The Consequences of Russo-Georgian War

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The Consequences of Russo-Georgian War Mise au Point A Russian convoy outside the village of Dzhaba in South Ossetia Photo : Dmitry Kostyukov/AFP- Getty Images Much Ado about Nothing? The Consequences of Russo-Georgian War Par Elena Mizrokhi, Auxiliaire de recherche pour la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur les conflits identitaires et le terrorisme et pour le Programme Paix et sécurité internationales The confrontation between Russia and six-point plan, proved to be a failure when Russia Georgia that took place from the 7th to the 13th of announced that its troops in the two enclaves August 2008 was Moscow‟s first act of military would "be considered foreign troops stationed in aggression against a neighbouring state since the independent states under bilateral agreements" invasion of Afghanistan in 1978 (Cornell et al., one month after the cease fire. It remains unclear, 2008). The 5 day conflict was rich in rhetoric as who if anyone, benefited from the August well as action. Its consequences, however, were confrontation. In a way, Russia succeeded in significant mostly on a regional level and did not hampering any possible resolution of the two result in an upheaval of the new multipolar world conflicts that would inevitably limit its role in the as some experts argued they would. Russia‟s region. However, Moscow‟s more likely recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the objective to use the two republics as pawns to 26th of August 2008 has changed the political punish Georgia for its pro-Western policy landscape of the South Caucasus. Despite the ambitions, has not received even a minimal show reinforced economic and political links with of support among Russia‟s allies let alone the Russia the two republics today find themselves other members of the world stage. This bellicose more isolated than before the war. The behaviour did stir up old feelings among international initiatives to mediate the situation prominent Eastern European intellectuals and and resolve the frozen conflicts, notably the EU political figures who called out against the Page 1 Mise au Point international community‟s meek acceptance of et al., 2008). The Mission established that all another de facto annexation of foreign territories sides to the conflict - Georgian forces, Russian by a larger power (Havel et al., 2009). forces and South Ossetian forces, irregular armed groups, volunteers - committed violations of A look back on the conflict International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law. Overall, the 1000 page long account One year after the end of the of the five day war did not produce any new confrontation, the very basic facts of the conflict insights or draw significant conclusions with still represent a point of contention. The long- respect to the conflict. awaited report sponsored by the Council of European Union and headed by the Swiss Certain analysts criticised the report for what diplomat Heidi Tagliavini was expected to shed seemed to be a reiteration of EU‟s stance on the some much needed light on the matter. The report issue in place as early as September 2008, when concluded that both sides violated international in an emergency summit the economic bloc law: Georgia, when it attacked the separatist expressed the opinion that Georgia‟s military region of South Ossetia on August 8, 2008 (being action was "not acceptable" and that Russia's responsible for the outbreak of hostilities); response was "disproportionate" (Georgian Daily, Russia, when it invaded Georgia (Tagliavini, September 30, 2009). Not surprisingly, both 2009). Russia and Georgia seemed to interpret the Commission‟s findings in their own favour. The former expressed particular satisfaction with reports conclusion that Georgia started the war (Kiernan, 2009). The Georgian government in the meantime reported that its interpretation of events was confirmed by the Commission (Kiernan, 2009). On the other hand, a report by the Central Asia Caucasus Institute was much more critical of Russia‟s actions in the conflict arguing that the invasion of Georgia was premeditated. And while, academics will continue to debate whether Russian tanks were “already advancing inside Georgian territory when Georgian forces Streets in Gori, Georgia. launched their attack on Tskhinvali; there seems Photo: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP-Getty Images little doubt that they were at least on the move toward the border” (Cornell et al., 2008). The Mission also asserted that Russia has been pursuing increasingly aggressive and While the facts of the „5 day war‟ will continue to interventionist policies in the region for some be disputed, experts on both side of the spectrum time (Cornell et al., 2008). Indeed, the August agree that the conflict was a humanitarian disaster showdown was merely the climax of hostilities. and that Georgia suffered