Unwritten Alliance”: the Policy of a Persuasive Approximation Between Brazil and the United States (1889-1906)

FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS CENTRO DE PESQUISA E DOCUMENTAÇÃO DE HISTÓRIA CONTEMPORÂNEA DO BRASIL – CPDOC PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM HISTÓRIA, POLÍTICA E BENS CULTURAIS MESTRADO ACADÊMICO EM HISTÓRIA, POLÍTICA E BENS CULTURAIS

AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE “UNWRITTEN ALLIANCE”: THE POLICY OF A PERSUASIVE APPROXIMATION BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES (1889-1906)

OLIVIER NICOLAS RONALD FRANÇOIS BODART

ACADEMIC ADVISOR: PROF. MATIAS SPEKTOR

Rio de Janeiro, November 2018

AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE “UNWRITTEN ALLIANCE”: THE POLICY OF A PERSUASIVE APPROXIMATION BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES (1889-1906)

OLIVIER NICOLAS RONALD FRANÇOIS BODART

Master dissertation in History, Politics and Cultural Assets presented to Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil – CPDOC as partially required to obtain a Master degree in History.

Rio de Janeiro, November 2018

Ficha catalográfica elaborada pela Biblioteca Mario Henrique Simonsen/FGV

Bodart, Olivier Nicolas Ronald François An alternative to the "unwritten alliance" : the policy of a persuasive approximation between Brazil and the United States (1889-1906) / Olivier Nicolas Ronald François. – 2018. 145 f.

Dissertação (mestrado) – Escola de Ciências Sociais da Fundação Getulio Vargas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em História, Política e Bens Culturais. Orientador: Matias Spektor. Inclui bibliografia.

1. Diplomacia. 2. Rio Branco, José Maria da Silva Paranhos, Barão do, 1845-1912. 3. Brasil - Relações exteriores - Estados Unidos. 4. Estados Unidos - Relações exteriores - Brasil. I. Spektor, Matias. II. Escola de Ciências Sociais da Fundação Getulio Vargas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em História, Política e Bens Culturais. III.Título.

CDD – 327.2

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although the act of academic writing is often a solitary moment, the research part definitely represents a collaborative work with a tremendous amount of people involved and innumerous gratifying experiences en route. First of all, I would like to give a special thank you to my advisor, Prof. Matias Spektor, for always giving me pertinent comments and precious guidance along each step of my research, and my academic career. I also would like to stress the generosity of Profs. Alexandre Luís Moreli Rocha, Maurício Santoro, João Daniel Lima de Almeida, Rodrigo Goyena Soares, Oliver Stuenkel, and Guilherme Casarões for their availability and their enthusiasm in listening and reading about my project; always providing me some useful feedback. I am also thankful for the great influence, in many ways, that this dissertation received thanks to the entire staff from the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC) from Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), in Rio de Janeiro. I am very grateful to the Boards of Directors from Fundação Getulio Vargas for allowing me to do this research with the help of a grant. The dedicated employees, trainees and volunteers from the National Archives (NARA I and II) at College Park, Maryland, United States of America and from the Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil who support me in my historical archives research deserved all my admiration for their professionalism. Last but certainly not least, thank you for the support of my family in Brazil and in Belgium. Much gratitude, admiration and love are dedicated to my spouse, Joselita, for her precious understanding, generous advice and kind patience during my endless moments of studies and writing. I cannot miss to give a very special gros bisous to my son, Basílio, who was born during the course of this dissertation and gave me more strength and maturity to achieve my goals. I am sure you all feel as proud and victorious as I am after having accomplished this intellectual challenge.

“Nations move more for interests than feelings”1

“The persuasive means are, in my opinion, the single ones to be made use of, in order to succeed in delicate negotiations like these, by a nation like Brazil that does not enjoy sufficient power to impose its will on an important military power”2

1 Translation from the author: “As nações se movem mais por interesses que por sentimentos”. Minister Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to J. M. da Silva Paranhos do Rio-Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, March, 30th, 1906, n°2, p. 4. File: 405-5-17, reservado. Buenos Aires Oficios, 1906-1908, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 2 Translation from the author: ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, apud Ricupero, 1995: 54, pp. 128.

ABSTRACT

This work aims at presenting an alternative version to the unwritten alliance that commonly describes the U.S. and Brazil relations at the beginning of the 20th century when they became closer and more intense. By unpacking the foreign policy strategies of each party and the perception of power towards each other, it appeared that Washington and Rio de Janeiro shared a perception of international changes as far as hemispherical matters. This converged into a persuasive approximation that mainly served Brazilian interests to contain the Argentine republic’s ambitions and divergent influences; without nonetheless the need to officialize the specific relation.

Keywords: U.S.-Brazil relationship, Argentina, Approximation, Perception, Rio Branco.

RESUMO

Este trabalho busca apresentar uma versão alternativa à aliança não-escrita que comumente descreve as relações entre os Estados Unidos e o Brasil no início do século XX quando elas ficaram mais próximas e intensas. Ao desfazer as políticas externas de cada ator e a percepção perante cada um, concluímos que Washington e Rio de Janeiro compartilhavam uma percepção das mudanças internacionais no âmbito hemisférico. Isto convergiu em uma aproximação persuasiva para o Brasil poder conter as ambições de poder e de influência divergentes da República Argentina; sem contudo a necessidade de oficializar esta específica relação.

Palavras-Chave: E.U.-Brasil relações, Argentina, Aproximação, Percepção, Rio Branco.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude a pour objectif de présenter une version alternative de l’alliance non- écrite qui généralement décrit les relations entre les États-Unis et le Brésil au début du XXe siècle lorsque celles-ci sont devenues plus proches et plus intenses. En dénouant les politiques étrangères de chaque protagoniste mais aussi en analysant la perception de chacun de l’autre, il apparaît que Washington et Rio de Janeiro partageaient une perception des changements internationaux en rapport au continent américain. Cela a convergé vers un rapprochement persuasif au service du Brésil afin de principalement contenir les ambitions de pouvoir et d’influence divergentes de la République d’Argentine; sans toutefois la nécessité de rendre officielle cette spécifique relation.

Mots-Clés: Relations U.S.-Brésil, Argentine, Rapprochement, Perception, Rio Branco.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 1

CHAPTER 1 | U.S. and Brazil Domestic Asymmetry - 1889-1901 //////////////////////// 24 1.1. U.S. Domestic Politics For International Ambitions ////////////////////////////////////// 24 1.2. Settling U.S. Foreign Policy: Between Legacy And Progressive Principles ////// 26 1.3. Washington “Offensive” Foreign Policy Toolbox ///////////////////////////////////////// 28 1.3.1. 20th Century’s Monroe Doctrine: Universal Projection //////////////////////// 29 1.3.2. Pan-American Conferences And Pan-Americanism Ideals //////////////////// 32 1.4. T. Roosevelt’s Ambitious International Project ///////////////////////////////////////////// 35 1.5. Hemispherical Reactions To U.S. Vision Of International Order //////////////////// 36 1.6. Brazilian Domestic Level: Instability In Changes ////////////////////////////////////////// 39 1.7. Brazilian Foreign Policy Reorientation //////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 43 1.7.1. U.S.-Brazil: First Pragmatic Approximation Attempt /////////////////////////// 45 1.7.2. Brazilian’s Perception Regarding The U.S. ///////////////////////////////////////// 46 1.8. Perception of Power Distribution In South America ////////////////////////////////////// 49 1.8.1. Argentina As A “Special” Neighbor /////////////////////////////////////////////////// 50 1.8.2. Tariffs War Between The U.S. And Argentina ////////////////////////////////////// 51 1.8.3. Brazilian Concerns About Argentina’s Naval Power //////////////////////////// 53 1.9. Conclusions /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 54

CHAPTER 2 | New Perceptions of Power in the Americas - 1902-1904 //////////////// 57 2.1. U.S. Moral Foreign Policy ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 58 2.1.1. The White House’s Perception About The South Of The Americas ///////// 59 2.1.2 The U.S. Department Of State’s Views Towards South America ///////////// 61 2.2. South American Perception Of Power ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 63 2.2.1. Brazilian Gains vs. Argentine Losses ////////////////////////////////////////////////// 63 2.2.2. Double “B”: Bolivia And Bolivian Syndicate ////////////////////////////////////// 64 2.2.3. Brazilian Military Power Situation ///////////////////////////////////////////////////// 66 2.2.4. Argentine Search For Regional Influence: Isolate Brazil ////////////////////// 68 2.3. Switch In The Americas ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 71 2.3.1. Reorganizing The Balance of Power in South America: Venezuela Case 71 2.3.2. Three U.S. Steps Towards South America //////////////////////////////////////////// 72 2.4. Argentina Takes the Lead /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 75

2.4.1. U.S.-Argentine Attempts at Forming an Alliance ////////////////////////////////// 75 2.4.2. Drago’s Doctrine Attempt ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 77 2.4.3. South American Solidarity Attempt ///////////////////////////////////////////////////// 79 2.5. Brazilian Reaction To The Venezuelan Case //////////////////////////////////////////////// 80 2.5.1. Rio Branco’s International Views ////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 81 2.5.2 Tightening Relations Between Argentina And Brazil ///////////////////////////// 85 2.6. Revolutions In South America: U.S. Views ////////////////////////////////////////////////// 87 2.7. Conclusions /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 89

CHAPTER 3 | The Illusive Alliances - 1905-1906 /////////////////////////////////////////////// 91 3.1. Confidently Assuring U.S. Influence: Roosevelt Corollary //////////////////////////// 92 3.1.1. Consequences in Brazil ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 93 3.2. Decisive action, symbolic gesture: elevation to Embassies ///////////////////////////// 96 3.2.1. U.S. Legation Perceptions Of Rio Branco’s Policy ///////////////////////////// 100 3.3. Rio Branco’s Multilateralist Approach To International Relations //////////////// 101 3.4. Two Perceptions For One Cause //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 102 3.4.1. Rio Branco’s Perception Of The U.S. - For Argentine Purposes ////////// 102 3.4.2. Illusive Alliance – A-B-C ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 103 3.4.3. Rio Branco’s Perception Of Argentina - For U.S. Purposes //////////////// 106 3.4.4. Illusive Alliance – U.S. Embassy ////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 106 3.5. U.S. Foreign Policy towards South America /////////////////////////////////////////////// 108 3.6. Two Statesmen To Catalyze The Illusive Brazil-U.S. Alliance ///////////////////// 110 3.6.1. An Idealist - Elihu Root /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 111 3.6.2. A Convinced Monroeist - Joaquim Nabuco //////////////////////////////////////// 113 3.7. 3rd Pan-American Conference In Rio De Janeiro ///////////////////////////////////////// 115 3.7.1. Argentina’s Opposition //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 115 3.7.2. Rio Branco’s Instructions to Nabuco Prior To The 3rd Pan-American Conference ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 116 3.7.3. Rio Branco’s Explicit Message To U.S. ///////////////////////////////////////////// 119 3.8. Conclusions ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 120

CONCLUSION ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 122

BIBLIOGRAPHY ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 129

INTRODUCTION

On the 9th of August 1906, the President and the Secretary General of the 3rd Pan-American Conference firmly criticized the misbehaviors of the press corps during the official sessions hosted in the Monroe Palace in Rio de Janeiro. Among their main complaints was the fact that official documents and papers were stolen, journalists were sitting in the designated seats of delegations, and some were playing hide and seek behind curtains during private meetings. Highly irritated with these attitudes, both Brazilian officials at the head of the organization, Joaquim Nabuco and Assis Brazil, announced that, consequently, the press would be excluded from the room every time a crucial political or a diplomatic debate was to occur.3 According to the Herald of New York, that decision followed a polemic interview of the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rio Branco by the well-known Argentinian journalist Ignacio Orzali. In the piece published fourteen days earlier by the Buenos Aires newspaper “La Nacion”, Orzali credited Rio Branco for these following words regarding Latin America: “Countries which cannot govern themselves and which do not possess sufficient strength to suppress continual revolution have no right to exist and should give place to stronger nations”. A couple of days later, a telegram was also “mistakenly” sent to Bogotá wrongly attributing these words to Rio Branco’s Pan-American Conference opening speech and was published in Spanish-American newspapers.4 In response, Rio Branco called the Argentinian journalist “a liar” and published, in the Brazilian press, a semi-official denial article commenting the whole incident: “The dispatch to Bogota gives an idea of the intrigues that some press

3 Translation by the author. Silvino Gurgel do Amaral, Trade Representative, United States of Brazil Embassy in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron of Rio Branco, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, September 14th 1906, dispatch n° 40: Single Attachment: The New York Herald, September 10th 1906, “Press boycotts Rio conference”. Arquivo Particular do Barão Do Rio Branco, Lata: 854, Maço: 02, Relações exteriores, Pasta: 14. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 4 Translation by the author. Silvino Gurgel do Amaral, Trade Representative, United States of Brazil Embassy in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron of Rio Branco, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, August 11th 1906, dispatch n° 38: Attachment n°1: The New York Herald, August 8th 1906, “Baron Rio Branco’s Denial”. Arquivo Particular do Barão Do Rio Branco, Lata: 854, Maço: 02, Relações exteriores, Pasta: 14. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro.

2 correspondents are indulging in in order to create in certain Spanish-American countries feelings of distrust and ill will against Brazil”5. The 3rd Pan-American Conference organized in 1906 in Rio de Janeiro, and principally the U.S. Secretary of State’s official visit, as a special guest is often represented in existing literature as the zenith of a new foreign policy orientation between Rio de Janeiro and Washington that had started a few years earlier, at the turn of the century. Between 1902 and 1906, the two sides had worked to actively shape a new, closer diplomatic relationship. The process had relied on the leadership of a handful of key officials, and was now reaching its apex. As this dissertation will show, on the American side, Elihu Root, respectively Secretary of War and Secretary of State under T. Roosevelt’s administration, designed and implemented the new policy towards Brazil. From Rio de Janeiro, the policy was ran by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, known as Baron of Rio Branco, with the support, in a second phase, of his Ambassador in Washington, Joaquim Nabuco. Both nations worked in a collaborative effort - at different level - to pursue their political interests and achieve a historical approximation that is commonly characterized by the expert literature as the most intense and the closest in terms of relations between the United States and Brazil up to these days.6 This dissertation focuses on the construction of that specific relationship between both hemispherical nations between 1902 and 1906, based on previous relations that began at the Brazilian Republic Proclamation in 1889. My goal is to

5 Ibidem. 6 BUENO, Clodoaldo; CERVO Amado Luiz. História da Política Exterior do Brasil. UNB, 5a Ediçao, 2014; BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003; HIRST, Monica. Brasil-Estados Unidos: desencontros e afinidades. Rio de Janeiro, FGV Editora, 2009; PEREIRA, Paulo José dos Reis. A política Externa da Primeira República e os Estados Unidos: A Atuação de Joaquim Nabuco em Washington (1905-1910). São Paulo: Hucitec/FAPESP, 2006; RICUPERO, Rubens. Rio Branco: O Brasil no Mundo. Editoria Contraponto, Rio de Janeiro, 2000; RICUPERO, Rubens. A Diplomacia Na Construção do Brasil: 1750-2016. Versal Editores, 2017; SMITH, Joseph. Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889-1930. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991; TEIXEIRA, Carlos Gustavo Poggio. Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem: Regional Politics and the Absent Empire. Lexington Books, 2012; VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Dia que Adiaram o Carnaval: Política Externa e a Construção do Brasil. UNESP, 2010; VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Evangelho do Barão: Rio Branco e a Identidade Brasileira. UNESP, 2012.

3 better understand the logic of that approximation between the United States of America and Brazil in the beginning of the 20th century. For this, I will unpack the motivations of each of the parties, and analyze the politics behind that phenomenon. More specifically, I seek to answer the following question: How best can we characterize the U.S.-Brazil relationship at the turn of the twentieth century? Answering this question matters because existing literature describes the enterprise as an unwritten alliance, but here I offer an alternative explanation of what took place on the ground. Instead of framing this relationship as an informal or semi-formal alliance, I believe we can more productively understand what happened at the time by thinking in terms of a persuasive approximation. By leading a persuasive approximation policy, I mean that the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Rio Branco, made full benefit of a tradition of cordial relations but mainly a shared perception with Washington about shifts in the international balance of power at the turn of the 20th century to get closer to the U.S. government. By maneuvering so, his main goal was to deter expensive and aggressive behaviors of a third agent involved in the equation: the Argentine republic. Because the Argentinian-Brazilian diplomatic relations were particularly tense, the communication between both governments troubled and misled, and no signals of cooperation from the Argentine capital given at this time, the intention in Rio de Janeiro was to signal to its direct border neighbor – via the U.S. channel - that Brazilian authorities were nonetheless precisely aware of its geopolitically suspicious intentions in South America. Thanks to close relations with the U.S. – perceived in South America as the hemispherical emerging power -, Rio Branco could restrain any hypothetical offensive actions from Argentina. This specific approximation - at the service of the persuasive policy - provided many other advantages: low-cost, autonomy, and did not require institutionalization. By consequence, this type of behavior cannot be characterized as an alliance – written or unwritten. Brazil-U.S relations were after all loose rather than tight, with levels of mutual commitment minimal. There were no provisions of budgets on either side to build up a special relationship with the other, nor were there new institutions set up to formalize mutual commitment. Administrations in Washington and Rio de Janeiro did not set up new bodies to manage relations with the other side, nor were there any provisions introduced to establish a division of labor between the two countries in their relations with the rest of the hemisphere. As the dissertation will show, the trove

4 of evidence that is now available suggests that the density of the bilateral relationship between Brazil and the United States at the time of Rio Branco was thinner than it is normally taken to be. Our task is to properly specify the terms under which the two sides set out to cooperate. The process of diplomatic approximation between Brazil and the United States of America in the beginning of the twentieth century is, as seen above, normally described as an unwritten alliance7, an expression consecrated by the American historian E. Bradford Burns8. Published in 1966, two years after the beginning of the last military dictatorship in Brazil, the book9 continues to be the major work of reference regarding the topic, having mainly influenced various generations of scholars in Brazil10 and across the world11. Burns defines the relation between the U.S. and Brazil as an unwritten alliance to mutually support one another within the regional fora of the time. This arrangement is presented by the author as part and parcel of the broader approximation between the two countries that started in 188912. This process would include U.S. government

7 BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966. This is the first published book by the author. 8 Edward Bradford Burns (1932-1995) was an assistant professor of history at UCLA (1964-67) and professor, UCLA (1969-93). He was born in Muscatine, Iowa. He specialized in Latin American history. 9 In 2003, the book was published in Portuguese by FUNAG, under the title: A aliança não escrita: O Barão do Rio-Branco e as relações do Brasil com os EUA. The reader should be aware that FUNAG is a Brazilian government agency and the official publisher of the Ministery of Foreign Relations. More info: http://www.funag.gov.br/index.php/en/. Another important fact is that this study was translated from English to Portuguese by Sérgio Bath, a Brazilian retired diplomat. 10 PECEQUILO, Cristina. As Relações Brasil Estados Unidos. Fino Traço, 2012. BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Capítulo I. In: Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 43-69. CERVO Amado, Luiz; BUENO, Clodoaldo. História da política exterior do Brasil. UNB, 2008. BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política externa da Primeira República. Os anos de apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003. TEIXEIRA, Carlos Gustavo Poggio. Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem: Regional Politics and the Absent Empire. Lexington Books, 2012. GARCIA, Eugenio Vargas. Cronologia das Relações Internacionais do Brasil. 2a Edição, Editora Sairava, 2000. 11 CRANDALL, Britta H. Hemispheric Giants: The Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011. HIRST, Monica. Brasil-Estados Unidos: desencontros e afinidades. Rio de Janeiro, FGV Editora, 2009. LANGLEY, Lester D. America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere, University of Georgia Press; 2nd edition, 2010. ROETT, Riordan. Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society, Praeger Special Studies, 5th Edition, 1999. SELCHER, Wayne A. Brazil in the international system: the rise of a middle power. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981. SMITH, Joseph. Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889-1930. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. Standford University Press, 1997. TULCHIN, Joseph S. Latin America in International Politics: Challenging US Hegemony, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2016. 12 “Although the past provided several historical arguments in favor of the theory of traditional friendship, a close scrutiny reveals that 1889, only thirteen years before Rio-Branco’s ministry, marked the real beginning of a continuously close relations between Brazil and the United States”. BURNS, E.

5 support to the military who exiled the Brazilian emperor and founded a Republic (1889)13, the recognition of the new regime (1890)14, political and military support during the military “Brazilian Naval Revolts” (1893-94)15 in Rio de Janeiro’s harbor, and bilateral economic and trade missions for mutual benefit16. These ties, along the years, were established with much support in Brazil from leading politicians and intellectuals such as Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil17, Salvador de Mendonça18, and Joaquim Nabuco19. The U.S. captured the imagination of a generation of Brazilian leaders to the extent that the Brazilian military that took office went as far as renaming their country: the United States of Brazil in 189120. Burns describes the alliance as unwritten or informal because it was based on and informed by traditional, historical or necessary friendship. For the author, a trustful and intimate relationship was built between the two countries that led to uniform harmony based on tacit agreement or special agreement.21 As a consequence, no written documents, signed treaties were consequently necessary. For him, the approximation was a necessity for Brazil22 to achieve its national interests and foreign policy: international prestige, Southern American leadership and settlement of Brazilian borders23. However, for the North American government, the

Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 165. 13 BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Capítulo I. In: Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 43-69. 14 SMITH, Joseph. The United States and the Americas-Brazil and the US: Convergence and divergence. The University of Georgia Press, Athens & London, Kindle file, 2010. 15 NABUCO, Joaquim. A Intervenção Estrangeira Durante a Revolta de 1893. Edições do Senado Federal, Vol. 21, Brasília, 2003, pp. 55, 66, 98-100. 16 TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. Standford University Press, 1997. 17 Centro de História e Documentação Diplomática. Assis Brasil: Um Diplomata Da República. 1a Ed., Vol. I e II. FUNAG, Rio de Janeiro, 2006. 18 MENDONÇA, Carlos Sussekind de. Salvador de Mendonça: democrata do Império e da República. Rio de Janeiro, INL/MEC, 1960. 19 ALONSO, Angela Maria. Joaquim Nabuco. Companhia das Letras, 2007 - CHDD - Centro de História e Documentação Diplomática. Joaquim Nabuco: Embaixador Vol. I e II. Brasília, FUNAG, 2011. 20 “Since the inconfidência in 1789, Brazilians had admired and hoped to emulate the North American form of government”. “The rapid economic growth of the United States, its expanding industrialization, and its increasing manufacturing efficiency excited the admiration of Brazil”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 167. 21 BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966. 22 “In studying the solidification of that friendship it becomes clear that the approximation was more important to Brazil than the United States and that Brazil took the initiative in effecting it”. Ibidem, p. 203. 23 Ibidem, p. 204.

6 approximation was “simply a part of a larger concern with world diplomacy”24. On Burn’s views, Washington agreed to this because Rio de Janeiro behaved according to the American will and was thus seen as sufficiently trustworthy to become a close associate in the Western Hemisphere25. Burns argues that an alliance between the United States of America and Brazil took shape because of mutual positive reinforcement between the two countries. The supportive role of Washington in the arbitration of Brazilian border disputes and other diplomatic events helped to create a trustful relationship26. The two countries also shared geopolitical concerns such as Spanish-American Republic instability. Each one of the protagonists controlled its own geopolitical influential zone wherein the American government was taking care of Central America, Brazil would take care of South America, and would help to create a bridge between the United States of America and Latin America.27 The explicit recognition by the Brazilian government of the American Monroe Doctrine and its keen participation in the U.S. concept of Pan-Americanism - as opposed to Argentina’s pushback against American designs - also favored that privileged relationship28. Above all, Burns points out the commercial rationale behind approximation. He argues that Brazil’s structural economic change at the turn of the 20th century, from sugar cane to coffee agriculture was a key factor behind approximation with the United States29. This switch in crop originated in an impressive “Coffee Boom” that led Brazil between 1889 and 1930 to undergo major economic growth30. This phenomenon began in the middle of the 19th century, with a significant

24 Ibidem. p. 204 25 “The good will of Root and Roosevelt complemented and facilitated the efforts of the Brazilian foreign minister and ambassador”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 203. 26 Respectively, the author cites: the Acre dispute (1902-03), the recognition of Panama (1903), settlement of Peruvian-Brazilian controversy (1903-09), the elevation of the legations to embassies (1905), the Panther affair (1905), the visit of Root in Rio de Janeiro (1906). 27 “Brazil recognized the sphere of influence of the United States in the Caribbean, while the United States did not interfere in Brazil’s sphere of influence, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. There seems to have been a tacit accord whereby Brazil acknowledged the hegemony of the United States in North America and the United States respected Brazilian pretensions to the hegemony of South America”. Ibidem, p. 207. 28 “In addition to their allegiance to Pan-Americanism and without in any way intending to contradict it, both supported the Monroe Doctrine”. Ibidem, p. 207. 29 “Cheap suitable land, high profits, large numbers of immigrant workers, and a rising world demand made coffee a popular and lucrative crop”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 2. 30 “Of the many changes brought by the overthrow of the empire, perhaps the most fundamental was the recognition of coffee as the principal crop in the Brazilian economy”. Ibidem, p. 1.

7 mark in 1870-1880, when the Brazilian production began to show signs of fast expansion31. Between 1822 and 1889, the Brazilian coffee export grew 75 times. Simultaneously, the worldwide coffee consumption rose 15 times along the same period. In 1850, Brazilian coffee planters were producing more than half of worldwide production that led the southern American country to produce 5 times the production of all other countries together by 1906.32 For example, in ten years, from 1880-81 to 1890-91, coffee production rose from 3,7 million sacks (60kg) to 5,5 million sacks whereas, in 1901-02, production reached an extraordinary amount of 16,3 million sacks33. The first years of 1900 represented a peak in production that allowed Brazil to come close to dominating the global market for coffee, an economic transformation that underwrote Washington’s decision to privilege Rio de Janeiro as its major partner in South America34. During the first decade of the 20th century, under Rio Branco’s administration, the Brazilian coffee exporters maintained their steady ascension witnessing a high international demand and solidly establishing its privileged situation, especially in relation to Washington. Despite an asymmetric relation regarding trade balance, between 1902 and 1912, the coffee exports heading the U.S. market skyrocketed from 79 millions to 124 millions U.S. dollars.35 In fact, the American market was the largest in the world for Brazilian exports and Brazil appeared to be the main U.S. commercial partner, just after European countries36. Great Britain continued to occupy the first place as the main trade partner along with Germany and France37.

31 Translated by the author. TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. Standford University Press, 1997, p. 112. 32 Translated by the author. TOPIK, Steven. As relações entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos na época de Rio Branco. Sessão IV in: Rio Branco, a América do Sul e a modernização do Brasil. ALMINO, João; CARDIM, Carlos Henrique (org.), Rio de Janeiro, EMC, 2002, p. 411. 33 Transled by the author. FURTADO, Celso. Formação Económica do Brasil. Editora Cia das Letras, Rio de Janeiro, 1959, p. 251. 34 “Perhaps even stronger than the political and the diplomatic bonds drawing together the two countries were the commercial ties”. Ibidem, p. 202. 35 Translated by the author. TOPIK, Steven. As relações entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos na época de Rio Branco. Sessão IV in: Rio Branco, a América do Sul e a modernização do Brasil. ALMINO, João; CARDIM, Carlos Henrique (org.), Rio de Janeiro, EMC, 2002, p. 412. 36 Translated by the author. TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. Standford University Press, 1997, p. 14. 37 Translated by the author. “(...) during the two first decades of the Republic, Brazil kept close trade relations with main European great-powers: Great-Britain and France but also with Germany. Great- Britain continued being the main trade partner of Brazil, although its participation on the Brazilian market had dropped from 40% to 25-30%, due to German competition (...)”. BETHELL, Leslie.

