Z
THE ROLE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN THE
INDEPENDENCE OF ZIMBABWE 1976-1980
by
NTHATHEDZENI NICHOLAS DANGALE
Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
MAGISTER ARTIUM
in HISTORY
in the FACULTY OF ARTS
at the
RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY
JOHANNESBURG PROMOTER: 1996 PROFESSOR H J VAN ASWEGEN DEDICATION
Dedicated to my mother, who spent every cent she had to put me through school.
May God bless you.
_____,,..-----D- .0G--6=■.
ii. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks are due to my wife, Asnath Maano, and my two children, Urangani and Ipfi, who gave me unqualified support throughout my years of study; to Prof H J van Aswegen, who tirelessly made this mini-dissertation a success and to my friend Dr Deon Gouws, who always encouraged me to work hard. OPSOMMING (SUMMARY)
Hierdie mini-verhandeling beskryf die rol van die Patriotiese Front in die bevryding van Zimbabwe tussen 1976 en 1980. Die presidente van die frontlinie-state het 'n beroep gedoen op die twee Zimbabwiese nasionalisteleiers, Joshua Nkomo van ZAPU en Robert Mugabe van ZANU, om 'n alliansie te vorm sodat hulle met 'n verenigde front die regime van Ian Smith kon pak. Hierdie alliansie het op 9 Oktober 1976 tot stand gekom, met die seen van die presidente van die frontlinie-state. Die alliansie het ekonomiese, militere en politieke steun geniet van die internasionale gemeenskap, die OAE en die frontlinie-state, en is beskou as die enigste mondstuk van die verdrukte massas Afrikane in Zimbabwe.
Die leiers van die PF het, nieteenstaande verskille in ideologie, dieselfde oogmerke nagestreef. Hulle wou albei Zimbabwe bevry van die Ian Smith-regime. Dit was hierdie doel wat die twee leiers verenig het totdat bevryding in 1980 bereik is. Daar was ernstige verskille tussen hulle as leiers van die alliansie. Daar was etniese verskille. Hulle kon ook the daarin slaag om 'n verenigde militere front te vorm nie. ZANU-guerillas het gevolglik die swaarste militere las gedra. Nkomo het ook voortdurend geheime samesprekings met Ian Smith gevoer sonder Mugabe se medewete. Hierdie samesprekings het byna die PF laat skeur en het probleme veroorsaak tussen die presidente van die frontlinie-state, veral tussen presidente Kaunda en Nyerere. Dit het bewys dat die PF bloot 'n gerieflikheidshuwelik was.
Tog het die PF-leierskap bymekaar gebly ten spyte van hul probleme. Hulle het daarin geslaag om by alle onderhandelinge 'n verenigde front voor te hou, van die Geneefse Konferensie regdeur tot by die Lancasterhuis-Konferensie van 1979. Nkomo is tydens al die onderhandelinge beskou as die meer gematigde politikus, wat buigsaam was in sy politieke benadering tot die aard van die stryd om die bevryding van Zimbabwe. Mugabe was militant en konsekwent in sy kragdadige politieke benadering. Mugabe het die gewapende stryd gesien as die enigste manier om Zimbabwe te bevry. Nkomo het enige benadering wat
iv. vryheid aan Zimbabwe kon besorg, verwelkom, maar hy is deurentyd deur Mugabe se militantheid gelei.
Die PF se strategie tydens die Lancasterhuis-Konferensie van 1979 het the gewerk me. Brittanje het besef dat, ten einde die probleem van Zimbabwe op te los, hy sy koloniale mag (wat hy sedert die UDI in 1965 verloor het) sou moes teruglcry. Dit was by die Lancasterhuis-Konferensie onder voorsitterskap van Lord Carrington waar Brittanje sy koloniale verantwoordelikheid weer aanvaar het. Dit was Brittanje wat die terme voorgeskryf het, the die PF of die regering van Biskop Muzorewa the. Lord Carrington het die ondersteuning geniet van die presidente van die frontlinie-state, wie se lande ernstige ekonomiese bankrotskap in die gesig gestaar het weens die gevolge van die guerilla-oorlog wat hulle ondersteun het. Die presidente se rol in die onderhandelinge moet the geringgeskat word the omdat dit hulle druk op die PF was wat Nkomo en Mugabe geforseer het om die Lancasterhuis-Grondwet vir die onafhanklikheid van Zimbabwe te aanvaar en te onderteken. Die sukses van die Lancasterhuis-Konferensie het die geskiedenis van Zimbabwe ingrypend verander. Zimbabwe-Rhodesie, soos hy vir 'n kort periode tydens Muzorewa se binnelandse-skikkingsregering bekend gestaan het, het op 17 April 1980 as Zimbabwe bekend geword, met Robert Gabriel Mugabe as sy eerste wettige Afrikaan-president, nadat sy party (ZANU [PFD die 1980-verkiesing gewen het.
v. ABBREVIATIONS
ANC African National Council AP Assembly Points/Assembly Places FLP Front-line President FLPS Front-line Presidents FLS Front-line States NDP National Democratic Party NIBMAR No Independence Before Majority African Rule OAU Organisation of African Unity PF Patriotic Front RF Rhodesian Front SA South Africa SADF South African Defence Forces SC Security Council (United Nations) UANC United African National Council UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence UN United Nations Organisation USA United States of America UK United Kingdom ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union ZANU(PF) - Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) ZAPU Zimbabwe African People's Union ZIPA Zimbabwe Independence People's Army ZIPRA Zimbabwe Independence People's Revolutionary Army ZLA Zimbabwe Liberation Army ZLC Zimbabwe Liberation Council ZR Zimbabwe-Rhodesia ZUPO Zimbabwe Union People's Organisation
vi. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page OPSOMMING iv ABBREVIATIONS vi
CHAPTER 1: THE TOPIC - INTRODUCTION 1.1 The importance of the topic 1.2 Aims and problem statement 1.3 Research methodology 1.4 Historiography 1.5 Structure of the study
CHAPTER 2: THE BACKGROUND OF THE PF LEADERSHIP 2-1 2.1 Background 2-1 2.2 The formation of the PF ENDNOTES
CHAPTER 3: THE PF AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC 3-1 INITIATIVE (THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS) 3.1 The PF and the Geneva Conference 3-1 3.2 Deliberations 3.3 The PF and Ivor Richard's diplomatic initiative 3.4 The PF and the Anglo-American diplomatic endeavour ENDNOTES
CHAPTER 4: ROBERT MUGABE AND JOSHUA NKOMO - 4-1 INTERNAL DISPUTES 4.1 The PF and the internal settlement 4-1 4.2 The Malta Conference 4.3 Smith and Nkomo's secret talks ENDNOTES
vii. CHAPTER 5. THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE 1979 5-1 5.1 Reasons why the delegates attended the conference 5-1 5.2 The Lancaster House Conference 5.2.1 The delegates' objectives 5.2.2 Deliberations 5.2.3 Political pressure on PF ENDNOTES
CHAPTER 6. THE FINAL EPISODE (THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD) 6-1 6.1 The PF and the transitional government 6-1 6.2 Conclusion ENDNOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY 7-1-7-7
viii. Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
CHAPTER 1: THE TOPIC - INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC
The struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe dates back to the 1890's when the Africans North of the Limpopo River fought to prevent the white settlers from the south occupying their land. The uprisings were crushed in 1897 and for almost seventy years the Africans of the country the settlers called Rhodesia witnessed their most fertile lands being taken away. They were subjected to increasingly repressive legislation and became virtual slaves in their own land, subjects of the whim and the will of the settler. Throughout these harsh years, Africans in Rhodesia waged serious resistance to the white man's rule until the early sixties when they gradually came to recognise that only through armed struggle could they liberate their land. The armed struggle became the only means they could use to destroy Prime Minister Ian Smith's obduracy after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965.
Before UDI, two liberation movements, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and the splinter organisation, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under Rev Ndabaningi Sithole and then later under Robert Mugabe who took over from Rev Sithole, were banned in Rhodesia. They had separate guerrilla groups fighting against Ian Smith's regime. They were operating from different countries. ZAPU of Joshua Nkomo was operating from Zambia with the support of Russia and Cuba, whilst ZANU of Robert Mugabe was operating from Mozambique with the help of China. Both armies adopted opposing ideologies as well as disparate strategies of insurgency. It was this element of divided loyalties that widened the gap and implanted a sense of ill feeling between the two liberation movements.
1-1 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
Prime Minister Ian Smith had the leverage of exploiting these differences by fighting them separately but at the same time it cost him concentration because he could not direct his armies at one enemy. The organisations' history was that of conflict which also affected their support base. The politics of these organisations were divided according to tribal lines, with Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) a Ndbele and Robert Mugabe (ZANU) a Shona. Bishop Abel Muzorewa continued to lead the African National Council (ANC) and Rev Sithole continued to lead the ZANU faction which was not under Robert Mugabe.
On 6 September 1974 a conference was called in Dar en Salaam by the Front-line Presidents, i.e. the presidents of Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana. The Rhodesian Nationalists were pressurised by the Presidents for a unification of the various factions of the ANC. On 7 December 1974, the Lusaka agreement signed by them creating an umbrella organisation, the new ANC, failed. On 25 August 1975, South African Prime Minister B.J. Vorster and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda initiated the Victoria Bridge talks attended by the nationalists against Ian Smith. Their bid to bring peace in Rhodesia also failed. On 5 September 1976 the Frontline Presidents made another effort to *unite the nationalists but it also failed. It was during Dr Henry Kissinger's initiative that the Frontline State leaders succeeded in securing a united front of Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe (ZANU) on 9 October 1976, so that they could present a united front at the Geneva Conference of 28 October 1976 against Ian Smith's government. It excluded Bishop Muzorewa and Rev Sithole. The new alliance was called the Patriotic Front (PF). It was supposed to have been a united front against white power in Rhodesia. It was to be bound by a philosophy, strategy and a bond of trust but such factors were not available as the main pillars of its political strength and existence. Only convenience and expediency dictated during the course of its existence. It was a shaky alliance.
1-2 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
This mini dissertation resulted from research undertaken for a seminar course on "Africa and South Africa". Especially a seminar on "Zimbabwe, international diplomacy and independence 1976-1980" awakened my interest in the role of the Patriotic Front (PF), an alliance of Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe (ZANU), in the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. Out of a variety of role players, the PF played a very conspicuous role which consequently directed me to study the role of the PF in the independence of Zimbabwe. The PF was by far the main nationalist organisation in Zimbabwe and if it wasn't for it, the independence of Zimbabwe wouldn't have been achieved as it is, since the other Zimbabwean Nationalists, Bishop Muzorewa, Rev Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau, turned into Ian Smith's puppets by accepting his internal settlement which excluded the leaders of the PF, who regarded it as the sell-out of the African people in Zimbabwe. It is, therefore, imperative to look at what the PF had done since its inception on 9 October 1976 and to change the history of Zimbabwe.
The authors who wrote about the struggle of Zimbabwe looked at the general trend of events leading to independence without specifically analysing the role of the PF. They were concerned with the history of the struggle of Zimbabwe and not about the role of the PF as such. It is for this reason that the role of the Patriotic Front in the independence of Zimbabwe from 1976 to 1980 needs to be researched.
It is sixteen years now since the independence of Zimbabwe. The time that has elapsed allows one to study this period with a new look without emotions clouding one's perspective. More materials are available to allow a greater perspective of the role of the PF during the struggle for independence of Zimbabwe from 1976 to 1980. This study focuses mainly on the period 1976-1980. The PF was formed in 1976 and Zimbabwe became an independent nation in 1980. It is, however, important to analyse briefly the political background that shaped the leadership of the Patriotic Front who were brought from different situations and circumstances. For that reason the period before 1976 will be dealt with briefly. It was in 1975 that Joshua
1-3 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
Nkomo had secret meetings with Ian Smith. These secret meetings had encouraged Smith to continue to hold such meetings even after 1976 with Joshua Nkomo whom he regarded as a moderate politician rather than Robert Mugabe, the militant. They contributed to the internal problems of the PF because Smith's aim was to split the PF. It will also look at the events that led to the formation of the PF. But what had happened after 1980 won't be dealt with because after independence in 1980, Zimbabwe entered a new political phase after the PF's split before elections leading to the independence.
1.2 AIMS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Although a short period, the history of the PF between 1976 and 1980 was very complex due to various circumstances and factors, such as the war of liberation in which they were involved, pressure from Ian Smith's white government, pressure from outside (mostly from Frontline States, USA and Britain) and internal problems. It is important to analyse the inner history of the PF looking at its internal dynamics that shaped the course they took between 1976 and 1980. Various aspects leading to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 have been written in general, but very little attention has so far been exclusively given and directed to the extent to which the Patriotic Front was committed to the total liberation of Zimbabwe. The present study, therefore, is aimed at filling this gap in the histography of Zimbabwe. The objective is to analyse the PF's role during the years 1976 up to 1980.
The leaders of this alliance wanted to achieve total liberation but internal struggles, dissentions and pressures from outside made the road to independence a very difficult one. The ultimate aim, therefore, is to analyse the formation of the PF, the aims and objectives of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, the strategies, inner political and personal differences that caused a lot of dynamics that nearly led to the disintegration of the PF alliance, the role of the Frontline States, the PF's role in the
1-4 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done. whole process leading to the independence of Zimbabwe, and to demonstrate the extent to which they were committed to the liberation of Zimbabwe. The internal struggles and dissentions raised questions which would be asked. With Robert Mugabe being militant and Joshua Nkomo being moderate, how did the two leaders manage to work together for the liberation of Zimbabwe, different as they were? How did they manage to reconcile their different ideologies for the benefit of the success of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe?
The formation of the PF came after an exhaustive period of searching for an alliance amongst African Nationalists in Zimbabwe by the Frontline State presidents, until President Nyrere called Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe and persuaded them to sort out their political differences which were the obstacles to finding a union between the two. It was after this meeting that the two leaders buried the hatchet and struck an alliance on 9 October 1976, so that in further talks they would present a united front against Smith's regime. Other nationalists, Bishop Muzorewa and Rev Sithole, were left outside because of the political struggle that took place in 1975 and left them in the cold without command of different groups of guerrillas who gave their support to Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe (ZANU). They were also despised by the Frontline State Presidents because of their political approaches to the liberation of Zimbabwe and above all they did not command substantial support from the masses in the country. They were regarded as sellouts and friends of the enemy, Prime Minister Ian Smith. It is, therefore, necessary to achieve the aim as stated earlier on by undertaking an analysis that would clearly depict the PF's role in the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.
The study will investigate the strategies and the political approach to the negotiations in which the PF became involved. It will look at their continuing political differences in their approaches to the nature of the struggle for liberation. This selection of dates between 1976 and 1980 is done in order to depict the role of
1-5 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done. the PF, Frontline State Presidents (FLPS) and Britain in the achievement of the total liberation of Zimbabwe.
The study will give a balanced perspective of the issues surrounding the PF's role, and an attempt will be made to focus on the following questions.
0 What were the leaders of the PF's ideologies and aims?
The question analyses the leaders and the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, focusing on their differences, ideologies, educational achievements, social and political background. The two were brought up from different tribes, that is Nkomo being a Ndebele and Mugabe a Shona. It also analyses why they had different political and military backing from different countries. It was that backing that had shaped their different ideologies which in turn shaped the nature of the struggle the two leaders waged.
@ What brought them together?
This question looks at the reasons that forced Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe to come together and form a Patriotic Front. Although they had different approaches to the struggle, they both had the one major aim of liberating Zimbabwe. With the help of the frontline state leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe realised that they could not win the struggle if waged from different fronts, and that they had to wage it on a united front against Ian Smith's regime.
It will also be analysed what held them together since the alliance was shaky and almost broke up. Finally it will look at why Joshua Nkomo had shouldered the responsibility for forming the alliance. 1-6 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
What was the role of the Frontline States on the PF?
It was the Frontline State leaders who since 1975 had been struggling endlessly for the formation of a united front by the nationalists so that they could deal with Smith's regime. They always wanted to see the nationalists in Zimbabwe fighting against Ian Smith together. It is, therefore necessary to analyse their role on PF throughout all the negotiations in which the PF was involved. The support they offered to the PF and not to the other nationalists, Bishop Muzorewa and Rev Sithole needs to be analysed looking at why the FLPS preferred to support the PF and not Bishop Muzorewa and Rev Sithole. It also looks at the role the FLPS played during the Lancaster House Conference and their pressure on the PF during the conference.
What was the PF's role during negotiations?
In all the negotiations in which the PF was involved, it employed a strategy of war pronouncement, demand and rejection. The question looks at those strategies used by the PF analysing whether they have succeeded or not. It will also look at how the PF responded to the support and pressure as exerted by the FLPS on it and at why the PF split before elections in 1980.
What was the role of the Rhodesian Front (Ian Smith)?
The question analyses the role of Ian Smith during the negotiations with the PF. It also analyses the reasons behind Smith's and Nkomo's secret talks, it will look at why Smith did not succeed in splitting the PF and at the problems such meetings caused the PF and the FLPS.
1-7 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
What was the role of the USA, Britain and pressure groups?
The question analyses the role of the USA, Britain and the pressure groups that helped the PF to stay together, and to form policies and strategies. The PF was able to assess its capabilities when dealing with the USA and Britain looking at the ways and means of bringing a viable solution to the problem of Zimbabwe. It will also analyse why the Anglo-American initiative failed and look at the support the PF received from pressure groups like the OAU, UN and the Commonwealth countries throughout the years 1976 to 1980.
Why the Smith -Muzorewa internal settlement failed?
It is imperative to analyse the causes of the failure of the internal settlement which put the Nationalists in the leadership of the new government in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The question will also analyse the PF's refusal to participate in that government and why the international community refused to recognise the internal settlement.
Why the Lancaster House Conference became a success?
The conference wouldn't have succeeded if the participants were not prepared to negotiate regardless of all the problems they might have encountered. The question analyses the role of Britain in the person of Lord Carrington and why the PF accepted a compromised deal. It also investigates the strategies of the PF to find out if ever the PF leadership was able to employ their strategies during negotiations at London.
1-8 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The significant part in this study is the fact that no recent attempts have been made to research and analyse specifically the role of the PF. What has been attempted up to now is the gathering and representation analysis of available information on the independence of Zimbabwe. Thus this study, on the other hand, attempts to present the major threads of the debates by presenting and correlating the more significant arguments found in the widespread literature. This has entailed some significant selecting of material to keep chapters within reasonable limits
Books used in this study provided useful and valuable information though not dealing specifically with the role of the PF. They provided information that covers other role players like the USA, Britain and the Frontline States. However, throughout the literary study information specific to the topic was available and provided the linkage of the PF's role in the independence of Zimbabwe. The problems faced in the course of the research of this topic were that no books dealt specifically with the role of the PF and that there are few books available that deal with the topic. Other sources used in this topic were articles, newspapers and documents but they give tentative useful information and brought forth a variety of interpretations. They are very brief and composed of speeches and mostly reports on what had happened and fall short of giving detailed information. The problem encountered was that they too, don't deal specifically with the PF but provide information from which the researcher would select only what suited the topic.
Because this work is a mini dissertation very little primary source material has been used. The focus has mainly been on secondary sources. This includes among others, books, articles, newspapers and research bulletins such as Africa Contemporary Record.
1-9 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
1.4 HISTORIOGRAPHY
At the same time a historiographical analysis will be given to assess how the authors treated failed to treat this inner history, looking at why they tended to focus on broader aspects of the struggle and not on what had happened in the ranks of the PF.
During research two main schools of thought could be clearly defined when examining the approach advanced by various authors when writing about the history of Zimbabwe. Certain authors can be classified as pro-African in their approach. These are the authors who support and justify the African course in the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe. They are supported by some authors who are neither pro-African (pro-black) nor pro-white (pro-European) in their approach but are sympathetic to the African cause for the independence of Zimbabwe. However, they don't ignore issues advanced by the PF, Frontline States, Britain and the USA, particularly the role of Lord Carrington at the Lancaster House conference in 1979. They show the role of the PF since its inception in 1976 to independence in 1980 and avoid blaming the PF or Britain for all the flaws that might have occurred during the period of international diplomacy (1976-1980) until Zimbabwe became independent in 1980.
These authors were able to show the militancy of the PF especially Robert Mugabe, in order to justify and drive home their point of view, the internal disputes that nearly ruined the alliance and the strong militant diplomatic position of Britain during the Lancaster House conference. Authors associated with this group are: J. Nkomo, Nkomo the story of my life, Bishop A.T. Muzorewa, Rise and walk, an autobiography, Jeffrey Davidow, A peace in Southern Africa, the Lancaster House conference on Rhodesia, 1979, T.J. Lamelle, Africa Today, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1978- 1979, Africa Contemporary Record, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Vol.2., No.2, 1978 and C.J. de Kierk, Zimbabwe: Van Lancaster Huis tot
1-10 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
onathanklilcheid, Desember 1979 tot April 1980. All these authors exposed the PF's role in the independence of Zimbabwe and were able to describe in their analysis the difference between Robert Gabriel Mugabe and Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo. Nevertheless their works are very informative in respect of the PF's involvement in the struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe.
The second school of thought is that of authors who give a more academic and balanced account about the role of the PF in its bid to achieve total independence of Zimbabwe. Their analysis cannot be diagnosed as either pro-African or pro-white (pro-PF or pro-Smith government). However, they can clearly show the PF and Britain's flaws and successes in the process of diplomacy which shows steps taken by both parties in their bid to achieve a peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe. Such authors are: C. Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, annual survey and documents, Vol. 9 - Vol. xii, 1976-1980, Hawley, E.A. Africa Today, Vol. 24-Vol 25, 1977- 1978, M. Charlton, The last colony in Africa, diplomacy and the independence of Rhodesia, D. Smith, Mugabe, M Tamarkin, The making of Zimbabwe and M. Meredith, The past is another country. They project the two leaders of the PF as different partners fighting for the same course.
There are no authors who depict an attitude of extremism in support, either for the African cause for independence in Zimbabwe or for the whites in their fight against Africans in their bid to protect the minority regime of Ian Smith.
1.5. MILITARY ORGANISATIONS IN RHOSEDIA -ZIMBABWE
It is imperative to give a short history of the military organisations in Rhodesia- Zimbabwe. These organisations or military wings were formed by ZAPU and ZANU who were members of the PF alliance which was formed on the 9 October 1976. There were some military organisations which were formed a part from those that were under ZAPU and ZANU. Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
After the National Democratic Party (NDP) was banned in 1961, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was immediately formed with Joshua Nkomo as its president. In 1965, ZAPU began the armed struggle. ZAPU'S military wing was called Zimbabwe Independence People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Its soldiers received their military training in the Soviet Union, Zambia and in other countries. ZIPRA became ZAPU's political vanguard. They were under the command of Alfred Mangena. It was a predominately Ndebele organisation. The ZIPRA forces pledged their political and military support to their president Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU leadership throughout the years of the armed struggle in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe.
In 1963 the nationalist movement split for the first time. A group broke away from ZAPU and built Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Ndabaningi Sithole was elected president, but Robert Mugabe who was the secretary-general of ZANU took over the leadership of the organisation after leadership problems. ZANU'S military wing was called Zimbabwe African National liberation Army (ZANLA). ZANLA forces were politically and militarily linked with China, Mozambique and other countries. ZANLA became the political vanguard of ZANU and they supported their president Robert Mugabe, and the entire ZANU leadership. They were under the command of Josiah Tongogara who died on the eve of Zimbabwe independence. It was dominated by Shona cadres.
In 1974 the Zimbabwe Liberation Council was formed in an attempt to launch a joint military action against the Rhodesian army of Ian Smith. The military wing of the ZLC was called the Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA). Ndabaningi Sithole chose his nephew John Gwindingwi to command the new force. His appointment was not welcomed by members of the ZANLA and ZAPRA high commands, some of whom such as Nhongo were excluded altogether from the new command. However the creation of ZLC and ZLA was not successful and virtually ceased to exist.
1-12 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
By January 1976 a joint guerrila force, called the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) was formed. It included cadres from ZANLA and ZIPRA led by an eighteen-member military committee, nine from each of the two guerrila forces. The overall commander of ZIPA was Rex Nhongo, the most senior ZANLA guerrila at liberty, and the second position of political commissar was filled by Alfred 'Nikita' Mangena, the commander of ZIPRA. ZIPA or the Third Force as it became known was born from a combination of several factors. The presidents of the Front Line States had decided to resume the war. They were frustrated by the divisive squabbling among the nationalist leaders. ZIPA was composed mostly by ZANLA forces of ZANU. It was intended to co-ordinate the fighting forces of ZANLA and ZIPRA under unified command . During the Geneva Conference of 28 October 1976 ZIPA sent an independent delegation led by Nhongo. Nkomo stated that ZIPA was part of ZANLA forces and they formed part of Mugabe's delegation. ZIPA'S formation was not successful and by the end of 1976 it virtually ceased to exist. They joined ZANLA forces under Robert Mugabe.
Reacting to external diplomatic pressure, the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU forged a military and political alliance on a 9 October 1976 under the name of the Patriotic Front (PF). The PF military sub-committee tried to unite ZIPRA and ZANLA forces so that they could wage a united armed struggle against the Smith government. This initiative didn't work out because ZIPRA Cadres attributed their opposition to unity to the killing of their comrades by ZANLA guerrillas at Magagoo in 1976. Another factor was that ZIPRA forces did not trust ZIPA and ZANLA forces who had thrown their support to Robert Mogabe of ZANU.After this ill fated attempt to military unity ZAPU and ZANU agreed to wage independent wars against the Rhodesians. ZIPRA operated in the Western Matabeleland provinces while ZANLA operated from Mozambigue into the East and Southern provinces. They never merged until Zimbabwe got independence in 1980.
1-13 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY This study has been constructed along the following lines set up in terms of organisation of data in order to deal with the above in a chronological way to see how the inner history and dynamics developed during this period, 1976-1980.
CHAPTER 1: THE TOPIC - INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 2: THE BACKGROUND OF THE PF LEADERSHIP
This chapter will look at the political background of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, focusing on their educational, social and ideological differences emanating from those countries who rendered political and military assistance to both of them, i.e. China and Russia. It will also focus on their tribal differences since they also had an impact on their political setup which affected their aims in regard to their approach in the struggle for independence of Zimbabwe.
CHAPTER 3: THE PF AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE (THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS)
This chapter will analyse steps taken by the PF when it decided to participate in the Geneva Conference, looking at the strategies, philosophy or bond of trust which the PF leadership might have implemented during negotiations. It will also investigate the inner history of disputes and dissentions in the PF camp. It will analyse the method and strategies employed by the PF whilst dealing with the British Secretary of the aborted Geneva Conference, Ivor Richard, and the Anglo-American diplomatic endeavour. It will focus at their point of conflict and agreements and the Frontline States' role during negotiations.
