Baku Dialoguesbaku Dialogues Policy Perspectives on the Silk Road Region

BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021

Identity & Language ‘Azeri’ vs. ‘Azerbaijani’ Jala Garibova

New Caucasus Emerging Achieving Full Resolution to the Karabakh Conflict Steven J. Klein Spotlight on Normalization Gulshan Pashayeva Winning the Peace F. Murat Özkaleli Security and Economic Implications for Georgia Mamuka Tsereteli

Geopolitics Along the Silk Road What Do Energy Sanctions Say About the World? Aurélie Bros The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Ali Haider Saleem & Arhama Siddiqa

Profile in Leadership Azerbaijan’s Educator-Statesman at Eighty S. Frederick Starr

1 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021

ISSN Print: 2709-1848 ISSN Online: 2709-1856 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021

Identity & Language ‘Azeri’ vs. ‘Azerbaijani’ Jala Garibova

Geopolitics Along the Silk Road What Do Energy Sanctions Say About the World? Aurélie Bros The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Ali Haider Saleem & Arhama Siddiqa

Profile in Leadership Azerbaijan’s Educator-Statesman at Eighty S. Frederick Starr

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 2 3 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION bakudialogues.ada.edu.az

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Essays

8 ‘Azeri’ vs. ‘Azerbaijani’ Jala Garibova

40 Achieving Full Resolution to the Karabakh Conflict Steven J. Klein

54 Spotlight on Normalization Gulshan Pashayeva

74 Winning the Peace F. Murat Özkaleli

94 Georgia After the Second Karabakh War Mamuka Tsereteli

110 What Do Energy Sanctions Say About the World? Aurélie Bros

126 The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Ali Haider Saleem & Arhama Siddiqa

Profile in Leadership

146 Azerbaijan’s Educator-Statesman at Eighty S. Frederick Starr

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 6 7 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES

link between ‘Æsir’ of which references ‘Azeri’ vs. ‘Azerbaijani’ and the origin of The main focus of these to the above-men- ‘Turks/Tyrks,’ the debates is whether using tioned claims are people who lived in ‘Azeri’ versus ‘Azerbaijani’ a part—and also Language and Identity in “Tyrkland.” Ac- on the reasons the cording to this as the name of the tit- term ‘Azeri’ has Nation-building medieval Scandi- ular group and/or lan- produced active navian historian, guage is correct, appro- debates and some- Jala Garibova the former left priate, and conceptually times resulted in Troy (an ancient comprehensive. misunderstand- city immortalized ings and even dis- hether in everyday Some find the term ‘Azeri’ falla- by Homer and lo- agreements, both conversations, media cious; others produce arguments cated on the present territory of the in Azerbaijan and abroad. In order discussions, or social in its support on the basis of var- Republic of Turkey), where ‘Turks/ to have a comprehensive picture of media,W not infrequently do we hear ious sources, notably including the Tyrks’ lived, to settle in Europe the realities (both synchronic and assorted debates regarding the use Prose Edda—an Old Norse account and, in particular, in Scandinavia. diachronic) surrounding these de- of the term ‘Azeri’ in reference to of historical sagas and mythologies bates, we have incorporated some the titular ethnic group and the written or compiled in Iceland by Still others go back to cer- degree of a historical-comparative titular language of the Republic 13th-century scholar and politician tain reference made by var- perspective into this article whilst of Azerbaijan (as well as those Snorri Sturluson. Proponents of ious medieval Islamic scholars avoiding as much as possible the who belong to this same group the latter approach point to certain and travelers (including Ahmad use of technical and specialist and speak this same language be- toponyms and ethnonyms found Al-Ya’qubi, Al-Masudi, and Ibn terminology. yond its borders). While the use in that text—including ‘Asgard,’ Hawqal) to languages spoken in of ‘Azeri’—although restricted to ‘As(as),’ and even ‘Asia,’ as well as northwestern Iran to link them certain domains—can be traced to the deity name ‘Æsir’—and on with the terms ‘Azeri/Azari,’ which, National Revival back many years, debates around that basis claim the existence of according to this point of view, are Dynamics the use of this term (and its deriv- a relationship between these, on either of Iranian or Turkic origin. atives) have intensified within the one hand, and the root of the word s post-colonial countries, framework of national revival ten- ‘Azer/Aser,’ on another hand. To We will certainly not discuss in Athe authorities of the for- dencies in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. this can be added the fact that, aside detail the veracity of the claims mer-Soviet Muslim states— The main focus of these debates from being the term used to identify made by Sturluson or the me- Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz- is whether using ‘Azeri’ versus the principal pantheon of Nordic dieval Islamic authors, as this stan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and ‘Azerbaijani’ as the name of the mythology, ‘Æsir’ is also used in would require an approach far Uzbekistan—have placed strong titular group and/or language the Prose Edda to designate people different from one appropriate emphasis on national revival since is correct, appropriate, and from Asia. Moreover, Sturluson to a policy journal such as Baku achieving (or re-achieving) inde- conceptually comprehensive. himself claims the existence of a Dialogues. We will, however, pendence. In the wake of more than attempt to shed light on the ele- 70 years of having had to share a Jala Garibova is Vice-Rector for International Relations and Professor of General ments of identity construction dis- common Soviet identity—during Linguistics at the Azerbaijan University of Languages. course in post-Soviet Azerbaijan— which time national languages

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 8 9 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES and identities were constructed as Overall, the post-Soviet quest for Soviet Person” understood as an Union informed not only the con- umbrella identities to dominate identity in all six of the aforemen- idealized, social archetype shaped tent but also dictated, to varying over, and often suppress, national/ tioned states reflected a tendency by ideological conformity and cul- degrees, the direction of their ethnic identities of Soviet peoples of self-redefinition (mainly through tural commonality. The Soviet po- respective future tendencies. (although to varying degrees)—the changing identity symbols), with a litical system needed such a com- concept of language and affiliation further common goal of achieving monality for the consolidation of (both ethnic and national) has ac- self-representation in a global (and the Union—an empire in all but Language and Identity quired a significant role in the - re regional) setting characterized by name. A key element of this required spective nation-building processes geopolitical and socioeconomic the abolishment of existing iden- anguage has become an im- in the former-Soviet Muslim states. rearrangements. This generic ten- tity repertoires (whether national/ Lportant angle from which po- Thus in the early 1990s, language dency is rooted in the commonality ethnic or corporate) of the nations litical and social tendencies in the and identity became platforms of the historical experience of the six or communities falling within the six post-Soviet Muslim countries from which to achieve national in- countries. Each entered its newest borders of the USSR. In spite of the are often analyzed. In fact, language tegration and soci- stage in history implicit nationalistic tendencies of has long been a contributing factor etal cohesion. This heavily burdened certain groups of people—mainly to both the politicization of society has been sustained, Contemporary tendencies with the traumatic representing intelligentsia in the and social stratification within each to one degree or of identity construction in experience of the “sovereign” nations of the 15 con- of these states. another, into the Soviet influence stituent republics, but also in lesser present in those six the former-Soviet Muslim on their respective administrative strata—Soviet de- Nevertheless, language use and countries (and of States could be viewed as identities. In fact, cisionmakers were able to create ethnic/national affiliation in -Azer course elsewhere part of a unique post- one can plausibly and to some extent implant into baijan and Central Asia were not in the Silk Road re- Soviet phenomenon assert that perhaps the minds of the broad masses feel- necessarily mutually dependable gion). Even today, shaped on the basis of never and nowhere ings of belonging to a large-group, for many centuries, although lan- national revival re- common features. in the world but in supra-national identity. guage is often viewed as the main mains quite an ex- the Soviet Union pillar for the construction of iden- pressive tendency, were aspects of the For the New Soviet Person, this tity and the development of affil- as we observe the continuing de- national identities of various na- was expressed in the comprehen- iation. Starting from the Middle velopment of linguistic policies and tions manipulated so skillfully and sion of the USSR as the primary Ages, the use of Persian, along planning, identity politics, educa- with such obvious results—the re- motherland, and Russia as “the el- with Arabic, was spread among tion policies, and public and social percussions of which are likely to be derly brother.” In fact, the collapse of educated Muslims. While Arabic media discourse strategies taking felt for generations to come. the Soviet Union was unexpectedly was learned and used as the lan- place in many of these states. shocking for many (even for those guage of the mosque (being the he strategic goal of the Soviet who had longed for it for years). language in which the Holy Quran Contemporary tendencies of Tnationalities policy was First puzzled by the sudden dis- was composed), Persian became identity construction in the for- the creation of a unique Homo connection with Moscow, the new the language of officialdom, litera- mer-Soviet Muslim States could Sovieticus (to refer to the term states then embarked on journeys ture, and culture in many Muslim be viewed as part of a unique coined by Alexander Zinoviev in to establish their own independent states, including those established post-Soviet phenomenon shaped his 1974 satirical monograph)— polities, and the commonality of or run by Turkic clans. In par- on the basis of common features. what the authorities called a “New the historic experience in the Soviet ticular, Persian was the cultural

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 10 11 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES language of Azerbaijani Turks and he widespread promotion school level but also in higher fact that the Soviet regime did not Central Asians until the beginning Tof the Russian language in education. (Azerbaijan was one aim at making everyone Russian; of the 20th century. The Turkic the Soviet Union resulted in the of only three constituent Soviet rather, the purpose was to shape literary language, in which a huge decrease of available domains for republics—the other two were a Soviet citizenry (along the New number of precious literary works the expression of native languages, Georgia and Armenia—that rec- Soviet Person archetype) able to were created, had a significant share particularly in urban settings. Since ognized its titular language as a communicate in a common lan- of Persian and Arabic borrowings. the Russian language opened op- state language in its own constitu- guage yet representing differing In reality, the use of the Persian portunities for better education and tion.) Moreover, Azerbaijani was ethnic backgrounds. language was a class marker: an in- cultural development—mainly in a required sub- dicator of social prestige and edu- the face of lacking native language ject in Russian- Painting in broad cation level. It was not necessarily resources and worse equipped, medium instruc- The continued use of na- strokes, one could an expression of ethnic or national or totally lacking, native lan- tion schools at tional languages in rural say that the Soviet affiliation or identity. guage schools—native languages all levels. There- settings in the peripheries nationalities policy in urban circles were often looked fore, if the urban was based on the A similar linguistic pattern of be- down upon and associated with elites in Central during the Soviet era was recognition and havior was observed during the backwardness and rural belonging. Asia (especially in among the strongest fac- development of period when Russian was the dom- Kazakhstan) were, tors preventing the disap- distinct national- inant language on the territory of The continued use of national for most part, pearance of the everyday ities (understood Azerbaijan and the five former-So- languages in rural settings in the Russian monolin- use of these languages. within acceptable viet Central Asian states. More or peripheries during the Soviet era guals, in Azerbaijan ideological param- less from the onset of Russian ex- was among the strongest factors they were mostly eters) with distinct pansion into these areas, the Rus- preventing the disappearance of bilingual, although in many cases cultures and languages. Hence, the sian language became a means for the everyday use of these languages. their Russian was much better spread of Russian, which was pro- receiving education, developing ca- In Kazakhstan, for example, people than their Azerbaijani, and some moted to dominance over other reer opportunities, and, hence, be- in rural areas even credit them- of their family members either languages spoken by the various coming wealthier and more socially selves for preserving the native lan- did not want or were not able nationalities inhabiting the Soviet prominent. An intelligentsia from guage and culture, which is obvious to use their native languages in Union, did not imply the elimi- what were called the “backward from their referring to urban Ka- everyday discourse. nation of national languages. The Muslim communities” was being zakhs—many of whom do not (or nationalities were to keep their formed mainly thanks to those who at least did not until recently) know owever, both in Azerbaijan national languages and create lit- had received education in Russia the native language—as “asphalt Hand the Central Asia states, erature and art in these and with or in educational establishments Kazakhs.” language preference shifts of any de- a sort of native spirit. This would where the language of education gree were not expressions of shifts reach out to the broad masses in was mainly in Russian. Therefore, In Azerbaijan, the situation in ethnic affiliation (although these order to spread the Soviet ideology Russian was gradually securing a was somewhat more favor- were, as noted above, strong social among them. Certainly, the replace in the repertoire of educated able for the native language. markers); the bottom line was that sults of the prevalence of the Rus- Muslims, which naturally contrib- Azerbaijani was always used as a linguistic aptitude in Russian did sian language—particularly in the uted to positive changes in their lin- language of instruction not only not mean one had become Russian. main cities of Azerbaijan and the guistic attitude towards this language. at the primary and secondary This was due at least in part to the five Central Asian republics—often

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 12 13 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES led to Russian monolingualism Prokofiev) were also slammed for were not fluent in Azerbaijani used The Case of Azerbaijan and resulted in shifts from native formalism, rejection of melody, that language (though at the in- language usage among city elites; and for engaging in some anti-art formal level), not Russian, for the zerbaijan, one of the five and in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and anti-people directions that performance of wedding speeches, ATurkic-speaking (and one of this additionally brought about the denied traditional foundations for the expression of best wishes the six majority Muslim) sovereign sweeping changes in urban lan- of music and high expectations during traditional holiday gather- republics of the Soviet Union, re- guage ecologies (in Kazakhstan and of the Soviet peoples. The resolu- ings, for the conveying of condo- gained its independence in 1991. As Kyrgyzstan demographics were an- tion called on “Soviet composers lences during funerals, and so on. in the case in all former-Soviet re- other significant factor, as the major to imbue themselves with the high publics, the drive for independence cities in these republics became spirit and refined taste with which On the contrary, Russian gen- was, in one form or another, partly heavily populated by Russians). In the Soviet people make demands erally served—as we have already (and implicitly) initiated by pro- fact, the Soviets had to mainly rely on music and [...] to ensure such an noted—as a language that provided cesses that had begun to emerge in on peripheries in the enforcement upsurge in creative work that will better opportunities for education embryonic form in the late 1980s, of their nationalities policy: on quickly move the Soviet musical and employment in the entire re- especially through the implementa- people who were powerful chan- culture forward.” gion. It was, hence, viewed as a so- tion of the policies of glasnost and nels in transmitting folklore, music, cial, not national marker, and was perestroika. customs, traditions, and literature National languages were also not equivalent to national identity. in their respective native languages, prime sources and useful instru- At most, it was a marker of “being However, the degree to which the content of which was also ments for spreading Soviet ide- urban” and “more cultural,” and the immediate post-Soviet na- ideologized. ology among the masses. More- was utilized as an instrument of tion-building processes were over, the Soviet version of Russian prejudice against the non-urban. smooth or painful, quiet or inten- An interesting illustration of the culture was not able to make And, of course, it served as the sive, slow or speedy, soft or radical Soviets’ appeal to national spirits in significant inroads into the core pan-Soviet lingua franca (Russian could be linked to various factors. shaping the Soviet identity is a 1948 of existing socio-cultural prac- continues to perform this function These included previous statehood Politburo resolution regarding the tices as manifested on occasions across most of the former-Soviet experiences, previous or existing ethnic-Georgian composer Vano like weddings, funerals, cuisine, space today). territorial or ethnic conflicts, his- Muradeli’s opera The Great Friend- music, dances, marriage patterns, tory of socio-cultural develop- ship that had recently had its pre- naming practices, and so on. Even So, in reality, the linkage between ment, literary traditions, history mier. While the main target of the preserved religious affiliations language and identity in the for- of media, as well as the status, use, criticism in that resolution was the remained strong. Although at- mer-Soviet Muslim states is, first and development of the literary alleged falsification of historic facts tending religious ceremonies was of all, of a social character. Thus, language. All these factors, whether in the libretto (Stalin took a per- banned in various phases (and in the context of social integration taken one at a time or collectively, sonal interest in this affair, which when allowed, always frowned and national solidarity, what mat- varied among the former-Soviet reminded him of the suicide of one upon), people nevertheless con- tered (and still does) is not only Muslim countries. Azerbaijan was of his formerly close collaborators, tinued to follow religious rituals who you are and what language you among the countries where the na- after attending one of the opera’s associated with holiday in familial speak; what is also at least of equal tion-building process was accom- first performances in Moscow), a settings. Nor was the Russian lan- importance is how you (and others) panied with vigor and expressive- number of composers (among them guage able to penetrate into tradi- define your ethnic belonging and ness, but also with a degree of pain Dmitri Shostakovich and Sergei tional practices. Even those who native language. and trauma due to the onset and

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 14 15 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES subsequent outcome of the First also the issue of its name, to which enhanced) the process of de- Turk’ (‘Azərbaycan Türkü’) as Karabakh War. both of the below questions were Sovietization. Supported mostly the name of the country’s titular simultaneously relevant: a) how do (and often in its more radical form) group and ‘Azerbaijani Turkish/ he major nation-building (and should) we call ourselves and by more nationalistically oriented Azerbaijani Turkic’ (‘Azərbaycan Tideology of post-1991 our language; and b) how do (and political groups (and the political Türkcəsi’) as the name of the Azerbaijan can be said to be should) others refer to us and our elites represented by these groups), country’s titular language. Both what has come to be known as language. Turkification ten- became reference “Azerbaijanism,” which consti- dencies lost their The debates over the points for groups tuted the core element of identity The years immediately following intensity when the for whom Tur- construction. A close review of the dissolution of the Soviet New Azerbaijan terms ‘Azerbaijani’ versus kicness was an nearly three decades of Azerbaijan’s Union in Azerbaijan saw intensive Party, headed by ‘Turkish/Turkic’ lost sa- important part of post-independence development Turkification in almost all spheres Heydar Aliyev, lience with the adoption identity expres- shows three main strategies of iden- including politics, foreign rela- came to power in of the 1995 Constitution, sion. While these tity reconstruction: policy formu- tions, language policy, and nar- 1993—although which stated the name of terms did not lation and legislation (laws, presi- rative shaping. These were years here it must be make inroads into dential decrees, etc.), construction characterized by strong and highly stressed that the the titular language to be official domains of symbolic and expressive tenden- recognition of the ‘Azerbaijani.’ in the country, discursive re- cies of romantic Turkic roots of they did become sources (creating The major nation- nationalism, when Azerbaijan’s titular part of public dis- or recreating nar- building ideology of post- Turkism took prev- nation was not denied and con- course and scholarly parlance and ratives), and social 1991 Azerbaijan can alence over other tinues to remain a significant back- were (and still are, in some quar- engagement (active identity paradigms: ground element in the country’s ters) used simultaneously (and patriotism). The be said to be what has the term ‘Türk’ was identity discourse. somehow competitively) with the first two strategies come to be known as a preferred form of term ‘Azerbaijani.’ were more charac- “Azerbaijanism,” which reference, both for he debates over the teristic of the first constituted the core the country’s tit- Tterms ‘Azerbaijani’ versus What has often produced inten- two decades after element of identity ular ethnic group ‘Turkish/Turkic’—but also those sive debates in traditional media independence, construction. and its language. It centered on adopting the existing (television, print) and on various while the third one appeared in formal Turkish alphabet versus a dis- social media channels was not so gained more sa- documents, laws, tinct Azerbaijani one as part of much related to the competition lience during the third decade of in- media, textbooks, and public dis- the process of shifting away from between proponents of these two dependence. The main focal point course, thus replacing the term the Cyrillic script that had been categories of terms but rather to in identity construction, in partic- ‘Azerbaijani’ for a time. in use throughout most of the So- their competing representations ular in the early years of indepen- viet period—lost salience with the in formal and informal discourse. dence, was language and national/ Clearly, this was a response to adoption of the 1995 Constitu- Both terms appear in two forms, ethnic affiliation.” Interestingly, the identity trauma caused by tion, which stated the name of the where we encounter either the el- one of the strongest points of de- Soviet identity politics and a ten- titular language to be ‘Azerbaijani.’ ement ‘Azerbaijani’ or its reduced bate for Azerbaijanis was not only dency that both resulted from However, this also produced a con- form ‘Azeri.’ Here we come to the the issue of language use per se, but and then accompanied (but also cessive paradigm of ‘Azerbaijani crux of the matter.

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The term ‘Azeri’ is basically some). Consequently, these people Russian Empire also came to be Republic (ADR), which existed used by foreigners, including cit- prefer the use of a term that can be called ‘Tatars,’ a term imposed by between 1918 and 1920. The ide- izens of Turkey, and most fre- directly associated with at least the imperial discourse. Azerbaijanis ology on which the Republic was quently in reference to the name of geographical origin of the titular living in Iran, on the other hand, grounded incorporated Turkism Azerbaijan’s titular language. While nation (i.e., with Azerbaijan) in the were and still are referred to as as one of the basic elements—the many foreigners that opt to use the absence of the name that would ‘Turks.’ other one being Azerbaijanism. form ‘Azeri’ genuinely believe they clearly show the Turkic origin of The name ‘Azerbaijan’ was intro- employ the correct term for refer- the titular nation. Again, for Azerbaijanis living in duced by the ADR’s founders on ring to the country’s titular lan- the Russian Empire the popular the basis of linguistic and cultural guage, the use of this reduced form form of self-reference was ‘Muslim.’ proximity with the population usually sparks an emotional reac- History of Identity The word ‘Turk’ gained signifi- living in the Azerbaijan province of tion among Azerbaijanis. To some, Construction cance among Azerbaijanis in the Iran. Mahammad Amin Rasulzade, the reduced form—particularly if Russian Empire only towards the whose words and deeds stood at used formally—is considered a dis- et us now take a step back end of the 19th and beginning of the root of the ADR’s state ideology, paragement, as it allegedly depreci- Lby examining the nature the 20th century, when the intelli- also claimed that the south-eastern ates the importance of the name of of these debates in the context of gentsia began to promote Turkic- part of the Caucasus was also his- the nation and its language. Thus, the historic route along which the ness (affiliation with the Turkic torically referred to as “Azerbaijan.” these people take it as a mark of terms describing the ethnic name root) as a platform from which to Historians claim that the name disrespect towards the people of and language of the titular group promote a national awakening. ‘Azerbaijan’ as a political term Azerbaijan and their language. took shape. Historically, the titular Turkicness (or Turkism) was not based on geographic affiliation was Others believe that many for- ethnic group in Azerbaijan was promoted as a political platform chosen also for the purpose of ac- eigners use the ‘Turk,’ although but rather as a liberal socio-cultural commodating non-Turkic minority reduced form be- the majority of movement within the framework groups: thus ‘Azerbaijan’ was also cause they think Historically, the titular Azerbaijanis used of which the intelligentsia repre- seen as a supra-ethnic identity this is the right ethnic group in Azerbai- the word ‘Muslim’ senting the Turkic communities, from the perspective of the ADR’s one to use and that as self-reference. including Azerbaijanis (or Azerbai- founders. these foreigners jan was ‘Turk,’ although As a result of great jani Turks), tried to solve problems simply need to be the majority of Azerbai- power competi- of literacy and education within Thus, the paradigm that incor- informed about janis used the word ‘Mus- tion and several their communities, establish media porated Turkism as an ethno-cul- the correct form. lim’ as self-reference. wars and resulting in local languages, and launch tural affiliation together with Still others see peace treaties, the alphabet/language reforms. Azerbaijanism as a citizenship af- the term ‘Azeri’ as geographic space filiation played a significant role dangerous, as it implicitly links inhabited by ethnic-Azerbaijanis urkism also became an im- in shaping the national identity of Azerbaijan’s titular ethnicity to became divided between the Rus- Tportant element in the na- Azerbaijanis in the first decades of some hypothetical group that sian and Persian empires in the tional-liberation movement of the the 20th century. That Turkism was would be, by implication, non- early 19th century (around the time Azerbaijani intelligentsia at the be- a strong element—and that it was Turkic (we will come to a discus- the Napoleonic Wars were being ginning of the 20th century—the promoted also within the context sion later on about how this hypo- fought in Europe). At some point movement that led in the forma- of Azerbaijanism—is obvious from thetical ethnicity is termed ‘Azer’ by thereafter, Azerbaijanis living in the tion of the Azerbaijan Democratic even a cursory examination of inter

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 18 19 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES alia the constitution, laws, official Ankara and Moscow in the early ‘A zərbaycanlı,’ which stands for the names. Thus, in the Soviet era, the declarations, and parliamentary days of both the Republic of Turkey word ‘Azerbaijanian’ or ‘Azerbai- word ‘Azerbaijani’ was not an um- speeches of the two years during and the USSR), the local intelligentsia jani’—a reference to ethnic affili- brella term for the entire popula- which the ADR existed. On the placed strong emphasis on Turkism ation. It has been noted in several tion of Azerbaijan, but only for the other hand, an examination of the as a building element for language sources, though, that before late titular ethnic group; and it was only literature and journalism produced and alphabet reforms, including the 1930s (when the term ‘Azerbaijani’ the titular group whose name had during those and surrounding years development of a common Turkic came to be used to refer to the tit- undergone intervention. As such, also reveal, for the most part, a type script and terminology, which would ular ethnic group), the term was even in contemporary Azerbaijan, of discourse elevating Turkism as a bring all Turks of the Soviet Union used to cover the entire popula- minorities can formally claim both strong element of ethnic affiliation closer together and allow them to tion of Azerbaijan. The late 1930s ethnic and citizenship identity together with Azerbaijanism as a benefit from one another and from thus represents the start of a his- levels whilst for the titular group framework of a societal/statehood certain achievements in Turkey in toric stage that marked the onset there is no such two-layer iden- affiliation within which Turkism relevant fields. of an era of identity reshaping for tity paradigm—at least at the level should be promoted. the people of Azerbaijan: affilia- of formal discourse (understood This sort of thinking was also tion with the Turkic world began to as official documents, legislation, Turkism was still a strong point given pride of place at the First wane, whether this be understood decrees, speeches by state leaders, of discourse even in the first years Turkology Congress, which was in terms of language, history, or and so on). of Soviet state-building and lan- held in Baku in 1926. In retrospect, culture. Histories were rewritten to guage-planning initiatives. In of- however, this event came to repre- overshadow or de-emphasize the Certainly, self-perception among ficial domains, the name of the sent the beginning of the end of the titular nation’s Turkic roots and its representatives of the titular group titular nation and its language “Turkism era” in the Soviet Union. natural links with the Turkic lan- became more nuanced in the pro- was known as ‘Türk’ (Turkish/ Those who were active promoters guage and culture. As a result, the cess of de-Sovietization. This pro- Turkic) and textbooks teaching of Turkic language unification and titular ethnic group of Azerbaijan cess, we can note, saw a huge shift the mother tongue were published who referred to the cultural and lin- was gradually pulled away from in historical narrative with regards under the title Türk Dili (meaning guistic closeness of all Turks were recognizing its ethnic roots, true to the ethnic roots of the titular “Turkish/Turkic language”). In labeled as “Pan-Turkists” and pun- history, and longstanding affiliation nation, as well as produced a rap- particular, during the years of what ished severely. Many of them went with the greater Turkic world. prochement in bilateral relations was known as “indigenization” (or on to become victims of Stalin’s with Turkey not only in political “rootedness” or “nativization”—the Great Purge of the late 1930s. Although some claim—based but also in educational and cultural term in Russian is ‘korenizatsiya’), on a few cases of the usage of the spheres, in turn contributing to an members of the local intelligentsia n this period, the term term ‘Azerbaijani’ as a reference to overall rapprochement between the were coopted, their native lan- I‘Turkish/Turkic’ came to be a citizen of Azerbaijan (in partic- two countries and the heightened guage-promotion and literacy ini- squeezed out gradually from public ular before late 1930s)—that the popularity of the phrase “one na- tiatives were favored, and local discourse and replaced by the term word ‘Azerbaijani’ was invented tion, two states.” Thus, more and cadres with knowledge of the local ‘A zərbaycan,’ which stands for as a corporate term to encompass more Azerbaijanis, in particular titular languages were trained and both ‘Azerbaijan’ and ‘Azerbaijani’ all ethnicities living in Azerbaijan, those of younger age, emphasize incorporated into the nomenkla- (e.g., ‘Azərbaycan dili’ meaning Soviet-era records and statistical ac- the underlying Turkic identity of tura. Inspired by this (but probably ‘Azerbaijani’ or the ‘Azerbaijani counts clearly show that ethnic mi- the titular nation and make a rel- also by the close relations between language’), as well as the term norities had retained their original evant reference to it in informal

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 20 21 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES discourse, media debates, and so- shaped as a distinctive paradigm ur observations of the dis- the country regarding not only cial media interaction. This has over a period of decades. This posi- Ocourse dynamics of the tolerance but also, more broadly, also been affected by Azerbaijan’s tion was also defended by minority past few months have revealed a the cross-cultural dimensions of increasing role in the activities of groups and Russian-speaking strengthened self-perception of Azerbaijani society; this has in turn Turkic integrative academic and Azerbaijanis for whom the terms identity as ‘Azerbaijani’ in the con- generated feelings of pride among cultural networks like the Inter- ‘Azerbaijani’ was a safer paradigm text of the return of Karabakh and Azerbaijanis and deepened the har- national Organization of Turkic in terms of preserving their ethnic the restoration of Azerbaijan’s ter- monious coexistence of different Culture (Türksoy), but also the or cultural identity. ritorial integrity brought about by cultural, linguistic, and religious Turkic Council. its victory in the Second Karabakh group within the country. Azerbaijaniness as an ethnic War. This historic event has not owever that may be, the use identity began to be enhanced in just become a factor in restoring fforts undertaken in the con- Hof the word ‘Azerbaijani’ 1993 with the adoption of a series national sentiments of justice and Estruction of an agentive iden- to refer to a supra-ethnic iden- of laws and legislative acts. The dignity for Azerbaijanis; it has also tity through engaging social agency, tity is predominantly a new, post- 1995 promulgation of a new Con- strengthened the concept of citizen- as noted above, should also be Soviet approach. The term ‘Türk,’ stitution—whereby the name of ship identity that has come to ex- viewed as another serious factor en- which laid at the foundation of the ethnic group and its language press not only peaceful co-existence hancing citizenship identity. With the immediate was officially between the titular and minority the progress of nation-building, post-Soviet iden- established as groups in Azerbaijan but also con- top-down identity policies them- tity construction The use of the word ‘Azerbaijani’— tributed to the further unification selves produce and encourage so- in Azerbaijan, was ‘Azerbaijani’ to refer to represents a fur- of all ethnic groups living in the cial engagement by enabling social not met with un- a supra-ethnic identity ther milestone. country by providing an opportu- agency. Social agency includes the equivocal favor, is predominantly a new, Separately, the nity to genuinely come together in incorporation of active involvement however, and was term ‘Azerbaijani’ common cause. by various groups and the contribu- contested by some post-Soviet approach. is also used to tion of various types of experience groups for whom imply the entire Here we can also note other fac- into the overall identity ideology. ‘Türk’ referred only to the Turks people of Azerbaijan, including tors that have contributed to the Discourse in the country has re- of Turkey. Of course, Soviet na- both the titular group and the enhancement of the citizenship cently focused on social agency tion-building had done its job: country’s ethnic minorities—al- identity among Azerbaijanis. Mul- and action as expressions of na- for many, true knowledge about though the titular ethnic group ticulturalism, which was declared tional spirit and patriotism, which, the ethnic composition of the tit- is still referred to as ‘Azerbaijani’ as Azerbaijan’s state strategy in in turn, has been accompanied by ular nation had already gone into (not ‘Turk’) in formal discourse 2013 and has been communicated a number of important steps taken oblivion. and many people in Azerbaijan through various national pride ini- to engage younger citizens as active prefer to identify themselves as tiatives since then, should be seen participants in the construction of a Certainly, there were other Azerbaijanis to explicitly distin- as an additional factor shaping new Azerbaijani society. groups in Azerbaijan that, while guish themselves from the Turks a stronger citizenship identity. recognizing the historic roots of of Turkey. In other words, ac- Although much remains to be Such steps include the financing the titular group, still preferred cording to this latter conception, achieved in the practical sphere, of the education abroad and the the term ‘Azerbaijani’ as a discrete an ‘Azerbaijani’ is defined as a cit- this strategy has generated a sig- recruitment of young people (in- identity that had already been izen of the Republic of Azerbaijan. nificant level of discourse within cluding those educated through

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 22 23 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES such sponsored education pro- Avowed vs. Ascribed according to them, overshadows Second, the corporate identity grams outside Azerbaijan) in newly the discrete Azerbaijani iden- format of Turkism. This paradigm established social service struc- Identity tity. For them, identification with is mostly preferred by groups rep- tures (such as the DOST Agency, Azerbaijan as a geographical term resenting the titular ethnicity for the ASAN service), government f we consider the identity and/or as the name of a state is whom affiliation with a larger offices, research think-tanks, and Irepertoires of Azerbaijanis a basis for identifying the titular group is more important than the international culture and sporting through the lens of avowed versus ethnic group: most important identity provided by citizenship. It events. Recent political discourse ascribed identities—in other is the territory and the state to should be noted in this context that has also emphasized the impor- words, if we look at the identity which they belong rather than various corporate identity models tance of constructive patriotism for repertoires as they are expressed by to the greater Turkic world from based on religious, cultural, ethnic, modern nation-building. It can be various social groups themselves— which their ancestors originate. and sometimes geographical ties predicted that the country’s citizen- then we can observe that there is no Also, some of those who adhere have emerged in Azerbaijan at dif- ship identity shaped through such single choice of identity format for to the term ‘Azerbaijani’ reject the ferent stages of history and played and similar processes will become Azerbaijanis in terms of ethnic/na- term ‘Turk’ because they think a powerful role in the structuring a strong stimulus for further en- tional affiliation. Moreover, what that the ethno-genetic structure of of the states that emerged on the hancing citizens’ self-perception as is most frequently observed is a Azerbaijanis is a complex one, since territory of today’s Azerbaijan (and ‘Azerbaijani.’ co-existence of, and sometimes a the dominant Turkic element in the north-west part of Iran), as well clash between, different identity the ethno-genesis of Azerbaijanis as in the development of national Here it might be useful to add paradigms in a single repertoire. has mixed with a variety of other or social identity. Today, however, that similar tendencies of redefini- We must note here that while iden- elements (including Iranian and the most salient corporate identity tion have recently been taking place tity is certainly a multi-layered phe- Caucasian ones) through many among Azerbaijanis is Turkism. in Kazakhstan: although observed nomenon in itself—and that each centuries following the migration Although a corporate Muslim iden- mainly among Russians, there is a identity paradigm undoubtedly of the Seljuk Turks from Asia in tity has also emerged as a post-So- new trend in the country to use the includes several components—the the 11th century (and possibly viet phenomenon, it is not as wide- term ‘Kazakhstani’ (i.e., someone or historical record suggests that one earlier migrations of Turks, as spread and not active due, first of something from Kazakhstan) inter- or two of its components emerge many scholars in both Turkey and all, to the prevalence of secularism changeably with the term ‘Kazakh’ as most distinct and most salient Azerbaijan claim the presence of in Azerbaijan. (the term used for the titular ethnic in most cases. Thus, it is possible Turks in this part of the world long group of the country). The term to distinguish at least five distinct before then). This identity format Third, a mixed identity format ‘Kazakhstani’ is used in popular identity paradigms, each of which is also preferred by those groups, that has various representations, in- and sometimes academic literature, will be examined briefly in turn. whether titular or minority, for cluding Azerbaijani+Turkic; Azer- mainly in the Russian language, as whom the citizenship identity is prior baijani+ ex-Soviet; Azerbaijani+ a reference to the entire population First, the discrete national iden- to the ethnic identity. These groups ethnic non-Turkic; Azerbaijani- of the country. As a reaction to this, tity format of Azerbaijanism. This see Azerbaijanism as an umbrella Caucasian, Azerbaijani+cosmo- there even appeared some debates format is most preferred by those paradigm covering both titular and politan, etc. This paradigm is in the country’s press as to whether within the titular group who wish minority groups at the level of citi- claimed by those who prefer to the name of the country should be to identify themselves discretely zenship. In this context, it is possible identify themselves through a dual changed to something like ‘Qazaq and distinctly as Azerbaijanis and to view this paradigm also as a social/ or a more complex affiliation. For eli’ (‘Kazakh land’). reject Turkism as a format which, societal identity format. some (in particular for minorities

