Consolidating Democracy in South Africa

18–20 August 1999 Holiday Inn Umtata Table of Contents

Introduction 5 Prof. Roy du Pré, Dean: Faculty of Arts and Professor of History, University of Transkei (Unitra)

Opening Remarks 7 Xoliswa Jozana, Dept. of Political Studies, Unitra

Welcoming Remarks 9 Dr Michael Lange, Resident Representative, Konrad Adenauer Foundation

Keynote Address: Consolidating Democracy in South Africa 13 Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu, Development Bank of South Africa, Midrand

Consolidating Democracy in Eastern Europe After the Collapse of Communism, 17 With Special Reference to Russia Dr Anita McCreath, Dept. of Russian Studies, Unisa

Consolidating Democracy in Southern Africa, With Special Reference to Namibia 23 Prof. Tapera Chirawu, Dept. of Political Science, University of Namibia

The Silent Revolution: the Aids Pandemic and the Military in South Africa 29 Dr Robert Shell, Population Research Unit, Rhodes University, East London

South Africa’s Three-in-One Revolution 43 Allister Sparks, SABC Television, Johannesburg

The 1999 Election and the Prospects of Consolidating Democracy in South Africa 49 Prof. Alexander Johnston, School of Undergraduate Studies, University of Natal

Crime, Corruption, and Democracy in South Africa 57 Dr Constanze Bauer, Dept. of Public Administration, Vista University

3 Table of Contents

Unemployment, Poverty and Democracy in South Africa 67 Dr Tembeka Mpako-Ntusi, Dept. of Social Work, Unitra

Racism and Democracy in South Africa 71 Anthony Johnson, Reader’s Digest, Cape Town

Effective and Efficient Multilingualism in the Building of a Democratic South Africa or 75 Linguistic Hegemony and Marginalisation Dr Kathleen Heugh, Project for the Study of Alternative Education in South Africa (PRAESA), UCT

Globalisation and Democracy: Reconciling Economic and Political Liberalism in South Africa 83 Dr Meenal Shrivastava, Dept. of Political Studies, Unitra

Racial Categorisation: Threats to South Africa’s Fledgling Democracy 87 Prof. Roy du Pré, Dean: Faculty of Arts and Professor of History, Unitra

Consolidating Democracy in South Africa: the New National Party Perspective 101 Francois Beukman, NNP Spokesperson, Constitutional Affairs

Consolidating Democracy in South Africa: the African Christian Democratic 105 Party Perspective JoAnn Downs, ACDP MMP

Towards Consolidating Democracy in South Africa, With Special Reference to the 107 Concept of Self-Determination Dr Petrus Liebenberg, Director, Foundation for the Study of Minorities in South Africa

Democracy and Human Rights 115 Pansy Tlakula, South African Human Rights Commission

Democratic Consolidation in South Africa: Weaknesses and Pitfalls 119 Xoliswa Jozana, Dept. of Political Studies, Unitra

Programme 125

Participants’ List 129

Seminar Reports 133

Occasional Paper Series 135

4 Introduction

For the first time in its history, South Africa experienced a non-racial, one-person, one-vote democratic election in April 1994. This election was considered a miracle by most South Africans after 44 years of apartheid rule. International observers considered it one of the most remarkable in history and a first of its kind for Africa.

What made this first democratic election notable was the absence of violence. In fact none of the well publicised fears were realised. South Africa experienced a remarkably peaceful election and a stable period thereafter. Despite predictions to the contrary, the new government made encouraging strides. Laws were passed which entrenched human rights; which turned the police service around, protected workers, and which recognised the rights of domestic workers, the poor, children, the abused, the aged and the downtrodden.

In 1999 South Africa went to the polls a second time. Against the odds, and in the face of dire warn- ings, South Africa had survived five years of “black” rule. The scorecard of the ANC government showed that while there were areas of concern, the government had passed its first test. Consolidating our fledgling democracy therefore began to loom large as the next important step deserving attention.

Because of the importance of consolidating a young democracy in South Africa, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in collaboration with the Faculty of Arts of the University of Transkei, organised a conference from 18 to 20 August 1999. The international conference on Consolidating Democracy in South Africa met at Umtata, Eastern Cape, South Africa to examine ways to achieve this aim. The organisers provided a forum for academics, non-governmental organisations, politicians, political parties, government spokespersons and others to discuss dimensions in the consolidation of democracy in this country.

The first objective of this conference was to compare and contrast democracy in other countries with that in South Africa. Speakers were invited from a variety of backgrounds and countries so that a comparative perspective of democracy could be gained. Academic papers addressed the problems, nature and trends in democracy in regions and countries such as Central America, Eastern Europe and Russia, and Zambia and Namibia. Academics, political activists, journalists and researchers examined the developments – negative and positive – which led to the establishment of a democratic dispensation in this country. A number of speakers examined the threats to democracy in South Africa, while others looked at positive steps being taken to consolidate democracy.

A second objective of the conference was to bring together representatives of the established and represented political parties in South Africa. Representatives not only presented their parties’ views on democracy and how they saw it, but made suggestions on how they could contribute towards strengthening and broadening democracy.

5 Introduction

The third objective of the conference was to find ways to strengthen and consolidate democracy in South Africa. While it was accepted that a conference of this nature could not hope to find all the solutions and the answers, it nevertheless provided a forum for political and other interested parties to meet, discuss, debate and identify issues. It is to be hoped that by publishing a representative sample of some of the papers presented at the conference, we can stimulate debate and provide a basis for an on-going examination of ways to strengthen democracy in South Africa and provide an example for Africa to emulate.

It is the hope of the organisers that the democratic miracle in South Africa will not turn out to be a mirage or a flash in the pan, and that this conference will have begun a debate which looks at ways to strengthen what we have and to ensure that a solid and secure political dispensation is left for future generations. Moreover, it is our earnest desire to prove that democracy can work in Africa.

Professor Roy du Pré Dean: Faculty of Arts and Professor of History University of Transkei

6 Opening Remarks

Xoliswa Jozana

INTRODUCTION ly, an attempt, albeit limited, has been made by The current conjuncture of democratisation in David Beetham who proposes a “two-election Africa raises one fundamental question: what test” by which an incumbent government are the prospects for the consolidation of which came to power through free and fair democracy in Africa? We are gathered here elections is defeated at subsequent elections today to discuss the prospects for the consoli- and accepts the verdict of the ballot box. In dation of democracy in South Africa. In assess- other words, the defeated incumbent governing the prospects for the consolidation of ment must respect the wishes of the people and democracy in Africa, political analysts have forego the spoils of the office. More important- asked different questions and have employed a ly, as Beetham argues, democracy can be variety of criteria. deemed to be consolidated when a government Christopher Clapham and John Wisemen rec- is “capable of withstanding pressures and ommend “a minimalist system of democracy”. shocks”, including the shock of dissent and By this they mean a system in which there is opposition (1994). However, while the transfer political competition between political parties of power to the opposition is a vital ingredient in free and fair elections and which allows for of democracy, a robust and sustainable democ- the real possibility of alternative parties and the racy requires more than a merely procedural involvement of civil society in the public form of democracy. realm. In defense of this conception of democracy, they argue that their model of “a merely 2. BEYOND ELECTORALISM procedural form of democracy” does represent Meaningful democracy goes beyond electoral- “a marked improvement on the level of democ- ism to include the improvement of the material racy that most African states have hitherto conditions of the people and the fulfillment of experienced (Clapham and Wisemen, 1997: their expectations. Zambia is a case in point. 220). Should we stop at this conceptualisation There was a successful transfer of power to the in our search for factors and indices of a gen- opposition in that country, but its democracy uine democratic consolidation in South Africa? was threatened when President Frederick Chi- Does electoralism or formal political democra- luba’s government failed to meet the expecta- cy really constitute a path to the consolidation tions of the ordinary people in the country. of democracy? What do we mean by consolida- There was a real danger to Zambia’s democra- tion and how do we judge a consolidated cy when the restive population seemed to be democracy? propelling Chiluba towards a retreat from the democratic gains which were made by the pop- 1. CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY ular democratic movement in 1992. Facing Owing to the differences in our conception of mounting social problems, Chiluba’s govern- democracy, it is not easy to arrive at a precise ment progressively turned to authoritarianism. index of a consolidated democracy. Fortunate- The case of Zambia is therefore a pointer to the

7 Jozana limitations of electoralism. The deprivation human rights but also to voice anger at the which the mass of the population in Africa suf- appalling economic conditions in African fered under authoritarian systems makes it dif- states. The new multi-party governments have ficult to employ Clapham and Wiseman’s yet to demonstrate to their electorates that there “minimalist system of democracy” in assessing is a correlation between democracy and eco- the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. nomic progress, otherwise their path toward Sustaining democracy requires more than democratic consolidation will be fraught with electoralism – as my paper focusing on weak- difficulties. nesses, threats and dangers to democratic consolidation will attempt to argue (see page 119 CONCLUSION of this volume). In addition to procedural for- South Africa has crossed the threshold of “two mal democracy of free and fair elections, suc- consecutive elections” which classifies her as a cessful democratic consolidation in developing consolidated democracy, according to the liber- countries must involve the fulfillment of the al democracy paradigm. But the country, as one minimum expectations of the people and that political observer has aptly described, is not yet implies the broadening of participation by the “out of the woods and not yet one in which masses within the expanding economies of democracy has fully taken root, although the these developing societies. vine is ripening”. A serious threat to democratic consolidation Democratic consolidation remains an open in Africa, is economic crisis and the concomi- task and certainly means more than formal tant external imposition of economic manage- political democracy. Peace, security, healthy ment which undermines the choice or freedom economic conditions, fulfillment of the material of action on the part of the governments in conditions of the poor, a democratic political Africa. Accordingly, the elected governments culture and a viable civil society are all ingredi- are left with limited options but to implement ents of democratic consolidation. More impor- externally determined policies which do not tantly, the new democracy has yet to face the directly benefit the people who elected them test of the rotation of political parties, whereby into power. Popular social movements in the the incumbent government accepts defeat in 1990s emerged not only to pressure the authori- future elections and there is a peaceful transfer tarian regimes to restore people’s fundamental of power to the opposition.

8 Welcoming Remarks

Michael Lange

INTRODUCTION infant multi-party democracy in the new South On behalf of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Africa. (KAF), I would like to extend a warm welcome to you all. As some of you may know, this is 1. BACKGROUND the fourth conference that KAF has jointly For those wondering what kind of organisation organised with the University of the Transkei KAF is, allow me to sketch a brief background (Unitra) and I am delighted that, with the repre- to the German political foundations and to out- sentatives of Unitra, we have been able to line some of the reasoning behind the involve- invite you to take part in these deliberations. ment of KAF in academic endeavours of this We have chosen a highly appropriate topic nature. for this year’s conference and I can only hope The German political foundations are a that – after a long period of electioneering fol- unique feature of today’s democratic culture in lowed by a period of relaxation – we will be Germany. The move behind their creation, sufficiently invigorated to discuss the issues which dates back to the 1960s, was the expec- with the necessary passion and composure. tation that political and civic education would This conference will focus on issues that are help develop and consolidate democracy in very close to KAF’s heart, namely, questions post-war Germany. relating to the consolidation of democracy in Both in Germany and abroad, these founda- different parts of the world and also the threats tions seek to further develop and encourage to the many new democracies posed by, for people to engage in the political debate, thus example: strengthening democracy and promoting a plu- • crime and corruption ralistic society. By engaging in a variety of • unemployment and poverty activities, they help to strengthen the concept • racism in multi-ethnic societies. of human rights, assist economic development These questions, as much as possible remedies and help to implement social justice and the or ways to safeguard and consolidate democra- rule of law. cies, shall dominate the proceedings. We KAF is one of five such political foundations believe that these issues are as much a concern in Germany and is closely affiliated to the to KAF as they should be to every South Christian Democratic Union Party of former African citizen who has only recently been German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. asked to judge the performance of South KAF is represented in many countries Africa’s first democratically elected govern- throughout the world and with an annual gener- ment. al budget of approximately DM200 million is – By assisting in bringing about this confer- we believe – actively assuming a share of ence we hope that KAF, which I have the privi- responsibility in shaping international relations. lege to represent here today, is contributing in a Our aim as a political foundation working in meaningful way to the consolidation of this Africa, is to encourage the people of this conti-

9 Lange nent to play an even more active part in the out allowing a multi-party contest. At the same political and social lives of their communities, time, the notion of democratisation is not nec- thus strengthening democracy and promoting a essarily a peaceful process. Although democra- pluralistic society. cy is the only form of power in which the KAF is currently running wide-ranging pro- appointment of the government is regulated grammes in different parts of Africa, as well as peacefully, the call to political competition in in different provinces of South Africa. The election campaigns sometimes leads to an esca- Foundation cooperates not only with centrist lation of underlying tensions, leading to clashes political parties and their respective think-tanks between militant supporters – and even South but, as you will note from today’s event, also Africa has seen enough of this in the past. with reputable education and research institu- As a result, there has been an emerging con- tions. sensus that a simplistic imposition of Western- style multi-party systems on African societies, 2. THE WINDS OF CHANGE is not as automatically beneficial as was imag- We have all witnessed the rapid change that has ined. taken place in Africa since the end of the Cold War some eight years ago. Almost the entire 3. THREATS TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION continent has, in an amazingly short time, made A different question altogether is the issue, remarkable progress towards political participa- which figures prominently on today’s agenda, tion. regarding the consolidation of infant democra- Parliamentary and presidential elections, cies such as South Africa and a variety of possi- which give voters the opportunity to choose ble threats that accompany it. between parties, persons and programmes are Talking of threats, we should note that South seen as an indicator of democracy. In many Africa has just concluded an election where cases, opposition parties have been formed only 100 000 more people than in 1994 were legally and “gone public” for the first time. eligible to vote in this country’s second democ- They have called, above all, for the abolition of ratic election. the one-party system and for the modernisation Accusations remain that some of the deci- of electoral systems. sions taken in regard to those groups allowed By 1996, almost all African countries had and those not allowed to vote in the elections held more or less competitive parliamentary may have been prompted by calculations that it elections and international monitoring teams would benefit some parties to the detriment of declared approximately half of them free and others. fair. In 1995-96 alone, 12 African countries had I strongly believe that we have to realise elections, of which only one brought about a nowadays, more than in the past, that threats to change of government. The other parliamentary free and fair elections stem foremost from ques- and presidential elections confirmed the incum- tionable voter-registration processes than from bent parties and governments in power. the administration of elections on election day. The conclusion which can be drawn from this After all, the right of every citizen to vote is brief overview of the electoral process in Africa enshrined in the constitution of this country and in recent years, is that the holding of elections should not be compromised by too many has been mostly an expression of a growing administrative procedures, even with the inten- desire for democratic legitimatisation of power. tion of preventing electoral fraud. Looking back It has been crucial for our expanding activi- into South Africa’s past history, people died for ties in Africa in general, and in sub-Saharan the right to vote and it seems to me an unan- Africa in particular, that democracy-oriented swered question, whether or not one should institutions and structures have been developing restrict people’s right to vote to the extent that considerably in recent years. Opportunities to it has been done during the recent election in work in areas of central political importance South Africa. have consequently widened, not least for organisations such as KAF. 3.1 Poverty as a threat to the consolidation We are all aware that a proper democratic of democracy electoral process cannot be implemented with- Recent polls are proof of the fact that the imple-

10 Lange mentation of democracy and the rule of law, the new South Africa today, crime is of fore- together with the economic transformation of most concern to most if not all the people in South Africa, cannot be continuously imple- South Africa. Many say that the Rule of Law mented without causing frustration and disap- has all but disappeared. Criminals seem better pointment to many who – since the election protected under the new law of the land (consti- victory of the governing parties – have been tution) than the average law-abiding citizen. yearning for instant material rewards. Some professional observers of the crime situa- This is even more understandable in light of tion have even warned that the situation has the fact that approximately 19 million South moved dangerously close to anarchy. Africans, representing almost half of the popu- If we define tyranny as “public order without lation, must be considered poor in the sense that freedom” and anarchy as “freedom without their incomes fall below the poverty line and public order”, we somehow seem to witness in that the Gini-coefficient – a measure for the South Africa of today the former being inequality in a society – is considered to be one replaced by the latter. of the highest in the world. I cannot believe that the people of this coun- This means that the top 20% of the South try have struggled against the tyranny of apart- African population accounts for 70% of nation- heid, only to have to live with the anarchy of al expenditure, whereas the bottom 20% ac- crime. counts for a mere 1%. This makes South Africa I trust we all share the conviction that the one of the countries with the highest income process of transformation will be successful inequality in the world. only if democracy, the rule of law, and the prin- A recently published United Nations report ciple of just participation in the economic indicated that if one takes “white South Africa” development of the country by all sectors of as a country of its own in a ranking of per capi- society are understood, accepted and continu- ta income groups, South Africa would occupy ously implemented. 13th place next to Spain. If one did the same with “black South Africa”, it would occupy 3.3 Unemployment as a threat to the 113th place next to the Democratic Republic of consolidation of democracy Congo (DRC). Many therefore speak of a per- Since 1994 we have witnessed a reversal in sisting “economic apartheid”, where it seems economic policy from a rather state driven, that the South Africa of today is less of a “rain- market-assisted Reconstruction and Develop- bow nation” than “a country of two nations”; ment Programme (RDP) to a more market-dri- one white and relatively prosperous and the ven state-assisted Gear (Growth, Employment other black and poor. and Redistribution) policy. Despite this macro- Fair distribution of economic opportunity, economic policy shift, unemployment still and as a result income, is a prime element of a stands at between 23% and 38% of the labour social market economy and therefore an indis- force, depending on the definition of unemploy- pensable policy concern to us. It is here that we ment used. These rates seem to many to be see a role for the state, namely to ensure equali- unacceptable and at the same time we are wit- ty of opportunity (not outcome) and to assist nessing further retrenchments in the public sec- with tax measures so that the proceeds of a tor and more restrictive labour legislation, country’s economic development are distrib- which is frustrating efforts by the private sector uted more equitably. to employ more people. With the collapse of communism, market While we encourage the government to economies have irrefutably proved their superi- remain committed to its economic policy ority as engines of human prosperity. The bene- framework of restructuring the public sector fits of a free and social economic order are and pursuing financial discipline, we hope for being increasingly recognised not only world- the recognition that only a growing private sec- wide, but in Africa as well. tor can be the key to conquering unemployment. What seems true, however, is that aspects 3.2 Crime as a threat to the consolidation of such as crime, poverty and unemployment are democracy interrelated. When we look at surveys and opinion polls in As a result of a poor local savings rate, a

11 Lange country which so badly needs foreign long-term ally, the then outlawed opposition movement investment capital can ill afford a situation (the African National Congress) concluded, where crime, and the climate of fear resulting also correctly, that it was impossible to seize from it, is increasingly becoming an effective South Africa by force. Subsequently, the two discouragement for foreign and local invest- leading personalities of their respective movement. ments turned South Africa away from conflict One need not be an economist to realise that and towards democratic togetherness and coop- the urgently needed millions of jobs will only eration. A new vision of South Africa emerged, be created if a climate exists that is conducive when South Africans of all colours – as a cul- for existing enterprises to grow their businesses mination of the political revolution in South and for entrepreneurs to invest their money in Africa – went to the polls for the first time. new enterprises. South Africa is today considered by many Everywhere in the world one can find proof observers to be a legally consolidated democra- of the fact that independent, small- and medi- cy, in which development towards a constitu- um-sized enterprises and micro-businesses tional, pluralistic state, ruled by the new law of managed by responsible entrepreneurs are the the land, appears to be irreversible. sturdiest pillars of economic development. It is But by transforming white minority rule to in this sector, where future jobs will be created. black majority government, only the founda- In the economic reality of a globalising world tions of a peaceful democratic society have economy, governments will no longer be able been laid. In order to make the new South to create lasting employment, only entrepre- Africa a winning nation it will, I believe, neurs will be able to do so. The role of govern- depend: ment is therefore to guarantee fiscal discipline, • as much on the willingness of those who to help spread business ethics and to create a were wronged under the old regime to put the new entrepreneurial spirit among the millions good of the so-called rainbow nation above of job seekers. their desire for retribution (reconciliation), and CONCLUSION • as much on the acceptance that the tyranny of Some people argue that apartheid was South apartheid should not be replaced by the anar- Africa’s Berlin Wall. It was a great divider, chy of rampant crime. artificially separating people who, in the final Building and maintaining a strong and enduring analysis, were bound to share the same destiny. democracy on these foundations will further- When apartheid fell as part of a chain reac- more depend on a continuing commitment by tion set off not least by events in my country all segments of South Africa’s diverse popula- and culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall, tion to reconciliation and far-reaching econom- the then governing party (National Party) cor- ic and social transformation. KAF is willing to rectly read the writing on the wall. Coincident- contribute to this process.

12 Keynote Address: Consolidating Democracy in South Africa

Wiseman Nkuhlu

INTRODUCTION fully agree with my selection of the most out- In opening Parliament on 25 June 1999, standing achievements of our young democra- President Mbeki said the following: cy. I hope at least, however, that you agree that “We are on course. Steadily, the dark a firm foundation for a non-sexist, non-racial clouds of despair are lifting, giving way to democracy is now in place. our season of hope. Our country, which, for In my assessment, the most outstanding centuries bled from a thousand wounds, is achievement is the adoption of a constitution progressing towards its healing. The contin- that protects and upholds human dignity, uing process of social and national emanci- human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and pation, to which we are all subject, consti- non-sexism, universal adult suffrage and multi- tutes an evolving act of self-definition. At party democracy. The second is the removal of the dawn of a new life, our practical actions racist and sexist laws from the statutes and must ensure that none can challenge us their replacement with laws that seek to pro- when we say – we are a nation at work to mote social justice and equality. This has been build a better life.” achieved virtually in all departments, but more Yes, there can be no better introduction to the notably in education, health, labour, welfare, subject of consolidating democracy in South sports and land affairs. Africa. Building a democracy is a process. It Third, is the establishment of institutions that has a starting date, but no completion date. The support constitutional democracy such as the building process starts with a momentous break Constitutional Court, the Public Protector, the from the past. This fills the population with Human Rights Commission, the Commission energy, emotion and hope. But once the op- for Gender Equality and the Electoral Commis- pressive or undemocratic regime has been dis- sion. All these institutions are independent and lodged, the first elections held, a government of accountable to the National Assembly and not the people installed, oppressive laws removed to individual politicians. from the statute books and new structures of The fourth most important achievement is the democracy introduced, the real process of use of the fiscal budget as an instrument of reconstruction – which is less exciting and has social justice and redistribution and not as an no event around which to mobilise the masses – instrument for benefiting a racial minority. begins. This is where we are now. In this paper Since 1994, the fiscal budget has played a we highlight some of the achievements of the major role in reducing racial inequalities first five years of democracy and then discuss through national departments such as health, the challenges that still confront us as a nation. education and welfare. Fifth, is improved delivery of electricity, 1. FIRST FIVE YEARS OF DEMOCRACY: water, telecommunication services and health HIGHLIGHTS care services to previously disadvantaged com- I admit upfront that I do not expect all of you to munities. It is true that we have a long way to

13 Nkuhlu go, but an impressive start has been made. longer purely on racial lines. Tony Leon claims There are also notable achievements in housing, that a significant percentage of Afrikaners school building and land reform, but the record voted for the Democratic Party in the recent is not as impressive as in the sectors mentioned elections. What is becoming evident is that earlier. there is no longer a party that can claim to be The sixth most important achievement I the sole voice of the Afrikaner. On the other would like to highlight is the transformation of hand, parties such as Azapo that did not partici- the economy. The South African economy of pate in 1994, participated in the 1999 elections. 1999 is totally different from that of 1994. The The conclusion, therefore, is that the national fiscal deficit is declining annually and the poli- constitution is enjoying increasing support. cy of defending the value of the rand has been discarded. The focus is now on creating an 2. THE CURRENT SITUATION: BRIEF COMMENTS environment conducive to sustained economic Having highlighted the achievements of the growth through lower inflation and lower inter- first five years of democracy, the question now est rates. The use of tariffs and industry specific is whether there are still gaps and weaknesses tax incentives, is being replaced by a more effi- that could undermine long term political stabili- cient policy of lower corporate taxation. In ty or not. other words, a foundation is being established To answer the question, we have to evaluate for a more competitive, efficient economy that the facts. This is not difficult, as there is plenty is better positioned to achieve and sustain high- of material to work on, ranging from local er levels of growth. media reports, official government reports, Seventh, is the work of the Truth and research findings by independent researchers Reconciliation Commission. Given the time and authoritative reports by international bodies constraints and the complexity caused by the such as the World Economic Forum, the fact that its work had to cover human rights International Monetary Fund and the World violations committed by the liberation move- Bank. ments in the process of dislodging an unjust Overwhelming evidence confirms that the regime on the one hand, and violations by the political transformation has been a great suc- unjust regime in resisting the struggle for jus- cess. Politically, South Africa is a new country. tice on the other, it has done very well. Racist laws have been removed. There are non- The eighth issue is the transformation of gov- racial political structures at all three levels of ernment departments and parastatals. This government and all South Africans enjoy uni- process is still at an early stage, but is worth versal human rights. mentioning. Parastatals and utilities such as The message of reconciliation is being spread Eskom, Telkom, Transnet, the Industrial throughout the country. As a consequence, Development Corporation, the Land Bank and political tolerance is on the increase and distrust the Development Bank of Southern Africa are of the new political dispensation is on a rapid now instruments of reconstruction and develop- decline – as evidenced by increased participa- ment. They service all the people of South tion in the 1999 national elections. Africa and not only a minority as in the past. On the other hand, however, there are con- The penultimate achievement is the restruc- cerns about the poor performance of the econo- turing and privatisation of state assets. Much as my. Questions are being asked whether democ- progress has been slow and in certain cases dis- racy can be sustained in a country with such appointing, the privatisation of radio stations high levels of economic inequality, poverty and was a great success. The partial privatisation of unemployment. There are also concerns about Telkom also has been a success. law enforcement and delivery of essential ser- Last, but not least, I believe that we have vices such as education, housing and health made significant progress towards national rec- care. The third tier of government is also a mat- onciliation. What has been achieved within a ter of concern. space of five years is mind boggling. In 1994, All in all, the verdict is that South Africa has Afrikaners voted mainly for their own political made a good start, especially with political parties such as the Freedom Front and the transformation, but this is not enough. To National Party. Now, the divisions are no secure democracy in the medium to long term,

14 Nkuhlu people must experience positive changes in 1995/1996. The impact of globalisation and their material conditions. My thesis is therefore resultant cost cutting by major corporations has that to consolidate democracy, the country must accelerated job losses even further in recent give priority to economic issues and effective years. The pressure to improve cost efficiency government in the next five years. and to put more reliance on markets is also compelling governments and parastatals to 3. PRIORITIES IN CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY streamline operations. The result in the short The first priority is that the government must term is increased retrenchments. The promise is do everything possible to promote high eco- high levels of growth and increased employ- nomic growth. The economic policy framework ment in the medium- to long-term. must be supportive of both high economic In my view, the exclusion of an increasing growth and equity. In other words, it must rec- number of young people from the mainstream oncile the key elements of the Gear (the economy needs to be addressed urgently. The Growth, Employment and Redistribution) strat- restructuring of the economy and increased egy with the Reconstruction and Development investment in infrastructure are important ini- Programme. tiatives, but not sufficient on their own. I High economic growth would generate believe that there must be a national pro- resources for social development on a more sus- gramme that is directed at job creation. It must tainable basis. Secondly, it would make a posi- encompass skills development and transforma- tive contribution towards job creation and the tion of the economy in the direction of knowl- alleviation of poverty. Politically, it would facil- edge-intensive goods and services. This must itate the process of racial economic integration. happen now, not some time in the future. In addition, a growing economy would be able The fourth priority in consolidating democra- to absorb blacks without reducing jobs for cy is the restoration of effective law enforce- whites. Actually, whites would be better posi- ment. This is by far the most important respon- tioned to prosper because of their higher levels sibility of government. The country now has of financial and technological knowledge. one of the best constitutions in the world and The second priority is to increase delivery of the majority of South Africans are proud of it. essential infrastructure and social services. To Somehow, however, respect for the law re- achieve this, the government must increase its mains low. fixed investment expenditure by reducing con- This must change, not in five years’ time, but sumption expenditure. This will release more within the next three years, because the longer resources for investment in basic education, we take to restore law enforcement, the more health care, police, justice, etc. In addition, difficult it is going to become. Under apartheid, steps must be taken to improve management in there was no respect for the law by virtually all all key delivery departments. The delivery of sectors of the South African society. The rea- electricity, water, housing and telecommunica- sons were obvious. An illegitimate government tion should be financed primarily by relevant was using illegitimate means to stay in power. development institutions and the private sector, As a consequence, the oppressed lost respect but the government must subsidise the poor in a for the law. On the other hand, the illegitimate transparent manner. regime and its supporters used immoral and Without access to these essential goods and illegal means to oppose the struggle for justice services, the poor, who are predominantly and by so doing, condoned non-compliance black, will remain marginalised. Secondly, they with the law. will not be in a position to realise their potential The danger is that, if respect for the law is as individual human beings. not restored and the current situation is allowed The third priority is to address structural to escalate, South Africans will not enjoy basic unemployment. Unemployment has been grow- human rights such as freedom of movement, ing since the 1980s and what is more disturbing security of the person, privacy, security of is that the linkage between economic growth property, etc. This will be tragic indeed because and job creation has weakened. This is evi- it will mean that all the sacrifices made were denced by the negligible impact on job creation for nothing. of the relatively high growth achieved during The fifth priority is land reform and stabilisa-

15 Nkuhlu tion of rural areas. Both issues are critical to dents to follow. South Africa is the only long term political stability. Experience in other African country that has a large white popula- countries shows that land reform can play a tion which continues to play a significant politi- major role in reducing economic inequalities cal role in post liberation. and, combined with well planned and well exe- Language differences among Africans do not cuted integrated rural development, can make a seem to constitute a threat. All the language major contribution in improving the quality of groups are fairly represented in the political life in rural areas. structures and find it easy to work together The provision of telephones and electricity is because of a common history and a shared not enough and may not even be appropriate commitment to non-sexist, non-racial democra- given the fact that to afford the services, the cy. households or individuals must be earning cash The last priority on my list is the develop- incomes. What is needed is integrated rural ment of a national consciousness or patriotism, development which focuses not only on the which encompasses a sense of pride and re- provision of infrastructure, but also on income sponsibility. In my assessment, many of the generating activities. problems we are experiencing have to do with Given the fact that rural communities account the lack of a national consciousness. for a significant percentage of voters, their The fact that our courts are not functioning as plight has to be addressed, otherwise, there is a they should, the police are collaborating with risk of alienation. The power of traditional criminals, communities are hiding thieves and leaders is another reason for highlighting the bank robbers, prisoners are finding it easy to need for a strategy for sustainable rural devel- escape and schools are dysfunctional as well as opment. the fact that we are finding it difficult to place The sixth priority is black economic empow- issues of national priority above our personal or erment. The integration of the black elite in the sectorial interests, is indicative of a serious lack mainstream economy needs to be accelerated. of national consciousness. This must be done for both economic and polit- All the institutions we have established, ical reasons. The economy needs a bigger pool including government departments at all levels, of professionals and entrepreneurs with a dif- will only function if each and every one of us is ferent perspective about where this country is prepared to accept responsibility. Freedom going. In addition, black professionals have sig- comes with responsibility, without responsibili- nificant political influence. If they realise that ty, freedom is hollow. established business is not supportive, they will not hesitate to use it. CONCLUSION The solution, therefore, is to take the matter South Africa has made a good start. The foun- of black economic empowerment more serious- dation for a stable democracy is in place. What ly. Currently, there is no clear conceptualisation is needed, is to close the gaps and to build on of black economic empowerment and no the gains. To do that, we have to address the national strategy. What is being referred to as priorities I have highlighted, not necessarily in black empowerment is a collection of mecha- the sequence in which they are presented, but in nisms and structures that are used to enable the context of a comprehensive national strate- blacks to acquire shares in established compa- gy. This must happen not in three or five years’ nies. There is neither a clear policy framework, time, but must be incorporated in a long-term nor a national strategy. national development strategy. The seventh priority is the issue of language In short, South Africa needs the equivalent of and self-determination. This is a very delicate the 20/20 economic plan of Malaysia. The plan matter that is capable of balkanising the coun- must spell out key policies, programmes, com- try. Fortunately, at this stage, it is only the petencies and goals. Above all, the leadership Afrikaners who seem to be having some con- across the country must take responsibility for cerns. Although I do not see an easy solution, I promoting and guiding the implementation of can say with confidence that the leadership the plan. This will give hope to all our people takes the matter very seriously and is managing as well as energise them to strive for higher lev- it very well. Unfortunately there are no prece- els of productivity and responsibilities.

16 Consolidating Democracy in Eastern Europe After the Collapse of Communism, With Special Reference to Russia

Anita McCreath

INTRODUCTION Russia and some of its former satellites are Democracy means power of, for and by the experiencing problems at present. people, while consolidating would mean to In the ninth century the city state Kiev, cra- strengthen democracy and merge it into one. A dle of the Russian nation, had a rudimentary shining example of this immediately comes to form of democratic government: its princes mind; namely, Western Europe with its many ruled, aided by a “veche” (a sort of people’s different nationalities, languages and monetary assembly). There were cultural and trade links units. Here the people decided to become unit- with Constantinople resulting in economic ed in a European Union (EU) which led to prosperity. The Testament, written in the 12th political stability and economic strength. In century by the Grand Prince Vladimir new emerging democracies, there is a tendency Monomakh, can be considered a manifesto for towards secession. human rights. But then came the Mongolian However, although a democratic form of domination with its inhuman, authoritarian government has its shortcomings, it still seems rule, probably laying the foundation for the the best way to rule since it avoids the excesses Russian czarist tradition of absolute power over that can, and usually do, occur in an autocracy state and church, that lasted till the abdication – power corrupts, absolute power corrupts of Czar Nicholas II in February 1917. An inter- absolutely. regnum of six months followed (Russia was We in South Africa should try to learn a les- then seen as the most democratic country in the son from the success – or lack of it – in the world) until that was interrupted by the Eastern European democratic systems. Bolshevik Revolution in October. Lenin’s assumption of power took Russia back to a dic- 1. EASTERN EUROPE BEFORE THE COLLAPSE OF tatorship which became most repressive during COMMUNISM Stalin’s rule. The name Russia changed to the Before the collapse of communism, Eastern Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which Europe stretched from the Baltic states comprised 14 republics surrounding the great (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in the north- central Federal Republic. The latter included west, down through Poland, East Germany, Leningrad and Moscow and stretched all the Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia (with its way east to the Bering Sea. At the end of own status from 1948 under Tito) and Albania, World War II with the defeat of Germany, then further east and up towards the north: Soviet troops moved west rapidly in order to Bulgaria and Rumania. The fate of these coun- capture Berlin before their allies could get tries was indelibly linked to the most important there. At the same time the Soviet system member state – the enormous Soviet Union, spread into Eastern Europe, leading to the cre- dominating and deciding the future of this ation of the satellite system. Because Stalin whole satellite region. refused Marshall Aid for the whole “Eastern A brief glance at history may clarify why Bloc” it struggled to recover financially from

17 McCreath the destruction caused by the war. Besides, novel idea. Outward democratisation came Soviet communism which stifled enterprise and about naturally, particularly since Gorbachev initiative, did not succeed economically. enjoyed walking around among the masses with Furthermore, it is estimated that during his his attractive wife and the electorate loved it. holocaust, Stalin eliminated about 30 million But the fate of a democracy is intertwined with people who represented the cream of the popu- economic performance because there remain lation. (Solzhenitsyn’s assessment is 40 mil- the societal priorities and inherently unattain- lion). Exact figures are difficult to supply since able social expectations. This conflict of ideolo- no official records were kept. gies is present throughout Eastern Europe and Western Europe – scared of this vast power indeed in most nascent democracies. In order to bloc hidden behind its “iron curtain” – intro- solve it, the economy must grow fast. duced the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Meanwhile the satellite countries became (Nato) in 1949 to protect itself. As a counter, restive and wanted their own representation. the Soviet Union established its Warsaw Pact in The Berlin Wall, symbol of the division 1955 by virtue whereof all the Eastern Euro- between East and West, was brought down in pean satellites became militarily and economi- 1989 by rebellious Germans. Gorbachev did cally dependent on each other and on the Soviet nothing to stop it. The Soviet Union as a super- Union. power started crumbling and with it, Gorba- After the death of the last decrepit and inef- chev’s popularity. In his fight against alco- fective old-style rulers, a breath of fresh air holism – endemic to Russia since the earliest came when Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the times – he had to face bitter resistance. After a reins of government in 1985. He acknowledged failed coup, organised by communist hardlin- that the Soviet system had failed, but believed ers, a young, daring and enthusiastic Yeltsin that openness (glasnost), reconstruction (pere- came into the limelight in August 1991. stroika) and democratisation would improve the Gorbachev resigned at the end of the year, situation. From here-on, a chain of events led to Yeltsin took over and formally ended commu- the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe: nism with the formation of the Commonwealth glasnost opened Russian eyes to the high stan- of Independent States (CIS) on 31 December dard of living in Western countries, travel l991. This excluded the three Baltic states, became less restricted, trade and economic Ukraine and Georgia (later also Belarus) that cooperation started. Unrealistic expectations of wanted complete independence. a new lifestyle were born. However, via the now free media, pernicious Western influences 2. THE YELTSIN ERA which came seeping in – such as superficial Not so slowly but surely, Yeltsin’s image materialistic values, drug abuse, pornography changed, although he was supported by the and free sex – threatened to undermine the West because of his democratic ideals. Once Russian moral fibre. Previous victimisation of again the economy proved to be the greatest the Russian people, with the hitherto hidden ills obstacle: runaway inflation wiped out savings of the past, also came to the fore which caused and devalued salaries and pensions. Despite a sense of insecurity. Nevertheless, the real promises, the CIS did not attract much foreign fiasco was perestroika. What Lenin had execut- capital – this may have been caused by rampant ed very successfully with his New Economic corruption, interminable red tape, legal chaos Policy in 1922 – namely, reintroducing free and political instability. The latter manifested enterprise which led from starvation and depri- itself in the desire of various regions to break vation (food requisitioning in the rural areas) to away from Moscow: first Nagorno Karabakh sufficiency in a surprisingly short period of (Armenia’s enclave), then Chechnia (in the time – seemed impossible during Gorbachev’s Caucassus, with a long and bitter history of rule: 70 years of communism with its prescrib- Russian rule, including Stalin’s mass deporta- ed production quotas whether for collective tion for treason during World War II) and now farming or nationalised industries, without neighbouring Dagestan (vital oil pipelines tra- regard to consumerism, had killed all personal verse this area), while Kazakhstan (with its incentive. Russians had forgotten about work- nuclear arsenal) is rebellious. To make matters ing hard for private profit; free enterprise was a worse, the mercurial Yeltsin, grown old and ail-

18 McCreath ing (both physically and mentally), clings to Being closer to Western Europe and having power by fair means or foul. He arbitrarily fires been subjected to communism for nearly 30 his ministers, advisers and aides. He is erratic years, makes the situation in the former satel- and very unpopular. Last August the rouble lites very different from Russia. crashed; there is a foreign debt of $150 billion, Estonia, the small northern-most Baltic state, excessive taxation but also tax evasion by the rapidly re-established its democratic institutions ultra-rich and a low savings rate. The govern- and was the first to rejoin the global economy. ment bond market collapsed, the stock market With a strong private sector, its liberal free plunged, there is no cash flow, prices are soar- trade and sound monetary policies, it created ing and crime is increasing. The government one of the most stable currencies in Central lives on credit, but the real plight is poverty and Europe. Its southern neighbour, Latvia, has rampant unemployment. been taking longer to understand and imple- An attempt to impeach Yeltsin in May 1999 ment the fundamental underpinnings of a failed – there are rumours that the Kremlin democracy, but there is stability and progress. offered each deputy $30 000 to stay away from In Lithuania, crime increased dramatically the proceedings. Bribery and corruption are not since 1991, risking to undermine the reform new in Russia but these allegations are blatantly process, but the government is taking a hard disturbing. Although Yeltsin assumed dictatori- line. Though it is lagging behind the two other al powers and abandoned democratic principles Baltic states, its trade with the West is improv- for political survival, the United States (US) ing, the private sector is developing and its eco- gave him qualified support as it still considered nomic restructuring is on track. Its transition to him the lesser of political evils. The Duma elec- transparent and accountable governance is sup- tions are at the end of 1999 and the current ported by citizens’ empowerment through presidential term ends in the middle of 2000. democratic political processes. Many presidential candidates are waiting in the Poland’s successful transition to a free mar- wings: Luzhkov (Moscow mayor), Primakov ket democracy – by evolution from communist (past prime minister), Chernomyrdin (past pre- dictatorship, by compromise and by national mier), Kiriyenko (present premier), general reconciliation – is complete and this, of course, Lebed (who settled the Chechnia conflict), contributes to its political stability. In this Boris Berezovsky (multibillionaire with vast process the Polish people showed courage, power), Zhirinowsky (ultra-nationalist), imagination and diligence. Though the elec- Zhuganov (communist) and Dzhugashvili torate’s widespread disaffection with the politi- (Stalin’s grandson with neo-Stalinist ideas). cal elite is a cause for concern, the country’s international status is continuously improving 3. THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM as Nato and EU membership draw nearer. Let us now look at the former East European Protocols for accession to Nato were signed in satellite countries after the collapse of commu- December 1997 and Poland was also consid- nism. At present these countries are all new ered a suitable candidate for “first wave” mem- democracies, and we shall establish whether bership of the EU. they have been consolidating this form of gov- With vast financial backing by West Ger- ernment or not. After almost half a century of many and with the tradition of an industrial Soviet rule this whole region is less prosperous state, the economy of East Germany has grown than Western Europe: there are still large, from 7 to 10% per year, making it the fastest unpainted, badly plastered drab-looking tene- developing democracy in Europe. Of course, ment buildings in urban areas, while the coun- consolidation with its Western counterpart was tryside in general has little sparkle and is still the greatest contributing factor to its successful backward. However, there are many new transition. However, it should be mentioned Western-style developments. Historically all that the mentality of its citizens is very different these countries were torn between the interests and that in spirit they are less united. of the Western powers and Russia, the latter Czechoslovakia, despite its division in 1992 having been the exclusive dominant force from into the Czech and Slovak Federative Repub- 1945 to 1990. Now they all seem to want to lics, despite political scandals, crime and cor- shake off the Soviet legacy. ruption (which exist in most new democracies)

19 McCreath has become a reliable democracy with a rela- states to secede, is still on track but it is certain- tively high standard of living. A policy of grad- ly not consolidating. ual deregulation of monopolies and the devel- In 1989 Bulgaria’s Communist Party leader opment of a competitive market environment was forced to resign and Bulgaria started its helps to create transparency of economic rela- redemocratising process. At present it is a plu- tions. It should be borne in mind, however, that ralistic, parliamentary republic. It has become a this country has an industrial tradition. It quali- candidate for membership in the EU and Nato. fies for Nato and EU membership. The rights and property of the old parties are Democratisation, marketisation and the rule restored as well as private property, taken away of law have been central to the new political during the period of nationalisation and collec- agenda of Hungary. The institutional transition tivisation of assets during the communist and socioeconomic transformation are interac- regime. Furthermore, Bulgarian ethnic Turks tive parts of adaptation, modernisation and are entitled to all rights enjoyed by Bulgarian value changes. But nothing is perfect yet (like citizens. These are consolidating factors for a in the other Eastern European countries): democracy. instead of a smoothly working market economy Romania is poor, like the other countries in and contented citizens, second best solutions this southern part of the “Eastern bloc”. It is will still have to do for some time. Yet institu- still struggling with the transition to a market- tional changes have become irreversible and based economy. After the collapse of commu- free enterprise is established. nism it was left with an obsolete industrial base Now to the Balkan states. Despite a common so that the economic restructuring programme Slavic ancestry the former Yugoslavia, a con- lagged behind most of its neighbours. However, solidated country strengthened by tradelinks from 1997 Romania’s policies on privatisation, with the West, consisted of distinctive ethnic agricultural and financial reform started bearing parts: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia with fruit. Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. In Albania is the poorest country in Europe. 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their inde- After an extreme Stalinist regime led by Hoxha pendence. A year later Bosnia/Herzegovina lasting 45 years until 1985, universal standards voted to secede, but then vicious fighting of democracy and human rights should perhaps between Christians and Muslims broke out be somewhat accommodated. There was much there. Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed them- political turmoil up to the 1996 elections. By selves as a joint independent state. Unfortunate- that time the economic reorientation was still in ly there too, in the Kosovo region, a conflict an early phase, but it was widely evident; a started between Christians and Muslims; it led market-led approach was promoted for trade to widespread atrocities. This area is of great and antiquated industries were upgraded. emotional and national importance to Serbia From the above, it becomes clear that coun- because a decisive battle against Turkey took tries with a democratic tradition have per- place there in 1389. On the Kosovo battlefield formed better than those with a history of the Serbian czar, most of his aristocracy as well despotic rule. It would appear that the former as the Turkish sultan, died. Recently this histor- “Eastern bloc” states could be absorbed as ical, national, religious and ethnic hatred flared democracies by Western Europe, but Russia has up again between the Russian Orthodox been mismanaged for too long, and still is. Serbians and Muslim ethnic Albanians who are Despite its inherent wealth, the standard of liv- in the majority there. Nato, led by the US (pipe- ing is very low. lines run through the Balkans) moved in with Yet there is another side to this coin. sophisticated weapons and destroyed large parts Economic woes can be deceptive: much eco- of Serbia. Russia (the seat of the Russian nomic activity is hidden (to evade tax) and Orthodox Church) tried to show defiance but because productive capacity, fixed capital and did not go further. Today, ravaged by war, infrastructure are merely under-utilised, it does Serbia’s economy is in tatters. Democracy in not imply that it is non-existent. Russia has a the former Yugoslavia, though threatened by highly educated and trained labour force, the dictatorial behaviour of Serbia’s communist nuclear reserves, and vast sources of oil, gas leader Milosevic which caused the different and raw materials.

