenfrage am 10, Juli 1920," pp. 284-87. 13 Karl Bergmann , The History of Reparations (London, 1927) , p, 41. "' " 14 Schulze-Bidlingmaier, ed,, I, 449, 593, Schulthess' Europaeischer Geschichtskalender, 1922, 63, 201-02. 16 Erich Eyck, A History of the, Weimar Republic, trans. Harlan P, Hanson and Robert G, L. Waite (New York, 1967), I, p. 200. 17 Schulthess', 1922, 63, 202-03. 18 Harold G. Moulton, The Reparation Plan: An Inter­ pretation of the Reports of the Expert Committees Appointed by the Reparations Commission, November 30, 1923 (New York, r§"24) , p. 152. Moulton used 1920-22 data for his conclusions. ConstantinoBresciani-Turroni, The Economics of In­ flation, trans. Millicent E. Sayers (rept. London, 1968), p. 191. 20 . Frank D. Graham, Exchange, Prices and Production in Hyper-Inflation: Germany, 1920-1923 (Princeton, 1930), table XXVIII, p. 237. 21 Ibid., p. 288. 22 Bresciani-Turroni, p. 198. 23 Ibid«i P« 211. See also pp. 203-10 24 Manchester Guardian, November 2, 1922, "The Dariac Report." 33 25 Schulze-Bidlingmaier, I, pp, 415*0.7; p, 301, note 6. The Communist Party was willing to cooperate with the Social Democrats and labor unions on these questions. See pp. 520-22. 26 Schulthess', 1922, 63, pp. 291-93, ?7 Michaelis and Schraepler, eds. Ursachen und Folgen, IV, no 987, "Abkommen zwischen Hugo Stinnes und Marquis de Lubersac, August/September 1922, ueber deutsche Sachliefer- ungen fuer den Wiederaufbau in Frankreich," pp. 411-13. 28 Schulze-Bidlingmaier, II, pp. 1066-69, 29 Laubach, p. 273. 30 Bergmann, p. 143.

31 Schulze-Bidlingmaier, II, p. 1077, note 2. Also, Kurt Koszyk, Deutsche Press, 1914-1945 (Berlin, 1972), p. 142. For an extended discussion of the role played by the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in the Weimar Republic see Koszyk, Chapter 4, pp. 135-59. 32 Krupp Archiv, Werksarchiv, IV, 1418, Besprechung der Herrn Wiedfeldt mit Lloyd George in London am 1. Maerz 1922, pp. 17-18. The discussion was primarily in prepara­ tion for the Genoa Conference but included a wide range of topics. The typewritten copy in the Krupp Archiv runs to fifty-nine pages. See also, Laubach, p. 295. 33 Schulze-Bidlingmaier, II, pp. 1088-89, note 1. 34 Laubach, p. 287. 35 George W. F. Hallgarten, Hitler, Reichswehr und Industrie: Zur Geschichte der Jahre 1918-1933 (Frankfurt Am Main, 1955T, pp. 52-52. 36 Ibid., pp. 47-49. 37 Gustav Stolper, The German Economy, 1870 to the Present (New York, 1967), excerpted in Fritz K. Ringer, ed., The German Inflation of 1923 (New York, 1969), p. 85. 38 Although industrialists benefited from the inflation they did not cause the inflation. At the same time, however, they did not wish to see the inflation end until a final solution was found to reparations as well as domestic ques­ tions concerning government interference in the economy. 34 See, Gossweiler, pp. 143-55, Wolfram Fischer, Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik 1918-1945 (Opladen, 1968), pp. 19-26. Fischer argues Cp. 25), inexplicably, that the German government was unaware that an unbalanced budget was causing the inflation, which is simply not true. From the outset of the steep decline of the mark in 1921 the Wirth government was well aware of the causes of the in­ flation and tried to correct the situation through taxes and loans, all without success. It is true that repara­ tions in cash virtually ceased after 1921, thus in effect relieving pressure on the budget, but the German govern­ ment still had to pay for deliveries in kind. Although it is also true that the central Reichsbank, until 26 May 1922 when by law the Reichschancellor lost control over it, kept granting credit to other banks which fueled the inflation in this way. For evidence showing the awareness of the Wirth government of the relationship between the budget and the inflation see the documents in Schulze- Bidlingmaier, I, dealing with the tax and loan questions. For an explanation of the inflation as a conspiracy by industrialists see Curt Geyer, Drei Verderber Deutschlands. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Deutschlands und der Reparations- frage 1920-1924 (Berlin, 1924). Also, Kuczynsky, Die Ge­ schichte der Lage ..., 16, pp. 49-68.

Schulze-Bidlingmaier, II, pp. 1136-37. Also, Rudolf Morsey, Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei, 1917-1933 (Duesseldorf, 1966), p. 486. 40 Hallgarten, p. 17. 41 Karl Heinz Harbeck, ed., Das Kabmett Cuno: 22. November 1922 bis 12. August 1923 (Akten der Reichskanzlei: Weimarer Republik) (Boppard Am Rhein, 1968), p. 65, note 6. 42 Ibid., p. 64, note 4. 43 Ibid., p. 66, note 8. 44 Schulthess', 1922, 63, p. 222. 5 Hallgarten, pp. 58-59. CHAPTER TWO DIVISIONS IN THE ANTI-FRENCH FRONT

On the morrow of the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr a feeling of moral outrage swept through Germany. Contemporary observers, remembering the antagonisms among Germans since the 1918 revolution, interpreted this wave of emotionalism as evidence of a rebirth of German national unity. Lord D'Abernon, the British Ambassador in Berlin, confided to his diary in mid-January 1923 that class ha­ treds in Germany had been swept away by the wave of patriot- 1 ism which followed the Ruhr occupation. This evaluation was perhaps premature. The appearance of unity was brief. In fact, the presence of foreign troops in the Ruhr height­ ened the political conflicts and class tensions x^hich had remained unresolved in Germany since 1918. The crisis which followed the Ruhr occupation soon became a struggle of German against German as well as a struggle of Germans against the French and Belgians, As the brief history of democracy in Germany up to 1923 had shown, any crisis, in the end, transformed itself into a threat to the existence of the Republic. Of those political parties in Germany which supported the Republic, 35 36 the Social Democrats were the most sensitive to any shift in the political climate which might indicate a weakening of the democratic spirit. Rudolf Hilferding, the party's leading theoretician, declared the Republic the only state form which gave the working classes the means to realize 2 their goals of economic and political equality. As a result of the Ruhr occupation the Social Democrats feared that an unrestrained German nationalism would reemerge. If left unchecked, such chauvinism promised to increase the hatreds among European nations as well as strengthen the rightist enemies of the German Republic. The Social Democrats and their allies in the Free Labor unions re­ garded with suspicion anything less than a full commitment to international cooperation and democracy. This position led the Social Democrats to battle both extreme left and extreme right during the coming months. It also estranged them from the Catholic Center Party, their former coalition partner in the Wirth cabinet. Future conflicts between Social Democrats and their traditional allies in the Democratic and Catholic Center parties were foreshadowed on the eve of the occupation. In an attempt to demonstrate solidarity a tumultuous rally was held in the city of Essen. This was all the more im­ portant since recent initiatives by Socialists and liberals for simplifying divorce, granting equal rights to 37 illegitimate children, and guaranteeing the preeminence of nondenominational schools had created bitter antagonisms in the city. Speakers from the Social Democratic, Dem­ ocratic, and Catholic Center parties addressed an enormous and emotionally charged crowd in the center of the city, The tone and substance of each speaker's remarks reflect­ ed attitudinal differences which widened in the coming weeks. Dr. Rudolf Keller, regional chairman of the Dem­ ocratic Party, denounced the aggression of the French and appealed strongly to the national sentiments of the crowd, "In this hour of need," he said, "party differences are of no significance," Keller was followed by Dr, Johannes Bell,chairman of the Catholic Center Party in the Essen electoral district. Bell, who lived under the cloud of having been a signer of the Treaty of Versailles, delivered a fiery speech similar to Keller's, The Social Democratic speaker, however, carefully avoided inflammatory rhetoric. Rather than calumniating the French he protested the occu­ pation in general terms, denouncing "militarism in any 3 country" and "any foreign military rule." His intent was to calm the crowd, to defuse passions, and to appeal for rational solutions to complex problems. Throughout the occupation the Social Democrats and their labor allies refused to identify themselves with ex­ cessive nationalist sentiments. Within a fortnight of the 38 commencement of the occupation Heinrich Meyer, Secretary of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB) in Duesseldorf, the roof organization of the Free Trade Unions, expressed Social Democratic concern over the developing mood in the occupied zone. To Meyer's alarm, French arrests of government officials in the Ruhr had provoked demonstrat­ ions in which extreme nationalism had emerged. Most object­ ionable to him was the singing of anti-French songs which conjured up old hatreds, conflicted with labor's inter­ nationalism, and placed in jeopardy the hoped-for support of international labor organizations such as the Amsterdam International. In a sharply worded letter to Chancellor Cuno on 27 January Meyer complained that "workers were strongly disturbed by the singing of unacceptable songs /giegreich wollen wir Frankreich schlagen, Die Wacht am Rhein~7, hold their breadths and ask whether or not, under such circumstances, they are still in the position to take part in the steps to be taken against the occupation." Meyer also reported that at a Duesseldorf meeting of of.leaders of Free Unions in the Ruhr there had been strong objections to the fact that leaders of the ADGB in Berlin had entered into discussions with the Cuno government. The feeling in the Ruhr was that these discussions should be broken off so that the unions could "go their own way." Meyer had quieted the discontent by pointing to his own 39 public position which had been a bulwark against all national distemper. Meyer pleaded with Cuno to openly and unequivocal­ ly position himself against all forms of nationalist excess. If the government hesitated, Meyer foresaw the danger of the majority of Social Democratic workers detaching them­ selves from the united front and going their own way, "For the workers the question is not to victoriously defeat France (siegreich Frankreich zu schlagen) but to maintain the German democratic Republic. If people exist who do not or will not understand this position of the workers, then this must be made crystal clear to them. The Reichskanzler must take the opportunity to underscore that the present struggle is concerned with nothing other than the unity' and 4 survival of the German Republic." As the following incident demonstrates, Social Demo­ cratic anxieties over nationalism led not only to conflicts with the Cuno government but also to conflicts with Catholic Centrists in the Ruhr. Immediately upon the occupation, the Berlin government forbade the delivery of coal and coke to the French. To no avail, French authorities held a number of pourparlers with German mine owners in an effort to extract delivery commitments from them. Upon their re­ fusal, General Devignes, the commander of French forces in Essen, ordered their arrest on 23 January. Arraigned, tried and convicted before a French courts-martial in Mainz, the industrialists were fined and quickly released. 40 They then returned to Essen by train, As the train moved slowly north through the towns and cities of the Rhineland, frenetic crowds lined the right of way. In Essen thousands awaited the train's arrival at the main station. Upon arrival patriotic songs were sung and speakers passionately denounced French cupidity and treachery. The Social Dem- . ocrats and Free Unions ordered their members not to par­ ticipate in the demonstration, calling it a mob composed of riff-raff (Gesindel). The boycott substantiated the position taken by the Social Democrats and their labor allies at the outset of the occupation..Under the head­ lines, "The Nationalist Danger," the 16 January edition of the Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung (EAZ), the voice of the Social Democrats in Essen and the Ruhr, berated Poincare's folly in stirring up nationalists in Germany who were attempting to take over the streets and provoke conflict with the occupation troops. On the day following the return of the sentenced industrialists to Essen the EAZ ran the headline, "Beware of the Nationalists!" The accompanying story warned workers to be cautious of any type of heroic comedy. "All the bourgeois papers," the account continued, "called yesterday for demonstrations during the arrival of the sentenced men in Essen. As if payment by mine owners of a few thousand francs was a heroic act. It is in the interest of certain circles to 41 create martyrs. In the name of all workers, we protest against the deception which took place yesterday. Organized workers refused to join the Lumpen who took part in the nationalist excesses yesterday." The Catholic Center Party had urged its followers to participate in the demonstration. The Essener Volks-Zeitung (EVZ), the Catholic Center news­ paper in Essen, denounced the Social Democratic boycott of the demonstration in provocative language. It accused the Social Democrats of "remaining true to their ideology, some­ times pink, sometimes red," and "attempting to accomodate themselves to their radical sister," the Communists. The editorial writer of the EVZ also found it puzzling that Social Democrats were "always ready to defend the Republic with general strikes, but now that the enemy was here de- 5 nounced demonstrators as riff-raff." Clearly each party perceived a different enemy. Leading members of the Catholic clergy in the Ruhr and Rhineland contributed to the anxieties of the Social Democrats concerning the rising tide of nationalism in Germany. In a New Year's diocesan letter Cardinal Schulte of Cologne used the Treaty of Versailles as a vehicle to vent his anti-French sentiments. Following his denunci­ ation of French designs on the Rhineland, Schulte concluded his letter by saying that the clergy and bishops of Colonge 6 "are German and will remain German, come what may!" 42 Schulte's speeches increased in vehemence after the French moved into the Ruhr, Speaking before a meeting of the "Cologne Catholics for Religious Schools" he again de­ livered a tirade against the Treaty of Versailles, character­ izing it as a "terror without end following the end of terror." In conclusion he publicly demanded what ultra- nationalists were then urging upon the Cuno government— to proclaim the Treaty of Versailles void as a result of the illegal French occupation of the Ruhr. "We may appear defenseless, but timid and discouraged (kleinmuetig) we will not be. God will not allow French trees to grow up 7 to the sky." Schulte followed a vigourous speaking schedule in the Rhineland and the Ruhr, attacking France as an enemy, proclaiming the unity of the German population above class and couching his verbal forays in spiritual terms reminis­ cent of war time rhetoric. "An unequalled feeling of sanc­ tified strength (heilige Kraft) has again come alive in our oppressed Fatherland despite its internal unrest and 8 external powerlessness." In a similar vein the Bishop of Paderborn proclaimed Sunday 14 January a day of mourning in Ruhr and Westphalian churches. In a pastoral letter to be read at all masses on that day he denounced the occupation and called for a new unity among Germans and the suspension of all class and political conflict, "True Catholic, true German has always been our election slogan," 43 he concluded his letter to his parishioners,Catholic Church was guaranteed its rights. As a party the Catholic Center was not wholly committed whole-heartedly to the principle of democracy, the republican state form, and the parliamentary system. In addition, the revolution­ ary form of the Republic's creation conflicted with Catholic ideology. The promise of a pluralistic state with a strong Marxist influence, even in the form of moderate German Social Democracy, was perceived as posing grave dangers. Of primary concern to the Catholic Center was the danger of a new Kulturkampf. The Center, therefore, sought alli­ ances to the right against the new "secular" forces in 15 Germany following the revolution. The theoretical framework for an alliance with the right had been worked out two years prior to the Ruhr crisis by Adam Stegerwald, a conservative leader of the Christian Labor Unions. He had been aided by other conservative and monarchist members of the Catholic Center such as Heinrich Bruening, the future Reich Chancellor. Their intent was to create a "large moderate party on the basis of 'positive Christian convictions' and thus consolidate the splintered 46 Weimar system, at the same time checking the Social Dem- 16 ocrats," Stegerwald outlined these ideas in an address to the Congress of Christian Labor Unions which met in Essen in November 1920, With Christian workers forming the necessary popular base, Stegerwald and his supporters envisioned a national political party which would attempt to bridge class differences. Their intent was to unite Catholic and Protestants in a strong middle-class party with close ties to more conservative parties on the right. This new middle party was to be based upon national, Christ­ ian, and democratic principles. However, as Stegerwald made clear, "national" did not mean an unlimited commit­ ment to the Republic. Furthermore, in place of a ration­ alistic and mechanistic "Western" democracy Stegerwald juxtaposed an "organic" democracy in which people in some unspecified manner participated in the determination of their political fate. "Social" meant a renunciation of the concept of class conflict to be replaced by an inter- gration of classes into the total community (Volksganze). The entire concept was captured in the term Volksgemein- schaft which implied the possibility of uniting Germans above narrow special interests by providing them with the 17 ideal of membership in a community. It was upon the basis of these vague and possibly anti-democratic ideas that Stegerwald and his supporters intended to build their 47 new party, Stegerwald's plan met with little success in 19 20. Significant oppostion came from small but forceful groups of workers in the Ruhr, an important center of Catholic political power. These workers felt themselves threatened by the very same reactionary forces which Stegerwald and other conservative Center Party members regarded as possible confederates. They fought for a positive acceptance of the Republic and formed an oppostion group within the Catholic workers movement which eventually became "the keystone of the left within the Weimar Christian labor 18 movement." By late 1922 oppostion groups within the Catholic Workers Union in the Ruhr pursued a political line critical of the capitalist economic order as well as middle class parties of the right. This led to strong ties with the Social Democrats and, following the frustrations of 19 1923, even as far left as the Communist Party. In­ terestingly enough, Cardinal Schulte's nationalistic speeches, when reprinted in the Catholic press of the Ruhr, were often accompanied by appeals for the formation of a new political party along the lines of Stegerwald's orig­ inal design. The appeals called for a majority middle- of-the-road party, "based upon the crystal-clear proposit­ ions of the Christian state doctrine with a committed /"Christian/ orientation for the multifarious political, 48 economic, and in particular cultural problems /~of the 20 dayy\ " Obviously there was a significant faction with­ in the Catholic Center Party which still wanted a solid alliance with the right. Shortly before the French marched into the Ruhr, Cen­ trists provoked Social Democrats by the conciliatory attitude they were adopting towards the right. Joseph Wirth, during the closing days of his cabinet in November 1922, had considered asking the conservative, anti-repub­ lican and industry-dominated German People's Party to join his coalition. The Social Democrats, however, would not consider sharing power with the People's Party. Moreover, since the People's Party had opposed at that time the monetary and fiscal measures needed for the success of the Wirth-Rathenau fulfillment policy, the Socialists held the People's Party ultimately responsible for the imminent occupation of the Ruhr. Wirth, speaking before a Cologne conference of the Catholic Center Party on 7 January 1923 in his capacity as party leader, simply ignored the legit­ imate concerns of the Social Democrats, his former co­ alition partner. He praised the conservative Cuno cabinet, in which several members of the People's Party held port­ folios, for its "consolidation of power" and foresaw the possibility of stability in Germany as a result of a move- 21 ment towards the right and away from socialism. The 49 Social Democratic press in the Ruhr attacked Wirth and the Catholic Center for their continuing attempts to establish closer ties with the right, thereby weakening the strength of the Republic. An editorial in the Essener Arbeiter-r Zeitung reminded the Center that their actions were under?- taken without regard for the thousands of workers among their ranks. In closing, the editors urged that "Christ­ ian workers should finally exit from a party which is not in a position to represent their interests." Centrists 22 denounced the editorial as demagoguery. Social Democrats, in addition to the considerations already mentioned, were unnerved by the strong national stand of the Catholic Center and their friendliness to­ wards the right, as symbolized by Wirth's speech, for the following reasons. The presence of foreign troops in the Ruhr resulted from the inability of the Germans to agree on how to meet their Versailles obligations. The working class parties insisted that industry should bear the greatest cost of reparations. Businessmen, in order to increase productivity, cut costs, pay reparations, and still maintain a profit margin, sought to revoke the eight- hour workday in Germany. Labor saw this as an attempt to place the full burden of reparations on the backs of workers. Thus German attitudes towards the domestic compromises necessary to meet Allied reparations demands had been 50 shaped primarily by class considerations, Prior to the occupation neither side had been strong enough to force through its own solution. These divisive issues still re­ mained to be resolved after the Ruhr was occupied. Any new political alignment in Germany was bound to affect the shape of future reparation plans and therefore the in­ terests of both workers and industrialists. More important­ ly, after the Ruhr was occupied, class tensions and polit­ ical conflicts among Germans posed significant problems for coordinating defense actions in the Ruhr. ' The German government, with the aim of protesting the occupation, frustrating the attempt to take reparations by military means, and forcing the withdrawal of the occupiers, mounted a campaign of passive resistance in the Ruhr. Ger­ mans in the Ruhr were forbidden to cooperate with the oc- 23 cupation forces. The effectiveness of resistance hinged upon cooperation between workers and employers in a front of national defense. This, however, posed special problems for the Social Democrats and their union affiliates. As far as the Social Democrats were concerned, the obstacles which industrialists had placed in the path of fulfillment had created the circumstances which brought foreign occu­ pation of the Ruhr. Now that the French were in the Ruhr they were unwilling to allow themselves to be used as a tool of conservative, right-wing power politics. Social Democrats were, therefore, skeptical of a front of national unity in the bourgeois sense, i,e,, a Burgfrieden, such as was proclaimed in 1914, which would attempt to submerge the continuing real conflicts between workers and employers, The abiding antagonisms between Ruhr industrialists and Social Democrats surfaced two days prior to the occu­ pation. In a strategy meeting with the Rheinish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate Heinrich Limbertz, representing the Socialist miners in the Ruhr, found himself at loggerheads with Hugo Stinnes. Stinnes insisted on a continuation of the policy of intransigence towards the French. In the eyes of the Social Democrats this so-called Katastrophenpolitik had directly contributed to the French decision to use force to collect reparations. Limbertz refused to go along with Stinnes and denounced the "national unity front" as an empty phrase "designed to impress the apolitical bourgeois 24 masses; it is a national danger." Despite the difficulties and encumbrances of the moment the goal of Social Democratic policy continued tobeto further understanding between the peoples of Europe. They held firm to their argument that only international solutions could lessen German suffering and refused to associate themselves with any move towards a unilateral German renunciation of the Treaty of Versailles or reparations as demanded by the right. 52 As before the occupation, the Social Democratic press pledged the working class to a policy of fulfillment based upon Germany's capacity to pay reparations. Vorwaerts, the leading voice of the party in Germany, pledged the support of German workers exclusively to those who wished to coop­ erate with the signers of the Treaty of Versailles, Only in this way could Europe hope to free itself from the con­ tinuing horrors and crises of reparations, Workers, how­ ever, in regard passive resistance, "did not for a moment intend to place themselves defensively before the cash registers of property owners in an effort to deny Germany's creditors what, with full authority and right, they were en­ titled to and what was possible within Germany's productive 25 capacity." The reasonableness of the Social Democratic position on the reparations issue did not prevent caviling from the Catholic Center, Dr. Josef Hess, a Center deputy, spoke to the Prussian Landtag on 25 January 1923, Eschewing the question of justice, Hess said the French must be com­ pensated because they were the victors, just as the French had had to pay following their defeat in 1871, It was simply a matter of having lost the war, "but, and now I come to the disagreement that I have with the speaker of the Social Democratic Party—the claims of the French must be held within the bounds which are reasonable for Germany and must not overstep those bounds which would crush the 53 26 defeated Germany," Actually, that was exactly what the Social Democrats had also been saying. One day prior to the Vorwaerts article, Rudolf Breit- scheid, one of the Socialists' leading foreign policy ex­ perts, gave a clearer explanation of working class par­ ticipation in passive resistance. Breitscheid, in a speech before the Reichstag on 26 January, defined it as part of the class conflict which continued during, and was contain­ ed within, the crisis of the Ruhr occupation, "The defense position which the workers in the Ruhr have adopted is a part of the proletarian class struggle." According to Breitscheid the occupation was the direct result of the excesses of capitalism and imperialism, a position very close to that of the Communists, as will be discussed below. The occupation of the Ruhr was launched by French capital­ ists on the assumption that the time had come for the Comite des Forges to dominate the central European coal and steel industry. German workers were at that moment witnessing the attempt of the Comite7 des Forges to seize the Ruhr in order to enable French coal and steel industrialists, in a way as yet unclear, to exercise control over the central European coal and steel industries in cooperation with