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 24 25 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES living in Azerbaijan), this duality to their citizenship identity; b) qua individuals, and even avoid the would-be language under is constructed as ethnic+national/ representatives of the titular group any strong emphasis on ethnic the name ‘Azeri’ spoken by this citizenship identity; for others, who consider the term ‘Azerbaijani’ affiliation. alleged ‘Azer/Azeri/Azari’ group. this is a paradigm that has at least as an ethnic identity to be delusive two layers: a primary ethnic (or since it implies a geographical as asravi’s ideology, known ethnic-national with respect to opposed to an ethnic affiliation. ‘Azeri’ or Not ‘Azeri’ Kalso as Kasravism in those for whom Azerbaijani is These groups identify themselves as Azerbaijani scholarship, is rejected both ethnic and national iden- Turks of Azerbaijan, and their iden- ere we should make an by many scholars, writers, and tity) layer and a secondary one tification is different from those for Hadditional yet critically public figures in Azerbaijan - (in that is associated with a broader whom being a Turk is a more ge- important point. None of the cluding Adalat Tahirzade, Nasib geography (e.g., Azerbaijani+ neric concept that equals to being above discussed identity par- Nasibli, Aydin Balayev, Gazanfar Caucasian, which is the least popular a member of a common Turkic adigms imply any relationship Kazimov, and Shirvani Adilli) who but may emerge as a growing ten- family. As distinct from the latter, with the aforementioned old do not accept the delusive term dency in the context of post-Second the former recognizes and adheres ethnic Iranian group that falls ‘Azeri’ to denote an extinct Iranian Karabakh War peacebuilding to a distinct format of Turkicness under the moniker ‘Azer(i)/ language. They see Kasravi’s hy- endeavors and the growing em- that has developed on the territory Azar(i)’ that—as alleged by one pothesis as a strategy towards de- phasis on regional co-existence), a of Azerbaijan for centuries. To a of the founders of Pan-Iranism, nying Azerbaijanis’ Turkic roots grander ethnic layer (in particular degree, this can be compared to an- the Iran-based scholar Ahmad and presenting them as Turkified , Azerbaijani+Turkic), a cultural other discrete Turkism paradigm— Kasravi, in his famous treatise Persians: Kasravi claimed that past (Azerbaijani+ex-Soviet or namely, Turkestani Turkism— Azari or the Ancient Language of Azerbaijanis were of Iranian, not Azerbaijani+Russian), a mixed claimed by Central Asians, in Azerbaijan (1925)—were ancient Turkic origin, and that their lan- family background (Azerbaijani+ particular by Uzbeks, who often Persians and lived in Azerbaijan guage was Turkified with the - mi Russian, Azerbaijani+other ethnic claim that they, not the Turks of before the arrival of the Seljuk gration of the Seljuks when the minority, etc.), or an international Turkey, are the world’s real, pure, Turks and were then assimilated influx of Turkic words into their education background that adds and authentic Turks. by Turks to become present-day native ‘Azeri/Azari’ language began. cosmopolitan elements into the Azerbaijanis/Azerbaijani Turks, Following the above-mentioned identity paradigm (Azerbaijani+ Fifth, identity as an individual losing their original language in Azerbaijani scholars and writers, American). Unlike the corporate that is claimed by a small, mar- the process. (Here we can add that we would like to emphasize here identity format, wherein the smaller ginal group composed mainly of Kasravi basically had in mind the that there is simply no basis on segment merges into the bigger one, young people with liberalist, lib- province of Azerbaijan, which which to prove this hypothetical the mixed identity format accom- ertarian, or sometimes anarchist occupies the north-western part ‘Azeri’ language. In fact, Kasravi modates two or several segments, tendencies. Individuals belonging of Iran, as he never accepted the and his followers (some also from which allows these to co-exist more to this category—especially those name ‘Azerbaijan’ for the territory Azerbaijan) have not provided any or less without tension. identifying themselves as liber- on the other side of the Arax river, illustration whatsoever confirming tarian or anarchist—reject any namely the present-day Republic of the existence of the ‘Azeri/Azari’ Fourth, an ethnic identity format kind of affiliation with the na- Azerbaijan identified by him language or a particular ethnic that is claimed by two groups: a) tion-state, or with national or as Caucasian Albania.) Neither group speaking this purported lan- representatives of ethnic minorities citizenship identity, and prefer to do any of the five paradigms guage. Kasravi claimed that ‘Azari/ for whom ethnic affiliation is prior identify themselves as individuals imply any relationship with Azeri,’ or ‘Old Azari/Old Azeri’ is

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 26 27 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES an ancient Iranian dialect that was ethnic group and its widespread th as in in the word ‘that,’ hence the Iran. ‘Dari,’ which literally means once widespread in almost the en- language disappearing without a two versions of spelling) when de- “court language,” is a political name tire province of Azerbaijan (in Iran) trace. If a language is to be consid- scribing languages spoken in some given to New Persian since the 10th up to the Arax river and became ex- ered extinct, then there will be no parts of the territory of present-day century but is also used by medi- tinct after the migrations of Seljuks. lingering remnants. Furthermore, northwestern Iran—historically eval-era scholars as a reference to Some scholars who came in his the Tati language, with its varieties, known as Atropatene, a kingdom the Iranian dialects spoken in the wake and expanded his hypothesis is a language in its own right and its established by the Persian/ eastern and northeastern parts of (particularly Boris Miller) claimed different dialects have been spoken Achaemenid satrap Atropates Iran. It is thus evident that the me- that ‘Old Azeri/Old Azari’ was in northwestern Iran for ages: Tats in 323 BC, which according to dieval Arab scholars and travelers to spoken in Ardabil, a city in north- are mentioned as early as in Hero- some scholars, including Tadeusz whom Kasravi described languages western Iran, and that some Tati va- dotus’ account of the Achaemenids, Swietochowski, also lies at the or dialects were making references rieties spoken in Iranian Azerbaijan and, with the sole exception of the source of the name ‘Azerbaijan.’ to particular areas where those lan- (in particular, Harzandi and Karin- hypothesis put forward by Kasravi guages and dialects were spoken or gani) are remnants of this extinct and his followers, they have never However, although these Arabic to particular populations living in language. been identified as ‘Azeris/Azaris’ in sources refer to different lan- those areas, and not to ethnicities. any historical record. As far as the guages spoken on the territory of Nothing more. Moreover, there are scholars Talysh language is concerned, the Atropatene, these references do not in Azerbaijan that claim that the term ‘Talysh’ has been existent in imply any linkage between the word As far as ‘al-Azariyya/al-Adariyya’ Talysh language is also a descen- history since ancient times and the naming a language and the name is concerned, many scholars claim dant of this alleged ‘Azari/Azeri’ origin of the ethnonym is linked of an ethnic group speaking that that this is a reduced, modified, language. First, it is unlikely that to the term ‘Cadusi,’ an ancient same language. For example, the or distorted form originating a widely-spoken language would Iranian group, which is also men- Arabic sources to which Kasravi re- from a longer name ‘Azerbaijan,’ go extinct without leaving any tioned in Strabo’s work. These facts fers describe these languages using which evolved from the word traces (it takes a long time even speak against both the Tati and the such collocations as ‘al-Azariyya/ ‘Atropatene’ while being subject for less widely-spread languages Talysh languages being secondary al-Adariyya,’ ‘al-Fahlaviyya/ to various transformations in to go extinct): if Iranian languages to, and descending from, an illu- al-Pahlaviyya,’ and ‘al-Dariyya.’ Arabic and Persian including and dialects of various scopes and sionary language identified by the None of these are the names of Aturpatkan, Adurbadagan, breadths have survived in Iran and term ‘Azeri.’ ethnic groups (at least during Adarbadgan, Âzarâbâdagân, etc. Azerbaijan since ancient times to the time when these sources ap- Moreover, as Kazimov indicates, our days, then how come such a asravi and his supporters peared) or the names of languages in a number of Arabic sources the widely-spoken language—namely, Krefer to a few medieval pertaining to a particular ethnic above-mentioned collocation ap- the hypothetical ‘Azeri/Azari’—has Arabic scholars and travelers who, group: Pahlavi 9 (although the term pears in the form ‘al-Azarbi(yya)/ not survived at all? Also, as Shirvan it is claimed, used the word ‘al- derives from the form Parthawik, al-Adarbiyya’ or ‘al-Azarbicide/ Adilli indicates, in the medieval Azariyya/al-Adariyya’ (the Arabic which means “Parthian”) was al-Adarbicide’ (Kazimov refers to period when verbal (as opposed to letter representing the second known as the official language of the one medieval source where the written) communication prevailed, letter of the word ‘Azariyya’ is pro- Sassanid Empire but was also used author uses the collocation ‘ba- assimilation was hardly possible: nounced somewhat between z and by medieval scholars as a reference l-Azarbicide/ba-l-Adarbicide’ to quite simply, it is difficult to imagine d, like the English dental sound rep- to the Iranian dialects spoken in the imply “in the language of people of the rapid assimilation of an entire resented by the letter combination western and northwestern parts of Azerbaijan”). Also, as we examine

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 28 29 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES the scholarly interpretations of the owever obscure this journey languages and dialects continued to as ‘Azeri/Azari’ that spoke a partic- reports made by medieval Islamic Hinto scholarly disputations be present, and some even thrived: if ular ‘Azeri’ language and that disap- authors, we see that only a re- may appear to some readers, it is they disappeared, this most probably peared with the Seljuk expansion. stricted number among them—in- in many ways necessary to refer to happened due to intra-family lan- The historical record is clear that the cluding Al-Masoudi (10th century) them notwithstanding the fact that guage contact rather than due to the Seljuk Turks who migrated to Asia and Yaqut al-Hamawi (12-13th cen- this essay should not be consid- Turkic influence. Minor were protectors rather than turies)—referred to ‘al-Azariyya/al- ered to be an extension of the de- eliminators of Iranian languages Adariyya’; there were others—e.g., bate about whether the languages It should also be noted that many and cultures. The Persian language Ibn-al-Muqaffa (8th century), referred by the aforementioned Arabic scholars pointed to the was always highly esteemed and Ibn-Hawqal (10th century), Hamza Arabic authors belonged to Turkic, difference between ‘al-Azariyya/ embraced by the Turkic ruling Esfahani (10th century), and Al- Iranian, or some other language al-Adariyya’ and other vernaculars elites, first as the language of high Moqaddasu (10th century)—who family/group; in fact, this issue spoken on the territory of Atropa- poetry (the rules of Persian poetry mentioned other names when de- should be of no importance with tene—sometimes these languages became the very foundations of the scribing the languages of northwest respect to the main points of the were so different that they were elite Divan literature) and then as a Iran. For example, Ibn-al-Muqaffa present essay. Indeed, these Arab mutually unintelli- social marker de- mentioned that the languages travelers could have encountered gible—which might fining high social spoken in the Azerbaijan of Iran a variety of languages and dialects well mean that There is no basis to accept hierarchy. were called ‘Pahlavi/Fahlavi’ and belonging to both Iranian and what they had ac- the existence of a partic- Ibn Hawqal referred to them as Turkic language families spoken tually encountered ular ethnic group identi- Furthermore, if ‘al-Farisyya’ (Persian languages). on the territory of today’s Iranian was either a Turkic fied as ‘Azeri/Azari’ that Azerbaijanis (or Al-Moqaddasi stated that the lan- Azerbaijan at that time. language or a hy- spoke a particular ‘Azeri’ Azerbaijani Turks) guages and dialects spoken in the brid code formed language and that dis- are descendants Azerbaijan of Iran were partly Dari When speaking about different from the mixture of Iranians, what and partly convoluted, all of which vernaculars, Al-Masoudi refers to of Turkic and Ira- appeared with the Seljuk then happened are known as Farsi. The word ‘al- the spread of these varieties on a nian vernaculars, or expansion. to the Turks who Azariyya’ is indeed mentioned by vast territory stretching from Azer- even code-mixing massively migrated Ya’qubi (9th century), but again as baijan (in Iran) and Derbent across between Turkic and Iranian vernac- to, and settled in, their multiple a reference to Persians from a par- to Armenia, Arran, and Baylaqan. ulars. Taking the fact of unintelligi- states, empires, and kingdoms ticular area: “The people of Azer- Al-Masoudi refers to these languages bility into account, many scholars on the territory of northwestern baijan are a mixture of Ajams of as being “Persian,” which was a ge- (including Kazimov) consider that Iran? Who and where are their ‘al-Azariyya/al-Adariyya’ and old neric term used at that time also to what the medieval authors referred descendants? Therefore, what the Javedanis.” (To clarify, ‘Ajam’ is an replace the term ‘Iranian’: it is cer- to as ‘al-Azariyya/al-Adariyya’ were medieval scholars implied by re- Arabic word meaning a non-na- tain that what Al-Masoudi had wit- in fact Turkic language(s). ferring to the term ‘al-Azariyya/ tive of Arabic often used to indicate nessed across such a vast territory al-Adariyya’ was most probably Iranians, and ‘Javedanis’ is used were not only vernaculars of Iranian he general point we have at- some combination of languages, to identify followers of Javidan, origin. On the other hand, while the Ttempted to make in the last dialects, and vernaculars—whether the leader of the Khurramites, a Turkic languages gained dominance few paragraphs is that there is no Turkic, Iranian, both, a hybrid be- 9th-century Iranian political and as they expanded throughout the basis to accept the existence of a tween them, or mixture thereof religious movement.) vast territory, indigenous Iranian particular ethnic group identified (mixed codes)—spoken on the

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 30 31 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES territory that was known as hus, the term ‘Azeri’ as a textbooks were published under the considerable influence on Azerbai- Azerbaijan. Last but not least, even Treference to the language or title Azəri dili (meaning “Azeri lan- jani linguistics, in particular, in the if, somehow, a hypothetical ‘Azeri’ ethnic affiliation of Azerbaijanis, guage”), and media texts, literary 1930s and 1940s. One of Azerbaijan’s ethnic group could be imagined at least as promoted by Kasravi, is pieces, and formal documents also famous Soviet-era linguists, Mam- and a link could then be established illusory. Therefore, all possible in- contained the word ‘Azeri.’ madagha Shiraliyev, assigned much between this alleged group and its formal references by Azerbaijanis credit to Marr’s theory, referring to it hypothetical (extinct) language, themselves, or by foreigners, to the his usage, however, should be as the “New Language Theory.” This this would still not demonstrate a name of the nation or its language Tunderstood as part of the lan- is how Shiraliyev explained the root link between this purported group in the form of ‘Azer’ or ‘Azeri’ should guage policy of those years, which of the Azerbaijani language based on (or its would-be language) and the be seen, first of all, as nothing but was to a great extent informed by Marr’s theory in 1939: “The close- toponym ‘Azerbaijan,’ as the seg- patterns resulting from shortening the theories of the Georgia-born lin- ness between the Turkic system of ment ‘-baycan’ does not denote in accordance with the Principle guistic paleontologist Nikolai Marr. languages is not the result of a false affiliation with, or belonging to, of Least Effort, which in the con- Although the term ‘Azeri’ did not ‘mother tongue’ concept, but rather a geographical place (as does, for text of linguistics claims that lan- live long in official parlance, it did a historical combination of different example, the element ‘-stan’). Nei- guage changes or evolves because make its way to certain sources and tribal languages.” ther would it serve as a basis for speakers simplify their speech in literary works. According to Marr’s speculating about any relation- various ways, including by the use theory, all the languages of the lienation of Azerbaijanis from ship between the hypothetical of abbreviations. world are related to each other and Atheir Turkic roots constituted ‘Azeri’ language and the name concepts such as proto-language, a part of the Soviet Union’s politics of of today’s Azerbaijani, which is The use of the shortened form by root language, and parent language nation-building. The rejection of the (politically) formed as a name foreigners can also be explained by do not hold up. Marr claimed that Turkic origin of Azerbaijan’s titular given to an Oghuz Turkic lan- a lack of etymological knowledge the development of languages was group was also exercised through guage on the basis of geograph- regarding the word ‘Azerbaijan’ not a process of one language fur- holding to false ethnic terms such as ical affiliation. To be clear: we do (plus derivatives) and its structural ther fragmenting and splitting into ‘Azer/Azeri,’ even though some of the not debate the possibility of less peculiarities. On the other hand, many “newborn” languages. Rather, proponents of this approach would, popular dialects or smaller ver- it is also possible for foreigners to as Marr claimed, languages were as a result, need to artificially link naculars (into which we certainly come across the shortened form in formed as an outcome of a clash the titular nation to Iranians or Cau- cannot place Kasravi’s hypothet- the speech of Azerbaijanis them- of different varieties from different casians. In a word, everything that ical ‘Azari/Aseri’) disappearing or selves or to read it from media parts of the world, resulting from was not Turkic was considered to be merging into stronger and wid- (including social media), where factors like migration and language suitable. The term ‘Azer/Azeri’ also er-spread ones as a result of lan- this form appears sometimes even contact, with further fusion into resonated with the historical narra- guage contact. What we question as part of formal discourse. Cer- one language. Thus, according to tive of those times, which focused here is the identity of a particular tainly, many Azerbaijanis could Marr, the genetic relationship of on depriving the ethnogenesis of language and an ethnic group have heard this version from their languages was not a valid theory. Azerbaijanis of their Turkic elements. with the name ‘Azeri,’ which was elderly family members and rela- clearly fabricated by proponents tives who lived in the immediate Marr also claimed that the fu- Thus, the use of the term ‘Azeri,’ of the aforementioned hypoth- post-Stalinist years, when the term sion of all of the languages of the which was associated with Kas- esis with the purpose of denying ‘Azeri’ was used in both official and world would be completed in the ravi’s theory claiming the Iranian Azerbaijanis in Iran their Turkic roots. public discourse. In this period, era of communism. His theory had origin of Azerbaijanis, did not con-

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 32 33 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES flict with the nation-building dis- Interestingly, between 1935 and ‘Azeri’ was further used as a syn- these opinions supporting the course that the Stalinist regime had 1939, Meskehtian Turks were iden- onym for the word ‘Azerbaijani’ aforementioned fourth identity designed for Azerbaijan. tified as Azerbaijani and during this by writers, media representatives, paradigm, through which attempts period the Azerbaijani language and scholars living both in the are made to justify a lengthy history he same destiny had reached was introduced as the language of times of the Azerbaijan Democratic of the discrete Turkic identity of TAhiska or Mesketian Turks instruction at their local schools. Republic and in early years of the Azerbaijani people. who formerly lived in Meskheti, a Later, starting in 1939, the Soviet Soviet regime. highland area in Georgia, before regime again reidentified Ahiska There are other scholars—in- they were deported from Georgia Turks as Islamized and Turkified We should also note that this very cluding philologist Firudin Jalilov, to Central Asia in 1944 under Georgians. We should also note fact—namely, that the word ‘Azeri’ who served as Azerbaijan’s educa- Stalin’s decision accusing them that the term ‘Azerbaijani’ was was used not only as a reference tion minister in the early 1990s— of treason and espionage during used to imply some other Turkic to the hypothetical Iranian ethnic that claim the term ‘Azer’ is trace- World War II. Their destiny during groups living in the USSR (prob- group but was also encountered able back to the root ‘Az/As,’ which Soviet times is broadly discussed by ably mostly in the South Caucasus), in the discourse of the founders of was allegedly the name of an an- Ayşegül Aydıngün, Çigğdem Balım not only the Ahiska Turks. Thus, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic— cient tribe within the Turkic ethnic Harding, Matthew Hoover, Igor an editor’s comment to the 1939 has encouraged some intellectuals, group. The tribe with the name Kuznetsov, and Steve Swerdlow in Soviet population census reprinted including Ahmadli himself, to ‘Az/As’ is encountered in ancient their 2008 paper titled “Meskhetian in 1992 reads: “Many Turks living propose the consideration of the Turkic texts (more precisely, on Turks: An Introduction to their His- in the USSR were registered as term ‘Azer’ as an ethnic name for ancient monument inscriptions), tory, Culture, and Resettlement Ex- Azerbaijani in 1939. This was due Azerbaijan’s titular nation. These is mentioned by renowned Turkol- periences.” As the authors indicate, to the policy of Azerbaijanization of views are also based on the fact ogists such as V. V. Bartold and is the identity of Ahiska Turks was Turks starting from 1926. During that the word ‘Azerbaijan’ is a referred to in the Old Norse work manipulated in several different the passportization of 1930s, many geographical name and that the Prose Edda (a reference to which ways with the establishment of the Turks were registered/recorded as derivative form ‘Azerbaijani’ does served the starting point of this Soviet regime in Georgia in 1921. Azerbaijani.” not necessarily imply an ethnic essay). Jalilov also claims that the el- The early years of this regime saw affiliation. Ahmadli’s opinion is ement ‘az/as’ has survived not only the persistent denial of the Turkic e should note, however, supported, on a slightly different in the toponym ‘Azerbaijan,’ but roots of the Ahiska Turks: they Wthat the term ‘Azeri’ was not level, by some other scholars, in- also in some other toponyms such were proclaimed and presented as a pure creation stemming from the cluding Gazanfar Kazimov, who, as ‘Astrakhan,’ ‘Astara,’ ‘Kazan,’ and ethnic Georgians who were Turki- Stalinist era. As underscored a few as we noted above, think that the ‘Kaspi.’ Whether or not the afore- fied and adopted Islam during var- years ago by Badirkhan Ahmadli of term ‘Azeri/Azari,’ which appears mentioned Iranian ethnic group ious Ottoman invasions of Georgia. the Nizami Institute of Literature of as ‘al-Azariyya/al-Adariyya’ in me- ‘Azer’ and the Turkic tribe ‘Az/As’ They were nevertheless allowed to the Azerbaijan National Academy dieval Arabic resources, was used has ever existed in history is a sep- study in Turkish at school. of Sciences, the term ‘Azeri’ was to denote the language of a Turkic arate issue of inquiry, and we will used by one of the founders of the population that inhabited north- not consider it here. (Moreover, it Beginning in the mid-1920s, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, western Iran and that, therefore, is not possible to say, based on ref- Soviet policymakers started to call Mahammad Amin Rasulzade, in the term ‘Azeri’ should have been erences made by literally a few me- them ‘Turks’ and thus returned a 1919 article entitled “Azerbaijan inherited to identify the Turks of dieval scholars, whether the form their Turkic identity to them. and Iran” and elsewhere. The word Azerbaijan. We can certainly see ‘al-Azariyya/al-Adariyya’ implied

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Iranian-proper or Turkic-proper official domains. Neither is it con- observed among Azerbaijanis living n the basis of this brief ex- languages: both would be ideologi- sistent with the official language in Iran who call themselves ‘Turks.’ Oamination of identity in cally (and probably also politically) policy of Azerbaijan, with the coun- This rejection has recently been Azerbaijan, one can conclude that imbued positions.) However, as try’s Constitution, and with any made manifest more frequently we are far from imposing the use of many scholars also claim, no sub- relevant legislation, according to in public discourse, in particular this or another term as reference or stantial ground has been uncov- which the correct term for referring among Iran’s intellectuals and po- self-reference in informal discourse. ered thus far to allow us to link any both to the titular nation and to its litical activists who are ethnically People identify themselves the way of these two alleged groups to the language is ‘Azerbaijani.’ Turks. During recent television they feel comfortable or confident, toponym ‘Azerbaijan.’ debates organized for presidential and they certainly choose—for ere it is useful to recall that election candidates in Iran, Mohsun the purpose of identifying them- Hin the early 2000s discus- Mehralizade, an ethnic-Azerbaijani selves (and sometimes their com- Fostering Cohesion sions took place both at the govern- Turk candidate, protested the use patriots)—a linguistic form that mental level as well as in popular of the term ‘Azeri appeals to them onsequently, prevailing media outlets in the context of a language’ used by for a variety of Using the term of identi- Cpublic and scholarly opinion process to create localized versions his competitor, reasons. Someone in contemporary Azerbaijan does of Microsoft products. Many aca- Ibrahim Raisi, a ty contained in the Con- might choose to not support the use of the term demic voices came out against using candidate from the stitution of the Republic use the word ‘Azeri’ ‘Azeri.’ Some have sought to com- the term ‘Azeri’ in Microsoft inter- conservative wing, of Azerbaijan, and thus just because it is pare it to the shortened form ‘Brit,’ faces and commands, and some op- who thanked Azer- established as the for- easier and shorter. which has come to be used inter- erational regimes were even consid- baijani Turks for mal name of the titular Some may opt for changeably in some circles (pri- ering changing the form ‘Azeri’ into supporting him the ‘Azeri Turk’ marily in the UK) with the term ‘Azerbaijani.’ The initiative seems during his election nation and its language, form (instead of ‘British.’ To many this comparison not to have been supported by the campaign. Meh- should remain the unified ‘Azerbaijani Turk’) is fallacious, confusing, artifi- company’s implementation plan, ralizade opposed reference word in formal for the same reason. cial, and, frankly, to some degree as many operating systems still use Raisi with the fol- documents and scholarly Others may wish degrading. the form ‘Azeri.’ Many do not re- lowing words: “I literature. to identify them- gard the interface-level appearance would like to bring selves as ‘Turks,’ as There is also the argument that of the word ‘Azeri’ as an important a correction to the a reference to their the term ‘Azeri’ can neither be problem and think the reduction is word ‘Azeri’ used by Mr. Raisi. We Turkic roots. Moreover, as much as linked to any eth- applied for the pur- don’t have people who speak Azeri people are free to choose a linguistic nicity, geography, poses of linguistic in our country. Both in Western and form, so they are free to oppose a or ideology, and Consequently, prevail- economy. Eastern Azerbaijan [i.e., two Iranian term ascribed to them. therefore should be provinces], across from Hamadan, avoided. Moreover, ing public and scholarly We also cannot Zanjan, Isfahan, Ardabil, Khorasan, We will certainly continue to bear the use of the term opinion in contemporary fail to mention that and Huzistan, we have people who witness to informal discussions, so- ‘Azeri’ is also dis- Azerbaijan does not sup- the opposition to speak Turkic, not Azeri. Therefore, I cial media debates, and even media couraged in public port the use of the term the term ‘Azeri’ to think the respected presidential can- disputes sometimes imbued with discourse, and it ‘Azeri.’ denote language didate should be more careful when high emotions, mutual accusa- does not appear in is also continually using the word ‘Azeri.’” tions, annoyance, and indignation.

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However, as far as formal discourse Heinz Kloss identified as “Ausbau” is concerned, standardization in (translated variously as ‘expansion,’ usage is that towards which we ‘development,’ or ‘shaping’). should continue to aim. Using the term of identity contained in the None of these or other sim- Constitution of the Republic of ilar reasons has ever been con- Azerbaijan, and thus established sidered as a justifiable reason for as the formal name of the titular the arbitrary use of the name of nation and its language, should re- an ethnic group or its language in main the unified reference word in formal discourse, once such name formal documents and scholarly lit- has officially been established. erature. As some other ethnonyms Azerbaijani is the official name- de (e.g., Norwegian, Ukrainian) show, termined for Azerbaijan’s titular terms established as references ethnic group and its language. While to an ethnic group and/or its lan- debating these terms in academic guage do not always follow a logic journals or elsewhere is normal within which an ethnonym may and should cause no concern, and be justified linguistically. Further- while the use of a shortened form more, some languages take their is normal in informal discourse, the names from ethnic groups that are use of these various debated or con- formed—often politically, as part tracted terms as references in both of a nation-building or national official and scholarly discourse may identity-construction strategy—by add to confusion and inconsistency a principle that German linguist and should, naturally, be avoided. BD

bakudialogues.ada.edu.az

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In Israel’s case, the PLO relocated words convey meanings and values. Achieving Full Resolution to to Tunis, from where it was able to In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rebuild its power base and receive for example, the territories cap- the Karabakh Conflict support from the Soviet Union, tured by Israel in 1967 are known while Hezbollah—which didn’t even alternately as Judea and Samaria, exist at the time of the defeat of the the West Bank and Gaza, or the Steven J. Klein PLO in 1982—arose with the sup- Occupied Territories. Sometimes port of Iran to become a much more the preference of one term over an- formidable and menacing force in other for the same geographic area zerbaijan’s decisive de- While it is tempting to declare southern Lebanon than the PLO implies partisanship, but at other feat of Armenia in the the conflict over and to talk strictly had been. In the case of America’s times it is seen as a sign of neu- Second Karabakh War of post-conflict construction and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the re- trality even at the risk of offending is A certainly cause for optimism development, a handful of coun- sulting power vacuum allowed nu- one side or another. In the case of that any remaining issues be- tries have painfully learned that merous external forces to enter the the territory still under nominal tween the two countries can be such declarations can be prema- picture and disrupt the plans of the ethnic-Armenian control in Azer- resolved through diplomacy ture. For instance, in August 1982 United States. Moreover, corruption baijan, it will be referred to here as rather than military might. After Israeli Prime Minister Menachem and disorganization within the gov- Nagorno-Karabakh, in line with the all, Azerbaijan managed to re- Begin predicted that the immi- ernments established with American November 10th, 2020 statement by cover all the territories outside nent defeat of the Palestine Liber- help contributed to the deterioration the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Karabakh enclave captured ation Organization (PLO) in Leb- of stability in the region. and Russia. and occupied by Armenia since anon portended 40 years of peace; the 1990s—as well as parts of and in May 2003 U.S. President These failures provide a stern re- And a caveat: as with any regime, the former Nagorno-Karabakh George W. Bush declared “Mission minder to be cautious about pre- we in civil society who are not Autonomous Oblast itself—in Accomplished” after ousting Saddam maturely declaring a conflict to be privy to the inner-workings and addition to forcing Armenia Hussein from power in Iraq. Both over. Leaders still need to evaluate thinking of political leaders cannot to withdraw all its troops from of these declarations came back to the post-victory reality and all the know whether its leaders truly want sovereign Azerbaijani terri- haunt the respective countries that geopolitical factors that could get in peace or merely engage in rhetoric tory. However, past indisput- had believed they had put behind the way of translating their military to cover up their true intentions to able successes in other conflicts them the conflict at issue. accomplishments into permanent engage in military force to attain indicate that Azerbaijan must political gains. Then, based on the their goals. This paper takes at face be careful not to overestimate The crucial element that both of assessment of their means and alter- value statements made by Azer- its capabilities to translate the the aforementioned leaders had natives, they can plot out a strategy baijani President Ilham Aliyev at recent military triumph into missed was that they did not control based on the options that are realis- an April 2021 conference in Baku, full resolution of the Nagorno- completely the fate of the conflict tically in their power to control. co-organized by ADA University Karabakh conflict. they chose to treat as being resolved. and the Center of Analysis of In- note on language before pro- ternational Relations (AIRCenter) ceeding: language is symbol- under the banner “New Vision Steven J. Klein is an adjunct instructor at Tel Aviv University in the International A M.A. Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation. He is also a senior editor at ically powerful, particularly in so- for South Caucasus: Post-Conflict Haaretz English Edition, where he contributes articles on conflict and Israeli society. cial and political conflicts in which Development and Cooperation.”