20 McCreath

Moreover, Russians love their soil and those ly the US). In general they value culture, they who own a bit of land produce a large percent- help each other and are not used to cut-throat age of the country’s agricultural output. Their business. It should of course be mentioned that efficiency and productivity is a consolidating the younger generation is growing up with a factor in a weak nascent democracy. To avoid different orientation and that they are the suc- wasting, private ownership is best because gen- cessful businessmen. erally one uses one’s own money more cau- tiously and prudently than that of the state’s. CONCLUSION The most important and difficult of any change With all these contradictions, the future remains is in the sentiments and moral opinions of the uncertain – Russia might well sink back into its people. Unlike Westerners, Russians are used well-known form of government, namely to hardship and sometimes welcome it. The autocracy. That is precisely what every country easy living is not attractive to everyone and should try to avoid, and we in South Africa they are disenchanted with the West (particular- must heed this advice.

REFERENCES

[COUNTRY LISTING] [FACTBOOK HOME PAGE]. Social Consequences of Reform. Edward Romania. Available at . England: 1992. Developments in the Czech Republic since PATRICK, JOHN J. Report on Latvia’s 1990. September 1998. Available at Democracy Advancement Center. Civnet . MAZREKU, ELIO & VASO, ANDRIAN. REC: EUROPEAN FORUM. Basic Facts of Bulgaria. Doors to Democracy - CEE: Albania (1). January 1998. Available at . facts.htm>. TIME MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL. The New Facts & Figures - Brief History & Background Poland: Rebirth of a Nation. May 3, 1999 of the Balkkan Conflict. Available at TÖKÉS, RUDOLF. Political Transition and Social FREEZE, GREGORY L. Russia. A History. Oxford Transformation in Hungary. Available at University Press: 1997. . 20th Century (Part 6/6). Available at US AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT . FACT SHEET. Estonia Graduates from US History Detailed. Available at . World 1917-1991. Arnold Publishers, Lon- USAID COUNTRY PROFILE: Lithuania - Febru- don, New York, Sydney, Auckkland: 1998. ary 1997. Available at .

21 Consolidating Democracy in Southern Africa, With Special Reference to Namibia

Tapera Chirawu

INTRODUCTION appointed on the strength of their special skills, Namibia occupies 824 268 km2. It has a popu- status in the society, and experience.3 On the lation of 1.7 million, a gross domestic product whole, the Namibian constitution treats well of US$3.23 billion and per capita income of and protects all citizens in or outside political US$1.966. It became independent on 21 March life, particularly in terms of freedom of expres- 1990, under a constitution that espouses gen- sion and assembly. An important attestation to uine democracy.1 Since then it has organised this fact is the “Open Talk Show,” a radio pro- one presidential and one National Assembly gramme in which anyone, anywhere regardless election in 1994, one for local and regional of his/her political, religious, tribal or ethnic authorities in 1992, and a second for local orientation, can call in to bring to the attention authorities in 1998. Preparations are under way of the Namibian society his/her observations to go to the polls again to elect a president and vis-à-vis political, institutional or individual members of Parliament (MPs) in 1999. actions that may raise concern in the country. In comparison to the constitutions of other Coupled with the Prime Minister’s “question Southern African Development Community and answer” radio programme during which member states, particularly that of Zimbabwe, people ask him direct questions on anything the constitution of Namibia is acceptably pro- that may be distasteful to them as members of gressive in the sense that it treats all aspirants the society, no country can claim to be doing to political office equally. Firstly, it provides everything possible to strengthen democracy, for the election by direct, universal and equal better than Namibia. suffrage of a president to serve for not more Another overt and national activity buttress- than two five-year terms.2 In the case of the sit- ing that effort, is the gender programme to ting President, Dr. Sam Nujoma, his ascen- which major institutions in the country are dance to the Office of the President in 1990 committed. The Department of Women Affairs was through appointment by the Constituent in the President’s Office, the Multi-Discip- Assembly. It was not by direct, universal suf- linary Research Centre at the University of frage elections, as prescribed by the constitu- Namibia, and the prescriptions of the affirm- tion. It was only five years later that the masses ative action policy are collaboratively and were directly involved in his election as indeed commendably making great strides in President, a fact which is likely to fuel intense bringing about gender equality in all walks of debate on African politics for some time to life in Namibia. One cannot have democracy come. for men and not for women and claim to be Secondly, the Namibian constitution empow- nationally democratic. ers the sitting President to appoint not more Also important to note is Namibia’s policy of than six MPs. However, the appointees do not reconciliation. After decades of apartheid and have voting rights although they participate in bloody, racial war, successful efforts to forge parliamentary debates. They are basically peaceful coexistence were beyond anyone’s

23 Chirawu imagination, particularly at the time of indepen- ity over South West Africa, and the conditions dence in 1990. It was the commitment of the to find a settlement to the war situation in the political leadership that made it successful. country. The leaders of Swapo should indeed Hence, there is unquestionable peace in the be commended for their visionary approach (in country. anticipation) to the way forward that would be By comparison, the constitution of Zim- accommodating and acceptable to all sections babwe is silent on the number of terms a presi- of society. They did it through a policy of rec- dent can stay in office.4 Furthermore, it onciliation and institutionalisation of participa- empowers the head of state to appoint eight tive democracy, by way of taking the govern- governors, ten chiefs, and 12 other people who ment to the people: decentralisation. are usually from his political party as MPs.5 Constitutionally, therefore, he can appoint 30 1. POLICY OF RECONCILIATION MPs from his party. This means that political Although its population is small, Namibia’s party in control of the government begins with civil service personnel is said to number more 30 unopposed members to zero for the opposi- than 4000.15 This is a result of the 1989 peace- tion groups in every election. It is generally ful elections which effectively meant retaining believed that the situation has contributed to the white civil servants. Former Swapo adversaries convening of the debate on the country’s con- did not lose their jobs as per a constitutional stitution and parliamentary procedures.6 The provision.16 At the same time those who were objective is to achieve some degree of democ- excluded, mostly blacks, were brought in, racy.7 which meant a large expansion of the civil ser- Conceived as an idea in Botswana in 1979,8 vice. Reconciliation therefore remains an the emergence of the Southern African Deve- important key to the achievement and consoli- lopment Community Conference (SADCC) in dation of democracy in the country. However, 1980 was indeed a landmark in the evolution of its twin sister, decentralisation, has a broader political ideas as well as economic programmes scope. It focuses on the establishment of local in the region. Namibia joined the Conference and regional governments, and on the opera- ten years later. The idea for a democratic tions of traditional authorities, municipalities regional unity progressively grew into a com- and settlements. pulsion, a response to both local and external When Swapo wrote Chapter 12 of its 1989 pressures. It has since received additional impe- election manifesto, and insisted that the tus from the emergence of the European Constituent Assembly includes it in the national Community. constitution, it became clear that once On the other hand, decolonisation in Namibia enshrined in the country’s highest policy docu- has largely meant opening up the political ment, sharing of the government responsibili- process to those previously denied the right to ties among lower levels of administration participate. Hence, it can be rightly said that the would not be reversed. In fact, it was augment- 1990s have witnessed pressure of a different ed by chapters 4, 5, 8, 12 and 13 which collabo- kind: consolidation of the democracies attained ratively articulate rules and regulations at independence. Namibia could not escape the designed to facilitate broad consensual partici- demand. Having become independent in 1990, pation in the processes of government.17 A the country could be looked at as a special case, rainbow of organisations representing political given the role played by the United Nations, in parties, civic and community organisations, stu- particular resolutions 338 (iv) of 1949,9 resolu- dent groups, trade unions and the public at large tion 2145 (xxi) of 1966,10 resolution 385 of are indeed benefiting from these constitutional 1976,11 resolution 435 of 1978,12 Chapter 12 of provisions. In particular Chapter three succinct- the South West Africa People’s Organisation ly articulates human rights, effectively facilitat- (Swapo) constitution,13 and Chapter 3 of the ing uninhibited mass participation in political Namibian constitution.14 These collaboratively democratic processes. discussed the international status of the then South West Africa, the inalienable rights of the 2. LOCAL AND REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS people of South West Africa to freedom and Local administration in Namibia today is as independence, United Nations legal responsibil- much an integral part of central government as

24 Chirawu were the ethnic-based 11 local governments of areas. Since settlements can grow to become the pre-independence time. Article 102 of the local authorities, there is need for central gov- constitution provided the spirit for the scope ernment to keep tracking the developments at and purpose of the Regional Authority Act 22 each settlement. Once the relevant information and Local Authority Act 23. These provided for is communicated to the NPC, the settlement’s the establishment of regional and local councils project requirements are included on the nation- respectively. All were passed and enacted in al priority list. 1992. However, it remained for the Electoral The link between central government and Act 24, also of 1992, to articulate the modus local authorities is simplest in the sense that it operandi for the elections, and the elected offi- focuses on the programme and not on the need cers tenure of office.18 for financial assistance from government. The traditional authorities also link up with central 3. TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES government, particularly on matters of culture, Another important aspect of taking government administration of subventions, and financial to the people through decentralisation is the management. The authorities were established inclusion of traditional authorities. The by the Traditional Authority Act 17 of 1995. Traditional Authority Act 17 of 1995 took cog- Following the promulgation of the Council of nisance of that need.19 The instrument estab- Traditional Leaders in 1997, the scene had been lished the fourth layer of government. set for the implementation of the empowerment of democratically elected local authorities in 4. OPERATIONAL LINKAGES rural areas.22 The decentralisation process in Namibia was The formulation and implementation of the intentionally designed to be spearheaded by the decentralisation policy in Namibia is a clear Ministry of Regional, Local Government and attestation of “an overriding preoccupation of Housing. Nationally it is coordinated by the the Namibian state and government: the exten- Office of the Prime Minister. sion of democracy to the people of Namibia to whom it has been unjustly denied for so 5. THE ROLE OF CABINET long”.23 The policy comprehensively articulates Naturally, Cabinet dominates National Assem- the programmes for, and value of, political bly debates. It initiates, plays a leading role in processes and the pivotal nature of macro-eco- discussions, and finalises and formalises poli- nomics and prudent fiscal policy manage- cies. To ensure smooth policy implementation ment.24 and to prevent duplication of activities, effective planning becomes a necessity for the pur- 6. FREE PRESS poses of harmonising the national developmen- The Prime Minister of the Republic of Namibia tal planning process. To that end, the govern- is on record as telling the news media that they ment established the National Planning can write anything on everything without fear Commission (NPC),20 and made it the principal of being arrested (as long as they do not violate actor for rationalising national developmental individual rights entrenched in the constitu- priorities.21 tion). Consequently, Namibia is a shining It coordinates the entire planning process by example of respecting the role of the press in assisting sectoral decision making in an effort development. No journalist has been harassed to prevent redundancy and contradictions, due by government for what s/he wrote. to the multiplicity of ministerial programmes Furthermore, the government has allowed the taking place at the same time. creation of an “Open Talk Show” on the radio. A clear link between the ministries and There are no holds barred to what any caller regional councils also exists. The issuance of can comment on, criticise, suggest or express as Cabinet Instruction 10/1 (C1.10/1) which calls long as s/he does not use abusive language. on all ministries to place their functionaries in Many refer to it as an “open parliament”. It is the regions under the authority of regional indeed consolidation of democracy in practice. councils seems to consolidate the linkage. At the lowest level of the ladder is the link 7. BEYOND THE WALLS OF PARLIAMENT between central government and settlement The launching of the SADC Parliamentary

25 Chirawu

Forum in Namibia in October 199325 is yet fur- effort aimed at attaining economic democra- ther proof of Namibia’s commitment to consol- cy and independence.” idating democracy in the region. As observed by the then Minister of Fisheries and Marine CONCLUSION Resources of Namibia, Hon. Helmut Angula, In the opinion of Michael Parenti, “democracy SADCC had failed “to mass organisations and is a process encompassed in party elections and legislatures into the mainstream of regional parliamentarism, functioning with presumably cooperation”.26 Commenting on the SADC meaningful substantive effect regardless of the Treaty signed in August 1992, the Speaker of immense inequalities in wealth and power”.29 the National Assembly Dr. Mose Tjitendero Its consolidation should unquestionably depend stated: “there is a conspicuous absence of the on tolerance for dissenting opinion, encourage- role of elected representatives of the member ment of self-expression, existence of opposition states”.27 Therefore, as Minister Angula later parties, and broad participation in the political said: processes. After all, “society is a moral commu- “The establishment of a SADC nity, a collectivity of people who share certain Parliamentary Forum, is an indication of values, which legitimise the inequalities of our strong commitment to boldly tackle set- social organisation and cause people to accept backs that our organisation has been experi- them as morally justified”.30 The prevailing encing in the pursuit of the noble objective political environment in Namibia could not be of regional cooperation and integration, an better described.

ENDNOTES 1) Namibia. The Constitution of the Republic 10)Ibid., pp. 141-142. Namibia, 1990. 11) Ibid., pp. 204-212. 2) Ibid., pp. 19-20. 12)Alfred Moleah. Namibia: The Struggle for 3) Ibid., p. 24. Liberation. Wilmington, Delaware: DISA 4) Zimbabwe. Constitution of Zimbabwe, Press, Inc., 1983. Revised Edition, 1996. p. 18. 13)Ministry RLGH, Decentralisation, Deve- 5) Ibid., 21, 38. lopment and Democracy: A Decentrali- 6) Zimbabwe Parliament. Strengthening sation Policy for the Republic of Namibia, Parliamentary Democracy in Zimbabwe. 1997. Vol 1. 1998. 14)Namibia. The Constitution, op cit. p. 7. 7) Ibid. 15)SADC Information Office, 1998. 8) Forum. SADC Parliamentary Forum: The 16)Namibia. The Constitution, pp. 7-15. Windhoek Initiative, AWEPA, 1993. 17)Namibia. The Constitution, op cit. 9) Alfred Moleah. Namibia: The Struggle for pp. 17-57. Liberation. Wilmington, Delaware: DISA 18)The Government, Government Gazette, Press, Inc., 1983, pp. 135-136. Notice No. 115, 1992.

26 Chirawu

19)Ministry RLGH, op cit., p 66. 26)Ibid., p. 55. 20)Ministry RLGH, op cit. 27)Forum, p. 8. 21)Ibid., p. 19. 28)Ibid., p. 56. 22)Ministry RLGH, A Decentralisation Policy 29)Michael Parenti, The Power and the for the Republic of Namibia, Vol 1, Sept. Powerless, New York: St. Martins Press, 1997. p. 34. 1978. pp .157-203. 23)Ministry RLGH, op cit., p. 9. 30)Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 24)Ibid., pp. 9-13. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966. 25)Forum, The Windhoek Initiative, op cit. p. 19.

REFERENCES CHAZAN, NAOMI ET AL., (1992): Politics and MOLEAH, ALFRED, (1983): Namibia: The Society in Contemporary Africa. Second Struggle For Liberation. Wilmington, Del.: Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner DISA Press, Inc. Publishers. NAMIBIA, (1990): The Constitution of the GOVERNMENT GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF Republic of Namibia. Windhoek. NAMIBIA, (1992): Government Notice No. NKRUMAH, KWAME, (1970): Class Struggle in 115: Promulgation of Regional Council Act. Africa. New York: International Publishers. 1992 (Act 22 of 1992 of the National PARENTI, MICHAEL, (1978): Power and the Assembly). Windhoek. 31 August, 1992. Powerless. New York: St. Martins Press. ______, (1992): Government Notice 116: PARLIAMENT, ZIMBABWE, (1998): Strengthening Promulgation of Local Authorities Act. 1992 Parliamentary Democracy in Zimbabwe, (Act 23 of 1992 of the National Assembly). Executive Summary. Vol. 1. Harare: Govern- Windhoek. 31 August, 1992. ment Printers. JOHNSON, CHALMERS, (1966): Revolutionary REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA. Regional Planning and Change. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. Development Policy. Windhoek: National MINISTRY OF REGIONAL, LOCAL GOVERNMENT & Planning Commission. HOUSING, (1997): Decentralisation, Develop- SADC PARLIAMENTARY FORUM, (1993): The ment and Democracy: A Decentralisation Windhoek Initiative. AWEPA. Policy for the Republic of Namibia, 1997. UNITED NATIONS, (1987): The Political, ______, (1997): A Decentralisation Policy Economic, Social and Military Situation in for the Republic of Namibia. Vol. 1. and Relating to Namibia: Reports of Standing September, 1997. Committee II of the United Nation Council ______, (1998): The Policy, its Development for Namibia. New York: United Nations, and Implementation. Vol. 2. March, 1998. 1987.

27 The Silent Revolution: the Aids Pandemic and the Military in South Africa*

Robert Shell

ABSTRACT HIV/AIDS, it is quite conceivable that at least The author explores the importance of the sit- some HIV/AIDS vectors might have been inter- ing of military bases in the primary transmis- nal, i.e. virtually embedded in South African sion chain of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in communities near South African Defence Force Southern Africa. After reviewing the African (SADF) military installations from near the comparative literature and attempting a history inception of the epidemic in the early 1980s and of the South African military policy to conceivably, even earlier. One of the main rea- HIV/AIDS, he focuses on two urban regions sons HIV/AIDS has spread so rapidly in Africa with military bases. Since the Eastern Cape is that the continent has been embroiled in blood transfusion services only screened blood twenty years of intermittent military violence in for HIV in 1988, it is conjectured that the blood diverse regions such as Angola, Burundi, supply played an important part in making the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Moçambique, pandemic heterosexual. New case-level Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, HIV/AIDS and new mortality data from these Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe. War creates the regions are used to shed light on the variant perfect conditions for the transmission of HIV rapidity of the spread in certain communities. (Van der Vliet, 1996: 81) and war is one of While traditional vectors – such as truck routes Africa’s major businesses. – are common to communities with or without military bases, this new hypothesis of the 1. REVIEW OF THE COMPARATIVE LITERATURE Trojan Horse army base provides urgent cues Ever since Raymond L. Humphries, an HIV for both advocacy and counselling intervention. positive soldier at Fort Benning, Georgia, USA, knowingly made several women positive INTRODUCTION through consensual sodomy and vaginal inter- Trucks, monkeys and migrant labour are cur- course and boasted at his court martial to hav- rently the most popular suspected African vec- ing had unprotected sex with “at least” eight tors of transmission of the HIV/AIDS pandem- women after his HIV test, American re- ic, at least in the living rooms of middle class searchers have been rivetted by the military South Africa. While municipal authorities con- impact on HIV transmission and the culture tinue to suspect in-migration from rural areas as which prompts such behaviour (Anon., the most obvious – even time-honoured – origin 1998:4). However, the military base hypothesis of all their health problems including appears to be new to South African HIV/AIDS researchers but to no others (Lasky et al., 1997; *The financial assistance of the National Research Smallman-Raynor and Cliff 1991; Torres- Foundation towards the research of the PRU is acknowledged. Opinions expressed in this paper and Anjel, 1992; Webb, 1997). For rhetorical pur- conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are poses the conjecture that HIV/AIDS is spread not necessarily to be attributed to the NRF (formerly by military bases has been termed the Trojan Centre for Science Development). Horse hypothesis.

29 Shell

1.1 Liberia Medical officers of the Ugandan contingent of Military bases in African civil wars are known the troops in Liberia were aware of HIV/AIDS to have been instrumental in spreading the epi- and advocated condom distribution. demic. Even peacekeeping missions were It proved difficult to interview the Liberian guilty. For example, from 1989 to1995 Liberia military on child prostitution, a pattern familiar had been in a state of civil war. Monrovia, the in South Africa. However, secondary sources capital, fell within an area protected by foreign indicated that even foreign troops took advan- troops. A “Save the Children” research initia- tage of the extreme poverty of women and girls tive was launched in 1994 due to concern over in the local setting and ruthlessly exploited their increasing HIV/AIDS prevalence in the town vulnerable economic situations for sex. The sol- and that hundreds of women and young girls diers preferred using child prostitutes as they were involved in sex work with military per- were less demanding with little or no responsi- sonnel (Elliott 1996: 254). bility and they would take whatever was given Focus group discussions were held with to them in return for sex. The use of young girls small groups of girls between the ages of for sex is also seen as a means of avoiding HIV twelve and nineteen involved in sex work. infection. Here one must remember the wide There were seven girls to a group. Group dis- belief of the virgin cure myth in some popula- cussions were followed up with individual tions, a belief which predates the HIV/AIDS interviews. Interviews were also held with mili- pandemic (Shell, 1998: 29-30). tary personnel. However, it was difficult to Sporadic violence is still endemic in Liberia. encourage military personnel to discuss the Moreover, foreign troops are involved frequent- issue of child prostitution and the number of ly in emergency situations. The author grimly responses received were limited. All of the girls concluded that urgent policy recommendations interviewed recalled that they had had their first were needed to ensure that international and sexual experience between the ages of ten and local military personnel obtained mandatory thirteen years and were thereby unlikely to be training on the United Nations (UN) Conven- screened for HIV in traditional antenatal clinic tions on the Rights of the Child and education surveillance systems which target fully fecund, on HIV/AIDS/STD (sexually transmitted dis- indeed only childbearing, women. ease) prevention (Elliott, 1996: 254). Pre-menarche Liberian girls received gifts in the form of cash, food items and material 1.2 Uganda rewards in return for sexual relations with mili- In a classic paper, Smallman-Raynor and Cliff tary personnel. Younger girls demanded less in demonstrated, for the first time using scientific return for sex work than older girls, who data, that the classic association of war and dis- demanded money rather than goods. The major- ease substantially accounts for the observed ity of the girls in child sex work were involved geographical distribution of reported clinical for economic necessity in the absence of any HIV/AIDS cases in Uganda (Smallman-Ray- other capacity or opportunities to earn income. nor, 1991). The authors demonstrate using Many girls supported families. Some girls had regression analyses that both the spread of HIV their own children to care for and needed the infection in the 1980s, and the subsequent money for the motherhood for which they were development of AIDS to its 1990 spatial pat- often unprepared. Girls had a very low aware- tern, were significantly and positively correlat- ness concerning HIV transmission and preven- ed with ethnic patterns of recruitment into the tion. Many believed that condoms caused can- Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) cer of the vagina or that condoms would be after the overthrow of Idi Amin some ten years caught internally. Many of the girls interviewed earlier in 1979. had been raped during their time as child prosti- Their study assumes the estimated mean tutes and some endured sexual episodes involv- incubation period of 8 to 10 years for HIV. ing two to five men at once. Military personnel Their study underlines the need for cognisance were often resistant to condom use and com- of historical factors which may have influenced plained about the irksome latex preventing current patterns of AIDS seen in Southern flesh-to-flesh contact. Other soldiers of other Africa. The findings may also have important nationalities remained suspicious of their use. implications for AIDS forecasting and control

30 Shell in Southern African countries which have heavily slaved area in the world. Its three hori- recently experienced war. The results were zontal unlinked railway lines into the interior specifically compared with parallel analyses of were built on the old slave trade routes and tes- other HIV hypotheses such as the truck vectors, tify to the continuity of extractive exploitation traditionally advanced to account for the report- even during periods of sporadic colonial mod- ed geographical distribution of AIDS in ernisation. The littoral is characterised by the Uganda (Smallman-Taylor, 1991:70-71). relics of the wealth of settler domination and a There has also been a subsequent study of the mulatto class while the interior is heavily popu- effects of mass demobilisation of Ugandan lated by unmixed African groups. The south- troops which revealed devastating results for eastern interior is where the diamonds lie while the rural areas where the demobilised HIV posi- the coastline is dominated by seagoing derricks tive soldiers retired (Ogen and Loy, 996:473). pumping out crude oil from the seabeds. About 50 000 UPDF (Uganda People’s Broadly speaking, the oil corporations sustain Defence Forces) soldiers have been demo- the MPLA while the diamond cartel, De Beers, bilised, some of them because they were supports Jonas Savimbi’s group in the vast PLWAs (People Living with AIDS). Many of south-eastern quadrant. the soldiers with HIV/AIDS have been When South African troops invaded Angola retrenched from the army over the past two in 1975, the situation worsened. South African years and returned to their home villages. security began to be tied up with Angola’s Positive sero status was a major criterion for future. When the “Revolution of the demobilisation. However, hardly any coun- Carnations” in Lisbon in 1974 took the South selling was undertaken to prepare these demo- African military intelligentsia by surprise, the bilised soldiers how to avoid high risk behav- South African military quickly moved in with iour as they reintegrated into civilian society. troops and mobile 155 mm howitzers. As What are the implications in terms of the Annette Seegers points out, the Portuguese rev- spread of HIV/AIDS in Uganda? There are now olution was a gift to the South West Africa understandable fears that this may accelerate People’s Organisation (SWAPO) who after the spread of HIV/AIDS in rural areas to where 1974 did not have to go through Portuguese most of the demobilised soldiers return. Con- lines to get to Ovamboland (Seegers, 1996: sidering the high incidence of HIV/AIDS in the 210). Ugandan military and the UN determination Up to that point, Angola had also been a that a soldier’s sero status is a major considera- focus area in the cold war. The United Soviet tion in being demobilised or mustered out, there Socialist Republic (USSR) had supported the is urgent need to prepare soldiers for demobili- coastal MPLA while the Central Intelligence sation and a return to civilian life. This applies Agency supported the FNLA in the north, and not only to Uganda, but to all other parts of mainland China (and others) supported Savimbi Africa such as Angola, Namibia and South in the south. The USSR believed the South Africa where demobilisation is taking place. Africans’ incursions were being encouraged by The South African military do not demobilise the United States (US) and, not to be outdone, PLWAs but rather “muster them out”, i.e. no sent in their own puppets (Seegers, 1990: 211). further combat and no crossing of international Nearly 500 000 Cuban troops (almost as many borders. This has had the effect of South as the 580 000 the US had sent to Vietnam) African military personnel not being anxious to arrived through Luanda airport. By the time the undergo on-base testing. last Cuban soldiers had left in 1992, some thought the situation would stabilise and even 1.3 Angola improve, but it worsened. The simplification of Angola has been a country cursed with continu- interests did not lead to a resolution of issues. ous civil wars since its colonial occupation by After 1994 the oil corporations and the dia- the Portuguese in the 15th century. Even in pre- mond cartel, De Beers, began to slug it out with colonial times in the Northern Congo kingdom the help of ex-South African mercenaries, a there is evidence that the area was engulfed in horrible example of what free market corporate war during the first European contacts. capitalism does when the developed world is no Moreover, the country was probably the most longer interested for ideological reasons.

31 Shell

Corporate greed, not the dictates of the cold dor of refugees, returning exiles, military per- war, now dominates the Angolan landscape. sonnel of all nations, migrant workers and There was a rush to acquire control of Angola’s probably the most import single geographical remaining undersea and underground wealth. node of HIV/AIDS transmission in Southern The people of Angola have not yet emerged Africa, definitely one of the world’s AIDS hot from their multiple ordeals and, not surprising- spots. ly, are demoralised and dispirited, the perfect breeding ground for the silent epidemic. 1.3.1 Angola and Cuba’s forces It is little wonder then that the country has so The best fix we have on Angolan sero preva- little HIV surveillance. The various UNAIDS lence is the HIV rate of Cuban veterans return- fact sheets on Angola are virtually empty – ser- ing from the Angolan killing fields (1976- ried columns of white space interspersed by 1992). But then one immediately has to con- boiler-plated paragraphs. These are preceded by front the denominator; how many Cubans were a suspicious, indeed unbelievably low, national in Angola? The 500 000 figure has been debat- prevalence of 2.12% (UNAIDS, 1999:3). There ed. South African sources are inclined to sug- is no article on HIV prevalence in the area gest that there were only 50 000 Cuban military north of Ovamboland and south of Luanda in in Angola (Scheper-Hughes, 1993:1426). any literature that this author could find on When Cuba received its military personnel Popline. back from those areas in southern Angola The suspicion of high southern Angolan where European and African South Africans prevalence is based on had also served since 1975, all were tested and • the length and ferocity of war there since according to Cuban authorities “a large num- 1961 ber” were found seropositive. No more exact • the HIV rate of returning Cuban veterans figures have ever emerged from the Cuban gov- • the low rate of returning Portuguese colonists ernment. Consequently, remote sensing of after 1975 and Cuban positives is a debate on its own depend- • the extremely high HIV prevalence in ing on whether you live in Cuba or Miami. Katimo Mulilo, the SADF headquarters in the The UNAIDS estimates of Cuba do reveal Caprivi Strip, that long appendix of land one anomalous demographic characteristic abutting southern Angola, Botswana, Zambia namely a high sex composition of 298 males and Zimbabwe (see map). per 100 females which is consistent with an all The Caprivi strip is a busy international corri- male army returning from an HIV region (UNAIDS, 1998:6). However, a high concentration of male homosexuals might also partly explain this. However, other neighbouring Hispanic Caribbean cultures (e.g. Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic) do not reveal such a pattern and it therefore seems more likely to attribute the Cuban sex composition pattern to the male Cuban personnel returning from Angola. The Cuban population pyramid may be regarded as a classic

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hegemony by Special Forces (Spestake). Douglas Webb, now working for the Save the Children Fund, found that in northern Namibia HIV prevalence was related to proximity to military bases rather than proximity to trucking routes (Webb, 1997:101-108). The most prominent anomalies are those of Ruacana and Eenhana, which are both small military stations. The traffic density was not significant, but the HIV:hepatitis B ratio was moderately arrested Trojan Horse pattern. high (1:4 and 1:2 respectively). This clustering Cuba has always enjoyed a long preventative of HIV at Ruacana and Eenhana was primarily health tradition but also has an ambiguous due to the military bases, where HIV preva- human rights history. For example, the island lence among blood donors was far higher than was the birthplace of the concentration camp. in the surrounding population. Sexual relations The concentrados were introduced in 1895 by between the soldiers and students at the local the Spanish military to settle rebellious freed secondary schools – just as in the Liberian case slaves, the concept then being adopted and cited above and in Grahamstown, below – adapted in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) by probably caused the HIV prevalence to be high- the British and then finally perfected by the er at the schools than expected. Germans in World War Two. These two tradi- HIV prevalence among blood donors at the tions seemed to mesh in Cuba’s response to secondary school in Ruacana was 3.4% (n=59) HIV/AIDS with the result that all HIV positives in 1993. Ruacana was where Eugene de Kock were quarantined in the famous (if you live in was stationed in 1977 (Pauw, 1997:37), while Cuba), or infamous (if you live in Miami), at Ombalantu secondary school, approximately Sanitorios with approved positives being 80 kilometres southwards along the main road, allowed to go out with an approved partner HIV prevalence stood at 1.7% (n=174). At after six months’ intensive training, counselling Eenhana, the Haimbili secondary school had an and surveillance of all sexual behaviour. The HIV prevalence of 4.3% and a HIV:hepatitis B inmates are, however, treated with exemplary ratio of 1:2 (n=46), well above the area aver- care (Scheper-Hughes, 1993: 965-967, 942; de age. This clustering was probably due to the Gordon, et al., 1993:1426). military base, as the settlement is relatively iso- lated from the main road network and had a low 1.4 Namibia local traffic density of 120 vehicles per day. As Northern Namibia in the area formerly termed Webb points out, the four military bases in the Ovamboland has been particularly ravaged both region, of which Ondangwa and Oshakati are by the military and HIV. The Ovambo people the largest, form the nuclei of clearly defined straddle an international boundary, the Cunene HIV clusters in themselves. The location of River. Their land has been the site of the stamp- these bases reflects the strategic requirements ing ground for the SADF’s offensive against of the SADF during the 1970s and 1980s. SWAPO and also against the Cuban presence What Webb could not know is that these in Angola and a staging ground for supporting areas were the same areas where 200 Inkatha Savimbi’s UNITA. From the mid 1970s the Freedom Party (IFP) cadres were trained in the region has been completely transformed by 1980s and early 1990s to destabilise KwaZulu- Operation Savannah and the assumption of Natal (Webb was writing before the revelations

33 Shell of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Africa for political reasons (alluded to above) Commission [TRC]). Why the IFP forces were but most of all since career soldiers fear being trained in that operational area is unknown but “mustered out”, i.e. taken out of combat roles the fact remains then that those 200 military and especially not chosen for the favoured pool personnel lived and trained in one of the high- of soldiers who will see combat service in est prevalence HIV zones in Africa. This was another country. The SANDF – to its credit – also the zone in which the notorious Eugene De does not discharge any people who are seropos- Kock was based before being posted to itive but are obliged to withdraw people with Vlakplaas, his job was to command a unit of HIV from combat roles. Of the 9000 recruits Koevoet and, it has also emerged, to train the chosen to go to Lesotho only 2000 were free to IFP cadres; during his tour he personally killed go. 550 SWAPO guerrillas (Pauw, 1997:30-31, 37- Once South African veterans returned to their 41). Northern Namibia (including the Caprivi) home country and were incorporated into the – as can be seen in the accompanying graphic – new SANDF, they were distributed all over the was an essential node in the pre-1994 transmis- country and thereby became an almost perfectly sion vectors into the whole of South Africa. randomly distributed set of sites for the incipi- ent epidemic between 1992 and 1994. Recruits 2. CHANGING VECTORS FOLLOWING THE who were called up on national service simply RETURN OF CADRES FROM CENTRAL AFRICA returned to their homes. South African HIV Possibly, returning cadres who had served in researchers are seemingly unaware of the central Africa and elsewhere on the continent potential of HIV/AIDS in their defence forces. during the struggle before 1994 contracted HIV there (the various homeland armies, Ciskei, Transkei, etc. were also incorporated into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) at this time, but they were probably not infected). When discussions were being held on the integration of the defence force, it was agreed by the (African National Congress) ANC that there would be no testing of incom- ing personnel. This followed a revelation by Prison Services public relations director Brigadier Erica van Zyl who claimed that seven of the “security prisoners” at Pollsmoor were HIV positive. An unnamed “senior” ANC spokeswomen claimed that the ANC were “absolutely opposed” to the compulsory testing of exiles (Cape Times, 1990). This became a sensitive political issue and it was agreed that there would be no testing, a tragic and conceivable catastrophic watershed event for the history of AIDS in South Africa. A month later, a journal entitled Armed Forces ran an article by Dr Steven Hatfill which pointed out that since 2.1 The installation of the heterosexual the US military tested recruits so should South pandemic African (Hatfield, 1990:9-10). If there had been any testing, the HIV pandemic Further, the UN has stipulated that troops might have been arrested as it was in Cuba. As who cross borders, or who are involved in com- it happened there was no testing. To make mat- bat, cannot be HIV positive. This is an interna- ters worse, the blood transfusion services went tional law. Compliance would imply that on in their time-honoured way of seeking their mandatory testing would have to be done for donated blood from among other institutions, every member of every defence force in the military establishments. This was after the world. This testing has not occurred in South demobilisation of the Angolan war effort.