According to Burns, the paramount change in commodity initiated in 1889 led to a crucial political switch. During the “Coffee Boom” years, the Brazilian government under Rodrigues Alves (1902-06), Afonso Pena (1906-09) and, Nilo Peçanha (1909-10) and Hermes da Fonseca (1910-14), managed to deal with market and production fluctuation and economic world depression by manipulating prices, contracting foreign loans, and stimulating government interventions with the purpose of keeping its competitiveness on the international coffee market38. From the highly lucrative coffee industry emerged an influential group of coffee planters that managed to create intimate relations with the federal government and “(…) political control by the coffee interests characterized the First Republic”39. For Burns, the “Coffee Boom” was a source of peace, progress and prosperity for Brazil. This favorable economic situation helped to understand the new Brazilian experience and prosperity: the reshaping of Brazilian politics and economy. Coupled with unprecedented changes in demography, immigration, politics, urbanism, infrastructure and nationalism, Brazil became a natural magnet for the United States in South America. However, this Brazilian “miracle” was highly dependent on the coffee industry and its export network40. Burns argues that Salvador de Mendonça, the Brazilian commercial attaché in New York (1876-1890) and then consul in Washington (1890-1898), understood the potential for growth in U.S. demand for Brazilian coffee41. After all, since 1870, the North American market absorbed more than half of the Brazilian coffee production dedicated to foreign exportation; being the principal buyer of the commodity42. From 1890 to 1898, the Brazilian diplomat worked hard on building a bilateral relationship between both nations in order to sign a commercial treaty43. In 1891, a reciprocity agreement was signed allowing most of the Brazilian commodities to cross the

Joaquim Nabuco No Mundo: abolicionista, jornalista e diplomata. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Bem-Te-Vi, 2016, p. 186. 38 Ibidem, pp. 5-10. 39 Ibidem, p. 5. 40 “The sale of several natural products, particularly coffee, in the world market ensured Brazilian prosperity”. “(…) Brazil had successfully made the change from a monarchy dependent on the support of the sugar barons to a republic dependent for its order and progress on the coffee industry”. Ibidem, pp. 62, 199. 41 “For many years, North Americans had been the principal purchasers of Brazil’s three major exports: coffee, rubber, and cocoa. Since 1865, the United States had taken the single largest share of Brazils coffee; (…)”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 63. 42 Ibidem. 43 “Understanding the importance of the North American market for Brazilian products, he tried to solidify commercial relations with a formal treaty”. Ibidem, p. 60.

American borders almost free of taxes 44 . American goods received the same treatment. Nonetheless, despite Salvador de Mendonça’s enthusiasm, the reciprocity agreement was cancelled in 189445 by the Brazilian authorities and a new form of bilateral commercial relations was established under the Dingley Tariff in 1897. The latter more advantageous for Brazil, and unfavorable for the United States allowed commodities to enter on the American market totally free of taxes46. Despite the numerous attempts of the U.S. administration to reduce Brazilian tariffs in favor of North American products, this commercial imbalance continued during Rio Branco’s tenure as foreign minister. From 1902 to 1912, the Brazil-U.S. complementary47 trade helped Brazil to sell four times more products to the United States than the opposite48. As pointed out above, Bradford Burns set the mold for scholarship on U.S.- Brazilian relations in the first decade of the twentieth century. But his work presents several problems and has received several criticisms, which I seek to lay out below. Perhaps the first limitation in Burn’s work is the narrow focus on the role of the foreign ministers behind the unwritten alliance. For all the emphasis on the commercial dimensions of diplomatic approximation, he tells us little about the interconnection between economics and politics at the time. Second, Burns does not take into consideration external factors such as the balance of power and power perception as a catalyst of foreign policy creation. This dimension, as I will show in this dissertation, is a crucial factor in shaping U.S. and Brazilian behavior at the time. Third, Burns centrally focuses on the Brazilian state characteristics and its actors, without giving due weight to the role of the United States. Ironically, what should be a narrative dominated by the interaction between two sides – because of that alliance - ends up being an account which privileges one side at the expenses of the other, and presents the outcomes as direct results of the preferences of one side.

44 “ (…) Brazil’s principal exports, rubber, coffee, sugar, and hides, entered the expanding American market either duty-free or nearly so”. Ibidem. 45 Translation by the author. “From 1890 to 1892, the United States bought 218 million US dollars in Brazilian products, 95% without customs taxes. Brazil imported 38 million US dollars from the United States, 87% under heavy taxes”. ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de; BARBOSA, Rubens Antônio. Relações Brasil - Estados Unidos: Assimetrias e Convergências. Ed. Saraiva, 2002, p. 116. 46 “The Brazilian tariff policy was unfavorable to North American imports and in no way reciprocated North American generosity. A cursory glance at the trade statistics during the period graphically shows the trade imbalance in favor of Brazil, which sold in the American Market and purchased in the English Market”. Ibidem, p. 63. 47 “Brazil sold tropical and semitropical products on the world market. The United States sold manufactured goods and raw produce from temperate zones.” Ibidem, p. 166. 48 “In fact, by 1902, the United States admitted duty-free 94.5 percent of the Brazilian imports and collected an average duty on total Brazilian imports of 4.8 percent. On the other hand, Brazil admitted no imports from the United States duty-free, the average duty amounting to 45 percent”. Ibidem.

Even though, after the proclamation of the Republic in 1889, Brazil faced clear and severe signs of disturbance, fragility, and instability49, in Burns’ optimistic views, positive politics and economic structural changes in Brazil, due to the “coffee boom”, influenced the local authorities to feel confident enough to start a proactive foreign policy without considering Brazilian domestic challenges as a valid reason for an approximation with the U.S. 50 As seen earlier, the historian based his main argument on stating that Brazilian foreign policy was strictly grounded on commerce because Rio Branco considered trade as a tool to achieve his foreign policy51. The Brazilian foreign minister could bring closer political relations with Washington by focusing all his efforts on keeping, by all means, favored tariffs policy as a unique and special relationship between the two countries52. This analysis depicts a high level of dependence on American commerce to formulate Brazilian foreign policy and does not take into consideration other essential Brazilian domestic economic factors. After the Republic proclamation, despite Brazil’s efforts to improve its insertion in the international economy, the “First decade of the Republic regime was one of the most difficult for the economic policy”53. International commerce was still relative in Brazilian domestic economic balance and the country was still showing some signs of a closed economy until the first decade of the 20th century considering that “the exports value per capita, although, it grew from US$ 11,7 in 1872 to US$ 12,9 in 1913, does not define Brazil as a notably open economy, because these values are close to Latin America tropical average, this is, without including Argentina,

49 Military coup (1889), “Armada” Revolts (1891-94), “Canudos” War (1896-97), Vaccine Revolt (1904), Panther Case (1905), “Chibata” Revolt (1910), “Contestado” War (1912-16). During these national events, civilians and military losses were counted. 50 “Prosperous and peaceful at home, Brazil could turn its full attention to international relations and could concentrate its energy on the formation and execution of a constructive foreign policy for the first time in several decade”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian- American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 20. 51 “The pragmatic Rio-Branco understood that relationship between commerce and diplomacy”. BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 62. 52 “The sale of several natural products, particularly coffee, in the world market ensured Brazilian prosperity. Prosperity brought progress and together they strengthened the Baron’s chances of successfully carrying out his foreign policy”. Ibidem, p. 63. 53 Transled by the author. FRANCO H. B., Gustavo. A Primeira década Republicana, chapter 1, p. 11. In PAIVA ABREAU DE, Marcelo (org.). A Ordem Do Progresso: cem anos de política econômica republicana (1889-1989), Elsevier Editora, Rio de Janeiro, 1990.

Uruguay and Chile”54. Besides, if Rio de Janeiro switched its diplomatic axis from London to Washington at the beginning of the 20th century, Brazilian authorities were still entangled with a series of important loans55 contracted, among others, in London. Between 1902 and 1913, “the federal foreign debt value, for example, expanded from £30,9 million in 1890 to £44,2 million in 1900, but in 1913 reached the number of £144,3 million”. As far as foreign investments, “(…) from 1860 to 1902, capital of foreign companies established in the country reached £105 million, whereas the total for foreign companies established during 1903-1913 is around £190 million”.56 This equation of foreign capital, foreign debts and export would be the roots of the Brazilian politics of international economy during the “First Republic” and often considered as the cause of instability within its macro-economy.57 By focusing on a Brazilian-centered argument, Burns also gives extensive emphasis to Rio Branco58 as the source and catalyst of this approximation. In this respect, Burns argues that Rio Branco’s considered the United States of America as a model and a guide59. This semi-biographical approach definitely provides the reader insights about the Brazilian foreign minister’s private life and his political profile. Rio

54 Transled by the author. FRANCO H. B., Gustavo. A Primeira década Republicana, chapter 1, p. 12. In PAIVA ABREAU DE, Marcelo (org.). A Ordem Do Progresso: cem anos de política econômica republicana (1889-1989), Elsevier Editora, Rio de Janeiro, 1990. 55 “The Brazilian dependence on the London financial markets continued without any major alteration”. Translation by the author. RICUPERO, Rubens. Rio Branco: o Brasil no mundo. Editoria Contraponto, 2000, pp. 35-6. “The agreement was negotiated as a moratorium and named “funding loan” (…). “ The government would receive 10 million pounds, and provide the national customs benefits as a guarantee”. “The new loan interests would only begin to be charged after three years and the amortization after thirteen years, the rest should be paid within a diluated 63 years delay”. Translation by the author. SEVCENKO, Nicolau. A Revolta da Vacina: Mentes insanas em corpos rebeldes Cosac Naify, 2010, p. 57. “The important international finantial group under the Rothschild House closely followed the Brazilian financial economy, particularly after the funding loan in 1898”. Translation by the author. FURTADO, Celso. Formação Económica do Brasil. Editora Cia das Letras, Rio de Janeiro, 1959, p. 254. 56 Transled by the author. FRANCO H. B., Gustavo. A Primeira década Republicana, chapter 1, p. 12. In PAIVA ABREAU DE, Marcelo (org.). A Ordem Do Progresso: cem anos de política econômica republicana (1889-1989), Elsevier Editora, Rio de Janeiro, 1990. 57 Ibidem, p. 13. 58 The title of the book gives us a glimpse of this central role from Rio Branco according to Burns: “The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations.” 59 “His goal was for Brazil to imitate the success of the United States and at its side to exercise considerable influence in the world.” BURNS, E. Bradford. The Unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations. Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 86. The reader should be aware that the author based his argument on a correspondence from Rio Branco to Nabuco from the archive - the personal Nabuco’s archive. More important is to take into consideration that the date is unknown: Rio Branco to Nabuco, no date, AJN.

Branco perceived his neighbor in the North as a growing power within the western hemisphere and the shift of international power from London to Washington at the beginning of the 20th century. As a result, the Brazilian diplomat planned to switch Brazilian diplomatic axis from London to Washington. Nonetheless, Burns does not mention anything about Brazil’s own power perception and ambitions (defensive or offensive) within the international system, and only states that strengthening relations between Brazil and the United States was one of the foreign minister goals. Besides, he does not even mention the extensive regional tensions occurring in neighboring South American countries at that time either. In order to sustain his focus on the Brazilian government and authorities as the source of this approximation, Burns mainly concentrated his efforts researching in Brazilian official and non-official archives. The reader will note that he is a little too close to the official Brazilian position on Rio Branco and the relationship with the United States that was prevalent at the time of writing. Burns does not spend much time in American diplomatic archives or in the private archives of the U.S. protagonists such as Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root. There is little attention given to the U.S. side to explain the approximation between Washington and Rio de Janeiro. In his work, E. Bradford Burns mainly drew on documents from the Historical Archive of Itamaraty (HAI) and, to a lesser extent, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Overall, the use of primary sources is very limited. No official correspondence between American diplomats in Washington and Brazilian diplomats in Rio de Janeiro, for instance, made it in the book. He mainly focused his study on the primary sources from the Historical Archive of Itamaraty (HAI), drawing most of his attention to the correspondence between the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) and its embassy in Washington and, to the official communication between Rio Branco and the American Secretary of State: Elihu Root. The book’s organization also seems to serve perfectly Burns’ Brazilian- centered analysis. Instead of using a chronological narrative explaining the successive causes of the approximation among respective governments, the author mainly built his arguments by depicting Brazilian internal factors as the reasons to shift towards the United States.

In addition, it is worth considering Burn’s terminology when he describes the highest level of Brazil-U.S. relations as an unwritten alliance60. This term was borrowed from Winston Churchill’s speech at the English-Speaking Union in honor of General Gruenther, the North Atlantic treaty Organization’s Supreme Allied Commander in 1954: "We are entitled to fix our thoughts on the mind, and I think I may say Majesty, of the unwritten alliance which binds the British Commonwealth and Empire to the great Republic of the United States. It is an alliance far closer in fact than many which exist in writing. It is a treaty with more enduring elements than clauses and protocols. We have history, law, philosophy and literature; we have sentiment and common interest; we have language. We are often in agreement on current events and we stand on the same foundation of the supreme realities of the modern world". 61

This speech is one among many post-war speeches given by Churchill between 1953 and 1959 about the necessity of an Anglo-American “special relationship” and “friendship”. Based on the ideological conception of Churchill’s unwritten alliance, the application of this concept to Brazil-U.S relations seems not to fill any of the Churchill requirements: no common language, no common sentiment, no common history, law, philosophy or literature. Despite that, over the 305 pages in the book, the nouns and adverbs friend(s)62, friendship63 and friendly64 extensively appear for a total of 129 times to justify the nature of the relationship between Brazil and the United States of America. Reading Burns it is impossible not to remember Martin Wight’s reflections on friendship between states in international relations:

“Alliances are not friendships within International Politics – unless, as Aristotle observed, one uses the word friendship to describe relations based on utility. Alliances cannot be uninterested. The field of friendship extends itself to the point that a man gives his life for his friends; but self-sacrifice

60 Several academic reviews about Burn’s book release in the 60’s already mentioned the terminology issue. Cf.: Dexter Perkins. Review: The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations by E. Bradford Burns. The Journal of American History Vol. 54, No. 1 (Jun., 1967), Oxford University Press. pp. 176-177. Alan K. Manchester. Review: The Unwritten Alliance. Rio Branco and Brazilian-American Relations by E. Bradford Burns. The Hispanic American Historical Review Vol. 47, No. 1 (Feb., 1967), Duke University Press. pp. 128-129. 61 CHURCHILL, Winston. Post-war Speeches: The Unwritten Alliance: Rosetta Books, kindle file, 2014. 62 The noun “friend(s)” appears 10 times: pp. 65, 111, 140, 142, 156, 170, 183, 207 and 209. 63 “Friendship” is present 85 times during the scholar argumentation: pp. 61, 62, 65, 66, 70, 76, 84, 87, 90, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 107, 108, 111, 113, 114, 120, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 139, 140, 141, 143, 157, 160, 165, 171, 176, 177, 178, 179, 187, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 209. 64 The adverb “friendly” is used 34 times: pp. 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 76, 85, 87, 89, 95, 101, 115, 128, 130, 132, 134, 135, 141, 144, 166, 168, 176, 177, 178, 179, 201, 204.

is not permitted to governments whose right is to protect the interests of 65 the people”.

What is thus lacking in Burn’s evaluation of the relationship is a reasoned argument as to why and how friendship might have evolved between Brazil and the United States, and the degree to which such friendship might have translated or not into actual diplomatic cooperation in tough areas where friction or disagreement might be expected. In sum, Burns Brazil-centered analysis provides a particularly narrow interpretation of the so-called unwritten alliance, and presents various challenges to scholarly exploit in order to enhance the debate over the Brazil-U.S. approximation in beginning of the 20th century. Burn’s book greatly influenced the Brazilian scholarly debate regarding the Brazil-U.S. relationship during the First Republic. It is nonetheless astonishing to notice that, since 1966, the qualified unwritten alliance has not been refuted or complemented by additional accounts. On the contrary, Burns’s argument was received positively among scholars as testified in Brazilian studies, as mentioned earlier, with respect to Brazilian foreign policy during this period. Although some recent semi-biographies or studies gently criticize the concept of the unwritten alliance, very few nonetheless offer a detailed analysis and/or an alternative narrative nor a new concept. In his brief but dense book, the experienced Brazilian Diplomat, Rubens Ricupero, provides a more incisive analysis regarding Rio Branco’s myth as a national hero and softens Rio Branco’s actions and achievements by intelligently contextualizing the man and his circumstances. For Ricupero, the U.S.-Brazil approximation is due to the establishment of the Republic, a domestic political shift that resulted in Brazil losing its privileged relationship with Great-Britain. Brazil was isolated and weak; also in an asymmetric position in front of international, hemisphere-wide and regional threats. Pragmatically, Rio Branco perceived the U.S. as a growing power. The minister benefited from the bilateral commercial relations as

65 Translation by the author. WIGHT, Martin. A Política do Poder. Trad. C. Sérgio Duarte, 2a edição, Editora Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais; São Paulo, 2002. Capitulo XII: Alianças. p. 117.

15 a way of approximating. His aim was to use the prestige of Washington in order to neutralize hypothetical threats.66 Likewise, the two recent works from Luís Cláudio Villafañe provide a somewhat critical view with respect to Rio Branco’s myth and his legacy as the minister of Foreign Affairs. In his latest book, the diplomat describes Rio Branco as a great manipulator, calculating, articulator, and a very influential and distrustful person. This leaves the concept of unwritten alliance pretty fragile. Villafañe’s main argument to explain this special relation is grounded on the necessity for Brazil, thanks to the Monroe Doctrine, to protect itself from European imperialism, and by extension from neighboring countries intrigues 67 . In his next-to-last book, he organizes his arguments around the myth of a nation construction. The author highlights how Rio Branco succeeded in using manipulation in order to create a certain definition of the Brazilian identity abroad. According to Villafañe, Rio Branco had a certain vision about Brazil and its international insertion. The Brazilian diplomat thought pragmatically about his foreign policy, including the approximation with the U.S., with the objective of serving the national interests and the building of a national identity68. In the same direction as pointed by Burns, Clodoaldo Bueno identified two reasons that pushed Rio Branco to approach the U.S. For him, economic and political interests nourished this new trend in Brazilian foreign policy. On the one side, the complementary economies and the advantageous commerce for Brazil represented a tremendous opportunity for the viability of the agribusiness economy. On the other side, politically, Rio Branco acknowledged and fully supported the U.S. foreign policy towards the Western Hemisphere: the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. The Brazilian minister envisioned them as a defensive tool for Brazil. This pragmatic alignment to Washington, qualified by Bueno as an entente cordial, permitted Rio Branco to channel and neutralize hypothetical intrigues from neighboring countries, rivals or competitors, such as Argentina. At the same time, Brazil could benefit from a prestigious position in the hemisphere, mainly in South America. In his book, Bueno discards the term unwritten alliance based on the Joseph

66 RICUPERO, Rubens. Rio Branco: o Brasil no mundo. Editoria Contraponto, 2000, pp. 34-9. 67 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Evangelho do Barão: Rio Branco e a Identidade Brasileira. UNESP, 2012. 68 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Dia que Adiaram o Carnaval : Política Externa e a Construção do Brasil. UNESP, 2010.

Smith’s argument that the relationship between Rio de Janeiro and Washington was more unilateral, for Brazil, than reciprocal.69 Smith states that Brazil had an interest in the concept of alliance but such policy never really materialized and remained purely aspirational instead. For him, the coffee economy definitely influenced the approximation but only unilaterally. As a matter of fact, thanks to its privileged trade position, the United States tried to bargain more tariff concessions on more American products. However, the Brazilian government, mainly Congress, kept being reluctant to concede tariff advantages to Washington. Rio Branco’s approximation was also to influence his desire to play a leading role in South America. However, the book also mentioned some doubts about the honesty of a truly Brazilian friendship to U.S. considering various misunderstandings and disagreements, and a better communication with European delegations. For the American officials, Brazil was still perceived as a remote region and the zone of influence of U.S. foreign policy only extended to Central America. In addition, some U.S. officials considered the nation as sensitively lacking economic and military power. Despite the fact that American diplomats were more interested in improving commercial tariff conditions than tightening political relations with Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian authorities never attended their requests.70 Steven Topik argues in the same way stating that national and international competitive economics were the reasons why Brazil and the U.S. started to try tightening their relations, under the Blaine-Mendonça reciprocity agreement, at the end of the 19th century. The American professor underlines that Brazilian and U.S. commercial development and early close relations in the hemisphere were not part of an organized government strategy but originated more from internal political conflicts of interests among politicians and private individuals and groups. The European economic imperialism was also seen as a threat to economic development for both sides. However, Topik warns that, despite an agreement and accord between both nations, there is no evidence of a total alignment from Brazil. On the contrary, Brazilian pragmatic nationalism muted American economic imperialist needs because U.S. efforts were not rewarded, and the reciprocal trade agreement failed to

69 BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, pp. 21, 145-67. 70 SMITH, Joseph. Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889- 1930. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991, pp. 35-8-67.

17 materialize. For Brazil, a reciprocal trade agreement was already meaning close relations with Washington to use as a tool to maintain political survival and support frontier disputes with Argentina, besides dealing with British influence in South America.71 In his turn, Brazilian political scientist and historian, Moniz Bandeira argues that the nature of the bilateral economy between the U.S. and Brazil, and between Argentina and Great Britain played a significant role in Brazilian approximation. Washington and Buenos Aires had a competitive commerce. This situation consequently put the Argentinian economy under pressure because the latter could only count on the European market for its survival. Besides, U.S. foreign policy towards the hemisphere was to increase influence and exclude the British from it. Without many options, Argentina attempted to aggressively pressure Rio de Janeiro to enter the market. Pressured and perceived as isolated in South America, Brazil naturally strengthened relations with Washington.72 Commercial relations with the U.S. were vital for Brazil to develop its national interests. Rio Branco wanted his nation to be recognized as the leader in South America. This is the reason why Brazilian officials, and especially Joaquim Nabuco, worked on a “Diplomatic approximation” with Washington. According to Carlos Gustavo Poggio Teixeira, the renewed foreign policy was simple: align as much as possible to U.S. foreign policy’s interests. However, an alliance never really materialized, nor discussed in private. The author adds that South America was definitely not a strategic region for the U.S. They didn’t want to be involved in South American affairs. The only relative objective for gravitating toward Brazil was to obtain tariff concessions and improve its “public relations” among Southern Spanish republics.73 More recently, João Paulo Soares Alsina Junior drew special attention to his peculiar interpretation of the U.S.-Brazil “informal entente”, and especially for his focus on Argentina. To him, the approximation is not to be justified by friendship or ideology. The search for prestige, by aligning to an emergent power such as the U.S., was one of the reasons to this enterprise. By doing so, Brazil could be perceived as a

71 TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. Standford University Press, 1997. 72 BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 136. 73 TEIXEIRA, Carlos Gustavo Poggio. Brazil, the United States, and the South American Subsystem: Regional Politics and the Absent Empire. Lexington Books, Kindle file, 2012.

18 stable and different nation from the others in South American, and especially in a context where Argentina was the main economic and military power. The ongoing balance of power stimulated by Argentina, and principally related to an unsolved frontier issue in the southern region, was also taken into consideration by Rio Branco’s pragmatism. U.S.-Brazil close relations could neutralize intrigues in Washington from undesired rivalry against Brazil and reduce American involvement to the detriment of Rio de Janeiro. The support from Washington could also be used as a defensive tool against European imperialism in South America.74 Although Alsina’s and Bandeira’s arguments do not claim to offer an in-depth analysis of the origins of U.S.-Brazil foreign relations, perceptions and dynamic, they represent nonetheless a valuable starting point for this research, especially as far as Argentina is concerned. Buenos Aires’s assertive diplomacy towards the Southern American region appeared to be a common challenge to Washington and Rio de Janeiro, and could be a factor to explain the necessity to create a Brazil-U.S. counter-power. Brazilian authorities not only quickly recognized the asymmetry towards the United States, and the formation of a new great power but also perceived the slight threat of a foreign policy strategy tending to create a unipolar Western Hemisphere system under Washington’s watch. Besides, Rio de Janeiro considered the Argentine Republic as a direct threat because of its proximity, economic and military power coupled with Buenos Aires “natural” ambitions to dominate the southern regional subsystem; excluding any Northern or Central American influence. In the field of world politics, one can seek a better understanding of the interstate relations and connections in many different ways. For William C. Wohlforth, power is a central element but it is definitely not an easily measurable notion that one can only base on static criteria such as: army, territory, economy, population, material resources, diplomacy and, influence75. This implies that the rational or material power of one state is definitely taken into consideration but nonetheless appeared to have less impact than the perception of power when considering the original impulse of changes in the international landscape. The author

74 ALSINA JUNIOR, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, pp. 182-85. 75 “Many authors assume that the balance of power is a real distribution of capabilities, to which states adjust or fail to adjust”. WOHLFORTH, William Curti. The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War. Cornell University Press, 1993, p.6.

19 argues that the relation between nations can be characterized by the manners of reading that statesmen and leaders make of the international power dynamic76. This perception of power analysis is definitely not concrete or static. On the one hand, because of the wide range of perceptions, both nations can analyze the same phenomenon in ways that are expressively different. One should then also be aware and pay attention to misinterpretation of perception of power due to the particularly abstract characteristics. On the other hand, at a domestic level, this power evaluation is a function that is constantly evolving according to time and context. According to Wohlforth, abstract, external and internal elements 77 that combine together to constitute power are taken into consideration by the eyes of the observers. The distribution78 of power, mainly based on external factors, is also essential to this analysis in order to better understand the mechanics79, the dynamic and circulation. For the American scholar, the necessity to think about prestige80 to make sense of world politics and its relation to power is also crucial. This is why, besides being grounded on historical facts and archives, this study will also be conceptually informed thanks to Wohlforth’s concept of perception from the International Relations Theory field. This will give us a close-up about Washington and Rio de Janeiro respective government’s perceptions of power towards each other and how the North American and Brazilian statesmen pictured the interstate dynamic of power at the beginning of the 20th century. This will also be the opportunity to understand the manner this perception and interpretation evolved along the years, considering that each state had

76 “If power influences the course of international politics, it must do so largely through the perceptions of the people who make decisions on behalf of states”, Ibidem, p. 2. 77 “What do people think power is? What elements combine to constitute national power? What resources matter in world politics? How important are military capabilities as opposed to economic or other resources? How important are forces-in-being in comparison with potential? How do observers rank sea power versus land power?”, Ibidem, p. 27. 78 “How does one country rank against the other great powers? Which states are great powers? How did they see underlying changes in the distribution of power? Who was gaining and who was falling behind?”, Ibidem, p. 27. 79 “How does the balance of power work? What is the relationship between power and state behavior? How will an increase in A power affect the behavior of B, C, D? Bandwagoning? Balancing? Do the decision makers believe that an increase in their country’s power will attract other states or dislodge members from an opposing alliance? Alliances are a source of stability or instability?”. Ibidem, p. 28. 80 “Who has the most diplomatic weight? Who has the greatest influence over global politics? How is the hierarchy changing? What is the relationship between power and prestige? Which capabilities translate into power? Will an increase in power leads to greater weight in diplomatic councils?” “Statesmen are attentive to the way others perceive their power and prestige because a favorable impression abroad will increase the likelihood of successful diplomacy“, Ibidem, p. 28.

20 its peculiar way of thinking about: the other states, its global order position, and its ways to achieve its foreign policy81. This dissertation aims at demonstrating how Brazilian authorities understood the arrangement with Washington and how the Northern American authorities understood the arrangement with Rio de Janeiro. The focus will thus be centered on the statesmen and, the interpretation of their actions taking into consideration their perception of power and, the international stage order. These diplomatic movements, including the approximation between Theodore Roosevelt’s and Rio Branco’s governments, will be perceived as strategic behaviors that encourage them to position their respective states on an international scale. In order to provide a detailed narrative of this phenomenon of approximation, it appeared to be paramount to analyze and interpret the official archives of the respective departments of state and the personal archives of the decision-makers at that time. Despite the fact that this work begins with a detailed study of the balance of power and perception of power concepts within the framework of international relations, the aim is to offer a new angle of this diplomatic and historical event, principally highlighting new available sources. Therefore, it has nothing to do with the test of neither any international relations theory nor adopting any history of international relations school. The main objective is to explain the mechanisms of this peculiar approximation between the two nations by unpacking the concept of unwritten alliance advanced by E. Bradford Burns, more than fifty years ago. To achieve our goal, we worked on new primary research sources and, with contemporaries’ secondary bibliography references. This is why, the first step in the process of our qualitative research was to study the narrative proposal of many secondary sources such as academic books, articles and theses to frame the bilateral dynamic (Brazil-USA) and the insertion on the international stage. In the same way, aspect of the theoretical part in this study was sustained thanks to academic reading as far as alliance formation, power perception and balance of power are concerned. To constitute this specific knowledge, academic

81 “The way one looks at foreign policy depends on how one thinks the world works”. “Even when blessed with hindsight, shared definitions, and very loose requirements for accuracy, scholars and statesmen may discover different balances of power at the same time. Indeed, contradictory assessments of and beliefs about the balance of power can coexist in the mind of an individual statesman or scholar”, Ibidem, p. 18.