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Aliyev expressed there a commit- region—a gesture that will require remaining and being reintegrated In contrast, Russia is, at the very ment to resolve outstanding issues action in order to assuage a people into Azerbaijan rather than aban- least, key to Azerbaijan reasserting through negotiations and to reab- traumatized by the recent fighting doning their homes and relocating full authority over the enclave— sorb the Armenians of Karabakh and steeped in a narrative of griev- to Armenia or elsewhere. if not engendering a thawing of in a spirit of peace and reconcili- ance that dates back decades. relations between Azerbaijan ation, reserving the military op- rmenia is less of a hindrance and the Karabakh Armenians. It tion only in the eventuality that Thus, the pursuit of Azerbaijan’s Ato Azerbaijan’s overall goals should also be recognized that Armenia should signal preference interests requires managing its in the wake of its military defeat. Russia has the capability of occu- for belligerency. relationships with the Armenian The country is in political disarray pying Nagorno-Karabakh beyond residents of the rump Nagorno- (and this will unlikely come to an its five-year mandate. While the Karabakh as well as Armenia and end in the wake of the June par- November 10th, 2020, peace State of Play Russia. Comparatively speaking, liamentary election). It has to di- deal makes extension of Russia’s the latter two relationships are gest the realization that it cannot peacekeeping mission contingent egarding Nagorno-Karabakh, easier, as demonstrated by Pres- compete militarily with Azerbaijan on mutual agreement by both Rthe interests of Azerbaijan are ident Aliyev’s participation and has no prospects of regaining Azerbaijan and Armenia, Putin arguably simple and easily achiev- in three-way talks with Presi- the territories it had seized in the has a record of ignoring diplo- able: to reestablish full sovereignty dent Vladimir Putin and Prime 1990s. Moreover, it cannot com- matic agreements in favor of ad- over all of its internationally- Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Jan- pete economically with Azerbaijan. vancing Russia’s own interests. recognized territory, presumably uary and the establishment of a One hopes that Armenia would In 2008, Russia de-recognized once the Russian peacekeepers high-level trilateral working group. grasp that restoring diplomatic and Georgia’s territorial integrity in withdraw from the parts of the en- Nagorno-Karabakh is more chal- economic relations best serves the order to justify its intervention in clave in which they are now present; lenging because Azerbaijan, rea- long-term interests of its people, South Ossetia, and in 2014 Moscow to repopulate those sonably, does not but it will take some time to re- de-recognized Ukraine’s territorial lands; and to revi- The pursuit of Azerbaijan’s recognize the legit- cover from the trauma of losing the integrity in order to justify its an- talize the regional imacy of the self- Second Karabakh War. In the mean- nexation of Crimea and its inter- economy. How- interests requires manag- declared Republic time, Armenia is in no position to vention in Donbass. If Russia de- ever, sovereignty ing its relationships with of Artsakh that interfere with Azerbaijan’s plans cides to stay past the expiration of is but one com- the Armenian residents claims to represent to redevelop the liberated areas or its peacekeeping mission, there is ponent. There is of the rump Nagorno- the residents of the to reassert in practice its claims virtually nothing Azerbaijan can also the question Karabakh as well as enclave, and also over the remainder of Nagorno- do to force it to leave. of what will be the Armenia and Russia. because this same Karabakh. Nor can it be ex- future of the resi- enclave, protected pected to be particularly helpful ussia is already positioning dents of Nagorno- by Russian peace- with repairing relations between Ritself as the patron of Karabakh. Aliyev has stated that keepers, has declined to engage Azerbaijan and the Karabakh Nagorno-Karabakh, which styles he considers Karabakh Armenians with Azerbaijan in any regard, Armenians, since its interest con- itself as the unrecognized Re- as Azerbaijani citizens. This is an even basic trade. Yet, the onus re- sists in arguing a case on the in- public of Artsakh. In March 2021, important statement signaling that mains on Azerbaijan to make a ternational stage that Nagorno- Duma parliamentarian Konstantin Azerbaijan does not wish to drive convincing case that the enclaves’ Karabakh must remain outside Zatulin, a member of the ruling out ethnic-Armenians from the present residents will be better off direct Azerbaijani sovereignty. United Russia party, met with two

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 42 43 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES members of the unrecognized par- Preferences and Realities dilemma is that seeking a purely longer than some may be aware: liament in Nagorno-Karabakh in diplomatic solution requires ac- Taiwan, Northern Cyprus, Western order to develop inter-parliamen- resident Aliyev has already cepting damage to one’s own inter- Sahara, Transnistria, Somaliland, tary relations, a step that could Pexpressed that his first pref- ests because one is choosing not to South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and not have been taken without Pu- erence is to settle remaining issues force the other side to back down, Kosovo. When the UN tried to tin’s consent. Then, in April 2021, through negotiations. While it unless one can bluff well enough broker talks between Serbia and Moscow reportedly summoned seems at first glance that Azerbaijan to convince the other side that the the ethnic-Albanian authorities in Arayik Harutyunyan, the self-de- holds all the cards and could finish use of military force is imminent. Kosovo, the youngest of the nine clared president of Artsakh, for the job, as it were, through mili- If Russia communicates to the entities mentioned above, the unofficial talks (Russia does not tary means as it started the job last Armenians that it will not abandon Finnish mediator Martti Ahtisaari officially recognize the enclave) in year, the presence of Russian peace- them in the eventuality of a diplo- told the Serbian negotiators in order to scold him for being too keepers severely restricts this alter- matic stalemate, then Azerbaijan 2006 that after being free of Serbian subservient to Pashinyan because native. Given the aforementioned will not be able to threaten cred- administration for seven years, doing so does not serve the en- moves Russia has made to posi- ibly military intervention and will there was no going back. If the clave’s interests. And, in late April tion itself to make Nagorno-Kara- thus have to accept idea of restoring 2021, Russia donated 15,000 doses bakh its political protectorate, some damage to Serbian rule over of its Sputnik V vaccine against it is reasonable to conclude that its interests, which Azerbaijan is attempting Kosovo seemed COVID-19 to the enclave. All these Moscow will not tolerate another can be defined as to be the first country to so daunting after moves clearly position Russia as the military campaign the way it did reintegrating Na- peacefully regain sover- just seven years, protector of Nagorno-Karabakh. in late 2020. This scenario has im- gorno-Karabakh eignty over rebel-held ter- one could imagine Considering that Putin envisions portant repercussions not only on fully into the Azer- the resistance of Russia reasserting in some fashion Azerbaijan’s military prospects to baijani political ritory that has acted as Karabakh Arme- the power it held when it formed reassert sovereignty in practice over system without an unrecognized country nians must feel the nucleus of the Soviet Union the remainder of Karabakh but also any special p for an extended period of after living without (and before that, imperial Russia), its maneuverability in negotiations. rivileges for the time. Azerbaijani rule it stands to reason that just as Russia enclave. for 30 years. has reestablished a presence in the The reason for Azerbaijan’s bar- former Soviet Socialist Republics gaining position being weaker than It may also help to remember ith these challenges in of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine it would seem to be at first glance that despite the international Wmind, let us consider con- without showing any signs of with- can be found in crisis management principle of the right of sover- structive steps Azerbaijan can take drawing, it will be reluctant to theory. The premise of this theory eignty, Azerbaijan is attempting on its own in order to bring the give up its foothold in Azerbaijan, is that one party to a conflict vio- to enter into unchartered waters long-term conflict to a satisfactory no matter the reason for its initial lates the status quo in order to ad- in the post-World War II era: to conclusion. Recall that it should re-entry. vance its own interests. In the case be the first country to peacefully not count on reciprocity from of Nagorno-Karabakh, the status regain sovereignty over rebel-held Yerevan, which is the least likely Azerbaijan must therefore tread quo of Azerbaijani sovereignty territory that has acted as an un- to make concessions but is also carefully regarding Nagorno- was violated. The aggrieved side recognized country for an ex- ultimately the least relevant to re- Karabakh in order to advance its then has a choice to respond diplo- tended period of time. Aside from integrating Nagorno-Karabakh own interests there. matically or militarily. The policy Nagorno-Karabakh, the list is into Azerbaijan. So, the focus will

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 44 45 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES be on steps in communicating Aliyev’s seemingly generous offer practically its duty if it wants the soldier with whom he was training Azerbaijan’s intentions to the to receive Azerbaijani citizenship best chance of Karabakh Armenians as part of a NATO exercise and wel- Karabakh Armenians and to is likely to be interpreted as a to submit to Azerbaijani authority. coming him back as a national hero Moscow. The less safe the en- similar trap. And, as many Pales- Moreover, messaging is a neces- in 2012; referring to or likening clave’s ethnic-Armenian residents tinians refuse to do business with sary if not a sufficient condition Armenians to fascists, dogs, barbar- feel about living again under Israel as part of a greater anti- for reconciliation. ians, or vandals; and calling for an Azerbaijani rule (in whatever normalization campaign, so it active struggle with Armenia. The form), the less likely Russia will seems that Karabakh Armenians Consistency is also crucial. The ubiquitous billboard campaign that be willing to agree to withdraw are avoiding normalization with Palestinians have long undercut Karabakh is Azerbaijan—albeit in its peacekeepers. On the other Azerbaijan. their own credibility by making response to Pashinyan’s statement hand, if Russia will be convinced pro-peace pronouncements that Karabakh is Armenia—was that the security of Karabakh n Nagorno-Karabakh, we are abroad in English but bellig- also a rallying cry for Azerbaijanis Armenians is guaranteed—and that Iwitnessing already negative at- erent and antisemitic remarks in to back the campaign to regain ter- it has nothing more to gain by an titudes toward Azerbaijanis hard- Arabic at home in public speeches, ritory that they otherwise may not extended occupation—then it will ened over 30 years of occupation, on local media, and in the school have felt due to its geographic isola- be more likely to withdraw and a consequence of which is that, system. When preparing one’s tion. All these gestures and slogans allow Azerbaijan to reassert full notwithstanding the outcome of people for potential war, as served a purpose in unifying Azer- control of the enclave. the Second Karabakh War, very Azerbaijan did in recent years, baijanis behind last year’s war, but few ethnic-Armenians consider such mixed messaging is more un- they were also not lost on the Kara- The first priority should be to friendship to be possible with derstandable because the outcome bakh Armenians, who fear what the continue signaling Azerbaijan’s Azerbaijanis or seem willing to do of the conflict is uncertain. How- implications are for their long-term readiness to reengage with the business with them. The departure ever, in a post-conflict environ- well-being should they be reinte- Karabakh Armenians, which can of ethnic-Armenians from the areas ment mixed messaging undercuts grated into Azerbaijan. be conducted unilaterally. How- retaken by Azerbaijan during the peace and reconciliation efforts ever, Azerbaijan has to consider fighting or ceded back to Azerbaijan whilst signaling that violence is The starkness of the mixed how such messages would be in- through the agreement to end the still a preference despite protesta- messaging may have grown terpreted on the Armenian side. war indicates the lack of trust they tions to the contrary. even greater in wake of the war. Given the low level of trust, the have in the Azerbaijani regime. Azerbaijan seems to be doubling Armenians are likely to reactively Karabakh Armenians clearly suffer zerbaijan is a case in point. down on its messaging, in par- devalue Azerbaijani gestures. East from a security dilemma, fearful AIn years past, even as ticular with the War Trophies Jerusalem Palestinians and Golan of and opposed to a future in Azerbaijan pursued the diplomatic Museum. While the intent may Druze living in the territories oc- Azerbaijan because they appear to route to resolving the conflict over be to glorify last year’s victory cupied by Israel since 1967 have be unable to conceive how such a Nagorno-Karabakh, the coun- and reinforce support for the war refused Israel’s offer to apply for future would work. try’s leadership, including Presi- itself in the Azerbaijani psyche, citizenship as a diplomatic trap, dent Aliyev, also engaged in anti- some outside observers have been because doing so would be con- However, Armenian intransi- Armenian or belligerent messaging. shocked and disappointed by what ceding to Israel that it has the right gence need not deter Azerbaijan. Such examples include pardoning they perceive as a dehumaniza- of sovereignty over their respective As the official sovereign authority, Ramil Safarov, who was convicted tion of Armenians. For Arme- areas. For Karabakh Armenians, breaking down that resistance is of axing to death an Armenian nians, the public display provides

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 46 47 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES further confirmation for their biases Karabakh Armenians as part of a Azerbaijan’s primary concern Russian protectors that trade is against Azerbaijan as a regime that greater truth and reconciliation in the region must be and nat- a peace trap that fails to address cannot be trusted to resume rule over commission. It should be clear on urally is focused on the repop- their security dilemmas once they Nagorno-Karabakh. Meanwhile, the the message that there will be no ulation of its liberated lands, are at the mercy of Azerbaijani continued “Karabakh is Azerbaijan” retribution for the events of the this process will take years. In authorities. campaign also reinforces the percep- 1990s—if Azerbaijan is willing to the meantime, Azerbaijan can tion among Karabakh Armenians make that concession—but also that exploit its renewed access to he most effective strategy for that they have no future in Azerbaijan. it wants to hear from the Karabakh Nagorno-Karabakh by offering TAzerbaijan to make the case Armenians their grievances and ex- trade opportunities to its resi- that Karabakh Armenians can feel periences to understand what fears dents, even though it is expected safe and secure under its rule is What Can Baku Do? prevent them from being willing to to be rebuffed in the near future. to offer a form of local self-gover- live under Azerbaijani rule. nance. However, hat can be done to ease Trade is one Azerbaijan is Wthe anxiety of Karabakh While it is reasonable to expect area in which The paradox of self-rule is hardly inclined Armenians and increase the confi- Azerbaijan to continue to be critical Nagorno-Karabakh that the greater the com- to make such an dence of Russia without compro- of the Armenian government, dis- may follow Armenia’s offer. After all, mising on Azerbaijani interests? tinction should be made between lead if Azerbaijan petencies granted, the Armenia rejected Doing so requires a multi-step pro- the regime and the people. Elimi- can make progress more levels are created previous offers cess that involves more than trying nating Armenophobic comments on that front with for peaceful bargaining, of autonomy for to convince Karabakh Armenians is a simple solution, especially for its neighbor. The the less likely a region is Nagorno- that they have leaders so sensitive further along plans going to be secessionist. Karabakh in the nothing to fear but to the Turkophobia to develop east-west failed negotia- rather letting them What can be done to ease that prevails in trade extending be- tions of the 2000s know that they the anxiety of Karabakh Armenia. Going a yond the Lachin corridor and and 2010s. Azerbaijan is in a strong and their concerns Armenians and increase step further would north-south trade based on the enough position to deny Nagorno- are being heard the confidence of Russia involve messaging old Soviet-era trade routes, the Karabakh self-governance and no and addressed. that emphasizes more tempted Karabakh Arme- longer needs to make such a conces- Messaging should without compromising on Azerbaijan’s mul- nians will be to access these op- sion to Armenia, which is powerless focus on the no- Azerbaijani interests? ticulturalism and portunities, especially if Armenia is to stop it from imposing its own tion that Karabakh its commitment exploiting them. rule. Aliyev himself has ruled out Armenians will be able to maintain to finding a place for Karabakh such an arrangement in the wake of some measure of control over their Armenians in Azerbaijani society. Still, it must be recognized that victory. The most he seems inclined lives, that they will be able to enjoy trade on Azerbaijan’s terms can to offer is cultural autonomy, which economic prosperity, and that they uch positive rhetoric needs also be viewed by wary Kara- was mentioned during the war in will enjoy political and civil rights. Spractical reinforcement to be bakh Armenians as recognizing October 2020. Besides, autonomy perceived as credible. This goal the legitimacy of Baku’s sover- is often perceived as an invita- It would be helpful for can be achieved by investing in eignty. Thus, they may see their tion to secessionism, the last thing Azerbaijan to set up a team on Nagorno-Karabakh’s microeco- interests in continued resistance Azerbaijan would want to reestablishing communication with nomy with Russia’s help. While and making the case to their encourage.

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However, fears of self-gover- While Nagorno-Karabakh is agreement is that disputes within Armenian rebel leaders to invade nance, which can run the gamut too small and too weak to de- the region are submitted to the In- the enclave. Moreover, it would not from granting limited local au- mand self-governance, the issue ternational Court of Justice in the enjoy any favorite status above that thority over schools and health remains on the table because its Hague. The arrangement has al- of Nakhchivan, so there is a prec- services to full autonomy, are mis- withholding will lead to one of two lowed it to become a prosperous edent for such an arrangement. guided. In fact, the paradox of self- scenarios: either the Russians will area that is a bridge to trade be- However, given the statements rule is that the greater the compe- refuse to withdraw from Nagorno- tween Italy and Austria and con- made by Azerbaijan’s president, this tencies granted, the more levels are Karabakh or, if Baku can still pre- tributes significant tax revenue to option is less likely to be considered created for peaceful bargaining, the vail upon Moscow to pull out, the Rome—truly a win-win situation. despite the advantages it offers. less likely a region is going to be Armenians will empty out Nagorno- secessionist. Increased autonomy Karabakh. If Azerbaijan is fine This option, while in many ways third option then is to focus weakened the secessionist move- with the prospect of a depopulated ideal, is in all likelihood not an ar- Aon local self-governance. ment in Canada’s Quebec and the Nagorno-Karabakh, that is its rangement the current leadership The basis would be Chapter IX of UK’s Scotland, prerogative. This in Azerbaijan would entertain for a the Constitution of the Republic while efforts to re- paper proceeds number of reasons. Besides the fact of Azerbaijan. However, adhering strict autonomy in What would be the ideal upon the presump- that such arrangements have been strictly to Chapter IX seems un- Spain’s Catalonia form of self-governance, tion, based on agreed between friendlier coun- likely to allay the fears of Karabakh and Yugoslavia’s one that serves both the President Aliyev’s tries that enjoyed relative parity in Armenians. It may require commu- Serbian province interests of the central recent statements, power, Baku would be understand- nicating with Karabakh Armenian of Kosovo raised government in Baku and that he would ably loathe to give favorable status representatives through the Rus- secessionist fervor the future residents of prefer that they to an ethnic-Armenian enclave that sians and selling a package deal that in those coun- remain there, as had rebelled against its authority. Moscow find acceptable, which tries. States like Sri Nagorno-Karabakh? Azerbaijani citi- the Kremlin in turn could convey Lanka that denied zens, in which case A second option would be to to the Karabakh Armenians as a minority calls for federalism or he will need to offer some form of award Nagorno-Karabakh au- take-it-or-leave-it offer before the local autonomy faced greater civil self-governance. tonomy on the same level as the inevitable handover of power. unrest or even civil war. Nakhchivan Autonomous Re- hat would be the ideal public, as per Chapter VIII, A more favorable arrangement Azerbaijanis might look at their So- Wform of self-governance, Articles 134-141 of the Constitu- would expand the powers of the viet past as an example of a federation one that serves both the interests of tion of the Republic of Azerbaijan. local government beyond those that broke up, but federal arrange- the central government in Baku and This would, of course, require a elicited in Chapter VIII, Article 144 ments like the ones in the Soviet the future residents of Nagorno- constitutional amendment, but of the Constitution of the Republic Union and Yugoslavia had been es- Karabakh? The most successful ar- President Aliyev could sell this ar- of Azerbaijan. Enhanced powers tablished without the consent of the rangements involve full autonomy rangement to the Azerbaijani public could include judiciary powers leadership (and residents) of the indi- in exchange for a binding agree- as a grand gesture to the people of for strictly local affairs, providing vidual federal and autonomous units. ment that rules out the option of Nagorno-Karabakh, the vast ma- administrative services, health That is why these sham federations secession. The model agreement jority of whom did not have a say services, education, and policing. spurred grievances and separatism is South Tyrol in Italy. One of the in the decision of the Armenian Returning ethnic-Azerbaijanis in places like Nagorno-Karabakh. keys to South Tyrol’s autonomy government or the Karabakh would receive proportional

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 50 51 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES representation. The unrecog- type arrangement could be made Modus Vivendi hand in the negotiations. How- nized Artsakh regime already whereby the Armenian-dominated ever, should they stay in defiance handles all these competencies, raions would have veto power ould any these arrange- of Baku’s wishes, the Karabakh so it could transition to doing so over any laws that adversely affect Wments be acceptable to Armenians would then be able under supervision of and in con- ethnic-Armenian heritage or lan- either Azerbaijan or the Karabakh to up their demands. Thus, if the junction with the central authori- guage rights in their districts—of Armenians? I expect resistance on Azerbaijani state truly wants the ties in Baku, after adjustments for course, in exchange for ethnic- both sides due to Azerbaijan’s cur- Karabakh Armenians to remain Azerbaijani licensing and regu- Azerbaijanis returning to those rent perception of its bargaining within a reunited Azerbaijan, it is latory standards, curricula, and raions having equal veto rights over power and the lack of trust on the ultimately in Azerbaijan’s interest laws. To fulfill Aliyev’s idea of the local government regarding any Armenian side. However, some- to find that modus vivendi sooner cultural autonomy, a permanent local bylaw adversely affecting their where in between them lies the only rather than later. It will take much joint antiquities authority should own heritage or language. modus vivendi. If there is no viable hard work to regain the resident be established to preserve ethnic- bargaining zone, either Russia will Armenians’ confidence, and if choose to retain its peacekeepers not theirs, then at least that of the Armenian heritage as well as the Speaking of which, language would in Nagorno-Karabakh, to Baku’s Russians so that they would be heritage of other ethnic communi- be an issue, so provisions would have chagrin, or the Armenians of willing convincingly to sell the idea ties in Nagorno-Karabakh. to be made to allow initially for the Nagorno-Karabakh will choose to to the Karabakh Armenians. use of Armenian in the legal sphere, The biggest steps short of au- depart with the Russians, which even though Azerbaijan is the state’s tonomy, however, would be to would be a human tragedy. Ultimately, Azerbaijan holds the sole official language. Article 45 of close the circle on the divisions fate of the Karabakh Armenians in the Constitution of the Republic of of the First Karabakh War, which The period between now and its hands, and one can only hope Azerbaijan does state that “everyone include the abolishing of the orig- November 2025 is crucial. As long that it will choose to turn the page has the right to use his/her native inal Nagorno-Karabakh Auton- as the accepted wisdom is that the on the recent bloody history of the omous Oblast and the redistri- language” and that “nobody may peacekeepers will leave at that point two peoples and usher in a new era bution of its territory among the be deprived of right to use his/her (in line with the terms of the peace of peace, prosperity, and fruitful co- neighboring administrative raions. mother tongue.” Thus, it would deal), Azerbaijan has the upper existence. BD Such adjustments and commit- not be a stretch to make a special ments could also go a long way in provision for Armenian to be used keeping Karabakh Armenians in in an official capacity within - Na place, once they realize that ab- gorno-Karabakh. Help should be sorption into Azerbaijan is inevi- offered with translation services—at table. The administrative bound- least during a transition period—in aries could be redrawn to keep the order to help comply with require- Armenian towns together. Leg- ments to use the official language in bakudialogues.ada.edu.az islation could be passed to guar- official documents, state enterprises, antee that the district head ap- and organizations, or to understand pointed by the president will be official statutes and rulings, as noted a local resident, i.e., a Karabakh in Articles 8-14 of the Constitution Armenian. Finally, a consociational of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

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five years along the contact line extremely important process for Spotlight on Normalization in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the future return, in the coming the Lachin corridor route to pro- years, of Azerbaijani internally dis- vide security arrangements for the placed persons (IDPs)—originally Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations in the Armenian minority residing in the from the Jabrayil, Fuzuli, Zangilan, mountainous part of Karabakh. Gubadli, Agdam, Kalbajar, Wake of the Second Karabakh War and Lachin districts, as well as Third, Turkey and Russia, repre- from the territory of the former senting two different intergovern- Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Gulshan Pashayeva mental military alliances—namely, Oblast (NKAO)—to their perma- NATO and the Collective Security nent places of residence that were ore than half a year has demanding the immediate, com- Treaty Organization (CSTO)— for occupied by Armenian armed passed since the end of plete, and unconditional with- the first time formalized coopera- forces. The UNHCR has been as- the Second Karabakh drawal of Armenian armed forces tion anywhere in the post-Soviet signed to oversee this task. At the WarM and the signing of the Mos- from the occupied Azerbaijani ter- space through the establishment same time, Armenians from the cow-brokered trilateral statement ritories. At the same time, a new of a joint Turkish-Russian Center Nagorno-Karabakh conflict area who by the President of the Republic of political reality has emerged in the for control over the ceasefire and fled to Armenia during the Second Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of region as a result of the war. This the cessation of all hostilities in the Karabakh War have also been gradu- the Republic of Armenia, and the has brought about at least seven Nagorno-Karabakh conflict area, in ally returning to their homes. President of the Russian Federation implications: compliance with a memorandum on a complete ceasefire and a ces- signed by the defense chiefs of both Sixth, there is now a window of sation of all hostilities in the zone First, for the first time, an countries on November 11th, 2020. opportunity for the normalization of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. occupation was brought to an end of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations through a combination of mili- Fourth, by signing a second tri- if Armenia concentrates on its own These developments have ended tary and political means in one of lateral statement on January 11th, internationally recognized sover- the almost 30-year-long illegal the protracted ethno-territorial 2021, the President of the Republic eign territory and withdraws ter- Armenian occupation, restoring conflicts in the post-Soviet space. of Azerbaijan, the Prime Min- ritorial claims against Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. ister of the Republic of Armenia, After recognizing one another’s They have also contributed to the Second, for the first time, a peace- and the President of the Russian territorial integrity, Armenia and ultimate implementation of nu- keeping operation was initiated Federation paved the way for the Azerbaijan can, in the future, sign a merous decisions and resolutions in this conflict zone. According to development of cross-border trans- formal peace treaty. adopted by various international the terms of the aforementioned portation routes and boosting eco- organizations, including four November 10th, 2020, trilateral nomic growth to benefit the overall Seventh, Armenia and Turkey resolutions of the UN Security statement, 1,960 Russian peace- region. could also normalize their bilateral Council (822, 853, 874, and 884) keepers are deployed for at least relations if Armenia withdraws its Fifth, today, consistent work territorial claims against Turkey Gulshan Pashayeva is a Board Member of the Baku-based Center of Analysis by Azerbaijan towards post-con- and both countries find common of International Relations (AIR Center) whose areas of expertise include conflict flict reconstruction is ongoing in ground relating to the tragic events resolution and security studies, gender, and language policy issues. the liberated territories. This is an of 1915. The reconciliation of these

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 54 55 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES two nations could also, eventu- post-conflict environments estab- Armenian Army but also caused Unfortunately, the process of se- ally, become very beneficial for the lished in Azerbaijan and Armenia political turmoil and plunged the rious reflection on the causes of further development of the South after the Second Karabakh War. country into a political crisis amid Armenia’s failure in the Second Caucasus. the apathy of the population. Karabakh War has not yet begun in On the one hand, there is Armenia because, for such recogni- hus, if the processes of normal- a common understanding in Such a reaction from Armenian so- tion to occur, it is necessary first to Tization between Armenia and Azerbaijan that the Armenia- ciety is unsurprising because, over the destroy many fundamental myths Azerbaijan and between Armenia Azerbaijan conflict in and around years, the Azerbaijani territories occu- that underlie modern Armenian and Turkey take the Karabakh re- pied during the First Karabakh War statehood. place, these could gion has been re- were presented in lead not only to the If the processes of normal- solved. “Now we Armenia as a return Following the Unfortunately, the pro- opening of the bor- ization between Armenia need to look into of “historical lands” resignation of the ders between them the future. Despite and a restoration of cess of serious reflection Armenian Prime and Azerbaijan and be- but also contribute 30 years of occupa- historical justice. In on the causes of Arme- Minister, Nikol tween Armenia and to regional stability tion and large-scale fact, by mytholo- nia’s failure in the Second Pashinyan, a snap and development Turkey take place, these destruction and gizing the past, Ar- parliamentary elec- Karabakh War has not as well as lead to could lead not only to devastation on the menia’s ideologists tion will take place yet begun in Armenia. trans-regional co- the opening of the bor- liberated territo- tried to establish on June 20th, 2021 operation among ders between them but ries, Azerbaijan is Armenian ethno-na- (this essay was fi- the three South ready to look to the tionalism. However, nalized in the days Caucasian states also contribute to region- future—to plan its the people who utilize such mytho- before this election). However, the and the wider real stability and develop- future as part of an logical manipulation subsequently situation in Armenia is unstable, gion. At the same ment as well as lead to integrated South become the victims of their own con- and a struggle for political leader- time, it would trans-regional cooper- Caucasus region,” struct, losing touch with reality as a ship is currently under way. create an enabling ation among the three stated Azerbaijani result. Incidentally, in a November environment that President Ilham 2020 interview with the BBC, Gerard here are also questions re- South Caucasian states could be more con- Aliyev during an Libaridian, who served as an adviser Tgarding the future role of ducive for future and the wider region. online discussion to the first president of Armenia, the OSCE Minsk Group, which dialogue and in- organized by the Levon Ter-Petrosian, touched upon has been involved in the medi- teractions between Nizami Ganjavi the main reasons behind the defeat of ation process of the Armenia- Armenians and Azerbaijanis, on International Center on May 20th, Armenia and underlined that the origins Azerbaijan conflict in and around the one hand, and Armenians and 2021. of Armenia’s current problems are con- the Karabakh region since 1992. Turks, on the other. nected with the fact that the elite—in the After the Second Karabakh War, the On the other hand, the situation interview he uses the pronoun “we”— role this institution could play going However, today there are certain is in stark contrast in post-con- gave the people incorrect informa- forward seems rather uncertain. thorny issues that create obstacles flict Armenia. The humiliating de- tion and erroneous analysis, offered Today, it is mainly Russia that is ac- to moving from war rhetoric into feat of this country in the Second unrealistic scenarios as possible tive in the region as a peacekeeper a peace agenda, which are closely Karabakh War not only shattered solutions, and pushed nationalism and mediator of the various issues intertwined with the different the myth of the invincibility of the instead of statehood. breaking out between Armenia and

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Azerbaijan. It is very likely that this politicization of protection of To date, the negative effects of the of all its conflict-affected territo- dissatisfies the two other Co-chairs religious and cultural heritage, im- Armenian occupation have only ries. Thus, for the year 2021, $1.3 of the Minsk Group, namely France pediments to opening of transport started to come to light. The facts billion has been allocated for the and the United States: presumably, and economic communications, on the ground are heartbreaking, restoration of infrastructure—in they too would like to be engaged and raising the question of the so- owing to the enormous extent particular gas, water, electricity, in these processes. However, on called issue of Karabakh’s “status” of the destruction committed by and communications, as well as the one hand, after the Second by Armenia, and a divergence of Armenians in the occupied cultural and historical monuments. Karabakh War France’s support opinion on the future role of the Azerbaijani territories. Although Work related to the finalization of a for Armenia’s position to a certain OSCE Minsk Group are among there was some information from state program on “The Restoration degree jeopardizes its impartiality the most contested subjects. Mean- books written by foreign authors and Sustainable Development of as a Co-chair of the OSCE Minsk while, in the mid-to-long term, the and video footage from interna- Territories of the Rpublic of Group. On the other hand, the reintegration of both Azerbaijanis tional media sources on Karabakh, Azerbaijan Liberated from recognition in April 2021 by U.S. and Armenians into Azerbaijan’s the dawning of the reality is nev- Occupation for 2021-2025” is also President Joe Biden of the 1915 newly rebuilt Karabakh region ertheless almost beyond compre- nearing completion. events as a “genocide” could also should be considered. hension. Not only were virtually have a negative impact on the nor- all the homes of around 700,000 It is envisaged that these territo- malization of the Armenian-Turkish Azerbaijani IDPs destroyed, but in ries will be turned into a green en- relationship and could also compli- Security Challenges complete ruin also lie public build- ergy zone. In fact, the construction cate relations between Armenia and ings, schools, hospitals, mosques, of “smart villages” and “smart cities” Azerbaijan. n the period between the First cultural and historical monu- in the liberated Zangilan district Iand Second Karabakh Wars, ments, and cemeteries in the liber- has already been announced by the Thus, despite the (so-far) only ethnic-Armenians lived in the ated territories. Azerbaijani government. The first near-complete implementation of decimated Azerbaijani towns and “smart village” pilot project will both the November 10th, 2020, villages of the former NKAO and the he Azerbaijani government cover three Aghali villages of the and January 11th, 2021, trilat- seven occupied Azerbaijani districts Thas made it clear that the total Zangilan district, where 200 indi- eral statements, certain pressing adjacent to it. During this period, material damage caused to the Azer- vidual houses are planned to be issues and concerns still remain Armenia “exercise[d] effective baijani territories when they were built initially. This project will be unresolved, which complicate control” over the entirety of the under Armenian occupation will implemented within the following the normalization of relations be- then-occupied territory, as the Eu- be calculated with the participation five components: housing, - man tween Azerbaijan and Armenia. ropean Court of Human Rights’ of international institutions so that ufacturing, social services, “smart In the short term, Armenia’s re- judgment in Chiragov and Others v. Armenia could be held account- agriculture,” and alternative energy. fusal to provide information Armenia (2015) made clear. Only able to pay compensation before Additionally, all residential houses, about minefield locations, com- after the Second Karabakh War international courts in the future. social facilities, and public catering plications in the delineation of the and the November 10th, 2020, tri- facilities will be provided with Armenian-Azerbaijani interna- lateral statement is there now a At the same time, following the alternative energy sources. tional border, misinterpretation prospect of visiting these territories November 10th, 2020, trilateral by Armenia of the situation with and grasping the full scope of the statement, the Azerbaijani gov- Concurrently, work has already respect to the Armenian detainees reality hidden from the Azerbaijani ernment has started a process of begun on the construction of new remaining in Azerbaijan’s custody, people’s eyes for almost three decades. reconstruction and restoration highways, railways, and airports—

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 58 59 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES precursors to developing master Following the liberation of its petition calling on Armenia to re- territories of Azerbaijan results in plans for rebuilding cities in the lib- territories, Azerbaijan has started lease the location of mines and the gross violation of the rights and erated areas in order to accelerate to carry out operations to clear the UXOs in the liberated territories, and freedoms envisaged in the ECHR. the process of the safe and digni- mines, unexploded munitions, and this is one of the most signed petitions Azerbaijan also requested that the fied return of Azerbaijani IDPs to other hazards left behind by Arme- on the change.org website to date. Court urgently grant interim mea- their places of origin. At the time of nian forces. As of early June 2021, sures and place an obligation on writing, approximately 600 km of nearly 35,000 mines and UXOs On February 22nd, 2021, Armenia to submit the maps and all roads in seven directions and 158 have been cleared from over 9,106 Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister relevant information indicating the km of railways in two directions hectares in the liberated territories. Jeyhun Bayramov wrote to UN location of landmines. are being built; also, one airport is Secretary-General Antonio Gu- already being built in Fuzuli and Nevertheless, the provision of terres and requested that he urge hus, Armenia’s refusal to fully two more airports will be built in detailed and accurate information Armenia to release the location of Tprovide information about Zangilan and Lachin districts in the about the location of the mines is minefields in Azerbaijan’s liberated minefield locations creates a - se time ahead. Here we can add that paramount to save human lives and territories. In his rious obstacle for the master plan for the reconstruc- accelerate the post-conflict recon- letter, the min- effective demining tion of the city of Agdam has already struction process. Between the end of ister stressed that Armenia’s refusal to ful- and the prevention been developed and approved. the Second Karabakh War and early “Armenia’s consis- ly provide information of further casual- June 2021, more than 120 Azerbai- tent disregard of our about minefield locations ties. As this edition janis, both servicemen and civilians, repeated appeals to of Baku Dialogues Minefields have been injured or killed in mine release information creates a serious obsta- was going to press, explosions in the liberated territories. on the location of cle for effective demining a welcome devel- owever, there are certain the minefields seri- and the prevention of fur- opment took place Hpressing security challenges It is obvious that without this data, ously questions that ther casualties. that appears to rep- that need to be overcome in real- tragic deaths and injuries on the lib- country’s sincerity resent a harbinger izing these goals. One of them is erated territories will continue hap- for a normalization for a more con- Armenia’s refusal to fully provide pening. Just recently, on June 4th, of relations with Azerbaijan on the structive approach on this and the information about minefield loca- 2021, a vehicle carrying a group of basis of mutual recognition of and related issue of detainees. tions. The liberated Azerbaijani ter- Azerbaijani journalists was struck by respect for each other’s sovereignty, ritories are one of the world’s most an anti-tank mine in the liberated territorial integrity, and inviolability On June 12th, 2021, after ex- mine-contaminated areas, containing Kalbajar district. As a result, two of international borders.” treme pressure was applied on numerous anti-personnel and an- journalists and one public servant Armenia by various countries and ti-tank mines as well as unexploded were killed, and four others were Recently Azerbaijan also lodged international organizations, the ordinance (UXO). Hundreds of hospitalized with various injuries. its second interstate application Armenian side agreed to transfer the thousands of landmines were planted against Armenia with the Euro- maps of 97,000 anti-tank and anti- there by Armenian forces throughout ut again, to reiterate: Ar- pean Court of Human Rights personnel mines planted during its the years of occupation and during Bmenia has, until now, refused (ECHR), informing the Court that occupation in the Agdam district the agreed withdrawal from these to fully provide information about the continuing refusal by Armenia of Azerbaijan in exchange for 15 territories in the immediate wake of minefield locations to Azerbaijan. to hand over the location of the Armenian detainees in Azerbaijan’s the Second Karabakh War. Over 15,000 people have signed a minefields in the liberated custody.