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According to the recollection of Dr Santos, who “I had to organise for the askaris to get work heads up the Blood Transfusion Services in as security guards at the hotels, but the real rea- Port Elizabeth, it was the military who request- son was so that they could spread AIDS among ed to withdraw from the arrangement in 1985. the prostitutes,” says Van Heerden. Nortje says HIV screening of the blood supply – according the arrangement did not last long as they were to Dr Etienne du Plessis, the pioneer of HIV/ not “disciplined” enough, whatever that meant. AIDS data collection in the Eastern Cape and But De Kock, successfully cultivating the director of Health Services in Port Elizabeth – halo of the antihero, now prides himself on hav- only began in 1988. Thus, the blood supply of ing always told the truth when appearing before the Eastern Cape was wide open to HIV conta- the TRC. Consequently, he now has more cred- mination for almost a decade after the first ibility than his henchmen. For example, De Angolan incursions by South African troops. Kock claimed it was simply a “lie” that he had Donated blood and blood products serve ever instructed Nortje and Van Heerden to many clients. One thinks immediately of trau- effect such a plan. De Kock’s denial is inge- ma victims, victims of automobile accidents nious: “It is a known fact that the most regular and gunshot wounds, but by far the largest clients of black prostitutes are white men. I group of recipients are pregnant women. The wouldn’t have achieved anything by infecting unscreened blood supply before 1988 was prostitutes.” De Kock stressed that he was therefore probably an important vector in help- “never a racist” and in mitigation he claimed ing turn the homosexual epidemic into a hetero- that he had had his askaris regularly tested for sexual pandemic. AIDS and had demanded good medical treatment for those who were infected – implying 2.2 Suspected infection vectors within South that others had not. Such fastidiousness and Africa before 1994 care was not restricted to simply testing his The following plan which was never brought askaris but extended to being a buddy in the up in any TRC court illustrates the views of field of operations. For example, he told extremists within the security forces with Jacques Pauw how he carried a wounded respect to HIV and AIDS. Eugene de Kock, AIDS-infected askari out of Swaziland and per- Willie Nortje and Brood van Heerden are well- sonally gave him emergency medical treatment. known to most South African television audi- De Kock said he was afterwards covered with ences. The reconstruction of the following blood and even had to wash it out of his mouth events is based on separate affidavits signed in (Pauw, 1997: 70-71). Denmark by Willie Nortje and Brood van De Kock admitted that “it was not impossi- Heerden for Idasa (Pauw 1997: 70-1, 77). ble” that Van Heerden could have concocted In 1990, four askaris were diagnosed as being such a plan, as he was “a hardened racist,” but HIV positive or suffering from AIDS. Willie why Nortje would lie about it, he was unable to Nortje claimed they had become “a problem” explain. Whatever the truth of this astounding because the other askaris would not drive with allegation – which should receive much more them or use the same facilities. Eugene de Kock national attention – it would appear that at an devised a plan: he instructed Brood van early stage of the South African pandemic, Heerden – who by then had left Vlakplaas and some security personnel themselves were think- was working for a banking group – to find ing in terms of their own Trojan Horse, presum- “work” for them in Johannesburg. Van Heerden ably not just “following orders”. The case has persuaded the manager of the Chelsea and now come before the TRC, but the hearing Little Roseneath Hotels in Hillbrow to employ keeps getting postponed. the infected askaris as security guards. The manager did not know they had AIDS. The four APARTHEID FORCES SPREAD AIDS askaris, Ydam, Stretcher, Sebole and Vietnam, Mail and Guardian were still members of Vlakplaas and were paid BRONWEN ROBERTS, by the unit. “De Kock instructed them to infect JOHANNESBURG, FRIDAY 12 NOVEMBER 1999 black prostitutes in the area with AIDS,” says 9.30AM. Nortje, who “handled” the men and visited TWO apartheid-era security officers have them frequently (Pauw, 1997:70-1). asked the Truth and Reconciliation

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Commission for amnesty for their part in Askari model the total number of AIDS deaths the use of askaris to spread AIDS in 1990, by the year 2021 could be 365 788. That is the the TRC said on Thursday. havoc Ydam, Stretcher, Sebole and Vietnam They have implicated four of their former could still wreak. colleagues and four askaris from the ANC and Pan African Congress. 2.3 The Eastern Cape The applicants, Willie Nortje and Andries Jacklyn Cock, a prominent feminist sociologist, van Heerden, will appear before the com- writing on the SADF in 1991, does not mention mission’s amnesty committee next week. the HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, her book They were Vlakplaas operatives and lays bare the machismo of South African worked for the new government’s National defence force personnel and may still be con- Intelligence Agency after apartheid ended sidered a useful exposé of the sexist culture in 1994. among army personnel before 1994 (Cock, “The askaris who had AIDS were used to 1991: passim). Machismo must be considered spread the disease by infecting prostitutes in in its own right as an important attitudinal vec- two Hillbrow hotels, the Chelsea and Little tor of HIV/AIDS, and, of course, of any sexual- Rose, in May 1990,” the commission said in ly transmitted infection. a statement. One traumatic anecdote from Cock’s work on One of those implicated is apartheid the Eastern Cape armed forces may serve to set assassin Eugene de Kock, who is serving a the mis a scène for that province: 262-year sentence for crimes he committed Lena ______(now deceased) did not while head of Vlakplaas. know her age, but at the time she made the fol- De Kock is seeking amnesty for more lowing sworn statement she was estimated to than 100 incidents of murder, torture and be in her seventies. She has eight children and fraud. – AFP many grandchildren who are in high school. Nor is this a simple horror anecdote. Anyone I live with my husband at ______Street, familiar with HIV/AIDS component projection Lingelihle (the African township) in models knows that one of the inputs is the Cradock. On Saturday 3 August 1985 I saw small number of seed individuals needed at the two vehicles patrolling the streets around outset of an HIV epidemic. For purposes of my house. I think they are called Hippos. In illustration, an AIDS component model seeded the late evening I walked to a relative’s with four positive askaris and four commercial home. I was alone. A Hippo drove up sex workers in 1985 into an HIV-free popula- behind me and stopped. Two white soldiers tion of 1 million with the following assump- jumped out. One said, “Here walks a bitch, tions: 43% of the 1 million are not at risk and alone at night, probably looking for a man. the population has low in-migration (see Table We’ll help her.” The words were spoken in 1 for assumptions). The accompanying figure is Afrikaans. One soldier lifted me by my an ogive, the accumulated AIDS deaths. In the shoulders and one by my ankles. I struggled and said, “Where are you tak- The Askari ogive: accumulated AIDS deaths up to and including 2021 ing me?” The same soldier said, “You’ll see.” There were other soldiers in the Hippo, but I don’t know how many. The Hippo drove to the national road and went towards Port Elizabeth. The soldiers did not speak or inter- fere with me, but the same two held me. A few kilometres away the Hippo stopped. The one soldier jumped out and the other pushed me out. The two soldiers lifted me

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over the fence and climbed over. The Hippo the female learners in one school in the region drove in the same direction. I can identify talk of “nothing but the barracks.” According to the spot. The two soldiers were very young. the same source, male army personnel routinely The one held my arms while the other lifted open charge accounts for these teenage con- my dress and removed my slip and panties. quests at nearby departmental stores, a phenom- I said, “What are you doing children?” The enon similar to the Liberian model (supra, page one replied ‘Ons gaan jou naai. As jy nie 30). According to the Medical Officer of Health wil, gaan ons jou doodmaak [We are going of Grahamstown, which has both high unem- to fuck you. If you don’t we’ll kill you]. ployment and a large army base (and a town They then pushed me down with my hips on bypassed by trucks), a high proportion of a big stone. The one soldier held my arms Friday evening casualties involve army person- over my head on the ground. The other sol- nel fighting over these weekend affaires de dier (who had done all the talking) raped coeurs. Hospital personnel are specially warned me. He was very rough and I was bleeding of the dangers of accidental blood infection when he finished. The other said, ‘Maak from wounds from these particular army fights. gou! Ek is haastig. Ek wil ook naai [Hurry There are several military bases in the up. I’m in a hurry. I also want to fuck]. The Eastern Cape, namely Port Elizabeth (EP two men switched positions. The one held Command and Group 6), Grahamstown (6 SAI, my hands over my head. The other raped Group 7), Queenstown (Group 39) and Umtata me. He was also rough. The two soldiers (Group 46 and 14 SAI). The Kaffrarian Rifles then walked away towards the road, but army unit in East London has been closed but more towards Port Elizabeth than direct. the town is still the headquarters of Group 8. The first soldier asked me, ‘Sal jy vir ons If we look at HIV/AIDS occurrences in the ken?’ [Will you recognise us?]. I said, ‘Ek PE area, two clear patterns immediately sal nie vir julle ken.’ [I will not recognise emerge: first, the trucking hypothesis may be you]. I pulled my dress down, left my slip confirmed by looking at the high prevalence and panties and walked to Michalsdal adjacent to the truck stop in the diagram. [emphasis added] (Cock, 1991: 215-21). Port Elizabeth On the following Monday Lena went to the police station: I saw one coloured and one black security policeman together, and I told them the story in Xhosa. They recorded the facts and asked questions. I was not asked to sign anything. They asked if I knew the soldiers or the Hippo number. They said they would contact me, and have not done so (Cock, 1991: 215-21). According to a confidential interview with Lena’s daughter the old lady succumbed to HIV/AIDS , a ravaging illness and died. Rape is only one, albeit an important and dramatic vector of heterosexual transmission. It is conjectured on the basis of cases elsewhere in Liberia and Uganda, that returning veterans – among whom were many heros – all with assured state employment would appear as most admirable suitors to any impressionable young, poor woman consulting her nuptial options. Further research is needed but some Second, one may discern bubbles of infection local anecdotal evidence lends some weight to next to the main military establishment which is this hypothesis. A conversation with a high clearly not on the national road or even near it. school teacher in Grahamstown revealed that There seems to be a double peak (1992,1994-

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5) in the accompanying surface chart, suggest- 2.4 Grahamstown mortality ing that the military and police were already Ms Smons Qaga has assiduously collected 7179 infected and then, after 1994, were again infect- mortality cases from the Home Affairs offices ed, possibly following the incorporation of lib- in Grahamstown for the Population Research eration group cadres in the integration of the Unit as part of her dissertation. The fruits of her SANDF. One should particularly note the high work are displayed in the following compara- proportion among the small number of the early tive graphic. Her results are consistent with the cases. high mortality in working age groups associat-

38 Shell ed with the HIV epidemic. There are many implications for a study such as this. The first is that targeted intervention within South Africa is made easier. There are, of course, other implications about national security. SANDF forces are better off than their neighbours in terms of HIV/AIDS, but the South African forces are quickly catching up as one can see in the accompanying dia- grams. The situation seems fraught with insecurity.

CONCLUSIONS While AIDS continues to spread throughout the country with literally nothing to stop it, South African researchers seem oblivious, even resistant, to the military epidemiology. Yet nobody has presented a convincing explanation for the pronounced regional variance in the provincial breakdowns and within provinces there seems to be an equivalent ignorance. The Trojan Horse hypothesis should be considered as a key explanatory variable in terms of the uneven spread of the epidemic in any province or sub-region. For example, a city like Umtata with several military bases would seem to be a likely candidate for high infectivity and therefore provide an opportunity for research, counselling and other urgent interventions.

Table 1: Assumptions of Askari model

Beginning of epidemic Beginning of epidemic in RSA 1985: in RSA 1985:

Initial Population (lx), Year 1 000 000 Other Assumptions Value Risk Group % of Pop Infant AIDS mortality 0.3 CSW=commercial sex worker 1.0% Median term to death of HIV+ (14-24) 10 STD=sexually transmitted disease 6.0% Median term to death of HIV+ (25-34) 10 RSK 50.0% Median term to death of HIV+ (35+) 10 NOT at risk 43.0% Proportion of perinatal infection 0.25 TOTAL 100.0% Proportion infected via mothers’ milk 0.1 Proportion of male births 0.507389 Immigration Risk Group % of Imm. Rel Male->Fem infectivity 2 CSW 1.5% Imported infectivity (male CSW) seed 4 STD 6.0% Imported infectivity (fem CSW) seed 4 RSK 65.0% NOT 27.5% TOTAL 100.0%

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41 South Africa’s Three-in-One Revolution

Allister Sparks

INTRODUCTION transformation. After 300 years of colonial seg- I want to address what I think is the main rea- regation and 51 years of apartheid, the country son why South Africa has not been given ade- was led into a negotiated settlement resulting in quate credit for its performance in the five a non-racial, fully democratic political system years since our first democratic election; why it with the world’s most progressive democratic continues to get a generally critical press, par- constitution. ticularly overseas; and why so much attention This has been hailed by the world as a mira- is paid to what are considered areas of failure, cle, and rightly so. But the sheer drama of it such as the fall in the value of the rand, bur- has obscured the other two revolutions. geoning unemployment and the concomitant Revolution No 2 is the transformation of increase in the crime rate. South Africa from an isolationist siege econo- This stems, I believe, from a gross underesti- my facing international sanctions to an mation of the task that has confronted the new economy that must compete in the global majority government. It has been infinitely marketplace. more complex and difficult than anyone imag- This is the really big one. Its socio-political ined. For South Africa is not simply undertak- impact worldwide is, I believe, only going to ing a socio-political revolution, working to be fully felt in the coming century and will be democratise the modern world’s most deeply greater even than that of the Industrial Revolu- entrenched system of institutionalised racism tion of the 19th century. No escape, despite and political authoritarianism, daunting though Luddites. that is in itself. It is attempting three simultane- Already the exposure South Africa has had to ous revolutions rolled into one. subject itself to, in taking the initial steps, has We all know about the first revolution, from been traumatic. apartheid to democracy, which commands all First of all, the manufacturing sector of the the attention. Yet the other two get little atten- old South African economy was built largely tion, although their impact on society is actual- on import substitution, with local industries ly much greater. And the fact that all three are operating behind high protective tariff walls. It occurring simultaneously is what is so impor- was a pattern that intensified as sanctions were tant. imposed. Yet I have not seen a single media commen- Now, to participate in the global economy tator, or the so-called political analysts, or aca- we have to open up. Trade liberalisation demics even notice the convergence of these requires that those tariff walls come down, three dramatic happenings in our country. exposing our protected industries to the cold So let us look at these three revolutions, and blast of international competition. To survive at how they interact with each other to make they have to become more efficient, which the problem even more difficult. means embarking on the tough route of down- Revolution No 1, of course, is the political sizing, increasing productivity and investing in

43 Sparks more modern capital equipment. This, of In 1980 the gold price was above $600 a fine course, means increasing unemployment, at ounce. Today it is hovering around $260 an least in the short- and medium-term. ounce. Tougher still is the exposure to ruthless inter- At the same time the new government is national currency raiders, to the hedge funds withdrawing the fat agricultural subsidies that search their computers for signs of curren- which the apartheid regime paid to its white cy weakness and which can drive down target- farming constituents, many of whom are now ed currencies for their own get-hugely-rich succumbing to the hard realities of what is an profits. It is an Information Revolution phe- arid climate in many regions, where agriculture nomenon as well as a global market phenome- has never really been a viable option. non. The two are one. So, as the old primary producing economy This particular global blast, as we all know, fades out rapidly, a new one of manufactured blew every single emerging economy in the exports must be put in its place. And our indus- world into crisis. It swept the world, from tries are not geared to play this role. As I have Russia and Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia, already pointed out, most were geared towards Singapore and South Korea in the east – those import substitution. Only a handful, such as Asian “tigers” that were supposed to be the Rothmans, South African Breweries and our economic models for the developing world – to wine and fruit-canning industries, have been Mexico and Brazil in the west; 38% of the significant exporters. world’s economies were plunged into reces- Those then are the three revolutions rolled sion. into one. South Africa’s currency devaluations and the rise in unemployment – common to all these 1. CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS emerging economies – simply and simplistical- What compounds the difficulty is a crippling ly get attributed to failures by the new black conflict between the requirements of these majority government. simultaneous revolutions. In fact, South Africa did better than most in On the one hand the government, as a libera- weathering the crisis. Certainly better than tion movement that has just come to power, Brazil, the world’s current ICU patient, which faces the political imperative of having to deliv- is a much bigger, more sophisticated and more er more jobs and better pay to its constituents developed economy than ours with a much who have been deprived for so long – while on more experienced government to deal with the the other hand the harsh reality of the global crisis. market is that it leads to increased unemploy- Our economy has suffered, no doubt about ment and pressure on wages, at least in the that, and it is certainly tough to find ourselves short-term. And no one knows how long or having to cope with a R6 dollar and a Rl 0 short that term is likely to be. pound. But much of that too, is a trend inherit- Even some of the developed countries of ed from the old regime. The rand has been Europe are feeling this unemployment squeeze. shedding value steadily for 20 years, often at a Both Germany and France are currently experi- considerably faster rate than now. encing unemployment at around 12%. Now for Revolution No 3, which is just as Looking now to the third arm of the three-in- challenging. South Africa is moving rapidly one revolution, in seeking to make the transi- from being a primary producing economy tion from primary producer to manufacturing based on agriculture and mining to becoming exporter, the government has to deal with the an export-driven economy based on manufac- fact that the old economy required an abun- tured goods. dance of cheap, unskilled labour, while the new The country’s gold resources are dwindling one requires a smaller, highly skilled workforce and the gold price is falling. In 1980, only 19 – and the apartheid regime, as a matter of poli- years ago, one-sixth of South Africa’s total pro- cy, prevented the black population from acquir- duction was from gold; today it is less than ing skills. one-thirtieth and still falling. What’s more, it The purpose of the policy was, firstly, to pro- will continue to fall until somewhere around the tect white jobs, but also to attempt the Sysiphe- year 2020 when the gold will be finished. an task of reversing the relentless influx of rural

44 Sparks black people to the cities – to force them back ratic constitution is working and by now is into the Bantustans, which were supposed to firmly bedded down. This is in itself a success become independent. story and must be seen as South Africa’s great- The result was that black people were given est asset in terms of international image. That, separate and inferior education (most in fact in turn, I would suggest, is also its greatest pro- received no education at all). They were barred tection. Despite its two-thirds majority, the from the major universities. They were prohib- government would surely be foolish to tamper ited by law from doing skilled work. Until 1979 with so valuable a national asset. they were not allowed to join trade unions, and The second significant aspect of the election so they could not become apprentices. They is that it marked a remarkably smooth transition were not allowed to form companies or even of power from Nelson Mandela, the founding partnerships. They could not establish business- father of the new South Africa, to his anointed es, except simple shops selling perishable pro- successor. Mandela’s retirement after a one- duce – and even then their trading licenses had term presidency is in itself remarkable; it sets to be renewed annually. an example to Africa as a whole, a continent It must be the only instance in all history where the trend has been to cling to power for where a government deliberately, as a matter of life until overthrown by a coup. policy, crippled the skills base of its country’s The election result was a remarkable achieve- working class. ment for the African National Congress (ANC) Only in 1979 were black people able to join and Mbeki personally. It is no easy task to fol- and form trade unions. And it was not until the low in the wake of a living legend such as 1980s that those crippling laws, the Job Mandela, yet Mbeki has done so and increased Reservation Act and the Physical Planning Act, his party’s majority in the process. were withdrawn and the white universities The increased majority was doubly remark- slowly opened, so that black people could start able, given that the ANC has fallen short on acquiring skills and gradually begin legally to many of its 1994 election promises, that it has do skilled work. presided over an economic recession which But education and building up a national cul- sent unemployment soaring and the currency ture of skilled workmanship takes time. Even plunging, and that crime has rocketed to record fixing a dysfunctional education system where proportions. For many in the black population, 60% of the teachers are themselves inadequate- life is tougher now than it was before the ANC ly educated takes time. came to power. Add to that the fact that this is a political 2. POST-ELECTION POLITICAL LANDSCAPE organisation that has abandoned its popular That being the background against which the socialist policies which it instilled in the minds new Mbeki Administration has to perform, let of its followers over many years, and has gone us now look at the political landscape estab- instead for a business-friendly, market-based lished for it by the 1999 general election. policy. While it came to power pledging to The first and most important thing to note is “nationalise the commanding heights of the that the election was smooth, successful and economy,” it is in fact busily privatising those peaceful. For a country which only five years state enterprises that it inherited from the old ago was expected to descend into a slaughter- regime. Moreover, it has followed tough fiscal house of racial and political rivalry, this is policies that have pushed up the unemployment indeed a second miracle. In fact, counting the rate in the interests of restructuring the econo- local elections of 1996, we have now had three my for global competition. peaceful, successful elections in those five All of this exposed the ANC to the danger of years. In that relatively short space of time losing support to a more populist challenger. South Africa has established itself as a mature, Yet it increased its majority, and the parties of normal democracy, where free and fair elec- the left – the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) tions take place regularly, peacefully and pre- and the Azanian People’s Organisation dictably. This must be our biggest single gain (AZAPO) – were decimated to the point of near in terms of international image. extinction. What this also means is that our new democ- This opens the way for Mbeki to press ahead

45 Sparks even more vigorously with his market-related the least noticed of all the consequences of the policies. He has nothing to fear from his left – a June election. Not only is Afrikaner separatism fact which I think we can see manifesting itself dead, but so too, 100 years after the start of the right now with the tough line the government is Boer War, is Afrikaner nationalism – the force taking with the public service unions. which dominated South Africa for the whole of It is worth noting in all this that our electoral this century, which gave South Africa system is the most generous in the world to apartheid, and which looked invincible for so small parties. It is a proportional representation long. system with no minimum requirement, as in Its embodiment, the National Party, slumped Germany where parties must make a cut of from 21% of the vote in 1994 to 6.87% now, 5%. Under the South African system, even a and from the position of official opposition to party which gets one quarter of one per cent of fourth place. the votes cast – in this case a mere 38 000 votes More significant still, the big winner on the out of a total electorate of 18 million – qualifies opposition side, the DP, now has more it for a seat in Parliament. Afrikaner supporters than the NNP. Even some And so we have a landslide victory for one members of the Freedom Front switched to the party, and yet there are still 12 opposition par- DP. Clearly they did so because they saw the ties represented in Parliament. That is unique in DP as a more effective opponent of the ANC the world. A multiplicity of voices in this multi- than the traditional Afrikaner parties. It means cultural country. that for the first time in more than half a centu- It is worth pausing here; note that the ANC’s ry, the majority of Afrikaners are casting their 66% of the vote gives it 66% of the seats, votes according to what they perceive to be whereas Tony Blair’s landslide victory in the political effectiveness rather than ethnic soli- last British general election gave him 63% of darity. So Afrikaner ethnic nationalism is dead. the seats in the House of Commons on the A historic moment indeed. strength of only 49% of the votes. One worrying feature is that the election If South Africa had a Westminster-style con- failed to break the racial – as distinct from eth- stituency-based electoral system, it would be nic – patterns of voting and has resulted in a very close right now to a one-party state. Parliament that is too divided on racial lines to Another striking feature of the election is be healthy. that, despite the system’s exceptional generosi- The government side will be predominantly ty to small parties, those of the extreme right as black – particularly now that the ANC has well as those of the extreme left have been vir- formed an alliance with Mangosuthu Buthele- tually eliminated. The Afrikaner separatist zi’s IFP – while the opposition benches are Freedom Front, led by the former chief of occupied mainly by white, coloured and Indian apartheid South Africa’s Defence Force, Gen. minorities. Constand Viljoen, was reduced to less than one I have to say that the DP is largely to blame percent of the national vote, as was newcomer for this. Although it has been the big winner on Louis Luyt and his Federal Alliance. the opposition side, its campaign and particular- As Viljoen himself observed after the results ly the pugnacious style of its leader, Tony were in, there is clearly no constituency left for Leon, alienated black voters while attracting Afrikaner separatism. The idea of an Afrikaner conservative whites. It campaigned under the “volkstaat” is dead. slogan of being the party with “the guts to fight With the parties of the far left and far right back”, which blacks saw as a commitment to decimated, Parliament is now dominated by fighting back against their newly acquired parties of the centre. All the top five – the power, causing them to react strongly against ANC, the Democratic Party (DP), the Inkatha the DP. At the same time many old apartheid Freedom Party (IFP), the New National Party supporters, resentful of affirmative action and (NNP) and the United Democratic Movement their loss of privileges, responded to Leon’s in- (UDM) – are committed to policies of free mar- your-face style and flocked to his party. ket capitalist development. While this had the merit of destroying the far And now to my final observation on what is right and Afrikaner nationalism generally, the perhaps the most remarkable but, astonishingly, downside is that the DP may have alienated

46 Sparks itself from the black community to the point government. To do that, growth potential in the where it has lost all growth potential there. black community is obviously essential. Nei- Given that whites will constitute only 4% of the ther Leon’s DP nor what is left of the National electorate at the next general election in 2004, Party has that potential at the moment, and with the new official Opposition may well have Leon now swelled with confidence and holding painted itself into a corner as a number of ana- the position of Leader of the Opposition, get- lysts are suggesting. ting the right kind of realignment is going to be difficult. Unless of course, the current tensions CONCLUSION between the ANC and the alliance parties, What South Africa needs now in order to con- Cosatu, result in a split and the formation of a solidate its democracy is a realignment of oppo- strong socialist workers party. sition forces to establish a party capable of But somehow I don’t think the state is in challenging the ANC as a credible alternative place for that just yet.

47 The 1999 Election and the Prospects of Consolidating Democracy in South Africa1

Alexander Johnston

INTRODUCTION confirmed and a two-thirds majority might The result of South Africa's first democratic have made a great difference. In 1999, the con- general election in 1994 had something in com- stitution's status was quite different. On the mon with a successful children's birthday whole, observers and analysts were unim- party. It was clear from the beginning whose pressed by opposition concerns that the ANC day it was and where the bulk of the spoils would tamper greatly with the constitution if would go, but the African National Congress’ they won a sufficient majority. Even the few – (ANC's) failure to win a two-thirds majority and quickly stifled – voices raised on the ANC consoled the others. And those guests who side, to the effect that a two-thirds majority was might have spoiled the occasion with tears and needed to “complete the revolution” set off few tantrums were rewarded too – with control of alarm bells. provincial parliaments in KwaZulu-Natal and These calls were less an indication of totali- the Western Cape, as well as positions in a tarian reflexes, more an expression of naivete. Government of National Unity. These things The ANC needs constitutional powers to helped make the 1999 election an occasion for coerce obdurate counter-revolutionaries much general and not just partisan rejoicing. less than it needs the ability to inspire engage- Divorced from the euphoria and sense of ment and compliance in a broad range of relief that attended the 1994 poll and robbed of national goals, across the whole range of citi- any uncertainty about the outcome, observers zens, not least its own supporters. of this year's election have had to work much The true significance of the 1999 election, harder to read its significance. The succession however, was less to do with the succession, issue – President Mandela's retirement and the size of the majority, or the redistribution of President Mbeki's installation – figured largely electoral support among the “opposition” par- in coverage of the election both at home and ties. The significance lies in the manner in overseas. which the election took place and the way its Despite the prominence accorded to it, how- result was accepted. The peaceful, largely ever, the succession had been long discounted uncontentious way the election was run and the by a determined campaign on the part of both seamless transfer of authority from one govern- government and the ANC to communicate the ment to the next without as much as a hiccup in information that Mbeki was the de facto centre the state, business or society, confirmed to even of policy making and coordination long before the most skeptical Africa-watcher that stable, the election. The question of whether or not the democratic government is well-rooted in South ANC would achieve a two-thirds majority this Africa. There may be shortcomings in the way time around also had its share of headlines. But institutions operate, but there is no challenge to the issue presented itself quite differently in their legitimacy; no lurking threat of a praetori- 1999 from the transitional days of 1994. Then, an takeover; no secessionist crisis; no fear of a the constitution had still to be finalised and populist insurrection; no serious suspicion that

49 Johnston the government is seeking to overthrow the late democratisers. Two issues could be useful- principles of constitutional rule. ly addressed in this way, the balance between Although democracy has been consolidated state and market; and the question of national to the satisfaction of all but the most convinced identity. Afro-pessimists, however, it should be apparent to even the most casual observer that South 1. LATE DEMOCRATISATION Africa's political culture is fraught with contra- 1.1 State and market dictions. To some extent, perhaps, this is rather In the case of early democratisers – the devel- a banal statement. It would be surprising to find oped countries of the West – the extension of a political culture without contradictions. political rights tended to be accompanied by Arguably, such a culture would, by definition, three other things. The first was increasing gov- cease to be political. Nevertheless, one of the ernment activism. As E.J. Hobsbawn succinctly ways in which we try to interpret the politics of puts it: “The twentieth century multiplied the any given state is the extent to which its politi- occasions when it became essential for govern- cal culture subsumes and integrates contradic- ments to govern.”3 Democratisation was not the tions in discourse, values, practices, codes and only reason for this, but it was an important forms of organisation. In South Africa, the one. The second thing was the extension of acceptance of multi-party democracy is contra- rights to industrial organisation and bargaining. dicted by the electoral dominance of one party; This led in turn to a prominent role for organ- lip service to national identity and common citi- ised labour as a stakeholder in public policy. zenship is contradicted by the incorrigible The third thing was the development of welfare provincialism of the Inkatha Freedom Party's legislation – and ultimately welfare states – (IFP’s) strength in KwaZulu-Natal and that of which gave at least minimum material security the New National Party in the Western Cape; to the whole population. These developments the contradictions of tradition and modernity were uneven in pace and spread, as well as sub- make a clear, confident articulation of African ject to reversal. Nonetheless, in the 30 years nationalism rather difficult; racial patterns in after the Second World War, throughout the voting behaviour belie the disappearance of for- “long boom” or the “golden years of capital- mal racial categories in public life. ism”, for early democratisers, democracy came Certainly, the contradictions of South to mean a historic compromise. This was the Africa's political culture are sharp and numer- culmination of 100 years or more of the exten- ous. Ambiguities surround questions of nation sion of political rights in “... a sort of marriage and national identity; reconciliation and adver- between economic liberalism and social democ- sarial politics co-exist uneasily; political leaders racy (or in American terms, Rooseveltian New may appear at one meeting in a lounge suit and Deal policy), with substantial borrowings from the next in traditional dress; communist cabinet the USSR, which had pioneered the idea of ministers champion macroeconomic policies of economic planning”.4 This compromise formed impeccable orthodox austerity and in the same the basis of a consensus among thinkers and breath justify restrictive labour market policies; decision makers in the West. the ruling political organisation has the dual “All wanted a world of rising production, personalities of political party and liberation growing foreign trade, full employment, movement. industrialisation and modernisation, and all Each of these (and the other contradictions of were prepared to achieve it, if need be, South Africa's political culture) can be under- through systematic government control and stood in their own right and on their own terms. the management of mixed economies, and All the same, it is worth looking for a frame- by cooperating with organised labour move- work in which to place all of them. Economic ments so long as they were not communist. historians are accustomed to distinguishing The Golden Age of Capitalism would have between “early” and “late” industrialising been impossible without this consensus that nations, finding this a useful way to approach the economy of private enterprise needed to the study of economic development.2 The same be saved from itself to survive.”5 principle can be helpful in understanding politi- By the time South Africa had embarked in cal culture, if we distinguish between early and earnest on its career as a late democratiser –

50 Johnston

“late” in this context signified by after the end make each of these cases, while the government of the Cold War – this consensus was at an end tries to harmonise them. Powerful forces ensure and the compromise it was based on was every- that this is not easy. Given that the option of where being re-engineered, or, critics would isolation from global markets is not available to say, dismantled. In the Western countries South Africa, there are powerful forces in whose uninterrupted enjoyment of economic favour of fiscal rigor and the free market. Once growth had been rudely interrupted by the a country has adopted the persona of an stagflation of the 1970s, welfare budgets were “emerging market” and embraced “global com- trimmed, entitlements were more strictly petitiveness”, it is difficult to sell, or even defined, trade unions had their rights curtailed defend departures from the principles which and their political influence drastically reduced, allegedly govern these things, no matter how privatisation was everywhere on the agenda. compelling the need to soften or compromise It is across the range of issues such as these them may seem from the standpoint of an indi- that the contradictions between early and late vidual national history. democratisation can be seen in South Africa's Under these circumstances, there is insistent political culture today. The contradictions can pressure from markets, investors, international be seen in specific policy questions. How much financial organisations and Western govern- privatisation how soon? How big an impedi- ments to learn the lessons of sound political ment to employment creation are regulated economy from early democratisers. Constant labour markets? They can also be seen in much reminders of success and failure in these terms larger issues – do the labour movement and the are provided by rankings of competitiveness South African Communist Party (SACP) undu- and other such indices. ly influence the government? Or, to argue from What cannot be ignored, however, is the fact the opposite corner, is it so hypnotised by glob- that this debate is taking place in the context of al financial orthodoxy that it is prepared to give a national democratic revolution. In the first up the gains in industrial democracy so recently place, this has profound implications of racial won as part of the struggle for political rights? redress, which are difficult to contemplate with- The question is how should recent trends in out government activism well beyond that rec- early democratisers be viewed by interested and ommended by the lessons of early democratis- contending parties in a late democratiser such ers. In the second place, the right to a central as South Africa. The question is especially per- place of influence in the making of public poli- tinent in South Africa, where a struggle for cy which has been won by organised labour in political rights produced a corporatist result in South Africa, was won in the course of the the fields of industrial relations and the making struggle for national political rights and is of public policy, which is uncannily like the inseparable from it. Indeed, it can be argued arrangements which have been recently dis- that democratic workplace rights were won mantled in the industrialised West. prior to national political rights and were a pre- Are the new orthodoxies of fiscal rigor and condition for the successful organisation of the the curbing of union power “lessons” or “ad- struggle to win them. vances” available to late democratisers, in the In this way, it is not surprising that the histor- way that technological adaptations of scientific ical role played by the labour movement and discovery and new techniques of industrial the SACP in the liberation struggle, as well as organisation and production were available to the consequent horizontal integration of the late industrialisers, which they could use to ANC, the Congress of South African Trade leapfrog into positions of advantage? Unions (Cosatu) and the SACP in the ANC Or should they be seen less as policies and alliance, are powerful forces working to ring- arrangements which have intrinsic and transfer- fence at least some corporatist and regulated able utility, and more as expressions of a features of the South African political economy changing balance of social and economic power which have been the product of the country's in the societies concerned, bearing little rele- trajectory of late democratisation, but which are vance to South Africa, where the balance is deemed no longer acceptable in early democra- quite different? tisers.6 Powerful voices are raised in South Africa to Under the circumstances, there appear to be

51 Johnston two choices. One is to dwell, as it were, in two reach of any democratic legislature ... The historical periods at once, trying to adapt struc- rules of the game of the market must be ele- tures and practices from the golden years of vated beyond any possibility of revision high corporatism and co-determination to the through democratic choice.”8 contemporary conditions of globalisation and Gray himself reckons that this is “an unrealis- the free market, creating some uniquely nation- able fantasy”, but it is taken seriously enough al democratic compromise along the way. by South African policy makers. This is reflect- The other is greatly to speed up (and perhaps ed in their proclaimed aim to turn the Non- short-circuit altogether) the trajectory of Aligned Movement (of which South Africa cur- democratisation experienced earlier by the rently holds the Chair) from an unwieldy and developed countries. This goes from the incoherent culture of rhetorical solidarity, to a achievement of political rights, to a politico- streamlined pressure group of the South, economic compromise fashioned from Fordism, focused on bargaining in transnational trade, Keynesian economics and some degree or other development and financial negotiations.9 of corporatism, then eventually a staged with- A more optimistic inference – at any rate, for drawal to a much-pruned version, which leans hard-pressed governments such as the South heavily to the free market. African government – is that under conditions In effect, of course, in trying to develop a of democracy, there will be cyclical movement democratic political culture, South Africa's between market freedom and market regulation. political classes of all persuasions face a nation- As the failures and costs of free and regulated al version of a global problem; namely, recon- markets make themselves apparent, powerful ciling democracy with the free market. John social and political interests compete to make Gray points out some of the difficulties. the case for one or the other. In the process, “The truth is that free markets are creatures some sort of equilibrium appropriate to a spe- of state power, and persist only as long as cific set of national circumstances is found and the state is able to prevent human needs for underwritten by the state. Certainly, this seems security and the control of economic risk to be the assumption that underlies the domi- from finding political expression ... In the nant political culture in South Africa. Critics absence of a strong state dedicated to a lib- might argue that this assumption reflects wish eral economic programme, markets will fulfillment, or alternatively that the state is too inevitably be encumbered by a myriad of weak to underwrite any more clear-cut and rad- constraints and regulations ... The implica- ical choice. tions of these truths for the project of con- What is clear is that the challenge of reconcil- structing a worldwide free market in an age ing state and market under the conditions of of democratic government are profound. late democratisation and a national democratic They are that the rules of the game of the revolution has imposed difficult calculations of market must be insulated from democratic cost on the government and ruling party. At deliberation and political amendment. present, scenarios haunt this calculation. The Democracy and the free market are rivals, first involves the re-negotiation of the corpo- not allies.”7 ratist features of South Africa's post-apartheid A number of inferences could be drawn by the political economy, notably the protections political classes and policy makers of any given extended to workers by the regulated labour country from Gray's, on the whole downbeat, market provided for in the Basic Conditions of assessment of the relationship between democ- Employment Act and the Labour Relations Act. racy and the free market. One pessimistic inter- Under this scenario, there would be social costs pretation (alluded to by Gray himself) is that for workers and their families and potentially transnational organisations (such as the World destabilising costs of political upheaval, given Trade Organisation) will insulate the rules of Cosatu's high level of political organisation and the market from democracy: influence. “Those who seek to design a free market on The second scenario proceeds from the a worldwide scale have always insisted that assumption that South Africa's protected labour the legal framework which defines and regime seriously inhibits employment creation. entrenches it must be placed beyond the The social costs are felt by the unemployed, but

52 Johnston the political costs are much less direct and Arguably, this spirit of compromise has been immediate than the potential costs of tampering developed into a belief in South African excep- with the existing labour regime. This is because tionalism, born of the unlikelihood of the the unemployed are much more difficult to achievements of 1990-94, and the global organise into the kind of solidarity and collec- acclaim which greeted them. At worst this can tive behaviour that can be expected from the become an almost hubristic belief that South employed, and which would have direct and Africa can beat the odds and make its own immediate political consequences at the polls or terms between the state and the market, or any in the streets. In any case, identification with other awkward, contradictory forces that pre- the ruling party remains strong on quasi-nation- sent themselves. alist grounds and there is still room for Consciously or unconsciously, the lack of improvement in the material circumstances of coherence in government economic policy is a the unemployed (in the provision of basic infra- manifestation of this cultural predisposition to structure and services to peri-urban and rural exceptionalism. What has made the incoher- areas). Both of these mitigate the direct expres- ence sustainable up to now has been the collat- sion of political discontent at continued unem- eral legitimacy, which the government has ployment, for the present at least. enjoyed by claiming the lion's share of the However, in the longer term, there is the credit for ending apartheid and the large elec- threat of less direct, more diffuse political con- toral mandate of 1994. Added to these sequences, resulting from the social decay resources has been a period of grace accorded (including crime) which comes from long-term to the government's Gear (Growth, Employ- high levels of unemployment. ment and Redistribution) policy. The first of The government has not lacked resolve in these assets still has currency in the wake of the imposing costs on workers in particular indus- even more impressive win in 1999. However, tries in pursuit of “modernising” economic in time the government will come to be judged policies, notably tariff reduction. However, it more and more on its policies and less on its has been much more cautious in any actions collateral legitimacy; indeed Mbeki and the that might affect the status of organised labour ANC have explicitly encouraged this. and its members across the board. The assump- Gear was somewhat incautiously announced tion is that the political costs of long-term high with explicit and ambitious goals. While the unemployment have been more acceptable up policy (or more accurately, the package of poli- to now than the risk of upheaval from any dis- cies) has been quite successful in its inflation- ruption to its relationship with organised and deficit-reducing targets, it has been well labour. short on predictions of employment and eco- In some respects it is not surprising that nomic growth. South Africa has not made a more coherent and The failure of Gear to meet its own targets decisive effort to choose, one way or the other, has led to growing concern that unless inroads between the rival claims of state and market, are made into the high unemployment figures, and to reconcile the contradictions of late the political problems of social decay will democratisation. Crosscutting political pres- advance from the long to the short term. The sures are very strong and they have global as new government has been firm that the general well as national origins. Policy choices are direction of Gear remains its guiding principle never pure, they involve measurements and pre- in macroeconomic matters, but the way is qui- dictions of social and political costs, which in etly being prepared for adjustments. The first turn involve not only calculations of power but real test of willingness to revisit economic poli- historical and emotional identification. The cy will come in mid-August when the govern- South African context has been particularly ment makes good its pre-election promise to intense in this respect. As one “transformation” review labour legislation, especially those pro- issue after another has been faced, South visions which allegedly inhibit employment Africa's political classes have acquired a creation. Not surprisingly, Cosatu is very suspi- reflexive spirit of compromise – and postpone- cious of this initiative and the Labour Minister ment – which has made the transition to democ- Mbathisi Mdladlana has listed in detail the pro- racy possible in the first place. visions which are up for revision, promising