1-14 Chapter 1: The topic - why it is important and why it is being done.
CHAPTER 4: ROBERT MUGABE AND JOSHUA NKOMO - INTERNAL DISPUTES
This chapter will focus on why the internal settlement was never viewed by the Rhodesian Community as an alternative and at why it failed dismally. It will also look at the Malta Conference and most importantly, it will examine and analyse the reasons behind Nkomo and Smith's secret talks that created mistrust between the leadership of the PF and how that affected the Frontline States' relations amongst themselves.
CHAPTER 5: THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE 1979
This chapter will focus on the forces under which the delegates were compelled to attend the conference and also on which strategies were employed by the Chairman, Lord Carrington, when dealing with the PF. It will also look at the effects of the political pressure as exerted on the PF leadership, especially on Robert Mugabe, who was singled out as the more militant person than Joshua Nkomo, the moderate.
CHAPTER 6: THE FINAL EPISODE (THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD)
This last chapter will examine how the transitional government handled the transitional period until democratic elections were held. It will also analyse the effects of disputes and dissension as the cause of the PF's disintegration towards the elections.
1-15 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership.
CHAPTER 2: THE BACKGROUND OF THE PF LEADERSHIP
2.1 BACKGROUND
On 18 April 1980 the dreams of the pioneers of the Patriotic Front became a reality. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, as it was then known, became independent with the subsequent change of the name to Zimbabwe. That dream was the liberation of the people of Zimbabwe and the demise of colonialist Rhodesia. Colonialism spurred the revolution. Every revolution has its leaders: these were Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo (ZAPU) and Robert Gabriel Mugabe (ZANU) who formed the Patriotic Front. These two leaders had distinctive leadership qualities. These qualities will now be discussed by specifically referring to Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe who were the architects of the Patriotic Front, a political alliance that played a major political role in the independence of Zimbabwe.
The qualities of these statesmen of Zimbabwe are characterised by similarities in educational and social background, political aims, ideologies influenced by where they got political and military support and by their tribal affiliations which backed their local political and military support. Though the two nationalists were leading different liberation movements, they had quite marked similarities. According to Jeffrey Davidow the sixty-two-year-old Nkomo and the fifty-five-year-old Mugabe were similar in some ways. Like other Zimbabwean, leaders of their generation they owed their early education to white missionaries. Both had spent more than a decade imprisoned or otherwise confined by the Smith regime. And of course, both leaders were firmly committed to African majority rule.°
Joshua Nkomo, the nationalist leader on whom it had become apparent the United States and British settlement initiative had been built, received his primary
2-1 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. education at Tjolotjo School. In 1941, having saved enough money for a single year of secondary education, he travelled by train to Durban, South Africa, where he
enrolled at Adams College. 2)
In 1944 he enrolled at the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Science in Johannesburg where his fees for a three year course of study had been paid by Mrs Hoskins. Here he completed his matriculation and obtained his Diploma. In 1947 he returned to Rhodesia and was employed by Rhodesia Railways as a social worker, the first African to be given such a post. During the next two years he continued his studies for an external degree with the University of South Africa and graduated Bachelor of
Arts in Economics and Sociology. 3)
The way in which Joshua Nkomo had received his primary education was the same as that of Robert Mugabe, differing only on the tertiary level of education. Robert Mugabe was educated to standard VI at Kutama mission and also qualified there as a primary school teacher. 4) During the same period (1940's) he completed his secondary education and commercial studies for a degree with the University of South Africa. In 1949 he won a scholarship to Fort Hare, South Africa, where he graduated BA in 1951. In 1954 he was transferred to Gwelo where he obtained his B.Ed degree by correspondence. In 1955 he obtained B.Sc. from the University of London. While in detention his amibition for academic advancement returned and he sat successfully for three more degrees, including LLB(London) and B.Admin (London). 5) With all these achievements Robert Mugabe has been regarded as a top African intellectual, who had a remarkable academic career earning six degrees.
Though the two nationalists were well lettered, they had many obvious political, ideological and military differences which are easily identifiable through style, outlook and relative organisational strengths. While in Johannesburg, Joshua Nkomo came under the influence of Dr Zuma and A. Lembede, two of the leaders of the African National Congress in South Africa, although he took little part in the
2-2 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. political discussions that absorbed many of his fellow students. 6) Through the influence of Enoch Dumbutshena he moved into the political sphere and in 1952 he was elected President of the African National Council (ANC) in Rhodesia. Greatly influenced at this time by moral re-armament he tried, in conjunction with leaders in Northern Rhodesia and elsewhere to unite all African organisations in the All- African Peoples' Convention. The attempt was not successful and the Convention disbanded in 1954. 7) In 1952 he accepted an invitation from Sir Godfrey Huggins, then Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, to represent the Africans at the London Conference on the proposed federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. He returned from London bitterly opposed to the proposals but could make no impression in the face of overwhelming European support for the federal concept. 8)
In 1957, however, the Youth League (ANYL) founded in Salisbury two years previously by George Nyandoro, James Chikerema and Edson Sithole, joined together with the Bulawayo branch of the old African National Council and on 12 September Joshua Nkomo was elected President of the reformed African National Counci1.9) In 1961 tension built up between the NDP (National Democratic Party) and the authorities, followed by civil unrest which led to the banning of the party by the government on 10 December. The party adopted a policy of greater militancy. On 20 September 1962 ZAPU, too, was banned by the government and most of its leaders were restricted for three months to the area surrounding their home villages.
Joshua Nkomo was in Lusaka when ZAPU was banned. 10) While in exile Joshua Nkomo came to the conclusion that the time had passed when anything useful could be achieved by party action within Southern Rhodesia. He concluded in setting up a government in exile, which, by freely bringing pressure to bear on the UN, the OAU and other sympathetic bodies, would stimulate international action to effect political change at home. The idea was good but lacked enough support, and strained relations with other leaders within the party. Robert Cary states that when Joshua Nkomo called a meeting of the executive in Dar Es Salaam to discuss the
2-3 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. matter he came under strong pressure from the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Enoch Dumbutshena and President Nyerere, who felt that he should return to Salisbury and suffer the same restraints as the other leaders. He followed this advice and on his arrival back in Southern Rhodesia was restricted for three months to Kezi, South of Bulawayo.")
On his release from restriction he travelled to New York, where he addressed the UN Committee of 24 on 23 March 1963. Soon after his return to Southern Rhodesia he called a meeting of the National executive in Dar es Salaam. Joshua Nkomo persuaded his colleagues, insisting that it was the wish of President Nyerere as well as some other African leaders that they should go to Dar es Salaam to discuss setting up a government in exile. Mugabe had misgivings about the proposal but, in common with most of his colleagues, had little contact with African leaders in those days. They assembled in Dar es Salaam on 12 April and, to their great surprise, Nyerere professed to have no knowledge of the plan to set up a government in exile. 12) He made it clear that their place was at home. In June Kaunda also expressed his disapproval of the executive's absence from Southern Rhodesia.
This opposition to Nkomo' idea acted as a catalyst for those who had been growing increasingly discontented with his leadership. They wanted a firmer policy of confrontation with the settlers and a new, more decisive political party. They found Nkomo indecisive and they were concerned at what they perceived to be a lack of confidence in him in Tanzania, Zambia and some other African countries which supported the liberation struggle. Nkomo, they felt, had been vacillating for over a decade by joining the federation talks in 1952, and then running for a federal seat and more recently by his handling of the 1961 'constitution issue'. 13)
Robert Cary states that in this atmosphere the criticism took several forms, there were those who favoured a policy of confrontation with the government whatever the consequences, those who believed that it was essential to form a new political party to replace the banned ZAPU, and those who felt that Joshua Nkomo had
2-4 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. become too accustomed to the 'fleshpots' of international travel and was, therefore, unwilling to suffer personal hardship. There were also perhaps some whose ambition to lead the movement was greater than their loyalty to the cause and who saw a chance to advance their positions. 14)
But the crisis could not be avoided indefinitely and after intercepting letters from executive members in Dar es Salaam, saying that they had lost confidence in his leadership, Nkomo suspended Ndabaningi Sithole, Takawira, Mugabe and Moton Malianga. They retaliated by suspending him but, as he was at home and they were still outside, Nkomo held an immediate tactical advantage. 15) Joshua Nkomo's relations with his fellow patriots got worse and led to the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) on August 1963. With the formation of ZANU, the stage was set for a major clash. David Martin states that some of the ugliest incidents in nationalist politics followed. Rival supporters attacked each other with any weapon they could lay their hands on and many people were killed as former colleagues turned against each other. Homes and stores were burned and looted. 16) The African people in Rhodesia were divided along political lines due to the formation of ZANU with some Africans supporting ZAPU of Joshua Nkomo and others supporting ZANU of Rev Sithole and later of Robert Mugabe.
Robert Mugabe had first become interested in politics when a student at Fort Hare and had joined the Youth League wing of the S.A. African National Congress. The political experience he had gained whilst in Ghana was an advantage in the Rhodesian movement and he was strongly pressurised to give up his teaching post and stay in Salisbury. The Rand Daily Mail of 10 June 1976 reported that Mugabe had been in Rhodesia in 1960 on six months' long leave from his teaching post in Ghana when he was caught up in the resurgence in nationalist politics and decided to stay. His decision cost him his freedom for more than 10 years. He was elected publicity secretary of the National democratic Party in 1960 and later was an office bearer in ZAPU under Mr Nkomo. But in the big Nationalist split in 1963 he followed the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole in forming ZANU. He became its secretary-
2-5 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. general. In 1964 Mr Mugabe made his famous "Cowboy" speech against Mr Smith and the Rhodesian Front. 17) Robert Mugabe followed the Rev Sithole in 1963 because he was not satisfied with Joshua Nkomo's leadership and he favoured the formation of a new political party. It resulted in a year's jail sentence under the
Law and Order Maintenance Act.' 8)
He was also involved in a struggle for the leadership of ZANU. A group of six leading ZANU personalities, including Edgar Tekere, Moton Malianga, Maurice Nyaqumbo, Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe decided that the presidency of the party should be put to a fresh vote. In the ensuing ballot Robert Mugabe gained the most votes, and the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole was deposed. 19)
Their different political persuasions had also affected their political ideologies and beliefs. Jeffrey Davidow says the two men also differed in their approaches to the nature and goals of the war they were directing. Heavily influenced by Marxist- Leninist and other revolutionary thinkers, Mugabe viewed violence as an inescapable and integral element of revolutionary struggle, necessary not only to defeat the enemy but also to politicise the fighters and the masses and to prepare them for the kind of societal restructuring a new state would bring about. 20) For Nkomo violence was a tactic, but not necessarily an ennobling enterprise. Unlike Mugabe, Nkomo's ideological pronouncements about the economy of an independent Zimbabwe were fuzzy. His occasional espousals of state socialism were not given serious credit by most observers, who were well aware of Nkomo's own capitalist endeavours. 21) David Smith supports Davidow in showing this ideological gap between Mugabe and Nkomo by saying that ideologically they were worlds apart. 22)
In analysing the two leaders it is clear that the leadership styles of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe were influenced by their ideological beliefs, and that those had created a wedge between the two. Mugabe was a socialist who believed in violence as a means to achieve freedom, and Nkomo a capitalist and a moderate who did not
2-6 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. favour violence. Such differences would affect their political persuasions because they belonged in different parties of ideas. This could have been one of the reasons that forced Mugabe to join ZANU.
These ideological differences were greatly compounded by affiliations to various arms suppliers. Paul L. Moorcraft states that in 1976 Mugabe tended to look to China for inspiration and support of his troops in Mozambique. Later Nkomo was to build up a Soviet-backed and Cuban-trained army in Zambia. The armies adopted opposing ideologies as well as disparate strategies of insurgency. 23) This was because Mugabe and Nkomo were ideologically different. Mugabe preferred to get help from China which propagated socialist ideas. Nkomo did not care where his help came from other than that which he received from Russia and Cuba. Joshua Nkomo states that he was prepared to accept support for the Zimbabwean cause wherever it came from, provided it was not in exchange for future commitments. 24) One generous personal contributor was the British based international businessman, Tiny Rowland, the man whose contacts both with the South African government and with President Kaunda, facilitated the author's release and that of the other Nationalist leaders from detention in 1974. 25) Joshua Nkomo was more flexible than Robert Mugabe whose help came from one source, China. This shows the different leadership styles these two leaders had. Robert Mugabe was more focused than Joshua Nkomo, and ideologically they were worlds apart.
It was this element of divided loyalties that widened the gap and implanted a sense of ill feeling in Mugabe about Nkomo. Mugabe disliked what he saw as Nkomo's expediency, arms from Moscow and financial support from the Lonrho mining empire. He himself jealously protected his independence and had always insisted that there would be no strings attached to any help he got. 26) Mugabe had had little faith in Nkomo ever since he had flirted with the Rhodesian government even before Ian Smith took over.
2-7 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. Their differences are further explained in regard to their political and military approaches. Jeffrey Davidow states that the relationship of each man to his political and military organisation also differed. Nkomo was ZAPU. He was its first and only leader, and its army had been created by him after his position of authority had been well established. Perhaps reflecting the kingly tradition of the Matabele, who invested their chiefs with more power than did the Shona, Nkomo tended to rule his delegation by fear, tolerating little debate and permitting less dissension. Mugabe, on the other hand, owed his position of power to ZANU's military forces. The organisation's history was that of conflict. It was not until early 1976 that ZANU's military leaders threw their weight behind Mugabe as the organisation's principal
political force. 27)
Another factor that affected Nkomo's and Mugabe's political backing was that of tribal rivalry. Paul L. Moorcraft states that the Zimbabwean splits were partly tribal. Bloody clashes erupted in guerrilla camps between Ndebele oriented ZAPU cadres and the predominantly Shona ZANU forces.. But the Zimbabwean splits which occurred because of the political rivalries within the Shona and Ndebele clans were equally complex and significant. Such traditional differences were compounded by affiliations to various arms suppliers. 27) Moorcraft confirms that the black Zimbabweans were divided along political party lines which affected the political support of the leaders of the Patriotic Front.
Socially Nkomo and Mugabe were two worlds apart and that also had an influence on their political persuasions. According to Jeffrey Davidow Nkomo first entered public affairs as a labour leader and he still maintained a sort of back slapping, hail fellow well met persona. His falstaffian physique conveyed an air of avuncular pleasantness, which was somehow comforting to the wide variety of individuals and governments that found him easier to approach than his leaner, more austere colleague. 29) Mugabe had been a schoolteacher. He was more introspective, less outgoing, more intellectual than the ZAPU leader, cool where Nkomo was warm. Christine Sylvester concurs with Davidow when describing Mugabe but goes further
2-8 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. when she says that according to biographers, this intellectual schoolteacher and low profile nationalist, was publicity chair for earlier nationalist parties. Careful by nature, despite his personal standing, he wasn't entirely comfortable with the role of guerrilla leader but no one who heard his impassioned advocacy of the armed struggle in any of his numerous visits to the camps, doubted his commitment." ) The two leaders came from different background composed of different interests but could form a good team in political matters since Nkomo would use in debates his experience gained in labour affairs and Mugabe would use his intellectual ability in solving political problems that would challenge them.
2.2 THE FORMATION OF THE PF
Though Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe reflected great contrast in terms of their political ideologies and leadership qualities, the formation of an alliance amongst nationalists in Zimbabwe had always been of paramount importance to both of them. This initiative was shouldered by the leaders of the Frontline States after they had realised the great division amongst the nationalist leaders whilst dealing with the Ian Smith regime. This unity initiative has to be analysed as far back as from 1974. On 6 September Nkomo was present at the summit conference called in Dar es Salaam by the presidents of Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana. At this conference, which was attended by other Rhodesian nationalist leaders, much pressure was applied by the presidents for a unification of the various factions of the ANC.31) On 7 December 1974, the Lusaka Agreement was signed by the ANC, FROLIZI, ZANU and ZAPU, thereby creating an umbrella organisation, the new ANC.
The new unity did not last long, but it did signal the beginning of a new phase in the struggle. 32) The failure of this unity initiative did reflect the political immaturity coupled with an idea of promoting selfish ambitions, and that the effects of the 1963 split were still with them. The divisions in the nationalist movement derived from
2-9 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. causes as complex as the situation in which they emerged. The following factors, however, appear relevant to any attempt at an explanation. Munhamu Botsio Utete states that ideological considerations could be entirely discounted as a factor in the divisions of the nationalist movement. A further factor in the division in the nationalist movement was that of external derivation. In particular, some of the actions of the so-called Frontline States appeared to be based on considerations only peripherally related to the liberation of Zimbabwe. 33) Utete's analysis holds water because if it were not for their ideological differences the nationalists would supposedly have sacrificed their differences, and formed a united front before negotiating with the Smith regime. Unfortunately the opposite prevailed.
The failure of the 1974 unity initiative did not, however, dash the Frontline State leaders' hopes, but instead kept them hoping that unity would finally be arrived at some time. On 5 September 1976 the Frontline Presidents made an effort to unite all the national factions. The special meeting was opened in Dar es Salaam, attended by the FLPS, the top leadership of the different nationalist factions (Mugabe, Nkomo, Muzorewa and Sithole), and four ZIPA leaders led by Rex Nhongo. According to M. Tamarkin there were various reasons for that meeting. It may have been partly prompted by the massacre of more than 600 black Rhodesians on 9 August in a camp in Mozambique by Rhodesian troops. At this stage the war was also sharply escalating and the quest for unity became again a matter of high priority. The FLPS turned again to the political leaders because the unity of the rival military structures and leaders proved as elusive as that of the political factions. They might have hoped that the leaders' visit at the camp might
have softened their mutual hostility and resistance to unity. 34)
It was clear that deep-rooted political differences amongst the nationalists were still strong and that unity was only possible if the leaders were willing to compromise. If the FLPS had hoped to bring them all together, it was an unqualified failure. Four days of meetings behind closed doors failed to produce national unity. According to David Smith, Mugabe and Nkomo did not even attempt to reconcile
2-10 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. their differences. Mugabe, in particular, was scathing about Nkomo, accusing him of pulling ZAPU out of the war and allowing ZANU and ZIPA to carry the battle and the losses alone. Sithole withdrew from the ANC and said he would form his own independent ZAPU. Muzorewa left for Rhodesia in the hopes of being the one nationalist with a base back home. 35) M. Tamarkin states that Mugabe blamed Nkomo for the failure because Nkomo continued to view unity as detrimental to the position of his movement and to his own ambitions. He came to Dar es Salaam to deliver a coup de grace to Muzorewa and his ANC, rather than to assist in the search for unity.36)
In analysing the failure of the Dar es Salaam unity meeting, M. Tamarkin states that the Dar es Salaam meeting in failing to achieve unity sealed the fate of those who had no guerrilla forces under their command. The Dar es Salaam unity talks were, from an FLP perspective, totally counter-productive. Not only did they fail to forge unity between the political leaders and between the political and military wings of the Nationalist movement, but also the process of disintegration of ZIPA, on which so many hopes had been pinned, was completed. 37) Furthermore, the Dar es Salaam unity talks exposed serious political differences between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. Robert Mugabe blamed Joshua Nkomo of bringing unity talks to a failure by looking down upon Muzorewa and Sithole. Robert Mugabe again blamed Nkomo for withdrawing his forces from the battle field and leaving ZANU and ZIPA to do the fighting. On the other hand, emerging after the collapse of the talks, Nkomo declared, rather jubilantly, that the meeting had been the burial ground of the old ANC. However, if the unity talks had succeeded Bishop Muzorewa and Rev Sithole would have been saved because they would have had military support which they did not have.
After the failure of the Dar es Salaam unity endeavour, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe were contemplating to form a united front because they were the only leaders who had military support as compared to Bishop Muzorewa and Rev Sithole. In the Rand Daily Mail of 28 September 1976 it was reported that two major rival
2-11 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. nationalist groups had the previous day (27 September 1976) moved towards forming a united front, ready to take power in a Black ruled Rhodesia. The Rhodesian based African National Council (ANC) of Mr Joshua Nkomo and the militant Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) guerrillas fighting in Rhodesia appeared to be inching towards an accommodation which would squeeze out other nationalists. An alliance between them would combine powerful political and military elements which could eclipse their rivals, including bishop Abel Muzorewa, head of the external wing of the ANC and the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole, a contender for the ZANU leadership. 38) Unfortunately the move did not produce any success because the two leaders were not yet ready for a unity. They were still pursuing their own hidden agendas and they were still more concerned about leadership squabbles affecting their liberation movements.
The Frontline Presidents did not give up the quest for unity amongst the nationalists who appeared to be nursing their differences rather than working for a united front. By the time the US-Rhodesia initiative reached its climax in September 1976, the nationalist movement was still badly divided, politically and militarily. Nationalist attitudes in the period leading up to the Geneva Conference in the nationalist camp were those of mistrust and division. As seen earlier, the FLPS made another abortive attempt to unify all the nationalist factions in September 1976. This failure did not put an end to the search for unity and political alliances. 39)
Paradoxically, at the centre of this search was Nkomo, who played a major role in frustrating the September unity effort. Nkomo was plainly aware of his weakness in the face of future military and political challenges. M. Tamarkin states that despite bitter traditional hostility and rivalry, Nkomo sought an alliance with Mubage's ZANU. In view of the expanding guerrilla war, an alliance, distinct from unity, with ZANU was a sound investment in the future. As a member of such a powerful alliance, Nkomo could hope to undermine Muzorewa's domestic base and transform his own ANC into the dominant domestic nationalist organisation. 40) An alliance
2-12 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. could at least enable ZANU to keep a watchful eye on the scheming and volatile Nkomo. -
While negotiating with ZANU, Nkomo also sounded out Muzorewa for a possible alliance.41) This search for reinsurance was indicative of Nkomo's perception of his own political weakness. Although he had been engaged in a bitter struggle with Muzorewa over the legitimacy of their respective, competing ANC's, an alliance with him was not without merit. Ideologically, Muzorewa's ANC was more appealing to Nkomo than ZANU militants. Together they could hope to monopolise the African domestic political scene. This could compensate for his military weakness. On 30 September, in Gaborone, Nkomo offered Muzorewa unity. This offer should have appealed to Muzorewa who lacked regional and international support and whose position within the nationalist camp had been seriously eroded. 42) Muzorewa, however, did not accept the offer. The presidents again encouraged Nkomo to meet Muzorewa to form a triple alliance since they regarded Muzorewa as having appreciable support inside the country. In the triple alliance, Mugabe was going to be part of it without Sithole.
High emotions for unity were fuelled once again following Smith's announcement on majority rule. The Rand Daily Mail of 2 October 1976 reported that concerted efforts were being made to achieve unity among the rival Rhodesian African Nationalist factions on the eve of the proposed Rhodesian Constitutional Conference. In a significant move yesterday the two rival ANC leaders, Mr Joshua Nkomo and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, met for an hour in Gaberone." 43) President Kaunda was instrumental in trying to get the two leaders together. The two leaders agreed to resume their talks on 4 October in Salisbury. Once again the Botswana unity initiative like other endeavours couldn't produce the intended results. Martin Meredith says that on Sunday 3 October Muzorewa returned from exile to Salisbury, to one of the most tumultuous welcomes ever accorded to a nationalist. At least one hundred thousand Africans turned out in the black suburbs of Highfield to greet him, singing and shouting the Muzorewa slogan. The size of his welcome was in striking
2-13 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. contract to the one accorded nine days previously to Nkomo, when he returned to Salisbury after five months' exile. Only fifteen hundred Africans turned out for him. Impressed by his obvious popularity at home, Muzorewa saw no need to link with Nkomo.") Echoing Meredith's position Lester A. Sobel states that Muzorewa returned to Salisbury on 3 October after 14 months of self-imposed exile. He was greeted enthusiastically by an estimated 100,000 blacks. Nkomo had been greeted by only 2000 during a brief visit to the city on 25 September.
On Monday Nkomo flew from Bulawayo to Salisbury to meet Bishop Muzorewa as pre-arranged. He was not officially welcomed. In The Chronicle of 5 October 1976 it was reported that the Muzorewa ANC Secretary-General, Dr Gordon Chavunduka, had confirmed that the Nkomo group had been told that the Muzorewa wing had "more important issues to discuss at the moment" and had no time to meet Mr Nkomo. 49) According to The Chronicle it was obvious to Joshua Nkomo that he was less important and that his unity initiative was not regarded as necessary. It cast a lot of doubts as to whether Bishop Muzorewa had ever given the unity initiative a thorough thought. If he had taken the opportunity it would have convinced blacks in Rhodesia that Muzorewa was a progressive leader fighting for their freedom like the other Nationalist leaders. Bishop Muzorewa had reasons for his refusal. Andre Astrow states that Muzorewa resisted Nkomo's overtures for an alliance because considerable hostility existed not only between Muzorewa and Nkomo, but also between Nkomo and many of Muzorewa's top aides. 46) This sealed any hope for an alliance between Nkomo and Muzorewa.
Joshua Nkomo refused to be discouraged by the support accorded to Bishop Muzorewa. The Rhodesia Herald of 6 October 1976 reported that Nkomo had said the size of the crowd welcoming an African Nationalist was not an accurate indication of a leader's following in Rhodesia. "The Muzorewa welcome is not the point, we are engaged in very serious matters and should not be playing games like open Mercedes politics. When we contacted him yesterday he said he was busy for
a few days, and I couldn't wait". 47)
2-14 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership.
Nkomo couldn't wait because time was against him since the Geneva Conference was approaching and it was upon his shoulders to bring the nationalists together as suggested by the Frontline State presidents. In the Rand Daily Mail of 5 October 1976 it was reported that Nkomo had been asked by the Black 'Frontline' Presidents to bring Rhodesia's leaders together. It was for this reason that his aides were meeting Robert Mugabe.") This gives all the reasons why Nkomo had no choice but to force his way through and talk to Robert Mugabe. But it did not mean he could not have opted to talk to Sithole. It was just because Sithole had no strong political backing abroad and internally. He, therefore, preferred to talk to Robert Mugabe.
An alliance between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe had the Frontline presidents' blessing. From their own soundings, the Frontline presidents now knew Mugabe had the support and confidence of most of the ZANU guerrillas and ZIPA units. 49) It was, therefore, necessary for Nkomo to strike an alliance with Robert Mugabe because he was to benefit from it: Robert Mugabe had the support of the guerrillas needed for any successful armed struggle in Rhodesia.