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Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry After the Second Karabakh War spokesperson Leyla Abdullayeva has In contrast, Russia had pro- expressed its appreciation for and the subsequent Moscow- stressed that Azerbaijan merely con- posed setting up a joint Armenian- the support of the Georgian gov- brokered trilateral statement of tinues to strengthen its border pro- Azerbaijani commission on the ernment headed by the Prime November 10th, 2020, when the tection system within the framework delimitation and demarcation of Minister of Georgia, Irakli Garib- seven districts adjacent to former of the country’s territorial integrity, borders, with the participation of ashvili, for the implementation NKAO previously occupied by adding that this process is performed Russia as a consultant or medi- of this humanitarian action. It Armenia fell back under Azerbaijan’s based on maps defining the bor- ator. However, Armen Grigoryan, also acknowledged the media- control, this section of the border derline between the two countries, Secretary of the Security Council tion role of U.S. Secretary of State between Armenia and Azerbaijan which the Armenian side also has. of Armenia, has said that demar- Antony Blinken, Acting Assistant returned to its previous, Soviet Abdullayeva further noted that any cation work could not start until Secretary of State for European geography. Thus, the Armenian- disagreements between the parties Azerbaijani troops leave what he and Eurasian Affairs Philip Azerbaijani international border on border issues should be resolved termed Armenian territory. On Reeker, the President of the Eu- now borders the Syunik, Vayots by political and diplomatic means. the other hand, Azerbaijan backs ropean Council Charles Michel, Dzor and Gegharkunik provinces Russia’s proposal to establish a and the Swedish Chairmanship of Armenia and the Zangilan, However, for more than a month trilateral commission on the de- of the OSCE for their respective Gubadli, Lachin, and Kalbajar dis- the Armenian side has tried to po- limitation and demarcation of the contributions to the process. tricts of Azerbaijan. However, it is still liticize these border tensions as well Azerbaijani-Armenian border, as difficult for local Armenians to read- as aggravate the situation further Azerbaijan’s Prime Minister Ali Hopefully, this process will con- just to this new reality and reconcile by various provocative acts and Asadov made clear at the meeting tinue and the Armenian side will themselves to this new landscape. statements. For example, on several of the CIS Council of Heads of fully provide information about occasions Pashinyan has appealed Government that took place on minefield locations to prevent In fact, there have been recent to the CSTO to hold consultations May 28th, 2021, in Minsk. further civilian casualties. tensions along the Armenian- on this issue (in doing so, he cited Azerbaijani international border. Article 2 of the organization’s ne day earlier, the Azerbai- The situation was exacerbated on Treaty), as well as a number of Ojani Defense Ministry an- Border Delineation May 12th, 2021, when the Arme- other heads of state. nounced that it had detained six nian side accused Azerbaijan of de- Armenian servicemen near the he second pressing secu- ploying hundreds of troops on the Interestingly, the CSTO’s re- village of Yukhary Ayrim in the Trity challenge currently is eastern border of Armenia around sponse has been quite restrained: Kalbajar district. These soldiers the delineation of the Armenian- the Karagol/Sev lake area; how- no support has so far been forth- stand accused of trying to mine Azerbaijani international border. ever, the Azerbaijani side has de- coming to Yerevan’s position, supply routes leading to the po- Because of the Armenian occupa- nied crossing the border, stating notwithstanding the fact that sitions of the Azerbaijani Armed tion, Azerbaijan was able to con- that its forces were only defending Armenia, unlike Azerbaijan, is a Forces deployed at the state border trol only partially its international their sovereign territory and that member state of this military al- with Armenia. The Armenian border with Armenia. At the same Azerbaijan was restoring its interna- liance. On the other hand, coun- Defense Ministry, in its turn, con- time, neither delimitation nor tionally recognized borders. tries such as France have called firmed that six of its soldiers had demarcation processes have been for Armenia’s territorial integrity been taken prisoner, but empha- implemented between these two Commenting on this border inci- to be respected and for Azerbaijan sized that they were trying to carry states over the years. dent, Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry to pull back its troops. out engineering work in the border

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 62 63 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES area of the Gegharkunik prov- two states based on relevant official Karabakh War clearly states that civilian. Of these 62 saboteurs, 14 ince of Armenia. At the same time, maps. This process, he continued, is the “exchange of prisoners of war were charged under the relevant Pashinyan urged international ob- carried out through direct technical and other detainees and bodies of articles of the Criminal Code of servers to be sent from Russia or contacts between the parties and with the dead shall be carried out.” Since Azerbaijan, and the indictment other OSCE Minsk Group countries the participation of border services, that time, in accordance with its approved by the country’s Deputy to this section of Armenia’s border as a result of which border issues in obligations under this agreement, Prosecutor General was sent to with Azerbaijan. the liberated Gubadli, Kalbajar, and Azerbaijan has released and repatri- court for consideration. In addi- Zangilan districts have been resolved. ated more than 70 Armenians in its tion, a criminal investigation has On June 1st, 2021, another Furthermore, the letter goes on to custody who were entitled to POW been completed against 13 other provocation was prevented by say, even after the joint demarcation status. Azerbaijan also found and suspected members of this illegal Azerbaijani Armed Forces when of the border in those geographies, handed over to the Armenian side armed group and has also been about 40 Armenian soldiers pene- Azerbaijan allows Armenian citizens the bodies of nearly 1,600 Arme- sent to the court in Azerbaijan. trated into Azerbaijan’s territory near to use the Goris-Kafan highway, nian soldiers. However, Armenia Meanwhile, as a humanitarian ges- the village Armudlu of the Kalbajar part of which passes through the has not yet released information on ture, Azerbaijan released and repa- district. With no use of weaponry, territory of Azerbaijan. Against the whereabouts of close to 4,000 triated first ten then an additional they were immediately driven back this background, it seems highly Azerbaijanis who went missing four members of this group back to from the territory of Azerbaijan. likely that Armenia’s provoca- during the First Karabakh War. Armenia. tive campaign in the Karagol/Sev These and similar developments lake area is mainly aimed at fur- n the other hand, in the However, provocations along showcase that, perhaps, there are thering domestic political goals in Operiod after the trilateral the Armenian-Azerbaijani interna- certain political circles in Armenia Armenia’s pre-election process. statement was signed, various tional border have continued: re- that are interested in causing prov- Armenian sabotage groups connaissance-sabotage groups were ocations in the areas bordering have tried to cross illegally into sent to the territory of Azerbaijan Azerbaijan in order to increase Detainees Azerbaijan with the aim of engaging by Armenia on May 27th, 2021, and tensions and internationalize the in sabotage and terrorist activities. then again on June 1st, 2021. While issue of delineating the Armenian- he third security challenge One of such groups, consisting of six Armenian servicemen from two Azerbaijani border. At the same Trevolves around the situa- 62 Armenian citizens, was detained reconnaissance-sabotage groups time, it is clear that this issue be- tion regarding Armenian detainees on December 13th, 2020, as a re- were detained while planting mines came even more complicated due to remaining in Azerbaijan’s custody. sult of a joint anti-terror operation on May 27th, 2021, 40 Armenian the electoral campaign in Armenia. Unfortunately, due to the misrep- conducted by Azerbaijan’s State servicemen who were trying to in- resentation and distortion of facts Security Service and its Ministry of filtrate into Azerbaijani territory Here we can refer to a letter sent to by the Armenian government, this Defense. Prior to its capture, this were, as mentioned previously, UN Secretary-General Guterres by issue has not been perceived clearly group had been suspected of com- immediately driven back by the Azerbaijan’s Permanent Represen- and objectively by the international mitting a series of terrorist attacks Azerbaijani Army with no use of tative to the United Nations Yashar community to date. against Azerbaijani military ser- weaponry on June 1st, 2021. Aliyev on June 7th, 2021. Therein, the vicemen and civilians in the coun- Azerbaijani diplomat indicates that Article 8 of the Moscow-brokered try’s Khojavend district, causing In addition, the court convicted Baku and Yerevan have been working trilateral statement of November the deaths of four servicemen and an ethnic-Armenian citizen of Leb- to clarify the borderline between the 10th, 2020, that ended the Second inflicting serious injuries on one anon who had been charged on

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 64 65 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES three counts under the Criminal Concurrently, as discussed above, is regarded as a war crime under espite Azerbaijan’s repeated Code of Azerbaijan: participation on June 12th, 2021, Azerbaijan re- international law. According to the Dclaims that Azerbaijani cul- of a mercenary in a military con- leased 15 Armenian detainees re- 1954 Hague Convention, occu- tural and religious heritage, such flict or military operation (article maining in Azerbaijan’s custody in pying forces have to respect and as mosques, museums, libraries, 114.3); terrorism by a group of per- exchange for providing Azerbaijan preserve cultural property and theatres, and so on were destroyed sons, organized group or criminal with maps of 97,000 anti-tank and prevent the theft of said property under the Armenian occupation, re- organization (article 214.2.1); and anti-personal landmines in the in the event of an armed conflict. peated calls over many years to send illegal crossing of the state border Agdam district. It should be men- Unfortunately, during the period of fact-finding missions remained (article 318.2). In imposing its 20- tioned that the investigation con- Armenian occupation these guide- unanswered by international orga- year sentence, the court indicated cluded that the detainees repatri- lines were ignored. As Aghayev put nizations such as UNESCO. Only he will serve five years in prison ated to Armenia had not committed it, “the scope of this destruction after the Second Karabakh War before being transfered to a maxi- serious crimes against Azerbaijan could make even Daesh jealous.” came to an end—that is to say, only mum-security correctional facility and its citizens. once the Armenian side had ex- for the remainder of his incarcera- As noted by the Azerbaijani For- pressed a concern about the fate of tion. Over the course of the inves- eign Ministry in April 2021, “as Armenian cultural and reli- tigation it was revealed that the ac- Politicization of Heritage of today, the Ministry of Culture gious heritage sites in liberated cused had accepted to take part in Protection of Azerbaijan has identified more Karabakh—did UNESCO sud- military operations as a mercenary than 400 monuments that have denly call for a mission to be sent to in the de-occupied territories of or almost three decades, been destroyed in the liberated Azerbaijan. This appears to indicate Azerbaijan in exchange for $2,500, Fthe separatist regime oper- territories. The total number of the existence of a double standard together with other mercenaries. ating in the occupied territories of monuments in these territories is when it comes to Christian and Azerbaijan tried to distort the or- up to 3,000. Cultural and religious Muslim cultural and religious her- hus, all of the aforementioned igin and use of cultural and reli- property belonging to Azerbaijan itage. Such blatant application of Tcases demonstrate that the gious heritage located there. In has been looted, desecrated, al- political hypocrisy is, obviously, re- Armenian detainees remaining in early July 2020, one of Azerbaijan’s tered, and illegally exported to grettable and, quite frankly, beyond Azerbaijan’s custody at the moment top diplomats serving abroad, Armenia. Twenty-two museums comprehension. cannot be considered POWs, be- Nasimi Aghayev, published an essay and museum branches with over cause they have been charged with in Medium in which he argued that 100,000 artefacts on the liberated In late December 2020 inter- engaging in sabotage, terrorist and “almost all once Azerbaijani-pop- territories have been destroyed.” view, presidential adviser Hikmat mercenary activities in the period ulated towns, villages, and even Additionally, based on the data of Hajiyev pressed this point home: after the signing of the November streets, have been renamed after the the Azerbaijan National Academy “UNESCO is an intergovernmental 10th, 2020, trilateral statement. In- occupation, and Armenianized, in of Sciences, out of 67 mosques lo- organization and must carry out vestigations with regards to these un- a vicious attempt to erase any traces cated on the territory of the former its activities in accordance with its lawful acts by Armenian servicemen of Azerbaijanis’ age-old presence in NKAO and the seven adjacent mandate in an objective and im- is ongoing; their criminal liability Karabakh.” Azerbaijani districts, 63 were com- partial manner. UNESCO officials under Azerbaijani law clearly falls pletely destroyed and four were dam- should not be preoccupied with outside the scope of Article 8 of the It is well known that the delib- aged. In other words, not a single advancing the national agenda of Moscow-brokered November 10th, erate destruction of cultural and mosque was left untouched by the the countries they are citizens of. 2020, trilateral statement. religious monuments of any nation Armenian occupation. UNESCO should not become an

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 66 67 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES instrument of political influence of Armenian heritage in Karabakh nor After the Second Karabakh War, trilateral working group headed by any state. This is a great blow to his opposes the visit of the UNESCO the idea of revitalizing the trans- the deputy prime ministers of the authority and independence. The mission to the liberated territories; portation corridor that could re- three signatory countries was es- protection of cultural heritage is a what Baku does demand, however, unite mainland Azerbaijan with its tablished. This high-level working universal obligation and should not is that any such mission is carried out exclave, the Nakhchivan Autono- group is tasked with leading a tech- be used for political purposes.” under relevant procedures and in mous Republic (NAR), has become nical process devise concrete plans accordance with international law. much more concrete. Coined the on “railway and automobile com- Azerbaijani authorities have un- Claims to the contrary, raised by the “Zangazur transportation cor- munication” as a matter of priority derlined that, as a multi-cultural Armenian side, only serve to po- ridor,” Azerbaijan is keen to see the and submit them to the leaders of and multi-confessional country, it liticize deleteriously this sensitive associated road and rail infrastruc- Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia has striven to protect the religious issue. ture built in 44-km territory within for approval. Several meetings have heritage and culture of all of its Armenia in order to connect Asia been held at various level in this people. The most recent example of and Europe. regard. this was the inclusive nature of the Impediments to Kharibulbul Music Festival, which Cooperation In fact, Article 9 of the November n anticipation of the fulfillment was organized on the theme of 10th, 2020, trilateral statement stip- Iof the aforementioned trilateral “Multiculturalism in Azerbaijani ver the past few decades, ulates the unblocking (the term agreements, Azerbaijan has already Music” and took place in liber- OAzerbaijan has been involved used in the document is “resto- begun work on various connec- ated Shusha, the cultural capital of actively in the process of launching ration”) of “all economic and trans- tivity projects in the liberated areas Azerbaijan, in mid-May 2021. The regional connectivity projects cov- port links in the region.” (With re- and other parts of the country. For festival brought together musical ering not only east-west but also spect to mainland Azerbaijan and instance, work is currently under performances of various ethnic north-south and north-west tra- NAR, the purpose of renewing all way on the construction of the and national groups living in Azer- jectories. The full implementation Soviet era links is indicated as being Horadiz-Agbend railway, the foun- baijan. Addressing the audience at of the November 10th, 2020, tri- the “unimpeded movement of citi- dation of which was laid by Presi- the opening of the festival, President lateral agreement would bring Ar- zens, vehicles, and goods in both dent Aliyev in February 2021. It will Aliyev underlined that all people in menia into this regional fold, so to directions.”) Article 9 also provides connect Horadiz (located in the Azerbaijan coexist speak. Indeed, the an explicit assurance (the phrase in Fuzuli district) to Agbend (located in an atmosphere end of Yerevan’s the document is “shall be ensured”) in the Zangilan district) where the of “friendship, The end of Yerevan’s transportation and that “new transportation commu- borders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, brotherhood, and transportation and eco- economic isolation nications linking the Nakhchivan and Iran meet. Moreover, work has solidarity; and this nomic isolation would would transform Autonomous Republic with the begun on those part of the corridor 44-day war showed transform the South the South Cau- western regions of Azerbaijan” will in NAR that require renovation again that there is Caucasus and potential- casus and poten- be constructed. and will be completed in less than national unity and tially the entire three years, with the rest having re- national solidarity ly the entire Silk Road Silk Road region The entirety of the follow up mained operational over the years. in our country.” region into a world-class into a world-class January 11th, 2021, trilateral state- However, the most complicated Thus, it is clear that economic, logistics, and economic, logis- ment focuses on the implementa- part of the establishment of the Azerbaijan neither tourism hub. tics, and tourism tion of Article 9 of the November Zangazur transportation corridor, at intends to destroy hub. 10th, 2020, one. To that end, a least from a political and economic

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 68 69 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES perspectives, is the section that needs January 11th, 2021, that produced The OSCE Minsk Group arteries and strengthen regional to pass through Armenia’s Syunik the second trilateral statement, stability and security.” province. Railway and automobile President Aliyev emphasized that and the “Status Issue” communications that existed along the “opening of transport commu- een against this backdrop, the this route during USSR will need to nications serves the interests of the he Minsk Group has spear- Sfuture destiny of the OSCE be restored, as these were dismantled peoples of Azerbaijan, Armenia, headed the OSCE’s efforts Minsk Group seems rather uncertain by Armenia during the period of oc- Russia, and our neighbors. I am toT find a peaceful solution to the today. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, cupation of Azerbaijani territories. confident that neighboring coun- Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in and the Armenian occupation has been tries would also actively engage in around the Karabakh region since brought to an end and the Armenia- Notwithstanding other imped- the establishment of a diversified March 1992. De- Azerbaijan conflict iments to the construction of the network of transportation corri- spite the ceasefire in and around Zangazur transportation corridor dors and arteries in our region. We agreement reached The future destiny of the Karabakh has been reconnecting mainland Azerbaijan must continue to identify areas of by the conflicting OSCE Minsk Group seems resolved. The so- with NAR, route projections in- activity that are effective and result- parties in May rather uncertain today. called “status” issue dicate that both railway and auto- oriented in the short term.” 1994, successive is thus no longer mobile communi- mediation efforts relevant—and cer- cation are likely to Pragmatically, led by the Co-chairs of the OSCE tainly not subject to the mediation pass through the Pragmatically, the re- the reopening Minsk Group were unsuccessful in activities of the Minsk Group. town of Meghri opening of transport of transport and achieving any breakthrough in the on the Armenian and economic commu- economic com- negotiation process. On the other hand, Armenia is side of the border munications is eager to keep the OSCE Minsk with Iran located nications is beneficial beneficial not only Following the Second Karabakh Group alive for its own ends. From on the Aras river. not only for Azerbaijan for Azerbaijan War and the November 10th, 2020, Armenia’s perspective, the con- This appears to be and Armenia, but also and Armenia, but trilateral statement, Armenia’s pres- flict has neither yet been resolved one of the reasons for neighboring states, also for neigh- ence as an occupying force in the nor has the “status” of Nagorno that the November namely Russia, Iran, and boring states, territory of Azerbaijan was annihi- Karabakh yet been determined. 10th, 2020, trilat- namely Russia, lated; Azerbaijan’s territorial integ- Therefore, a negotiation process eral statement indi- Turkey. Iran, and Turkey. rity has now been restored. should be continued with Russia and cates that, although Understandably, the other two Minsk Group Co-chairs. Armenia “guarantees the safety of this issue is heavily politicized in Thus, as President Aliyev stated [these] transport links, [...] control Armenia, due in no small mea- at a joint press conference held with Obviously, this means that there over transport shall be exercised sure to the parliamentary election Russian President Vladimir Putin is a certain divergence of opinion by the bodies of the Border Guard campaign. Once the results are and Armenian Prime Minister on the role of the OSCE Minsk Service of the Federal Security announced and a government is Nikol Pashinyan on January 11th, Group at the moment. Service (FSB) of Russia.” formed, it might be possible for 2021, “the Nagorno-Karabakh con- planning and work on the portion flict has been consigned to history o this should be added the In remarks made at the joint of the corridors passing through and we must think about the future, Tassessment that its previous news conference following the the territory of Armenia to move how to live together as neighbors, work neither very productive nor trilateral meeting in Moscow on forward more smoothly. how to work to open transport particularly meaningful. This was

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 70 71 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES once again confirmed on December organized in Baku by ADA Univer- zerbaijan has mobilized all Building trust between two soci- 12th, 2020 during a meeting in sity and the Center of Analysis of In- Aefforts to restore and make eties divided by conflict for decades Baku between President Aliyev and ternational Relations (AIR Center) habitable its conflict-affected ter- requires a significant amount of the Minsk Group Co-chairs (or at in mid-April 2021, he noted that ritories and to ensure the safe and time, understanding, and patience. least their Western members; the “there could be some areas where dignified return of Azerbaijani The level of trust obviously needs Russian member’s “inability to [the Minsk Group] could play IDPs to their places of origin in the to be dramatically increased. It will travel” meant that Russia was rep- their role in the post-conflict situ- Karabakh region. The government also be crucial to reduce the sense resented by its ambassador to ation—not as a group which needs is also determined to reintegrate of victimhood and to humanize Azerbaijan). He was clear: “the to help to resolve the conflict.” In its citizens of Armenian origin the image of the adversary. All this Minsk Group did not play any role elaborating his answer, he put the who reside in the territories that will be an arduous and long-term in the resolution of the conflict, al- onus on the Minsk Group to “think are currently under the control of process. Confidence-building mea- though the Minsk Group had a man- [up] something creative; to be sup- the Russian peacekeepers. Thus, sures will be essential and it seems date to do it for 28 years. [...] And portive; not to do something which in order to restore the peaceful co- likely that their implementation this is a reality.” Azerbaijan’s pres- can damage this fragile peace; not existence of all of citizens affected will require the interaction of Track ident also added that his country to give some unrealistic promises to by the conflict, considerable addi- One and Track Two diplomatic had “resolved” the conflict by itself: Armenia; and to try to be neutral; tional efforts will need to be made. endeavors. BD “by defeating Armenia on the bat- to try to be impartial and to try to tlefield,” he continued, “we forced seal this situation.” He also noted the aggressor to admit its defeat, to that in the event Armenia would sign a declaration that we consider wish to engage in talks on a “fu- as an act of capitulation of Armenia. ture peace agreement,” then “there [...] The conflict is resolved [and] could be a lot of room for interna- Azerbaijan did it by military- tional players. There are the issues political means.” of demarcation, delimitation, interaction,” he concluded. At the same time, it seems likely the Minsk Group will not simply President Aliyev’s point was dissolve itself. Thus, in order to jus- a sequential one: the process of tify its continued existence, some normalization of interstate re- bakudialogues.ada.edu.az new roles and responsibilities will lations between Armenia and need to be brought forth: new tasks Azerbaijan should begin by tack- and functions will be conceived, ling the three aforementioned is- thus enabling this mechanism to sues, as well as other thorny ones; carry on its work in the near future. their resolution would open the way for the signing of a peace On this point President Aliyev treaty. And in this context, he has also made his views known. made it clear that “a lot of room” For instance, during an in-person could be provided to “interna- international conference co- tional players” to play their roles.

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After winning David Lake and Winning the Peace the war, Azerbaijan Winning the peace con- Donald Rothchild now faces another sists in ensuring the ter- argue that “intense Azerbaijan’s Karabakh big task: winning ritorial, economic, social, ethnic conflict is the peace. This con- and political reintegra- most often caused sists in ensuring by collective fears Reintegration Challenges the territorial, eco- tion of Karabakh into of the future”—in nomic, social, and Azerbaijan, while at the particular, the prev- F. Murat Özkaleli political reintegra- same time ensuring that alence of fears that tion of Karabakh regional peace and stabil- the physical secu- into Azerbaijan, ity is kept intact. rity of a given ethnic he Karabakh conflict was third signatory. The settlement, while at the same group is threatened. not resolved peacefully. which is more than a conventional time ensuring that Decades of unfruitful truce but less than a full peace regional peace and stability is kept Fear of a lack of secure future in negotiationsT held under the aus- agreement, ensured the return intact. Peace and security in the re- the South Caucasus is an extension of pices of the Co-chairs of the OSCE of the remaining five occupied gion would allow for the flourishing what the past has brought. As Stuart Minsk Group (France, Russia, and Azerbaijani areas immediately. A of much-needed investments in in- J. Kaufman observed in his book the United States) produced no dip- five-kilometer-wide corridor con- frastructure and the revitalization of Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics lomatic solution. The 30-year-long necting Armenia to Karabakh was Karabakh’s economy. And yet, this of Ethnic War (2001), the longstanding stalemate ended when Azerbaijan opened through Lachin, with con- is a particularly challenging task, conflict over Karabakh represents a re-gained its occupied territories trol granted to a newly-established for Armenians continue to reject fundamental clash between the Arme- with a decisive military victory Russian peacekeeping force, which Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over nian myth-symbol complex fueled by after 44 days of fighting. After the also took over control of Khan- Karabakh. The presence of Russian historical fears and the corresponding Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan kendi and some surrounding areas peacekeepers is generally inter- Azerbaijani one that emphasizes a restored its territorial integrity in populated by ethnic-Armenians. preted by the Armenian leadership desire to protect its sovereignty and conformity with four UN Security Despite some delays, the trilat- as a shield for the practical mainte- territorial integrity. Consequently, Council resolutions. eral settlement is being enforced nance of their de facto control over containing fears with respect to Azer- and the Armenian occupation of the areas within the Russian peace- baijan’s sovereignty and territorial in- Formally, Azerbaijan’s sover- 20 percent of Azerbaijani territo- keeping zone, against Azerbaijan’s tegrity is the crucial component for eignty over all Karabakh was re- ries came to an end in early 2021. de jure authority in the region. breaking the cycle of the security di- stored through the signing of a tri- Other provisions of the settlement, lemma in Karabakh, which requires lateral settlement that was reached such as the establishment of the both the effective management of in- between Azerbaijan and Armenia free movement of all Azerbaijani Breaking the Security formation and dealing with credible on November 10th, 2010, with persons, services, and capital to Dilemma commitment problems. Russia being the facilitator and the region, is to follow. n a 1996 International Security or three decades, Baku had article entitled “Containing refused to negotiate with F. Murat Özkaleli is an Assistant Professor of International Affairs at ADA University I F and a former political advisor to the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Fear: The Origins and Management Karabakh Armenians, as it would Cyprus. of Ethnic Conflict,” co-authors have been interpreted as having

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 74 75 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES granted quasi-political recogni- into Azerbaijan is vital for pro- balancing Russia There are multiple tion to the breakaway entity, whose tecting Azerbaijan’s territorial integ- against the Western The reintegration offactors that set the “independence” was both unilater- rity and reintegrating the country’s powers—most Karabakh into the rest context in which ally declared prior to the breakup ethnic-Armenian citizenry into the importantly, the of Azerbaijan requires a Azerbaijan’s au- of the Soviet Union and remained fabric of society while at the same United States and thorities will have completely unrecognized interna- time ensuring peace, security, and France. The two- multi-layer, sequential to operate. Each tionally in the subsequent decades. prosperity in the South Caucasus. level game struc- policy approach charac- of these factors Even Armenia itself never formally As Azerbaijani President Ilham ture of Azerbaijan’s terized by a high toler- should be dealt recognized the entity proclaimed Aliyev has stated on numerous oc- future Karabakh ance for contingent and with in two ways by the Karabakh Armenians. casions since the Second Karabakh policies, along with adaptive alternatives. simultaneously: War came to an end, the country possible signaling distinctly on their The fact that Azerbaijan has en- aims to sustain peace in the region problems towards own and as part of sured its territorial integrity as a re- and is ready to normalize relations the competing Minsk Group an overall whole made up of the sult of the outcome of the Second with Armenia. In other words, the Co-chairs, adds layers of com- cumulation of all such factors and Karabakh War suggests that Baku’s peace can be won with hard work, plexity to the situation. Should the their effects. primary engaging party in the time expressions of mutual tolerance, Azerbaijani leadership be seen to be ahead will now be the Karabakh and conciliatory steps. backing down or even making com- Put succinctly, the territorial, Armenian community, whose promises, it will face domestic audi- social, economic, and political re- members are citizens of Azerbaijan. ence costs; likewise with respect to integration of Karabakh will re- Of course, crucial roles will also Audience Costs increasing international pressure to quire controlling audience costs, need to be played by Yerevan and have ethnic-Armenians included in both domestic and external. A other external stakeholders in terms aku’s ultimate goal is to fully the governance of Karabakh, where whole-of-government, coordinated of providing support in the man- Breintegrate Karabakh into it seems likely that Russia and the effort will obviously be required, agement of “ethnic fear,” to refer to the rest of Azerbaijan; yet this can United States will have conflicting necessitating the need for the emer- Lake and Rothchild’s terminology. only be done in stages and will demands. gence of a highly complex matrix take years to complete. Aside from for policy planning. Ancient hatreds spanning centu- material obstacles, the Azerbaijani All these complex audience costs ries, the traumas associated with leadership will likely face a situ- make it imperative for Baku to the First Karabakh War, the effects ation of complex “audience cost” work on sustainable governance Property, Reconstruction, of nearly three decades of occupa- with respect to the reintegration and power sharing structures for and Resettlement tion, and the recent liberation of of Karabakh. (Generally speaking, achieving peace and prosperity in the occupied territories by a com- audience costs in international re- the Karabakh of the future. nevitably, the Azerbaijan gov- bination of the use of force and dip- lations theory are the costs that Iernment will organize the re- lomatic brinksmanship make it ex- leaders pay from backing down be- he reintegration of Karabakh turn of more than 600,000 internally tremely difficult, in the immediate fore their opponents in interstate Tinto the rest of Azerbaijan, displaced people to their homes. term, to expect that this ethnic fear disputes.) The leadership in Baku therefore, requires a multi-layer, This is an evidently daunting task (and the myriad problems derived will need to balance domestic audi- sequential policy approach charac- not only because of the sheer num- from it) can be overcome. Still, the ence costs against external audience terized by a high tolerance for con- bers involved (the re-mobilization gradual reintegration of Karabakh costs; the latter further requires tingent and adaptive alternatives. of between 5 and 10 percent of the

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 76 77 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES entire population of Azerbaijan is the dwellings formerly inhabited by inated by landmines and unex- molished by the forces and agents in and of itself a logistic nightmare), ethnic-Azerbaijanis were burned to ploded ordnance, and more than of the Armenian occupation, or but also because many of these the ground with contagious frenzy 100,000 people have been killed or resettled by ethnic-Armenian oc- IDPs’ dwellings were destroyed by right before the district was trans- injured due to contact with such ar- cupants. Categories need to be set Armenian forces during the occu- ferred back to Azerbaijan as a part maments since 1975). carefully and cartographic invento- pation. of the November 10th, 2020, agree- ries must be thoroughly prepared. ment. Moreover, virtually all of The return of IDPs to their homes In this context, certain decisions Roughly speaking, the urban Karabakh’s cultural and religious will necessarily have to be a gradual made by the European Court of terrain of the occupied territories sites, including the ones located and controlled process—one that Human Rights (ECHR) should be can be divided into three major in Azerbaijan’s cultural capital of can begin in earnest only after the carefully examined. Its decisions in clusters, when the pre-1989 demo- Shusha, were destroyed during the cleaning of explosives has been Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey graphics and the current situation occupation. While some of these completed and infrastructure has (2010) may be of particular sig- are compared: (1) areas that had monuments of world heritage can been rebuilt—both requiring heavy nificance, as the rulings sought to an ethnic-Armenian majority and be rebuilt, many are beyond repair. and sustained state investment. balance between former and cur- are still populated by Armenians rent property owners: the court (e.g., Khankendi, Khojavend, Ag- Due to this wholescale urbicide, Until then, most of the liberated indicated that returning properties dere); (2) areas that had an eth- most cities and towns in Karabakh Karabakh region will remain under to the old owners should not result nic-Azerbaijani majority and were will need to be built back up from the administration of Azerbaijani se- in human right violations for the populated by ethnic-Armenians scratch. This is obviously a long- curity forces, as the regeneration of ci- current owners. After a three-de- between the First and Second Kara- term and costly proposition that vilian life may take considerable time. cades long occupation, property bakh Wars (e.g., Shusha, Kelbajar, will pose significant economic and This may turn out to be a blessing in issues have become very complex Lachin, Kubatli, Zengilan, Jabrail); social challenges for Azerbaijan. disguise from a public administration and therefore must be dealt with (3) areas that had an ethnic-Azer- perspective. For instance, a new Im- diligently. baijan majority but were uninhab- urthermore, hundreds of movable Property Administration ited or became uninhabitable (e.g., Fthousands of anti-personnel may be introduced (or the country’s In short, Karabakh today needs Agdam, Fuzuli). and anti-tank mines, coupled with existing one may be given a broader a massive infrastructure overhaul, countless booby-traps and pieces mandate) with objective of making but such an effort cannot be limited Agdam was the center of the Kara- of unexploded ordnance, were laid a comprehensive assessment of as- to the reconstruction of demolished bakh region until the early 1990s, in these districts by the forces of sets in the Karabakh region. All the homes and towns. Time has been with population of more than Armenian occupation. Like in Af- buildings must be counted and cate- frozen since the early 1990s in many 130,000. Its current situation can ghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and else- gorized, and land and property titles parts of the liberated region. Power, only be compared to Hiroshima, where, heavy mine contamination must be re-issued. water, and sewage systems are all Warsaw, or Dresden after the devas- not only prevents the immediate outdated and damaged. Existing tations of war. Similarly, Fuzuli—a return of civilians but poses a threat There will be tens of thousands roads and railways require major settlement once home to nearly to the resumption of normalcy for of applications from Azerbaijan’s repairs and new ones will need to 90,000 people—is now a complete a period of decades after the guns IDP community to reclaim lost be built. Construction of new air- ghost town. Ethnic-Armenians have been silenced. The case of property. In many instances, their ports has already begun. All these populated the Kelbajar district after Vietnam is illustrative: 20 percent property will have been destroyed efforts also face problems related the First Karabakh War but most of of the country remains contam- either by neglect, purposefully de- to minesweeping and funding. All-

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 78 79 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES told, all of Karabakh will become of the OSCE, and perhaps Russia) However that may be, providing Karabakh is rich in natural re- one giant construction site. but there is much more work still the minefield maps to Azerbaijan sources, including gold and coal to be done. Moscow might step up would constitute an excellent gesture reserves. Karabakh also contains on its own; or join hands with the on the part of the Armenian side, sig- an abundance of renewable en- Minefield Maps as a Key other two Minsk Group Co-chairs; naling a willingness for cooperation. ergy sources. The Azerbaijan to Peace or the actors involved in the Agdam At the same time, of course, it could Energy Regulatory Agency arrangement could build on their lead to considerable audience costs (AREA) reports that one quarter of nfortunately, Armenia success. on the home front, making a uni- Azerbaijan’s water resources—about Uhas so far refused to pro- lateral handover nearly impossible. 2,56 billion cubic meters of water vide all the minefields maps in its What is certain is that Yerevan In this regard, some sort of bilat- per annum—is generated in the possession. The welcome excep- did not give away these maps for eral Commission on Humanitarian Karabakh region. AREA also indi- tion, which took place as Baku nothing: they were essentially Matters could be established under cates that Karabakh’s strong streams Dialogues was going to press, was traded for 15 Armenian detainees the auspices of the International feed not only the Tartar, Khuda- the surrender of maps for the in Azerbaijani custody. Its policy Committee of the Red Cross, the farin, and Giz Galasi hydroelectric Agdam district. But this represents may become more flexible after International Red Cross and Red power plants but also the Sarsang/ only a “tiny part of the maps we the June 20th, 2021, parliamentary Crescent Movement, the Minsk Sugovushan water reservoir, which have,” as the acting prime minister elections are held in Armenia. On Group, or, as discussed above, the is one of Azerbaijan’s tallest dams. of Armenia, Nicol Pashinyan, ad- the other hand, Yerevan’s reluc- actors involved in facilitating the In short, AREA estimates that the mitted soon thereafter. tance to provide all the minefields Agdam landmines map arrange- occupied territories were contrib- maps it possesses may be consid- ment. Whatever the modality, the uting as much as 30 percent to The demining process would ered a purposeful delaying tactic Azerbaijani side can expect to be Armenia’s annual GDP. gain significant pace if full for Azerbaijani resettlement. But presented with demands from the Armenian cooperation were to be such a tactic can only slow down Armenian side—humanitarian or While the Sugovushan water secured for humanitarian purposes, this process, not prevent it from otherwise. reservoir is likely to make a as the untold number of remaining proceeding. considerable contribution to explosives pose a clear and present Azerbaijan’s agricultural output in danger to civilian lives. Neither hatever lies behind Revitalization and the time to come and the reinte- Azerbaijan nor Armenia is a party WYerevan’s reluctance to act, Reparations gration of Karabakh’s gold reserves to the Ottawa Convention on the Armenia will be held responsible promises to strengthen Azerbaijan’s Prohibition of the Use, Stock- for all the human and material loss evitalizing the economy and currency, which was devaluated piling, Production and Transfer of resulting from landmine explo- Rputting on solid ground the in 2016 due to low oil prices. And Anti-Personnel Mines and on sions covering the areas where it public finances of the liberated overall, the wholescale reconstruc- Their Destruction, which came has refused to hand over the maps: areas constitute two other critical tion of the liberated areas will also into force in 1999. Thus, the issue both Azerbaijan and Armenia have steps Azerbaijan can take to rein- make a significant contribution to requires bilateral negotiations. been parties to the European Con- tegrate the region successfully into the country’s economy. Georgia facilitated the handover of vention on Human Rights since the rest of the country as well as the Agdam maps (with the support 2002, which gives the ECHR juris- transform it into both a politically This revitalization is good for of the United States, the European diction. Other international courts peaceful and economically gainful the Karabakh Armenians as well, Union, the Swedish chairmanship can be petitioned, as well. part of the South Caucasus. increasing the likelihood for the