German industrialists. In order to prevent this German 27 workers participated in the defense actions in the Ruhr. In this sense there existed a form of negative national 54 unity. Workers were protecting the right of self-deter­ mination for the German economy. This minimal commitment was undertaken despite the basic conflicts which existed between capital and labor in Germany. In the general pro­ test against the illegality of the Ruhr occupation Social 28 Democrats participated in the 'united defense front,' However, there was not and "could not be a political united front of the Social Democratic Party with the middle-class 29 bourgeois parties," Nor could there be any compromise on the larger question of how the issue of reparations ul­ timately would be resolved. The Social Democrats stuck closely to their belief that only a democratic restructuring 30 of the German economy could solve Germany's problems. Breitscheid's interpretation of the Ruhr defense front was attacked by members of the Center and the bourgeois parties in the Reichstag. The speaker for the Center accused Breitscheid of arrogance and presumption since "in the occupied zone there were innumerable numbers of workers who were not Social Democrats but stood behind the Christian Labor Unions. These workers did not participate in the defense struggle from considerations arising out of class conflict. Rather, these workers participated in order to insure the freedom and rights of the entire German 31 people," Karl Helfferich, the German National People's Party representative, took issue with Breitscheid's attack 55 on the German industrialists on the grounds that, he, Breitscheid, had insinuated that they were willing to co­ operate with the French in the joint exploitation of the Ruhr. The speaker for the German Democrats demanded that the idea of class conflict be pushed aside. "We must protect the Fatherland against brutal force through a common front extending from German Nationalists to Com- 32 munists." Only the Communist Party representative, Hermann Remmele, spoke in defense of Breitscheid. The bourgeois call for a united front from left to right was an attempt to mindlessly pit all Germans against all Frenchmen whereas only a small group of capitalists were at odds. In fact, as he spoke, French workers, both Socialists and Communists, were behind bars for protesting the occupation. The German bourgeoisie themselves were not interested in a national front, but only in finding a pretext for crushing their enemies within Germany. "The National Socialists have expressly declared that before a national struggle against the foreign enemy is waged the enemy within must be dealt with," Also, to attempt to make heroes out of German capitalists was absurd. Ruhr indus­ trialists such as Fritz Thyssen, after the French were in the Ruhr and before the Berlin government expressly for­ bade them to do so, were willing to sell the French coal and coke for cash. Remmele foresaw, on the basis of 56 Breitshceid's interpretation of events, the possibility of a proletarian united front of Social Democrats and Communists. "If what Breitscheid has said here today is the postion of the Social Democrats for the near future, then we are ready to join them in a united front of the proletariat. I say 33 this openly from this rostrum." In contrast to the attitude of Social Democrats and Communists, the leaders of the Christian unions, with the exception of Heinrich Imbusch, the head of the Christain miners, looked favorably on a united front with their employers in the Ruhr. Imbusch, shortly after the occupa­ tion, questioned the long-term good will of the Ruhr in­ dustrialists. He felt that the united front proposed by the latter was merely a tactic on the part of industry and that when the immediate crisis of the occupation had passed, industry would choose to forget the contributions that labor had made to the united front and the defense of the Ruhr and continue its attack on the major social achieve- 34 ments of labor, particularly the eight-hour day. However, other Christian labor leaders such as Steger, the head of the Christian Miners Union in Essen, denied, as did the Catholic hierarchy, that an antagonistic relationship exist­ ed between labor and capital. Steger urged that whatever bitterness existed on the side of labor must now be for­ gotten. He also expressed the belief that relations between 57 workers and employers would improve as a result of their 35 cooperation in defense of the Ruhr, Franz Wieber, Catholic Center Reichstag member and head of the Christ­ ian Metal Workers Union, wished to recreate a worker- employer front similar to the one that had helped stem the 36 revolution in 1918-1919. The Essener Volks-Zeitung(EVZ) expressed the opinion that there was a qualitative difference between French and German capitalism, the latter being much superior from the perspective of the workers. The editors of the EVZ ignored the inveterate opposition which Ruhr industrialists had mounted against the eight-hour day and Wirth's tax proposals and argued that German workers had achieved more under German capitalism than their French counterparts had under French capitalism. Either delib­ erately distorting or naively misunderstanding the criti­ cisms of the Social Democrats and the Communists, the article concluded with the warning that "German workers would make a bad choice if they exchanged German for French capitalism. If French capitalism, aided by militarism, brings the Ruhr firmly into its hands, then it must begin dismembering our achievements in order to quiet its own 37 workers." In the same vein the Secretary of the Christian- National Railroad Workers Union in Essen, Bonn, speaking on the Ruhr occupation, acknowledged that there was a threat 58 to the social position of German labor, especially in re­ gard to the eight-^hour day. However, in contrast to the Social Democrats and Communists, Bohn placed the responsi­ bility for the threat to working conditions in Germany ex­ clusively on external factors, specifically on the shoulders of the Allies, rather than holding German employers equally accountable. "The Allies, through the pressure of repara- 38 tions, made the eight-hour day, in the end, impossible." The editor of the EVZ, Johannes Bredemann, pointed out that German workers would not allow themselves to be deceived by French propaganda. The French, according to Breddemann, contrary to their claim of having undertaken the occupation only to coerce German industrialists, were attempting to coerce the entire German population. Thus the occupation had little to do with class antagonisms either domestically or internationally but was a conflict between national groups. "The Christian-national workers stand fast to the Fatherland and the French, who covet our country, can't equip enough black or white troops in order to subdue eternally the German people." Bredemann closed by attack­ ing the internationalist position of the Social Democrats. Here Bredemann referred to the fact that just before the occupation the Social Democratic Party had dispatched delegates to Amsterdam to discuss with other members of the Amsterdam International Labor Organization the 59 possibility of answering the French occupation of the Ruhr with a European-wide general strike, The idea was abandoned as unrealistic, Bredemann dismissed these efforts as evi­ dence of "the total failure of internationalism--we can 39 only depend on ourselves," The growing disagreements between the leaders of sig­ nificant numbers of workers in the Ruhr and the Berlin government prompted Chancellor Cuno to make a quick tour of the occupied zone in early February, Cuno met with business, labor and political party leaders in Bochum, Dortmund and Essen, At the Dortmund meeting Stinnes and other industrialists were present. The Social Democrats took this opportunity to restate their objections to govern­ ment policy. Meier, a member of the executive board of the Alten Verband (the miners' union associated with the Social Democrats in the Ruhr), pledged the support of his workers to the government in its opposition to the occupation, but raised grave reservations about the direction in which that policy was proceeding, Meier warned those present that "under no circumstances would workers tolerate a Kata- strophenpolitik. No policy of catastrophe, as during the war, in which all depended on one turn of the card. Ab­ solutely, no policy of catastrophe!" Meier demanded Cuno's assurance that every opportunity be seized which provided the chance of reaching some understanding with the French, 60 "Workers who had been weakened by the war must not now be allowed to be bled white," Meier also demanded that the government set no prior condition for negotiations "such as first withdrawal and then negotiation"'—the position, in fact, which the government had taken and which the parties of the center and right along with the industrial- 40 ists supported. Cuno, in answering Meier, dissociated himself from industry and placed his cabinet above party,"a cabinet in which party politics plays no role, while I myself am not a party member." According to the Chancellor, the German government- was not pursuing a policy of catastrophe nor playing party politics, but following only a German policy which in the end would allow the German people to escape conflict forever (alien Streitigkeiten fuer immer zu ent- gehen). Cuno, however, felt that negotiations at the moment would weaken Germany's position and that Germany would have to hold out until the French realized that they had suffered a fiasco. To offer to negotiate during the middle of a defensive action would, according to Cuno, "be 41 an extraordinary mistake," The question of negotiation during the course of the occupation soon became a serious issue between the Cuno government and the Social Democrats and Free Unions of the Ruhr. For Cuno and his supporters among the Catholic Center 61 and bourgeois parties, passive resistance represented the instrument which would force the French to withdraw from the Ruhr, After withdrawal, negotiations could once again begin concerning reparations. For Social Democrats passive resistance merely represented a bargaining instrument with which to negotiate. "Withdrawal is the goal we want," Meier said at Dortmund, "but we will achieve it only through 42 negotiation." This was the issue on which the Communists seized to launch a campaign of their own. To them the disagreements between employers and workers were not merely a matter of different tactics, but a confrontation that touched on the very nature of the capitalist system. As they saw it, the occupation of the Ruhr by the French and Belgians was simply an outgrowth of the never ending battle between rival capitalist factions over a particularly lucrative market. On this view the Communists and Social Democrats were in essential agreement. The Rote Fahne, in explaining the causes for the occupation, pointed out disagreements between French and German industrialists who were eager to rationalize central European steel production by forming a common trust on both sides of the Rhine, French steel pro­ ducers wanted 60 per cent of the common shares, leaving Krupp, Thyssen and Stinnes in a minority position. Thus the Ruhr occupation resulted from a falling out among French 62 and German industrialists, over the question of equal par- 43 ticipation in the trust or 10 per cent. As did the Social Democrats, German Communists also feared the rise of national hatreds among the working classes. National­ ism, it was felt, would only benefit the industrialists on both sides of the Rhine. The need for class solidarity was all the more important because the German Communist Party (KPD) was also convinced that the great bourgeoisie, the Ruhr industrialists in particular, would use the occu­ pation crisis to reinforce its position by sponsoring fascist groups. The Communists gave voice to their anxie­ ties at a meeting in Essen on 6 January, "On both sides of the border the occupation will release the worst type of reaction and open the way to all forms of fascism. New seeds for international war will be created. And, above all, whatever solution the capitalist pirates may find it must necessarily lead to only one result: the toiling masses will work longer and more intensively, pay more 44 taxes and eat less ...." The class struggle perspective of the KPD and its position in regard to the causes and possible resolution of the Ruhr conflict precluded the possibility that it would support the call by the Cuno government ("the Stinnes 45 government of heavy industry," according to Zinoviev) for all Germans to join in a national united front. In 63 keeping with Karl Liebknecht's admonition to the European working class that "Per Hauptfeind steht im eigenen Land," the delegates at the Essen conference agreed that "the ob­ ject of attack (Angriffsobjekt) of the working class must be the bourgeoisie, /""German, French, Belgian, etc._j_7 in 46 one's own country." At the same time, however, the Ruhr had to be defended against French imperialism which had "attacked in order to take for itself what had been denied _ 47 it / at Versailles/." German workers, therefore, had to fight a two-front action. The French had to be checked in the Ruhr and the German bourgeoisie checked throughout Germany. The German Communists stated their position in strident headlines in the Rote Fahne—'Smite Poincare and 48 Cuno on the Ruhr and on the Spree.' While the German Communists felt that with the occu­ pation of the Ruhr a decisive moment in post-war develop­ ments had been reached, divisions within the party arose over the question at to which tactics would best serve the interests of the working class. The KPD majority agreed with Karl Radek that at that moment "the conquest of power 49 L Xi §t armis was/ not on the agenda." The majority, therefore, saw the Ruhr crisis as an opportunity for devel­ oping revolutionary consciousness among workers. This, in turn, would lead to a proletarian united front eventuating in a worker's government ( a coalition of the KPD and SPD), 64 Once achieved, a worker's government would institute "a radical democratic tax policy, with state participation in big business and a comprehensive levy on the Reich's economic substance, i.e., industry and agriculture, (Erfass- 50 ung der Sachwerte)." In foreign policy, recognizing that it could not break the chains of the Treaty of Versailles, a German worker's government would initiate negotiations with France, It would honorably and openly make known the means by which the debts of the working people of Germany, inherited from the bourgeoisie, would be paid. Also, it would take over all capitalist collateral (wird selbst Pfaender von den Kapitalisten in die Hand nehmen) and guarantee that the word of German capitalists could be re­ lied on. In this way a worker's government would help workers to bear the weight with which the bankrupt im- 51 perialist bourgeoisie had burdened them. In order to prevent imperialistic French capitalism, through control of the Ruhr, from exercising economic and military dom­ ination over Europe, the struggle in the Ruhr would mean­ while continue until the Cuno government had been replaced by a worker's government. Only at that moment would it be possible to make certain that the cost of the lost war was not borne exclusively by German workers for the benefit of those who had determined its goals, duration, and de- structiveness. 65 The Social Democratic leaders, because of the antir- Republic record of the Communists, did not believe in the possibility of cooperation with the KPD, They remained exceedingly distrustful of Communist suggestions proposing the formation of a united front. The KPD majority attempt­ ed to remove this stumbling block by adopting a new atti­ tude towards the Republic. At the Eighth Party Congress, held in Leipzig form 28 January to 1 February 1923 to dis­ cuss the Ruhr crisis, a worker's government was defined as "an attempt on the part of the working class within the limits and primarily through the means of bourgeois dem­ ocracy, supported by proletarian institutions and the pro­ letarian mass movement, to carry out policies in the in- 52 terests of workers." At the same time the reluctance of the Social Democratic leaders to join with the KPD was to be overcome by using factory councils to attract the support of the Social Democratic rank and file for the Communist program. This would build class solidarity at the grass-roots level (Einheitsfront von unten), The KPD majority felt that the Social Democratic leadership, under pressure from the rank and file, would be forced to agree to join the proletarian united front and form a worker's government (Einheitsfront von oben), In the eyes of the KPD majority this was the best defense against the 53 French as well as the German bourgeoisie. 66 In contrast to the majority opinion a left-oppositional group within the KPD viewed the Ruhr occupation as an "objective" opportunity for revolution. The dissenters rejected the majority view that a coalition with the Social Democrats would aid the cause of workers, They were against all forms of "democratic/reformist illusion" 54 and opposed any cooperation with the SPDleadership. In­ stead, the left-oppostion wanted the party to concentrate all its energies on winning over workers through factory councils (Einheitsfront nur von unten) in preparation for seizing production in the Ruhr as the first step to revo­ lution throughout Germany. Clara Zetkin, speaking for the majority at the Essen party day in March, argued that a take-over of the mines and factories of the Ruhr would endanger all German workers. Once the German bourgeoisie felt the knife at their throats they would quickly open the way to negotiation with the French. French troops would then turn on German workers. "Both French and German capitalists are brothers in expropriation. What happened in 1871 against the Communards will happen again if the occupation of the mines and take-over of production 55 leads to a struggle against the German bourgeoisie," Ruth Fischer, speaking for the left-opposition, argued that if the KPD refused to act in the Ruhr and "create here /~a/ revolutionary island," its policy in the rest 67 of Germany had no meaning, "We must take production and factories in our own hands, That would of course be dangerous in many ways .... I hear the objection that you are playing into the hands of the French. But Lenin did not shrink from accepting support from the Kaiser's govern- 56 ment for his trip to Russia." Factionalism aside, the KPD, with good reason, looked to the Ruhr workers for support during 1923. The left- opposition saw ready allies among Ruhr syndicalists for 57 seizure of the factories. More important to the majority position, however, was the fact that since 1918 the Social Democratic Party had been steadily losing support among Ruhr workers. In the city of Essen, for example, the moderate Majority Social Democrats won 28.7 per cent in the National Assembly elections in January 1919, The more radical Independent Social Democrats won 9.5 per cent. The Spartacists, not yet constituted as the German Communist Party, boycotted the elections. In the Prussian State elections, which followed within seven days, the Majority Socialists increased their margin to 32,2 per cent while 58 the Independents lost 1.5 per cent. However, during the days of radicalization which followed, particularly during the Kapp Putsch in 1920, the Majority Socialists lost their influence over large numbers of workers in Essen to 59 thelndependents and Communists. 68 In Essen, as in the Reich, the Independent Social Democrats were divided between those who favored a parr. liamentary state form but called for wide-ranging social­ ization and those who wanted to turn the German revolution into a world revolution and establish socialism in Germany in the form of a council system on the soviet model. At its Halle party conference in October 1920, a majority of the Independents voted to join the Third International. Immediately following that meeting the left-wing of the Essen Independents united with the KPD to form the United Communist Party of Germany with an estimated membership in the city of 12,000. The remainder of the Independents joined with the Majority Social Democrats to form the United Social Democratic Party. Thus by 1920 a significant number of wrokers in Essen went over to those forces which felt that the revolution of 1918 had not gone far enough 60 in restructuring the state and its social institutions. Similar divisions had taken place within Essen's Free (Socialist) labor unions, an important prop for the Majority Social Democrats. Numerically, the two most important of these unions were the German Metal Workers Union and the Mine Workers Union. In 1919 there had been an enormous groundswell among Ruhr workers for socialization of mines and factories, some rank and file members demanding a general strike if necessary to realize their aims. 69 However, Otto Hue, head of the miners union, and Heinrich Limbertz, a Majority Social Democrat and editor of the Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung, both felt that rash actions would bring about economic catastrophe, Maintaining effective control and backed by a significant number of followers among the Rhineland-Westphalian Workers' and Soldiers' Council, they helped prevent a general strike and pledged cooperation with industrialists under the Central Coop­ erative Agreement (Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft, ZAG) worked " 61 out by Karl Legien and Hugo Stinnes on 15 November 1918. The ZAG was viewed differently by workers and employers. For employers the agreement represented a finger in the dike against the rising tide of revolution. Labor, on the other hand, believed that through the mechanisms estab­ lished by the agreement they would gradually win a voice 62 in economic decisions. This view proved illusory. In contrast to the moderate leadership of the miners union, the Essen metal workers were led by more aggressive people. At the Nuernberg Congress of the Free Unions in 1919 members called for the establishment of a council system to carry out socialization. Shortly thereafter the German Metal Workers Union, the largest and most in­ fluential in the Free Union movement, withdrew from the ZAG. The increasing radicalization of this union led to the decision, urged by moderates, at the Stuttgart 70 Conference of the German metal workers in 192 0, to expell any Communist factions from local labor unions, The de­ cision led to unexpected results in Essen, Communists made strenuous efforts to capture the leadership of the union. Despite appeals by moderates "not to take the road to Moscow," the election proved a defeat for the united list of Moderate-Independent Social Democrats. The Com­ munists won by a margin of almost 2 to 1. As a result, the leadership of the strongest labor union in Essen, with a membership of 28,000, went over to the Communists in 63 1921. The tendency of the workers in Essen to move left­ ward was symptomatic of the difficulty moderate Social Democrats had during the Weimar period in attempting to tie together Theorie und Praxis. As Marxists they view­ ed reality as being determined by society's class struc­ ture. Class conflict was the means to be used to change the bourgeois-capitalist state into a socialist state. However, convinced that time was working in their favor and also for practical political considerations, the Social Democratic Party sought to achieve its objectives by grad­ ual reforms. It took part in coalition governments and thereby legitimized the state's existence, all the while unwilling to commit itself to leading the fight for far- reaching changes in Germany's economic/social structure. 71 Social Democratic ambiyalences--the party's commitment to the Republic modified by its reluctance to act decisively to turn political democracy into social democracy—alien­ ated large numbers of workers, as evidenced in Essen, The democratic Republic, the old dream of the German labor movement, had been joyfully greeted by workers in 1918- 1919. It promised, if not the immediate realization of socialism, at least a discernible improvement in the eco­ nomic, social and political situation of the workers. Yet three years after the revolution the Republic still had not freed workers from their economic insecurity nor mod­ ified social inequities. More importantly, the Republic had not gone far enough in curbing the domination of those elite groups-the military, bureaucracy, aristocracy, and great bourgeoisie—which had dominated Germany prior to 1914. The failures had provoked pent up workers'grievances among the workers—another reason why, during the Ruhr crisis, the Social Democrats were reluctant to associate themselves too closely with bourgeois parties of the right in a united national front. Similarly, this existing dis­ content makes more understandable their sharp reaction to the Catholic Center's attempt to build bridges to the right. It also explains why Communists received growing support from Ruhr workers during the occupation. 72 During the opening months of the occupation the KPD made significant gains among Ruhr workers. Through its affiliate, the Union der Hand-und Kopfarbeiter, the party focused its attention on the Congress of Rhenish-West- phalian Factory Councils. The Congress became the driving force behind the rebirth of interest in the factory council movement in the rest of Germany. The decline of union membership in 1923 and the new strength of the factory councils reflected a changing attitude on the part of workers. 64 The KPD benefited from this new interest. On 21 February the German Metal Workers Union (Essen) held elections for the executive board of the Krupp factory councils. The 65 KPD list won 353 votes, the SPD list 337. The KPD now led the Krupp factory councils, Essen's largest employer. Afraid of the growing strength and militancy of the factory council movement and the KPD, the Cuno government announced on 1 March that scheduled elections for the Reich Worker's Council were not to be held. The government claimed that the tumultuous situation in Germany made elections im­ possible. The KPD, pointing to the radically changed con­ sciousness of the workers as a result of the Ruhr occupation, protested the delay as an attempt to deny workers a means 66 by which to express their discontent. Similarly, KPD-led control committees were having success in organizing the unemployed in the Ruhr. Carl Severing, the Social Democratic 73 Minister of the Interior for Prussia, issued an order ex­ plicitly forbidding city administrations in the Ruhr from dealing with ad hoc committees representing the unemployed. Only labor unions were to be recognized as representatives of the unemployed. Severing told Ruhr administrators that "the unions /""were/ having difficulty enough convincing their unemployed members that only they could best serve their wishes. It would be a betrayal of these efforts if a communal administration entered negotiations without con- 67 sidering the political power factors involved." Statistics notwithstanding, the growth of factory councils and control committees during the first months of the Ruhr occupation demonstrated the favorable response of Socialist and Catholic workers in the Ruhr to the KPD 68 majority position. Some workers, no doubt, were attract­ ed by the KPD's willingness, in the face of the perceived nationalist and fascist threat, to stand on the basis of the bourgeois state and the Weimar constitution. Also, the KPD position for a settlement of the crisis was clearer, stronger and more logical than that of the SPD. Both par­ ties called for a quick, negotiated settlement with the French and pledged to pay reparations to the Allies, Both called for sweeping domestic reforms in the form of new tax laws to pay for reparations and insure that workers did not bear the full cost of those reparations. The KPD 74 majority, however, called for a workers * government to realize these ends. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, attempted to use their influence to pressure the bourgeois Cuno government into negotiating, Yet what­ ever the differences between Social Democrats and Comiaunists, the aims of both working class parties were in conflict with those of the single most powerful private interest group in Germany, the Ruhr industrialists. Industrial circles in the Ruhr looked upon the occu­ pation in epic-like terms. It was to be "the final battle of World War I /"which/ will determine ultimate victory. The 1914/18 war /"was/ lost as a result of political and military half-measures. If industrial circles now engage in half measures (eine Halbheit jetz auf wirtschaftlichem 69 Gebiet) the same misfortune will result. Thus, the Katastrophenpolitik, which had been pursued by many Ruhr industrialists since 192 0, which had increased French anx­ ieties, and which had ultimately led to the occupation of the Ruhr, was to be continued. While the industrialists were aware that that policy was a gamble, the hoped-for outcome appeared to outweigh the risks and dangers. In­ ternationally , due to the importance of Ruhr coal in the European economy, the Ruhr magnates wagered that Europe as a whole would suffer economic dislocation once mining in the Ruhr was interrupted by military occupation. They 75 were convinced that this would prove, dramatically and conclusively, the economic interdependence of victors and vanquished. They believed that once the French had in­ dulged in the obsession of occupying the Ruhr and received little coal as compensation, the way would be open for a favorable renegotiation of Germany's reparation obligations. A victory gained in this way would contribute significantly to a rebirth of German national feeling and inner strength. In addition, the Ruhr industry intended to pledge its support, at the right moment, for moderate reparation de­ liveries and payments provided that the Reichstag abandoned the eight-hour day in Germany. Its foreign and domestic burdens lightened, heavy industry could then look for­ ward to a competitive chance on the world's markets with­ out the aid of an inflated currency. As early as 1920 at

