Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 23, November, 1977 , Page 28648 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Other Developments among African Nationalists inside Rhodesia

At a press conference on Sept. 2 Mr Smith did not reject the proposals out of hand but was highly critical of many of their features.

The plan appeared to him to be “a very cunning scheme” to put the Patriotic Front in power; it was, he said, a “crazy suggestion” that the “terrorists” fighting against his Government should form the basis of the future security forces; to surrender power to some such organization as a United Nations peace-keeping force during the transition was to him “an almost insane suggestion”; and he went on: “It seems to me almost a crazy suggestion to ask a Government and people to dissolve themselves, to surrender, without even knowing what their replacement is going to be.” In his view the whole plan was “not only ill-conceived, it was rushed”. He added, however, that after the proposals had been analysed by a subcommittee, “we will give it [the analysis] serious consideration and a careful and considered reply to the proposals”.

Mr Mark Partridge, then Rhodesia's Minister of Defence, said on Sept. 8 that neither he nor his Government would accept the disbandment of the Rhodesian Army or the incorporation into it of “terrorists”.

Mr , accompanied by Mr David Smith (the Rhodesian Deputy Prime Minister), held talks in Pretoria on Sept. 12 with Mr Vorster and Mr R. F. Botha, the talks also being attended by two other South African ministers Mr Chris Heunis (Economic Affairs) and Mr P. W. Botha (Defence).

It was reported afterwards that Mr Vorster had expressed concern that any outright Rhodesian dismissal of the Anglo-American proposals would entail trade and oil sanctions imposed against South Africa by the United Nations once the latter had endorsed the proposals. (Mr Heunis had already, on Sept. 9, outlined the South African Government's strategy in the event of such sanctions, disclosing that orders had been given to stockpile strategic and other imported material, including oil. According to a South African expert, oil produced from coal in South Africa would provide only about 30 per cent of the country's requirements.)

Mr R. F. Botha said on Sept. 19 that his Government had committed itself to the effort to obtain an internationally acceptable solution in Rhodesia, but that the proposed security arrangements were incapable of creating the necessary conditions for a ceasefire in Rhodesia. He also issued a warning against the threats of tightening sanctions against Rhodesia or extending them to South Africa, as these would be “counter-productive”, and he added: “There is a point beyond which we cannot be pushed, and that point has just now been reached.” Of South Africa's views on majority rule for Rhodesia he said: “On the basis of Mr Smith's own acceptance of majority rule, South Africa would wish to see clearly who commands that majority support. If Mr Nkomo can win it openly and fairly, then he wins, and it would be foolish of South Africa to turn against a man who has proved he commands the majority support.”

On Sept. 28 Mr Smith said in the House of Assembly that the Anglo-American terms would have to be put to a referendum of the White electorate before they could be accepted, and that rejection by the White voters would negate the settlement, just as would disagreement among the African nationalist parties.

Among African and Commonwealth leaders the proposals had a varied reception.

Mr , secretary-general of the African People's Organization (ZAPU, led by Mr Nkomo), said in Lusaka on Sept. 2 that the Patriotic Front rejected the Anglo-American proposals and would continue its guerrilla warfare until Mr Smith “surrendered to the people of Zimbabwe”. He objected in particular to the wide powers to be given to the Resident Commissioner and to the proposed retention of units of the Rhodesian Army.

President Nyerere welcomed the Anglo-American plan on Sept. 1, saying: “The Western powers have now firmly indicated that they are prepared to use their influence to bring about the transfer of power to the majority of people in southern Africa.” He added, however, “We have to be on our guard… that the current initiatives do not result in depriving the people of southern Africa of the victory for which so many of their countrymen and women have died.”

Mr Shridath S. Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, strongly supported the proposals in a statement issued on Sept. 2, when he urged Commonwealth Governments to assist the process of reaching a peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe.

President Kaunda of , however, said on Sept. 5 during a visit to his country by Lieut.- General Olusegun Obasanjo, the Nigerian head of state, that the proposals were based on the “glaringly false” premise that Mr Smith would voluntarily surrender power-which made the plan “a non-starter”. Lieut.-General Obasanjo, on the other hand, said that he believed in the sincerity of Britain and the United States, that the plan should be given “a fair chance”, even though the guerrillas in Rhodesia should “not relent in their efforts until Mr Smith and his conspirators are removed” and that there should be no failure to recognize the guerrillas as “a basic nucleus in the new military force of Zimbabwe”.

At the end of a meeting between Lieut.-General Obasanjo and President Mobutu of Zaïre in Kinshasa on Sept. 7, the two leaders declared in a joint statement that the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia should be supported “provided it is correctly enforced without delaying manoeuvres or rearguard tricks”.