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 80 81 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES onset of sustainable prosperity— the region’s financial reintegration to describe the plight of countless In contrast, schools and uni- something that they never had into Azerbaijan is paying the sala- tress over the nearly 30-year period. versities where the language of during the period of occupation. ries of state employees in Karabakh instruction is Azerbaijani, Rus- Lastly, economic revitalization can with the manat—especially those All of these losses bring the ne- sian, Georgian, Turkish, and so establish a base for enduring peace hired by the Armenian occupation cessity of compensation to the on operate without hindrance in between Karabakh Azerbaijanis forces (e.g., schoolteachers, med- forefront. Nevertheless, the ques- Azerbaijan. More broadly, and Karabakh Armenians. Like ical doctors, nurses, police officers, tion of war and occupation repa- Azerbaijan is a proudly multiethnic, Alsace-Lorraine or South Tyrol local government employees, and rations is a bilateral issue between multiconfessional, and multicul- after World War II, Karabakh has so on). In short, regenerating local Armenia and Azerbaijan; it is not tural society made up not only of the potential to turn into a signifier income streams and redistributing directly relevant to the issue of ethnic-Azerbaijanis but also many of peace and cooperation instead of resources from the central budget how to reintegrate Karabakh (and ethnic Russians, Lezgis, and Jews. remaining a synonym for conflict in Baku require making serious the Karabakh Armenians) into There are nearly 100,000 ethnic- and division. public finance plans for Karabakh. Azerbaijan. In fact, the reparations Armenians living in Azerbaijan. The region’s financial reintegra- issue may serve the cause of jus- Thus, Azerbaijan is well equipped here are, however, some tion also requires reintroducing tice and satisfy the demands of the to reintegrate the Karabakh Arme- Toutstanding issues that Azerbaijan’s banking system into Azerbaijani public, but it may also nians into its already diverse social, need to be resolved urgently. First, the region. Thus, opening branches impede the much-needed process economic, and education system. Azerbaijan’s currency, the manat, of the Azerbaijani Central Bank as of reconciliation. should replace all foreign curren- well as Azerbaijani retail and com- Karabakh Armenians had lived in cies in Karabakh even though for- mercial banks all over Karabakh, an unrecognized entity for nearly eign ones such as the Russian ruble, including in places like Khankendi, Dealing With Ancient three decades, which makes them, the U.S. dollar, or the euro may be may become a priority for Baku in Hatreds at best, reluctant to be reintegrated used in the Russian peacekeeping the near future. Such moves may be into the Republic of Azerbaijan. In zone during the transition period crucial to revitalizing Karabakh’s ne of the key distinctions this regard, reorienting the rhet- established by the November 10th, local economy through the provi- Oto be made regarding the oric of the Armenian elite towards 2021, trilateral statement. sion of loans and other services. nature of the Karabakh conflict is coexistence and cooperation is a that how to define and explain it. vital condition for reconciliation to While some tax exemptions may zerbaijan suffered extensive Partisans of the Armenian posi- be able to move forward. The po- be provided for the liberated areas Alosses to its national earn- tion tend to describe the nature of tential for reconciliation is high, during this same transition pe- ings potential during the period of the Karabakh conflict as primor- if the sides demonstrate a genuine riod, Azerbaijani’s taxation regime the Armenian occupation: the uni- dial and innate. This has even been willingness to prioritize regional should be introduced eventually in lateral seizure and exploitation of reflected in Yerevan’s official- pop development—both economic and order to levy taxes on income and natural sources (mining, electrical ulation policy, which sanctioned social. property. Customs should also be production, etc.) clearly constituted the expulsion of all non-ethnic- regulated in conformity with the a breach of international law. At the Armenians from Armenia and the zerbaijan’s willingness to rest of Azerbaijan’s international same time, the forests of Karabakh occupied areas as well as initiated Afocus on the economic de- borders so as to avoid creating a were devastated during occupation, forced assimilation programs such velopment of the region provides quasi-state within the state. A fur- such that senior Azerbaijani offi- as the closing of schools that follow a unique opportunity for peace ther important detail regarding cials have used the word “ecocide” a Russian language curriculum. and prosperity for the entire South

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Caucasus to take hold. Neverthe- may take to reintegrate Karabakh Last but not least, with in order to less, it requires two to tango, as Armenians through a complex in- Baku’s reintegration The process of ethnic achieve the full the saying goes. Even though rec- stitutional design will likely face re- policies are likely to conflict de-escalation in reintegration of onciliation and economic revital- sistance by the organized Armenian face domestic oppo- Karabakh should begin the region into ization would be beneficial for the diaspora. Baku will need to figure sition. Azerbaijani with identifying par- Azerbaijan. Karabakh Armenians, more than out how to overcome both the chal- public opinion is seven months after the trilateral agree- lenge of its outreach initiatives being also not immune to ticular conflict triggers The power ment came into force the rhetoric of dismissed immediately and counter emotional stimuli: and precipitating events sharing question— the Armenian elite has shown virtu- accusations of wanting to assimilate some circles are and their management or, more broadly, ally no sign of reconciliatory or coop- the Karabakh Armenian community. likely to attempt to through the implementa- the question of erative sentiments. Quite the contrary, frame the govern- tion of well-designed and the political inclu- for the most part it remains stuck in hus, the “ethnic outbidding” ment’s reintegration sion of Karabakh carefully implemented in- the past and continue to stumble into Tthat Timothy D. Sisk defined in plans as constituting Armenians—may pitfalls of overextension by relying Power Sharing and International Me- concessions to the tegrative policies. become an even heavily on what Jack Snyder called diation in Ethnic Conflicts (1996) as ‘enemy.’ more perplexing “myths of empire” (the title of his 1993 “extremist ethnic group leaders who one should it be- book): an admixture of domestic poli- decry moderation with enemies as a All this carries with it the danger come a pretext for external med- tics and expansionist ambitions. sellout of group interest” presents a of turning mutual ethnic outbidding dling and, in turn, be seen as a chal- genuine threat to Baku’s reintegration into a combative dialectic that turns lenge to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty Moreover, Armenia has yet to deal plans. In fact, one could expect to see into a pretext for the reemergence and territorial integrity. with its diaspora issue. No other na- that the more successful these have a of yet another round of violent con- tion has a greater disconnect between chance of becoming, the more likely flict. Hence, the process of ethnic Even with no or at least limited the power of its state and the power it is that they will be rejected by both conflict de-escalation in Karabakh outside interference, however, of its organized diaspora, as a result the government in Yerevan and the should begin with identifying par- power sharing in a multi-ethnic set- of which the latter plays a uniquely organized Armenian diaspora coming ticular conflict triggers and precipi- ting is an evidently thorny issue: it disproportionally strong role in de- together to pressure the Karabakh tating events and their management could lead to the fragmentation of signing the country’s policies. The Armenian leadership to retain an un- through the implementation of a state (e.g., Yugoslavia) or nurture organized Armenian diaspora—es- compromising, ultranationalist stance. well-designed and carefully imple- democratic secessionist aspirations pecially those branches based in the Moreover, other external powers mented integrative policies. (e.g., Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia). United States and France—often im- that have historically supported Either way, power sharing is an ex- pose their ultranationalist, even belli- Armenian political causes are unlikely tremely difficult but ultimately nec- cose rhetoric into the country’s public ever to be fully satisfied with Azerbai- Governance and Power essary subject to be discussed for discourse and policymaking process, jan’s reintegration plans to the point Sharing ensuring the full reintegration of instead of leveraging their evident that—if past behavior can serve as a Karabakh into Azerbaijan. influence to help establish peace and predictor of future action—demand hat Karabakh’s new prosperity in the South Caucasus. after demand can be expected to be Wgovernance structure will It could be very well argued made until Baku’s effective sover- look like probably represents the that the concern with respect to The point here is that the steps eignty over Karabakh is seen as being single most speculated topic in the Karabakh is exclusively “gover- various steps that Azerbaijan compromised. knot of issues that need to dealt nance,” not “power sharing,” since

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 84 85 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES even if the approxi- community would executive; four, adopting a highly A New Public mately 100,000 eth- Obviously, a minority hardly accept any proportional electoral system in a Administration Structure nic-Armenians (no population that makes up governance struc- parliamentary framework; and five, one really knows more or less 1 percent of a ture that excludes acknowledging group rights or cor- the exact popula- their active par- zerbaijan needs to estab- country’s total population porate (nonterritorial) federalism. tion number) that ticipation in the Alish a new political structure is quite unlikely to warrant for Karabakh. The design of such resided in the re- local administrative He also provides five integrative gion during the the granting of any serious bodies. There is no a structure will necessarily have to conflict-regulating practices: one, occupation were serious question be incorporated into the existing form of power sharing at creating a mixed, or nonethnic, fed- all to return (or re- the central government that this position Azerbaijani political system. One al- eral structure; two, establishing an ternative is to create a bicommunal main, as the case level. will be supported may be) would by all three Minsk inclusive, centralized unitary state; public administration system in not constitute a Group Co-chairs three, adopting majoritarian but Karabakh based on the facts on the sufficiently sizeable minority in a and other international actors like ethnically neutral, or nonethnic, grounds, a component of which country with a population of over European Union. executive, legislative, and admin- could involve the establishment of 10 million. Obviously, a minority istrative decision-making bodies; a distinct local ethnic-Armenian population that makes up more n his aforementioned book, four, adopting a semi-majoritarian representation schema. There are or less 1 percent of a country’s ITimothy Sisk provides a ty- or semi-proportional electoral crucial components for such a bi- total population is quite unlikely pology for conflict-regulating prac- system that encourages the forma- communal administration. An to warrant the granting of any se- tices that may provide a starting tion of pre-election coalitions (vote initial task is to define the bound- rious form of power sharing at the point for thinking about this issue. pooling) across ethnic divides; and aries and population of Karabakh. central government level, except He argues that “the consociational five, devising ethnicity-blind public If the boundaries of the Nagorno- perhaps the allocation of a guar- and integrative approaches can policies Karabakh Autonomous Oblast anteed number of seats to ethnic- be fruitfully viewed as conceptual (NKAO) from the Soviet era may be Armenians in the country’s poles in a spectrum of specific While Sisk’s two approaches may taken as a starting point, then these parliament. conflict-regulating institutions consisted of five administrative dis- provide a general conceptual frame- and practices that promote power tricts (Askaran, Hadrut, Mardakert, work for conflict-regulating prac- Nevertheless, Karabakh’s partic- sharing.” Martuni, and Shusha) that, taken to- tices, other particular factors ought ular political history adds both com- gether, correspond more or less to the to set more practical parameters for plexity and context to the situation. Sisk goes on to provide five con- operational area of the Russian peace- In the wake of the Second Karabakh sociational conflict-regulating Karabakh’s political reintegration keeping contingent—the notable and War, virtually the entire Karabakh practices: one, granting territorial into Azerbaijan. These include: the highly symbolic exception being Armenian population is now located autonomy and creating confed- political history of the Karabakh Shusha, which was regained by the in a small pocket of territory in eral arrangements; two, creating a region, Soviet-era administrative Azerbaijani Armed Forces in the last and around the city of Khankendi. polycommunal, or ethnic, feder- structure, comparative examples days of the Second Karabakh War. Still continuing their effective con- ation; three, adopting group pro- in the post-Soviet space (especially trol there thanks to the presence of portional representation in admin- Russia’s experience), and the cur- A single category of Azerbaijani Russian peacekeepers, the leader- istration appointments, including rent public administration struc- citizenship is necessary to main- ship of the Karabakh Armenian consensus decision rules in the ture of the Republic of Azerbaijan. tain, although a special kind of

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 86 87 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES residency status may be negotiated Armenians from Armenia and as ultranationalism still prevails conflict between Israel and the for those who choose to reside in other countries (including Syria) among the ruling elite, which con- Arab states. However, there is also (or return to) Karabakh. Soviet- were moved to the region. Thus, siders the Russian peacekeeper a chance for reversing the tide and era census data may be taken as ethnic-Armenians ineligible for contingent as their community’s winning the peace. This depends the principal basis for determining Azerbaijani citizenship may be protector and guarantor of the on three major factors: the gover- residency status. Soviet-era sources asked to leave; yet this also requires status quo. Without the at least nance and power sharing initiatives indicate that around 145,000 eth- a careful planning in order to pre- implicit consent of the Karabakh that Azerbaijan will take in the pro- nic-Armenians and nearly 41,000 vent the onset of a new political Armenians, however, peace and cess of Karabakh’s reintegration; ethnic-Azerbaijanis lived on the crisis being generated on a human- prosperity in the region—and in the Armenian reactions to these initia- territory of the NKAO in 1989. itarian basis, which could serve as a South Caucasus in general—will be tives; and the role of, and relation- Azerbaijan may seek to pursue pretext for foreign meddling. virtually impossible to achieve; its ship between, external actors in the policies that could reverse the re- absence would increase the likeli- overall context of determining the gion’s ethnic osmosis. During the In 2017, the secessionist regime hood that bullets not ballots would balance of power between Russia Soviet period, Karabakh was able operating in the occupied territo- again become the determining and the United States over the geo- to sustain an ethnically-mixed ries enacted a new “constitution” for factor of political ends. politically pivotal South Caucasus population: ethnic-Azerbaijanis their unrecognized state. A “presi- region. and ethnic-Armenians coexisted dential” system was established and for decades in relative peace. Once a 33-seat unicameral “parliament” Three Keys to Karabakh’s nce a region of conten- Shusha is repopulated with re- formed the legislative branch. These Reintegration Otion and ongoing wars be- turning ethnic-Azerbaijanis, the political bodies aimed to earn some tween Germany and France, today population balance in Karabakh legitimacy for the regime operating n the Spring 2021 issue of Alsace-Lorraine is a home of the may be restored. In turn, ethnic- in Karabakh, notwithstanding their IBaku Dialogues, Laurence European Parliament and the Armenians may expect to maintain non-recognition by Azerbaijan and Broers argued that the Armenian- Council of Europe—the region ethnically-Armenian homogenous the rest of the international com- Azerbaijani conflict has yet to be is now a symbol of conflict trans- towns in Karabakh. munity. Declaring these to be illegal resolved. Instead, he suggested it formation and peacebuilding. is one thing; abolishing them is an- would be more accurate to state that Alsace-Lorraine can become an new census would need to other. Eventually, institutions formed it has been “repackaged and em- inspiration for Karabakh. Aside Abe conducted in order to within the constitutional and legal bedded in a new, highly complex, from its practical effectiveness, determine the exact number of framework of the Republic of Azer- and unpredictable web of linkages.” as applied by visionary politi- ethnic-Armenians still living in baijan must be established in Kara- cians like Jean Monnet, Robert Karabakh—notwithstanding the bakh; in all probability, the new legal The present trajectory of the Schuman, and Konrad Adenauer, risk of heightened tensions due to structures provided by Baku will try, dispute is such that it may indeed the European experience can also the fact that such a census would as much as possible, to follow the come to be seen in retrospect as provide a theoretical alternative, only include those ethnic-Arme- footsteps of past and current practice having constituted the continuation namely Ernst B. Haas’s “neofunc- nians eligible for citizenship of by Karabakh Armenians. of the conflict, with new violent ad- tionalism”—an eclectic yet highly the Republic of Azerbaijan. It is ditional episodes taking place in the influential approach to integra- a commonly known fact that Ye- Securing the consent of the future. This would put the South tion that combined David Mi- revan pursued a settlement policy Karabakh Armenians is desirable Caucasus on a path similar to the trany’s functionalist insight and in the occupied territories: ethnic- but at the same time very difficult, one resulting from the protracted Monnet’s pragmatism. As pointed

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 88 89 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES out by Philippe C. Schmitter in a various writings of G. John Iken- and securing the representation Cypriots since 1964 (or, as some 2006 review article that appeared berry, whose historically enlight- of ethnic-Armenian citizens of argue, since 1974). in the Journal of European Public ened “strategic restraint” approach Azerbaijan in Karabakh’s gover- Policy, Haas’s neofunctionalism ad- provides important insights ap- nance and power sharing bodies Still, the Annan Plan and its an- dresses how to use specialized ex- plicable to winning the peace in needs to be established. As Iken- nexes—which was prepared by in- perts by focusing on economically Karabakh. In this regard, berry emphasizes, the basic ternational experts in the context of fruitful topics at the sub-national Azerbaijan, as the unequivocal problem of order formation is bicommunal negotiations between level as the basis for creating spill- victor of the Second Karabakh coping with the “asymmetries of Turkish and Greek Cypriots that over effect to gradually solve other War, can nurture a constitutional power.” As the victorious side, had gone on for decades—includes politically charged issues. In short, order that “serves the weak as well Azerbaijan now has a better chance many useful aspects for dealing with neofunctionalism is a theory that as the powerful,” as Ikenberry put it to break the security dilemma by the present situation. So without suggests the possibility of creating in the revised edition of his book, taking concrete steps for including losing sight of the sui generis nature collaborative atmosphere between After Victory: Institutions, Strategic ethnic-Armenians in a new gover- of the Karabakh situation, casting a former belligerents. Restraint, and the Rebuilding of nance and power sharing regime glance back at parts of the Annan Order After Major Wars (2019). in the process of the reintegration Plan may still be helpful in devel- In this regard, starting from the of Karabakh. Nevertheless, the eth- oping an integrative approach to efficient provision of the most hile taking into account nic-Armenian side also has to adopt governance and power sharing. basic services (e.g., postal de- Wthe importance of ensuring a cooperative spirit for winning the livery, banking, electrification, a regional balance of power, the peace in Karabakh. he first key element derived gasification, potable water), an - in new institutional design for the Tfrom the Annan Plan is in a ter-communal cooperative spirit Karabakh region of the Republic ere it could be instructive way the most basic: recognizing may evolve, in turn producing a of Azerbaijan could adopt the main Hto examine the example of ethnic-Armenians’ right to exist in spillover pattern that would in- principles of multiethnic gover- Cyprus, whereby in 2004 the Karabakh—something that has al- creasingly spread to other public nance and power sharing. Setting United Nations put forward a com- ready been granted by Azerbaijan. services. Instead of trying to ac- the administrative boundaries of prehensive peace proposal known Baku can turn this recognition into complish everything at once, a the new public administration as the Annan Plan in which thorny practice by including ethnic-Ar- step-by-step, sequential approach structure for Karabakh may rep- issues such as property, citizenship, menians in Karabakh’s new gover- may be more advisable. Sensitivities resent an initial step for ensuring residency, and identity were dealt nance and power structure. In turn, to local reactions would be factored the spatial component of the new with. Of course, from a legal stand- and this is the second key element, into policymaking; thus the model public administration. Enshrining point, there is a crucial distinction the ethnic-Armenian side needs to should be highly receptive and in- the protection of the rights of the between the status of the Turkish recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty stitutionally capable of adapting to ethnic-Armenian population, with Cypriots and the Karabakh Arme- over Karabakh—which is some- contingencies on the ground as well legal guarantees, would also consti- nians, as the former was a consti- thing that has not been acknowl- as external remonstrations. tute a crucial human component in tutive community of the Republic edged, yet. this regard. of Cyprus (along with the Greek probably more realistic al- Cypriots). Thus, the UN had to Unfortunately, Yerevan has re- Aternative to the idealism All told, a delicate balance be- recognize their political equality nounced neither its territorial of the European neofunctionalist tween political order (i.e., sus- even though sovereignty had been claims over Karabakh nor the approach is to be found in the taining Azerbaijan’s sovereignty) exercised exclusively by the Greek political identity built upon this

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 90 91 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES refusal—what Broers calls “aug- rael. The United States and France, mented Armenia.” All the major in contrast, have been largely left powers and international organiza- out of the picture. As the Biden tions recognize Karabakh as a part Administration has been trying of Azerbaijan—and have done so to reinstitute Washington’s pos- since the country regained its inde- ture of global hegemony—which pendence in 1991. Thus, Armenia’s contradicts Russia’s polycentric present attitude prevents it from understanding of the world— benefiting from the main - com Karabakh can easily turn into an- mitments of international society other flashpoint between these whilst further delaying the onset of two great powers, in addition to a process to secure peace and pros- Ukraine and Georgia. On the other perity in the South Caucasus. hand, the Karabakh issue can become a theater in which Moscow The third key is the position and Washington can cooperate—or of the relevant external actors. at least avoid further tension—as Turkey and Russia have become had notably been the case during “frenemies” over the past decade, the time of President Heydar competing in various geographies Aliyev’s brilliantly crafted diplo- such as Syria, Libya, Ukraine, matic achievement that produced and Georgia whilst simultane- the Contract of the Century that ously cooperating in various other paved the way for the delivery of domains, especially on the crit- Azerbaijani oil to world markets. ical energy issue. The Turkish- Russian balance over Karabakh has or decades the Azerbaijani side been carefully sustained by Baku. Fhad sought to win the war in Azerbaijan also maintains a careful Karabakh, and Baku succeeded. diplomatic posture towards Iran, There is now an opportunity to win despite the country’s increasing the peace, however elusive it may at level of military cooperation with Is- first glance appear to be at present. BD

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Russian Federation—was named baijan. Georgia aligned itself with Georgia After the Second North Ossetia, while the Tskhinvali the Western powers, determined region of Georgia—with the Ossetian to join NATO and the EU. The population at the time concentrated conflicts on Georgian territory are Karabakh War in the border areas with Russia—was seen as punishment from Russia for named South Ossetia.) Georgia’s pro-Western focus. As Security and Economic Implications a result, there has been a heavy As of today, all three of these Russian military presence in the areas are self-proclaimed indepen- separatist areas of Georgia since Mamuka Tsereteli dent states, are formally ruled by de the Russian invasion to Georgia in facto governments, and saw fierce 2008. he outcome of the The conflicts in the South military confrontation in the early Second Karabakh War Caucasus were the primary challenge 1990s. In 2008, the Tskhinvali region Azerbaijan has a more nu- between Azerbaijan for transforming the strategic assets became the battleground between anced foreign policy, balancing andT Armenia significantly trans- of this region into greater political Russian and Georgian forces. In between Russia, Turkey, and the formed the geopolitical reality and economic success. Three major 2020, Azerbaijan regained through West. Azerbaijan also has substan- in the South Caucasus, with im - conflict areas in the South Caucasus a combination of military action tial hydrocarbon wealth located plications for the wider Black were former autonomous regions, and diplomatic brinksmanship all in the Caspian Sea, with major Sea-Caspian region. The unsettled created in the early Soviet period: seven regions outside of Nagorno- oil and natural gas fields already political geography of the South Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Karabakh that had been occupied connected to the Black Sea and Caucasus and the ethno-political the Tskhinvali region, what was called by Armenia, as well as one-third Mediterranean through pipe- separatism fueled by external actors South Ossetia. (Briefly: the latter term of the former Nagorno-Karabakh lines, ports, railroads, and so on. since the early 1990s left bleeding was introduced by the Soviets in the region. In the case of Abkhazia Azerbaijan and Georgia are allied wounds on the bodies of the newly 1920s as a name for the newly created and the Tskhinvali region/South with Turkey in energy projects and re-emerged sovereign states of autonomous area in Georgia, popu- Ossetia, as of mid-2021, these ter- in trade. Azerbaijan had no Russian Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. lated by Ossetians alongside ethnic ritories remain, in reality, governed troops on its territory until the re- These conflicts have determined Georgians. The historic homeland by Russian occupational forces. The sumption of the military conflict in the trajectory of the geopolitical of Ossetians is located to the north Russian military influence was -in 2020 and, more precisely, the fol- developments of the region for the of the Greater Caucasus mountains. serted into Karabakh after the war low-up peace deal, which allowed last 30 years, including on the for- Following the Soviet tradition of that ended on November 10th, 2020, Russian peacekeepers to separate eign policy orientations of these planting ethno-political time bombs, with Russian peacekeepers playing Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in new states. Ossetia proper—located in the an increasing role in the governance Karabakh. of the region. espite the conflicts of the Mamuka Tsereteli is a Senior Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & n terms of geopolitical orienta- Dearly 1990s, the first decades Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer Ition, Armenia willingly allowed of independence after the breakup in the School of International Service at American University in Washington, DC. Russian troops onto its territory, of the Soviet Union were marked by He has more than thirty years of experience in academia, diplomacy and business development, focusing on security and economic/business/energy developments in the seeing them as a security guar- the strengthening of the sovereignty Black Sea-Caspian region. antee and deterrent against Azer- and statehood of all three South

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Caucasus states. The United States presence and leadership in the 1,960 peacekeepers in Karabakh to flict, obtained some leverage over strongly supported this process region, Russia has regained signif- an already significant military pres- Azerbaijan while further increasing in partnership with its NATO ally icant power and influence in the ence in Armenia and in Georgia’s Armenia’s security dependence Turkey, facilitating energy infra- Black Sea region and the South two breakaway regions. This mil- on Russia. While Turkey now has structure development in the region Caucasus. itary presence can allow Russia to a greater role in the affairs of the as a foundation for the economic establish military control over parts South Caucasus, it is no longer sovereignty of these countries. The prelude to Russia’s increased of the South Caucasus on relatively seen as necessarily the channel of American and Turkish support was role in the Black Sea region was the short notice. After the use of mili- Western interests in the region; enforced by multiple economic and 2008 invasion of Georgia and sub- tary force in Georgia in 2008 and in Turkey rather appears to be rep- transportation initiatives from the sequent military occupation of sig- Ukraine in 2014, this threat is not resenting its own national interest EU. These efforts brought about nificant parts of the country. This merely perceived, but real. Military the way President Recep Tayyip the development of vibrant energy, was followed by the annexation of success in Georgia and Ukraine Erdogan and his domestic allies un- trade, and transit Crimea in 2014, also emboldened Russia to move derstand it. connections be- which allowed more aggressively in the Middle tween the Black Due to a weakening Russia to exponen- East, especially with its presence As a result, we are moving to- Sea-Caspian region U.S.-Turkish alliance since tially increase its in Syria. The strategic significance wards a new and yet still forming and the Mediter- the start of the Second Iraq military presence of the weak Western response to status quo in the South Caucasus, ranean, delivering War and the overall decline in the Black Sea re- Russian aggression in the South with different actors facing different huge economic and gion, as well as to Caucasus and the Black Sea region challenges as well as opportunities. of America’s presence and political benefits to establish a platform has become more evident as time all the energy pro- leadership in the region, for power projec- has passed. zerbaijan achieved a sig- ducing and transit Russia has regained signif- tion that aimed Anificant military victory countries of the re- icant power and influence not only at the and territorial gains, more than it gion: Kazakhstan, in the Black Sea region and Black Sea but the Broader Implications of ever realistically hoped to achieve Turkmenistan, the South Caucasus. Mediterranean as the Second Karabakh War at the negotiating table. Seven Azerbaijan, and well. By controlling regions outside of Nagorno- Georgia. Turkey Crimea, Russia he outcome of the military Karabakh, previously occupied by was, and continues to be, the major has now almost complete strategic Tconflict between Azerbaijan Armenia, returned to Azerbaijani beneficiary of the economic, po- dominance over the Black Sea. This and Armenia in Karabakh also has control. These include the entire litical, and security benefits of the situation, however, re-emphasized significant implications beyond length of the Azerbaijani-Iranian East-West energy and transporta- the importance of NATO member- the regional perspective. The war border in the south of the country tion corridor, as well as of the ex- ship for Turkey, despite the deterio- demonstrated that with great power and regions between Armenia and panding pipeline, railway, highway, ration of Turkey’s bilateral relation- consent (in this case, from Russia Nagorno-Karabakh, except for a and port infrastructure linking the ships with several leading NATO and Turkey), smaller actors (in this 5-kilometer-wide transportation country to Caspian resources and member states. case, Azerbaijan) can achieve their corridor known as the Lachin markets. But due to a weakening national objectives with military Corridor, that remains under the U.S.-Turkish alliance since the After the Second Karabakh War, means more efficiently than with control of the Russian peacekeeper start of the Second Iraq War and Russia increased its military pres- diplomacy. Russia, by maintaining force. About one-third of the former the overall decline of America’s ence in the South Caucasus, adding neutrality in the military con- Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh

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Autonomous Oblast reverted to tary peacekeepers. The access has not delivered about Russia’s role Azerbaijani control, including the road via Lachin from Armenia to any meaningful re- Both the Second Kara- in the security in- town of Shusha—a medieval citadel Armenian-controlled territories sults for Azerbaijan bakh War and the Novem- terests of Armenia of utmost military and cultural- in Karabakh will also be under for three decades. ber 10th, 2020, trilateral seems to be one historical importance to both sides. Russian control. In addition, one explanation for the important segment of the trilateral onsequently, agreement concluded be- limited and slow This military success will help document is that border troops CRussia is a tween Armenia, Azerbai- Russian response Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s presi- of the Russian Federal Security beneficiary of the jan, and Russia represents to the conflict. dent, to further consolidate power Service (FSB) will be in charge of outcome of the war; major diplomatic failures domestically and gain more respect safeguarding access from Azer- while this should for the West. Meanwhile, internationally, particularly in the baijan to Nakhchivan via Armenia. not be exaggerated, Turkey moved wider Black Sea-Caspian region The agreement does not specify the it cannot be disre- further away from where strong leaders traditionally size and operational modalities of garded either. It is now back in the the role of channeling Western in- garner greater respect. those troops, however. role of the arbiter and peacekeeper terests in the region to the role of in the Azerbaijani-Armenian con- pursuing sovereign Turkish in- At the same time, Azerbai- All of these elements of Russian flict, with the ability to change the terests in the South Caucasus and jan’s success is not without cost. military engagement represent status quo again in the future at its wider Black Sea-Caspian region— Azerbaijan had to agree to delegate gains for the Russian Federation discretion. Most importantly, with essentially neglecting the opinion part of its sovereign rights to the and were the result of compromises its peacekeeping role in the conflict of its Western partners. Turkey is Russian military over some parts made by the Azerbaijani side. The and the necessity of keeping logis- very happy with the outcome of of de jure Azerbaijani territory (for geopolitical consequences of this tical and supply lines open, Russia the war, as Erdogan has stated on a five-year period, according to decision are yet to be seen and un- is establishing a long-term military many occasions. If all the points of the November 10th, 2020, trilat- derstood. Meanwhile, at this stage presence in the region. the trilateral agreement are imple- eral agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan clearly wants to work mented, Turkey will have direct Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended with Russia to achieve what it con- The military defeat caused sig- access to mainland Azerbaijan via the war). The un- siders a priority nificant internal political tensions Nakhchivan and Armenia, hypo- stated implication national objective. in Armenia. It weakened the coun- thetically leading to normalized of the aforemen- The war demonstrat- This sends a posi- try’s reform-minded leadership, relations with Yerevan and the tioned document ed that with great pow- tive message from headed by Prime Minister Nicol opening of its borders with Armenia is that the ma- er consent (in this case, the Russian per- Pashinyan, who came to power as well—one of Erdogan’s longtime jority of the former from Russia and Turkey), spective: you have through one of President objectives. Due to these interests, Nagorno-Karabakh smaller actors (in this case, a better chance Vladimir Putin’s much-despised it appears that Turkey is not overly Autonomous of success in the color revolutions. To the extent concerned with the Russian peace- Oblast will remain Azerbaijan) can achieve conflict if you are that an Armenian leader can be keeper presence in Azerbaijan. under Armenian their national objectives on good terms independent-minded vis-à-vis administrative with military means with Russia. This Russia, Pashinyan was perceived Both the Second Karabakh War control—of course more efficiently than with contrasts with the as such, but also as being more and the November 10th, 2020, tri- now secured by diplomacy. Western effort of Western-leaning compared to his lateral agreement concluded be- Russian mili- mediation, which predecessors. Reminding him tween Armenia, Azerbaijan, and

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Russia represents major diplo- when it is fully implemented, this to trade with India but the new reality matic failures for the West. The ab- transportation route may attract and China via the For Georgia, the goals of in the region calls sence of the United States and the Russian cargo destined for Turkey Iranian ports of European and Transat- for reevaluating European Union (as well as the along with some volume from Bender Abbas and lantic integration remain and reassessing OSCE Minsk Group) from the Central Asia, which would mean Chabahar. This Georgia’s strategy process of negotiating the mo- that Georgian Black Sea ports would north-south trade the same, but the new more than ever dalities of the peace agreement be bypassed. Also, there may be route is a major reality in the region calls in the past. What demonstrate that the international some volumes redirected from the competitor with for reevaluating and re- follows is an as- framework for conflict settle- Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway to- the Caspian-Black assessing Georgia’s strate- sessment of the ment was replaced by a de facto ward the Baku-Nakhchivan-Turkey Sea route, since it gy more than ever in the principal chal- Turkey-Russia format. The two direction, although these volumes may also attract lenges that Georgia Western co-chairs of the OSCE are insignificant; transshipments on increased volumes past. needs to take into Minsk Group in charge of the the BTK railway in 2020 amounted of Central Asian account in the for- conflict (namely France and the to only 10,500 TEU, a tiny fraction of cargo destined for mulation of its new United States), were completely ig- the railway’s planned capacity of 6.5 Asian markets. The Nakhchivan strategy whilst keeping in mind that nored by its third co-chair (namely million tons. corridor may be attractive for previous strategies did not result Russia) in the talks that determined some volumes of specific Russian in tangible (and credible) security the timing and the outcome of the While very important for cargo going to Turkey, but Russia guarantees for the country. war (enshrined in the trilateral Azerbaijan—and potentially for would prefer Iran as a transit agreement). The West and NATO the normalization of Armenian- partner to access Asian markets, The major and most obvious were also ignored by NATO ally Azerbaijani-Turkish relationships and its own Black Sea ports to ac- challenge is the increased Russian Turkey, which provided support to going forward—the real transit po- cess the Eastern Mediterranean military presence in the region. In Azerbaijan without consulting its tential of the Nakhchivan corridor and Europe. addition to the larger geopolitical NATO partners. The diminishing will be limited for the foreseeable implications of this fact, it has direct role of Western institutions in de- future due to political, geographic, military-security implications for velopments in the Russian neigh- infrastructural, and financial rea- Security and Economic Georgia itself. Russian peacekeepers borhood has been in Russia’s in- sons. At the same time, this po- Implications for Georgia in the region will need logistical terest for more than two decades. tential normalization significantly support; thus, Georgia may find it- improves the strategic position of he impacts for Georgia of self pressured to open air or land potentially significant devel- Azerbaijan while also opening up Tthe outcome of the Second access for Russian military supplies. Aopment for the region may opportunities for Armenia, which Karabakh War are multiple and Georgia was already asked to open its be the eventual re-opening of the di- has found itself in a very painful Tbilisi needs a new strategy to airspace to transport Russian peace- rect railway line between Azerbaijan, position after its military defeat in adapt to new realities: consider- keepers on November 10th and 11th, Armenia, and Turkey as a conse- Karabakh. ation must be taken of the gains 2020—immediately after the signing quence of the post-war settlement. and losses of the conflict’s active of the trilateral peace statement. As Obviously, it will take time, in- In terms of Russia’s use of the participants as well as of post-con- was reported, requests to allow over- vestment, and significant political Nakhchivan corridor, it is more re- flict developments. For Georgia, flights of Russian military planes will to implement this element of alistic to expect greater utilization the goals of European and Transat- were made by both the Armenian and the trilateral agreement. But if and by Russia of Iranian infrastructure lantic integration remain the same, Azerbaijani governments.