President J. Nyerere brought the two together in Dar en Salaam at the beginning of October 1976. They spent seven long days talking and on 9 October announced the alliance. They called it the Patriotic Front. Unfortunately the alliance had no terms of agreement which would bind them. David Smith states that there was no common philosophy, strategy, or even the bond of trust and friendship. Convenience and expediency dictated. 50) Nkomo hoped to gain from association with the ZANU guerrilla army which in 1976 was vastly increasing the scale of its onslaught on Rhodesia. When he joined the Patriotic Front, Nkomo's guerrilla army was not as big as Mugabe's and had little impact within Rhodesia. 51) It was upon this alliance that the proposals would be made genuinely acceptable to the African people in Rhodesia. If Nkomo and Mugabe could form a front to contest
2-15 . Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. the details rather than the principle, of a Rhodesian settlement on the basis of majority rule, much might develop.
The alliance was a strange pact between two disparate groups. W.H. Morris-Jones states that the alliance between Nkomo and Mugabe was a strange marriage of convenience, especially as Nkomo was supported by the multinational company, Lonrho, and Mugabe had adopted Marxist-Leninist-Maosim. Personally the men also differed strongly: Nkomo imprecise and jovial, Mugabe intellectual and ascetic. 52) It appeared to be a shaky alliance, though there were some advantages to consider both for ZAPU and ZANU. The most important reasons why the alliance even became possible at that time was the position in which both Mugabe and Nkomo found themselves. Mugabe, who was establishing himself as the sole leader of ZANU found the formation of the PF to his advantage. Andre Astrow says he needed to build up his support among different elements within ZANU, from both the old generation leaders and the younger leaders who had run ZANU in exile, but who were now in Zambian goals. The formation of the PF could help to consolidate his position by strengthening the party as a whole, and it could also establish himself as the leading force behind this development. Furthermore, this would ensure Sithole's final isolation from the party, while he continued to claim to be its leader. More importantly it enabled Mugabe to consolidate his control of ZIPA and ZANLA. 53)
Apart from this the formation of the PF also enabled ZANU to use Nkomo's influence on Kaunda to secure the release of its military and political leaders from Zambian prisons. The leaders included Muzi, Kangai, Gumbo, Hamadziripi and Tongogara. Astrow states that the emergence of the PF and the international support it enjoyed, prompted both ZAPU and ZANU to assert their authority over the guerrilla forces in the aftermath of the Geneva Conference. Firstly, the formation of the PF provided the potential for unity between ZANU and ZAPU which had eluded them since the split in 1963. Secondly, ZIPA had failed to establish a united military wing in the Nationalist movement and lastly the formation
2-16 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership. of the PF had provided new hope for the Frontline States by uniting the Nationalist movement and providing at least a possibility of creating a single army. 54)
When analysing the formation of the PF, it becomes clear that the whole idea of unity was not the nationalists' idea but that of the Frontline Presidents. For them it was a big mistake to launch an uncoordinated struggle against the Smith regime. It is obvious that there was a large gap between Nkomo and Mugabe. Nkomo preferred ties with Bishop Muzorewa so that he would be able to control Muzorewa. But after Nkomo had been rebuffed by Muzorewa, he turned to Robert Mugabe whose guerrillas were doing most of the fighting. The two leaders had the same aims. They both wanted to liberate the African people from Smith's regime. It was this aim that brought them together in an alliance. It was a political achievement by the Frontline leaders and the Nationalists of the PF to be able to dump their political differences in the name of unity, so that they could fight against the Smith regime as a United Front. Through the formation of the PF the political struggle in Rhodesia entered a new political phase.
2-17 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership.
ENDNOTES
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, the Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979, p.47.
CARY, R. African nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, who's who, p.18.
Ibid., p.19.
Ibid., p.167.
Ibid., p.170. THE RAND DAILY MAIL, 6 October 1976, p.17.
Ibid., p.19.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.20.
Ibid., p.23.
Ibid., p.24.
Ibid.
MARTIN, D. The struggle for Zimbabwe, the Chimurenga war, p.70.
CARY, R. African nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, p.19.
MARTIN, D. The struggle for Zimbabwe, p.70.
Ibid., p.71.
THE RAND DAILY MAIL, 6 October 1976, p.17.
Ibid.
CARY, R. African nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, p.170.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.48.
2-18 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership.
Ibid.
SMITH, D. Mugabe, p.133.
MOORCRAFT, P L. A short thousand years, p.43.
NKOMO, J. Nkomo, the story of my life, p.182.
Ibid.
SMITH, D. Mugabe, p.133.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.4.8.
MOORCRAFT, P L. A short thousand years, p.43.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.47.
SYLVESTER, C. The terrain of contradictory development, p.53
CARY, R. African nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, p.30.
PALMBERG, M. The struggle for Africa, p.191.
UTETE, C M B. The road to Zimbabwe, p.120.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, p.118.
SMITH, D. Mugabe, p.91.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, p.118.
Ibid.
THE RAND DAILY MAIL, 28.9.1976, p.7.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, p.149.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.150.
Ibid.
THE RAND DAILY MAIL, 2 October 1976, p.5.
2-19 Chapter 2: The background of the PF leadership.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.267.
THE CHRONICLE, 5 October1976, p.l.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.102.
THE RHODESIAN HERALD, 6 October 1976, p.2.
THE RAND DAILY MAIL, 5 October 1976, p.1.
THE CHRONICLE, 5 October 1976, p.l.
SMITH, D. Mugabe, p.93.
MORRIS-JONES, W.H. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, behind and beyond Lancaster House, p.95.
Ibid.
MUZOREWA, Bishop A.T. Rise up and walk, p.102.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.269.
2-20 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative...
CHAPTER 3: THE PF AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE (THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS)
3.1 THE PF AND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
The formation of the Patriotic Front on 9 October 1976 was a historic move by the FLPS at a time when the international diplomacy initiative headed by U.S. Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger, was at its highest climax. This chapter will focus on the role of the PF, Britain and the other nationalists, Bishop Muzorewa and Rev Sithole (who were not members of the PF) in the Geneva Conference of 28 October 1976, chaired by Mr Ivor Richard, the British UN representative, in his diplomatic initiative and in the Anglo-American initiative for peace in Rhodesia led by Dr David Owen and Andrew Young.
The Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, accepted the Kissinger proposals in principle for change of government in Rhodesia on condition that the two most important portfolios of defence and law and order where in white hands. Mr Smith said it was imperative to retain the confidence of the white population during the transition period. If these portfolios did not remain under white control for a while, white Rhodesians would leave rather than face the inevitable disaster that would follow.° Smith's position was supported by the Rhodesian Front, the ruling party, and by his fellow minority whites in Rhodesia. It is clear that Smith wanted to alleviate white fears to strengthen white control of political affairs in Rhodesia and to protect them from Rhodesian blacks who were in the majority.
The news of Ian Smith's acceptance of the Kissinger package was received with mixed feelings by his black counterparts in Rhodesia and by the Frontline States. In
3-1 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... October the FLPS convened to discuss the forthcoming conference. They reiterated their rejection of the Kissinger plan and called Britain to assume the role of an effective decolonizer. In The Chronicle of 18.10.1976 it was reported that President Nyerere, Chairman of the Frontline group said "today's summit had reaffirmed the Frontline States' stand against the powers and composition of the transitional council of state as outlined by Mr Ian Smith, and their rejection of Mr Smith's demands that security responsibilities remain in white hands in Rhodesia." 2) They agreed that ZIPA should continue to wage a relentless guerrilla war until power was transferred. The mood of the FLPS was also reflected in their solid support for the PF and ZIPA, the political and military manifestations of militant nationalism. 3) The FLPS' stand had given the nationalists a platform on which they could accept or reject Kissinger's package because of the support they were receiving from the FLPS.
It should be noted, however, that the FLPS had not yet formally accorded exclusive recognition to any nationalist group. They did not object to Muzorewa's participation in the Conference and even decided not to exclude Sithole. 4) The FLPS couldn't give unqualified support to either of the two groups (the PF and the other nationlists) presumably because they were not sure of the support the two groups commanded in Rhodesia. Any decision to recognise either side would have been a premature one. The Frontline Presidents as assigned by Kissinger failed to convince the nationalists particularly on the question of security portfolios. The nationalists rejected the Kissinger proposals outright and specifically demanded control of the security portfolios. 5) Though the Kissinger proposals were conditionally accepted by Prime Minister Smith and rejected by the FLPS and the nationalists, he called upon Britain to convene a conference in October because his term of office was about to expire. It was finally announced by Britain that the conference was going to be held in Geneva on 28 October 1976, under the chairmanship of Ivor Richard. Already the chances of its success were very slim.
3-2 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... Before the conference got underway the Kissinger package raised mixed feelings as expressed by the Smith and the nationalist delegation. According to Martin Meredith, Smith insisted that the purpose of the conference was solely to implement the Kissinger proposals, which included white control of defence and law and order. Concurring with Meredith, Joshua Nkomo states that Smith was not really interested in negotiating. He seemed to think that the conference would merely ratify what Kissinger had led him to believe was a deal involving the surrender of the nationalsists. 6) Smith's mission was that of continuing to empower whites in Rhodesia even in a government in which Africans in Rhodesia would be in power. That is why he was reluctant to engage in negotiations with people he knew were in favour of majority rule in Rhodesia.
On the side of the nationalists, the Patriotic Front in particular, the mood was different. Mugabe was the most militant of all the nationalists. His attitude depicted the political differences between him and Joshua Nkomo, his partner in the Patriotic Front. Martin Meredith states that while Mugabe was opposed to negations, Nkomo favoured them. But the Frontline Presidents were confident that Mugabe could be induced to go to a conference. 7) However, there were more profound reasons why Mugabe was not too keen to attend the talks. Neither ZANU nor ZIPA wanted a transitional government, whatever its nature. They wanted a military victory and a direct take over, partly for political and ideological reasons. A negotiated transfer would probably necessitate a coalition with leaders like Muzorewa and Nkomo. This they wanted to avoid at all costs. They were also of the opinion that an interim administration formed by white settlers and black nationalists was bound to lead to economic disaster. 8) Robert Mugabe had a burning desire to restructure Rhodesian society on a scale which far surpassed any of the other nationalists' ideas. While Nkomo looked for a certain measure of accommodation with the whites, Mugabe believed that they should be given no special protection. 9) This difference in political approach to the nature of the struggle between Mugabe and Nkomo shows the internal dynamics of the PF and casts a lot of doubts as to whether the alliance could stand the test of time
3-3 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative...
Though Robert Mugabe depicted that militant mood, he was forced to attend the conference by the Frontline Presidents. They had reasons for that. According to Paul Moorcraft, they needed a settlement and they needed foreign aid, particularly in Zambia and Mozambique, where the economies were tottering. 1°) The FLPS realised that Mugabe could render any settlement useless by continuing the war. They were in favour of the war but it had to be backed up by negotiations. They knew that he commanded substantial support from the guerrillas who were doing most of the fighting against Smith's government. Unlike the Rhodesian negotiations of 1974-1975, the FLPS did not exert a moderating influence on their clients." They adopted this hard-line stand due to economic problems in their own countries. They wanted the nationalists to negotiate seriously.
The formation of the PF reduced the possibility of Smith, the British and the Americans being able to play upon divisions during negotiations. Division amongst the nationalists was still obvious. In the Daily News of 11.10.1976 it was reported that in Lusaka, nationalist leader Ndabaningi Sithole described the new alliance between Nkomo and Mugabe as an attempt to squeeze him out of the running for power in Zimbabwe. 12) Ndabaningi Sithole's attack on the PF was justified on the grounds that he was not on good terms with Mugabe who took over leadership of ZANU from him.
Apart from the nationalists' division amongst themselves, they had some problems with the basis on which the Geneva Conference would be conducted. Ian Smith wanted the conference to be based on the Kissinger proposals, which was opposed by the nationalists. Faced with such an adamant and united African position regarding the very basis of the conference, the British adopted the American attitude, namely that the Kissinger proposals were nothing but a basis for negotiations. 13)
The PF's strategy at the conference was that of demand and reject as a means to deal with the Smith regime and with rival Zimbabwean leaders, Bishop Abel Muzorewa
3-4 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... and Rev Ndabaningi Sithole. As the conference days were approaching, the leaders of the PF made their stand clear by putting forward their demands. They issued a list of demands to make the climate of the conference more conducive to agreement. These included the release of all political prisoners and detainees, the abolition of protected villages, the suspension of all political activity and the Rhodesian government should not be allowed to send a separate delegation to the conference. 14)
The Rhodesia Herald of 26.10.1976 went further to report that they demanded that the 'racist regime' of Mr Ian Smith must cease and desist from the massacre and genocide now being perpetrated by the Fascist forces throughout Zimbabwe. Britain must appoint a member of its government to chair the conference and must clarify immediately Britian's role and status at the conference. They reiterated their demand that Mr Smith's delegation could attend the conference only as part of the British delegation. 15) These demands had the effect of jeopardising the conference before it even started because Britain had to consider these demands and if they failed to meet them the PF would then decide to attend or boycott the conference. The demands had been put forward in order to deal with the Smith regime and the other nationalist leaders.
The Patriotic Front went on pressurising Britain before the conference got started to turn the conference into a constitutionalised one, and this time they were very specific as they challenged the position of Ivor Richard whom Britain appointed as the Chairman of the conference. According to Lester A. Sobel, they demanded that Britain name a cabinet minister to chair the Geneva Conference in place of Ivor Richard, Britian's representative to the United Nations 16) They wanted a senior British minister to reflect more fully Britain's responsibility for Rhodesian affairs. These pre-conditions, though levelling the playing ground at the Geneva Conference, had the weight to frustrate the British government and Smith's intentions. To the other nationalists who were not part of the PF, it was meant to show them that they represent no one in Zimbabwe and to degrade their position since they couldn't put forward theirs. 3-5 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative...
The levelling of the playing ground for this conference was very shaky because the PF again chastised Britain's colonial record and threatened to boycott the opening if their demands were not met. For of all their demands very few were met. In the Rhodesian Herald of 27.10.1976 it was reported that British officials began putting pressure on the Rhodesian government to release detainees. 17) The move was in support of one of the radical demands made by two black nationalist delegations to the bedevilled Rhodesian settlement conference due to open the following day. There had been no response to the other tough demands by the Mugabe-Nkomo alliance that Rhodesian security forces lay down their arms and that Mr Smith attend
the conference only as part of the British delegation.' 8)
The objections against Richard's political position did not stop and posed a serious threat to the conference. Less than three hours before the conference was due to open the leaders of the Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, confronted British officials with demands that Richard's status be upgraded. They also insisted that the Rhodesian delegation sit with the British in the council chamber of the Palais des Nations. 19) The PF's strategy was to make sure that Ivor Richard had more constitutional powers that would enable him to decolonise Rhodesia. They realised that without these powers Richard would just be a political figurehead, without the necessary powers with which he could deliver Rhodesia from the Smith regime.
The nationalists felt that having the Rhodesians and British sitting together would symbolise their collaboration but they did not press this demand and the British made no move to meet it. They were told that Richard would have powers similar to a cabinet minister. This apparently satisfied them sufficiently to allow the conference to open. 20) It was on these grounds that the PF backed down, though their demands were strong. They backed down on the understanding that Britain would indeed give Ivor Richard powers similar to a cabinet minister's, though they were annoyed by the British government's refusal to meet their numerous pre-
3-6 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... conference demands they had made during the previous four days. Their strategy failed because Smith was not relegated and the powers they wanted Richard to have were not granted. Britain refused Smith to be part of their delegation because they did not want to be seen collaborating with Smith, which they had in fact been doing since UDI because if it were not so, they would have crushed Smith's government long before.
The other strategy employed by the PF was that of making war threats which they knew would cause a lot of concern among the delegates and specifically to the British government and to Ian Smith's regime. The Rhodesian nationalist leader, Joshua Nkomo, said that if the Rhodesian settlement conference failed there would be real war in Rhodesia and it would be sharp and short. 21) The strategy was aimed at increasing fear amongst other delegates and to entice Britain to be more serious with the Rhodesian problem. This militant stand was confirmed by Robert Mugabe during his opening address. "If the negotiations fail we shall have no option but to continue to resort to war in order to achieve our freedom and independence. We have assembled here to have independence granted to us by the British government without equivocation. " 22) The PF leadership knew that Britain and Smith were brought to Geneva because of the war the PF guerrillas were launching against the Smith army. They wanted Britain to play a leading role in delivering Rhodesia from white rule and to stop her political doddering.
3.2 DELIBERATIONS
When deliberations started, the first four weeks were taken up by an inconclusive debate about a date for independence. David Martin states that Nkomo and Mugabe wanted independence in a little over ten months on 1 September 1977. Smith clung to the outside limit of two years; Muzorewa and Sithole remained in the middle and Richard tried to get a compromise date of 1 March 1978. 23) Realising that no immediate answer was forthcoming, Robert Mugabe again threatened the conference
3-7 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... delegates. He gave notice that he would walk out of the talks unless power was transferred to a black government within 12 months. "It has got to be 12 months or
35 24) we go . Mugabe was very emphatic about the date, hopefully because most of his guerrillas were fighting against the Smith regime.
Failing to resolve the date issue, Richard was called to London to report, on the stalled talks to the British foreign and commonwealth secretary, Anthony Grosland, Richard came back without a solution and for more than a week the conference was deadlocked over the issue of the independence date.
The Rhodesian government, Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev Sithole agreed to drop the date issue and move into negotiations about a transitional administration. 25) This was going to leave the PF out of the conference because they were not prepared to drop the date issue. They maintained their position until Richard came with a compromise formula to try to meet the nationalist position. Muzorewa, Sithole and Van der Byl, Rhodesia's Foreign Minister, expressed reservations about the formula but they were anxious to move on to substantial issues. Mugabe and Nkomo rejected the compromise and demanded that the British government should commit itself to an immutable date, specifically 1 December 1977. 26)
The time-scale issue should not have presented a problem at all since it was not the only element in the Kissinger plan. The nationalists, however, insisted that this issue be negotiated and agreed upon before the conference proceeded. It became such a stumbling block because of the deep mistrust shared by the nationalists towards Smith. Thus, from the nationalists' point of view, it was vital to shorten the transitional period as much as possible. Furthermore the PF and ZIPA and ZANU in particular, were suspicious of the British motives as well. They suspected that they intended to pre-empt their victory and the establishment in Rhodesia of a truly
socialist state. 27)
3-8 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... Robert Mugabe was not satisfied because the formula did not take into account his demand for independence after twelve months. On the other hand Smith, too, was not happy because he wanted independence to be achieved in a two years' period as stated in the Kissinger plan. However, he was forced to accept the compromise. According to Meredith it was only strong pressure from the FLPS which induced Mugabe to accept the final compromise. 28) Nkomo was not conspicuous over the date issue. He was very agreeable, unlike his partner, Robert Mugabe, who was always militant in his approach. This shows the difference between the two leaders of the PF.
Britain's compromise date of 1 March 1978 did not resolve the date issue. David Martin states that in reality the matter was deferred without an independence date being fixed and the conference moved into another inconclusive phase. Concurring with Martin, Tamarkin says that not being really agreed upon by either the nationalists or the Rhodesian government, the issue of the independence date was deferred rather than resolved. 29) R was because from the start Britain failed to show her commitment to the Rhodesian course of independence, because such a minor issue as the independence date would have been agreed upon by all parties if Britain was fully committed.
The next issue to be tackled was that of the interim government and the election process. The PF continued to use demand, rejection and acceptance strategies but differences among the nationalists continued to exist. Such issues were not supposed to cause a problem. Nationalist leader Bishop Abel Muzorewa called for an election based on universal adult suffrage to be held in Rhodesia to elect the Prime Minister of a transitional government and maintained that this could be done within 14 days. But the hard line Patriotic Front of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo immediately denounced the scheme as a political gimmick and a selfish and impractical plan. 30) The PF's reaction was due to the failure of Muzorewa who did not consult them, and because they wanted to discredit Bishop Muzorewa. The PF once again realised that Muzorewa's suggestion would mean that elections would be
3-9 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... held under the canopy of the Smith regime, which they did not want. They would only agree if such elections were held under an interim government controlled by the liberation movement, namely the PF itself.
This issue caused a lot of confusion amongst the delegates since none of them came with a concrete plan. According to Meredith none of the delegations could agree on what form an interim government should take. All four nationalists rejected the idea of a Council of State as envisaged in the Kissinger proposals. Beyond that, the PF wanted a council of ministers with full legislative and executive powers, control of the army and police and most of the portfolios. The PF also demanded the installation of a British commissioner, who would be given limited powers. 31) Muzorewa, too, wanted a British commissioner, but with greater power to preside over a national security council, which would be charged with transforming the guerrilla forces into a national army. There wasn't a clear cut solution concerning the form the interim government should take since all the delegates had differences over it.
Another issue which caused disagreement was the issue of elections. Differences amongst the nationalists themselves, especially between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, leaders of the PF, became clear at a time when they were supposed to be one. Mugabe, under pressure from the militants, argued that there should be no need for elections as part of the independence process, because power should automatically pass to the national liberation forces. Nkomo disagreed and it was at this point that ZIPA sent its own delegation. 32) They came to curb further disagreements between the leaders of the PF. It was a guerrilla group that was backing Robert Mugabe. Their arrival at the conference boosted the PF's negotiation morale and helped them resolve their differences. In The Chronicle of 26.11.76 it was reported that the Patriotic Front alliance held intensive talks without reconciling the internal differences that were becoming increasingly apparent. Nkomo's delegation had already decided to accept the British plan, which named 1 March 1978 as the ultimate date for independence. But the ZANU half of the
3-10 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... alliance did not want to back down on demands for a fixed, unconditional date for a power hand over within 12 months. 33) It was obvious that differences within the PF leadership were due to their differences of approach and of conflicting interests and strategies aimed at bringing freedom to Rhodesia. The Mugabe delegation of ZANU did not want to accept 1 March 1978 as the independence day because they couldn't trust Smith's and Britain's intentions and it would look like bowing to Britain and Smith's regime.
Due to the continued disagreements and the rejection of the Kissinger proposals the PF presented counter proposals on 30 November and 2 December, which envisaged a direct British role in the transitional period. Bishop Muzorewa condemned ZANU leader Robert Mugabe and ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo for opposing elections for the interim Rhodesian government. He accused the Patriotic Front of creating an anti-democratic front along with the white minority government delegation. 34) Muzorewa's accusations came from frustration caused by the PF which was strategically rejecting almost everything the British, Smith and Muzorewa and Sithole delegations had suggested. Because of the militant stance of the PF, Muzorewa's delegation appeared to be doing nothing in the Geneva Conference. According the The Chronicle of 30.11.1976, it was reported that the progress of this conference has shown that only the PF stood unequivocally opposed to the forces of imperialism and colonialism, a position which correctly represents the basic
aspirations of the struggling broad masses of Zimbabwe. 35)
Richard realised that the conference was not achieving anything and on 14 December he adjourned the conference until 17 January 1977. It never resumed again. On leaving the Geneva Conference, counter attack statements were made by the delegates. The statements of the PF leaders upon departing from Geneva did not augur well for the future British efforts. Nkomo said that he was interested in nothing less than the total surrender of the RF government and the hand over of power to the guerrilla forces. Mugabe demanded much the same. They also condemned the British and the Americans for wanting to establish a puppet
3-11 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... reactionary regime in Rhodesia. 36) On the other side, Van der Byl was busy attacking the political style of the PF. He said that the speeches of the PF were almost a parody, "a music hall caricature of communist invective". 37) Muzorewa had a go at Smith and Nkomo. He called Smith's men "the forces of evil" and the PF the "pathetic front". 38) The Patriotic Front, as viewed by other delegates, looked like the main cause of the Geneva Conference's failure because of its demand and rejectionist stance coupled with its uncompromising attitude. Indeed the PF successfully dealt with the Smith regime, Bishop Muzorewa and Rev Sithole, as they had planned before the conference got started.
The chances for the survival of the Geneva Conference were very slim. The existence of ZIPA as a separate organisation was a crucial factor in preventing a compromise solution from being accepted at the Geneva Conference. 39) Smith did not like ZIPA as it was composed of guerrillas who were fighting his soldiers. It strengthened the PF's uncompromising stand, especially Robert Mugabe's who did not want to compromise at all.
The conference failed largely because Smith insisted that an overall settlement must be worked out according to the Kissinger plan which, in his view, did not specify black rule. His delegation rejected the Patriotic Front's proposal that black control should begin with the interim government, maintaining instead that the main task of the conference was to establish an interim government prior to majority nile. 40) The conference failed to bridge the gap that existed between the PF and the Smith regime. However, it also failed in many other things. According to Ndabaningi Sithole, the Geneva Conference did not secure agreement on a new constitution and on the transitional arrangement because the African leaders demanded more than Smith had agreed with Kissinger to concede, and because Richard was unable to persuade Smith to accept British proposals that aimed to bridge the gap between the Rhodesian Front and the nationalists. 411
3-12 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative...
The absence of African Nationalist unity was also a major factor in the Geneva Conference. The conference failed because the blacks could not agree amongst themselves to form a United Front to compel Smith to shift from his firm stand that the Kissinger package was non-negotiable. African disunity had once again disrupted the nationalist cause. The rift between the political leadership of the PF and the guerrilla commanders grew so wide that a separate guerrilla group arrived in Geneva to oversee the Mugabe-Nkomo shenanigans. The black leaders distrusted each other more than they distrusted the RF. 42) That is why the ZIPA delegation arrived at the conference to curb further disagreements between the PF leadership. Even though there were differences amongst the nationalists, the PF managed to keep up their alliance and dealt with the Smith regime by mostly rejecting the Kissinger package and by putting their own demands.
The strength of the PF wouldn't have been realised by Britain, the Smith regime, the other nationalists and the whole world if it wasn't for the Geneva Conference. Wilfred Burchett says that although the Geneva Conference achieved none of its stated aims, the by-products were of fundamental importance. It provided a forum for consolidation among the real national liberation militants, but brought about the exposure of those who believed it was possible to talk their way into independence and the top power positions. It projected the Patriotic Front into the unrivalled first place and provided a tribune for it to make its aims known to the outside world. 43) That is why the PF leadership considered itself as the legitimate representatives of the nationalist forces and of the people of Zimbabwe, and was able to project Muzorewa and Sithole as Smith's puppets and render them useless during negotiations. They were so weak that some of Muzorewa's top aides wanted to join the PF because they accused Muzorewa of leaning towards the demands of the enemy, Ian Smith.
The failure of the Geneva Conference increased calls for the escalation of the war for freedom in Zimbabwe. The Zambia Daily Mail of 8.11.1976 reported that the five Frontline African states declared that war was the only way to black rule in
3-13 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... Rhodesia and that this appears to reflect a growing disillusionment with the Geneva Conference.") The Frontline States had high hopes for success because their countries were suffering economic hardships and they blamed Britain and Smith. Hence their call for more war which would bring freedom to Zimbabwe.