the Spa Conference Hugo Stinnes had outlined just such a 70 plan. His attitude was shared by others who identified closely with the interests of the Ruhr industry. In the same year the Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht had counseled Oskar Hergt, the chairman of the far right German National People's Party, and Karl Helfferich that "the French should be enticed into Germany over the Ruhr /""question/, so that, out of lack of internal strength, they would fail and give up the whole enterprise /""of attempting to coerce Germany/," A year later, in answer to the question by a prominent 76 party member of whether, or not a 'Katastrophe', such as the occupation of the Ruhr, would bring enormous difficult­ ies upon Germany, Hergt had said "But other things too can result, Germany's power of resistance will grow simulta­ neously with the recognition that the fate of Germany is tied to that of Europe. Also, the distress of the Entente 71 will induce them to make concessions (Nachgiebigkeit)." Despite the general optimism of the Ruhr industrial­ ists that the occupation could be used to serve their in­ terests, the situation was potentially dangerous. By occu­ pying the Ruhr the French intended to extract coal and coke in quantities sufficient to meet their own needs and the reparations obligations of Germany. The success or failure of their mission depended upon the attitude of the Ruhr workers. Aware of this, General Degoutte, the French commander of the Rhine Army, explained to his troops on the eve of the occupation that the value of the entire action was "dependent on the work of the population. Work must therefore continue and troops must, at all costs, 72 avoid anything which will interrupt it." With the aim of securing the cooperation of the Ruhr population, French authorities intended to drive a wedge between workers and employers by exploiting already existing tensions. In a meeting with German labor leaders, General Denvignes, head of the French Bureau of Civilian Affairs, pledged the 77 support of the occupying forces in strikes over wages and guaranteed the eight

Ruhr industrialists, while publicly pledging them­ selves to a national united front, urged, however, behind the scenes that severe actions be taken against their newly embraced working class allies. Apprehensive in Feb­ ruary that Social Democrats and the Free labor unions were about to launch a counteraction against the flood of emo­ tional nationalism sweeping Germany, pretexts were to be found to muzzle the Social Democrats and smash the Commu- 81 nists. At the same time, with the intent of protecting the advantages of the united-front tactic, right-wing extremists were to be reined in. Paul Reusch was warned in late January to use caution in Bavaria, the center of anti-Republican and Nazi activity in Germany, "I must once again entreat you to devote the greatest attention 82 to things in Bavaria, It would be criminal folly if the Bavarians would attack now /""the Berlin government/ or undertake other provocative measures. In one stroke the painfully created united front here /""in the Ruhr/ would be destroyed beyond repair. It is therefore imperative that everyone who has direct or indirect relations with 82 the Bavarians use them energetically." The implication no doubt was that Reusch was to use his influence to tone down the rabidly nationalist editorials of the anti-Republic Muenchner Neuesten Nachrichten. This newspaper was partly owned by Karl Haniel, chairman of the board of Gutehoffnungs- huette. The success of industry's plans depended upon a sus­ tained resistance against the French for at least three months. Ruhr industrialists estimated that the Lorraine iron and steel producers could get by on their coal and coke reserves for ninety days at the most. As these in­ ventories were depleted and the steel furnaces banked, mounting pressure on Premier Poincare from French iron 83 and steel interests would force him to negotiate. In addition, the occupation had weakened the franc on the international currency exchanges, bringing with it increased inflationary pressure in France, Domestic unrest was sure to increase as a result, further weakening Poincare's bargaining position. German optimists even saw the 83 84 possibility of a revolution.in France, On the other hand, if resistance in the Ruhr broke down too early or the German government proved too eager to negotiate, the French would be the victors and the "catastrophe policy" of Ruhr industry might indeed have catastrophic con- 85 sequences. In February, aware that Chancellor Cuno was being pressured by Social Democrats to negotiate, Paul Reusch sought private assurances from Cuno that he would refuse to negotiate as long as the French remained in the Ruhr. Cuno reportedly reassured Reusch that he had no intention of abandoning the government's statedposition of no nego- 86 tiation before withdrawal. Cuno, at the same time, came under pressure from others close to the business community to take stronger measures against the Social Democrats. Adolf Kempkes, business manager of the German People's Party and a member of the Reichstag, wrote to State Sec­ retary Hamm, chief of the Reich Chancellory, on 9 February, citing headlines from the Social Democratic press in the Ruhr which demanded immediate negotiations with the French. Kempkes, repeating the obvious, pointed out that this position was in contrast with that of the government, and he asked that action be taken against the Social Democratic 87 press, Kempkes reflected the real fears of business in­ terests in a letter to Paul Reusch, also dated 9 February, 84 requesting money to prepare for the Reichstag elections still a year away. He pointed out to Reusch that the Social Democrats were finding increased sympathy for their ideas as a result of the occupation. Kempkes went on to warn Reusch that the middle class had to close its ranks if the Socialists were to be prevented from winning a major­ ity in the 1924 elections. "Recent experience has shown that should this occur they /""the Social Democrats/ would carry through their ideas which would have a disastrous 88 effect upon private industry." The first week of February brought with it new dangers for the Ruhr industry. On 31 January the French government announced that effective 1 February all coal shipments be­ tween occupied and unoccupied Germany was subject to 89 French control. The industrialists had, in part, based their resistance plans on the shipment of large amounts of coal, coke and steel products eastward into unoccupied Germany, Only in this way could the needed financial liquidity be maintained to pay and feed workers. The tariff barrier denied Ruhr industry an outlet for its goods and shortened its cash flow, a situation which couldn't be borne for an extended period. Ruhr industrialists rec­ ognized that the French could, in the end, break them financially and perhaps lead to French control of German 90 firms in the Ruhr. 85 To counter, this new threat the Ruhr industry sought to tap new financial sources through American and British contacts. This failing,Ruhr industrialists showed an in-r tense interest in merging with American and British firms, Ruhr businessman assumed that American and British coal and steel producers had a common interest in building a British-German or American-German combine to prevent the French drive for industrial hegemony in Europe, H. Schaeffer, a Krupp director, wrote to his London confidant Baron Bruno von Schroeder on 24 Februaryconcerning the Ruhr situation, "As you probably heard the idea has surfaced in England for an English partnership in German industry, primarily to keep German industry liquid. On the other hand, accord­ ing to newspaper accounts, the French are attempting to reach an agreement with the English for a common exploit tation of Ruhr industry. The question can be posed whether or not it would be better for the English to reach a direct agreement with German industry so that a common front against the French aspirations can be built," Schroeder replied on 2 March, outlining the difficulties, under the circumstances, of Schaeffer's proposals. "Everyone would say it was merely done under present pressures. The question also arises whether or not a strong enough common 91 stand could be taken as is necessary. 86 Some Ruhr firms also tried to satisfy their need for liquidity across the Atlantic, Karl Haniel, chairman of the board of Gutehoffnungshuette, and Franz Bergers, member of the board of directors of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks AG, which since 1920 belonged to the Rhine-Elbe Union, a linchpin in the Stinnes empire, traveled to New York in March to seek aid from American industrialists. The trip led to further discussions in Rome at the end of March be­ tween President Gary of United States Steel and Hugo 92 Stinnes. Through Otto Wiedfeldt, the German Ambassador to the United States and a former Krupp director, the Krupp firm sought to make contact with American banks, Wiedfeldt advised Gustav Krupp, the head of the firm, that a small American bank could offer only little financial support while a large bank would demand too much control. He did, however, point out to Krupp that Henry Ford had expressed interest in a partnership, but Wiedfeldt noted also that a partnership with an American steel company would offer more benefits. In the end unfruitful, these negotiations were important as a counter-balance to growing French 93 pressures to secure participation in Ruhr industry. With the support of heavy industry in the Ruhr the German government had pledged itself to the heroic gesture of "no negotiation without withdrawal," The government, however, seemed incapable of adjusting to the reaiitites 87 which, demanded that passive resistance without negotiations be maintained only as long as it was a serviceable weapon, a point industry grasped clearly. The early optimism of some Ruhr industrialists soon gave way to growing concern among other industrialists over the growing radicalization of the Ruhr workers who were opposed to the national united front with their employers and were energetically pushing for socialization as the only solution to Germany's prob­ lems. The chairman of the Reichausschuss fuer Handel, In­ dustrie und Gewerbe feared that what was mere talk in Feb­ ruary would grow into revolution if the deadlock lasted on into the summer. He wrote to State Secretary Hamm that "the longer the term of occupation, the stronger the ten­ dency will be to smash the united front. The result will most certainly be domestic disorder and a weakening of our bargaining position. It is obvious that the French policy of force has raised again the basic questions of the ex­ istence of private enterprise in Germany. It is, however, certain that German forces against capitalist economic forms will not stop at Germany's borders. .,. For this reason in­ ternational capital must come together to eliminate the 94 present danger in Germany," Financial pressures and anxiety over the domestic situation led Ruhr industry to make overtures for nego­ tiations in early spring 1923, On 5 March Gustav Krupp 88 addressed a. worker's meeting in Essen and announced German industry's willingness to enter negotiations for the ex­ change of German coal for French iron ore. In addition, he pledged industry's readiness to rebuild the devastated regions of France. Hugo Stinnes, while maintaining a posture of intransigence in his newspapers, entered into direct negotiations with Professor Haguenin, the official French representative on the Reparations Commission in Berlin. Stinnes had worked out a reparations plan which he wanted Haguenin to lay before Poincare. Its most grand­ iose point was for Franco-German cooperation in the ex­ ploitation of France's colonies, The schemes collapsed with the collapse of the mark in April. The French tasted victory. Besides, Haguenin could not assure Poincare that Stinnes was acting on behalf of the German government.

Poincare said that he would negotiate only with official 95 representatives of the German government. The willingness of German industry to negotiate with the French in early spring 1923 reflected the intensification of economic and political pressure both at home and abroad. The industrialists, however, continued to pursue their attempts to by-pass their own government and arrange a private enterprise/state agreement between themselves and the French, a goal they had been pursuing since the Spa Conference in 1920. The reasoning was clear—a settlement 89 privately negotiated would best protect their own in­ terests internationally and in turn give them enormous political leverage at home, The opening weeks and months of the Ruhr occupation showed that although Germans of widely contrasting political opinion and social status perceived the occupation as a common threac, they remained divided as to the means and ends to counter the threat. The actions of the workers and their leaders in Essen and the Ruhr indicates that these divisions developed roughly along class and ideo­ logical lines, as did those of Ruhr industrialists and their allies among the Catholic Center and bourgeois parties. The reason for these internal divisions was due to the fact that there was more at stake than simply re­ solving the differences with France which arose out of the Treaty of Versailles. Ultimately France had to be pacified by meeting her demands, if only partially. To do this, however, meant domestic reform either along the lines which the working class parties wanted^—drastic tax reform and special levies on industry and agriculture (Erfassung der Sachwerte)—or along conservative lines— cancellation of the economic gains labor had made since 1918. Thus, there raged two simultaneous battles in Ger­ many in 1923, one in the Ruhr against the French and one throughout Germany among Germans. Whichever group was 90 successful in having its plan accepted to resolve the Ruhr conflict would, as a result, set a new course for Germany. NOTES

1 Michaelis and Schraepler, eds., Ursachen und Folgen, V, no. 1004a, "Aufzeichnung des britischen Botschafters Lord D'Abernon zur Ruhrbesetzung, 21 Janaury 1923," pp.43- 44. 2 See "Programm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutsch­ lands (Mehrheits-Sozialdemokratie)," Goerlitz 1921, in: Wolfgang Abendroth, Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Sozial- demokratie. (Frankfurt Am Main, 1964), pp. 102-06. Also, Rudolf Hilferding, "Probleme der Zeit," in: Die Gesselschaft, I (1924), p. 13. 3 Hermann Kromberg, Politischen Stroemungen und Wahlen im Stadt-und Landkreis Essen von der November-Revolution 1918 bis zur Reichstagswahl vom Dezember 1924, Diss. Bonn 1968, pp. 182-84. 4 Bundesarchiv/Koblenz, R43 1/206, pp. 171-73. Here­ after cited as BA/K. I cite pages only where archivists have paginated folders, otherwise only the folder is cited. Also, Lothar Erdmann, Die Gewerkschaften im Ruhr- kampf, (Berlin, 1924), p. 90. 5 Essener Volks-Zeitung, 28 January 1923, no. 24. The Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek/Stadtbibliothek Essen has no holdings for the Social Democratic Essener Arbeiter- Zeitung from January through March 1923. The Essener Volks- Zeitung, in the course of its polemics with the EAZ, always excerpted large passages from the EAZ editorials at issue. I have quoted from these excerpts, Essener Volks-Zeitung, 3 January, 1923, no. 3. 7 Ibid., 16 January 1923, no. 13, 8 Ibid., 13 February 1923, no. 37. 9 Ibid., 16 January 1923, no. 13. 10 Ibid., 10 February 1923, no. 35.

91 92 11 Friedrich Ra,tter von Lama, Papst und Kurie in ihren Politik nach dem Weltkyieg; Darge'stellf unter besonderer Beruecksichtung' des Verhaeltnisses zwischen' dem Vatikan und Deutschland, (Illertissen, /"Bavaria/-, 1925), pp, 607- IOT 12 Ibid,, p, 620, 13 This view of course had been prominent in Germany since the Paris Peace negotiations in 1919, It was given new impetus in the Fall of 1922 with the publication of the Daria Report (see above, Chapter I, pp. 13-14). In mid-January 1923 Paul Reusch, General Director of the Gute­ hof fnungshuette in Oberhausen, in an interview with the American weekly The Nation, updated the view for the sake of the American public, Reusch said that the French had attempted to secure the cooperation of German industry immediately upon occupation of the Ruhr. The French plan, according to Reusch, would have given France a European monopoly on the production of steel as well as other pro­ ducts. "We refused; had we accepted, we would now all be employees of the Comite7 des Forges as well as traitors." German copy of the interview in Gutehoffnungshuette, Historisches Archiv, 300193008/21 (hereafter cited as GHH). Dr. Kurt Sorge, chairman of the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie, (Rdl), presented a similar view at a meeting of the Rdl "on 9 March 1923, published in Geschaeftliche Mit- teilungen fuer die Mitglieder des Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Industrie, 1923, no. 7, Berlin, 22, March 1923, in: GHH 30019320/3a. (This communique, distributed ex­ clusively to members of the Rdl, is an important source for business thinking and activity during the Weimar period). See also, Bericht der Handelskammer fuer die Kreise Essen, Muelheim-Ruhr und Oberhausen, 1923. The view expressed by Reusch and other business leaders was also shared by Social Democrats. Most remarkable perhaps is the almost identical analysis of events, from an eco­ nomic viewpoint, of the Catholic Center and Communist Party. See Ursachen und Folgen, V, no. 1000, "Die Reichs- tagsdebatten vom 13. Januar 1923, e, Aus einer Rede des Abg. Froelich (KPD)," and Essener Volks-Zeitung, 28 January 1923, no. 24. 14 Essener Volks-Zeitung, 13 February 1923, no. 37. 15 Morsey, pp. 607-21; Sigmund Neumann, Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik, (rept. Stuttgart, 1965), p. 43. 93 16 Helga Grebing, Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiter- bewegung, CMuenchen, 1971) , p," 171; Morsey, p, 610, 17 Herbert Kuehr, Parteien und Wahlen im Stadt-und Landkreis Essen in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik, (Duessel­ dorf, 1973), pp. 59-61; Heinrich Bruening, Memoiren 1918- 1934, I, (Muenchen, 1972), pp. 72-80; Grebing, p, 191; Morsey, pp. 371, 610, Morsey (p. 370) points out that the project was also co-sponsored by Heinrich Brauns, the priest who served as Reich Labor Minister form 1920-1928. Morsey makes less of Bruening's contribution to the plan than does Bruening himself in his memoirs. 18 Grebing, p. 191; Morsey, p. 372. 19 Grebing, p. 194. See also, Werner Methfessel, "Christlich-Soziale Reichspartei (CSRP), in: Die buerger- lichen Parteien und anderer buergerlicher Interessen- organisationen vom Vormaerz bis zum Jahre 1945, (East Berlin, 1970), I, pp. 256-57. Dieter Fricke and Herbert Gottwald, "Katholische Arbeitervereine," ibid., II, p, 269, 20 Essener Volks-Zeitung, 14 January 1923, no. 12. 21 Morsey, pp. 502-03. 22 Essener Volks-Zeitung, 7 January 1923, no, 6. 23 Production in mines and factories was to cease if French or Belgian troops entered a work place. Once they left work was to resume. It was intended, in this way, to frustrate French and Belgian hopes of extracting reparations coal while at the same time keeping the majority of workers off the streets. The origins of passive resistance were deliberately obscured. Chancellor Cuno, as did at first his successor, Gustav Stresemann, denied government re­ sponsibility for passive resistance and cultivated the contention that the resistance had arisen spontaneously from the German population. This position served diplomatic as well as propaganda purposes. If the German government had not instigated passive resistance it could claim it was impotent to stop it. While it was true that passive resistance reflected the mood of the German population, it was equally true that the policy would have been in­ conceivable without he organizational and financial help of the central government. When, in September 1923, Chan­ cellor Stresemann saw the policy as an obstacle to a settlement he stopped financial aid to Ruhr workers and passive resistance ended despite some opposition from the workers in the Ruhr. See below, Chapter IV, pp. 179-80. 94 4 Hans Spethmann, ZwoeIf Jahre Ruhrbergbau, CBerlin, 1 1928), IV, p. 86, -v. •! ' >," * ' " 'i '^:—; " 25 Ibid., p. 108. 26 Ursachen und Folgen, V, no, 1013, "Abg, Dr, Hess (Z) ueber die Stellung der Katholischen Kirche im Rheinland zum Ruhreinmarsch Frankreichs," 25. Januar 1923, pp.54-56, 27 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, I, Wahlperiodes 1920, Vol. 358, pp. 9526-31. 28 Note should be taken to distinguish the concept of a 'united national front' from that of a 'united proletarian front.' The former, adopted by conservatives, attempted to define a national interest in defending the Ruhr to which all Germans should rally • The latter was a class concept, formulated by the Communists, to define workers' opposition to both the French occupation of the Ruhr as well as to the German bourgeoisie. 29 Erdmann, p. 87. 30 Verhand1ungen des Reichstags, Ibid., p. 9530, 31 Ibid., pp. 9531-35, See also, Helga Grebing, Zen- trum und katholische Arbeiterschaft. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Zentrums in der Weimarer Republik, Diss. West Berlin 1953, p. 119. 32 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Ibid. 33 Ibid., pp. 9536-39. 34 Bruening, I, p. 94. 35 Essener Volks-Zeitung, 14 January, no. 12. 36 Bruening, I, pp. 93-94. 37 Essener Volks-Zeitung, 3 February 1923, no. 29. Ibid., 17 January 1923, no. 14. 39 Ibid., 4 February 1923, no, 30. 40 Spethmann, pp. 117-32. Ibid. 95 42 Ibid, 43 Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (East Berlin, 1966), VII,2, no. 303, See also, Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiter­ bewegung (East Berlin, 1966), 3, pp, 375-76, Dokumente und Materialien, ibid,. no, 300; "Auf- ruf der Konferenz europaeischer Kommunistischer Parteien am 6. und 7. Januar 1923 in Essen zum Kampf gegen die drohende Ruhrbesetzung." 45 Internationale Pressekorrespondenz, no. 223, 23 November 1922, p. 1599, "Bericht des Exekutivkomitees und Diskussion. 3. Plenarsitzung, 10. November 1922, vor- mittags. (Berichterstatter: Zinoviev)." (Hereafter cited as Inprekorr). 4 6 A. Losowsky, "Die Besetzung des Ruhrbeckens und das internationale Proletariat," Inprekorr, no, 47, 14 March 1923, pp, 359 f. 47 Ruhr Echo, no. 44, 21 February 1923. 48 Dokumente und Materialien, ibid., no. 303. 49 Inprekorr, no. 223, 23 November 1922, pp, 1063-64. 50 Ibid., no. 20, 30 January 1923, pp. 151-53, "Manifest des Parteitages der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands an das Internationale Proletariat." Ibid. Ossip K. Flechtheim, Die KPD in der Weimarer Re­ publik (Frankfurt Am Main, 1969), p. 175. 53 Inprekorr, no. 223, 23 November 1922, p, 1600. 54 Ibid., p. 1601; Flechtheim, p. 174. 55 Ruhr Echo, 24 March 1923, no. 71, 26 March, no. 72.

