Mise au Point

A Russian convoy outside the village of Dzhaba in Photo : Dmitry Kostyukov/AFP- Getty Images

Much Ado about Nothing? The Consequences of Russo-Georgian War

Par Elena Mizrokhi, Auxiliaire de recherche pour la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur les conflits identitaires et le terrorisme et pour le Programme Paix et sécurité internationales

The confrontation between Russia and six-point plan, proved to be a failure when Russia Georgia that took place from the 7th to the 13th of announced that its troops in the two enclaves August 2008 was ‟s first act of military would "be considered foreign troops stationed in aggression against a neighbouring state since the independent states under bilateral agreements" invasion of Afghanistan in 1978 (Cornell et al., one month after the cease fire. It remains unclear, 2008). The 5 day conflict was rich in rhetoric as who if anyone, benefited from the August well as action. Its consequences, however, were confrontation. In a way, Russia succeeded in significant mostly on a regional level and did not hampering any possible resolution of the two result in an upheaval of the new multipolar world conflicts that would inevitably limit its role in the as some experts argued they would. Russia‟s region. However, Moscow‟s more likely recognition of and South Ossetia on the objective to use the two republics as pawns to 26th of August 2008 has changed the political punish Georgia for its pro-Western policy landscape of the South Caucasus. Despite the ambitions, has not received even a minimal show reinforced economic and political links with of support among Russia‟s allies let alone the Russia the two republics today find themselves other members of the world stage. This bellicose more isolated than before the war. The behaviour did stir up old feelings among international initiatives to mediate the situation prominent Eastern European intellectuals and and resolve the frozen conflicts, notably the EU political figures who called out against the

Page 1

Mise au Point international community‟s meek acceptance of et al., 2008). The Mission established that all another de facto annexation of foreign territories sides to the conflict - Georgian forces, Russian by a larger power (Havel et al., 2009). forces and South Ossetian forces, irregular armed groups, volunteers - committed violations of A look back on the conflict International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law. Overall, the 1000 page long account One year after the end of the of the five day war did not produce any new confrontation, the very basic facts of the conflict insights or draw significant conclusions with still represent a point of contention. The long- respect to the conflict. awaited report sponsored by the Council of and headed by the Swiss Certain analysts criticised the report for what diplomat Heidi Tagliavini was expected to shed seemed to be a reiteration of EU‟s stance on the some much needed light on the matter. The report issue in place as early as September 2008, when concluded that both sides violated international in an emergency summit the economic bloc law: Georgia, when it attacked the separatist expressed the opinion that Georgia‟s military region of South Ossetia on August 8, 2008 (being action was "not acceptable" and that Russia's responsible for the outbreak of hostilities); response was "disproportionate" (Georgian Daily, Russia, when it invaded Georgia (Tagliavini, September 30, 2009). Not surprisingly, both 2009). Russia and Georgia seemed to interpret the Commission‟s findings in their own favour. The former expressed particular satisfaction with reports conclusion that Georgia started the war (Kiernan, 2009). The Georgian government in the meantime reported that its interpretation of events was confirmed by the Commission (Kiernan, 2009). On the other hand, a report by the Central Asia Caucasus Institute was much more critical of Russia‟s actions in the conflict arguing that the invasion of Georgia was premeditated. And while, academics will continue to debate whether Russian tanks were “already advancing inside Georgian territory when Georgian forces Streets in Gori, Georgia. launched their attack on Tskhinvali; there seems Photo: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP-Getty Images little doubt that they were at least on the move toward the border” (Cornell et al., 2008). The Mission also asserted that Russia has been pursuing increasingly aggressive and While the facts of the „5 day war‟ will continue to interventionist policies in the region for some be disputed, experts on both side of the spectrum time (Cornell et al., 2008). Indeed, the August agree that the conflict was a humanitarian disaster showdown was merely the climax of hostilities. and that Georgia suffered immense material The notable events leading up to August 2008 losses. Georgia's economy and infrastructure include Russia‟s ban of imports of Georgian wine were greatly damaged by the war. Russia's forces and mineral water (2006); creation of a Russian destroyed a substantial amount of Georgia's military base in the district of Java, north of military equipment and physical capital Tskhinvali with substantial refuelling capabilities (including bridges, buildings, and roads) for armoured vehicles; a presidential decree (Rayfield, 2009). Georgia has lost its entire air- instructing the Russian regional and federal defence system. Reportedly, Russian forces government to open political, social, and captured and destroyed a significant portion of economic relations with Abkhazia and South the Georgian army's arsenals. They also seized up Ossetia (2008); an increase of Russia‟s to 150 units of Georgian heavy weaponry peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia; (Barabanov, 2009). Nonetheless, the tangible Abkhazia‟s requests for permanent Russian damage ensued during the conflict cannot be military presence on its territory (2008) (Cornell

