Training in Hazmat and Rail Security: Current Status and Future Needs of Rail Workers and Community Members

NOVEMBER 2006

PREPARED FOR

CITIZENS FOR RAIL SAFETY BY

BRENDA CANTRE LL, MARIA LAZO, AND RUTH RUTTENBERG RAIL WORKERS HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRAINING PROGRAM NATIONAL LABOR COLLEGE 10000 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE SILVER SPRING, MD 20903

©CITIZENS FOR RAIL SAFETY, INC.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS OF RAIL WORKERS AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In-depth quality training for rail workers and community members is essential for saving lives and health. It is currently inadequate. Just one 90-ton rail car of chlorine, whether involved in an accident or act of terrorism, could create a toxic cloud 40 miles long and 10 miles wide and could kill as many as 100,000 people in 30 minutes. One estimate of a worst case scenario for a nuclear transportation accident in an urban area could cost --- in cleanup, evacuation, and business loss – from several billion to several tens of billions of dollars.

Railroads in the United States transport 1.8 million shipments of hazardous materials every year, using 100,000 tank cars, filled with such chemicals as chlorine, anhydrous ammonia, cyanide compounds, flammable liquids and pesticides. The result is one million tons of hazardous material being moving across the nation daily. Every day tank cars filled with hazardous materials travel by homes, schools, and hospitals, and through the middle of cities and along highways.

Between 1988 and 2003 there were 181 acts of terror, worldwide, involving railroads and related rail targets. Security experts and government officials, as well as chemical and rail trade associations, acknowledge the vulnerability of railcars, bridges, and tunnels to intentional acts of terror. The risk of death and serious illness from unintentional accidents involving hazardous materials is also high. Though the vast majority, 99.98 percent according to the railroads, of Hazmat shipments arrive safely and without major incident, there are fatalities, hospitalizations, and/or evacuations every year from the escape of a large quantity of gases or liquids.

Quality training for rail workers, emergency responders, and residents of rail communities – including joint training exercises – is one necessary part of an overall safety and security action plan. Changes also need to be made in rail equipment and operations to make Hazmat transport safer.

I. Key Findings

I.A. Training

ƒ Rail workers are poorly trained in recognizing and responding to Hazmats. Railroad training focuses on rules and operations, not preparedness and first on the scene response.

ƒ The typical emergency responders are poorly trained in responding to Hazmat incidents, especially involving rail, and usually have little knowledge of the rail infrastructure in their communities or the chemicals moving through by rail.

ƒ Citizens in “rail communities” generally know little about the Hazmats moving through their towns and do not know what to do should there be an emergency. Rail Hazmats

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY P. i often run through densely populated areas.

ƒ There are few forums that bring together rail workers, emergency responders, and citizens to learn about and plan for rail Hazmat incidents. There are very few joint training exercises.

ƒ Many communities are without emergency action plans for rail emergencies.

ƒ Hazmat safety and health training saves lives. Trainees learn to go upwind, to use binoculars rather than approach a leaking tank car, to call for professional Hazmat assistance, to use resources to determine such life saving information as isolation distance. In two recent and fatal rail Hazmat accidents, more and better training could have saved lives. In Graniteville, South Carolina in 2005 a conductor lived because his military training taught him not to run, but to walk out of a cloud of chemical gas. Chlorine killed his engineer partner, who without training, ran and because of his deep inhalation of chlorine gas, ran to his death. Also, in Graniteville, residents did not generally know that the gas cloud that threatened them was heavier than air and that their safest escape was not only upwind, but also uphill. In Bexar County, Texas, in 2004, three people -- a trainman and two community residents -- died as a result of a major chlorine leak following a derailment. If emergency dispatchers knew the dangers of rail Hazmat and the lethal nature of chemical releases, appropriate advice and a proper response to the 911 calls might have saved those residents. Instead they heard the word smoke and difficulty breathing and sent firefighters to an assumed medical emergency.

ƒ A well-trained and knowledgeable workforce is the first line of defense to keep a minor event from becoming a major hazardous materials incident. In most rail emergencies, rail workers are first on the scene. Joint training exercises with community emergency responders, as well as annual refresher training for rail workers and responders alike, is important.

ƒ Rail workers need security training, and according to research by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Railroad Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program, 80 percent of workers have not received any security training beyond being told to be vigilant and report anything suspicious.

I.B. Security

ƒ Rail cars, tracks, yards, and basic infrastructure are not sufficiently secure. They are not only poorly protected from possible terrorists, but often in poor maintenance, making them more vulnerable to accidents.

ƒ Rail Hazmat cars are extremely vulnerable when they sit for hours and even days and weeks, unattended and unsecured, along track sidings and in yards.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY P. ii I.C. Radioactive Shipments

ƒ Over the next decade the amount of radioactive waste to be transported by rail will grow substantially, and there must be training of affected individuals and development of emergency action plans along affected train routes.

II. Key Recommendations (from among more than 100)

II.A. TRAINING!

For Workers

ƒ Address the critical need for Hazmat training – awareness, preparedness, prevention, and emergency response – for rail workers. Organize and stage rigorous joint training and exercises with fire, police, dispatchers, and emergency medical personnel at hospitals. Develop minimum criteria for quality rail Hazmat courses that include hands-on small group exercises led by fully trained peer trainers. All rail workers need to be an integral part of team briefings. A well-trained and knowledgeable workforce is the first line of defense to keep a minor incident from becoming a major hazardous materials incident.

ƒ Achieve buy-in for Hazmat and rail security training by all Class I, short-line, and passenger railroads. Require rail carriers to develop a rail worker training program and to train all of their rail workers within one year.

For Emergency Responders and Community Residents

ƒ Provide rail Hazmat awareness training for emergency responders (including police) and residents of rail communities – not just about Hazmat in rail transportation, but also about the roles of evacuation vs. shelter-in-place and the importance of wind direction and elevation.

ƒ Training needs to include specific knowledge of what Hazmats are transported through ones community. Railroads should provide regular information on what hazardous materials are moving by rail through their communities.

ƒ Communities need to develop and implement emergency action plans, and then provide training on the plans so everyone knows what to do if there is an emergency.

ƒ 911 centers should develop a checklist with standard operating procedures.

ƒ Assemble a committee of citizens and associated organizations to assert their right-to- know about existing risks.

For Health Care Professionals and Emergency Dispatchers

ƒ Provide specialized training for health care professionals, who will be “first receivers” in the event of an emergency. Ensure that emergency medical service and hospital emergency department staffs have the necessary guidance to plan for, and improve their ability to respond to, incidents that involve human exposure to hazardous materials.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY P. iii ƒ Provide rail Hazmat awareness training to all emergency dispatchers.

II.B. Need for Railroads to Improve Equipment and Operating Procedures

ƒ Adopt operating procedures to enhance the safety and health of everyone – in daily activities as well as in the event of a Hazmat incident.

ƒ Upgrade and secure cars and infrastructure – yards, tracks, bridges, and tunnels -- against the threats of Hazmat incidents, whether accidental or pre-meditated. ƒ Minimize the use of cars for chemical storage. ƒ Replace cars in poor condition. ƒ Where possible re-route Hazmat shipments to avoid rail transport through major population centers. ƒ Do not allow trains to leave terminals without proper paperwork. ƒ Hire more railroad police.

II.C. Government Needs to Be More Involved

ƒ Make issues related to Hazmat and security training a more visible part of the work of relevant federal agencies, like the National Transportation Safety Board, Federal Railroad Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security.

ƒ Pass legislation to upgrade and mandate in-depth, quality training for rail workers, emergency response personnel, and the community.

ƒ Penalize rail corporations who fail to adequately train.

ƒ Require the railroads to regularly inform officials of the 25 main Hazmats going through or adjacent to their communities.

ƒ Dedicate and increase funding for rail and mass transit security.

ƒ Enforce Superfund and state clean-up for designated rail yards.

ƒ Promote research in epidemiology and toxicology to better document the relationship between exposure to Hazmats and disease.

ƒ Require a comprehensive medical surveillance program for all rail workers and contract employees.

III. Summary and Conclusions

Millions of lives and billions of dollars are at stake in efforts to improve rail safety and security. Quality training is key. Hands-on, small group exercises led by highly qualified peer trainers – supplemented by simulations, audio visuals, and group discussion – need to reach all who may

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY P. iv be affected. Short videos and tests on rules are insufficient. Education and training need to cover first response, familiarity with local emergency action plans, hazard identification, health effects, and how to use resources. Partnerships among rail companies, rail unions, federal legislators and regulators, state and local emergency responders, and community residents are in the best interest of all parties.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY P. v CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS OF RAIL WORKERS AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS

CITIZENS FOR RAIL SAFETY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary

Introduction: An Urgent Need for Improvements in Hazmat and Security Training...... 1

The Problem...... 1 The Importance of Training...... 4

I. Safety and Security Problems for the Nation’s Railroads, Its Workers, and the Communities Along Rail Routes ...... 7

I.A. Examples of Recent Rail Hazmat Incidents...... 10 I.B. Use of Rail Cars to Store Hazmats ...... 13 I.C. Rail Cars in Poor Condition...... 16 I.D. Rail Hazmat Shipments Traveling Through Populated and Strategic Areas ...... 18 I.E. Potential Impact of a Rail Accident Involving Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or Highly Contaminated Radioactive Waste...... 20 I.F. Poor Security...... 22

II. The High Economic Cost of Hazmat Incidents ...... 23

III. Role for Training ...... 26

III.A. Description of Existing Hazmat Training for Rail Workers...... 29

III.A.1. Training by the Railroads...... 29 III.A.2. Other Providers of Hazmat Training for Rail Workers...... 32

III.B. Description and Assessment of Existing Hazmat Training for Emergency Responders...... 34

III.B.1. Examples from Current Prevention and Response Training...... 36 III.B.2. Programs Supported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) .38

III.C. Description of Existing Hazmat Training for Community Residents...... 39

III.C.1. The Community’s Need to Know ...... 41 III.C.2. Local Emergency Planning Committees...... 42

TABLE OF CONTENTS P. 1 III.D. Training Materials...... 44

III.D.1. Training Materials for Rail Workers...... 45 III.D.2. Training Materials for Emergency Responders ...... 46 III.D.3. Training Materials for Members of the Community...... 46

III.E. Specific Examples of Where Training Could Have Made a Difference...... 47

III.F. General Principles for Training Excellence...... 49

IV. Recommendations...... 52

IV.A. Improve and Expand Training ...... 52

For Rail Workers ...... 52 For Emergency Responders ...... 54 For Government ...... 55 For Community Residents ...... 55

IV.B. Better Access to Information ...... 56

IV.C. Minimize the Use of Cars for Storage ...... 56

IV.D. Eliminate Cars in Poor Condition...... 57

IV.E. Improve Community Awareness and Action...... 57

IV.F. Need for Data Analysis...... 58

IV.G. Improve Emergency Response ...... 59

IV.H. More Use of Engineering Controls...... 59

IV.I. Improve Maintenance and Operations...... 60

IV.J. Build Partnerships...... 60

IV.K. Proper Access and Use of Personal Protective Equipment...... 61

IV.L. More Planning...... 61

IV.M. Policy Initiatives and Actions ...... 63

IV.N. Rerouting Where Feasible...... 64

IV.O. Improve Security, Surveillance, and Vigilance ...... 64

IV.P. Make Yards and Stations Safer...... 65

TABLE OF CONTENTS P. 2 IV.Q. Other ...... 65

V. Summary and Conclusions ...... 66

Bibliography

Tables

Table 1: Most Common Hazardous Substances Released During Rail Events, Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) System, 16 States, 1999-2004

Table 2: Average Cost Per Hazmat Incident By Transportation Mode

Table 3: Hazmat Summary by Mode of Transportation / Cause for 2005, Serious Incidents

Appendices

Appendix 1: “Community Workbook”

Appendix 2: General Findings and Recommendations

Appendix 3: Specific Findings and Recommendations

TABLE OF CONTENTS P. 3 TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS OF RAIL WORKERS AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS

CITIZENS FOR RAIL SAFETY

SEPTEMBER 2006

Introduction: An Urgent Need for Improvements in Hazmat and Security Training

An accident or act of terrorism, in a densely populated area, involving just one 90-ton rail car of chlorine, with a targeted explosive device, could create a toxic cloud 40 miles long and 10 miles wide and could kill as many as 100,000 people in 30 minutes.1

The Problem

Railroads in the United States transport 1.8 million shipments of hazardous materials every year,2 using 100,000 tank cars,3 filled with such chemicals as chlorine, anhydrous ammonia, cyanide compounds, flammable liquids and pesticides. The result is one million tons of hazardous material being transported across the nation daily.4 After coal, chemicals and allied products have the highest tonnage -- nearly 170 million tons in 2004

1 J. Boris, Naval Research Laboratory, “Results of a Large Urban Release,” Testimony to Washington, D.C. City Council, October 6, 2003.

2 Association of American Railroads, Policy and Economics Department, “Hazmat Transport: Mandatory Rerouting and Pre-Notification,” January 2006, http://www.aar.org, retrieved July 2006.

3 Association of American Railroads, Railroad Facts, 2003 Edition; Association of American Railroads, Policy and Economics Department, “Railroad’s: The Safe Way to Move,” January 2006; Association of American Railroads, “Hazmat Transport …,” January 2006; David Kocieniewski, “Despite 9/11 Effect, Railyards are Still Vulnerable,” New York Times, March 27, 2006.

4 Hon. Elijah Cummings, “There is a better – and safer – way to run the nation’s railroads,” The Hill Newspaper, September 4, 2002.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 1 -- of all the types of freight carried by rail.5 More than 64 percent of chemicals that are toxic when inhaled are currently transported by rail.6 BNSF alone transports:7

• Enough propane each year to fill more than 100 million five-gallon propane tanks • Enough lube oil to fill 1.6 billion quarts of motor oil • Enough petroleum wax to produce 100 million fire logs • Enough asphalt to lay a single lane road four times around the equator.

Every day tank cars filled with hazardous materials travel past homes, schools, and hospitals, through the middle of cities, and along highways.

Besides the potential for huge loss of life, there is also the risk of, literally, billions of dollars of burden to individuals, the communities, businesses, and general economy of the country. One expert study8 estimated that a worst case scenario for a nuclear transportation accident in an urban area could cost --- in cleanup, evacuation, and business loss –from several billion to several hundred billion dollars. Well over 100,000 people could be downwind and contaminated. Using four scenarios, the authors calculated that with a severe spent fuel truck accident in Las Vegas, the decontamination costs would range from $2 billion to $28 billion, but the same category accident by rail would yield decontamination costs of $15 billion to $190 billion.

5 Association of American Railroads, Policy & Economics Department, “Class I Railroad Statistics, January 13, 2006. There are 7 Class I U.S. railroads: BNSF Railway (BNSF), CSX Transportation (CSX), Grand Trunk Corporation, Kansas City Southern Railway, Norfolk Southern Combined Railroad Subsidiaries (NS), Soo Line Railroad, and Union Pacific Railroads (UP) as well as regional, local, and switching and terminal railroads. The seven Class I U.S. railroads account for 93 percent of the industry’s total revenue. There are 31 regional and over 500 local (shortline or switching and terminal) railroads. There are approximately 175,000 rail workers across the United States. Each of the Class I railroads has operating revenue in excess of $289.4 million. Two Canadian railroads have enough revenue that if they were U.S. companies, would be U.S. Class I railroads: Canadian National Railway and Canadian Pacific Railway. Both own railroads in the U.S. that by themselves qualify to be Class I railroads. Two Mexican railroads would also be Class I if they were U.S. railroads: Ferrocarril Mexicano and Kansas City Southern de Mexico.

6 Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Department of Homeland Security in Congressional testimony, cited in Judy Thomas, “One-man train crew plan raises security fears,” McClatchy Newspapers, June 2006.

7 BNSF Railway, “BNSF Facts,” http://www.bnsf.com/media/bnsffacts.html, retrieved July 7, 2006.

8 Matthew Lamb, Marvin Resnikoff, and Richard Moore, “Worst Case Credible Nuclear Transportation Accidents: Analysis for Urban and Rural Nevada,” Radioactive Waste Management Associates, New York City, August 2001, http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/trans/rwma0108.pdf, retrieved June 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 2 Another study, for the State of Nevada,9 found that under the conditions of the Baltimore Tunnel fire in 2001 (see discussion later in this paper), had there been a release of radionuclides from a single rail cask, the accident could contaminate three square miles. Failure to adequately clean up the contamination would cost $13.7 billion and would cause 4,000 to 28,000 cancer deaths over the following 50 years. Between 200 and 1,400 cancer fatalities would be expected during the first year. While spent fuel casks are very strong, and designed to withstand a 1475° F. fire for 30 minutes, the Baltimore Tunnel burned for several days at temperatures that exceeded 1500° F.

One would think that with such risks to life, health, and the economy, that rail security and hazardous materials (Hazmat) safety would be a national priority, especially post 9- 11. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case. No national planning to make rail operations more secure has occurred. Ninety percent, or $4.6 billion in FY05, of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA in the Department of Homeland Security) budget is for aviation security. What is left is just $32 million for truck, bus, port, pipeline, transit, and rail together. According to one security expert, “Rail security is off track.”10

The potential for deadly accidents, natural disasters, and man-made acts of terror involving railroads is high across the nation. There are also risks from leaks and spills, and contamination of soil, water, and air from everyday activities of the nation’s railroads. Among the many necessary activities to safeguard workers, emergency responders, and communities is training – training for disaster response and training to safeguard against Hazmat incidents.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the current status of training about hazardous materials and rail security -- for railroad employees, emergency responders, and citizens of rail communities -- and to identify future training needs and make recommendations. The paper explores the nature of Hazmat and security training, along with descriptions of model programs and their results. Responses of rail workers, emergency responders, and citizens about their perceived needs for training, the power of training when they receive it, and their assessment of future training needs is also shared. Because of the focus on hazardous materials and security, this study mainly addresses the nation’s freight railroads.

9 M. Lamb and M. Resnikoff, “Radiological Consequences of Severe Rail Accident Involving Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments to Yucca Mountain. Hypothetical Baltimore Rail Tunnel Involving SNF,” Radioactive Waste Management Associates, September 2001 in Marvin Resnikoff, “Testimony by Marvin Resnikoff, Joint Hearing on Transportation of Spent Rods to the Proposed Yucca Mountain Storage Facility, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Railroads, April 25, 2002.

10 Fred Millar, “New Strategies to Protect America: Putting Rail Security on the Right Track,” Critical Infrastructure Security Series, Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress. org/atf/cf..., retrieved July 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 3 The Importance of Training

Safety and health training saves lives. The outcomes of training have been documented through the experiences of the Worker Education and Training Program (WETP) of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), which has supported training for over a million workers since 1987.11 Training makes a difference, and lack of training can be deadly. In Graniteville, South Carolina, in 2005, for example, training of the railroad operating personnel, local citizens, and factory workers could have saved lives. According to one rail safety expert: “Graniteville, S.C. I assisted in investigating the derailment as part of the BLET12-safety task force. I feel if the train crew involved was better versed on Hazmat exposure, a fatality would not have occurred.”

There are multiple examples where training did or could have made a difference in Graniteville.

• Saving the life of the railroad conductor: The railroad engineer ran out of the poisonous chlorine; his deep breathing intensified his exposure and he was overcome. The conductor, on the other hand, had received training in the military and knew, that in the case of poison gas, one should walk calmly out of the plume and breathe as shallowly as possible. The conductor survived.13

• Saving lives of residents living close to the derailment:

o “... a former chemistry teacher, saw a green cloud boiling up the gorge toward Powell Street and shouted at his neighbors to get inside. ‘Get in the house!’ he yelled. ‘Turn off your ventilation!’ He knew chlorine when he saw it, and he was quick to follow his own advice.”14

o The Graniteville derailment included three cars carrying 90 tons each of deadly chlorine gas. Sixty tons of chlorine went into the night air and instantly vaporized.15 Many victims were overcome when they ran down hill

11 National Clearinghouse of Workers Safety and Health Training for Hazardous Waste Workers and Emergency Responders, for U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, “Minimum Health and Safety Training Criteria: Guidance for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER), HAZWOPER-Supporting and All-Hazards Disaster Prevention, Preparedness, and Response,” May 2005.

12 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen

13 Interview with Mr. Brian McLaughlin, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, Local Chair, Division 85, Columbia, South Carolina.

14 N.J. Nidifer, Un-Natural Disaster: Stories of Survival After Graniteville Tragedy, Harbor House, Augusta, Georgia, 2005.

15 Nidifer, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 4 into the chlorine poison. Being able to identify chlorine and learning that chlorine is heavier than air might have saved ones life or health.

In Bexar County, Texas in 2004, lives might have been saved if emergency dispatchers had received Hazmat awareness training. A Union Pacific train struck a Burlington Northern train, resulting in the derailment of four locomotives and 35 rail cars. A 90-ton chlorine car was breached and released tons of chlorine. There were also releases of nitrogen fertilizer and diesel fuel, and a fire resulted from some of the spilled fuel. Three people died, one rail worker and two community residents. Forty-three people were transported to hospitals. Training of emergency dispatchers might have saved lives; it could have prevented injuries. If the lethal nature of a release had been known or even suspected, the calls for help from those who subsequently died, might have been better handled – in both terms of dispatching emergency response and also the instructions which dispatchers could have given to the distressed callers. According to an investigative report by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 911 dispatchers only picked up on the words “smoke” and “difficulty breathing,” even though “various callers to 911 mentioned ‘train derailment’ or ‘train wreck.’” Volunteer firefighters initially responded to a ‘medical emergency’ based on 911 information. They were not aware of the train derailment and the major emergency until they arrived on the scene. Key information collected early on by entities operating under mutual aid agreements was disregarded or not readily acted upon. Because the engineer and conductor were injured, the manifest was not available and the cargo and released material could not be easily identified. Some residents were told to evacuate and others to shelter-in-place. Those who were told to shelter-in-place were not adequately instructed in how to do that safely.16 EPA had many recommendations for needed training and future actions. (See Recommendations section of this paper for some of them.)

Sometimes a Hazmat incident is an accidental derailment, with Hazmat releases killing rail workers and citizens alike. Also, of great concern is the possibility of a pre- meditated, terrorist attack. Yet, even without major accidents or acts of terrorism, too many people die, become ill, and are injured from rail incidents involving hazardous materials. Every day Hazmat incidents endanger the lives of those who work and live around rail yards and track. Rail workers are regularly exposed to hazardous materials. Engineers, conductors, and track workers breathe diesel exhaust and diesel fumes. Carmen are exposed to many chemical vapors when they clean rail cars, as well as being exposed to solvents and degreasers. Track workers are exposed to the chemicals that leak or spill along the track bed and they are frequently exposed to creosote (used to treat the rail ties) and silica.17 Just two daily anecdotal examples, of hundreds, provided

16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 6, “Emergency Response Review: Union Pacific/Burlington Northern Train Derailment, Macdona, Texas, Final Report,” August 18, 2004.