Bishop Muzorewa said at a meeting of White Rhodesian farmers on Sept. 6 that he welcomed the Anglo-American proposals and that it would be “dangerous” for any Black leader to negotiate directly with Mr Smith on achieving an “internal” settlement. At the end of a four-day meeting of Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo in Maputo (Mozambique) the two Patriotic Front leaders declared in a joint statement on Sept. 14 that the Anglo-American proposals could form the basis for “further negotiations” although the “absolute powers” proposed for the British Resident Commissioner were not acceptable.

Mr Nkomo also objected to the proposed UN peace-keeping force and demanded the disbandment of the entire existing Rhodesian security forces, including the police, but he also said. “We are prepared to absorb into our forces some elements from the security forces.”

Mr Mugabe was reported to have sent a copy of the Patriotic Front's “counter-proposals” to Mr Stephen Miles, the British high commissioner in Zambia.

The “front-line” Presidents announced after a further meeting (in Maputo), attended by all of them except President Neto of Angola, on Sept. 22–23 that in their view the Anglo-American American proposals formed “a sufficient basis for further negotiations between the parties concerned”, although President Nyerere added that they contained “many negative features” and left “many questions unanswered”.

Following the defection of several leading members of Bishop Muzorewa's UANC[see page 28553], the Bishop announced on Aug. 24 that he had dissolved his entire central committee and national executive.

This announcement was followed by the resignation and withdrawal from politics of Dr Gordon Chavunduka, the organization's former secretary-general, who stated that the Bishop had no powers to dissolve anything.

At a meeting held in Que Que on Sept. 10 and attended by over 5,000 people the Bishop announced new organs of the U.N. and the appointment of Mr James Chikerema as first vice- president with responsibility for foreign affairs-which was approved by acclamation.

Mr Chikerema, a former leader of Mr Nkomo's ZAPU and later leader of the Frolizi group[see page 24963], returned to Rhodesia on Sept. 18 after 13 years of self-imposed exile since being released from detention in 1963[see 19295 A].

Upon his return Mr Chikerema declared on Sept. 19 that he was in favour of two of Mr Smith's moat crucial demands in connexion with a settlement-that the existing armed forces should remain intact and that the White minority should be given a parliamentary “blocking mechanism” under majority rule as a safeguard against “retrogressive legislation”. He stated that he wished to help settle the country's problems peacefully, and he rejected “outside interference” by the “front-line” states and also any alliance with the Rev. . At the same time he asserted. The armed struggle is being fought for a genuine cause, and until that cause is settled the struggle will go on.” He claimed that this struggle was supported by “99 per cent of the people of this country”.

Bishop Muzorewa, however, dissociated himself from these remarks on Sept. 21 when he said that Mr Chikerema's statement reflected only his own views. An apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole was made by President Banda of Malawi when the two Rhodesian African leaders visited that country on Sept. 13–14.

Mr Sithole was meanwhile making efforts to broaden the basis of his wing of the ANC.

On Aug. 26 Mr Sithole announced the formation of a new political movement called “Unity” which, he stated, was aimed at “the transfer of power from the White minority to the Black majority” and which would have links with the conservative ZUPO, led by Chiefs Chirau and Ndiweni [see above].

In a statement reported on Sept. 1 he claimed that the ZANU guerrillas (operating from Mozambique) would respond to his leadership and that he would be able to command that support as part of a settlement under UN Security Council supervision backed by a UN peace- keeping force.

At a meeting of about 100 Whites in Salisbury on Sept. 5 Mr Sithole made it clear that he was committed to a negotiated internationally recognised settlement as envisaged in the Anglo- American proposals and that he would not co-operate with Mr Smith in an “internal” settlement. With regard to the continued presence of Whites in an independent Zimbabwe he said that they would have an important role to play in maintaining the economy and infrastructure of the country, but that this aim could only be achieved by acceptance of the Anglo-American proposals, including that of forming a nationalist army based on guerrilla forces.

On Sept. 7 Mr Sithole said that he had not yet come to a final conclusion on the proposals but that he accepted “the principle of „one man, one vote‟, for which many of our people have died”.

At a “constitutional consultative conference” organized by him and attended by Black and White representatives of various groups (but boycotted by all other nationalist movements), Mr Sithole welcomed the Anglo-American proposals as holding out the prospect of “peace for our country”- whereas rejection, he sald, would mean “a decision to continue the war”-and reiterated that the people were entitled to unity, nationhood and a peaceful settlement in a country which was not just for Whites or for Blacks but “for human beings”. The conference decided to call for a number of changes in the proposals to be embodied in a document.

During August and September 1977 the war between African nationalist gueriillas and Rhodesian security forces intensified further and an increasing number of incidents occurred on Rhodesia's borders with Zambia and Botswana.