21 platforms such as JStor, Google Scholar and Proquest besides Amazon and the Mario Henrique Simonsen Library at Fundação Getulio Vargas were a great help to provide a wider as possible understanding. Afterwards, I turned to the analysis of primary sources. All the documents from the Brazilian diplomacy used in this study were consulted, in situ, at the Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (Historical Archive at Itamaraty), heretofore AHI82 in the city of Rio de Janeiro. As far as the U.S. official documents are concerned, the research was conducted on two levels. On the one hand, official documents were analyzed - in person - at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA I and II)83, respectively in the cities of Washington, Washington D.C. and College Park, Maryland, United States of America. In addition, some research was done at the Library of Congress 84 in Washington. This part of the research was necessary due to the fact that most of the records were not made available online. On the other hand, other North American documents were found online thanks to the free access to the Foreign Relations of USA library (FRUS)85 and Theodore Roosevelt Center 86. In the same way, I use the relevant secondary literature when official documents were not available or to confirm specific historical interpretations

82 The Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, in Portuguese, is open to general public for research. This national archive is located in Rio de Janeiro and only contains official diplomatic documents, maps and photos and, also private documents of statesmen from 1808 to 1959. All documents after this period can be found in Arquivos do Itamaraty in Brasilia, the Brazilian capital. It is mandatory to schedule by phone or by email prior visiting. The day of your visit, your ID will be asked. It is not permitted to enter the facilities wearing shorts. The collection is not available online and it is impossible to make copies there. Address: Av. Mal. Floriano, 196 - Centro, Rio de Janeiro - RJ, 20080-002. More information: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/services#research 83 The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA I) contains microfilms and manuscripts archives from the Department of Defense, Navy and others. More information: https://www.archives.gov/dc-metro/washington#address. NARA II is home to microfilms and textual records from the U.S. Department of States in relation to many countries. From 1789 to 1906, documents are not available online. From 1906 to 1910, records are available for purchase. From 1910 to 1963, documents are only available there for consulting. More information: https://www.archives.gov/dc-metro/college-park#loc. Those two institutions are open to general public for research and it is not necessary to schedule a visit in advance. To get access to collection, you will need to register and get your reader card. Equipment is available to make copies. 84 It is possible to research the president Theodore Roosevelt and secretary of state Elihu Root’s political correspondence during their terms, on microfilms or manuscripts, at The Library of Congress. More information: http://www.loc.gov/rr/. The institution is open to general public for research and It is not necessary to schedule a visit in advance. To get access to collection, you will need to register and get your reader card. Equipment is available to make copies. 85 More information about this project from the University of Wisconsin in collaboration with the University of Chicago and its online collection content about U.S. Foreign Policy decisions: https://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/frus/ 86 The Theodore Roosevelt digital collection includes photos, letters, films, diaries, papers, scrapbooks from the 26th president of the United States of America. This broad collection, mainly about T. Roosevelt private life, is organized by the Dickinson State University in North Dakota. More information: http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/

22 regarding the North American and Brazilian governments. At AHI, the objective was specifically to browse the diplomatic correspondence (sent and received) between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Brazilian delegations in Washington and Buenos Aires. This helped me better understand the perception of power the Brazilian statesmen had from the United States of America and Argentina. This is why, letters, telegrams, memos, treaties, and speeches from 1898 to 1910 were cautiously selected and interpreted in order to speak about this USA-Brazil approximation. Besides, searching in Rio Branco’s private archive gave us the chance, through his personal notes and speeches, to identify his position as a decision-maker more clearly, about Washington, Buenos-Aires, and Brazil’s opportunities to insert itself on the international stage. At NARA II, the results were more positive. Indeed, the microfilm records from the Department of State87 turned out to be highly relevant with a focus on letters, memoranda, ciphers, reports, telegrams from/to the Department of State from/to the U.S. and non-U.S. diplomatic delegations in Brazil and Argentina. Once again, this was useful to identify the perception of power from the North American diplomacy towards South America and its protagonists. Other records, some documents from the Office of Inter-American Affairs88 or from records of International Conferences89 were selected for their relevance, particularity regarding sensitive affairs at that time. In the first chapter, we will analyze the significant structural domestic changes in the U.S. and in Brazil that led to reorganization within the international order. This perceived transformation of international dynamic will be presented as the source of this approximation, and as the foundation of a gradual foreign policy strategy adaptation in Washington and in Rio de Janeiro. This chapter will cover the period from the establishment of the Brazilian Republic in 1889 to 1901. The second chapter will focus on the evolution of perception of each protagonist regarding their respective national insertion within the international system. The first U.S. intervention in South America in 1902 and the call of the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904 will define the chronology of this part. The exclusive and peculiar analysis made by Brazilian and U.S. authorities converged into the beginning of a pragmatic and mutual approximation with the objective of informally building a strategy of restraint

87 Within NARA II documents, the main Record Group related to diplomatic delegations, representations and foreign policy is to be found in: RG59. 88 This bunch of archives can be found at NARA II: RG229. 89 For more detail about International Conferences, see NARA II: RG43.

23 towards a self-proclaimed competitor in the western hemisphere, namely Argentina. Within the third chapter, we will emphasize the tireless diplomatic and public efforts made by Joaquim Nabuco in the service of the maintenance of an “illusive alliance” with the U.S. authorities, mainly fueled by Nabuco’s fierce ideology.

CHAPTER 1 | U.S. and Brazil Domestic Asymmetry | 1889-1901

The period lasting from the establishment of the Brazilian Republic (1889) to the beginning of the 20th century provided advancements, at respective levels, for Washington and Rio de Janeiro authorities in terms of domestic political and economic aspects. Despite maintaining a significant asymmetry in terms of national developments, these changes, along with international order remodeling as seen later in this analysis, would nevertheless be translated into their respective diplomacy.

1.1. U.S. Domestic Politics For International Ambitions

At the turn of the 20th century, the U.S. Federal Republic administration could count on an effective economy, strong political institutions and a central government that sought, through the end of the 19th century, to accumulate state power. Within this context, the decision making power in foreign policy was essentially concentrated in the hands of very few: the President and close advisers.90 In an extraordinarily short time, the U.S. economy successfully underwent a transition from an agribusiness model, mainly in the southern regions, to an effective industrialized model, spread across central and northern regions of the Atlantic.91 Since the beginning of the 19th century, the U.S. could benefit from a series of favorable domestic factors such as plenty of land, a large amount of natural resources, a numerous workforce made up of U.S. nationals and immigrants and the beginning of massive investments in machinery to intensively stimulate its national economy. In addition, the privileged position of the U.S. nation on the international stage, as totally remote from European conflicts and its great economic relations with Great Britain, the most powerful navy, drastically limited the need for the U.S. government to invest in defensive means. As a result, around 1850, the U.S. was already considered a

90 ZAKARIA, Fareed. “From wealth to power”: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 30. 91 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de; BARBOSA, Rubens Antônio. Relações Brasil- Estados Unidos: Assimetrias e Convergências. Ed. Saraiva, 2002, p. 103.

25 powerful economy, albeit still mainly focused on its domestic market.92 From the end of the American Civil War to the Hispanic-American War (1898), the Northern American nation successfully made the transition from an economy based on commodities to one organized around manufactured products, but with one more advantage. At the time the U.S. manufacturers were massively putting agribusiness machines, products made of steel and iron and electric equipment on the international market; the transport revolution and its cost reduction simultaneously kept stimulating the U.S. agribusiness exports: “Between 1860 and 1914, the United States increased their exports more than seven times (from 334 million dollars to 2,365 billion dollars) (…).93 Thanks to U.S. government incentives in industrialization, high tariff policy for importation, and stimulation of a free and competitive national market, the United States quickly consolidated its share as the largest and more efficient industrialized economy worldwide, and became a fierce competitor for other industrialized countries on the global market. The highly competitive U.S. economy that was mainly based on industry, finance and commerce and organized around influential businessmen encouraged the U.S. Secretary of State to boost international insertion, following the economic imperialism model adopted by the British authorities during the 19th century, and search for increasing international relations with other nations, mainly based on trade, in order to open new markets, and relieve the domestic production excess.94 Besides this successful and effective domestic economy, some strategic foreign policy victories also helped the U.S. administration in the sense of accumulating power, prestige and confidence within the different political parties and the public opinion that allowed officials wishing to expend the political influence of the nation abroad based on the blueprint of their successful domestic strategy. The U.S. government intended to take full advantage of its increasing international prestige that had already changed its social position within the world order hierarchy. The United States was, by the end of the 19th century, perceived as the self-

92 KENNEDY, Paul. Ascensão e queda das grandes potências: transformação econômica e conflito militar de 1500 a 2000. 12a Edição. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Campus, 1989, pp. 175-6. 93 Ibidem, p. 238. 94 ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de; BARBOSA, Rubens Antônio. Relações Brasil - Estados Unidos: Assimetrias e Convergências. Ed. Saraiva, 2002, pp. 109-13. KENNEDY, Paul. Ascensão e queda das grandes potências: transformação econômica e conflito militar de 1500 a 2000. 12a Edição. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Campus, 1989, p. 239.

26 proclaimed great power of the Americas wanting to gain more and more influence on the international stage, and project its political ambitions as far as possible. Within this situation of state power and prestige accumulation, these latter internal factors pushed T. Roosevelt to set up an active and ambitious foreign policy95.

1.2. Settling U.S. Foreign Policy: Between Legacy And Progressive Principles

On September 14th 1901, only couple of days following the assassination of the President William McKinley by the American anarchist Leon Czolgosz at the Pan- American Exposition in New York, Theodore Roosevelt assumed command of one of the most promising nations within the Western Hemisphere. The former Secretary of Navy, and briefly Vice-President (1901), was the direct successor, and therefore not chosen by the American people through an election process. All these elements put him in a challenging political situation, as far as political parties and public opinion are concerned. The new President inherited from William McKinley’s administration an extremely active and protectionist economy led by an organized industry. Regarding foreign policy, President McKinley’s administration had been more assertive. During his four years and few months as the head of the U.S., McKinley sustained an aggressive and imperialistic foreign policy made of powerful and effective international interventions. That campaign was focused on the neighboring countries, such as the Spanish- American war in Cuba, the annexation of Hawaii, and the oppressive political domination and presence in the Philippines, Guam Island and Puerto Rico. Thanks to that series of successful victories, the 25th Presidential administration accumulated valuable defensive and offensive power continuing the traditional imperialism race launched during the period of “Manifest Destiny”.96 Nonetheless, considering the level of industrialization, population and military means of these satellite nations, one can definitely regard these actions as extremely unbalanced and asymmetric victories; definitely in favor of the U.S. On December 3rd 1901, the newly appointed President of the United States

95 ZAKARIA, Fareed. “From wealth to power”: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton University Press, 1998. 96 BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 25.

27 gave his first address97 to the Senate and in front of a House of Representatives still shocked by the assassination of his predecessor. Roosevelt’s tone was liberal. He urged his audience to take opportunity of the domestic economic phenomenon and gain international markets, especially because of excess of natural resources and due to new territorial acquisition and trade, and political influence in the neighboring countries. In order to stimulate the American domestic market and enhance international trade opportunities, the head of the state planned on keeping the same importation and exportation tariffs, working on reciprocity with other nations, improving consular services and building a merchant ship fleet in order to not depend on other nations.98 U.S. self-sufficiency and independence within the international order could already be interpreted as a “leitmotiv” between the lines. In addition, his intention was to settle protectionist laws for stricter border control against unfriendly labor immigration and to favor an “honest and efficient”99 immigration by applying an intelligence test upon arrival in American territory. Regarding domestic politics, due to the seriousness of the situation in relation to McKinley’s assassination, T. Roosevelt warned firmly that any kind of group against the current trend of American politics, emphasizing principally the anarchist groups spread within the American states, would not be tolerated. In relation to this specific domestic issue, the President then made his first public message regarding his views about the international order asking for collaboration among nations and political treaties between them to punish anarchy. According to him, anarchy was a “crime against the whole human race”100. To some extent, this message was also very much oriented to the unstable South-American Republics struggling with an “endemic anarchy” 101. This international call and statement stressing the importance of human beings as a group or a race would be the settlement of a subtly balanced foreign policy. On the one hand, the latter was based

97 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901. . Last consulted March 13th 2017. 98 MORRIS, Edmund. Theodore Rex. New York, The Modern Library, Kindle file, 2002. 99 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901. . Last consulted March 13th 2017, p. XX. 100 Ibidem, p. XIII. 101 ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, p. 81.

28 on a defensive or pacific approach more related to national philosophy and humanism ideals. On the other hand, the tone was more offensive and aggressive because of its imperialist nature. Besides, the fact that T. Roosevelt also stated his wish to change the American diplomatic administration by qualifying the organization as “(…) entirely inadequate to existing conditions (…)”102 testified to the understanding of a switch in world politics, and consequently the necessity to adapt foreign policy strategies. Although the end of T. Roosevelt first message to the Congress is related to international concern of staying in good terms with other nations103, he would ground his foreign policy on an assertive speech.

1.3. Washington “Offensive” Foreign Policy Toolbox

At the beginning of his administration, the 26th President of the United States and his few advisers envisioned the U.S. foreign policy as an open field. The U.S. officials were then implementing strategies in order to gain more power, influence and prestige not only within the hemisphere but also mainly on the international stage. This is why, on the one hand, the principle of the “Monroe Doctrine” was not only borrowed from the 5th President of the United States, James Monroe (1817-1825) but also reinterpreted and settled as an aggressive defensive tool. On the other hand, the “Pan-Americanism”104 as a tool of economic and political influence was still trying to find its pace. Both were used simultaneously in order to stimulate a collaborative system among the American nations based on “multilateralism” but mainly to serve U.S. national interests.105

102 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901. . Last consulted March 13th 2017, p. XLVI. 103 Ibidem, p. XXIII. 104 “The Pan-Americanism movement in the United States found further inspiration in the ideas and policies of the Old World. The very term Pan-American was itself one of many such conjuctions, such as Pan-germanism and Pan-Slavism, that denoted the integration of peoples or economies in the nineteenth century”. SEXTON, Jay. The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America. First Edition edition. Hill and Wang, 2011, p. 188. 105 Translation by the author: KISSINGER, Henry. Diplomacia. Translation Saul S. Gefter. Livraria Francisco Alves Editora S.A. Rio de Janeiro, 1997. pp. 33-4.

1.3.1. 20th Century’s Monroe Doctrine: Universal Projection

In the part of his speech regarding the “Monroe Doctrine”, T. Roosevelt reaffirmed that the principle, from James Monroe’s seventh message to Congress106, is still valid and entirely part of his foreign policy’s ambitions. At the beginning of the 19th century, James Monroe, already in his second term, settled one of the most influential diplomatic strategies related to the U.S. domestic and foreign policy by recognizing the nations of the American continent as free, independent and no longer subject to any European imperialism as far as colonization is concerned. In other words: European powers had to seek another part of the world to put their imperialism into practice. No more “Old World” intervention would be tolerated in North America, Central America or even South America. In very few lines, the new policy was defined. Although the tone was pretty straightforward, the ways to apply this new principle were left undefined and its foundation as a proactive American policy within the global order was, likewise, still fragile.107 By doing so, James Monroe established this strategy as a general principle to be considered as a firm belief and followed by all, politicians and public opinion alike. As a result, it became easier to justify any governmental action under this widely accepted principle. However, President T. Roosevelt, in his speech, provided a more proactive interpretation than 78 years earlier. Indeed, his objective was to call for collaboration among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. At this stage, he stated: “The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States”. 108 Additionally, he also gave another dimension to American projection justifying in a couple of lines after that the use of the Monroe Doctrine would be “(…) simply a step, and a long step, toward assuring the universal peace of the world

106 James Monroe: "Seventh Annual Message," December 2nd, 1823. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. . Last consulted March 7th 2017. 107 SEXTON, Jay. The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America. First Edition. Hill and Wang, 2011, pp. 4-5. 108 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901, p. XXXVI. . Last consulted March 13th 2017.

30 by securing the possibility of permanent peace on this hemisphere” 109. By doing so, firstly, T. Roosevelt was acknowledging and reinforcing the 1823’s ideas of the Americas on the U.S political radar and, secondly, he was establishing American foreign policy’s ambitions to be proactive by playing, not only as a regional role but also as more internationally dominant by officially alleging a quest of domestic and regional peace and stability. Within this declared influence, the doctrine, according to T. Roosevelt, would allow a more secure free trade among nations and would be beneficial for the Americas as a whole. This is why the new President claimed a non- intervention and an anti-colonialism policy. However, these so-called peaceful international ambitions fueled by a national ideology were to be backed up by a drastic increase in naval force. For President T. Roosevelt, former Secretary of the Navy and author of one book110 on the subject, the building and the training of a modern Navy besides increasing staff number was paramount for the United States to assume the hypothetical domestic consequences of an active role in world order. In his words: “Whether we desire it or not, we must henceforth recognize that we have international duties no less than international rights”111. By supposedly offering political security and defensive protection from foreign powers to Latin nations, the U.S. intentions were to count on a hemispherical shift in the balance of power and gain more prestige, support, and autonomy that consequently led to relative power accumulation. In fact, according to the Secretary of State’s perception, it was almost obvious for freshly independent and still fragile Latin republics to follow the hemispherical emerging nation, the United States. The administration in Washington behaved like a “chaperon” against a supposed direct threat from the European powers, such as France, Great Britain or Germany, who were organized efficiently, albeit unsteadily, under various types of alliances, with active power projection and/or with a network

109 Ibidem. 110 In 1882, at the age of 23 year old, Theodore Roosevelt published a book entitled: ‘The Naval War of 1812. In his first book, the author analyzed the war between the British and the American navies. At that time, this book was considered as the unique reference on the topic and commented as a major influence on the creation of the modern American navy. 111 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901, p. XXXVII. Last consulted March 13th 2017.

31 of colonies opening international relations around the globe.112 This illustrates perfectly foreign policy ambitions at the service of the domestic policy. By evoking an American “Moral Foreign Policy” by stating idealistic and pacific international ambitions, T. Roosevelt simultaneously placed the U.S. in a moral and superior position, above not only nations of the New World but, consequently, above the nations of the Old World. By applying the same principle used in 1823 to be able to gain political influence and control of the Americas, T. Roosevelt pursued the creation of a “hemispheric system” 113 ruled by its own mechanisms. Bringing back the Monroe Doctrine to the beginning of the 20th century’s reality definitely indicated continuity in the foreign policy, however, not necessarily because of a tradition. Indeed, this responded to a long-lasting project, officially started by President James Monroe, of excluding European influence, mainly England, from the Western Hemisphere. By the time T. Roosevelt entered the “White House”114, the project was still under construction. However, during the previous decades, the results had been of a significant importance. Under T. Roosevelt, this foreign policy consequently took a more incisive way, and, supported by a strong, prestigious and influential American nation, a shift of attitude regarding American diplomacy towards European Powers appeared in favor of the former. The revival of the Monroe Doctrine allowed the new President to seek to maneuver assertively among nations from the Americas and thus preventively in view of European nations; helping him cope, simultaneously, with a regional and global political situation by locking the American continent under the U.S. “sphere of influence” thanks to that powerful principle.

112 SARAIVA, José Flavio Sombra (org.). História das Relações Internacionais Contemporâneas: da sociedade internacional do século XX à era da globalização. Ed. Saraiva, 2a edição, 2008, pp. 98-113. 113 In the middle of September 1901, the American President underlined a selection of phrases from the article: “How America really feels towards England”. The arguments related to the Western Hemisphere seemed to have drawn the President’s special attention. Here are the few lines of his interest: “The American policy is simple. It is based upon the fact the United States is, and intends to remain, the paramount power of the Western Hemisphere”; “… in discussions with European Powers on matters affecting the American continent they are as hard as Krupp armor-plate”; “Americans consider nothing really serious unless it affects the Western Hemisphere, and nothing that does affect the Western Hemisphere seems to them trivial”. How America really feels towards England. 1901-09- 14. pp. 665-674. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o34590. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. pp. 670, 673. 114 According to T. Roosevelt Birthplace-National Historic Site exhibition in New York, Theodore Roosevelt gave this nickname. More info: www.nps.gov/thrb. Last consulted on June 6th 2017.

1.3.2. Pan-American Conferences And Pan-Americanism Ideals

Besides bringing back the Monroe’s principle to the 20th century, a part of T. Roosevelt’s foreign policy strategy was also to be found in President McKinley’s legacy and especially in relation to the Pan-American Conferences organization. Under the 25th President’s administration and mainly thanks to the Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, the U.S. foreign policy started to build mechanisms in order to broaden its relations with Republics from the Western Hemisphere through diplomatic and economic ties.115 The first summit was held in Washington D.C., in 1889. Thirteen countries from the Western Hemisphere participated, including Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina, back then perceived as the most influential nations in the region. By October 8, 1901, T. Roosevelt was already fully involved in this topic. On this date, he sent one of his first diplomatic documents116 to the Secretary of State in relation to the delegates’ instructions for the second Pan-American Conference to be held in the city of Mexico, from October 22, 1901 to January 31, 1902. These six pages, as far as foreign relations are concerned, already expressed the tone of the future speech that would be presented in front of the House of the Representatives a bit more than a month later. T. Roosevelt carefully summarized the objective of this conference mainly based on pragmatic political and commercial U.S interests. Firstly, the author explained the necessity of maintaining politically self- governed republics within the continent, “(…) without external restraint and interference”117. In relation to that, he then warned about the danger of political instability and lack of freedom in Central and South America that could “(…) bring upon them the calamity of foreign interference (…)”118 and therefore “(…) would be a

115 “What they (NFTA: U.S. policymakers) saw in Mexico was an open economic system in which American entrepreneurs could profit from the exploitation of a developing economy without the need for costly interventions by the United States government. They hoped to extend this favorable system to the entire Western Hemisphere”. SEXTON, Jay. The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America. First Edition. Hill and Wang, 2011, p. 188. 116 MORRIS, Edmund. Theodore Rex. New York, The Modern Library, Kindle file, 2002. 117 Theodore Roosevelt, 26th President of the United States to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay, October 8, 1901, p. 1; International Conference Records. U.S Delegation to Second International Conference of American States. Letters Sent, AUG. 1901-MAY 1902. Entry 25. Box. n°1. Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions, Record Group 43, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 118 Ibidem.

33 misfortune to us”119. In order to avoid that, T. Roosevelt’s foreign strategy was to explicitly create a collaborative system among the American Republics to be able to keep European influence out of the Western Hemisphere. However, the Vice- President urged the American delegates not to take the lead during the meeting in order to advertise a “generous cooperation for the common good”120 and consequently to “(…) disabuse their minds of any false impression, if such exist, regarding the attitude and purposes of the United States”121. Although the form was an attempt to show a softer face of the American diplomacy, or in other words, to promote the American foreign policy as to be friendly towards the other nations, the proposition was clearly to establish the U.S.A as the key influence to be respected. This attitude is clear when, a couple of lines further, T. Roosevelt informed the American delegation to make the other nations understand that any attempt to engage against the United States by creating an unbalanced region, due to political instability and/or conflicts, would be “(…) seriously condemned”122. This soft-aggressive narrative is to be considered a glimpse of the “Roosevelt Corollary” that would appear couple of years later. Secondly, as far as commercial relations were concerned, T. Roosevelt’s instructions were straightforward. The image of the U.S as a peaceful and friendly nation towards its neighboring nations should be, one more time, stressed through commercial conversations with the other delegations. The speech to be held was to promote the more advanced Northern American industry to help the Latin American countries “(…) to expand into strong and flourishing communities (…)”123 and not to take commercial advantage of this trade. The idea of a free liberal market was part of the U.S. commercial diplomacy at the Conference in Mexico. Special attention was given to the South American trade, still very slow at that time and dominated by the British, in order to work on commercial infrastructure development to benefit trade relations between the United States and the south zone. Thirdly, T. Roosevelt alerted the U.S. delegation to special issues. His

119 Ibidem. 120 Ibidem. 121 Ibidem, p. 2. 122 Theodore Roosevelt, 26th President of the United States to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay, October 8, 1901, p. 2; International Conference Records. U.S Delegation to Second International Conference of American States. Letters Sent, AUG. 1901-MAY 1902. Entry 25. Box. n°1. Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions, Record Group 43, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 123 Ibidem, p. 3.

34 recommendation was that there was no room for directly settling disputes among nations during the Conference by taking part in arbitrary questions. On the contrary, the delegates should promote pacific settlements through arbitrary mechanisms and norms using international and regional institutions. The objective was to present the U.S. as a non-interventionist nation as far as other nations’ domestic or international conflicts. Washington attempted to escape from the interventionist image circulating among the other nations in the Americas. As a conclusion of this official document, the President stated that the main purpose of this hemispheric meeting was: “(…) to tighten the bonds of friendship and good understanding between all the Republics represented (…)”124 Nonetheless, on the Latin American side, the aggressive and greedy position from the U.S delegation towards the Latin nations still echoed from the first Pan- American conference in 1889, and especially for the Argentinian Republic. The latter had maintained the bitter taste of the imperialistic attitude as far as U.S. hemispherical political and economic official requests were concerned. By doing so, T. Roosevelt gave continuity to the previous foreign policy strategy, started in 1889, and pursued the U.S. intentions to create a “spirit of collaboration” among the hemispheric nations inspired by Simon Bolivar’s ideas of “Pan-Americanism”125. For the North American administration, this feeling of unity represented by a so-called collaborative hemispheric system where all the nations from the Americas were invited to participate and to dialogue was a way to dilute the U.S.’s economic and political imperialism over the rest of the New World. However, this approximation strategy remained on a diplomatic level while, mainly on the U.S. side, a friendly narrative was constructed to be written in speeches and reports. The fact that this initiative originated in the U.S., the head of the organization was the U.S. Secretary of State and that the administration facilities were located in Washington D.C. gave very few room to doubt about the role that the North American nation wanted to play, not only during these forums, but also within the hemisphere. If the official spirit of the invitation were to build a united Western

124 Ibidem, p. 5. 125 The roots of this idea are to be found in Simon Bolivar’s original idea from 1826. The Venezuelan political leader wanted to create a real collaborative system among Latin American nations excluding the United States, already viewed as imperialistic on the continent. See: GASPAR, Edmund. United States-Latin America: a special relationship? AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1978. pp. 23-6, 68.

Hemisphere, this approximation would also serve pragmatic interests, such as national security. On the one hand, the creation of a union among the nations of the Americas by building solid political and economic ties would definitely create a geopolitical block united against a similar threat: the European powers. On the other hand, for the Latin American nations, the threat also came from Washington itself. Although the U.S. was perceived as a threat by Latin American nations due to its accumulation of national power and its aggressive foreign policy at the end of the 19th century, the U.S. administrations knew very little about its faraway neighbors, especially in South America. Indeed, its political and defensive interests reached only as far as the Isthmus of Panama. That is why the function of these international meetings would also serve to better understand the way Latin America countries were conducting their diplomacy, the perception they had of U.S. foreign policy and to control the hypothetical alliances formation that could be a threat to Washington’s international ambitions and eventually to national security. In summary, these forums could be seen as a place where national strategic intelligence was also invited for the wealth of U.S. domestic politics.

1.4. T. Roosevelt’s Ambitious International Project

On the international stage, although the previous presidential administration of William McKinley (1897-1901) had accumulated sufficient state power in order to stabilize its domestic and political interests, benefit from the vigorous American industrialization and establish the federal republic as a model, its imperialistic and aggressive foreign policy, up to that time, was regarded as threatening among the young republics of the New World126. As a matter of fact, the repetitive political invasions, economic dominance, and armed conflicts of the United States in Hawaii (1898), Cuba (1898), Puerto Rico (1898) and the Philippines (1899) showed, nonetheless, for the nation, some extremely positive aspects as far as defensive strategy was concerned. Being at war and winning against a European power sent a clear message to the rest of the nations; the U.S. won’t hesitate to make use of all the material power in its possession and the

126 SEXTON, Jay. The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America. First Edition. Hill and Wang, 2011, p. 189.