17 Silica is also known as sand, silica sand, quartz. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health: “exposures to respirable crystalline silica are associated with the development of silicosis, lung cancer, pulmonary tuberculosis, and airways diseases,” http://www.cdc.gov/ niosh/topics/silica/, retrieved July 6, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 5 by rail worker trainees of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program provide context for some of the daily Hazmat exposures:18

ƒ “…main line trains come in leaking chemicals from over the sides of tank cars. The odor is very sickening and the substance lands on the cross ties. It is reported but it stays there for a very long time. There are diesel fuel spills at the engine service truck that have contaminated the soil and maybe the water table.”

ƒ “Copper concentrate trains are not covered with plastic or any other material. At 50 MPH a cloud of dust will blow off the train into the prevailing wind.”

Rail worker trainees at the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program (RWTP) identified chemicals and other hazards they face at work. In the few minutes given for this exercise they collectively listed, over a two year period, more than 200 hazardous materials -- from chlorine to asbestos, molten sulfur to radioactive materials, anhydrous ammonia to uranium and weed spray. The 25 chemicals most frequently carried by rail are listed in Appendix I as part of the “Community Guide.”

To be active participants in promoting their own safety and security, rail workers need training to understand the hazards and risks they face. When asked about some of the health effects of their exposures, trainees at the RWTP listed many diseases and health problems that they feared were related to workplace exposures. Based on what they perceived to be diagnosis for a suspiciously disproportionate number of rail workers, they listed: asbestos-caused diseases, asthma, bloody nose, brain damage, brain cancer, chest pain/tightness, colon cancer, dermatitis, dizziness, early deaths, equilibrium disabilities, headaches, kidney cancer, leukemia, liver diseases, lung cancer, lung diseases, lymphoma, multiple myeloma, pancreatic cancer, rashes, respiratory problems, silicosis, stomach cancer, skin cancer, testicular cancer, throat cancer, toxic poisoning, watery eyes. All rail workers should be covered by a comprehensive medical surveillance program. Medical, epidemiological, and toxicology studies could establish relationships between exposure and disease.

This report for the Citizens for Rail Safety encompasses hazards from the catastrophic to the common. All endanger nearby residents, with hazards and a potential toll in people’s lives and health as well as damage to property and businesses that support local economies. It documents how in-depth quality Hazmat training for all concerned has and will improve safety. It also documents what happens when people are not trained. The literature review for this study is comprehensive, but by no means exhaustive. The objectives of this report include developing recommendations and win-win strategies that will strengthen the nation’s railroads and protect those who work at, live near, and respond to hazardous materials incidents -- associated with rail.

18 Supported by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS). Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program, National Labor College, Fifteen Years of Documented Success: Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program, 1991-2005, Evaluation Draft Report, May 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 6 I. Safety and Security Problems for the Nation’s Railroads, Its Workers, and the Communities Along Rail Routes

“Our network of tracks, bridges, and terminals presents a huge security problem.”19 Charles Dettmann, Exec VP-Safety and Operations Association of American Railroads

Railroads play a key role in the movement of hazardous materials across the United States. The nation’s railroads carry over 40 percent of chemicals and allied products shipped, even though they are less than one percent of the shipments.20 A single shipment on a long train can carry a powerful weapon of mass destruction. The FBI warned in 2002 that Al Qaeda might be planning to attack trains in the United States, possibly causing derailments or blowing up tank cars laden with hazardous materials.21 Between 1988 and 2003, there were, world-wide approximately 181 terrorist attacks on trains and related rail targets, resulting in over 430 deaths and several thousand injuries.22

Rail incidents cause hundreds of hazardous materials releases each year. In just 16 states (reporting to the voluntary Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance System), from 1999-2004, there were 1299 substances released in 1165 rail incidents.23 (See Table 1.) Seventeen chemicals accounted for over one-third of all releases. There were eleven reports of chlorine releases following derailments that were responsible for multiple deaths and many hundreds of injuries.

The railroads report that “about 99.98 percent of hazardous materials transported by rail move without incident.”24 This is in part based on CSX announcing that in a year only 9

19 Charles Dettmann, Executive Vice President-Safety and Operations, Association of American Railroads, “Impacts of Security on Rail Supply Chains,” remarks at Chemical Week’s Transportation/Distribution Conference, New Orleans, January 22, 2003.

20 U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, Hazardous Materials Shipments, October 1998.

21 Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Press Office, Press Release, October 24, 2002, Washington, D.C., http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel02/nlets102402.htm, retrieved July 10, 2006; Walt Bogdanich and Christopher Drew, “Deadly Leak Underscores Concerns about Rail Safety,” New York Times, January 9, 2005

22 Jack Riley, Director of RAND Public Safety and Justice, “Statement of Jack Riley Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, March 23, 2004.

23 Because the HSEES system is voluntary and includes less than one-third of U.S. states, the numbers are definitely underreported. The 2002 Minot, North Dakota derailment, for example, in which one person died and more than a thousand were injured, is not part of this data base.

24 Tom White, spokesperson for the American Association of Railroads, quoted in Phil Pitchford, Ben Goad, David Danelski, Mark Kawar, “Toxic Cargo: Rails Carry a Growing Risk,” Press-Enterprise, http://www.pe.com/digitalextra/metro/trains/inland.html, retrieved July 4, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 7 of 518,000 rail cars handled by CSXT released any contents due to a derailment.25 The risk may be statistically low, yet is of little comfort to the families of those that die. It is little comfort to the rail workers who are injured or become ill. According to a study by the federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR):26 “Although a statistically rare occurrence, the effects on public health from the release of hazardous substances during rail transportation are potentially catastrophic.”

Accidents that occur while transporting Hazmats by rail are more harmful to the health of the general public than hazardous materials from other modes of transport and from fixed facilities.27 ATSDR found (over a five year period studied) that hazardous substance emergencies involving rail occurred most often in or near areas that are more densely populated and were more likely to affect the general public than employees of the railroad or emergency response personnel. The study found that at least one residence was within a quarter mile of 46 percent of rail incidents, whereas the number was 37 percent for non-rail events. Also, 49 percent of rail events occurred on week nights between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. when residents are most likely to be at home, whereas for non- rail events it was 42 percent.

Chemicals carried by rail are particularly vulnerable to a terrorist act. Richard Falkenrath, Deputy Homeland Security advisor to President Bush and now Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism for the New York City Police Department, said chemicals such as chlorine, ammonia, phosgene, and methyl bromide — so-called toxic- inhalation-hazards, or TIH, industrial chemicals — are “uniquely deadly, pervasive and susceptible to terrorist attack.”28 In a 2005 editorial to the Washington Post,29 Mr. Falkenrath chastised the Department of Homeland Security, saying:

“The federal government has the authority to regulate the security of chemicals as they are being transported on roads, railways and waterways. With only one minor exception, the administration has not exercised this authority in any substantial way since Sept. 11. There has been no meaningful improvement in the security of [hazardous] chemicals moving through our population centers.”

25 CSX, “Safety is a Way of Life,” http://www.csx.com/?fuseaction=general.csxo_safety, 2004, retrieved July 7, 2006; CSX, “Impressive Record of Hazmat Safety,” http://www.csx.com/?fuseaction= general.csxo_env, retrieved July 7, 2006.

26 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, “Public Health Consequences from Hazardous Substances Acutely Released During Rail Transit – South Carolina, 2005; Selected States, 1999-2004,” MMWR Weekly, January 28, 2005.

27 Ibid.

28 Jim Snyder, “Chemical plants still vulnerable, critics say,” The Hill, July 13, 2005.

29 Richard A. Falkenrath, “We Could Breathe Easier: The government must increase the security of toxic chemicals in transit,” editorial to the Washington Post,” March 29, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 8 Emanating from his experience at Homeland Security, he had several recommendations, including:

• The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Transportation (DOT) should promulgate regulations requiring chemical shippers to track the movement of all hazardous chemicals electronically • To report these data to DHS in real time • To use fingerprint-based access controls for all chemical conveyances • To adopt container signs that do not reveal the contents to most observers • To perform rigorous background checks on all employees • To strengthen the physical resilience of chemical containers • To ship decoy containers alongside filled containers • To install perimeter security at loading and switching stations.

Officials at the American Chemistry Council (ACC), which represents the leading chemical companies, have expressed their concern with rail Hazmat safety. According to Marty Durbin, Managing Director of Federal Affairs for ACC, “We are concerned that [our] partnership is being compromised by our rail partners and we believe their proposals are driving us down the wrong track regarding hazardous materials transportation safety.”30

According to FRA, “the train accident rate has not shown substantive improvement in recent years.”31 In 2005 alone, there were 3,152 rail accidents and 2,256 derailments. In the period from 2003 to 2005, rail collisions increased from 192 to 261 and employee fatalities are up 25 percent.32

The Centers for Disease Control concludes about rail Hazmat shipments:33

“Although nearly all of these materials safely reach their destinations, many are explosive, flammable, toxic, and corrosive and can be extremely dangerous when improperly released. These materials frequently are transported over, through, and under areas that are densely populated or populated by schools, hospitals, or nursing homes, where the

30 American Chemistry Council, “ACC Committed to Safe, Reliable Hazardous Material Transportation by Rail: Association Calls for Comprehensive Approach to Hazmat Rail Safety,” News Release, June 13, 2006, http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_acc/bin.asp?CID=206&DID=2489&DOC=FILE.PDF, retrieved July 10, 2006.

31 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railway Administration, “Federal Railroad Administration Action Plan for Addressing Critical Railroad Safety Issues,” May 16, 2005.

32 Federal Railroad Administration in Judy Thomas, “One-man train crew plan raises security fears,” McClatchy Newspapers, June 2006.

33 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, “Public Health Consequences … - South Carolina, 2005; Selected States, 1999-2004,” MMWR Weekly, January 28, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 9 consequences of an acute release could result in environmental damage, severe injury, or death.”

I.A. Examples of Recent Rail Hazmat Incidents

The most devastating recent incident was in January 2005 – a derailment in Graniteville, South Carolina that left nine people dead and hundreds injured from chlorine inhalation. The images -- of residents, workers, and emergency responders -- in a small town in the middle of the night running for their lives and trying to rescue the fallen – reached national television. Side-by-side with heroism, was the realization that better training with pre-incident planning could have saved lives and health.

Statistics on rail Hazmat incidents come from an array of federal and private databases. Each has different reporting requirements, and so it is very difficult to compare statistics. According to the Federal Railroad Administration, it is “not possible to identify reportable events that were omitted from a railroad’s submission.”34 Three causes of incidents predominate: derailment, interior corrosion, and incompatible products, with derailments by far being the main event type. Other causes included broken, defective, or missing components; polymerization of commodities; over-filled or over-pressurized cars; open valves; or impact with sharp or protruding object. According to Department of Transportation (DOT) data, less than one percent was due to human error. (See Table 1.) Data are collected in different formats. DOT statistics on 2004 Hazmat problems listed 964 damaged rail Hazmat cars.35 There have been many “near-misses,” mostly involving derailments with Hazmat cars that did not leak.

Below are a few examples of recent and serious rail incidents, some of which were deadly and others which nearly missed loss of life and health:

9 June 2006, a dozen cars from a BNSF train derailed east of Houston. Part of U.S. Highway 90 was closed. One tanker leaked about 50 gallons of flammable methanol over two hours. One rail car ended up in a nearby creek.36

9 In March 2006, in Marquette, Iowa, approximately 2,500 gallons of diesel fuel leaked from an Iowa Chicago and Eastern Railroad train, when a tank car was punctured by a rock. The tank slowly emptied over a 28-mile stretch of track.37

34 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, “Railroad Safety Statistics, Annual Report,” 2004.

35 U.S. Department of Transportation, “Railroad Safety Statistics – Annual Report 2004,” Table 6-2, November 30, 2005.

36 Associated Press, “U.S. 90 remains closed after freight train derailment,” June 29, 2006.

37 Iowa Department of Natural Resources, “Hazardous Substances Incident Report, Spill Number 033106-RLT-0911,” reported March 31, 2006 and National Response Center, “2006 National Response Team Incident Summaries,” Incident Report #7926-6.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 10 9 In March 2006, a CSX train derailed because of a large amount of fuel it leaked. Miami-Dade (Florida) Fire Rescue responded and officials called the Department of Environmental Resources Management.38

9 In August 2005, Canadian Northern (CN) had three hazardous materials incidents. First, four cars from a 23-car train jumped the track south of Prince George. Two shovelsful of highly toxic sodium chlorate, a chemical used in the pulp and paper industry and fatal in small doses leaked from a car. Next, twelve of 44 cars of a CN train derailed west of Edmonton and spilled 730,000 liters of toxic fuel oil, as well as a potentially hazardous wood preservative, into Lake Wabamun. Third, a CN train dumped highly corrosive sodium hydroxide into the Fraser River, killing thousands of fish and other wildlife.39

9 In spring 2005, a 61-year old Arkansas woman died when propylene, leaking from a ruptured rail car, formed a flammable gas cloud that moved 800 feet before igniting, apparently from a gas heater in the woman's home.40

9 In January 2005, in Graniteville, South Carolina, a derailment caused a catastrophic release of chlorine that left nine people dead, 58 hospitalized, and hundreds seeking treatment. Months later, many victims had continuing symptoms of coughing, chest pains, headaches, dizziness, and nausea.41

9 In June 2004, in Macdona, Texas, (Bexar County near San Antonio) a UP train and a BNSF train collided. Four locomotives and 19 cars derailed from the UP train and 16 cars from the BNSF train. There was a release of chlorine and an area within a two-mile radius was evacuated. Three people died – one rail worker and two near-by residents. More than 40 went to hospitals for treatment.42

9 In February 2003, twenty-two of 108 cars of a CN Railway freight train derailed near Tamaroa, Illinois. The result was fire and the release from several tank cars

38 CBS Broadcasting, Inc., CBS4 News, Southwest Miami-Dade, “Train Derails in Southwest Miami- Dade,” March 29, 2006.

39 Bell Globemedia Inc., Canadian Press, “Latest CN derailment makes five in August,” August 20, 2005, http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews..., retrieved July 24, 2006.

40 Pitchford, Goad, Danelski, Kawar, “Toxic Cargo …”

41 South Carolina Director of Bureau of Disease Control Jerry Gibson, reported in http://spewingforth.blogspot.com/2006/01/graniteville-sc-one-year-later.html, retrieved March 28, 2006. A final report is not yet complete because epidemiological work is still on going. Existing data are still preliminary. (e-mail correspondence with James Gibson, Director, Bureau of Disease Control, South Carolina, July 25, 2006 and Erick Svendsen, South Carolina State Epidemiologist, July 2006.

42 National Transportation Safety Board, “NTSB to Hold Public Hearing on 2004 Macdona, Texas Train Accident,” NTSB News, April 6, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 11 of vinyl chloride, methanol, phosphoric acid, and hydrochloric acid. Eight hundred-fifty residents were evacuated.43

9 In 2002, a Canadian Pacific Railway freight train derailed outside Minot, North Dakota. Five tank cars carrying a liquefied type of ammonia gas broke open, releasing toxic fumes that killed one resident, seriously injured eleven, and injured an additional 322 people. Approximately 11,600 people occupied the area affected by the vapor plume.44

9 In 2002, a Norfolk Southern train derailed in Farragut, Tennessee. A tank car containing sulfuric acid was punctured and released a cloud of toxic fumes. Local responders evacuated approximately 2,600 people, for about 2 ½ days.45

9 July 2001 a CSX freight train derailed in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore where eleven of its 60 cars left the track. Four were tank cars: one with tripropylene, two with hydrochloric acid, and one with di(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate. The tripropylene car was punctured and ignited. The fire spread to several adjacent cars and the resulting heat, smoke, and fumes hindered access to the tunnel for several days.46 Rail traffic along the East Coast was disrupted as were roads in downtown Baltimore. Fiber optic communications were also disrupted. 47 Five people were injured.48

9 July 2001 in Riverview, Michigan, a pipe attached to a fitting on the unloading line of a railroad tank car fractured and separated, resulting in the release of methyl mercaptan, a poisonous and flammable gas. It then ignited. Fire damage to cargo transfer hoses on an adjacent tank car resulted in the release of chlorine gas. Three plant employees died and several were injured. About 2,000 residents

43 National Transportation Safety Board, “NTSB To Meet on Illinois Train Derailment and Hazmat Release,” NTSB News, January 19, 2005.

44 National Transportation Safety Board, “Derailment of Canadian Pacific Railway Freight Train 292-16 and Subsequent Release of Anhydrous Ammonia Near Minot, North Dakota, January 18, 2002,” http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/RAR0401.pdf, retrieved July 2006; Walt Bogdanich and Christopher Drew, “Deadly Leak Underscores Concerns about Rail Safety,” New York Times, January 9, 2005.

45 National Transportation Safety Board, “Derailment of Norfolk Southern Railway Train 15T, Farragut, Tennessee, September 15, 2002,” http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2003/RAB0305.pdf, retrieved July 2006; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Rail Conference, “High Alert: Workers Warn of Security Gaps on Nation's Railroads,” 2005.

46 National Transportation Safety Board, “Safety Recommendation,” R-04-13, January 5, 2005.

47 Riley, March 23, 2004.

48 National Transportation Safety Board, “Railroad Accident Brief,” Accident Number DCA-01-MR-004, NTSB/RAB-04/08, 2004.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 12 were evacuated. Two tank cars, railroad track, and plant equipment were damaged.49

Whenever such an emergency occurs – large or small – quick and knowledgeable action is critical. As the people immediately and first on the scene and those who clean up from an incident, it is imperative that -- whether rail worker, emergency responder, or a nearby resident -- those involved in protecting themselves and others know what to do and what not to do. In-depth, quality training is key.

I.B. Use of Rail Cars to Store Hazmats

Railroad companies sometimes use rail cars for storage rather than for transportation. There are many thousands of stored Hazmat cars nationwide.50 The Government Accounting Office,51 in a 2003 report, recommended that minimum security standards be developed for Hazmats stored in rail cars. Nearly two years later, federal transportation- security agencies still had not produced those standards.52 When rail cars are hooked up to chemical plant processes, unloading and loading is sometimes considered part of ‘transportation,’ putting the trains under federal DOT jurisdiction, thus preempting state and local governments from issuing more stringent rules. Also, railroads may lease track to chemical companies and label the rail car storage as “storage in transit,” a condition which companies assert is outside of any regulation.53 DOT rail Hazmat regulation allows rail Hazmat cars to sit no longer than 48 hours, but there are loopholes in the regulation:54

ƒ “A chemical company can lease a siding from a railroad and leave Hazmat cars there indefinitely, even loading and unloading from them.

ƒ There are ‘rolling leases,’ in which chemical companies lease only the stretch of track directly under the car, so the lease moves when the car moves.”

49 National Transportation Safety Board, “Hazardous Materials Release from Railroad Tank Car with Subsequent Fire at Riverview, Michigan, July 14, 2001, Executive Summary,” NTSB HZM-02/01.

50 U.S. General Accounting Office, Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-Based Plan Needed, GAO-03-435, April 30, 2003; Bruce Henderson, “Dangerous Materials Sit for Days in North and South Carolina Rail Cars,” Charlotte Observer, April 10, 2005.

51 Effective July 7, 2004, the GAO's legal name became the Government Accountability Office.

52 Bruce Henderson, “Dangerous Materials Sit for Days in North and South Carolina Rail Cars,” Charlotte Observer, April 10, 2005.

53 Fred Millar, “Railcar Hazmats Storage: Reducing Risks in a Time of Terrorism,” 2001, http://www.mapcruzin.com/chemical_catastrophe/millar3.htm, retrieved July 8, 2006.

54 Ibid.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 13 There are other ways to “work” the regulations meant to protect the public from storing Hazmats in rail cars:55

“Federal transportation officials and state chemical safety officials report that chemical companies are massively escaping effective oversight, e.g., under federal EPA or OSHA regulations and/or state and local Right-to- Know and disaster prevention regulations, by making increasingly extensive use of railcars for on-site storage and process feed instead of using their own onsite fixed chemical storage containers. When railcars are hooked up to chemical plant processes for direct use, their ‘unloading and loading’ is considered by some companies to be still part of ‘transportation’, and thus regulated by U.S. DOT regulations (49CFR) --- which preempt the potentially more stringent requirements (varying by jurisdiction) of local, state and federal regulations on fixed facilities.”

A specific example of rail car storage:56 a rail yard just three miles from Newark, New Jersey and seven miles from New York City, stores 90-ton tanker cars full of hazardous chemicals. Especially dangerous is when these cars are stored near petroleum storage tanks, natural gas depots or propane tanks, a frequent occurrence in Northern New Jersey.

Another example: In the Carolinas, according to federal records, vandals released Hazmat from idled rail cars at least twice in the past five years.57 In May 2004, the Charlotte, North Carolina Fire Department battalion chief noticed more than 20 rail cars stopped on a rail spur near a neighborhood northwest of town for at least two days, carrying munitions headed for Fort Bragg. Orange placards identified the cargo as explosives. A lock on one of the cars was broken, although the FBI reported none of the munitions were stolen.

After questions from the Charlotte Observer, Norfolk Southern said it would move about five chemical rail cars left in March 2005 on a lonely stretch of track south of Huntersville, North Carolina in order “to provide better security.”58

Residents of some Charlotte-area towns grew uneasy about Hazmat cars parked nearby. Kannapolis and Huntersville residents complained to the railroads, with mixed results, about Hazmat rail cars left parked on open rail lines in their downtowns. A rail yard in downtown Kannapolis, officials say, is a temporary parking lot for Norfolk Southern trains. Some cars displayed placards for highly toxic ammonia and corrosive nitric acid.59

55 Ibid.

56 Kocieniewski, March 27, 2006.

57 Henderson, April 10, 2005.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 14 In Huntersville, an area resident noticed chemical tank cars parked along Main Street in 2004. He looked up the chemical on the Internet -- toluene diisocyanate (TDI), a chemical whose toxic vapors can cause lung damage. He called town hall. “Those things were literally parked in peoples’ front yards over there. If you’re going to have a chemical that’s that dangerous, it should not be stored outside a locked facility.” Foamex International, whose Cornelius plant uses TDI to make polyurethane foam, says it secures incoming cars behind locked gates. But its chemical supplier is responsible for the cars until they arrive.60

At least 60 freight trains move through the Charlotte region each day, passing within a mile of nearly 800,000 people. No law, however, forces the rail companies to reveal how much Hazmat rolls through the region -- or sits parked in rail cars.61

The Federal Railroad Administration, in October 2005, issued a safety notice:62

“advising shippers, consignees, and railroads of the dangers of allowing cars of ‘time-sensitive’ chemicals to remain undelivered beyond their anticipated date of placement and to recommend enhanced procedures to avoid such occurrences. This action is being taken to improve the safety and reliability of hazardous materials shipments by railroad.”