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nother important challenge understatement to say that this gion. Iran, Turkey, and Geor- ne interesting detail is that is the renewed call for a six- collaboration did not end well for gia (I mention Georgia as well, there is no mention of either A as being a part of the South O party cooperation platform fea- the independence and sovereignty Caucasus) have the same in- Abkhazia or the Tskhinvali region/ turing the three countries of the of the three young South Caucasus terests. In general, initiatives South Ossetia as political entities in South Caucasus plus Iran, Russia, states that were extinguished by are being made to motivate the the South Caucasus in the context of and Turkey—a proposal first in- the machinations of Moscow and three republics of the South the 3+3 initiative’s discussion among troduced by Erdogan as the Pact Ankara, allowing the Bolshevik Caucasus to build their rela- Russian policymakers and observers tions with the participation of for Stability and Cooperation in regime to annex of all three of the their neighbors—Russia, Iran, (as a reminder, Russia technically the South Caucasus after Russia’s Caucasus’ nascent states. and Turkey—in the context recognizes these parts of Georgia as invasion of Georgia in 2008. While of the new reality where there “independent states”). There are dif- in Baku to attend the Victory Day ut the interest of the Rus- is no war and all parties agree ferent interpretations as to why this to lift the embargos and oth- military parade in December 2020, sian Federation in the 3+3 may be the case. The obvious one is B er restrictions on normal life Erdogan stated that this initiative initiative, as it has been called by in this important part of the that even Russia doesn’t really see has the support of all three major some, has not been confirmed by world. There is no doubt that these regions as independent states. regional powers (namely Russia, any official statement or comment the Islamic Republic of Iran is A less obvious reason is that Russia is Turkey and Iran). During his from Putin, or by any other top interested in joining all of these sending a message to Georgia—you projects. January 2021 regional tour, Ira- Russian official, for that matter. Some settle with us, and, like Azerbaijan, nian foreign minister Mohammad Russian observers have been you may have a chance for some ter- This should, however, be read Javad Zarif said in Moscow that openly negative about the initiative ritorial gains as well. alongside the final part of his - an this initiative was the “most im- because it would institutionalize swer, in which he speaks of Russia portant goal of this regional trip” Turkey’s growing influence in the So far, there is no clarity concerning taking a “direct part in the efforts for Tehran. region, which they perceive as a the official Armenian or Azerbai- envisioned by the agreements on danger to their country’s interests. jani attitude with regards to this 3+3 unblocking economic and trans- By construction this initiative initiative, but Georgia affiliates - it port connections” before adding would exclude Western insti- However, one indirect positive self with Western institutions and, that, tutions and countries from the indication may be gleaned from this realistically or not, desires greater affairs of the South Caucasus; statement made by Russian Foreign Western participation in the affairs in addition to Russia, Iran, and this indeed appears to be Minister Sergey Lavrov at a press and Turkey, many countries, of the South Caucasus. Obviously, one of its central objectives. At conference held after meeting Zarif including several European Turkey is a part of NATO and sup- the same time, this initiative re- during the latter’s aforementioned states, are willing to join the ports Georgia’s NATO membership calls for many in the Caucasus visit to Moscow: efforts to restore the econo- as well, so participation in this new the successful collaboration be- my in Nagorno-Karabakh and initiative doesn’t necessarily mean around it. I think this intention tween two newly-established You asked me whether the can only be welcomed. The closing the door to all Western insti- states—the Soviet Union and the three countries will face chal- bottom line is that all external tutions for the participant countries. Republic of Turkey—emerging lenges on the road to peace. participants must realize that from the ashes of two fallen em- If you have in mind Russia, now it is important to create, But the question remains: what Azerbaijan, and Armenia, they strengthen, and make reliable pires more than a century ago to are not the only ones that are and durable the economic value could this new grouping bring keep Western powers out of the interested in a calm, peaceful foundation of future life in the to Georgia? Would it help to restore Caucasus. It is a dramatic life and prosperity in the re- South Caucasus. the country’s territorial integrity?

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Would Russia move its troops out it could become the source of addi- this same regime, Georgia’s security of Georgia’s de jure sovereign terri- tional military supplies to the latter. including steps İt is essential for Georgia priorities should tory and reverse its decision on rec- But given new geopolitical realities towards greater to understand how far remain moving ognizing the independence of the that include Azerbaijan itself plan- economic inte- outside support can go, forward with re- separatist regions of Georgia? ning to allow Russian transit to gration, the rights gards to both EU Armenia, the Georgia-Russia rail of Russians to and to not exaggerate ex- and NATO inte- These are highly unlikely devel- link may become less of a sensitive own property in pectations while trying to gration in the mul- opments, which makes Georgia’s issue for Baku. Abkhazia, and so extract as much as pos- tilateral sphere, as participation in this type of initia- on. These conces- sible from international well as deepening tive impossible. However, Georgian precondi- sions, if material- partnerships. bilateral security tions for opening the railway are ized, would ease ties with key stra- n the context of opening unlikely to change significantly. the de facto annex- tegic partners like Itransportation links between In addition, Russia’s real appetite ation of the region by the Russian the United States, Turkey, and Azerbaijan and Armenia as part of to open this railway was always Federation. Azerbaijan as well as the coun - the post-conflict settlement out- at question, as any normalization try’s Black Sea neighbors lined in the November 10th, 2020, between Georgians and Abkha- (namely Ukraine, Romania, trilateral statement, an initiative zians would be seen as a threat to Georgia’s Response and Bulgaria). But it is essential may arise to consider re-opening Moscow’s ability to manipulate for Georgia to understand how the rail link between Russia and the situation in Georgia’s occupied s it responds to these and far outside support can go, and Georgia through the separatist regions. Aother national security to not exaggerate expectations region of Abkhazia, which is cur- challenges (including the ongoing while trying to extract as much as rently under the effective control he next challenge is the in- and expected negative economic possible from international part- of the Russian military. This link Tcreased Russian pressure impact of the COVID-19 pan- nerships. With the help of part - would be important for Armenia, on the separatist leadership in demic) it is important for Georgia ners, Georgia should continue and for many years both Yerevan Abkhazia to give up whatever to reevaluate and redefine its to focus on developing its terri - and Moscow have called on Tbilisi domestic power it has national security strategy and torial defense capabilities and on to allow its operation to restart. on local affairs in the Geor- create functioning mechanisms acquiring advanced, more effi- gian breakaway region. The for its optimal implementation. cient and cost-effective defensive Georgia has always wanted this case of Karabakh has shown to The best possible way forward technologies and weapons. issue to be linked to both the with- Abkhazian separatists, as well as to for Tbilisi would be to conceptu- drawal of Russian troops from others, that Russia carries a big stick alize national objectives in light of his focus on hardcore security Georgian territory and the return yet a very small carrot for those ‘al- new realities, formulate the basic Tneeds to be complemented of the displaced ethnic Georgian lies’ that fully depend on Moscow. principles of its national security with meaningful cooperation on re- population to Abkhazia, which con- It should come as no surprise, then, strategy on this basis, and en- gional infrastructure development stituted a majority of the region’s that when the leader of the Abkhaz gage its international partners in and EU-Black Sea-Caspian connec- pre-conflict population. In the past, separatist regime met Putin on designing a detailed action plan tivity. The new reality in the region Azerbaijan opposed the opening of November 12th, 2020, he began to with assigned resources and orga- cannot change Georgia’s role as the this railway connection between discuss multiple concessions that nizational mechanisms of imple- critical transit country for energy Russia and Armenia out of fear that had been unacceptable previously to mentation. resources.

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Put simply: Caspian oil and gas An increased role in bridging the and transit between the Caspian economic security of Georgia will will continue to flow via Georgia to Silk Road region with Europe and and Black Sea countries. It is im- depend on its openness and ability outside markets for many years to the states of the Mediterranean lit- portant for Georgia and Azerbaijan to attract more export-oriented income; and the South Caucasus cor- toral would represent a key factor of to achieve the same degree of un- dustries and activities. Collabora- ridor will remain the shortest trans- stability for Georgia. derstanding and collaboration on tive efforts with Georgian partners portation link between Central issues of general cargo transit as would allow regional companies to Asia and the Black Sea and Eastern This process will require major they similarly had (and continue to be a part of this process during the Europe. diplomatic effort and coordination, have) on the development of energy post-pandemic recovery. along with political leadership. In transit infrastructure. International Moreover, it will be important for the past, the most successful in- donor institutions, like the World When it comes to internal devel- Georgia and Azerbaijan—as well frastructure projects in the energy Bank, the European Bank for opment, Tbilisi’s priority should be as other partner sector became Reconstruction structural reform, countries—to con- possible with lead- and Development, which can reduce tinue working The region’s countries ership and strong the U.S. Inter- The Second Karabakh the state’s role in together on is- need to make extra ef- diplomatic effort national Devel- War has drastically the economy and sues of container from the United opment Finance help to unleash the and general cargo forts to re-engage with States, backed by Corporation, and changed geopolitical and creative entrepre- transit. Georgia major actors. Particular Turkey and re- the Asian Devel- geo-economic realities in neurial capacity of needs to take a attention should be paid gional leaders. The opment Bank can the South Caucasus, with Georgians. In times proactive position to reaching out to the region’s countries play positive roles different moving parts of dealing with in this process. At- European Union, which need to make extra not only in this co- whose shapes are still the consequences tracting cargo for may be a major benefi- efforts to re-engage ordination effort of global crises, European markets with major actors. but also in funding evolving whilst proceed- the privatization from the broader ciary of the additional Particular atten- projects that will ing in the general direc- of state assets is Silk Road region, access routes to markets tion should be paid facilitate transport tion of a new tectonic of the only way that which extends into and resources. to reaching out as well as digital regional stability. Georgia can attract Western China, to the European and energy con- international and Afghanistan, and Union, which may nectivity. These domestic capital perhaps the Indian subcontinent, be a major beneficiary of the addi- institutions, together with the EU, and transform passive state assets is a realistic target if all the transit tional access routes to markets and could also help Georgia to capitalize into productive assets. countries can collaborate. Signif- resources. on its Deep and Comprehensive icant public funding invested in Free Trade Agreement with the EU. Internal political stability and the Caspian ports and other infrastruc- n the absence of active sup- full mobilization of intellectual, or- ture in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Iport from the outside, greater Moreover, the re-arrangement ganizational, economic, military/ and Azerbaijan, as well as private regional coordination is crucial. of global supply chains in the political, and diplomatic resources investments in Georgian ports, can Georgia needs to adopt a more pro- post-pandemic world could open are all essential preconditions for only be justified if those cargo vol- active posture and invite partner opportunities for Georgia to at- the successful planning of Georgia’s umes are attracted by lower cost countries and institutions to play tract industries that are oriented national security for several, very and efficient movement of cargo. an active role in facilitating trade towards European markets. The difficult years to come.

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he Second Karabakh War tions with its strategic partners. Thas drastically changed geo- Stability in the South Caucasus political and geo-economic reali- in general, and in Georgia in parties in the South Caucasus, with ticular, needs to be seen as being different moving parts whose in the interest of many different shapes are still evolving whilst actors. Such a development rep- proceeding in the general direc- resents the only conceivable way tion of a new tectonic of regional for Georgia to ensure its security stability. Georgia needs to adapt in the absence of full NATO mem- to these new emerging realities bership or the credible issuance of by expanding its horizon for al- bilateral security guarantees from liances whilst deepening rela- its strategic partners. BD

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The Center delivers interdisciplinary educational and training programs, outreach activities, and support to academic research on EU policy and EU-Azerbaijan cooperation.

Centre of Excellence in EU Studies at ADA University

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has been partic- unipolar, rules- What Do Energy Sanctions ularly noticeable The use of economic sanc- based order is now since the early tions greatly increased under pressure, 1970s. Over the during the post-World perhaps even du- Say About the World? past several de- ress—some argue War II era, especially in cades, they have it is coming to an essentially become the energy sector. end. Certainly, its Aurélie Bros a way for energy geopolitical un- producers and con- derpinnings have tatecraft is often under- Princeton University’s David sumers to exert disapproval over dramatically changed, as rising stood as the art of con - A. Baldwin wrote in 1985 that one another and to weaken those powers seek to recalibrate their ducting state affairs in economic sanctions are divided considered to be morally respon- respective voices in order to re- orderS to exert a direct influ - into two main categories: those sible for objectionable policies (not write global rules that, they assert ence on other actors in the in - with a punitive function and always related to energy issues). En- (with at least some justification), ternational system in order to those aimed at encouraging or ergy sanctions, therefore, are often they did not have much of a hand get them to do what they would rewarding. He also noted that paired with non-energy economic in designing. In such a changing not do otherwise. To achieve they impact trade (e.g. embargo, sanctions targeting a large array of environment, the mechanisms, their goals, policymakers are quotas, and (un)favorable tariff goods and services. For example, the achievements, and the moral able to employ a variety of le - discriminations) as well as cap- an oil embargo can take place in permissibility related to energy vers such as diplomacy, propa- ital (e.g. aid suspension, con- tandem with nuclear-related sanc- sanctions—in addition to their ganda, military statecraft, and trols on imports or exports, and tions aimed at stopping military enormous and long-lasting re- economic statecraft. According (dis)advantageous taxation), and use of civilian nuclear power tech- sulting pain that goes well beyond to Elizabeth Ellis of the Inter- that they can be used wisely or nology—as in the Iranian case. the economic sphere—have come Disciplinary Ethics Applied unwisely, justly or unjustly, de- under increasing criticism in dif- Energy sanctions are always ferent parts of the world. Centre of the University of Leeds, pending on the situation at hand. deeply rooted in a wider polit- the latter category encompasses ical and economic environment, his essay will explore the all economic means—including Although economic sanctions reflecting the global order of system established during recourse to economic sanctions— have a long history, with origins T their time. This essay will focus the 20th century that legitimized that might be used by interna - in Antiquity, they are unequally mainly on the bipolar interna- (in certain cases) the use of en- tional actors with the intention distributed over time. For ex- tional system led by the United ergy sanctions, as well as the par- of (i) preventing objectionable ample, their use greatly increased States and the Soviet Union be- tial loss of their efficiency and le- policy or behavior, (ii) sending during the post-World War II era, tween 1947 and 1991, which was gitimacy caused by a progressive a message, or (iii) punishing especially in the energy sector. This followed by a post-Cold War in- shift towards a polycentric global unlawful policy or behavior. increasing use of energy sanctions ternational system in which the order. Since oil and gas-related United States assumed the role of sanctions constitute the majority Aurélie Bros, an independent researcher, holds a joint PhD in geopolitics from the the world’s leading power, sup- of energy sanctions, these two re- Sorbonne and the Russian Academy of Sciences. She is a former Lecturer on Govern- ment and Senior Fellow at Harvard University, where she served as Program Leader ported by Western-dominated sources will stand at the heart of of the Energy Project at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. organizations. Nevertheless, this the analysis.

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The first part of nomic sanctions, Finally, during Wilson’s ad- n the environment of the Cold the essay looks at The mechanisms, the in the hope that re- dress at the Coliseum at the State IWar, where the prospect of the origins of eco- achievements, and the course to military Fair Grounds in Indianapolis in all-out nuclear war had inhibited nomic sanctions moral permissibility re- statecraft could September 1919, he framed a nar- the main powers in using military and the progres- be prevented. rative that emphasized economic statecraft against one another whilst sive establishment lated to energy sanctions U.S. President sanctions (his term: “absolute eco- allowing client states to do so (e.g. of a world order have come under increas- Woodrow Wilson nomic boycott”) as the League’s Vietnam, Afghanistan), economic wherein certain ing criticism in different became one of the “central machinery,” portraying it sanctions became an attractive op- nations decided to parts of the world. main architects of as a more humane and peaceful al- tion. In Soviet eyes, this kind of make use of them. economic sanc- ternative to war as well as a means sanction made it possible to tighten The second part tions. By promoting of deterring aggression. the stranglehold over the sphere of analyses the sudden rise in im- the League of Nations, he endowed influence of the USSR via (un)prof- portance of oil and gas in foreign the first intergovernmental organi- To some extent, the system pro- itable quotas, embargos, and price- policymaking and the unfolding zation with the mission to maintain moted by Wilson was a source of fixing. To some extent, this can be tugs-of-war between consuming peace in the world and the right to inspiration after World War II. The described as a stick-and-carrot ap- and/or producing countries. Un- enforce economic sanctions against United Nations became the new proach, which gave Moscow room derstanding the historic and signif- those that break the rules. principal international organiza- for maneuver since each positive icant role of the United States, the tion, whose first enumerated -pur sanction was a fertile ground for Russian Federation, and relevant Secondly, he supported a system pose was to “maintain international subsequent negative sanctions that Middle East states forms an im- in which Western countries took peace and security.” It enshrined could be introduced on a whim. portant part of this analysis. The center stage in the exercise of economic sanctions, while the Outside of this territory, Moscow third and final section scrutinizes power. This saw the “Principal Security Council—whose five per- enjoyed a more limited set of mea- the scope and characteristics of en- Allied and Associated Powers” of manent members were China, sures due to the structural problems ergy sanctions nowadays, noting the Versailles Treaty—which in- France, the Soviet Union (later of the Soviet command economy that these are being called into cluded the original text of the Russia), the United Kingdom, and that had worsened over time and question due to the rise of new great Covenant of the League of the United States—centralized the prevented the economic system to powers in an international context Nations—namely “the British act of decisionmaking. Owing to compete effectively on the global characterized, inter alia, by a rising Empire, France, Italy, and the increasingly total nature of war- stage. In other words, imposing awareness of the perils of climate Japan,” (the United States was fare, economic sanctions aroused effective economic sanctions on change. also listed but famously did not interest because they were per- Western nations was no easy task. ratify the treaty, notwithstanding ceived by sanctioning states as a Wilson’s support, and was thus lower-cost and lower-risk course The situation was fairly different Rise of Economic Statecraft never a member of the League) of action. This also confirmed in the United States. The reason becoming permanent members of the overwhelmingly Western- was as follows: in the aftermath of n the aftermath of World War the now all-but-forgotten League character of the exercise of power, World War II, Washington con- II, the major Allied Powers ad- Council, a type of executive body and above all, led to the concen- trolled two-thirds of the world’s vocated a higher use of economic directing the organization’s busi- tration of power in the hands of gold reserves and was the sole statecraft that encompassed - co ness whose main function was the world’s two superpowers: the power whose economy had escaped ercive policy tools, such as eco- to settle international disputes. United States and the Soviet Union. the conflict relatively unscathed.

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Furthermore, the conclusion of statecraft of the United States and Crude Reality: Petroleum in World European need for oil immedi- the Bretton Woods Agreement in its European allies. (This has some- History (2012). Despite the pro- ately began raising concerns in July 1944 and the establishment of times been authorized by the UN gressive transformation in mobility Washington. On the one hand, its institutions (the International Security Council, which means that of people and goods via the inven- Americans feared that skyrocketing Monetary Fund and what became in some instances sanctions have tion of the automobile, oil had lim- demand in western Europe would the World Bank Group) strength- been endorsed by both China and ited commercial uses. This natural cause supplies at home to reduce. ened the central role of the U.S. Russia as representing acceptable— resource truly became a strategic On the other hand, the Americans currency. Progressively, America that is to say, legitimate—tools of commodity on the eve of World feared the possibility of western tightened its influence over the contemporary statecraft.) War I when the American and European countries signing agree- economy of other countries by ce- British navies converted from coal ments with the energy-rich Soviet menting the role of the U.S. dollar American political scientist to oil-use in order to increase warf- Union. After all, at that time, the as the world’s reserve currency, and Jonathan Kirshner lists four reasons ighting capability, as Black explains. USSR was a leading hydrocarbon thus as the world’s leading currency. for this development: first, mul- Unsurprisingly, other powers fol- producer and was supplying oil and Last but not least, the country rap- tiplying tensions and/or conflicts lowed suit. In historian Daniel natural gas to its satellites in central idly became an undisputed techno- between participants in the former Yergin’s classic book, The Prize: and eastern Europe. logical and commercial power due anti-Soviet alliance; second, an in- The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and to its capacity to create, develop, creasing number of market econo- Power (1991), the author notes that s a result of this context, the and deploy new technologies. Such mies vulnerable to economic state- the control of oil had been a key AMiddle East generated in- a privileged situation allowed the craft; third, refusal of some great factor in determining the victors of creasing interest from outside powers United States to impose stringent powers’ practice to resort to force World War II, adding that the con- for its oil, which was uniquely plentiful and sometimes long-lived eco- in some cases (e.g. Germany); and flict buttressed the strategic nature and easy to produce. For example, on nomic sanctions against the Soviet fourth, using sanctions as “an early of oil. It became an indispensable his way back from the February 1945 Union (later Russia) and its allies, method to influence in a conflict.” material for lubricating machin- Yalta Conference with Stalin and third countries, and even its own eries and guns, manufacturing Churchill, having only weeks to live, allies, such as when France, Israel, This shows that a policy of eco- synthetic rubber for use as tires for U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the UK concerted to invade nomic sanctions remains a privilege airplanes or jeeps, laying runways, famously initiated a strategic alliance Egypt in 1956 in the wake of the enjoyed by a handful of countries. and so on. The list goes on. with the founder of Saudi Arabia, nationalization of the Suez Canal. King Abdulaziz ibn Saud, during a An expanding use of this resource secret meeting held onboard the USS n the immediate post-Cold Energy Sanctions Emerge in the military sector coupled Quincy anchored in the Suez Canal. IWar period, the United States with a ravenous oil appetite to fuel became the unchallenged super- he oil industry as we post-war recovery led to the need This led to the establishment power: in the famous terminology Tknow it today was born in to secure physical access to oil re- of what came to be known as provided by Charles Krauthammer, the mid-nineteenth century in sources. As the world’s leading oil the “petrodollar,” which saw U.S. during what he called the “unipolar Azerbaijan and the United States. producer at the end of World War dollars paid to oil-exporting moment,” the United States enjoyed “Particularly around Baku, tech- II, the United States could count countries in exchange for oil. total hegemony. Since the collapse nological advancements helped on sufficiently high domestic oil This was made possible thanks of the Soviet Union, sanctions to power petroleum’s viability,” as production to supply its domestic to the aforementioned Bretton have become the dominant tool of historian Brian C. Black puts it in market. But the increasing western Wood Agreement. According to

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Georgetown University’s David S. constituted the first, although tions between the Middle East and showed the world that it could use Painter, this agreement led to the unsuccessful, try. the West. It also led to the creation its control over oil production to establishment of a system whereby of the Organization of Petroleum influence a political agenda. Oil American oil companies began to While the Middle East progres- Exporting Countries (OPEC) the prices skyrocketed (by the time the invest heavily in that part of the sively became the biggest non- following year. The members of embargo was lifted in March 1974, world to supply America’s western communist oil exporter (with the the newly-formed cartel viewed the the global price of oil had risen European allies, which in turn in- Persian Gulf states collectively acquisition of knowledge and expe- nearly 300 percent). directly supported the internation- leading the way, headed of course rience in the oil and gas industry alization of these companies whilst by Saudi Arabia), the United States of paramount importance. It was, In response to this situation, establishing American preeminence made access to oil reserves the pillar after all, a means of reducing their Western countries initiated a in the postwar international system. of its foreign policy due to the West’s dependence on the West. Soon project to diversify oil import The two main beneficiaries of this rising dependence on hydrocarbons thereafter, Arab countries followed sources (e.g., the North Sea), and were Standard Oil (later Exxon)— extracted from that region. In order the Iranian example and started es- natural gas turned out to be a se- in 1948 it gained a 30 percent to contain various Soviet political tablishing national oil companies rious alternative to oil, notably in stake in the Arabian-American Oil breakthroughs in the region in the with the aim of establishing coop- western Europe. The decrease in Company (Aramco, later changed wake of the Suez Crisis, U.S. Presi- erative relations with Western inter- oil output in the wake of the 1979 to Saudi Aramco)—and of course dent Dwight D. Eisenhower in early national oil companies. Slowly but Iranian Revolution reinforced this the Kingdom Saudi Arabia itself. January 1957 proclaimed American surely, they succeeded in turning trend and brought energy efficiency readiness to provide military and the oil market in their favor. OPEC to the fore. Increasing concerns The Middle East’s oil-producing economic aid to any government managed to influence the inter- about the West’s high dependence countries grew more richer and in the “general area of the Middle national price of oil by raising or on Middle East oil and gas also their respective shares in world hy- East” that needed help in resisting lowering production levels. This led to the development of new hydrocarbon production continued to “international communism.” This placed significant responsibility on drocarbons extraction methods— increase. Nevertheless, control over came to known as the Eisenhower Saudi Arabia due to the fact that the including fracking in the United exports and marketing of oil and Doctrine and represents a milestone kingdom was responsible for a sig- States—in an attempt to achieve gas remained under the control of in U.S. foreign policy in that it not nificant proportion of the OPEC’s greater energy independence. How- Western international oil companies. only expanded the geographic scope output and had spare capacity. ever, it also pushed several western Naturally, over time these countries of containment but also declared that Europe countries towards the So- sought to gain greater control over policy to be, henceforth, a means In 1973, OPEC wielded its power viet Union. The USSR’s oil and gas their own resources, as related in some of securing access to, as he put it, even further by initiating an oil em- imports contracts multiplied from detail by Peter Mansfield and Nicolas “petroleum products.” bargo against a number of Western the 1970s onwards and led to se- Pelham in their book, A History of the countries—including the U.S., the rious tensions inside the Western Middle East (1991). Iranian prime n 1959, Western international UK, Canada, The Netherlands, bloc (more on this below). minister Mohammad Mossadegh’s Ioil companies cut crude oil and Japan (but not France or West attempt to get rid of British influ- prices in Venezuela and the Arab Germany, although of course he dissolution of the So- ence and nationalize his country’s oil oil producing countries without they too felt its effects)— Tviet Union in 1991 left the industry so as to regain sovereignty consulting the host governments. identified as supportive of Israel in United States standing as the over the development of its nat- Understandably, this caused an up- the Yom Kippur War against Syria world’s sole superpower. Soon non- ural resources in the early 1950s roar and took a heavy toll on rela- and Egypt. By doing so, the cartel OPEC countries, starting with the

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Russian Federation, seized the Russia) and the world’s largest revive the economy in a post-pan- had their expected impact, but this opportunity to challenge the su- oil producer in 2018 (surpassing demic world. In other words, Biden turned out to be a double-edged premacy of oil-producing coun- Saudi Arabia). By putting forward is embarking on a modernization sword. One of the main down- tries from the Middle East. Russia the concept of energy dominance, drive that ought, ultimately, to side effects of OPEC’s success in tried to reinforce its position on the Trump Administration trans- allow his country to remain a great wielding this “weapon” was the the European market by increasing formed the United States into a energy power, in both hard and soft demonization of its member coun- exports, multiplying its export cor- global energy superpower. This power terms. tries in the Western media. This ridors (including by bypassing for- strategy accorded with the “America led to widespread hostility and re- mer-Soviet republics like Ukraine), First” doctrine—a pullback strategy sentment and nourished the idea of and penetrating the natural gas of sorts, reflecting decreasing Rebalance of Power “oil blackmail.” In such an environ- value chain. It also started to acquire American tolerance for the global ment, diversification and energy shares in the Asian market, where role the United States embraced he global rebalance of power efficiency policies gained -in im energy demand was booming and after World War II (without consid- Thas had at least three conse- portance in Western countries. For prices were skyrocketing, as well as ering the likely consequences). quences on the use of energy sanc- example, the American quest for by attempting to supply gas to the tions. In the context of the Middle energy independence needs to be U.S. market—this option remained Donald Trump was a one-term East, this has manifested itself as a understood as a means to draw a line wishful thinking—through new gas U.S. president. The November loss of efficiency rather than a loss under the country’s dependence on fields such as the Shtokmanovskoye 2020 election of his successor, Joe of legitimacy. In the Russian con- Middle East hydrocarbons. field located in the Barents Sea. Biden, has been saluted as a return text, the country’s influence is de- to “rules-based international order,” creasing but remains solid in the Furthermore, diversification was What has come to be known as especially by America’s European post-Soviet space. Lastly, the end all the more crucial because of the the “shale revolution” (leading to allies. When it comes to energy, of the “unipolar moment” has re- recurrent use of military state- an increase in oil and gas produc- however, Biden has continued his sulted in a loss of legitimacy in the craft against energy infrastruc- tion) combined with a gradual shift predecessor’s strategy of making new world order for the West. Each ture during armed conflicts. Two towards low-carbon sources and re- America self-sufficient through the of the three consequences will be striking examples include the Iraq- newables supported by the Obama reduction of hydrocarbon imports. examined in turn. Iran war during the 1980s and the Administration constituted a game- On the other hand, Biden differs First Gulf War, when Iraqi forces changer: the United States was on its from Trump in having launched First, the Middle East. As noted set fire to Kuwaiti oil fields after way to self-sufficiency and thereby initiatives to reboot—in a fairly above, OPEC had recourse to what Baghdad’s invasion of the country. stood to increase its national sta- unique way—the role of the United was called the “oil weapon” time bility in a volatile global economy. States in fighting climate change. and again in decades past. Each Over the past few decades, we When Donald Trump came into In addition to defining objec- embargo and cut in production have observed a progressive loss of the White House in January 2017, tives aimed at lowering American produced fears of power of OPEC, the United States stood on the cusp greenhouse gas emissions and en- shortages in indus- which conse- of energy independence. According couraging research support into trialized countries The global rebalance of quently makes the to the U.S. Energy Information cutting-edge technologies, Biden’s and led to an in- power has had at least use of sanctions Administration, the country be- proposed infrastructure plan could crease in the price three consequences on the implemented by came the world’s largest natural (i) strengthen U.S. energy security, of oil. In a sense, use of energy sanctions. the cartel less ef- gas producer in 2011 (surpassing (ii) increase social justice, and (iii) energy sanctions fective, if not

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 118 119 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES unnecessary. Since the 2014 drop in in a bid to gain protection against the price of Russian gas. After the an- In conclusion, the future of en- global oil prices, the cartel, led by any kind of Russian military and nexation of the peninsula by Russia ergy sanctions in post-Soviet states Saudi Arabia, has placed particular economic statecraft. in 2014, Russia cancelled the Kharkiv largely depends on the desire of emphasis on keeping control of oil Accords, which immediately led to these nations to maintain eco- prices in a bid to counterbalance The stick-and-carrot policy led a spiraling increase in gas prices in nomic, political, and military rela- American and Russian influence to mixed reactions in other post- Ukraine. Since then, Kyiv has acted tions with the Russian Federation. over prices. Implementing sanc- Soviet republics like Belarus and in a way so as to protect itself against Quite often, the politico-economic tions against consuming countries Ukraine, but also in the three South Russian influence: furthering its rap- emancipation of these countries has not been on the agenda for Caucasus and five Central Asia prochement with the West while ap- is at the very heart of the eman- quite a while. Rather, the past few states—what the editors of Baku Di- plying European energy regulations. cipation process from Moscow’s years have witnessed a greater focus alogues identify as the core of the Silk influence and energy issues are on market forces. Road region—that emerged from Other former Soviet republics just a part of the whole picture, the breakup of the Soviet Union. took a decision to maintain their as described inter alia by Morena econd, Russia. Following the After achieving independence, most respective links Skalamera in a Scollapse of the USSR, the of the former Soviet republics signed with Russia. Here 2018 article pub- Russian Federation inherited the economic agreements with the Rus- we can list Ar- The future of energy lished by Insight former Soviet Union’s energy obli- sian Federation, which also included menia, Belarus, sanctions in post-Soviet Turkey and Mar- gations, including those related to security issues (a legacy of the Soviet Kazakhstan, and garita Balmaceda states largely depends on trade in the energy sector. Former system). By doing so, they main- Kyrgyzstan, all in her 2015 book Soviet republics as well as former tained the combination of positive of which joined the desire of these nations The Politics of En- satellite states inherited a high de- and negative sanctions. the Eurasian Eco- to maintain economic, ergy Dependency. pendence on Russian energy. In the nomic Union in political, and military re- Answers have late 1990s, a large majority of former Numerous energy crises unfolded 2014 or 2015. A lations with the Russian been varied, as re- COMECON countries, plus the from this imbroglio. The April 2010 regional energy Federation. cently observed Baltic states, sought to align their Agreement between Ukraine and market began to in Belarus, but oil and gas contracts with western Russia on the Black Sea Fleet in take shape under the reactions each European standards (this included Ukraine (commonly known as the the auspices of this economic union. time feed resentments and ex- switching from cost-plus pricing Kharkiv Accords) is a prime example. However, negotiations have been pose Moscow to the same realities to net-back replacement value gas The context goes back to May 1997, arduous for although Moscow has that Middle-Eastern oil producing pricing with oil-product index- when Ukraine and Russia signed a been keen to abolish some positive countries are facing: diversifica- ation). It was perceived as a safe- partition treaty allowing the Russian sanctions that were considered too tion and energy efficiency policies, guard against the aforementioned Black Sea Fleet to stay in Sevastopol expensive for the Russian budget, and a tarnished image—especially stick-and-carrot policy—i.e., (un) until 2017. After long and arduous other members of this union sup- in the West—with major political profitable quotas, embargos, and negotiations, Moscow and Kyiv ported such sanctions. Though consequences. price fixing that can be changed came to an agreement in 2010: the positive sanctions can be disrup- on a whim. This pivot towards the Russian fleet would stay in Crimea tive over a long period of time be- astly, the end of the “unipolar West was always accompanied by until 2042, with a possible five-year cause they are the basis for negative Lmoment” and the resulting membership applications to NATO extension. In return, Ukraine would sanctions, they can also be finan- loss of legitimacy has obviously also or the European Union (or both) benefit from a significant discount on cially attractive in the short term. had an impact on the West with