56 IbidTU-A . 57 Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism; A Study in the Origins of the State Party (Cambridge, Mass., 1948) , p. 255; Jahrbuch fuer Wirtschaft, Politik und Arbeiter­ bewegung, 1923-1924 (Hamburg, n,d.), p, 589, 96 5 Kuehr, pp, 101-02, 59 Erhard Lucas, Maerzrevolution 1920; Per bewaffnete Arbeiteraufstand im Ruhrgebiet in seiner inneren Struktur und seinem Verhaeltnis zu den Klassenkaempfen in den ver- schiedenen Regionen des Reiches (Frankfurt Am Main, 1973), pp, 103-21. Exact figures are not available. However, the successes of the Communists discussed below gives sub­ stance to the statement, 60 Kuehr, p. 102. See also, Arthur Rosenberg, Dem- okratie und Klassenkampf: Ausgewaehlte Studien, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ed. (Frankfurt Am Main, 1974), pp. 262-89. 61 Kuehr, p, 105. ° Gerald D. Feldman, "German Business between War and Revolution: The Origins of the Stinnes-Legien Agree­ ment," in: Gerhard A. Ritter, ed. Entstehung und Wandel der modernen Gesellschaft: Festschrift fuer Hans Rosen­ berg zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin, 1974), passim, 63 Kuehr, pp. 106-07. Helga Timm, Die Deutsche Sozialpolitik und der Bruch der Grossen Koalition im Maerz 19 30 (Duesseldorf, 1952), p. 16, 64 Factory councils became part of the legal struct­ ure of the German Republic according to the Weimar con­ stitution (Article 165). Until 1923 the councils re­ mained moribund and ineffective, the result of disinterest on the part of labor union leaders who saw the councils as a threat to their own power. More radical working- class leaders, such as Heinrich Bradler, saw factory councils as full of possibilities for changing the social structure of Germany. The KPD, lacking strength in the labor unions, focused its attention upon factory councils. The Ruhr occupation, the inflation and the struggle to preserve the eight-hour day radicalized workers anew in 1923. Increasingly workers came to view the coun­ cils as a means to pressure their unions and to effect a change in the social structure through direct action. Charles Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe; Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the decade after World War I (Princeton, 1975), pp. 138-53; Timm, p. 34. See also, Heinrich Brandler, "Durch die Raete zur Einheit der Arbeiterklasse und zum Kommunismus," Komm. Zeitfragen, No. I, Chemnitz, n.d. (1919?). Cited in: K.H. Tjaden, Struktur und Funktion der "KPD-Opposition" (KPO): Eine organisations- soziologische Untersuchung zur "Rechts"-Opposition im 97 deutschen Kommunismus zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik, Mar- burger Abhandlungen zur Politiscken Wissenschaft, 4 (Meisenheim Am Glan, 1964), p, 5f, 65 Ruhr Echo,-22 February 1923, no, 45. Westfaelische Arbeiter-Zeitung, 1 March 1923, no, 51, 67 Hauptstaatsarchiv Duesseldorf/ Kalkum, Regierung Duesseldorf 16839, Severing to Grutzner, 21 April 1923. (Hereafter cited as HAD/K, Reg, Duess,), 68 Grebing, Geschichte, p. 167. Arthur Rosenberg, A History of the Weimar Republic, Ian F, D, Morrow and L. Marie Sieveking, trans., (London, 1936), p. 195. 69 GHH 300193008/7, Report to Paul Reusch, Essen 1/26/1923. See above, Chapter I, pp. 9-10. 71 Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam, I, DNVP, No, 4, p. 91; DNVP, No. 7, p. 29, 0, Hergt to Schweinichen, 9/11/ 1921. Cited by Wolfgang Ruge, "Deutschnationale Volks- partei," in: Die buergerlichen Parteien und anderer buerger- licher Interessenorganisationen vom Vormaerz bis zum Jahre 1945, (East Berlin, 1970), I, p. 734, 72 BA/K, R43 1/209, Rheinarmee Stab: Instruktion betr. Verhalten der Truppen im Falle der Ruhrbesetzung, 1/10/1923. (Translated copy). 73 BA/K, R43 1/205, Report, Verein Deutschen Eisen-u. Stahl-Industrieller, 1/20/1923. 74 BA/K, R43 1/206, Reusch to Cuno, 2/1/1923

75 GHH 300193008/7, Reports: Janaury-February, Essen, 2/6/1923.

76 BA/K, R43 1/205, ibid.; GHH 300193008/7, Blank to Reusch, 1/22/1923; GHH 300l9320/2b, Blank to Reusch, 1/22/ 1923. 77 GHH 300193008/7, Blank to Reusch, 1/22/1923; Wolt- mann to Reusch, 1/18/1923; Woltmann meeting with factory directors, 1/19/1923; GHH 3063/3, Rundschreiben, Arbeitgeber- vereinigung, No. 52/53, 3/28/1923. 98 78 GHH 3063/3, Handelskammer Bochum, Rhein-Ruhr Hilfe, 2/15/1923; GHH 300193008/7, Blank to Reusch, 1/22/1923"; Karl-Heinz Harbeck, ed,, Das Kabinett Cuno, p, 237, 79 GHH 300193008/7, Blank to Reusch, 1/22/1923. 80 GHH 300193008/7, Report to Reusch, Essen 1/26/1923. 81 BA/K, R43 1/2 08, Report, Verein Deutschen Eisen-u, Stahl-Industrieller, 2/13/1923. 82 GHH 300193008/7, Blank to Reusch, 1/22/1923. 83 GHH 300193008/7, Report to Reusch, Essen, 1/26/1923. 84 BA/K, R43 1/206, Der Reichskommissar fuer die Kohlen- verteilung, Kohlenausfuhrstelle 2/1/1923. 85 GiiH 300193000/6, Reusch to Haniel, 2/16/1923. 86 Ibid. 87 BA/K, R43 1/207, Kempkes to Hamm, 2/9/1923, 88 GHH 30019393/0, Kempkes to Reusch, 2/9/1923. 8 9 Ursachen und Folgen, V, no. 1016, "Note der Fran- zoesischen Regierung vom 31. Januar 1923 betr. die Kohlen- lieferungen aus dem besetzten Gebiet,"p, 60, 90 GHH 300193000/6, Reusch to Haniel, 2/25/1923, Also, Werner Link, "Die Ruhrbesetzung und die wirtschafts- politischen Interessen der USA," in: Viertelj ahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte, IV, 1969, pp. 372-82. 91 Krupp Archiv/Werks Archiv, IV, 2054, Schaeffer to Schroeder, 2/22/1923; Schroeder to Schaeffer, 3/2/1923. Also Krupp Archiv/Werks Archiv, IV 1387 and Krupp Archiv/ Familien Archiv Huegel, IV, E 13, for correspondence between Leslie Urquart, Boris Said and members of the Krupp direct­ orate dealing with questions of English industrial par­ ticipation in the Krupp firm. 92 Ernst Schroeder, "Otto Wiedfeldt als Politiker und Botschafter der Weimarer Republik," in: Beitraege zur Ge- shcichte von Stadt und Stift Essen, Vol, 86, (n.d.), p. 209. Link, loc. cit. 99 BA/K, R43 I/2Q6, Chairman, Reichsauschuss fuer Handel, Industrie und Gewerbe to State Secretary Hamm, 2/1/1923, 95 Antonma Vallentin-Luchaire, Stresemann, trans. Eric Sutton, (New York, 1931), pp, 96-99, CHAPTER THREE PASSIVE RESISTANCE AT ITS HEIGHT

Ruhr coal and coke, as shown in Chapter One, was in­ dispensable for French heavy industry and the health of the French economy in general. The French occupied the Ruhr with the intent of increasing the flow of coal and coke to France as specified in the reparations provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Passive resistance, however, frustrated French plans. It was answered with economic sanctions and physical coercion of the Ruhr population. By March the occupation had reached the point of an all- out economic war. The opening barrage in the economic offensive came on 31 January. On that day the French forbade, effective 1 February, the shipment of coal to unoccupied Germany. This order was followed by a second on 11 February which established a customs barrier around the Ruhr. It levied special import and export duties on German goods, forbade the export of iron and steel pro­ ducts as well as other manufactured goods. Special li­ cense arrangements were required, for which a stiff price in foreign currency was charged, of those Ruhr goods not specifically barred from export. In addition, Ruhr mine owners were ordered to pay the occupation authorities

100 101 1 the German federal coal tax on each ton of coal mined. These measures merely served to dislocate the German economy; they did not, however, improve France *s chances of securing the quantities of coal needed by her indus­ tries. The problem to which the French found no solution was transportation, not production. Coal continued to be mined in the Ruhr, Striking German railroad workers, under strict orders from Berlin, refused to transport it westward. Coal, in mountainous quantities, began to pile up at pitheads and in the yards of industrial users in the Ruhr. Space soon began to run short and German railroad officials in Essen ordered the coal loaded on to railroad cars. This, too, provided only a short-term solution, Railroad officials reported in March that the entire rail­ road net in Essen was quickly becoming a parking lot for 2 loaded coal cars. Occupation authorities reacted to the passive resistance of German railroad workers by expelling large numbers of them from the Ruhr along with their fam­ ilies. Of the 75,714 people expelled from the Ruhr in 1923 9,000 were railroad employees accompanied by 23,000 3 family dependents. Coercion, however, failed to move coal, French authorities had been forewarned. Prior to the occupation the French labor newspaper, Le Peuple, had dismissed 102 as friyolous the belief that occupation authorities could 4 operate Ruhr railroads without the aid of German workers< Frustrated, the French established the Regie djss chemins de fer des terrltoires occupes, known simply as the Regie. Its purpose was to oversee the operation of Ruhr rail­ roads and recruit workers. Wilhelm Groener, German minister of transportation, forbade workers to cooperate 5 with this agency also. In desperation the French brought 10,000 French and 1,000 Belgian railroad workers into the Ruhr. Numbers, however, failed to compensate for famil­ iarity with the complexities of running and maintaining 2,500 km of rail lines in the Ruhr. As of April 15, three months or seventy-five workdays from the beginning of the occupation, French authorities had gotten 375,000 tons of coal, an average of 5,000 tons a day. This compared un­ favorably to the last three months of 1922 when Luxembourg and Belgium together had received 52,000 tons per work day. German officials estiiaated that the Re*gie in 1923 operated at 50 per cent capacity compared to 1922 German operating 6 figures. This, however, was a 1923 average. The largest gains made by the Regie in operating capacity occurred only after the ending of passive resistance in September 1923 when German railroad workers were permitted to work for the R^gie. Measured in these terms, passive resistance proved itself to be an effective weapon against the 103 occupation, German success, however, was purchased at an enormous cost to the physical well-being of the Ruhr population. The experience of Essen may serve as an example, As the metropole of the Ruhr, its transportation hub, and a major producer of coal and coke, Essen became the administrative center for the occupation. The city became the headquarters for the French army, the Mission de contr6le des mines usines, the Coal Commission, the Re*gie, the Export-Import Commission and the Rhine-Herne Canal Commission. This placed a heavy burden upon public services and the city's inhabitants. The presence of this number of administrative agencies, each demanding office and housing space for per­ sonnel, in addition to the presence of thousands of troops, created an insolvable housing shortage, a critical problem in the city before the occupation. Private homes and public schools were seized by French forces to house bureau­ crats, officers and men. Facilities important to public health and morale such as public baths, recreational facil­ ities, and hospital beds were seized for military use. The city had to place at the disposal of occupation authorities one-third of its hospital capacity. Following the suspen­ sion of the Essen police force uncontrolled prostitution increased in the city, resulting in an epidemic increase of veneral disease. The transportation snarl resulting 104 from striking railroad workers immediately created short­ ages in the city's food supply. Perishables such as milk disappeared almost entirely from the diets of the city's inhabitants, creating special problems for families with infants as well as for those who for health reasons needed a daily supply of milk. Citizens also found their civil liberties severely abridged. Suspension of news­ papers and liability to search and seizure became common practice. Censorship of theater and public entertainment was also severe. Performances of Schiller's Wilhelm Tell, 7 because of its patriotic theme, were forbidden. Often, city officials had to choose between obeying orders from Berlin or acting in the best interest of the city's population. When ordered to prevent delivery of coal to the French army for cooking and heating purposes city administrators refused, arguing convincingly that the occupiers would turn to burning school desks or seizing coal from German homes. The order was dropped. Again, when ordered by the Reich's transport ministry to cut off electricty, water, and gas to the major railroad terminals occupied by the French in Essen, city admin­ istrators said that they did not take orders from the transport ministry. They pointed out that large numbers of people in those sections of the city where the stations 8 were located would also lose water, gas and electricty. 105 In other matters more important to passive resistance city officials carried out orders from Berlin with esprit, of ten enduring imprisonment. Despite considerable harder- ship there appeared no significant cooperation between German citizens and the occupying force. City officials, in answer to inquiries, reported to Berlin that stories of unemployed workers mining coal for the French were based on unfounded rumors. Small numbers of unemployed, however, had gone to work for the French-administered railroad and were loading coal for shipment to France 9 and Belgium. Incidents resulting in injury and death to the Ruhr population occurred frequently. Otto Gessler, Reichs- wehr minister, reports that 92 people lost their lives during the occupation either through violence or accident 10 attributable to occupying forces. Thirteen of those deaths were the result of an incident at the Krupp factory in Essen. At seven o'clock on the morning of 31 March, Holy Saturday, a small French military detail of eleven men under the command of a young officer, a Lt. Durieux, entered the Krupp factory complex in Essen. Its task was to await the arrival of a commission being sent to requisition motor vehicles, The commission arrived shortly after nine o'clock, but left abruptly when the factory's sirens began to wail, a common practice 106 adopted as a signal for workers to lay down tools, According to his later testimony, Durieux, having received no countermanding orders, considered himself still under his original orders and remained at the Krupp garage. Crowds of workers assembled in front of the garage. Patriotic songs were sung and objects thrown at the garage entrance. A member of the crowd waved a pistol. Pamphlets were thrown from a window in the Krupp administration building which read "No coal for the French/Belgian im­ perialists. :' Intermittent negotiations between members of the Krupp factory council and Durieux took place. He was guaranteed safe passage if he marched out of the factory compound. Durieux refused. At approximately eleven o'clock windows in the garage were broken and steam from a nearby engine began to filter into the garage. Durieux, according to his later testimony, un­ nerved by the endless wailing of the sirens and a change in the mood of the crowd, ordered his men to shoot out the lights at the exit to the garage, Forty-five people were hit by machine gun fire. Thirteen died, fifteen 11 were seriously injured, French authorities arrested several directors of the Krupp firm along with a member of the factory council immediately following the incident. French intentions were not clear. On 2 April the acting mayor of Essen 107 addressed a sharply worded note to General Jacquementf the commanding officer of the 77th Infantry Division occupying Essen. In it he demanded that those responsi^ ble for the Krupp incident be brought to justice, Jacqe-r mont answered on 4 April, "In response to your letter of 2 April demanding that those responsible for Holy Saturday be punished; The responsibility falls upon the directors of the Krupp works. The justice which you call for is 12 thus in the process of being carried out," Gustav Krupp was later arrested and placed on trial along with three of his directors and a member of the factory council. Four other directors were tried in absentia. All were accused of "attempted murder against members of the occu­ pying force by inciting resistance among workers on the morning of 31 March and disturbing public order by setting sirens going, a signal for the assembly of workers which predetermined the possibility of violence." A military court found the defendants guilty. Sentences ranged from fifteen years imprisonment for Gustav Krupp to six months imprisonment for the member of the factory council. Evaluation of the incident among working class groups differed according to ideological perspective. Communists attributed the incident to the fact that ultra-rnationalists had been active at the Krupp factory for weeks prior to the Holy Saturday incident. In an edition of the Ruhr Echo 108 rushed to press shortly after the French, force entered the Krupp factory, but before the shooting incident oc­ curred, a Communist newspaperman, fresh from the scene, reported that a large number of nationalist provocateurs had mixed with the workers assembled before the Krupp garage. A number of these nationalists were students identified easily by their brightly colored fraternity caps. The nationalists, according to the reporter, urged that the workers take action against the French soldiers but were shouted down by workers. Thus for the Communists the incident was the result, in part, of nationalist and fascist provocation. The day following the massacre the Ruhr Echo headlines read, "Krupp hounds workers into Poin­ care 's bullets." In the story which followed Poincare7 and the Comite des Forges were made equally liable with 14 Krupp for the deaths of the thirteen workers. The Commu­ nist interpretation of the incident was in keeping with the party' s pledge to fight both Poincare' and the German bourgeoisie during the occupation. Communists therefore found themselves in agreement with the indictments brought by the French authorities against the Krupp directorate. Communist reports of provocateurs were not, however, mere propagandist fabrications. The Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung, the Socialist newspaper, confirmed these Communist reports. The EAZ, however, placed the major responsibility upon 109 the French and protested against the arrest of the Krupp 15 directorate. On the surface the Krupp incident served as a rallyr ing point for the population of Essen, the Ruhr and Germany, Public demonstrations, however, pointed to the fact that the forces which divided Germans were more powerful than the emotions evoked by a shared tragedy, A twenty-four hour strike was called throughout the Ruhr on the day of burial. The dead had been waked at the Krupp factory. Thousands of people lined the streets as the funeral pro­ cession moved from the factory to the cemetary. The cask­ ets of the thirteen workers were covered in the colors of the German Republic. The flags and bunting displayed in the streets, however, were a mixture of the black, red and gold colors of the German Republic, a political as well as a national symbol of devotion to democracy and the Republic, and the black, white and red colors of the old monarchy, adopted for sentimental and symbolic reasons 16 by right-wing opponents of the Republic, One of the slain workers had been a member of the German Communist Party. His comrades marched in the funeral procession carrying the red flag with hammer and sickle of inter­ national Communism. Catholics were outraged by that flag. The Catholic press in Essen made it an issue for several weeks following the burial, objecting to the fact 110 that their faithful had been laid to rest under ''the 17 same symbol under which Bishops in Russia are executed," The Socialist press in Essen, as ever caxitioning its readership against the use of violence, pointed out that right-wing nationalist forces had wanted such a catastrophe as had occurred at the Krupp factory. Nazi and other right- wing groups did increase their activities in Essen follow­ ing the occupation, but police officials reported that these groups found almost no support among the general 18 population. Surprisingly, these groups made little use of the Krupp incident for^propaganda purposes. This might be due to the fact that those who had been killed were members of either Socialist or Christian trade unions. One had been a Communist. In addition, these men had been killed while demonstrating passively. Also, Christian and Socialist labor groups had taken their burial as an oppor­ tunity to once again demand a negotiated settlement between France and Germany. Circumstances such as these were not the material out of which nationalist, anti-Republic myths were created. Instead, fascist and anti-democratic forces found a heroic symbol for their protest against both France and the German Republic in one Albert Louis Schlageter, executed at the Golzheimer Heide cemetary in Duesseldorf on 26 May 19 23 for sabotage. Ill In broad outline, Schlageter's life conformed to that of other young men who had come of age during the First World War, Of middle-class background, Schlageter interuppted his education and volunteered for the Army. He distinguished himself in the field, was decorated and commissioned an officer. Upon war's end he attempted briefly to adjust to civilian life and matriculated at the University of Freiburg, Restlessness precluded serious study. He left the university and joined a Freikorps fight­ ing in the Baltic, Later he joined the Heinz Sturm Bat­ talion, led by "Heinz" Oskar Hauenstein, then fighting in Upper Silesia against the Poles, In November 1922, accom­ panied by Hauenstein and members of the Rossbach Freikorps Schlageter went to Munich. Here he heard Hitler speak and as a result later joined the Nazi party, becoming number sixty-one on the membership list of the NSDAP