36 nation is to be considered, from now on, as a big player. At least in the Western Hemisphere. However, these interventions had sensitively damaged international perception of U.S. ambitions, mainly among Latin American republics. Besides being part of the construction of the American nation, the use of a fierce and straightforward foreign policy by the former President definitely grounded the foundation of an “offensive and external” search for hierarchy127 by withdrawing the Spanish influence from the nearby region and consequently by building a defensive perimeter from the southwest to southeast of American shores. The United States was ready for the next step, and T. Roosevelt took full responsibility of this ambitious international expansion project. Within his first speech to the Congress, T. Roosevelt would set the foundation of his foreign policy’s intentions by using a manicheistic narrative to justify his political choices and actions, domestically and internationally. The structure was thus set up under moral and anti-colonial collective principles; trade and diplomatic relations structured the interaction among states and international conferences were to be seen as a collaborative strategy to favor union among states from the Americas. Besides, T. Roosevelt was aiming for the creation of an international system based on American values and led by American rules.

1.5. Hemispherical Reactions To U.S. Vision Of International Order

At the beginning of T. Roosevelt’s administration, very few tangible relations had developed towards South American nations under previous governments. Nonetheless, Brazil appeared to be a bit more privileged. Despite pressures from influential American businessmen and individual attempts by James G. Blaine, for Washington, the very few diplomatic relations related to commerce, especially with Brazil, seemed to be a sufficient though poor channel of communication between the North and the South.128 Since the very 1st Pan–American Conference hosted in Washington (1889), the Argentinian government opposed Blaine’s imperialistic ideas to create a trade union between American republics in order to favor U.S. market insertion and expel

127 This term has been borrowed from WOHLFORTH, William Curti in The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War. Cornell University Press, 1993. 128 TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. Standford University Press, 1997, pp. 373-383.

European commerce and political influence from the western hemisphere. This strategy was an issue for Argentina. Indeed, between 1880 and 1910, the southern American nation experienced its “(…) most spectacular expansion process in the history of capitalism”129 and this phenomenal progress of its economy and the international market insertion depended principally upon London’s massive investments and a lucrative trade balance with other European nations 130 . For Argentina, European privileged relations were vital to its domestic development, its political insertion into the region and its international commerce insertion into the “Old World”. Buenos Aires’ officials understood Blain’s hemispherical trade project as an attempt to economically isolate Argentina131. However, with T. Roosevelt’s ambitious project, South American republics began to catch the attention of the Department of State. U.S. authorities started to understand that its accumulation of domestic power and influence in Central America became a perceived threat in the hemisphere. Stronger counter-power was expected to appear due to a more assertive U.S. leadership attempt in the south of the hemisphere. That is why Washington was closely accompanying the development of domestic economies and politics, for example in Brazil132, and power distribution within South American republics. In that sense, under President McKinley’s administration, few months before his assassination in 1901, the American Secretary of State John Milton Hay received a correspondence from the Legation of the United States of America in Petrópolis, Brazil drawing attention to a suspicious articulation among the three main southern

129 Translation by the author. PARADISO, José. Um Lugar No Mundo: A Argentina e A Busca De Identidade Internacional. Translation by Sérgio Blath. Rio de Janeiro. Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 2005, p. 37. 130 Translation by the author: “In 1880, the main commerce partners were France (29,9%), Belgium (26,6%) and Great-Britain (9,9%). Two decades afterwards, the United Kingdom stood in the first place (20,7%), following by Germany (17,4%), France (16,5%) and Belgium (15,6%)”. Ibidem, p. 38. 131 Translation by the author: Sáenz Pena argued that “there was something extraordinary in Mr. Blain’s plan, because he intended to leave us without any communication with Europe, at the same time that he left us without any communication with his country, refusing us consumers and market access”. Ibidem, p. 65, apud Roque Sáenz Pena, Escritos y discurso, Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1914-1915, vol. I, p. 84. 132 Charles Page Bryan, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay, March 17, 1900, n°232. Subject: “Political situation”. Synopsis: “Monarchistic plots fail. Brazilian government shows and wins confidence. Financial situation improved”. Papers of the Legation of the United States of America, Petrópolis, Brazil. File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives, n°121, Roll 67, dispatches from the United States to Brazil, volume 65, January 3-December 27, 1900. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

38 powers: Argentina, Brazil and Chile.133 In the confidential document dated from 1901 and entitled “Relations between Brazil and neighboring countries”134, Charles Page Bryan, the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, warned his administration that a report, from the Chilean Minister in Brazil, Joaquin Godoy135, had widely circulated among officials stating that he had been authorized by his government to organize an alliance between Brazil, Argentina and Chile in order to “offset American influence on this continent”. Even though, in the same correspondence, a denial letter from Joaquin Godoy was enclosed, this showed the first signal of a collaborative diplomatic articulation to wish to reaffirm the South American region as independent within the Western Hemisphere. A few months later in the same year, Joaquin Godoy died of natural causes in Rio de Janeiro. Interestingly, a couple of months earlier, in January 1900, John Milton Hay sent another telegram to Charles Page Bryan in Brazil responding positively to the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary’s question whether or not denying the fact, released in the Washington newspapers, that the U.S. government did not approve of Brazil’s approximation towards neighboring countries. John Milton Hay then instructed him to maneuver among the foreign diplomatic delegations in Rio de Janeiro.136 Furthermore, at the end of 1901, a couple of days after T. Roosevelt’s first official speech in front of Congress, the Brazilian delegation in Washington wrote a long letter to the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to comment on the address and specifically on the Monroe Doctrine, considered as the most important

133 Charles Page Bryan, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil for the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay, January 18, 1901, n°307. Subject: “Relations between Brazil and neighboring Republics”. Papers of the Legation of the United States of America, Petrópolis, Brazil. File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives, n°121, Roll 68, dispatches from United States Ministers to Brazil, volume 66, January 4-October 30, 1901. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 134 Charles Page Bryan, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay, January 18, 1901, n°307, p.2; Papers of the Legation of the United States of America, Petrópolis, Brazil (National Archives Microfilm Publication), Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 135 N.B: In Chilean history, Joaquin Godoy is well known for being one of the most skillful and complete diplomats. During his career, he was Minister in Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, two times in the United States and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 136 John Milton Hay, U.S. Secretary of State to Charles Page Bryan, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil, January 25, 1900, n°208; File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives, n°77, Roll 26, diplomatic instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906, Brazil, volume 18-19, November 27, 1893-August 9, 1906. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

39 part. T. Roosevelt’s speech, in regard to James Monroe’s principles, was seen by the Brazilian officials as a “new interpretation”137 of the Doctrine. In that sense, the Brazilian delegation in Washington understood and stressed that “(…) no American nation would be allowed to gain territories at the cost of others”138. Although this so- called new interpretation would supposedly bring peace among the American Republics (especially between Brazil and Argentina regarding territorial disputes), the Brazilian officials perceived it as a maneuver by the U.S. government to regain trust from the American Republics and deny any attempt to expand the U.S. territories.

1.6. Brazilian Domestic Level: Instability In Changes

On the other side of the hemisphere, the newly proclaimed United States of Brazil was still domestically recovering from their political transition that led the nation to sweep the Monarchy and proclaim the Republic, on November 15, 1889. This event was due to the result of a series of structural issues that had characterized the Monarchy since the independence of Brazil, in 1822. During the following years, the regime underwent some paramount transformations that profoundly changed economic and social structures, and consequently influenced politics. The modernization of production and transportation, such as the extension of railways, the creation of steamboat lines along the Brazilian coast and the use of sophisticated means of production provided a favorable context for a fast evolution that positively affected the production in some regions of Brazil. The West of São Paulo state and its coffee industry emerged as the primer economic national activity alongside sugar, rubber and cotton. A phenomenon of industrial capitalism within Brazilian society rose in the second part of the 19th century. A new influential and dynamic elite, organized around coffee interests, appeared to shake the traditional political paradigms by structuring itself around an immigrant workforce, infrastructure investments, credit stimulation and exports. This new group of

137 Translation by the author: R. Reidner de Amaral, Brazilian Delegation in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olyntho de Magalhães, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, December 9th 1901, dispatch n°3043, p.1. Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Washington, dispatches, 1900-1902. File: 234-1-1. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 138 Translation by the author: R. Reidner de Amaral, Brazilian Delegation in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olyntho de Magalhães, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, December 9th 1901, n°3043, p.2. Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Washington, dispatches, 1900-1902. File: 234-1-1. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

40 businessmen was highly dissatisfied with the government policy that they considered as too centralized, and therefore seen as a limitation on its new entrepreneurialism and the growth of its business. The coffee industry representatives were hoping for a federal model that would provide more autonomy, and the ideas of the Republican Party, officially launched in 1870, converged with their wish.139 Since the Paraguayan War (1864-70), army officials also happened to be strongly opposed to Dom Pedro II’s policy that they viewed as not sufficiently recognizing them and not giving enough career opportunities. By the beginning of the 1870’s, Republican and positivist ideas were already widely circulating among some protagonists in the Army and Navy. Republican politicians and coffee businessmen did not encounter any difficulties to convince army officials to form a temporary alliance in order to oppose the current regime and achieve mutual pragmatic interests.140 This Brazilian political switch was then launched in Rio de Janeiro and orchestrated by a small part of the low-ranking army officials, coupled with a large amount of young cadets from the Military School. That bunch of cadets were a fundamental piece of the achievement of this event, mainly because of their vivid enthusiasm to claim themselves against the general ideas of the monarchy as belonging to the past and viewed the Republic as a synonym of progress, based on the imported positivist ideas and science from the Frenchman Auguste Comte.141 Although this “soft” revolution happened relatively peacefully in order to establish a military government, the following years would be more challenging and the young Republic’s stability would be tested many times, even violently. This fact, in addition to structural problems would definitely bring a sensation of fragility and instability at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the new millennium.142 As far as politics, despite the succession of various presidents, the Republican model managed to maintain itself by sustaining a relative political stability during the

139 VIOTTI DA COSTA, Emilia. Da Monarquia à República: momentos decisivos. 5a edição, São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1989, pp. 336-345. 140 Ibidem, pp. 354-357. 141 CASTRO, Celso. “A proclamação da República”. Col. Descobrindo o Brasil, Jorge Zahar, 1999. 142 CARVALHO, José Murilo. Os Bestializados. O Rio de Janeiro e a República que não foi. 3. ed. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1989, pp. 31-2; SEVCENKO, Nicolau. A Revolta da Vacina: Mentes insanas em corpos rebeldes. Cosac Naify, 2010, p. 12; ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, p. 70. VIOTTI DA COSTA, Emilia. Da Monarquia à República: momentos decisivos. 5a edição, São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1989, p. 281.

41 first years of the First Republic. Until 1898, the presidencies were respectively divided among military officers under an authoritarian regime and, later on, defined by an oligarchy under a civilian government (1895-1906). During the civil period, the political system organization among the parties would be conventionally described as the “Coffee with milk” politics that would be considered as the cornerstone and the direct consequence of Brazilian political stability during the entire “Old Republic”. This expression would emerge in the late 1920s and has been circulating among scholars since then.143 The expression describes the bi-influential role played within Congress by São Paulo and Minas Gerais; the two more powerful states in terms of voter representation and economy. The former was the first largest coffee producer and the latter, the second largest besides a significant milk producer. The idea behind “Coffee with milk” mainly highlights the construction and maintenance of a political mix established by an alliance system between both states to maintain power and influence along the years. The majority within the Brazilian Congress was alternatively led by this oligarchic alliance organized around economic interests related to exportation economy.144 Despite this apparent stability, many internal factors question the political stability of the “Coffee with milk” alliance model as a so-called robust structure favoring its maintenance. Such internal party disputes, opposition parties, private economic groups, fierce monarchists, several changes in majority power distribution, social revolts and the Federal State itself are to be seen as significant forces influencing this political domestic fight for hegemony, creating an unstable and fragile domestic political scenario.145 This alliance system brought waves of stability and instability but nevertheless helped, throughout the first years of the “Old Republic”, to maintain the political model working by stopping a perpetual political hegemony to establish itself for too long146. The political elite also helped to maintain this illusive stability by social aspects, a few illegal strategies and manipulative practices. Socially speaking, the Republic’s proclamation brought a spirit of progress

143 VISCARDI, Cláudia Maria Ribeiro. O teatro das oligarquias: uma revisão da "política do café com leite". Belo Horizonte: C/Arte, 2001, pp. 20-1. 144 Ibidem, p. 19. 145 Ibidem, pp. 51-72. 146 VISCARDI, Cláudia Maria Ribeiro. O teatro das oligarquias: uma revisão da "política do café com leite". Belo Horizonte: C/Arte, 2001, p. 22.

42 and modernization that, in theory, would positively affect all classes of Brazilians. However, in practice it seems that only a share of the bourgeois elite was vibrating in the streets of the Federal Capital under the rhythm of a promising future, mainly copied from western industrialized nations. The proclamation of the Republic and the abolition of slavery in 1888 paved the way to a new political culture and new social practices on behalf of modernity.147 If this characterized transition created a necessary and understood rupture, for the higher classes, the transition was a little more blurred for the lower classes. Indeed, from a centralized authority pictured by a king and empowered by religion where citizen’s rights were none, the monarchy turned to a Republic wherein authority was applied by the state and power was distributed to the hands of the citizens, via, supposedly, democratic participation. Although the monarchy did not give any rights, not even status to its subjects, the first years of the Republic would not be so different. Indeed, with the change in regime came the definition of being an individual citizen, the idea of belonging to a collective and all the democratic rights related to this new function. Each Brazilian citizen became responsible for himself and his choices with the hope to make his voice heard. Unfortunately, the highest point of the democratic system represented by the vote was, by the 1891 constitution, allowed according to excluding factors: literacy, gender and decent incomes. In other words, considering the high rate of illiterates, women and sub-employed or unemployed Brazilians at that time, the population’s vote participation was insignificant, politicizing only the highest classes. Moreover, even for the voters, censorship was a reality and could sometimes be fatal. Indeed, citizens could be bribed, assaulted or even assassinated on their way to the polls. Consequently, the lower classes struggled, sometimes aggressively to take part in this modern and ambitious national identity building through the definition of citizenship while the elite fully enjoyed its prestigious position. This lack of participation questioned the degree of depth regarding the Brazilian transition from monarchy to republic and appeared to have happened only symbolically. In reality, the same privileges were maintained for the elite group and subservience for the

147 MELLO, Maria Tereza Chaves de. A modernidade republicana. Tempo [online]. 2009, vol.13, n.26, pp.15-31. ISSN 1413-7704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S1413-77042009000100002.

43 popular class.148 Essentially, a political revolution149 did not happen. Concerning the economy, during the first years of the military dictatorship (1889-1894), the economic project from the government was principally related to an attempt to industrialize a nation, at that time mainly supporting its economy thanks to agribusiness. That attempt led to severe and profound economic crises during this period where inflation negatively influenced Brazilians’ daily life. As a reaction to these repetitive failures and in order to counter the end of the profitable slave trade in 1888, the civil opposition, led by businessmen, started to rise to advance their interests in relation to coffee industry. Only under President Campos Sales (1898-1902), that a rigid and drastic financial reform took shape and one more loan from European bankers was contracted. This unpopular reform mainly benefited the coffee industry because its mechanisms were based on a local currency valuation, an increase in trade exchange flux values and importation taxes. The coffee hegemony coupled with political power was definitively established within the Brazilian Republic.150

1.7. Brazilian Foreign Policy Reorientation

Before the Republic, the foreign policy from the Empire was pretty limited to maintaining a direct and special connection with Portugal and the other European monarchies, especially Great Britain. Of course, cordial relations were maintained with the other nations of the American continent. However, these didn’t go further than diplomacy in order to solve borders and related conflicts, navigation rights and debts in relation to foreign loans. International trade was also part of the Empire’s agenda, albeit shyly, considering its active role in the worldwide slave trade.151 Understandably, this specific attitude from the government comforted the perception of neighboring American nations that basically, Brazil was not more than the Portuguese royal court living in the Americas. Under the tropical monarchy, a

148 CARVALHO, José Murilo. Os Bestializados. O Rio de Janeiro e a República que não foi. 3. ed. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1989, pp. 43-4, 74-90, 160. 149 N.B: In this context, the term “revolution” is not understood as a violent movement in an attempt to bring change but more an attempt to bring a fundamental change or a neat rupture from one political model and its ideology, practices and purposes to another. 150 SEVCENKO, Nicolau. A Revolta da Vacina: Mentes insanas em corpos rebeldes Cosac Naify, 2010, pp 56-9. 151 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Brasil entre a America e a Europa: O Império e o Interamericanismo (do Congresso do Panama à Conferência de Washington). UNESP, 2003, pp 21-8.

44 strong ideology was circulating among the officials as far as foreign policy: “its anti- Americanism, such as a feeling against the United States, or such as an attitude against Hispanic America”152. Consequently, this foreign policy helped to build an image of Brazil as isolationist in the Western Hemisphere. This led to the conclusion that, until the proclamation of the Republic, even though Brazil belonged to the Americas, it hadn’t paid much attention to its American insertion yet. On the contrary, its national identity was principally based on European concepts.153 The event of the 15th of November 1889 would radically change this long lasting foreign policy tradition. Since then, Brazil would search for hemispheric insertion through a definition of itself mainly in relation to other American nations. However, domestically, the difficulty of finding a coalition in politics in addition to social and economic instability endured by the Republic during its formative years dramatically was reflected in its foreign policy. Indeed, the Republican project, as far as foreign interests are concerned, drastically lacked meaning, efficiency and direction in the aftermath of 1889.154 Instead of planning a proactive foreign policy, the choices of the Republicans were mainly motivated by reactionary principles. In this regard, in order to emphasize and stigmatize the fall of the old regime, the foreign policy was also used as a political tool to legitimize the new regime. That is why the ideology and the concepts written in the Republican Manifest in 1870 were redeemed, nonetheless, almost twenty years later. The core of this speech related to Brazil’s insertion on the international stage was of a pro-Americanism, or a continental diplomacy, that would be translated later on as ”Pan-Americanism”155. The message to international nations was pristine. However, without any international order analysis, the illegitimate Republican government abandoned, on ideological grounds, a more than three centuries’ old

152 N.B: However, it is interesting to remember that in 1876, the Imperador Dom Pedro II, from Brazil, paid the first official visit in history to the United States government. The Brazilian authority and his staff took also the opportunity to cross the United States and visit 28 states for a period of almost three months. Dom Pedro II wrote a detailed diary about this trip. It is possible to access online to his diary, in Portuguese, from the online archive of the Imperial Museum. See: http://www.museuimperial.gov.br/diario-d-pedro-ii.html. Last consulted on April 26th 2017. 153 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Evangelho do Barão: Rio Branco e a Identidade Brasileira. UNESP, 2012, pp. 20-52. 154 BUENO, Clodoaldo; CERVO Amado Luiz. História da Política Exterior do Brasil. UNB, 5a Ediçao, 2014, p. 176. 155 N.B: In the Republican manifest, the following line, many time quoted by scholars, summarizes the Republican spirit towards the international order: “We are from America and we want to be Americans”. Translation by the author: MELO, Américo Brasiliense de Almeida. Os programas dos partidos e o 2º Império, Manifesto Republicano de 1870, São Paulo, 1878. . Last consulted April 10th 2017.

45 diplomatic tradition in benefit of an open and almost exclusive foreign policy towards the Western Hemisphere. 156 Although the first diplomatic moves towards this “Pan-Americanism” idealism were terrible “faux-pas” and mainly led by “Brazilian sentimentalism”, some of the following actions depicted more mature ideas.

1.7.1. U.S.-Brazil: First Pragmatic Approximation Attempt

The Brazilian General Consul in Washington and Republican, Salvador de Mendonça, played a surprisingly active role abroad and put all his efforts into trying to build tight relations with the U.S. government between 1889 and 1894.157 This strategic articulation respectively was an attempt to create a defensive and offensive alliance (1889), gain recognition of the Brazilian Republic (1890), sign an international trade agreement for coffee, leather and sugar favoring Brazil (1891) and later, the negotiation of U.S. support and influence in its domestic politics during the “Revolta Armada” (1894), an armed conflict between different political forces in Rio de Janeiro.158 According to the negotiator, the signing of the international trade agreement was beneficial for Brazil that he described as “(…) the beginning of a new era, for our international relations, for the domestic economy of our states (…)”159. Even though the relations between the two continental nations started to get closer thanks to Salvador de Mendonça’s diplomacy in Washington, his two more ambitious projects involving the United States failed: the alliance and the international trade treaty. It is still unclear, in a time when the Brazilian foreign policy was not neatly defined, what the political motivations and/or the personal interests of Salvador de Mendonça were in dedicating so much energy to this project160.

156 BUENO, Clodoaldo. A República e sua Política Exterior (1889-1902). Unesp, 1995, pp. 22-30. 157 TOPIK, Steven. Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. Standford University Press, 1997, p. 11. 158 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Evangelho do Barão: Rio Branco e a Identidade Brasileira. UNESP, 2012, p. 51-5. 159 Consul-Geral, Salvador de Mendonça, Brazilian Delegation in Washington to temporary Minister and Secretary of State Conselheiro Trisato de Alencar Araripe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, February 17th 1891. n°1182. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 160 N.B: In the introduction of “A República e sua Política Exterior (1889-1902)” of Clodoaldo Bueno, the Brazilian historian, Amado Luiz Cervo, stressed this lack of empirical information on the subject within the history of Brazilian foreign policy. Steven Topic also mentioned some doubts about the honesty of Salvador de Mendonça. More recently, João Paulo Soares Alsina Junior also questioned

At the turn of the 20th century, the end of slavery in 1888 and the Proclamation of Republic in 1889 depicted a new image of Brazil to be perceived internationally. Brazil had joined the group of republics, although very late, by aligning its regime with the political ideology ruling the Americas. However, with very little support from Europe, and mainly Portugal, facing rising hemispheric and regional power threats, Brazil entered the new century with numerous challenges. The nation was then defensively, economically and politically weak besides being extremely dependent on agribusiness.

1.7.2. Brazilian’s Perception Regarding The U.S.

Not only were Brazilian politicians and diplomats aware of their current challenging domestic situation but also about the balance of power that was reestablishing itself on the continent due to signs of U.S. expansion and Brazil’s foreign policy reorientation. Indeed, a couple of months prior to McKinley’s assassination, in May 1901, Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, the Brazilian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington (1898-1902) sent a very informative letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, Olyntho de Magalhães (1898-1902). In this two-page document, attached to two newspaper articles, the Brazilian diplomat wrote an accurate analysis regarding Brazil’s perception of the ongoing American foreign policy and the international threat. The same commented on the statements in the newspapers made by the American Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil, Charles Page Bryan in regards to a U.S. Department of State’s narrative that started emerging publicly at the turn of the 20th century. As a matter of fact, in the beginning of the 1900’s, the American Secretary of War, Elihu Root, already brought back the Monroe Doctrine on the international political stage. A bit more than a year before T. Roosevelt’s address on the subject in December 1901, the statesman argued that Germany had to be perceived as a threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere, and consequently be regarded as a serious threat to U.S. national security. For Elihu Root, German immigration needed to be closely watched because the danger would emerge from these well-established colonies, since

Salvador de Mendonça’s attitude in “Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval”. Editora FGV, 2015, p. 95.

47 the beginning of the 19th century, in Central and mainly in South America. This imminent danger would result in a fight for the Monroe Doctrine principles declared the U.S. Secretary of War.161 Still under President McKinley’s administration, the aim of this offensive American speech, from the Ministry of War, was clearly starting to project Northern American power, in the American Republics thanks to an identified but nonetheless hypothetical German threat. As we have seen, that argument would be reused, in a more diplomatic way, by T. Roosevelt’s Department of State with the aim to project, this time, political influence in the hemisphere. In addition, this official threat perception led, as the Brazilian diplomacy in Washington wisely analyzed, to an American national project. Indeed, for the Brazilian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington, this “old intrigue” regarding hypothetical German bad intentions, lacking arguments162, was to be seen as a U.S. strategy to gain public opinion and government members at home in order to gather them under a common interest: national security. The threat perception was therefore used in order to justify an interventionist and imperialist foreign policy and, consequently, to stimulate and serve the American naval industry’s interests and U.S. rearmament.163 These observations from Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil testified to a mature analysis regarding American politics and a better understanding of the balance of power on the continent that mattered to the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. Secretary of State, John Hay, would confirm a couple of days later, these facts during a private interview in Washington. In the eye-opening transcription of the meeting between both statesmen, John Hay confessed, evoking “intimacy”, “friendship” and “confidentiality”, that the U.S.

161 Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, Brazilian Delegation in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olyntho de Magalhães, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, April 30th 1900, n°107. Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Washington, dispatches, 1900-1902, File: 234-1-1. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 162 Translation by the author: “Besides this, Ambassadors from Germany in Washington and in Rio de Janeiro, in 1900 and 1901, denied any existence of more ambitious intention from the government that they represented”. BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, p. 337, apud PERKINS, 1964, p.180; VALLA, 1972, p. 38-39. 163 Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, Brazilian Delegation in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olyntho de Magalhães, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, May 12th 1901, n°3024, Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Washington, dispatches, 1900-1902, File: 234-1-1. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

48 government did not have any proof of a German preparation or any other Great European Power to conquer new territories in Latin America, not even in Brazil, before adding that the new circumstances of the United States required an army and a navy renewal. In order to “neutralize” the negative idea, by the American people, of a permanent army, the Monroe Doctrine seemed to perfectly justify the rearmament project.164 This document clearly defined another side of the political use of the Monroe Doctrine for U.S. domestic purposes and interests. Furthermore, a friendly and personal correspondence, between T. Roosevelt, as Governor of New York, and Elihu Root three months earlier, on January 29th 1900, better explains the origin of Root’s mindset declaration and the reasons why the United States Secretary of War urgently needed to increase its military and navy power. As T. Roosevelt wrote, supporting Root’s political project, in his letter:

“If the disaster to the British Empire, which so many of our more thoughtless fellow countrymen seem to desire, should come about, it may very well be that in but a few years we shall be face to face with the question of either abandoning the Monroe Doctrine and submitting to the acquisition of American territory by some great military European power, or going to war, and in that case we should do well or ill almost accordingly as we do or do not give you proper support in the great job you are doing”. 165

This statement highlighted, on the one hand, the fact that, the U.S. rearmament was mandatory in order to fully defend the Monroe Doctrine’s principles because, on the other hand, the British Empire could be sooner or later in an unbalanced, weak, and tough situation in front of other European powers. This also proves that London was still at that time the guarantee of the Monroe Doctrine’s sustainability on the American continent. In fact, the British government was responsible for securing other European great powers, because of its naval superiority and also thanks to a sophisticated system of balance of power back in Europe, from intervening in the Western Hemisphere. In that sense, Juan Bautista Alberdi, from the Argentinian diplomatic corps, had already stated that the Monroe Doctrine originated from the British

164 Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, Brazilian Delegation in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olyntho de Magalhães, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, May 11th 1900, Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Washington, dispatches, 1900-1902, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 165 Governor of New York, Theodore Roosevelt to Secretary of War, Elihu Root. January 29th 1900, E. Root papers, Special Correspondence, 1896-1924, Box 162-163. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

49 authorities, and particularly from the foreign Secretary, George Canning. He also mentioned in a statement: “It was established that if a defense against Europe was necessary, it would come from Europe itself”166. In South America, Argentinian authorities were not the only one doubting the real intentions of the United States. Brazilian authorities were also aware, via Washington, of these maneuvers to rearm the Army and the Navy and continued to pay close attention to U.S. foreign policy.

1.8. Perception of Power Distribution In South America

While the U.S. administration was domestically working on a political discourse to convince public opinion and politicians of Germany as an imminent threat and was internationally trying to positively influence the foreign diplomatic delegations in the Americas, the Brazilian authorities were facing a more concrete, direct and regional threat: Argentina. Although the long lasting frontier conflict in the Palmas region had been resolved between both nations by arbitration in 1898, and respective presidential visits (1899-1900) between the President of Brazil Campos Sales and the President of Argentina Julio Roca were made, the situation was still sensitive. Despite the fact that Brazil had won the right to officially consider this litigious part of land in South Brazil as part of its territory, the treaty was not ratified yet on the Argentinian side and Rio de Janeiro was putting some pressure to accelerate the process.167 In addition, the climate of hostility was also increasing due to some attacks and persecution perpetrated by “Argentinian authorities” or “Argentinian Public Force Agents” on Brazilians citizens in the region reported by the Brazilian Minister in Buenos Aires.168 Consequently, diplomatic exchanges were, in many ways, loaded with rivalry.