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 120 121 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES respect to the use of energy sanc- to cutting-edge technologies and mismanagement. The key question financial institutions, insurance tions. In recent years, the number know-how (the latter of which di- is whether the Biden Administra- companies, and energy companies of studies dedicated to analyzing rectly undermines the development tion and the EU—each hoping to cannot operate within Iranian and the consequences of economic of national oil and gas fields), have lead the global transition to clean Russian jurisdictions unless under sanctions and illustrating their a domino effect that should not be energy—will manage to keep up the strict terms defined by Washington. effects on sanctioned countries underestimated. fight against nuclear proliferation has grown significantly. The main and other security threats without During Trump’s presidency, en- conclusions of these studies have Firstly, they exacerbate pollu- hampering the fight against climate ergy sanctions tended to trigger undermined the narrative—which tion levels during exploration and change. adaptation measures in sanctioned had been mainly forged by the West production of gas and oil fields as countries much more than in the during the 20th century—that legit- well as the transportation of natural he central role of the United past. The case of Russia is cer- imized their use. Economic sanc- resources, heightening the risk of TStates in the process of im- tainly one of the most interesting. tions, including energy sanctions, ecological disasters. Secondly, they posing and implementing economic Moscow’s adaptation now hinges on have often shifted make large-scale sanctions is also a the pursuit of the the burden of harm investment in the cause for concern following five poli- from targeted states Economic sanctions, in- expansion and/or for other regional The central role of the cies: (a) launching to civilians. In a cluding energy sanctions, modernization of and global powers. United States in the pro- new marketing 2016 article enti- have often shifted the energy grids much American extrater- cess of imposing and im- choices towards tled “Ethics, Inter- burden of harm from tar- difficult, if not -im ritorial sanctions plementing economic Asia; (b) increasing national Affairs and geted states to civilians. possible, which have become the sanctions is also a cause cooperation with Western Double contributes to primary vehicle for non-Western insti- Standards,” former slowing down the signaling and even for concern for other re- tutions, located for UN Assistant-Secretary-General transition towards cleaner energy implementing U.S. gional and global powers. the most part lo- Ramesh Thakur listed the three systems. Thirdly, they preclude the political objectives. cated in Asia or in main side-effects of sanctions on ci- conversion of raw products into the Middle East; (c) implementing vilians: premature deaths, food in- refined fuels (e.g., gasoline, diesel, To put it simply, Washington has import replacement measures (via security, and lack of medicines and and kerosene), which mostly leads given itself jurisdiction to impose countries like China) aimed at medical equipment. Such facts have to an increase in the consumption economic sanctions—including tackling the country’s more limited resulted in sharp criticism towards of low-quality fuels (due to the lack energy sanctions—that target for- access to Western technologies; (d) the use of economic statecraft by of an alternative). This leads to eigners on foreign soil. Hence the developing its own technology; and Western countries to achieve for- massive air pollution, which in turn use of the term “extraterritorial (e) reducing the number of transac- eign policy objectives. results in major social and health sanctions.” This has been made pos- tions denominated in U.S. dollars. crises. sible mainly due to America’s mon- Energy sanctions also give rise to etary and technological supremacy. Nevertheless, even when put to- their morally questionable effects. Iran, the world’s sixth-largest The result is a comprehensive set gether these measures do not con- Capital market restrictions, prohi- emitter of greenhouse gases in 2019, of restrictions that either precludes stitute a silver bullet. As in the days bitions of transactions dealing with is a prime example: the country business conducted in U.S. dollars of the Soviet Union, Russia has new long-term debts, limitations suffers from all three of these prob- or involves an American firm or limited room for maneuver due on technical assistance, and access lems, which are heightened by individual (or both). For example, to structural problems of both its

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 122 123 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES economy and finan- Washington and when diplomacy means of exerting cial system. Thus, During Trump’s presiden- its allies in western is deemed insuf- To a certain extent, war pressure through the country is trying cy, energy sanctions tend- Europe without un- ficient and other has become the weapon dependence (in- to fight back by ed to trigger adaptation dermining Trans- tools of statecraft of the poor, while eco- cluding tech- adapting itself with atlanticism. But are judged to be too nology, finance, Chinese support, measures in sanctioned Trump’s presidency costly. Economic nomic and energy sanc- and imports). but Moscow is nei- countries much more did. Energy sanc- and energy sanctions have become the ther able to prevent than in the past. The case tions imposed by tions have made it weapon of rich and pow- To a certain ex- the imposition of of Russia is certainly one the United States possible to avoid erful nations. tent, war has be- new sanctions nor of the most interesting. were increas- armed conflicts come the weapon compete at a finan- ingly perceived by between heavily of the poor, while cial and technolog- European states as a armed great powers, but they have economic and energy sanctions ical level with the United States in direct threat to their own economic not prevented bloodsheds at their have become the weapon of rich particular. Of course, as a permanent interests (as well as to those of the peripheries. They are more a reflec- and powerful nations. In a unipolar member of the UN Security Council, European Union as a whole)—in tion of geopolitical realities rather world, energy sanctions reflected Russia has the capacity to block UN particular those restricting Euro- than a set of high-minded moral faith in U.S. leadership as well as the sanctions targeting the energy sector pean companies from doing busi- values. To some extent, imposing absence of reasonable alternatives. of third countries, often receiving ness in Russian and Iran. On that sanctions has progressively become China’s rise and Russia’s promotion support from China in this regard. subject, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline a privilege enjoyed by a few great of multipolarity is bringing this to Over the past few years, China has po- has been a bone of contention be- powers, starting with the global en- an end—if it has not already come. sitioned itself as a counterbalance to tween Washington and Brussels/ ergy superpower, the United States. Certainly, the EU is looking for Washington’s sanctions supremacy, Berlin. So far, a status quo seems to closer cooperation with the United while expending its position in the have been found. The Biden Admin- Throughout the 20th century, States since Biden came to power, world economy and defending its istration has confirmed that it would each power center has developed a but this has not resulted in a snap- economic interests. not impose sanctions on corpora- narrative to justify the use of sanc- back to 2016: Trump’s hostility has tions that built the gas pipeline; and tions. The Middle East sought to not been forgotten. Only time will Last but not least, energy sanctions the EU has not created mechanisms regain its sovereignty over its nat- tell whether the United States will have become a bone of contention in order to shield itself from U.S. ural resources. The Soviet Union be able to retain its central role in within the West itself. As previously sanctions and possible interferences wanted to support those states that the process of imposing economic earlier in this essay, the United States in its energy sector. embraced its ideological values. The and energy sanctions—especially in has interfered in European energy West wanted to avoid wars. While the context of ambitions to mitigate issues in the past. One of the most each side cultivated its own sense of against the effects of climate change famous examples is when Ronald Weapon of the Rich and being right, sanctions have contin- by weaning the world off its depen- Reagan attempted to meddle with Powerful uously led to escalating tensions be- dence on hydrocarbon sources of the energy import policies of western cause they have primarily become a energy. BD European countries by imposing requently criticized, even unilateral economic sanctions on the Fderided, economic and en- Soviet Union in the 1980s. That sit- ergy sanctions remain an alterna- uation generated tensions between tive of choice to other policy tools

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strengthen their has paved the way The China-Pakistan economic relation- Over the past six years, for further cooper- ship, many issues CPEC has helped Paki- ation between the Economic Corridor are being addressed stan in overcoming many two countries and through joint ef- obstacles in the way of the there is a growing forts. Pakistan is interest in China’s Cementing Silk Road Dreams keen to learn from country’s economic and business community China’s experience social progress. to explore opportu- in eradicating pov- nities in Pakistan. Ali Haider Saleem and Arhama Siddiqa erty and developing an industrial base. At the same time, China has Pakistan’s vibrant agricul- a keen interest in various sectors of ture sector and proposed Special he term Silk Road is used by continents, is a long-term, strategic Pakistan’s economy, which can ben- Economic Zones (SEZs) under Tscholars to describe a network investment plan with the objective efit the peoples of both countries. CPEC are the main target areas for of trading posts and markets linking of facilitating economic integration Chinese investments in the coming East Asia to the Mediterranean. In of countries in line with the historic resently, CPEC is transi- years. A number of initiatives have terms of geographical context, the Silk Road. In April 2015, China’s Ptioning into its next phase. been undertaken to modernize editors of Baku Dialogues define President, Xi Jinping announced The primary focus of the initial Pakistan’s agriculture sector with the region as the “geographic space the China-Pakistan Economic stage was energy and infrastructure the help of Chinese support. In looking west past Anatolia to the Corridor (CPEC), which amounts development. Pakistan’s economy January 2021, for example, an warm seas beyond; north across the to BRI’s flagship project. This -en was stagnant due to critical defi- online platform was launched to Caspian towards the Great Plain and terprise, which encompasses road, ciencies but Chinese investments in facilitate both agricultural and in- the Great Steppe; east to the peaks rail, and oil pipeline links, will help various projects have reinvigorated dustrial cooperation. In reference of the Altai and the arid sands of the Beijing advance its influence across the economy. More than 12,000 to this, Chairman of the Pakistan Taklamakan; and south towards the South and Central Asia. MW of energy has been added Agricultural Research Council Mu- Hindu Kush and the Indus valley, while the country’s GDP reached hammad Azeem Khan stated that looping down around in the direc- Over the past six years, CPEC $314 billion in 2018, as compared such “cooperation will not only im- tion of the Persian Gulf and across the has helped Pakistan in overcoming to $244 billion in 2014. Moreover, prove crop production and ensure Fertile Crescent.” States falling under many obstacles in the way of the what have been called the “Early food security, but it will also be a this parasol include China, Pakistan, country’s economic and social Harvest” projects created 30,000 fate changer for the people of Paki- Iran, Turkey, the five Central Asian progress. These obstacles include jobs for locals. Also, the prolonged stan.” Moreover, the Government of republics, Azerbaijan, and Russia. tackling the energy shortage, scanty energy crisis has largely been over- Pakistan is determined to promote infrastructure, and limited capacity come much to the relief of local inequitable and inclusive growth; China’s Belt and Road Initia- to support social welfare programs. dustries. Finally, development work hence, it is pushing for cooperation tive (BRI), which traverses several As China and Pakistan look to on roads and ports has increased in areas beyond financial incen- market access and provided avenues tives. Speaking at the second Belt Ali Haider Saleem is an economic and geopolitical analyst at Global Village Space, for more people across the country and Road Forum held in April 2019, where he also serves as Sub-editor. Arhama Siddiqa is a Research Fellow at the to integrate in the economy. The Prime Minister Imran Khan re- Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad. success of these and other projects vealed that the next phase of CPEC

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 126 127 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES would focus on socio-economic itated, [and] planned way towards the two countries, and this essay industrialization has turned it into uplift, poverty alleviation, agricul- a recognized model of modernity, will also explore the incentives the largest manufacturing country tural cooperation, and industrial usually to the standard of an ex- for China in supporting socio- in the world and is now called in development. The development of isting society regarded as modern.” economic progress in Pakistan. some circles the world’s factory. the first Special Economic Zone This theory is applicable since Paki- As before, the Chinese leadership within the CPEC framework is now stan aims to follow China’s path to- In short, the aim of this essay is considers trade and regional inte- underway, promising to create mil- wards development and modernity. to evaluate the prospects of the gration a cornerstone for sustain- lions of jobs and boost output. In socio-economic projects that fall able economic prosperity. This March 2021, the Chinese embassy he tilt towards socio- within the scope of CPEC as well as approach also reinforces Chinese in Islamabad hosted the China- Teconomic development the wider implications of CPEC on principles of peaceful coexistence, Pakistan Seed Industry Coopera- under the framework of CPEC socio-economic development for which it maintains forms the basis tion and Exchange Forum with the shows that basic human needs and Pakistan. It will also give an over- of its foreign policy. aim of strengthening collaboration standard of living cannot be ig- view of how BRI, and CPEC, can fit in seed production between the two nored at the expense of industrial in with the plans of countries that BRI was launched in 2013. By countries. Boosting Pakistan’s seed and infrastructural development. make up the South Caucasus, with some accounts, this grand project production capacity will save mil- During the most recent election a sharp focus on Azerbaijan. flows in two trajectories: an over- lions of dollars on imports. campaign, the current Pakistan land economic belt, which com- government promised to promote prise six development corridors, Standard modernization theory inclusive growth and had identified The Silk Road, BRI, and and a maritime route. China’s casts development as a uniform CPEC as a prospective contributor CPEC President, Xi Jinping, launched evolutionary route that all societies towards achieving this goal. By ex- BRI to revive the ancient silk route follow, from agricultural, rural, and amining the state of social and eco- s mentioned above, the Silk and enhance economic coopera- traditional societies nomic indicators of ARoad is the historical link tion with the region. The overland to post-industrial, Pakistan, this essay between China and the West. It corridors include—in Chinese ter- urban, and modern The tilt towards so- will explain the rea- has been carrying goods and ideas minology—the China Pakistan forms. It looks at cio-economic develop- sons that led to the from one place to another for a mil- Economic Corridor (CPEC); the the internal factors ment under the frame- inclusion of such lennia and more. Places that came China, Mongolia, Russia Economic in between also benefited from the of a country while work of CPEC shows that projects under Corridor; the New Eurasia Land assuming that with CPEC. Moreover, exchanges, increasing both their Bridge Economic Corridor (NELB); assistance, “tradi- basic human needs and the Chinese side relevance and prosperity. For many the China-Central and West Asia tional” countries standard of living cannot has also expressed years China had been dubbed as a Economic Corridor (CCWAEC); can be brought to be ignored at the expense its willingness to sleeping giant, as Western coun- the China-Indochina Peninsula the level of devel- of industrial and infra- help raise the stan- tries become stronger economically Economic Corridor (CICPEC); oped countries. structural development. dard of living in and militarily in the 20th century. and the Bangladesh-China- Another defini- Pakistan, which In recent decades, however, China India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. tion of moderniza- makes China has regained its influence in the Out of these six corridors, CPEC tion, authored by sociologist Piotr more than a foreign investor in the Silk Road region (and beyond) on is the only bilateral corridor and is Sztompka, reads thusly: “a society country. All this suggests a new the back of sustained economic considered as the flagship project of advancing in an intentional, premed- avenue of cooperation between and social progress. China’s rapid the Belt and Road Initiative.

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Again, referring to Chinese named, time and again, a “game having to worry about any pos- The economic transformation terminology, BRI consists of the changer” for Pakistan. BRI connects sible trade disruptions through that has taken place in China is Silk Road Economic Belt and China’s western province of the Malacca Strait.” He opines that nothing short of miraculous. In the 21st-century Maritime Silk Xinjiang with Pakistan’s flagship northern, western, and southern the early decades of the People’s Road, which, taken together, will Gwadar port. The aim is to stim- branch corridors can be developed Republic, poverty was widespread make it more expansive than ulate bilateral trade as well as en- “off of the original CPEC core to and economic opportunities were the ancient Silk Road. It will hance connectivity with the broader strengthen integration with the na- limited. A large portion of the pop- also include countries in South- region through this route. tions of Central Asia, West Asia ulation suffered from hunger and east Asia and Latin America (Mideast), and Africa.” This idea has lived without basic necessities for but China will prioritize west- China has invested heavily in also been taken up by various Paki- life. Before the economic reforms ward expansion from Xinjiang. Pakistan’s energy sector and infra- stani academics and policymakers initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, In this regard, China’s National structure development, and is also at bilateral and multilateral forums 250 million people rural inhabi- Development and Reform supporting the country’s industri- alike. tants of China lived below the pov- Commission (NDRC) has under- alization and its socio-economic erty line. Literacy levels were low lined plans to make “good use of development through this flagship Since its inception, CPEC has and entire regions of the country Xinjiang's geographical advan- endeavor. The projects being un- been the subject of much interna- posed a serious burden on the na- tages and its role as an important dertaken in Pakistan under the tional scrutiny relative to any other tional economy. window of westward opening up, framework of CPEC indicate clearly BRI project. This comes as no sur- making it a key transportation, that the Chinese leadership is comprise, since if it is completed as With Deng’s economic reforms, trade, logistics, culture, science, and mitted to advancing the socio- envisioned, CPEC will have a sub- the situation began rapidly to education center and a core area on economic progress of its partner stantial impact on China’s global change for the better. Hundreds of the Silk Road Economic Belt. countries. Moreover, both Pakistan geopolitical and economic interests. millions were lifted out of poverty and China have invited other coun- due to modernization, industri- he axiomatic point that de- tries to be a part of CPEC in the alization, and opening up. China Trives from the above is that pursuit of regional development. Socio-economic Progress recorded impressive GDP growth the countries of Central Asia and in China over a number of years. From less the South Caucasus will inevitably ccording to analyst than $150 billion in 1978, China’s be vital parts of BRI-associated AAndrew Korybko, “CPEC ocio-economic development GDP crossed $13 trillion in 2019. projects. is the spinal cord of the emerging Stakes into account public con- multipolar world order because it cerns in executing social and eco- Chinese workers came to be pro- Undoubtedly, CPEC is one of the provides China with reliable non- nomic policy initiatives. The aim vided with adequate facilities and most ambitious Malacca access to of these initiatives is to bring about knowledge, which turned them into sustained improvement to the living components of the Еhe countries of Central the Indian Ocean, productive members of society. The Belt and Road Ini- which in turn conditions of a society as well as pro- Human Development Index (HDI) tiative—a fact that Asia and the South Cauca- connects China vide better economic opportunities. assesses three basic dimensions of can be evidenced sus will inevitably be vital with the Mideast, In the past few decades, China has human development: a long and in how this mul- parts of BRI-associated European, and managed to achieve many of its de- healthy life, access to knowledge tibillion-dollar projects. African market- velopment targets and its society is and a decent standard of living. project has been places without continuously progressing materially. It increased from 0.423 in 1980 to

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0.752, which places China in the hygiene and poor nutritional intake making investments. [...] We were lighted the role of CPEC in both high human development category. prevents the mental and physical at rock bottom when the Chinese alleviating poverty and helping growth of children. [government] came and rescued the country achieve its target. In us.” Moreover, he has repeatedly this context, Sania Nishtar, Prime Socio-economic Projects nderstanding the preferences praised the Chinese development Minister Khan’s Special Assistant Under CPEC Uof Pakistan’s government model and recently said that “if we on Poverty Alleviation and Social and its leaders, the Chinese have can learn from any one country in Protection said that “not only is PEC’s original focus opened up possibilities for bilateral the world, it is China. Their devel- CPEC a remarkable demonstration Cwas twofold: improving cooperation in areas of social development model suits Pakistan the of our time-tested friendship, but it Pakistan’s infrastructure and re- opment. As a result, in April 2019, best .” is also an ideal milieu for socio-eco- solving its energy crisis. While a Memorandum of Understanding nomic development which will these two areas are critical for any was signed between China and Overcoming Pakistan’s contribute to uplifting people and emerging economy, issues related Pakistan with respect to promoting graduating them out of poverty.” to malnutrition, illiteracy, and un- technological advancement in Development Constraints employment cannot be ignored. the agricultural sector, improving The Human Capital Index (HCI) healthcare facilities, and providing o fully appreciate CPEC’s measures the amount of human As a key generator of achieving quality education and vocational Ttransformative opportunity capital that a child born today prosperity in Pakistan, CPEC training. China’s then ambassador for Pakistan, it is necessary to ex- can expect to attain by age 18, has enabled the government to to Pakistan, Yao Jing, stated that amine in some detail the state of given the risks of poor healthcare commit further on improving the “by meeting the Pakistani people’s Pakistan’s development situa- and poor education that prevail social wellbeing of the populace. needs, China-Pakistan cooperation tion. We can begin with the World in the country in which he or she Honoring this commitment is par- will bring more tangible benefits to Bank’s poverty headcount ratio—a lives. Pakistan is positioned in the ticularly important for the prime Pakistanis.” useful indicator to assess the state bottom quartile, with a score of minister, who is well-known for of progress in a society. This ratio 0.39, whereas China finds itself in the his social work. The fame Imran This sentiment was also ex- consists of the percentage of the second quartile, with a score of 0.67. Khan earned as cricketer helped pressed by the Chinese side during population of a given country living him to successfully carry out his the 9th Joint Coordination Com- below its national poverty line. Pakistan’s score indicates that oppor- philanthropic and humanitarian mittee (JCC) held in Islamabad in Pakistan’s poverty headcount ratio tunities are still lacking for the majority campaigns since retiring from his November 2019. The Chinese in 2015 was 24.3 percent whereas of children in Pakistan. According to playing career. He had been mainly delegation, led by NDRC Vice- China’s poverty headcount ratio Pakistan’s most re- involved in education and health- Chairman Ning Jizhe, made it clear was only 5.7 percent Human De- cent. In 2019, Pa- care, and his efforts in these fields the socio-economic projects will To fully appreciate CPEC’s velopment Report, contributed to his political rise. be given high consideration under kistan’s Voluntary inequality in educa- During both the 2013 and 2018 CPEC. National Review transformative opportuni- tion stands at 46.2 election campaigns, Khan drew at- of the implemen- ty for Pakistan, it is nec- percent. This goes tention to Pakistan’s deteriorating In an interview with CNBC in tation of the UN essary to examine in some to show that any living conditions. He expressed 2020, Prime Minister Khan said 2030 Agenda for detail the state of Pakistan’s progress made in Sustainable De- particular concern about the issue that “Pakistan is grateful to China, development situation. Pakistan has not of stunted growth, where poor as it helped us in difficult times by velopment high- been inclusive.

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number of reasons help he policies adopted by A path-breaking recent book by and services. At the same time, as Aexplain Pakistan’s lack of Tsuccessive Pakistani gov- Ishrat Husain, a former Governor countries develop, women’s capa- progress in the socio-economic ernments to address these issues of the State Bank of Pakistan and bilities typically improve, while development sphere. The country have, for the most part, not suc- Prime Minister Khan’s Adviser on social constraints weaken, enabling has faced political instability vir- ceeded due to poor implementa- Institutional Reforms and Austerity, women to engage in work outside tually from the moment it gained tion plans and corruption. There provides an explanation of how the the home.” However, the Global independence, in 1947. It has been is a strong relationship between country’s elitist model operates and Gender Gap Index Report 2021, observed that in countries where good governance and poverty damages the economy. Entitled Pa- published by the World Economic the chances of a government col- reduction. Poor governance has kistan: The Economy of an Elitist Forum, ranked Pakistan 153 out lapsing are higher, the achievement been a key reason for Pakistan’s State (2019), the book argues that of 156 countries in terms of gender of robust economic growth is cor- unsatisfactory social and eco- elite state capture and market cap- parity. respondingly lower. In an unstable nomic development. ture has resulted in the “creation of political environment, investment a vicious cycle of inefficiency and Illiteracy not only affects an in- diminishes and development ac- Moreover, huge chunks of public inequitable distribution of wealth.” dividual’s destiny; it also has an tivity slows down. The trickle-down sector development funds are re- In Why Nations Fail (2012), Daron impact on society. High levels of effects are borne by the entire- so directed to members of assemblies Acemoglu and James Robinson illiteracy also hamper the func- ciety. Without serious policy conti- as “discretionary funding,” who discuss how nations fall when the tioning of democratic institu- nuity, achieving the desired results then invest them on politically public institutions operate to serve tions, as it reduces the likelihood of public development projects be- motivated projects and schemes the interests of the elite. According that voters can inform themselves comes almost impossible. in their respective constituencies. to them, extractive economic insti- properly about the issues at stake. Unfortunately, they are not held ac- tutions and self-serving representa- It also limits their participation in Pakistan is the sixth most pop- countable for the detrimental out- tives impede economic growth and various decisionmaking processes ulated country in the world. Its come of such projects and are often unleash poverty. and increases the likelihood of population density is even greater re-elected. their concerns being marginalized than that of China. Limited re- ultural and religious issues and even neglected. sources and poor governance have Transparency International’s Cor- Chave also kept the country made things worse. Many people ruption Perceptions Index 2020 gave from developing. The female lit- xternal factors have also across the country do not enjoy a Pakistan a score of 31 out of 100. eracy rate is much lower than Eposed impediments to decent standard of living, with in- This score reveals the perceived male one. Similarly, a much fewer Pakistan’s economic and social equality and non-inclusive policies levels of public sector corruption number of women are active in the progress. Pakistan’s relations with hampering the country’s socio- according to experts and business- workforce as compared to men. Ac- its neighbors, except for China, economic progress. Almost two- people on a scale of 0 to 100, where cording to Sher Verick of the Inter- have not been smooth. It has gone thirds of Pakistanis lives in rural areas 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very national Labor Organization, “fe- to war with India on three occa- (63 percent), which are mostly deprived clean. Pakistan’s score was lower male labor supply is both a driver sions and has been involved in the of public goods and basic necessities. than the average score of 43. It can and an outcome of development. war on terror for close to two de- Moreover, poor education enrolment be concluded that the Pakistani so- Women’s supply of labor increases cades. The state’s security and de- rates and a low rate of female participa- ciety usually does not benefit from household incomes, which helps fense engagements have been pri- tion in the labor force also contribute to state institutions as much as could families escape poverty and in- oritized over the general wellbeing poor living standards. be expected. crease their consumption of goods of the public.

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emulate the success of Beijing in Pakistan. Public transport infra- pacity-building opportunities for Pakistan’s reliance on aid and eradicating poverty. The inclusion structure is also being expanded Pakistani scientists. loans from Western institutions has of a socio-economic component under CPEC, which will reduce also played its part. The conditions within the framework of CPEC is pollution caused by vehicles. Lastly, the development of vo- attached to their programs force also going to boost the progress of cational training centers and tech- the government to cut spending on Pakistani society. uring a December 2020 nology transfers will also help Paki- development projects. The devel- Dmeeting held between stani society to shift towards modern opment projects they sponsor have Special Assistant to the Prime Min- and eco-friendly economic practices. made only a limited contribution Action Against Climate ister on Climate Change Malik towards social and economic ad- Change Amin Aslam and China’s current vancement in Pakistan. ambassador to Pakistan, Nong Chinese Commitments ccording to Germanwatch’s Rong, it was agreed that efforts will n the other hand, Paki- A2020 Global Climate Risk be made to turn CPEC into a model he Chinese do not ignore Ostan-China economic co- Index report, Pakistan lost 9,989 green belt initiative. The senior Tthe fact that socio-economic operation in general and CPEC in lives, suffered economic losses Chinese diplomat stated that there conditions of Pakistan require se- particular focuses on key areas for worth $3.8 billion, and witnessed is a huge scope and opportunities rious attention. They have made Pakistan’s development. Islamabad 152 extreme weather events from of working jointly to promote a firm commitments to provide sup- and Beijing have both demon- 1999 to 2018. The same report also common green vision for enhanced port to the Pakistani government. strated a strong commitment to- raised the alarm that Pakistan’s environmental sustainability and The second phase of CPEC incor- wards the timely completion of vulnerability to climate change is climate resilience against the ad- porates the government’s agenda all agreed projects. The people of increasing. Experts such as Boston verse impacts of the climate change. for inclusive and sustainable devel- Pakistan have benefitted from the University’s Adil Najam concur, opment, as discussed above. China construction of energy projects pointing the finger both at a legacy Growing cooperation between has also supported Pakistan in com- and highways. Unlike the Western of negligence and lack of action. the two countries within the CPEC batting the COVID-19 pandemic model, there is confidence at both framework has also led to increasing by sending out medical teams and the policymaking and popular level The construction work and ex- collaboration between Pakistani and relevant equipment. In addition, that the Chinese model will be able pansion of industrial activities Chinese academic institutes as they China has sent millions of vaccine to help Pakistan achieve its devel- under CPEC will further stress the look to address challenges faced by the doses for free, which has helped Pa- opment targets. With fewer condi- environment. Given that the lead- society. To that end, the China-Paki- kistan significantly in keeping the tions, Pakistan can bank on Chi- ership of both countries strongly stan Joint Research Centre on Earth outbreak under control. Moreover, nese investment to attain its true committed to fighting climate Sciences has also been launched by the progress on CPEC projects did not economic potential. change, measures are now being Chinese Academy of Sciences in slow down noticeably due to the taken to reduce the harmful effects collaboration with the Higher Ed- pandemic. In line with modernization on the environment of CPEC- ucation Commission of Pakistan. theory, Pakistan has been able to related activities. Both sides are It has brought together Chinese In June 2019, it was announced achieve considerable economic also working on sustainable proj- and Pakistani scholars to conduct that China would provide a $1 billion and social progress thanks to Chi- ects, like building renewable research on ecology, climate change, grant for the socio-economic uplift of nese assistance. Moreover, the energy plants and promoting and sustainable development in Pakistan. The funds are being allo- leadership in Pakistan is keen to greener agricultural practices in Pakistan. It is also providing ca- cated to the key sectors identified by

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 136 137 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES the Pakistani government. Projects socio-economic projects in t the same time, whoever BRI initiative. CPEC’s success will include scholarships for Pakistani Pakistan, China aims to contribute Aseeks to disrupt CPEC’s pave way for more countries to fully students to study in Chinese universi- concretely to the country’s social progress has set their sights on the endorse BRI and reject the negative ties, the construction of a desalination and political stability. The Chinese province. The 2016 capture of In- claims of rival actors in the region. plant in Gwadar, the establishment of have witnessed for themselves the dian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav by the hospital in Gwadar, solar powered importance of a stable political en- Pakistani authorities and the con- o avoid foreign interven- lighting equipment for households vironment in ensuring economic tents of his confession statement is a Ttion, it is essential to engage in Baluchistan, and the upgrading prosperity and have demonstrated case in point. India has persistently the younger generations and pro- of vocational training institutes. a welcome seriousness in passing raised objections against CPEC and vide them with adequate economic China will also assist Pakistan in on their experience to colleagues in is using all the considerable means opportunities. Both China and modernizing its agricultural sector. Pakistan. at its disposal to halt its progress. Pakistan are working diligently to India not only wants to instigate in- create jobs for locals people and Chinese agricultural experts have Pakistan also has a large youth stability in Pakistan, but New Delhi address any doubts regarding the visited the country since then and population and accommodating is doing all it can to place obstacles inclusivity of various CPEC proj- composed a short- the millions of new in the way of China’s expansion in ects. This will lead to peace and so- list of projects entrants into the the region and beyond. cial stability in Pakistan, which also in Pakistan after China realizes that the labor force each serves the interests of China. holding discussion success of CPEC will ul- year poses a huge Given the scale of both the with local experts. timately pave the way challenge. The geo-economic and geopolitical With the United States and its Chinese companies country’s current implications of BRI, regional allies aggressively executing their for the successful imple- have also expressed economic growth and global powers have become Indo-Pacific strategy to curtail interest in relo- mentation of the Belt and rate is not sufficient alarmed. Countries such as the China, Beijing has to maneuver its cating to Pakistan Road Initiative. to absorb this youth United States, Japan, and India economic and diplomatic efforts and hiring Pakistani bulge. Everyone have not endorsed Beijing’s plans. tactfully. Pakistan’s geographical workers. Thousands knows by now that They are fearful of Chinese expan- location and its deep-rooted ties of Pakistani students have already unemployment is a major driver of sion at their expense. Some of the with China make it a critical theater availed themselves scholarships of- social and political instability. Such suspicions regarding the viability in which Beijing is able to play its fered by the Chinese government, an environment becomes vulner- of CPEC have been propagated by cards properly. while many others have undergone able to rival external forces. these countries. specialized training in China in When an American official voiced various fields and returned back to The most underdeveloped prov- China believes that there is a her criticism of CPEC’s financing Pakistan to work on CPEC-related ince in Pakistan is Baluchistan. For planned and sponsored propa- mechanism as well as expressed projects. a number of reasons, it probably ganda against BRI and therefore concern regarding its harmful im- has the most critical role to play in continuously makes efforts to ad- pact on the people of Pakistan, the hina realizes that the suc- ensuring the success of CPEC. This dress concerns. Since CPEC is re- Chinese were quick to refute her Ccess of CPEC will ultimately flagship BRI project has given the garded as the flagship project of claims. They also made it clear that pave the way for the successful im- government and people of Baluch- BRI, the outcome of Chinese in- they will never put Pakistan under plementation of the Belt and Road istan a much-needed chance to turn vestments in Pakistan will go a long any financial stress. So far, they Initiative. By actively supporting things around for the better. way in determining the fate of the have kept their word.