Ortsgruppe Berlin. Hauenstein joined as number sixty- 19 two. Konrad Heiden, in his biography of Hitler, called young men such as Schlageter and Hauenstein "armed in­ tellectuals." Lacking any social, intellectual, or emo­ tional roots in democratic ideas or movements and psych­ ologically wounded by their war experiences, these young men found themselves adrift in a radically altered post­ war Germany. Their officer days remained for many of them the high point of their lives. Their alienation found an 112 20 outlet in anti-Republic activities. The Ruhr occu-- pation presented new opportunities for many of these drifting, inactive and unemployed soldiers of fortune, Schlageter's terrorist activities in the Ruhr were part of a wider, if low-level conspiracy among minor government, police and railroad officials, junior Army officers, members of Ruhr business groups and Albrecht von Graefe, Reinhold Wulle, and Wilhelm Kenning, leaders of the German People's Freedom Party, the northern counter­ part of the Nazi party. Schlageter, along with other captured members of the group, testified at their trial to the existence of this cabal. Hauenstein provided a more detailed picture of the activities and connections of the group to other right-wing organizations in Germany in a statement given to a Prussian police official follow­ ing his arrest by German authorities, Hauenstein was arrested in Elberfeld, a town immedi­ ately across the line which divided the occupied Ruhr from unoccupied Germany. It was from Elberfeld that Hauenstein had directed the activities of Schlageter's group in Essen. He was in that city on the eve of Schlageter's execution ostensibly to attempt a rescue. His arrest had been ordered by Prussian Minister of the Interior Carl Severing, a Social Democrat and singleminded opponent of right-wing extremists. Because of the arrest of Hauenstein, the 113 would-be liberator of Schlageter, Severing became equally responsible, in the opinion of right-wing extremists, for Schlageter's death, The tone of Hauenstein's testimony to Weitzel, the Prussian police inspector who interviewed him, betrays a hurt pride and confusion over the reasons for his arrest. According to Hauenstein, the activities of his group in the Ruhr had been coordinated with police, business, military and government officials, Hauenstein provided Weitzel with a detailed account of sabotage in the Ruhr. According to Hauenstein, he, Schlageter, and others became involved in sabotage activities in the Ruhr at the request of a Krupp employee, an engineer named Haller, Haller had approached Hauenstein on 10 January in Berlin enquiring about the possibility of mounting active resist­ ance in the Ruhr against the impending French occupation. Hauenstein agreed to rendezvous with Haller in Essen. On 12 January Hauenstein met with Haller in the administration building of the Krupp firm. Haller outlined a plan to strengthen passive resistance in the Ruhr by creating an organization which would have a threefold task: first, to report the movements of the French army, second, to report the activities of the French intelligence service, third, to destroy railroad lines in an effort to sabotage French attempts to seize coal and coke, Hauenstein was to lead 114 the organization. The group was to receive four million marks a month, Hauenstein agreed to the proposal but set one condition. He would undertake the task only if assured of the cooperation of local authorities. On 13 January Hauenstein, accompanied by Haller, attended a meeting of the Essen Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber approved the plan, deciding that it was in the interest of the German Wirtschaft. The Chamber, however, reserved the right to approve or disapprove of each planned act of sabotage on the basis of whether or not it was purposeful. In his statement to Weitzel Hauenstein named no specific members of the Essen Chamber but said he was prepared to identify these people. Similar discussions took place with rail­ road officials in Elberfeld. As a result of these dis­ cussions four acts of sabotage were carried out against the French. To prove his accusations, Hauenstein pre­ sented Weitzel with communiques between himself and rail­ road officials. Hauenstein also told Weitzel that he could not have assembled his organization without the active help of the Essen police. A number of his companions were then being held in a Breslau jail. The Essen police requested their release and supplied the group with false identity papers. Through such methods Hauenstein assembled about thirty members of Organisation Heinz in the Ruhr, The thirty 115 were diyided into three groups each assigned to a different part of the Ruhr. Schlageter, with ten men, was assigned Essen as his area of operation. Hauenstein set up head­ quarters in Elberfeld. Among their other activities the group carried out assassinations, eight in all, of suspect­ ed German informers paid by the French, One, supposedly a Communist, was murdered by the Schlageter group one hundred yards from the Essen police headquarters only mo­ ments after his release by the Essen police. At the end of January, feeling that his activities did not have official sanction at a high enough level, Hauenstein went to Berlin and contacted a number of junior army officers. He was assured that the army had a lively interest in his activities but that for obvious reasons it could not participate directly. Hauenstein returned to Elberfeld, took up his activities once again and was joined for two months by an unofficial representative of the Reichswehr, a Lt. von der Osten. Through this con­ tact sophisticated timing devices were supplied by the Army for sabotage. Hauenstein said that he continued his contacts with Haller and also received orders from a Graf Beisel von Gymnich, allegedly a director of the Krupp firm. Although he denied having any domestic political goals of his own, he may also have been in touch with the leaders of the German People's Freedom Party, von Graefe and Wulle, 116 and with Gerhard Rossbach, leader of the Rossbach Freikorps 21 — group and confidant of von Graefe and Wullet Considering that sixty thousand striking German railr- road workers had reduced coal and coke shipments to France and Belgium to a fraction of 1922 deliveries, the activities of the Schlageter group appears rather pointless. How­ ever, an analysis of these activities must be multi-leveled and consider as well the involvment of well known right- wing political figures such as von Graefe and Wulle, both members of the Reichstag. Considered on perhaps the most superficial level, that of personal motivation, Schlageter's actions betray a susceptibility to adolescent conceptions of romantic heroism, adventure and machismo not uncommonly found among right-wing activitsts during the Weimar period, despite the fact that many of these people were war vet­ erans with actual experiences of death and dying locked into memory. In this sense Schlageter, although certainly aware of the immediate goals of the political movements in which he was involved, probably dwelled little upon such complexities. For men like him action was an end in itself. This was attested to by a former member of Organisation Heinz who later wrote a novel concerning his experiences. "Politics had no interest for us .... We were soldiers and said the hell with everything else ,,, We were young guys without any political ideas—why should we bother 117 ourselves with politics?,,, If Hauenstein was ready to give his support to this man' /Hitler/ that was good enough 22 ~ *~ for me," At certain times individual propensities for violence may serve a common good. This, however, was not the case during the Ruhr occupation, French military authorities had publicly announced that reprisals would be taken against the civilian population in the event of sabotage. Respon­ sible political and labor leaders from the Catholic Center, Social Democratic, and Communist parties, knowing that sab­ otage would increase the suffering of the civilian popula­ tion, escalate violence., and contribute nothing to the resolution of the issues which had brought about the occu­ pation, uncompromisingly condemned sabotage activities. Also, saboteurs found no sympathy among the general pop­ ulation. The sentiments of the rank and file were clearly expressed in a letter written to the Ruhr Echo by a rail­ road worker following an act of sabotage on the Werden- Kettwig rail line in Essen on 4 April—the very act, in­ cidentally, for which Schlageter was later executed. This worker wrote that this was the third sabotage attempt on the line in three days "which means that a group is system­ atically at work. If these bandits succeed in their crim­ inal activities, innocent people will be killed and occu­ pation authorities will resort to mass expulsions of 118 railroad workers. Railroad workers dissociate themselves from these teams of nationalist fanatics. They know that workers will have to bear the consequences of such actions 23 while the offenders disappear," The activities of the Schlageter group did in fact bring swift and severe re­ prisals from the French military. For sabotage on the Essen-Huegel railroad line the city of Essen was fined and the acting mayor sentenced to two years' imprisonment. As a result of the destruction of a small bridge in Kalkum on the Essen-Duesseldorf line the Mayor of Kaiserswerth, the town contiguous to Kalkum, was arrested, the town fined and the Kalkum woods, through which the rail line ran and in which the local population took great pride, were cut 24 down. The task took several months to complete. Right-wing extremists such as Hauenstein, von Graefe, Wulle, and Rossbach were certainly aware of the negative effect that terrorism in the Ruhr might have on a united national front against the French. While working class leaders rejected violence as a matter or principle, their fears stemmed, however, in part from the possibility that their own organizations, as well as the French, might be­ come the target of right-wing terror. The destruction of a Social Democratic relief agency building in Muenster, on the periphery of the Ruhr, was attributed to right-wing 25 terrorists operating in the Ruhr. Ruhr industrialists 119 took seriously warnings from labor leaders that national­ ist excesses would alienate the working class from a national united front and jeopardize passive resistance. Knowing that workers were the backbone of passive resistance, leading Ruhr industrialists used their influence to insure that ultra-nationalist groups, such as those in Bavaria, 26 were held in check. Right-wing support of sabotage in the Ruhr becomes understandable only if one views anti-French terrorist activities from the perspective of domestic political conflict in Germany. The extreme right in Germany was at a loss as to how to react and take advantage of the Ruhr occupation. Hit­ ler's reaction serves as an example. During the early weeks of January he was afraid that the occupation would unite Germans, regardless of ideologies, behind the Cuno government. Any such unity, accompanied by an ebbing of class conflict, would naturally strengthen the German Re­ public. (As it turned out, this was a needless fear.) Hitler, however, had no use for national unity if he was not in a position to exploit or control it. For Hitler and others the real enemy was not the French occupiers of the Ruhr but the Berlin government. Hitler expressed his views in his party's newspaper, the Voelkischer Beobachter, in January: "So long as a nation does not do away with the assassins within its own borders, no external successes 120 can be possible, While written and spoken protests are directed against the French, the real deadly enemy of the German people lurks within the wall of the nation..,, Down with the November criminals and with all the nonsense 27 of a united front." Almost identical sentiments were expressed, if more graphically, by von Graefe to Chancellor Cuno, In a letter to Cuno protesting the dissolution of the German People's Freedom Party in Prussia, von Graefe told Cuno that no resistance, passive, or perhaps event­ ually active, was possible without the active support of voelkisch and nationalist groups. Von Graefe went on to say that without the support of nationalist groups " a true national united front was only an armless torso while an apparent united front under the influence of traitors to the fatherland was saddled with many birth defects (Missgeburt)." Von Graefe foamed at Cuno that "any govern­ ment which wants to carry out a national foreign policy must rest upon a firm and dependable phalanx internally. This possibility you do not have so long as you include in the illusory united front international circles which contribute /to the/ decomposition /of the nation/ while the strongest national forces, in contrast to the traitors, are forced out. You must in the end know upon which stool you will /choose to/ sit, otherwise you will fall between 28 both." Cuno, in a later personal discussion with von Graefe, 121 abruptly broke off the conversation when von Graefe, with satisfaction, told Cuno that civil war in Germany was in- 29 evitable. In November 1923 von Graefe took the opportunity to bear public witness to his convictions. At the urgent summons of General Ludendorff he rushed to Munich, arriving just in time to march beside Hitler to the Odeonsplatz 30 where the group was dispersed by police. Hauenstein, after the November debacle, later contributed to rebuilding the 31 party as the editor of a Nazi newspaper in Hanover, Schlageter's terrorist activities in the Ruhr appear more intelligble when placed within this wider context of the aims of right-wing extremist groups in 1923. The aim of such people as von Graefe, Hauenstein, Rossback, Hitler, and lesser figures was to deliver a stab in the back to the German Republic while it was struggling to overcome the crisis of the French occupation. For ideological and practical reasons right-wing extremists could not join in a national united front with supporters of the Republic. Evidently, they accepted the risk that sabotage would alienate the working class and endanger both the united front and passive resistance and perhaps even thought it desirable, since Christian, Communist and Social Democratic workers were obstacles to their assumption of power any­ way. 122 Certainly Schlageter. did not consider himself ex­ pendable. He did, however, prove to be more valuable to anti-Republic forces dead than alive, Schlageter became one of the first heroes in the Nazi Pantheon, Hitler, in a eulogy, said that "The German people didn't deserve this sacrifice .... The German people of today is truly 32 not worthy of possessing a Schlageter," The working class press in Essen denounced Schlageter's execution at the hands of the French but argued that he should have been turned over to German authorities and tried in a German court since his acts were equally punishable under German 33 law. Shortly after Schlageter's execution a fund raising campaign was begun in the Ruhr for a Schlageter memorial. Ruhr industrialists were the force behind the campaign. Even here, however, they took the utmost caution so as not to anger Ruhr workers. Their intention was to elevate Schlageter to a national rather than a right-wing hero. The campaign got under way in early June, with General Ludendorff, a figure detested by workers because of his close identification with right-wing causes, desirous of playing a major role. Ruhr industrialists quickly stopped him. Paul Reusch wrote to Karl Haniel concerning the mem­ orial and Ludendorff's role, "I am of the opinion that Ludendorff should keep his fingers out of the thing 123 and the memorial should be left to circles in the occupied area. My friends in industry are in agreement, Herr 34 Voegler and friends have been informed," Workers, however, could not have been deceived by the attempt to turn Schlageter into a national hero; when his body crossed into unoccupied Germany for burial the casket had been covered with a black, white and red flag. Passive resistance, despite attempts by extremists to disrupt it, effectively blocked the French in the Ruhr and hurt the French economy. Heavy industrial production in Lorraine was crippled for want of coal and coke. Also, the cost of the occupation forced the Poincare7 government to increase its spending which contributed to inflation. The French inflation rate was also affected by a flight from the franc on international money markets which in- 35 creased the cost of imports. Passive resistance, how­ ever, proved even more economically disastrous to its users. Workers in the Ruhr became charges of the German government which paid them for non-production. The Cuno government, aware that defensive action in the Ruhr depended upon the control of inflation, attempted to stablilize the currency by massive purchases of marks on foreign currency exchanges. With Germany's major industrial region crippled this could only be a short-run emergency measure. Yet as a concession to the right-wing in Germany the Cuno government had adopted 124 the position of refusing to negotiate with. France as long as the Ruhr was occupied. This meant a long-term test of wills and was incompatible with the Cuno government's short-range attempt to control inflation by purchasing marks abroad. The support action failed on 18 April, Com­ pared to the dollar, the mark now began its catastrophic decline. This "death of money" (Heiden) led to increased domestic conflict in Germany and forced the Cuno govern­ ment to reassess it postion. As discussed in Chapter Two, there had been a diver­ gence of views between Ruhr workers and the Cuno govern­ ment concerning the ends of passive resistance. Workers viewed passive resistance only as a defensive means lead­ ing to negotiations with the French, while the Cuno govern­ ment saw it as a means to force the French to withdraw. Cuno disregarded repeated warnings from the Ruhr that worker support of passive resistance was conditional. Various sources reported that workers' support of passive resistance depended upon vigorous control of right-wing extremism, measures to insure that the economic burdens of the occupation were borne equally by all classes, and that significant efforts be made on the part of government to guarantee that, workers and their families did not starve. As long as workers received this support, in the majority, they would support the government. However, as one foreign 125 correspondent reported,, should workers, and their families begin to starve a catastrophe could be expected the re-r ,.36 suits of which were unforeseeable,

As a result of supply and inflationary problems the food situation in the Ruhr became critical in early spring.

The wages of miners had improved from 47,7 per cent of the pre-war wage in January 1923 to 86,2 per cent in March,

However, following the collapse of the mark in April, wages plummeted to 47.6 per cent of the pre-war level by

July. As the following table shows, each decline in the mark meant a decline in the purchasing power of workers and a slide in living standards.

Table 1. Cost of living index in Essen: 1914 = 1

Cost of living Dollar to mark

1914 Jan. 1 1 2.40 RM 1923 Jan. 2 1120 7,260 April 10 2954 21,152 July 3 37651 160,400 Aug. 1 586,045 11,027,500

Source. Herman Emil Kromberg, Politischen Stroemungen und Wahlen im Stadt-und Landkreis Essen von der Novem­ ber revolution bis zur Reichstagswahl vom Dezember 1924 (Bonn: Dissertation 1968), p. 20.

The French contibuted to inflationary and supply

problems, increasing the intenstiy of the crisis, French

authorities seized currency from banks and government 126 agencies. Even an hour's delay in the payment of wages and relief funds meant a loss in purchasing power. This action by the French had a twofold purpose. First, and most obvious, was the intent to prevent the support of passive resistance through subsistence payments to workers. Second, by seizing currency, occupation authorities intend­ ed to compensate themselves for the refusal of the German government to consider paying the cost of the occupation. Occupation authorities contributed indirectly to the food supply problem by their inability to run the railroads. In April the Regie seized the main railroad station in Essen which left the city dependent upon motor transport for its food supply. This proved inefficient and increased the 39 cost of food considerably. Although the causes were national and international, there were local attempts to control inflation in the Ruhr, all short-lived and ineffective. Price-control commissions were established in Essen, composed of representatives from the major labor unions under the direction of city admin­ istrators. Regulated prices at the retail level, however, quickly fell behind wholesale prices, making it impossible for store owners to restock. The effort to control in­ flation in this way was quickly abandoned, More forceful measures were used by control committees made up of the unemployed. These groups attempted to force store owners 127 to roll back prices under threat of violence, Small businessmen in Essen, -the object of scorn by workers and facing economic ruin, were the first to break rank with passive resistance. They decided in mid-March that they would no longer obey their government's order not to sell 40 goods to French troops. Inflation, even in circumstances of relative political stability, sets one group of society against another. In the Ruhr, one of the most tangible results of the inflation was that it increased conflict among different social classes. Money now became available in such quantities that anti-Republic groups were able to signif­ icantly increase their activities. Schlageter had test­ ified to this fact at his trial. The purpose of this in­ creased right-wing activity was to prevent the social­ ists from stabbing Germany in the back (um den sozial- 41 istischen Dolchstoss abzufangen). At the same time that inflation opened new sources of funds for right- wing extremists and reinforced the economic position of those classes which opposed the Republic, it weakened the position of those which supported the Republic. Funds collected by trade unions and the Social Democratic Party evaporated, As a result of the economic crisis and the apparent reluctance of the Cuno government to act de­ cisively to equalize the burden among all Germans, workers 128 in the: Ruhr came to view- the state as the servant of 42 those classes which were economically dominant. Workers, already suspicious of Cuno prior to the occupation, were also angered by the Chancellor's reluctance to take swift and unequivocal action against right-wing extremism. More and more, by early spring, Ruhr workers came to focus their attention on the question of who bore the greatest burden for the defense of the Ruhr. In this regard workers scrutinized the tax and anti- inflation policies of the German government. The wage policies of Ruhr industrialists also came under attack. Government officials, aware that passive resistance de­ pended upon control of inflation, saw the need for wage and price controls. This, however, proved impossible. Labor demanded wage rates which realistically reflected the spiraling cost of living while Ruhr industrialists, facing a liquidity crisis, were reluctant to sacrifice profit margins in the interest of price stability. This attitude was reflected in discussions between State Sec­ retary Hamm and the industrialist Ernst von Borsig in February. Von Borsig, chairman of the powerful Organi­ zation of German Employers and influential industrialist in his own right, suggested to Hamm that control of in­ flation and the interrelated question of maintaining passive resistance in the Ruhr depended upon whether or 129 not wage rates for March could be held at February levels, Von Borsig admitted that it would not be a simple task to convince labor unions of the merits of his proposition. He did not indicate what sacrifices industry was willing to 43 undertake. A fact which further embittered labor was that heavy industry was in a better position to exploit the inflation than any other group in Germany, Industry's advantages were derived from, among other things, the structure of the tax system. The inequities of the tax system became more and more glaring as the rate of inflation increased. Industry, commercial concerns, and agricultural interests paid taxes once a year on the basis of a year's profits. Workers paid taxes weekly on their earnings. In addition to the deferment of industrial profit taxes the tax system provided industrialists with an interest-free source of capital. Employer's paid their workers' withholding taxes to the government finance office on a quarterly basis. In the meantime the already collected revenues could be used by employers for the immediate purchase of raw materials 44 or currency speculation. Also, in the interest of price stability, the German government had suspended the coal tax due on each ton of coal produced at the outset of the occupation. 130 Ruhr industrialists shared still another advantage over the daily wage earner. From the beginning of the occupation they had negotiated huge credits from the Reichsbank. In a number of cases, such as the less di­ versified Krupp firm, these credits were indispensable. On the whole, however, in the eyes of one financial ex­ pert, easy credit was unjustifiable and contributed to the inflation rate. The intent of extending credit was to enable Ruhr industry to produce for stock rather than to permit the French from benefiting from export duties on sales outside the district. In this way workers would be kept busy and passive resistance strengthened. In actual fact credits were so freely disbursed that they were used for speculation in foreign exchange and other purposes alien to the intent of the Cuno government. As a result the German mark was attacked from two sides at once—lack of production in the Ruhr and increased govern­ ment spending as well as speculation on currency markets. The ammunition was supplied by the German government.