166 Translation by the author: SAENZ PENA, Roque. Escritos y discursos, Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1914- 1915, vol.I, p. 384, apud Um Lugar No Mundo: A Argentina e A Busca De Identidade Internacional”. Translation by Sérgio Blath. Rio de Janeiro. Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 2005, p. 66. 167 Henrique de Barros Cavalcanti de Lacerda, Brazilian Minister, Brazilian Delegation in Buenos Aires to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olyntho de Magalhães, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, January 8th 1900. Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, Offices, 1900-1901, File: 206-1-11, 12, 13. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 168 Henrique de Barros Cavalcanti de Lacerda, Brazilian Minister, Brazilian Delegation in Buenos Aires to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olyntho de Magalhães, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, January 2nd and 17th 1900, Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, Offices, 1900-1901, File: 206-1-11, 12, 13. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

1.8.1. Argentina As A “Special” Neighbor

By the beginning of the 20th century, relations between Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro were highly competitive and incredibly tense. In the official delegations and Ministries of Foreign Affairs correspondences, three topics were fiercely discussed: hemispheric trade competition, naval rearmament race, and regional hegemony.169 In the last decades of the 19th century, Argentina had already lived its “golden age” for a couple of years The South American nation had accumulated some characteristics of a fast growing economy, transforming the country as one of the key players in the world trade market besides significantly increasing the need for political influence in the region170. In a very short period of time, thanks to massive British investments, the Argentinian authorities succeeded in astonishingly boosting its population, immigration rate, infrastructure, and international trade. As a result, at the turn of the 20th century Argentina was a highly competitive, centralized state on the international stage, supported and tied economically by a “de facto alliance”171 with a powerful European great power, Great Britain. Besides, Buenos Aires was searching for establishing its influence in South America by forming regional political alliances and by leading an anti-Northern American imperialism campaign.172 That topic was overly sensitive for Argentina knowing that the United States was their direct and fierce competitor on the export-import continental market. Besides, the Brazilian delegation was also directly involved in that intense triangular negotiation about tariffs that would stretch along the first years of the 20th century.

169 BUENO, Clodoaldo; CERVO Amado Luiz. História da Política Exterior do Brasil. UNB, 5a Ediçao, 2014, p. 182. 170 PARADISO, José. Um Lugar No Mundo: A Argentina e A Busca De Identidade Internacional. Translation by Sérgio Blath. Rio de Janeiro. Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 2005, p. 62. 171 N.B: This term was brought by the Argentinian sociologist José in “Um Lugar No Mundo: A Argentina e A Busca De Identidade Internacional”. Translation by Sérgio Blath. Rio de Janeiro. Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 2005, p. 67. 172 PARADISO, José. Um Lugar No Mundo: A Argentina e A Busca De Identidade Internacional. Translation by Sérgio Blath. Rio de Janeiro. Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 2005, p. 37-40. BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 59.

1.8.2. Tariffs War Between The U.S. And Argentina

The U.S. authorities encountered difficulties in penetrating the Latin American market and Argentina was a recurrent issue173. Indeed, since March 1899, Charles Page Bryan, the U.S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil was trying to negotiate a trade reciprocity with Brazilian Campos Salles’s government regarding the free entry of American flour. This strategy of Washington would lead to an intense “Flour War”174 between the two main exporters, Argentina and the United States, and the principal buyer, Brazil. This first negotiation left the U.S. unsatisfied by the cautious decision not to show favoritism from Rio de Janeiro.175 Understanding that this would be difficult to grant to the U.S. government because it could not offer it at the same time, to Argentinian flour that was the direct competitor, Washington subtly proposed only a reduction on flour imported in barrels and not in sacks.176 Acting aggressively in the same market as Argentina, the American strategy was definitely to increase the competition with the Argentinian flour and gain some market share. Besides, the above would also serve Washington’s political interests in demonstrating its influence, destabilizing the already established trade relationship between Brazil and Argentina and increasing the diplomatic tensions even more.177 In the middle of the year 1900, Charles Page Bryan showed a more incisive speech regarding the topic and started to put a lot of pressure on the Brazilian government to grant this reduction on flour tariffs in barrels to the detriment of

173 BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, p. 67-8. 174 Translation by the author: BUENO, Clodoaldo. A República e sua Política Exterior (1889-1902). Unesp, 1995, p. 233. 175 Charles Page Bryan, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay, March 2, 1900, n°227, Papers of the Legation of the United States of America, Petrópolis, Brazil. File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives, n°121, Roll 67, dispatches from the United States to Brazil, volume 65, January 3-December 27, 1900. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 176 John Milton Hay, U.S. Secretary of State to Charles Page Bryan, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil to the, July 27, 1900, n°207; Papers of the Department of State, Washington, United States of America. Microfiche Records in the National Archives, n°77, Roll 26, diplomatic instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906, Brazil, volume 18-19, November 27, 1893-August 9, 1906. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 177 N.B: According to Luiz Alberto Muniz Bandeira, “(…) the rivalry between both countries, to a large extent, was the consequence of commercially dependent ties that they maintained with different and opposing powers, Great-Britain and the U.S.A. Translation by the author. BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 39.

Argentinian flour. By using sharper arguments, such as Brazil had “an immense commercial obligation”, and threatening to increase Brazilian coffee importation tariffs in the U.S., Washington was desperate to close the negotiation deal before the official visit of Brazilian President Campos Salles in Buenos Aires planned at the end of the same year. 178 The U.S. authorities already seemed to be afraid of an approximation between both neighbors’ nations. Responding to North American pressures, the Brazilian Minister announced an increase in the tariff on flour in sacks and stagnation in the tariff on flour in barrels.179 Clearly, Argentine commerce would be hurt by this measure, and reactions from the government in Buenos Aires were just around the corner. Indeed, during a meeting with Ciro de Azevedo, Brazilian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Buenos Aires, the Argentinian President Roca vigorously highlighted that this Northern American maneuver represented a clear “customs threat”180 and was a totally “unfriendly”181 act towards Argentina, a friendly country. President Roca added that he intended to informally pressure the United States officials in Washington in order to stress this ungenerous attempt to compete with a similar product. Surprisingly enough, official complaints by President Roca were absolutely not oriented towards the Brazilian government and its decision to favor Washington. On the contrary, the tone of this conversation was pretty neutral and no questions were asked of the Brazilian official about the nature of this trade agreement. By acting so, Argentinian authorities were definitely picturing the United States as a “troublemaker”, and indeed it was playing this role. As it appeared, despite this “Flour War”, Buenos Aires seemed to make some diplomatic effort to keep cordial relations

178 Charles Page Bryan, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay, August 30, 1900, n°270, pp.1-2; Papers of the Legation of the United States of America, Petrópolis. Microfiche Records in the National Archives, n°121, Roll 67, despatches from the United States to Brazil, volume 65, January 3-December 27, 1900. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 179 Charles Page Bryan, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay, October 13, 1900, n°284, pp.1-2; Papers of the Legation of the United States of America, Petrópolis. Microfiche Records in the National Archives, n°121, Roll 67, despatches from the United States to Brazil, volume 65, January 3-December 27, 1900. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 180 Translation by the author: Ciro de Azevedo, Brazilian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Buenos Aires to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olyntho de Magalhães, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, December 17th 1900, p. 3. Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, Offices, 1900-1901. File: 206-1-11, 12, 13. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 181 Ibidem, p. 2.

53 with Brazil in an attempt to rally one of the neighbor nations to its cause.

1.8.3. Brazilian Concerns About Argentina’s Naval Power

For Argentina, it was diplomatically interesting to seek to maintain close relations with Brazil considering the ongoing frontier conflict with Chile since the end of the 19th century. However, for the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, Argentina was, more than ever, a source of concern; mainly because of the consequences of this threatening war between Buenos Aires and Santiago that had led, along the years, to a heavy rise in hostile armaments and military power.182 In fact, each nation had invested endless piles of money in the war industry because of an imminent threat perception and uncertainty towards the other. This strategy consequently led to a “security dilemma”183 that, considering the regional dimension of this issue, automatically became a sensitive subject in the capital of Brazil. So sensitive that, already in 1900 the Brazilian delegation in Buenos Aires warned Rio de Janeiro about the rising evolution of the Argentinian Navy; the hypothetical consequences that could occur not only to Brazil but also to South America; and the Brazilian measures that should be rapidly taken in order to tackle this identified and growing threat. In a four page confidential report, W. C. Gonçalves Pereira stressed some essential aspects of Brazilian Foreign policy in South America at the turn of the 20th century. Thanks to a complete and historical analysis about the Argentinian navy, the Brazilian Ambassador drew attention to the fact that, from 1895 to 1900, the sea power of Buenos Aires more than doubled during these five years of tensions between Argentina and Chile. As a consequence, the Brazilian navy experienced an uncomfortable inferiority compared to its highly armed neighbor. Although the relations were better than ever, and despite the visit of the Brazilian President Campos Salles to Buenos Aires, this alarming situation was considered a threat to the Southern American peace, especially for Brazil. In addition, W. C. Gonçalves Pereira stressed that “(…) a latent historical rivalry between both nations and the end of “the security dilemma” in the

182 N.B: For a more detailed analysis about the Argentinian-Chilean conflict, see BUENO, Clodoaldo. A República e sua Política Exterior (1889-1902). Unesp, 1995, pp. 255-65. 183 N.B: This concept was brought by the realism theory. For more information, see BAYLIS, John; OWENS, Patricia; SMITH Steve (Orgs). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 95.

54 region could help Argentina to search for South American hegemony disregarding or even disrespecting the Brazilian government”184. In his conclusion, W. C. Gonçalves Pereira gave a clear understanding of what defined or was perceived as legitimate power for Brazil and also what the role of Brazil was in the Southern part of the continent. He urged Brazilian government authorities to invest in a naval project because the latter could not be improvised within months. His last words stated:

“(…) I have the deepest conviction that the most solid guarantee of a long- lasting peace for Brazil, and consequently for South America will be one resting on the maintenance, from our side and all the time, of a fleet superior to any one of them (A/N: South American countries)”.185

Politically, economically and militarily powerful, Argentina seemed to naturally represent the perfect candidate for strong domination of the Southern part of the Americas under an open reorganization of power on the continent. And Brazil was perfectly aware of its current weaknesses.

1.9. Conclusions

At the turn of the 20th century, the fast U.S. accumulation of domestic power, and confidence added to power and political influence in its very near region defined a more ambitious U.S. foreign policy. The beginning of the new T. Roosevelt’s administration began by bringing a more sophisticated dimension that paved the way for U.S. worldwide ambitions. Washington was clearly in an attempt to redefine the rules of the international order, starting with the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. domestic transformation and changes in leading its foreign policy significantly influenced the perception of Latin American nations towards the balance of power in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil was closely monitoring Washington’s moves and regional powers’ reactions to U.S ambitions. Argentina was perceived by Rio de Janeiro and by Washington as a potential difficulty for the new balance of power in the Americas. Although the Brazilian authorities could already count on a strong commercial

184 Translation by the author: W. C. Gonçalves Pereira, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to Olyntho de Magalhães, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, August 7th 1900, Confidential n°2. Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, Offices, 1900-1901. Files: 206-1-11, 12, and 13. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 185 Ibidem.

55 relation with the U.S. thanks to the establishment of a lucrative coffee exportation dynamic since the end of the 19th century, a clear power and political asymmetry, that would not interfere with the approximation, was nonetheless defining their relation as “Unequal giants”186. However, Rio de Janeiro witnessed a great maturity and a pertinent analysis in relation to changes in the international order at the turn of the 20th century. The fast changing influence and affirmation of the U.S. foreign policy as a leader within the Western Hemisphere and its direct regional consequences on balance of power in the Americas were neatly perceived and understood by Brazilian authorities, even before Rio Branco’s administration. Facing new challenges, mainly in the neighboring Southern region, and despite numerous domestic difficulties, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs kept working hard on depicting a favorable and stable image of the country among U.S. diplomats in Washington and Rio de Janeiro. As a consequence, in 1902, the beginning of an approximation between the U.S. and the Brazilian governments emerged, more significantly thanks to a very sophisticated, calculated, and gradual diplomatic campaign, especially on the Brazilian side. This diplomatic move in direction of strengthening ties with Washington was motivated under a commonly perceived hemispheric challenge: Argentina. Buenos Aires was usually perceived as the economic leader187 of the Hispanic republics in the Americas, a strong alliance catalyst 188 and a fierce representative of Bolivarianism’s189 original ideas as to form a political and territorial unit among Hispanic countries in the Americas, whereas the new millennium would bring back for the Western Hemisphere, under the calculated U.S. foreign policy, anti- colonialism ideas. While the Western Hemisphere was entering the 20th century under the political shade of the U.S. newly self-proclaimed “Monroe Doctrine”, the continuity

186 SMITH, Joseph. Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889- 1930. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. 187 Translated by the author: “The interamerican environment became conditioned by (...); Argentinian diplomatic activism (stimulated by its economic splendor)...”. HIRST, Monica. Brasil-Estados Unidos: desencontros e afinidades. Rio de Janeiro, FGV Editora, 2009, p. 22. 188 Translated by the author: “(...) the vertiginous development of Argentina, since 1880 and until the first world war, led Brazil to fear that Argentina could organize an important anti-brazilian front in South America”. PARADISO, José. Um Lugar No Mundo: A Argentina e A Busca De Identidade Internacional. Translation by Sérgio Blath. Rio de Janeiro. Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 2005, apud Hélio Jaguaribe, p. 55. 189 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Brasil entre a America e a Europa: O Império e o Interamericanismo (do Congresso do Panama à Conferência de Washington). UNESP, 2012, 2003, pp. 59-65.

56 of the illusive “Pan-American” union attempt but also under an atmosphere of mistrust from Latin-American republics, towards the U.S. intentions, a series of international events would give a new dimension to Brazil-U.S relations. Several firm international actions, mainly led by Washington, would also be perceived by the nations of the Americas as a necessity to react and adapt their foreign policy strategies in search of legitimizing their power and influence in the Americas, at a regional and hemispherical level.

CHAPTER 2 | New Perceptions Of Power In The Americas | 1902-1904

From 1875 to 1914, the international order underwent a moment of mutation that is often characterized as the “Age of Empire”. During this period, European nations such as Germany, Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, France and Spain but also the United States and Japan were actively seeking to expend their economic and political influence on a worldwide scale through the establishment of colonies or political control. In very little time, these great powers divided among themselves many territories in Africa and in the Pacific region in order to create a global economic network.190 In the Western Hemisphere, the year 1902 appeared to be a turning point due to the beginning of strategic movements regarding Brazil-U.S. foreign policies and relations. The crisis involving U.S. authorities and European powers in the ports of Venezuela, the Panamanian revolt, and the Bolivian Syndicate episode appeared to be the perfect opportunity for Washington and Rio de Janeiro to express their understanding of an international shift of power, and confirm the beginning of their respective international insertion through a remodeled foreign policy strategy elaborated, on one hand, by the freshly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rio Branco, and on the other hand, by the Secretary of State John Milton Hay. In South America, on December 1st 1902, a large crowd of enthusiastic citizens, curious, politicians and officials gathered at the harbor docks of Rio de Janeiro to welcome the return of who is nowadays considered – institutionally - as one of the pillar of Brazilian diplomacy. Rio Branco, freshly promoted Minister of Foreign Affairs, was making his acclaimed return in Brazil after 26 years of service in different European capitals. During his first official speech in the Naval Club, in front of a crowd, among them politicians and the President of Brazil, Rodrigues Alves, the charismatic diplomat claimed: “I am not here at the service of a political party: I am here to serve our Brazil that everybody wishes to regard as united, righteous, strong

190 HOBSBAWM, Eric J. A Era dos Impérios: 1875-1914. São Paulo, Paz e Terra, 2009, pp. 97-123.

58 and respected” 191 . A day after, on December 2nd 1902, U.S. senators and representatives met on Capitol Hill, in Washington, to listen to T. Roosevelt’s second annual speech.

2.1. U.S. Moral Foreign Policy

This year, for his second speech, the U.S. President quickly highlighted his foreign policy strategy. After only a few minutes, the occasion was given to legitimize the latest imperialistic aggressive conquests and occupations in the neighboring countries that had kept the Secretary of State, John Hay, busy:

“As a people, we have played a large part in the world, and we are bent upon making our future even larger than the past. In particular, the events of the last four years have definitely decided that, for woe or for weal, our place must be great among nations”. 192

The argument was, as seen in chapter one, continuing to establish among the politicians and the public opinion a sense of U.S. uniqueness and exception as a nation and consequently, to give it the paramount responsibility of projecting its power abroad for the benefit of the world. This argument would not spread to the Isthmus question in Central America. Since the first days of his presidency in 1901, T. Roosevelt had been personally devoting a large amount of energy to the international and multilateral negotiations between U.S. authorities, France, Nicaragua and Panama to build a canal. The Secretary of State, John Hay, helped closely by the President, was actually involved in a very pro-active foreign policy for creating a safety zone in the Caribbean in order to assure U.S. national security. American foreign policy had continued to extend its reach towards the south of the continent, and had strategically stopped in Central America with the Isthmus question mainly considered by T. Roosevelt as a national security and economic

191 Translated by the author: « Não venho servir a um partido político: venho servir ao nosso Brasil, que todos desejamos ver unido, íntegro, forte e respeitado ». ASSUMPÇÃO, Embaixador Roberto Luiz de Araújo (org.). Obras do Barão do Rio Branco IX: discursos. – Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012, p. 108. 192 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 2, 1902. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902, p.1. . Last consulted November 16th 2017.

59 project as he stated: “The canal will be of great benefit to America, and of importance to the whole world. It will be of advantage to us industrially and also as improving our military position”193. After having acted strongly and firmly in the separation of Panama from Colombia, in June 1902, the U.S. Congress finally voted on the acquisition from France of the canal rights that would start to be built in Panama in the year 1904.194 Behind this “Moral Foreign Policy” related to U.S. world duty, however, as one of T. Roosevelt’s most famous quotes states perfectly (“Speak softly and carry a big stick, you will go far”195), the rearmament of the U.S. navy was also a vivid and obsessive preoccupation, not only defensively196 but also offensively197, of the U.S. President, mainly justifying the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine as the reason.

2.1.1. The White House’s Perception About The South Of The Americas

After a year at the head of the White House, the U.S. President’s strategy regarding the South American republics was not defined. For the U.S. President, the southern region was still to be considered as a whole, and bilateral relations were far from being part of his international agenda198. With

193 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 2, 1902. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902, p.21. . Last consulted November 16th 2017. 194 MORRIS, Edmund. Theodore Rex. Chapter 3: One vast, Smoothly Running. New York, The Modern Library, Kindle file, 2002. 195 MORRIS, Edmund. Theodore Rex. Chapter 15: The Black Crystal. New York, The Modern Library, Kindle file, 2002. 196 “A good navy is not provocative of war. It is the surest guarantee of peace”. United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1902. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902, p. 26. 197 “There should be no halt in the work of building up the Navy, providing every year additional fighting craft”. United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 2, 1902. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902, p. 26. . Last consulted November 16th 2017. 198 N.B: In comparison, in his second speech in front of the Senate and House of Representatives, T. Roosevelt explicitly mentioned that: “(…) we definitely took the ground that Cuba must hereafter have closer political relations with us than with any other power. Thus in a sense Cuba has become part of our international political system”. United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 2, 1902. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902, p.20.

60 very few exceptions, in his annual speech foreign policy rhetoric continued to be universal and global for the Western Hemisphere. However, in Washington, the principle of the Monroe Doctrine was still a challenge as far as being recognized and accepted by other American nations (or by European powers) as stated by Roosevelt: “No independent nation in America need have slightest fear of aggression from the United States”199. As seen in T. Roosevelt’s correspondence below about his personal perception regarding the South of the Americas, he even thought about sharing the U.S. “sphere of influence”. Earlier this year, on March 6th, 1902, a confidential and intimate correspondence was sent from Washington to Baron H. S. Sternburg, German diplomat in Calcutta, India. Inside, T. Roosevelt commented on Prince Henry of Prussia’s positive visit200 to the United States, and took the opportunity to demonstrate his admiration for the German Kaiser Wilhelm II (A/N: Henry’s brother) by stating how “(…) a great man he was, not only as a ruler, but as a reorganizer of his army”201. Furthermore, the U.S. President wrote a personal opinion:

“I am myself convinced that the United States and Germany can work in the closest intimacy and with heartiest mutual good-will for the benefits of both, not only in China, but in South America as well; but I am not at all sure that other people share this view, especially on your side of the water”.202

This idea of an international alliance surprised on various levels. First, this letter demonstrated an intimate relation with German officials. Second, this present statement contradicted T. Roosevelt’s latest political statements as far as the Monroe Doctrine and its defense against Great European powers threat. Third, his words put at idx?type=article&did=FRUS.FRUS1902.TRoosevelt&id=FRUS.FRUS1902&isize=M>. Last consulted November 20th 2017. 199 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 2, 1902. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1902, p.21. . Last consulted November 16th 2017. 200 N.B: At this occasion, T. Roosevelt stated in a welcome speech: “We admire their great past and great present, and we wish them all possible success in the future. May the friendship between the border of two peoples ever grow stronger !” President of the United States, T. Roosevelt’s welcome speech, 1902, T. Roosevelt papers, Series 14, Correspondence and other documents, 1897-1903, Reel 453. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 201 President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, White House, Washington, to Baron H. S. Sternburg, German Legation, Calcutta, India. March 6th 1902, personal, p.2. T. Roosevelt papers, Series 14, Correspondence and Other Documents, 1897-1903, Reel 453. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 202 Ibidem, p. 2.

61 check Root’s argument, used in 1900, as to present German colonies in Brazil as a threat, and consequently reinforced the thesis of the use of this fact for domestic rearmament purposes.203 Fourth, this gives confidence to argue for the limitation for the U.S. Navy alone to protect, under the Monroe Doctrine, the entire Western Hemisphere, and thus the search for a new ally (not Great Britain anymore)204 to share the responsibility within South America.205 By doing so, on the one hand, the 26th U.S. President proved his perception towards Germany as a great political nation and navy power, more important than Great Britain, and, on the other hand, that he also was not interested in articulating or disregarded any alliance with any Southern republics regarding the guarantee of the Monroe Doctrine. On the contrary, early 1903, the U.S. President started to show some more pragmatic interests towards the Southern region and more understanding regarding the fragile balance of power in South America. His interest was purely defensive as he analyzed the growing of “(…) a feeling against the United States among the South Republics”206 led by Chile whereas “(…) Argentine is distrustful of Chile”207. In this letter, T. Roosevelt asked the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, whether a Military Attaché should be sent to Buenos Aires to counter this attempt. Nothing was done in this respect.

2.1.2. The U.S. Department Of State’s Views Towards South America

At the beginning of 1902, the U.S. Department of State, via its diplomatic delegations, continued to report about South America’s perception of balance of power. In January 1902, according to Secretary Thomas C. Dawson208, in the U.S. delegation in Petrópolis, although tensions were highly sensed between Argentina and

203 Cf. Germany’s unfunded threat as a pretext, p. 47. 204 Ibidem, p. 47. 205 ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, p. 172 apud Mitchell (1996:253). 206 B.F Barnes, Acting Secretary to the President, Oyster Bay, N.Y., to E. Root, Secretary of War, July 27th 1903, personal. T. Roosevelt papers, Series 14, Correspondence and Other Documents, 1897- 1903, Reel 453. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 207 Ibidem. 208 Thomas C. Dawson was secretary of U.S. Legation in Brazil from 1891 to 1904. He was then promoted to U.S. Minister and Consul General in the Dominican Republic (1904-1909) before being Ambassador to Colombia (1907-09), to Chile (1909), and to Panama (1910). Between 1903 and 1904, he wrote a 2-volume book entitled: “The South American Republics”.

Chile, the general frame of the region was positive and confidant. Brazil was viewed as maintaining “peaceful” relations with neighbor countries, and “neutral” in case of conflict between Buenos Aires and Santiago. As analyzed by the U.S. official, Rio de Janeiro was then perceived as politically isolated in the region, without involvement in the regional issues: “Efforts have been made very guardedly by both countries (A/N: Argentina and Chile) to secure Brazil’s alliance or at least friendliness, but without success”209. Before ending the diplomat report by stating that “I do not think that anything short of a menace to the independence of Paraguay or Uruguay would induce her (A/N: Brazil) to depart from a strict neutrality in case of war”210. This U.S. perception of the Southern balance of power depicted Brazil, in the beginning of 1902, as not searching for any alliance with directly neighboring countries. On the contrary, Argentina and Chile, were viewed as attempting to gain power via an approximation attempt with Rio de Janeiro. Besides, Uruguay and Paraguay were to be observed as satellites and fragile independent nations that could be threatened at any time by a southern power, and consequently influenced the regional balance of power211. Later in June 1903, the U.S. Minister to Brazil, David E. Thompson, framed an extremely positive picture of Brazil, Argentina and Chile relations for his Department of State. The U.S. official recognized the three countries as the main powers that “ (…) should always be at peace with one-another and work together for the common good and common defense of this part of the world”212, and therefore acknowledged the regional responsibility, and simultaneously, the sphere of influence. This sounded like Rio Branco’s attempt of creating a “union” between Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

209 Thomas C. Dawson, Secretary of the U.S. Legation in Brazil to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay, January 8, 1902, n°389, pp.1-2; Papers of the Legation of the United States of America, Petrópolis. Microfiche Records in the National Archives, n°121, Roll 69, dispatches from the United States Ministers to Brazil, volume 67, November 1, 1901-September 15, 1902. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 210 Ibidem. 211 N.B: Clodoaldo Bueno and João Paulo Soares Alsina maintained that Brazil closely monitored the independence of Uruguay and Paraguay, especially in relation to Argentina that was seen as searching to extend its territory in order to restore the Vice-Reinado and thus create a counter-power to Brazil within the region. BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, p. 171; ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, p. 69. 212 David E. Thompson, Secretary of the U.S. Legation in Brazil to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay June 6th, 1903, n°32, p.1; Microfiche Records in the National Archives, n°121, Roll 70, dispatches from the United States Ministers to Brazil, volume 68, September 27, 1902-October 30, 1903. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

Before concluding that “Even treaties of alliances have been proposed but I believe the consensus of opinion is against such unnecessary committal”213, the U.S. official summarized the relations dynamic among the three southern republics very briefly and superficially. He started by saying that “The friendship between Brazil and Chile is long- standing and is attributable to the fact that Chile is the only country in South America which does not border Brazil at some point”214 and “(…) the Chileans are the most warlike, energetic and arbitrary while the Brazilian are the most peaceful, conservative and law-biding people in south America”215. As far as Argentina, “Brazilian friendliness towards Argentina is largely due to her interest in and desire to increase, her trade with that country”216.

2.2. South American Perception Of Power

By mid 1902, three southern republics were therefore established as the main regional powers: Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay and Paraguay principally gravitated in their shade, and relations with them were often activated in order to serve the main powers’ strategies and ambitions. If relations were considered as cordial between Brazil and Chile, a long lasting diplomatic dynamic of approximation and detachment related to regional affirmation had grown, during the 19th century, to build an atmosphere of tensions between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. That phenomenon would even stretch to the beginning of the 20th century: relations between both countries grew at the rhythm of significant up’s and down’s.217

2.2.1. Brazilian Gains vs. Argentine Losses

At the end of the 19th century, while the U.S. was occupied with securing an outer safety perimeter in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, Brazil was simultaneously solving crucial border issues related to its national security. Up to 1902, Rio de Janeiro, thanks to meticulous negotiations from the diplomat Rio

213 Ibidem. p.2. 214 Ibidem. p.2. 215 Ibidem. p.2. 216 Ibidem. p.2. 217 BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Capítulo I. In: Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 47-64.