This FRA advisory emanated from an August 2005 event in the Linwood Yard in Cincinnati, operated by the Indiana and Ohio Railway Company. A release there, from a tank car containing 24,000 gallons of styrene monomer, led to an evacuation of 800 people as well as the closing of 4 schools and halting transportation on the Ohio River. FRA found the cause of the incident was polymerization of the styrene monomer due to the deterioration of the inhibiting agent as a result of the extended time in transportation. The tank car began transit in December 2004 and spent weeks in one location and months in another. It had been in the Linwood Yard since March 2005. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) subsequently issued Circular OT-55-H, with operating practices for transporting Hazmats – and styrene monomer was put on a list of 30-day

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, “Notice of Safety Advisory 2005-04,” Federal Railroad Administration in Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 193, October 6, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 15 time-in-transit sensitive products.63 On September 2, 2005 FRA, in a press conference, said:64

“It is deeply troubling that a hazardous material shipment, according to initial accounts was left for months in a Cincinnati rail yard… If we find that one or more parties violated federal hazardous materials regulations, we will take all appropriate enforcement actions, including imposing the strictest penalties permitted by law.”

A “solution” for parked tank cars, presented by the Department of Homeland Security, seems to hide rather than solve the problem:65

“Concerned about the potential for a terrorist attack on freight trains, New Jersey’s homeland security czar [July 24, 2006] proposed walling off the view of parked chemical tanker cars along the New Jersey Turnpike at critical points near Newark Liberty International Airport and farther south in Linden.”

According to the New Jersey Homeland Security director, Richard Canas, “You can’t hit what you can’t see.”66 Mr. Canas plans to start earmarking several millions of dollars of state funds to erect fencing.

Community training, awareness, and subsequent activism could help provide public officials and emergency responders with up-to-date information on hazardous materials in tank cars on sidings, as well as activism to make communities safer.

I.C. Rail Tank Cars in Poor Condition

In 2004, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that more than half of the 60,000 rail tank cars used to transport hazardous materials were not built according to current standards and were susceptible to rupture in the case of an accident.67 The NTSB

63 Office of the Federal Register, “Notice of Safety Advisory 2005-04,” October 6, 2005.

64 Federal Railroad Administration, “Statement of Federal Railroad Administrator Joseph H. Boardman on the Cincinnati Rail Car Incident,” Press Release, September 2, 2005.

65 Ron Marsico, “Homeland chief wants to wall off chemical tankers along Pike,” The Star-Leger, July 25, 2006, based on interviews (according to e-mail correspondence with the authors).

66 Ibid.

67 National Transportation Safety Board, … North Dakota, January 18, 2002,” NTSB/RAR-04/01, 2004; Jonathan Salant, Associated Press, March 10, 2004; Alexandra Marks, “Why railroad safety debate keeps rolling,” Christian Science Monitor, January 24, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 16 also reported that a 1989 requirement for tougher steel has made all new tank cars safer, but about 60 percent of pressurized tank cars currently in use were built before 1989.68

FRA has begun research, arising from the Minot, North Dakota accident in 2002, to assess the consequences of tank cars involved in derailments. The work is also relevant to preventing tragedies such as in Bexar County and Graniteville. The research involves modeling tank car structural integrity. It should be completed by July 2008, but could have been by December 2006 if necessary additional funding had been made available.69

Many rail Hazmat incidents are caused by tank car corrosion. The economic impact of such an event can be significant. Just as one example, in 1998 in California the liner in a rail tanker containing hydrochloric acid failed and a leak occurred. The following is a brief description:70

The rail industry supports the tank car vulnerability studies that were part of the recently passed SAFETEA-LU legislation, which included a requirement for FRA to initiate rulemaking on tank car design.71

“On May 21, 1998, a chemical transportation safety manager of a large railroad company was contacted by a car foreman in Colton, CA, who reported that a train tank car was leaking from the bottom portion of the car … 8 to 10 gal per hour … The San Bernadino, CA, Fire Department was notified due to the toxic nature of the product vapors. The area where the tank car was to be placed and the repair shop were evacuated… An entry team removed the valving from the product liquid line on the top of the car and placed a containment system to capture the leaking product underneath the car… Several attempts were made to putty the weld at the side plate, which only resulted in the leak moving to other areas of the weld…Two 55 gal drums of free product were captured during this event. The waste and a batch of contaminated soil were delivered to a facility for proper disposal.”

68 National Transportation Safety Board, … North Dakota, January 18, 2002,” NTSB/RAR-04/01, 2004; Pitchford, Goad, Danelski, Kawar, “Toxic Cargo …”

69 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railway Administration, “Federal Railroad Administration Action Plan for Addressing Critical Railroad Safety Issues,” May 16, 2005.

70 Michael Brongers, CC Technologies, Hazardous Materials Transport: Cost of Corrosion, Appendix R, Hazardous Materials Transport, http://www.corrosioncost.com/pdf/hazmattrans.pdf, retrieved May 2006.

71 Association of American Railroads, “Hazmat Transport: Mandatory Rerouting and Pre-Notification,” January 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 17 I.D. Rail Hazmat Shipments Traveling Through Populated and Strategic Areas

“We must…judge our security options in a different light than we might have judged them in the past.”72 Norman Mineta, Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation

In September 2001, the U.S. Department of Transportation requested “shippers and transporters of high-hazard materials to consider altering routes to avoid populated areas whenever practicable.”73 In 2005, Richard Falkenrath, Deputy Homeland Security advisor to President Bush and now Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism for the New York City Police Department, and Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.) warned Congress of the danger posed by the rail transport of hazardous chemicals.74

According to Homeland Security expert Fred Millar, “If you see a chlorine tank car coming into your major target city, that means homeland security is a joke…If we don’t reroute these cargoes, we are prepositioning them exactly where the terrorists would like to have them, right in the middle of our major target cities and that just puts in danger the American public who is kept in blissful ignorance of this.”75 Millar suggests that the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) add to NFPA1 the following language:76

“Certain hazardous materials cargoes shall not be transported by highway or rail into or out of a High Threat Target Area, as designated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, except where the shipper of the hazardous material has obtained a permit from the local fire department or other locally designated agency.”

72 U.S. Department of Transportation, “Hazmat Transportation Community Urged to Increase Safety Measures, Safety Alert, September 2001, http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/reports/salerts/safe9-01.pdf, retrieved July 2006.

73 U.S. Department of Transportation, … Safety Alert, September 2001.

74 Mimi Hall, “Cities may ban trains with chemicals,” USA Today, June 22, 2006.

75 WKRC 12 Cincinnati, “Local 12 Investigates: Toxic Targets,” May 16, 2006, http://www.wkrc. com/News/Local/, retrieved, July 4, 2006.

76 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), “Proposed anti-terrorism restrictions on haz-mat transportation through Washington also urged for NFPA 1 to cover capital and other high-threat-target U.S. cities,” NFPA Journal, January 29, 2004.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 18 Millar argues that alternative rail routes for avoiding major target cities are often available. He gives the following example:77

“A chemical manufacturing facility in Georgia, shipping chlorine gas to a user facility in New Jersey can use CSXT’s line through Washington, Baltimore, Wilmington, and Philadelphia or it could use Norfolk Southern’s line, which swings 50 miles west of Washington, passing through such non-target areas as Elkton, West Virginia, Luray, Virginia, Hagerstown, Maryland and Reading, Pennsylvania, from which feeder lines reach the major northeast cities.”

But no anti-terrorism mandate encourages either the supplier or the railroad to choose the safer option.

In 2005, Washington, DC was the first city to place a ban on hazardous materials shipments on routes through vulnerable sites, when the DC City Council passed the Terrorism Prevention in Hazardous Materials Transportation Emergency Act of 2005. On average, six rail cars a week, each carrying 90 tons of chlorine, passed within 20 blocks of the Capitol, where escaping gas could kill or injure about 100 people per second – lethal within 2 to 5 miles and dangerous for 14 miles.78 CSXT challenged the District of Columbia in Court and lost.79

In 2006 at least six other major cities were considering bans or limits on Hazmat shipments: Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Las Vegas, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh.80 Las Vegas already has an ordinance banning nuclear waste shipments.81 When Hazmats are traveling through cities, it is especially important to have strong training programs and pre-incident planning, activities that could save lives and health.

77 Fred Millar, “New Strategies to Protect America: Putting Rail Security on the Right Track,” Critical Infrastructure Security Series, Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress. org/atf/cf..., retrieved July 2006

78 Sally Quinn, “Hell on Wheels: Why are trains that carry potentially lethal cargo allowed to transit the capital?” Washington Post, March 12, 2006.

79 United States District Court for the District of Columbia, CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Anthony A . Williams, et al.

80 Hall, June 22, 2006.

81 Suzanne Struglinski, “Rail ban could increase danger,” Las Vegas Sun, October 21, 2005 and Associated Press in Las Vegas Sun, “Ruling may help Vegas block rail shipments,” April 19, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 19 One set of recommendations calls for a national re-routing study to identify re-routing options to avoid target cities. Five main components of that study would be:82

1. Compile a list of the most dangerous cargo transported by rail. 2. Identify those target cities where re-routing options exist. 3. Improve computer modeling for assessing routes. 4. Require railroads to enter into interchange agreements to share routing. 5. Establish better mechanisms for dispute resolution.

The culture of the railroad industry needs to change. According to one expert, railroad companies seem used to operating as national entities, bypassing state or local governments.83 One needs to lobby the federal government for regulation and enforcement, but short of that, state and local governments may be called to action – as they were in Las Vegas and Washington, DC.

I.E. Potential Impact of a Rail Accident Involving Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or Highly Contaminated Radioactive Waste

“Transportation targets are different than fixed targets; they are much more difficult to defend.”84

Radioactive shipments by rail are poised to increase in the future, perhaps doubling in the near future, as the Department of Energy (DOE) accelerates its cleanup schedule. Materials for storage at Yucca Mountain in Nevada are expected to be approximately 100,000 shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste.85 Transportation routes will go through 43 states.86 Currently, there are approximately three million packages of radioactive hazardous materials shipped every year. DOE makes approximately 20,000 radioactive material and waste shipments each year. Rail carries all types of radioactive material and waste. While the majority of shipments are by truck, trains carry the very large and heavy packages that trucks cannot handle.87

82 Millar, “New Strategies …”

83 Ibid.

84 James Ballard, “Testimony of James David Ballard, Ph.D., Consultant on behalf of the State of Nevada, Transportation of Spent Fuel Rods to the Proposed Yucca Mountain Storage Facility, Before the Subcommittees on Highways and Transit and Railroads, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,” U.S. House of Representatives, April 25, 2002.

85 Public Citizen, Hazardous Materials Unsecured: Terrorist Use of Trucks and Trains a Major Threat,” 2004, http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF1B4.pdf, retrieved July 20006.

86 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Yucca Mountain Standards,” March 8, 2006, http://www.epa.gov/radiation/yucca/about.htm#transport_repository, retrieved August 2006.

87 U.S. Department of Energy, Modular Emergency Response Radiological Transportation Training (MERRTT), Student Guides, March 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 20 Both DOE and the State of Nevada have assessed the potential impact, in health and damage to the economy, from an accident or act of sabotage involving spent nuclear fuel and/or highly contaminated radioactive waste.88 The DOE and Nevada studies, and independent scientists, agree that even without an incident, there is a negative effect on property values along transport routes for these commodities. The cost of a major rail accident, according to DOE in 1985 could be $620 million, or $1.1 billion in 2005 dollars, in a rural area and $2 billion, or $3.6 billion in 2005 dollars, in an urban area with approximately 5 to 30 latent cancer fatalities. The State of Nevada estimated that there could be hundreds of cancer deaths and the cost would be tens of billions of dollars – not including business losses and decreased property values.

An expert consultant for the State of Nevada shared with a Congressional subcommittee a number of ways that terrorists might compromise waste shipments:89

• “Theft of a petroleum transportation vehicle and use thereafter as a mobile bomb device against a truck or rail shipment • Use of an explosive device against a co-existent rail shipment of volatile chemicals that would act as an attack device for a mixed car rail shipment. • Use of falsified transportation credentials or insider knowledge to gain access to shipments with the intent to create a radiological dispersion. • The taking of hostages and using them as human shields until the final attack consequences are achieved. • The use of numbers of attackers as part of a capture and radiological release scenario.”

These tactics are all areas where training for rail workers, emergency responders, and community residents are important.

The Governor of Nevada, Kenny Guinn, in 2002, told Congress that it was critical for Congress to order an analysis of the terrorism risks associated with mass transport to Yucca Mountain.90 He explained that DOE had never done such an analysis and that the nuclear utilities argue that it is only the jurisdiction of the U.S. military to evaluate terrorism risks in spent fuel transport, not a subject for analysis by DOE, NRC, the Department of Transportation or the industry.

88 State of Nevada, “Risky Transit – The Federal Government’s Risky and Unnecessary Plan to Ship Spent Nuclear Fuel and Highly Radioactive Waste on the Nation’s Highways and Railroads,” http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news2001/nn11313.pdf, 2001, retrieved April 2006.

89 Ballard, “Testimony …,” April 25, 2002.

90 Governor Kenny Guinn, “Statement of Kenny C. Guinn, Governor of the State of Nevada Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittees on Railroads and Transportation and Hazardous Materials,” U.S. Congress, April 25, 2002.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 21 I.F. Poor Security

“Al-Queda is … eyeing transportation and energy infrastructures – the destruction of which could cripple the US economy, create fear and panic, and cause mass casualties… I worry, in particular, about the US rail system’s myriad vulnerabilities.”91 Robert S. Mueller III, FBI Director

And there is, perhaps, no easier way for Al-Queda to fulfill its goal than to “take out” a (chlorine filled) tank car.

A reminder for how easy it could be to sabotage a train: The Associated Press August 1, 2006 reported that “a CSX freight train flipped off the tracks after hitting a piece of railroad equipment deliberately left in its path.”92

The National Journal, in 2004 asked a dozen experts to assess the progress of Homeland Security’s key anti-terror program. Aviation security and the Patriot Act got the highest marks. The assessment of railways was among the lowest.93 Railway security received a “D-” (1.6 on a 5.0 scale).94

Many have documented areas where rail security needs improvement. Fully training rail workers on their company’s security plan and their role in it is a critical element of improved security. So are not storing Hazmats on rail sidings, improving the integrity of the tank car itself, fencing and lighting and security personnel for rail yards, etc.

There are many political efforts to require improved security:

• The U.S. Conference of Mayors wants Homeland Security to require mayors be notified when hazardous materials are moving through their towns.95

• The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) wants more security cameras. An APTA survey found that over 2,000 rail stations have no security

91 Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI, “War on Terrorism,” Congressional Testimony Before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States, February 11, 2003.

92 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, reporting Associated Press story, “FBI suspects sabotage in CSX train Derailment,” August 1, 2006, http://www.ble.org/pr/news/ headline.asp?id=16609, retrieved August 8, 2006.

93 Siobhan Gorman, “War on Terror Eclipses Homeland Security Effort,” National Journal, May 4, 2004, http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=28388& printerfriendlyVers=1&, retrieved July 27, 2006.

94 Power point based on National Journal article, May 1, 2004, http://www.njcphp.ort/ppt/UAtalk_ 10.05.ppt, retrieved July 2006; Siobhan Gorman, National Journal, “Homeland Security – Second Class Security,” May 1, 2004.

95 Robert Gehrke, “Rail cars: Rolling targets,” Salt Lake Tribune, August 7, 2005, http://www.sltrib.com/ portlet/article/html/fragments/print_article.jsp?article=2921226, retrieved July 13, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 22 cameras. Over 5,000 commuter rail cars and 10,000 heavy rail cars have no security cameras.96

• The military has a role through its Military Traffic Management Command, with 30,000 miles of rail designated as “STRACNET”, essential to national defense.97

• The FBI increased its liaison with the rail industry by inviting a railroad police officer to represent the nation’s railroad police to join its National Joint Terrorism Task Force. Through this representative (a Supervisory Special Agent with Norfolk Southern’s Railroad Police Department), the FBI now provides training to joint terrorism Task Forces that have critical railroad assets in their areas.98

The railroads have taken action to increase security. After September 11, AAR created five rail industry task forces to conduct a thorough risk analysis and develop a comprehensive plan of risk reduction. The groups worked on information technology and communications, physical infrastructure, operational security, hazardous materials, and military movements.99 Outside security experts worked with railroad personnel on each task force. The teams developed more than 100 countermeasures to strengthen security. AAR worked to solidify links with the Departments of Defense, Transportation and Homeland Security as well as law enforcement and security agencies. AAR adopted the resulting “Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan.” AAR established a 24/7 Operations Center, in constant communications with operations centers for each railroad and the appropriate federal authorities, so threat information could be relayed quickly. The railroads increased employee security awareness and “training” so that 200,000 employees “became the eyes and ears of the railroad industry’s security.” And, the railroads compared employee records to FBI terrorist lists.

II. The High Economic Cost of Hazmat Incidents

Rail Hazmat incidents, according to Department of Transportation data,100 are, on average, significantly more costly than Hazmat incidents from any other mode. (See Table 2.) Air Hazmat incidents in 2005 were about $500 each; water incidents averaged $24,500, and highway $73,000. Rail incidents averaged $142,000 each. (See Table III.) As already stated, a rail disaster involving spent nuclear fuel or high level radioactive waste could have a devastating economic impact – of tens of billions of dollars.

96 Testimony of William W. Millar, President, American Public Transportation Association, Before the Subcommittee on Highways, Transit, and Pipelines of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. 2nd Session, March 29, 2006, http://www.house.gov/transportation/, retrieved August 2006.

97 Dettmann, January 22, 2003.

98 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001, April 14, 2004.

99 Dettmann, January 22, 2003.

100 U.S. Department of Transportation, Hazardous Materials Information System, data as of May 1, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 23 Below are just a few examples of Hazmat incidents and some of the costs associated with them. They are in no way full and complete costs. Some are just assessment of damages; others include environmental remediation or the cost of emergency response; others reflect the settlement of law suits. A full economic accounting would be the subject of further research and would include not just the direct costs of an incident, but also a range of indirect costs, including lost work time, cost to hospitals and insurance companies and out-of-pocket expenses of those needing medical assistance. They might include lost work days, lost jobs, disability payments or other costs incurred only because a rail Hazmat incident occurred. DOT acknowledges its underestimation of costs:101

“Property damage figures maintained by DOT, however, understate the full cost of hazardous materials incidents. The costs associated with evacuations, closures of transportation arteries, emergency responses, or social costs, such as lost lives; injuries; and delays to the traveling public are usually not reported to RSPA [Research and Special Programs Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation].”

Graniteville, South Carolina, 2005. In the first seven months after the Graniteville derailment, Norfolk Southern spent $52.5 million on cleanup costs.102 Just four days after the accident, the South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center noted damage to electrical systems and equipment within homes and businesses, the cost of first response and recovery operations, damage to fire and EMS response vehicles, and the treatment of the victims.103 Clearly there were also significant additional costs associated with settlement of law suits, fines, expenses of evacuees, lost work time, long-term medical expenses, and a range of other problems associated with the incident.

Bexar County, Texas, 2004. In Bexar County, in 2004 alone, there were 25 rail accidents, five fatalities, and almost 50 injuries. Derailments and related deaths generated more than a dozen law suits. One was settled for $9 million ($9.3 million in 2005 dollars).104 Early property damages and environmental clean-up, reported by the National Transportation Safety Board, exceeded $7 million ($7.2 million in 2005 dollars).105

101 U.S. Department of Transportation, “Departmentwide Program Evaluation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Programs,” March 2000, http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/ reports/hmpe_execsum.pdf, retrieved July 2006.

102 Report to Securities and Exchange Commission in http://spewingforth.blogspot.com/2006/01/ graniteville-sc-one-year-later.html, retrieved March 28, 2006.

103 South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center, “Situation Report #10,” January 12, 2005.

104 Ken Rodriguez, “Union Pacific’s stewardship still a wreck waiting to happen,” San Antonio Express- News, web posted: May 21, 2006.

105 National Transportation Safety Board, Macdona, Texas, April 6, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 24 Pico Rivera, California, 2004. Though there were no injuries, this derailment of three locomotives and eleven cars, left 5,000 gallons of diesel fuel released and 100 people evacuated. UP estimated the monetary damage at $2.7 million ($2.8 million in 2005 dollars).106

Tamaroa, Illinois, 2003. Damage to track, equipment and the cost of clean-up in a Hazmat incident were estimated to be $1.9 million.107 ($2 million in 2005 dollars)

Minot, North Dakota, 2002. When a freight train derailed outside Minot, one resident died and eleven were seriously injured. Approximately 11,600 people occupied the area affected by the vapor plume. NTSB estimated that damages exceeded $2 million ($2.2 million in 2005 dollars), and more than $8 million ($8.7 million in 2005 dollars) was spent for environmental remediation.108

Farragut, Tennessee, 2002. A Norfolk Southern train derailed, releasing a cloud of toxic sulfuric acid fumes. Damages were estimated at $1 million ($1.1 million in 2005 dollars).109

Baltimore, Maryland, 2001.110 In 2001 a CSX freight train carrying tankers of flammable and hazardous chemicals partially derailed in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore. The derailment caused an inferno that not only presented danger to rail workers, citizens, and emergency responders, but also paralyzed downtown Baltimore for several days. Beyond the economic losses from stalled city activities, the city estimated the clean-up cost at approximately $12 million ($13.2 million in 2005 dollars). NTSB estimated the costs of response and clean-up together at approximately $12 million ($13.2 million in 2005 dollars).111 In February 2006, CSX agreed to pay the city $2 million ($2.2 million in 2005 dollars). The city had claimed that CSX failed to properly maintain the track. CSX claimed that the cause of the incident was a broken water main in the tunnel. Investigation by the NTSB failed to determine a cause. CSX also paid more than $300,000 ($331,000 in 2005 dollars) in overtime to city workers.112 Besides monetary payment the settlement provided for increased communication between the city

106 National Transportation Safety Board, “Railroad Accident Brief,” NTSB/RAB-05-02, May 31, 2005.

107 National Transportation Safety Board, Illinois Train Derailment, January 19, 2005.

108 National Transportation Safety Board, North Dakota, January 18, 2002; Walt Bogdanich and Christopher Drew, “Deadly Leak Underscores Concerns about Rail Safety,” New York Times, January 9, 2005.

109 National Transportation Safety Board, “Derailment of Norfolk Southern Railway Train 15T, Farragut, Tennessee, September 15, 2002,” http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2003/RAB0305.pdf, retrieved July 2006.

110 National Transportation Safety Board, “Railroad Accident Brief,” Accident Number DCA-01-MR-004, NTSB/RAB-04/08, 2004.

111 National Transportation Safety Board, “Safety Recommendation,” R-04-13, January 5, 2005.

112 Michael Dresser, “CSX to pay $2 million to Baltimore,” The Baltimore Sun, February 14, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 25 and CSX on hazardous and non-hazardous shipments, including shared access to police radio frequencies and also real time surveillance images from tunnel security cameras. CSX promised to provide past and future information on hazardous materials transported through Baltimore.