The continuation of these tax, wage and credit policies in the middle of a catastrophic inflation amounted to a full exploitation of the economically weak by the econom­ ically strong. Labor constantly reminded the government of this fact and pleaded for a change in policy, Under the circumstances of a national crisis these issues became 131 volatile and threatened to cripple passiye resistance. Andreas Hermes, Reichsminister of finance, candidly told State Secretary Hamm in April that once the population in the occupied zone got the feeling that the propertied classes were evading taxes, passive resistance in the 45 Ruhr would be in immediate danger. The economic concerns of workers filled the pages of the Social Democratic and Communist press. These news­ papers kept asking as to who sacrificed most to defend the Ruhr and the German Republic and who benefited from the economic crisis which resulted. In mid-February the Rheinische-Zeitung, a Social Democratic newspaper, ran front-page stories under the headlines "Stab in the Back," The newspaper published documents, reportedly purloined from the offices of the Organization of German Employers, which outlined a plan on the part of Ruhr industrialists to split the financially weakened Free labor movement in the Ruhr and influence the leaders of the Christian and Hirsch-Duncker unions to vote against wage increases. In other related stories under the leader, "Is this the United Front?" the newspaper outlined the advantages industry was deriving from the tax system and the use of government credit for currency speculation. Industrial spokesmen mounted a broad counter campaign in the bourgeois press, attacking the stories as false and the documents as 132 46 forgeries. True or not, what was significant was that large numbers of workers in the Ruhr found the stories plausible. Social Democratic newspapers outside the occu­ pied zone ran similar stories causing the Cuno government considerable concern with regard to the united front and defense actions in the Ruhr. Mid-April brought the first indications that the in­ tensity of suffering among the unemployed in Essen had reached the boiling point. The unemployed in the city made new demands upon city administrators for increased relief payments and an immediate emergency payment of 150,000 marks. They threatened to demolish the city hall if their demands were not met. The threat was not carried out, but city officials feared that the "danger is always present that a catastrophe could arise if the workers get weapons." Four days after this warning to Regierungs- praesident Gruetzner in Duesseldorf, the unemployed in Essen, their demands unmet,decided to try to get weapons by seizing a police station. They were met by a citizens' vigilante committee. Two of the unemployed were shot and killed by the committee. Due to the fact that the unem­ ployed in Essen were still a small percentage of the total population, these outbursts in April remained isolated and unorganized. They were, however, indicative of a changing mood and held the prospect of more serious disorders to come. 133 More important was the growing discontent among rail­ road workers and miners. The mood of railroad workers, perhaps most responsible for the success of passive resist­ ance in the Ruhr, had been slowly worsening because of the condition of wages and support payments in the Ruhr, Local leaders in the Ruhr had pointed out in reports to Berlin in March that the united front and defensive actions in the Ruhr were in danger because of the attitude of the railroad workers. "Battles are not won with hungry soldiers," 48 they warned. Coal miners also voiced their discontent with conditions and in a 13/14 April vote in Essen they demanded, unanimously and aggressively, that Cuno open the 49 way to negotiations. As far as labor was concerned passive resistance had both served its purpose and reached its height by April, There was nothing left to be gained by a continuation of the policy and something to be gained by entering nego- 50 tiations while passive resistance was still at its height. Until April the Chancellor, under pressure from industrial­ ists and the extreme right wing, chose to ignore the desires of labor. However, with the economic situation worsening and labor discontent in the Ruhr growing, Cuno gave in to the demands of labor and political moderates and addressed a reparations proposal to the French on 2 May. 134 For a number of reasons the German proposals were rejected by the French and Belgians on 6 May, followed shortly thereafter by the British and Italians. Rather than leaving the determination of the amount of reparations open to international arbitration, the German note offered a fixed amount of "30 billion gold marks." Even this sum, however, was offered with a number of qualifying clauses and conditions such as stabilization of the mark and German equality in international commerce. The tone of the note, a concession to the right in Germany, also aroused the anger of the French, At its opening and close the note emphasized that passive resistance would continue until 51 the Ruhr was evacuated. Poincare' cleverly seized upon this prior condition in his note of rejection. He pointed out that in contrast to the claim of the German govern­ ment that passive resistance was spontaneous, it now admitted that it had the power to start or extend it at will. Poincare made the discontinuation of passive resist- 52 ance a precondition to negotiation. This, in turn, para­ lyzed the Cuno government. After its solemn declaration it could not now abandon passive resistance at the demand of the French. In fact, Cuno intended to continue passive 53 resistance on through the winter. This intent would re­ quire new efforts to stabilize the mark and prop up trade union support in the Ruhr. Cuno, however, was still too 135 subservient to industry to propose any comprehensive measures to control inflation or to make the reparations offer which labor demanded. State Secretary Hamm noted prior to the German reparations offer that any proposal which did not bind German industry to specific obligations 54 would not be taken seriously by the Allies. This had been the position of the trade unions since 1920. In mid-May, following the rejection of the Cuno note, the dam in the Ruhr appeared as if it were about to burst. A wave of strikes swept the occupied zone. The causes for the outbreak of strikes in the Ruhr in raid-May were primarily economic, a combination of inadequate wages and living standards. Negotiation with miners on May 1, the first since February, had resulted in a 13 per cent increase in wages for the first half of the month. No agreement was reached for the second half of the month because labor unions were unwilling to bind their members to wage contracts which were sure to be quickly overtaken by the inflation spiral. The negotiations concluded on 1 May were not a realistic appraisal of the minimal needs of workers. Between 18 April and the end of June the mark depreciated sevenfold to 150,000 per dollar. The agree­ ments did, however, reflect the position of employers who argued that wage restraint was a necessary tool for con? trolling inflation. This argument was particularly 136 difficult for the trade unions to accept since they blamed heavy industry for undermining the government's attempt to control inflation through support action on international money markets. On 18 April the Stinnes interests purchased huge amounts of foreign currency which sent the mark into accelerated decline. Labor had been reluctant to accept the official explanation that Stinnes had been commissioned by the government to purchase badly needed British coal which justified his search for Devisen. Rather, labor had concentrated on Stinnes' prior criticism, since he stood to lose by stabilization, of the government's support action, and the attacks in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, a Stinnes- owned newspaper, on rumors of possible negotiations with 56 the French. The rapid spread of the strike movement throughout the Ruhr revealed the deep and bitter antagonism of workers for the Cuno government. The sentiment which most often surfaced among workers was that although they were the backbone of passive resistance the government had done almost nothing to support them. Members of the Christian miners' union, representing 16,000 miners in the city of Essen, meeting on 10 May, expressed resentment at the wage arrangements which had just been worked out with the help of government arbitration. They felt that they had done their utmost in the defense of the Ruhr and in return had received little, if any, sympathy or understanding on the 137 57 wage question from the government, This theme re­ appeared, more vehemently, after the strikes reached Essen, The Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung accused the Cuno government of neglecting labor while carrying out finan­ cial and economic policies which allowed industry to pro- 58 fit from a national crisis. Railroad workers were per­ haps most angered since they had suffered not merely eco­ nomic but also physical hardships through expulsions as a result of the occupation. Their contempt for the Cuno government found expression in a sharply worded, sarcastic resolution adopted by the Essen railroad workers on 23 May. The membership agreed that since their government consis­ tently failed to protect them from either physical or eco­ nomic hardships their only alternative was to appeal to heaven for redress. A dour warning concluded the reso­ lution. 'Does the government believe that its policies are designed to increase the desire on the part of rail­ road workers to continue the struggle? ... We regard it as our most sacred duty to make all this clear in order not to be responsible for a collapse of our defense actions, despite our solidarity with the united front up to now, as a result of these incomprehensible occurrences 59 on the part of the government.' There were clear in­ dications that railroad workers were losing hope, Wil- helm Groener, Reichs transport minister, reported in a 138 cabinet session on 17 May that 200 to 30Q railroad workers 60 in the Ruhr had gone over to the service of the French, Workers in Essen began to strike on 26 May, Their demands were identical to those workers already on strike in other parts of the Ruhr, a 50 per cent increase in wages retroactive to 1 May and increased unemployment benefits. Forewarned by bloody incidents in other Ruhr cities such as Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen and Bochum, where sixteen workers had been killed in strikes, workers in Essen showed little inclination for radicalism. They realized that strikes could not bring about a change in the circumstances which had created the strike conditions. This was true not only for the large majority of mod­ erate workers but, with the exception of a small number of ultra-leftists, for Communists as well. During the strike days in Essen, and despite the fact that 300,000 workers were on strike throughout the Ruhr, the Ruhr Echo warned its membership that "we are not in a position today to establish a proletarian dictatorship. We must first 61 develop the revolutionary will of the majority." Com­ munists pursued this line of reasoning in factory council and trade union meetings. While a small number of radicals called for a general strike against the government, a ma­ jority of the membership of the Communist-controlled Essen 62 metal workers union voted against the resolution. 139 In meetings of other trade unions the Social Democratic press reported that Communists repeatedly voted against a general strike or any putsch attempts. Even in a gen­ eral meeting of the factory council congress, dominated by the KPD and a source of constant criticism of the 63 government, a majority voted against a general strike. The Communist Union of White and Blue Collar Workers even went so far as to agree to participate with Christian, Free, and Hirsch-Duncker union members in an auxiliary 64 police force to maintain order in Essen during the strikes. KPD actions during the strikes reflected the party's con­ viction that premature radical action would merely al­ ienate the majority of workers and further isolate the party. Communists in Essen were also afraid that radical action might lead to the needless massacre of workers, a responsibility which they did not wish to accept. When workers returned to work on 29/30 May the KPD strike command in Essen ordered its membership to return to work 65 also. The strikes ended in Essen almost as quickly as they had begun. On 28 May the Reichs labor ministry approved 66 a 53 per cent increase in wages for the Ruhr coal miners. This measure was suited to bringing the strikes in the Ruhr to an end. It also proved that workers saw little hope that violence would solve their economic problems. 140 In fact, the opposite was true, Workers were conscious that a civil war begun in the Ruhr would gravely harm the entire nation. Their intent from the beginning of the occupation had been not merely to defend the Ruhr against the French but to defend the Repulbic against right-wing radicalism. Any violence in the Ruhr would have been counter-productive to this aim. Although concluded quickly, the May strikes marked the end of the period of truce between the Ruhr workers and the Cuno government. As a result of the bitterness left by the strikes a cabinet crisis remained imminent. In addition, working class discontent with government policy had been fueled in the midst of the strikes by Ruhr industrialists. In a 25 May note to Cuno the Reichs­ verband der deutschen Industrie, dominated by Ruhr in­ dustrialists, demanded the final abolition of the de­ mobilization laws, with their protection of the eight- hour day, as well as the elimination of the arbitration provisions of the Weimar constitution which protected labor unions, as a prior condition before industry would "voluntarily" pledge its capital towards any new rep- 67 aration offer. Industry's demands were almost an identical restatement of those which had been presented in 1922 prior to the occupation of the Ruhr and indi­ cated that industry now felt the time had come to force 141 acceptance of its will. The' German government, with reason, was reluctant to publish the note for fear of pushing working class anger in the Ruhr over the edge. This did not, however, prevent 68 Stinnes' DAZ from publishing the demands of industry. Reaction from labor in the Ruhr was swift and clear. The EAZ wrote that there could be no question of workers giving up the eight-hour day, "German workers refuse to accept any more of the burden while a small group con­ tinues to make profits and, despite the suffering of the population, expresses its patriotism through tax fraud. The so-called offer of German industry is a stab in the 69 back of Ruhr workers on the defense front." For labor, the brazenness of the industrial offer was another indication that German heavy industry regarded itself as an independent power within Germany, intent upon dealing with the government as an equal in its own in­ terest. Moreover, labor regarded the offer as only the most recent example of the weakness of Chancellor Cuno. Although the Cuno cabinet attempted to reassert its leader­ ship role and its independence, it could not prevent new tensions from arising out of the industrial offer. A de- nunciaton of the offer by the EAZ on 6 June was really a list of grievances against the Cuno government. The ed­ itors asserted that for partriotic reasons Social Democrats 142 had decided to remain neutral towards the Cuno. cabinet following the Ruhr occupation, Cuno, however/ had conr- sistently allowed himself to be influenced by reaction-v­ aries, doing little or nothing to counter the growing threat of fascism in Germany while, at the same time, proceeding against workers in Saxony and Thuringia. In contrast to the demands of workers that passive resist­ ance in the Ruhr be used as an instrument to force the French to negotiate, Cuno, with the aid of reactionary elements, sabotaged this goal. Also, the May strikes and the continued suffering in the Ruhr would not have happened if Cuno had acted decisively and spoken forcefully with heavy industry and the banks rather that giving in to in- 70 dustrial interests. The Essen branch of the relatively conservative General Federation of Employees went even further in its condemnation of Cuno and industry: "We pledged ourselves to make all the necessary sacrifices to end the occupation and save the Republic. The wage policies of industry and the industrial offer has sabo­ taged the united front. A united front between labor and capital is no longer possible." The union also warned Cuno against accepting the industrial offer at any time in the future because it "must bring civil war in its path. It is a stab in the back of those who struggle in the Ruhr. No one class has the right to dictate policy 143 71 to the state," The workers in the Ruhr were not happy with the wage increases they had received in May but under the circum­ stances of occupation they felt powerless to effect a change in their condition without jeopardizing the defense of the Ruhr. Following the May strikes workers recommitted them­ selves to passive resistance. There was, however, a major change in their attitude. They were no longer com­ mitted to the Cuno government. Social Democrats in Essen, for the first time since the beginning of the occupation, openly spoke of the possibility "either in the near or not so distant future" of organizing a common front with the KPD "if the KPD, in a clear way, frees itself from Moscow." By June, the myth of a national united front was over and with it the attempt to define a collective interest in de­ fending the Ruhr against the French. The only important question which now remained was which group would succeed in bringing the occupation to an end under circumstances favorable to its own interests. NOTES

Ursachen und Folgen, V, no. 1016, p. 60; Graham, p. 75; Harbeck, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno, p. 159, note 16, p. 286, note 3. 2 Harbeck, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno, p. 303, note 3. 3 Otto Gessler, Reichswehrpolitik in der Weimarer Zeit (Stuttgart, 1958), pp. 244-47. 4 Cited in Essener Volks-Zeitung, no. 7, 9 January 1923. Ursachen und Folgen, V, no. 1037, "Verfuegung des Reichsverkehrsministers Groener vom 25. Maerz 1923," p. 93. 6 Harbeck, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno, p. 501, 7 Heinrich Dicke, Die Stadt Essen im Ruhrkampf: Denk- schrift (stadtarchiv Essen, n.d.), pp. 51-55. 8 BA/K, R43 1/187, Bruegger to Cuno. 9 HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 16383. Gessler, ibid. 11 HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 16610. File contains sworn statements of eyewitnesses, correspondence between Essen city administration and newspaper clippings. Krupp Archiv/ Familien Archiv Huegel, IV E13, contains summaries of trial of Krupp directors which followed incident and Lt, Durieux's testimony. 12 HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 17063. 13 Dicke, p. 107. 14 Ruhr Echo, no. 76, 31 March 1923; no, 77, 1 April 1923. 144 145 15 Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung, no, 64, 3 April 1923; no, 65, 4 April 1923, 16 Paul Wentzke, Ruhrkampf, I, p, 380, 17 HAD/K, Reg, Duess, 16610, clipping of Freiheit, no. 102, 1 May 1923. 18 HAD/K, Reg, Duess. 17055, 11 January Police Report; 17076, 3 April Police Situation Report; 16751, 12 February Police Situation Report; 16780, 12 March Police Situation Report. 19 Robert G.L,Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany 1918-1923 (New York, 1969), pp. 236-37, 20 Konrad Heiden, Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power (Boston, 1969), p. 29. 21 . . The above account is based on Hauenstein's state­ ment to Weitzel in: BA/K, R43 1/213 and official German government correspondence, newspaper files and copies of Schlageter's testimony and the testimonies of his co­ conspirators in HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 16389. 22 Friedrich Glombowski, Organisation Heinz (O.H,): Das Schicksal der Kamaraden Schlageters (Berlin, 1934), pp. 22-23, 127. Cited in Waite, pp. 267-68. 23 Ruhr Echo, no. 82, 9 April 1923. 24 HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 17063, Report: Mayor of Kaisers- werth to Regierungspraesident Duesseldorf. 25 Harbeck, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno, p. 707, note 18. 26 GHH 300193008/7, Blank to Reusch 1/22/1923. 27 Heiden, p. 164. 28 Harbeck, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno, pp. 316-19, 29 Ibid., p. 520, note 2. 30 Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny (New York, 1962), p. 111. Waite, p. 288f, 146 32 Heiden, p, 134, 33 Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung, no, 94, 18 May 1923. 34 GHH 300193000/7, Reusch to Haniel 6/17/1923. 35 Eleanor Lansing Dulles, The French Franc; 1914- 1928 (New York, 1929), pp, 154-68. ""' """ 3 6 Neue Zuericher Zeitung, no. 581, 30 April 1923. 37 Bresciani-Turroni, p, 311. 38 Dicke, pp. 478-95. 39 HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 16573, Essen Police Report 16 May 1023. 40 Harbeck, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno, pp. 334-41. 41 Bresciani-Turroni, pp, 330-32. 42 Harbeck, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno, p, 264. note 6. 43 Bresciani-Turroni, p. 105. • Alos, Bruening, Mem- oiren, I, 88f. 44 BA/K, R43 1/212, Hermes to Hamm, 28 April 1923. 45 Rheinische Zeitung, no. 39, 15 February 1923. Governmental and industrial reaction in: BA/K, R43 1/209. 46 HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 16845, Schaeffer to Gruetzner, 20 April 1923. 47 BA/K, R43 1/212, Gruetzner to Severing, 12 March 1923 48 BA/K, R43 1/212, Verband der Bergarbeiter Deutsch­ lands to Cuno, 14 April 1923, 49 Harbeck, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno, pp, 418-19. 50 Ursachen und Folgen, V, no. 1044, "Neue deutsche Vorschlaege zum Reparationsproblem," pp. 121-24; Bergmann, pp. 191-93. 51 Ibid., "Franzoesische Antwortnote," pp. 125-30. 147 52 Charles S, Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe (Princeton, 1975), p. 371, T""'" 53 Harbeck, ed,, Das Kabinett Cuno, p. 445, 54 Ibid., p, 459, note 2, Also, Die WestIndustrie, no. 121, 1 June 1923. 55 Maier, p, 367, 56 Essener Volks-Zeitung, no, 123, 12 May 1923. 57 Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung, no. 100, 26 May 1923. 58 BA/K, R43 1/213, 23 May 1923 Entschliessung des erweiterten Vorstandes der Keichsgewerksschaft deutscher Eisenbahnbeamten und Anwaerter des Bezirks Essen, 59 Harbeck, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno, p, 482. 60 Ruhr Echo, 23 May 1923 61 Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung, no, 99, 25 May 1923. 62 Ibid., no. 102, 29 May 1923. 6 3 Dicke, p. 196. 64 Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution The Com­ munist Bid For Pewer In Germany, 1921-1923 (Princeton,1963), p. 325. 65 Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung, no. 101, 28 May 1923 6 6 Harbeck, ed., Das Kabinett Cuno, p. 508. 6 7 Ibid., p. 514, note 3, 68 Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung, no. 103, 6 June 1923. 69 Ibid., no. 109, 6 June 1923, 70 Ibid., no. 120, 19 June 1923, CHAPTER FOUR THE END OF THE STRUGGLE

The frustrations of Ruhr workers increased during the early summer months of 1923. Physical deprivations contin­ ued. The transportation snarl made it all but impossible to supply the Ruhr with necessary foodstuffs. Stores were opened only a few hours a day and food, along with other necessities such as clothing, began to be rationed. Real wages, due to the currency inflation, continued to shrink each day. Bread became a luxury and potatoes were not available as a substitute. Housewives were becoming in­ creasingly alarmed over the effect an expected winter fuel shortage would have on the health of their families. Each new day, according to one observer, increased the possi- 1 bility of riots. Political concerns heightened worker discontent. The tax policies of the Reich still favored business interests over those of the wage earner. Workers also remained firm in their belief that industry was profiting from govern­ ment credits granted for the support of passive resistance and that the state was actually controlled by their employ­ ers. In addition to these concerns workers worried also about the survival of the Republic itself. They suspected 148 149 that the government could not rely on the Army to protect itself against rightrw-ing extremism. This suspicion, com­ bined with increased right-wing activity on the periphery of the Ruhr and in Bavaria, made more difficult the task of Ruhr labor leaders who were attempting to check the 2 growing sympathy among workers for left radicalism. Work­ ers could see little difference between the suppression of the Social Democratic and Communist parties and their press by the Bavarian government on the one hand and sim^- ilar measures of the French in the Ruhr on the other. In their eyes Cuno's lack of decisiveness in Bavaria merely reflected his ambivalence towards the survival of the Re­ public. Leipart, chairman of the ADGB, spelled out for Cuno the imminent repercussions of his inactivity. "If the Reich's government places any value on the attitude of the Ruhr population, if only to continue the despairing resistance in the Ruhr for a short time longer, it can neither rationalize nor tolerate the actions of the Bavarian government but must enforce the law to defend 3 the Republic throughout Germany." In addition to these concerns labor was still of the opinion that it was being kept in the dark about political and economic decisions which affected the long term in­ terests of workers. This had been labor's constant com­ plaint from the outset of the occupation, Cuno, in the 150 interim, had done little to meet his critics head on by entering into meaningful discussions with labor. Ex­ cluded from the Chancellor"-s confidence, labor saw itself as a willingless tool indispensable for resistance in the Ruhr but with little clout within the government's privy councils, A crisis appeared unavoidable.