53 Johnston that the basic principles of employee protection the rare places where these two things coincide) are not at issue. Despite these assurances, no longer have the autonomy and the power to unless job loss and employment creation fig- deliver visionary projects of old, such as the ures improve, it will be difficult to avoid hard New Deal, the Great Society and the Welfare and divisive soul searching on the subject of the State. coherence of government economic policy. At the same time as post-nationalism makes itself felt, neo-nationalism – in the form of the 1.2 Nationalism in post-apartheid South fissiparous and conflictual ethnic and religious Africa nationalisms of the former Yugoslavia and By the time the ANC came to power in 1994, USSR – testifies to the continuing potency of post-nationalism and neo-nationalism charac- nationalism's dark side. terised global politics rather than the national- In a world of post-nationalism and neo- ism which had sustained it in the years of strug- nationalism, the ANC's expectations of nation- gle. The liberation movement had drawn hood, sovereignty and self-determination, strength from a conception of nationalism that which had sustained them through the years of looked forward to an unproblematic people struggle, quickly came to seem obsolete and achieving the right of self-determination, which unsustainable. The ANC quickly learned the allowed mobilisation for national goals under limits of government, both inside and outside conditions of sovereign autonomy. Not all the country. Markets were unimpressed with ANC leaders believed in every essential of that rhetoric. An electorate which could deliver conception (especially in private), but it is true close to a two-thirds majority in the 1994 elec- to say that most were quite unprepared for the tion, showed that its cooperation could not extent to which the world they inherited was always be relied on in matters of local and “post-nationalist”. national taxes (to name only one example). The term “post-nationalism” is not used here Whatever it had understood by nation state, to mean that people have ceased entirely to national sovereignty, national self-determina- think of themselves as citizens of a particular tion or any other concept derived from the idea state or that these states have ceased to behave of the nation, once in government, the ANC as organised units in trade and war, as states was forced into retreat, compromise and impro- have always done. visation. However, much of the developed world is At the same time, the IFP's determined cam- post-nationalist in the way that governments paign for extensive regional autonomy and its there have to relate to populations. It is to indi- sometimes bellicose expressions of Zulu ethnic- viduals as consumers of private satisfactions ity, seemed to pose a serious threat to the unity and accumulators of wealth, rather than in com- of African nationalism right at the moment of munities of strong emotional ties, vivid shared its triumph. The ambiguous Zulu factor – feder- mythologies and communal purposes that gov- alism or secession? African nationalist or ernments have to appeal. When political parties apartheid puppet? – in the politics of negotia- and leaders in the competition for governing tion and transition, served notice that the dan- power represent themselves to their peoples, it gers of neo-nationalism were at home as well as is as managers who are competent to reproduce abroad. the conditions of accumulation and consump- Fortunately, by the time the politics of nego- tion. The role of national leader, with the vision tiation took a hold, nationalism was not too and moral authority to define national goals, to closely or rigorously defined as a popular posi- demand obligations and even sacrifices, as well tion in the ANC's brand of liberation politics. as to provide benefits, is a lot less marketable. A sort of pragmatic inclusiveness came to dom- Post-nationalism is driven by the foreshorten- inate the movement's position, at the expense ing of physical and cultural distance brought by of abstract theorising and demanding conceptu- globalisation, by the mushrooming possibilities alisation. Constructing the broadest possible of private satisfactions and the relative shrink- front against apartheid was not compatible with ing of public and communal space. Above all, it dogmatism over the composition or mission of is driven by individuals' realisation that the the nation. Rigorous requirements over these states and the nations they belong to (even in things would carry with them the danger of dis-

54 Johnston sent and fragmentation, perhaps of reverse the reality of global post-nationalism and the racism. At a time when the ruling ideology of threat of Zulu (and Afrikaner) neo-nationalism, Afrikaner nationalism was becoming progres- this approving verdict certainly has plausibility. sively disarticulated and fragmented, it would As always, however, there is a downside. In have been poor strategy to confront those the years since the first democratic election, whites that were looking for a way out, with an concern has come to be regularly expressed African nationalism which intimidated and about a lack of moral cohesion and common excluded them. The electoral fate of the Pan purpose in the South African population. Africanist Congress (PAC) makes it clear that Political, business and religious leaders express the ANC made the correct choice. themselves freely on this topic in a variety of When the ANC came to power, the world contexts which may include crime, corruption was generally unhelpful to nationalist aspira- and dereliction of civic duties, or emigration tions, at least of the traditional kind. But thanks and the acceptable limits of political opposition. to its history, the ANC was in possession of a What is usually being expressed, either implic- nationalism that suited the circumstances quite itly or explicitly, is the desire for some more well. However strong the underlying emotional clearly defined and demanding sense of nation- appeal to its own core support, in its outside al identity. appearance it was weakly developed, flexible, The problem is who or what can provide it? accommodating and not particularly demanding For the present, South Africa's political culture of those who would subscribe to it. has three distinct dimensions. They are: It was very good for the purposes of reconcil- • The politics of business and labour, joined by iation and coexistence with those from outside the government in the “golden triangle” of the ANC's traditions, black as well as white. It corporatism. accepted the principal force of post-nationalism • The rhetoric of national democratic revolu- – that is, that in a consumption-oriented capital- tion and racial transformation. ist democracy, a sense of national identity has • The discourse of an emerging market in to compete with all sorts of other forces such as which “global competitiveness” and con- gender and social mobility as well as other formist economic policies are paramount. more private self-definitions. This is not to It is difficult to conceive of a new sense of mention the drift to private satisfactions, which national identity and purpose that could tran- is encouraged by even modest increments of scend the contradictions of these three. To take material improvement in people's lives, espe- only one of problems (but one of the most im- cially under the relentless spur to consumerism portant), there is no consensus on the most provided by global popular culture. basic understanding of the significance of the If ANC leaders needed confirmation of this past ten years. At least three versions are on phenomenon, they only had to look at the fate offer: of their principal antagonist over the years: • The Rainbow Nation came to its senses and Afrikaner nationalism. Social mobility and stepped off the path of mutual destruction affluence caused enough Afrikaners to redefine (relegated mainly now to ceremonial occa- themselves, for the movement to collapse as a sions, such as the retirement of President political force. Under contemporary conditions, Mandela). all political movements whose existence is • The liberation movement fought a successful predicated on conceptions of nation and nation- campaign against a cunning and resourceful al self-determination risk the same fate, provid- enemy which was prepared to carry on the ed political democracy and improvement of war under the guise of negotiation (the ver- material conditions are present. sion favoured by the ANC and which it Those who criticise nationalism as a basis for would like to install as national orthodoxy). political belief and action might be tempted to • A brave experiment in multi-party democracy applaud the ANC's post-apartheid conception has degenerated into creeping, constitutional of nationalism for having provided a weak authoritarianism and de facto one party rule in injection of the stuff, an inoculation against the which minorities are marginalised (believed ideology's worst excesses. Poised as South by most whites, coloureds and Indians). Africa was in the early and mid-1990s between To these contradictions, should be added the

55 Johnston declining currency of nationalism which was Africa's admirable progress since 1990 has alluded to above; the blandishments of alterna- been achieved by cultivating a political culture tive identities; the encroachments on the quali- of incorporation and compromise, which has ties of national autonomy and state sovereignty ended to postpone or dilute sharp choices and which in the past gave meaning and visibility to painful decisions. The first year or so of the nationalism. new government's tenure will clarify whether It is clear that President Mbeki is conscious or not this culture will continue. It will become of these difficulties and he has visibly begun to clearer whether or not a whole host of occupa- chart a course in the disputed waters of post- tional and identity groups, ranging from tradi- nationalism. The most interesting sign of this is tional leaders, emerging black capitalists and the emphasis given to the African Renaissance organised workers, to Zulus, Afrikaners and idea. Perhaps by situating issues of pride and skilled white professionals, remain incorporated purpose in the continent, rather than confining in a constellation of political sub-cultures, held them within the borders of South Africa itself, together by the electoral hegemony and diplo- he can hope to escape some of the parochial matic ingenuity of the ANC. contradictions of identity which plague the The alternative is for a more integrated issue of what constitutes nationalism in the national political culture and a more coherent South African context. vision of the national interest to emerge. That will not be easy, but perhaps late democratisers CONCLUSION can take heart from Landes' conclusion about It is obvious what the principal public policy late industrialisers: issues are in the post-election period: crime; “... that latecomers need to make special law and order; education; labour market policy; arrangements to compensate for their back- and the need to create more jobs. Underlying wardness and for changes elsewhere; and these issues are larger questions relating to the that with intelligence and will, they can find main themes of this discussion. Much of South ways of doing so.”10

ENDNOTES 1) This paper has also been published in the ism, socialism and the future of South United States, in Issue, a journal of opinion African politics” Indicator South Africa of the American African Studies Vol. 16 (1) Autumn 1999, pp.36-41 Association. 7) Gray, J. False Dawn: the Delusions of 2) For a succinct discussion see Landes, D. Global Capitalism London, Granta Books The Wealth and Poverty of Nations London, (1998) p.17. Little, Brown (1998) pp.273-5. 8) Gray False Dawn p.19. 3) Hobsbawn, E.J. The Age of Extremes: the 9) See Johnston, A.M “Between unilateralism Short Twentieth Century London, Michael and the culture of solidarity: the Non- Joseph (1994) p.140. Aligned Movement after the Durban sum- 4) Hobsbawn The Age of Extremes p.270. mit” Indicator South Africa Vol. 15 (3) 5) Hobsbawn The Age of Extremes p.273. 1998, pp.9-14. 6) For a fuller discussion, see Johnston, A.M. 10)Landes The Wealth and Poverty of Nations “The Left and the ANC alliance, national- p.275.

56 Crime, Corruption and Democracy in South Africa

Constanze Bauer

ABSTRACT the political office-bearer and the public offi- The main aim of this paper is to look at corrup- cial are able to account in public for his/her tion and democracy in South Africa. The inten- actions. They need to remember at all times tion is to see the effect which the prevalence of that public money is being used and that they crime and corruption has on the development are in the service of the public and not a specif- and sustainability of democracy in this country. ic government (Du Plessis, 1989: 551-552). Ethics, values and morals all exercise an influ- Public officials are those people responsible ence on the public official and on corruption in for implementing the policy decided upon by general. What is also important to note, is that the government of the day, viz. the political corruption can generate a spill-over effect, office-bearer. Public officials indirectly serve whereby corruption can spill over from politi- the interests of the public and through their cal office-bearers to public officials and then to actions, are accountable to the political office- all spheres of society. If the correct ethics, val- bearer who in turn is accountable to society, ues and morals form part of the personal con- not only for his/her actions but also for the duct of the public, it would go a long way actions of public officials who fall under his/ towards sound public administration and good her area of authority. A political office-bearer governance. The intention of this paper is to is dependent upon the approval of society if show maladministration in government depart- he/she wishes to remain in office as society’s ments in South Africa before 1994 and malad- disapproval could result in dismissal from ministration in government departments in office or failure to be re-elected. South Africa, post-1994 election. However, as soon as the political office-bear- The prevalence of corruption occurs at both er and public official forsakes the public inter- the higher level as well as the lower level of est for personal interest or gain, corruption is society and occurs among both public officials said to have taken place. Corruption can occur and political office-bearers. Measures to con- in various forms and can differ from situation trol corruption will also be discussed, with to situation. The crux of the matter is, however, emphasis on the Public Protector and the Heath that corruption occurs whenever politicians and Special Investigative Unit. Finally, the influ- public officials misuse their power in the exer- ence which unchecked corruption and crime cising of duties and make themselves guilty of will have on democracy in South Africa will behaviour deviant from prescribed rules and also be provided. regulations, such deviant behaviour being to the political office-bearer and the public offi- INTRODUCTION cial’s benefit and detrimental to a third party, The primary task of the political office-bearer or the general public (Du Plessis, 1989: 551- and the public official, is the promotion of the 552). The most important aspect of corruptible general welfare of the community – a task that behaviour is that private gain was secured at should be performed in such a way that both public expense.

57 Bauer

1. WHAT IS CORRUPTION such a nature that he/she feels entitled to The statutory definition of corruption in South receive gifts or compensation for services ren- Africa is found in section 1 of the Prevention of dered as he/she would have been entitled to Corruption Act, 1992 (Act 94 of 1992). It states such gifts or compensation, when viewed in the following: terms of the practice of his/her traditional cul- • Any person shall be deemed guilty of a cor- ture. However, in terms of Western values and ruptible offence whenever such a person cor- norms, if a member of the public wants to offer ruptly accepts, obtains, or agrees to accept a public official a gift or compensation if a cer- any gift as an inducement or reward for him- tain function were to be fulfilled, it would con- self/herself or any other person; stitute bribery (Caiden, 1977: 303). A complex • the result of such an action leading to favour relationship exists between different cultures or disfavour being shown to the party offer- and what constitutes corruption. In South ing the inducement; and Africa, it is essential that an understanding of • any person who corruptly gives or accepts the different cultures is developed not only any gift from a party as an inducement or within the public service but also by the public reward for rendering services on behalf and to ensure that no misunderstanding exists in in favour of the designated party shall be future, regarding what would be termed cor- deemed guilty of a corruptible offence. ruptible behaviour. The presence of people Caiden and Caiden (1978:494) provide the fol- from different cultures not only in the public lowing relevant viewpoint regarding corruption service but also in government presently to be and its effect on society: found in South Africa, serves to accentuate the “Corruption is a particularly viral form of difficulties associated with developing a work organisational cancer. Once it enters the life ethic which would not cause affront to both the stream of a public agency it quickly spreads public official and political office-bearer, but to all parts. In some, it may show immedi- would also be acceptable to the public. ately; in others it may go undetected for a It is thus essential for a public official to long time. If untreated, it will eventually place national and the community’s needs destroy the effectiveness of the diseased before his/her personal and family interests, organ. Even if treated, there is no guarantee values and norms. If not, corrupt behaviour has that it will be eliminated or that all infected taken place at public expense. Whatever form areas will be reached, or that it will not corruption takes, in any form of government or reappear. It is highly contagious, debilitat- political system, it influences that system. ing and costly to treat. There the analogy Joubert (1979:12) views corruption in this ends. Corruption is man-made. The possi- regard as being “not only harmful to the state bilities of stamping it out altogether are and the government involved, but detrimental remote. We may catch it here and there, but and injurious to that most import ingredient of it reappears in some form as soon as we state existence, the people”. relax our vigilance. We do not eliminate it, Consideration must continually be given to we merely drive it underground. We can the existence of values and morals deemed by make the corrupt suspend operations tem- the public to be sound and desirable, as well as porarily. We can dissuade the tempted. But providing the background for sound administra- it lingers, hovering always in the back- tion. Acknowledgement and manifestation of ground for the next opportunity.” the value norms of public administration in the Corruption as a phenomenon is complicated conduct of the authorities, would also serve as a because of the conflict of values and norms as guideline for public officials in the performance they differ from culture to culture. Behaviour of their official duties. It is thus essential that regarded as deviant in terms of Western democ- throughout public administration, an effort ratic values and norms may, for instance, be should be made to ensure that effective govern- regarded as acceptable behaviour in a development is being realised and that attention should ing African state (Malan, 1990: 16). be given to those values which are of impor- It can happen, for example, that tradition tance to the community. The right ethical binding the black public official in South Africa behaviour based on accepted values, norms and is, according to his/her values and norms, of morals would ensure that the public official’s

58 Bauer first duty would be towards the community of tempts police to take the law into their own which he/she is a member and would be a great hands. With many other problems to face – help to combat unethical and corruptible behav- a civil service and armed forces in transi- iour. However, the presence of conflicting val- tion; a police force which is overworked ues prevalent in society, will have an effect on and short on skills; and with some officials how to draw up a code of ethics that makes pro- open to bribery – the South African govern- vision for the conflicting value system among ment has had difficulty in responding to public officials. such threats.” The following conditions and causes are deemed to be associated with the occurrence of 2. MALADMINISTRATION IN GOVERNMENT corruption among public officials: greed; DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA BEFORE 1994 patronage; nepotism; bribery; ghosting; bid-rig- Examples of corruption found in South Africa ging; graft; and kickbacks. There are certain between 1985-1994 include ghosting, phoney forms of corruption which are not only different contracts, bribery, fraud, kick-backs and greed. from those attributed to the public official, but The former Department of Development Aid that can also be associated with political office- was investigated by a state commission under bearers, for example conflict of interest, lack of Justice B de Villiers Pickard in 1991(known as public interest leading to corruption, politicisa- the Pickard Commission), which discovered a tion of the public service and political interfer- culture of corruption and irregularities, tender ence, excessive administrative secrecy, and fraud, favouritism and nepotism and a lack of vote buying. It is essential to show these causes accountability. According to the Pickard Report and conditions in order to create an awareness (1991: 112-112;147), it seems that the apartheid among politicians that corruption is not limited era contributed to the development of a culture only to public officials. These forms of corrup- of corruption where “public officials felt they tion can, however, also be associated with pub- were missing out if they were not helping them- lic officials. selves … many of these public officials had South Africa is currently experiencing a become disillusioned by their futile attempts to phase of grave public concern regarding the serve the apartheid ideology of administering high crime rate, which is having an effect on the removal and resettlement of thousands of foreign investors who contemplate investing black people. (They) have developed a syn- here. There are no short-term answers to or drome of a lack of enthusiasm to the extent quick fixes for the country’s crime problem. sometimes of apathy and the huge amounts of The government is acutely aware of the severity money made available to the department of the problem and gives it ongoing attention became too tempting to resist for some offi- such as: cials. Self-preservation and self-protection • a larger police budget against criticism have become matters of pri- • restructuring and demilitarising the police mary importance even to the detriment of the • civilian control over the police force very cause itself.” • retraining of police officers • specific anti-crime drives in large cities 2.1 Lack of political responsibility and • anti-corruption units and the Office for accountability Serious Economic Crimes It was the reaction of the National Party (NP) to • prison reform the Pickard Report that clearly showed that • inner-city business forums to combat crime political office-bearers had not been prepared to in certain crime ridden areas (Venter, 1998: accept responsibility for the wrong-doings of 17). their departments. Former Minister Dr Gerrit According to Barber (1998: 324): Viljoen had seen no reason to take the political “the combination of domestic and interna- rap and had stated that a minister in South tional crime is a serious and direct threat to Africa was not expected to pay for any contra- the state: it undermines legitimate economic ventions in his/her department, even if it had activity, breeds corruption, challenges the been serious. Dr Viljoen had argued further in authority of the government, fosters insta- his defence, that his action undertaken against bility in areas like KwaZulu-Natal, and alleged corruption and maladministration from

59 Bauer

1984-1989 had been sufficient to absolve him at their posts, move to another department or of political responsibility despite the fact that slide into retirement. Also, the principle of min- these actions had not appeared to have been isterial responsibility was no longer honoured successful (Financial Mail, 19 June 1992: 36). in South Africa, allowing Cabinet Ministers to Dr Viljoen had stated further that “the fact that “preside happily over corrupt inefficient depart- a minister is responsible and answerable basi- ments, safe in the knowledge that it is the offi- cally means responsible and answerable to give cials who will take the blame when this is proper account, particularly to Parliament. But exposed. Dr Viljoen headed the Department it certainly does not mean responsible and responsible for one of the most sensitive areas answerable to personally take the blame in of South African life. Effectively, he was every instance if he is the guilty person.”(As responsible for the misuse of funds earmarked quoted in the Financial Mail, 19 June 1992: for black education which is grossly inferior 38.) To further accentuate the non-accountabili- and where there are enormous backlogs. It is ty stance of the political office-bearers of the wrong that Dr Viljoen should be allowed to NP, the Pickard Commission of Inquiry had simply wash his hands of what has taken place” eventually been appointed by President De (Weekend Post, 22 September 1990: 12). Klerk on the insistence of the Parliamentary Joint Commission on Public Accounts. This 3. MALADMINISTRATION IN GOVERNMENT had been the first time that a select government DEPARTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA, POST-1994 committee – on public accounts – had recom- ELECTION mended such a step to the President (The Corruption is also prevalent in government Citizen, 19 June 1992:8; Sunday Times, 20 administration after the 1994 election and October 1991: 2). seems to be on the increase. Corruption takes The Department of Education was investigat- place in all three spheres of government – cen- ed by a state commission headed by Mrs Justice tral, provincial and local – and appears to take E. van den Heever from 1988 to 1992 (also on the same format as before 1994. According known as the Van den Heever Commission). It to Mr Justice William Heath, who is heading a discovered numerous cases of corruption, fraud, special team tasked with the rooting out of cor- bribery, kick-backs, ghosting and a general lack ruption at all levels of government, “syndicates of accountability. The findings of the engaged in corrupt activities are active through- Commission of Inquiry were published in four out the entire spectrum of the country and are reports, of which the second, third and fourth flourishing as had never been the case in the reports contain examples of cases of corruption, past.”(As quoted in Die Volksblad, 26 February as stated above. The extent of corruption dis- 1998: 1.) Forms of corruption that have taken covered led Mrs Justice van den Heever to state place include bribery and fraud, favouritism the following: and nepotism. “It is difficult to believe that so many irreg- Figures released by the Department of Health ularities could take place within one depart- in the second half of 1997, show that more than ment … without the knowledge of the DG; R4.3 million had been stolen from feeding the deputy DG, the Treasury; the Auditor- schemes in South Africa’s nine provinces, with General … Why was it left to the press to the Eastern Cape accounting for the lion’s share open this Aegean stable.” (As quoted in the of misappropriation – more than R2.3 million – Financial Mail, 21 September 1990: 43.) as a result of theft, corruption, fraud or mis- management. In the Northern Province, police 2.2 Ultimate responsibility have been investigating the theft of at least Concerning the issue of ultimate political R1.6 million after a member of the school feed- responsibility, the then responsible Minister, Dr ing scheme used the money to buy food for per- Gerrit Viljoen, was simply allowed to retreat sonal use. Investigations were also being car- from the whole sordid affair without having to ried out against another member of the project, be accountable for the actions of his subordi- for fraudulently using government cheques to nates. Such action was possible because in spend R83 000. South Africa, a system functioned where people In Mpumalanga, at least R30 000 was lost who are accused are merely allowed to continue after project members stole cheque books and

60 Bauer used them fraudulently (The Star, 20 August those officials who have to enforce the laws of 1997: 1). According to Dr. Mamphela Ram- the community. At this level, bribes play a phele, “... it is not surprising that the scourge of decisive role in determining the work of a cor- corruption remains deepest in those parts of the rupt public official (McMillan, 1978: 326). country most profoundly influenced by bantus- If corruption at both the higher and lower tan policies – the Eastern Cape and the levels of government were not combated ruth- Northern Province ... It is important to stress lessly and effective by programmes developed that the evils of the past do not justify corrup- to end the occurrence of corruption, the danger tion today nor exonerate us from the responsi- exists that it will inevitably spill over to the bility of taking collective responsibility” other spheres of society. (Sunday Times, 7 June 1998: 21). Corruption as discussed thus far, can occur at 4.1 Spill-over effect both the higher level as well as the lower level If corruption were not redressed or checked, it of society and occurs among both public offi- would “spill over” to other spheres of society cials and political office-bearers. and affect increasing portions of that society. The effect of systemic corruption includes the 4. HIGH-LEVEL AND LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION following: The main difference between high-level corrup- • A perpetuation of closed politics and the tion and low-level corruption can be traced to restriction of access may occur, thereby pre- the difference in the visibility of decisions venting social change in political institutions. made that led to corruption. Decisions that led • Suppression of the opposition could con- to corruption, taken at higher levels of govern- tribute to increasing resentment. This could ment – for example the decisions taken by a entail that corruption – far from being an cabinet minister – are of much more importance alternative to violence – is in most cases than those taken by a lower level political accompanied by more violence. office-bearer or even a public official (Rose- • The perpetuation and widening of class, eco- Ackerman, 1978: 175-176). nomic and social divisions which contributes Corruption at the higher levels of government to societal strain and the prevention of cohe- can involve corrupt behaviour by cabinet minis- sion. ters, judges, ambassadors and senior public • Prevention of policy changes, particularly officials. Such corrupt behaviour will inevitably where this works against immediate market not only lead to a reduction of public confi- consideration. dence in government action, but also to a reduc- • Blocking administrative reform, thereby tion of public willingness to trust government making deleterious administrative practices, departments with substantial authority or fund- such as induced delays, profitable. ing (Nice, 1986: 287). Higher order corrupt • The diversion of public resources as well as behaviour will therefore have a detrimental contributing to a situation of private afflu- effect on the functioning of public administra- ence, public squalor, especially serious where tion as such. affluence is confined to the few – systemic The public official at the higher strata in the corruption is not limited to a special case. public service is usually in a position to deter- • It has an accumulative effect on public per- mine the way in which departmental goals are ceptions and expectations which subverts obtained. They are in the position to fall prey to trust and cooperation far beyond the impact corrupt behaviour due to their bargaining power on the individuals immediately concerned. with non-government entities (Rose-Ackerman, • Systemic corruption is not confined to poor, 1978: 67-69). Public officials at the lower strata developing or modernising countries, but is of the public service pass data and information to be found in all organisational societies. upwards without attempting to evaluate the (Caiden, 1977: 307-308). information, compared to public officials at a higher level who have to choose between a 4.2 Leader-follower spill-over speedy decision and an informed one (Rose- Political leaders of society play a major and Ackerman, 1978: 175-176). Corruption occur- permanent role in shaping public opinion and ring at the lower levels of government involves societal behaviour. Whenever corruption mani-

61 Bauer fests itself among political leaders, it is sending everybody is engulfed in an administrative cul- out a wrong message to society which could ture that tolerates the fruits of corruption affect the trust, loyalty and personal integrity of (Carina, 1995: 15). their followers. Whenever political leaders misuse their leadership positions in society, they 5. MEASURES TO CONTROL CORRUPTION establish an example which tends to erode the It is essential that measures to control corrup- moral base of law that can provide an ideal tion exist. Even if they cannot eradicate corrup- opportunity for other kinds of offenders to tion completely, at least they can and do play rationalise their conduct. It is thus clear that an effective role in controlling corruption or the manifestations of corrupt behaviour among occurrence of corruption. It is essential to political leaders – whether by excessive use of remember that corruption pervades the entire rewards or by massive abuse of the system – environment and does not necessarily focus on will inevitably filter down and be emulated by a particular area, and that the measures to be members of the leader’s organisation or depart- implemented address the broad spectrum of the ment (Werner, 1983: 149-150). occurrence of corruption. Accountability by both the public official and 4.3 Dimensions of corruption spill-over effect the political office-bearer can be regarded as Manifestations of corrupt behaviour among the forming the “cornerstone of democracy and upper strata of public officials are the most dif- civilisation”(Hillard, 1991:16). Responsibility ficult to detect because it is a petty and border- for action or inaction is the foundation of line type of corruption, as neither the public, accountability and the personal integrity and the political office-bearer or the public official public accountability for each and every politi- regard it as being punishable. Although every cal office-bearer – even that of the President/ code of law contains definitions of corruption, Premier – is essential to ensure clean govern- it also makes provision for extenuating circum- ment (Wronsley, 1986: 164-166). Professor stances. If left unchecked, this form of corrup- Klitgaard sums it up colloquially by stating that tion could become a destructive force in soci- “the first step to combat corruption is to fry the ety, especially if it achieves legitimate status big fish” (as quoted in Wronsley, 1993: 14). which could contribute to the legitimisation of Political office-bearers should be forced to other types of corruption. resign if found guilty of committing an offence. As such, it would become more difficult to The policy of transferring ministers from one define what constitutes corrupt behaviour, portfolio to another without demanding their resulting in a further momentum of spilling resignation is usually inadequate in combating over being established, “while corruption is corruption. The case studies of maladministra- psychologically condoned or rationalised tion in government departments have indicated because it is so prevalent. By attributing little or the lack of political accountability prevalent no importance to a corrupt act, trivialisation among political office-bearers in South Africa. and rationalisation function as a self-perpetrat- Despite serious incidents of maladministration ing mechanism” (Werner, 1983: 158). and corruption, the responsible ministers did not accept responsibility for the actions of pub- 4.4 Institutional spill-over lic officials deployed in their departments, Corrupt political and administrative leaders resulting in the all-pervasive culture of corrup- could allow their corrupt behaviour to spread tion, as shown in the subsequent commissions from institution to institution, with corruption of inquiry. even spreading from family to school and from South Africa has experienced a number of organised religion to voluntary social organisa- commissions of inquiry since 1948. But instead tions (Werner, 1983: 150). Effective institution- of serving the purpose for which they had been al corruption can become so regularised and established, they have in most cases gathered institutionalised that organisational structures dust on government shelves. Commissions of actually protect the perpetrators of corruption, inquiry should be an effective instrument to while at the same time penalising those who combat corruption as they bring to light where live up to the old norms. Employees thus pro- ordinary police methods might have been inad- tect and cover up for each other and eventually equate. However, their success depends on how

62 Bauer efficiently the investigation was conducted. 117 of 1991; Corruption Act, No. 94 of 1992; With regard to corruption, they can be a mas- Public Protector Act, No. 23 of 1994; Audit sive aid to criminal justice (Hiemstra, 1991:94- Arrangement Act, No. 122 of 1992; Special 96). Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act, An important measure in the fight corruption No. 74 of 1996; Proceeds of Organised Crime is appropriate legislation which not only deals Act, No. 76 of 1996; Auditor-General Act, No. with corruption, but should also contain the 12 of 1995; Reporting on Public Entities Act, necessary penalties and fines to serve as a No. 93 of 1992; and the Public Service Act, No. deterrent. Legislative measures should not be 103 of 1994. The above-mentioned legislation drawn up in such a manner that leaves the serves as an indication that the necessary leg- impression that public officials have a tendency islative measures exist to combat corruption, towards unethical behaviour. Measures should however, the success of these measures rather be drawn up which would prevent offi- depends on whether they are going to be imple- cials from being guilty of unethical behaviour mented or merely gather dust. (Andrews, 1994: 39). In South Africa, the fol- As a supplement to legal stipulations, there lowing legislative measures exist that can be are also regulations, codes, procedural prescrip- used in the fight against corruption: Investi- tions and guides, of which a code of ethics and gation of Serious Economic Offences Act, No. Public Service Regulations can serve as an

Cases successfully completed and/or in respect of which orders were granted from 1 April 1998 to 30 September 1998 (Heath Special Investigating Unit - Interim Report 1998/99: 6)

No. Description of cases Value

1. Recovering of farms in former Transkei 20 654 000 00 2. Recovering of state owned vehicles - Dept of Transport: KwaZulu-Natal 33 000 000 00 3. Daily bread feed scheme: attachment of assets 4 500 000 00 4. Stolen cheque - Kokstad: Stop payment 540 000 00 5. Fraud: lease agreements - City Council of Durban 625 000 00 6a. Butterworth - Councillors: ready for trial 1 300 000 00 6b. Butterworth - arrear service levies: process of recovering 31 000 000 00 7. Rental agreement - KIM Diamond: ready for trial 2 300 000 00 8. Lease agreements (photostat machines) - Northern Cape Provincial Government: settlements - total amount in issue with some defendants 17 000 000 00 9. Stolen blank warrant voucher - Dept. of Justice, Mpumalanga 4 300 000 00 10. Sarafina II: ready for trial 6 000 000 00 11. Magwa tea corporation: ready for trial 10 000 000 00 12. Fraud - motor finance schemes 435 000 00 13. Alienation of hotels, a holiday resort and other immovable property - Transkei coast interdicts to stop transactions 6 000 000 00 14. Occupying state land for holiday purposes - West Coast (Caries); judgement granted 4 000 000 00 15. Overcharged fees attorney: Umtata full recovery of R13 million, R5 million taxed off account during investigations and balance to be claimed 18 000 000 00 16. Stolen blank cheques - EC Dept of Education - Investigation almost completed 1 232 000 00 17. Bursaries - Dept. of Public Works: EC: recovered without tribunal order 196 000 00 18. Overpayment to private company: (Ex Ciskei Defence Force) 58 000 00 19. Fraudulent quotations - Dept of Public Works (EC):Non-delivery: 130 000 00 payment stopped 20. Mpumalanga Parks Board - promissory notes/guarantees: interdict to stop payment/documents recovered in New York 340 000 000 00 TOTAL VALUE 501 261 000 00

63 Bauer example. Implementation of these measures a Proclamation referring the matter to the Unit would not only be of assistance in combating for investigation. The lapse of time before a corruption, but can also be used to combat mal- Proclamation can be obtained often leads to administration. great frustration and to a large degree negative- Codes of ethics are ideal measures that can ly affects the swift reaction of the Unit. For be used to control and minimise indiscretion example, the bringing of Urgent Applications in and corruptive behaviour and can also serve as cases where the need arises is seriously ham- an aid to government in its legitimacy (Clapper, pered by this as the Unit does not have locus 1996: 23). Viewed from a South African per- standi to bring such applications unless the mat- spective – especially in light of the new consti- ter has been proclaimed” (Heath Special Invest- tutional dispensation and the elimination of cor- igating Unit - Interim Report, 1998/99: 6). ruption in South Africa – “an ethical code of The Constitution of South Africa, No. 108 of conduct will be of particular value since stabili- 1996 makes provision for the Office of the ty will not be dependent merely on a majority Public Protector and the operational require- government … diverse values may be fused in ments of the office are provided for under the a common value system against groups, can be Public Protector Act, No. 23 of 1994 and measured … can serve as a type of watchdog to amended by the Public Protector Amendment once again call parties and groupings to order Act, No. 113 of 1998. The importance of this and accountability … will make a contribution office cannot be underestimated as the Public to the openness of the public service and the Protector will in future investigate all cases of reconciliation of different standards” (Van der corruption and maladministration and will fulfil Walt, 1995: 167-168). the following functions: to investigate any con- The Heath Special Investigating Unit was duct in state affairs, or in public administration established by the then President Mandela in in any sphere of government, that is alleged or March 1997 to investigate serious cases of mal- suspected to be improper or to result in any practice, corruption and fraud involving state impropriety or prejudice; to report on that con- assets or money. It works in tandem with a spe- dition; and to take appropriate action. The con- cial tribunal which tries civil matters arising out stitution provides that the office is independent, of the investigations. The court has the power subject only to the constitution itself and the to make orders, issue interdicts and warrants of law, and that it must be impartial and perform arrest and subpoena witnesses. It also works its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. closely with the Office for Serious Economic The nature of complaints range from corruption Offences, the Public Protector and the South in a department which has to approve building African Public Service (Financial Mail, 31 July plans of transitional metropolitan council sub- 1998:34). structures, to tender fraud – irregularity in the According to Hazelhurst (1998: 34), “de- awarding of a tender, for example, a more pressing as it is to discover the extent of corrup- expensive tender is accepted with no justification in South Africa, it would be worse if these tion or suspected improper preference with cases of wrong doing were not exposed and the regard to tender awards (Public Protector money involved not recovered”. A draft amend- Report No. 4, 1996: 5). ment of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act, No. 74 of 1996 has been 6. CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY forwarded to the Minister of Justice and other It should be clear by now, that if unchecked, relevant authorities, aimed at streamlining the corruption and crime hold serious consequences process of successfully combating maladminis- for the development and sustainability of tration, corruption and misappropriation. A democracy in any country and seriously under- major obstacle for the effective functioning of mine the existence of the state. For example: the Unit has been the requirement that allega- “the scale of corruption in post-communist tions must first be referred to the necessary Russia, unrivalled elsewhere, permeates the authorities, “hereafter a (usually) lengthy entire society including its top political lead- process is followed before the Department of ers. As the capital flight out of Russia is, it Justice submits a draft Proclamation to the seems, commensurate to the size of corrup- office of the President and which culminates in tion in the country … since the second half

64 Bauer

of the 1980s as much as 17 billion US dol- within the public service, high on the public lars out of 86 billion US dollars in foreign agenda. By listening to the experiences, con- aid has been diverted away from intended cerns and wishes of the people, Mr Mbeki will purposes and recycled to Western banks. As obtain a first hand impression of the problem of the single largest source of investment all corruption and will be able to assess the quality over the world is domestic savings it follows of service in the police, the justice system and that Russia’s economic growth has been local authorities. This campaign builds upon the seriously stunted due to a substantial capital foundations of the legal and constitutional flight out of the country. Organised crime in framework and partnerships built over the past Russian flourishes because law is not few years and comes hard on the heels of recent enforced and the persons responsible for its high profile actions of the government to com- enforcement are corruptible, too. It is a bat corruption, such as the Anti-Corruption vicious circle which will be difficult to Summit held in Parliament in April this year break, yet, without achieving it, the national and the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Summit economy will not prosper nor democracy be of November 1998. As President, fighting consolidated. For democracy to function crime and corruption will be a key focus of well, certain conditions must be met; elimi- Mbeki’s administration (press release, 3 May nation of large scale corruption, it appears, is 1999). However, it is crucial that any opposi- one of them” (Zuzowski, 1999: 136). tion to corruption and crime must go beyond For South Africa with its divided societies: mere rhetoric. This is important for democracy “the challenge to democracy is for the state itself. to deliver all public goods (such as public According to Professor Philip Heyman of the service appointments and state contracts) to Harvard University’s law school, corruption is all citizens without discrimination, irrespec- particularly dangerous in a fragile democracy, tive of ascriptive identity, communal affilia- as it provides a rationalisation to abandon tion or partisan loyalty. Where this fails to democratic practices in favour of autocratic materialise, the partisan ethnic state practices. The rationale behind nearly all coups emerges as an instrument of one communi- in fragile democracies, is that they are seen as ty, and delivers public goods to that com- providing a solution to corruption. However, it munity at the expense of others. Corruption is important to remember that “only a democra- exacerbates such inequities and therefore cy offers the constitutional mechanisms and undermines democracy directly”(Du Toit, public accountability necessary to counter cor- 1998: 157). ruption. Another major risk that corruption The fight against corruption and crime in South holds for democracy is that it breeds cynicism Africa will only be successful if leaders set the and alienation in ordinary people. If a society correct tone and stick to it. For example, reaches the point where people believe they are Mandela’s pledge of a “zero tolerance” policy losing out if they don’t indulge in corrupt activ- on corruption as “you clean a staircase by start- ities, the rule of law gives way to the law of the ing at the top. The commitment of our leader- jungle”(Ramphele, 1998: 21). Is this the future ship to clean government is a crucial national we want for our country? asset. International experience shows that once leadership is contaminated, the battle becomes CONCLUSION a phoney war in which strategies are devised to Corruption has been, and is still, prevalent in catch the small players while the big fish go the public sector of South Africa with the mis- free”(Ramphele, 1998: 21). management of state money holding serious At least it appears that political leaders in this implications for the community in a democratic country are taking the threat that corruption state. Lack of accountability, responsibility and holds for the future existence of the state seri- control measures all provide the ideal breeding ously, as can be seen by a visit made by the ground for corruptible and unethical behaviour then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki to the on the part of public officials, which is com- provinces as part of the government’s Anti- pounded when political office-bearers by their Corruption Campaign. The specific intention of non-acceptance of responsibility, help to per- these visits is to place corruption and service petuate this condition to the detriment of demo-

65 Bauer cratic governance in a country. It is clear that paign against corruption will be unsuccessful. accountability starts at the top, viz. the political A lack of moral and political consensus could office-bearers, and if the political office-bearers result in inefficient government and if little refuse to accept accountability for their actions, importance is placed on the maintenance of the wrong message would be sent to public central moral-ethical norms and values by the officials. Unless it is made abundantly clear community, the democratic nature of the state that accountability starts at the top, any cam- will be seriously threatened.