Clymers, Indiana, 1999. A sudden and catastrophic rupture of a tank car at a cement plant propelled a tank car 750 feet and over multistory storage tanks. Approximately 20,000 gallons of toxic and flammable hazardous waste were released. Damages, including property damage and costs from lost production, were estimated at nearly $8.2 million ($9.6 million in 2005 dollars).113

Rail Hazmat incidents clearly can cost millions of dollars each – resulting collectively, after full cost accounting, at tens of millions of dollars per year, or more. This, of course, does not include non-economic costs associated with death, disease, disability, and degradation of the environment.

III. Role for Training

A well-trained and knowledgeable workforce is the first line of defense to keep a minor event from becoming a major hazardous materials incident. Joint training exercises with those first on the scene -- rail workers and emergency responders -- can assure more efficient response in the event of an emergency.

The Federal Railroad Administration asserts there is a need for “training of all who play a role in preparation of these [hazardous materials] shipments and their movement.”114 The price in paid working time may be large, but each multi-million dollar incident averted results in the training more than paying for itself. Annual refresher training is also recommended. When CFR 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) was promulgated Hazmat clean-up companies complained about potential cost. Years later, with an excellent record and few injuries, businesses seem to have stopped complaining.

There is a lack of adequate Hazmat and security training for rail and rail transit employees. Training could save lives. What is the preparedness of U.S. workers? A survey by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) -- that represents railroad engineers, trainmen, and track workers – found that 84 percent said they had not received any training within the previous twelve months on terrorism prevention and response. IBT called for mandatory training for all rail employees.115 These results were

113 National Transportation Safety Board, “Rupture of a Railroad Tank Car Containing Hazardous Waste Near Clymers, Indiana, February 18, 1999, Abstract” NTSB HZM-01/01, retrieved May 31, 2006.

114 Allan Rutter, Administrator Federal Railroad Administration, “Testimony of Allan Rutter Before the Subcommittee on Railroads of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives,” June 6, 2002.

115 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), “High Alert: Workers Warn of Security Gaps on Nation’s Railroads,” 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 26 corroborated by several years of similar surveys by the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program.116 And, hearings by the Arizona Corporation Commission in January 2006, with senior inspectors of the state’s Railroad Safety Section, reinforced the findings of the Teamsters Rail Conference Report.117

Shortly after 9-11 the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) found, in a survey of its members, that 80 percent of employers had not provided them with any security training. In another survey in 2005, approximately 60 percent of ATU members remained untrained in emergency preparedness and response.118 The organization representing the transit industry, American Public Transportation Association (APTA), has expressed the need for funding for additional training for front line employees. The president of APTA in Congressional testimony cited a survey of transit agencies on public transportation security. Of the six priorities for operational improvements, three were the need for more money for training: training for security personnel, joint transit/law enforcement training, and security training for other transit personnel.119

An official of the American Chemistry Council, in testimony before Congress, had the following to say about training:

“As customers of rail service, we are concerned about testimony presented by representatives of rail labor unions at the recent DOT hazardous materials meeting (May 31 and June 1) regarding the railroads’ reported training and staffing deficiencies.”120

One might expect significant discussion of training by the National Transportation Safety Board. But, the only publication it lists as one of its “Studies and Special Reports,” dates to 1979 and is entitled “Results of a Survey on Occupational Training in the Railroad Industry.”121 One might hope that Hazmat and security training be an integral part of all activities associated with railroads, both in the private and in the public sector.

116 From annual evaluation reports of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program.

117 PRNewswire, “Arizona Railroad Safety Hearing Reinforces Teamster Report: Testimony Reveals Serious Security Gaps on Nation’s Railroads,” January 18, 2006, http://www.prnewswire.com, retrieved May 2006; Arizona Corporation Commission, http://www.state.az.us.

118 U.S. House or Representatives, “Detour Ahead: Critical Vulnerabilities in America’s Rail and Mass Transit Security Programs,” Prepared at the request of Congressman Bennie Thompson, ranking member, by the Democratic Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, 2006.

119 Testimony of William W. Millar, March 29, 2006.

120 Testimony of Martin Durbin, Managing Director, Federal Affairs, American Chemistry Council, Before the Subcommittee on Railroads of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “Current Issues in Rail Transportation of Hazardous Materials,” June 13, 2006.

121 National Transportation Safety Board, “Results of a Survey on Occupational Training in the Railroad Industry,” NTSB Report Number: SIR-79-01, adopted on 9/21/79.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 27 Rail workers themselves have been concerned about lack of training for a long time. In testimony before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Railroads, Thomas Pontolillo, Director of Regulatory Affairs for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), said:122

“Worker training in the handling of hazardous materials has been a particular sore point for the BLET, and for all of Rail Labor. The training provided by the industry is so minimal that we long ago, took matters into our own hands. Hazardous materials training programs have been provided under labor sponsorship at the National Labor College.

“Our Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program has been a resounding success. The program has, over its fifteen years, continually evolved and expanded to meet the training and competency needs of rail workers that are not afforded by the railroads…Because of this program… tens of thousands of rail workers are working more safety and in safer environments.”

Mr. Pontolillo went on to describe a new program of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program: Modular Emergency Response Radiological Transportation Training in which peer trainers are taught, so they can in turn provide training to other rail workers. He said that he was unaware of any railroad currently conducting training that focused on transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste – this despite the fact that the U.S. Department of Energy is expected to begin a 38-year project, to begin in 2007, to transport such waste from DOE sites to disposal facilities, often across the continent.

A Congressional Report in 2006 faulted TSA, for insufficient action in the area of worker training. The Report recommended the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program at the National Labor College:123

“In the absence of TSA action, the National Labor College, George Meany Campus, has also developed courses, including the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program…TSA should also identify the gaps that currently exist in front-line employee training and mandate training to close this critical gap. This training should be developed using TSA resources and should be required for all front-line rail and mass transit employees. TSA should work with FTA, FRA, NTI, and the National Labor College when developing this training.”

122 Thomas Pontolillo, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, “Testimony of Thomas A. Pontilillo Before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Railroads, Hearings on Current Issues in Rail Transportation of Hazardous Materials,” June 13, 2006.

123 U.S. House or Representatives, “Detour Ahead: ..,” 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 28 III.A. Description of Existing Hazmat Training for Rail Workers

Rail workers are first on the scene. While not emergency responders, they need to know what not to do and what to do. The rail industry and its workers are ill-prepared to face Hazmat and security emergencies: 124

“Four years after September 11th, two years after the Madrid bombings, and six months after the bombings in London, the United States has still not taken the necessary steps to improve rail security. Our rail workers haven’t received terrorism prevention and response training, and we are wholly unprepared to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack or disaster on the rails. It’s inexcusable. This is a low-cost, and enormously effective step we can take to heighten security and preparedness on our railways. It’s a matter of common sense.”

III.A.1. Training by the Railroads

The railroad industry, according to the Association of American Railroads (AAR), has “increased employee training to ensure that the industry’s more than 200,000 employees serve as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the security effort.”125 AAR writes that after September 11, 2001, “we enhanced security-related employee training.”126 The following is the outline of that program:127

• Employees are the industry’s “eyes and ears • Security is now part of daily employee briefings • Supplemental measures include: o Videos with examples of suspicious activities and how to report them o Rewards for useful tips and ideas • Additional communications via emails, brochures, posters, newsletters and individual contacts.

In-depth Hazmat and security training are not on the list. Hazmat education is not on the list. According to the president and chief executive officer of AAR Edward Hamberger, “…to help protect their employees and the communities they serve, railroads offer basic hazardous material awareness training to all employees. Employees learn to recognize a

124 Honorable Stephen Lynch, “Congressman Lynch Introduces Legislation to Prepare Rail Workers to Respond to a Terrorist Attack or Natural Disaster,” Press Release, December 6, 2005.

125 Association of American Railroads, “Rail Security Plan,” http://222.aar.org/Rail_Safety/ Rail_Security_plan.asp, retrieved April 20, 2006.

126 Association of American Railroads, “Freight Rail Security Briefing,” 2006, http://www.aar.org/rail_ safety/securityppt2006.pdf, retrieved May 31, 2006.

127 Ibid.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 29 hazmat emergency and whom to contact in an emergency.”128 But what is the content and depth of this training if there are no hands-on exercises or group discussions. Is a 5 or 10 minute video training?

There are some rail programs for on-the-job training. One successful technique is cited in an FRA study:129 after discussion with railroad officials and focus groups with yard representatives, one best practice is to “select OJT mentors who are interested in training new hires and are effective trainers. Compensate mentors appropriately.” Such efforts should be duplicated across the country.

CSX and Norfolk Southern operate major training facilities in central locations – CSX in Atlanta and NS in McDonough, Georgia. UP operates training programs at its Salt Lake City training center. With technology for computer-based learning and simulation experiences, the facilities could well target hazardous materials understanding and first- on-the-scene response. While safety is a focus, as described, training is oriented toward operating skills and knowledge of rules. This paper recommends emphasis on Hazmat as well.

U.S. railroad companies have programs to enhance rail safety, but are they solid, quality training? BNSF says, “our police team continues to educate employees on work, personal and home security, as well as working to change employee behavior to increase awareness of security risks.”130 BNSF, for example, in 2003, began its “On Guard” program to “recognize employees who protect BNSF’s resources.” Employees are encouraged to report security violations, check identifications, check security of trains, report trespassers, and report crime. Alert employees get a BNSF “On Guard” pin and articles are posted in BNSF Today.131 The railroads distributed thousands of videos and pamphlets about Hazmat safety. Is any of this in-depth or quality training?

At CSX, which has over 500,000 hazardous shipments a year, “engineers and conductors are required to undergo annual training and testing on safety, environmental and operating rules.” The training is through interactive learning pods and “pits crew members’ skills against what is referred to as ‘the golden run,’ the most efficient, safe run possible. The learning tool helps crew members determine where their skills are lacking

128 Edward R. Hamberger, President and CEO, Association of American Railroads, “Hearing on Railroad Tank Car Safety: Statement of Edward R. Hamberger Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Railroads,” June 13, 2006.

129 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, An Examination of Railroad Yard Worker Safety, DOT/FRA/ORD-01-20, July 2001.

130 BNSF Railway, “News Release: BNSF Railway Asks Rail Fans for Cooperation to Keep America’s Rail System Safe,” June 7, 2006, http://www.bnsf.com/media/news/articles/2006/06/ 2006-06- 07a.html, retrieved July 7, 2006.

131 BNSF Railway, “New ‘On Guard’ Program Recognizes Employees Who Enhance Security,” http://www.bnsf.com/tools/resourceprotection/on_guard.html, retrieved July 7, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 30 and how they can operate their equipment in a more safe manner.”132 There is no mention of teaching rail employees what to do in an emergency situation. CSX training on hazardous materials is “designed to make CSXT employees and customers aware of the need to properly handle hazardous materials.”133 Still, no mention of first-on-the- scene training or education and awareness training about hazardous materials, their health effects, or how to use resource material.

Other safety programs, described by AAR outside of Pueblo, include:134

• Mock safety drills and table top simulations in communities • On-going training programs for those employees who have response or communications responsibilities in an emergency • Emergency exercises to test operability of written emergency response plans • Facility tours for emergency responders to promote emergency preparedness and provide up-to-date knowledge of facility operations • Audits of Hazmat contractors to ensure that equipment, training and response capabilities meet standards.

All such activities are to be applauded and, hopefully, expanded across the country.

Union Pacific has a safety process that “ranges from employees warming up before work with stretching exercises to top executives visiting terminals and shops to talk about safety and get feedback. “At Union Pacific, safety is as much a part of the morning job briefing as how many ties are to be installed or how many cars are to be switched.” The company also provides ergonomic assessments, PPE, and training in first aid and CPR.135 Where in this description are Hazmat and security? Should daily safety briefings and visits by top executives be considered training? It is in-depth quality training that Hazmat safety and security advocates want to hear about.

Norfolk Southern is “committed to continuously improving operating safety by effectively managing fatigue and promoting alertness in our operating employees.”136 How is this done? By distributing videos and training manuals to all train and engine employees. UP and CSX also use the video training program. There are eight-hour

132 Sandy Smith, “Safety Rolls Along at CSX Transportation,” Occupational Hazards, September 12, 2003.

133 Ibid.

134 Association of American Railroads, “Railroads Train Thousands of Emergency Responders in Communities Across America,” http://www.aar.org/hazmat/EmergencyResponders.pdf, retrieved May 28, 2006.

135 Sandy Smith, “At Union Pacific, Safety is Number One: Ask any employee at Union Pacific Railroad and they’ll tell you, ‘Safety is my responsibility,’” Occupational Hazards, October 26, 2005.

136 University of Denver, College of Education, “Norfolk Southern Railroad,” http://www.du.edu/ ~psherry/fatigue/norfolk.html, retrieved, June 21, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 31 workshops on “alertness and attention to duty.” Where are the 8-hour workshops on hazardous materials awareness? Videos alone are not sufficient training.

Why is there criticism of Hazmat training programs delivered by the railroads? The International Brotherhood of Teamsters issued a report in 2005137 that found 62 percent of those surveyed saying they had not been trained about their role in their company’s emergency response plans. AAR charged that the report was hyperbolic and inaccurate, stating that there are federal requirements for such training.138 But, these results were corroborated by several years of similar surveys by the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program.139

The conflict may lie with the definition of training? A few words at a morning safety briefing are not training. A 5-10 minute video is not training. How does one define knowing ones role in an employer’s emergency response plan? Rules and skill training cannot “stand in” for Hazmat and security training. In September 2006 testimony AAR President and CEO Ed Hamberger told a Congressional Committee that the railroads are providing employees comprehensive security training.140 His description was new hire and new manager training programs encompassing topics such as what to do when an employee sees a stranger or suspicious activity on rail property; to whom to report the anomaly; the need to keep information about train movements and cargoes confidential; and the need to keep rail property safe and security. While all this is necessary, it only scratches the surface of the types of initial Hazmat and security training and refresher training needed by all rail workers. It falls far short of comprehensive and lacks the necessary depth and quality.

III.A.2. Other Providers of Hazmat Training for Rail Workers

In its 16th year, the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program, with funds from the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) and the North American Railway Foundation, and run by the National Labor College (NLC), continues to lead the way in small group, hands-on classes taught by specially trained peer instructors, who are themselves full-time rail workers. Over 20,000 rail workers who register on their own or through their union, have benefited from this training. The program represents a consortium of eight railroad unions. Rail workers have been trained from 49 states and the District of Colombia. (Hawaii has no railroads.) Many courses are held at the National Labor College; others in the field. There are a range of classes

137 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), “High Alert … 2005.

138 As reported in a Public Broadcasting System program, “Toxic Transport: Railroad Workers Speak Out,” June 30, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/226/railroad-security.html, retrieved July 20, 2006.

139 From annual evaluation reports of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program.

140 Edward R. Hamberger, “Statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and CEO, Association of American Railroads,” Hearings on Security Training for Railroad and Transit Employees, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, September 28, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 32 lasting from four hours to five days, as well as DOT Security, DOE RadWorker, facilitated On-line Emergency Responder Awareness, OSHA 10, Disaster Site training, and training through rail-community partnerships. Rail workers also learn about incident command and how to serve as skilled support personnel in the event of an emergency or act of terrorism. The program maintains a web site, both in Spanish and English, with a wealth of information and refresher exercises. Among the program objectives:141

• Ensuring that the highest possible levels of worker safety, public safety, and environmental protection are maintained during rail transportation of hazardous materials • Minimizing the risk that hazardous substances will be inadvertently released into air, water, or soil during rail transportation.

Trainees come from Class I, short line, and passenger and commuter railroads. Training is cross-craft, cross-union, and cross-company – maximizing the learning of each from the other. Rail workers leave the training much more familiar with placards, markings and shipping papers; with reading and interpreting the DOT Emergency Response Guide (ERG) and with the safety requirements for various hazard classes. They learn toxicology and about the physical properties of hazards. Rail workers are better able to protect their own lives and health, as well as being able to keep their fellow workers and members of communities, across the nation, safer. Joint rail-community training, through the program, has improved the readiness of emergency response personnel to respond to rail Hazmat incidents.

After the fatal derailment in Bexar County, Texas in 2004, all 38 emergency dispatchers in the County – police, fire, and EMT – were required to take the on-line awareness class of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program. The Program offered, free of charge, training materials and mentoring by experienced rail peer trainers, drawing upon funding from NIEHS. Had the emergency dispatchers better understood chemicals and derailments, emergency response might have been different that night in Bexar County. Two members of the community might not have died. Most of those who took the course learned a significant amount about Hazmats. Those that were also volunteer responders expressed gratitude for what they felt they could apply in their emergency response work as well as in their dispatch work.142

Not only do peer trainers from the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program train their fellow rail workers and sometimes members of the community, but so do the class attendees. One trainee in a follow-up interview said: “We sent two Carmen to the Hazmat training at the Meany Center [National Labor College] and then they taught the rest.” Another trainee said: “I hope to reach out to the community I live in by putting

141 Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program, National Labor College, Fifteen Years of Documented Success: Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program, 1991-2005, Evaluation Draft Report, May 2006.

142 Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program, National Labor College, Evaluation of On-Line Training, 2004-2005 Grant Year, November 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 33 together a presentation that may be appropriate for the schools and/or emergency response personnel.” Others have done briefings for volunteer fire fighters in their communities.143 A maintenance-of-way safety liaison with more than 25 years of experience uses his NLC training in his own training courses every quarter. He regularly duplicates material he received during training.

Sometimes rail workers and managers train together at NLC. The results in once such case:144

“The yard superintendent has become much more safety conscious, much more approachable, and much more willing to accept and implement changes. He’s had windsocks put up. The workers in the yard are currently working on a plan with the local fire department on responding to incidents in the yard. This step was taken because the local response community was unfamiliar with the rail yard and the yard itself is so large (extends the length of the town), that response personnel and the yard workers are attempting to map and code the yards. Once they returned from training, they pulled out the yard evacuation plan and reviewed it. The workshop was in a dangerous location, and the evacuation plan had workers rally at a location that was generally downwind and next to a huge fuel tank. Appropriate changes were made.”

There are many examples in which training did or could have made a difference. Just two examples from follow-up surveys with trainees:145

• “Isolated diesel spill and kept it out of waterway…Training gave me knowledge.”

• “Leak of hazardous material: not direct involvement but dealt with concern of the handling of the 22 minute delay calling 911 through the safety committee. Train master wanted to send someone in with a plastic bucket to see what it was.”

III.B. Description and Assessment of Existing Hazmat Training for Emergency Responders

When disaster strikes the nation depends on the emergency response community.146 Yet, most fire departments are poorly trained in derailment and rail hazmat response. The National Volunteer Fire Council says that “America’s fire service is in need of Federal

143 From annual evaluation reports of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program.

144 Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program, National Labor College, Fifteen Years ..., May 2006.

145 From annual evaluation reports of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program.

146 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Protecting Emergency Responders: Safety Management in Disaster and Terrorism Response, 2004.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 34 assistance and partnership,” not only for new equipment, but for training as well, and it has called on Congress to increase appropriations.147

The U.S. Fire Administration has identified six tasks that the public sector should perform to meet its Hazmat training responsibilities:148

• “Ensure that proper hazard and vulnerability analyses are conducted to determine response and planning needs; • Determine public sector employee roles and competency needs in planning and response; • Conduct training needs assessments to establish and prioritize employee needs for competency and refresher training; • Develop short- and long-term training plans that address the training needs for compliance with OSHA 1910.120(q) and EPA 311; • Manage the jurisdiction’s training curriculum for planning and response, including assessing courses for proper objectives, content, and methodology, and revising, updating, and developing courses to meet training requirements not presently addressed; and • Ensure that the training delivery is effective.”

Annually, the rail industry sponsors a Hazardous Materials Seminar for emergency responders, shippers, contractors, and railroad emergency personnel.149 The industry also works with communities to conduct full-scale emergency response drills. Individually, railroads sponsor trainings for first responders at the Emergency Response Training Center in Pueblo, Colorado. Training includes hazardous materials technician, tank car specialist, advanced tank car specialist, intermodal specialist, incident commander, advanced Hazmat technician, highway emergency response, weapons of mass destruction, Hazmat monitoring, transportation specialist.150 Such programs need to reach more responders and rail workers.

Some fire departments provide hazardous materials training to all their employees. Rocky Mount, North Carolina,151 for example, a community on a major east coast rail

147 National Volunteer Fire Council, “The Needs of America’s Volunteer Fire Service,” http://www.nvfc. org/news/hhn_american_fireservice_needs.html, retrieved August 8, 2006.

148 U.S. Fire Administration, Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) Curriculum, December 28, 2005, http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/subjects/hazmat/hmep.shtn, retrieved August 8, 2006.

149 Association of American Railroads, “Railroads Train Thousands of Emergency Responders in Communities Across America,” http://www.aar.org/hazmat/EmergencyResponders.pdf, retrieved May 28, 2006.

150 Ibid.

150 Ibid.

151 City of Rocky Mount, North Carolina, Fire Department, “Operations: Hazardous Materials,” http://www.ci.rocky-mt.nc.us/fire/op-hazmat.html, retrieved August 8, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 35 corridor, has a Hazmat program with fire fighters who have received specialized training in the prevention and mitigation of hazardous materials incidents. All personnel are certified at the OSHA Operations Level, with a 40 hour course and 8 hours of annual refresher training. Train derailments is one of the subjects covered. Required knowledge for Rocky Mount fire fighters includes:152

• “Recognition and identification of a hazardous materials incident • Field use of complex scientific monitoring equipment • Safe methods of containing chemical spills • Various reference materials to determine hazards of chemicals • Physical and chemical characteristics of hazardous materials • Incident command • Proper protective clothing.”

IAFF has a range of Hazmat Training Programs. Some help emergency responders if faced with a rail emergency. Two trainees who wrote to the IAFF in thanks:153

• “Rail tank car left track and was spilling contents. Assessed situation from a distance with binoculars and determined that product in car was chlorine. Set up defensive perimeter and requested HAZMAT team. Before the course I would have just rushed up to the tank car to see the situation up close and probably exposed others and myself needlessly to this harmful chemical.”

• “Before the course I had little knowledge of reference sources such as the DOT ERG. After the course, responded to an alarm at a residence where our Captain spotted several containers on site. Viewing the placards and labels together with the ERG, a determination was made to pull back the company and call in the HAZMAT team. It was learned that one of the container contents would have reacted with water if we proceeded and started hose lines. In the past, the Captain said he would have been the last person to pick up and use the ERG.”