Branco, Brazil had already started to strengthen its borders, and gained important strategic and peaceful victories that, at the same time, significantly extended its territory. In 1895, after winning an international arbitration, Brazil contained Argentina’s expansion and strategic ambitions by legally obtaining the right to consider, as Brazilian, more than 30 000 km2 contested by Argentina, in the southern region of the country. Argentina’s victory would have implied the presence of an Argentine enclave on Brazilian land separating two important southern Brazilian states from the rest. In 1900, another diplomatic victory through international arbitration, again by Rio Branco and his team, helped to solve another border claim in French Guyana, north of Brazil. One more time, Brazilian authorities strategically succeeded on various geopolitical levels. First, they contained the Great European Power influence close to the country. Second, they increased Brazilian territory by 260 000 Km2 and third, they withdrew European presence from the Amazon River that led directly to the heart of Amazonia.218 Already in 1902, Rio Branco was again on his way to another important victory with the Acre question involving the border with Bolivia and an international Chartered Company.

2.2.2. Double “B”: Bolivia And Bolivian Syndicate

The Brazilian Republic had inherited, from the Brazilian Empire, territorial claims and border issues with neighboring countries that were still not legally solved or defined. Between 1899 and 1902, a claim regarding a vast part of a territory encompassing the Northwest Brazil and the West of Bolivia started to take shape within the Bolivian authorities. According to the “Ayacucho Treaty” signed between Brazil and Bolivia in 1867, the litigious region was recognized as part of Bolivian territory. Nonetheless, due to the lucrative rubber production, Brazilian workers mainly occupied the region. Surprisingly, the regional issue also had hemispherical ramification, and had been reactivated by a foreign influence. Since 1899, Bolivia was negotiating a treaty to concede exclusive rights in the region to a foreign company headquartered in New York City. The “Bolivian Syndicate” company was composed

218 HEINSFELD, Adelar. A geopolitica de Rio Branco: as fronteiras nacionais e o isolamento argentino. Edições Unoesc, Joaçaba, 2003, pp.38-44.

65 of European investors but mainly by influential North American investors. Among them: W. Enlou Roosevelt, President T. Roosevelt’s cousin.219 This enterprise directly worried Brazilian authorities because it represented a conglomerate of powerful businessmen taking part of a strategic region that included a part of the Amazonas and the use of the nearby river. As stated in a Brazilian memorandum sent to the U.S. Department of State, from Rio de Janeiro, the opposition to Bolivia was mainly oriented towards the Bolivian Syndicate. “Brazil does not want that to begin in South America, and much less in its immediate vicinity, the Chartered Company system (…)”220 before adding a couple of lines further that “It has nothing to do with the influence of a determined nation but the system itself”221. This denial maneuver responded directly to intrigue by the Bolivian Minister’s declaration in Washington who stated to the U.S. Department of State that: “(…) the Foreign Office of Brazil manifests and tells the South American governments that through the Bolivian Syndicate the United States tries to take hold and to conquer South American territory”222. Bolivian authorities desperately tried to gain support from Washington to resist against any Brazilian military conflict. Thanks to intense diplomatic relations with John Hay, Assis Brasil officially obtained a denial regarding any intervention in Bolivia or any conquest of South America through Acre, separating the Department of State from this private enterprise. However, the atmosphere between Washington and Rio de Janeiro was of mistrust. The Brazilian Minister in Washington doubted John Hay’s honesty when the latter declared a hypothetical U.S. intervention only in case if American citizens’ rights were to be threatened. Various examples of international Chartered companies in Asia and Africa that claimed citizens’ rights to justify imperialism did not help to strengthen confidence. Brazilian diplomats witnessed closely how economic interests

219 Ibidem, pp. 48-63. 220 Translation by the author: “O Brasil não deseja que se inicie na America do Sul, e muito menos na sua imediata vizinhança, o systema das “Chartered Companies (...)”. Legação dos EUA do Brasil, Washington, Memorandum, July 16th, 1902. Microfiche Records in the National Archives, n°49, Roll 8, Notes from the Brazilian Legation in the United States to the Department of State, volume 8, January 24, 1901-July 27, 1906. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 221 Translation by the author: “Não se trata de influência de uma determinada nação, mas do systema em si”. Ibidem. 222 Remarks of the Bolivian Minister presented in writing to U.S. Department of State, July 10th, 1902, Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o282347. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University.

66 were moving towards ambitions of conquest.223 However, Rio Branco succeeded in negotiating the purchase of Bolivian Syndicate concession rights prior to signing, in November 1903, the Petrópolis Treaty that celebrated the purchase of more than 190 000 km2 from Bolivia. The fact that the Bolivian Syndicate easily accepted to be compensated and withdrew rapidly from Bolivia without the U.S. government intervention suggests no tangible ambitions to enter the quest of gaining South America territory. With the Acre case, diplomatic relations between Brazil and the U.S. strengthened and demonstrated a strong, oriented, and sophisticated Brazilian diplomacy that did not hesitate to face the American administration.

2.2.3. Brazilian Military Power Situation

Due to this audacious Brazilian geopolitical enterprise, neighboring countries, especially Argentina, were tensely witnessing the extensive increase, on the one hand, of Brazilian territory, and on the other hand, the consolidating of the nation and the state. However, despite being the biggest Southern American country, in terms of geography and continuing to gain space, that could be seen for some as an advantage, Brazilian territory still represented a challenge for Rio de Janeiro as far as administration, economy, borders, regional conflicts, immigration, and above all security. At the same time as Brazil, under Rio Branco’s vigorous and firm administration, was considerably extending its territory by giving more geographical importance to the region, Argentina and Chile had significantly increased their military power during the last years of the 19th century, mainly due to their border conflict. Between 1891 and 1902, Argentina, Brazil’s direct neighboring country, improved its naval power to reach the 10th worldwide position in terms of tonnage224. In 1900, the Argentine naval fleet reached 94.891 tons and the Chilean Navy 43.430 tons versus the Brazilian one of 33.401 tons. However, the Brazilian Navy had a ready

223 BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Capítulo I. In: Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p. 78-87. 224 ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, pp. 120-1.

67 for combat fleet composed of only 12 vessels; only 4 could be sent at any moment 225. In 1902, the Brazilian Army and Navy were in an extremely difficult situation. The republic had lost its prestigious regional position as a military power that used to characterize the Brazilian Empire very well. The Republic proclamation (1889) brought, in addition of severe economic issues, a series of domestic tensions related to political power distribution between civilians, military, and politicians that sensitively limited Brazilian military development. The tensions and clash of interests between the Army and the Navy profoundly damaged the Brazilian military’s reputation and prestige and significantly weakened its power projection due to loss of important materials and officials.226 As a fierce geographer 227 , military historian, and fine analyst, this very unfavorable situation, especially towards Argentina, worried Rio Branco. The fragile and explosive balance of power, the atmosphere of mistrust among Southern republics and the approximation between Santiago and Buenos Aires were also to be added in the equation that justified Rio Branco’s foreign policy strategy to protect Brazil’s borders. For the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, borders were crucial elements to enhance the definition and consolidation of a nation. Brazil could only be fully “united, righteous, strong, and respected”228 thanks to a strong military power229. Soon after his inauguration, Rio Branco was already fully involved in direct negotiations with hostile Bolivia and Peru in the Acre question that almost required the use of power. Facing a weak Brazilian military contingent, he called for the rearmament of the Army and the Navy, as did Brazilian Ambassador W. C. Gonçalves Pereira in Buenos Aires; unfortunately without any “green light” from the Minister of Navy, Almirante Julio Cézar de Noronha. Only on December 14th 1904, Congress approved an ambitious Navy rearmament plan that would only be ready in 1910 and could therefore directly compete with neighboring countries and offer a satisfactory coastal defensive fleet. Brazil continued at the mercy of various domestic and

225 Ibidem. pp. 135-7; BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Capítulo I. In: Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p.64. 226 ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, pp. 135-6, 139-141; BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, p. 183-4. 227 MORAES, Antonio Carlos Robert. O Barao do rio Branco e a geografia. In: O emprego do poder militar como estratégia de Rio Branco. In: Barão do Rio Branco: 100 anos de Memoria. FUNAG, 2012. 228 ASSUMPÇÃO, Embaixador Roberto Luiz de Araújo (org.). Obras do Barão do Rio Branco IX: discursos. – Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012. 229 BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, p. 221.

68 international threats from 1889 to 1910.230 Rio Branco was definitely aware that the Navy rearmament could be a long lasting enterprise. Nonetheless, Brazilian defense could not wait since the territory was growing fast, and the fluvial network was definitely an asset for defensive purposes. When dealing with border claims between France and Brazil in the Amapa question (1897-1900), Rio Branco was already lucid about the Brazilian military situation and how to deal with the issue: “The persuasive means are, in my opinion, the single ones to be made use of, in order to succeed in delicate negotiations like these, by a nation like Brazil that does not enjoy a sufficient power to impose its will on an important military power”231. Like T. Roosevelt, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs was influenced by Alfred Manhan’s theses on geopolitics and sea power.232 As it appears, Rio Branco was aware that without military power, only International law could be used as a way of persuasion in order to protect the nation. This understanding converged with the newly proclaimed U.S. “Moral Foreign Policy”, acting in favor of international peace, that arose with T. Roosevelt and took shape with the Venezuelan case.

2.2.4. Argentine Search For Regional Influence: Isolate Brazil

While Brazil was dealing with its expansion and rearmament, Buenos Aires continued its quest for legitimacy by leading an unstable and unpredictable foreign policy to lock the southern region - under its watch - by stimulating attempts at alliances and diplomatic plots among neighboring countries. In addition, the impulsive search for national and individual political advantages interestingly recalled the dynamic, at that time, among the great powers in Europe. By the turn of the 20th century, Argentina and Chile were exiting a long lasting and tense conflict, related to borders that led them to negotiate a disarmament treaty.

230 GUEDES, J. Max. O Barão do Rio Branco e a Modernização da Defesa, pp. 307-30. Sessão III in: Rio Branco, a América do Sul e a modernização do Brasil. ALMINO, João; CARDIM, Carlos Henrique (org.), Rio de Janeiro, EMC, 2002, p. 307-30. 231 ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, apud Ricupero, 1995: 54, pp. 128. 232 BITTENCOURT, Armando de Senna. O emprego do poder militar como estratégia de Rio Branco. In: Barão do Rio Branco: 100 anos de Memoria. FUNAG, 2012. BUENO, Clodoaldo. Rio Branco e a política internacional da sua época. In: Barão do Rio Branco: 100 anos de Memoria. FUNAG, 2012.

Thanks to the “May Treaty”, Argentina and Chile had finally come to a common agreement that made way for a new Argentine foreign policy. In mid 1902, the death of Amancio Alcorta, the former Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, seemed to have provided a switch in Argentine international politics that drew special attention from the Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires. Joaquín Víctor González, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced to Cyro Azevedo, the Brazilian Minister in Buenos Aires the will not to intervene anymore in the Pacific matters that is “a risky protection policy to weak nations that could not offer compensative advantages”233. The Argentine Minister stated that “the governmental project will be of equivalent neutrality (…)”234 and which was celebrated as a “triumph”235 by Chilean authorities. Besides, the growing approximation attempt from Buenos Aires with Chile was also perceived as “(…) an antagonism between the current moment and the past”236 by Brazil because Argentine politics “(…) went from the communion of interests with Peru and Bolivia that, at a critical moment, led to an offensive and defensive alliance to a complete indifference”237. According to Cyro Azevedo, this radical political switch depicted “such a violent reaction”238 that provided an unpredictable scenario.

233 Translation by the author: “uma política arriscada de proteção a nações fracas que não poderiam offerecer vantagens compensativas”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to Olyntho de Magalhães, Brazilian State Minister of Foreign Relations, Minister of Foreign Affairs, July, 15th, 1902, n°13, reservado, p.1, 405-5-17. Pastas Recolhidas das Embaixadas Brasileiras, Parte IV, confidenciais e reservados, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 234 Translation by the author: “(...) o proposito governamental seria a neutralidade equivalente”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to Olyntho de Magalhães, Brazilian State Minister of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June, 25th, 1902, n°12, reservado, p.170, 405-5-17. Pastas Recolhidas das Embaixadas Brasileiras, Parte IV, confidenciais e reservados. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 235 Translation by the author: “(...) o Chile considera um triumpho (...)”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to Olyntho de Magalhães, Brazilian State Minister of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July, 15th, 1902, n°13, reservado, p.1, 405-5-17. Pastas Recolhidas das Embaixadas Brasileiras, Parte IV, confidenciais e reservados. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 236 Translation by the author: “(...) o antagonismo entre o momento presente e o passado”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to Olyntho de Magalhães, Brazilian State Minister of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June, 25th, 1902, n°12, reservado, p.170, 405-5-17. Pastas Recolhidas das Embaixadas Brasileiras, Parte IV, confidenciais e reservados. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 237 Translation by the author: “(...) passando da comunhão de interesses com o Peru e o Bolivia, que, em momento critico, encaminhou-se para uma aliança ofensiva e defensiva, para a indiferença completa”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to Olyntho de Magalhães, Brazilian State Minister of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July, 15th, 1902, n°13, reservado, p.1, 405-5-17. Pastas Recolhidas das Embaixadas Brasileiras, Parte IV, confidenciais e reservados. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 238 Translation by the author: “(...) reacção tão violenta (...)”. Ibidem, p.1.

At the same time, President, Julio Roca and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis M. Drago, were attempting to also increase Argentine influence and prestige in the region by negotiating trade and politics approximation with Brazil. On the one hand, justifying the two markets’ proximity, Argentina would offer entry free of taxes for Brazilian coffee (directly competing with free of taxes U.S. entry), matte and tobacco. For the Minister of Foreign Affaires, the trade agreement would bring: “besides immediate advantages for both countries, it was convenient that the more powerful nations from South America tighten their relations and harmonize their interests in order to be able to, at a particular moment, join against ambitions from North America or Europe”239. On the other hand, Roca aligned with Brazilian policy towards the Acre territory and the Bolivian Syndicate, and claimed legitimate to “secure a continental autonomy, forbidding dangerous intrusions from one conqueror and absorbing element (A/N: the U.S.)”240. He also offered his service to arbitrate the claim between Brazil and Bolivia. However, the Brazilian diplomat perceived a plot between Bolivia and Argentina. In this case that would favor Bolivia, already seen by Brazil as untrustworthy, and serve Argentine interests. In front of this mistrust, the Brazilian authorities denied both Argentinian requests.241 One more example of the Argentine untrustworthy diplomacy came later this year with the organization in Buenos Aires of a “sanitary league” with Paraguay and Uruguay. By negotiating a quarantine imposition on Rio de Janeiro’s port, Argentina attempted to commercially isolate Brazil in the region.242 Despite all of Buenos Aires efforts to gain influence in South America, the

239 Translation by the author: “(...) além vantagens imediatas dois paizes era conveniente que as nações mais fortes America Sul estreitassem relações e harmonizassem interesses para o fim poderem em momento dado ligarem-se contra ambição Norte Americana ou Europa”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to Olyntho de Magalhães, Brazilian State Minister of Foreign Relations, Minister of Foreign Affairs, September, 3rd, 1902, n°17, reservado, p.5, 405-5-17. Pastas Recolhidas das Embaixadas Brasileiras, Parte IV, confidenciais e reservados. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 240 Translation by the author: “(…) assegurar a autonomia continental, impedindo intrusões perigosas de um elemento conquistador e absorvente”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to Olyntho de Magalhães, Brazilian State Ministry of Foreign Relations, Minister of Foreign Affairs, August, 18th, 1902, confidencial, p.3, 405-5-17. Pastas Recolhidas das Embaixadas Brasileiras, Parte IV, confidenciais e reservados. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 241 Ibidem, p.3. 242 Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to Olyntho de Magalhães, Brazilian State Minister of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October, 13th, 1902, n°18, p.1, 405-5- 18. Pastas Recolhidas das Embaixadas Brasileiras, Parte IV, confidenciais e reservados. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

71 regional board would be, one more time, shaken by the event of December 1902.

2.3. Switch In The Americas

2.3.1. Reorganizing The Balance of Power in South America: Venezuela Case

On December 9th, an armed fleet made up of a coalition between the European powers of Germany, England, and Italy, took the Venezuelan authorities and the Americas by surprise by anchoring in the La Guayra port, and imposing a political and economical blockade. Their objective was to pressure the government to honor, as fast as necessary, an unpaid debt contracted by the authorities in Caracas using power, threat and the hypothetical use of force as an argument.243 Only one year after claiming the return of the Monroe Doctrine - under new terms - this European “Gunboat diplomacy” left Washington in a delicate situation as far as its Western Hemisphere defensive promises. This action was led by two sea powers more advanced than the U.S. Navy, especially by the German navy, considered as one of the more powerful at that time.244 The U.S. authorities could definitely not stay neutral in this incident or their attempt to gain influence on the continent would be doomed. In T. Roosevelt’s view, the hypothetical threat was of a European establishment in the region justified by the Caracas failure in paying debt. The American President already blamed exactly the same type of colonialism in 1901245. In order to assure and secure its “sphere of influence”, Washington had only two options to sustain its paramount role in front of the rest of the continent: a military or a diplomatic action. Both were activated. Interestingly, U.S. naval maneuvers were occurring near the blockade region, and vessels went on their way while the diplomatic path had already been privileged. British and German authorities, prior the

243 CERVO Amado, Luiz; BUENO, Clodoaldo. História da política exterior do Brasil. UNB, 2008, p. 192-3, BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, pp. 143-149. 244 ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, p. 171-2. 245 “(...) there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil”: United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901, p. XXXVI. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901. . Last consulted December 1st 2017.

72 blockade, had warned Washington of the intentions of European powers in La Guayra246. Although assuring not intending to acquire new territories247. Isolated and in decline in Europe, London seemed to be looking for oversea political support by giving more importance to the U.S., emerging as a great power in the Americas248. However, the destruction by the German Navy of four Venezuelan gunboats on December 9th demonstrated clear signals of hostility. The German use of force in the sea, close to the Isthmus, would pressure the Venezuelan President Castro to ask for arbitration, via Washington, just as to justify the Monroe Doctrine. For logical reasons, T. Roosevelt refused to arbitrate the case that could have been in contradiction with the Monroe Doctrine. He brought it successfully, after having dissuaded Berlin from military intervention by imposing a 10 day ultimatum, to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands.249

2.3.2. Three U.S. Steps Towards South America

Around the year 1902, the U.S. foreign policy continued its massive quest of global influence, recognition, and projection; mainly related to its national security. After having conquered – horizontally – the west of the North American territories and other illegitimate territories along the first half of 19th century (under the Manifest Destiny), the second half of the century, and the beginning of the 20th would witness a – vertical – phase of projection towards the south of the continent to affirm its

246 MORRIS, Edmund. Theodore Rex. Chapter 12: Not A Cloud on the Horizon. New York, The Modern Library, Kindle file, 2002. N.B: Various Brazilian scholars see this event as a turning point in U.S. foreign policy as far as assuring hemispherical influence. By Great-Britain and German “subordination”, Washington would have obtained full recognition as the great power of the Américas. However, this litterature, based on secondary sources, does not support the thesis using explicit archives. See: BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, p. 149; CERVO Amado, Luiz; BUENO, Clodoaldo. História da política exterior do Brasil. UNB, 2008, p. 192-3, BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, p. 192; ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, p. 172. 247 “His Excellency the German Ambassador, on his recent return from Berlin, personaly conveyed to the President the assurance of the German Emperor that his Majesty’s Government had no purpose or intention to make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the South American continent Memorandum from John Hay to Theodor von Holleben, December 16th, 1901, p. 1. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o36233. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. 248 CERVO Amado, Luiz; BUENO, Clodoaldo. História da política exterior do Brasil. UNB, 2008, p. 192-3, BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, p. 116. 249 MORRIS, Edmund. Theodore Rex. Chapter 13: The Big Stick. New York, The Modern Library, Kindle file, 2002.

73 political and power presence, sometimes by diplomatic negotiations, but often by military actions and occupation.250 The set of actions and reactions elaborated in Washington “(…) were stages in a great-power policy, not unlike that of Western European states during the same period”251, and reinforced the perception of American imperialism. The beginning of the 20th century was synominous with Washington’s increasing of influence and intrusion towards South America due to three international and political decisions regarding Panama, Brazil and Venezuela. If the Bolivian Syndicate directly related to a private U.S. and British enterprise very distantly related to some U.S. government officials, the Panama Canal and the Venezuelan case were paramount U.S. diplomatic and politics victories against the influence of the greatest European powers at that time, and clear signals for the other Latin-American countries. As stated by T. Roosevelt in a confident speech in Chicago, in April, 1903:

“The terms which we have secured as those under which the Isthmian canal is to be built, and the course of events in the Venezuela matter, have shown not merely the ever growing influence of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, but also, I think I may safely say, have exemplified the firm purpose of the United States that its growth and influence and power shall redound not to the harm but to the benefit of our sister republics whose strength is less”.252

In Central America, Washington’s negotiations concluded the exclusion of French influence related to the concession and fully obtained the rights to build and run the Canal; obtaining trade and defense superiority in the region. T. Roosevelt would qualify this accomplishment as: “the great bit of work of my administration, and from the material and constructive standpoint one of the greatest bits of work that

250 “The nineteenth century was the age of imperialism (…). The United States also entered the race, founding its own colonial empire that embraced Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal area, the Virgin Islands, and the Philippines- a total roughly 200,000 square miles of territory, of which only 5,500 square miles were in the Western Hemisphere”. GASPAR, Edmund. United States-Latin America: a special relationship? AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1978, p. 19-20. BANDEIRA Moniz, Luiz Alberto. Capítulo I. In: Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Revan, 2003, p.25. 251 GASPAR, Edmund. United States-Latin America: a special relationship? AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1978, p. 19. 252 Address of President Roosevelt at Chicago, Illinois, April 2, 1903, The Monroe Doctrine. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o289667, pp. 24-5. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. Last consulted November 27th 2017.

74 the twentieth century will see”253 as he already considered the canal, in 1901, as “(…) connecting North and South America”254. In South America, Washington’s influence in the Venezuelan case was highly acclaimed and celebrated by T. Roosevelt, especially regarding the Monroe Doctrine affirmation towards European great Powers. In a personal letter sent to Albert Shaw, an influential American journalist and scholar, the President perceived the arbitration acceptance, by German and British governments, “after no little difficulty” as “a great triumph” and an acknowledgement of the Monroe Doctrine principles:

“The principles we there set forth were explicitly accepted by both Germany and England, and of course nothing that they have done or threatened to do so far has in any way, shaped, or conflicted with our contention as to what the Monroe Doctrine means.255

He also reinforced his vision of the Western Hemisphere as belonging to the U.S. political “Sphere of influence” by stating that:

“Of course I take for granted that you would support me in refusing to acknowledge the power of the Hague court or of any other tribunal or of any other power to overrule us as regards to our attitude on what I consider the cardinal feature of American foreign diplomacy (A/N: the Monroe Doctrine)”.256

By forcing two European Great Powers to solve their claims in The Hague, far away from the Western Hemisphere, without any use of power, the American aggressive imperialism seemed to have vanished into a peaceful and prestigious way to make diplomacy. Washington managed to symbolically withdraw, mainly, German attempts to influence on the continent, and succeeded in passively attracting political support from Great Britain as anticipated in September, 1902, by Joaquim Nabuco, Brazilian Ambassador to London (1901-1905): “Joining both (A/N: Brazilian) legations from London and Washington is what shall be, because it is a single politics, today England

253 MORRIS, Edmund. Theodore Rex. Chapter 7: Genius, Force, Originality. New York, The Modern Library, Kindle file, 2002. 254 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901. . Last consulted November 23rd 13th 2017, p. XXXV. 255 Personal letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Albert Shaw, December 26th, 1902, p. 1-2. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o183811. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. 256 Ibidem.

75 is the more North American among the nations”257. These three U.S. steps towards South America not only increased its own perception as an established and recognized power but also put Washington in an isolated position from Europe and locked its prestige even more among the American nations. In the Southern republics, the series of events involving the U.S. authorities and its approach towards the southern region were also perceived as a source of discussion. Between the ministers of foreign affairs and diplomatic legations abroad, the Monroe Doctrine activation in the Venezuelan case especially caught attention.

2.4. Argentina Takes the Lead

2.4.1. Argentine Attempts at Forming an Alliance

On March 11th, 1903, the U.S. Department of State released in the Press the content of the correspondence between Buenos Aires and Washington that dated from December 1902 at the time the Venezuelan crisis was at its peak. A couple of days after the blockade, Luis M. Drago, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs had instructed his Minister in Washington, Martín García Mérou, to negotiate an approximation with the U.S. Department of State. Desperately searching for international projection, the Argentine Republic announced the wish of a sort of offensive and defensive alliance with Washington in support of the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. Secretary of State denied the proposition stating that Monroe Doctrine is an American principle that only Washington guarantees, and that “the policy of the United States precluded alliances, whatever their object (…)”258. This article was enclosed in a correspondence from the Brazilian legation in Washington, and sent, on

257 Translation by the author: “Unindo as duas legações de Londres e Washington é o que devêra ser, porque é uma só política, hoje a Inglaterra sendo a mais Norte Americana das nações”. Joaquim Nabuco, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London, England to Rio Branco, Geral Consul, Brazilian legation in Berlin, Germany, September, 7th, 1902, 832-1, REC 118, Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 258 Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, Brazilian Delegation in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Maria Paranhos do Rio Branco, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, March 19th 1903, n°2032, File: 234-1-1. “The New York Herald: Argentina Stirs European Powers”, March 14th, 1903. Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Washington, dispatches, 1903-1904. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

March 19th, 1903, to Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro. The Argentine diplomatic attempt towards the U.S. authorities caught very special attention from the Brazilian authorities, and the official letter to Rio Branco confirmed the enterprise along with the Argentine President’s justification speech to Congress in May 1903259. The latter was perceived as a diplomatic disaster and untrustworthy. As commented by Joaquim Francisco Assis Brasil, Minister in Washington: “Luis M. Drago and the Argentine Minister here were not well inspired when they ventured to invite the American government to join them in their international political declarations”260. The Brazilian diplomat also criticized the Argentine manner of doing diplomacy: “It is strange the insistence that the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs showed in carrying on his spectacular concept, without being informed confidentially before on how his overtures would be received by the American government, thereby putting him at risk of a fiasco, that is a fact today”261. This also proved that Argentine Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State did not have a direct access to each other. Likewise, Assis Brasil was also surprised by Mérou’s declaration to “solemnly” acclaim the Monroe Doctrine as perceived by Brazil as a “(…) protectorate of other republics of this hemisphere by the United States (…)”262. At this stage, Rio de Janeiro had not taken any official position regarding the Doctrine, which demonstrated that Rio Branco did not consider necessary to internationally recognize Brazil under U.S. influence, and did not consider Brazil under any foreign influence.

259 “It is understood, in fact, that the Republic has not gone in search of protectors or alliances (…)”. Mr Ames to Mr Hay, legation of the United States, Buenos Aires, May 6, 1903. United States Department of State. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903, p. 9; Argentine Republic pp. 1-13. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903. 260 Translation by the author: “L. Drago e o Ministro Argentino aqui não foram bem inspirados quando se abalançaram a convidar o Governo Americano para os acompanhar nas suas declarações de política internacional”. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, Brazilian Delegation in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Maria Paranhos do Rio Branco, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, March 19th 1903, n°2032, p.1, File: 234-1-1. Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Washington, dispatches, 1903-1904. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 261 Translation by the author: “E estranha a insistência que mostra o Ministro argentino das Relações Exteriores em levar por deante a sua espectacular concepção, sem se haver informado antes confidencialmente de como as suas aberturas seriam recebidas pelo Governo Americano, arriscando-se assim ao fiasco que é hoje um facto”. Ibidem, p.2. 262 Translation by the author: “(...) protectorado das demais Republicas d’este hemisfério pelos EUA (...)”. Ibidem, p. 2.

At the end of the document, Assis Brasil congratulated Rio Branco for having declined the Argentine invitation in relation to its “projected diplomatic enterprise”263 towards Washington. Rio Branco was paying close and clever attention to Brazilian prestige and international image by keeping strong diplomatic relations, being neutral and mainly by avoiding unnecessary alliances.