In the face of opposition from labor, industrialists continued to defend their earlier economic package and to contest labor's claims that workers were being asked to shoulder the burden of reparations under the industrial plan. In an early June editorial in the DAZ, Hermann Buecher, chairman of the Allgemeine Electrizitaets^Gessel- schaft, responded to labor's criticism of the industrial offer. Buecher challenged labor's claim that industry wanted to oppress it. "We pledged 50 per cent of the present worth of German industry and are ready to produce payments. We are prepared to do what the political parties and unions have demanded of us for years, namely to make extraordinary sacrifices." Industrialists argued that reparation payments, during the first years of their plan, could only come out of industrial assets. To compensate for these losses they demanded special tax considerations and a guaranteed margin of profit. According to business leaders the health of the entire German economy and the welfare of the nation as a whole depended upon industry's 151 ability to accumulate profits, Buecher explained that "without the possibility of capital accumulation we can not exist," According to industry, increased production was the only means which would provide the margin of pro­ fit necessary for survival. The eight-hour workday had to be sacrificed in the national interest. In summation Buecher denounced as simply false labor's claim that it 4 alone was being called upon to make sacrifices. Buecher, quite correctly, concluded his remarks in the DAZ by pointing out the primacy of politics over eco­ nomics. He said that in the end the questions which placed labor and industry at odds could only be resolved when "the political factors are resolved which will create the necessary conditions allowing German industry to de­ velop." He also warned Chancellor Cuno about any future arrangements concerning reparations. "Any government which puts its name to reparations obligations must /first/ create an atmosphere of political stability for carrying out /those/ purely economic measures." Buecher's emphasis on political stability was an in­ dication of the anxieties of business leaders rather than an expression of self-confidence. Increasingly, industrial­ ists in the Ruhr found themselves pressured from two sides. On the one side stood the French; on the other side stood their own workers. By summer French tariff barriers and 152 military controls had totally isolated the Ruhr econom- . ically. In addition, the occupation authorities stepped up the seizure of coal and were slowly mastering the Ruhr railroad net to transport it. French authorities also began to cordon off coal stockpiled at pitheads and 5 within factory compounds, In July, Krupp managers in Essen predicted factory closings in the near future due to lack of fuel. They estimated that the Krupp factories as a whole could continue production for only another three months. Some departments, however, would be forced to shut down within four to six weeks. Admittedly, these projections, based on hard facts, were the most optim- 6 istic allowable. Labor unrest added to the concerns of employers, Strikes increased in frequency. By summer, in marked contrast to strikes which had taken place prior to May, workers were organizing strikes against their German em­ ployers. Factory managers, fearful of a putsch, hoped to 7 prevent it by lockouts. The use of the lockout was self- defeating since it threw all workers into the street, not merely those who were striking. During these weeks of turmoil Ruhr workers domonstrated a new independence, militancy and unwillingness to compromise. Wildcat strikers among the Essen transport workers refused to accept the arbitration of the Reich labor ministry in 153 8 July, Employers, clearly had lost control of the sitKarl Jarres, Mayor of Duisburg, when asked how long the Ruhr could hold out, estimated that it could not be depended upon past the end of September. In any event, Jarres said, the end would 17 certainly come before the beginning of the cold weather. Numerous other reports from the Ruhr supported Jarres' conclusions. Johannes Bredemann, executive secretary of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund in Essen, reported on 10 September that although the situation in Essen was quiet for the moment, union leaders were convinced that unrest in the mines could be expected any day. The enormous dis­ content among miners and metal workers stemmed from the almost immediate loss, through inflation, of the moderate gains that had been made in the latest wage agreements. Bredemann told Stresemann that increasing numbers of miners were expressing a willingness to work for the French. In addition, syndicalists were meeting with increased success in organizing miners, Bredemann concluded that this demoralizing attitude on the part of the miners could 158 only be attributed to their bitterness over their low wages and that Stresemann should take every opportunity 18 to reach an agreement with the French, This view was also held by Karl Martmoeller, a member of the executive 19 committee of the socialist miner's union. Other reports from labor circles in the Ruhr described a rampant fatalism among the working population; they had lost the will to 20 carry on passive resistance. By the end of September miners had declared that they would not work as long as 21 their wages failed to keep pace with inflation. In a general meeting of the Free Unions of Rhineland/Westphalia on 19 September in Essen workers voted in the majority that passive resistance had to be suspended as quickly as 22 possible. In the face of this rank and file opposition no government in Berlin could continue passive resistance and hope to remain in power. The only consolation the Chancellor could draw from the situation was that there was no sympathy among the general population in Essen and the Ruhr for the separatist movement in the Rhineland. Nationalists in the Ruhr were, however, still opposed to the sacrifice of passive resistance, The Rheinisch- Westfaelische Zeitung, owned by the arch-conservative Theodor Reismann-Grone and voice of the nationalist right, became the rallying point for this view in Essen and the Ruhr. These circles spoke openly of Stresemann as a traitor 159 and it was suggested that Stresemann should be put quickly in his grave in the same way that Rathenau and Erzberger had been put in theirs. In the face of overwhelming evi­ dence to the contrary nationalists argued that the struggle in the Ruhr could be continued and that victory was within grasp "if the Jewish government didn't once again betray the German people" as it had in 1918, Any compromise for 23 these circles was out of the question, Opinion among the People's Party in the Ruhr was divided. A number of leading party members supported Stresemann, along with his inclination to abandon passive resistance, unconditionally. They, however, had to struggle against the industrial-led faction within their party. Industrialists feared that following the end of passive resistance they would be forced to make sacrifices which they could not bear. The situation in the People's Party in the Ruhr was further complicated by the fact that heavy industry appeared ready to arrange a practical accommoda­ tion with its counterparts in France concerning questions of coke and coal. At this moment, Stresemann received support for the abandonment of passive resistance from a surprising source after which dissension among conservative groups in the Ruhr effectively ended, Hugo Stinnes, in contrast to earlier positions he had taken, now urged the political leaders to confer as quickly as possible with 160 the Entente in order to establish collectively the nec­ essary conditions not only to make Germany productive again but to save her, Europe and the world from cata-^ strophe. Such a step, accordingto Stinnes,was not to be interpreted as a sign of German weakness but as a neces- 25 sity to save western Europe, On 10 September, in a meeting of the Reichstag delegation of the People's Party, Stinnes revealed the shape of the spectre haunting Europe as he saw it. "Within two weeks we will have civil war, Hil- ferding's /economic/ policy won't stop it. Longer working hours, create a currency, deal severely with Saxony and Thuringia. Not a day must be lost or the Stresemann cab- 26 inet will be overthrown in the streets," Stinnes' fears were not exaggerated. The Communists in the Ruhr and elsewhere in Germany were finding growing sympathy among the masses of the population. The wage question had also reached a new crisis point. Negotiations with the Reich's Labor Ministry were deadlocked over the question of support for the unemployed in the Ruhr. Finally, on 12 September, the labor ministry announced that the government would no longer guarantee Ruhr work­ ers 100 per cent of their wages. Workers were to be guaranteed only two-thirds of their wages, Employers vigorously objected. Workers would not only starve but the labor press would accuse employers of a stab in the 161 back, Industrialists concluded that the government was 27 planning to abandon them financially, If this were SQ their only alternative would be to dig into the substance of their firms, first by liquidating holdings in other firms through the sale of common stock abroad and then by using their last capital reserves. The money raised by such means would be immediately consumed by food pur­ chases and wage supplements. Industrialists felt their" 28 ruin was unavoidable. It was, however, doubtful that even these drastic financial measures would bring security. The mood of the workers was unpredictable. There was a great deal of unrest in Essen and city administrators could offer no reassurances to employers. Each day the city's streets were filled with six to eight thousand 29 people demonstrating for increased unemployment payments. City officials admitted openly that the city was helpless. Industrialists were now convinced that there was nothing left to be gained by continuing passive resistance. During the last week of September Stresemann decided to abandon passive resistance. Stresemann told repre­ sentatives of the various political parties of the occu­ pied areas in a cabinet meeting on September 24 that no further advantages could be expected from continuing passive resistance. He also explained that contrary to his original intention, there was no longer hope that 162 the occupying powers would grant the concessions he sought—the release of German citizens arrested during the occupation and the reestablishment of German sovereign­ ty in the occupied regions—'before passive resistance was abandoned. With the exception of the representatives of the German National People's Party, all those attending the meeting supported the Chancellor's decision to suspend resistance in the Ruhr. In another meeting later that afternoon Stresemann again received support from repre- 30 sentatives of industry and other groups in the Ruhr. On 26 September an announcement was made to the German 31 people of the "necessity to break off the struggle." The following day the Allies were officially notified of the abandonment of passive resistance. The reaction of the various political groups in the Ruhr to the ending of passive resistance was in keeping with their long established positions. The Social Dem­ ocrats saw it as the final realization of the policy they had urged since the beginning of the occupation. Workers, however, were aware that the end of resistance was only a prelude to a general settlement and worried over the shape such an agreement would take. More importantly, they were concerned over the question of who would have the greatest say in determining a final settlement with the French and whether or not their interests would be protected. The 163 Communists, now a force to be reckoned with in the Ruhr and unconcerned about the fate of the Berlin government, were unrestrained in their warnings of the immediate threat to working-class interests following the end of passive resistance. "Abandonment of passive resistance without seizing the substance of industry will mean new suffering for the working and middle class. It will also mean the realization of the Stinnes program, the abandonment of the eight-hour workday, increased tax burdens on workers, sus­ pension of the right to strike and the right to organize, the dismantling of the social protection laws and will turn the German "democracy" into a plaything of French and 32 German industrialists and financiers." Ruhr Communists, sensing that the moment of decision had come, now became more militant in their organizational activities. On the morrow of the official announcement of the ending of passive resistance Communists in Essen organized a massive demonstration in the city's streets. Demonstrators numbering three to four thousand, under red flags, assembled in Essen's main square, carrying signs which warned workers that they were being bartered away 33 to the interests of the international capitalist movement. For Communists the ending of passive resistance was only the first step in a drive against German workers. Of equal concern was the growing militancy of Hitler and 164 the fascist formations in Bavaria, Hitler, among others, was now calling for a march on Berlin, If successful, the working-class movement in Germany would be crushed, Com­ munists feverishly stepped up their appeals to join them in a united front of the left, Ruhr Communists, to no 34 avial, called for workers to join them in a general strike. The industrialists, too, were aware that the moment for action had come and were interested in arranging a quick agreement with the French over questions of repa­ rations and coal deliveries. Of primary concern to Ruhr industrialists was an agreement which could be worked out between themselves and the French, It was felt that this type of arrangement would exclude the dictates of the cen^- tral government and preclude Social Democratic interference. A circular letter of the Zweckverband nordwestdeutscher Wirtschaftsvertretung e.V., a Ruhr industrial lobby group, expressed this sentiment most clearly. "The heavy encum­ brance of the cabinet with leftist personalities makes it clear that Ruhr industrial circles must push energetically for their own interests. ,.. This means that the attempt to establish direct negotiations with the French must be 35 continued." There was, however, more at stake than merely an agreement with the French in order to bring the Ruhr into production again, Ruhr industrialists saw that if they were successful in reaching an agreement with the 165 French they would become the guarantors of Germany*s rep­ aration plan. This in turn would give them the leverage to force through the domestic reforms which they had been demanding. Industry now appeared ready to push for its ultimatums,

The collapse of the Stresemann cabinet on 3 October increased the urgency and complexity of the situation. The Social Democratic members of the coalition refused to approve the wording of a sweeping enabling bill which, among other things, would give the cabinet the authority to suspend the eight-hour workday. Members of the People's Party in the cabinet and the Reichstag insisted that this be included in the bill. Neither side would compromise and the coalition broke up over this issue, Business in­ terests now appeared ready to take action independent of parliament. At a general meeting in Berlin, on 5 October, of the Verein deutscher Eisen-und Stahl Industrieller businessmen expressed their exasperation with the most recent political developments.and a strong desire to break the political deadlock decisively. Speakers recounted the litany of woes which had affected Germany since 1918. The lost war and the revolution had crippled Germany econom­ ically. "If this sickness is not done away with the German iron and steel industry will be destroyed," The major ob­ stacle for business interests was the labor and social 166 service laws which had been enacted after, the revolution, "They prevented a free economy from functioning and fast­ ened upon Germany a policy of consumption rather than pro­ duction. For this the Marxist/Social Democratic ideas are guilty," Businessmen pointed to the inflexibility of Social Democrats as the major cause for the collapse of the Stresemann coalition. In any event they were doubtful that an enabling act would help as long as the achievements of the revolution were kept. Nonetheless they affirmed that a general economic improvement could only be expected from increased production and this in turn could only be g aranteed through absolute executive power over economic, financial and social questions. It was, however, to be expected that Social Democrats would block the way to any rational solution to Germany's economic problems, The meeting concluded that "the impression has arisen among the general population that parliamentarism had failed, ...that a government must be built another way. Yes, even that a constitutional change is necessary,1' At the conclusion of the meeting the executive committee of the Verein adopted a resolution which barely skirted treason to the Republic, "Parliamentarism has failed. Only strong- willed and single-minded men (zielbewusste Maenner), trusted by the people, can help us surmount the present emergency. The first goal must be to preserve the unity of the Reich, 167 second, to preserve the freedom of the economy and of work which leads to health, the third, to establish dom-. estic law and order (Ruhe und O'rdnung) , Only when this new order is achieved at home will Germany again win new 37 respect abroad." Sentiments such as these culminated in plans in November to establish a "Direktorium" headed by a combination of business and military leaders with absolute executive authority to deal with Germany's eco­ nomic and social problems. By November, however, much of what the right had sought through a directorate had already been won by other means and the move had become unneces- 38 sary. The Ruhr industrialists took the first step towards their eventual success by opening negotiations with the French. Poincare' had cleared the path to a private in­ itiative by refusing to consider the offer of the German government to negotiate and pledge private property to guarantee fulfillment of reparations. On 3 October, the day of the cabinet collapse, the Ruhr industrialists formed a committee to deal with the French on questions of coal deliveries to fulfill reparation obligations. Pre­ liminary discussions between a committee of six Ruhr in­ dustrialists and General Degoutte took place in Duesseldorf 39 on 5 October. The industrialists expressed the strong desire to resume production in the Ruhr now that passive 168 resistance had ended, Among the problems discussed dur­ ing their first meeting were the question of payment of the German coal tax to France, tariff problems, the re­ lease of Germans imprisoned during the Ruhr occupation as well as the release of confiscated raw materials, In addition, Stinnes raised the question of the eight-hour day with Degoutte. In Stinnes' mind this was the key to a solution in the Ruhr. Suspension of the eight-hour day would increase production, lessen costs, preserve a profit margin and allow Ruhr industry to meet its pledges to the French. Degoutte, while expressing the opinion that German workers were "totally decadent and dissolute (total ver- kommen und verlottert)," took the position that the length of the workday was an internal German question, to be reg- 40 ulated by German law, and that he would not interfere. Members of the committee, however, got the impression that despite this disclaimer Degoutte was prepared to use his forces should unrest arise in the Ruhr as a result of a 41 suspension of the eight-hour workday. in any event, the committee informed Degoutte that due to the absolute need to increase production they intended to suspend the eight- 42 hour workday in the Ruhr on October 8, that coming Monday. Stinnes informed Stresemann, then in the midst of attempting to form a new cabinet, first by telephone, of his discussions with Degoutte, Private discussions between 169 the two followed and finally, at Stresemann*s request, Stinnes summarized what had taken place in a note on 7 October. In that note Stinnes asked Stresemann if the German government intended to make the necessary arrange^ ments with the French concerning the Ruhr through the immediate resumption of negotiations with the Reparations Commission. If not, Stinnes asked if the government was willing to leave the settlement of Ruhr problems to rep­ resentatives of the occupied region, more particularly representatives of the Rheinish/Westphalian coal industry so they could attempt to reach a modus vivendi with the French authorities. In addition, Stinnes asked Stresemann for tax rebates and a guarantee of government credit to offset the anticipated cost of a settlement as well as 43 government backing for suspension of the eight-hour day. Before receiving a reply from the chancellor the Ruhr industrialists, without consulting labor, suspended the eight-hour workday on 8 October. Evidently, industry based its decision in part upon false assumptions. During discussions with Labor Minister Brauns the previous week industrialists had come away with the impression that they would have a free hand in the question of the eight-hour 44 workday in the Ruhr. On the day of suspension industry explained its action in the following way/ "The exigency of the hour following the abandonment of passive resistance 170 makes it necessary that Germany find the cheapest means available to produce the largest quantities of coal. As of today ten-hour shifts are required in the mines and 45 twelve hours above ground," Aware of the volatility of the situation, the major labor unions in the Ruhr acted with restraint. The unions instructed their workers to ignore the dictate of their employers,' work their normal 46 shifts and leave the mines after eight hours' work. The unions took note of the fact that employers were now giv­ ing free rein to their dictatorial inclinations and an­ nounced that by unilaterally suspending the eighth-hour day the employers had not only broken legally binding wage and hour contracts but had shattered the idea of the possibility of cooperation between labor and management, Ruhr labor leaders observed that the action of employers was not merely frivolous but under the circumstances

dangerous and that "it was no accident that revolutionary 47 feeling had found a fertile ground in Germany." Hugo Stinnes spoke in defense of the decision and implied that he had the support of the government, "What is now being characterized as the 'Stinnes dictatorship' is nothing other than the view of the Reich Chancellor and the People's 48 Party since the beginning of the present crisis." Stin­ nes was correct. The dominant view within the People's Party was that the limitation on the workday was Germany's 171 most severe handicap to economic recovery, Stresemann shared this view. He regarded the eight-hour day as "the most foolish" of the revolutionary laws. As noted above, Stresemann"s first cabinet broke up over the issue of the eight-hour day. This was primarily due to the fact that the chancellor refused to attempt to sway members of his own party to abandon their position in regard to the eight- hour workday and not insist that the cabinet be empowered 49 to suspend the workday law, As a result of their own actions the Ruhr industrial­ ists now faced the possibility of a united labor front of the left in the Ruhr, with the exception of the Christian labor unions. This had been the nightmare of employers and the dream of Communists from the first day of the occupation. Wage discussions between employers and unions which had been planned for the week of 8 October were now 50 boycotted by labor. In addition, the three major Socialist labor unions in the Ruhr formed an action committee on 11 October. At a strategy meeting the action committee's exec- 51 utive was voted the power to call a general strike. More importantly, Social Democratic party leaders in the Ruhr now came under significant pressure from their rank and file to change their tactics. At a Social Democratic party congress in the Ruhr the leadership admitted that a significant majority of their members now favored close 52 cooperation with the Communists, 172 What was perhaps most important in the unilateral suspension of the eightrhour day by employers was that it symbolized a shift of power away from labor. As long as passive resistance had been an important instrument of government policy in the Ruhr the cooperation of the trade unions had been crucial, However, with the termination of passive resistance the Socialists and their trade union allies lost that leverage. By clinging desperately to the eight-hour day they had now become the major obstacle to a settlement and the question of resuming production in the Ruhr had shaped itself into a conflict between employ­ ers and workers. The balance of power, however, was held by the French. Their decision whether or not to intervene would make the difference between the success or failure of either workers or employers. The urgency of the sit­ uation favored employers. In the end in order to prevent the collapse of the Republic the Social Democratic and union leaders decided to yield. They sacrificed the eight- hour day and endorsed conservative solutions. The rank and file in the Ruhr, however, refused to yield. It was at that point, as discussed below, that French military power played a decisive.role.

Stresemann had delayed replying to Stinnes' note: of 7 October for five days. The major reason for the delay was his hope that negotiations then under way in Brussels 173 and Paris would lead to- an understanding that would open the way for the resumption of production in the Ruhr, Re­ ports from Paris, however, indicated that these discussions would yield nothing, Poincare' claimed that passive resist­ ance in the Ruhr had still not ended and therefore meaning- 53 ful negotiations could not be undertaken, Poincare's charge was without foundation. In fact, his real aim was to delay negotiations with the German government in order to reach an understanding with the Ruhr industrialists, who in his mind were the real arbiters of economic power in Germany. Poincare's willingness to make special arrange­ ments with Ruhr industry was demonstrated on 9 October when Otto Wollf, head of the Phoenix-und Rheinstahlgruppe, signed an agreement with MICUM on coal deliveries and pay­ ment of the German coal tax to France. Stresemann noted, in reference to the Wolff agreement, that nothing more could be expected from negotiations in Paris. Poincare' was convinced that France had more to gain through special agreements with the Ruhr industry than with the German 54 government. In a cabinet meeting on October 10 Strese­ mann pointed to the two overriding problems of the moment: reparations had to be paid and work in the Ruhr had to begin again. The latter was the key to the planned currency re­ forms and promised a return to domestic tranquility and an end to the threat to the unity of the Reich, Although 174 the German government was willing to pledge fulfillment of its reparation obligations, it was clear, given the financial situation, that it was unable to resume payments. The cabinet concluded that since it could not pay, the only recourse was to empower the Ruhr industrialists to 55 negotiate with the French. The way was now open to a general settlement. Stresemann, in his reply to Stinnes, admitted frankly that the Reich government did not have the financial means to meet the French demands. The bankruptcy of the Reich also precluded the possibility that the German government could guarantee to the Ruhr industrialists immediate pay­ ment for the reparations coal to be delivered to the French or for the coal which had been seized by the French since the beginning of the occupation. Stresemann did, however, promise to lift the German coal tax. In regard to Stinnes' anxiety concerning the eight-hour workday, Stresemann pointed out that this question would probably resolve it­ self within days. Stresemann could offer this reassurance because during negotiations on 6 October, which led to the formation of his second coalition cabinet, factional dif­ ferences over the question of the eight-hour workday had been resolved. The non-socialist parties agreed to exclude the authority to regulate the length of the workday from the proposed enabling act. In return, Social Democrats 175 agreed to allow the passage of regular legislation that would temporarily suspend the eight-hour day while con­ firming it at the same time as the normal standard. In conclusion, Stresemann informed Stinnes that under the circumstances the Reich government, in order to assure the resumption of full production in the Ruhr area, granted the Ruhr industrialists great latitude in dealing with the French concerning coal deliveries. The government, however, reserved the right to veto any agreement which 56 infringed on its sovereignty. Serious negotiations between Ruhr industrialists and the French bargaining agency, MICUM, got under way imme­ diately. By 20 October Stinnes optimistically reported to Stresemann that an agreement with the French appeared 57 possible. Ruhr industrialists were willing to deliver 18 per cent of all Ruhr coal production along with an immediate payment of 10 per cent of the coal tax accrued since January 1923. The balance of the coal tax was -to be paid in monthly installments, terminating in April 58 1924. Ruhr industrialists sought compensation for these demands in the form of tax credits from the German govern­ ment. More specifically, Stinnes asked Stresemann to guarantee the waiver of the value-added tax and allow credit to industry's tax accounts for the amount of the coal taxes to be paid to the French. This would insure 176 the margin of profit necessary ^or capital improvements. Ultimately, however, Stinnes said that the ability of the Ruhr industry to compete abroad could only be guaranteed 59 if Ruhr workers accepted a longer work day. Stresemann agreed to these demands. He also told Stinnes that his cabinet would consider lifting corporate income and prop- 60 erty taxes. With these assurances industry reached its final agree­ ment with the MICUM on 23 November. After difficult nego­ tiations the Ruhr industrialists promised to deliver to the French 21 per cent of their coal production until mid- December and 27 per cent thereafter until April 1924 when 61 the agreement expired. The settlement was costly. It did, however, allow Ruhr industry to plan for resumption of production free from the threat of French interference and confiscation. More importantly, the MICUM agreement gave the Ruhr industrialists the leverage to force through the necessary legislation, then stalled in the Reichstag, to liquidate the eight-hour workday. According to in­ dustrialists "Fulfillment could only be achieved by cost cutting. The factories could only survive through ex­ ploitation (Ausnutzung) of the available labor possibilities.