Robert Mugabe continued with his militant stand. He said no solution to Rhodesia's problems could come from a constitutional conference unless the war was intensified successfully. The emphasis should be on the armed struggle not on the constitutional conference because the settler community and its colonial father, Britain, was not prepared for the transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe. The issue was, therefore, not capable of solution by mere talks, "we have got to keep fighting the white regime until it is toppled." 45) This statement was a confirmation of what Nkomo and Mugabe had said before the conference started. They pledged to step up the war if the conference failed.
The calls for war were supported by other political organisations. Edward Hawley says that the collapse of the Geneva talks had left no alternative but to step up the fighting against the Smith regime. For this reason the OAU appealed to African and foreign governments to increase their material assistance and moral support to Zimbabwe's nationalists with all aid to be channelled through the liberation committee. 46) It was clear that the Frontline States and the OAU' s support to the PF was solely meant to destroy the Smith regime and was meant to strengthen the PF quest for freedom through all possible means.
Britain on the other hand, had to carry the blame for the failure of the Geneva Conference because as a colonial power she should have showed a sense of commitment, but did not. This lack of sincerity had invited many accusations from the PF leadership. In the Daily News of 16.12.1976 it was reported that the Patriotic Front alliance had criticised the Anglo-American settlement plans accepted by Rhodesian white minority leader Ian Smith. They were designed to hoodwink the people of Zimbabwe into accepting a puppet regime for their independence. They
3-14 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... also enhanced the so called nationalist leaders who fell for the dangling imperialist carrot. 47) The PF, being the pace setter, felt justified to put their blame at the doors of Britain and the USA because their role at the conference was very minimal. The PF had been calling for Britain to be more serious and committed to decolonizing Zimbabwe but Britain failed to do so.
On the other hand Muzorewa put the blame on the PF and RF. Bishop Abel Muzorewa stated that it was the Patriotic Front, together with the Rhodesian Front, who wrecked the Geneva Conference." ) Muzorewa's analysis was based on the intransigent attitude of the PF and the RF who were not willing to negotiate in good faith. But there were other factors to be considered. From the outset the chasm between the Ian Smith government and the African Nationalists, and the very wide differences between the black leaders had always made it extremely unlikely that any quick agreement could be reached. 49) The PF got what it wanted, since it always wanted the conference to fail because they realised that Ivor Richard had no constitutional power to free Rhodesia from Smith's government, but the Geneva Conference set up the momentum for future negotiations.
3.3 THE PF AND IVOR RICHARD'S DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE
The unsuccessful endeavour of the Geneva Conference was not the end of the Patriotic Front's struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe. The PF was pleased by its failure but Britain was not because her intention of creating a moderate black government was far from reached. Britain, through their chairman of the adjourned Geneva Conference, Ivor Richard, embarked on a mission aimed at bringing viable proposals for majority rule in Zimbabwe. It was doubtful as to whether the PF, which had lost faith and trust in Britain, would be pleased by the new British initiative led by the very same man they regarded as a political minor who had no constitutional powers. While in London, Ivor Richard engaged in a concentrated exercise of polishing up Britain's proposals for an interim government in Rhodesia and co-ordinating British and United states policy. He planned to meet African
3-15 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... heads of state in Southern Africa, the PF leadership, Smith and South African Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster.
Richard's new proposals received a rebuff before he embarked on his Southern Africa tour. On hearing of the new proposals, Robert Mugabe reacted immediately. The Daily News of 25 December 1976 reported that Robert Mugabe had rejected the four methods of administering Defence and Law and Order ministries during the transitional period. "We want the transfer of power to be total. And we want the transitional government to be in complete control of the vital portfolios of defence and law and order". 50) It was clear that Mugabe was still as militant as before when dealing with Britain and Rhodesia. His views were that the nationalist interests should be paramount and that power should be transferred to the Rhodesian blacks. If Britain failed to meet these demands the war would continue and Richard's shuttle to Africa would be doomed.
In his African Safari, Richard met Smith on 1 January 1977 and discussed with him Britain's new proposals for the transitional government. Unfortunately Smith criticised Richard's handling of the Geneva Conference and was suspicious that Richard's intention was to put forward his new plan as a take it or leave it solution, which he refiised. 51) Prime Minister Vorster showed as mild an interest in the new British plan as Smith had done. He wanted a negotiated settlement to be conducted within the framework of the Kissinger plan and he wanted an assurance from the Frontline States that war would stop immediately the interim government was in power. 52)
After consulting Smith and Vorster, Richard continued to consult the FLPS and the Nationalists. Continuing his safari, Richard found a more favourable response to his ideas from Khama, Machel, Nyerere and Kaunda. All argued that the war should be stopped once an acceptable interim government was installed. Nkomo and Mugabe, however, were indifferent. They wanted firm proposals in writing from Richard before they were willing to consider them fully. 53) This stance was
3-16 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... taken by the PF leadership because they knew they had all the support they needed. The FLPS re-affirmed their support of the nationalist movement of Zimbabwe in their struggle to free Zimbabwe from the yoke of colonialism and racist minority rule. In this regard the leaders commended the Patriotic Front for the unity they had demonstrated, especially during the Geneva Conference, and urged that this unity be maintained and consolidated. The leaders decided to give full political, material and diplomatic support to the Patriotic Front to enable them to realise the objectives of their just struggle. 54) With this support the Patriotic Front's position was strengthened.
From various quarters, both in Rhodesia and elsewhere, the question was being asked why the Frontline presidents chose to back the Nkomo-Mugabe Patriotic Front. There were obvious reasons why the FLPS chose to support the PF. The Chairman of the Frontline States, president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, said that the decision was taken because both wings of the Patriotic Front were backed by the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). 55) But there were three other considerations why the Frontline countries placed their weight behind the PF. The experience of the conflicting allegiances of the Angolan Civil War was taken into account. A realistic compromise was struck to support the Patriotic Front. Thus the presidents avoided a possible repeat of their divided efforts on Angola, and a split in their ranks. Secondly, the presidents felt that a leadership which could demonstrate political maturity and viability, and also muster military substance, was needed. Nkomo had the political and military backing of ZAPU. He also had the sympathy of many African leaders. They acknowledged him as an international, veteran, political personality. Mugabe on the other hand, had the credentials of a leader of ZIPA and would throw into the partnership a formidable military force. He would also bring with him part of the ZANU political support which he had wrested from Sithole. Thirdly, the decision of the Frontline presidents was also calculated to get agreement on Britain's proposals for a settlement. 56)
3-17 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... The Frontline States' support to the PF was destroyed by Ivor Richard who regarded it as a threat to his mission. Such support would encourage the PF to stage a fierce war in Rhodesia and Ivor Richard gave a strong warning that if the Rhodesian talks failed, the world would be faced with a situation as dangerous as the Second World War. Once a war had started, it would involve other nations and if the Rhodesian war continued, the potential for disaster was enormous. 57) This feeling was also expressed by Muzorewa who said the decision by the Frontline heads of state to support and recognise the Patriotic Front would only produce bitterness and bloodshed. 58) The PF was, according to Muzorewa, always making war threats and derailed all the hopes of a peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe.
On 10 January 1977, Richard met with the two nationalist leaders but failed to win their support for the British proposals for an interim transitional government. The two nationalist leaders rejected British plans for a resident British Commissioner to supervise the transition and a British role in the areas of national defence and security, insisting on a limited British role and nationalist responsibility for internal
security and defence. 59)
This militant posture might have been encouraged by Kaunda, who addressed the liberation committee of the organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 29 January and charged Richard with calling off the Geneva negotiations without consulting the Rhodesian Nationalists. This was a political blow to Richard's mission. M. Tamarkin states that Richard's mission came finally to a dead end on 30 January 1977, when he was rebuffed by the PF, whose leaders refused to meet him in Lusaka because of their annoyance at his unilateral termination of the talks. 60) Sobel concurs with Tamarkin when he says the Patriotic Front refused to meet Richard in Lusaka, Zambia because of Kaunda's charge. They said Richard's action had left the nationalists with no choice but guerrilla warfare to defeat the white minority government. They rejected future consultations with Britain until Britain was prepared to adopt a positive, unequivocal and more determined stand to effect the
3-18 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... transfer of power. 61) The Patriotic Front was again using its strategy to force Britain to be more serious and commit herself to the freedom of Zimbabwe.
Richard's proposals were also rejected by Smith, who made a nation-wide broadcast to give his own version. The proposals, he said, were closely aligned to what the PF and the Frontline presidents had been demanding. They would have led to immediate black rule and the imposition of a Marxist indoctrinated regime. 62) Smith rejected Richard's proposals because they seemed to favour the PF and the FLPS, yet the proposals were going to effect a joint administration during the interim period.
The rejection of Richard's proposals by the nationalist leaders was due to the unqualified support the PF received from the OAU, which was frustrated by the failure of the Geneva Conference and saw the war against the Smith regime as the only alternative. According to Edward A. Hawley, the OAU had appealed to African and foreign governments to increase their material assistance and moral support to Zimbabwe's nationalists, with all aid to be channelled through the liberation committee and at the same meeting, the OAU strongly endorsed the Patriotic Front as the only legitimate liberation group in Zimbabwe and called upon member states to extend military, political and diplomatic backing only to it. 63) The support from the FLPS and OAU strengthened their military, political and diplomatic position in such a way that the PF was regarded as the political pace setter in the political affairs in Zimbabwe and internationally because it was obvious that no decision regarding the Zimbabwean independence could be arrived at without the PF.
With all the fuss Richard had to go back to the drawing board to redefine his new proposals. On 18 January Richard met Smith and discussed his new proposals. He then met the FLPS at a meeting in Lusaka where they again announced their exclusive recognition for the PF.
3-19 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... Colin Legum states that this decision, intended to strengthen the unity of the Zimbabwean fighting front, had two serious consequences. The first was that it virtually ensured Smith's rejection of the British proposals since the implications of the FLPS' recognition meant that effective power would pass into the hands of Mugabe and Nkomo. The second was that while unifying the Zimbabweans, it widened the rift between Muzorewa's supporters and the PF which forced Muzorewa to pursue his own independent initiative inside Rhodesia, just as Nkomo had done a year earlier. 64) Smith felt threatened and Muzorewa felt sidelined in the political affairs of Zimbabwe.
It became clear that Smith rejected Richard's proposals because of South African support. Vorster had done another U-turn, petrol and ammunition supplies flowed again, South African combat police returned to the operation repulse area in the South of Rhodesia, with their liaison officers quite visible in and around Fort Victoria and training of Rhodesian jet pilots, recommenced in the Transvaal. Vorster and his new foreign minister R.F. Botha now favoured an internal solution
which would exclude the PF and the armed guerrillas entirely. 65)
Richard's endeavour failed because neither party co-operated. Smith acknowledged the strong sentiment for a negotiated settlement. His difficulty was that, having decided to discard the British plan, he depended on coming to terms with moderate nationalists like Muzorewa, who despite encouragement, showed no enthusiasm for mutual discussion. From Smith's point of view, an alliance with Muzorewa seemed feasible. 66) The FLPS' support for the PF forced Muzorewa and the ANC to see their future in terms of an internal solution in the same way that Smith did. When Smith was contemplating an internal settlement as the answer, the PF declared that they would not hold further talks with Britain unless she showed more determination to achieve majority rule. In The Citizen of 31 January 1977 it was reported that "the present circumstances arising from the unilateral cancellation of the constitutional talks by Britain compel us to adopt the attitude that any talks between us and Mr Ivor Richard are a futile exercise". 67) Richard's endeavour failed mostly
3-20 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... because Britain was not yet willing to take over the responsibility over Rhodesia and decolonise her from the racist Smith regime.
3.4 THE PF AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVOUR
The chairman of the adjourned Geneva Conference, Ivor Richard, failed to secure a viable solution for the independence of Zimbabwe. He tried to negotiate with the PF, FLPS, Smith and South Africa, hoping that he would bring majority rule in Rhodesia, but the PF's and Smith's rejection of his proposals led to his failure. Both parties received unqualified support from their principals. The PF had all the support from the FPLS, OAU and the internal community, whilst Ian Smith received his support from South Africa.
The support they both received from their principals strengthened their political stance in a way that the British government was left without a clear idea of what to do next as there seemed to be little prospect of salvaging anything from the debris of the Geneva Conference or Ivor Richard's spent mission. It was now time that Britain should realise her colonial responsibility as once demanded by the PF.
Britain now acknowledged this demand. Meredith states that the outcome of the Geneva Conference obliged Britain to assume a major role in trying to solve the conflict, and in London government officials concluded that they could not simply do nothing. 68) The realisation had been triggered by the PF and Smith who could not find a common political solution for the independence of Zimbabwe. Britain avoided responsibility for years, but now because of the PF's demand and Smith's intransigence, they felt they should assume it.
3-21 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... After Jimmy Carter took office in February 1977, as President of the USA, he felt that a positive interest in Africa would encourage black voters who had helped to put him into power. One of his first acts was to call for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment which allowed American companies to buy Rhodesian chrome in spite of sanctions. The amendment was repealed in March as a signal to the Rhodesians that under no circumstances could they count on any form of American assistance any longer. British Prime Minister Callaghan visited Washington at about the same time, searching for American assistance in finding a Rhodesian solution. Instead of running alongside while Kissinger carried the ball, they would now take the leading role with American support. 69) Such a task was entrusted to Dr David Owen, British Foreign Secretary, who was later joined by Andrew Young, US Ambassador to the United Nations.
In his African safari, Owen toured the Frontline States, from 11 to 17 April, discussing his proposals and hearing what they had to say to him. Dr Owen and Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, agreed to sponsor a conference to discuss a constitution. On hearing about the Anglo-American initiative for a settlement in Zimbabwe, Mugabe once again posed his militant stand. Mugabe saw it as imperialist manoeuvres aimed at the neutralisation of their war effort and negating their success, and being disadvantaged through the instrumentality of a home based stooge and reactionary leadership, which only in theory paid lip service to the principle of majority rule." ) Mugabe still regarded war as the only answer to their struggles.
Owen and Cyrus Vance agreed to sponsor a conference to discuss a constitution. Throughout Dr Owen's exploratory shuttle, he emphasised two points: that an independence conference, as he preferred to call it, must reflect as many shades of Rhodesian opinion as possible, and that the British government had little power to implement an agreement and would rely on the muscle of the United States. 71) It was on that very point that Owen got into immediate difficulty with the Patriotic Front. Meredith states that both Mugabe and Nkomo raised objections about
3-22 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... American participation in the conference, worried that it might harm their relations with the Soviet Union. They demanded that negotiations should be conducted exclusively between the PF, as the sole representative of the African population, and Britain as the colonial power. 72) They wanted Ian Smith to be relegated to the position of a British delegation. This was a definite setback which required the re- evaluation of the whole initiative. Owen was particularly upset about the objection to US participation at the conference, which he considered as a vital component of his strategy. This was quite unacceptable to him and at a press conference later he stated that if formation of a constitution for an independent Zimbabwe was to be discussed everybody who was going to live under that constitution had to be
represented. 73)
Presidents Nyerere, Machel, Khama and Kaunda, however, approved Owen's strategy with optimism at achieving a peaceful transfer to majority rule in Rhodesia in 1978. They assured Owen that their support for the Patriotic Front would not stop, but accepted that the other nationalist organisations should participate in any constitutional talks. 74) Muzorewa states that the Frontline States' support for the Anglo-American initiative was essential since basically they were in control of ZIPA. Precisely because the Frontline States favoured an orderly transfer of power to majority rule and had adopted the military alternative only as a last choice, it was not difficult to gain their support. 75) Mugabe was always in favour of the war as the most viable option which could bring liberation in Rhodesia.
Again the Frontline States' position encouraged Dr Owen to go ahead with his diplomatic endeavour. By the time he arrived in Salisbury on 15 April, he was confident that the initiative had a chance of success. Before meeting Smith, Owen firstly went to South Africa where Vorster was impressed by his fresh, pragmatic style, but when he arrived in Rhodesia, Smith put before him his demands. Meredith states that Smith stressed the need to devise a constitution which would preserve the confidence of the whites. Specifically he wanted extra white representation in parliament and a parliamentary blocking mechanism to ensure that
3-23 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... entrenched clauses in the constitution could not be changed except with white approval, he asked for guarantees about the impartiality of the judiciary, safeguards for white pensions and the retention of the security forces. 76) Smith put his demands before Dr Owen knowing very well that he had already made up his mind for an internal settlement with moderate blacks. He knew that the internal settlement would secure the white confidence and he was aware that the PF would refuse his demands.
Dr Owen realised that the two parties had different demands which needed to be married, but Owen did not take them seriously because he thought that those differences would be settled at a constitutional conference scheduled to be held before July. The PF's objections could be countered on the support they always knew they had from the Frontline States. Olajede Aluko states that the Frontline States, on behalf of Africa, put forward conditions which had to be satisfied before any legitimate settlement of the conflict in Zimbabwe could be achieved. They said that any agreement must ensure majority rule under a government led by the Patriotic Front. Finally Kaunda emphasised this position in 1977 as he was addressing the OAU' s liberation committee saying that Mr Smith and the whole world must be informed that no agreement reached without the Patriotic Front would be acceptable and would end in civil war. 77) This support strengthened the PF in the struggle for the total liberation of Zimbabwe and that again gave them leverage to deny and object against any suggestion put before them. Dr Owen acknowledged the PF's and Smith's concerns equally well and it was on him to come up with new proposals that would satisfy both parties.
During the Anglo-American process things were not normal in the PF's camp. Some distinct events occurred that nearly split the PF leadership. The guerrilla offensive failed to force the hand of the Rhodesian government partly because of lack of unity and co-ordination in the guerrilla camp. On 17 January 1977 ZANU and ZAPU set up a ten-member co-ordinating committee to implement the jointly agreed programme. Despite much deliberation and encouragement by the regional
3-24 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... patrons, military unity was still elusive. The truth of the matter was that the question of ZANU-ZAPU unity was still most problematic. Nyerere admitted in July 1977 that obstacles to unity were deep-seated differences between the two movements. 7 8) Despite fighting a common enemy for broadly the same goal, namely liberation, ZANU and ZAPU, Mugabe and Nkomo were strange bedfellows.
After this ill fated attempt at military unity ZAPU and ZANU agreed to wage independent wars against the Rhodesians, ZIPRA would operate in the western Matabeleland provinces with rear bases in Zambia, while ZANLA operated from Mozambique into the east and southern provinces. 79) H. Ellert states that this division of territory also meant that ZANLA no longer received their full share of military aid being channelled into Zambia by the Soviet Union and East Germany. ZANLA was forced to seek assistance elsewhere and found it in Yugoslavia, Romania and China. 80) At this stage they came to no firm agreement on the conduct of the war apart from agreeing to fight together and Mugabe insisting that Nkomo throw more men into the field. This long standing rivalry and animosity which dated back to the early 1960's had been recently fuelled and exacerbated by the cohabitation under the ZIPA roof. Tamarkin states that speaking to the PF military sub-committee, ZIPRA cadres attributed their opposition to unity to the killing of their comrades by ZANLA guerrillas at Magagoo in 1976. 81) The ZIPRA forces of Nkomo couldn't agree to such a military unity because of their long rivalry with ZANLA forces of Mugabe which led to many of their guerrillas losing lives. And when ZIPA came into the picture, the ZIPRA forces were threatened because ZIPA forces were supporting Robert Mugabe. That is why ZIPRA couldn't form a military unity with ZANLA forces because they did not trust ZIPA and ZANLA forces.
The delay in the implementation of unity generated suspicions in the uneasy alliance. Whatever chances there were of forging closer ties were wrecked by the meeting of Smith and Kenneth Kaunda in late September in Lusaka, which caused a furore when news of it leaked out, irritating Muzorewa and Sithole and causing a
3-25 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... deep rift between the two wings of the Patriotic Front and among the Frontline States. There was no doubt that Smith was prepared to countenance an agreement with Nkomo through Kaunda, who had always seen Nkomo as the most likely and suitable to succeed to the presidency. 82) These meetings were arranged by Tiny Rowland, the head of Lonrho, which has vast investments in mining, land, commerce, industry and the oil pipeline connecting Umtali to the port of Beira. Within two months of the meeting with Smith, Kaunda proposed to his Frontline colleagues a new strategy that was fundamentally opposed to their long held principles of elections based on one man one vote and no independence before majority rule. Now he wanted them to accept NIBMAR , no elections before
majority rule. 83)
This meeting appealed to Kaunda. Zambia was in need of a settlement as much as Rhodesia. The Zambian economy was in a critical state, its giant coppermines
operating at a loss and there were constant shortages of food and consumer goods. 84) On the other side Smith's interest in Nkomo was two-fold. According to David Martin he regarded him as the most astute black politician in the field and he was impressed, moreover, by the calibre of his black and white advisers. Despite Russian support for his movement, Smith believed, as a result of his negotiations from 1975 to 1976, that Nkomo was essentially a moderate pro-western leader, amenable to safeguarding white interests. Smith reasoned that if he could lure Nkomo into negotiation, he would stall the threatened offensive, split the PF, reinforce his own bid for an internal settlement and fortify Nkomo's ambition to
become the first president of Zimbabwe. 85)
They had met briefly once before during the Victoria Falls Conference in 1975 when both their fortunes were in a better state. This time far more was at stake. Smith repeated his objections to the Anglo-American plan. He suggested that it would be in Zambia's interests to persuade Nkomo to participate in an internal settlement. The difficulty that both men faced was that Nkomo was a minority leader who could not expect to win an election. That problem could be overcome if Nkomo's
3-26 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... candidature was supported by the whites, with their extra parliamentary
representation, and by one or more of the other African factions. 86)
The impact of the Smith-Kaunda meeting, when the news broke one week later, was considerable. Kaunda was severely criticised in the Zambian Parliament and he incurred the displeasure of the other Frontline States which had not been informed in advance. An even more hostile reaction came, not surprisingly, from ZANU. ZANU leaders immediately suspected that the meeting could have had little purpose other than to further the interests of Nkomo and the lingering animosity that they had felt for Kaunda since the mass arrests in 1975 swelled to a new peak 87) Mugabe attacked Kaunda for agreeing to the meeting and refused to accept his assurance that Nkomo had not been present, and postponed talks he was due to hold with Nkomo on the merger between ZANU and ZAPU into a single political party. The open split in the PF that Smith's visit to Lusaka caused was never far below the surface. Mugabe and Nkomo differed over strategy as well as tactics and the rivalry between the movements they led divided them even further. Nkomo was personally ambitious, Mugabe was ambitious for the cause. Nkomo still believed in the merits of negotiation as a way of settling the conflict, Mugabe argued that war was the only means by which the nationalists could effect revolutionary change. 88) Thus Smith's secret trip to Lusaka revived old grievances and rivalries between ZAPU and ZANU.
Kaunda reacted angrily and in public to Mugabe's criticism and some of his government officials called for the banning of Mugabe and ZANU, but Kaunda's front line colleagues were equally critical, perhaps more at the outcome than the fact of the meeting. 89) It was also the beginning of a problem between Kaunda and Nyerere. Nyerere objected to Kaunda's proposal during a meeting at Mbaba in Northern Zambia in November, that the principle of elections now written into the Anglo-American proposals be dropped, and Zimbabwe instead become independent
with a government of national unity based on the Patriotic Front. 90)
3-27 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... Further differences flared between Nkomo and Mugabe in November 1977 around the Anglo-American proposal to hold the election before independence. Tamarkin states that while Nkomo insisted on holding the election after independence, Mugabe demanded that it be held during the interim period. hi early December Nkomo responded to Owen's invitation to come to London for talks, while Mugabe declined.91) On 7 and 8 December Mugabe and Nkomo conferred in Maputo, after almost three months during which they had not met, and papered over the differences regarding the Anglo-American proposals.
When analysing the deep seated causes of the rift in the PF, Tamarkin states that the PF was basically a tactical alliance, a platform which both movements sought in order to further common as well as particular goals and interests. Neither was genuinely seeking unity in equality. Neither was prepared to relinquish ideology or to discard ambitions. For Mugabe, unity was the absorption of ZAPU and ZIPRA into ZANU. He was too devoted to ZANU and its historic mission to contemplate its dilution. For Nkomo with his ethnically limited mobilisation potential full unity would have been politically suicidal. Nkomo had little interest in military unity in which his guerrillas would be submerged. A loose alliance served him well in keeping his options open. 92) The most important issue which generated frustration, suspicion, tension and animosity within the ranks of the PF was the pursuit of the war. Dr Owen was unable to manipulate these differences, but if he succeeded, he would have succeeded in putting through his proposals.
Despite their differences the PF was able to stay until Owen realised that he had to adopt a very flexible approach to narrow down the area of disagreement between Smith and the PF. Dr Owen was frustrated by USA and Britain for refusing to offer military assistance in Rhodesia. Owen settled to the formation of a consultative group. He immediately put up a joint Anglo-American consultative group comprised of John Graham and Stephen Low who toured African capitals exploring what terms for a settlement could be arranged with a view to closing gaps and reaching an agreement. The difficulty they faced was to devise a formula which satisfied both
3-28 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... the Rhodesian government and the PF. The principal stumbling block was no longer the issue of one man one vote. 93) The alternative allowed for full and equal U.S. participation. It also circumvented the PF objection to the participation of Smith and the moderate nationalists in the conference. The resort to this alternative indicated a certain Anglo-American bias towards the PF but it was not long before they ran into problems. According to Meredith a formidable obstacle developed over the role of the security forces. The PF regarded the security forces as the fighting arm of the RF, distrusted their intention of staying neutral after any settlement and demanded that the guerrilla forces should reap the rewards of bringing down the white regime by taking control of security. In discussions with the Anglo-American negotiations, Smith stuck firmly to his view of the merits of a qualified franchise, and in public he continued to equate one man one vote with `mob rule' and banana republics. 94) Smith was adamant that the security forces would have to be retained. Without them, he warned, the whites would abandon the country. The issue was simply not negotiable.
Between those two stands, no compromise seemed available. In July Graham and Low arrived, armed with a specific set of proposals for a new constitution and an interim government in which the contentious issue of security was dealt with. They proposed that the government forces and the guerrillas should be integrated. From both sides the response was not encouraging. In Lusaka Nkomo demanded that the PF should take charge of an interim government and be given control of security and British presence was not needed whereas in Salisbury Smith disliked the idea of British control of Rhodesia for it would wrest from him the ability to protect white interests and he was scornful of the idea to integrate the government and guerrilla forces. 95) The Graham and Low initiative failed to reconcile the different ideas of the PF and Smith. Nkomo went further to demand that Britain commit itself to handing over power in Rhodesia to the Front.