REFERENCES ANDREWS, Y, (1988): The Personnel Function. tive analysis. New Jersey: Transaction Pretoria: HAUM. Books. BARBER, J, (1988): South Africa’s foreign poli- NICE, R. (1996): Dictionary of criminology. cy. Venter A., ed. Government politics in London: Vision. the new South Africa. Pretoria: Van Schaik. PUBLIC PROTECTOR - FIRST HALF-YEARLY CAIDEN, G.E., (May/June 1977): Administrative REPORT 1996 REPORT NO. 4. (http://www. corruption. Public Administration Review. polity.org.za/govt/pubprot/pubprot04.html.) CARINA, L.V., (April 1995): Administrative PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, NO. 94 OF accountability: a review of the evolution, 1992. meaning and operationalisation of a key ROSE-ACKERMAN, S. (1978): Corruption: a concept in public administration. Philippine study in political economy. New York: Journal of Public Administration, XXVII Academic Press. (2). RSA(REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA) RP 31/1990. DIE VOLKSBLAD, 26 February 1998. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into DU PLESSIS, W., (1989): Korrupsie en regering- the Department of Education and Training. setiek. Koers, 54(4). October 1990. (Also known as the Van den DU TOIT, P., (1988): Corruption and the autono- Heever Report.). mous state: comparing South Africa’s 1993 RSA (REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA) RP 73/1992. and 1996 constitutions. SAIPA, 33(3). Report of the Commission of Inquiry into FINANCIAL MAIL, 21 September 1990 the Department of Development Aid. May FINANCIAL MAIL, 19 June 1992. 1991. (Also known as the Pickard Report.). Financial Mail, 31 July 1998. SUNDAY TIMES, 20 October 1991. HAZELHURST, E., (31 July 1998): The Heath SUNDAY TIMES, 7 June 1998. Special Investigating Unit. Financial Mail THE CITIZEN, 19 June 1992. HEATH SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNIT - INTERIM THE STAR, 20 August 1997. REPORT 1998/99. (http://www/polity.org.za/ VAN DER WALT, P.J., (1991): Ethical state con- govdocs/commissions/1998/heath.html) duct guarded. Policy Review 4(10). HIEMSTRA, VG, (1991): The role of commis- VENTER, A. ED, (1998): Government politics in sions of inquiry, in Gildenhuys, JS H. the new South Africa. Pretoria: Van Schaik. Ethics and the public sector. Kenwyn: Juta. WEEKEND POST, 22 September 1990. HILLARD, VG, (1992): Corruption in the public WERNER, S.B, (March/April 1983): New direc- sector. Boardroom 4. tions in the study of administrative corrup- JOUBERT, PS (1979): Corruption in government tion. Public Administrative Review. and politics. University of Zululand. WRONSLEY, R.P., (September 1993): MALAN, G, (April 1990): Korrupsie in die Combating corruption. Unpublished paper. openbare sektor. Nexus. WRONSLEY, R.P., (March /April 1994): MCMILLAN, N. (1978): Corruption in the public Combating corruption. The South African service of British colonies and ex-colonies Treasurer. in West Africa, in Heidenheimer, A.J. ZUZOWSKI, R, (1998): Russian democracy in Political corruption: readings in compara- labour, 1991 -1997. Politikon 25(1).

66 Unemployment, Poverty and Democracy in South Africa

Tembeka Mpako-Ntusi

INTRODUCTION adequate ingredients and life was good. Human My first response to this topic was “disservices intellect coupled with some social conditions of modern developments”. This impromptu drove human beings to want to make life better. reaction lingered in my mind for some time This drive saw some men make changes such until I decided to unpack my thoughts and to as the move from subsistence farming to eco- package them in portable pieces capable of nomic farming, home manufacturing of goods meaningful mental processing. Compliant with to industrial manufacturing. Urban centres the academic tradition, I started by trying to emerged where people concentrated. Indus- redefine the concepts. Contrasting employment trialisation and technological developments with work removed my emphasis from unem- improved the quality of life for most people the ployment to idleness. Then, I did not perceive world over. Indeed, good intentions paid the poverty as lack of material resources for human expected dividends. Needless to say, material survival. Actually, I adopted a perception of natural resources were depleted in the process poverty shared with me by informants in a pre- and great damage was caused even to the vious research study in a rural area of Mqan- atmosphere. Pollution – the unanticipated con- duli. Poverty was described as a lack of oppor- sequence of industrialisation and urbanisation – tunity to use oneself in a meaningful way that raised its ugly head, and most developed coun- contributes positively to one’s existence or sur- tries were caught unprepared. While either vival. If a person is idle (not working) because ignoring this problem or acknowledging it but there are no opportunities for a meaningful doing nothing about it, technological develop- contribution to one’s physical existence, then ments escalated to the point of even displacing such a person does not need or has no use for urban employees. Mechanisation of large-scale democracy. How can we expect a person to be economic farming coupled with mechanisation involved in taking care of his secondary needs of manufacturing industries made more and when he is incapable or disempowered by mod- more employees redundant. ern developments from taking care of his basic needs? I guess this is where my reaction – dis- 2. HERE WE ARE services of modern developments – came from. 2.1 Poverty and unemployment Hence my decision to discuss my thoughts on Rural families that used to depend on subsis- the unanticipated consequences of good inten- tence farming and home industries are now tions. unable to use available land and their own intellect and physical energies to produce food. 1. LOOKING BACK The land is either not arable, or the climate is There was a time when families worked collec- no longer conducive. There is global warming, tively, and worked very had to meet the sur- the El Ninõs and other factors. Seasons of the vival needs of each member. Natural resources, year are no longer predictable. Live stock does human intellect and sheer physical energy were not have enough grass to graze or enough

67 Mpako-Ntusi drinking water. Even the little that is still sur- rate of crime and violence. Social scientists like viving is often stolen from the owners. myself believe that there is a strong correlation Urban industries that have benefited from between the two concepts – poverty and crime. modern technological developments no longer While we cannot emphatically claim a cause need the large hordes of workers that used to and effect relationship between the two, it is service them. Machinery is preferred for its true that persons with no meaningful employ- reliability and loyalty since trade unions are an ment find criminal activity an alternative to additional threat to undisturbed productivity. being idle. We have heard several testimonies of Neither the under-developed rural areas nor the desperate job seekers who are lured to organised developed urban areas have work opportunities crime as a means of employment. Since there is for the majority of able-bodied persons willing no alternative, most respectable and peace lov- to use their human intellect and their physical ing citizens end up in criminal activities driven energy in the meaningful provision of resources by the need to provide for themselves and their for their own survival. Hence the high rate of families. This is not in any way claiming that all unemployment and poverty. Are these not the criminals are poor persons who have no alterna- unanticipated consequences of good intentions? tive way of earning a living. But research evi- Are these not the disservices of modern devel- dence exists showing that when the rate of opments? unemployment and poverty increases, so does Several terms have been fabricated to the rate of crime and violence, and when the describe these situations. Different causes and rate of employment increases, the rate of crime effects have been advanced. Yes, unemploy- and violence decreases. Hence such old sayings ment and poverty of different shapes and levels such as “the devil finds work for idle hands”. are a global scourge. Both developed and How democratic can we expect our criminal under-developed countries are grappling with population to be? these contemporary social issues and related problems emanating from them. Statistics of 2.3 Economic development vs political unemployment and poverty datum lines have development been calculated and circulated. Some countries One of my favourite authors is William Julius are more affected than others. Instead of condi- Wilson who writes profusely on poverty, race tions being better with time, things are getting issues and social policy. In his book The Truly worse at different rates. Disadvantaged, he focuses on social change and social dislocations. He maintains that the 2.2 Democracy desire to meet economic needs leads to social Trying to fit the implementation of democracy dislocation, while family structure is closely into the above scenario makes one wonder. I related to the amount of poverty in the family. allowed my own imagination to roam wildly. Political power is also closely related to eco- At this point I remembered Harry Schwarz, nomic power. A crude expression of that rela- South Africa’s ambassador in the US, who tionship was practiced by tribal authorities in declared that “poverty corrodes freedom”. If the rural areas where, for example, a man who democracy is something that can be implement- had no livestock was not allowed to have a say ed by persons who are said to be free, how free during community meetings. In most cases, are people who are poor to implement democra- economically disadvantaged persons would cy? If one is disempowered by circumstances probably lack the enthusiasm to participate in and cannot freely use one’s own intellect and these forums where the issues discussed have physical energy to provide for one’s own sur- very little if anything to do with the priorities of vival, how can the same person be expected to the poor. have the power to make choices at a national Another worthwhile contribution by Wilson political level? If one is incapable of taking is found in his book The Declining Significance care of one’s own basic needs (food and shel- of Race. In this book, Wilson reviews class dif- ter), how can one be expected to exercise a ferences and concludes that race is no longer a political right which meets the secondary needs major criteria deciding one’s fate, but that any- of nation building? one can belong to the underclass if they are dis- South Africa is presently dealing with a high empowered from doing any meaningful work.

68 Mpako-Ntusi

Also, the opposite is true: if one has the oppor- – revival of rural areas (need for rural tunity to engage in meaningful work, the signif- development by economically active adults icance of race declines. Thus, empowered – should not only see rural areas as retire- blacks who have the opportunities to provide ment places or places to bury the dead). responsibly for themselves and their families, are equally capable of meaningful political 4. FROM POVERTY TO DIGNITY involvement. Therefore it becomes clear that Social scientists have thought of alternative political power can be exercised by anyone irre- strategies to alleviate poverty. Some of these spective of race, as long as they are economi- are useless theoretical fabrications while others cally viable. The two can coexist, but economic are reports on case studies. Hampden-Turner development has to precede political develop- (1975) provides us with one of those tested ment for a proper synergy to be maintained and anecdotes. He writes about community devel- sustained. opment corporations as one of those strategies One of Wilson’s later publications – When that have led unemployed persons from poverty Work Disappears – starts to address strategies to dignity (political development). He exposes for alleviating poverty. While he starts by the power of community development corpora- analysing the consequences of unemployment, tions to provide social, economic and political he moves on to a discourse on the structure of leverage which enables poor persons to bring opportunity, focusing specifically on social pol- about social change. Hampden-Turner presents icy challenges and the need for intensive his theory simply and clearly, showing how it research effort on poverty to enable policy for- has been applied successfully in different cases. mulators to make informed decisions. One of the reviews on this publication described it as a brilliant psychological theory 3. BEYOND RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS in support of the self-determination principle. I am always impressed by student association More prescriptions on how to reverse poverty meetings’ agendas. They always have an item – are offered by Piven and Cloward in their book “Way forward”. Now that we have briefly and The Politics of Turmoil. They have devoted a superficially reviewed the origin, the present whole section to an analysis of strategies to end state, and contemporary thought on unemploy- poverty which they call “Mobilising the poor: ment, poverty and democracy, it would be irre- how it can be done”. It is tested anecdotes such sponsible of us to consider our job done. There as these which give us hope in the belief that is a need to go beyond scholarly interpretations some things have been tried, and some things to strategic planning and implementation in have been successful. order to address contemporary social issues. • Social policy: CONCLUSION – repeal of discriminatory statutes I would like to end on a positive note. It is true – sensible and sensitive implementation of that poverty, however perceived, retards affirmative action democracy. It is also true that unemployment – social welfare programmes and projects and poverty are now an integral part of modern (poverty alleviation) development. Therefore, strategies for poverty – fair labour laws alleviation should and must be found in modern – taxation reviews technological developments. Use of human • Non-governmental organisations: intellect, physical energy and the remaining – formal and informal partnerships natural and technological resources still holds • Independent initiatives: the hope to human dignity. We need to trans- – attitude transformation (need to move form disservices into services. If the Turners away from the mentality of entitlement) and the Pivens and Clowards were able to cre- – opportunity creation (education on small- ate useful strategies to address the poverty scale entrepreneurship) problems of their times and localities, so can – self-confidence and self-sufficiency we, and we will. This conference and other (respect for land use and opportunity for similar efforts are evidence of the beginning of subsistence farming) that process.

69 Mpako-Ntusi

REFERENCES

CLOWARD, RICHARD A. AND PIVEN, FRANCES Freedom. Washington D.C.: Embassy of FOX., (1974): The Politics of Turmoil: Essays South Africa. on Poverty, Race and Urban Crisis. New WILSON, WILLIAM JULIUS., (1980): The York: Vintage Books. Declining Significance of Race. Chicago and EHRENREICH, JOHN H., (1985): The Altruistic London: University of Chicago Press. Imagination. Ithaca and London: Cornell ______(1987): The Truly University Press. Disadvantaged. Chicago and London: HAMPDEN-TURNER, CHARLES., (1975): From University of Chicago Press. Poverty to Dignity. New York: Anchor ______(1996): When Work Disappears. Books. New York: Vintage Books. SCHWARZ, HARRY., (1993): Poverty Corrodes

70 Racism and Democracy in South Africa

Anthony Johnson

INTRODUCTION racially segregated but that, for purely peda- I would like to lead into this topic with two gogical reasons, some schools be reserved for anecdotes. They relate to circumstances on two black males. non-African continents but I believe they might Around the time I was in Jackson, one of the help to inform the debate on how, in practical television networks ran an exposé it had done terms, we might address the challenge of deal- on the remarkably resilient nature of racial dis- ing with racism in a democratic South Africa. crimination, both overt and covert, in the South The first relates to a visit I paid to the town in particular. The investigation traced the for- of Jackson, Mississippi, in the United States tunes and type of treatment meted out to two (US) “Deep South” a few years back as part of adult graduates of an Ivy League university – a broader investigation into race relations in the one white and one black – as they went about US and the legacy of the civil rights movement day-to-day routines as varied as renting an which had risen to prominence some three apartment to visiting a shoe store. The impact decades earlier. of the vastly different manner in which the two At the local museum I studied some of the were handled was devastating. early ringing charters and lists of demands of The second anecdote takes us to the Saxen- civil rights leaders, who at the time were mili- hausen concentration camp and museum just tating for not merely an end to rampant racism, outside Berlin, which I visited as part of an but also the installation of a new social and exploration of racism over the years in Ger- legal order that contained many overtones of many and the impact of the racial holocaust 50 non-racialism. years on. In my discussions with black community Saxenhausen was a model concentration leaders, educationalists and businesspeople I camp, in the sense that it was a cutting edge was somewhat taken aback by the extent to prototype institution where many of the experi- which many of the old agendas had shifted. ments in racial persecution and engineering Certainly, a desire for the equal treatment of were carried out first, before being transferred African Americans was still there – but there to camps further away from Berlin (where the was barely any evidence, even residual, of a bulk of the Nazi leadership was based). striving for a goal that included an integrated As was the case at the holocaust museum in brave new America. Berlin, the curator at Saxenhausen did not tire Many prominent blacks I interviewed of bewailing the shortage of state funds and seemed comfortable with largely racially dis- public support for preserving historically price- creet institutions such as schools and universi- less artifacts so important to bringing home the ties – some even viewed them as essential for consequences of what happens when racial big- progress and the fair treatment of African otry and hatred spin out of control. Americans. A few educationalists even argued The firebomb attacks on restored concentra- passionately that schools should not only be tion camp barracks by right-wingers were han-

71 Johnson dled by the curator with surprising equanimity. when one of the locals boasted after the inci- What almost brought him to tears, however, dent that a white person living in Balfour had was the fact that ordinary German citizens – one of three choices when dealing with a black: still – were unmotivated to preserve priceless “You either shoot him, bliksem him or paint documents and books about the holocaust him – it’s your choice”. which were rotting in damp cellars across the Five years since the formal end to white country and that they were content to sell off minority rule, the Human Rights Commission, invaluable artifacts from that era to flea mar- in its latest annual report, provides official con- kets, instead of handing them over to museums firmation of the still widespread nature of race for restoration, preservation and public display. discrimination in South Africa. Allegations of discrimination certainly ac- 1. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED counted for the bulk of the complaints received There is a lesson for South Africa, I believe, in by the commission last year. The announce- these two anecdotes from two of the most ment – barely days after the painting outrage – advanced and mature democracies in the world. that South Africa’s keenly awaited anti-dis- The citizens and opinion leaders in both coun- crimination law would be tabled in Parliament tries have, for many decades, experienced satu- soon, could hardly have been more timely. ration exposure about the evils of racism and Indeed, the draft law has been drawn up by racial stereotyping via their educational and the Human Rights Commission on behalf of the legal systems, powerful political party and civil Department of Justice to give effect to the pro- society pressure groups and international pub- vision in the constitution – the founding docu- licity campaigns. ment of our new democracy – that national leg- A great deal of time, money and energy has islation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit been devoted to rooting out racism and discrim- unfair discrimination within three years of the ination is these well-resourced nations. Con- adoption of the constitution. siderable legal sanctions have also been introduced to punish those who practice racial dis- 2. THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS crimination or promote racial hatred. Yet both The Prevention and Prohibition of Unfair Dis- in terms of overt and more subtle manifesta- crimination Draft Bill (which also has a work- tions of racism, or racially based discrimina- ing title of the Promotion of Equality Bill) has tion, there is still plenty of room for progress or already been dubbed the Equity Bill for ease of improvement. use. This is advisable since it is likely to What then of South Africa, where after years become one of the most discussed pieces of of officially encouraging and enforcing racism legislation to be handled by Parliament since while many countries were moving in the oppo- South Africa became a democracy in 1994. site direction, the move to consolidate our new Hugely broad and ambitious in its scope, it democracy is in fast-track mode as we attempt contains measures likely to touch the lives of to make up for lost time and wasted opportuni- most citizens on virtually a daily basis once it is ties? promulgated, probably early in 2000. The white farmer who recently hit the head- The legislation is currently being studied by lines after painting a black man silver for tres- Justice Minister Penuell Maduna before being passing on his property, claims that his actions passed on to Cabinet for approval. The next were sparked by rampant criminality in the area step will be the release of the document for rather than racism. The impending court case public comment and detailed examination by will no doubt tease out more details about the the Justice Portfolio Committee. It will then be farmer’s actual motives for a deed which discussed in plenary by the National Assembly shocked much of the nation. and the National Council of Provinces. But the widely divergent responses to the The draft legislation in its current form aims incident from members on different sides of the to outlaw discrimination – both by the state and racial divide in the sleepy Mpumalanga town of private individuals – on at least 15 grounds: Balfour shows that enmity, distrust and naked race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic or social racism remain rife in the new South Africa. origin, marital status, pregnancy, age, disabili- This reality was captured quite chillingly ty, religion, belief, conscience, culture, lan-

72 Johnson guage and, probably most controversially, eco- The Human Rights Commission and the nomic status. Department of Justice have certainly had their Many of these areas, or aspects of them, are work cut out trying to formulate a law with already covered by, for example, labour legisla- such a sweeping ambit, which attempts to tion, but with an obviously more limited sphere address a set of challenges with so many roots of application. Chapter 2 of the Constitution that run so deep into our nation’s past. (the Bill of Rights) also covers some of this ter- The spirit of the Equity Bill is similar to anti- ritory, but attempts to seek remedies to viola- discrimination legislation that exists in Britain. tions via the Constitutional Court can be both However, critical details about enforcement time-consuming and costly. mechanisms still have to be resolved. The intention of this new piece of legislation In Britain, where laws are more fragmented is to simplify and speed up the eradication of along racial and gender lines, a tribunal system discrimination. As part of this exercise the has been set up as a relatively swift remedy to Equity Bill not only attempts to define the deal with the floods of discrimination com- thorny question of what in fact constitutes dis- plaints received. South African politicians will crimination, but also the nuts and bolts of how ultimately have to decide whether to go this to get rid of it. It also makes provision for some CCMA-type route or whether to deal with dis- hefty penalties – fines of up to R70 000 and jail crimination cases via a special “equality divi- terms for more severe transgressions. sion” in our courts. One of the biggest dangers facing this piece A matter which is likely to spark consider- of legislation is that it could come to be seen as able debate and even controversy is that in a quick fix – a sort of miracle solution – among terms of the current draft of the law, “equality the many millions of South Africans that have tribunals” will not be bound by rules of evi- historically suffered discrimination in a variety dence and will be empowered to act without of forms and continue to do so. Touted as the regard to “technicalities or legal forms”. most important piece of legislation, after the It is envisaged that structures such as the constitution itself, to ever come before the Human Rights Commission and the Gender democratic Parliament, the anti-discrimination Commission will be used to receive and investi- law could raise expectations that will be diffi- gate complaints. But one has to question cult to fulfill. whether there is the political will to massively It is all very well to have a comprehensive boost the capacity and budgets of these histori- piece of legislation with noble intentions, but cally underfunded and already overstretched among the questions that should always be bodies. It is all very well to have a Rolls Royce asked are: constitution that makes provision for a wide • How enforceable is it? range of independent watchdog institutions bol- • How affordable is it? stering democracy – but the Rolls has to be • How easy is it to understand and interpret? properly serviced and taken for regular spins so • Does it raise and invite more questions than that the public can admire and appreciate it. answers? If the new law is not effectively enforced – or • Does it have unintended consequences? applied only selectively – it could, sadly, devel- • Does it conflict with or fly in the face of op a reputation of being toothless or unfair. other existing or pending legislation? What is not clear is whether the categories of • Does it fall foul of any of the provisions of potential discrimination will receive equal the highest law in the land – the constitution? weighting in practice or whether, like the affir- • Does it subscribe to basic tenets of law such mative action policies of many companies, as the presumption of innocence until a court racial discrimination will effectively enjoy a proves otherwise or does the onus fall on higher priority in reality than, say, gender dis- individuals to disprove charges – in this case parities. Such a pecking order could have an of discrimination – made against them? impact on the credibility or general acceptance • Can the problem it seeks to address be of the law. achieved by legal remedies alone or does the In a similar vein, will clauses outlawing dis- solution lie in a more complex, multi-faceted crimination on the grounds of language be matrix of forces operating in concert? taken seriously when, for example, certain lan-

73 Johnson guages routinely receive (unfair) preferential The broad – or in snooker parlance “calling all treatment in Parliament and government, which pockets” – nature of some of the media-related presumably should know better? clauses could end up conflicting with the free African languages, the mother tongues of the speech provisions contained in the Bill of majority of the population, invariably end up Rights. getting the short end of the stick. But it will be They could also well be out of sync with the interesting to see if the increasingly vociferous, spirit of the soon-to-be-tabled Open Democracy but much depleted band of Freedom Front MPs Bill – South Africa’s answer to the freedom of will in future resort to citing the equity law information legislation in countries such as the when refusing to buckle up in aircraft because US. Somewhat ominously, however, the Equity the safety instructions are issued only in Bill contains a proviso that if its provisions English. (They are already arguing that the conflict with any other law (apart from the signing of the international convention on constitution, of course), then the provision of apartheid should mean that affirmative action the new Act will apply. policies will have to be revisited.) Perhaps the area of greatest debate and legal Questions are already being asked in legal dispute will revolve around clauses that attempt and commercial circles about whether the to eradicate discrimination on the grounds of Equity Bill in its current form would rule out economic status, which, as we know, still large- affirmative action advertisements for jobs. ly reflects racial cleavages in our society. This The current draft declares that no person or could have a major effect on private clubs, organ of state will be allowed to discriminate schools, hospitals and a variety of banking, against anyone in any way by “advertising in a lending and other institutions. manner which unjustly excludes or disadvan- tages potential applicants from any group”. CONCLUSION There are, of course, a host of other areas Dealing with South Africa’s enormous legacy where questions of interpretation of the law will of discrimination in a practical manner that is have to be sorted out. meaningful to ordinary citizens is clearly not On the gender front, will men’s groups, as going to be easy. As one of the drafters of the has happened in Britain, launch legal chal- legislation, Human Rights Commissioner Jody lenges to pubs hosting “ladies nights” because Kollapen, conceded in a recent interview: this supposedly violates the spirit of the law? “If you see the law as the sole answer (to An area of the legislation that is bound to be eradicating discrimination), you will be dis- subject to huge contest are the provisions appointed. Ultimately, it involves changing which, if applied narrowly, could severely human nature and attitudes, and it would be inhibit freedom of speech and press freedom. naive to think that law can do that.”

74 Effective and Efficient Multilingualism in the Building of a Democratic South Africa or Linguistic Hegemony and Marginalisation

Kathleen Heugh

INTRODUCTION both within government and civil society – per- In a multilingual society such as South Africa, sist in one-directional communicative activi- if we are serious about democracy then we ties, through a language which has little mean- have to be serious about effective and efficient ing for the majority. Thus, the apparently inex- channels of communication. Through which orable drive toward a reliance on English as the languages are we informing people about their predominant language for communication rights and the services they can or should means quite simply that we are leaving 80% of expect government to deliver? To be plain, people on the fringe, beyond the borders of unless we use the very languages familiar to democratic participation. people in their daily lives, there can be no effective communication. If we believe that 1. ENSURE THE MAINTENANCE OF A RULING economic rejuvenation is necessary to strength- ELITE en the process of democracy, then to what South Africa is by no means alone as far as this extent are we making the best use of the lin- particular phenomenon is concerned. Most guistic resources of people in the workplace? If countries in sub-Saharan Africa are in the grip we have identified certain languages as official, of policies which ensure the maintenance of a then should we not, at the very least, use these ruling elite. Bernd Heine, a scholar from languages for official purposes of communica- Cologne, who has done some of the most tion? respected language audits in Africa argues that: We do not have, nor are we likely to have, a “According to a conservative estimate, less single language which can function as a viable than twenty percent of the African people lingua franca in this country. The fact of the are able to make use of their official lan- matter is that 80% of the population is profi- guage ... only ten percent of the people of cient in languages other than English, and is the francophone countries of Africa speak unable to use English as a useful tool for com- French and that only one or two percent munication for anything other than very limited speak it fluently and can think in it. The sit- communicative functions. In other words, no uation in anglophone Africa is comparable; more than 20% has an adequate proficiency of although there are some English-speaking English for communicative purposes in the states, like Nigeria, where more than one- workplace, for accessing services, for deriving fifth in fact do speak English, on average meaning from the education system, or for par- the percentage of English speakers is likely ticipating in provincial and national tiers of to be below twenty percent. This situation government. Yet, the leadership of the country is even more pronounced in the lusophone – by which I mean those in senior positions states such as Angola or Moçambique,

75 Heugh

where hardly more than one-tenth of the primary vehicle through which cognitive devel- national population is able to make use of opment will best occur. More than this, if one its national official language, Portuguese” wants to ensure that pupils are going to be able (1992:27). to succeed with the content of the curriculum as Sociolinguists are attributing the gap between well as the learning of a language of wider the language of the ruling class and the lan- communication, then the mother tongue has to guage/s of ordinary people, to the structural be maintained and used as at least one of the constraints of the political economy (for exam- primary languages of learning. Alamin Mazrui ple, Tollefson 1991). Jonathan Pool (1993:53- has recently attributed the failure of education 4) argues that if there is enormous pressure on this continent to an inherited educational from the proletariat to access the language of infrastructure which is colonial both in charac- rule, then there must be considerable distance ter and content. More specifically, it is one between the ruling elite and the proletariat. He which is infused with negative value attached to furthermore argues that as the language of indigenous languages, and positive values rule/power becomes more difficult to access, attached only to the ex-colonial language/s. the greater the desire to obtain power. In other “The process of colonial education had the words, the distance between the elite and the general effect of marginalising most African proletariat is mirrored by the distance between languages in favour of Euro-languages, cre- those who are proficient in the language of rule ating an imperialist linguistic configuration and those who are not proficient in this lan- that came to legitimise and reproduce the guage. Thus a drive toward monolingualism for unequal division of power and resources activities of high status means quite simply that between the speakers of Euro-languages only a few will enjoy participation in these and speakers of African languages” activities. It also implies that, if in South Africa (Mazrui, 1997:35). there is enormous pressure from speakers of The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had languages other than English to access English, in 1986 taken this reality into serious considera- then the road towards democracy is a very long tion and adopted a “Language Plan of Action one, and that it is for the foreseeable future very for Africa” which recognised that: unlikely that the majority will gain sufficient “... the cultural advancement of the African access to English. Pool, after Edelman (1977), peoples and the acceleration of their eco- argues pessimistically that: nomic and social development will not be “(T)hose who have political power use it to possible without harnessing in a practical get power over language, and those who manner indigenous African languages in have power over language use it to get that advancement and development ... That political power, with the result that the ideal the adoption and practical promotion of of democratic government is never African languages as the official languages achieved” (Pool, 1993:31). of the state are certain to have great advantages over the use of non-indigenous lan- 2. EDUCATION guages in democratising the process of for- Of course nothing is one dimensional, and mal education and involvement of the clearly in South Africa we are trying to unravel African populations in the political, cultural the threads of contradictory forces which propel and economic affairs of their country ... and us both towards and away from democracy. that mass literacy campaigns cannot suc- Access to language and hence power should be ceed without the use of indigenous African possible via the domain of formal education, languages” (OAU, 1987:1-2). especially if power is linked to a language other The OAU further recognised the positive role than the one used in one’s local community. of African languages in the promotion of unity There have been countless commissions of across national borders, as well as the de facto enquiry, recommendations and policy decisions reality of individual and societal multilingual- taken in Africa during the course of this centu- ism on the continent. None of this suggested ry, each one attesting to the importance of jettisoning the use of the international lan- maintaining and developing the use of the home guages, rather, it suggested that rational lan- language in the formal education system as the guage policy of each member state should

76 Heugh include an international language, but in its inexorably towards English and away from the rightful place alongside and together with the languages of the majority. indigenous languages within the multilingual The reasons usually made explicit elsewhere specifics of each state. and often offered here, are linked to apparent In addition to the OAU statement, respected budgetary concerns and a fear, by a largely linguists on the continent have been arguing monolingual and elite minority, of multilingual- that a language policy which proactively incor- ism. Bamgbose points out that: porates indigenous languages into both the “Experience with education in African lan- mainstream economy and education system is guages shows that in spite of the difficulties essential to development: which are often mentioned (multiplicity of “... efforts should be made by language languages, cost, smaller languages, linguis- planners themselves ... to make government tically mixed classes in urban areas, aware of the short- and long-term economic language development (,) status etc.), it can benefits of proper language planning to the be achieved, provided there is a strong will enterprise of national development. to do so. The alternative of not using ... Language planning is ... as important as African languages in education is ultimately any other aspect of economic planning and more costly and less democratic as well as the place of language planning is therefore wasteful to both human and material in the “National Development Plan”, as a development ...” (Bamgbose, 1996:13). concomitant of all other aspects of econom- Bamgbose’s point about the cost of not using ic planning for national development” African languages is extremely important, but (Chumbow, 1987:20-22). is not generally understood by the ruling class. Chumbow advised furthermore, that govern- Rather, those in power tend to cite their own ment language policy in Africa is too top-down misconceptions about the unaffordability of and that policy would be more likely to be suc- using more languages rather than fewer in edu- cessful if it were responsive to informed agen- cation. Sometimes they go even further and dis- cies in civil society. This particular point was count research evidence to the contrary.1 I picked up in South Africa by Neville Alexander intend to return to this point a bit later. who has argued since 1990 for “language planning from below” (see Alexander, 1992). 4. UNDERESTIMATING THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE Despite developments and the efforts of lin- 3. RECOMMENDATIONS guists and educators elsewhere in Africa, as A distillation of the recommendations from well as the efforts of language planners in across the continent during the course of this South Africa over the past decade, the role of century boils down to three things: language in the shaping of a democratic South • the integration of African languages in the Africa has been at best, seriously underestimat- mainstream economic and development plan ed, or, at worst, entirely ignored, in virtually • the maintenance of African languages as pri- every official domain over the past few years. mary languages of learning alongside the To begin with neither the Reconstruction and learning of a language of wider communica- Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, nor tion, such as French or English and its successor, the Growth, Employment and • the inclusion of those with language planning Redistribution (Gear) strategy of 1996 integrat- expertise in the formulation of policy as well ed or included language policy and planning as its implementation. into the economic plan for the country. For one reason or another, the recommenda- The language clauses in the 1993 Constitu- tions of the earlier commissions and the tion not only identified 11 official languages Language Plan itself have either not been, or but promised that conditions would be created have been only partially implemented in other for their equal use. The 1996 Constitution, African countries. What perplexes sociolin- however, lost all reference to “equal use”. guists from other countries, who are sending There were, though, a few serious and creative flocks of post-graduate students to study the responses to the challenge this presented. In implementation of our progressive constitution- particular, the Minister of Arts, Culture, al language clauses, is why we are moving Science and Technology, then Ben Ngubane,

77 Heugh quickly appointed a democratically conceived frustrates progress and many of the activities of consultative body, the Language Plan Task the Board. Group (Langtag) to draw up a Language Plan At other levels, public responses to the lan- for the country. This was a particularly inspired guage clauses in the 1993 Constitution were decision and it synchronised very well with the mixed. The response from the private sector recommendations of Chumbow a decade earlier was to move with increasing speed away from in terms of the appropriate process of language official bilingual practice towards monolingual planning. practice in English. This was mirrored by the Secondly, following, the constitutional provi- practice in national parliament and provincial sion for a statutory body for language, the Pan legislatures, with the exception of the Free South African Language Board Act was passed State, where very rapidly, with the assistance of in September 1995, and the body was estab- Flemish funds, a multilingual interpreting ser- lished in April of 1996 to fulfil the obligations vice was established and one which works most spelt out in the Interim Constitution of 1993. In efficiently. Perhaps the most confounding particular, these were in regard to its indepen- response of all was in the Northern Cape, where dence from government and its role in advising approximately 1% of the population has and monitoring language policy and planning English as a first language and less than 10% of developments. the province has a working proficiency in However, as soon as the 1996 Constitution English. Despite this, the legislature has operat- came into being, the dilution of the language ed primarily in English and the previous clauses and the removal of the requirement to Speaker actively discouraged the use of any ensure the equal status of the official languages, language or language service other than resulted in a slowing of momentum and a English, on the grounds of economic feasibility. change of direction from within government. Advertisements for jobs in the provincial The removal of the goal or target of equal status administration were, until 1998, usually pub- left the Department of Arts, Culture, Science lished in English only, which has meant that and Technology floundering. The Langtag applicants for senior positions have been large- report delivered to the Minister in August 1996, ly from outside the province. The practical has subsequently been diluted through several democratisation for people of the province can drafts within the department and has still not certainly not advance under these circum- emerged as a useful piece of legislation which stances. might provide government with a clearly spelt out language policy and implementation plan 5. LANGUAGE IN THE DOMAIN OF EDUCATION with the necessary time-frames. PANSALB, in Perhaps the activities in relation to the language the meantime, found itself paralysed by a set of issue in the domain of education is where I impenetrable regulations and under the bureau- would like to place the greatest emphasis today. cratic control of DACST and the Public Service The Department of Education (DoE) responded Commission. Lionel Mtshali, who replaced to the 1993 Constitution by initiating, in 1995, Ngubane as minister, informed PANSALB a process of developing a new language in edu- through the Deputy Director-General Musa cation policy. The policy was finally announced Xulu in March 1998 that the Board was to in July 1997 and is based on the principle of refrain from attempting to make policy or additive bilingualism which means keeping the advise on matters of language policy. The mother tongue throughout school, while adding department would make language policy. The a second and possibly third language. It means Board would carry out this policy. The argu- more or less that most students would, by about ment was that the 1993 Constitution under the fifth year of school, spend about half of the which the PANSALB Act fell, had been super- school day learning through the mother tongue seded by the 1996 Constitution. Amendments and half of the day working through and learn- to the PANSALB Act, intended to bring it into ing English. Unfortunately this policy develop- line with the 1996 Constitution, were finally ment was kept entirely separate from the paral- passed by Parliament in early 1999, but at the lel Curriculum 2005 process, the net result time of writing, the Act has not yet been signed being that Curriculum 2005 has been conceived by the President nor gazetted. Effectively this of in an English Second Language paradigm,

78 Heugh rather than the multilingual paradigm of the only pragmatic option available to a nation” language in education policy. The Curriculum (Mazrui, 1997:39). 2005 documents and terminology are thus far in Ironically enough, researchers attached to the an impenetrable and jargonised variety of World Bank have shown that the costs related English. Ninety percent of the Grade 1 and 2 to multilingual education are not nearly as sig- teachers who are at present affected, speak lan- nificant as they might seem. Vawda & Patrinos guages other than English and teach through (1998) are careful to say that there are increas- languages other than English at this level of the ed costs involved in textbook production, and school system. In other words, they have little these increase gradually when the print-run hope of getting to grips with the documentation declines from 20 000 to 15 000, thereafter the because, quite simply, the terminology is unfa- per unit cost increases dramatically. miliar and the level of English which the docu- The crucial issue for South Africa, is that we ments require has never before been required of are looking at materials in only 11 languages, these teachers. My own experience with teach- and each one of these would require print-runs ers in the Western Cape is that the terminology of over 20 000 per grade across the school sys- undermines them, and they have little hope of tem. Initially, there are costs relating to the working effectively with the new curriculum development of materials in local languages, under these circumstances. but these costs decrease as systems are estab- The next important consideration is that few lished and skills are developed. In addition, teachers know what the new language in educa- Vawda & Patrinos point out that there is a tion policy is and the departments of education range of strategies which can be employed as have yet to spell out how it should be imple- cost-minimising strategies. mented or integrated with the curriculum. With Among these are cooperation with neigh- the exception of a few schools in which PRAE- bouring countries with regard to shared lan- SA (Project for the Study of Alternative Edu- guages and use in education. Initially, if we are cation in South Africa) works, I am unaware of to look at the cost implications for bilingual any school which is actively engaged in imple- education for children in this country, and menting the new language policy. Officials in based on Vawda & Patrinos’ calculations, these the DoE and the Western Cape Education would amount to about a 10% increase in the Department have cited the cost factor as one of portion of the budget allocated to materials the deterrents to implementation and I would development/provision. This 10% increase like to knock this excuse on the head once and includes the cost of redesigning teacher training for all. programmes to equip teachers to maintain the Quite frankly, I do not believe that it is the home language, while adding the second lan- cost factor which is the stumbling block, rather, guage (probably English) so that both lan- I think (and following the work of Tollefson guages become effective languages of 1991, Phillipson 1992, Pool 1993 and others), learning.2 The increase would also cover the that this conveniently hides the reluctance of start-up costs of systems design for materials the ruling elite to share power, and language is development. The dramatic developments in a tool to block the sharing of power. If there information technology make the generation of were a genuine will to get on with the job of school materials in several languages easier and working with the languages of this country, the cheaper than ever before. They also mean that mechanisms would be quickly discovered. urban schools with complicated linguistic pro- Among the many agencies that perpetuate the files would be able to download the appropriate myth of cost is the World Bank. Mazrui draws linguistic combinations to match their needs. from World Bank documents to demonstrate My estimation is that this would constitute a that while the organisation recognises the im- 10% increase of expenditure in materials devel- portance of the mother tongue in education, it opment over approximately 10 years.3 Simul- nevertheless: taneously, pre-service teacher training pro- “‘understands’ that there are many instances grammes would have to begin the adjustments when ... instruction in the European lan- necessary immediately, but adjustments linked guages ... is more appropriate than instruc- to language issues should not result in cost tion in local languages ... and ... may be the increases.4

79 Heugh

How does this translate across the entire edu- about the African Renaissance and about reha- cation budget? Actual expenditure in the bilitating the Afrikaans language (1999), and 1995/6 year reveals an 88% allocation to the Minister of Education Kader Asmal is seri- salaries, and only 2% to school textbooks (The ous about achieving mass literacy, then perhaps Education Foundation, 1998). Thus, if we were there may be some hope that the distance to increase the expenditure on school textbooks between the language of rule and those of ordi- by 10% over the next decade, this would mean nary people may decrease. There is little doubt simply that the textbook figure would increase anywhere that mass literacy can only be from 2% to 2.2% of the budget. In other words, achieved in the languages used proficiently by the ruse that textbook costs prohibit local lan- people in their daily lives. guages is absurd. There is also little doubt that literacy is an essential requirement for democratic participa- CONCLUSION tion in society. Secondly, we are fortunate to Commitment, however, has to come from gov- have the example of Afrikaans from which we ernment. A government which conducts most can learn so much in the elaboration and mod- of its business in English and is profiled in the ernisation of languages for the purposes of edu- media through English, is not supporting multi- cation, economic activity as well as gover- lingualism. If the contrary threads which at one nance. moment propel government away from a shar- Then, as Neville Alexander (1999) points ing of power, can be successfully tempered by out, there can be no African Renaissance with- ideological concerns which dovetail with effi- out African languages, because any movement cient language planning, which would include which mobilises people towards the rediscovery the participation of agencies from civil society, of indigenous knowledge systems must clearly then perhaps we have some possibility of be dependent upon discovering this knowledge progress. Thus, if Thabo Mbeki is serious both through the languages in which it resides.

ENDNOTES

1) See the final two paragraphs in the chapter agencies in liaison with DoE, would cover on language in Getting Learning Right: most of the costs. Report of the President’s Education 4) In actual fact, most teachers in South Africa Initiative (Taylor & Vinjevold 1999:225-6). are not adequately equipped to teach in any 2) The point being that pupils would then have classroom, and for there to be any headway the best possible opportunity to become with necessary curriculum changes there bilingually proficient as well as academical- will have to be large-scale teacher develop- ly successful by the exit point from school. ment programmes set in place. The upgrad- 3) Both PANSALB and DACST have ing of requisite language in education skills language development budgets. Careful and proficiencies of teachers is one compo- rationalisation of resources and effective nent of a larger issue, thus most of these planning for terminology and dictionary costs need to be spread across both lan- development for education by these two guage and curriculum transformation.