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Beijing is aware that Pakistani is viewed as an integral part of as well as a number of non-oil in- from being an increasingly important society is vulnerable to foreign in- the China-Central Asia-West Asia vestment projects. These included part of various global value chains. tervention, which can turn into a Economic Corridor (CCWAEC)— a Strategic Partnership Agreement security threat that could negatively principally the Trans-Caucasus between the Azerbaijan Railways affect not just their projects but the Transit Corridor (TCTC), which Company and the Chinese Conti- Bilateral Relations & entire region as well. By focusing links China to Turkey and Europe. nental Bridge International Logis- Regional Integration on the social and economic devel- In the past few years, Azerbaijan tics Company as well as a Strategic opment of Pakistan, China can help has made several investments along Memorandum of Cooperation on akistan-Azerbaijan ties are avert security-related challenges. the TCTC. Included in these is the ICT infrastructure development Pbased on a mutuality of re- By establishing peace in Pakistan, new Port of Baku and upgrades to between AzerTelecom and China spect and trust, bounded by the China can extend its win-win the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Telecom. At present, Baku and profession of a common faith. Pa- strategy into the wider region more Beijing are in the midst of negoti- kistan was amongst the first coun- smoothly. rade between China and ations on a bilateral preferential tries to recognize the independence TAzerbaijan has also sig- trade agreement. of Azerbaijan and played an in- nificantly increased in the past strumental role at the UN Security Azerbaijan and BRI few years. The latter accounts for articipation in BRI will help Council with respect to the adop- nearly $1 billion of China’s FDI. Pin boosting Azerbaijan’s trade, tion of four resolutions pertaining his is a good place to discuss At present, the two countries co- drawing in foreign investment and to the Karabakh issue. Pakistan’s TAzerbaijan’s place in the Belt operate in a number of projects in amassing aggregate income. A re- support for Azerbaijan in the liber- and Road Initiative as well as briefly the petrochemical industry and are cent World Bank study shows that ation of Karabakh was second only touch upon its bilateral relation- moving towards collaborating in in the long run, BRI could increase to Turkey—something that has also ship with both China and Pakistan. avenues of transportation, commu- Azerbaijan’s GDP by up to 21 per- contributed to raising the bilateral In the Fall 2020 edition of Baku nication, and tourism. China and cent. However, for such positive relationship to a new level. Dialogues, Director-General of the Azerbaijan have also participated effects, it is important for comple- Port of Baku Taleh Ziyadov wrote in several high-level forums related mentary policies to be put in place Another thing that brings both about Azerbaijan’s unique connec- to BRI and have also signed var- so as to support the gamut of in- countries together is their desire for tivity potential: “The country’s ious agreements in this regard. For vestment projects on offer. Right development and progress. CPEC strategic location at the crossroads Azerbaijan, taking full advantage institutional reforms and policies can be a common development of major Eurasian land and air of all that BRI has to offer is a high will not only help deepen regional fulcrum for both countries since it transport corridors is entrenching priority. integration but also represents in many its status as a vital Silk Road region accelerate and sub- ways an ideal inte- trade and logistics hub.” Similarly, China also views stantiate the ben- By engaging in BRI, Azer- gration platform. Azerbaijan as an important BRI efits arising from CPEC can turn Both China and Azerbaijan re- partner. Following Azerbaijan’s BRI. baijan can diversify its Pakistan into a gard BRI as a great development participation in the second Belt economy and profit from global pivot state. opportunity. As Tsinghua Univer- and Road Forum for International By engaging in being an increasingly im- Similarly, Azer- sity’s Yu Hongjun has written in Cooperation in 2019, the two sides BRI, Azerbaijan portant part of various baijan’s corner- these pages (also in the Fall 2020 signed ten agreements related to en- can diversify its global value chains. stone dedication edition, as it happens), Azerbaijan ergy, worth a total of $821 million, economy and profit to promoting and

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 140 141 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES deepening coop- (CCWAEC)—one of Asia. The energy crisis further welfare of the people, raise the stan- eration in the Silk During the January 2021 of BRI’s six desig- intensified the stressful position of dard of living of the common man, Road region—both trilateral meeting be- nated development the economy. prevent the concentration of wealth within the context tween the foreign min- corridors. and means of production in a few of BRI and more CPEC did not go down well with hands, and secure social justice and broadly, including isters of Pakistan, Azer- The main goal some countries, as it had the po- equal opportunity for all. its formal support baijan, and Turkey in for both Pakistan tential to uplift the economic and for establishing a Islamabad, the feasibility and Azerbaijan social conditions in Pakistan. A The CPEC projects have the po- 3+3 platform that of connecting the coun- should be to build struggling country becomes more tential to deliver all those objectives. would include all tries via CPEC’s west- upon this stra- vulnerable to foreign interventions However, careful planning and im- its neighboring ward expansion was dis- tegic partnership. and can be easily exploited to carry plementation is necessary to mini- countries—makes Investors in out the vested interests of external mize risks and maximize benefits. it an increas- cussed in detail. Azerbaijan should players. Although China and Paki- CPEC has kick-started a number ingly attractive explore opportu- stan have enjoyed strong military of projects simultaneously, which hub for BRI projects. The ex- nities of joint ventures within the and diplomatic re- makes planning pansion of BRI routes will in- Special Economic Zones (SEZs) lations, economic CPEC did not go down and management variably bring enormous socio- that are being set up under CPEC, cooperation was quite strenuous. As economic benefits in the region as this would help bolster bilateral very restricted well with some countries, Aristotle noted mil- business cooperation and accel- prior to CPEC. The as it had the potential lennia ago, “well uring the January 2021 erate economic development in multi-sector devel- to uplift the economic begun is half done.” Dtrilateral meeting between both Pakistan and Azerbaijan. opment work being and social conditions in Accurate planning, the foreign ministers of Pakistan, undertaken under Pakistan. implementation, Azerbaijan, and Turkey in Islam- CPEC has certainly and sustainability abad, the feasibility of connecting Looking Ahead given Pakistan a should be empha- the countries via CPEC’s westward greater sense of economic security. sized over the pace of project com- expansion was discussed in detail. he Chinese investments It is up to Pakistan’s leaders to get pletion. It must also be ensured that Another topic of discussion was Tpouring into Pakistan under the most out of this alternate source projects are primarily initiated to Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second the CPEC framework have offered of development assistance. So far it facilitate public rather than political Karabakh War, which opens the the country a lifeline. Prior to the looks like things are moving in the interests. way for the establishment of the April 2015 agreement, foreign right direction. Zengazur transportation corridor countries were reluctant to un- mployment generation will relinking mainland Azerbaijan dertake any largescale projects in PEC projects must not be Ebe the key determinant of the with its Nakhchivan exclave. This Pakistan. Pakistan faced political Cinitiated in isolation; rather, success of CPEC. At present, the project, which is an integral part instability and a destructive war on they should meet the requirements economy is not growing at a rate of the trilateral agreement that terror. Apart from foreign invest- of the overall development strategy. that can absorb the labor force. In ended the war, would strengthen ment drying up in the country, the The economic and social objectives the coming years, it will continue to both the foundations and the geo- local economy was in a downturn. of the government, as underlined be a daunting challenge for policy- economic logic of the China-Central Many businesses were shutting by the Planning Commission of makers. The non-socio-economic Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor down or relocating to other parts Pakistan, are to promote the projects of CPEC also have a vital

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 142 143 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES contribution to make. They have Pakistan’s standard of living can only the capacity to provide jobs to mil- be ensured if a well-designed, long- lions of workers in Pakistan. There term development policy catering are high hopes that in the near fu- to public concerns and changing ture, the economy will pick up its circumstances is put into practice. pace on the back of CPEC, which in turn will generate even more eco- The economy is burdened with nomic opportunities. If CPEC falls external payment obligations due to short of this promise, then there the mismanagement of resources. could be dire social and economic The cycle of looking for aid each consequences. time there is a financial crisis needs to be broken. What Pakistan should Youth unemployment is a recipe learn from China is how to opti- for social and political instability. mally mobilize domestic resources The educational and training pro- and a provide for a robust gover- grams under CPEC must be ex- nance system. tended. In Pakistan, there are limited linkages between industry and Challenges like climate change academia. University graduates and COVID-19 require a collective do not acquire the necessary skills approach. China has taken consid- during the course of their studies erable steps to counter them and is to meet the demands of the job in a position to support other coun- market. This gap needs to be filled tries. China has always supported through collaborations at various Pakistan during testing times and levels. A more able and skillful Pakistan should continue to work workforce can attract more foreign closely with China to address these investment in the future. challenges.

slamabad’s policymakers The bottom line is simple: the Ishould realize that the model smooth implementation of CPEC adopted by China has to be ad- can lead to further possibilities of justed to make it work for Pakistan. economic growth and prosperity Undoubtedly, Pakistan can learn in the Silk Road Region, benefiting a great deal from Chinese exper- not only China, obviously, and tise and benefit from their -sup Pakistan but also Azerbaijan and a port, but a sustained increase in whole host of other countries. BD

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portrait, which is written in celebration of his distinguished subject’s 80th Profile in Leadership birthday. All know Hafiz Pashayev as someone who has used his talents in the fields of science, diplomacy, and education to champion his country’s interests in a post-Soviet world. His mild and accessible temperament en- Azerbaijan’s Educator- courages those around him to focus on whatever issue is at hand, without pausing to enquire into his ruling values and the aspirations that arise from Statesman at Eighty them. This is unfortunate, for in both areas he has much to say. One’s values and goals in life can arise from many sources, among them Hafiz Pashayev and His Vision of being childhood influences, religious or philosophical affirmations, study of the past or personal crises, efforts to peer into the future, or sheer chance. ADA University In the case of Hafiz Pashayev, they flowed organically from highly diverse yet intermeshed influences that began in his parents’ home and extended S. Frederick Starr through his adult life.

All know Hafiz Pashayev as Hafiz Pashayev’s father, Mir Jalal . Frederick Starr is Chairman of the Central Asia Caucasus Institute & Silk someone who has used his Pashayev, was a self-made scholar, pro- Road Studies Program, a research and policy center affiliated with the talents in the fields of science, fessor, and writer who as a child was American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC and the Institute for brought by his parents into northern SecurityS and Development Policy in Stockholm. He is also Distinguished Fellow diplomacy, and education to Azerbaijan from across the Araz river in for Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy Institute. He co-founded the Kennan champion his country’s interests in a post-Soviet world. the final decades of the Russian empire. Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, served for 11 He completed his initial studies in Ganja years as President of Oberlin College, and served in the early 2000s as pro-tem where he became a teacher before going Rector of the University of Central Asia. He is a trustee of ADA University, the on to earn a doctorate for his studies of the great Azerbaijani 16th-century recipient of an honorary doctorate in the humanities from ADA University, and a thinker and poet, Fuzuli. He subsequently went on to write immensely pop- member of the Baku Dialogues Editorial Advisory Council. ular stories of daily life in his homeland, most of them gently poking fun at Soviet bureaucracy. He had studied his subject at first hand and had no Hafiz Pashayev—scientist, diplomat, educator, and citizen of modern illusions about the system under which he lived and toiled, but channeled Azerbaijan—has many admirers and friends, including the author of this his views into wry tales, not protests. Though a member of the cultural establishment, Mir Jalal was a loner amidst a wide circle of friends, a man who preferred drinking tea with family and colleagues to becoming “Dried S. Frederick Starr is Chairman of the Central Asia Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a research and policy center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Up in Meetings,” to cite the title of one of his droll tales. Understanding the Council in Washington, DC and the Institute for Security and Development Policy in drift of Soviet life, he encouraged two of his sons (Hafiz as well as Arif, his Stockholm. He is also Distinguished Fellow for Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy older brother), to study physics, not literature, whilst the third, Agil, studied Institute. He co-founded the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International philology. Center for Scholars, served for 11 years as President of Oberlin College, and served in the early 2000s as pro-tem Rector of the University of Central Asia. He is a trustee of ADA University, the recipient of an honorary doctorate in the humanities from ADA It was no mean achievement to rise to the upper levels of physics in the University, and a member of the Baku Dialogues Editorial Advisory Council. Soviet Union, as young Hafiz quickly did. He did doctoral research at

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 146 147 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow, which at the time independent personalities who were committed to their communities and to civic was the world’s premier institution for the study of thermonuclear fu- betterment. Though neither they nor Hafiz commonly used the word, they were sion and plasma physics. In the mid-1970s he was allowed to go abroad free citizens, not subjects. to conduct postdoctoral research at the University of California at Irvine. Hafiz’s impressions of America were heady and extended far beyond the eanwhile, the underpinnings of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan were realm of physics to include universities, education in general, and social Mshaking. This reached a climax when the neighboring Republic life in all its dimensions. His father prudently counselled him to keep his of Armenia seized Azerbaijani territory in and around Karabakh, and observations on America to himself. He did, spending three decades at the when bloody ethnic confrontations broke out across both countries and Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences (ANAS) where, in the course of in Baku itself. National feeling in Baku ran high and Soviet leader Mikhail time, he came to serve as Director of the Metal Physics Laboratory at the Gorbachev, fearing complete chaos and outright secession, declared a ANAS Institute of Physics whilst continuing his research and publishing state of emergency there. On January 19th, 1990, Gorbachev declared the scores of scientific papers in leading inter- city to be in a state of emergency and sent in more than 25,000 interior national journals. The cultural memory to forces of the Red Army to quell the large crowd that had assembled in the which Hafiz Pashayev was Azerbaijani capital. Three days of fighting left hundreds of Azerbaijanis o this point, Hafiz was a rising heir extended back still fur- dead or injured. Hafiz Pashayev witnessed it all and concluded that Soviet TSoviet scientist in a prestigious ther, to the oil boom of the rule was collapsing, and that Azerbaijan henceforth would be on its own. field, a member of the elite by any mea- late 19th century, when Baku sure. Though from an academic family, Even then, Hafiz returned for several years to his scientific work and to he was also the son of a noted and qui- became a sophisticated out- the professorial life in which his father had preceded him. More published etly independent writer who, rather than post of Europe, and even be- papers flowed from his research. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union flaunting any skepticism about Soviet yond that, to great writers left Azerbaijan and the other non-Russian republics adrift, and without the rule he may have harbored, translated and poets who wrote in Azer- means to support such basic institutions as schools, hospitals, universities, it into wry and even absurd tales rooted baijani, not Russian. and research institutes. Besides, physics in Azerbaijan had been intimately in the reality known to all readers of the linked with Moscow, a relationship that had clearly been suspended and Azerbaijani language. And, it should be noted, though Mir Jalal Pashayev possibly would be terminated. Meanwhile, a new and independent govern- followed his own stars, he was part of an impressive Azerbaijani intelligen- ment had formed and was sending out ambassadors to represent indepen- tsia with a strong cultural memory that stretched back to the post-World dent Azerbaijan to the world. Hafiz, with his American experience, was the War I era Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, which had ended only with the obvious candidate to serve as Azerbaijan’s first ambassador to the United Red Army’s invasion in 1920. States. The appointment was made in late 1992 and he was 51 years old.

The cultural memory to which Hafiz Pashayev was heir extended back still fur- Hafiz Pashayev was not the only Soviet-era physicist who retooled as a dip- ther, to the oil boom of the late 19th century, when Baku became a sophisticated lomat or statesman. Another to do so was Stanislav Shushkevich, a physicist outpost of Europe, and even beyond that, to great writers and poets who wrote in and engineer who in 1991 became the first head of state of independent Be- Azerbaijani, not Russian. Though a member in good standing of the Soviet intelli- larus after it seceded from the Soviet Union. Still another was Meret Orazov, gentsia and fully integrated into the world of Russian language and culture, Hafiz a younger physicist from Turkmenistan who went on to become his coun- stood proudly as a son of Azerbaijan and part of a generation of well-educated Azer- try’s ambassador to Washington. These and other former Soviet physicists baijanis who felt that it was high time to reclaim their intellectual and cultural her- all followed in the footsteps of Russian physicist Andrei Sakharov, who did itage. He could see that earlier generations of Azerbaijanis had produced bright and more than anyone else to broaden the calling of scientist to include civic and

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 148 149 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES patriotic activity independent of the state. Many of the Soviet Union’s rising the political valence of each of these issues differed radically, with the oil physicists, Hafiz among them, chose not to engage in politics directly. Yet scores and pipelines eliciting warm support from those responsible for America’s of them exhibited a commitment to civic betterment, public service, and to full national security and economic interests but skepticism and even opposi- participation in the cultural and intellectual currents of the day in Europe and tion from what was then called the “human rights lobby.” Meanwhile, the America. Karabakh question caused Armenia, its diplomats, and members of the large Armenian emigration in the United States to mount a vehement and well- afiz Pashayev took up his ambassadorial duties in Washington in Feb- organized opposition to everyone and everything associated with Azerbaijan. Hruary 1993. He and his beloved wife, Rana, were outsiders in a city where many long-resident foreign diplomats were accepted as insiders. Fur- Azerbaijan’s supporters and opponents on the two issues differed radically. ther complicating his life were the two major issues that confronted him even For obvious reasons, the main supporters of the development and transport before his arrival. The first was British Petroleum’s contract with the govern- of Azerbaijan’s oil to the West were British and American businessmen and ment of Azerbaijan to vastly increase the country’s production of oil and the the few specialists in geopolitics in the U.S. Congress and academia, while concomitant project—equally vast in scope—to build a pipeline for the ex- the most vociferous forces aligned against Azerbaijan on the Karabakh issue port of Azerbaijan’s oil from Baku to the West. Even though American oil were the large and well-organized communities of Armenian emigres and firms were not directly involved in either of these projects, they had profound their descendants in California, New England, and elsewhere in America. implications for American diplomacy of, and especially for, Washington’s The former tended to work quietly and behind the scenes; while the latter increasingly fragile relations with the post-Soviet government in Moscow. mounted one of the largest, most expensive, and most visible domestic Precisely because both governments saw both of these projects as breaking American lobbying efforts on any foreign policy issue. Russia’s monopoly control over the South Caucasus, Washington welcomed and supported the initiatives whilst Moscow opposed them. t is a gross understatement to say that these two projects demanded Idiametrically different skillsets and techniques from the embassy of The second issue that further complicated his life, as it were, was to re- Azerbaijan. No one, including Hafiz Pashayev, could have been expected to dress the losses that Azerbaijan had suffered during what is now called the possess them all. In his engaging memoir, Racing Up Hill (2006), Pashayev First Karabakh War that Armenia had waged against Azerbaijan from 1992 provided a compendium of documents and impressions that shed light on to 1994. The war had ended with Armenia in control not only of the enclave what he admits was an uphill struggle. Suffice it to say that his method was of Karabakh and one fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory, but with tens of thou- to gather on his staff a talented group of young Azerbaijanis who focused sands of deaths on both sides and 740,000 Azerbaijanis having been ex- on the more public dimensions of the agenda, while he himself addressed pelled from their homes. Never mind that the UN Security Council passed those matters that could best be advanced through face-to-face contacts on four resolutions “reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the the basis of cordial personal relations. This method succeeded brilliantly. Azerbaijani republic” and “demand[ing] [...] the immediate, complete, and He selected the most promising young diplomats and trained them mainly unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces” from Karabakh and the by personal example, just as Mir Jalal Pashayev had done with young Hafiz. surrounding regions. The Armenian government was staunchly committed Members of his Washington staff went on to serve in Baku at the highest level to holding onto its wartime gains at all costs and to using diplomacy to of government, the diplomatic service, and academia. Meanwhile, the personal thwart Azerbaijan in every way possible. links Hafiz Pashayev formed with many key American politicians and statesmen proved immensely productive at the time and were to endure through the years. Either of these issues would have challenged even the most seasoned diplomat. But Hafiz was, he freely admitted, both a neophyte in diplomacy and In the end, the battle to counter the work of the Armenian government and a newcomer to the political and social labyrinth of Washington. Worse yet, their co-nationals among the American citizenry proved the most vexing.

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In a brilliant and deeply injurious move, the two groups collaborated to least one occasion. Instead, those who supported repeal had to settle for an put forward a seemingly minor revision to the U.S. Freedom Support Act annual waiver, which continues to this day. (1992) that would prevent the United States government from extending any form of direct aid to the government of Azerbaijan. But would anyone There is nothing more bizarre here is nothing more bizarre than the in the U.S. Congress actually introduce this legislation, which was so clearly than the fact that the struggle Tfact that the struggle over Section 907 at odds with America’s own interests? over Section 907 took place took place simultaneously with the develop- simultaneously with the de- ment of an important strategic relationship The person who championed this damaging initiative in Congress was velopment of an important between Azerbaijan and the United States, Senator John Kerry, who had been successfully lobbied by organized strategic relationship between and that that relationship was to prove as enduring as the shell of Section 907. For- Armenian groups in his home state of Massachusetts. Never mind that Azerbaijan and the United President Bill Clinton, a fellow Democrat, opposed Kerry’s move, and that tunately, over the years the Kerry initia- States, and that that relation- neither Kerry nor his staff bothered to gain a more thorough and accurate tive has faded and the strategic links have picture of the situation in Karabakh or of developments in Azerbaijan itself. ship was to prove as enduring only strengthened. Many people deserve However casual its genesis, this ban made Azerbaijan the only post-Soviet as the shell of Section 907. credit for this legerdemain, including se- state to be prevented from receiving direct aid from the United States gov- nior Washington figures Richard Armitage, ernment to facilitate economic development, political reform, and social Sam Brownback, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Dick Cheney, Bob Livingston, Strobe advancement and stability. Talbott and, of course, Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Heydar Aliyev, and Ilham Aliyev. But were it not for persistent but low-keyed efforts I recently came across an interview Hafiz gave to an Azerbaijani publica- of Hafiz Pashayev, and for the many personal contacts he had developed with tion in the fall of 2006 that I believe encapsulates an important thread of his officials in the departments of State and Defense, as well as in Congress, it is thinking on this critical question: doubtful that this happy state would ever have been reached.

The U.S. government’s decision to deprive us of assistance during the desper- The combination of oil and pipeline politics, security issues, and ateness of our fundamental needs, was a devastating blow to us morally. One Section 907 not only took up the lion’s share of Hafiz Pashayev’s time in must view Section 907 in its historical and political context. Throughout those Washington, but these matters also dominated his memoir, in both the long years of the Soviet occupation of our country, we had looked to America as a beacon of hope, democracy, and justice. For us, America could be counted English and Azerbaijani editions. However, all these topics together do not upon to be a strong defender of human rights. We had aspired to those life-af- comprise the sum of his activities while serving as Azerbaijan’s ambassador firming qualities; we dreamed of the day when government would look after our to the United States. His life in Washington had confirmed his earlier impres- own people in the same way. [...] So [...] as we were trying to shake off Soviet sion that Americans were woefully ignorant not only of Azerbaijan but of oppression—an effort which the United States itself had actively endorsed and encouraged—we discovered that they, too, had shunned us, ignored our needs the Caucasus as a whole and of Central Asia as well. Soviet rule had isolated and abandoned us when we needed help the most. Psychologically, it was a de- his country and the region from the world and the world had reciprocated moralizing blow. by ignoring those lands. At worst, many in the West assumed they were all somehow part of Russia. In order for independent Azerbaijan fully to take its The battle over Section 907, as it came to be called, was less a partisan place in the world, this ignorance had to be overcome, not only among elected than a personal issue. Democrats in the White House and the State Depart- officials and bureaucrats but among the populace of the West as a whole. ment supported repeal but Democrats in Congress, led by Kerry, dug in their heels. In spite of endless letters and face-to-face meetings, Hafiz was It was in such a mood that Hafiz Pashayev in 1996 learned from his friend never able to have Section 907 repealed, although he came very close on at Zbigniew Brzezinski that plans were underway to set up a “Central Asia

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Institute” in Washington that the author of this sketch would head up. Hafiz truth, but few saw it so clearly as he did—both in terms of the need for an immediately contacted me and suggested that the new institute should in- informed citizens and for the kind of study in the humanities and social clude in its purview the Caucasus as well, and I readily agreed. In subse- sciences necessary to prepare them. He had had opportunity to discuss this quent discussions, I made it clear that this new institute would base its re- matter with the country’s new president, Ilham Aliyev, whose diverse ca- search purely on the evidence at hand and avoid advocacy on behalf of any reer in academia and business—and also his extensive contacts with the of the countries under study. So enthusiastically did Pashayev agree to this West—had led him to the same conclu- principle that the newly-established Central Asia-Caucasus Institute invited Long before returning to sion. In March 2005—the second year of him to deliver its first public address. Ever the scientist, Hafiz used his speech Baku, Hafiz Pashayev had the new presidency and a year before Pa- to champion the principle of scholarly independence, while at the same time concluded that the type and shayev’s return to Baku—a conversation urging his audience to pay closer attention to the Caucasus as a region. level of education that Azer- between him and President Aliyev took a very practical turn. Since the author of this baijan had inherited from So- afiz Pashayev served as Azerbaijan’s ambassador to the United States sketch was present at and participated in viet times would retard and Hfor nearly 14 years. His experience had taught him several important that discussion in the presidential office, it lessons. First, it convinced him that lasting progress in international rela- distort all future progress. can be reported in some detail. tions, as in all other spheres, arises not from adroit diplomatic maneuvers or clever theories but from the level of knowledge and general culture of the Hafiz began by expressing his view that Azerbaijan’s universities and pre- key actors and of the societies from which they are drawn. His experience paratory schools were in need of fundamental reform. They needed to be in Baku and Washington left him in no doubt as to the positive role that free of all the impedimenta of Soviet higher education, he noted, before leaders can play. Hafiz held Azerbaijan’s president, Heydar Aliyev, in the making the case that the country’s future progress would largely depend deepest respect, and also admired the even temperament and tenacity of his on such changes being enacted. Only an educated public, Ambassador son and successor, Ilham Aliyev. Of course, as an Azerbaijani he knew full Pashayev said, could adapt to change and grasp the needs and possibili- well that the possession of natural resources could be a plus—in the short ties of responsible citizenship. President Aliyev strongly agreed but noted term at least. But Hafiz believed that even the wisest top-down changes and in a somber tone that the bundle of laws on education that independent resource-driven boosts to the economy would be unsustainable without a Azerbaijan had inherited from Soviet times could stifle any such initiatives. breadth of knowledge and understanding among the society at large. Rather than simply giving up, President Aliyev suggested what amounted to a laboratory test of the new thinking in education, one that could be This perspective placed education not merely as an adornment of the launched immediately. Azerbaijan’s government at the time was greatly ex- good society but as the necessary precondition for its existence. Far from panding its representation abroad, opening several dozen new embassies all being a mere theory, Hafiz based this conclusion on his on-the-spot contacts at once. Scores of future diplomats had to be recruited and trained. Why not with the curricula of schools and universities in the United States, Canada, apply to this task the new thinking in education, in order to test its validity and western Europe. He had found there no place for rote learning, or for and learn how best to apply it? dogmas to be accepted a priori. As his tenure in Washington drew to an end, his commitment to these truths was stronger than ever. And so the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy was born. In order to ce- ment the link between the new institution and the Ministry of Foreign ong before returning to Baku, Hafiz Pashayev had concluded that the Affairs, President Aliyev named Hafiz Pashayev Deputy Minister of Foreign Ltype and level of education that Azerbaijan had inherited from So- Affairs. The minister, Elmar Mammadyarov, had served under Pashayev viet times would retard and distort all future progress. There were others at the Washington embassy. Launched in a building near the Ministry of in Azerbaijan and the other newly independent states who grasped this Foreign Affairs, “ADA,” as it became known, quickly gained a reputation for

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 154 155 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES high competence and seriousness of purpose. Its courses addressed all the Argentina, The Bahamas, Fiji, Mexico, and the United States, as well as main issues facing Azerbaijan: the geopolitics of energy; the future of the from Azerbaijan itself. Caspian region; great power competition; the evolution of global finance; and so forth. At the same time, it ventured into issues of history and culture The rising tide of applications from secondary school graduates within that were commonly seen as the domain of the humanities. The original pur- Azerbaijan posed a special challenge. In Soviet times, the culture of higher pose of ADA was not merely to train diplomats in the craft of their field but education included ample space for influential parents to weigh in on be- to educate them to function effectively in a modern and sophisticated post- half of their children’s applications. So pervasive was this corrupt practice Soviet world. And the key to that education was an understanding of civic that it was considered a normal benefit of rank and status. It was therefore life and of citizenship, each integral to the achievement of what Hafiz has only a matter of time before some minister or senior official would tele- identified as ADA’s strategic goal: the offering of a world-class education in phone ADA’s rector on behalf of his son or daughter. This test came in the Azerbaijan. second year of ADA’s existence and Hafiz passed with flying colors. Thanks to his tactful manner the rector was able to send a clear signal to the local ith English as the language of The original purpose of ADA elite, and without eliciting a backlash. Winstruction, ADA was able to at- was not merely to train dip- tract an international faculty from the lomats in the craft of their y its second or third year it was clear to all that ADA was evolving be- outset. To further enrich the educational field but to educate them to Byond its initial formal mission as a diplomatic academy and becoming environment, Rector Pashayev invited function effectively in a mod- a fully-fledged academic institution. The challenge was to plan and build several accomplished international fig- ern and sophisticated post- a diversified undergraduate institution while at the same time continuing ures to be in residence. Among these Soviet world. And the key to to develop the Diplomatic Academy. This had been the shared vision of were the respected Georgian diplomat that education was an un- President Aliyev and Rector Pashayev from the outset. Indeed, while still Tedo Japaridze, the Tatar-Russian plasma derstanding of civic life and serving as Azerbaijan’s ambassador in Washington, Hafiz had advanced this physicist and former director of the Space of citizenship, each integral project along four important lines. Research Institute of the USSR Roald Sag- to the achievement of what deev, and former advisor to U.S. Secretary Hafiz has identified as ADA’s First, he actively studied European and American institutions in search of State James Baker on Soviet nationality strategic goal: the offering of of the most appropriate models for new institution in Azerbaijan. He felt issues Paul Goble, whom Rector Pashayev a world-class education in that Azerbaijan lacked the range of talents needed to sustain a new me- named ADA’s director of research and Azerbaijan. ga-university of the American type, nor were the resources at hand to do so. publications. Further, he realized that graduates of Azerbaijan’s secondary schools were not adequately prepared to plunge directly into professional training, as is Very early in its young life ADA began to accept other students be- common in Europe. This left the American liberal arts college, with its em- sides rising Azerbaijani diplomats. Word spread quickly that an inno- phasis on basic education in the humanities, social sciences, and physical vative new institution had opened on the shores of the Caspian and let- sciences, as the most appropriate model. ters of enquiry began pouring in. To handle this rising tide of interest Rector Pashayev named a director of admissions and regularized the In order to gain a more concrete understanding of such institutions, application process. Within a couple of years the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Hafiz (while still in Washington) had visited a range of liberal arts col- Academy was attracting advanced students from dozens of countries, in- leges, among them Swarthmore in Pennsylvania and Middlebury in cluding some immediate neighbors and various states whose geography Vermont. He also consulted with the author of this essay on his experi- encompasses the Silk Road region, but also from faraway nations like ence as president of Oberlin College, the world’s first institution of higher

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 156 157 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES education to grant degrees to women and the training ground for several story of ADA and Hafiz Pashayev’s leadership. The result? An institution Nobel Prize winners. that will long remain a work in progress, in the best possible meaning of the term. The future rector drew a number of conclusions from this enquiry. Azerbaijan’s new institution must embrace the arts, sciences, and human- Such a measured approach does not exclude acting on targets of opportu- ities—not as pre-professional programs but in order to enable graduates to nity. Typically, while the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy was transformed then go on to master any field. This meant rejecting all rote learning, an into ADA University in 2014, it was only in 2020 that Hafiz became con- emphasis on rigorous interaction between students and faculty and among vinced the time had come to recruit the necessary personnel to establish on students, and the development of high competence in both writing and a permanent basis a scholarly rigorous policy journal focusing on interna- speaking. Such a program would be possible only in a residential institutional and regional affairs, namelyBaku Dialogues. tion, where living and learning would be combined. And it would require not only a broad and compulsory first year program but a preparatory year Similarly, Pashayev took a regional approach from the outset and be- as well. lieved that the University should build strong ties with the nearby countries of Central Asia. Turkmenistan was an obvious starting point, but a long- s he had done in both his scientific work and as ambassador, in standing dispute between Baku and Ashgabat over rights to exploit an oil Abuilding ADA Hafiz Pashayev began by assembling a team of gifted deposit beneath the Caspian Sea prevented progress. So Hafiz Pashayev, in and energetic young people. He made sure they grasped his broad aims his dual capacity as ADA rector and Azerbaijani deputy foreign minister, but otherwise allowed them great freedom of action. He also engaged an made a low-keyed visit to the Turkmen capital in 2014. The president of American architectural firm to begin planning a residential campus that Turkmenistan eventually paid a return visit to Baku and, in due course, the would foster the educational program he envisioned. Finally, in order to dispute concerning the extraction of undersea hydrocarbons was resolved. create the basis for longer-term independence, Rector Pashayev established Students from Turkmenistan and other Central Asian countries now study a permanent endowment and set up a foundation in Washington to raise at ADA University. and manage such funds. A third example has been the evolution of the idea—first raised in 2013 in Scarcely less noteworthy than the strategic plan for ADA University is the form of a proposal to host a technopark to encourage homegrown entre- the measured pace at which it has been developed. Instead of a Soviet-type preneurship—of establishing a Science and Technology Village adjacent to crash program that initially dazzles but eventually reveals deep flaws in the main ADA campus. Originally conceived as a way to further the work of concept and execution, the establishment of ADA University has proceeded the university’s School of Information Technologies and Engineering, the in a careful “step-by-step” manner. This more organic approach allows for idea gathered momentum in early 2020 during President Aliyev’s state visit rethinking along the way and for adjustments that respond to perceived to Italy. In conversation with Italy’s prime minister, Giuseppe Conte, he sug- realities. Such an approach is properly built not only with the skills of an gested working together to set up an Italy-Azerbaijan University. Hafiz had engineer but also with the sensibility of a gardener. Sustainable growth, been a member of the Azerbaijani delegation (he signed a Memorandum of even if at times dizzyingly rapid, must remain holistic and organic. It must Understanding on academic exchange programs), and by the time it had re- not succumb to an indolent, mechanical process but instead be cultivated turned home, the two men had come to an agreement that ADA University prudentially and allowed to evolve naturally; it must set a pace for growth would spearhead this project, which if all goes well is expected to launch that is deliberate; it must make the most of every opportunity for renewal; in a few years’ time. At present, the plan is to draw on the strengths of var- and it must stay true to the purpose that animated its founding whilst taking ious top-notch Italian universities and offer dual degrees with a consortium care to allow for constant adjustment and adaptability. At bottom, this is the of Italian universities in electrical engineering, design and architecture, IT

Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 158 159 Vol. 4 | No. 4 | Summer 2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES and computer sciences, business and management, agrobusiness and food temperament has distanced him from polemics and traditional politics. In- science, and other related areas, while at the same time establish new col- stead, he has focused on what he is for, not what he is against. And the core laborative models with private-sector industry and high-tech entrepreneurs of his philosophy as a scientist, diplomat, and educator has remained con- headquartered in both countries. The idea is still in its planning stage and is sistent throughout his life: to affirm the constructive role of free, educated, likely to evolve further in perhaps unexpected ways before seeing the light and independent men and women. During half his life he had observed of day. Whatever its final form, Hafiz Pashayev and ADA University should how the Soviet system thwarted the development of such people, ques- be credited for standing at the forefront of what may turn out to be yet tioning their loyalty and undermining the meritocratic imperative, and he another seminal development in the history of preparing Azerbaijan. knew well the cost this had imposed on individuals and society. But instead of engaging in frontal combat with holdovers of the past, he has devoted his tal- he mode and pace by which Pashayev has developed ADA ents to creating better alternatives. In this mission he has been extraordinarily TUniversity flowed naturally from his deep aversion to top-down so- productive. We should rejoice in the fact that he continues to be so today. BD cial engineering. He had seen how this worked in Soviet times and knew well its flaws. He knew that effective modern societies require free citizens, and that Soviet pedagogy, based on authority, standardization, and conformity, could not produce them. Absent such a citizenry, the best efforts of polit- The goal of Hafiz Pashayev’s ical leaders and diplomats reinforce the educational strategy is thus very habits that long hampered social to develop free, independent, and personal development and that sup- and modern citizens, not pressed invention, innovation, initiative, standardized subjects. and freedom.

The goal of Hafiz Pashayev’s educational strategy is thus to develop free, independent, and modern citizens, not standardized subjects. This bakudialogues.ada.edu.az was the same philosophy that undergirded his father’s life as a writer and teacher as well as his own role as the head of a major scientific institution in Azerbaijan. It informed his own work as a diplomat in Washington, where he was widely seen as an exemplar of such a worldview, and also pervaded in his role as Azerbaijan’s deputy foreign minister and, of course, in his stewardship of ADA University.

Viewed from a great distance, it is easy to underestimate the impediments that can stymie anyone who champions such a philosophy in a developing country, even a sophisticated one like Azerbaijan. The central role of families in such traditional societies can create loyalties that are sometimes at odds with the free and equal exercise of individual citizenship. The rise of new wealth can also dim the voice of those who do not share it. Hafiz Pashayev has lived his life in such an environment. But his mild

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BAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION

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