Page 2

Mise au Point compared to the human casualties. Human Rights It should be noted that the two territories exhibit Watch has reported that the number of victims of quite different relationships with their protector. the August war totalled at least 850, with more They have also taken dramatically different than 100 000 civilians fleeing their homes of approaches to their independence (Whitmore, which around 35 000 still have not been able to 2009). Abkhazia seems to be set on preserving return (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The and institutionalising its independence from organisation also concluded that both sides were Georgia as well as Russia, while South Ossetia guilty of serious human rights violations envisions an eventual union with its Russian particularly, but not exclusively, due to the use of fraternal republic – North Ossetia. The inevitable cluster bombs. cooperation between the Abkhaz and the Russian authorities has begun to change the landscape of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: the Abkhazia. For the mean time Russia buys all of idiosyncrasies Abkhazia's exports, particularly tangerines and construction materials (Smoltczyk, 2009). In the eyes of the administrations of Kremlin‟s relations with South Ossetia on the Abkhazia and South Ossetia all the losses were other hand, seem more complicated. The justified since they gained what they longed for – symbolic visit of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin independence. However, having gained only the and Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov to participate recognition of Russia, Nicaragua and most in the anniversary celebration of South Ossetia‟s recently Venezuela, thanks to a hefty loan and independence did not take place (RFE/RL, 2009). arms deal (Felgenhauer, 2009), the two republics The most obvious source of friction between have not become full fledged members of the Eduard Kokoity, South Ossetia‟s de facto international community. In fact, they are president, and the Russian leadership is the arguably more ostracised following the August ongoing harassment of Stroyprogress, a confrontation. International isolation comes with subsidiary company of Russia's Gazprom that has obvious drawbacks. just completed construction of a gas pipeline that will supply Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, with Russian gas. The owner of Stroyprogress, businessman Albert Djussoyev, is one of Kokoity's main political rivals (RFE/RL, 2009). Another reason for possible frustration with Kokoity is insistence on the „unresolved territorial issues with Georgia of the Truso Valley,‟ currently within the boundaries of Georgia that he claimed to be historic Ossetian land (Kvelashvili, 2009) a position not presently echoed by the Kremlin. Despite the tensions between Moscow and its client regions the political isolation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Source : The New York Times is pushing both further into Russia‟s embrace and Moscow has no choice but to offer them some The two republics have no currency, and cannot sort of assistance. borrow money in the financial markets, because, under international law, they don‟t exist. For the One year on, the conflicts are still frozen rest of the world, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are merely Georgian provinces with delusions of Ultimately, the issue at hand is the lack of grandeur, with as many inhabitants as a mid-sized resolution of the frozen conflicts in the two European city (Smotlczyk, 2009). The republics republics. The war of August 2008 did nothing to have thus their hands tied – and must inevitably improve the disputes; on the contrary it has led to turn to Russia, whether like it or not, as it is the a deterioration of the situation. The main obstacle only state that has some stake in their survival. to a resolution is the lack of international presence in the territories. This void drastically

Page 3

Mise au Point undermines the prospects of the two republics also agreed to defend Abkhazia‟s territorial gaining international legitimacy. Both, the UN waters that according to international law remain and the OSCE missions had to cease action after, under Georgia's jurisdiction (RFE/RL, 2009). respectively 16 and 17 years of operation, due to Certain analysts perceive this move is a maritime Russia‟s insistence that the missions be vested equivalent of Moscow's methods on land in the with a new mandate to take into account the South Caucasus: shifting land borders de facto consequences of the 2008 military conflict through military action, implanting Russian (Peuch, 2009). Presently, the EU is the only military bases there, thereby rendering international body that is manning an observer international law inapplicable in large parts of the mission on the de facto border between Georgia region (Socor, 2009). and South Ossetia (The Guardian, 2009). The EU contingent patrolling the 170-kilometer Georgian border with Abkhazia consists of 69 men from 13 nations (Klussmann and Schepp, 2009). It is hard to imagine how this geopolitical stalemate can be resolved with such minimal involvement of the international community.