immense material The notable events leading up to August 2008 losses. Georgia's economy and infrastructure include Russia‟s ban of imports of Georgian wine were greatly damaged by the war. Russia's forces and mineral water (2006); creation of a Russian destroyed a substantial amount of Georgia's military base in the district of Java, north of military equipment and physical capital Tskhinvali with substantial refuelling capabilities (including bridges, buildings, and roads) for armoured vehicles; a presidential decree (Rayfield, 2009). Georgia has lost its entire air- instructing the Russian regional and federal defence system. Reportedly, Russian forces government to open political, social, and captured and destroyed a significant portion of economic relations with Abkhazia and South the Georgian army's arsenals. They also seized up Ossetia (2008); an increase of Russia‟s to 150 units of Georgian heavy weaponry peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia; (Barabanov, 2009). Nonetheless, the tangible Abkhazia‟s requests for permanent Russian damage ensued during the conflict cannot be military presence on its territory (2008) (Cornell Page 2 Mise au Point compared to the human casualties. Human Rights It should be noted that the two territories exhibit Watch has reported that the number of victims of quite different relationships with their protector. the August war totalled at least 850, with more They have also taken dramatically different than 100 000 civilians fleeing their homes of approaches to their independence (Whitmore, which around 35 000 still have not been able to 2009). Abkhazia seems to be set on preserving return (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The and institutionalising its independence from organisation also concluded that both sides were Georgia as well as Russia, while South Ossetia guilty of serious human rights violations envisions an eventual union with its Russian particularly, but not exclusively, due to the use of fraternal republic – North Ossetia. The inevitable cluster bombs. cooperation between the Abkhaz and the Russian authorities has begun to change the landscape of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: the Abkhazia. For the mean time Russia buys all of idiosyncrasies Abkhazia's exports, particularly tangerines and construction materials (Smoltczyk, 2009). In the eyes of the administrations of Kremlin‟s relations with South Ossetia on the Abkhazia and South Ossetia all the losses were other hand, seem more complicated. The justified since they gained what they longed for – symbolic visit of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin independence. However, having gained only the and Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov to participate recognition of Russia, Nicaragua and most in the anniversary celebration of South Ossetia‟s recently Venezuela, thanks to a hefty loan and independence did not take place (RFE/RL, 2009). arms deal (Felgenhauer, 2009), the two republics The most obvious source of friction between have not become full fledged members of the Eduard Kokoity, South Ossetia‟s de facto international community. In fact, they are president, and the Russian leadership is the arguably more ostracised following the August ongoing harassment of Stroyprogress, a confrontation. International isolation comes with subsidiary company of Russia's Gazprom that has obvious drawbacks. just completed construction of a gas pipeline that will supply Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, with Russian gas. The owner of Stroyprogress, businessman Albert Djussoyev, is one of Kokoity's main political rivals (RFE/RL, 2009). Another reason for possible frustration with Kokoity is insistence on the „unresolved territorial issues with Georgia of the Truso Valley,‟ currently within the boundaries of Georgia that he claimed to be historic Ossetian land (Kvelashvili, 2009) a position not presently echoed by the Kremlin. Despite the tensions between Moscow and its client regions the political isolation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Source : The New York Times is pushing both further into Russia‟s embrace and Moscow has no choice but to offer them some The two republics have no currency, and cannot sort of assistance. borrow money in the financial markets, because, under international law, they don‟t exist. For the One year on, the conflicts are still frozen rest of the world, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are merely Georgian provinces with delusions of Ultimately, the issue at hand is the lack of grandeur, with as many inhabitants as a mid-sized resolution of the frozen conflicts in the two European city (Smotlczyk, 2009). The republics republics. The war of August 2008 did nothing to have thus their hands tied – and must inevitably improve the disputes; on the contrary it has led to turn to Russia, whether like it or not, as it is the
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