III.B.1. Examples from Current Prevention and Response Training

There are few programs to train emergency responders for approaching a rail Hazmat emergency. One that came to Baltimore in 2004, three years after the tunnel fire, was delivered at no cost by BP Amoco.154 During that particular training week, BP Amoco offered six 4-hour sessions, using their Safety Train, a modified 22,000 gallon general tank car, with most of the valves and fittings that tank cars may contain. One important lesson of the training is that contrary to the typical fire department training to move

152 Ibid.

153 International Association of Fire Fighters, “HAZMAT Training,” Virtual Academy, http://www.iaff. org/academy/hazmat/courses/stories.html, retrieved July 26, 2006.

154 Ilene Holin, “2001 tunnel fire spurs advanced training: Area responders receive lessons on reacting to railway spills, blazes,” Baltimore Sun, July 14, 2004.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 36 quickly, in a tank car fire moving quickly can be fatal. According to BP’s regulatory compliance manager: “with these types of containers, moving quickly isn’t the thing to do. You need a step-by-step approach.”

CSX began a Hazmat Sentinels program in the early 1990’s, which equips a select group of approximately eighty CSX employees with specialized hazardous materials and emergency response training. Approximately 25 percent of these sentinels are part of an advanced, “Sentinels Plus” group.155 The basic sentinel program is 40 hours and brings CSX sentinels together with emergency responders. Sentinels learn to recognize and identify different types of tank cars and containers, analyze an incident and determine proper corrective actions, and assess damage to equipment. They also practice in simulated derailment situations.156 System-wide and expanded greatly, this program could significantly improve Hazmat safety.

NIEHS funds the International Association of Fire Fighters to train its membership in hazardous materials response, though not specific to railroads. NIEHS funds others, including a consortium led by the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey that provides Hazmat training for many groups, including volunteer fire fighters and members of the New Jersey State Police.

With support from the Federal Transit Administration, Washington area Metro workers built a training facility with the nation's first training tunnel where emergency workers can practice how to respond to rail disasters.157 Metro began designing the center before September 11 as a place where local fire, police and special operations teams could perform disaster drills under realistic conditions. The Landover, Maryland facility is available to emergency responder training nationwide.

FRA, in a rail safety action plan,158 put emphasis on ensuring that emergency responders have timely access to hazardous materials information. With timely access comes the need for training and action. The Association of American Railroads, with encouragement from FRA, in March 2005, amended its “Recommended Operating Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials,” Circular No. OT-55-G, to expressly provide that local responders, upon written request, will be provided with a ranked listing of the top 25 hazardous materials transported through the community.159 While this is an important step forward, FRA in its 2005 Action Plan found that “these efforts alone have not been sufficient for some local responders to gain confidence in

155 Sandy Smith, September 12, 2003.

156 CSXT, “CSXT Adds 32 New Sentinels to Hazmat Ranks,” CSXT Midweek Reports, May 17, 2002, http://www.bullsheet.com/news/midweek-1.html, retrieved June 21, 2006.

157 Lyndsey Layton, “Training Tunnel First in U.S.,” Washington Post, May 11, 2002.

158 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railway Administration, “Federal Railroad Administration Action Plan for Addressing Critical Railroad Safety Issues,” May 16, 2005.

159 Ibid.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 37 handling hazardous materials incidents.” Why not routinely provide the list of the top 25 hazardous materials transported through a community to the local responders in each affected community?

III.B.2. Programs Supported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

DHS provides training for emergency responders, not necessarily specific to rail:160

• by ensuring that emergency response professionals are prepared, equipped and trained for any situation, and • by bringing together information and resources to prepare for and respond to a terrorist attack, natural disaster or other large-scale emergency.

DHS also runs a Firefighter Assistance Grants Program. In addition, its Office of Grants and Training supports “training to enhance the capacity of states and local jurisdictions to prevent, deter, and respond safely and effectively to incidents of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.”161 Training programs include direct delivery, train-the- trainer, computer-based training, web-based training, and video tele-conferencing. The Office of Grants and Programs at DHS validates its training programs through its Training and Data Exchange (TRADE) Group, comprised of multiple government agencies.162

DHS training programs are developed and delivered by the Department’s “Training Partners,” who include: the Center for Domestic Preparedness, the National Center for Biomedical Research and Training, Louisiana State University, the National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center, Texas Engineering Extension Service, the Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center, New Mexico Tech, the National Center for Exercise Excellence, Nevada Test Site, Community Research Associates, US Army Dugway Proving Ground, the International Association of Fire Fighters, the Naval Post Graduate School, the National Sheriff's Association, General Physics Corporation at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Science Applications International Corporation, George Washington University, Michigan State University, National Terrorism Preparedness Institute, International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, and International Association of Chiefs of Police. None, however, seem to include rail workers or citizens in communities potentially affected by a rail Hazmat incident.

160 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Emergencies and Disasters,” http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ display?theme=63, retrieved May 28, 2006.

161 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Grants and Training, “Overview,” http://www.ojp. usdoj.gov/odp/training.htm, retrieved May 28, 2006.

162 United States Fire Administration's National Fire Academy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Emergency Management Institute, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Department of Homeland Security

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 38 The Department of Homeland Security funds Hazmat training for specific groups of emergency responders. One example was in Natchez, Mississippi, where fire fighters, water treatment employees, and EMTs took part in a 40-hour course to teach them what they need to know in case of an emergency. State Fire Academy instructors taught the course. Training was in part geared toward the possibility of a rail incident. According to an associate instructor with the academy: “We are teaching them to put on different level suits and the proper selection of suits. If there is a rail car chlorine spill and all entities are activated to respond all training will be similar.” 163

III.C. Description of Existing Hazmat Training for Community Residents

Though limited, there are many types of Hazmat training programs for community residents. Some focus on members of a community involved in emergency response and/or emergency planning. Some include all members of the community. Some focus on emergency response training and some focus more directly on rail Hazmat issues. Below are just a few examples of programs sponsored by government and/or industry.

CERT Training. The Department of Homeland Security, through FEMA has a multi- million dollar program in emergency preparedness and response to train citizens to be better prepared to respond to emergencies in their communities through training as part of a community’s CERT (Community Emergency Response Team).164 CERT members have 20 hours of training in disaster preparedness, basic disaster operations, fire safety, light search and rescue, and other topics. The training also involves simulations.

CERT training can and has made a difference. A CERT trainer from New Jersey165 told the authors in June 2006 that residents of a New Jersey town where he had done CERT training called him to say that their community had experienced a derailment, and because of the CERT training, they knew what to do.

TRANSCAER®. The Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER®) - which is supported by the American Chemistry Council, the Association of American Railroads, the Chlorine Institute, the Chemical Educational Foundation, and the National Tank Truck Carriers as well as emergency response industries and government – promotes rail Hazmat safety through trainings and exhibits.166

163 Julie Finley, “Area Emergency Workers Take Weeklong Course in Handling Hazardous Materials,” Natchez Democrat, July 16, 2004.

164 National Volunteer Fire Council, “Homeland Security Helps Train Citizens for Emergencies with $19 million for Community Emergency Response Teams,” http://www.nvfc.org/news/hn_homeland_ 19mil.html, retrieved August 8, 2006.

165 Participant in Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program in Carteret, NJ, June 2006.

166 American Chemical Council, press release, “Police, Fire, and Emergency Medical Teams Perform Live Safety Drills at Georgia Public Safety Training Center,” October 8, 2003.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 39 The Chlorine Institute says it spends “$4-5 billion dollar [on the] North American Chlor- Alkali Industry’s safety advancement initiatives in the area of transportation and bulk storage.”167 Some of these resources go to training and development of training materials. For example, in 2005, the Chlorine Institute’s Transportation Committee, in cooperation with TRANSCAER®, offered training for first responders at the Union Pacific Lesperance Rail Yard in St. Louis, Missouri. The training took place outside, and was hands-on, including a chlorine station (chlorine tank car, and cylinder), a hydrochloric acid station (HCL tank car, HCL), a caustic and sodium hypo station (caustic tank car, caustic and bleach trailers), and a rail safety station. One hundred to 150 first responders from the St. Louis area were to attend and be assigned to groups that rotated through the training stations every 45 minutes.168

In 2003 TRANSCAER® brought to Forsyth, Georgia a special emergency response “training” train, operated by Norfolk Southern. The visit was “to increase public awareness of the safe transportation of hazardous materials and help emergency responders plan.”169 According to a press release from the American Chemistry Council:170

“Special training cars will exhibit life-saving rescue methods and techniques for those that might respond to a chemical transportation incident or spill. With this training, the rail, chemical and trucking industries are continuing their long tradition of working with local community emergency personnel to prepare them for emergencies involving the transportation of hazardous materials, helping keep citizens in these communities safe…This TRAN[S]CAER® event demonstrates our commitment to training local emergency responders across the country, stated Greg Lebedev, President and CEO of the American Chemical Council.”

TRANSCAER® activities:171

ƒ “Encourage partnerships between citizens and industry to develop an awareness of transportation emergency preparedness, ƒ Help emergency planning groups identify hazardous materials moving through the community,

167 Chlorine Institute, Inc., https://www.cl2.com/newsdetail.cfm?itemnumber=2518, retrieved May 27, 2006.

168 TRANSCAER®, “Regional and State Information,” http://www.transcaer.org/public/regional.cfm? region=5&state=MO, retrieved May 27, 2006.

169 American Chemical Council, press release, October 8, 2003.

170 Ibid.

171 TRANSCAER®, “FAQs,” http://www.transcaer.org/public/faqs.cfm?help_id=82, retrieved May 28, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 40 ƒ Provide guidance for local officials to develop and evaluate the community emergency response plan, and ƒ Assist with training and testing for emergency preparedness.”

Through their own efforts, as well as TRANSCAER®, railroads do provide training for more than 20,000 emergency responders per year.172 While training for 20,000 is important, the need is far greater with approximately 250,000 full-time paid fire fighters and paramedics and 2 million volunteer firefighters.

Operation Respond. Railroads provide assistance to Operation Respond, a nonprofit institute that develops technological tools and training for emergency response professionals. Operation Respond has an Emergency Information System (OREIS), a software tool that provides emergency responders with necessary information to respond to safety and security incidents. Information includes what is necessary for hazardous materials response and clean-up, passenger railroad rescue and response, and counter- terrorism operations. OREIS has a web-based training program.173

III.C.1. The Community’s Need to Know

“Our citizens should have a reasonable expectation that hazardous materials are being shipped in the safest manner possible and that local first responders are aware of such shipments in advance.” Akron, Ohio Mayor Donald Plusquellic, President U.S. Conference of Mayors

Some experts express their concern that the American public is deliberately being kept in the dark about rail hazards in their communities. According to a hazardous materials inspector for Ohio, “…it’s wide open, no fences, no gates, no security, it’s wide open.”174

The U.S. Conference of Mayors, after the Graniteville fatalities, asked the Department of Homeland Security to assess notification procedures of freight railroads carrying hazardous materials so that city officials would “be aware of what is going through their neighborhoods and business districts.”175 Railroads provide assistance to communities in developing and evaluating emergency response plans. Upon request, they provide local emergency response agencies, at a minimum, with a list of the 25 hazardous materials most likely to be transported by rail in their areas.176 FRA also launched a pilot program

172 Association of American Railroads, Policy and Economics Department, “Hazmat Transport: Mandatory Rerouting and Pre-Notification,” January 2006.

173 Appalachian Transportation Institute, “Operation Respond: Welcome,” http://oreis.tedis-wv.org/oreis/, retrieved August 8, 2006.

174 WKRC 12 Cincinnati, “Local 12 Investigates: Toxic Targets,” May 16, 2006, http://www.wkrc. com/News/Local/, retrieved, July 4, 2006.

175 Esther D’Amico, “Moving Through Unfriendly Territory,” Chemical Week, January 25, 2006.

176 Association of American Railroads, “Hazmat Transport …” January 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 41 to provide emergency responders with real-time information about hazardous materials involved in a train accident.177 Full and continuous evaluation of this effort is important, especially information about the awareness of emergency response organizations of this opportunity and the number of requests. Consideration should be given to the railroads being proactive and supplying this information to all emergency response departments near railroad corridors. Evaluation is also needed to assess a process of improved access to real-time information about hazardous materials movements.

CN has a Safety Community Fund. The Fund provides an annual $25,000 incentive to encourage communities across Canada to incorporate rail safety in the business plans they submit to the Canadian Safe Communities Foundation. The focus is to raise public awareness about the importance of safety around railroad property to reduce injuries,178 but a fund such as this, especially one with greater funding, could also be used to enhance awareness about Hazmat.

Another role for some citizens is being tried by BNSF.179 BNSF in June 2006 began to recruit rail fans to help keep its properties safe by reporting suspicious activities and to help prevent possible security breaches. Rail fans register for the program, Citizens United for Rail Security (CRS), and receive an official identification card and access to news and information on the BNSF CRS Web site.

Several groups urge that citizens become more active in promoting rail and security, by finding out more about hazardous materials in ones area, putting together a committee of citizens and organizations to promote ones right-to-know, making demands for action by local officials, and by introducing an ordinance to ones’ city or county council to reduce risk.180

III.C.2. Local Emergency Planning Committees

The need for local emergency planning is profound. At the time of the devastating Howard Street tunnel fire, Baltimore’s 440-page emergency plan did not address the possibility of a devastating chemical accident involving transportation and it never mentioned the tunnel. This was despite the fact that the city Fire Marshal William Martin said just after the fire, “Most of my worry is about transportation accidents, because they

177 D’Amico, Chemical Week, January 25, 2006.

178 Safe Communities Foundation, “CN Safe Community Fund,” http://www.safecommunities.ca/ CN%20Safe%20Community%20Fund.htm, retrieved July 5, 2006.

179 BNSF Railway, “News Release: BNSF Railway Asks Rail Fans for Cooperation to Keep America’s Rail System Safe,” June 7, 2006, http://www.bnsf.com/media/news/articles/2006/06/2006-06- 07a.html, retrieved July 7, 2006.

180 Public Broadcasting System, “Toxic Transport, Action Steps: Hazardous Materials Transport,” June 30, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/226/hazardous-transport.html, retrieved July 20, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 42 can happen anywhere.” 181 Even the evacuation planning in the document, three pages long, was not detailed enough to provide a working blueprint for evacuations and so did not fulfill Congressional requirements.182

There is great opportunity for communities to do pre-planning and establish community training and awareness programs through their Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC). LEPCs were established by the EPCRA, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986, in which Congress requires that each state create a State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), responsible for implementing EPCRA within its state. The SERCS in turn have established about 3500 local emergency planning districts and there is a LEPC in each district. LEPC membership must include, at a minimum, local officials including police, fire, civil defense, public health, transportation, and environmental professionals, as well as representatives of facilities subject to the emergency planning requirements, community groups, and the media. The LEPCs must develop an emergency response plan, review it at least annually, and provide information about chemicals in the community to citizens.

According to EPRCA, there are nine main parts to a community emergency response plan:183

• “Identify facilities and transportation routes of extremely hazardous substances; • Describe emergency response procedures, on and off site; • Designate a community coordinator and facility coordinator(s) to implement the plan; • Outline emergency notification procedures; • Describe how to determine the probably affected areas and population by releases; • Describe local emergency equipment and facilities and the persons responsible for them; • Outline evacuation plans; • Provide a training program for emergency responders (including schedules); and, • Provide methods and schedules for exercising emergency response plans.”

A community, with such an emergency response plan, could well save lives and health in a rail Hazmat emergency.

181 Heather Dewar, Marcia Myers, Kimberly Wilson, “Accident plan leaves city unprepared: Its 440 pages fail to consider tunnel, deal with toxic spills,” Baltimore Sun, July 26, 2001.

182 Heather Dewar, “Officials to improve city emergency plan: Spokesman says firefighters prepared for chemical spills,” Baltimore Sun, July 27, 2001.

183 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “EPCRA Overview,” February 16, 2006, http://yosemite. epa.gov/OSWER/Ceppoweb.nsf/content/epcraoverview.htm, retrieved August 8, 2006; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act: Factsheet,” EPA 550-I-00-004, March 2000.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 43 Some LEPCs are very active and are vigilant about the hazardous materials that pass through their jurisdiction by rail. Some are training community residents; many are upgrading the training of their local emergency responders. In 2002 the Delaware County Local Emergency Planning Committee, for example, commissioned a study of hazardous commodity flow through the county.184 Truck, waterways, pipeline, and rail were studied. Two railroads, CSX and Norfolk Southern, provide commercial rail service through the county and tracks are primarily along the Delaware River and along Interstate 95. These two rail carriers transported over 140 different hazardous materials through the county – with 25 Hazmats accounting for 75 percent of all Hazmats moved. Also of concern were the many creeks and streams that run through the county and which are crossed by transportation. A Hazmat release at one of these crossings could easily affect numerous locations down stream.

III.D. Training Materials

There are many existing training materials and many other published materials that are valuable resources for training. Many resources are valuable for rail workers, emergency responders, and community activists. Three are particularly important:

• The Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG),185 which provides information on specific hazardous materials. One major purpose of the ERG is to help first responders find emergency procedures quickly. With the guide, one can decode ID numbers, symbols, colors, and placards. Rail workers find use for the guide on a daily basis to identify their Hazmat exposures and take precautions, as well as to determine proper procedures for leaks and spills.

• The NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health) Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards186 presents information in tabular form for nearly 700 chemicals. Information comes from recognized experts in industrial hygiene, occupational medicine, and toxicology, as well as from NIOSH Criteria Documents. It also provides NIOSH’s recommended exposure levels for each substance as well as the legal permissible exposure limits from OSHA. For each chemical there is information about personal protection, first aid, and chemical and physical properties. The Pocket Guide is written for workers, employees, and occupational professionals.

• Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) are technical documents containing information on the properties, hazards and safe handling of hazardous chemicals.

184 Delaware County Local Emergency Planning Committee, Pennsylvania, Hazardous Commodity Flow Study, 2002.

185 U.S. Department of Transportation, Transport Canada, and the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation of Mexico (SCT), Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG), 2004.

186 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-149, September 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 44 MSDSs, for each hazardous material on a work site, are required to be available to workers.

III.D.1. Training Materials for Rail Workers

Being able to take “home” relevant materials – training manuals and resources – from a training helps workers reinforce what they have learned. Watching a video or listening to a lecture does not do that. The more one participates and the more modes of teaching (listening, hands-on, small group discussion, power point, video, resource guides, written course books), the more the course material is reinforced. Materials should reflect the learning needs of workers, not just the regulatory requirements for class time. It is clearly relevant for company training to include rule books and videos, but these materials, while necessary, are insufficient.

The Department of Energy has student guides for its training – with text, pictures, exercises to test ones understanding, and mock exercises on radiological survey instruments and dosimetry devices. Its Modular Emergency Response Radiological Transportation Training Program (MERRTT)187 covers radiological basics, biological effects, radioactive material shipping packages, incident control, contamination and exposure, decontamination, and a module dedicated to Rail Transportation of radiological materials.

Rail companies have their own safety manuals and rulebooks. They also have a number of safety and security videos.

Training materials for the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program (RWTP) are continually evaluated and enhanced. There are both student manuals and instructor manuals. And, there are many small group activities, resource materials, written exercises and worksheets, DOT charts on labeling and placarding, and electronic enhancements.

The RWTP eight hour awareness course188 has modules in first responder awareness, regulatory agencies, chemical and physical properties, health effects, hazardous materials regulations, hazard recognition, DOT hazard communication, the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG), and other resources for hazardous materials. Each has substantial amounts of course material in the course book. It is, for example, not useful to have a copy of the ERG and not know how to use it, or not know the meanings of key concepts such as flash point, vapor density, or oxidizer. Understanding hazardous materials, as well as knowledge of operating rules, is key to basic Hazmat training.

187 U.S. Department of Energy, Modular Emergency Response Radiological Transportation Training Program (MERRTT), March 2005, rev.3.

188 Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program, Awareness Level Hazmat Course, National Labor College, June 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 45 The RWTP five-day course has a similar workbook, as does each course. Each course also has a detailed trainers guide, complete with discussion questions, lists of materials and tools needed for each module, pedagogical suggestions, copies of power points, etc.

III.D.2. Training Materials for Emergency Responders

Some of the training materials for rail workers are appropriate as materials for emergency responders. Emergency responders need to know many specifics related to railroad Hazmat emergencies, including recognition of different types of tank cars, reading placards and markings, using the ERG, and understanding the roles of skilled rail support personnel in the incident command system. Many have never learned about toxicology and health effects of exposure to hazardous materials. These are, of course, all in addition to the skilled training specific to emergency responders.

III.D.3. Training Materials for Members of the Community

Community residents also need to learn the basics of railroad Hazmat awareness. Courses that combine rail workers and emergency responders and community residents result in each learning from the other. Many times the community residents are also teachers, public works employees, police officers, government workers, and community leaders who can take their Hazmat knowledge back to their jobs as well. Learning to identify cars and placards and use resource materials is key in their understanding of rail Hazmat dangers and incidents. In addition, emphasis for community residents should include better understanding of a community’s emergency action plan, evacuation, shelter-in-place, and emergency communication. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) has developed many materials for basic emergency situations. See information for a community-based public education campaign detailing proper evacuation (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/ evacuationfacts.asp), shelter-in-place plans (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/sheltering facts.asp), decontamination procedures (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/personal cleaningfacts.asp), deploying public warning systems (e.g., sirens), practice drills, and public shelters.

The department of public safety and environment of CSX provides training and emergency planning materials to emergency response agencies at no cost. But, why are these materials not provided to emergency responders adjacent to rail yards and track? Three items are available for order from the CSX website:189

1. Community Awareness Emergency Planning Guide. The guide is a reference for agency decision makers rather than for use in individual training of responders. 2. Emergency Response to Railroad Incidents Self-Study Guide. This is a training and reference document. The guide contains information about safety

189 CSX, “Training Materials for Emergency Responders,” http://csxhazmat.kor-tx.com, retrieved July 7, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 46 around the railroad, incident preplanning and initial response procedures. Upon completion, trainees are issued a certificate. 3. Emergency Response to Railroad Incidents Self Study Video. The video is a companion resource to the self study guide.

Several guides for citizen education exist. Based on review of many of these guides and focus groups with rail workers and emergency responders,190 a possible guide, with a focus on rail Hazmat and security, was drafted by the authors of this report. (See Appendix 1 to review the suggested information for such a guide.)

Training materials need to be tested throughout their development and use. Training materials need to be at the appropriate reading level for trainees. A study by FRA, found that the reading level of written materials, used in training railroad tank car Hazmat loaders at chemical plants, was higher than the reading skills of the trainees. The conclusion: “Some of the substances handled are so hazardous, and the potential consequence of a serious non-accident release is so great, that chemical companies should consider assessing the reading level of their materials and making any necessary modifications to make the materials appropriate to the skills of their employees.” 191

Training materials need to cover all “need-to-know” information as well as background material and specific examples, to reinforce “need-to-know” curriculum. Materials need to be interesting as well as informative. Materials alone are insufficient. There needs to be interaction among students and with an instructor – be it face to face or on-line. Training needs to be reinforced with exercises and simulations. Training through “videos only” is not good training.

