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University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA St. John's Road, Tyler's Green High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR 77-319866 FLYNN, John Francis, 1943- THE 1923 RUHR CRISIS AS A TWO-FRONT WAR: INTRA-GERMAN AND GERMAN-FRENCH CONFRONTATIONS. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1977 History, modern University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48ioe , THE 1923 RUHR CRISIS AS A TWO-FRONT WAR; INTRA-GERMAN AND GERMAN-FRENCH CONFRONTATIONS DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By John F. Flynn, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 1977 Reading Committee: Approved By Andreas Dorpalen R. Clayton Roberts John C. Rule // Jl 4/0 oJ(JU^^ Adviser Department of History PREFACE On 11 January 1923, three years almost to the day after the Versailles Peace Treaty went into effect, French and Belgian troops marched into the Ruhr in an effort to collect forcefully the reparations which Germany had pledged in the treaty but failed to deliver. This study examines both the German reaction to the occupation as well as the conflicts within Germany which followed the occupation. In the end, the outcome of these internal conflicts shaped the final agreement with the French which ended the year of crisis. I wish to express my gratitude to all thoso who assisted me in the completion of this project. In 1973, at a critical moment during the research, the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst graciously granted me a second year of support. Among those who facilitated the research were the staffs of the Stadtarchiv Essen, the Hauptstaatsarchiv Duesseldorf/Kalkum, and the Bundes- archiv Koblenz as well as the staff of the Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek/Stadtbibliothek Essen, The staff of the library of the University of Duesseldorf lent special help in securing materials on inter-library loan, I am also grateful to Bodo Herzog at the Firmenarchiv of the Gute- hoffnungshuette for aiding me in my research while there ii and to Graf von Zedwitz-rArnim for permitting me to visit the Friedrich. Krupp Archiv/Villa Kuegel, Ess,en, I wish also to acknowledge a special debt of grat itude to my adviser, Professor Andreas Dorpalen, with-r out whose encouragement, constructive criticism, and abiding patience this dissertation would never have been finished. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Beth, who shared my Odyssey and who too is a quester. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Preface ii List of Tables v CHAPTER I. THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS 1 II. DIVISIONS IN THE ANTI-FRENCH FRONT 35 III. PASSIVE RESISTANCE AT ITS HEIGHT 100 IV. THE END OF THE STRUGGLE 148 V. CONCLUSIONS 185 BIBLIOGRAPHY 192 IV LIST OF TABLES Table 1 Cost of living index in Essen 125 v CHAPTER ONE THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS During the despair-filled days of October 1918 Ger many's rulers decided upon a 'revolution from above' with the hope of channeling democracy onto an acceptable path and achieving peace on the basis of President Wilson's 1 Fourteen-Points proposals. However, owing to the slow ness of the peace negotiations and the fear that the war would not end, exhausted and demoralized German workers overthrew the monarchy and established a Republic. The popular German revolution of November 1918 was, in turn, disarmed by the alliance struck between Fri'edrich Ebert, the leader of the Majority Socialists, and Field Marshal von Hindenburg, who remained at the head of the army even after the abdication of Emperor William II. In this way the fabric of the old state was saved against the onslaught of leftist radicalism. The new government of Social Dem ocrats and Independent Socialists pursued an essentially conservative policy that repressed the worker's movement 2 in the name of law and order. In effect Germany accepted democracy only as an addendum to military defeat. Behind a veneer of democracy, her economic and social structure, 1 2 though challenged, remained essentially unchanged. In terms of central European Realpolitik, the war of 1914-1918 had ended in stalemate. Only the entry of the United States had checked Germany—temporarily, as it turn ed out. Following the conclusion of hostilities, France, having failed to secure American and British guarantees ensuring her national security, hoped to contain her dy namic German neighbor, in part, through a strict interpre tation of the Treaty of Versailles. Occupation of German territory and reparations in cash and kind were viewed by the French as promising national security: they would safe guard her economic predominance on the continent. Occupa tion of German territory, the Saar Basin for example, would limit German access to raw materials, coal in this case, while reparations would limit profits, denying Germany investment capital and curbing her potential for ecomomic 3 expansion and arms production. Given the internal struct ure of the new Reich, however, French dreams for security were tenuous. Those individuals who had provided the ideo logical basis for Germany's far-reaching, expropriative economic war aims remained the arbiters of economic power in Germany, shaping its institutions and influencing, if at times only negatively, the direction of public policy. Both the German revolution and the Treaty of Versailles were direct attacks upon the German industrial oligarchy. Although it is true- that the supporters of a socialist 3 revolution in Germany had been unable to put their ideas into practice in 1918, the disappearance of the Obrigkeits- staat threw open to question all authority relations which the monarchy had protected. It was on this system, along with unlimited control of private property, that German business interests had based their claim to authority and leadership. The revolution juxtaposed to this ideology the claims of workers and their representative organizations that labor should share in the political, social and eco nomic decision-making process. Ultimately it thus laid claim to the right to dispose of private property. Among the most militant agitators for such claims were the labor 4 unions in the mining and steel industries of the Ruhr. The effects of the lost war proved no less a threat to German industrial interests than did the German revolution. As the Treaty of Versailles proved, hidden behind the rhet oric of Allied propaganda was the intent to shackle the German industrial Prometheus, an intent not greeted with equanimity east of the Rhine. Germany had been stripped of her colonies and merchant fleet, she had lost six and a half million of her population along with 13 per cent of her pre-war territory, 15.7 per cent of her coal producing area, 48.2 per cent of her iron ore, and 19 per cent of her iron and steel producing capacity. Also, nearly all of her overseas investments, amounting to approximately 6.5 billion dollars, had been seized or liquidated. Other provisions 4 of the treaty imposed many controls and limitations upon 5 German industry. Its position jeopardized at home by the rising expecta tions of the working classes and abroad by the demands of the victorious Allies, German industry hoped nonetheless to use to political advantage the economic leverage salvaged from defeat and revolution. While the revision of the Treaty of Versailles was championed by all Germans, regardless of their position on the political spectrum, a portion of German industry, primarily concentrated among and led by Ruhr industrialists, was particularly active, in alliance with other anti-republican forces, in efforts to secure both a revision of the treaty and" a reversal of the new political order in Germany. Joseph Wirth, upon becoming Chancellor in May 19 21, pledged his government to fulfill German reparation obliga tions fixed at 13 2 billion gold marks.