2.4.2. Drago’s Doctrine Attempt

While T. Roosevelt was celebrating his diplomatic success, by the end of 1902, Luis M. Drago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Argentine Republic was addressing a sharp note to his Argentinian Minister in Washington, copied to the U.S. Department of State, regarding the Venezuelan crisis management by the American authorities. In this document, the Argentine Republic took a position and…

“(…) felt alarmed at the knowledge that the failure of Venezuela to meet the payments of its public debt is given as one of the determining causes of the capture of its fleet, the bombardment of one of its ports, and the establishment of a rigorous blockade along its shore”.264

Facing this incident, Luis M. Drago opposed the relative neutrality of the U.S. authorities, and consequently questioned the principle of the doctrine “defended with so much zeal on all occasions by the United States”265 that Buenos Aires “solemnly adhered to”266. Even though Buenos Aires recognized the right to claim debts, by letting this happen the Minister also criticized the U.S. authorities that, passively, favor the power of the mighty over weak nations, the extreme radicalism of covering the full debt immediately, and the violation of sovereignty before reminding them of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine foundation principles of non-intervention from European powers. By so doing, the Monroe Doctrine not only favored intervention from other powers but also from the United States, and thus confirmed T. Roosevelt’s statement:

263 Translation by the author: “(...) projectada empresa diplomática (...)”. Ibidem, p. 2. 264 M. Drago, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic to Martín García Mérou, Minister of the Argentine Republic to the United States (Transmitted to the Department of State by the Argentine Minister), Argentine Republic, Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship, Buenos Aires, December 29, 1902. United States Department of State. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903, pp. 2-3; Argentine Republic pp. 1-13. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903. 265 Ibidem, p. 3. 266 Ibidem.

“We do not guarantee any State against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non- American power”267. To avoid further intervention among weak republics, Luis M. Drago stressed the limitation and weakness of the Monroe Doctrine and proposed, considering the management of the Venezuelan crisis, that “(…) the public debt can not justify armed intervention much less the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power”268. By actively evoking what would be later called as the “Drago Doctrine”, the Argentine Republic established itself as the representative and the leader of the Southern Republics. This diplomatic maneuver, directly oriented towards Washington, was also - one more time- to sweep the American influence from the Southern region. At the same time, the note perfectly served Buenos Aires’ interests regarding its involvement in high value British loans that were contracted to sustain the security dilemma between Argentine and Chile, and that could be problematic for Buenos Aires in case of difficulties of collection in the future. Although Buenos Aires recognized, with some limitation, the Monroe Doctrine, and the U.S. as the great power of the continent269 to protect against European threats, the clear message to Washington was not to interfere in the politics of the South American republics: “Long, perhaps, is the road that the South American nations still have to travel. But they have faith enough and energy and worth sufficient to bring them to their final development with mutual support (Emphasis added)”270. Buenos Aires definitely did not picture itself as subordinate to Washington. However, Luis M. Drago’s rhetoric was still fragile and did not really echoe in Washington, nor within South American republics. When Brazilian opinion and

267 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1901. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901, p. 36-7. Last consulted November 16th 2017. 268 United States Department of State. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903, p 4; Argentine Republic pp. 1-13. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903. 269 ”(…) as the sincere expression of the sentiments of a nation (A/N: Argentina) that has faith in its destiny and in that of this whole continent, at whose head march the United States, (…)”. United States Department of State. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903, p. 5; Argentine Republic pp. 1-13. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903. 270 Ibidem.

79 position on Drago’s note was requested, Rio de Janeiro preferred to stay neutral271. The Argentine attempt to appear as a hemispherical leader, and mainly in the Southern region, failed due to a series of actions led by a disorganized, disloyal and manipulative diplomatic corps that was perceived as untrustworthy by Brazil. If Argentina, in theory, perceived itself as a “natural leader” in South America due to fantastic economic and military growth, in practice the Argentinian authorities were still confused about how to materialize this power in order to gain more influence in the Western Hemisphere. Not very confident, Buenos Aires was desperately searching for support to back up its ideas of international projection and prestige.

2.4.3. South American Solidarity Attempt

In January, 1903, the Argentine Minister in Washington, Martín García Mérou, in reference to the Venezuelan case, informed his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis M. Drago that, after a private and personal meeting with the U.S. subsecretary of State, the “Northern American government thought appropriate the initiative of the nations from America to protest in common agreement against the use of military force to obtain loan collection (…)”272. William Paine Lord, the U.S. minister in Buenos Aires, firmly denied by stating the opposite. His government had confidentially warned him to discreetly advise the Argentine authorities not to intervene “(…) in order to avoid a disastrous precedent for the nations of the American continent”273. Despite that, Luis M. Drago, as noticed by Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian Minister in Buenos Aires, the Argentine Foreign Minister, like a couple of months before, “Insinuated again his wish of a concrete action from Brazil, Argentina and Chile but

271 Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to J. M. da Silva Paranhos do Rio- Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, December, 31st, 1902, n°107, File: 206-1-12, confidential. Buenos Aires Oficios, 1902-1903, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 272 Translation by the author: “Governo Norte Americano conveniência iniciativa nações Americana protestar comum acordo contra emprego força armada para obter pagamento emprestimentos (...)”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to J. M. da Silva Paranhos do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, January, 28th, 1903, n°713, confidential, p.1, File: 206-1- 12, confidential. Buenos Aires Oficios, 1902-1903, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 273 Translation by the author: “(...) para o fim de evitar um precedente desastroso nações continente americano”. Ibidem, p. 2.

80 gave to understand his wish that Brazil take the initiative”274; knowing that “the Argentine Minister in Chile was already searching for Santiago’s chancellery’s adhesion (…)”275. However, the Brazilian diplomat would depict Drago’s request as “(…) highlighted by hesitations regarding the results of that plan of protest (…)”276. This document clearly stressed some communication issues between Argentine officials that raised difficulties for a clear U.S. foreign policy perception. As mentioned by Drago himself, he “(…) does not have a cordial relationship with the Argentine Minister in Washington”277. Witnessing these cohesion problems, Cyro de Azevedo drew attention to Rio Branco of his perception towards Argentina, and its “(…) lack of a policy direction plan, and also a significant mistrust in the effect of this attempt at common action from the three more powerful nations of South America”278 that were pictured – from Buenos Aires – as the “South American solidarity”279.

2.5. Brazilian Reaction To The Venezuelan Case

Only a couple of days after taking office at Itamaraty, the Venezuelan case would be the first crucial matter and test for the new Brazilian foreign Minister. The Brazilian authorities’ position regarding the U.S. management of the crisis between Caracas and the European Powers changed the nature of diplomatic relations with the U.S. as well as its southern neighbors, exposed Brazil to more insertion in international politics, and gave more prestige to Brazilian foreign policy. On January 16th, 1903, Rio Branco sent a telegram to the Buenos Aires legation explaining that the U.S. Secretary of State, John Hay, had advised the Brazilian Minister in Washington, Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, that it was not opportune for his government to intervene in the Venezuelan case against European powers.

274 Translation by the author: “Insinuou novamente desejo acção concreta Brasil, Argentina e Chile mas deixou perceber desejo iniciativa Brasil”. Ibidem, p. 3. 275 Translation by the author: “(...) o Ministro argentino no Chile, procurava a adesão da chancelleria de Santiago (...)”. Ibidem, p. 4. 276 Translation by the author: “(...) maracada hesitação quanto ao resultado do plano de protesto (...)”. Ibidem, p. 3. 277 Translation by the author: “(...) não mantem relações cordeaes com o Ministro Argentino em Washington”. Ibidem, p. 4. 278 Translation by the author: “(...) a carência de um plano de conduta política e ainda uma acentuada desconfiança no efeito d’essa tentativa de acção conjunta das tres nações mais fortes da America do Sul”. Ibidem, p. 4. 279 Translation by the author: “ (...) solidariedade sul americana”. Ibidem, p. 5.

From the Federal capital in Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs then responded to the U.S. authorities that his “federal government thinks like the American one”280 which was already perceived, in September 1902, through Joaquim Nabuco’s, Brazilian Ambassador to London, personal comments to Rio Branco: “I am more satisfied now with the government language about Acre, beforehand with the unofficial language in relation to the United States.281 Rio Branco also gave his personal opinion to his Minister in Washington stating that “we are in good relation with the governments in conflict with Venezuela and our interest advises us to maintain these relations, and the Argentine Republic has the same interest”282.

2.5.1. Rio Branco’s International Views

It is commonly accepted that Rio Branco didn’t leave a systematic register of his ideas and orientations as far as world politics or Brazilian insertion are concerned283, and that the statesman was a cold-blooded pragmatist284. However, a close analysis of his career can already give some hints on the political and diplomat environment in which the statesman evolved. Since his first steps into diplomacy, Rio Branco had always been a privileged witness of the current regional, international and hemispherical affairs that mattered for Brazil during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.

280 Translation by the author: “(...) o governo federal pensa como o americano”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to J. M. da Silva Paranhos do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, January, 28th, 1903, n°713, confidential, p.1, File: 206-1-12, confidential. Buenos Aires Oficios, 1902-1903, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. N.B: It is often accepted by scholars that Rio Branco had full independence in his political maneuvers. However, this fact would deserve some more nuances. 281 Translation by the author: “Estou mais satisfeito agora com a linguagem do governo sobre o Acre, sobretudo com a linguagem oficiosa em relação aos Estados Unidos.” Eu sou um forte Monroista, como lhe disse, e por isso rande partidário da aproximação cada vez maior entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos”. Joaquim Nabuco, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London, England to Rio Branco, Geral Consul, Brazilian legation in Berlin, Germany, September, 7th, 1902, 832-1, REC 118, pp. 6-7. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 282 Translation by the author: “Estamos em bôas relações com os governos em conflicto com Venezuela e o nosso interesse aconselha que mantenhamos essas relações e igual interesse tem a República Argentina”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to J. M. da Silva Paranhos do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, January, 28th, 1903, n°713, confidential, p.2, File: 206-1-12, confidential. Buenos Aires Oficios, 1902-1903, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 283 BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, p. 23; VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Evangelho do Barão: Rio Branco e a Identidade Brasileira. UNESP, 2012, p. 12. 284 RICUPERO, Rubens. Rio Branco: O Brasil no Mundo. Editoria Contraponto, Rio de Janeiro, 2000, p. 39.

Regionally, Argentina had always been part of his geopolitics and historic understanding but also priorities285. Rio Branco’s father, Visconde de Rio Branco (1819-1880) was an eminent and respected statesman who dealt for many years with the border conflicts between Argentina and Brazil in the Palmas region, prior to being resolved by his son years after (1895). Without any doubt, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs was influenced by Saquarema’s political views that traditionally, in the years of the Monarchy, led a containment policy against Argentina in order to maintain Buenos Aires isolated in the Southern region.286 Internationally, for more than two decades (1876-1902) of diplomatic office287 and private life in important European cities such as Liverpool, Bern, Berlin and Paris, Rio Branco had gained significant knowledge and proved to have a global understanding of international relations and what power, prestige and perception meant. In close relations with the diplomacy of European great powers, he developed a better understanding of the ongoing “European Concert” dynamic and sophistication besides the economic Imperialism, and the expensive and dominant role of great European powers within international affairs. At the end of the 19th century, he could witness several international events that established the European powers dominant position even more on the international stage. The Berlin Conference (1884-85) regarding European trade in Africa and the continuation of the colonization that had already started since 1876; the Indochina conquest by French authorities late 19th century; the well-established British domination in India; the unequal trade treaties and harbor opening imposition in China and its division under European spheres of influence, the forced trade and navigation opening in Japan, the Boer War involving the British Empire in South Africa (1899-1902) and the Fachoda Crisis (1898) between French and British authorities in Eastern Africa were all definitely regarded as potentially threatening for Brazil.288

285 DORATIOTO, F. M. A política platina do Barão do Rio Branco. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, a. 43, n. 2, 2000, pp. 130-149. 286 LYNCH, Christian Edward Cyril. Um saquarema no Itamaraty: por uma abordagem renovada do pensamento político do Barão do Rio Branco. Rev. Bras. Ciênc. Polít. no.15 Brasília Sep./Dec. 2014. 287 DE SEIXAS CORREA, Luiz Felipe. O Barão do Rio Branco chefe de missão: Liverpool, Washington, Berna e Berlim. In: Barão do Rio Branco: 100 anos de Memoria. FUNAG, 2012, pp. 31- 57. 288 SARAIVA, José Flavio Sombra (org.). História das Relações Internacionais Contemporâneas: da sociedade internacional do século XX à era da globalização. Ed. Saraiva, 2a edição, 2008, pp. 98-105.

Besides, hemispherically, the United States was also giving clear signals of imperialism at the end of the 19th century. During the border negotiations between Argentina and Brazil (1893-95), Rio Branco spent two years, in New York and Washington, closely witnessing the height of the American glory that turned the country, in 1895, into the first worldwide industrial power289, and also the beginning of a more assertive U.S. Foreign Policy regarding the Western Hemisphere. His stay allowed him to create close friendships with the American entourage. Rio Branco shared the Brazilian diplomatic views regarding the U.S. as giving explicit signals of emerging as a hemispherical power 290. As stated by the Brazilian Minister in Washington, Rio Branco was “(…) one of the better informed Brazilian statesman about American politics”291. However, Rio Branco partially agreed with the U.S. Foreign Policy and he did not hesitate to oppose Washington, as seen in various explicit occasions such as, for example, the 3rd International Conference speech in Rio de Janeiro (1906)292, his position during the 2nd International Conference in Hague (1907) or even when he wrote positively, in 1906, about the U.S. Foreign Policy in the press, albeit under a pseudonym clearly identified by the U.S. Department of State293. In front of this new shift of power in the Americas, the statesman decided not to oppose Washington but rather take advantage of cordial, privileged diplomatic, and

BUENO, Clodoaldo. Rio Branco e a política internacional de sua época. In: Barão do Rio Branco: 100 anos de Memoria. FUNAG, 2012, pp.253-91. 289 ALSINA, João Paulo Soares. Rio-Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval. Editora FGV, 2015, p. 48. 290 BUENO, Clodoaldo. Política Externa da Primeira República. Os Anos de Apogeu – de 1902 a 1918. Paz e Terra. 2003, p. 47; VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Evangelho do Barão : Rio Branco e a Identidade Brasileira. UNESP, 2012, p. 101; CERVO Amado, Luiz; BUENO, Clodoaldo. História da política exterior do Brasil. UNB, 2008, p. 192-9; HIRST, Monica. Brasil-Estados Unidos: desencontros e afinidades. Rio de Janeiro, FGV Editora, 2009, p. 20; RICUPERO, Rubens. A Diplomacia Na Construção do Brasil: 1750-2016. Versal Editores, 2017, p. 308; BETHELL, Leslie. Joaquim Nabuco No Mundo: abolicionista, jornalista e diplomata. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Bem-Te-Vi, 2016, p. 191. 291 Translation by the author:“(...) um dos estadistas brasileiros mais bem informados da política americana”. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, Brazilian Delegation in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Maria Paranhos do Rio Branco, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, April 15th, 1903, p.2, File: 234-1-2. Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Washington, dispatches, 1903-1904. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 292 ASSUMPÇÃO, Embaixador Roberto Luiz de Araújo (org.). Obras do Barão do Rio Branco IX : discursos. – Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012, p. 149. 293 Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Lloyd C. Griscom, to American Embassy in Petropolis, Brazil to Elihu Root, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, August 27, 1906, n°19: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1906. M1889, Roll10, 2097. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

84 personal relations (since 1898) between his Minister, Joaquim Francisco Assis Brasil and the U.S. Secretary of State, John Hay, in order to be closely and directly informed about the hemispherical politics. This allowed him to maneuver confidently among the reshaped international politics in the Americas, under the ambitious U.S. Foreign Policy, and act in favor of strengthening the Brazilian State. However, Rio Branco did want to maintain Brazil’s autonomy in its foreign relations. To do so, already in 1903, the Minister - as opposed to Buenos Aires - did not publicly recognize the Monroe Doctrine nor considered it valid in diplomatic correspondences. On the contrary, Rio Branco demonstrated a more subtle interpretation that did not recognize Brazil as a U.S. protectorate. By doing so, he pictured an image of Brazil as isolated, like an island294, from the rest of the Southern republics and without any international problems. In Rio Branco’s perception, he only acknowledged the U.S. influence as an example to show the good way of civilization and economic development. He considered that:

“(…) this country was called to exercise the more beneficial moral influence (Emphasis added) among the American republics, using its large prestige and its trust that it will more and more solidly inspire them, to advise them within their difficulties, mainly international ones, without in any way affecting the sovereignty of each one”.295

By not considering necessary the U.S. protection for Brazil, and by acknowledging this specific “moral responsibility”, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs maneuvered to reduce the perception of domestic asymmetry between Washington and Rio de Janeiro by starting to build a symmetry based on an ideological convergence related to international politics. And the Minister in Washington was of great help. As stated by Joaquim Assis Brasil during a private meeting at U.S. Secretary of State, John Hay’s house: “(...) I well recognized and truly applauded the politics followed by this government to abstain from any kind of intervention, mediation or good offices in case of such difficulties, unless it happened to have a

294 N.B: This conception can be better understood in: PREUSS, Ori. Bridging the Island: Brazilians’ Views of Spanish America and Themselves, 1865–1912. Madrid, Iberoamericana, 2011. 295 Translation by the author:“(...) este paiz estava chamado a exercer a mais benéfica influencia moral entre as Repubicas americanas, usando de seu grande prestigio e da confiança que lhes irá mais e mais solidamente inspirando, para as aconselhar nas suas difficuldades, principalmente nas de caracter internacional, sem de modo algum affectar a soberania de cada um”. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil, Brazilian Delegation in Washington to Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Maria Paranhos do Rio Branco, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro, April 15th, 1903, p.2-3, File: 234-1-2. Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Washington, dispatches, 1903- 1904. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

85 request from all parties involved (…)”296. If the Minister Brazilian Minister in Washington, from 1889 to 1898, Salvador de Mendonça, tried to build an alliance with the U.S. through an economic diplomacy, the next Minister, under Rio Branco’s impulse engaged in a political diplomacy.

2.5.2. Tightening Relations Between Argentina And Brazil

During 1904, diplomatic correspondence between the Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires and Itamaraty in Rio de Janeiro drastically increased. Disturbing Argentine diplomatic actions within the Southern region and the continent followed the same trend. In reaction, Brazilian diplomats continued to monitor unpredictable Argentine diplomacy and its thirst for South American leadership closely. For Rio de Janeiro, the explicit division and disorganization among Argentine politicians, as far as international political views, were still sources of concern. The remote and unilateral actions taken by Buenos Aires on the international stage, in the first years of 1900, were seen by Brazil as a result of “(…) the vanity to believe that the Argentine initiative can dominate or lead South American politics”297, and as a 298 “(…) lack of international vision (Emphasis added) (…)” . Brazilian authorities did not acknowledge Buenos Aires’ attitude to take the regional political lead alone in order to create a unique South American policy without consulting Chile and Brazil. For the latter, “not even its (A/N: Argentina) current interest, nor its conditions would allow remote or counter actions”. In the Brazilian opinion, opposing threats or taking opportunities related to South America, as a region, should have been dealt with by creating a “union” between Argentina-Brazil-Chile, and not individually by a single leader. Rio de Janeiro did not want to take the lead because it was aware of its own weaknesses, especially regarding its territorial defense. Brazil also perceived the other Southern

296 Translation by the author:“(...) eu bem reconhecia e applaudia mesmo, a política seguida por este governo de se abster de qualquer intervenção, mediação ou bons officios, em caso de taes dificuldades desde que não houvesse para isso pedido de todas partes interessadas (...)”. Ibidem, p. 3. 297 Translation by the author: “(…) da vaidade de acreditarem que a iniciativa Argentina pode dominar ou encaminhar a politica sul-americana”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to J. M. da Silva Paranhos do Rio Branco, State Minister of Foreign Relations, January 14th, 1904, n°3, reservado, p. 40, 405-5-18. Pastas Recolhidas das Embaixadas Brasileiras, Parte IV, confidenciais e reservados. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 298 Translation by the author: “(…) Este defeito de visão internacional (…)”. Ibidem, p. 40.

86 powers as too weak to individually oppose international threats. Nonetheless, Brazilian regional ambitions, as a block, were disturbed by Argentine politicians of whom “(…) There were those in Congress opposed to this union project (…)”299, often for individual reasons. Not only was the Argentine Republic acting in hemispherical politics, but also as analyzed by the Brazilian Minister in Buenos Aires, Cyro Azevedo, into delicate regional matters. Argentina persisted in its disturbing and highly risky foreign policy by getting fully involved in the civil revolution, led by the “Blancos” opposition party in Uruguay because of “(…) President Roca’s friendship with some leaders of this party with whom he has interacted for many years”300. Simultaneously, Buenos Aires also supported the revolution in Paraguay. This situation was very explosive for the balance of power in South America, and even more so for Brazil because, in case of the revolutionaries’ victory, the “ (…) hypothesis of an incorporation of Uruguay into the Argentine federation (…)”301 was discussed between President Roca and the opposition leaders. The intervention in Paraguay was also seen by Brazil as “(…) a political project symptom that already does not limit itself to the Oriental State”302. This could have been a paramount national security threat because Brazil was involved in a very intense conflict with Peru in Acre, mobilizing part of its military troops, and the Navy was considered inferior to the Argentine Navy. Mid 1904, an Argentine delegation paid an official visit to Washington and drew special attention from the Brazilian legation. Buenos Aires was searching for influence and prestige to serve its South American hegemony project. According to the Argentine delegation, T. Roosevelt served Buenos Aires ambitions perfectly by stating that the “(…) progress and the race conditions granted it an important role in

299 Translation by the author: “(…) há que se oppunha no Congresso a este projecto de união (…)”. Ibidem, p. 40. 300 Translation from the author:“(...) amistosa do Sr. General Roca, por alguns chefes d’aquelle partido com quem possua, há muitos annos”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to J. M. da Silva Paranhos do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, March, 26th, 1904, n°1884, confidencial, p. 5, 405-2-2, Legação em Buenos Aires, correspondencia geral recebida, despaches, 1904-1906. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 301 Translation from the author: “(...) hypothese de uma incorporação do Uruguay a federação argentina (...)”. Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires to J. M. da Silva Paranhos do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, August 15th, 1904, n°4, confidencial (reservadíssimo), p. 50, 405-5-18, Pastas Recolhidas das Embaixadas Brasileiras, Parte IV, confidenciais e reservados. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 302 Translation from the author:“(...) uma symptoma de projecto políticos que ja não se limitam ao Estado Oriental” Ibidem, p. 50.

South American civilization and make from it the nation elected to maintain on this continent the Monroe Doctrine”303. In the Brazilian view, confirmed by Rio Branco, the U.S. President’s statement was due more to the “(…) state of mind that Mister Roosevelt was then into than to any defined political proposal”. The analysis also pictured T. Roosevelt as “(…) admittedly easily influenced and impulsive (…)”304. Indeed, John Barrett, the U.S. Minister to Argentine Republic had just come back from Buenos Aires full of admiration for the nation. If Argentine relations were difficult with the U.S. Secretary of State, Buenos Aires seemed to have had a better effect on the U.S. President. However, the Argentine diplomats only reported Roosevelt’s words, and as seen previously, U.S. Foreign Policy towards South America was not defined yet. The U.S. head of State was not really interested in this matter and left for his Secretary of State. Even though T. Roosevelt’s - supposed words - were published in the Argentine Blue Book305 by the end of 1905, no U.S. official documents stated the content of this private encounter. A couple of months later, a denial from the U.S. President was officially sent, by the U.S. Department of State, to the Argentine capital306.

2.6. Revolutions In South America: U.S. Views

By late 1904, Argentine diplomacy was competing for leadership in South America via numerous attempts to gain U.S. support and recognition. At the same time, via its legation in Washington, the Brazilian diplomacy was building its international influence and prestige by undoing intrigues about Brazil, mainly coming from Southern republics; primarily Argentina. The unstable situation in Paraguay and Uruguay gave the opportunity to test Washington’s affinities.

303 Translation from the author: “(...) progresso e condições de raça lhe asseguram um papel preponderante na civizaçao da America do Sul e fazem della a nação eleita para manter nesse continente a doutrina de Monroe”. Minister Alfredo de Morais Gomes Ferreira, Brazilian legation in Washington to Senhor Barão do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, July 12th, 1904, n°4878, p. 2, 234-1-2, Legação em Washington, 1900-1908. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 304 Ibidem, p. 3. 305 Argentine Blue Book 1905. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o52173. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. Last consulted on January 7th, 2018. 306 Letter from Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary, Department of State, Washington to Theodore Roosevelt, June 28th, 1906. Letter from Robert Bacon to Theodore Roosevelt. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o53340. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. Last consulted on January 10th, 2018.

In September 1904, the U.S. Department of State was informed by Rio Branco, and confirmed via his Minister in Buenos Aires, of Argentine direct involvement, on the revolutionaries’ side, in the civil conflict in Paraguay and Uruguay. The fact is that previously, Argentine officials maneuvered in Washington in order to convince the U.S. authorities to intervene together to pacify Uruguay. Apart from this plot totally invalidating Roosevelt’s previous statement and discrediting Buenos Aires, it definitely served Brazilian diplomacy to gain the U.S. Department of State’s respect and trust. Francis B. Loomis, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, recognized the “(…) sophisticated politics from the Brazilian government, in contrast with the Argentine conduct, uncertain and probably revealing ambitious views (…)”307. The conversation between Francis B. Loomis and the Brazilian Minister, Gomes Ferreira, also revealed the scope of U.S. intervention and discredited the idea of the U.S. “sphere of influence” in South America. Although the Brazilian diplomat perceived the U.S. and their “(…) imperialist spirit of the leading power on the American continent (…)” 308 as a hypothetical justification for intervention in Paraguay and Uruguay, the distance was seen as an issue for the U.S. Nonetheless, Gomes Ferreira observed that a “(…) better understanding of the proper usefulness and value of some Southern American nations disposes the United States to understand that Brazil and Argentina assume the role of certifying the peace and the normal development on a certain part of our continent”309. The word of the U.S. Secretary of State, John Hay, perfectly confirmed this impression when cordially asked by Rio Branco to send two gunboats to Paraguay, he answered that he “(…) would prefer that Brazil, the most powerful nation of this continent to exert its influence in pacifying Paraguay”310 and declined the request. Rio

307 Translation from the author:“(...) política elevada do Brasil, em contraste com a conducta da Argentina, incerta e reveladora quiça de vistas ambiciosas (...)”. Minister Alfredo de Morais Gomes Ferreira, Brazilian legation in Washington to Senhor Barão do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, September 30th, 1904, n°6669, p.6, 234-1-2, Legação em Washington, 1900-1908. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 308 Translation by the author: “(...) espírito imperialista de potência dirigente no continente americano (...)”. Ibidem, p. 7. 309 Translation by the author: “(...) uma melhor comprehensão da convenencia propria e do valor de valor de algumas das nações sul-americanas incline os Estados Unidos a entender que o Brasil e a Argentina assumam o papel de assegurar a paz e o normal desenvolvimento em certa parte de nosso continente”. Ibidem, p. 7. 310 Translation by the author: “Preferia Brazil, nação mais poderosa continente, exercesse influencia pacificar Paraguay”. Minister Alfredo de Morais Gomes Ferreira, Brazilian legation in Washington to Senhor Barão do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, November, 30th, 1904, n°7624, p.3, 234-1-2, Legação em Washington, 1900-1908. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Branco’s approach to Washington differed sensitively from Buenos Aires when he stated to Hay, in the same document that “(…) we would greatly value this collaboration in the work of peace (Emphasis added)”311. Rio Branco’s ambitions for Brazil as gaining prestige and international projection by working for peace definitely converged with the T. Roosevelt foreign policy narrative, and helped to tighten the Rio de Janeiro-Washington connection.