III.E. Specific Examples of Where Training Could Have Made a Difference

As already explained, training could have made a difference in Graniteville and in San Antonio as well as in many day to day incidents, but there are many other examples. Below are just three others:

An Iowa Example192

FEMA, in October 2003, released a technical review of an AMTRAK derailment that left one person dead and 96 injured. The March 2001 derailment in rural Iowa led FEMA to

190 From trainees of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program, National Labor College, May- July 2006.

191 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Non-Accident Release of Hazmat from Railroad Tank Cars: Training Issues, FRA/ORD-99/05, July 1999.

192 U.S. Fire Administration, “FEMA Review of Amtrak Derailment Shows Relevance of ‘All-Hazards’ Training and Planning, October 22, 2003. (FEMA Report is available through www.usfa.fema.gov/ applications/publications/display.cfm?it=9-2099.)

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 47 list the following lessons learned:

• “The volume of radio traffic quickly overwhelmed the two-way communication system and limited 9-1-1 telephone lines. Cellular telephones were also ineffective. Incident planning should include provisions for alternate means of communications; • Train doors jammed when the derailment occurred and the train lost electrical power. The windows were not breakable and the cars were two stories high with narrow stairways, delaying search and research efforts; • The absence of emergency lighting in the train contributed to the disorientation of the passengers as they tried to exit the train; • Freezing temperatures at the time of the derailment helped stabilize the unpaved road bed but made shelter an issue for those non-injured passengers who were evacuated; and • The number of ambulances was quickly exhausted and school buses and privately owned vehicles were pressed into service to move passengers to safety. Future planning for a similar event should identify the types and sources for equipment that could be require[d] in a multiple casualty incident.”

U.S. Fire Administrator R. David Paulson said, “Lessons learned from this report underscore the importance of preparing, training and exercising for all hazards, by all first responders and departments.”

A California Example193

Worker training potentially could have avoided or ameliorated a San Bernardino derailment in April 2005. The train carried 28 Hazmat cars. Eight derailed or were damaged. One released its contents and while no one was reported hurt, the potential for a major disaster existed. Hazmat training teaches rail crews the importance of accurate shipping papers and the need to check them and be certain of their accuracy before moving a train. In this derailment, two with pressurized liquid chlorine, “the railroad’s paperwork on the hazardous cargo was wrong, giving emergency response crews inaccurate information.”194

Worker training teaches the importance of tank car integrity. While the decision to replace cars is one for management, when a federal safety agency is concerned with the crashworthiness of older cars, and a chlorine car with a one-inch crack was built in 1977, health and safety committees should be raising concerns. The same is true of poorly maintained track. At San Bernadino, an FRA report195 found that uneven track had

193 Pitchford, Goad, Danelski, Kawar, “Toxic Cargo …”

194 Ibid.

195 Federal Railroad Administration, Railroad Report 0405LA011, San Bernadino, California, April 2005, http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/cgi-bin..., retrieved August 9, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 48 ‘obvious and visible’ warping that should have been identified in a routine inspection. Damage to the siding was estimated to be $204,000.

Training of emergency managers teaches about safe evacuation and decisions to return home. In San Bernadino, “authorities mistakenly let residents back into their homes before it was safe, a state investigation showed. Residents included those from a neighborhood densely populated with small homes and two nearby mobile home parks, had to be re-evacuated.

An Example from Japan 196

Another example comes from the highly publicized Tokyo rail transit system and a terrorist attack there. In the 1995 sarin gas incident in Tokyo, two transit employees need not have died, if they had learned that they themselves should not have tried to dispose of the agent dispersal device, but rather evacuated and left the technical work to emergency response experts.

III.F. General Principles for Training Excellence

A good way to establish practical guidelines for training excellence is through development of guiding principles and minimum criteria for training programs. The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) through its Worker Education and Training Program (WETP) funds over 100 organizations to provide hazardous materials training for workers. NIEHS formulated, through a technical workshop in spring 2005, guiding principles and minimum criteria for hazardous materials training. With more than 100 organizations developing and evaluating hazardous materials training programs funded through NIEHS, success has been tied to peer trainers, state-of-the-art-technology, proven adult learning techniques, and careful curriculum development and evaluations. Key principles include:197

• “Peer-to-peer training with hands-on activities is the most effective model for worker training. This guidance recommends that hands-on training should fill at least one-third of the training program hours.

• “Computer-based training methods can greatly augment the effectiveness and reduce the cost of hazardous waste worker training, but should not be the sole form of training when workers’ health and safety are at risk especially with respect to skills training.

196 U.S. House or Representatives, “Detour Ahead …, 2006.

197 National Clearinghouse of Workers Safety and Health Training for Hazardous Waste Workers and Emergency Responders, for U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, “Minimum Health and Safety Training Criteria: Guidance for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response,” (HAZWOPER), HAZWOPER-Supporting and All-Hazards Disaster Prevention, Preparedness, and Response,” May 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 49 • “Worker safety and health training must be preceded by a needs analysis to ensure the appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes are being transmitted. The training must be followed by a proper evaluation to document the knowledge, skills or attitudes were acceptably transmitted and that the worker possesses the necessary abilities to perform the tasks.

• “Proven adult-learning techniques should be the core of all worker training.”

The following are basic principles of adult education as applied by WETP grantees at NIEHS to hazardous materials and related training programs:

1. “Adults learn best by doing. Knowledge alone is insufficient … Workers must also be competent and proficient in the unique skills that are required... Hands-on training, exercises, and proficiency assessment are essential. 2. “The training environment must be conducive to learning. HAZWOPER training has two distinct learning environments: the initial off-site training and the on-site, supervised training. The off-site training must provide the knowledge required to perform the work … and verify the satisfactory attainment of the related skills. On-site supervised training is intended to verify that the student can safely apply the necessary knowledge and skills in the actual workplace. 3 “Adults learn from a variety of learning activities including role playing, case studies, audio-visual presentations, discovery exercises, planning exercises, group discussions, lecture-discussions, report-back sessions, drills and exercises, computer use, web site access, computer simulations, and blended approaches using integrated instructional technologies. 4. “Adult learners need direct experience to apply new skills in the work environment. This principle is the underpinning of the need for the hands-on component of skills training. Scores on a knowledge test are not a satisfactory indication that new skills can be effectively and safely applied in the work setting. 5. “Adults need frequent non-judgmental feedback. Adult learners need to know how they are doing in a manner that is not judgmental. Training must respect students existing knowledge, skill, experiences, and circumstances. Opportunities must be provided for constructive feedback to each student in the training course. 6. “Small group activities are important to adult learners. This approach provides an opportunity for individual learners to share and discuss what they have learned with their peer students as adult learners benefit from the experiences of other participants. 7. “Adult learners respond better when they have the opportunity to learn from their peers. The WETP has recognized the critical importance of peer instructors since the inception of the program, and continues to do so. 8. “Adult learning must be reinforced. The knowledge and skills learned … must be retained to be of value to the student. This is the primary purpose of refresher training, which must include critical skills aspects. Site-specific training and periodic drills also serve as reinforcement mechanisms as newly learned knowledge and skills are applied in an actual or simulated work environment. 9. “Learning methods must consider the learner’s technological fluency. Not all adult learners are comfortable or fluent with technology-enhanced training tools,

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 50 such as computer-based or web-based methods. The students comfort level and fluency with technology must be considered before choosing technology- enhanced instructional methods and also during curriculum design. 10. “Adult education is empowering. The knowledge, skills, and experiences adults gain in educational programs should empower them to improve the conditions under which they work and live.”

Adults learn in a variety of ways. According to experts, one should consider incorporation of many of the following:

ƒ listening ƒ looking at visuals ƒ asking questions ƒ reading ƒ writing ƒ practicing with equipment ƒ discussing critical issues ƒ identifying problems ƒ planning actions ƒ trying out strategies in participatory ways.

Course materials and other training aids, include but are not limited to course syllabus, trainee manuals, instructor manuals, audio-visual aids, enhanced technology methods, handouts, demonstration equipment, and hands-on equipment.

NIEHS is not the only federal agency concerned about minimum criteria for training. The Centers for Disease Control’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), along with the Rand Corporation developed minimum criteria for safety and health training for all responders involved in disaster response operations. Theirs’ were content-based criteria, recommending that curriculum for the emergency response community should include a basic familiarity with:198

• “The ICS [incident command system] approach to disaster response • Common terminology for safety and health issues • An ‘all-hazards’ perspective on the range of hazards that could be encountered during disaster response activities • Relevant protective equipment, and when and how to use it • Decontamination and rehabilitation processes • An overview of the diverse organizations that are likely to become involved in major disaster response.”

198 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health with the Rand Corporation, Protecting Emergency Responders: Safety Management in Disaster and Terrorism Response, Volume 3, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2004-144. 2004.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 51 IV. Recommendations

There are literally hundreds of recommendations that emerge from this report. Below are some of them. The main overarching recommendation is in-depth quality training about rail Hazmats and security – for all rail workers, affected emergency responders, and local citizens. The dangers posed by rail transport of Hazmats are clear. There are many models and examples of best practice – some cited in this paper. Key is that rail transportation be as safe as possible, and that safety requires knowledge, training, and vigilance of all that may be affected.

The recommendations are organized by area of concern. First and foremost, of course, is training. Recommendation priorities are highlighted in the Executive Summary. See Appendix II for general findings and recommendations. See Appendix III for specific findings and recommendations sorted by who should be responsible for a given recommendation. (Where a recommendation is from a particular agency or publication or individual, that source is noted in parentheses.)

IV.A. Improve and Expand Training

ƒ There is a critical need for Hazmat training – awareness, preparedness, prevention, and emergency response – for rail workers and emergency responders. There is a need for rigorous joint training and exercises. Those workers that would be directly affected need to be an integral part of team briefings. A well- trained and knowledgeable workforce is the first line of defense to keep a minor incident from becoming a major hazardous materials incident.

ƒ Increase the breadth and depth of training.

For Workers

ƒ Achieve buy-in for Hazmat and rail security training by all class I, short-line, and passenger railroads. Require rail carriers to develop a rail worker training program and to train all of their rail workers within one year.

ƒ Although current federal Hazmat training requirements emphasize mastery of declarative knowledge, conduct both knowledge and performance testing to ensure that procedural learning has a successful outcome. (FRA)

ƒ Assure training in the proper use and selection of gloves, boots, hearing protection, respiratory protection, chemical protective equipment, etc.

ƒ Be sure emergency response personnel know access points to rail yards and track. Those who may be at a rail Hazmat incident need to know how to properly read placards and labels to identify chemicals.

ƒ CSX has guides and videos on emergency response to rail incidents that, upon request, are available to emergency response programs in the states where CSX

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 52 operations. CSX and all other railroads with such materials should be proactive and provide them to every emergency response group that might respond to a rail incident.

ƒ Develop minimum criteria for effective Hazmat training – both in content and delivery. Establish standard protocols for training that a rail corporation must provide. (IBT)

ƒ Ensure that employees who work with or around hazardous substances undergo continuous job safety training (e.g., hazardous materials training) and have access to appropriate personal protective equipment. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC)

ƒ Expand peer training programs across the country. Draw on the experience, expertise and success of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program.

ƒ Implement and train on ones emergency action plan.

ƒ Increase surveillance of freight equipment, through training of staff on observation and installation of video surveillance equipment.

ƒ Many of the railroads have consolidated training centers – like the center CSX opened in Atlanta in December 2004. There are locomotive simulators and classroom learning in a hands-on railroad operating environment.199 There should also be simulators and hands-on learning related to Hazmat and security training.

ƒ Provide live situational training exercises regarding various emergency scenarios, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and hazardous material explosions.

ƒ Provide rail workers with notification and training on railroad security plans, including a railroad carrier's threat level identification system, employee notification when such levels change, employee roles and responsibilities regarding the security plan, and lines of communication and coordination in the event of an emergency. (Proposed Rail Worker Emergency Training Act of 2005)

ƒ Railroads should adopt and use widely across the country the tested and acclaimed curriculum of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program of the National Labor College.

ƒ Require all railroad subcontractors and their employees to receive standardized training. (IBT)

ƒ Response procedures should be reviewed to ensure that transport does not unnecessarily expose response personnel, equipment, and transport vehicles to contamination from victims. The railroads should work together to participate in

199 CSX, “CSX Consolidated Training Center opens in Atlanta,” Press Release, December 3, 2004, http://www.csx.com/?fuseaction=media.news_detail&i=46619, retrieved June 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 53 “hands-on” training with railroad officials on specific response strategies and techniques for train derailments and hazardous materials releases. (EPA)

ƒ Teaching rail workers, emergency responders and citizens how to get and read information on specific hazardous materials: material safety data sheets, ERG, NIOSH Pocket Guide.

ƒ Those who may be at a rail Hazmat incident need to know how to properly read placards and labels.

ƒ Train all rail employees relative to the carrier’s security plan, including the employees’ specific roles and responsibilities related to such a security plan. (IBT)200

ƒ Train personnel and passengers to have a role in security by reporting suspicious behavior, identifying suspicious (especially unattended packages and luggage and improving readiness for evacuation and emergency actions. (RAND)

ƒ TSA should also identify the gaps that currently exist in front line employee training and mandate training to close them. This training should be developed using TSA resources and should be required for all front-line rail and mass transit employees. TSA should work with FTA, FRA, NTI and the National Labor College when developing this training. (Democratic staff, U.S. House of Representative, Committee on Homeland Security)

For Emergency Responders

ƒ Emergency response personnel need to become familiar with rail yards and the lay of railway lines and how to access track in an emergency.

ƒ Provide FEMA training to those likely to be at the scene of a rail Hazmat emergency.

ƒ Provide Hazmat training for all emergency dispatchers and rail dispatchers.

ƒ Provide Hazmat training for all emergency responders and all rail workers, including hands-on and small-group activities using peer trainers, when possible.

ƒ Provide live situational training exercises with various emergency scenarios, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and hazardous material explosions.

ƒ Response procedures should be reviewed to ensure that transport does not unnecessarily expose response personnel, equipment, and transport vehicles to contamination from victims. The railroads should work together to participate in

200 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, “High Alert … 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 54 “hands-on” training with railroad officials on specific response strategies and techniques for train derailments and hazardous materials releases. (EPA)

ƒ Teach rail workers, emergency responders and citizens how to get and read information on specific hazardous materials: material safety data sheets, ERG, NIOSH Pocket Guide.

ƒ Those who may be at a rail Hazmat incident need to know how to properly read placards and labels.

For Government

ƒ Make issues related to Hazmat and security training a more visible part of the work of relevant federal agencies, like NTSB, Department of Homeland Security and DOT.

ƒ Pass legislation to upgrade training for rail workers, emergency response personnel and the community, such as the “Rail Transit Safety and Security Act of 2005,” which was introduced by Congressman Stephen Lynch (D-MA) to overhaul training for rail workers, expand safety and communications systems, and improve emergency preparedness of America’s rail networks and personnel.

ƒ Penalize rail corporations who fail to adequately train workers in security/terrorism prevention, inspections of infrastructure, Hazmat (including nuclear waste), and OSHA’s Emergency Action Plans or Emergency Response Plans. (IBT)

ƒ Require the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish comprehensive guidelines for a rail worker emergency training program. The guidelines must address several key areas, including critical infrastructure and equipment security inspection, hazardous material storage, transport, and monitoring, unauthorized rail yard access, securing locomotive cabs and evacuation procedures.201

ƒ Require a comprehensive medical surveillance program for all rail workers.

ƒ Support medical, toxicology, and epidemiology research studies to establish links between disease and exposure to hazardous materials.

For Community Residents

ƒ Communities need to develop and implement emergency action plans. There needs to be training on the plans so everyone knows what to do if there is an emergency. The involvement of dispatchers is critical.

ƒ Provide awareness training for children in the schools.

201 U.S. House of Representatives, “Rail Worker Emergency Training Act of 2005,” H.R. 4372, 109th Congress, 1st Session, November 17, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 55 ƒ Provide awareness training for residents of rail communities – not just about Hazmats, but also about the roles of evacuation, shelter-in-place, the importance of wind direction and elevation.

ƒ Provide FEMA training to those likely to be at the scene of a rail emergency.

ƒ Provide live situational training exercises regarding various emergency scenarios, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and hazardous material explosions.

ƒ Provide specialized training for health care professionals who will be “first receivers” in the event of an emergency.

ƒ Train personnel and passengers to have a role in security by reporting suspicious behavior, identifying suspicious (especially unattended packages and luggage and improving readiness for evacuation and emergency actions. (RAND)

ƒ Training needs to include specific knowledge of what Hazmats are being transported through ones community. Communities – both those responsible in an emergency and the general public – should be regularly informed by the rail roads what hazardous materials are moving by rail through their communities.

ƒ Use the media to educate and provide information.

IV.B. Better Access to Information

ƒ 911 dispatchers should have the ability to contact the railroad’s response center hot line to obtain a list of materials carried on a specific shipment.202

ƒ Be sure emergency response personnel know access points to rail yards and track.

ƒ Ensure that emergency responders have timely access to hazardous materials information.

ƒ Have Material Safety Data Sheets available for all potentially affected in a Hazmat incident.

ƒ Require railroads to regularly inform officials of the hazardous materials going through or adjacent to their communities.

IV.C. Minimize the Use of Cars for Storage

ƒ Keep storage of Hazmat cars out of cities.

ƒ Require secure locations for tank cars rather than along the track and sidings. Enforce the requirement.

202 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 6, “Emergency Response Review: Union Pacific/Burlington Northern Train Derailment, Macdona, Texas, Final Report,” August 18, 2004.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 56 ƒ Keep hazardous loads in the yards until ready to go on the road.

ƒ Move dangerous car locations more often.

ƒ Tighten the regulations about how long Hazmat cars can sit on the tracks. The DOT rail hazmat regulation allows rail Hazmat cars to sit no longer than 48 hours, but there are several loopholes in the regulation which need to be closed; i.e., a chemical company can lease a siding from a railroad and leave Hazmat cars there indefinitely, even loading and unloading from them. There are “rolling leases,” in which chemical companies lease only the stretch of track directly under the car, so the lease moves when the car moves.

IV.D. Eliminate Cars in Poor Condition. More than half of the 60,000 rail tank cars used to transport hazardous materials are not built according to current standards and are susceptible to rupture in the case of an accident. They must be upgraded or replaced.

IV.E. Improve Community Awareness and Action

ƒ “Consider introducing an ordinance to [ones] city or county council to reduce risk, including the re-routing of the most dangerous cargoes away from the most sensitive areas (PBS, Toxic Transport):

o Once [one has] learned about the issue, have the facts at hand, and have a group of allies to support [the] cause, introduce the proposed ordinance. o After the ordinance is introduced, a public hearing is likely. If a public hearing is scheduled, arrange for strong witnesses to testify and rally supporters to attend the hearing o The issue will then move to a vote. It is a separate political decision to go forward with enactment of the ordinance.”

ƒ Develop a system for passenger communication and coordination in the event of an emergency.

ƒ “Find out more about hazardous materials transport in [ones] area. Contact the following for information on the extent and location of hazardous rail transportation in an area (PBS, Toxic Transport):

o The Right to Know Network: The RTK provides access to environmental databases as well as the ability to search for toxic pollution o [Ones] local railroad operators o [Ones] Local Emergency Planning Committee: Raise issues and find out if they know the volumes and worst case scenarios of the shipments. Ask if any agency reviews the chemical shippers and carriers’ security plans o [Ones] local chemical company facility managers: [One] can get a list of chemical companies from your local Emergency Planning Committee’s most recent plan…Ask each company if it has a policy for re-routing its hazardous

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 57 cargoes around target cities. Under the community-right-to-know act, chemical plants are required to disclose their worst-case scenarios for accidents.”

ƒ Let employees and the public be part of a plan to help in emergencies. Encourage participation in CERTs.

ƒ Make demands on local officials for re-assessment of (PBS, Toxic Transport):

o The “acceptable risk” for the community in a time of heightened terrorism risk awareness o Security measures and safety locations appropriate for the locale.”

ƒ Put together a committee of citizens and organizations who assert their right to know what risks there are due to … the storage and transportation of hazardous materials in general. Strong members of the committee would be (PBS, Toxic Transport):

o Emergency responders, including members of hazardous materials teams o Hospitals with emergency rooms that might have to handle mass casualties o School administrators, PTA members and teachers o Arenas, sports complexes or other facilities which host thousands of people o Media professionals who know how to reach newspapers and local media outlets.”

ƒ Educate residents on sirens used in their communities.

ƒ Involve residents in the development of emergency action plans in their communities and then be educated, based on those plans, on how to stay informed and what to do in the event of an emergency.

ƒ Inform residents about the chemicals stored, transported, manufactured in the community.

IV.F. Need for More Data Analysis

ƒ Conduct a “root cause analysis” whenever a rail Hazmat incident occurs and incorporate knowledge gained into training programs. (FRA)

ƒ Responding organizations need to ensure that information collected and disseminated by responders is evaluated and acted upon, as appropriate (EPA)

ƒ Review the company’s NAR [non-accident release] history to identify any specific causes that contribute to an incident and place emphasis on these causes in training programs. (FRA)

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 58 ƒ Use Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance data or other federal, state, and local databases to determine where most releases occur. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC)203

IV.G. Improve Emergency Response

ƒ 911 centers should develop a checklist/standard operating procedures that dispatchers can use to assist residents with such issues as how to shelter-in-place. (EPA)

ƒ Have Hazmat teams at all major rail yards.

ƒ Increase the number of Hazmat teams in communities and have Hazmat equipment on all emergency vehicles.

IV.H. More Use of Engineering Controls

ƒ Develop a real time tracking system for the most dangerous toxic rail cars.

ƒ Develop better protection for locomotive occupants, like bullet resistant walls and air bags.

ƒ Eliminate dark territory.

ƒ Have bladders in tank cars (Nascar fuel cells rarely rupture).

ƒ Install brake valve keys, used on German railroads, that lock the train’s brake valve and are in the engineers’ possession at all times.204

ƒ Integrate protective housings, valves and fittings into hazardous transport infrastructure to prevent tampering and facilitate emergency response. (RAND)205

ƒ Work for having less vulnerable tank cars in use. FRA has begun research to accelerate tank car structural integrity. The project should be completed by July 2008, but if necessary additional funding were available, it could have been completed by December 2006.206 Citizens could lobby for acceleration of this research.

203 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Public Health Consequences … South Carolina, 2005; Selected States, 1999-2004,” MMWR Weekly, January 28, 2005.

204 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, “BLET Convention Update: Delegates Hear of More Rail Security Dangers,” June 21, 2006, BLE NewFlash, http://www.ble.org/pr/news flash.asp?id=4318.

205 Riley, “Statement of Riley …,” March 23, 2004.

206 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railway Administration, “Federal Railroad Administration Action Plan for Addressing Critical Railroad Safety Issues,” May 16, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 59 IV.I. Improve Maintenance and Operations

ƒ Check against incompatible products.

ƒ Eliminate dark territory.