80 Heugh

REFERENCES

ALEXANDER N, (1992): “Language Planning Society in Africa. Johannesburg: Witwaters- from Below”. In Herbert R (ed) Language rand University Press. and Society in Africa. Johannesburg: OAU, (1987): Language Plan of Action for Witwatersrand University Press. Africa. Addis Ababa: OAU. ALEXANDER N, (1999): “An African MAZRUI A, (1997): “The World Bank, the Renaissance without African Languages?”. Language Question and the Future of African Paper presented at the Goedgedacht Forum, Education”. Race & Class 38.3: 35-47. Cape Town, 16 July. MBEKI, T, (1999): Address to the Afrikaner- BAMGBOSE A, (1987): “When is Language bond, Pretoria, 27 July. Planning not Planning?” The Journal of West PHILLIPSON R, (1992): Linguistic Imperialism. African Languages 7.1:6-14. Oxford: OUP. BAMGBOSE A, (1996): “African Language TAYLOR N & VINJEVOLD P, (1999): Getting Situation and its Implications for Language Learning Right: Report of the President’s Planning and Education”. Paper delivered at Education Initiative. Johannesburg: The Joint the Pan African Seminar on “The Problems Education Trust. and Prospects of the Use of African National TOLLEFSON J, (1991): Planning Language, Languages in Education” held in Accra, Planning Inequality. London: Longman. Ghana 26-30 August 1996. POOL J, (1993): “Linguistic exploitation”. CHUMBOW B.S., (1987): “Towards a Language International Journal of the Sociology of Planning Model for Africa”. The Journal of Language. 103:31-56. West African Languages 7.1:15-22. VAWDA A & PATRINOS H, (1998): “Producing EDUCATION FOUNDATION, (1998): EduSource, Educational Materials in Local Languages: No 20. March 1998. Craighall: The Costs from Guatemala and Senegal”. Paper Education Foundation. presented at the 10th World Congress of HEINE B, (1992): “Language Policies in Comparative Education Societies, held in Africa”. In Herbert R (ed) Language and Cape Town July 12-17.

81 Globalisation and Democracy: Reconciling Economic and Political Liberalism in South Africa

Meenal Shrivastava

INTRODUCTION ining multiple trajectories of globalisation. It The post–Second World War global economy brings in its political, cultural and biological was largely a creation by the major powers and aspects as equally important dimensions for was institutionalised through international consideration, both theoretically and political- financial institutions such as the International ly. Yet another definition of globalisation Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the defines it as the general dominance of capital- World Trade Organisation(WTO) and its ism as the economic ideology, and the globali- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade sation of finance, manufacturing and services. (GATT). However, over the years the global Here the IMF and World Bank are perceived as economy underwent a number of major and the main agents for implementing the tenets of unforeseen structural changes that had a serious market economy in the South. impact on the system (e.g. the collapse of the Exactly what globalisation is and where it fixed exchange rate system; Southern debt cri- has generated an impact, is a source of much sis; increasingly protectionist policies in the debate. However, much of the optimism about North; etc.). These changes gave rise to the globalisation arises from the assumption that it current international trends that are exercising a has a positive impact on developing countries. profound influence on development theory and As a concept, it stands on shaky empirical practice. The most important of these trends is ground as a descriptor of an economic process. “globalisation”, which is affecting the policy Since in economic terms, globalisation is not choices of South Africa and other states in the ubiquitous. Let us consider some examples in region. view of this statement – in the matter of distrib- This paper presents a critical analysis of the ution of trade and investment there are three impact of various aspects of globalisation on trends that are inconsistent with a globalisation the democratic process in South Africa. Speci- tendency: firstly, the national bases of most fically, the paper explores the linkages between production processes; secondly, the economic and political liberalism and its rele- North–South divisions; and, finally, the devel- vance for South Africa. opment of regional, rather than global, trade and investment. Even in the financial markets, 1. UNDERSTANDING GLOBALISATION where the evidence for globalisation is the Globalisation is defined in various ways. It is strongest, the price of capital has not con- defined as a vision of a borderless world or a verged, and there are marked differences in deepening of the internationalisation process, savings and investment rates between national which is believed to strengthen the functional and regional financial markets.1 and weaken the territorial dimension of However, globalisation performs very impor- development. The non-reductionist view of tant political functions – above all, it legitimis- globalisation delinks economy and globalisa- es the international pressures for states in the tion, opening up the theoretical space for imag- South to accept the hegemony of international

83 Shrivastava capital within their borders. Therefore, in politi- cepts of the autonomous interplay of free mar- cal terms, globalisation is pursued vehemently kets and minimalist states. and aggressively. The adjustment programmes However, the compromise of embedded lib- of international agencies use debt repayment to eralism has not been extended by the major substitute regulation by the state. Although the powers to the developing countries. In fact, the Western analysts term it as “the narrowing of North has attempted to force the South to adjust the gap between the predominant regional to full orthodox liberalism, without embedding forms of capitalism”, “growth of a functional it in the realities of their domestic state-society world market” or “economic homogenisation of relations. This new orthodoxy views the state the world”.2 In effect, it only leads to the subor- itself as a key obstacle to development and pre- dination of the state and its economy to the scribes export-led growth and a minimalist rules of capital accumulation set by markets as state, with the market as its major instrument of well as the core states. reform. The Western liberal vision has underestimat- 2. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN GLOBALISATION AND ed the role of the state in the following ways: DEMOCRACY firstly, even neoclassical economic reform Broadly, there are two aspects to the concept of requires a relatively strong and capable state globalisation – the economic aspect, which structure; secondly, any state, especially demo- includes liberal, neoclassical economic reform cratic, needs to buffer the socio-political conse- and the political aspect, which foresees a rapid quences of transformation; and thirdly, the lib- spread of democratic political structures. This eral vision of economic transformation might vision asserts a positive and reinforcing syner- not be the only possible or common path to gy between its economic and political aspects, transformation. Hence there is a need to formu- such that economic liberalisation and democra- late a new political economy of development, tisation are to take place simultaneously. which can strike a proper balance between However, this is hardly the economic and polit- state, market and development. In short, a form ical reality of the world today. Since the world of embedded liberalism for all, not just for the trading order is characterised more by econom- First World. ic mercantilism and regionalism than this vision acknowledges, and the world’s credit markets 3. SOUTH AFRICA AND GLOBALISATION are characterised more by skewed flows of cap- International finance has been an important fac- ital and technology. tor in South African economic development On the economic front, globalisation is inter- since the beginning of the country’s industriali- preted as having reduced, to an extent, the sation. In the 1980s, international financial power of the state with respect to its leverage flows dried up due to poor economic perfor- and control over economic policy.3 The domi- mance, the impact of sanctions and the global nant political economy in the West, however, debt crisis. However, since the transition to has been a form of compromise called “embed- democracy, the IMF, World Bank, and private ded liberalism”4 or “benign mercantilism”,5 and public foreign investors and institutions which involves the use of extensive state have rapidly returned to the country. Despite power, simultaneously in the interest of domes- concerns about the value and relevance of the tic stability and well being on the one hand, and development philosophy and advice of the international economic adjustment on the other. international financial institutions, neo-liberal State power has been employed to varying ideas have come to dominate the economic pol- degrees to restructure the economy, while min- icy framework in areas such as trade, monetary, imising and buffeting the disruptive domestic fiscal and labour policy. political and social consequences of liberal eco- The most telling example of the profound nomics at the international level. As a result, influence of capitalist ideology, is the oft-quoted modified international economic liberalism and Reconstruction and Development Programme domestic political stability and prosperity, via (RDP). In its initial form as an African National state intervention, coexist in a strained balance, Congress (ANC) policy document for discus- mediated by the pressures of democratic poli- sion (published in early 1994), it represented a tics; far removed, indeed, from the liberal pre- demand-oriented approach to the economy.

84 Shrivastava

However, the White Paper in September 1994 • Growth of protectionist measures among the showed a marked shift towards a supply-side industrialised countries. approach, more in line with the neo-liberal • The forced opening up of developing coun- thought pervading the IMF and the World Bank. tries’ domestic markets through the GATT/ Another illustration is the way in which regional WTO and other trade arrangements. development in Southern Africa is influenced South Africa entered its period of transition by the dictates of the global market. with the following advantages in relation to An understanding of the differences between these trends: the two elements of Political Economy is cru- • A relatively large and diversified manufactur- cial in this quest. The first element is “public ing sector. policies on economic matters”, which shape the • Open to inflows of foreign direct investment economic system and are made up of many and technology for many decades. intertwining elements – including issues such • Significant physical, banking and human as the nature of industrial policy, privatisation, resource base. property rights, etc. Public policy is affected by • Global competitive edge in sectors such as factors such as the nature of the organisations metallurgy, mining equipment, chemical and within the economy, the role of political organs, paper. the information structure, the distribution of The major weaknesses, despite these achieve- decision-making power, etc. The second elements, are: ment is “economic policy”, which can be • Large areas of industry are neither competi- defined as action or inaction within the frame- tive nor technologically dynamic. work of a given system which seeks to influ- • The relatively small size of manufactured ence outcomes – examples of economic policy exports. are monetary and fiscal policy. While neither is • Particularly behind in the advanced engineer- part of the other, the effect of uncertainty about ing sector and labour-intensive products. public policy on economic matters and on out- • A low productivity growth in the past two comes which reflect the effect of economic pol- decades. icy cannot be underestimated, since the out- Since its transition to democracy, South Africa comes it influences include savings rate, growth is undergoing a pathbreaking struggle to rate, public debt, job creation, provision of achieve structural reform. Evidently, academic housing, health care and education, etc. economic analysis and debate needs to move on However, in the context of South Africa, the to the development of a detailed and far-reach- economic system itself is not a given.6 Thus an ing policy agenda capable of tackling the lega- impossibly large burden is placed on the mone- cy of apartheid and radical enough to turn tary and fiscal policy elements of economic around the South African economy and society. policy. Public policy discussion about desired It is not enough to draw on international evi- improvements to the system draws attention dence without addressing the peculiarities of away from the need for a coherent and purpose- the South African situation. Only a regulated, ful current overall economic strategy policy. state-led growth and development strategy Non-delivery, brought about in large part by the offers the possibility for economic change suf- non-use of economic policy instruments, affects ficiently deep and sustainable to address the confidence in the economy. In the absence of problems of poverty and inequality, and to effective economic policy the domestic econo- strengthen democracy. my slows down. There has been a policy retreat in internation- The global economic trend in the past few al financial policy and strategy. It has been decades has been characterised by the follow- stripped of its commitment to regulate the ing: nature of South Africa’s relations with the • A subdued economic growth rate. international financial institutions and foreign • Domination of fiscal and monetary ortho- investors. Ideologically, the widespread accep- doxy. tance of economic orthodoxy, from stabilisation • Intensified international competition, increas- to trade liberalisation and privatisation, has ingly based on non-price factors such as pro- been the key reason for lack of progress in the duct quality, design, speed of innovation, etc. delivery of social and physical infrastructure.

85 Shrivastava

Coupled with capacity problems, these factors Since the political power of a country is have resulted in the absence of a coherent shaped and characterised by wealth and access industrial policy; the lack of a clear strategy for to the state or democratic participation, the Southern African regional integration; and a strong and organised support of mass-based failure to implement progressive reforms in the organisations in civil society (such as trade financial sector. This shift in economic policy unions) is crucial in resisting pressures from was facilitated, among other things, by a dis- international financial institutions and in adopt- tancing from the popular democratic culture, ing an integrated development approach. One which dominated union and anti-apartheid poli- critical element of an alternative strategy is an tics. active industrial policy, within the context of existing capacities, seeking out new opportuni- CONCLUSION ties in the restructured global economy. The ability to confront the internationalisation The East Asian experience has also demon- of capital is a question of state capacity and the strated that close integration into the world need is for building state capacity. The indica- economy is not a precondition for growth and tions are that IMF pressure on issues such as development. the budget deficit will only intensify, threaten- Instead, countries such as Japan, South Korea ing even more the capacity of the government and Taiwan integrated into the world economy to meet RDP objectives. The state therefore in the direction and at the extent to which it was needs to ensure that the capacity, efficacy and useful for them, which is referred to as “strate- efficiency of the state are improved in order to gic integration”. meet the challenges of development and to con- These cases also demonstrate that economic solidate democratic prospects in the country. In liberalisation and export-oriented development other words, to permit adjustment and to buffer demand strong and capable states. its costs, since it cannot be overlooked that The challenge for South Africa is to develop globalisation has also brought about increasing an economic strategy that would enable the income inequality, job insecurity and unem- country to meet and overcome domestic ployment in both developed and developing demands and deficits, while enabling it to com- countries of the world – undoubtedly, pete internationally, wherever appropriate and unfavourable conditions for the process of strategic, serving both development as well as democratisation. democracy.

ENDNOTES 1) Linda Weiss, “Globalisation and the myth of 4) John Gerard Ruggie, “International regimes, the powerless state”, New Left Review 225 transactions and change: Embedded liberal- (1997), pp.3-27. ism in the post-war economic order”, 2) See H. Bull and A. Watson (ed.), The International Organisation; 36 (2) 1982; Expansion of International Society (Oxford: 390-415. Clarendon, 1985) and Bjorn Hettne, 5) See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of “Globalism, regionalism and the europeanisa- International Relations (Princeton, 1987), pp. tion of Europe”, Politeia; 17 (3) 1998; 44-59. 404-405. 3) Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: 6) Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (ed.), The Political Economy of South (Cambridge, 1996). Africa’s Transition (Dryden, 1997).

86 Racial Categorisation: Threats to South Africa’s Fledgling Democracy

Roy du Pré

INTRODUCTION 1. STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM The account of the Trojan Horse in Grecian The struggle to gain freedom in South Africa history is well-known: the seemingly impreg- has been a struggle of many years, many cen- nable city of Troy which fell when the enemy, turies. There was the struggle against slavery tired of trying to take Troy, built a wooden (1657-1838); the struggle against segregatory horse, hid soldiers in its interior, waited for the attitudes and legislation since the 1800s; the Trojans to wheel it into the city; then sneaked struggle against disfranchisement (1902- out while the Trojans slept, opened the city 1990s); the struggle against political, residen- gates from within and gave access to the wait- tial and economic segregation; the struggle ing army to march in and defeat the Trojans. against English imperialism and colonialism; There are a number of Trojan Horses in and the struggle against Afrikaner nationalism South Africa’s fledgling democracy, which the (apartheid). A pattern in all of these struggles present government has taken over from the was fear of the “other”. This was manifested in former regime and entrenched in law, and colour prejudice, language prejudice and reli- which possess the potential to destroy this care- gious prejudice. Eventually colour prejudice fully crafted democracy of ours. Among the became the overriding prejudice affecting the many Trojan Horses are those such as the land relationship between peoples. question which relates to the issue of land dis- There was very little prejudice in the early possession and redistribution; and the contin- years of the Cape Colony. Relationships were ued use of apartheid racial categories which guided by whether one was Christian or hea- affects not only farmers’ attitudes to land and then and free or slave. The white–black issue their workers, but the whole issue of the contin- really only arose in the late 18th century when ued relationship between the previously trekboers reached Fish River and clashed with polarised and compartmentalised communities the numerically superior Xhosa. Fear of blacks in South Africa. Because the issue of race and crystallised and concretised in the Eastern Cape racism has so strongly permeated every level of region. It is here where racial attitudes hard- South African society, entertaining and encour- ened. When the Voortrekkers left for the Free aging racial stereotypes, categories and labels State and Transvaal, they took with them this carry the seeds to destroy attempts at building a attitude which eventually became the guiding non-racial, democratic society and a single principle and basis of apartheid, and the atti- South African nation. tude to land and farmworkers in South Africa. This paper will examine the background to In 1950, racial discrimination became the rise of racism and racial categorisation in entrenched in law and remained the corner- this country in order to provide a warning of stone of National Party (NP) policy until 1991. the potentially destructive consequences of bas- ing new legislation on the racially based foun- 2. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION dation of the past. In June 1991, after 43 years in power, the NP

87 Du Pré abolished all apartheid laws placed on the racial labelling, the foundation stone of statute books since 1949. The abolition of apartheid. Furthermore, a government of per- apartheid came about as part of the move sons who were victimised and stigmatised by towards negotiations for a non-racial democra- apartheid laws, has developed policies whose cy. The cornerstone of the NP’s apartheid poli- very basis are the same laws which people gave cy between 1948 and 1994 had been race clas- up their lives to have abolished. sification whereby the entire population had Racial labelling has been perpetuated in been racially labelled. This Act was of course many areas of South African life, most notably the very foundation of apartheid, as racially- in the education sector. The Department of based laws were only able to be applied after National Education requires schools to indicate people were identified by race and suitably the racial category of each child in a school. labelled. Race classification therefore made it Parents are requested to indicate the race of possible for apartheid to work. their children. Institutions of higher learning Although this law has since been abolished, have also been confronted with this dilemma. the labels have remained. The non-racial Students enrolling at universities and tech- Government of National Unity elected in April nikons are requested to indicate their race on 1994 retained racial labelling in order to imple- application forms. Recent restructuring in this ment policies of redress, such as affirmative sector has also required universities to submit action and equity employment. Thus, even three-year rolling plans based on projections. though race classification was introduced to The Department of National Education requires provide a foundation for racially based policies, institutions to project future enrolments and the government after 1994 has seen fit to per- staffing levels of “African, Coloured, Asiatic petuate this racist policy. and White” persons – the very levels of classifi- After 1994, affirmative action became one of cation used by the Population Registration Act the cornerstones of the new government’s poli- of the apartheid era.1 Application forms for cy. Through affirmative action legislation, the funding by the Human Sciences Research government sought to redress the inequities and Council (HSRC) require applicants to indicate imbalances of the past, by giving persons who their race based on the apartheid labels. were disadvantaged by virtue of the colour of The Employment Equity Bill passed in 1998 their skin the opportunity to take their rightful requires employers to hire according to percent- place in the economy and government of this age quotas to reflect the racial demographic country. In seeking to apply affirmative action, make-up of the country – again based on racial the government determined that the persons to categories. However, the crucial question is: if be affirmed needed to be identified. While this race classification was abolished in 1991, on was of course necessary to ensure that the cor- what basis do schools, universities, the HSRC rect recipients were identified, the government and employers decide who is “African, chose to base the identification process on Coloured, Asiatic and White”? In the case of racial classification set out in the Population institutions of higher learning, administrators, Registration Act of 1950. This Act was of deans, heads of departments and academics course the very foundation of apartheid, as the have to decide upon the racial category. This pillars of apartheid – viz. the Mixed Marriages, harks back to the days of race classification Immorality, Group Areas, Separate Amenities, boards when persons appeared before members Separate Representation of Voters’ Acts and of the board to be scientifically “examined.” A other laws – were only able to be applied after candidate was classified on the basis of people were identified by race and suitably “appearance”. labelled. In 1991, the NP acknowledged the The last census conducted in 1995 was very flawed basis of racial labelling and abolished sensitive to this issue of racial labels. Even racial classification, along with all other though the government was keen to get accu- apartheid legislation in June of that year. rate information on the number of people in The irony therefore is that a new non-racial various racial categories, it is worth noting that democratic government, in seeking to over- the census forms asked people what they con- come the inequities of race-based laws, has sidered themselves to be. Thus even though the chosen to base affirmative action policies on government needed to have race-based infor-

88 Du Pré mation for its affirmative action policies, at person’s race according to the colour of his least it allowed for self-classification. This is, skin. Everyone would have to carry an identity however, not the case at present in the instances card indicating his race.7 This would bring to referred to above. Employers, administrators, an abrupt halt the tradition of “passing”. educators and academics are required to “play However, when it was introduced, the discrimi- God” and identify persons on the basis of natory aspects of the proposed Act were delib- “appearance”, or their former racial categorisa- erately concealed. The Minister of the Interior tion. advanced as his motivation for the Act, that In order to determine the morality of affirma- population registration was necessary to obtain tive action and other legislation and practices important statistical information such as birth based on racial categorisation, it is necessary to date, race and national status;8 and, secondly, briefly examine the implementation and appli- that it was necessary to determine a person’s cation of race classification between 1950 and identity through the issue of personal docu- 1991 in South Africa. This paper seeks to ments for purposes such as control over illegal examine the origin and flawed basis of race immigrants, the curbing of tax avoidance, and classification and to provide a rational explana- the identification of persons for the purpose of tion why the continued use of racial labels is commercial transactions (e.g. the purchase of immoral, unethical and fraught with grave liquor).9 (Such reasons are very similar to those implications. provided today, viz, that the use of racial categories is necessary to ensure that the formerly 3. IMPLEMENTING RACE CLASSIFICATION disadvantaged are correctly identified in order In 1948 the NP came to power with a policy to provide redress.) According to the Minister, and a slogan which captured the imagination of the fact that all adults would be classified those who shared their views of race and segre- according to race, meant that there would be no gation. “Apartheid” became the rallying call for racial discrimination in the Act itself.10 white supremacists in this country.2 However, apartheid could only succeed if rigid racial sep- 4. CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION aration was practised. The first step in this Initially, only two categories of classification process was the introduction in 1949 and 1950 were positively defined, viz. European (white) of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages and the and Native (African).11 Everyone who was not Immorality Acts respectively. These laws for- “European” or “Native” was classified bade marriages between “Europeans” and “non- “Coloured”.12 In terms of the Population Europeans” as well as sex across the colour Registration Act a white person was someone line. However, at that stage the NP did not who (a) “in appearance obviously is a white know who exactly were “Europeans” and who person and who is not generally accepted as a were not. The major stumbling block was the coloured person”; or (b) “is generally accepted large number of South Africans of mixed race, as a white person and is not in appearance obvi- loosely referred to as “coloured”,3 who repre- ously not a white person, but does not include sented virtually the entire colour spectrum,4 any person ... who freely and voluntarily admits “some as black as pitch and some as white as that he is by descent a black or coloured per- snow”.5 Up to 1950, legislation did not provide son ...”.13 According to the above definitions, adequate definitions of the population. the criteria for “white” classification were Imprecise racial classification had led to a tradi- appearance and acceptance.14 The most striking tion of “passing” because of the difficulty of aspect of this definition was the absence of differentiating between whites and light- descent as a criterion. skinned “coloureds” on the one hand, and dark- The main tests for white classification were skinned “coloureds” and Africans on the other.6 that of looks (appearance) and social associa- As far as the policy of apartheid was concerned, tion (general acceptance).15 The first test was: the solution was to determine the “race” of an “Does the person look like a white person?” individual. Factors such as habits, education, speech, The government’s response was the Popu- deportment and demeanour in general also had lation Registration Act (No. 30 of 1950) which to be taken into account in judging this laid down guidelines for the determination of a “look”.16 According to the second test, a person

89 Du Pré had to be “generally accepted” as a white per- fuzzy definition of a white person, the rigid def- son at any place where he was “ordinarily resi- inition of a black person, and the inexact defini- dent, is employed or carries on business; mixes tion of the rest, shows that the NP government socially or takes part in other activities with in 1950 intended, on the one hand, to retain as other members of the public, and his associa- white as many people as possible who were tion with the members of his family and any generally accepted as white. As there are very other persons with whom he lives.”17 The crite- few persons in South Africa who have “pure rion was therefore not with whom the person white blood”, the test of descent was not con- chose to associate or with whom he mixed, but sidered. On the other hand, the NP clearly “how other people see and interpret his social intended to admit into the white group as few associations.”18 The third consideration was people as possible who did not have as much that someone could look like a white person “pure white blood”. The existing and future and be accepted as such, but if he admitted that white group was therefore kept as pure and he was a coloured, or his ancestors had “mixed small as possible. The Race Classification blood”, he could not be classified white.19 Board which was set up to ensure that everyone The definition of a “Native” was more was correctly classified, “did not apply the defi- straightforward. A “Native” (later, Black)20 nition of a white person positively to classify “means a person who is, or is generally accept- people as Whites, but negatively to exclude ed as, a member of an aboriginal race or tribe of them from the ranks of Whites.”25 Africa.”21 In this definition, descent was the main criterion. Customs and appearance played 5. PROBLEMS IN THE CLASSIFICATION PROCESS a role only when evidence of the person’s bio- The original purpose of the Population logical descent was absent. Everyone who did Registration Act was to place insurmountable not fit into the two positively defined categories obstacles in the way of anyone who wanted to were lumped under the omnibus label of pass from one race group to another. However, “Coloured”. The major problem confronting the the process of race classification was immedi- drafters of the Act was the description of a ately bedevilled by a number of unique prob- “Coloured”. The difficulty presented by this lems. Firstly, many persons who obtained white problem was already noted by an NP commis- classification did so by producing birth certifi- sion in 1945 which expressed the conviction cates to prove that they were white. Prior to that in relation to the question of “who is actu- 1950, it had been common practice for white ally a Coloured and who is not ... a manageable fathers whose wives were “non-white”, to definition will have to be given that will pro- attend to the registration of the birth of their vide sufficient satisfaction in practice.”22 By offspring. Because the father was white, the 1950 the government had not yet come up with government clerk duly recorded the infant as a “manageable definition.” For example, the “European”, without seeing the mother. After best that the Act could do was to define a 1950, these persons were successful in gaining “Coloured” person as one who was not white classification, received white identity “European” or “Native”. This group included documents and, in later years, were given white Chinese, Japanese, Indians and other persons of pensions.26 Asian origin, as well as persons of “mixed A second problem encountered arose out of race” such as Malays, Griquas, Basters, etc.23 the common practice prior to 1950 for parents Children of white and black, and white and to have their children baptised before their coloured parents, were classified according to births were registered. Baptismal certificates the race of the father if he was black or later served as the basis for the information coloured. However, if the father was white and contained in the birth certificate. The problem the mother not, then the child’s classification was that many South Africans were described was that of the mother’s.24 on their baptismal certificates as “mixed”.27 There was therefore no uniform or scientific This practice came about because children’s policy in determining the race of a person. One details were generally recorded by ministers of was white by appearance and acceptance; black religion. At the baptism of a child the minister by biological descent; or coloured, because one decided for himself, by looking at the parents, was neither white nor black. The deliberately what their ancestry was, and entered the child’s

90 Du Pré accordingly. However, prior to 1950, “mixed” condemned themselves to a second-class exis- did not necessarily mean mixed race but often tence. Many were able to “pass for white” and mixed nationality and mixed religion as well. did so. They had to, however, leave their neigh- Thus, children born of a Scot and a Frenchman bourhoods, their schools, their churches, their were sometimes indicated as “mixed” on their friends and, more tragically, their families. birth certificates (viz, mixed nationality). Child- They would never again be united because, to ren born of a Catholic parent and a Lutheran be seen associating with “Coloured” people parent were sometimes also indicated as often spelt disaster for “play-whites”. When “mixed” (viz., mixed religion). Then too, chil- friends and relatives passed them in the street, dren born of a white father and black mother, or the usual reaction was to turn their faces, sud- persons of indeterminate ancestry, were record- denly engage in window-shopping, or cross to ed as “mixed” (viz., mixed race). In most cases, the other side of the street.31 “White” relatives where the minister was not certain, he would would ask their “Coloured” family and friends indicate “mixed”.28 Because “mixed” did not to visit them at night. necessarily mean “mixed race”, the Race Classification Board after 1950 encountered 6. RACE CLASSIFICATION IN PRACTICE difficulties unravelling the various “race Because the Population Registration Act in groups” which clustered under the “mixed” 1950 only created two positively defined classi- umbrella. As a result, many persons and fami- fication levels, viz. “European” and “Native”, lies with “mixed” birth certificates were not whoever did not belong to one or the other was automatically classified “Coloured” when the automatically classified “Coloured”. Thus, the law was passed in 1950.29 In many cases, such “Coloured” population group was not a “mixed persons and families were “invited” to indicate race” group when it was originally conceived. the racial classification they desired to have This group included “pure blooded” Asians applied to themselves. If the representative of such as Chinese and Indians. While Chinese the Population Registrar had doubts about the were regarded as “Coloured” for purposes of racial group to which a person and his/her fami- classification, if they got letters from their con- ly belonged, all that had to be done was to sup- sul certifying them to be persons of good stand- ply the Population Registrar with a letter or ing, they could travel in white coaches on main- affidavit by at least one, or two if possible, of line trains.32 The application of the law to the following to the effect that the person was Japanese was even more complicated. Japanese regarded by them as white: were regarded as “Coloured” because the law • an officer in charge of a police station did not have a definition for them. However, • a school principal Japanese living in South Africa could get a per- • a minister of the church mit to live as white in terms of the Group Areas • an employer Act, buy houses in white areas and use white • a Senator, Member of Parliament or the amenities. Japanese tourists were technically Provincial Council “Coloured” but would be regarded as “White” • the mayor for a period of 90 days and be entitled to all the • the town clerk privileges enjoyed by whites. After that time • the chairman of an agricultural union. they once again became “Coloured”.33 During Two further affidavits from family friends were the time they had their “White” status, they also required.30 In this way thousands of could associate freely with white women. “mixed-blood” South Africans gained entry However, if they associated with “Coloured” or into the “white” population group. Chinese women, they would be committing an At first, many light-skinned coloured people offence under the Immorality Act.34 Later, in this situation did not take the Population Japanese living in South Africa were allowed to Registration Act too seriously. They did not reclassify and live in a white suburb if they envisage what a “Coloured” identity would married a white person. However, as trade mean to their lives as far as employment, edu- between South Africa and Japan increased in cation, marriage, social life, wealth and upward the 1970s and 1980s, all Japanese were granted mobility were concerned. Some elected to the status of “honourary white”. This was done retain a “Coloured” identity and unwittingly so as not to jeopardise trade relations by of-

91 Du Pré fending the Japanese government and Japanese was unsuccessful. In that year the Cape businessmen. Supreme Court decided that “coloured” chil- One of the consequences of race classifica- dren could not be excluded from public tion was the absurdity of multiple classifica- schools, because the judges were “unable to tions within the same family.35 In Parliament in agree on exactly how to differentiate between 1988, Ismail Essop pointed out that he was whites and light-skinned coloureds.”43 By the classified Cape Malay; two of his brothers were time race classification was introduced in 1950, classified “Coloured” and another “white”; two many “coloured” people, because they had sisters were classified “Coloured” and another lived, worked, worshiped and played with “Indian”.36 Furthermore, stated Essop, “in this whites, were classified white. Thus, the “white House we have a pure Egyptian classified nation”, already “mixed” by virtue of extensive Coloured.”37 The absurdity was starkly evident miscegenation in the 17th and 18th centuries, in practice. A “Coloured” taxi-operator who received an influx of a large number of mixed objected to regulations which compelled taxi race South Africans in the first half of the 20th drivers to only carry people of their own race, century. Since 1950, many more “Coloureds” pointed out that if he was only permitted to successfully reclassified.44 Thus, in the past carry “non-Europeans” in his car, he would not 300 years, and especially in the past 40 years, be able to carry his wife and mother because thousands of mixed race South Africans have, they were “white”.38 on a regular basis, been absorbed into the white group.45 7. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN Although the term “Coloured” implies that NATION such persons are of “mixed race”, not all per- The creation of the “Coloured” population sons of mixed race were classified “Coloured” group deserves particular scrutiny. While the in 1950 and, conversely, not all persons classi- law clearly defined the “European” and fied “Coloured” in 1950 were of mixed race. “Native” population groups in 1950, the Miscegenation during the first 200 years of “Coloured” population group was an imprecise, white settlement in South Africa brought a sig- ill-defined, melting-pot, supposedly comprising nificant amount of “non-white” blood into the people of “mixed race”. However, “mixed developing nation due to the large numbers of race” implied that the “European” and “Native” free and slave “blacks” in close proximity to population groups were “pure” groups. How- whites. By 1867, whites had at least 6.9% ever, no race exists which is not mixed, least of “mixed blood” in their veins.46 Thus, by the all the white South African “race”.39 In 1950, time race classification was introduced in 1950, the white South African population was “an South Africans were a mixed race “nation”. In exotic pot-pourri which (not least among 1959 the Cape Town historian and genealogist, Afrikaners) includes the indigenous people of M Jeffreys, wrote: South Africa.”40 “Non-white” blood had “It is fairly safe to say that where any fami- entered the “white nation” almost as soon as ly has been in this country for more than Van Riebeeck arrived at the Cape in 1652. In 200 years, the chances of having no infu- the 17th and 18th centuries there was wide- sion of colour are rather remote. Of the spread marriage and sex across the colour line families who were settled in South Africa resulting in large numbers of children of mixed before then, the chances of a colour infusion parentage.41 In many instances, because their are doubled with each added 25 years. The fathers were invariably white and Christian, Coloureds in the more established groups these mixed race children were absorbed into are not so far away from Whites as the white society.42 Whites might prefer to believe.”47 In the early part of the 20th century, large In 1960 Professor Gert Eloff of the University numbers of “coloured” persons lived among of the Orange Free State endorsed this view. He whites, went to the same schools and churches, estimated that whites whose forebears had lived played on the same sports teams and often mar- in South Africa for eight generations or longer ried across the colour line. In fact, the colour could be sure that at least five per cent of their lines were so blurred that an attempt in 1911 to racial composition was of non-white origin.48 define white and coloured for public purposes Dr E D du Toit of the Department of Genetics

92 Du Pré at the University of Cape Town in 1984 con- cards in 1969 to ensure victory for the pro-gov- firmed that there was a considerable admixture ernment Federal Party in the election for the of Khoisan, Negro and Asiatic genes to be Coloured Persons’ Representative Council elec- found in white South Africans and that they had tion.56 more than seven per cent “mixed blood”.49 Over the years, the flow of persons from the “Native” population group to the “Coloured” 8. THE FLUIDITY OF THE “COLOURED” population group became a steady stream as POPULATION GROUP Africans were increasingly subjected to dracon- While the label “Coloured” implies that such ian apartheid laws. The implementation of persons were of “mixed race”, not all persons influx control measures and the application of originally classified “Coloured” were in fact pass laws led many “Natives” to seek the com- “mixed”. Later, in order to refine race classifi- parative shelter and safety of the “Coloured” cation, another category, Asiatic, was created in label. They changed their names, their lan- 1967 to accommodate Indians and other guages and their domicile. Mthimkulu became Asians.50 Chinese were allowed to apply to be Grootboom; Ndlovu became Oliphant. Xhosa classified white.51 Japanese were also allowed and Sotho were exchanged for Afrikaans. to reclassify to white and all Japanese visitors Sophiatown and Western Native Township became “honourary whites”. Thus by a process were exchanged for Newclare and Kliptown in of legislative distillation, the “Coloured” popu- Johannesburg.57 Even whites who married lation came to consist more and more of “non-whites” were reclassified “Coloured” “mixed race” persons. However, this was never because that is what their children were classi- entirely so. Because of the greater privileges fied.58 Thus, if white men and women and enjoyed by persons classified “Coloured”, “Native” women could be declared “Coloured” many “Natives” tried for “Coloured” even simply because they were married to, or cohab- though procedures were put in place to ensure ited with “Coloured” persons; and if “pure that they did not succeed.52 The Group Areas blooded” Chinese, Japanese and Indians could Act of 1953 provided a loop-hole which many be declared “Coloured”; the moral and logical exploited. This Act declared the “Coloured” basis of a policy of separation on the grounds of group as consisting of “all persons who do not racial purity comes into question. fall into the White or Native group and also all women, including White or Native, who are 9. THE STIGMA OF LABELLING married to or who cohabit with, Coloured per- The misconception that a “Coloured” person is sons.”53 Many “Native” women with children a person of “mixed race” is still commonly held cohabited with “Coloured” men and they and today. This we have now seen is not the case. their children were subsequently classified However, if thousands of “mixed race” persons “Coloured”. Children born of the relationship have been, and are today members of the were also declared “Coloured”. In the Cape, the “white” group, who then was or is a “Colour- Coloured Labour Preference Policy excluded ed”, i.e. a supposedly “mixed race” member of Africans from working there and, in terms of the “Coloured” population group which existed the pass laws, could not live there.54 To avoid between 1950 and 1991? – apparently those deportation or arrest, they quickly learnt that if persons who were unacceptable, on the grounds they spoke Afrikaans they could pass for of social association and appearance, to be “Coloured”. They registered their children in included in the privileged group. Thus, race coloured schools. By attending “Coloured” classification was arbitrary. Those whom the churches, they were able to have their children NP decided in 1950 to shut out were not baptised, and the baptismal certificates later excluded because they were mixed per se, but provided the basis for information for registra- because they were too mixed and too different. tion papers. These were later used to prove they This therefore makes the continued use today of were “Coloured”. The same happened in the the term “coloured” problematical. When race Transvaal where the distinction between classification laws were scrapped in 1991, the coloured and African was not great.55 In the media and historians immediately ceased refer- Orange Free State, thousands of Africans with- ring to people as “Coloured”, viz a racially out identity papers were given coloured identity classified population group, but replaced it with

93 Du Pré the equally absurd “coloured”(lower case). The many light-skinned “Coloureds” in Johannes- explanation for its use is that the term merely burg started living in white areas. Because refers to “people of mixed race”. However, this “Coloured” people were a minority in is a spurious argument because the term is not Johannesburg, only the two major population being used in reference to all persons of “mixed groups were recognised and provided for. Dark race”. The “white” population group consists of complexion coloureds were generally lumped thousands of South Africans of “mixed race”, with Africans. Light-skinned persons who but they are not referred to as “coloured”. The could pass for white flocked to the cosmopoli- only people being referred to as “coloured” tan Hillbrow/Berea area which had many olive- today are those who were classified “Coloured” skinned Portuguese from Angola and Moçam- before 1991. The present-day use of the term bique, and swarthy Lebanese who were classi- “coloured” is therefore objectionable because it fied white. By the 1980s, they had made a perpetuates racist practices implemented in home in white areas, their children attended 1950. Moreover, of all the racial labels of the white private schools, and the parents worked apartheid era, this is the only one associated as whites. However, they still had “Coloured” with inferiority.59 During the past 46 years of identity cards. The need to “legalise” their NP rule, the term “Coloured” came to carry white status became pressing with time. Their with it a stigma of inferiority.60 Therefore, to children needed identity documents to write call someone a “coloured” today instantly matriculation examinations; parents wanted to labels him and sets him aside as inferior and buy the house or flat in the white area in which perpetuates the indignities, degradation and they were living. The children had white humiliation they suffered during the apartheid boyfriends and wanted to marry. And so, many era. The use of the term “coloured” after 1991 began the painful process of reclassification. is not only incorrect but a deeply insulting and In order to begin the process, “Coloured” unjust practice. persons had to get affidavits from whites con- Not only persons formerly classified “Col- firming that they were accepted by them as oured” are trapped by this label today. Many “white”.65 This was a painfully humiliating Africans lived for decades as “Coloured”. Their experience for a closet “Coloured”. One had to children attended “Coloured” schools and were go to one’s employer, friends and neighbours forbidden to speak a “Native” language for fear (people who thought all the years that one was of exposure. Now in the “new” South Africa, white) and reveal to them one’s “dark” secret. with affirmative action being increasingly Thereafter, once the affidavits were submit- applied in favour of Africans, these “Coloured” ted to the relevant government department,66 Africans are paying the penalty for having government officials would come around to the sought refuge in the “Coloured” label. applicant’s home and question the neighbours; to the workplace to question the employer and 10. THE PHENOMENON OF RECLASSIFICATION workmates, in order to establish that the appli- Reclassification was allowed since 1950 for cant was really accepted as white.67 Finally, the those who were, or felt they were, wrongly applicant had to be scrutinised by an official to classified.61 In many cases reclassification was comply with the criterion of appearance. When involuntary and persons were classified by the an official was satisfied that the applicant Population Registrar from “European” to looked “white”, he/she would receive a “white” “Coloured” or “Coloured” to “Native” if they classification, i.e. the racial code contained in could not supply proof that they were correctly the identity number, 01 through to 06 would be classified. Very few persons voluntarily reclas- changed to 00.68 sified to a lower rank.62 Most reclassifications In the 1970s, the NP realised that it could not to a higher rank were voluntary with the great- survive as an exclusive Afrikaner club. In 1976 est number being from “Cape Coloured” to the Theron Commission, set up to investigate “White”.63 In the 1950s guidelines for “border- the political and social position of the Coloured line” coloureds to follow for reclassification Population group, called into question the argu- were clearly spelt out and relatively painless.64 ment that coloured people comprised a separate In later years reclassification became easier but ethnic group. As this premise constituted part more humiliating. For example, in the 1970s of the foundation of the policy of apartheid, the

94 Du Pré commission instead urged that the Population the applicant received a new identity book with Registration Act “be so amended as to make a 00 “white” code. Most often, the interviewing both acceptance and descent criteria for purpos- official urged the successful applicants to es of population classification.”69 This would ensure that their children and parents, and in make it easier for those classified “Coloured” to fact, anyone else they were related to, came to apply for reclassification into the “white popu- apply for reclassification. The urging became lation group” and would remove a source of more urgent just before a general election. This aggravation for the coloured “petty bour- process never became public knowledge and geoisie” who had long considered themselves the revelation of such goings-on will probably part of white society.70 What the commission surprise most whites. Thousands of “Coloured” urged was the “siphoning off” of the petty people knew about this process but the details bourgeois “Coloured” into the white group. were hidden from the general public to avoid Those left in the “Coloured” group would be embarrassment for the government. Those who those not able to claim white ancestry or those reclassified through this process also kept quiet “too different” to be acceptable as “white”. The about it for fear of exposure. most telling recommendation was that the Reclassification, more than any other factor, “coloured population” should not be viewed as highlights the immorality of race classification. a community culturally different or distinguish- By making provision for reclassification, the able from the “white population”. These recom- Population Registration Act of 1950 opened the mendations were a dramatic somersault and door to biological mingling. The law thereby appeared to be an acknowledgement that race allowed persons who were mixed to enter the classification had little to do with race as such ranks of, and to marry, whites. Thus the illegal and that white classification had not been based became legalised.73 In itself, therefore, reclassi- on the so-called purity of the white population fication was an acknowledgement that there group. However, rather than change apartheid was no distinct and readily identifiable “pure” legislation and face protests from ultra-conserv- white group in South Africa; or that there was a atives, “the government proceeded stealthily to distinct and readily identifiable “Coloured” reform by exemption.”71 This led to the phe- group in South Africa. The Population Regis- nomenon of large-scale, and mostly secret, tration Act of 1950 therefore attempted the reclassification in the following decade. impossible by trying to “classify the unclassifi- In the 1980s, the government went out of its able.”74 By allowing for reclassification, the way to encourage “white-looking” coloureds to Population Registration carried within itself the apply to be classified “White”. Reclassification seeds of its own destruction. was refined to cut out the crass humiliation. All that a “Coloured” person had to do was to find 11. THE FAILURE OF THE POLICY OF RACE seven whites, any whites, who were prepared to CLASSIFICATION sign an affidavit to the effect that the “Colour- Race classification after 1950 cannot be ed” applicant was accepted by them as described as a process of racial separation but “White”. The absurdity of this process was one of “status restricting”, “status granting,”75 compounded by the fact that former “Colour- or “status bestowing.”76 The inability of the Act eds” who had reclassified could also sign an to do what it had been fashioned to do can be affidavit declaring that the “Coloured” appli- seen in the fact that between 1950 and 1988, cant was accepted by them as “White”. Thus, as the Act was amended 15 times. Section 1, the more and more “Coloureds” became “White”, definition section, was amended 11 times; sec- they could in turn vouch for others and ensure tion 8 was repealed by 1970; the majority of the that they too became “White”. The applicant rest of the sections, or paragraphs of sections, thereupon applied officially to be reclassified were repealed before 1986.77 Race classifica- and attached the supporting affidavits.72 Most tion also failed to successfully demarcate popu- often, the whole process was attended to by a lation groups and to solve the problem of lawyer for a fee of R1000. The next step was to “Coloured” identity. In August 1966 when an appear before an official who “examined” the Act was passed which made it compulsory for applicant to see whether he or she “appeared” every South African over the age of 16 to be in to be “White”. When the official was satisfied, possession of an identity card, the Minister of

95 Du Pré the Interior confessed that it would be a diffi- of the same family were classified across the cult task because, at that stage, about 268 000 spectrum on the basis of a spurious “scientific “borderline” cases had yet to be settled, viz. and biological” analysis. Individuals accepted “whites, 48 000; Coloureds, 179 000; Malays, by their community were suddenly rejected 14 000; Indians, 27; Chinese, 14; Bantu, when they were reclassified or exposed as 26 500.”78 However, stated the Minister, “I belonging to an inferior racial group. Those on cannot accept that there will be borderline cases the borderline, or who had been incorrectly for all time.” He added that his aim was “to classified, had to undergo the humiliation of close the gate so that we cannot continue indef- appearing before race classification boards. initely creating new borderline cases as rapidly Anyone who looked suspect suffered the humil- as we deal with the already existing cases.”79 iation of being chased off beaches or ejected But the August 1966 law did not help to “close from trains and buses by conductors.81 Families the gate”. By the time race classification was were hounded by their neighbours if one of scrapped in 1991, more than 40 years after its their children happened to be darker in com- introduction, the government still had not been plexion.82 Innocent children were summarily able to finally identify, classify, demarcate or thrown out of school. People lost their jobs.83 peg the entire population. The wrong classification deprived millions of Through the years, adjustments to the Act the right to vote; the right to live and work became increasingly immoral and hypocritical. where they wanted to; the right to marry and Japanese changed from “Coloured” to “White” associate with whom they wanted to; the right in order not to jeopardise trade between South to sports honours; the right to a decent life; the Africa and Japan. Thus economics, not racial right to civil rights. purity, came to determine racial classification. Race classification was not successful at sep- In the 1970s, the NP considered siphoning off arating persons on the grounds of purity of the “Coloured” petty bourgeoisie to dampen colour, nor at classifying the entire population. opposition from that quarter and to bolster the However, it was extremely successful at creat- white group in the face of rising black protest. ing a political, social and economic elite which Thus political survival, not racial purity, came enjoyed decades-long privilege, wealth and sta- to determine racial classification. tus – guaranteed by the Population Registration Act and jealously protected by numerous laws CONCLUSION introduced under the guise of apartheid.84 By The poet Adam Small summed up the feelings using the racial categorisation of the past, there of thousands of South Africans who suffered is the danger that this government will create a during the apartheid era because of the arbi- new political, social and economic elite, guar- trariness of race classification: “Die Here het anteed by affirmative action and equity em- gaskommel en die dice het verkeerd vi’ ons ployment policies and jealously guarded by geval. Daai’s maar al.”(God rolled the dice and numerous laws introduced under the guise of it fell wrongly for us. That’s all).80 redress. If that is the case, then the hopes of Race classification was not only arbitrary but building a new non-racial South African nation also immoral and hypocritical. Race classifica- will have received a setback before the process tion also had a devastating effect on the family has even begun. The modern-day Trojan Horse structure. Families were torn apart as members will have done its task again.