David Owen was determined enough to keep the Anglo-American initiative alive irrespective of Graham and Low's failure to bring a viable solution to the Rhodesian
3-29 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... problem. Between 23 and 24 July he went back to Washington to get detailed Anglo-American agreement. He even consulted the SA Foreign Minister, R.F. Botha, with the aim of engaging South Africa's support for the Anglo-American initiative. In August 1977, David Owen and Andy Young embarked on an African mission to discuss their proposals with the FLPS, PF, Sithole and Muzorewa, Smith and Vorster. Lester Sobel states that in Lusaka, Zambia, Young and Owen met on 27 August with representatives of the Frontline African States involved in the Rhodesian crisis. The Frontline States made it clear that there could be no compromise over Smith's removal from office and the dismantling of the Rhodesian army and on 28 August they met with Mugabe and Nkomo who rejected the proposal to introduce a U.N. peace keeping force in Rhodesia, saying that the Patriotic Front forces were the only forces entitled to supervise the transition to majority rule. 96)
Owen and Young flew to Pretoria without the endorsement of African states and thus with little hope of persuading Vorster to put pressure on Smith. The mood in South Africa was already hostile after the Americans had hinted to Vorster in Vienna and had bluntly told Botha in London that if the South Africans did not co- operate, the United states might fail to use its veto in the Security Council, thus allowing sanctions, including oil sanctions, to be imposed against South Africa. 97) This time South Africa pledged her support for Smith but at the same time criticising the USA and Britain. On the other hand the PF was still adamant and not willing to co-operate.
After the Anglo-American proposals were published on 1 September, Smith rejected them and was heavily criticised by the PF. Colin Legum states that both found some common ground in viewing it as a colonial concept. 98) Both parties viewed it as a colonist concept because it favoured neither party and they were not prepared to compromise their stance.
3-30 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative... Muzorewa and Sithole were comfortable with the Anglo-American proposals. SA changed her attitude when R.F. Botha on 19 September said that South Africa was committed to the effort to obtain an internationally acceptable solution in Rhodesia. This change of attitude was also shown by the FLPS. Sobel states that the five black African Frontline Nations on 24 September gave qualified but formal support to the Anglo-American plan to bring majority rule to Rhodesia and after a two-day meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, representatives from Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia said the plan would serve as a basis for further negotiations despite a lot of negative points. 99) The acceptance of the Anglo- American initiative by the FLPS never meant that they failed to see that it could not bring peace in Rhodesia. It did not have any influence on the PF leaders because they were always moving together avoiding contradictions and conflicting ideas and statements. However, the initiative paved the way for further talks.
It is clear that the Anglo-American initiative failed because the Frontline States did not put pressure on the PF to take the initiative as a serious step to liberation. Robert Mugabe continued to pose his militant stand and on the other hand Smith was still intransigent. The political differences between the leaders of the PF was not solved but they succeeded to work together bound by the common aim of liberating Rhodesia. The PF received support from the Frontline States which brought the alliance together for a common cause. The PF realised that Britain was not prepared to resume her colonial responsibilities as she did not appoint a Cabinet Minister or give Richard constitutional powers so that he could decolonise Rhodesia. During the negotiations the PF was stronger than the other nationalists. It monopolised the talks since its inception and gave no chance to the Smith regime, Muzorewa and Sithole to direct talks according to their terms. The PF's position was again strengthened by the support they received from the FLPS.
3-31 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative...
ENDNOTES
THE CHRONICLE, 12 October 1976.
THE CHRONICLE, 1.8 October 1976.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.153.
Ibid.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.269.
NKOMO, J. Nkomo, the story of my life, p.171.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.269.
MORRISON, G. Africa confidential, vol.17, no.21, October 22, 1976, p.3
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.275.
MOORCRAFT, P.L. A short thousand years, p.53.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.153.
BAUMIloGGER, G. The struggle for independence, vol.11, Document 162, p.174.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.153.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.268.
THE RHODESIAN HERALD, 26 October 1976.
SOBEL, L.A. Rhodesia, Zimbabwe 1971-77, p.96.
THE RHODESIAN HERALD, 27 October 1976.
Ibid. THE CHRONICLE, 29 October 1976.
3-32 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative...
Ibid.
THE RHODESIAN HERALD, 27 October 1976.
THE RHODESIAN HERALD, 30 October 1976.
MARTIN, D. et al. The struggle for Zimbabwe, the Chimurenga war, p.260.
THE CHRONICLE, 5 November 1976.
THE CHRONICLE, 17 November 1976.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.284.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.156.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.285.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.156.
THE RHODESIAN HERALD, 5 November 1976. THE CHRONICLE, 5 November 1976.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.285.
Ibid.
MUZOREWA, Bishop A.T. Rise up and walk, p.105.
THE CHRONICLE, 30 November 1976.
SOBEL, L.A. Rhodesia, Zimbabwe 1971-77, p.102.
THE CHRONICLE, 30 November 1976.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.158.
MOORCRAFT, P.L. A short thousand years, p.55.
Ibid.
MUZOREWA, Bishop A.T. Rise up and walk, p.105.
3-33 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative...
HAWLEY, E.A. Africa today, vol 24, p. 39.
MORRIS-JONES, W.H. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.95.
MOORCRAFT, P.L. A short thousand years, p.58.
BURCHETT, W. Southern Africa stands up, p.236.
BAUMHoGGER, G. The struggle for independence, vol.11, Document 191, p.207.
THE CHRONICLE, 10 December 1976.
HAWLEY, E.A. Africa today, vol 24, p. 39.
BAUMHiiGGER, G. The struggle for independence, vol.11, Document 204, p.230.
MUZOREWA, Bishop A.T. Rise up and walk, p.221.
MORRISON, G. Africa confidential, vol.17, no.25, December 17, 1976, p.l.
BAUMHoGGER, G. The struggle for independence, vol.11, Document 224, p.236.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.288.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.289.
Ibid.
MORRISON, G. Africa confidential, vol.18, no.3, February 4, 1977, p.8.
Ibid.
BAUMHoGGER, G. The struggle for independence, vo1.11, Document 204, p.240.
Ibid.
SOBEL, L.A. Rhodesia, Zimbabwe 1971-77, p.120.
3-34 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative...
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.170.
SOBEL, L.A. Rhodesia, Zimbabwe 1971-77, p.122.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.290.
HAWLEY, E.A. Africa today, vol 24, p.41.
LEGUM, C. The battle fronts of Southern Africa, p.63.
CAUTE, D. Under the skin, the death of white Rhodesia, p.86.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.292.
THE CITIZEN, 31 January 1977.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.294.
MARTIN, D. et al. The struggle for Zimbabwe, the Chimurenga war, p.267.
SMITH, D. et al. Mugabe, p.101.
MARTIN, D. et al. The struggle for Zimbabwe, the Chimurenga war, p.267.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.299.
HUDSON, H.P.W. Rhodesia, ending an era, p.169.
AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CUL- TURAL STUDIES, p. 4404.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.101.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.298.
OAUIKO, Southern Africa in the 1980's, p.32.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.174.
ELLERT, H. The Rhodesian front war, p.39.
Ibid.
3-35 Chapter 3: The PF and the international diplomatic initiative...
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.174.
SMITH, D. et al. Mugabe, p.101.
MARTIN, D. et al. The struggle for Zimbabwe, the Chimurenga war, p.284.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.317.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.318.
Ibid.
Ibid.
MARTIN, D. et al. The struggle for Zimbabwe, the Chimurenga war, p.285.
Ibid., p.286.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.175.
Ibid., p.174.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.299.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.300.
SOBEL, L.A. Rhodesia, Zimbabwe 1971-77, p.131.
MARTIN, D. et al. The struggle for Zimbabwe, the Chimurenga war, p.270.
LEGUM, C. The battle fronts of Southern Africa, p.82.
SOBEL, L.A. Rhodesia, Zimbabwe 1971-77, p.133.
3-36 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes.
CHAPTER 4: ROBERT MUGABE AND JOSHUA NKOMO - INTERNAL DISPUTES
1.1 THE PF AND THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT
The failure of Britain and the USA to bring about a solution to the Rhodesian problem, first at The Geneva Conference of 28 October 1976, and the subsequent failure of negotiations conducted by Ivor Richard, David Owen and Andrew Young, brought about various unexpected events in Rhodesia between late 1977 and early 1979. This chapter will firstly focus on why Smith resorted to establishing an internal settlement. It will also look at what happened at the Malta Conference. More important, however, it will analyse the reasons behind Smith and Nkomo's secret talks that created mistrust between the leadership of the PF, and at how this affected the Frontline States' relations amongst themselves.
In the course of October-November 1977 it became clear that no progress was being made with the implementation of the Anglo-American plan. The main reason was that both Smith's government and the Patriotic Front objected to efforts to achieve a cease-fire before an agreement had been reached on the political structure for the interim period which would lead to full and recognised independence. The establishment of the internal settlement changed the political situation in Zimbabwe- Rhodesia. The Patriotic Front and the international community were left in the cold. It became a serious problem between the PF leadership and the commonwealth members, that Britain and the USA might be tempted to recognise the internal settlement. On the other hand, Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorewa were looking for international recognition which would legalise the existence of the internal settlement. Due to frustration the PF agreed to meet the Anglo-American leadership at Malta to iron out their differences. However, the failure of the internal
4-1 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. settlement disorganised Smith in such a way that he resorted to secret talks with Nkomo in order to save his plan.
Though there were some shortcomings, Smith had reasons that forced him to consider his move to an internal settlement. According to Davidow the growing intensity of the guerrilla war, domestic economic difficulties and a creeping realisation that Rhodesia could not obtain international legitimacy without a preponderantly African government, propelled Smith into capitalising on divisions within the African nationalist movement.° Meredith is of the opinion that Smith believed that the support of the three black leaders by the black population would undercut the guerrilla campaign. Terrorists could only operate if they had the support at the grassroots level. 2) According to this assessment, once they had come to a settlement that had the support of ninety per cent of the people, the terrorists would no longer have grassroots support. 3) According to Davidow and Meredith the guerrilla war was one of those factors that forced Smith to opt for an internal settlement, which he thought would cut off the guerrilla activities operating in the country under the command of the PF.
Smith was favoured by circumstances because this happened at a time when the nationalists had problems amongst themselves. The exclusive recognition of the PF was a heavy blow to both Sithole and Muzorewa. In a highly regionalised and internationalised decolonisation crisis, regional support was an essential political asset. Sithole, having no loyal guerrillas and little domestic support, became politically irrelevant. Muzorewa, who commanded no guerrilla force, could at least claim an internal political organisation and popular support. 4) Both these leaders were forced to see their future in terms of an internal solution. On the other hand, the failure of the Anglo-American initiative allowed Smith at last to launch his favoured internal option. Obvious candidates were Chief Chirau and his ZUPO, Muzorewa and his UANC and Sithole with his private ZANU. 5) Tamarkin states that these shared two very serious shortcomings. Firstly they controlled no guerrilla armies. This meant that the internal regime with the existing limited military
4-2' Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. potential would have to face an escalating guerrilla war. Secondly, they lacked regional and broader African support. 6) This meant that the chances of such an internal settlement to secure African and international legitimacy and recognition were rather scant. However, Smith did not want it to look as if he did not invite the external leaders of the PF. Moorcraft says the external leaders in the PF were asked to join the talks in Salisbury. Smith did not want Mugabe but he hoped that Nkomo, his old adversary and leader of a fellow minority group, the Ndebele, would be tempted to participate.' ) Smith thought Nkomo could join because he always regarded him as a moderate leader as opposed to Mugabe who always showed his militant posture. Nkomo sated categorically that he would not go back to Zimbabwe to participate in the sham polls of 20 to 24 April, because they were being organised by a system he regarded as evil. 8 Nkomo was quite aware that joining the internal settlement would create serious problems for the PF and FLPS as it did before when he had secret talks with Smith without Mugabe, his partner in the PF.
The announcement of the successful conclusion of the internal settlement negotiations in Salisbury on 15 February 1978 marked the opening of a new chapter in the Rhodesian crisis. The constitutional agreement had been reached without participation of the leaders of the Patriotic Front, representing the nationalist guerrillas who had waged war against the Smith regime for at least six years. 9) When the Salisbury agreement was sealed, the leaders of the PF maintained their position by condemning the settlement with the support of the FLPS, Britain and the USA. The PF saw it as an act of betrayal by Smith's black collaborators, it refused to take seriously Smith's promise to hand over power to the majority and regarded the agreement as simply another of his ploys to divide and rule. 10) The PF's argument was based on the previous encounter when the PF was dealing with the Smith regime during the Geneva Conference.
The international community joined the PF in condemning the signing of the internal settlement. President Machel of Mozambique called on the west to prevent the
4-3 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, from reaching an internal settlement with black politicians as this could only escalate the racial conflict on the sub- continent." President Machel said that as a result of the exclusion of the PF which he regarded as the representative of the African people in Rhodesia. In reacting to the moves made by Smith in search of an internal solution, Britain and America
continued to press for a settlement which could include all the African factions.' 2) The international community reacted against internal settlement because it was done without the participation of the PF. A central role for the PF was seen as the best way of ensuring capitalist stability in the country. 13) Britain and the USA's condemnation of Smith's internal settlement was a strong signal that there couldn't be peace and economic stability if the PF was not part of it. They viewed the PF's role as a crucial one. Once again the PF was playing its part of political pace setter in Zimbabwe.
Realising that Smith was not going to back off, the PF employed its strategy of war pronouncement and rejection. Nkomo and Mugabe stated on behalf of the PF: "the agreement was completely bogus and left both political and military power in the hands of the settler minority". For the militant nationalists in the PF a naked, undisguised settler regime was preferable because it kept the line of division clear. This prompted the PF to sharpen their political-ideological stances. On 25 February 1978 the co-leaders of the PF declared their resolve to continue the struggle "for the attainment of true freedom and genuine independence", true and genuine becoming essential adjectives." ) The PF viewed the guerrilla struggle as their only way of thwarting the internal settlement. According to Tamarkin, on the eve of the signing of the internal agreement, the co-leaders of the PF stated "it is our common bond to ensure the immediate intensification of the war effort to defeat Fascist Smith, the collaborator gang of four, and the evil Anglo-American machinations". For ZANU, the armed struggle was the only appropriate strategic option. 15) ZANU had reasons for that. Robert Gabriel Mugabe states that, according to the eight point agreement signed in Salisbury, the so-called 'internal' settlement did not address the transfer of power to the majority with respect to the
4-4 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. institutions of power that were the linchpin of the racist colonial system of the Rhodesian minority regime. 16) It was for that reason that the PF had maintained the position that it was fighting for a non-racial society in Zimbabwe.
On 3 March 1979 the internal big four signed the Salisbury agreement which gave way for the April elections. Critics of the transitional government have dismissed as inconsequential any election in Rhodesia which excluded the external national leaders of the PF. The Publicity Secretary of ZAPU, Willie Musaruwa, vowed that the Patriotic Front would "turn Rhodesian in April". 17) Unfortunately the PF' s strategy of war threats did not work. The elections of 17 April 1979 were held and Bishop Muzorewa became the first black Prime Minister. Total mobilisation of the country's police and military reserves and the established security forces effectively prevented the guerrillas from carrying out their threat to disrupt the polling.' 8) The failure of the PF to stop the April elections showed that the PF had some weaknesses and that their war threats were meant to scare the internal leadership and the African people in Rhodesia so that they would not go to vote.
Thought the PF found it difficult to stop the elections, their guerrillas judged it necessary to aggravate the war and the misery it caused, by making the bishop's promises of peace and harmony look empty. They adopted tactics which were inherently unpopular. For instance, they closed down nearly twenty secondary schools after the elections, almost a sixth or the total. There was another wave of closures of mission stations, primary schools and clinics. The killing of supposed "sellouts", some of them with only the most tenuous connections with the government or bourgeoisie, was becoming more arbitrary, as the insurgents sought to tighten their hold on the people. 19) The result was that the bishop's authority was weakened at the same time as fear of the guerrillas eroded genuine sympathy for them.
Besides the guerrilla wars, the Muzorewa government had other serious political problems. All these problems were due to the absence of the PF in the internal
4-5 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. settlement government. In April, police arrested 80 African student protesters in Salisbury. Above all, the war of liberation was stepped up. Nkomo denounced the settlement as the greatest sell-out in the history of Africa. 20) The flaring of violence forced Muzorewa and Smith's government to be reactionary by using oppressive and unpopular policies, at the same time hoping that the African masses would come to accept it and force an end to the war. The more Muzorewa and his 'collaborators' stayed in power, the more they completely discredited themselves in the eyes of the African masses. 21) In no ways were Muzorewa and his collaborators viewed as the saviours of the African people because they did not identify themselves with the PF leadership which had the unqualified African support.
The international community also threw its weight behind the PF, which was regarded as the only legitimate representative of the African people in Rhodesia. Some African nations threatened a move to expel Great Britain from the commonwealth if it moved to recognise the internal settlement. Nigeria nationalised British Petroleum and threatened to withdraw its deposits from the Bank of England and cut all economic ties. 22) The warning came about as a threat to stop Britain from recognising Muzorewa's government which excluded the PF leadership. Miles Hudson states that the OAU and the Frontline Presidents had said that the Patriotic Front represented the Rhodesian people and, if the Patriotic Front was not involved, it was argued, it followed that the constitution was a farcical and unjust imposition by Smith and his stooges. This was the attitude adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on 14 March, when it approved a resolution to the effect that any Rhodesian internal settlement produced under the auspices of the present Salisbury administration was illegal and unacceptable. 23) This support for the PF was a heavy blow to the Muzorewa regime which needed international recognition. It was, however, clear that without the PF's participation in his government, international recognition could not be achieved.
The exclusion of the PF from the internal settlement government forced Britain and the USA to review their foreign relations and their political position towards the
4-6 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. newly established government of Bishop Muzorewa. The government of the US and Great Britain, which had attempted several months before to arrange a settlement that would have included the Patriotic Front, reacted and continued to press for involvement of the Patriotic Front leaders in any settlement. 24) This shows that Britain and the USA had realised that without the PF the existence of the internal settlement government was impossible and would only escalate the war which they wanted to stop. Jimmy Carter, the US President at the time was pressurised by Congress to lift sanctions against Rhodesia because to them the new government was attained through the principle of majority rule. That placed President Carter in a defensive position and he warned Congress that the support for the Muzorewa government would jeopardise American interest in black Africa and open the way for greater Soviet involvement in Southern Africa. The best solution, he insisted, was still a negotiated settlement to end the war, which would be acceptable to both Muzorewa and the PF, but Carter refused to lift sanctions because it would look like recognising the internal government. 25) The PF's refusal to join the internal government forced the USA to adopt a hard line attitude towards the Muzorewa government. It also put the Carter administration in a tight corner because for the USA to recognise the internal settlement would force increased Soviet involvement in Southern Africa as indicated above. It was then good for the Carter administration to support the PF rather than to give political recognition to the internal government.
Black African states joined other countries in support of the PF and condemnation of the internal settlement. They warned Britain of the possibility of a trade boycott costing billions of pounds if Britain recognised the Muzorewa government. This African militant stand was echoed by President Kaunda when he opened the commonwealth conference. Henry Wiseman states that in opening the Commonwealth Conference, President Kaunda stated that as far as Africa was concerned, Rhodesia was still a British colony and the April elections had only resulted in the emergence of an illegal and puppet government. 26) The international support for the PF forced Mrs Thatcher to pledge Britain to the attainment of
4-7 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia and sought to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the commonwealth and the international community as a whole would find acceptable, and which would offer the prospect of peace for the people of Rhodesia and her neighbours. 27) The British, USA and the black African States' position against the internal government had strengthened the PF's position against the internal government and made the PF continue waging the armed struggle in order to bring the Muzorewa government to its knees.
The internal settlement failed to deliver because the PF was not part of the government. The African people in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the international community were united in rejecting the legitimacy of the Muzorewa government, which was regarded as a political fraud in the history of Africa because the PF did not take part in its elections. They regarded the PF as the only alliance representing the interests of the people of Zimbabwe. If Mugabe and Nkomo were involved in the internal settlement, the Muzorewa government would have received international recognition and Zimbabwe would have been independent in 1979. However, the PF welcomed the Muzorewa government for political and military reasons. According to Moorcraft, a puppet government led by Muzorewa, especially if his apparently inept leadership could undermine the morale of the security forces, would be much easier to topple. 28) Moorcraft's analysis was accurate because the PF knew that Muzorewa had no strong loyal support from the Rhodesian security forces of Ian Smith, and that he did not have enough support from the defected guerrillas which could deter the PF's guerrillas. Lastly the PF leadership knew that Muzorewa lacked internal and international support, and this helped the PF, with the support of the international community to render the internal settlement government useless. But on the other hand, the establishment of the internal settlement government was an indication that the PF was also weak and unable to destroy Smith and Muzorewa completely. The establishment of the internal government frustrated the PF and the Anglo-American leadership, which was why they had to agree to meet at Malta for further talks that would iron out their differences. The PF realised that their
4-8 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. strategies could not work in stopping Smith and Muzorewa from forming the internal settlement government.
4.2 THE MALTA CONFERENCE
After the failure of the British sponsored Geneva Conference, the next significant international negotiations took place in Malta early in 1978, involving the Patriotic Front, the British and American governments and General Press Chand, the United Nations' military representative. Both British and American policies were becoming a little more realistic, since the men in charge of them had changed. Britain and America would go to the Malta talks to try to get two major changes in the policy of the leaders of the Patriotic Front terrorists; a cease-fire which would make UN supervised elections possible and willingness to take part in those elections before independence. 29) Britain and America were forced to change their politics towards the PF and Rhodesia in particular so that an immediate solution could be arrived at.
Originally, Owen and Vance had intended the Malta talks to include all the Rhodesian parties who had been represented in Geneva. However, when Smith declined they had to go along only with the PF. Owen regarded the Malta talks as the last attempt to convince Nkomo and Mugabe to accept the moderate nationalists as parties to a settlement." ) The prospect of an internal settlement reactivated the Anglo-American initiative and it influenced the PF leadership to co-operate with the USA and Britain. In early December 1977, immediately following the formal opening of the internal talks, Owen invited the leaders of the PF for further talks in Malta in the middle of the month. This he did despite the fact that the Anglo- American proposals had been essentially rejected by all concerned parties only a short while earlier. On 4 December 1977 Mugabe rejected the British invitation out of hand, claiming that they were not serious about the talks and reiterating his determination to achieve liberation through armed struggle. 31) Mugabe was still
4-9 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. determined to pursue the PF's strategy of war pronouncement which he knew would always pose a serious threat to the Anglo-American initiative and the Rhodesian government, including the internal nationalist leaders. It was not surprising because Mugabe always believed in war as the ultimate tool to bring freedom to Rhodesia. He had lost hope for negotiations, since Britain and the USA lacked sincerity in persuasing a solution in Rhodesian problems.
On 8 December, following a meeting in Maputo, Mugabe and Nkomo wrote a letter to Owen declining his invitation to come to London on 13 December to discuss the transition arrangements. The PF, they wrote, was put off by Owen's equivocal reaction to the Rhodesian raids and to the internal talks, and by his apparent down- 32 grading of the prospective talks as a result of Smith's refusal to take part. ' The British and the Americans were not distracted by this response. Having been rebuffed by both the domestic parties and the PF, they pursued their revitalised initiative through the African regional patrons. They made their approach through Machel, ZANU's patron. On 6 January 1978, Carver and Chand came to Maputo where they held three-day talks with the Mozambican president. Machel's previous belligerency and militancy had been mellowed by the considerable cumulative economic losses incurred by his country as a result of Rhodesian retaliatons. 33) On 19 January 1978, following a four day meeting in Maputo, Nkomo and Mugabe toed their host's line offering to meet Owen in Malta on 26 January. 34) The PF succumbed to Machel's pressure, Mugabe in particular, to attend the Malta talks, because his country was hit hard by economic hardships due to military and political support offered to Mugabe's guerrillas, who were launching military attacks to Ian Smith's regime from Mozambique. .
The staging of the Malta Conference was not without its problems. According to Astrow, Muzorewa was outraged at the British scheme to conduct cease-fire negotiations on Malta without his participation. In Muzorewa's view, this was evidence of a British plot to assist the return of Nkomo to Rhodesia and to impose him as the future leader of Zimbabwe. 35) Muzorewa reacted in this way because he
4-10 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. was afraid of Nkomo whom he knew if he could come back to Rhodesia, he would definitely take the lead of the internal settlement government. Muzorewa did not worry about Mugabe because he knew he was not favoured by Britain as much as Nkomo, the moderate.
On 29 January 1978, departing from London for Malta, both Owen and Young sharply criticised the internal settlement talks. 36) This was done for political reasons. The aim was to win the PF's favour since they knew that the PF was suspicious of Britain and the USA's attitude towards the internal settlement government. In February 1978, the PF leadership travelled to Malta for talks with the US and UK. The goal was to overcome the gap between the Owen-Young proposals and the objectives of the PF. The PF spelt out very clearly that it was looking forward to negotiating with Britain, but that it did not want to negotiate with Smith as had the internal nationalists. 37) The PF's statement could be seen as reactionary because they had been left out of the internal settlement and they knew that their position was secured by the unqualified support they were receiving from Africans in Rhodesia and the international community.
At Malta, despite the modifications designed to meet the PF's tastes, the gap between the proposals and the PF's position was still considerable. The proposals presented at Malta modified the original Anglo-American ones in providing for a governing council which the resident commissioner would be obliged to consult. 38) The PF strongly objected to what they considered the commissioner's "dictatorial powers". Although the gap between the sides narrowed only marginally, the talks did not end in a breakdown. The PF produced detailed counter-proposals to the Anglo-American plan. These included a number of important concessions such as acceptance of elections before independence with the right of all white and black Rhodesians to participate freely in them, a readiness to consider a possible UN role during the transition, and an indication that if a negotiated settlement were possible, they would not insist that the "armed struggle" offered the only path to independence. 39) The PF was ready to consider the reduction of the intensity of the
4-11 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. armed struggle. The PF argued that it was owing to the impact of the armed struggle that Smith had been prepared to hold internal talks in the first place. Therefore, the PF would not end the war unless it was given a dominant position in the interim government which was both recognised and entrenched. This reservation required the PF to form the bulk of the security forces during the transition period. Britain and the US were not willing to accept such a proposal, for this could not guarantee the preservation of their interests. 4°)
The British and the Americans believed that any solution without the PF was doomed to failure and would only exacerbate violence and regional instability. 41) The PF hoped that the talks would prevent the former supporting the internal settlement. To concretise that position, the PF agreed to bend. They agreed to a number of Anglo-American proposals. These included: holding 'free elections' under impartial supervision and the establishment of a transitional period during which British commissioner, Lord Carver would rule and in which the United Nations would have a role. All the fundamental points of the Anglo-American proposals were, therefore, accepted, with the exception of the specific military and political composition of the transitional period. 42) Britain and the USA were happy to find out that the PF at last had decided to accept their proposals because they had already realised that there couldn't be any solution without the PF's involvement. Owen believed that if the PF could be brought further into line with the Anglo- American plan, it would make the task of putting pressure on the transitional government to accept it that much easier. 43) Owen wanted to reconcile the PF and internal government leadership so that the two groups could form a joint government together. Unfortunately that did not work.