The profitability of industry could only be guaranteed if 62 the eight-hour day is suspended," At last industry had managed to identify the question of the suspension of the 177 eight-hour day with the national interest, Labor took issue with the trade-off between short- run sacrifices and long-run gains. Labor admitted that only the sacrifice of the eighth-hour day would allow Ger-. many to meet its burdensome Versailles obligations. The unions pointed out, however, that the industrialists were also granted tax compensations and that following the final payment of reparations, industry would maintain its advantageous position within the economic structure, Thus, ultimately, the sacrifices would actually have been made by labor alone. The two positions were irreconcilable. The suspension of the eight-hour day would perhaps have been more acceptable to labor had it been accompanied by other reforms. Adam Stegerwald, head of the Christian labor unions, felt that the sacrifices which the MICUM agreement entailed were one-sided, falling primarily upon labor. He proposed tax measures which did not favor one class over another and strict government control of price- fixing in the coal industry. Stegerwald, along with other labor leaders, argued that cartel arrangements in the Ruhr coal industry only served to eliminate competition and 63 fix prices at arbitrarily high levels. In labor's opin­ ion the continued existence of cartels in combination with the promised tax credits and the suspension of the eight- hour day served only the profit interests of industrialists 178 and effecti,yely shifted the burden of the MICUM agreements onto the workers. Although these arguments were substan­ tial, they were ignored because the Ruhr coal cartel pro­ vided a significant service for the length of the MICUM agreements. The cartel's rational planning of coal pro­ duction and distribution, whatever other drawbacks it may have had, contributed significantly to meeting the repara­ tion obligations pledged to the French, French negotiators recognized the importance of the Ruhr cartel at the time of the MICUM discussions and encouraged its location in Essen once again. The French set only one condition. Their former antagonist had to change its name from the Rhein- isch-westfaelisches Kohlensyndikat to the Verteilungs-und 64 Verkaufsvereinigung fuer Ruhrkohle. One of labor's alternatives to accepting the domestic results of the MICUM agreements was to strike. Despite the strong desire for a general strike on the part of the rank and file, particularly the radicalized Essen Metal Workers Union, Ruhr labor leaders, along with their allies in the Social Democratic and Catholic Center parties, were unwilling to go any further than verbal criticism. Leaders of the Christian trade unions and the Center Party rejected the idea of a general strike for ideological reasons. For them it represented the embodiment of the radical Marxist idea of class conflict. Social Democrats rejected it for 179 65 political reasons. Given the political situation in Germany in November/December 1923 a general strike would jeopardized the survival of the Republic, Under pressure from the labor ministry and with no practical alternatives to offer to the MICUM agreements, Ruhr labor leaders signed a wage-and-hour agreement with industry on 3 0 November. In it they obligated their members to work ten to twelve hours a day with no overall increase in pay.

Rank and file workers, days before the MICUM agree­ ment had been signed, had anticipated its results and had committed themselves to opposing any labor/management con­ tract which suspended the eight-hour day. Demonstrations in Essen now took on the aspect of open warfare. To pre­ serve the eight-hour day became the rallying cry of the demonstrators. Ruhr Communists spearheaded the resistance. Armed workers took to the streets. Barricades were erected at the Krupp factories and rifle fire exchanged between workers and police. Sporadic fighting and strikes con­ tinued in Essen and the Ruhr throughout December. The workers, however, were poorly armed and organized. The Essen police, in contrast to the May strikes during which the French had refused to allow them arms, were now strengthened and issued carbines by the occupation author­ ities. It was clear that the MICUM agreement had created an alliance of interest between French authorities and Ruhr 180.

/ industrialists. By signing the agreement Pojvncare and French heavy industry had realized one of their goals: to conclude a reparations contract with German heavy in^. dustry. The French too now had an interest in labor peace in the Ruhr and acted in accord with that interest. In instances where it appeared that strikers would get the upper hand French armored and motorcycle troops supported the local police. French authorities also expelled strike leaders from the Ruhr. This use of force in combination with lockouts and mass layoffs by employers broke the worker's resistance. At the end of December they began to return to work. Their only alternative would have been 66 starvation. NOTES

BA/K, R43 1/214, Der Reichs-und Staatskommissar fuer Gewerbliche Fragen Mehlich to Cuno, 7/19/1923, 2 BA/K, R43 1/214, Report by Ruhr labor leaders Meyer and Martmoeller, 7/20/1923. 3 BA/K R43 1/214, Leipart to Cuno, 7/19/1923. 4 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 248, 1 June 1923. 5 GHH 300193008/9, Woltmann to Reusch 7/6/1923; 300120/11, "Die Auswirkungen der Ruhrbesetzung auf die Betriebe der Gutehoffnungshuette." c Krupp Archiv/Familien Archiv Huegel, IV C89, July Report 1923. 7 GHH 300120/17, Crull Report, 7/31/1923. Q BA/K, R43 1/213, Gewerkschaft deutscher Eisenbahner und Staatsbediensteter to Cuno, 12 June 1923. 9 GHH 300193008/9, Holz to Reusch, 7/4/1923. 10 GHH 300120/17, Woltmann to Reusch, 8/13/1923. GHH 300193008/9, newspaper clippings, Iron and Trade Review, 14 June 1923; Spethmann, IV, p. 197; Ruhr Echo, 30 July 1923, 12 HAD/K, Reg. Duess, 16845, Police Report 8/13/1923. 13 Ibid. Gustav Stresemann, Vermaechtnis. Der Nachlass in drei Baenden, ed, Henry Bernhard (3 vols,, Berlin, 1932- T933), I, pp. 77-78, 15 Ibid., pp. 101-05, 113-14. 16 Ibid,, p. 115; Schulthess, 64, 1923, pp, 316-18. 181 182 17 Vermaechtnis, I, p, 116, 18 BA/K, R43 1/215, Bredemann; Bericht ueber die Lage in Einbruchtsgebiet 10 September 19.23, 19 BA/K, R43 1/215, Stegerwald to Stresemann 10 Sep-r- tember 1923. 20 Ibid. Also, BA/K, R43 1/215, Meeting of the De­ fense Committe, Unna 18 September 1923, 91 " BA/K, R43 1/215, Der Staatskommissar fuer oeffent- liche Ordnung to Stresemann 18 September 1923. 22 BA/K, R43 1/215, Telephone Report by the Social Democrat Mueller-Franken 20 September 1923. 23 BA/K, R43 1/215, Dinger Report 15 September 1923, 24 Ibid. 25 Stinnes in Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 September 1923. 2 6 Vermaechtnis, I, p. 117. 27 GHH 3001100/18, Report of meeting between repre­ sentatives of Ruhr industry and the Reich Labor Ministry. 28 Krupp Archiv/ Werks-Archiv, IV 2054, Schaeffer to Wendt 9/4/1923; Wendt to Schaeffer 9/12/1923; Schaeffer to Wendt 9/13/1923; Schaeffer to Foerster 9/14/1923. 29 HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 16845, Essen Polizeipraesident to Gruetzner 9/22/1923. 30 Vermaechtnis, I, p. 133 ff. 31 Ibid., p. 135. 2 HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 16966, KPD Nachrichtenblatt No. 93, 9 October 1923. 33 HAD/K, Reg, Duess. 16573, Essen Polizeipraesidenten: Tagesereignisse 9/27/1923. 34 HAD/K, Reg, Duess, 16966, KPD Nachrichtenblatt No. 96, 20 October 1923, 183 35 Krupp Archiv/Werks-Archiv, IV 1406, Report: Zweck^- verband 9/20/1923, 36 Henry Ashby Turner, Jr,, Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic (Princeton',' 1963)",' pp, 120T217 '""" 37 Krupp Archiv/Werks-rArchiv, IV 1402, Copy of minutes of meeting of the Verein deustcher Eisen-und Stahl Indust- rieller, Hotel Esplanade, Berlin 5 October 1923. 38 Maier, p, 386, 39 Krupp Archiv/Werks Archiv, IV 2550, Committee of Six report of negotiations with French 7 October 1923. 40 GHH 3001100/18, Kloeckner report on industrialists' meeting with Degoutte, 6 October 1923, 41 Krupp Archiv/Werks-Archiv, IV 2550, 7 October re­ port of Committee of Six. 42 Ibid. 43 GHH 3001100/18, Copy of Stinnes letter to Strese­ mann 10/7/1923. 44 GHH 3001100/18, 11 October meeting of Nordwest Gruppe. 45 Rheinisch-Westfaelische Zeitung, no. 359, 8 October 1923. 46 HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 16573, Police Report 10/9/1923. Essener Volks-Zeitung, no. 234, 9 October 1923. 48 Rheinisch-Westfaelische Zeitung, no. 361, 10 Oct­ ober 1923. 49 Turner, p. 121, 50 GHH 300193008/10, Nebelung to Reusch 10/12/1923. Krupp Archiv/Werks-Archiv, IV 1406, Report from Zweckverband 10/19/1923, 52 Ibid. 53 Vermaechtnis, I, pp. 160-62, 184 54 Ibid, 55 BA/K, R43 1/215, Auszug aus dem Protokol der Sitz- ung des Reichsministeriums vom 10 Oktober 1923, GHH 3001100/18, Copy Stresemann to Stinnes 10/12/ 1923. 57 GHH 3001102/46, Copy Stinnes to Stresemann 10/20/ 1923. c g Krupp Archiv/Werks-Archiv, IV 2550, Reusch to Wilmowsky 10/31/1923, 59 GHH 3001102/46, Stinnes to Stresemann 10/20/1923, 60 GHH 3001102/46, Stresemann to the "Sechserkommission des Bergbaulichen Vereins" 11/1/1923. 61 Maier, p. 393. 62 GHH 3 001100/18, Rundschreiben; Arbeitgeberverband 15 November 1923. 63 Essener Volks-Zeitung, 27 October 1923. GHH 3001900/3, Report to Reusch 12/1/1923. Essener Volks-Zeitung, no. 284, 16 December 1923. 6 6 HAD/K, Reg. Duess. 16845, Police Reports: Essen 22, 23, 24 November; 17076, Police Report: Essen 23 November; 17093, Police Reports: Essen November/December 1923. CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSIONS

Germans of widely divergent political views shared a common opinion as to French motivations for the occu­ pation of the Ruhr. To all Germans it was France's final attempt to guarantee for herself economic hegemony on the continent. Germans could not, however, agree on how best to check the French. Social Democrats felt that the best way to protect workers, despite the difficulties and en­ cumbrances of the moment, was to create understanding among populations, particularly between the French and German population. In an effort to avoid the dangers of a re- emergent rampant nationalism in Germany, Social Democrats called for immediate negotiation without preconditions, such as withdrawal followed by negotiation. Among the working class parties the German Communists saw most clearly the dangers for the working class. They pre­ dicted that capitalist interests would use the crisis to tighten their hold on the economy and for that pur­ pose sponsor fascist groups in Germany. As a result they abandoned temporarily their attacks on the Republic and called for working class solidarity to insure that future arrangements with the French be negotiated by a

185 186 worker's government, They felt that only in this way would agreements with the French take into consideration the interests of workers, However, such a united workings class front, as the Communists proposed it, never material­ ized—partly because the Catholic Center Party assumed a strongly nationalist position close to that of the more conservative nationalist groups, which kept the Catholic labor unions from joining the front (although individual Catholic workers were quite willing to do so) and partly because of the reservations of the Social Democratic leadership towards such a front (although here again many rank and file Socialists were ready to join it),

In contrast to the position of the working-class parties the Ruhr industrialists, in keeping with their own notions of how to force a solution to Germany's post­ war problems, insisted on a continued policy of intran­ sigence. As long as they remained in control of Ruhr in­ dustry they held the key to any settlement. It was their intent to frustrate French attempts to extract coal by force. At the right moment they intended to deal with a chastened France concerning coal and coke deliveries. This success in turn was then to be used in the domestic fight against the eight-hour day and other reforms which had been won by workers in 1918. 187 With the more violent scenes of the Ruhr occupation as a backdrop, the contest for power among social classes continued within Germany. German industrialists regarded the state as of great importance in so far as the state sets the social and economic climate in which business operates. Capitalist growth in Germany, beginning in the nineteenth century, had been furthered both politically and economically by the state, which regulated competition, maintained aggregate demand, ameliorated social distress and mollified discontent. Following the German revolution of-~ 1918, the decline of the laissez-faire state, in com­ bination with the increased strength of the working classes, presented German business interests with the nightmare of an interventionist state and a working-class majority. The commitment of the German industrialists to preserve a capitalist system of private property rights conflicted with the strong desire on the part of a working-class majority to expand the idea of democracy from political to economic equality. Faced with the problem of attempt­ ing to reconcile a combination of irreconcilable tenden­ cies, German industrial interests were convinced that capitalism and democracy were not compatible under the circumstances which existed after 1918. In an effort to regain full control of the state, the chief political objective of the German industrial class, along with other 188 bourgeois groups, was to exclude Socialists from any de­ cisive influence on the state. Yet another factor complicated the German situation after 1918. The Versailles Peace Treaty contributed to the difficulty of realizing the desire for economic equal­ ity, Due to the Allied demands the possibility of real economic growth after 1918 was questionable. The reduc­ tion in the rate of growth of German capitalism heightened the conflict between the two major capitalist objectives for the state: assisting in the accumulation of capital, and perpetuating the dominant social institutions and class relations. Near-zero economic growth meant constant or declining standards of living for major sections of the German population as well as low rates of profit. With the capitalist economy unable to deliver the goods for the moment, state efforts at social amelioration became in­ creasingly urgent. But what the state could do to "legitimize" the social order—introduce the eight-hour workday, reduce hours of work in occupations hazardous to health, provide income maintenance, job security and so on, was seen by the industrialists as yet another ex­ pensive deduction from profits and an obstacle to the pro­ cess of capital accumulation. The economic program of the industrialists required the augmentation of profits through significant reductions in wages, as well as cutbacks in 189 social services, This course led to an open attack on organized labor and the Republic, Given the constraints placed on the German economy by the Versailles Peace Treaty, economic growth was all but impossible and, without socialization, meant an in­ equitable distribution of income. Given the restraints, foreign and domestic, on such a distribution of income either the commitment to capitalism would have to give way before the onslaught of a democratic political force, or (again given the fact of inequality) political force would have to be curbed to preserve the structure of capitalism. The conservative and national-minded seg­ ments of the German industrial oligarchy reacted violently to these alternatives. These issues came to a head in 1923.

During the Ruhrkampf the industrialists tried to tap the nationalist sentiments of the German population to build an alliance across all classes in "defense" of Germany. At the same time, however, as represented by the plans for a "Direktorium" (see above Chapter IV, pp. 165-67), industrial interests proposed solutions that aimed at the predominance of business interests over those of labor. By late summer 1923, threatened with the possi­ bility of a united working-class at the grass-roots level, the Ruhr industrialists recognized that the Ruhr adventure 190 had to end, Passive resistance was stopped and negotia

The Ruhr arrangements led the way to the Dawes Plan and the final regulation of the reparations problem. More importantly, the Ruhr arrangements opened the way to a "second life" for German capitalism, following the defeats it had suffered in 1918, The new found strength of the German Republic after 1924 was not, however, the work of German democrats and socialists. The real republicans had suffered a serious defeat in 1923. The opponents of the 191

Republic( the industrial bourgeoisie, the bankers, the generals, the bureaucrats, agreed to tolerate the Republic as long as it served their interests. However, the funr damental contradictions between the political system and the social structure had not been resolved and carried with them the seeds for future conflicts. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Materials Bundesarchiv/Koblenz, Reichskanzlei (R43 I) Reichsfinanzministerium (R2) Friedrich Krupp A.G. Villa Huegel, Essen; Werksarchiv, including Otto Wiedfeldt Papers. Familienarchiv. Guttehoffnungshuette A.G. Firmenarchiv, Oberhausen, including Paul Reusch papers. Hauptstaatsarchiv Duesseldorf/Kalkum. Akten: Regierung Duesseldorf. Published Primary Sources Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichtags. Stenographische Berichte, vol. 358. Published Ministerial Records, Documents and Handbooks Akten der Reichskanzlei: Weimarer Republik, Karl Dietrich Erdmann and Wolfgang Mommsen, eds.: Die KabinetterWirth I und II: 10. Mai 1921 bis 26. Oktober, 26. Oktober 1921 bis 22. November 1922, Ingrid Schulze- Bidlingmaier, ed., (Boppard am Rhein, 1973). Das Kabinet Cuno. 22. November 192 2 bis 12, August 1923, Karl Hemz Harbeck, ed, , CBoppard am Rhein, 1968). Die buerglichen Parteien in Deutschland: Handbuch der Ge­ schichte der buergerlichen Parteien und anderer buergerlichen Interessenorganisationen vom Vormaerz bis zum Jahre 1945, 2 vols,, Dieter Fricke, ed., (East Berlin, 1974). Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewebung, Vol, VII/2, (East Berlin, 1966) .

192 193 Ursachen und Folgen; Vom deutschen Zusaamenbruch. 1918 un'd 1'9'45 bis zuy staatlichen Neuordnung Deutscii- lands in der Gegehwa'rt, Vols", V, VXV Herbert.' Michaelis and Ernst S'chraepler eds,, (Berlin, 1958), Schulthess' Europaeischer Gesichtskalender, 64, 1923.

Newspapers Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung Essener Arbeiter-Zeitung Essener Volks-Zeitung Rheinische-Westfaelische Zeitung Ruhr Echo

Selected Secondary Sources Allen, Henry T. My Rhineland Journal. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923. . The Rhineland Occupation. Indianapolis: Bobs-Merill Co., 1927. Angell, James W. The Recovery of Germany. New Haven: Yale Univeristy Press, 1929. Angress, Werner T. Stillborn Revolution, The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921-1923. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Barnikel, Hans-Heinrich. Theorie und Praxis der Kartelle. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972. Bergmann, Karl. The History of Reparations. London: E. Benn Ltd., 1927. Bresciani-Turroni, Constantino. The Economics of Inflation, A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany, T914-1923, tr. Millicent E. Sayers. London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1937. Bruening, Heinrich. Memoiren 1918-1934. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970, 194 Dahrendorf, Ralf, Society and Democracy in Germany, New- York: Doubleday, 1967, Dicke, H. Die Stadt Essen im Ruhrkampf: Gedenkschrift, 2 vols. Essen: Stadtarchiv Essen, n,dV' ~~ Erdman, Lothar. Die Gewerkschaften im Ruhrkampf, Berlin: Verlagsgesellschaft des Allgemeinen Deutschen GewerkT- schaftsbundes, 1924. Eyck, Erich. A History of the Weimar .Republic. Trans. Harlan P. Hanson and Robert G, L, Waite, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, Fischer, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War. New York: W.W. Norton and Co,, 1967. Fischer, Ruth. Stalin and German Communism, A Study in the Origins of the State Party, Cambridge, Mass,; Harcard University Press, 1948, Flechtheim, Ossip K. Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik. Frankfurt am Main: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1969, Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Vol. 3, East Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1966. Gossweiler, Kurt. Grossbanken, Industriemonopole, Staat: Oekonomie und Politik des staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus in Deutschland 1914-1932. East Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1971. Graham, Frank D. Exchange, Prices and Production in Hyper­ inflation: Germany, 1920-1923. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1930. Hallgarten, George W. F. Hitler, Reichswehr und Industrie: Zur Geschichte der Jahre 1918-1933. Frankfurt Am Main: Europaeischer Verlagsanstalt, 1955. Hartmann, Heinz, Authority and Organization in German Management, Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1959, ' Hortzschansky, Guenther. Der nationale Verrat der deutschen Monopolherren waehrend des Ruhrkampfes 1923. East Berlin; Dietz Verlag, 1961, Koszyk, Kurt. Deutsche Presse 1914-1945. Berlin; Colloqu­ ium Verlag, 197 2, 195 Kuczynski^ Juergen, Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter unter dem Kapital'ismus; Studien' zur Geschjchte des staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus in' Deutschland 1918 bis 1945. Vol, 16, East BerlinT"~Akademje Verlag I96T, ~""~ , Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Imperialismus, Vol. 1, Monopole und Unternehmer Verbaende, East Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1948, Kuehr, Herbert. Parteien und Wahlen im Stadt-und Landkreis Essen in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik. Duesseldorf; Droste Verlag, 1973. ~ Laubach, Ernst. Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth 1921/1922. Luebeck: Mathiesen Verlag, 1968, Liebe, Werner. Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei 1918- 924. Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 195o, Maier, Charles S. Recasting Bourgeois Europe; Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War I. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. Morsey, Rudolf. Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei, 1917-1923. Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1966. Moulton, Harold G. The Reparation Plan: An Interpretation of the Reports of the Expert Committees Appointed by the Reparations Commission, November 30, 1923, New York: McGraw Hill, 19 24. Neumann, Sigmund. Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1973. Rosenberg, Arthur. Demokratie und Klassenkampf: Ausge­ waehlte Studien. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ed. Frankfurt am Main, 1974. Ruge, Wolfgang. Deutschland von 1917 bis 1933. East Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1967. . Stresemann: Ein Lebensbild. East Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaft, 1966, Stresemann, Gustav. Vermaechtnis. Der Nachlass in Drei Baenden. ed, Henry Bernhard. Vol, I. Berlin; Ullstein Verlag, 1932. Spethmann, Hans. ZwoeIf Jahre Ruhrberbau, Vols. 3,4. Berlin: 1928. 196 Turner, Henry Ashby, - Stresemann and the politics of the Q£ the Weimar Republic, PrihcetonT* Princeton Univer­ sity Press, 1963, Vallentin-nLuchaire, Antonina, Stresemann, Trans, Eric Sutton, New York; 1931, ' ' Wentzke, Paul. Ruhrkampf. Berlin: Hobking, 1930, Zsigmond, L, Zur deutschen Frage 1918-1923: Die wirt- schaftlichen und internationalen Faktoren der Wiederbelebung des deutschen Imperialismus and Militarismus. Trans. P. Felix. Budapest:" Aka- demiai Kiado, 1964.

Unpublished Doctoral Dissertations

Grebing, Helga. "Zentrum und Katholische Arbeiterschaft, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Zentrums in der Weimarer Republik." Berlin: Freie Universitaet, 1953.

Kromberg, Hermann Emil. "Pclitischen Stroemungen und Wahlen im Stadt-und Landkreis Essen von der Nov- vemberrevoliition 1918 bis zur Reichstagswahl vom Dezember 1924." Bonn: 1968. Rycken, Hans. "Die MICUM Abkommen des Ruhrkohlenberg- baus 1923-1924." Giessen: 1924 Wenzel, Otto. "'Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands im Jahre 1923." Berlin: Freie Universitaet, 1955.