According to estimates by the Rhodesian security forces, reported on Sept. 17, some 3,000 “terrorists” loyal to Mr Mugabe had moved deep into eastern Rhodesia, intimidating the local population and killing up to four Black civilians a day, while about 600 “terrorists” with allegiance to Mr Nkomo were operating in the western half of the country. Mr Nkomo was believed to have an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 trained men and between 10,000 and 12,000 others still under training. Rhodesian sources gave the number of guerrillas who had died between December 1972 and Sept. 6, 1977, as 3,291, and that of guerrillas killed in 1977 (until Sept. 27) as 1,161 (147 of them in September alone). In addition some 2,000 civilians (including only about 100 Whites) had also lost their lives, as well as over 400 members of the security forces[For earlier figures to June 1977, see page 28551].

Mr A. J. Smith, the Secretary for Education, stated on Aug. 22 that since January 1977 a total of 356 primary schools and 11 secondary schools had been closed, 55,893 African primary school children and 2,865 secondary pupils had lost their places, and nearly 2,000 Black teachers had lost their jobs and 20 teachers their lives as a result of “terrorist” activities; furthermore, 610 school children and nine teachers had been abducted.

In Zambia a four-day blackout and curfew was imposed on Lusaka, Chilanga, Kafue and Livingstone on Sept. 3 after the Zambian Government had, on Aug. 31, accused Rhodesia of having dropped several bombs on the border town of Feira (on the Zambezi River), and firing had occurred on both sides of Zambia's border with Rhodesia; on Sept. 7 the Zambian authorities extended this blackout and curfew indefinitely.

On Sept. 11 President Kaunda alleged that Rhodesia had used napalm bombs in attacks against Zambia and added that, although such bombs were also being made in Zambia, he did not want to order his Army to hit back and “kill hundreds of people”. In Rhodesia, however, Combined Operations Headquarters categorically denied on Sept. 12 that napalm had been used by Rhodesia's forces.

In Botswana, the newly constituted Defence Force [see 28322 A] increasingly replaced the paramilitary Mobile Police Unit and was equipped, trained and given an infrastructure at an estimated cost of 15,000,000 pulas (or almost £11,000,000).

On Sept. 6 it was announced in Salisbury that guerrillas “operating from Botswana” had abducted 45 labourers from a ranch inside Rhodesia, while in Botswana it was claimed that Rhodesian aircraft had “indiscriminately” dropped bombs and fired machine-guns over Botswana territory this claim being, however, denied in Salisbury.

In a report compiled by the (Roman) Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia and published by the Catholic Institute for International Relations in London on Sept. 21 under the title Rhodesia: the Propaganda War [for earlier report see page 28203]the Rhodesian Army was accused of torturing Black civilians and using brutal methods to force tribesmen into “protected villages”.

In the report documented examples were given of extreme brutality, cases were cited of Roman Catholic priests and nuns being beaten during questioning, and claims were made that more than 500,000 people had been forced to move into protected villages, where space was “limited” and sanitation “inadequate”.

Many details given in the report were denied by a spokesman for the Rhodesian Ministry of Internal Affairs who was, on Sept. 22, quoted as saying that there were only about 260,000 people in protected villages and that tribespeople had asked to be moved into such villages in order to be shielded from terrorist intimidation.

Four members of the Commission for Justice and Peace had earlier been arrested, as announced on Sept. 4, on charges under the Law and Order (Amendment) Act and the Official Secrets Act.

They were Mr John Deary (the commission's chairman) Brother Joseph Dupuis (a Canadian missionary and organizing secretary of the Commission), Sister Janice Ann McLaughlin (a US national and press secretary) and the (West German) Rev. Dieter Bernd Scholz (vice-chairman of thc Commission), all of whom, except Sister McLaughlin. had been released on bail pending their trial. The Rev. D. B. Scholz had been served with a deportation order in August 1977, and on Sept. 17 he was again detained because he had, it was alleged, induced another person to destroy potentially incriminating documents. Sister McLaughlin was, accused of having prepared five “fact paper” for the Commission and on Sept. 13 she said in court, during an unsuccessful application for bail, that she supported the African “freedom fighters”. On Sept. 22 she was, before any trial had begun, declared a prohibited immigrant and deported to Johannesburg (South Africa), from where she was flown to New York.

The Rhodesian authorities also deported several other persons declared “undesirable”.

These included Sister Teresa Corby, an Irish Roman Catholic nun and mission doctor, expelled on Sept. 20, and the Rev. Joseph Pascal Slevin, an Irish Roman Catholic priest at the same mission station as Sister Corby, reported on Sept. 30 to have been ordered to leave the country where he had been a missionary for 15 years.