96 Du Pré

ENDNOTES

1) Dept. of National Education, Three-year 14) Debates of the Assembly, vol. 20 (22 Mar. Rolling Plans, June 1998. 1967), col. 3407. 2) H. Kenney, Power Pride and Prejudice: 15) A.J. Venter, Coloured: A Profile of Two The Years of Afrikaner Nationalist Rule in Million South Africans (Cape Town, 1974), South Africa (Johannesburg, 1991), 30-31. 7; Bunting, South African Reich, 160. 3) The term “coloured” will be used in this 16) J.D. Van der Vyver and D.J. Joubert, paper only for the purposes of identifica- Persone- en Familiereg (Johannesburg, tion and clarification. 1985), 279. See also Debates of 4) Weekly Mail and Guardian, 24 Mar. 1995. Parliament (22 Feb. 1988), col. 1663. 5) Ismail Essop quoting Adam Small, 17) Eloff, Race Classification, 25. Debates of Parliament vol.1 (22 Feb. 18) Van der Vyver and Joubert, Persone- en 1988), col. 1692. Familiereg, 280. 6) G.M. Frederickson, White Supremacy: A 19) Eloff, Race Classification, 25. Comparative Study in American and South 20) In the 1970s the term “black” came to be African History (New York, 1981), 270. used in reference to all persons who were “Passing” refers to the practice whereby victims of the NP’s policy of racial dis- light-skinned “persons of colour” passed crimination. However, at the time the law themselves off as “Europeans” in order to used the term “Black” in reference to enjoy the privileges and benefits attached Africans. Thus, the term “Black” is used to being white. At the other end of the here to describe persons who are today spectrum, Africans passed themselves off referred to as African. This term is only as “Coloured” to escape influx control and used in this context in this paper to facili- the economic, social and political disad- tate identification. vantages of being “Native”. 21) Eloff, Race Classification, 24. See also 7) B. Bunting, The Rise of the South African Joyce, Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 18. Reich (London, 1986), 160; C.F.J. Muller, 22) Report of the Sauer Commission (1945), 2. ed., Five Hundred Years: A History of 23) M. Simons, “Organised Coloured Political South Africa (Pretoria, 1984), 482. Movements”, in Occupational and Social 8) Debates of the Assembly, vol. 71 (8 Mar. Change among Coloured People in South 1950), col. 2499. Africa, eds., H.W.van der Merwe and 9) Ibid, col 2502. C.J.Groenewald (Cape Town, 1976), 203, 10) Ibid, col. 2520. 233; Cape Times, 2 Mar. 1961. 11) R.E. van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes: 24) Debates of Parliament vol. 1 (22 Feb. An Inside Look at the Coloured People 1988), col. 1663. (Cape Town, 1979), 5. 25) D.H. Van Wyk, “’n Administratiefregte- 12) Prior to 1950, “coloured” was a loosely like Ondersoek na die Stelsel van defined term used in reference to certain Rasseklassifikasie in Suid-Afrika” (LL.M- “people of colour”. Persons of mixed ori- Proefskrif, Unisa, 1974) 36-7. gin fell under this umbrella term. How- 26) In 1968, the government closed this loop- ever, the word was used mainly for statis- hole by law. The Births, Marriages and tical purposes and ease of identification. Deaths Registration Amendment Act pro- There was no question of a legally defined vided that no birth certificate for children “Coloured” nation or “volk” as the Afri- born after 1 Dec. 1967 should be regis- kaners would have it. The word “colour- tered unless the Registrar-General of ed” did not even appear on many birth cer- Births, Marriages and Deaths had con- tificates; the word “mixed” being used. firmed the race classification of the par- 13) Debates of Parliament (22 Feb. 1988), col. ents and of the child. The purpose of the 1663; T. Eloff, Government, Justice and Act was to ensure that the racial classifica- Race Classification (Stellenbosch, 1990), tion on a birth certificate was the same as 25. See also P.Joyce, The Rise and Fall of that on the population register. See Apartheid (Cape Town, 1990), 18. Bunting, South African Reich, 190-1.

97 Du Pré

27) Identity cards were not in use prior to British 5.2%, Other European 2.7%, 1950 (only Africans carried identity cards Unknown (possibly more non-white in the form of a pass book), and birth and blood) 3.5%. “Coloureds” have similar baptismal certificates became the common ethnic origins but in different, varying pro- forms of establishing identity or race. portions. See also Van der Ross, Myths 28) R.H. du Pré, Separate but Unequal: The and Attitudes, 32. Coloured People of South Africa; a 47) Rand Daily Mail, 13 July 1971. Political History (Johannesburg, 1994), 48) Ibid. 257. 49) Argus, 27 Aug. 1984; Debates of Parlia- 29) Ibid. ment vol. 1 (22 Feb. 1988), col. 1691. 30) Cape Times, 22 Sept. 1960. 50) This was mainly done because of the 31) This led to these “play-whites” being protests by Indians that they were not of referred to as “window-shopping whites” mixed race. However, many persons who or “vensterblankes”. See Debates of were later classified “Asiatic” sought a Parliament vol. 1 (22 Feb. 1988), col. “Coloured” classification because of the 1689. economic advantages it brought. In terms 32) Cape Times, 4 Feb. 1951. of the Group Areas Act, Indians could not 33) Cape Times, 2 Mar. 1961. live, nor own businesses in a “Coloured” 34) Ibid, 1 Dec. 1961. residential area. Thus marriage to a person 35) See also Muller, Five Hundred Years, 482. with a “Coloured” classification was a 36) I.Essop, Debates of Parliament vol. 1 (22 way out. As many Indians are of the Feb. 1988), col. 1690; Cape Times, 23 Islamic faith, and Cape Malays (who were Feb. 1988. classified “Coloured”) are mainly Mus- 37) I. Essop, Debates of Parliament (22 Feb. lims, marriages between these two were 1988), col. 1689; Cape Times, 23 Feb. common. See Van der Ross, Myths and 1988. Attitudes, 9. 38) Cape Times, 29 Aug. 1959. 51) Cape Times, 18 Dec. 1964. See also 39) I. Goldin, Making Race, The Politics and Mclennan, Apartheid: The Lighter Side, Economics of Coloured Identity in South 33-4. Africa (Cape Town, 1987), xxvii. 52) The Race Classification Board applied a 40) Ibid. variety of tests such as the “hair” test, the 41) See for example, R Shell, Children of “eyelid” test, the “bed” test, the “sports” Bondage (Johannesburg, 1994), 315-324. test, etc. See Du Pré, Separate but 42) H.F. Heese, Groep Sonder Grense Unequal, 69-71, for a more detailed dis- (Bellville, 1984), 5-23; J.S.Marais, The cussion of the various tests. Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937 53) K. Kirkwood, The Group Areas Act (Johannesburg, 1968), 282. (Braamfontein, 1951), 9. 43) Frederickson, White Supremacy, 270. 54) Goldin, Making Race, 151-2. This policy 44) See Du Pré, Separate but Unequal, 268-9, was applied in increasing intensity after for statistics on reclassification. 1956 as the government sought to placate 45) The consequence of this miscegenation coloured people after their disfranchise- and the absorption of “Coloureds” into the ment. white group was that later generations of 55) Weekly Mail and Guardian, 24 Mar. 1995. whites often showed strong “Coloured” 56) R.H. du Pré, “Confrontation, Cooptation characteristics resulting in tragic separa- and Collaboration: The Response and tion. For example, the Sandra Laing affair, Reaction of the Labour Party of South Sunday Times, 6 Aug. 1967 and 23 June Africa to Government Policy, 1965-1984” 1991; Debates of Parliament vol. 1 (22 (Ph.D thesis, Rhodes University, 1994), 46. Feb. 1988), col. 1690. 57) Weekly Mail and Guardian, 24 Mar. 1995. 46) Du Pré, Separate but Unequal, 36. The 58) Joyce, Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 24; K. ethnic composition of the Afrikaner by Kirkwood, The Group Areas Act (Braam- 1867 was, Netherlands 34.8%, German fontein, 1951), 9. 33.7%, French 13.2%, “Non-white” 6.9%, 59) See Marais, The Coloured People, 281-2.

98 Du Pré

60) Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 36-7; same ethnic origins as whites, descent as 73-4. criteria would make it easier for them to 61) The Survey of Race Relations by the South obtain white classification. African Institute of Race Relations, annu- 70) Goldin, Making Race, 151. The term ally printed a list of persons who applied “petty bourgeois” is used by Goldin to to the Race Classification Board for describe the coloured middle class which reclassification. This heartbreaking agitated throughout the 20th century for process was at once an indication of the equal rights. By introducing and tinkering distress suffered by thousands of South with laws which eased restrictions and dis- Africans at the hands of the NP social crimination experienced by this group, the engineers. government hoped to defuse hostility and 62) Debates of the Assembly, vol. 20 (22 Mar. dampen the clamour emanating from 1967), col. 3412. coloured people. 63) Van der Ross, Myths and Attitudes, 46. 71) Harrison, White Tribe, 276. 64) Cape Times, 22 Sept. 1960. 72) Department of Home Affairs, Question- 65) Harrison, White Tribe, 175. naire A, form GR6. 66) In contrast to identity photos which were 73) Prior to reclassification, marriage and sex black and white and full face, two colour with a white person was prohibited under photos, one full face and one profile, had the Mixed Marriages Act. Under the to accompany the affidavits and applica- Immorality Act, sex with a white person tion for reclassification. would have resulted in prosecution. 67) Victor and Janet Rego, interview with 74) Debates of the Assembly, vol. 20 (22 Mar. author, Pietermaritzburg, 8 Oct. 1994. 1967), col. 3405. 68) The 11th and 12th digits of the Identity 75) Van Wyk, “Administratiefregtelike Number contained one’s racial category, Ondersoek”, 3. viz. White - 00, Cape Coloured - 01, Cape 76) M. Wiechers, Administratiefreg (Durban, Malay - 02, Griqua - 03, Other Coloured - 1984), 147. 04, Asiatic - 05 and Other Asiatic - 06. 77) Debates of Parliament, vol. 1 (22 Feb. Natives were set aside as 07, although 1988), col. 1673. they carried a different form of identifica- 78) Debates of Assembly, vol. 20 (22 Mar. tion – the pass book. However, just before 1967), col. 3406. race classification was scrapped in 1991, 79) Bunting, South African Reich, 160. the Department of Home Affairs made the 80) Adam Small, “Die Here Het Gaskommel”, identity number “race-free”. All numbers in Groot Afrikaanse Verseboek, ed. D.J. 00 through to 07 were scrapped and every Opperman (Cape Town, 1971), 359. South African was given a neutral 08 clas- 81) For example, Argus, 14 Jan. 1956. sification. 82) Sunday Tribune, 9 July 1989. 69) Recommendations of the Commission of 83) Leach, The Afrikaners, 228. Inquiry into Matters Relating to the 84) See Ken Owen, Sunday Times, 25 Apr. Coloured Population Group (Theron 1993; R.H. du Pré, The Making of Racial Commission) (1976), 2. Because the Conflict in South Africa (Johannesburg, majority of “Coloured” people had the 1992), 243-9.

99 Consolidating Democracy in South Africa: the New National Party Perspective

Francois Beukman

INTRODUCTION their constitutional task is not hampered by a It is fitting that consolidation is the theme of lack of funds. A democracy is not a cheap this conference, particularly at the beginning of political system, and the Public Protector’s the second term of this democratic South ability to function at provincial level must not African Parliament. Democracy in the South be prejudiced by budget deficits. African context does not simply mean that the From a philosophical point of view it is also majority – 50% plus one, in the classic sense of important that all institutions provided for in the word – is the exclusive determiner of the the constitution should be implemented. Non- allocation of scarce resources and values. De- implementation can be detrimental to democra- mocracy also means that certain values must be cy. For example, the Commission for the embedded in the political system, not only Promotion and Protection of the Rights of structurally but also in decision making. Demo- Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communi- cracy can be assigned a traditional, exclusive ties has as yet not been established. This means definition or a more inclusive one, which that the interests of minorities are not promoted implies inclusiveness and diversity of participa- at formal constitutional level and this, in turn, tion and decision making. restrains varying views and approaches. The New National Party (NNP) believes that Diversity and sound debate are mostly at the the consolidation of democracy will depend core of a democracy. All forums for the devel- upon whether the inclusive route is followed, opment of diverse viewpoints at constitutional as diversity of views and alternative policy level must be optimally exploited. options are the key to maintaining the core values of a democracy. 2. CIVIL CONTROL Other institutions, such as the security services, 1. INDEPENDENT MONITORING ROLE must continually be monitored by civil control At a constitutional level, it is essential that to ensure the continuation of democracy and those institutions serving as counterbalances civil freedom. Unfortunately, at this late stage, within the formal constitutional state, fulfil Section 210 of the constitution has not yet been their independent monitoring role. Not only effected as the Inspector General of the active political supporters of the ruling party Security Forces has, after three years, not even should hold posts such as that of Auditor- been appointed. It is also important that institu- General or Public Protector, or be members of tions typical of a constitutional state be upheld the Independent Electoral Commission and the and given the opportunity to contribute to the Human Rights Commission. Individuals who augmentation of the constitutional state. are independent and who do not fear political interference should be candidates for such 3. NNP SUPPORTS AUTONOMOUS appointments. These institutions should fur- CONSTITUTIONAL COURT thermore be financially equipped in order that In its short existence, the Constitutional Court

101 Beukman is pre-eminently an institution that has built up al Congress (ANC) and the Minority Front of a credible and independent record. The NNP Amichand Rasjbansi have a two-thirds majority supports an autonomous Constitutional Court – the symbol of “unlimited” parliamentary which, as a specialist court with judges who are power. The ruling party therefore has a special experts in constitutional law, must be the arbi- responsibility to ensure that inclusivity is also trator in the field of human rights and constitu- promoted at parliamentary level. Legislative tional issues. amendments and proposals by opposition par- A change in this status and the resulting scal- ties must also be given careful consideration to ing down of the Court cannot be allowed. Insti- ensure that decisions are in the interests of the tutions that determine the parameters of democ- country and all its people. racy may not be the victims of rationalisation. Civil society must have a life of its own. The existence of various levels of govern- Arbitrary intervention and interference by the ment with autonomous functions is a prerequi- government of the day in civil society, can site for the consolidation of democracy. Ex- severely limit freedom of speech and indepen- clusive provincial legislative powers must be dent decision making by social, cultural and expanded. Provinces that do have the capacity sports institutions. Academic institutions must and expertise must be afforded the opportunity be afforded the opportunity to be institutions of to exercise such powers. The application of excellence, where critical and free thought is subsidiarity and fiscal federalism in effective encouraged. and well-run provincial and local government In states with a strong, dominant governing environments are a win-win approach for both party, co-opting of the intellectual elite, be it the authorities and the citizens. through encouragement or force, has often The NNP believes that the trend towards cen- become the precursor for the diminution of tralisation of power and authority at central civic freedoms and democratic rights. level is not in the long-term interest of the country. The various levels of government can 5. NEW FRAMEWORK FOR OPPOSITION only deliver effective service if the necessary COOPERATION ability is developed. Centralisation will render The NNP is convinced that the single contribut- inputs by provinces and local governments less ing factor to the consolidation of democracy, is relevant. In states with strong executive powers the establishment of a new framework for or where numerous governmental functions are opposition cooperation. concentrated in the Office of the President, the A strong, vibrant opposition, built on the role of the legislative power or parliament as an principles of shared values, is the best insur- instrument of influence and decision making ance policy that can be taken out for the consol- usually weakens. idation of democracy. As a counterbalancing mechanism, a vigilant 4. CRITICAL ROLE OF PARLIAMENT opposition with an electorally competitive The NNP is of the opinion that the role of stance towards the governing party can ensure Parliament is of critical importance to make that the government remains subject to moni- multiparty democracy work. Through its port- toring and review. Cooperation between oppo- folio committees, Parliament is an instrument sition parties is a requirement for creating this that promotes accountability and transparency. competitive stance. The percentage vote of Furthermore it is the forum where opposition opposition parties of the total vote has parties can engage the government on policy decreased drastically from 1994 to 1999. The issues. overall opposition picture has dimmed. For this reason it is important that parliamen- The proportional voting system inherently tarians of all parties, including the government, does not promote cooperation between political ensure that Parliament is not merely a rubber parties and thus opposition parties have to take stamp of the Cabinet. Legislation and proposals extraordinary measures to function within a that are prima facie unconstitutional and inhibit strong majority party environment. democratic values, must be exposed to severe It is therefore crucial that civil society institu- debate and scrutiny. tions jealously guard their independence and In the current Parliament, the African Nation- autonomy.

102 Beukman

6. TRANSFORMATION SHOULD BE INCLUSIVE • Promoting and protecting the founding prin- Transformation must not become a code word ciples of the constitution by making use of for exercising total control over the building the relevant agencies and the Constitutional blocks of civil society. Transformation must Court. indeed ensure that all relevant sectors of society • Offering constructive solutions in Parliament become involved in decision making and con- to the practical problems facing central, sultation. Conflict in African societies mostly provincial and local government. concerns the exclusion of minorities from the • Recognising inclusivity as a mechanism to decision-making process and the tendency to ensure representative government and good discourage the growth of opposition parties. governance. Constitutionalism is still the best principle to • Instituting vocal and public criticism on mal- ensure that multiparty approaches remain sound administration and corruption. and alive. Power sharing at executive level is vital for the promotion of political stability and CONCLUSION cooperation. Particularly in a society charac- The NNP is committed to an approach of con- terised by divisions, political cooperation structive engagement. In other words, the party among leaders of different parties is important will follow a critical, but constructive approach to counteract conflict and disintegration that are in engaging the ruling party in a continual poli- inherent in most societies. cy debate seeking a broad national consensus, The NNP believes that in this particular envi- especially in matters of substance. ronment, the strengthening of democracy can The NNP is in favour of closer cooperation be promoted through a constructive opposition between opposition parties on the basis of suffi- approach. cient policy overlap, a shared commitment to responsible opposition, and the advantages that 7. CONSTRUCTIVE OPPOSITION such cooperation will have in strengthening The opposition should play an active role in multiparty democracy. defining and evaluating policy to influence The upcoming municipal elections will be a decision making. A pure “Westminster” test case for opposition cooperation to promote approach will isolate the opposition. multiparty democracy. The constructive opposition approach implies The NNP’s first choice is to take part in these the following: elections as part of an alliance or front. • A commitment to the realignment of the The Municipal Structures Act has severe South African political landscape. implications for multiparty democracy at local • Acceptance of the principle that a deeply level. Cooperation between opposition parties divided society with historic tensions should is a prerequisite for accountable and transparent make provision for maximum participation local government. by all relevant political groupings. The NNP has accepted the challenge to con- • Engaging the ANC government in a proper tribute to the consolidation of multiparty debate on its policies and the preferred alter- democracy. We invite all interested parties to natives. become part of the process.

103 Consolidating Democracy in South Africa: the African Christian Democratic Party Perspective

JoAnn Downs

INTRODUCTION On the positive side, two parties have been When one considers the alternative scenarios formed that are not race based: the African that existed for South Africa, one cannot help Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and but come to the conclusion that the transforma- United Democratic Movement (UDM). Both tion from apartheid to democracy has been a are new on the political scene, one formed in miracle. We have chalked up a second success- 1993 and one in 1998. These parties represent ful election, and are now on the road to pre- the most viable future for South Africa, where dictable regular elections. For this we can be the consideration of a party is based on its poli- thankful and heartily congratulate ourselves. cies and its political skills and not on its claims We should be justifiably proud of our country. to represent or protect certain sectors of the Unfortunately there are always ifs and buts, population. I believe that they must be encour- problems that have to be brought into critical aged. It may take some time, but the ACDP, for debate, but opposing views and voices are example, has made more progress in less than needed to push us to perform better. Others five years, than the Democratic Party had have specialised in highlighting the economic attained in 1994, after 20 or so years in the woes that are attendant on our transition, many arena. The ACDP has no ethnically defined of which are probably avoidable, but I will not demographic upper limit, and is thus confident dwell on that particular aspect at the moment. I that it can break into the mainstream with time. would like to pick out four particular issues The second serious problem is the break- that could threaten a vibrant multi-party demo- down of the family unit. cracy. I believe that the most serious crime of apartheid was the criminalisation of normal 1. THREATS TO SOUTH AFRICA’S DEMOCRACY family life and the deliberate separation of fam- The first, and probably the most serious threat ilies. This is one of the single most important in my view, is continued polarisation in politics causes of the current high crime rate. along ethnic or racial lines. This is known as A lack of respect for the law took root the politics of difference. It is clear to see that because it was so obviously the tool of the as long as political parties are founded, led and oppressor, started here. When families are not voted for on the basis of their ethnicity, there together, transforming moral values and ethics will be much less focus on these parties’ actual and discipline in love, how can our people policies or performance. learn these things? Families living in reason- The capacity for viable opposition and the able circumstances are a stabilising influence in place for new ideas will be negated by, and will any democracy. The practice of leaving women be accepted or rejected based on, the racial pregnant continues, as does the habitual living make-up of the party or person presenting apart of families. them: the more things change the more they The third is Aids. The worst thing this coun- stay the same. try ever did was ignore the lessons learnt by

105 Downs other countries before us, and make exactly the debate by an HIV positive person: “I do not same mistakes. This pandemic is going to deva- inform my sexual partners of my HIV status, it state South Africa, both socially and economi- is up to healthy people to look after themselves. cally. Business needs to increase skills, but will Even if asked I would not divulge my status.” increasingly invest in a dying population. We Many people who are HIV positive share this are going to be faced with 800 000 healthy chil- unfortunate view. To me, these people are pre- dren orphaned by Aids by 2002. There are meditated murderers, yet we are only seeing the already about 150 000 of these orphans and no first court case now and no messages are being plans have been made apart from vague com- sent that it is an unconscionable act of evil to munity-based ideas regarding adoption. But the deliberately spread an incurable disease. This likelihood of a three-year-old being adopted is type of statement is not politically correct, you low. see. It is also not politically correct to talk If these children are not loved, wanted and about monogamy, abstinence until marriage educated, they could grow up to become a huge and condoms as a last resort. underclass of disenfranchised people, and this could lead to much instability. CONCLUSION The fourth is political correctness. The first I will be labelled a rightwing fundamentalist for example I will use is the Aids pandemic. The saying this, but in Uganda this very message proper treatment of the spread of Aids in this (which is still being played down) was promot- country was ignored, because treating Aids as a ed by the government and churches and led human rights issue was the politically correct directly to a decline in the Aids rate. They thing to do at the time. Early on I participated encourage testing before marriage too, and are in a debate on Aids and was told during that moving towards making Aids notifiable.

106 Towards Consolidating Democracy in South Africa, With Special Reference to the Concept of Self-Determination

Petrus Liebenberg

INTRODUCTION 1. THE DESIRE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IS Democracy in South Africa is still in its infan- NOT UNIQUE cy. As such it is fragile and vulnerable. There The national consciousness and self-determina- are many factors threatening this young democ- tion aspirations of the Afrikaner and other peo- racy. ples in South Africa are not singular and The fact that South Africa has a heteroge- unique. There are ample international examples neous population consisting of different peo- of similar ideals and aspirations among other ples, ethnic groups, cultures, languages and peoples and ethnic groups. The rediscovery and religions, indicates a high conflict potential. If reaffirmation of own identities by peoples and not acknowledged and constitutionally and oth- ethnic and other groups is one of the most erwise accommodated, it could put South important international phenomena of our time. Africa’s still untested democratic structures It is something that no government dare ignore under severe strain and even cause the total or attempt to suppress. Where governments collapse of these structures. have done so, the repercussions have led to vio- On the other hand, South Africa – because of lence and even – as in the case of the former its complex population composition – is well Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union – collapse placed to make an original and unique contri- and fragmentation. bution to democracy in finding the correct bal- Interestingly, many of the more than 180 ance between individual human rights and independent states of the world and the majori- group rights. In this way, a kind of democracy ty of African states, are experiencing ethnic that suits the specific needs not only of South and/or religious strife and conflict in some or Africa, but of many African states with multi- other form. ethnic populations, could be developed. Some of the well-known examples of ethnic The purpose of this paper is therefore to conflict and self-determination aspirations are: explain the concept of self-determination and • those of the French-speaking Canadians of to point out different forms and levels of self- Quebec to be acknowledged as a separate determination that could be relevant and ethno-political entity with its own language applicable to the South African situation. and culture In articles such as 185, 186 and 235, the • the conflict between the Serbs and ethnic 1996 Constitution in principle recognises the Albanians in Kosovo right of groups to forms of self-determination. • the struggle of the Kurds for independence By giving practical effect to these constitu- • the sporadic tension between Greeks and tional guarantees, peace, stability and develop- Turks in Cyprus ment will be enhanced. • the conflicts between ethnic and tribal groups This, in turn, will perhaps more than any- in many African states such as Angola, thing else, stabilise and consolidate democracy Namibia, the Democratic Republic of the in South Africa. Congo, Congo Brazzaville, Kenya, Rwanda,

107 Liebenberg

Burundi, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Soma- ferences between the respective value systems lia, Liberia, Algeria, South Africa, etc. and the better the chances of intra-statal tension and conflict because the state and its actions are 2. DIFFERENT FORMS AND LEVELS OF perceived by some groups to be illegitimate and SELF-DETERMINATION oppressive. If the particular government is not These and other examples of self-determination sensitive enough to the fears and aspirations of are, in the words of Petrella (1980:9): minority peoples and groups under its jurisdic- “... all different forms of the same phenom- tion, desperation and disillusionment among enon: the yearning by individuals, groups these groups may result in “politics of disasso- and areas for the right to exist, to be differ- ciation”. Requests for some or other kind of ent, and to have an autonomous vision of constitutional accommodation then turn into their future in the face of the trends and demands for self-determination. These self- choices expressed by the dominant groups.” determination demands – as was stated before This quotation from Petrella brings us to the – are not similar, but may differ according to crux of the matter. By referring to “different the circumstances of each particular people or forms of the same phenomenon”, he suggests group. that there are different forms and levels of self- Although the national state is still the basic determination; that the self-determination needs organisation model, it should to an increasing and aspirations of peoples and ethnic groups extent, become flexible and adaptable in order worldwide are not similar. They may vary to accommodate the ethno-cultural diversity according to time, place, circumstances and, within its borders as a conflict-avoiding and above all, threat-perception. The perceptions of conflict-regulatory mechanism. According to the same people or group regarding its self- Peeters (1993:2), only 9% of the states of the determination requirements, may therefore world are ethnically homogeneous and hence change over time. The aspirations for some only 4% of the world population lives in states form of autonomy may even become dormant “coinciding with the extension of their ethnic to the extent that it may seem to have disap- group.” In all other cases majorities and minori- peared, as was the case with some subjugated ties, differing to varying degrees ethnically, lin- peoples in, for instance, the former Soviet guistically, culturally and religiously, must live Union. together, thus creating a potential for conflict. Self-determination is therefore a complex and This conflict potential endangers not only the multi-faceted concept. The requests or demands the individual state, but can lead to cross-border for some or other form of self-determination is and regional instability. Intra-statal tension and usually to be found among peoples or ethnic conflict also invites external intervention and groups who, because of their minority status, justification for wars by proxy which can cause experience a feeling of insecurity, constriction a spiral reaction of violence, deprivation of or threat. The same can be true of a majority rights, terror, retaliation and even, in extreme group which is dominated by a minority exer- cases, ethnic cleansing. cising the political power. The nature and population composition of a particular state, often 4. NATIONALITY CONFLICTS AND NATION has a direct bearing on the number and type of BUILDING requests or demands for self-determination it Nationality conflicts, according to Peeters has to deal with. (1993:2), present themselves in two basic ways: • States with a clearly distinctive “staatsvolk” 3. THE UNITARY STATE UNDER PRESSURE and one or more nationalities, for example The modern state is usually regarded as a Spain, Italy, France. national unitary state that is supposed to act in • States composed of a number of nationalities the best interests of all its inhabitants. In states so that there is no clear “staatsvolk”, with fairly homogeneous populations, the state although some nationalities may attempt to and its institutions reflect the common values of project themselves as such. Examples include the population. It therefore enjoys a great deal the former Yugoslavia, Switzerland and of legitimacy among its citizens. The more het- South Africa. erogeneous the population, the greater the dif- States such as South Africa that fall in the latter

108 Liebenberg category, clearly have a higher conflict poten- well for Afro-Americans despite deliberate tial than states with an undisputed “staatsvolk”. attempts since the Civil Rights Movement of It is not so much the multiplicity of the ethnic the 1960s to make them an integral and (privi- groups that determine the conflict potential, but leged) part of the American nation. Only the rather, as Collins (1975), states: future will tell to what extent the melting pot • when the degree of participation in a com- will succeed in integrating Orientals and Latin mon economy is low Americans into the American nation. • when the degree of monopolisation of power As far as states with multi-ethnic populations by a dominant group is high and like South Africa are concerned, the melting • when ethnic cultures are easily distinguish- pot and nation building in the traditional sense, able. have been overtaken by the new reality of When confronted with the above situation the increasing ethnic consciousness and demands multi-ethnic state can react in one of three for self-determination. If governments do not ways: recognise these realities and make timely con- • Ignore it and use its power monopoly to pro- stitutional adjustments, the melting pot, in the mote nation building by artificially creating words of Glazer (1975) “become(s) a boiling and promoting national values. pot which tends to explode if one does not let • Suppress it with the accompanying risk of the steam out”. aggravating the conflict. The crucial question confronting govern- • Attempt to accommodate it through constitu- ments of states with diverse and multi-ethnic tional means. populations is how this steam-letting process is For a large part of the 20th century, the first to be accomplished. A balance should be struck option was predominant, based on 19th century between giving peoples and ethnic groups Western European thinking that the state will enough “breathing space” to avoid ethnic strife ultimately create the nation. Ra’anan (1980), and conflict, while at the same time safeguard- however, correctly points out that the “falla- ing the territorial integrity of the state. This cious assumption that certain Western concepts, brings us to the different manifestations of the which in fact have remained rare and unusual concept self-determination. products of a particular historical environment and experience, actually have universal applica- 5. MANIFESTATIONS OF SELF-DETERMINATION tion, has led both Westerners and Western edu- This concept in its modern sense originated at cated Afro-Asians to think and speak in such the beginning of this century and was given terms as ‘nation building’”. Even the term international recognition by US President “melting pot” which was used for instance in Woodrow Wilson in his famous speech of 17 the United States (US) to describe the nation June 1917. Through the Peace Treaty of building process, only functioned well as long Versailles, it led to the dismemberment of the as the ingredients share similar ethnic, cultural Austrian and Ottoman empires and in this way and religious values. In the case of the US and gave birth to a number of new states. After the Afrikaner, this has meant people from west- World War II the right of the self-determination ern and northern European background. The of peoples was recognised in the United Na- first phase of the American melting pot pro- tions (UN) Charter and consecutive resolutions duced the WASP – (White Anglo-Saxon of the General Assembly, leading eventually to Protestant) because the Dutch, German and the 1966 International Covenants. It soon, how- Scandinavian settlers accepted and adopted the ever, became apparent that this principle in UN dominant Anglo-Saxon culture and the English thinking applied to former colonial territories language. During the second phase Irish rather than to peoples. The newly independent Catholics, South Italians, Poles and Jews African states regarded their sometimes artifi- entered the melting pot and came out as Irish, cial and unnatural borders from the colonial era Italian, Polish and Jewish Americans, broadly as the basis for self-determination and not the accepting the WASP value-based state institu- rights of the ethnic groups which are sometimes tions and learning American English, but divided by these borders. With few exceptions, retaining their respective cultures and traditions Africa still regards the territorial integrity and till this day. The melting pot worked even less indivisibility of states on basis of the colonial

109 Liebenberg borders, as non-negotiable. The principle of Although the frustrated attempts at secession self-determination, in the view of Christescu are more than the successful examples – such (1981) as quoted by Peeters (1993), “cannot be as Bangladesh, Singapore and Eritrea – it will regarded as authorising the dismemberment or not deter peoples and ethnic groups with a per- amputation of sovereign states”. ception that all doors for a negotiated settlement are closed to them, from attempting seces- 5.1 Secession and the formation of a new sion. The relevant examples, successful and state as the ultimate choice unsuccessful, indicate that secession is often The will of subjugated peoples and ethnic characterised by armed conflict resulting in groups to rule themselves in their own territo- large-scale loss of life and destruction of prop- ries according to their own – in the words of erty. These examples also prove, however, that Buzan (1992) – “ideas of the state” sometimes, peoples and ethnic groups are sometimes pre- however, prevails over the opinions and legal pared to suffer these hardships in order to gain interpretations of academics and governments. the right to rule themselves. This fact places a The fragmentation of the former Soviet empire, grave responsibility on the shoulders of the of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, as well as affected governments and the international the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, amply community to act timeously and effectively in illustrate this point. order to avoid disaster. It can therefore be stated that territorial seces- For South Africa with its complex population sion whereby existing state borders are redrawn composition, its potential for ethnic conflict due and a new sovereign state comes into being, to the self-determination aspirations of peoples constitutes the final and most complete form of such as the Afrikaner and others, it would be self-determination a people or ethnic group can wise to take note of these examples. It illus- strive for. Secession occurs when the inhabitants trates and highlights the fact that unitary states of a certain region or province decide for them- where governments are unable or unwilling to selves to secede from the state of which it form- provide their peoples and ethnic groups with ed a part. This act of secession can take place as enough “breathing space”, tend to break up part of a negotiated settlement with the govern- sooner or later. ment of the former mother state or, as was often It is those other forms and levels of self- the case, against its will and as the result of a determination which could, in some cases, pre- successful liberation struggle. In some rare empt or avoid more radical solutions, that cases, secession can also occur in order to be should consequently occupy our attention. incorporated into an adjacent state where the Secession, as has already been stated, is a radi- particular group are feeling more at home. cal and ultimate option and is seldom attained While international and regional organisa- without either a protracted conflict and/or a tions such as the UN and the Organisation of lengthy constitutional process. All the other African Unity (OAU), and some individual forms and levels of self-determination before states, do not entertain the idea of secession as the point of secession, are jointly called internal a legitimate form of self-determination because self-determination (Brownlie, 1985). This again it violates the territorial integrity of a state, it is, can manifest itself in different ways. The as was stated above, not an unknown phenome- mildest and perhaps most uncomplicated of non. In this context the fact that territorial these manifestations is called cultural or corpo- integrity is often regarded as more important rative self-determination. Because it requires no than external territorial self-determination and specific consolidated territory, it is especially that governments were in the past prepared to applicable to a people or group living in “dias- go to war in order to prevent secession, is amp- pora” within its country of origin. ly illustrated by the many frustrated attempts in this regard. To quote but a few examples: the 5.2 Cultural or corporative self- Ananja rebels in southern Sudan, the Ibo people determination in Biafra, the rebellion in Katanga (now the (The terms “cultural” and “corporative” are Shaba province in the Democratic Republic of used here virtually as synonyms) the Congo) and the Confederacy during the The varying self-determination needs and American Civil War of 1861-64. requirements of different peoples and groups