The holding of the Malta Conference moved the PF from its original uncompromising stance to a more moderate position. According to Andre Astrow, the PF's acceptance of the premises of the Anglo-American initiative was another example of its willingness to seek a compromise with imperialism. 44) The PF's former stand was against compromise but at Malta this position was changed. It
4-12 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. was due to the pressure the PF received from the establishment of the internal settlement of Smith and Muzorewa. However, when the two parties parted from Malta, they agreed that they would meet again to iron out their remaining differences in April 1978. The conference which came to be known as "Malta Two", was then held in mid April 1978 in Dar es Salaam, with the addition of the American Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. According to Martin, the PF still argued it should play a major role in the governing council and that the internal leaders and Smith now represented a single entity. 45) It was at this conference where the PF agreed to a future constitutional conference. That was the most extensive point of agreement for the next two years: that an all party conference should be held. 46) Unfortunately the conference was interrupted by the Smith and Nkomo secret talks and that influenced the -conference delegates to fail to agree on those issues they did not agree at Malta, except to agree on a future conference which would be attended by all parties.
Analysing the Malta Conference, it was clear that it was intended to keep the Anglo- American initiative alive with the intention of arriving at an agreement with the PF which was frustrated by the internal settlement government which left them outside and which was calling to the international community for recognition. The absence of Muzorewa and Smith at Malta had encouraged the PF leadership to reach a consensus on issues which they had rejected all along. The conference again opened the way for an inclusive conference in future. Once again the PF's intransigent attitude was diluted at Malta.
4.3 SMITH AND NKOMO'S SECRET TALKS
Mr Ian Smith, a member of an internal settlement government, was determined to go ahead with his programme of action which included among other things, seeing Mr Joshua Nkomo again in his bid to try to bring a solution which would protect the white interests in Rhodesia, and which would be ale to call for unqualified
4-13 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua. Nkomo - internal disputes. international recognition of this internal settlement government. Smith tried high and low to lure Nkomo into joining him in the transitional government. This finally opened bilateral talks between Nkomo and Smith. Smith had genuine reasons for these talks with Nkomo. According to Meredith, Smith's interest in Nkomo was two-fold. He regarded him as the most astute black politician in the field and he was impressed moreover by the calibre of his black and white advisers. Despite Russian support for his movement, Smith believed, as a result of his negotiations in 1975, that Nkomo was essentially a moderate, pro western leader amenable to safeguarding white interests. 46) Smith knew that Nkomo's moderation would help to secure the interests of whites unlike Mugabe, who as he knew did not want whites to be given special treatment. One more thing that had encouraged Smith was that it was not his first meeting with Nkomo.
But Smith had other reasons. Cohn Legum says that the white Rhodesian leader was pursuing two parallel interests, to split and so weaken the Patriotic Front and to use Nkomo as a lever against Muzorewa who, at that stage, was still proving obdurate in negotiating the implementation of the agreement. Smith was also under pressure from Vorster to try to involve Nkomo in the settlement and to make whatever compromises were necessary to get it implemented. 47) Smith was forced to sacrifice his political beliefs in order to save the white community and in order to stop the war which was claiming more lives in Rhodesia. Smith realised that the internal government was not going to get international recognition because the PF was not part of it. US and British authorities knew for months that Mr Ian Smith had been trying secretly to reach a deal with Mr Joshua Nkomo, and so to break his Patriotic Front alliance with the more radical Mr Robert Mugabe. In an exclusive interview with The Citizen, Mr Bruce said that Mr Smith believed he could perhaps manipulate Mr Joshua Nkomo to return and become involved in the transitional govern nent. 48) But Mr Mugabe was a man who could not be budged. Mr Smith was not taking cognisance of the wider political implications which might result in splitting the Frontline States right down the middle and force Mr Mugabe to seek other political alliances that would destroy Mr Nkomo's political aspirations. To
4-14 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. break that alliance would also cause a major split among the Frontline Presidents and in turn have serious repercussions in the ranks of the Organisation of African
unity. 49)
On the other hand, Kaunda and Nkomo had their own reasons. Kaunda desperately needed a settlement of the Rhodesian conflict for both nationalist reasons and for reasons of national interests, but he also had a stake in helping Nkomo assure power in Zambia. Nkomo hoped that by first meeting with Smith alone he could negotiate a deal particularly favourable for his own future. 50) It was clear that Nkomo was not forced to have these secret meetings with Smith. It was out of his own will, influenced by Kaunda who had his own reasons. Nkomo's interests were more politically oriented because he wanted to prepare a way for his political future. In Lusaka Kaunda was even more eager than before to encourage signs of a deal between Smith and Nkomo for Zambia, by then, was virtually banIcrupt. 51) It was on these grounds that Kaunda was forced to support and favour Nkomo and Smith's secret talks because he wanted to save his country which was bankrupt. due to the guerrilla war waged from his country. President Kaunda, Smith and Nkomo were risking their political positions because this could bear bad results if the secret talks could become public. The reasons discussed above paved the way for Smith and Nkomo to meet. In August 1978 Chief Chirau met Nkomo secretly in London and suggested that Smith, despairing of Muzorewa and Sithole, was looking for a new alliance. 52) Since Nkomo had his own political ambitions, he accepted the invitation, because he knew that Smith's plans were failing, and that he was being viewed as the saviour for the white and African people in Rhodesia. The same message reached Nkomo from President Kaunda. Nkomo believed that Smith was ready to offer him something that he could not refuse and Smith for his part thought that Nkomo could stop the war.
On 14 August 1978 Smith, accompanied by two officials, flew secretly to Lusaka to discuss terms with Nkomo. What was common about these three leaders was that Smith did not inform Bishop Muzorewa or Rev Sithole, Nkomo did not inform
4-15 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. Mugabe, and President Kaunda did not inform other Frontline African states. 53) They were aware that if the secret talks became known, the results could be catastrophic. It could destroy all hopes for peace in Rhodesia because Nkomo and Mugabe, leaders of the PF, would have split, the Frontline State leaders would have been divided, and the internal nationalist leaders could refuse to co-operate, so the meeting had to be secret in order to maintain public trust and confidence. But the question is, what kind of deal did these two leaders think they were going to achieve at such a secret meeting? At the meeting Smith offered Nkomo the permanent chairmanship of the executive council, a position that would have made him, in theory at least, the head of the government until elections were held. 54) If Nkomo had accepted this position, Smith would have succeeded in splitting the PF. Nkomo was interested in the idea but wanted Mugabe to be included somewhere in the deal. 55) Nkomo was afraid that a deal with Mugabe, who commanded a large number of guerrillas, who were doing much more of the fighting than his, would place him in a precarious situation because he would find himself fighting against his partner in the PF.
Breaking the news to Mugabe that Smith, Nkomo and Kaunda had been dealing secretly behind his back again, and then asking for his co-operation, was obviously a difficult business. Whatever explanation was offered, Mugabe was bound to suspect a plot to split the PF and to further Nkomo's career. 56) Mugabe's reaction signified that he was not informed about the meeting, hopefully because they always regarded him as a militant politician who favoured war rather than negotiation for the liberation of Rhodesia. It cast a lot of doubt as to whether Mugabe would have accepted the invitation from Smith or Kaunda for such secret meetings. And when Mugabe arrived in Lusaka from Maputo on 17 August for a routine meeting of the PF, Nkomo shrank from telling him. 57) This was a sign of the side effects of the secret meeting. Nkomo was aware that his relations with Mugabe had been affected and that the split was imminent. Mugabe was then summoned to Lagos were Brigadier Garba explained what had happened and told him about the plan for a second meeting. Mugabe consulted his ZANU colleagues in Lusaka and then flew
4-16 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. back there before Smith was due to arrive. 58) It was clear that Mugabe and ZANU were not willing for any such talks with Smith. Predictably they rejected the idea of a meeting with Smith and, at the last minute, it was called off. 59) Mugabe and ZANU did not want to rubber stamp what Smith and Nkomo had agreed during their secret meetings. Mugabe's decision to refuse to attend the meeting was well calculated because it once again frustrated Smith's aims.
However, Smith was meeting Nkomo at a time when there was an obvious split between Mugabe and Nkomo over the Anglo-American plan for an all party peace conference. It showed that there was less consultation between the two leaders. A gap was developing between the two leaders. After the "Malta Two" conference it was agreed that an all party conference should go ahead once Britain and the U S had done more preparatory work to ensure its success. 60) This split was further expressed by Mugabe's secretary. According to The Citizen Mr Edgar Tekere, secretary general of Mr Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) also told a news conference that Mr Nkomo's forces were not doing enough fighting in Rhodesia's six year old war. 61) ZANU leadership felt that they could not agree with what Nkomo had said about the cancellation of the conference because it was their guerrillas who were fighting and dying on the battlefield. This shows that whatever differences there were between Nkomo and Mugabe, they would always affect their party members. That is why Nkomo was rebuked by Mugabe's committee members rather than by Mugabe himself. This split was further increased by the Smith - Nkomo secret meetings without Mugabe. The divergence of views appeared to be one of the most serious public splits in the alliance since its formation two years previously. Nkomo could not kill an all party conference unilaterally. These fluctuations of interests and views allowed Smith sufficient opportunity to manipulate Nkomo's political position.
The effects of the split in the PF also affected the organisations led by the two leaders. According to Astrow, all ZANU's old suspicions about ZAPU's intentions seemed confirmed. Nkomo's attempted deal could only further reinforce the
4-17 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. divisions within the nationalist parties. It strengthened tribal antagonism between the Shona and the Ndebele. The largely Shona guerrillas in ZANU resented the fact that a man whom they considered to be a leader representing the Ndebele was attempting to make a deal behind their backs, at the expense of their sacrifices in the war. 62) As was always the case, once Nkomo and Mugabe differed over a political issue, it affected their supporters. It is not surprising that ZANU guerrillas and supporters suspected Nkomo for selling out his own African people. This would again affect ZAPU and ZANU guerrillas fighting Smith's army side by side.
These Nkomo-Smith secret meetings also affected the Frontline State leaders. The meeting was totally against their policy, for one member of the PF to attend a meeting without the other member of the PF. Meredith says that from that point, a major split between the Frontline Presidents as well as within the PF, was inevitable. Nyerere was furious when he learnt about Kaunda's single handed diplomacy. 63) A serious problem was really created between the two Frontline leaders in such a way that the two leaders would always be suspicious of each other. Nyerere had all the reasons not to trust Kaunda because that was not the first time Kaunda was rebuked for the same offence. Nyerere warned that there would be no further contacts between Nkomo and Smith.
Smith's endeavour also caused problems in this own camp. When word of the meeting spread to Salisbury, Muzorewa and Sithole were equally angry. They were alarmed by this move to negotiate secretly with Nkomo, especially when they learned that Smith had promised to drop them in favour of Nkomo, Mugabe and Chief Chirau if the two Patriotic Front leaders were ready to co-operate. 64) Their worries were fuelled because they knew that if Smith could win Nkomo, it would be the end of their political careers in Rhodesia. They knew that Nkomo was more popular than they were and that his presence in the country would sideline them forever politically. The shooting down of the Air Rhodesia Viscount aircraft by the ZIPRA forces under ZAPU of Nkomo, killing 40 passengers including the survivors who were killed by the guerrillas, stopped Nkomo and Smith's further meetings.
4-18 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes. But equally importantly, it was felt internationally and even within ZAPU that Nkomo's handling of the incidents damaged ZAPU's reputation. Now many of Nkomo's admirers in Britain and Nigeria seemed to be going cold on him. 65) The shooting of the aircraft saved Nkomo's political position which was waning away amongst the African people in Rhodesia. It had political intentions. ZAPU wanted to be seen to be doing something for its people so that they should accept it again, especially its ZANU partners in the PF who were disgruntled by its leader, Nkomo, having had secret talks with Smith, their enemy.
When analysing the Smith - Nkomo secret meetings, it becomes evident that Nkomo and Kaunda were forced to favour those talks for both political and economic reasons. Nkomo wanted to enhance and secure his future political position, whereas Kaunda wanted a fast political settlement in Rhodesia because his country's economy was being ravaged by supporting guerrillas who were waging their attacks against the Rhodesian army from his country. On the other hand Smith wanted to secure white interests and international recognition, which would lead to the lifting of economic sanctions, by including Nkomo in his new government. Smith was aware that if he could lure Nkomo, he would finally split the alliance and, therefore, weaken the armed struggle. Mugabe would have been left alone in the struggle against his own partner in the PF. Hopefully this would lead to fierce fighting amongst their supporters and their guerrillas. These talks proved that the PF was indeed a marriage of convenience. Nkomo showed political flexibility which Mugabe did not have. It is doubtful that Nkomo would have ended the war by joining the internal settlement without Mugabe. Despite his forces' success in dominating the majority of Rhodesia's civilian population, the Nkomo-Smith affair stressed Mugabe's isolation. Above all, he lacked Nkomo's much more extensive diplomatic links and he lacked Nkomo's handsome supply of arms. 66) On the other hand, the secret meetings had also made it harder for the Anglo-Americans to deal with the PF because of the suspicion and mistrust that always ruled the leadership of the PF throughout its existence.
4-19 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes.
Keeping the talks secret meant that the three leaders were aware and afraid of the repercussions of these meetings. Their judgement was correct because Mugabe and the FLPS attacked Nkomo and Kaunda. Nkomo knew that Mugabe would not favour such talks even if he was invited because he did not trust either Nkomo's or Smith's intentions. Smith wouldn't even dare to invite Mugabe because he regarded him as a militant politician who favoured war for the liberation of Rhodesia and who did not believe in giving the white community special treatment. Smith's manoeuvres proved that Nkomo and Mugabe had differences in their political approaches to the nature of the struggle. Nkomo welcomed almost anything that could lead to the liberation of his people without looking at the implications thereafter. Mugabe was focused and regarded war as the only means to liberate Rhodesia from Ian Smith's regime. However, Nkomo and Mugabe were able to secure the alliance just because they wanted to liberate Rhodesia, and that united them with the help of the FLPS, who were concerned about the liberation of the people of Rhodesia, regardless of the differences which always rocked the PF alliance.
4-20 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes.
ENDNOTES
1. DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.22.
2. MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.327.
3. Ibid.
4. TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.158.
5. Ibid., p.201
6. Ibid.
7. MOORCRAFT, P.L. A short thousand years, p.84.
8. BAUMIloGGER, G. The struggle for independence, vol.IV, Document 750, p.852.
9. HULL, G. Africa Today, vol.25, no.2., April-June 1978, p.27.
10. LEGUM, C. Africa contemporary record documents, 1977-1978, vol.X, p.12.
11. THE CHRONICLE, 14 February 1978.
12. ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.110.
13. Ibid.
14. TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.211.
16. MUGABE, R.G. Our war of liberation, p.106.
15. Ibid., p.220.
LEMELLE, T.J. et.al ., Africa Today, vol.26, no.1, 1978-1979, p.8.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.35.
SMILEY, X. Africa confidential, vol.20, no.15, 18 July 1979, p.1.
4-21 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.115.
Ibid.
LEMELLE, T.J. etal., Africa Today, vol.26, no.1, 1978-1979, p.6.
HUDSON, M. Triumph or tragedy?, p.144.
HULL, G. Africa Today, vol.25, no.2., April-June 1978, p.27.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.366.
WISEMAN, H. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.8.
Ibid.
MOORCRAFT, P.L. A short thousand years, p.87.
THE CHRONICLE, 28 January 1978.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.207.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.208.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.322.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.208.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.130.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.208.
LEGUM, C. the battle fronts of Southern Africa, p.83.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.131.
4-22 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.208.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.131.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.333.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.131.
MARTIN, D. et al. The struggle for Zimbabwe, the Chimurenga war, p.292.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.316.
LEGUM, C. Africa contemporary record documents, 1978-1979, vol.XI, p.10.
THE CITIZEN, 4 September 1978.
Ibid.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.133.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.345.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.346.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
THE CITIZEN, 13 September 1978.
Ibid.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.133.
4-23 Chapter 4: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo - internal disputes.
MEREDITH, M. The past is another country, p.346.
LEGUM, C. Africa contemporary record documents, 1978-1979, vol.XI, p.10.
SMILEY, X. Africa confidential, vol.20, no.4, 14 February 1979, p.5.
SMILEY, X. Africa confidential, vol.19, no.18, 8 September 1978, p.2.
4-24 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979.
CHAPTER 5: THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE 1979
5.1 THE REASONS WHY THE DELEGATES ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE
The Geneva Conference chaired by Ivor Richard, his subsequent negotiations with the PF and the Rhodesian government, the Anglo-American endeavour, the internal settlement and the Malta talks, did not bring about peace in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. These events became the focus of world attention, demonstrating the seriousness with which Britain and the USA regarded the outcome of the armed struggle. Britain realised that the PF's armed struggle might become an internationalised issue which would damage her international recognition and world status. She realised again that there was a need to end the war in Zimbabwe. It was not only Britain, but also the Frontline States who felt that it was necessary and time that the armed struggle by the PF guerrillas should come to an end. This realisation was clearly shown at the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference attended by commonwealth heads of state from 1 to 7 August 1979. 1) It was at this conference that the political solution for Rhodesia was worked out.
This chapter will, therefore, firstly focus on the reasons why the delegates from various political groups decided to attend the Lancaster House Conference, and their objectives. It will also look at the strategies employed by the PF and the Chairman of the Conference, Lord Carrington. It will look at what transpired during the deliberations and analyse the political pressure exerted on the PF by the Frontline States, forcing the PF leadership to reach a settlement that would bring peace in Zimbabwe.
5-1 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. The negotiations aimed at liberating Zimbabwe, started during the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference as indicated above. It was at this conference that the Frontline States showed their unqualified support for genuine peace in Zimbabwe. When opening the conference in August 1979, Kaunda showed the FLPS' support for the PF. According to Henry Wiseman, Kaunda and the other heads of government pledged support for the PF because they recognised that there could be no lasting settlement unless all parties to the dispute were involved. That meant that the leaders of the parties comprising the PF would be asked to participate in the Constitutional Conference which the British government had now committed itself
to convene. 2)
Dr Kaunda, who had been a staunch supporter of Nkomo for over 20 years, attacked the British government's attitude to Bishop Muzorewa. He said "Zimbabwe was a British colony, and nothing has changed, it was illegal and merely a puppet government". 3) Mrs Thatcher listened attentively to President Kaunda's speech, but in her response refused to be drawn into open debate on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia issue. All she would say, was that Britain reaffirmed its wish to seek a settlement in its former colony, which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole would find acceptable and which would offer the prospect of peace. 4) The FLPS' support for the PF was an indication to the Commonwealth countries and the international community that the FLPS' stand for the PF had not changed and that they were prepared with the PF to push for peace. Mrs Thatcher's commitment to peace was, however, a light at the end of the tunnel and the delegates were more optimistic about a peaceful settlement. Her response was based on a tactical review of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian case and needed an immediate solution before it spread internationally.
The delegates, after securing Britain's commitment to peace, agreed upon a future course of action to resolve the problem. To facilitate the process, the Lusaka plan was drawn up by the Prime Ministers of Australia, Britain and Jamaica, together with the Presidents of Tanzania and Zambia, in planning a conference, to be held at
5-2 Chapter 5: The Lancaster.House Conference 1979. Lancaster House, where Mrs Thatcher's pledge would be redeemed. 5) This was arrived at because the Muzorewa-Smith government failed to end the guerrilla war. The process for peace was not to be delayed as agreed by the delegates. Within a week after the Lusaka Conference, Lord Carrington issued invitations to a constitutional conference to be held at Lancaster House in London, to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the PF. Now a new and major diplomatic effort to. bring about a negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian problem was underway.
Robert Mugabe was quick to respond to the Lusaka Conference call for a constitutional conference to be held at Lancaster House in London. He continued to pose his militant stand. His response was aimed at preparing the people of Zimbabwe for any eventuality. Mugabe called on the fighting masses of Zimbabwe, who had suffered for so long for the liberation of their country, not to believe or to be led to believe that Lancaster was their salvation. 6) "The masses, who have supported our struggle for so long, and all the fighting forces whose revolutionary zeal has brought the revolution to a stage where victory was now imminent, should continue to uphold the one instrument that we have used thus far in order to promote
our interests, the armed struggle, as the only method of finally achieving victory." 7) Mugabe's strategy for the liberation of Zimbabwe did not change. Like before, he regarded the armed struggle as the most viable method to free Zimbabwe from Ian Smith. What is important is that he did not denounce the Lancaster House Conference but alerted the people of Zimbabwe to it.
There were reasons which forced all the affected parties to consider going to Lancaster House in London. H.P.W. Hutson is of the opinion that it was not only the British nation which wanted a solution in Zimbabwe. The Frontline States of Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania and Angola all made further attempts to clamp down on the nationalist forces. The intensification of the war and the failure of the RF to defeat the guerrillas, badly disrupted the economies of Zambia and Mozambique in particular. 8) It was clear that war had compelled the Frontline State leaders to push ahead for a settlement. The conference came at a time when Zambia
5-3 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. and Mozambique were looking for a settlement. If it was not so they would not have supported the idea of a conference during the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference of August 1979.
The PF had no choice because at that time pressure was mounting on them from the FLPS who needed a settlement in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in order to save their countries from bankruptcy. According to Davidow the most important factor in the Patriotic Front's decision to attend was the influence of the Frontline States because their economies, particularly those of Zambia and Mozambique were suffering a horrendous toll as a result of the Rhodesian war. Finally the most significant motive force compelling the PF to attend the conference, was its desire not to give the British a clear path to recognition of the Muzorewa regime. 9) It was a wise decision by the PF because if they were not interested in the conference Britain would have decided to recognise the Muzorewa regime. The PF's struggle and its international recognition would have been in vain. The PF leadership always wanted to make sure that the Muzorewa government should be viewed by the African people in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as a sellout.
There was somthing in common between Muzorewa and the PF leaders. Both recognised that the Rhodesian war had reached a stalemate in which rapid victory was impossible and each believed that it enjoyed majority support among their country's African population. It was compelling for the two delegations to seek a settlement, for the Muzorewa regime's most important single consideration was the serious state of the country's economy, drained by the war effort and buffeted by world recession, high prices of imported oil and the effects of international economic sanctions. 10) Muzorewa, like the PF and the FLPS, realised that the war was the main reason for his government having to decide to attend the Lancaster House Conference. He accepted that his government had failed to stop the war and the only salvation for his government lay in attending the Lancaster House Conference in London.
5-4 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979.
The Patriotic Front agreed that they would attend the conference in London, but the PF leadership continued to make war threats. In The Chronicle of 21 August 1979, it was reported that the terrorist leaders, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, said in a joint statement that they were willing to talk, but would not stop fighting. By accepting the British invitation to attend the proposed conference, the Patriotic Front must clearly be understood to have done nothing more than indicate its willingness to negotiate a solution. 11) The PF knew that threats of war always reminded Britain and the Rhodesian government that without them there would never be peace in Rhodesia. The PF rejected both the proposed constitutional framework which had its basis in the illegal internal settlement constitution, and the proposal of a cease- fire. 12) The PF's rejection of the proposed constitution, which was made known to the conference delegates by Britain, did not mean that the PF was not willing to take part in the conference talks. They wanted a constitution in which they would have participated in its formation.
If Nkomo and Mugabe could reject the plan and persuade the Frontline Presidents and the OAU to back them, the Thatcher initiative would fail. Three possibilities would then exist. One was that Nkomo and Mugabe would agree with Muzorewa and_Smith_to hold new elections and let the best man win. The second was that Nkomo and Mugabe would reject the plan outright and the war would go on, and the third possibility was that Nkomo would detach himself from Mugabe and accept both the plan and the elections. In that event Mugabe would continue the guerrilla war alone. 13) This analysis shows the nature of the leadership of the PF. Nkomo and Mugabe had rejected the constitutional framework but what was very important was that they did not indicate that they would boycott the conference. The third possibility was at that stage not very strong because, as the Lancaster House Conference was approaching, the PF united to fight on despite their differences.
5-5 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. 5.2 THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE
5.2.1 The delegates' objectives
All the parties that assembled at the Lancaster House Conference in London from September 1979 to December 1979 had their specific objectives. The major British objective was to remove the Rhodesian problem as a constant thorn in the United Kingdom's side, because the UK representatives at international gatherings had wearied of the continuing and often bitter denunciations aimed at their country over its alleged abdication of responsibility for its colony. 14) Britain's reasons were based on the escalation of the war that was being waged by the PF with the support of the FLPS. She realised that solving the Rhodesian problem was overdue and that was why she finally acceded to the PF and the Frontline States' call for her to take over the colonial responsibility in order to solve the problem.
The Muzorewa delegation attending the conference had their objectives. According to C.J. de Klerk, Muzorewa and Smith mainly wanted recognition for the interim government. 15) Concurring with De Klerk, Davidow says for the Salisbury team, led by Bishop Muzorewa and Ian Smith, the principal goals were to obtain the lifting of sanctions, and rapid recognition. 16) The Muzorewa delegation was determined to fight for recognition at the conference because they believed that the April elections were legitimate and that it was the PF's choice to boycott the elections. They could not understand why their government could not be given legitimate recognition.
The PF leadership realised that they had reached a point of no return. The British government had taken up her colonial responsibility again and wanted to deal with the Rhodesian problem once and for all. In The Chronicle of 22 August 1979 it was reported that the PF had a six point plan for the conference. This plan was the outcome of a meeting over the weekend of 18 September 1979 between the leaders.") Nkomo listed these points as the main items the PF wanted resolved
5-6 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. before going on to discuss a constitution. The plan was in the form of questions. He listed them as follows: Whose army would defend Zimbabwe, whose police force would protect its people, whose laws would govern an election, what could be the future of the people's stolen land, apart from British supervisors and commonwealth observers, who would administer the elections and ensure the safety of the voters and the candidates, and whose administration and judiciary would serve the people. 18) The Chairman of the Conference and other delegates were to give satisfactory answers to the PF's plan. The PF did not have specific strategy behind the plan to force the Chairman and the Muzorewa government to give positive answers in order to satisfy them so that they could stay in the conference.