Under an amendment of Oct. 7, 1977, to the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations, Rhodesian publications (though not foreign correspondents) were required not to report on deportees without official permission.

Earlier in September 1977 the Catholic Institute for International Relations had published another report entitled From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe.

Its author, Mr Roger Riddell, claimed inter alia that the Rhodesian state reflected and promoted the interests of White farmers, local industrialists, White shopkeepers and financial organisations; that there were 4,000,000 acres of unused land in the “European” area of Rhodesia[see map on page 25225], that under newly introduced vagrancy laws the movement of labour from the Black reserves was strictly controlled, and that it was expected that during 1977 more than 30,000 Black Rhodesians would be “exported” to work in South African mines.

Mr Ian Smith declared on Sept. 18 that his Government had put certain proposals to Dr Owen for changes in the settlement proposals. He also disclosed that his Government had, after discussing the “option of an internal settlement” (with “moderate” Africans), decided by consensus that this option should be deferred and that it would be right “to see first if the Anglo-American proposals are going to make headway or not”. In an interview broadcast in London on Sept. 25 Mr Smith said that the application of the principle of “one man, one vote” would be acceptable only if the Whites were given a “blocking mechanism” and that nationalist guerrillas would be admitted to his Army-under his commanders-only after being “weil screened”.

It was disclosed on Oct. 1 that Mr Smith had, together with Mr Van der Byl and Mr Jack Gaylard, the Rhodesian Cabinet Secretary, visited Lusaka on Sept. 25 for talks with President Kaunda-apparently on an initiative by Mr Roland W. (“Tiny”) Rowland, the chief executive of Lonrho (which had extensive business interests in both Rhodesia and Zambia[see also page 27685]) and without any other government being notified about this meeting.

According to a Zambian Government statement on Oct. 1 the meeting had achieved “nothing of significance”, and a Zambian Government spokesman said on Oct. 2 that the Rhodesians had merely “set out their attitude towards the Anglo-American settlement plan” and explained why they objected to certain aspects of it. The Rhodesian Government, on the other hand, claimed that the visit had been made at the invitation of Zambia.

On Sept. 28 Mr Smith was reported to have invited Dr Owen to send Lord Carver to Salisbury, together with a UN special representative (when appointed), to discuss military aspects of the settlement proposals-though this invitation was not meant to imply Rhodesian acceptance of the proposals. However, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated on Oct. 3 that it was “inappropriate at this time” for Lord Carver to go to Rhodesia.

Upon a request made by the British Government on Sept. 25 the UN Security Council met on Sept. 28 to consider a British draft resolution authorizing the UN Secretary-General to send a special representative to Rhodesia, as envisaged in the Anglo-American proposals.

According to the draft resolution the UN representative was to work with Lord Carver and hold talks “with all the parties concerning the military and associated arrangements… considered necessary to effect the transition to majority rule”, and to report on the results of his discussions to the Council “as soon as possible”. Under an amendment proposed by Mr Mansur Rashid Kikhia, the Libyan permanent representative at the United Nations, and accepted by Britain, the special representative was to be appointed in consultation with members of the Council.

Mr Nkomo, who was allowed to address the Council on Sept. 28, said that he would not oppose the resolution but that the Patriotic Front would demand a voice in selecting a UN representative and in defining his powers and duties. (He had previously had consultations with Mr Oleg Troyanovsky, the Soviet Union's permanent representative at the United Nations, and also with representatives of the African “front-line” states.)

Mr Troyanovaky stated that, as the Africans favoured the sending of a UN representative to Rhodesia, he would not veto it although the Soviet Union had “the most serious doubts” about the Anglo-American plan and it was not for the United Nations directly to approve or not to approve the plan as a basis for a settlement. The resolution as amended was adopted on Sept. 29 by 13 votes to none, with the Soviet Union abstaining and China not participating.

Mr Nkomo said after his return to Lusaka on Sept. 30 that he had gone to New York to urge the Security Council to broaden the scope of the UN representative's task to cover all aspects of the transition period, and not only military matters.

Dr Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, confirmed on Oct. 4 that Lieut.-General Prem Chand (India) had been appointed as the UN Special Representative in Rhodesia.

General Prem Chand had, inter alia, been General Officer Commanding the UN forces in the then Katanga (now Shaba Province in Zaïre) in 1962–63[see page 19348] and of the UN force in Cyprus from December 1969[see page 23898] to December 1976, when he retired at his own request.

In Rhodesia a government spokesman said on Oct. 5 that the General would be welcome to come to Salisbury for talks with the Government.-(Times - Daily Telegraph - Financial Times - Guardian-Cmnd. 6919 - Foreign and Commonwealth Office - International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zürcher Zeitung - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - UN Information Centre, London - Cape Times)(Prev. rep. 28549 A)

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