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The Role of the Patriotic Front in the Independence of Zimbabwe, 1976

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Z THE ROLE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN THE INDEPENDENCE OF ZIMBABWE 1976-1980 by NTHATHEDZENI NICHOLAS DANGALE Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MAGISTER ARTIUM in HISTORY in the FACULTY OF ARTS at the RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY JOHANNESBURG PROMOTER: 1996 PROFESSOR H J VAN ASWEGEN DEDICATION Dedicated to my mother, who spent every cent she had to put me through school. May God bless you. _____,,..-----D- .0G--6=■. ii. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks are due to my wife, Asnath Maano, and my two children, Urangani and Ipfi, who gave me unqualified support throughout my years of study; to Prof H J van Aswegen, who tirelessly made this mini-dissertation a success and to my friend Dr Deon Gouws, who always encouraged me to work hard. OPSOMMING (SUMMARY) Hierdie mini-verhandeling beskryf die rol van die Patriotiese Front in die bevryding van Zimbabwe tussen 1976 en 1980. Die presidente van die frontlinie-state het 'n beroep gedoen op die twee Zimbabwiese nasionalisteleiers, Joshua Nkomo van ZAPU en Robert Mugabe van ZANU, om 'n alliansie te vorm sodat hulle met 'n verenigde front die regime van Ian Smith kon pak. Hierdie alliansie het op 9 Oktober 1976 tot stand gekom, met die seen van die presidente van die frontlinie-state. Die alliansie het ekonomiese, militere en politieke steun geniet van die internasionale gemeenskap, die OAE en die frontlinie-state, en is beskou as die enigste mondstuk van die verdrukte massas Afrikane in Zimbabwe. Die leiers van die PF het, nieteenstaande verskille in ideologie, dieselfde oogmerke nagestreef. Hulle wou albei Zimbabwe bevry van die Ian Smith-regime. Dit was hierdie doel wat die twee leiers verenig het totdat bevryding in 1980 bereik is. Daar was ernstige verskille tussen hulle as leiers van die alliansie. Daar was etniese verskille. Hulle kon ook the daarin slaag om 'n verenigde militere front te vorm nie. ZANU-guerillas het gevolglik die swaarste militere las gedra. Nkomo het ook voortdurend geheime samesprekings met Ian Smith gevoer sonder Mugabe se medewete. Hierdie samesprekings het byna die PF laat skeur en het probleme veroorsaak tussen die presidente van die frontlinie-state, veral tussen presidente Kaunda en Nyerere. Dit het bewys dat die PF bloot 'n gerieflikheidshuwelik was. Tog het die PF-leierskap bymekaar gebly ten spyte van hul probleme. Hulle het daarin geslaag om by alle onderhandelinge 'n verenigde front voor te hou, van die Geneefse Konferensie regdeur tot by die Lancasterhuis-Konferensie van 1979. Nkomo is tydens al die onderhandelinge beskou as die meer gematigde politikus, wat buigsaam was in sy politieke benadering tot die aard van die stryd om die bevryding van Zimbabwe. Mugabe was militant en konsekwent in sy kragdadige politieke benadering. Mugabe het die gewapende stryd gesien as die enigste manier om Zimbabwe te bevry. Nkomo het enige benadering wat iv. vryheid aan Zimbabwe kon besorg, verwelkom, maar hy is deurentyd deur Mugabe se militantheid gelei. Die PF se strategie tydens die Lancasterhuis-Konferensie van 1979 het the gewerk me. Brittanje het besef dat, ten einde die probleem van Zimbabwe op te los, hy sy koloniale mag (wat hy sedert die UDI in 1965 verloor het) sou moes teruglcry. Dit was by die Lancasterhuis-Konferensie onder voorsitterskap van Lord Carrington waar Brittanje sy koloniale verantwoordelikheid weer aanvaar het. Dit was Brittanje wat die terme voorgeskryf het, the die PF of die regering van Biskop Muzorewa the. Lord Carrington het die ondersteuning geniet van die presidente van die frontlinie-state, wie se lande ernstige ekonomiese bankrotskap in die gesig gestaar het weens die gevolge van die guerilla-oorlog wat hulle ondersteun het. Die presidente se rol in die onderhandelinge moet the geringgeskat word the omdat dit hulle druk op die PF was wat Nkomo en Mugabe geforseer het om die Lancasterhuis-Grondwet vir die onafhanklikheid van Zimbabwe te aanvaar en te onderteken. Die sukses van die Lancasterhuis-Konferensie het die geskiedenis van Zimbabwe ingrypend verander. Zimbabwe-Rhodesie, soos hy vir 'n kort periode tydens Muzorewa se binnelandse-skikkingsregering bekend gestaan het, het op 17 April 1980 as Zimbabwe bekend geword, met Robert Gabriel Mugabe as sy eerste wettige Afrikaan-president, nadat sy party (ZANU [PFD die 1980-verkiesing gewen het. v. ABBREVIATIONS ANC African National Council AP Assembly Points/Assembly Places FLP Front-line President FLPS Front-line Presidents FLS Front-line States NDP National Democratic Party NIBMAR No Independence Before Majority African Rule OAU Organisation of African Unity PF Patriotic Front RF Rhodesian Front SA South Africa SADF South African Defence Forces SC Security Council (United Nations) UANC United African National Council UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence UN United Nations Organisation USA United States of America UK United Kingdom ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union ZANU(PF) - Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) ZAPU Zimbabwe African People's Union ZIPA Zimbabwe Independence People's Army ZIPRA Zimbabwe Independence People's Revolutionary Army ZLA Zimbabwe Liberation Army ZLC Zimbabwe Liberation Council ZR Zimbabwe-Rhodesia ZUPO Zimbabwe Union People's Organisation vi. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page OPSOMMING iv ABBREVIATIONS vi CHAPTER 1: THE TOPIC - INTRODUCTION 1.1 The importance of the topic 1.2 Aims and problem statement 1.3 Research methodology 1.4 Historiography 1.5 Structure of the study CHAPTER 2: THE BACKGROUND OF THE PF LEADERSHIP 2-1 2.1 Background 2-1 2.2 The formation of the PF ENDNOTES CHAPTER 3: THE PF AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC 3-1 INITIATIVE (THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS) 3.1 The PF and the Geneva Conference 3-1 3.2 Deliberations 3.3 The PF and Ivor Richard's diplomatic initiative 3.4 The PF and the Anglo-American diplomatic endeavour ENDNOTES CHAPTER 4: ROBERT MUGABE AND JOSHUA NKOMO - 4-1 INTERNAL DISPUTES 4.1 The PF and the internal settlement 4-1 4.2 The Malta Conference 4.3 Smith and Nkomo's secret talks ENDNOTES vii. CHAPTER 5. THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE 1979 5-1 5.1 Reasons why the delegates attended the conference 5-1 5.2 The Lancaster House Conference 5.2.1 The delegates' objectives 5.2.2 Deliberations 5.2.3 Political pressure on PF ENDNOTES CHAPTER 6. THE FINAL EPISODE (THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD) 6-1 6.1 The PF and the transitional government 6-1 6.2 Conclusion ENDNOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY 7-1-7-7 viii. Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done. CHAPTER 1: THE TOPIC - INTRODUCTION 1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC The struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe dates back to the 1890's when the Africans North of the Limpopo River fought to prevent the white settlers from the south occupying their land. The uprisings were crushed in 1897 and for almost seventy years the Africans of the country the settlers called Rhodesia witnessed their most fertile lands being taken away. They were subjected to increasingly repressive legislation and became virtual slaves in their own land, subjects of the whim and the will of the settler. Throughout these harsh years, Africans in Rhodesia waged serious resistance to the white man's rule until the early sixties when they gradually came to recognise that only through armed struggle could they liberate their land. The armed struggle became the only means they could use to destroy Prime Minister Ian Smith's obduracy after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. Before UDI, two liberation movements, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and the splinter organisation, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under Rev Ndabaningi Sithole and then later under Robert Mugabe who took over from Rev Sithole, were banned in Rhodesia. They had separate guerrilla groups fighting against Ian Smith's regime. They were operating from different countries. ZAPU of Joshua Nkomo was operating from Zambia with the support of Russia and Cuba, whilst ZANU of Robert Mugabe was operating from Mozambique with the help of China. Both armies adopted opposing ideologies as well as disparate strategies of insurgency. It was this element of divided loyalties that widened the gap and implanted a sense of ill feeling between the two liberation movements. 1-1 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done. Prime Minister Ian Smith had the leverage of exploiting these differences by fighting them separately but at the same time it cost him concentration because he could not direct his armies at one enemy. The organisations' history was that of conflict which also affected their support base. The politics of these organisations were divided according to tribal lines, with Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) a Ndbele and Robert Mugabe (ZANU) a Shona. Bishop Abel Muzorewa continued to lead the African National Council (ANC) and Rev Sithole continued to lead the ZANU faction which was not under Robert Mugabe. On 6 September 1974 a conference was called in Dar en Salaam by the Front-line Presidents, i.e. the presidents of Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana. The Rhodesian Nationalists were pressurised by the Presidents for a unification of the various factions of the ANC. On 7 December 1974, the Lusaka agreement signed by them creating an umbrella organisation, the new ANC, failed. On 25 August 1975, South African Prime Minister B.J. Vorster and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda initiated the Victoria Bridge talks attended by the nationalists against Ian Smith. Their bid to bring peace in Rhodesia also failed. On 5 September 1976 the Frontline Presidents made another effort to *unite the nationalists but it also failed. It was during Dr Henry Kissinger's initiative that the Frontline State leaders succeeded in securing a united front of Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe (ZANU) on 9 October 1976, so that they could present a united front at the Geneva Conference of 28 October 1976 against Ian Smith's government.
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