ƒ Eliminate remote control assignments in the handling of Hazmats.

ƒ Emphasize the importance of preventive maintenance of equipment and vehicles. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC)

ƒ Have Hazmat teams at all major rail yards.

ƒ Have more track and car inspections. Inspect cars against internal corrosion.

ƒ Improve operations by monitoring for signal tampering; require crews and dispatchers to verify communications for train movements and dispatches; lock locomotive doors to prevent hijackings. (RAND)

ƒ Improve storage and labeling of chemicals in the yards. Apply NFPA (fire) labels to flammable/combustible storage cabinets and storage areas.

ƒ Improve track maintenance.

ƒ Inspect overheads, bridges, and tunnels daily.

ƒ Keep storage of Hazmat cars out of cities.

ƒ Lock gates.

ƒ Lock vehicles.

ƒ Repair gaps in fencing.

ƒ Reroute hazardous materials away from densely populated areas where feasible.

ƒ The railroads need to adopt operating procedures to enhance the safety and health of everyone in the event of a Hazmat incident.

ƒ Better secure and upgrade railroad infrastructure and cars against the threats of Hazmat incidents, whether accidental or pre-meditated.

ƒ Require railroads to regularly inform officials of the 25 main Hazmats going through or adjacent to their communities.

ƒ Review operating rules to remove any ambiguities relative to their meaning and application.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 60 IV.J. Build Partnerships

ƒ Assemble a committee of citizens and associated-organizations to assert the right- to-know about existing risks, especially due to rail car storage and Hazmats moving through ones community. Engage public officials in a discussion of what is “acceptable risk.” (Millar)

ƒ Provide emergency responders with access to railroad radio frequencies.

ƒ Identify key points of contacts among key organizations.

ƒ Review and update Mutual Aid Agreements. Responding agencies need to have confidence in each others abilities and training for these agreements to work. (EPA)

ƒ Actively involve rail employees, emergency responders, and community in emergency action plans and drills.

ƒ Improve communication among railroad personnel (officials and workers) and local emergency agencies such as fire, EMS, and police.

ƒ Improve communication between and among railroads and federal agencies.

ƒ Improve communication between railroads and their employees.

ƒ Ensure that personnel at the operations level notify appropriate communities before any action is initiated that may result in community concerns. (EPA)

ƒ Put information on the NLC Rail Workers Program web site describing models for rail-community partnerships.

IV.K. Proper Access and Use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

ƒ Assure that response teams have adequate air supplies. (EPA)

ƒ Assure the use of proper gloves, boots, hearing protection, respiratory protection, chemical protective equipment, etc.

ƒ Have binoculars available to read placards.

IV.L. More Planning

ƒ Be sure that emergency action plans cover the range of Hazmat incidents -- from minor spills to major disaster.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 61 ƒ Cities should coordinate with rail companies to assess rail lines throughout the area, to identify areas where blockages may occur in an area during a derailment that could prevent responders and residents to enter and egress. (EPA)

ƒ Collaborate with the Department of Defense to ensure the viability of Strategic Rail Corridor Network-designated rail lines that are capable of meeting unique DoD requirements, such as the ability to handle heavy, high or wide loads. (RAND)

ƒ Conduct training needs assessments to establish and prioritize employee needs for competency and refresher training. (U.S. Fire Administration)

ƒ Determine public sector employee roles and competency needs in planning and response. (U.S. Fire Administration)

ƒ Develop emergency response plans before hazardous substances events occur. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC)

ƒ Develop short- and long-term training plans that address the training needs for compliance with OSHA 1910.120(q) and EPA 311. (U.S. Fire Administration)

ƒ Ensure that proper hazard and vulnerability analyses are conducted to determine response and planning needs. (U.S. Fire Administration)

ƒ Ensure that the training delivery is effective. (U.S. Fire Administration)

ƒ EPA offers Emergency Response Reviews, which are entirely voluntary, but should be highly recommended for all communities, especially those near railroad tracks and yards.207 These reviews are designed to:

o “Review with a local community and state officials the response procedures and outcomes to a specific chemical accident affecting that community; o Share information about chemical response safety practices; o Develop potential recommendations and lessons learned to more effectively respond to an accidental release in the future; o Build cooperation among local, state, and federal government agencies.”

ƒ Initial entry teams may need to carry tools; e.g., bolt cutters, to gain forced entry to residences due to high security fences, locked gates, etc. (EPA)

ƒ Manage the jurisdiction’s training curriculum for planning and response, including assessing courses for proper objectives, content, and methodology, and revising, updating, and developing courses to meet training requirements not presently addressed. (U.S. Fire Administration)

207 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 6, “Emergency Response Review: Union Pacific/Burlington Northern Train Derailment, Macdona, Texas, Final Report,” August 18, 2004.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 62 ƒ Conduct a comprehensive review of hazardous materials rail safety. (ACC)208

IV.M. Policy Initiatives and Actions

ƒ Conduct vulnerability assessments on all rail and mass transit security systems. (Democratic staff, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security)

ƒ Dedicate funding for rail and mass transit security. (Democratic staff, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security)

ƒ Develop and enforce a baseline of security. (Democratic staff, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security)

ƒ Do not remove hazardous materials placards. (International Association of Fire Fighters)

ƒ Enforce Superfund and state clean-up for designated rail yards.

ƒ Have security similar to airports.

ƒ Improve information sharing with state and local governments. (Democratic staff, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security)

ƒ Make TSA in the Department of Homeland Security the clear leader for rail and mass transit security (Democratic staff, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security)

ƒ Mandate security training for all front line employees. (Democratic staff, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security)

ƒ Push for federal regulation and enforcement, recognizing that state and local actions may be needed.

ƒ Require rail and mass transit owners and operators to submit security plans. (Democratic staff, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security)

ƒ Require the Secretary of Homeland Security to consult with the Secretary of Transportation.209

208 Testimony of Martin Durbin, “Current Issues in Rail Transportation of Hazardous Materials,” June 13, 2006.

209 U.S. House of Representatives, “Rail Worker Emergency Training Act of 2005,” H.R. 4372, 109th Congress, 1st Session, November 17, 2005.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 63 ƒ Require TSA to complete a national rail and mass transit security strategy. (Democratic staff, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security)

IV.N. Rerouting Where Feasible

ƒ Reroute hazardous materials away from densely populated areas where feasible. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC)

IV.O. Improve Security, Surveillance, and Vigilance

ƒ Develop better protection for locomotive occupants, by improving locomotive crashworthiness, “hardening” locomotives against unauthorized entry, and by providing emergency escape equipment and training.

ƒ Develop distress codes for use by train crews, bridge tenders, and others as the Secretary of Homeland Security considers appropriate.

ƒ Do an analysis of terrorism risks associated with mass transport to Yucca Mountain. (State of Nevada)

ƒ Do not let trains leave without proper paperwork.

ƒ Have background, skills, and `fitness for duty' checks for railroad contractors, subcontractors, and their employees equal to those applicable to railroad employees.

ƒ Have more rigorous inspections of nuclear waste and Hazmats.

ƒ Have random inspections of critical areas.

ƒ Hire more railroad police. Definitely do not reduce their numbers.

ƒ Improve coordination of security efforts.

ƒ Increase surveillance of freight equipment, through training of staff on observation and the installation of video surveillance equipment. (RAND)

ƒ Install perimeter security at loading and switching stations. (Falkenrath)

ƒ Involve local police.

ƒ Provide more security cameras for rail cars. (APTA)

ƒ Ship decoy containers along side filled containers. (Falkenrath)

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 64 IV.P. Make Yards and Stations Safer

ƒ Devise buffer zone protection plans to secure the most perilous rail sites.

ƒ Install windsocks.

ƒ Check photo IDs of all employees.

ƒ Improve lighting in the yards. (RAND)

ƒ Install blast resistant trash containers. (RAND)

ƒ Install closed-circuit television. (RAND)

ƒ Install emergency alarms in yards.

ƒ Install perimeter security at loading and switching stations. (Falkenrath)

ƒ Install signage to increase awareness about danger. (RAND)

ƒ Lock gates.

ƒ Put barriers around stationary propane tank.

ƒ Repair gaps in fencing. (RAND)

ƒ Work toward better security of rail yards and rolling stock. Citizens can work toward fenced rail yards in their communities. For example, the Roseville rail yard of Sacramento, the largest rail yard west of the Mississippi River, has no fence line to keep people out.210

IV.Q. Other

ƒ Actively engage in epidemiological studies testing relationships between exposures and diseases.

ƒ Do not post rail radio frequencies on Internet.

ƒ Encourage chemical plants to find substitutes for the most toxic substances.

ƒ Install alarm system to warn workers.

ƒ Promote just-in-time manufacturing to reduce storage requirements. Decrease overall storage inventories and separating dangerous substances into smaller containment tanks.

210 “Trains Hauling Dangerous Materials Have Little Oversight: Some Say Sacramento is at Particular Risk,” KCRA 3, May 2006, http://www.kcra.com/news/9234544/detail.html, retrieved July 4, 2006.

TRAINING IN HAZMAT AND RAIL SECURITY: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE NEEDS P. 65 ƒ Secure the information infrastructure that terrorists could use to enhance attacks or cause systemic shutdowns. (RAND)

ƒ Use rail fans for information.

V. Summary and Conclusions

Millions of lives and billions of dollars are at stake in efforts to improve rail Hazmat safety and security. Besides improvements in infrastructure and operations, one key element that needs to be enhanced is training – training for rail workers, for emergency responders, and for residents of rail communities. This report documents the problems of hazardous material transport by rail. It studies rail Hazmat training, looking at both the roles for and types of training available to protect people and communities. Based on research findings, the report ends with dozens of recommendations to enhance rail safety and security – recommendations both for more effective training programs and for improvements in Hazmat safety and security generally.

Key to effective rail Hazmat training is that it reach all who may be affected. Cost- effective and pedagogically-preferred is training delivered by specially trained peer instructors. Curriculum is best when its focus is hands-on, small group exercises, enhanced by simulations, audiovisuals, and class discussion. Besides the rules, Hazmat trainees need to learn first response, hazard identification, health effects, and how to use resources. Well-trained rail workers and emergency responders can keep themselves safe and protect residents in affected communities. Well-trained residents can keep vigil and be active in their pursuit of rail safety and security in good times and help themselves and their neighbors in an emergency.

It is up to lawmakers, railroad executives, and the people on the ground to decide whether we will wait for a major rail disaster before strengthening safety and health training, or whether we will act now and prevent tragedies.

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U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP), Year-2003 Accomplishments, June 2004, http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/2003_sacp_annual_report.pdf, retrieved July 2, 2006.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP), Accomplishments for CY 2001, August 2002.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Safety Assurance And Compliance Program Report For CSX Transportation, Inc., October 16, 1997, Washington, D.C., The Executive Summary, http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/ csx/csx1.pdf, retrieved June 29, 2006.

BIBLIOGRAPHY P. 10 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP), Year-2002 Accomplishments, Year-2003 Audit Plans, April 2003, http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/ safety/SACP_2002.pdf, retrieved July 1, 2006.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railway Administration, “Federal Railroad Administration Action Plan for Addressing Critical Railroad Safety Issues,” May 16, 2005.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, Hazardous Materials Shipments, October 1998.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Transport Canada, and the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation of Mexico (SCT), Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG), 2004.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “EPCRA Overview,” February 16, 2006, http://yosemite.epa.gov/OSWER/Ceppoweb.nsf/content/epcraoverview.htm, retrieved August 8, 2006.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act: Factsheet,” EPA 550-I-00-004, March 2000.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 6, “Emergency Response Review: Union Pacific/Burlington Northern Train Derailment, Macdona, Texas, Final Report,” August 18, 2004.

U.S. Fire Administration, “FEMA Review of Amtrak Derailment Shows Relevance of ‘All-Hazards’ Training and Planning,” October 22, 2003. (FEMA Report is available through www.usfa.fema.gov/applications/publications/display.cfm?it=9-2099.)

U.S. Fire Administration, Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) Curriculum, December 28, 2005, http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/subjects/hazmat/hmep.shtn, retrieved August 8, 2006.

U.S. General Accounting Office, Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-Based Plan Needed, GAO-03-435, April 30, 2003.

U.S. House of Representatives, “Detour Ahead: Critical Vulnerabilities in America’s Rail and Mass Transit Security Programs,” Prepared at the request of Congressman Bennie Thompson, ranking member, by the Democratic Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, 2006.

U.S. House of Representatives, “Rail Worker Emergency Training Act of 2005,” H.R. 4372, 109th Congress, 1st Session, November 17, 2005.

BIBLIOGRAPHY P. 11 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Staff, Leaving the Nation At Risk: 33 Unfulfilled Promises Made by the Department of Homeland Security, http://hsc-democrats.house.gov/NR/rdonlyres/1C607310-3228- 4CCC-B13A-04A808A4C19B/0/HomelandSecurityDemocratsRevealUnfulfilled Promises.pdf, retrieved July 2006.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Anthony A. Williams, et al.

WKRC 12 Cincinnati, “Local 12 Investigates: Toxic Targets,” May 16, 2006, http://www.wkrc.com/News/Local/, retrieved, July 4, 2006.

BIBLIOGRAPHY P. 12

TABLE I

MOST COMMON HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES RELEASED DURING RAIL EVENTS HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES EMERGENCY EVENTS SURVEILLANCE (HSEES) SYSTEM 16 STATES* 1999-2004†

Source: CDC, MMWR, January 28, 2005.

TABLE II

HAZMAT SUMMARY BY MODE OF TRANSPORTATION / CAUSE FOR 2005 SERIOUS INCIDENTS*

Total 100 119 566 4 13,889,185

Source: Hazardous Materials Information System, U.S. Department of Transportation. Data as of 06/02/06.

TABLE III AVERAGE COST

PER HAZMAT INCIDENT BY TRANSPORTATION MODE

2005 COST PER TYPE OF INCIDENT # INCIDENTS TOTAL COST INCIDENT Air Incidents 17 $9575 $563 Water Incidents 3 $73,500 $24,500 Highway Incidents 402 $29,509,425 $73,406 Rail Incidents 98 $13,873,170 $141,562

Source: Hazardous Materials Information System, U.S. Department of Transportation.

9 Listen to the radio

9 Listen to emergency responders

9 Follow instructions

9 Stay away from the actual incident

9 Take your Family Disaster Supplies Kit and medications • Water and food • A change of clothing for each member of the family • Medication, eyeglasses, hearing aids or dentures, or things like canes and walkers, important papers • Personal items such as toothbrushes, deodorant, etc. • Items for your baby such as diapers, formula, or baby food • Reading material or children’s toys 9 Go upwind 9 Go uphill (in most situations) 9 Go at least ½ mile from railroad track 9 Move quickly and calmly 9 Take your cell phone

9 Help your community develop an evacuation plan 9 Know several routes out of town and away from the railroad tracks 9 Know the location of emergency shelters 9 Make plans with family members to communicate and to reunite 9 Have an emergency kit for evacuation 9 Have a prepare kit with one gallon of water/person/day; three days of food; clothes and bedding; mask of filters for breathing

9 Go inside immediately 9 Turn off inside ventilation 9 Go into a sealed room with few windows and doors that's above ground level because some chemicals are heavier than air, and may seep into basements even if the windows are closed 9 Seal windows and doors 9 Take emergency supplies upstairs 9 Listen to a radio or TV 9 Wait for further instructions 9 Cover nose and mouth 9 Reduce physical activity

9 One gallon of water per person per day 9 3 days of food per person 9 Clothes and bedding 9 Masks/filters for breathing 9 Duct tape and plastic sheeting or heavy-duty garbage bags 9 Battery-powered radio and extra batteries 9 Flashlight and extra batteries 9 First aid kit 9 Whistle 9 Moist towelettes 9 Wrench or pliers to turn off utilities 9 Manual can opener 9 Garbage bags and plastic ties for personal sanitation 9 Medicines/important family documents/cash

MOST LIKELY CHEMICALS TO BE IN RAIL CARS

Select Flam- Explo- How to Health Risks Health Risks ed Evacuation First aid* mable? sive? Identify Short Run Long Run UN # Alcohols, n.o.s. Yes, very Yes Dizziness or asphyxiation w/out Go uphill Flush skin & eyes w/ warning; burns skin & eyes Isolate 150 feet running water > 20 Spill:1000 feet min.s; wash skin w/ Fire: ½ mile soap & water Ammonia, Some may May Colorless gas Toxic; may be fatal if inhaled, Bronchitis Go uphill No mouth-to-mouth; anhydrous burn, but explode if w/ a pungent, ingested, or absorbed thro ugh skin; Isolate: 330 feet flush skin or eyes w/ none exposed to suffocating respiratory tract burns, skin, eye & Fire: 1 mile running water > 20 ignite heat; odor, corrosive mucous membrane burns, frostbite, min.s readily water chest pain, wheezing; effects of reactive contact or inhalation may be delayed Ammonium Accele- May Highly Inhalation, ingestion or contact Go uphill Flush skin or eyes w/ nitrate rates decom- reactive; white (skin, eyes) w/ vapors or substance Isolate: 150 feet for running water for > 20 burning pose crystalline may cause severe injury, burns or liquids, & 75 feet for minutes when explosive- (sand-like) death; overexposure can cause solids liquid hazard ly when nausea, vomiting, flushing of the Spill: 330 feet heated; face & neck, headache, weakness, Fire: 1/2 mile runoff faintness, & collapse; may may interfere with the ability of blood create fire/ to carry oxygen

explosion Carbon No Contai- Colorless, Dizziness or asphyxiation; burns, May damage Go uphill In case of contact w/ Dioxide, ners may odorless gas; severe injury &/or frostbite; developing fetus; Isolate: 330 feet liquefied gas, thaw refrigerated explode may be a headache, breathing difficulty, affects brain, Spill: 330 feet frosted parts w/ liquid when liquid or very tremors, confusion & ringing in the causing personality Fire: 1/2 mile lukewarm water heated cold solid ears, sweating, increased heart rate, changes & vision coma; asphyxia; convulsions, damage frostbite; brain damage; death Chlorine No, but Yes Greenish May be fatal if inhaled or absorbed Lung damage; Go uphill No mouth-to- mouth; can yellow gas w/ through skin; burns/frostbite; tooth damage; skin Isolate: 800 feet flush skin or eyes > 30 support pungent, dizziness; vomiting; effects may be disorders; loss of Spill: 1.5 miles min.s combus- irritating odor delayed sense of smell day/4.6 miles night tion Fire: ½ mile

Select Flam- Explo- How to Health Risks Health Risks ed Evacuation First aid* mable? sive? Identify Short Run Long Run UN # Diesel fuel Yes, Vapors Clear liquid w/ Burns skin & eyes; dizziness or May cause kidney Go uphill Flush skin or eyes w/ highly may form hydrocarbon suffocation; irritates nose & throat cancer & leukemia; Isolate: 150 feet running water > 20 explosive odor; may be causing coughing & wheezing; reproductive Spill: 1000 feet min.s mixtures dyed for headache, nausea, blurred vision, damage; kidney Fire: 1/2 mile w/ air identification; poor coordination, seizures, damage; irregular comma, & death heartbeat; permanent eye damage; rash w/ dry & cracking of skin; lung damage; poor appetite, muscle weakness, cramps, & possible brain damage Elevated Yes, very Yes Dizziness or asphyxiation w/out Isolate 150 feet Flush skin & eyes w/ temperature warning; burns skin & eyes Spill:1000 feet running water > 20 liquid, n.o.s. Fire: ½ mile min.s; wash w/ soap & water Environmenta- May burn Yes Dizziness or asphyxiation w/out Lung damage Isolate 150 feet for Flush skin & eyes w/ lly fix this but none warning; burns skin & eyes liquids & 25 feet for running water > 20 word ignite solids mins hazardous readily Fire: ½ mile substances, liquid, n.o.s. Flammable Yes, very Yes Dizziness or asphyxiation w/out Go uphill Flush skin & eyes w/ liquids, n.o.s. warning; burns skin & eyes Isolate 150 feet running water > 20 Spill:1000 feet min.s; wash skin w/ Fire: ½ mile soap & water

Freight All Kinds (FAK)- Hazardous Materials Fuel oil Yes, Forms Irritates or burns skin & eyes; Go uphill; Flush skin or eyes w/ highly explosive dizziness or suffocation Isolate: 150 feet running water for > 20 mixtures Spill: 1000 feet min.s; wash skin w/ w/ air Fire: 1/2 mile soap & water 1202 1993

Select Flam- Explo- How to Health Risks Health Risks ed Evacuation First aid* mable? sive? Identify Short Run Long Run UN # Fuel, aviation, Yes, very Yes; water Clear to Burns to skin & eyes; dizziness or Go uphill Flush skin & eyes w/ turbine engine reactive amber-colored suffocation Isolate 150 feet running water > 20 liquid Spill:1000 feet min.s; wash skin w/ Fire: ½ mile soap & water

Gasoline Yes, very Yes Clear liquid w/ Irritant to eyes, skin, mucous Cancer; liver, Go uphill Flush skin & eyes w/ a characteristic membrane; dermatitis; headache; kidney & central Isolate: 150 feet running water > 20 odor blurred vision; slurred speech; burn nervous system Spill: 1000 feet min.s; wash skin w/ skin/eyes damage Fire: ½ mile soap & water Hydrochloric Non- Contai- Clear colorless Toxic; inhalation, ingestion or Damage to Go uphill No mouth-to- mouth; acid combusti- ners may or slightly contact (skin, eyes) w/ vapors, respiratory organs, Isolate: 150 feet for flush skin or eyes w/ ble; explode yellow liquid. dusts or substance may cause eyes, skin, liquids & 75 feet for running water for > 20 contact w/ when When severe injury, burns or death; intestines solids min.s metals heated or concentrated it effects may be delayed Fire: 1/2 mile may if conta- fumes evolve minated flammable w/ water hydrogen gas Methanol Yes, very Yes Colorless May be fatal if inhaled, ingested, Blindness; Go uphill No mouth-to- mouth; liquid w/ a or absorbed by skin; dizziness/ dermatitis; liver & Isolate: 150 feet flush skin & eyes w/ characteristic suffocation; visual disturbance, nervous system Fire: ½ mile running water > 20 pungent odor coughing & wheezing damage; harm to min.s; wash skin w/ fetus soap & water Petroleum Yes, very Yes Colorless, Dizziness/asphyxiation; headache/ Damage to blood; Go uphill Do not induce Gases odorless gas vomiting; burns/frostbite eyes; kidney; Isolate: 330 feet vomiting; irrigate defatting of skin Spill: ½ mile eyes (held open) & Fire: 1 mile flush skin > 15 min.s; burns, cold, water; frostbite, warm water Phenol, molten 2312 Combusti When Colorless to Toxic; inhalation, ingestion or skin Anorexia, weight Stay upwind; No mouth-to-mouth; ble heated, light-pink, contact w/ material may cause loss, kidney & liver Isolate: 150 feet for flush skin or eyes w/ material: vapors crystalline severe injury or death; severe damage, dermatitis liquids & 75 feet for running water for > 20 may burn may form solid w/ a burns to skin & eyes; irritation solids; mins but does explosive sweet, acrid eyes, nose, throat; tremor, Fire: 1/2 mile not ignite mixtures odor convulsions, twitching; effects of readily w/ air contact or inhalation may be delayed