The absence of international monitoring suits Moscow‟s tightening grip on the two regions just right. The increased Russian presence in the regions is mostly military. Moscow has increased the number of troops stations in the regions to 7 600 according to official Kremlin media and 10 000 according to independent A Russian soldier raises the Russian flag at a border guard analysts (Whitmore, 2009). Russia has signed outpost in the South Ossetian village of Girei. Source: RFE/RL defence agreements with Georgia's breakaway regions, allowing Moscow to maintain military The security of the Black Sea region is bases for the next half-century. More importantly, becoming more pressing as other sovereign the Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh has agreed to nations, particularly Turkey, become involved in grant Russia control over Abkhazia's borders, the dilemma. A Turkish vessel was seized in airport, and railway system for a period of five international waters by Georgian coast guards years (RFE/RL, 2009). RFE/RL has also reported with accusation of smuggling oil to Abkhazia that Russian soldiers based in South Ossetia have (Sariisik, 2009). The tanker that was crossing the attempted to relocate a section of the border by Black Sea under a Panamanian flag had broken a moving the delimiting markers some 500 meters law banning any commercial activity in Abkhazia further into Georgian territory (Aptsiauri, 2009). without Georgian permission (Collin, 2009). The Another aspect of Moscow‟s control of the Abkhaz thus rightfully argue that Georgia is Abkhazia and South Ossetia are the economic pushing them into Moscow‟s orbit by preventing investments that have accompanied the military them from establishing economic relations with fortification. Russia will be contributing $77 European countries across the Black Sea (Collin, million to the Abkhaz budget, and Russia‟s 2009). The perpetuation of the state of Rosneft is set to development Abkhazia‟s international lawlessness with respect to the untouched oil fields (Judah, 2009). Black Sea plays right into Russia‟s hands that can argue to fill this legal vacuum by guaranteeing to A further point of international concern is protect the security of its client states. the state of the legal maritime regime in the Black Sea. Russia announced that it would seize any Who’s victory? Georgian ship it finds off Abkhazia's coast (Socor, 2009). This declaration came after Nonetheless, Russia did not come out as a Russian assurances to defend both regions' clear winner of the war with Georgia. Aside from airspace and to train their militaries. Russia has the negative publicity in the West, that was a

Page 4

Mise au Point given considering the strained relations Conclusion particularly with the United States, Moscow did not receive any considerable support among its Russia‟s military campaign in Georgia allies in the CIS. While, the presidents of five was not a response to the situation in South former Soviet republics flew into Tbilisi in a Ossetia and Abkhazia, but a move with strategic show of solidarity (Kramer and Barry, 2008), it is aims that far surpassed the political clout of the less Ukraine's backing for Saakashvili that will two territories. Indeed, the Russian aggression worry the Kremlin than Belarus's reticence. In appears to have sought to requite Georgia for its fact, Belarus's president Alexander Lukashenko pro-Western policy stance, and to achieve the ordered his foreign ministry "to take steps to demise of the Georgian government (Cornell et improve relations with the European Union and al., 2008). The war did not bring any dramatic the United States" shortly after the guns of change either in the region or globally. This, August fired (Krastev, 2008). In addition, however, is also ground for concern, since the Armenia, the most loyal ally of Moscow in the unfulfilled objectives may lead to a new Caucasus, rewarded Saakashvili with a medal of confrontation (Nodia, 2009). Before the war, honour - as if deliberately sending a message to while formally recognising these provinces as Russia (Nodia, 2009). This lack of enthusiasm for part of Georgia, Russia was their chief and only Moscow‟s show of force in Georgia is indicative protector with the territories that served as its of the long term trend of decreasing Russian strategic outposts in the south Caucasus (Nodia, influence in the region. 2009). Now everything is obvious and official, and Russia can extend its military power in both Unsurprisingly, the response of the regions without restraint, and in this lays Russia‟s international community at large was even more most considerable gain. On the political and lukewarm than that of the former communist economic fronts, the two republics will countries. Russia might have gained some ground undoubtedly be a strain on Russia. The one internationally with the US proposal to "reset" opportunity for Russia to obtain some substantial relations. However, this was not so much a return on its „investment‟ in the region comes reflection of American acceptance of the war or with the agreement between the governor of the Russian sphere of influence (Nodia, 2009) as it Krasnodar region and Abkhazian de facto was a genuine desire to improve diplomatic president Sergei Bagapsh, according to which relations that were at an all time low at the end of Abkhazia will provide assistance for the the second mandate of George W. Bush. Barack construction of Olympic facilities in Sochi Obama‟s policy towards Russia does signal the (Zhemukhov, 2009). The one true development belief that Georgia‟s importance to Washington is and likely long term consequence of the August simply belittled by Russia whose cooperation is war is the emergence of Turkey as a player of needed in order for any progress to be achieved influence in the Caucasus, thanks to its 500 000 on Afghanistan and Iran files (Rayfield, 2009). strong Abkhaz diaspora. In fact, Turkey‟s role in The EU‟s launch of the new Eastern Partnership the region could become even more prominent if with six post-Soviet countries - as well as the the diplomatic thaw with Armenia is to continue. acceleration of the Nabucco project are further evidence of the West reluctance to accept Références