110 Liebenberg under different conditions, affect the concept of fested when each cultural group within a com- self-determination. The status and geographical munity has its own municipal and local govern- location of the people or ethnic group in ques- ments. Such a concentration of population tion, often determine the form of self-determi- groups in specific municipalities also consti- nation which is practical and implementable at tutes economic benefits because each munici- a given stage. If, as is stated above, the mem- pality serves as an economic growth point for bers of the particular people or group are dis- members of that group. Kriek (1992:23) is of persed in such a way that they do not constitute the opinion that within such a dispensation, an a clear majority in any region or province, they equal distribution of production factors between will have little alternative but to accept cultural the different culture groups, is a precondition autonomy over specific matters such as educa- for social, economic and political harmony. tion and training. Cultural or corporative self- A good example of cultural/corporative self- determination therefore implies a type of non- determination is to be found in Brussels where territorial/cultural federalism where distinguish- members of the Dutch-speaking Flemish and able groups or communities live together, but the French-speaking Walloon culture groups take separate responsibility for their own cul- live intermingled. The Flemish have a special tural interests and, simultaneously, strive interest in cultural autonomy since they form towards cooperation regarding aspects of com- only about 19% of the population of Brussels. mon interests. Kriek (1992:22) correctly states The two groups share some common interests that the point of departure in such a system is and responsibilities, but specific cultural mat- that the state is not a collection of individuals, ters are dealt with by cultural councils. These but consists of several (or in the case of South cultural councils are vested with specific func- Africa a number of) collective entities, namely tions and, according to Kriek (1992:23), act cultural groups. within government structures on behalf of the Linder (1994:165) is of the opinion that cul- cultural communities. tural or corporative self-determination makes In terms of Article 127 of the Belgian Consti- peaceful co-existence between diverse cultural tution, cultural councils have jurisdiction over groups within the same territory possible. Ac- the following cultural affairs: cording to him, the advantage of this type of • the protection and promotion of language autonomy is that it avoids territorial and border • the training of researchers disputes which are usually associated with terri- • cultural heritage, museums and other cultural torial self-determination. For Friedrich (1975: and scientific institutions 223) the most important argument in favour of • the arts corporative/cultural self-determination is that: • radio and television services “... it does away with the entire problem of • libraries territorial districting which can then be • support for the written media tackled as a strictly administrative problem • policy regarding the youth without attention to the complicating issue • recreation and tourism of population distribution and its cultural • pre-school instruction and day-care centres and linguistic requirements and aspira- • further education and para-scholastic training tions.” and With reference to Linder’s statement, Friedrich • intellectual, moral and social training. points to the fact that, corporative self-determi- (Department of Constitutional Development. nation is moving away from rigid territorial Discussion Document, 1994:13-14) demarcation of powers and its associated prob- Though the Brussels model is perhaps the most lems of population density, economic viability striking example of corporative/cultural self- and other heckling questions connected with determination, this form of self-determination territorial demarcation. It simplifies the execu- also reveals itself in the rest of Belgium and to tion of decisions when there is a degree of geo- a greater or lesser extent in the constitutions of graphical concentration of members of the Estonia, Cyprus, Myanmar (the former Burma) minority group. and Croatia. Belgium, for example, is – as a It would thus appear that corporative/cultural result of the insistence by the Flemish on the self-determination in its purest form is mani- protection of their language and culture at the

111 Liebenberg community level – divided into three cultural no ideal model which can guarantee internal communities, namely Flemish, French and territorial self-determination as a peaceful solu- German. Besides the existence of these lan- tion. Every situation is unique and requires a guage-bound communities, the Belgian model kind of accommodation that suits the particular makes provision for regions (“Gewestes”). The circumstances. The granting of a greater degree major difference between a community and a of autonomy can in some situations modify and region, lies in the fact that membership to the pacify the demands of the particular group. former is culture- and identity-bound, while the Spain’s handling of the Basque and Catalonian latter has a territorial basis. questions are sometimes quoted as examples. The Belgian constitution makes provision for The Basques and the Catalonians, who make up both corporative/cultural and internal territorial the most prosperous sections of the population, self-determination. In the above discussion, enjoy considerable internal territorial self-deter- only those aspects which form the basis of culmination, which include own schools, radio, tural/corporative self-determination were television and other cultural activities, while it emphasised. In the following section the focus also has the authority to negotiate loans. This shifts to internal territorial self-determination. also applies to Andalusia. It is, however, still too early to reach specific conclusions regard- 5.3 Internal territorial self-determination ing the success of this experiment in internal As was noted previously, the self-determination territorial self-determination. At the moment it needs and aspirations of different peoples and seems as if it has a moderating effect on the ethnic groups are not identical. Internal territor- groups concerned. ial self-determination as the most common and On the other hand, the granting of greater most familiar form of self-determination, fea- autonomy sometimes seems to wet the appetite tures somewhere between these extremes – as it of elements within such a territory and only finds expression in federated states of a federa- serves as a stepping stone for further self-deter- tion or in provinces and/or regions and even mination demands. Quebec could be such a subregions of a unitary state. case. The constitutional problems which beset Relevant international examples of internal Canada, centres around Quebec’s desire for territorial self-determination include: Canada greater autonomy – perhaps even indepen- (Quebec), Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Italy dence. Quebec’s continued efforts towards (Southern Tyrol), the Russian Federation, greater autonomy illustrates the problematic sit- Cyprus, the Sudan, Nigeria, Israel (the Pales- uations with which federated states sometimes tinians question) and Sri Lanka. Territorial self- have to deal with: ought greater internal self- determination within states also varies accord- determination be granted in order to avert con- ing to the threat perceptions of the respective flict, or should the demands for more autonomy groups or peoples, their numbers, geographic be refused with the risk of placing the contin- location, economic situation, their relations ued existence of the federation in jeopardy? with the government in power and, above all, The mere granting of a greater degree of self- their will to reach their self-determination determination is therefore in itself no guarantee objectives. The objectives of the same group for greater stability. Nor can it prevent further may also change with time. Whether it will demands for more powers and functions. become more moderate or more radical in Provinces or regions with more powers than the nature will depend on a number of factors, as others (sui generis) according to the principle outlined above. Chen (1991:1291) correctly of asymmetry such as Quebec, some Spanish points out that the fundamental requirement provinces, etc., can either become loyal and co- inherent in self-determination “is a procedure, operative parts of the larger political unit or not a preset outcome; the fulfillment of a peo- eventually break away. In the application of ple’s genuine desires is more important than internal territorial self-determination, pragma- achievement of the label ‘independence’. If a tism rather than a rigid ideological approach, people’s freedom of choice is sustained, the seems to be the lesson to be learnt from the policy objective of self-determination is international examples. The success (so far) of achieved”. the pragmatic approach is emphasised by the International examples illustrate that there is Belgian, Swiss, Spanish and Southern Tyrolean

112 Liebenberg models in particular, while the ideological will serve as the spiritual home and dynamo for approach can generate greater conflict due to an cultural councils countrywide. over-emphasis on national unity and nation Territorial self-determination in the absolute building. What is needed more than anything sense of secession is not easily achievable. The else to make internal territorial self-determina- history of Bangladesh and Eritrea indicate that tion succeed, is a culture of tolerance – as is the armed conflict, the destruction of property and case with Switzerland. infrastructure, upheaval and large-scale loss of life, all characteristic of secession, tend to be CONCLUSION the rule rather than the exception. It also proves Cultural or corporative self-determination is that – though self-determination may achieve relevant to the South African situation. For the status of a legal right – it does not come South Africa with its intertwined ethno-cultural about automatically, and that peoples and eth- composition, corporative self-determination can nic groups are frequently prepared to take up serve as a mechanism to give effect to different arms in an attempt to achieve this right. An ethnic groups’ constitutional right to decide important principle at stake here, is that sover- their own cultural affairs. Within the South eign self-determination can only be achieved African political context, corporative self-deter- when an unambiguous desire thereto has been mination can be considered, particularly at the expressed by means of a referendum and that subregional and local levels. To accommodate such sovereignty be recognised internationally, the distinctive national cultural interests of the as was the case with Eritrea. peoples and groups, the idea of neighbourhood South Africa with its high conflict potential and cultural councils – as is found in Belgium due to its complex population composition and Myanmar – could be instituted for the peo- should take cognisance of examples such as ples and cultural groups requesting such coun- Bangladesh, Eritrea and, to a lesser extent, cils. As was stressed previously regarding inter- Singapore, which indicate that multi-ethnic nal territorial self-determination, a culture of states tend to fragment if the central govern- tolerance is also a prerequisite for the success- ment is unable or unwilling to provide peoples ful implementation of cultural self-determina- and groups within its borders, opportunities for tion. self-expression also in a territorial context. In Cultural/corporative self-determination offers fact, the fewer opportunities there are for self- promising possibilities for the Afrikaner in par- determination – cultural and territorial – the ticular. Because its members are dispersed greater the price that will eventually have to be throughout South Africa, cultural councils can paid. If peoples and ethnic groups do not have serve as the beginning of a process of moving or are not allowed to concentrate in territories towards more concrete forms of territorial self- of their own, such groups will eventually determination at subregional and even provin- demand a state of their own where they can cial level. Heraud and Peeters (1982) and other develop institutions and a lifestyle based on and experts on the question of self-determination in accordance with their culture, norms and val- are making the valid point that cultural/corpora- ues. Recent history shows that few national tive autonomy seldom in the long run satisfy governments were in the long-run successful in the aspirations of a particular people or group. suppressing these legitimate ideals and aspira- It can at best act, as is stated above, as the tions. It also indicates, however, that govern- beginning of a process that should eventually ments seldom grant these requests for self- lead to a form of territorial self-determination. determination out of own free will. The recog- At the same time, however, cultural autonomy nition and accommodation of reasonable cannot be sustainable if it is not linked to the requests for appropriate kinds of internal self- concept of an own territory, irrespective of how determination are, however, a vital mechanism large or small it may be. Such a cultural home for stabilising and consolidating democracy in with own educational and other institutions, South Africa.

113 Liebenberg

REFERENCES

BROWNLIE, I., (1985): The rights of peoples in systems : problems and solutions. Laval Uni- modern international law. In Bulletin ASLP, versity Press.) 1X, 1985. GLAZER, N., (1975): The universalisation of BUZAN, B. (1991): People, states and fear. ethnicity. Encounter. (2nd. Ed.) Colorado: Lynne Rienner KRIEK, D.J., (1992): Federalism: the solution? Publishers. Pretoria: HSRC Publishers. CHEN, L., (1991): Self-determination and world LINDER, W., (1994): Swiss democracy: possible public order. In Notre Dame Law Review. solutions to conflict in multicultural societies. Vol. 66, No. 5, 1991. London: St. Martin’s Press. COLLINS, R., (1975): In Conflict Sociology, PEETERS, Y.J.D. & HERAUD, G., (1982): Het New York, 1975. zelfbeschikkingsrecht der volkeren : historiek CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, en toepassing. Brussel. (1996): Act No. 108 of 1996 Government PEETERS, Y.J.D., (1993): Minorities between Printer, Pretoria 1996. self-determination and integration: a case for CHRISTESCU, A., (1981): Study on the right of South Africa. Brussel: European Research self-determination. United Nations, New Group on Federalism in Southern Africa. York. PETRELLA, K., (1980): Nationalist and regional- DEPARTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP- ist movement in Western Europe.(In Foster, MENT, (1994): “Korporatiewe Selfbeskik- C.R. ed. Nations without a state : ethnic king”. A discussion document. Pretoria. minorities in Western Europe. New York: FRIEDRICH, C.J., (1975): The politics of lan- Preager. guage and corporate federalism. In Havard, RA’ANAN, U., (1980): Ethnic resurgence in J.G. & Vigneaut, R. Multinational political modern democratic states. New York.

114 Democracy and Human Rights

Pansy Tlakula

INTRODUCTION transparent process. Institutions such as the A great 18th century French encylopaedist Human Rights Commission, the Commission once said: “Every age has its dominant idea”. for Gender Equality and the Public Protector In his address to the South African Parliament have been established to support this country’s late last year, former Commonwealth Secretary constitutional democracy. If we take all these General Chief Emeka Anyaoka said: “Our developments into consideration then, in the dominant idea on the eve of the millennium is words of President Thabo Mbeki, we as South democracy”. The struggle for democracy Africans can confidently say that “we are on throughout the world and on our continent is course” as far as democracy is concerned. indeed intensifying. This is signified by the proposal made a month ago by the Organisa- 1. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES tion of African Unity (OAU) heads of states While we are grateful for and celebrate our that, in future, governments that have not been smooth transition to democracy, we must also democratically elected should not be admitted acknowledge the fact that there are afflictions as members of the OAU. which threaten this young democracy and con- Five years ago, South Africa adopted a consequently threaten respect for human rights. stitution which makes this country the envy of These include growing xenophobia, poverty, many nations. In its preamble, this constitution unemployment, crime, family violence, rape, undertakes to: child rape and other forms of violence against “Heal the divisions of the past and establish women, racism, sexism and other forms of dis- a society based on democratic values, social crimination prevalent in our society. Although justice and fundamental rights. Lay the we have these, as well as many other obstacles foundations of a democratic and open soci- to surmount, our constitution – which has very ety in which government is based on the strong democratic institutions – provides us will of the people and, every citizen is with opportunities to address these challenges. equally protected by law ...” This constitution is one of the few in the All the nuts and bolts of democracy are in place world that reinforces a principle that is now in South Africa. Its constitution embodies a bill accepted internationally – namely, that human of rights which entrenches almost every con- rights are interdependent, interrelated and indi- ceivable right. It has held two free elections visible. It entrenches civil, political, cultural, since becoming a democracy and it has a trans- economic and social rights. parent and accountable government, and an It has been proven in many countries that in independent executive, legislature and judicia- the absence of civil and political rights, eco- ry. There are institutional structures in place to nomic and social rights cannot be enjoyed and ensure that human rights and the rule of law are vice versa. This explains why dictatorial, cor- protected. Corruption is dealt with and mem- rupt and undemocratic regimes, rich in oil and bers of the judiciary are appointed through a precious metals, have not prospered – for eco-

115 Tlakula nomic prosperity cannot be achieved without nations on the basis that these values are often democratic accountability, respect for human imposed on developing countries and have rights and the rule of law. made very little impact on their development. Although the interdependence and intercon- They maintain that globalisation has not shack- nectedness of human rights has widely been led the developed countries, as it is commonly accepted among human rights activists through- believed, because these countries still retain out the world, there is still disagreement among substantial autonomy in regulating their human rights scholars as to what must come economies and in designing their social poli- first. There is a school of thought that advocates cies.2 for the so-called “full-belly” thesis. According Let me point out that I have never been to this thesis, civil and political rights should be trained as an economist and am not qualified to put aside until social and economic develop- give a scientific analysis of this very complex ment has been attained. The proponents of this topic. However, my gut feeling is that all that thesis believe that “one man, one vote is mean- critics say about globalisation is probably its ingless unless accompanied by the principle of outcome or consequence. one man, one bread.” One of the commentators For some time now, scholars throughout the who does not agree with this thesis rejects it as world have began to analyse the impact of “a convenient rhetorical device for justifying globalisation on democracy and human rights. self-serving denials of civil and political rights Globalisation has forced many developing by African ruling classes.”1 Whatever the mer- states to adopt openness and other economic its or demerits of the “full-belly” thesis, in my policies that are friendly to its demands. This, opinion, one can only exercise social and eco- in my opinion, limits the power of these states nomic rights meaningfully in an environment to control their economic policies and reduces where civil and political rights are respected. their decision-making powers generally. As stated above, we as South Africans are for- States are forced to adhere to the demands of tunate because our constitution entrenches both globalisation because they fear that if they do civil and political rights on the one hand, and not do so, they will lose competitiveness in social and economic rights on the other. This terms of attracting capital. Globalisation there- gives us the opportunity to be a sustainable fore renders developing states irrelevant. In democracy. such a setting, because the state is irrelevant, it Having said all these wonderful things about cannot address problems of poverty, inequality South Africa, we should also remember that unemployment and other social and economic with our democratisation, we became part and needs due to the pressure of markets to cut back parcel of the international community and are on public spending. affected by what goes on internationally. We Taking South Africa as an example, our gov- entered the international arena in the era of eco- ernment in keeping with the expectations and nomic globalisation, which some hail as the demands of economic globalisation, has adopt- best and inevitable course in the future of ed the Growth, Employment and Redistribution mankind. Globalisation is said to have increas- (Gear) strategy – which is premised on the pro- ed human mobility, enhanced communication motion of economic growth and redistribution and technological developments as well as the of wealth in favour of the poor and the attrac- liberalisation of trade and investments. While tion of foreign investment. This policy calls for some of these are positive aspects of globalisa- the adoption of a tight fiscal policy which, it is tion, there are negative ones too. The antago- envisaged, will attract foreign investment and nists of globalisation hold it responsible for the increase our exports. This, of course, requires severe economic desolation and social instabili- strict monitoring of money supply and a reduc- ty experienced in most developing countries. tion of public spending. The strategy hopes to According to them, globalisation has resulted in achieve growth of some 6% in 2000, which it is prosperity for developed countries while plung- hoped will address unemployment and poverty ing developing countries into unspeakable – the so-called trickle down effect which has poverty. They dismiss as inaccurate the notion proved to be a myth in other parts of the world. that globalisation promotes the cross-pollina- As a new democracy, South Africa is still tion of economic ideas and values among suffering from the vestiges of colonialism and

116 Tlakula apartheid. The brutal policies of apartheid, with rights is crime. People blame human rights for their skewed patterns of income and wealth dis- the high incidence of crime and often say that tribution have made South Africa one of the the constitution is there for the protection of most unequal countries in the world. As a result criminals rather than the victims of crime. of the past discriminatory policies, the majority The truth of the matter is that crime is a vio- of black people – particularly people of African lation of human rights and this should be the descent – still do not have access to clean starting point in addressing crime in our coun- water, health care, education, adequate housing, try. The police service should therefore infuse etc. human rights into their crime prevention strate- The challenge facing us as a country is to gy. Research has proved throughout the world, ensure that the economic fundamentals that we that in almost all the new democracies, crime adopt are guided by the imperatives of develop- has accompanied the process of democratisa- ing and reconstructing our country. Unlike tion and the establishment of a human rights many countries, we are bound by the ideals of culture. our constitution to do so. As I mentioned In an attempt to respond to crime, democrati- above, unlike the constitutions of other coun- cally elected leaders tend to apply quick-fix tries, South Africa’s constitution entrenches methods that undermine democracy and human economic and social rights and puts in place rights in order to appease the population. The mechanisms for monitoring the implementation tendency is to introduce prison conditions that of these rights. In terms of the constitution, the violate international human rights standards, Human Rights Commission is mandated to and to introduce draconian laws that violate require annually from relevant organs of state, human rights. This is beginning to happen in information on the measures taken by these South Africa where there was talk of incarcerat- organs towards the realisation of the right to ing prisoners in ships at sea or in disused mine housing, health care, food, water, social securi- shafts so that they should never again see the ty and the environment.3 The aspirations of our light of day. There seems to be reluctance on constitution will ring hollow to the majority of the part of government to implement laws that the people in South Africa if the commitment to will ensure that a balance is kept between the achieve social justice is sacrificed for the sake rights of crime suspects and the obligation of of economic expediency. The challenge for the police when effecting arrests. 21st century is the need for the international A case in point is the implementation of community to begin serious dialogue on the amendments to Section 49 of the Criminal impact of existing international economic poli- Procedures Act which seeks to circumscribe the cies on the promotion of human rights, democ- use of force by police when effecting arrests. racy and the rule of law, particularly in devel- Although the amendment was assented to by oping countries where these policies continue Parliament sometime ago, it has still not come to marginalise such countries from mainstream into effect. global trade and make it difficult for them to regulate their economies. As one writer aptly CONCLUSION put it: I challenge human rights activists to stand up “The broader challenge for the 21st century and fight against the introduction of laws that is to engineer a new balance between the undermine human rights in the name of fighting market and society – one that will continue crime. If we allow this to happen, then it might to unleash the creative entrepreneurship just be the beginning of a serious erosion of without eroding the social basis for cooper- human rights and democracy. In a few years ation.”4 time, we may even begin to talk about amend- ing the constitution in order to empower the 2. CRIME AND HUMAN RIGHTS police to fight crime. This will indeed be a sad Another threat to our democracy and human day for our hard-won democracy.

117 Tlakula

ENDNOTES

1) “Cultural Relativisation and Human Rights. sation Debate” by Dani Rodrick in Has Reconsidering the Africanist Discourse” by Globalisation Gone Too Far? (Institution Banny Ibhawoh. Paper read at the sympo- for International Economics, 1997) p.21. sium on Human Rights and the Rule of 3) See 184(3) of the Constitution of the Law, held at the University of Illinois on 8- Republic of South Africa. 10 July 1999. 4) “Sense and Nonsense in the Globalisation 2) See “Sense and Nonsense in the Globali- Debate”, supra 35.

118 Democratic Consolidation in South Africa: Weaknesses and Pitfalls

Xoliswa Jozana

INTRODUCTION: of democracy to social, economic and cultural The 1990s have been the most significant years institutions, cannot be dodged in the context of of change since African countries became inde- developing regions. The thesis of this paper is pendent some three decades ago. The political therefore that the restriction of democracy to systems of African states have undergone the political sphere rules out of bounds the unprecedented transformation, from authoritar- question of more democracy. The process of ian singled-party to multi-party systems. democratisation means more than political Virtually all countries in sub-Saharan Africa democracy. In contrast to Christopher Clapham have been touched by the wave of democratisa- and John Wiseman's “minimalist system of tion which saw die-hard proponents of single- democracy”, the conception of democracy here, party systems grudgingly yielding to pressures goes beyond this narrow approach and involves to jettison authoritarian systems in favour of at the minimum the development and nurturing political democracy. Multi-party systems of a genuine democratic culture, the strengthen- embodying varying levels of democratic credi- ing of civil society, and the education and bility are now a feature of Africa's political empowerment of disadvantaged groups in landscape. urban and rural areas. Clapham and Wiseman In South Africa, the apartheid regime under advocate a minimal system of democracy that former President De Klerk was forced to merely involves a competition between politi- accede to the verdict of the ballot box that cal parties in free and fair elections and which brought to power the African National Con- allows for the real possibility of alternative par- gress (ANC). The sustained liberation drive by ties and the involvement of civil society in the the ANC and the Mass Democratic Movement public realm. The deprivation of the mass of in South Africa and the South West Africa the population under authoritarian systems in People’s Organisation (Swapo) in Namibia Africa, makes it difficult to accept Clapham brought down the last racist bastions in and Wiseman's procedural form of democracy Southern Africa. in assessing the consolidation of democracy in This paper seeks to critically examine the Africa generally, and South Africa specifically weaknesses and pitfalls of democratic consoli- (1995:220). dation in South Africa. It argues that the phe- To be sure, political democracy in the sense nomenon of democratisation in Africa has been of free and fair elections and political parties is given a narrow interpretation, associated with an essential ingredient of any society that is the dominant paradigm of liberal democracy, undergoing democratisation. It is, however, not which equates democracy with the formal pro- a sufficient or satisfactory measure of full cedures of elections without due regard to the democratisation. Surely, South Africa can be broader political and social context that gives regarded as a consolidated democracy if we the process its meaning. The question of full judge its process by the yardstick of liberal democratisation, which involves the extension democracy. Again, if we employ Samuel

119 Jozana

Huntington's “two-consecutive elections” socio-economic structure that was heavily threshold (1991) when assessing the country's skewed against the majority population. The democracy, South Africa passes with flying prospect of consolidating democracy was con- colours. fronted with a serious challenge to eliminate As the conception of democracy involves violence from society. This seems to be the more than what is termed electoralism in this achilles heel of the new democracy in South paper, the successful consolidation of democra- Africa. cy is fraught with difficulties in South Africa. It The dynamics of violence had created an is open to threats and dangers if the capacity of unstable political environment in the pre-1994 the state for economic growth, development election and had the potential to undermine the and distribution is perceived to be weak in conditions of free and fair elections in 1994. meeting the expectations or satisfying the mate- The greatest challenge to the government was rial needs of its people. The process faces seri- thus to create an environment which was ous challenges if the democratic forces are investor-friendly. Violence continued in politically immature and the political game is KwaZulu-Natal in the post-1994 election and viewed as a zero-sum game. Closely linked to this posed a great threat to the new democracy. the above criteria, is the need for a political cul- The conflict in KwaZulu-Natal dated back to at ture that is democratic and accompanied by a least 1983 and was largely a political conflict high level of political tolerance to sustain between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and democracy. the ANC (Schlemmer & Hirschfeld, 1994). The The consolidation of democracy also requires challenge to the ANC government was to fash- a demonstrable relationship between good gov- ion policies to counter political violence in this ernance and accountability (Mzongola-Ntalaja region and any consideration of policies had to G., 1997: 12-13). Public confidence in many take account of planned attacks on political authoritarian regimes in Africa was eroded by a competitors, mainly taking the form of assassi- lack of accountability and bad governance. To nations of local leaders and activists. stop at formal democracy and ignore other Although violence was considerably reduced pressing socio-economic outcomes of democra- in KwaZulu-Natal through a peace pact cy can lead to serious flaws in our theorisation between the IFP and the ANC, sporadic inci- of democratic consolidation. dences of violence nevertheless continued to Although there is reason for optimism tear up the social fabric of South Africa. There regarding democratic consolidation in South was a disturbing display of political intolerance Africa, its consolidation, nonetheless, faces a among the supporters of the two parties and this severe test in the most critical threshold in did not augur well for the consolidation of democratic consolidation – ie. a peaceful trans- democracy in South Africa. There is surely a fer of power to an opposition party other than causal link between political intolerance and the ANC. Again, the incumbent government political violence and, unless attempts to devel- has yet to prove that it has the capacity to with- op and nurture a genuine democratic culture are stand a wide range of challenges to its power, made by the government, political intolerance such as high levels of social and labour con- poses a serious obstacle to building a genuine flicts. Moreover, the chances for consolidating democracy. Although the total number of peo- its democracy lie principally with South ple who died in KwaZulu-Natal dropped from Africa's ability to limit claims that would seri- 633 in 1994 to 70 in 1999, civic education is ously damage its productive capacity and abili- still necessary in order to improve anti-democ- ty to meet the expectations of the members of ratic tendencies among supporters of different civil society. In short, its success is predicated political parties. No matter how low the levels on achieving a sustainable balance between of violence were in the 1999 election, this is not demands and possibilities. an indication that there is an emerging democratic culture among the supporters of the two 1. THE FIRST-ELECTION THRESHOLD parties. This was demonstrated by the new con- The range of problems that faced the new South flict between the United Democratic Movement African government when it came to power in (UDM) and the ANC supporters before the 1994 were indeed daunting. It had inherited a 1999 election. Democracy entails free competi-

120 Jozana tion for power among the contenders for the ernment to global economic orthodoxy of mon- political centre, and the zero-sum conception of etary and fiscal discipline. Among its goals, the political process has serious limitations to Gear correctly wants growth to be accompanied democratic consolidation. by redistribution, but its target growth projec- One of the greatest threats to democratic con- tions of six per cent by the year 2000 have been solidation in South Africa is the high rate of unrealistic. unemployment which has been directly linked Unemployment continues to rise and jobs for to the high rate of crime. In a matter of two the rapidly growing workforce will clearly be years since 1994, crime quickly filled the vacu- the major achilles heel of South Africa's demo- um left by political violence and its rapid cracy. Much of the increased crime, for increase has become a hindrance to economic instance, is due to the rapid growth of unem- development. Failure to improve the socio-eco- ployment over the past decades. Unemploy- nomic conditions of the majority population has ment has amplified physical hardship, and the led to the escalation of crime, as the poor and despair permeating many segments of society destitute might have realised that democracy has resulted in social decay and, by that very has not brought about the changes they expect- fact, threatens democratic consolidation in the ed. The promises that were made in the 1994 country. election under the banner of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) were to 2. PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC meet the basic needs of people, such as jobs, CONSOLIDATION housing, health care, social welfare, etc., and On 2 June 1999 South Africa passed the thresh- the provision of these services was crucial for old of a “second consecutive election” test, but sustaining the democratic gains that the ANC the breadth of the problems which faced the achieved at the ballot box. ANC government seemed to dwarf what politi- To be successful, democracy must have a cal pundits hailed as a success story in Africa's meaning to the people, that is, by offering them emerging democracy. The challenges were jobs and roofs over their heads. We may cite indeed daunting: the economic crisis was exac- Zambia as a case in point, in showing that fail- erbated the plummeting gold price, the public ure to satisfy the people's expectations can eas- sector unions with their demands for a 10% ily derail the consolidation of democracy. Presi- salary hike, a disillusioned population in some dent Frederick Chiluba's honeymoon was cut areas of the former Transkei region, wide short by the stark reality of the awesome task inequalities in the distribution of income, a his government faced. The people’s expecta- weak police force to deal effectively with crime tions that political change would bring about and a dysfunctional judicial system. All these instant economic improvement were unreal. problems paled the euphoria of a second free The prospects for a sustainable process of and fair election. There had emerged, on the democratic development in Zambia were other hand, an alarming culture that seemed to gloomy in the face of the International associate democracy with lawlessness. Monetary Funds' (IMF) structured adjustment The vision of the RDP had been abandoned programme which was imposed on the govern- in favour of the elitist development programme ment by the IMF. As the Zambian case demon- in Gear. The international financial institutions, strated, the hegemony of global capitalism is a the IMF and the World Bank, and domestic constraint to successful democratic capitalism. business interests had put pressure on the gov- In developing countries, the socio-economic ernment to abandon the “idealism” of the RDP. outcomes of democratisation seem to be as The expectations of the ordinary people who important as the periodic elections in judging had felt a sense of ownership and empower- the success of the democratic project. ment through the RDP were dissipated when In South Africa, any hope of achieving robust the government adopted the private-sector dri- democracy has been shattered by the shift from ven growth strategy. the people-centred approach of the RDP to the To be fair, some limited achievements in top-down approach of the government's social democracy have been made, but the Growth, Employment and Redistribution adoption of Gear under which redistribution is (Gear) strategy. Gear commits the ANC gov- predicated on growth, shows dim prospects for

121 Jozana broadening social democracy. For this reason, political process. Although, arguably, the emer- the prospects of sustaining democracy in South gence of a new party, the United Democratic Africa are uncertain, as long as the poor people Movement (UDM), nearly eroded the ANC’s perceive that the struggle to establish a more base of power in some parts of the former just socio-political and socio-economic distrib- Transkei, it was nevertheless a win-win situa- ution of power has been lost. Although there tion for the ANC, despite widespread percep- have been no signs of growing tensions and dis- tions that it had failed to deliver and to control illusionment at the apparent backtracking on the high levels of crime and unemployment. No campaign promises, the ANC government must party, for instance, was able to turn the disillu- face the possibility of high rates of crime and sionment of South Africa voters into political lawlessness in the country. support. Instead, the opposition in the 1999 Another serious barrier to democratic consol- election became fragmented, and thus made the idation is political immaturity of the democratic prospect of a strong opposition appear very forces. This has manifested itself in political bleak. intolerance and is the result of a lack of politi- The argument that South Africa is moving cal education on the nature of competitive poli- towards a system of one-party dominance – but tics. Before the 1994 elections, some areas were by no means a one-party state – stems from the “no-go zones”, where opposition parties were dismal performance of the opposition parties in denied the right to hold rallies. This is the kind the second consecutive elections in June 1999 of political culture South African inherited (Ibid:194). This happened despite widespread from the struggle against the dictatorship of reports about the disenchantment of the elec- apartheid and it has infected the body politic of torate, including the blacks, with the govern- society. Political education in the competitive ment’s weak capacity in dealing effectively political process was indeed lacking and, conse- with an alarming increase in crime and increas- quently, violence was the outcome of such ing unemployment. neglect. Indeed, the maturation of South Africa's There is also a danger of weakening the stan- democracy and the capacity to deepen it dards of probity and accountability if criticism depends largely on the strength of the opposi- is not allowed against a ruling party. Robust tion and a real possibility of removing the opposition is part and parcel of a vibrant incumbent government from power. democracy and cannot be blocked by dismiss- ing criticism as racially motivated and not con- CONCLUSION structive. Equally unpalatable is the suppres- In the final analysis, South Africa's democrati- sion of public criticism by some political par- sation process was indeed rare by the standards ties which insist that their members must chan- of Africa. There was a genuine transfer of nel their criticism through party structures. power to the liberation movement led by the Indeed, to pass as a patriot, a party member ANC and this happened under a climate of free must refrain from public criticism of one's and fair elections. There were no threats of vio- party. Public criticism is equated with a behav- lence from the defeated white racist party, the iour that brings the party into disrepute and a National Party and its supporters, which had person criticising the party is subject to discipli- dominated the political process for several nary measures (O'Malley P., 1999:105). This decades. type of action is hardly conducive to the Admittedly, the process of political pluralism creation of a new political culture in which in the sense of periodic free and fair elections is democracy may be sustained, as public criti- critical for democratic consolidation. It must, cism is necessary for the growth of democracy. however, be balanced with some measure of This is the same as an attack on the media by social democracy. As one astute political politicians which undermines democratic con- observer aptly remarked: “No system, democra- solidation. Not only is the role of the media tic or otherwise, is going to bring peace, harmo- important as a watchdog, but is also a vital ny and stability, unless it is able to give its citi- force in civil society. zens a certain degree of material well-being” South Africa has not yet reached a point (Africa Confidential, 1992). where opposition parties are a real force in the If the gains of the struggle for democracy are

122 Jozana benefiting only a minority of the population, the public realm by government, and if the that surely casts a shadow on the success of mass of the population does not enjoy the fruits democratisation. Instability and violence are the of its struggle, there is undoubtedly a real threat products of discontent with the management of to any attempt at democratic consolidation.

REFERENCES

AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Vol-33, No1, January O'MALLEY, P. (ed), (1999): Southern Africa: 1992. The People's Voices: Perspectives on BEETHAM, D., (1994): “Conditions for Democracy, National Democratic Institute Democratic Consolidation”, Review of for International Affairs, Western Cape. African Political Economy, No.60. SCHLEMMER, L.& HIRSCHFELD, I. (eds), (1994): HUNTINGTON, F. P., (1991): The Thirdwave: Founding Democracy and the New South Democratisation in the 20th Century, African Voter, Human Science Research Norman, University of Oaklahama Press. Council, Pretoria. MZONGOLA-NTALAJA, G.& LEE, M.C. (EDS), WISEMAN, J.A. (ED)., (1995): Democracy and (1997): The State and Democracy in Africa, Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, AAPS Books, Harare. Routledge, London.

123 Programme

Wednesday, 18 August 1999

15h00-15h20 Opening Remarks Mrs Xoliswa Jozana, Department of Political Studies, Unitra Dr Michael Lange, Resident Representative, Konrad Adenauer Foundation Welcome: Prof. Duma Malaza, Acting Vice-Chancellor, Unitra

FIRST SESSION CHAIR: PROF. DUMA MALAZA, UNITRA

15h20-16h00 Keynote Address: Consolidating Democracy in South Africa Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu, Development Bank of South Africa, Midrand

SECOND SESSION CHAIR: PROF. ATTIE COETSER, UNITRA

16h00-18h00 CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE, EASTERN EUROPE AND AFRICA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES • Consolidating Democracy in Eastern Europe After the Collapse of Communism, With Special Reference to Russia Dr Anita McCreath, Dept. of Russian Studies, Unisa • Consolidating Democracy in Central America With Special Reference to Nicaragua Guy Coultier, Roman Catholic Diocese, Umtata • Consolidatng Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa With Special Reference to Zambia Prof. Hugh MacMillan, Dept. of History, University of Transkei • Consolidating Democracy in Southern Africa With Special Reference to Namibia - Prof. Tapera Chirawu, Dept. of Political Science, University of Namibia DISCUSSION

125 Programme

Thursday, 19 August 1999

THIRD SESSION CHAIR: DR MEENAL SHRIVASTAVA, UNITRA

09h00-11h00 THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA • The Silent Revolution: The Aids Pandemic and the Military in South Africa Dr Robert Shell, Population Research Unit, Rhodes University, East London • South Africa’s Three-in-One-Revolution Allister Sparks, SABC Television, Johannesburg • The 1999 Election and the Prospects of Consolidating Democracy in South Africa Prof. Alexander Johnston, School of Undergraduate Studies, University of Natal

DISCUSSION

FOURTH SESSION CHAIR: PROF. HUGH MCMILLAN, UNITRA

11h30-13h00 THREATS TO DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 1 • Crime, Corruption, and Democracy Dr Constanze Bauer, Dept of Public Administration, Vista University • Unemployment, Poverty and Democracy Dr Tembeka Mpako-Ntusi, Dept of Social Work, University of Transkei • Racism and Democracy Anthony Johnson, Reader’s Digest, Cape Town

DISCUSSION

FIFTH SESSION CHAIR: PROF. ALEXANDER JOHNSTON, UNIVERSITY OF NATAL

14H00-15H30 THREATS TO DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 2 • Effective and Efficient Multilingualism in the Building of a Democratic South Africa or Linguistic Hegemony and Marginalisation Dr Kathleen Heugh, PRAESA, University of Cape Town • Globalisation and Democracy: Reconciling Economic and Political Liberalism in South Africa Dr Meenal Shrivastava, Dept of Political Studies, University of the Transkei • Racial Categorisation: Threats to South Africa’s Fledgling Democracy Prof. Roy du Pré, Faculty of Arts, University of Transkei

DISCUSSION

126 Programme

SIXTH SESSION CHAIR: PROF. JONATHAN JANSEN, UNIVERSITY OF DURBAN-WESTVILLE

16H00-17H30 CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY: PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES • Democratic Party - Eddie Trent • New National Party - Francois Beukman • United Democratic Party - Masilo Mabeta • African Christian Democratic Party - JoAnn Downs • Freedom Front - Dr Petrus Liebenberg

DISCUSSION

Friday, 20 August 1999

SEVENTH SESSION CHAIR: ROSEMARY TOWNSEND, UNITRA

09H00-11H00 CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY: IMPLICATIONS/CONTRIBUTIONS/ PROBLEMS/VIEWS • Democracy and Education Prof. Jonathan Jansen, Deputy Vice Chancellor, University of Durban Westville • Democracy and Gender Ms S Moiloa-Nqodi, ANC MP, Cape Town • Democracy and Human Rights Ms Pansy Tlakula, South African Human Rights Commission

DISCUSSION

EIGHTH SESSION CHAIR: PROF. NSOLO MIJERE, DEPT OF SOCIOLOGY

11H30-12H30 SAFEGUARDING AND CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA • Weaknesses and Pitfalls Xoliswa Jozana, Dept of Political Studies, Unitra • Opportunities and Strengths Allister Sparks, SABC Television, Johannesburg

127 Participants

Dr C. Bauer Prof. Brown Dr T Chisanga M. Gugo HOD-Public Unitra English Dept. Unitra UDM Administration Private Bag X1 Private Bag X1 43 Elliot Road Vista University UNITRA UNITRA UMTATA P.O. Box 380 5117 5117 BLOEMFONTEIN M. Hala 9300 Mr N. Buso Prof. A. Coetser SACP Unitra Student Afrikaans Dept. Unitra P.O. Box 514 Mrs Phyl Beck P.O. Box 132 Private Bag X1 UMTATA Justice COFIMVABA UNITRA P.O. Box 970 5380 5117 Dr K. Heugh GILLITTS PRAESA, UCT 3603 N. Cawe Fr G. Coultier Education Building Unitra RC Diocese - Umtata Private Bag Ms B Beukman Private Bag X1 P.O. Box 60 RONDERBOSCH Dept. of Criminology UNITRA UMTATA 7700 Unitra 5117 Private Bag X1 Mrs J. Downs Mr A Johnson UNITRA Mr P.O. Chabane ACDP Readers Digest 5117 English Dept. Unitra P.O. Box 636 Association Private Bag X1 WINKELSPRUIT 10 Glebe Road Mr F. Beukman UNITRA 4145 Ronderbosch New National Party 5117 CAPE TOWN P.O. Box 15 Prof. R.H. du Pré 7700 CAPE TOWN Mr C.P. Chaka Dean - Faculty of Arts 8000 English Dept. Unitra Private Bag X1 Prof. S. Johnston Private Bag X1 UNITRA School of Undergraduate N. Boakye UNITRA 5117 Studies Faculty of Arts 5117 University of Natal Private Bag X1 L. Genuka DURBAN UNITRA Dr T.O. Chirawu Faculty of Arts 4041 5117 University of Namibia Private Bag X1 P.O. Box 24520 UNITRA Ms X Jozana Rev. L. Bookholane WINDHOEK 5117 Dept. of Political Studies Religious Studies Private Bag X1 Private Bag X1 UNITRA UNITRA 5117 5117

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