Select Flam- Explo- How to Health Risks Health Risks ed Evacuation First aid* mable? sive? Identify Short Run Long Run UN # Phosphoric No, but May Thick, Burns to skin & eyes; coughing & Lung & eye Go uphill No mouth to mouth; Acid heat may ignite colorless, wheezing damage; dermatitis Isolate: 150 feet for do not induce cause combustib odorless, liquids & 75 feet for vomiting; flush skin decompos les crystalline solid & eyes w/ running ing & solid Fire: ½ mile water > 20 mins; wash toxic skin w/ soap & water fumes Propylene 1077 Yes, Forms Colorless gas Dizziness or asphyxiation; vapors May damage the Stay upwind Burns, cold water; 1075 extremely explosive with a slight may be irritating if inhaled; burns, liver & nervous Isolate: 330 feet in case of contact w/ mixtures odor, or a severe injury &/or frostbite; death system; may affect Spill: ½ mile liquefied gas, thaw w/ air liquid under may result from lack of oxygen the heart causing Fire: 1 mile frosted parts w/ pressure an irregular heart lukewarm water beat Sodium 1495 Accele- Yes, White, Inhalation, ingestion or contact May damage the Go uphill Flush skin or eyes w/ chlorate 2428 rates Decom- crystalline (skin, eyes) w/ vapors or substance kidneys Isolate: 150 feet for running water for > (solu- burning poses (sand-like) may cause severe injury, burns or liquids & 75 feet for mins tion) when explosive- solid death; fire may produce irritating, solids involved ly when corrosive &/or toxic gases; high Spill: 330 feet in a fire; heated or levels can interfere with the ability Fire: 1/2 mile may ignite involved of the blood to carry oxygen combus- in a fire; causing headaches, fatigue, tibles may react dizziness, & a blue color of the explosivel skin & lips y w/ fix hydrocarb ons (fuels) Sodium No, but Yes; may Colorless to Inhalation, ingestion, or skin Health effects can Isolate: 150 feet for Flush skin & eyes w/ hydroxide contact w/ ignite white, odorless contact may cause severe injury or last for months or liquids & 75 feet for running water > 20 (lye) metals combustib solid (flakes, death; may cause severe burns to years; very high solids mins; wash skin w/ may les; water beads, granular skin & eyes; effects of contact may exposure may Fire: ½ mile soap & water evolve reactive form be delayed; temporary loss of hair; cause lung damage flamm. bleeding, vomiting, diarrhea, fall in Hydro- blood pressure gen

Select Flam- Explo- How to Health Risks Health Risks ed Evacuation First aid* mable? sive? Identify Short Run Long Run UN # Styrene 2055 Yes, ver y Vapors Colorless to Burns skin & eyes; dizziness or Central nervous Go uphill; Flush skin or eyes w/ monomer, may form yellow, oily suffocation; irritation eyes, nose, system & liver Isolate: 150 feet running water for > 20 stabilized explosive liquid w/ a respiratory system; headache, damage; Spill: 1000 feet mins; wash skin w/ mixtures sweet, floral weakness, exhaustion, confusion, reproductive Fire: 1/2 mile soap & water w/ air; odor; most drowsiness, unsteady gait; hazards containers vapors are defatting of skin; possible liver may heavier than injury; reproductive effects explode air when heated Sulfur, molten 2448 Yes, very; Yes, very Opaque Burns to skin & eyes; irritate nose, Asthma; dermatitis; Isolate: 75 feet Flush skin & eyes w/ may yellow, throat, & lungs eye damage Spill: 330 feet running water > 20 reignite orange, or tan Fire: ½ mile mins; wash w/ soap & after liquid at water extin- elevated guished temperatures; characteristic pungent odor Sulfuric acid Burns, bu t Yes; water Colorless to Inhalation, ingestion, or skin Cancer; permanent Isolate 150 feet for No mouth to mouth; (battery acid) does not reactive dark-brown contact may cause severe injury or damage to lungs & liquids & 75 feet for do not induce ignite oily, odorless death; burns to skin & eyes; teeth solids vomiting; give large liquid pulmonary edema; bronchitis Fire: ½ mile amounts of water; flush skin & eyes w/ running water > 20 mins; wash skin w/ soap & water Vinyl Chloride 1 086 Yes, ver y; Yes; very Colorless gas Dizziness; Asphyxiation; Liver, brain, & Go uphill Skin: warm water; eye large fires explosive or liquid w/ a burns/frostbite; weakness; lung cancer; lung Isolate: 330 feet contact, flush > 15 are at greater pleasant odor abdominal pain; gastrointestinal damage; Spill: ½ mile mins; practically 3% at high bleeding scleroderma; Fire: 1 mile burns, cold, water inextingui concentrations reproductive frostbite, warm water shable hazard

Chemtrec: 800-424-9300 New Jersey Dep. Hotline: 1-877-WARN-DEP

Avoid contaminating ones food & drink

IMPOR TANT INFORMATION

TELEPHONE NUMBERS EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE: 9-1-1

If your a rea does not have 9-1-1 service, write down the local EMS number here: ______

If an accident involvin g hazardous materials occurs, you will be notified by the au th orities as to w hat steps to take. You may hear a siren, be called by telephone, or emergency personnel may d rive by and give instru ctions over a loudspeaker. Officials co uld even come to your door. If you hear a warning signal, you should go i ndoors and listen to a local Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) station for emergency instructions from county or state officials. As k your lo cal office of eme rgency manageme nt or Red Cross chapter w hich stations carry official messages in your co mmunity. Write them down here: EBS stations tha t serve my area: Station call letters Freq uency AM/FM ______

It is also important to write down the number of the Poison Control Center that s erv es you r area: Poison Control Center:______

Other important numbers: Local office of emergency management:______Local Red Cross chapter:______

Source: Red Cross

APPENDIX I P. 1

APPENDIX II

GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FINDINGS

A single rail Hazmat incident has the potential to kill hundreds of thousands and yet there is little quality training of those who would be affected most – rail workers, emergency responders, and citizens in “rail communities.”

TRAINING

Rail workers are poorly trained in recognizing and responding to Hazmats. Railroad training focuses on rules and operations, not preparedness and first on the scene response.

The typical emergency responders are poorly trained in responding to Hazmat incidents, especially involving rail, and usually have little knowledge of the rail infrastructure in their communities or the chemicals moving through by rail.

Citizens in “rail communities” generally know little about the Hazmats moving through their towns and do not know what to do should there be an emergency and rail Hazmats often run through densely populated areas.

There are few forums that bring together rail workers, emergency responders, and citizens to learn about and plan for rail Hazmat incidents. There are very few joint training exercises.

Many communities are without emergency action plans for rail emergencies.

HAZMAT

Every day tank cars filled with hazardous materials travel by homes, schools, and hospitals, and through the middle of cities and along highways.

APPENDIX II P. 1

SECURITY

There is insufficient security associated with cars, track, yards, and basic infrastructure. They are not only poorly protected from possi ble terrorists, but often in poor maintenance making them more vulnerable to accidents.

Rail Hazmat cars are extremely vulnerable when they sit for hours and even days and weeks, unattended and unsecured, along track sidings and in yards.

RAD SHIPMENTS

Over the next decade the amount of radioactive waste to be transported by rail will grow substantially, and there must be training of affected individuals and development of emergency action plans along affected train routes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TRAINING!

For Workers

• There is a critical need for Hazmat training – awareness, preparedness, prevention, and emergency response – for rail workers and emergency responders. There is a need for joint exercises. Those workers that would be directly affected need to be an integral part of team briefings. A well-trained and knowledgeable workforce is the first line of defense to keep a minor incident from becoming a major hazardous materials incident.

For Subcontractors

• Require all railroad subcontractors and their employees be subject to background checks and receive standardized training.

For Emergency Responders Community Residents

• There is a need for awareness training for residents of rail communities – not just about Hazmats, but also about the roles of evacuation, shelter-in-place, the importance of wind direction and elevation.

• Training needs to include specific knowledge of what Hazmats are being transported through ones community. Communities – both those responsible in an emergency and the general public – should be regularly informed by the rail roads what hazardous materials are moving by rail through their communities.

APPENDIX II P. 2

• Communities need to develop and implement emergency action plans. There needs to be training on the plans so everyone knows what to do if there is an emergency.

For Health Care Professionals

• There needs to be specialized training for health care professionals, who will be “first receivers” in the event of an emergency.

For Dispatchers

• Communities need to develop and implement emergency action plans. There needs to be TRAINING on the plans so everyone knows what to do if there is an emergency.

For Improved Safety, Health, and Security

• The railroads need to better secure and upgrade their infrastructure and cars against the threats of Hazmat incidents, whether accidental or pre-meditated.

• The railroads need to adopt operating procedures to enhance the safety and health of everyone in the event of a Hazmat incident.

APPENDIX II P. 3

APPENDIX III

SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Organized by Party Responsible for Acting on the Recommendations

FINDINS G

GENERAL

• Railroads in the United States transport more than 1.8 million shipments of hazardous materials every year, including 100,000 tank cars with toxic materials such as chlorine, anhydrous ammonia, cyanide compounds, flammable liquids, and pesticides. This amounts to one million tons of hazardous material being transported across the nation every day.

TAR INING

• Training rail workers, emergency responders, and community residents can save lives and health.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

• Rail Hazmat incidents are, on average, significantly more costly than Hazmat incidents from any other mode. Air Hazmat incidents in 2005 were only about $500 each; water incidents averaged $24,500, and highway $73,000. Rail incident averaged $142,000 each.

In Bexar County, Texas, in 2004 alone, there were 25 rail accidents, five fatalities, and almost 50 injuries. Derailments and related deaths generated more than a dozen law suits. One was settled for $9 million. In 2001 a CSX freight train carrying tankers of flammable and hazardous chemicals partially derailed in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore. Beyond the economic losses from stalled city activities, the city estimated the clean-up cost at approximately $12 million.

• Hazardous substance emergencies occur most often in or near areas that are more densely populated and at times when residents are most likely to be at home. This is more true in the case of rail incidents than non-rail incidents.

SECURITY

“I cannot imagine an easier way for al-Qaeda to fulfill its goal than to take out a (chlorine-filled) tank car.” (Fred Millar, Homeland Security expert and former toxics director, Friends of the Earth)

APPENDIX III P. 1

• An accident or act of terrorism, in a densely populated area, involving just one 90-ton rail car of chlorine could create a toxic cloud 40 miles long and 10 miles wide and could kill as ma ny as 100,000 people in 30 minutes.

RAD SHIPMENTS

• The potential impact, in health and damage to the economy, from an accident or act of sabotage involving spent nuclear fuel and/or highly contaminated radioactive waste is huge. The cost of a major rail accident, according to DOE in 1985 could be $620 million, or $1.125 billion in 2005 dollars, in a rural area and $2 billion, or $3.6 billion in 2005 dollars, in an urban area with ap proximately 5 to 30 latent cancer fatalities. The State of Nevada estimated that there could be hundreds of cancer deaths and the cost would be tens of billions of dollars – not including business losses and decreased property values.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For Rail Carriers

Training:

• Achieve buy-in for Hazmat and rail security training by all class I, short-line, and passenger railroads. Require rail carriers to develop a rail worker training program and to train all of their rail workers within one year.

• Assure training in the proper use and selection of proper gloves, boots, hearing protection, respiratory protection, chemical protective equipment, etc.

• Ensure that employees who work with or around hazardous substances undergo continuous job safety training (e.g., hazardous materials training) and have access to appropriate personal protective equipment.

• Expand peer training programs across the country. Draw on the experience and expertise of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program.

• Many of the railroads have consolidated training centers – like the center CSX opened in Atlanta in December 2004. There are locomotive simulators and classroom learning in a hands-on railroad operating environment. There should also be simulators and hands-on learning related to Hazmat and security training.

• Provide Hazmat training for all rail workers, including hands-on and small-group activities when possible.

• Provide live situational training exercises regarding various emergency scenarios, including terrorist attacks, natura l disasters, and hazardous material explosions.

APPENDIX III P. 2

• Provide rail workers with notification and training on railroad security plans, including a railroad carrier's threat level identification system, employee notification when such levels change, employee roles and responsibilities regarding the security plan, and lines of communication and coordination in the event of an emergency.

• Railroads should adopt and use the tested and acclaimed curriculum of the Rail Workers Hazardous Materials Training Program – National Labor College and specially-trained peer instructors broadly across the country.

• Teach rail workers how to get and read information on specific hazardous materials: material safety data sheets, ERG, NIOSH Pocket Guide.

• Those who may be at a rail Hazmat incident need to know how to properly read placards and labels to identify chemicals.

• Train personnel and passengers to have a role in security by reporting suspicious behavior, identifying suspicious articles (especially unattended packages and luggage), and improving readiness for evacuation and emergency actions.

• Require all railroad subcontractors and their employees to be subject to background checks and to receive standardized training.

Hazmat Safety and Operations:

• Protect against the mixing of incompatible products.

• Do away with dark territory.

• Do not let trains leave without proper paperwork.

• Have Hazmat teams at all major rail yards

• Have Material Safety Data Sheets readily available.

• Have more rigorous inspections of nuclear waste and Hazmats.

• Improve storage and labeling of chemicals in the yards. Apply NFPA (fire) labels to flammable/combustible storage cabinets and storage areas.

• Keep as much storage of Hazmat cars as possible out of cities.

• Route hazardous materials away from densely populated areas where feasible.

• More than half of the 60,000 rail tank cars used to transport hazardous materials are not built according to current standards and are susceptible to rupture in the case of an accident. They must be upgraded.

APPENDIX III P. 3

• The railroads should be required to regularly inform officials of the 25 main Hazmats going through or adjacent to their communities.

• Provide preventive maintenance of equipment and vehicles.

• Install windsocks.

Security:

• Positive identification of employees, vendors, contractors, etc.

• Develop a real time tracking system for the most dangerous toxic rail cars.

• Develop better protection for locomotive occupants, by improving locomotive crashworthiness, “hardening” locomotives against unauthorized entry, and by providing emergency escape equipment and training.

• Devise buffer zone protection plans to secure the most perilous rail sites.

• Eliminate remote control assignments in the handling of Hazmats.

• Have binoculars available to crews to read placards.

• Have bladders in tank cars (Nascar fuel cells rarely rupture).

• Have more track and car inspections.

• Hire more railroad police.

• Improve lighting in yards.

• Improve operations by monitoring for signal tampering; requiring crews and dispatchers to verify communications for train movements and dispatches; and locking locomotive doors to prevent hijackings.

• Improve track maintenance.

• Increase surveillance of freight equipment, through training of staff on observation and the installation of video surveillance equipment.

• Increase surveillance of freight equipment, through training of staff on observation and the installation of video surveillance equipment.

• Inspect overheads and bridges daily.

• Install emergency alarms and wind socks in yards to warn workers.

• Install signage in yards to increase awareness about danger.

APPENDIX III P. 4

• Install blast resistant trash containers.

• Install brake valve keys, used on Germany railroads, that lock the train’s brake valve and are in the engineers’ possession at all times.

• Install close-circuit television.

• Integrate protective housings, valves and fittings into hazardous transport infrastructure to prevent tampering and facilitate emergency response.

• Keep hazardous loads in secure yards until ready to go on the road.

• Lock gates.

• Move dangerous car locations more often.

• Put barriers up around stationary propane tank.

• Repair gaps in fencing.

• Secure the information infrastructure that terrorists could use to enhance attacks or cause systemic shutdowns.

• There needs to be better communication between and among railroads and federal agencies.

• There needs to be more and improved communication between railroads and their employees

• Use rail fans for information.

• Work toward better security of rail yards and rolling stock. Citizens can work toward fenced rail yards in their communities. For example, the Roseville rail yard of Sacramento, the largest rail yard west of the Mississippi River, has no fence line to keep people out.

For Emergency Responders and Community Action

Training:

• Be sure emergency response personnel know access points to rail yards and track. Those who may be at a rail Hazmat incident need to know how to properly read placards and labels to identify chemicals.

• CSX has guides and videos on emergency response to rail incidents that, upon request, are available to emergency response programs in the states where CSX operations. CSX and all other railroads with such materials should be proactive

APPENDIX III P. 5

and provide them to every emergency response group that might respond to a rail incident.

• Develop rigorous cross-training for rail workers and emergency response personnel within a community.

• Provide awareness training for children in the schools.

• Provide awareness training for members of community.

• Provide Hazmat training for all emergency dispatchers and rail dispatchers.

• Provide Hazmat training for all emergency responders, including hands-on and small-group activities when possible.

• Provide live situational training exercises regarding various emergency scenarios, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and hazardous material explosions.

• Teach emergency responders and citizens how to get and read information on specific hazardous materials: material safety data sheets, ERG, NIOSH Pocket Guide.

• The railroads should work together to participate in “hands-on” training with railroad officials and rail employees on specific response strategies and techniques for train derailments and hazardous materials releases.

• Train rail passengers to have a role in security by reporting suspicious behavior, identifying suspicious articles (especially unattended packages and luggage), and improving readiness for evacuation and emergency actions.

• There needs to be active involvement of rail, emergency response, and community in emergency action plans and drills.

Other for Emergency Responders:

• Emergency response personnel need to become familiar with rail yards and the lay of railway lines and how to access track in an emergency.

• Assure that community emergency response teams have adequate air supplies.

• Increase the number of Hazmat teams in communities and have Hazmat equipment on all emergency vehicles.

• Initial entry teams may need to carry tools; e.g., bolt cutters, to gain forced entry to residences due to high security fences, locked gates, etc.

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• Mutual Aid Agreements should be reviewed and updated. Responding agencies need to have confidence in each others abilities and training for these agreements to work.

• Personnel at the operations level should ensure that appropriate community notification occurs before any action is initiated that may result in community concerns.

• Response procedures should be reviewed to ensure that transport does not unnecessarily expose response personnel, equipment, and transport vehicles to contamination from victims.

• There needs to access for emergency responders to railroad radio frequencies.

• There needs to be better communication among railroad personnel (officials and workers) and local emergency agencies such as fire, EMS, and police.

Community Action and Awareness:

• 911 centers should develop a checklist/standard operating procedures that dispatchers could use to assist residents on how to shelter in place.

• 911 dispatchers should have the ability to contact the railroad’s response center hot line to obtain a list of materials carried on a specific shipment.

• Assemble a committee of citizens and associated-organizations to assert the right- to-know about existing risks, especially due to rail car storage and Hazmats moving through ones community. Engage public officials in a discussion of what is “acceptable risk.”

• Be sure that emergency action plans cover the range of Hazmat incidents --from minor spills to major disaster.

• Cities should coordinate with rail companies to assess lines throughout the area, to identify areas where blockages may occur in an area during a derailment that can prevent responders and residents to enter and egress.

• Conduct a “root cause analysis” whenever a rail Hazmat incident occurs and incorporate knowledge gained into training programs.

• Encourage chemical plants to find substitutes for the most toxic substances.

• Ensure that emergency medical service and hospital emergency department staffs have the necessary guidance to plan for, and improve their ability to respond to, incidents that involve human exposure to hazardous materials.

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• EPA offers Emergency Response Reviews, which are entirely voluntary, but should be highly recommended for all communities, especially those near railroad tracks and yards. These reviews are designed to:

¾ “Review with a local community and state officials the response procedures and outcomes to a specific chemical accident affecting that community; ¾ Share information about chemical response safety practices; ¾ Develop potential recommendations and lessons learned to more effectively respond to an accidental release in the future; ¾ Build cooperation among local, state, and federal government agencies.”

• Identify key points of contacts among key organizations.

• Involve local police.

• Put information on the NLC Rail Workers Program web site describing models for rail-community partnerships.

• Residents need to be involved in the development of emergency action plans in their communities and then be educated, based on those plans, on how to stay informed and what to do in the event of an emergency.

• Residents should be informed about the chemicals stored, transported, manufactured in the community.

• Develop emergency response plans before hazardous substances events occur, including a community-based public education campaign detailing proper evacuation and shelter-in-place plans, decontamination procedures, deploying public warning systems (e.g., sirens), practice drills, and public shelters.

• Review the company’s NAR [non-accident release} history to identify any specific causes that contribute to an incident and place emphasis on these causes in the training program.

• Use the media to educate and provide information.

• Work for having less vulnerable tank cars in use. Citizens could lobby for acceleration of on-going FRA research.

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For Government

Training:

• De v elop minimum criteria for effective Hazmat training – both in content and delivery. Establish standard protocols for training that a rail corporation must provide.

• Make issues related to Hazmat and security training a more visible part of the work of relevant federal agencies, like NTSB.

• Pass legislation to upgrade training for rail workers, emergency response personnel, and the community, such as the “Rail Transit Safety and Security Act of 2005,” which was introduced by Congressman Stephen Lynch (D-MA) to overhaul training for rail workers, expand safety and communications systems, and improve emergency preparedness of America’s rail networks and personnel.

• Penalize rail corporations who have failed to adequately train workers in security/terrorism prevention, inspections of infrastructure, Hazmat (including nuclear waste), and OSHA’s Emergency Action Plans or Emergency Response Plans.

• Provide FEMA training to those likely to be at the scene of a rail emergency.

• Require the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish comprehensive guidelines for a rail worker emergency training program. The guidelines must address several key areas, including critical infrastructure and equipment security inspection, hazardous material storage, transport, and monitoring, unauthorized rail yard access, securing locomotive cabs, personal protective equipment, and evacuation procedures. (Proposed Rail Worker Emergency Training Act of 2005)

Action:

• Collaborate with the Department of Defense to ensure the viability of Strategic Rail Corridor Network-designated rail lines that are capable of meeting unique DoD requirements, such as the ability to handle heavy, high or wide loads.

• Enforce Superfund and state clean-up for designated rail yards.

• Have random inspections of critical areas.

• Improve and enhance passenger screening at rail passenger stations.

• Require the Secretary of Homeland Security to consult with the Secretary of Transportation. (Proposed Rail Worker Emergency Training Act of 2005)

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• The DOT rail hazmat regulation allows rail Hazmat cars to sit no longer than 48 hours, but there are several loopholes in the regulation which need to be closed; i.e., a chemical company can lease a siding from a railroad and leave Hazmat cars there indefinitely, even loading and unloading from them. There are “rolling leases,” in which chemical companies lease only the stretch of track directly under the car, so the lease moves when the car moves.

• The Federal Railroad Administration in a rail safety action plan should put emphasis on ensuring that emergency responders have timely access to hazardous materials information.

• There needs to be better communication between and among railroads and federal agencies.

• Use Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance data or other federal, state, and local databases to determine where most releases occur.

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