Moscow‟s revisionist instruments (Nodia, 2009). “Analysis: Will anyone care about the Georgian War Report.” Certainly, Russian passportization schemes, Georgian Daily. September 30, 2009, which have gone on for decades now, will be http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vi ew&id=14914&Itemid=65 taken more seriously by the West since the protection of Russian citizens was one of the Aptsiauri, Goga. “Russian troops try to shift South Ossetian official reasons provided by the Kremlin for the border markers.” RFE/RL, August 3, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Troops_Try_To_Shift_Sout August conflict. h_Ossetia_Border_Markers/1791641.html

Barabanov, Mikhail. “The August War between Russia and Georgia.” Moscow Defence Brief, 15/1 2009. http://www.webcitation.org/5fm4fGQ5j

Page 5

Mise au Point

Collin, Matthew. “Real Benetton, Fake IKEA, No fuel.” The Moscow Times, August 24, 2009. Smoltczyk, Alexander. “Abkhazia's Attempt to Invent Itself.” Spiegel, August 27 2009, Cornell, Svante E. et al. “Russia‟s war in Georgia: causes and http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,645068,00.html implications for Georgia and the world.” Central Asia Caucasus Institute. Washington D.C.: Silk Road Studies Program, August Socor, Vladimir. “Naval Security Deficit Growing in the Black 2008. Sea.” Jamestown Eurasia Monitor, 6/170, September 17, 2009.

Felgenhauer, Pavel. “Venezuela's Multibillion Dollar Abkhazia Socor, Vladimir. “UNOMIG, RIP: the Curtain Finally Falls on a and South Ossetia Recognition Fee.” Jamestown Eurasia Monitor, Side-Show.” Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6/116 July 17, 6/170, September 17, 2009. 2009.

Gachechiladz, Levan. “Georgians know their President is terrified Tagliavini, Heidi. “Independent International Fact Finding of democracy.” The Independent. August 7, 2009. Mission on the Conflict in Georgia Report.” IIFFMCG. September 2009. http://www.ceiig.ch/Index.html “Georgia: Shooting yourself in both feet.” The Guardian, August 7, 2009. Whitmore, Brian. “One year after independence, Abkhazia and http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/aug/07/editorial- South Ossetia in legal gray zone.” RFE/RL, August 26, 2009. russia-georgia-south-ossetia

“Has South Ossetia‟s President Fallen out of Favour with Moscow.” RFE/RL, August 27, 2009.

Havel, Vaclav, et al., “Europe must stand up for Georgia Open Letter.” The Guardian, September 22, 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/sep/22/europe- georgia-russia

Judah, Ben. “Abkhazia: optimism and tension.” ISN, August 27, 2009.

Katz, Mark N. “The Lavrov Assessment.” ISN, May 20, 2009.

Kiernan, Christine. “Russia, Georgia view war report‟s blames through lenses.” World Focus. October 2, 2009, http://worldfocus.org/blog/2009/10/02/russia-georgia-view-war- reports-blame-through-lenses/7571/

Klussmann, Uwe and Mathias Schepp. “Kremlin‟s Powder keg: Moscow‟s troubles in the Caucasus.” Spiegel, August 3. 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,640252- 2,00.html

Kramer, Andrew E. and Ellen Barry. “Russia in accord with Georgians, sets withdrawal.” The New York Times, August 12, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/world/europe/13georgia.html

Krastev, Ivan. “Russia and the Georgia War – the Great Power trap.” Open Democracy, August 19, 2008.

Krastev, Ivan. “The Guns of August: non-event with consequences.” Open Democracy, August 5, 2009.

Kvelashvili, Giorgi. “Unconstrained, Russia eyes more Georgian territories.” Jamestown Foundation, September 28- October 2.

Nodia, Ghia. “The Russia-Georgia War: mission unaccomplished.” Open Democracy, August 17 2009.

Peuch, Jean-Christophe. “Georgia: OSCE Terminates its 17-year Georgian Mission.” Eurasia Insight, June 30, 2009.

Rayfield, Donald. “The Georgia- Russia War a year on.” Open Democracy, August 14, 2009.

Sarriişik, Döndü. “Abkhazia hopes for swift recognition from Turkey,” Hürriyet Daily News, September 10 2009. http://www.abkhazworld.com/news/290-abhazia-hopes-swift- recognition-from-turkey.html

Page 6