Above all, the two leaders of the PF had different personal wishes about the conference. According to David Smith Nkomo had come to the conference quietly optimistic of a settlement. Mugabe had always believed in the 'armed struggle', almost as an end in itself to prepare his party for power. 19) Nkomo was confident that the conference would bring a viable solution for Zimbabwe. But his partner, Mugabe, viewed the armed struggle as the answer to the liberation of Zimbabwe. The armed struggle to him was a preparation for power for his party to rule Zimbabwe. The optimism was fuelled by the British attitude which they knew was always ambiguous when dealing with the Rhodesian government, especially the Muzorewa regime. However, they were united for the liberation of Zimbabwe. That was their main aim.
Apart from their plan and different personal wishes, the PF leaders had collective objectives they wanted to achieve at the Lancaster House Conference. De Klerk says that Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe came to London with a much stronger position, but that had certain problems with their goals, especially whether the conference would promote goodwill and create conditions for total victory for the PE 20) This optimism was fuelled by the British attitude which they knew was always ambiguous when dealing with the Rhodesian government, especially the Muzorewa regime. The PF leadership had the problem within themselves.
5-7 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. Mugabe arrived at the conference still believing that the armed struggle was an answer to the Rhodesian problem. He believed in Mao's statement "You cannot win around the negotiation table what you haven't won at the battle field", whereas Nkomo accepted any chance that would bring peace in Zimbabwe.
Despite the plan and well-focused objectives they had the serious problem of leadership at the Lancaster House Conference. This problem was realised when the FLPS had a meeting on 9 April 1979. The conference proposed closer political unity within the Patriotic Front but this was not forthcoming. David Martin says the Frontline States had concluded that the principal obstacle to greater unity within the Patriotic Front was the question of political leadership. ZANU would not accept Nkomo and ZAPU would not accept Mugabe as overall leader, and the Frontline leaders believed that Nkomo would never voluntarily accept the number two place in any organisation. 21) Their plan was that Nkomo should become chairman and Mugabe secretary General. The most important department, Defence and Security, would be controlled by Mugabe, whose army was doing the bulk of the fighting. Nkomo read the document outlining the FLPS' plan in Dar es Salaam in the presence of Mugabe and the Frontline leaders. He realised immediately that he was placed in a weaker position and thrust it away across the table. 22) When the Lancaster House Conference opened on 10 September 1979, the PF had no specific leader since neither of the two leaders wanted to be led by the other. Both leaders led the PF _ delegation jointly.
5.2.2 Deliberations
Deliberations began in earnest at the Lancaster House Conference on 10 September 1979. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, opened the constitutional conference. He reminded the delegates that the conference should bear in mind throughout its discussions the framework set out in the Lusaka Communiqué, because it incorporated the views of the British government and marked the approach, which the commonwealth would support, and which would gain
5-8 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. international acceptance. Carrington's approach to the Lancaster House talks was guided by what he called the 'first prize' and the 'second prize' to be won at Lancaster House. The first prize was an agreement with all parties. He was convinced that this was in fact the only way of ending the war and of avoiding damage to Anglo-African relations. Only if that objective proved impossible to obtain would he then be ready to settle for the second prize, an agreement without the PF. 23) Carrington's strategy was quite uncompromising and it left little room for the PF to push for its proposals to be accepted.
Apart from the plan the PF had drawn up before the conference started, the PF was determined to attend the conference being well focused. Davidow says Nkomo and Mugabe came to London intent on maintaining the negotiating stance they had held firmly since the failed Geneva Conference of 1976. 24) Nyerere had warned Mugabe that he should neither underrate Carrington's skill nor the collective ability of Whitehall's constitutional draftsmen. The PF would appear together, but they must learn to negotiate together. If the PF failed to stand together, its two elements would fail separately. 25) Nyerere knew that Mugabe was too militant in his approach compared to Nkomo who was moderate. However, unlike Lord Carrington, the PF did not have a specific strategy except its former strategy of war pronouncement, demand and rejection. The Muzorewa delegation too had no specific strategy, but had one idea for the conference, namely to get international _ recognition of their government.
During discussions many issues with which the PF leadership was not happy were identified and they caused a tussle between themselves on the one side and Carrington and the Frontline States on the other. Carrington received a great deal of support from the Presidents of the Frontline States who, by now, were getting desperate to end the war which was ruining their economies. They were more eager than ever to see Britain assume her colonial responsibilities. 26) It was at this conference where Britain assumed her colonial authority through the chairman, Lord Carrington. The issues which were discussed among other things were: acceptance
5-9 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. of the constitutional proposals, the 20 per cent reserve seats for whites, automatic and dual citizenship, the land question and the cease-fire agreement. In order to achieve durable solutions, the PF's strategy was always at conflict with that of Lord Carrington.
The first problem encountered by the delegates was when Carrington was dealing with the Constitution. In The Citizen of 15 September 1979 it was reported that three conflicting constitutions for a legally independent Zimbabwe were before the Rhodesian peace conference. A British draft constitution would ensure black majority had control over parliament, the civil service, the military, the police and the judiciary. It allowed for special white representation in parliament. The Patriotic Front's constitution would deny whites special privileges and threatened to bar from citizenship any who had emigrated to the territory since the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. The third constitution was from the bi-raced Salisbury government of Premier Bishop Abel Muzorewa. It was the existing 1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution which gave 230 000 whites, about four per cent of the population, 28 per cent of the parliamentary seats and control of security forces, judiciary and public service until 1989. 27) Nevertheless, these constitutions envisaged one man one vote elections.
Carrington insisted that the British draft form the basis of discussions. It was here where the PF rejected the British draft because it protected while interests and they therefore presented theirs. Davidow says the British draft differed markedly from that presented by the Patriotic Front, which was single mindedly egalitarian and simply offered all citizens security and not privilege and equal rights without discrimination. The latter plan made no provision for special parliamentary seats for whites, for entrenched constitutional elements, or for the protection of private property or pension rights. 28) The PF's rejectionist stance proved that it was not prepared to accept any constitution that protected white interests in Zimbabwe. But this stance never worked for the PF. Britain rejected their demands. Britain's strategy was clear and straight: not to allow either the Patriotic Front to deprive
5-10 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. whites of all parliamentary representation nor let whites in the Muzorewa delegation preserve their veto powers. It was clear that Britain had really assumed her colonial authority over Zimbabwe and she would decolonise her herself since she had been called by the PF and the Frontline States to do so.
Britain's rejection of the PF's proposals shifted Nkomo's position. This shift showed Nkomo's moderation which made him different from his partner, Mugabe, the militant, who did not want to give whites special treatment. In The Rhodesian Herald of 18 September 1979, it was reported that the Patriotic Front leader, Joshua Nkomo, had made two important concessions in his team's proposals. Nkomo was prepared to accept the British demand for reserved white seats in a new parliament.
29) The second important compromise came when he indicated that the PF would no longer demand that its forces be in control of the country during transition. He said it had to be recognised that there were two armies and that it would be necessary to neutralise both. The Patriotic Front compromise was reached at a weekend meeting between the joint leaders. The sources said that both men felt they had established a clear advantage so far in the talks and that they intended to be seen moving forward in moderation. 30) The PF's position was due to Nyerere and Kaunda who advised both leaders to negotiate in good faith.
The Patriotic Front leaders felt they had turned the tables on Bishop Muzorewa's government and thwarted Salisbury's plans to depict them as conference wreckers. The PF tactic had been to refrain from striking hard-line postures, avoiding preconditions for the conference and heeding calls by their Frontline black African
backers to project themselves as serious negotiators and men of reason. 31)
It was Bishop Muzorewa who threatened to leave the conference early. Muzorewa had a problem like the PF: that his government's constitution was rejected and that only Britain's constitution was a deciding factor for Zimbabwe freedom. The Front made it clear it was not contemplating an early walkout. If the Bishop went home, fine. He could leave someone responsible behind and they would go on negotiating.
5-11 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979.
Mugabe said it would be "good riddance to bad rubbish" if the bishop went home. 32) Serious negotiations had not yet started, though the PF had already shown a very co-operative mood which could have led Lord Carrington to believe that a settlement was in sight. The question was, would the PF depict this mood throughout the conference. Mugabe seemed to have been weakened by his partner's moderation because he was also, like Nkomo, prepared to accept the reserved seats for whites in the Zimbabwe parliament.
Bishop Muzorewa refused to be played down by the PF who wanted his government to be seen to be uncooperative. He announced that his government had accepted in principle the British government's constitutional proposals for his country and he demanded in return that economic sanctions be ended. "We have accepted the general principles of the constitutional proposals submitted by the British government; we now demand and it is our right to do so, that the sanctions against us be lifted immediately, since they no longer hold any validity." 33) Muzorewa' s acceptance put the PF at the corner because its leadership had never publicly pronounced acceptance of the British draft constitution. Britain, however, maintained her position by refusing to lift sanctions. The Patriotic Front reacted militantly through its war pronouncement. According to The Chronicle of 22 September 1979, Mr Zuobgo said of the bishop's acceptance: "His mere agreement with the British government on anything would not bring peace. The war will continue, legality will not come until there is an agreement accepted by the Patriotic Front and the international community". 34) Even though Nkomo and Mugabe showed an attitude of moderation, they did not do away with their strategy of war pronouncement since it had worked for them and they believed it would still work for them at the London Conference.
The acceptance of the British draft constitution by the Muzorewa government left the onus for the conference's progress at the PF' s camp. Lord Carrington was looking at the black Frontline States, which hosted the PF forces, to exert their influence with Nkomo and Mugabe to bring them into line with the plan. Pressure
5-12 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. from the Frontline States, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola was said to be responsible for the comparatively moderate position already adopted by the PF at the conference. 35) Mozambique's Minister of Transport, Mr Jose Luis Cabaco, Zambian President Kaunda's special assistant, Mr Mark Chona, and officials from the embassies of Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana had been involved in behind the scenes lobbying between he PF and the British. 36) It was through pressures that changed the PF's stance that there could be progress. It was imperative for the Frontline States to play a major role specifically in persuading the PF to move for a settlement since the war, which was very much fiercer than before, was to come to an end.
The conference then moved to a crucial issue. The PF had already indicated earlier, after their-meeting, that they were prepared to accept the 20 per cent reserved seats for whites. But it was not easy for the PF to agree to this proposal. Robert Mugabe in particular, had been stubborn over it and regarded it as racist in nature. According to Verrier, the PF's original objections to the white Zimbabwe community retaining twenty seats in a parliament of one hundred were, doubtless, genuine enough but were not very substantial. Substantial or not, wrangles about this, and other elements in the constitution continued for six weeks. 37) The PF objected to the proposal because it was as if Britain was giving white Rhodesians special proposals, and if the PF failed to accept then she would force them through her second class solution method. Carrington had indicated before that Britain would not allow the PF to deprive whites of parliamentary representation, nor let whites in the Muzorewa delegation preserve their veto powers. Britain was afraid that if she did not protect either party the constitution for Zimbabwe would benefit only one section of the society, mostly Africans.
It is worth noting that before discussions started Nyerere had urged Mugabe to start negotiating in a conciliatory rather than a military mood. 38) Nyerere was aware that if Mugabe would negotiate in a militant manner, he would lose out rather than making use of the chance the London Conference had offered him and Nkomo. It
5-13 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. was pressure that persuaded the PF to concede to 20 per cent seats being reserved for whites. Davidow says Machel was the most instrumental of the FLPS' in pressing the PF toward a settlement. In September both parties accepted the proposal of 20 per cent reserved representation for whites in the lower house but this was a major concession on Mugabe's part, because he realised that a guaranteed twenty seats in a 100 member parliamentary body could place the whites in a king making role if the African vote were seriously fractionated. 39) The acceptance of 20 per cent reserved seats for whites depicted political differences within the PF leadership. According to Davidow, the prospect of the reserved seats was not as troubling for Nkomo, who wished to close no doors to potential coalition partners. Although at this time he wanted ZANU and ZAPU to contest the elections as one
party, Nkomo may have realised that Mugabe would not be inclined to do so. 40) Fortunately, Nkomo and Mugabe, despite their differences in approach and strategy, could not part ways. Nkomo says the most hopeful aspect of the Lancaster House proceedings was the co-operation that built up between Robert Mugabe and himself as leaders of the two wings of the Patriotic Front. 41) It was this cooperation which kept them together on a common course to liberate Zimbabwe.
Mugabe probably recognised the status that Nkomo enjoyed in Rhodesia and in the international community as the 'father of African Nationalism' in Rhodesia, having been President of the Congress before Sithole, Mugabe or Muzorewa had become members of the movement. 42) On the other hand, Mugabe was aware of the warning given to him by Nyerere, that of negotiating in a friendly mood rather than a militant one. Nkomo's position tranquillised Mugabe's militant stance, and they were advised to negotiate together at all times.
Another issue which raised a powerful argument between Britain and the PF in the constitution was that of citizenship. Britain proposed to grant automatic citizenship to all persons who were citizens before independence. The Patriotic Front regarded this as an attempt to force it to accept as citizens people who had come after UDI to support Rhodesia's rebellion. It also objected to the principle of dual citizenship,
5-14 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. since in its view a person could not be loyal both to Zimbabwe and to South Africa or any other hostile state. 43) The PF expressed its disapproval of the British proposal by putting forward their proposal regarding citizenship. In its draft constitution, the Patriotic Front proposed that no immigrants who arrived in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia after UDI on 11 November 1965 should automatically receive citizenship. 44) The British government objected to this provision, which it felt was contrary to the spirit of reconciliation in which the talks should be approved. About 40 000 whites at a rough estimate, might lose their citizenship under this provision. Thousands of white Rhodesians were entitled to British citizenship. Under a PF government, many of them would retain their British citizenship. They might then have to leave the country. 45) It was clear that Britain was protecting her fellow white citizens in Rhodesia, whom she knew very well that if they should lose their Rhodesian citizenship, this could bring serious problems to Britain herself because they would have to be resettled and find new jobs in Britain if they left Rhodesia. But the PF had reasons for their objection to automatic citizenship. In The Chronicle of 26 September 1979 it was reported that the PF wanted a 'review' process for such people in order to sift out 'mercenaries' and others whom they said assisted in perpetuating treason by the illegal regime. 46) These were the people the PF did not trust at all.
The Patriotic Front's refusal to accept Britain's proposals forced Lord Carrington to go back to the drawing board to amend his constitutional proposals. The new plan presented to the PF contained to major changes to the original proposals. The PF had objected to three key points in the original proposals - the right to citizenship of people who came to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia after UDI in 1965; the provision for an executive Prime Minister and not an executive president, and guarantees that any
land acquired by the state from private individuals would have to be paid for. 47) Again, Muzorewa wanted the PF to be viewed as conference wreckers. The Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Prime Minister announced that he had accepted the British government's constitutional proposals and that he was prepared to hold new elections. His condition was that Britain lift economic sanctions against
5-15 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. Zimbabwe. 48) Britain refused to do so, as she did before. Muzorewa's acceptance of the original draft put the PF under suspicion of a 'secret deal' between the government and Lord Carrington. According to the Rhodesia Herald of 5 October 1979, it was reported that Mugabe said that if the British tried to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia on the basis of a document not endorsed by the PF, the war would go on. "If they go ahead, we go ahead with the war. They invited us here to create peace. If they don't want to create peace, we go back and fight." 49) Mugabe's threat was a reminder to Britain and Muzorewa that they should not undermine the PF which was waging guerrilla war against Muzorewa's regime. Anything other than that would result in war.
Powerful pressures were building upon the Patriotic Front from the Frontline- Commonwealth countries to accept the British proposals. The draft constitution was cabled to leaders of the Frontline States on Wednesday 3 October 1979, and two presidents, Nyerere of Tanzania and Seretse Khama of Botswana, gave positive reactions to it. 50) The argument was being used that if the PF believed its own claim that it could win elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, it should go in and fight them, leaving its ideological programme for later. 51) This was a heavy challenge to the PF leadership, but it did not pay the dividend. The PF rejected the key points in the plan.
Carrington held off a breakdown of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitutional conference by giving the Patriotic Front a 48 hour deadline to change their minds and accept his proposals for a new constitution. He made it clear that he was not prepared to change the British draft constitution which the Prime Minister, Bishop Muzorewa, had already accepted. 52) The PF instead of accepting the British plan, presented a counter plan which was rejected by Carrington. In a statement, Lord Carrington said he would now open negotiations with Bishop Muzorewa on transitional arrangements leading to new elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 53) Carrington was ready to employ his second class solution, a strategy which was
5-16 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. going to leave the PF out of the peace process and that would influence the FLPS to disown them.
The 48-hour deadline was extended to 10 days, which he ended by calling in the PF leaders and asking them for a final 'yes' or 'no' to the British draft constitution. They did not give a positive reply and he told them he would begin discussions with Bishop Abel Muzorewa's government delegation on arrangements for implementing the draft, which the bishop accepted on 5 October. 54) It was clear Britain was prepared to go it alone with the Muzorewa government. But the PF was not going to let Carrington open negotiations with Muzorewa. On the other hand, Carrington was testing the PF and the Frontline States' strength.
The citizenship and the land question issues were debated simultaneously. Like the citizenship case the land question also posed serious threats to the peace conference in London. The Patriotic Front's criticism of the British plan increasingly focused on the issue of compensating whites for land that the PF argued had been stolen from its original African owners. Carrington told Mugabe and Nkomo that Britain would be prepared to grant financial assistance for land resettlement and redistribution schemes that an independent Zimbabwean government might undertake. 55) He did not commit the UK to a specific sum, but his intent was clear. The constitution acceptable to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia must provide for compensation to whites for land taken by the government, but Britain would be prepared to shoulder some of the financial burden. The British offer was pocketed by the PF
leaders and it did not lead to an immediate change in their stance. 56)
The PF agreed to rejoin the Lancaster House talks, claiming that assurances had been received that Britain, the United States and other countries would finance land, agricultural and economic development projects in a future state of Zimbabwe. "These assurances go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in government." 57) The PF's resentment was
5-17 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. due to the purpose of their struggle. Mugabe and Nkomo argued that their struggle was aimed at retrieving the land that was taken from the African people. It was after the British government's assurance, that it would handle the land question in financial terms, that the PF felt forced to rejoin the London Conference. Lord Carrington welcomed the PF and he said he now looked forward to discussing transitional arrangements.
The delay in reaching a settlement in London prompted South Africa to stage a protest in support of Muzorewa. Charlton says the South Africans acted in support of a constitutional outcome at Lancaster House, although their foreign minister, Pik Botha had expressed concern to Lord Carrington that because it was taking so long there to achieve one, Bishop Muzorewa's electoral prospects were receding. Time was on the side of the Patriotic Front in proving their military and now their political position. 58) South Africa's problem was the PF which they did not want to win the elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It was true that Muzorewa was losing out at the conference because the deliberations were centralised around Lord Carrington and the PF. Their protest neither scared nor moved Lord Carrington, and failed at getting him to change his way of conducting the London Conference.
On the contentious issue of a cease-fire, there was a serious wrangle which was brought to an end through the second class solution strategy. The cease-fire problems became the biggest obstacle of all to reaching an agreement with the PF, more especially because during negotiations a severely damaging attack was launched by the Rhodesian army into Zambia, destroying a number of its vital land communications. In a crisis atmosphere Nkomo and Mugabe flew to Dar es Salaam for a meeting with the FPLS, but they were pressurised to go back to the negotiating table to consolidate what they had won. On the day of the expiry of the ultimatum, the PF announced that, although aspects of the cease-fire proposals were extremely unpalatable, they were ready to accept them in full. 59) The PF accepted the cease- fire proposal through pressure from some members of the Frontline States. Legum says Machel remarked coldly that there was no struggle to continue, the PF should
5-18 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. go back to the negotiating table to consolidate what they had won. 60) The PF found themselves in a very real quandry: while they desperately wanted to see the settlement succeed for their own reasons, as well as to meet the wishes of the Frontline Presidents, they strongly suspected they might be walking into a British trap, which could lose them the war they had won. Their fear was that once the guerrillas came out of the bush and were concentrated in their camps, a pretext could be found by the Rhodesians and South Africans to break the cease-fire,
surround the camps and decimate the guerrillas. 61)
Another problem for the PF was the position of South Africa, now that they had accepted the ceasefire proposals. Nkomo and Mugabe demanded that, as part of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia cease-fire arrangements, the country's border with South Africa should be closed to movement of any armed forces. It was understood that the PF leaders argued that since Rhodesia's borders with Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana would be closed to all armed PF guerrillas once the cease-fire came into operation, a similar measure should be applied on the South African border. 62) The PF was afraid that South Africa had the potential to intervene in the Zimbabwe- Rhodesia affair since she was always supporting Muzorewa' s government which she thought might win the forthcoming elections.
When analysing the deliberation process at the Lancaster House Conference, it became clear that it was a political showdown between Britain (Lord Carrington) and the Patriotic Front of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. It shows that Britain and the PF were prepared to negotiate in order to solve the Rhodesian problem. It was Britain that was running the show. Lord Carrington was able to deal with the militant stance of the PF, and with Mugabe in particular. The support he received from the Frontline States empowered Lord Carrington to deliver Zimbabwe- Rhodesia from the internal settlement government of Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorewa. The Muzorewa delegation was acting as catalyst during the process by only accepting the British proposals, and applying pressure to the PF by leaving room to negotiate with Britain. During negotiations the PF' s strategy of war
5-19 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. pronouncement, demand and rejection, was not dumped but it could not change nor move Lord Carrington's iron hand, determined to liberate Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Carrington followed his approach based on first class and second class solution which was aimed at concluding an agreement with Muzorewa without the PF. He was able to assess the PF's strength and found it weak because the FLPS were tired of the war and needed a settlement badly. He made sure Britain would be seen dictating the terms to the PF and Muzorewa's government. If Carrington was not strong enough, Britain would have been criticised for not discharging her colonial responsibility for her colony, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The PF, on the other hand, acted and negotiated jointly as advised by their principals, Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere, who warned them to negotiate together. Throughout negotiations the PF, though they had their ideological differences, did not differ from nor criticise each other, but they stayed together and were more united than before. The FLPS' attitude was positive for a settlement and against anything the PF would do which could harm the peace process. They applied pressure on the PF in a way that finally pleased Carrington. He used to appeal to them whenever there was a deadlock between him and the PF. Collectively the FLPS' role was to make sure that the Lancaster House Conference succeeded because they were tired of the war and their economies were crumbling.
5.3.2 Political pressure on the PF
It was through pressure that the Lancaster House Conference was held and it was through pressure that the PF co-operated during the conference in London. The method used by the delegates, mostly the FLPS and Carrington on the PF, was pressure. The PF was clouded by pressure from the FLPS, and Lord Carrington successfully manipulated it according to his programme of action aimed at liberating Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. There was no other space the PF could have used to avoid pressure because the Frontline States with the help of the Commonwealth countries were focused and wanted peace badly. According to David Martin the Patriotic Front leaders faced pressures from to quarters: from their own guerrillas, many of
5-20 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. whom viewed the unfolding events as an attempt to prevent them gaining the victory they believed was near, and from the Frontline States, who emphasised that the Patriotic Front could not be seen to be responsible for wrecking the conference, and whose own economies were being wrecked by the war. 63) With this big cloud of pressure behind them the PF leadership had no way out and could not walk out. They had the pressure from their own guerrillas whom they should convince that it was not only through the barrel of a gun but also through talks that freedom could be achieved. On the other hand the FLPS were worried about their economic situation in their countries. The PF was left with no option but to cooperate with Lord Carrington and the FLPS.
Robert Mugabe, the member of the PF, was singled out by the FLS as a militant leader who could jeopardise the success of the Lancaster House Conference in London. Charlton says that the threat from the Frontline States was that, had Mugabe refused to go to London and explore the constitutional path, Rhodesia's economically prostrate neighbours would close down the "liberation war" which was being prosecuted from their territories. 64) This gave Lord Carrington a leverage to pin down the PF's militant stance, mostly Mugabe in particular. He realised that the Frontline State were tired of the war. Verrier says that Carrington correctly assessed the pressure being put on Mugabe by Nyerere and his fellow presidents to accept a compromise as Lancaster House and to take his chances at the ensuing election. 66) Nyerere knew of Mugabe's political position and he was aware that if he couldn't handle him firmly, there could be a chance that Mugabe might be left out of the peace process, or that the war would continue without Nkomo and the FLPS were fighting against that, hence the alliance.
During the negotiations the PF was rebuffed by Nyerere over transitional arrangements. On 4 November Nyerere indicated that he would not support the PF call for a UN peace keeping force, saying that Carrington "may be right", in rejecting it. He also said that Britain was probably right in relying on existing structures during the transition. 67) This meant that the PF had obviously not co-
5-21 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. ordinated its positions and tactics with its patrons. Kaunda warned that the FLPS were tired of the war and could not contemplate its continuation. Kuanda was always looking for peace at all costs and sometimes he was in conflict with his fellow Frontline State leaders.
Other role players who contributed in bringing an agreement at Lancaster House, were Tongogara, commander of the ZANU guerrillas, and president Machel of Mozambique. Josiah Tongogara was anxious to make a deal. He wanted to conclude a settlement. Astrow, quoting Tongogara, says "We just have to have a settlement, we cannot go back empty handed". 68) Tongogara as the commander of the ZANU guerrillas who were fighting, knew the pain of war and knew that the PF had to prove to the guerrillas in the field that it was not only a gun that could liberate Zimbabwe-Rhodesia but also negotiations. Mugabe could not take Tongogare lightly. But Tongogara was not alone in pushing for a settlement in London and exerting pressure on Mugabe. During the cease-fire talks Mugabe wanted Carrington to tell the South Africans to stay away from the border in order to enable checking on military movements. The PF was critical of the distribution of assembly points and feared that South African soldiers might ambush their guerrillas. At that critical juncture Machel stepped in. He sent an urgent message to Mugabe with Fernando Howana, one of his closest advisers, and his representative at Lancaster House. He told Mugabe unequivocally that the war was over and that he had to take the risks and fight the elections. 69) He also told him that should the conference fail, he would be granted asylum, but no bases from which to pursue the war. This was the ultimate FLPS' position which could not be ignored. 70) Tamarkin said that on 16 December Mugabe explained to his central committee that they had no option but to accept the British proposals. On 17 December 1979 the PF leaders initialled the cease-fire agreement. Mugabe had really no friend to lean on and the pressure was so great that the only option left to him was to bow to Machel's call. Machel was reliably reported to have told Mugabe: "We hear what you are saying, but we know you will hear us when we say the war must end". 71) Machel's pressure destroyed the PF's strategy of war
5-22 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. pronouncement, demand and rejection. The PF tried to demand, and rejected British proposals, but in the end it was Britain who won. During the Lancaster House Conference the Frontline States crossed a point of no return when dealing with the PF leadership and that paid the dividend.
Another source of pressure on the PF leadership at Lancaster was Lord Carrington' s political approach. According to Tamarkin, by 15 October, when the PF had not come forward, Carrington used, for the first time, his second class solution weapon. He suspended the PF from the negotiations until they accepted the constitutional proposals and stated his intention to proceed with bilateral talks with the Muzorewa delegation. 72) The PF' s obduracy was lessened by this strategy because the PF was forced to cooperate with. Lord Carrington (Britain) knowing very well that Britain was determined to go it alone. But such an endeavour would mean that the war would continue and the British government and possibly the United States, would expose itself to international criticism for unilaterally restoring Rhodesia to legality and lifting sanctions. Carrington, on the other side, said he was helped by the FLPS who were pressuring the PF to cooperate with him rather than to cause a deadlock at the conference.
The political pressure on the PF helped the Lancaster House Conference to come to a conclusion. If the FLPS and Carrington did not cooperate amongst themselves, the results of the conference wouldn't be what they had achieved on 17 December 1979. The FLPS' role in the conference contained the PF leadership in line with what they had agreed during the commonwealth conference in Lusaka. Britain emerged as a winner from the conference even though the talks were mostly conducted between them and the PF. Britain showed that she was determined to liberate Rhodesia through her colonial authority over her. Throughout the conference the nodal point was to liberate Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and it was to be done according to Britain's terms and not through the PF or Muzorewa' s government. With pressure having successfully been exerted on the PF, the conference dealt successfully with three inter-connected issues. Agreement was reached on the independence constitution
5-23 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. arrangements, on the independence period, and on acceptance of a cease-fire agreement.
5-24 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979.
ENDNOTES
ALASTAIR, M.T. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.3.
WISEMAN, H. et al. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.2
THE CHRONICLE, 2 August 1979.
Ibid.
HANCOCK, I. White liberals, p.250.
MUGABE, R.G. Our war of liberation, p.28.
Ibid.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.154.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.4.6.
Ibid. p.15.
THE CHRONICLE, 21 August 1979.
Ibid.
THE RAND DAILY MAIL, 24 August 1979.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.33.
DE KLERK, C.J. Zimbabwe: van Lancaster Huis tot onafhanklikheid, Desember 1979 tot April 1980, p.24.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.14.
THE CHRONICLE, 22 August 1979.
THE CHRONICLE, 12 September 1979.
SMITH, D. Mugabe, p.122.
DE KLERK, C.J. Zimbabwe: van Lancaster Huis tot onafhanklikheid, Desember 1979 tot April 1980, p.24.
5-25 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979.
MARTIN, D. The struggle for Zimbabwe, p.306.
Ibid.
LEGUM, C. Africa contemporary record, Annual survey and documents, 1979-1980, p.9.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.15.
VERRIER, A. The road to Zimbabwe 1890-1980, p.254.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.154.
THE CITIZEN, 15 September 1979.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.56.
THE RHODESIA HERALD, 18 September 1979.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
THE CITIZEN, 22 September 1979.
THE CHRONICLE, 22 September 1979.
THE RHODESIA HERALD, 24 September 1979.
THE CHRONICLE, 24 September 1979.
• VERRIER, A. The road to Zimbabwe 1890-1980, p.258.
Ibid., p.251.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.59.
NKOMO, J. Nkomo, p.194.
MORRIS-JONES, W.H. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.95.
WISEMAN, H. et al. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.8.
THE RAND DAILY MAIL, 26 September 1979. 5-26 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979.
Ibid.
THE CHRONICLE, 26 September 1979.
THE CHRONICLE, 4 October 1979.
THE CHRONICLE, 6 October 1979.
THE RHODESIA HERALD, 5 October 1979.
Ibid.
THE RAND DAILY MAIL, 8 October 1979.
THE RHODESIA HERALD, 10 October 1979.
THE CHRONICLE, 16 October 1979.
THE RAND DAILY MAIL, 16 October 1979.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.69.
Ibid.
THE RHODESIA HERALD, 19 October 1979.
CHARLTON, M. The last colony in Africa, p.96.
LEGUM, C. The battle fronts of Southern Africa, p.137.
Ibid., p.14.
Ibid., p.15.
THE RAND DAILY MAIL, 27 November 1979.
MARTIN, D. The struggle for Zimbabwe, p.315.
CHARLTON, M. The last colony in Africa, p.68.
VERRIER, A. The road to Zimbabwe 1890-1980, p.286.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.267.
5-27 Chapter 5: The Lancaster House Conference 1979. Ibid.. p.268.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.315.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.272.
Ibid.
Ibid.
SMITH, D. Mugabe, p.139.
TAMARKIN, M. The making of Zimbabwe, decolonisaton in regional and international politics, p.264.
5-28 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period.
CHAPTER 6: THE FINAL EPISODE: THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
5.1 THE PF AND THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
The negotiation battle at the Lancaster House Conference was not an easy one. The future and destiny of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was decided by the conference delegates. Lord Carrington successfully secured an agreement on 17 December 1979, signed by the PF, Bishop Muzorewa's government and the British government. Zimbabwe- Rhodesia was to be a free nation within a few months. It was left to the African people to decide who should lead them in an independent country. This chapter will focus on the disintegration of the PF. It will also look at how the transitional government handled the transitional period until democratic elections were held and then conclude with an overview of the views of various parties on the modern Zimbabwe.
The agreement initiated by the PF, the British government and the government of Bishop Muzorewa gave Lord Carrington powers to make sure that what they had achieved at the Lancaster House Conference was to be made a reality. To facilitate the smooth running of the transitional government, Lord Carrington removed all stumbling blocks that could frustrate the process. According to Ingham, Muzorewa had scarcely begun to feel the full weight of the opposition he faced. The British government, after getting the approval of the African leaders for an agreement, asked him to stand down from his office so that all parties could fight the elections on what the British optimistically described as equal terms. 1) Muzorewa's stepping down meant an end of his internal settlement government. Britain was able to directly control the transition period through the person of Lord Soames, the
transitional governor, as both Muzorewa and the PF had formally agreed to this. 2)
6-1 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. The appointment meant that Britain was in control of the political affairs in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, whether the PF liked it or not, and she was determined to make sure that independence was achieved. Lord Soames' appointment was a political strategy. Michael Charlton says the governor's arrival was intended to deprive all concerned of any incentive to delay or prevaricate further at the conference table. 3) This arrangement was designed to put anti-imperialist forces, the PF and its guerrillas in particular, into the mould the British had designed.
The Patriotic Front leadership was faced with an election challenge. Nkomo said that the PF would fight the election as an alliance rather than a single party. "We have fought the war as an alliance, we shall fight the elections as an alliance. " 4) Nkomo's view was shared by Joshiah Tongogara who died in the early hours of Boxing Day when the car in which he was travelling from Maputo to his headquarters in Chimoio collided with another vehicle. He had favoured elements in the party who wanted to fight the forthcoming election in unison with Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU. 5) Unfortunately Tongogara's view was not favoured nor entertained by his partners in the ZANU organisation. In The Rhodesian Herald of 28 December 1979 it was reported that in an interview Enos Nkala had said that strongly worded messages had been sent to Mugabe in London, warning against a continuing political alliance with Nkomo. "We know there was strong hostility to Nkomo among the Shona people due to many factors, including his past secret dealings with Ian Smith. 6) The conflicting views within the PF leadership indicated that the long-standing differences in the alliance were still alive and were strong enough to force the PF leadership to go to the elections separately.
But the major question besides the warning, was whether Mugabe and Nkomo would run together as the Patriotic Front or whether they and their supporters would insist on running separately, as had already been signalled by some ZANU leaders. For Nkomo, there were obvious advantages in running together, but senior ZANU officials argued that this would cost them votes in Mashonaland and would not resolve the vexed debate about which of the two leaders and parties had the largest
6-2 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. support in the country. 7) Robert Mugabe received the ZANU warning in a serious light and he was also of the idea of going to the elections without ZAPU. Nkomo said that he and Robert Mugabe had agreed to meet and to discuss the procedure for the elections that were due to take place in three months' time. "It seemed to me, and to many others in the leadership of both the ZAPU and ZANU wings of the PF, that when the elections come we must fight them as a single party. As agreed, on the morning after signing the Lancaster House Agreement, I went to Robert Mugabe's flat for our first talk. Where is Mr Mugabe? I asked. Oh, he left this morning for Dar es Salaam, came the reply. That was the end of our agreement to talk, broken not by me, but by Robert Mugabe and the leadership of ZANU. Next morning I heard on the radio that Robert, on arrival in Dar es Salaam, had
announced that he and ZANU would be fighting the elections on their own." 8)
Mugabe never regarded the PF as a united alliance which should fight elections as a party, but he regarded it as a marriage of convenience. There had never been military unity between the two military wings of the PF. On the other hand, Mugabe and Zanu's actions were influenced by the Nkomo-Smith secret meetings without Mugabe. It sent signals to Nkomo that Mugabe and ZANU couldn't trust him even after the Lancaster House Conference and during the process towards the elections. Mugabe and ZANU did not want to lose votes by being associated with Nkomo, in whom the people in the country had lost trust, because of those secret meetings with Smith.
A separation of the PF parties in the alliance was made official by some of ZANU's leadership confirming that ZANU was not going to fight the coming elections as an alliance. In The Chronicle of 29 December 1979, it was reported that making the announcement at a political rally at Zimbabwe grounds in Highfield, Salisbury, Nkalo said: "I have instructions to tell you that ZANU (PF), because that is what we are going to call it, shall contest the election as a separate entity. But that is not to say we are breaking the alliance with our ZAPU colleagues, we shall work out methods of maintaining the alliance. We shall retain some loose alliance with our
6-3 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. colleagues."9) ZANU's position was political in nature. ZANU didn't want to be seen to sever its ties with ZAPU of Nkomo. It wanted the African people to perceive the alliance as intact, whereas it was not.
In an interview published in Salisbury, Mugabe said that although he was convinced his party would win enough seats to form a government, it did not matter how many seats he won. Mr Nkomo's party were his natural allies and he would form a coalition with ZAPU leadership and to the African people in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia who were their supporters . There was no other way the PF was going to fight the elections as an alliance . The alliance's end vindicated Mugabe's call that the PF was a marriage of conenience. He could not trust Nkomo until election time They didn't part ways because they had achieved what they were fighting for, but because of the long standing suspicion, especially from Mugabe who did not have faith in Nkomo's political tactics, worsened by his refusal to commit his soldiers in a military alliance which would have made them fight more than they were doing, by his secret talks with Ian Smith.
The transitional period brought about various problems. Lord Soames had to make sure that British authority was felt throughout Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. He made sure that all leaders in the country realised that Britain was in control of the transitional process. To facilitate this, the new governor renewed the state of emergency for another six months in January 1980. Not surprisingly, Mugabe's ZANU (PF) became the major target for repression in the period between the cease-fire and the elections. The government, with the help of the security forces and Muzorewa's auxiliary army, imprisoned thousands of party workers, banned ZANU (PF) leader Enos Nkala, and tried to bar the whole organisation from campaigning in two provinces. 11) Soames' relations with the ZANU leader were initially extremely poor. The Rhodesian forces, whom the guerrilla leaders believed under the Lancaster House Agreement to be confined to barracks during the transition, were deployed by the governor against the guerrillas. 12) Lord Soames was viewed by
6-4 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. Lancaster House Agreement to be confined to barracks during the transition, were deployed by the governor against the guerrillas. 12) Lord Soames was viewed by ZANU as campaigning against ZANU (PF) by banning Enos Nkala to tip the scales in favour of ZANU (PF)'s opponents.
Nevertheless Mugabe reserved his harshest criticisms for Muzorewa, whom he accused of being the primary cause of the violations of the cease-fire through the utilisation of the auxiliary forces to intimidate people against the parties of the Patriotic Front by violence and other means. 13) Even though the auxiliaries were annexed to and under the control of the Rhodesian forces since Muzorewa's victory in the election of April 1977, they had been Muzorewa's private army and many believed that they still served his purposes.
The Patriotic Front wings, ZANU and ZAPU had problems that widened the split between Nkomo and Mugabe. According to The Chronicle of 6 February 1980, the rift between the guerrilla leaders widened with allegations by Nkomo's followers that they had been abducted and beaten by supporters of Mugabe. 14) Lord Soames' attack against ZANU (PF) leadership was due to Nkomo's allegations against his former partner in the PF alliance. Nkomo's allegation shows that Mugabe's supporters we clinging to Nkomo's flexible political tactics during the years of the struggle when he continued conducting secret talks with Smith. They were still suspicious of his political position.
With regard to another contentious issue, the governor was called upon to rid the country of South African troops. In the last days of December, "in a broadcast on Radio Maputo from headquarters in Mozambique, Mugabe avowed trickery" and charged that Britain had failed to expel South African troops from Rhodesia, claiming that some 1 000 South African ground troops and pilots were operating clandestinely. He threatened to reconsider the movement of the Patriotic Front
forces to the assembly points, if there was no satisfactory resolution of the matter. 15)
6-5 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. The issue continued to simmer until specific attention was directed to the presence of a south African battalion of some three to six hundred men stationed at Beit Bridge. The issue was seized upon by the Patriotic Front, the Frontline States and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) for constant attack on the complicity of the British government. African delegates also used the occasion to accuse the British government of misuse of the auxiliary forces "armed and at large" in maintaining law and order, and among other matters, of restricting the return of refugees to Rhodesia 16) Mugabe and Nkomo were vocal about the withdrawal of the South African army from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia because they knew that their presence could diffuse their chances of winning the elections, and that the SADF could kill their soldiers if they stayed in the country. In response to considerable domestic and international pressure, Lord Soames instructed the SADF to leave Beit Bridge on 31 January, but South African soldiers and equipment remained in the country until after the election. 17) Nkomo and Mugabe, though separated from their alliance, were united when they attacked the South African forces' presence in the country.
The former PF leadership, Nkomo and Mugabe, pressed for some concessions. One was that during the transition the governor would rely on a commonwealth force, rather than on the local police, to keep everyone honest and peaceful during the explosive demobilising, campaigning and voting periods. Another was the assembly points for each demobilising army, and the British finally agreed to an additional assembly point for guerrillas in the centre of the country. 18) This made for elections to be conducted in a fair political mood. The fears of Nkomo and Mugabe were allayed because their soldiers would not be attacked by the Rhodesian security forces.
The destiny of the Rhodesians was decided when they all went for elections monitored by Britain, the USA, the UNO and the OAU. Eric Pope-Symonds announced the result in a live radio broadcast to a hushed nation. ZANU (PF) had won fifty seven seats, an outright majority in the 100 seat parliament. Nkomo' s Patriotic Front had won twenty and the Bishop only three, leading to a popular joke
6-6 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. in the townships that Muzorewa had more helicopters (four) than he had seats in parliament. 19) The whites listened in stunned disbelief. Mugabe, the man Smith's propaganda machine had portrayed as a Marxist monster, had achieved what none of them believed possible. 20) The sense of numbed shock at the Mugabe victory reflected the complete failure of Rhodesian psychological warfare and political intelligence specialists to understand the political nature of insurgency. That the Mugabe victory came by the ballot as opposed to the bullet was the measure of the Rhodesian Front failure to integrate policy within military effort. 21) The white community were in favour of Muzorewa's party to win or at least Nkomo, whom they regarded as moderate, but not Mugabe, the militant. No wonder they were shocked to hear of his victory.
Robert Gabriel Mugabe was installed as President of Zimbabwe on 17 April 1980, before the eyes of Carrington and Margaret Thatcher, and that was the victory for the British diplomacy and administrative skills. The raising of the Zimbabwean flag just after midnight on 17 April by the ZANLA commander, Rex Nhongo, at a ceremony in Rufaro Stadium, Salisbury, attended by representatives of governments from all over the world, symbolised the new nation's two most important assets, peace and international recognition. Mugabe had appealed to all Zimbabweans to beat their swords into plough shears and join together in the task of reconstruction and nation building. 22) Countries like the Soviet Union and China were satisfied that the progressive forces had won, and the Frontline States and the OAU were jubilant that the war had ended, because majority rule was installed in Zimbabwe. The liberation movements PAC, ANC and SWAPO were present but the South African government was not represented. Botha's immediate reaction to Mugabe's victory was hostile, warning him of the direst consequences if he allowed Zimbabwe to be used as a base for South African guerrillas. 23) South Africa's sentiments were due to frustration because they did not like Mugabe and did not trust him.
6-7 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. The putting up of the transitional government was a clear indication that Britain and not the PF had the power to deliver independence in Zimbabwe, peacefully. During the transitional period the role of the PF leadership was that of a watchdog over the electoral and transitional rules to see that they were followed and to participate in elections in particular. Thought he PF split after the Lancaster House Conference, the road to the independence of Zimbabwe was a collective venture by ZAPU of Joshua Nkomo and ZANU of Robert Mugabe.
6.2 CONCLUSION
The Patriotic Front, though filled with problems within itself, managed to go through the negotiation process united in achieving independence for Zimbabwe. The Geneva Conference was bound to fail because the PF at that time was not a strong force. According to Miles Hudson, Nkomo found himself pulled along by Mugabe's extreme statements. Failure was inevitable from the start. Smith saw it in terms of implementing the Kissinger package. The Africans, still very divided, saw it in terms of negotiating a new government. The two positions were and remained totally irreconcilable. 24) It was difficult for the Geneva Conference to deliver because of diverse ideas and aims which were uncoordinated. Robert Mugabe was so strong in his militant pronouncement of war threats that Joshua Nkomo found himself following his partner in the PF. Disunity among Africans contributed a lot to its failure. The PF dominated the negotiation process and sank Ivor Richard.
The FLS, as the historic allies and supporters of the black Rhodesian Nationalist movements, had since the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia transferred their exclusive support to the Patriotic Front of Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and Robert Mugabe's ZANU. The FLS had also played an important role in ensuring that Bishop Muzorewa's "Government of National Unity" elected in April 1979, remained unrecognised throughout the world, and they remained committed, with
6-8 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. the PF, to the Anglo American plan for Rhodesia, formulated by David Owen and Andrew Young. 25) It was this exclusive recognition that fuelled the PF's militant stance, especially Robert Mugabe's who viewed war as the only means that could deliver freedom in Zimbabwe. That is why the Anglo-American initiative could not succeed because the PF leadership always had the FLPS support militarily and politically. Had Britain decided to recognise the Muzorewa government unilaterally, it would have incurred the wrath of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN) and the Commonwealth, and damaged relationships with the Carter administration and the EEC, which had declared its support for the PF. 26) Isolated British recognition, supported only by South Africa, would have almost certainly resulted in an intensification and further internationalisation of the war and provided Salisbury with little in return. 27) But because of the international support of the PF, Britain was forced to disown Muzorewa's government.
The PF leaders viewed the Lusaka Agreement with intense suspicion, as they regarded it as a British maneuvre designed to legitimise the Muzorewa administration and remove the dispute from the international arena by imposing British Colonial authority, and thereby ignoring OAU and UN resolutions. It was only after what Mugabe described as a forthright meeting with the FLPS at the non- aligned summit in Havana, that the PF agreed to attend the Lancaster House Conference despite grave reservations about departing from the Anglo-American proposals and about Britain's intentions. 28) Throughout the years of the struggle the PF leadership never trusted Britain, since she was unable to deal with the Smith regime and bring majority rule in Zimbabwe.
The Lancaster House Conference was brought about, among other factors, by the war. Hanock says exhausted by the war and ready for peace at any price, Rhodesian society in 1979 exhibited unmistakable signs of military failure, moral decline and political disintegration. 29) The realisation of war weariness brought all
6-9 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. the affected parties together for talks. The success of the Lancaster House Conference is owed to the involvement of the Frontline States in the Rhodesian problem. According to Peter C.W. Gutkind, the Patriotic Front accepted the constitution because there was enormous pressure from the Frontline States, Zambia and Mozambique in particular, who were under immense pressure because of the war. They both had responsibility for hundreds of thousands of refugees from Rhodesia. Their economies were slowly being destroyed and they were desperate for a settlement. 30) With such economic conditions, it was impossible for the FLS to encourage the PF to maintain its militant stand. It was because of this reason that the PF was forced to cooperate with Lord Carrington.
As the British, Salisbury and PF delegations battled through over three months of negotiations at Lancaster House, the influence of those international interests which had helped to shape the Lusaka Agreement continued to be evident. Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda and the South African Foreign Minister, Mr Pik Botha, all visited London at crucial moments in the talks and the Commonwealth secretary- general, Mr Shridath Ramphal, was actively involved throughout. 31) Their involvement during talks was because no parties wanted the Lancaster House Conference to fail, because that would mean the continuance of the war in Zimbabwe and the recognition of the internal settlement government of Muzorewa by Britain.
The rejectionist stand of the PF during negotiations was not without reason. Nkomo's view was that a constitution that could not be changed if the people wanted change was not a democratic constitution, and democracy was what Zimbabwe needed. "That was what I though we had won when I signed the formal agreement on 21 December 1979." 32) This was particularly damaging with respect to the issue of land. To bar the expropriation of land from settlers who had usurped it was a slap in the face for the entire mass of the colonised people, for whom land was a burning issue. 33) Political power without land was regarded as nothing by the PF. But due to pressure from the FLS, the PF was forced to sign a constitution which
6-10 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. guaranteed 20% reserve seats for whites which could not be abolished within seven years from the date of independence without a 100 per cent affirmative vote in the House of Assembly. 34) The PF was afraid of engaging itself in constitutional agreements that would jeopardise their constitutional rights as the constitution stood.
However, Davidow says the Lancaster House Conference succeeded because Rhodesia was ready for a settlement, and effective British diplomacy converted the favourable situation into the reality of an agreement acceptable to all of the parties. 35) When the details of the final agreement were disclosed there was little doubt which side had made the bulk of the concessions. Carrington had got what he wanted out of the negotiations. The PF leaders finally conceded to virtually every point of the plans he placed on the table at the beginning of the conference. Under pressure from Britain, the Rhodesian army and the presidents of the Frontline States, the PF made a series of compromises which guaranteed the status of the leadership of the new Zimbabwe but represented a setback for Zimbabwe workers and peasants. 36) Britain was leading the negotiations in such a way that the PF's militant stand could not work for them, but instead it called for more pressure from Carrington through his second class solution strategy and from the Frontline States.
The achievements at the London Conference were not without costs. The British were obliged to make commitments they might have preferred to avoid, such as the introduction of UK military forces during the transition and promises of aid for the new State. Britain gained what it had sought unsuccessfully for fifteen years, an honourable way out of the Rhodesian imbroglio. The PF obtained, through the electoral process made possible by the conference, what it controlled. Even the Muzorewa delegation, though ultimately vanquished, gained a clear shot at international respectability, the lifting of sanctions, an end to the war, and independence; goals which were though more important than perpetuating
themselves. 37)
6-11 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. might result in a combination of Muzorewa and parts of Nkomo's support or even the whole of it. 38) This signifies that Nkomo and Mugabe stayed together because they were faced with a common enemy, Ian Smith, and that they had one goal of liberating Zimbabwe from the Smith regime. But after the achievement of this goal, the PF split towards elections.
The presence of South African troops in Rhodesia throughout the election campaign damaged Lord Soames' credibility in the eyes of many observers, and was one of the major reasons why the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution at the beginning of February, calling on Britain to ensure full and impartial implementation of the letter and the spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement. 39) Britain was in favour of the South African forces in Rhodesia so that they could maintain law and order, and it was also in South Africa's political interest to have her forces in Rhodesia since they were in favour of Muzorewa to win elections.
Zimbabwe's independence marked the final collapse of the system of white ruled buffer states for South Africa and the final failure of its attempts to influence and contain the transfer of power. 40) Significantly, the installation of Mugabe's government in April 1980 was hailed on all sides as a victory. Carrington and Thatcher acclaimed a victory for British diplomacy and administrative skills. The British labour movement celebrated a victory of the national liberation movement in Zimbabwe"). British's heavy load was now lifted after she had agreed through force to assume her colonial responsibility and to liberate Zimbabwe. The handing over of power to Mugabe was achieved without further bloodshed which might well have resulted if the direction of affairs had faltered at the end. If Soames had been able to
improve on their situation, but they would still have lost. 42)
Majority rule was restored in Zimbabwe through international diplomacy brought about by the PF's refusal to accept the unacceptable proposals of Kissinger, Richard, Dr Owen and Andrew Young, because Britain by that time was avoiding her colonial responsibility. More credit should be accorded to the Frontline State leaders
6-12 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. for their unqualified support of the PF which always determined the politics of Zimbabwe. Presidents Nyerere, Kaunda and Machel were always at the forefront in the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. Today, Zimbabwe is a free country under the leadership of President Robert Gabriel Mugabe.
6-13 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period.
ENDNOTES
GIFFORD, A. Decolonization and African independence, p.209.
SYLVESTER, C. Zimbabwe, p.65.
CHARLTON, M. The last colony in Africa, p.131.
ASTROW, A. A revolution that lost its way? p.156.
THE CHRONICLE, 24 December 1979.
THE RHODESIA HERALD, 28 December 1979.
Ibid.
7 MARTIN, D. The struggle for Zimbabwe, p.328.
NKOMO, J. Nkomo, the story of my life, p.200.
THE CHRONICLE, 29 December 1979.
THE RHODESIA HERALD, 31 December 1979.
THE CITIZEN, 26 February 1980.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.156.
MARTIN, D. The struggle for Zimbabwe, p.323.
WISEMAN, H. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.22.
THE CHRONICLE, 6 February 1980.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.156.
WISEMAN, H. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.25.
GREGORY, M. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.22.
SYLVESTER, C. Zimbabwe, p.65.
MARTIN, D. The struggle for Zimbabwe, p.330.
6-14 Chapter 6: The final episode. The transitional period. Ibid.
EVANS, M. Fighting against Chimurenga, p.22.
GREGORY, M. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.16.
LEGUM, C. Africa contemporary record, Annual survey and documents, 1979-1980, p.23.
HUDSON, M. Triumph or tragedy? p.127.
GREGORY, M. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.1.
Ibid., p.2.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.3.
HANCOCK, J. White liberals, p.251.
INGHAM, K. Politics in modern Africa, p.269.
31 GREGORY, M. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.3.
NKOMO, J. Nkomo, the story of my life, p.199.
GREGORY, M. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.3.
Ibid.
DAVIDOW, J. A peace in Southern Africa, p.14.
ASTROW, A. Zimbabwe, p.155.
GIFFORD, A. et al. Decolonization and African independence, p.493.
CHARLTON, M. The last colony in Africa, p.131.
GREGORY, M. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, p.11.
GIFFORD, A. Decolonization and African independence, p.458.
ASTROW, A. A revolution that lost its way? p.156.
HUDSON, M. Triumph or tragedy? p.190.
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7-7