2.7. Conclusions

By increasing diplomatic relations with Washington, Brazil and Argentina exposed their foreign policy ambitions in front of the established hemispherical power. Facing two different diplomacy styles, intertwined with interests, the U.S. Department of State could picture Argentina as acting in Southern republics in an intrusive and disloyal way only for national projection purposes whereas Brazil - for pragmatic interests - defined itself as neutral and leading a policy based on civilized and modern concepts seen in international law, in favor of stability in South America and peace on the continent. The Brazilian political diplomacy, and mainly the perception of hemispherical balance, as concluded, was more in line with the U.S. foreign policy speech. The Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rio Branco, was definitely aware of this, and was willing to increase and take advantage of this favorable relation in order to sustain peace in South America against regional plots led mainly by Argentina, besides hypothetical international threats. That would bring the opportunity for Brazil to strengthen its national state via rearmament of the Navy and the Army and reach autonomy in the region. As sent to his Minister in the American capital, in December 1904: “In Washington, it is known that Brazil is a sincere friend of the United States, and for our part, we are doing and must do everything possible to improve, more and more, our friendly relations with this republic.”312

311 Translation by the author: “Muito estimaríamos esse collaboração na obra da paz”. Ibidem, p. 2. 312 Translation by the author: “Em Washington, sabe-se que o Brazil é paiz sinceramente amigo dos Estados Unidos, e, por nossa parte, fazemos e devemos fazer tudo quanto seja possivel para estreitar cada vez mais as nossas relações de amizade com essa República”. Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Alfredo de Morais Gomes Ferreira, Brazilian Legation in Washington, November, 23th, 1904, n°1, confidencial, p. 5, 444-4-6, Washington: Correspondencia recebida e despachos, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro.

However, by the end of 1904, the Brazilian Foreign Minister’s perception towards Washington and its imperialism grew ever more suspicious. On December 6th, the U.S. President stepped in Capitol Hill for his third address to the Senate and the House of Representatives. His straightforward and threatening words regarding the U.S. policy toward other nations of the Western Hemisphere echoed in every single South American country:

“If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by civilized nations, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.”313

313 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 6, 1904. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904, < http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1904>, Last consulted December 20th 2017.

CHAPTER 3 | The Illusive Alliances | 1905-1906

Several months prior to T. Roosevelt’s Corollary official release, the shade of its upcoming speech was already circulating among European political circles. In a private document sent from Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, the Brazilian Minister in London already warned his Foreign Minister about European perception regarding the U.S. policy. According to British Prime Minister, commenting on the Venezuelan case, “(…) the United States must call for themselves the control of these Republics (A/N: Latin America), because it was them that protected them against a deserved treatment (…)”314. Hemispherically, Brazil had to face the hypothetical threat of a more assertive U.S. foreign policy, under supposed moral and universal values, toward the Southern nations. Regionally, the nation had to cope more specifically with the aggressive and ambitious Argentine Republic’s project to take the lead in South America and also influence, in opposition to Washington, the Western Hemisphere politics. By 1905, internationally challenged and still defensively weak, Rio Branco accelerated the pace of his diplomacy, and formulated for Brazil a more manipulative, multilateral, cordial and pragmatic foreign policy that allowed him, through his well- informed and proactive legations network, to channel intrigues, hostile ambitions and be perceived differently from the common negative view of the Southern Republics at that time; while patiently hoping to strengthen the nation state. Rio Branco’s subtle hemispherical foreign policy was principally based on two fronts: Washington and Buenos Aires. In order to facilitate closer relations and give the illusion of intimacy, the Brazilian official strategy referred to each protagonist exclusively via his official representatives in both capitals nonetheless by using a Brazilian discourse converging with – simultaneously - the U.S. and Argentine hemispherical interests315.

314 Translation by the author: “(…) os Estados Unidos deviam chamar a si o contrôle d’essas Repúblicas (A/N: America Latina), pois eram elles que as protegiam contra o tratamento merecido por ellas (…)”. Joaquim Nabuco, Missao Especial junto Ao Sr. Mo. Rei da Italia in Roma to to Senhor Barão do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, Rio de Janeiro, April 4th, 1904, particular, REC 42, p. 2. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 315 N.B: It is relevant to observe that extremely few direct correspondences between T. Roosevelt and Rio Branco have been found during this research.

On the one hand, the Minister tightened a close approximation with the U.S. by acknowledging the U.S. foreign policy, by using the same argument grounded on peaceful concepts for the Western Hemisphere, and by informing the U.S. Department of State about the Southern balance of power. In Washington, the Brazilian diplomat, via Rio Branco, was in charge of discrediting Argentina’s foreign policy within the U.S. political circles. On the other hand, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs continued working on attempting to maintain cordial relations with Argentina by trying to build a hypothetical “union” or “intelligence” or “alliance” between Argentina-Brazil-Chile, supposedly against the U.S. imperialist ambitions and any hemispherical threat. To Rio Branco, both were individually perceived as not trustworthy but nonetheless helpful, as a duet, to channel respective ambitions; especially direct threats from Argentina.

3.1. Confidently Assuring U.S. Influence: Roosevelt Corollary

If the Monroe Doctrine, at the beginning of the 20th century, characterized the United States as the protector of the Western Hemisphere, T. Roosevelt’s Corollary, self-proclaimed at the end of 1904, gave an authoritarian and interventionist role to the U.S. And it was directly oriented towards the southern nations of the continent in order to hold them responsible or punish them. As stated in Roosevelt’s personal letter to the U.S. General Thomas H. Hubbard: “(…) the assertation of the right of protection carries with it the duty of insisting upon the small republics not violating the rights of the Nations (A/N: European) against which we protect them” 316 . By doing so, Washington also guaranteed to European nations against any “default” from the Southern Republics and thus served, furthermore, European interests. This Corollary also gave a universal side to the Monroe Doctrine by seeking to act, not on behalf of the U.S. any more, but under a recognized and sponsored international behavior to maintain among the nations; although still supervised by Washington. Once more, the direct Northern American intervention was diverted

316 Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States to General Thomas H. Hubbard, December 1st, 1904, rec 116, p. 187. Series 3, Letters Sent: 1888-1919, Vol. 1, Reel 363. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.

93 under a universal moral scope. The U.S. President wanted his Corollary to seem like an international norm that had to be followed among the nations of the Western Hemisphere in exchange for U.S. protection. Even though the Monroe Doctrine managed to consolidate an illusory political hemispherical block, with the U.S. as leader, at the end of the 19th century, several Latin American countries already started to question this protection and this self- proclaimed right of intervention.

3.1.1. Consequences in Brazil

In January 1905, the Brazilian Foreign Minister sent a long and important official document from Rio de Janeiro to his Minister in Washington in order to officially justify the Brazilian position regarding three crucial U.S. foreign policy matters: the Roosevelt Corollary, the Monroe Doctrine and the alleged Southern nations’ alliance against Washington. In Addition, Rio Branco also took the opportunity to comment on his diplomatic and strategic relations regarding the U.S. that involved the Southern Republics, mainly Argentina. This “manifest” covered a great part of his foreign policy and justified, somehow, his previous efforts of approximation with Washington. However, within these five pages, Rio Branco’s intention was also indirectly, through Alfredo de Moraes Gomes Perreira’s cordial relations with the U.S. Department of State, to deliver a message of understanding and support for Washington’s foreign policy. The Brazilian Foreign Minister wished to influence U.S. authorities’ perception toward Brazil and pictured it as apart from the rest of the Southern Republics; more on the same wavelength of its Northern neighbor. This is why Rio Branco began commenting on President Roosevelt’s Corollary:

“I don’t see any reason for the three main nations from South America, - Brazil, Chile and Argentina, - to be offended by the language of President Roosevelt and his Minister of War, his private friend. Nobody will be able to say with fairness that they are in the number of misgoverned or troubled nations that cannot make good use of their independence”.317

317 Translation from the author: “Não vejo motivo para quem as três principães nações da America do Sul, - o Brasil, o Chile e a Argentina, - se molestem com a linguagem do Presidente Roosevelt e a do seu ministro da Guerra, seu particular amigo. Ninguem podera dizer com justiça que ellas estão no numero das nações desgovernadas ou turbulentas que não sabem fazer “bom uso de sua

For Rio Branco, this addition to the Monroe Doctrine was to be answered as not being directly oriented towards Brazil, and consequently not to be considered as a threat for the country as he legitimized it as a civilized, stable and well-governed; as seen in the statement above. To him, the Corollary was to be perceived more as an issue for the misgoverned Latin Republics but mainly for the European Great Powers:

“These Great European Powers have a better reason to be offended by the declarations of the Message, by the objective that the government of the United States makes a point of intervening, whenever it is necessary, into European continental matters (…)”.318

In the same document, Rio Branco also resolved to finally and personally acknowledge the Monroe Doctrine, as a defensive shield 319 , by recognizing nonetheless, with more critical sense and reservations, its benefits for the Americas: “The Monroe Doctrine and the respect mixed with fear, that by its new processes the United States inspiring the great powers from Europe, has for many years served to prevent that they think about violence and conquest on our continent”320. However, he criticized the method used by Washington declaring that “The North American policy affirmations are usually made without subterfuge, with arrogant frankness above all when they target the more powerful governments from Europe and what we see is that these do not protest nor react, (…)321. If, by 1903, Rio Branco perceived the U.S. as a strong influence within the hemisphere, this time he gave an interpretation of worldwide influence to the Monroe Doctrine:

independencia”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Alfredo de Moreas Gomes Ferreira, Washington, January 31st, 1905, n°458, p.2. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 318 Translation by the author: “Mais fundamento teriam para se molestar com as declarações da Messagem essas grandes potencias Européas, pelo proposito que o governo dos Estados Unidos mostra de intervir, sempre que fôr necessario, nas questões do Continente Europeu (…)”. Ibidem, p. 3. 319 BUENO, Clodoaldo; CERVO Amado Luiz. História da Política Exterior do Brasil. UNB, 5a Edição, 2014, p. 192-4. 320 Translation from the author: “A Doutrina de Monroe e o respeito misturado de temor, que, pelos seus processos novos, os Estados Unidos inspiram às grandes potências da Europa tem servido para impedir, desde muitos annos, que ellas pensem em violencias e conquistas no nosso continente”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Alfredo de Moraes Gomes Ferreira, Washington, January 31st, 1905, n°458, p. 2-3. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 321 Translation by the author: “As affirmações da política norte-americana são feitas de ordinario sem ambages, com arrogante franqueza, sobretudo quando visam os mais poderosos governos da Europa e o que vemos é que estes não protestam nem reagem, (…)”. Ibidem, p. 3.

“The truth is that there were only Great powers in Europe and today they are the first to recognize that there is in the New World a new and powerful nation upon which they must count, and that she necessarily must have its part of influence in international politics of the entire world”.322

As previously seen, Rio Branco also took advantage of his correspondence to continue his role of intelligence and discrediting, in Washington, the actions of neighboring Southern countries: “The widely spoken of league of Hispanic-American Republics to face the United States is an unachievable thought, due to the impossibility of agreement between people in general so separate from each other, and it is even ridiculous, given the well-known weakness and lack of resources of all of them”323. He also added a paramount point of his approximation towards Washington by stating that Brazil is advised to: “(…) cultivate and narrow more and more this friendship, in order to be able to continue undoing the intrigues and the treacherous interventions from those envious of us and the occasional adversaries that the border matters have brought us”324. His argument was that: “There is no point in having confrontational politics, becoming unpleasant to the United States, like the powerless enemies that they count here and in almost the whole Hispanic America wish, because we will be able to render the efforts of our contestants useless in Washington”325. By 1905, the Brazilian diplomacy towards Washington was not only playing an opportunistic role of informing the U.S. authorities about the Southern Republics’ bad practices in the region or pragmatic attempts to use Washington in order to gain prestige in the South. In addition, thanks to a more official Brazilian discourse, Rio Branco strategically recognized the North American political influence by flattering its “national pride”326 and therefore creating an even closer relation. However, Rio Branco always maintained a certain distance from Washington

322 Translation by the author: “A verdade é que só havia grande potencias na Europa e hoje elas são as primeiras a reconhecer que há no Novo Mundo uma nova e poderosa nacão com quem devem contar e que necessariamente há de ter sua parte de influencia na politica internacional do mundo inteiro”. Ibidem, p. 3. 323 Translation by the author: “A tão falada liga das Republicas hispano-americanas para fazer frente aos Estados Unidos é pensamento irrealisavél, pela impossibilidade de accordo entre povos em geral tão separados um dos outros, e é até ridiculo, dada a conhecida fraqueza e falta de recursos de todos elles”. Ibidem, p. 4. 324 Translation by the author: “(…) a cultivar e a estreitar cada vez mais essa amizade, para que assim possamos continuar a desfazer os intrigos e os perfidos manejos de nossos invejosos de sempre e dos adversarios occasionães que as questões de fronteiras nos tem trazido”. Ibidem, p. 4. 325 Translation by the author: “Não ha de ser com uma politica de alfinetadas, tornando-nos desagradaveis aos Estados Unidos, como desejariam os impotentes inimigos que elles contam aqui e em quasi toda a America Hespanhola, que poderemos inutilizar em Washington os esforços de nossos contendores”. Ibidem, p. 5. 326 Translation by the author: “ (…) orgulho nacional”. Ibidem, p.4.

96 foreign policy because he never officially admitted the need for Brazil to be directly under the influence or protection of the U.S., recognized the advantages, nor wished to institutionalize the intimate relation. In addition, he criticized, non-officially, the self-proclaimed right of intervention of Washington, even in matters of the Great powers. Nonetheless, thanks to his realistic vision about the International order and his international ideology, Rio Branco successfully maneuvered and managed to tighten more and more the existing cordial diplomatic relations with the U.S. Department of State. Step by step, he gradually gained full confidence from Washington that led to the Brazilian government’s recognition by the symbolic elevation of Brazil and the U.S. respective legations to Embassies, in both capitals.

3.2. Decisive Action, Symbolic Gesture: Elevation To Embassies

Since 1892, European authorities had already opened several Embassies in the American capital. This was perceived as a sign of U.S. recognition as a first class nation by great European powers that influenced the international system at that time.327 On January 13th, 1905, the U.S. Legation in Rio de Janeiro and the Brazilian Legation in Washington were officially and simultaneously elevated to the rank of Embassies328. The U.S. Minister to Brazil, David E. Thompson, and the Minister to London, Joaquim Nabuco were respectively appointed Ambassadors. Rio Branco was greatly determinated to take maximum advantage of this highly symbolic and prestigious diplomatic event in order to influence the Southern balance of power. He had projected this elevation since June 1904.329 Even though, according to official records, the request to open reciprocal Embassies originally arose from the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, he nonetheless desperately tried to make it officially understood as a direct request from Washington. For this, the Brazilian official actively corresponded in the Brazilian press, to the U.S. delegations in Rio de Janeiro and also in Washington, via his

327 KENNEDY, Paul. Ascensão e queda das grandes potências: transformação econômica e conflito militar de 1500 a 2000. 12a Edição. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Campus, 1989, p. 191. 328 BUENO, Clodoaldo. O Barão do Rio Branco no Itamaraty (1902-1912). Rev. bras. polít. int. vol.55 no.2 Brasília July/Dec. 2012. On-line version ISSN 1983-3121. . Last consulted on January 18th, 2018. 329 PEREIRA, Paulo José dos Reis. A política Externa da Primeira República e os Estados Unidos: A Atuação de Joaquim Nabuco em Washington (1905-1910). São Paulo: Hucitec/FAPESP, 2006, p. 27.

97 legation. Well-known as a press manipulator330, Rio Branco started his mission by influencing the local newspaper: “O Paiz”. His goal was to shake the public opinion by promoting this event as unilateral. As seen in a U.S. official document, from D. E. Thomson, sent to his Secretary of State, John Hay, commenting on the article form January, 26th, 1905: “(…) one of the intents of this article is to attribute the originating of the Embassy idea to the American government”. Unfortunately for Rio Branco, the U.S. officials in Rio de Janeiro clearly perceived this suspicious maneuver as commented in the same document: “Astonishing as it may seem, I am compelled to say that there is no doubt but that this article was inspired by Baron Rio Branco, Foreign Minister, (…)”331. For this matter, Rio Branco also worked on convincing his legation in Washington by giving more credit to the U.S. as stated in a letter sent to his Minister, Gomes Ferreira: “The proof of appraisal that to Brazil the President Roosevelt has just given, establishing here the first Embassy of the United States in South America, I believe that it is enough to demonstrate the “invalidity” of the rumors spread by the Argentine legation in Washington (…) 332 . Rio Branco referred to rumors that Roosevelt had supposedly attributed to Argentina the role of the Monroe Doctrine in this part of the continent333. A couple of weeks later, the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador forwarded to Rio Branco a copy of his letter of credence334 to be addressed to the Brazilian

330 RICUPERO, Rubens. Rio Branco: O Brasil no Mundo. Editoria Contraponto, Rio de Janeiro, 2000, p. 37. PATRIOTA De MOURA, Cristina. Rio Branco: A Monarquia e a República. Rio de Janeiro. Editora FGV, 2003, p. 77. VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O Evangelho do Barão: Rio Branco e a Identidade Brasileira. UNESP, 2012, p. 153. 331 Minister. D. E. Thompson, U.S. legation in Rio de Janeiro to the Secretary of State, John Hay, Department of State, Washington. Subject: The Embassy, February 1st, 1905, Microfiche of Records in the National Archives: n°121, Roll 73, Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Brazil, Volume 71, January 3-August 28, 1905. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 332 Translation from the author: “A prova do apreço que ao Brasil acaba de dar o Presidente Roosevelt, estabelecendo aqui a primeiro embaixada dos Estados Unidos na America do Sul, creio que bastará para mostrar a “invalidade” dos boatos espalhados pela legação Argentina in Washington (…)”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Alfredo de Moreas Gomes Ferreira, Washington, January 21st, 1905, n°539, confidencial, p. 2. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 333 Cf. 2.5.2.: Tightening Relations Between Argentina And Brazil, pp. 85-7. 334 “The confidence and good will of yourself and your Government as demonstrated by the request that your Legation in Washington and that of my Government in Brazil be elevated to Embassies is received with much satisfaction by my President and Government. The friendship as long existing between the Government of the United States and that of Brazil is through this demonstration of fait

President Rodrigues Alves. The Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs reviewed the document and returned a draft335 to “copy and deliver instead of the one I (A/N: E. D. Thompson) had prepared”336. According to Rio Branco’s secretary, “(…) it would read better when translated (…) and the Minister (…) wished it to sound well when it was read in Argentina”337. Knowing that E. D. Thompson’s credentials were to be published in newspapers and delivered to foreign legations, Rio Branco’s corrections of this credence letter and words put in the mouth of the U.S. official sounded like an advertisement of the greatness of Brazil or an explicit message, as stated above to its rival: Argentina. According to the D. E. Thompson’s perception:

“The real reason, however, as there can be no doubt, for asking the change was the desire of the Minister to impress South America, more especially Argentina, by keeping up the effort he had started out upon to make it appear that our Government was the originator of the thought of elevating the two Legations to Embassies, and this because of the political greatness of Brazil”.338

Finally, the U.S. diplomat addressed a third and final version339 to the Brazilian President, on March 16th, wherein he attributed the legations’ elevation to both

hand good will emphasized in a way most gratifying to the Washington Government; and to me, realising as I personnally do the greatness of Brazil, the elevation of the Legations to Embassies brings a feeling of intense satisfaction; and it is the the hope of my President, my government, and myself, that this friendship will forever continue.” Enclosure n°1: Presentation speech, as originally written: selected extract. Minister. D. E. Thompson, U.S. legation in Rio de Janeiro to the Secretary of State, John Hay, Department of State, Washington. Subject: Presentation of Ambassador, March 18th, 1905, Microfiche of Records in the National Archives: n°121, Roll 73, Dispatches from the united States Ministers to Brazil, Volume 71, January 3-August 28, 1905. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 335 “The reciprocal confidence and good will of the two Governments, and their true intelligence of the interests of our continent, were again emphasized by the resolution simultaneously taken of raising their Legations at Washington and in Rio de Janeiro to the rank of Embassies. The friendship so long existing between the two countries has thus received a new consecration. I can assure Your Excellency that this act was very gratifying to my Government and has brought a feeling of intense satisfaction throughout the United States, where the greatness of Brazil, the ability of her statesmen and the respectability of her Government are well known, and where we are all desirous to see every day strenghthened the friendship between the two sister Republics”. Enclosure n°3: draft of speech submitted by Brazilian Foreign Minister: selected extract. Ibidem. 336 Ibidem. 337 Ibidem. 338 Ibidem. 339 “The reciprocal confidence and good will of the two Governments is again emphasized by the resolution of both, raising their Legations at Washington and in Rio de Janeiro to the rank of Embassies. The friendship so long existing between the two countries has thus received a new consecration. I can assure Your Excellency that this fact is very gratifying to my Government and has brought a feeling of intense satisfaction throughout my country, where the greatness of Brazil, the ability of her statesmen and the respectability of her Government are known, and where we are all desirous to see every day strenghthened the friendship between the two sister Republics”. Enclosure n°4: Speech as finally prepared and delivered by E. D. Thompson: selected extract. Ibidem.

99 governments. Rio Branco’s efforts to make full benefits of the Embassies upgrading announcement gave, one more example, nonetheless more explicit, of his skillful abilities to pragmatically use and manipulate diplomacy, in general, for national purposes. For this, the Brazilian Foreign Minister used to mainly work on the subtle level of perception. For Rio Branco, this event represented the final chapter of his approximation policy, launched in 1902 and based on previous stable relations since 1889, and the climax in terms of national benefits for Brazil as far as defensive aspects. The diplomat finally managed to officially establish the U.S.-Brazil relations as a fact to be dealt with in public opinion and foreign diplomatic corps. As an already on-going and previously seen strategy, he used the U.S. relations in order to achieve another objective: neutralize the Argentine Republic. Not only did Rio Branco wish the opening to be perceived as an American initiative, he also wanted the Brazil-U.S. existing relationship to be viewed, from now on, thanks to the elevation of the Embassies, as a “(…) true intelligence of interests of our continent (…)”. His successful diplomacy against Argentina took shape by creating, in the perception of other nations, especially in Buenos Aires, the – illusion - of a secret alliance with the U.S. He succeeded. However, the opening of the respective Embassies was not serving only Brazilian interests. By the beginning of the 20th century, Washington was recognized as the diplomatic center of Northern America and many Latin American legations were established in the capital. It was the right place, among others, for undoing Southern Republics plots, and, in the opinion of Brazilians, even U.S. intrigues340. On the other hand, Rio de Janeiro happened to be the diplomatic capital of South America341; also dealing with an intense part of intrigues against Washington. The U.S. Embassy was to be seen as an important and materialistic first long-term step in South America as far as intelligence. Already in 1904, the U.S. President questioned his Secretary of War, Elihu Root, whether it was necessary to send an Army Attaché

340 PEREIRA, Paulo José dos Reis. A política Externa da Primeira República e os Estados Unidos: A Atuação de Joaquim Nabuco em Washington (1905-1910). São Paulo: Hucitec/FAPESP, 2006, p. 29. 341 “At Rio Janeiro at all times are the diplomatic representatives of every South American country”. “Rio Janeiro must therefore always be the center of diplomatic influence for South America”. Confidential memorandum for the President regarding relations with South America. 1905-09-27. John Barrett o Theodore Roosevelt. Section 2, p.1. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital- Library/Record?libID=o51469. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University.

100 in Chile in order to avoid Southern alliances against the U.S342.

3.2.1. U.S. Legation Perceptions Of Rio Branco’s Policy

A suspicious atmosphere was therefore to be sensed by Washington in South America, mainly based on perceptions of diplomatic intrigues and supposed offensive-defensive alliances. However, regarding Brazil, it seemed to have been different. According to D. E. Thompson, “President Roosevelt’s policy towards South America is looked upon with some suspicion, and yet I believe he (A/N: Rio Branco) does not court this feeling, and wants to feel faith in our good intention”343. As it appeared, the approximation and the increasing relationship between Rio de Janeiro and Washington were definitely not as “natural” as it appeared nor based on such a reciprocal solid and trustful base. As more contact occurred, more understanding of respective pragmatic interests also appeared at the same time. For example, the U.S. Minister to Rio perceived Rio Branco’s “great satisfaction” to open Embassies as a sign of “(…) policy reasons to demonstrate satisfaction with our country, President Roosevelt, Secretary Hay, and their ideas of government”344. However, even though Brazilian interests were clearly identified by the U.S. officials, as seen below, the U.S. attitude towards Brazilian diplomacy was also of strengthening its relations. “From my early acquaintance with Baron Rio Branco it has been clear to me that his desire is that Brazil should in a way dominate South America, and the move of the exchange of Embassies is a move, it would seem, for a closer friendship with the Washington government, believing it will create a greater feeling of strength of his own”.345

Washington found in Brazil a “loyal and useful ally” among the Southern republics’

342 B. F. Barnes, Acting Secretary to the President, Oyster Bay, N.Y., to E. Root, Secretary of War, July 27th 1903, personal. T. Roosevelt papers, Series 14, Correspondence and Other Documents, 1897- 1903, Reel 453. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 343 Minister. D. E. Thompson, U.S. legation in Rio de Janeiro to the Secretary of State, John Hay, Department of State, Washington. Subject: Presentation of Ambassador, March 18th, 1905, Microfiche of Records in the National Archives: n°121, Roll 73, Dispatches from the united States Ministers to Brazil, Volume 71, January 3-August 28, 1905. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 344 Minister. D. E. Thompson, U.S. legation in Rio de Janeiro to the Secretary of State, John Hay, Department of State, Washington. Subject: Exchange of Ambassies, United States and Brazil, January 15th, 1905, Microfiche of Records in the National Archives: n°121, Roll 73, Dispatches from the united States Ministers to Brazil, Volume 71, January 3-August 28, 1905, p. 1. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 345 Ibidem, p. 2.

101 suspicious atmosphere towards the U.S. foreign policy, led especially by Argentina. The match was almost perfect because Brazilian perceived regional interests did not compete with U.S. hemispherical ambitions at all.

3.3. Rio Branco’s Multilateralist Approach To International Relations

Nonetheless, Rio Branco did not limit himself to this sole channel to achieve his objectives. Simultaneously, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs was also negotiating, since the end of November 1904, the necessity of agreements or a “(…) perfect and cordial intelligence between Argentina-Brazil-Chile”346, claiming peaceful ambitions, and had signed a secret defensive alliance treaty347 with Ecuador against Peru, in May 1904. Curiously enough, a few months earlier, in March 1904, Rio Branco sent to Thomas C. Dawson, U.S. Secretary of Legation in Brazil, a denial note that Brazil wanted to participate of a defensive alliance against the U.S. with Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia. According to his words: “(…) no such alliance had been or would be entered into by Brazil (…)”348. Surprisingly, The American diplomat also mentioned an “unexpected call” from Dr. Tobar, the Minister of Ecuador in Brazil, Peru and Argentina explaining to him the “ (…) impossibility and uselessness of South American countries forming any arrangement seeking aggressive joint action”. Only a couple of weeks later, Brazil and Ecuador signed this secret and defensive alliance treaty. In the same document, the Brazilian Minister also informed the U.S. legation in Brazil of his South American views on current affairs: “ (…) Peru is scheming with a view of making us think she is more friendly to us than the other South American powers – thereby hoping to procure the moral support of the United States in her

346 Translation from the author: “(...) perfeita e cordial intelligencia entre o Brasil, a argentina e o Chile”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires, November 21st, 1904, reservado, n°4-5907, p. 2. Legação em Buenos Aires, Correspondencia Geral Recebida, despachos, 1904-05. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 347 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. O tratado secreto do barão do Rio Branco: a Aliança entre a República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil e a do Equador In : CHDD – Cadernos do Centro de História e de Documentação Diplomática, Ano 14, Numero 27, Segundo Semestre 2015, FUNAG, 2016. 348 Minister. Thomas C. Dawson, U.S. legation in Petrópolis, Brazil to the Secretary of State, John Hay, Department of State, Washington. Subject: South American Alliance, March 19th, 1905, Microfiche of Records in the National Archives: n°121, Roll 71, Dispatches from the united States Ministers to Brazil, Volume 69, November 4, 1903-April 29, 1904, p. 1. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

102 border dispute with Brazil (…)”349. In addition and in parallel to his negotiations regarding the Argentine-Brazil- Chile “union”, Rio Branco maintained close and direct relations with Chile that he also considered paramount to his regional policy against Argentina. In 1905, he mentioned to his Minister in Santiago: “For our part, we won’t miss the chance to instill the closest union with Chile, because this attitude is the one that suits our interests in La Plata River (…)350, and also insinuated that the Chilean Minister at Rio de Janeiro had mentioned the wish of: “ (…) a secret alliance, defensive alliance, between Brazil and Chile”351.

3.4. Two Perceptions For One Cause

Among his multilateral articulations to channel regional ambitions, the Brazilian Foreign Minister nonetheless prioritized Argentine and U.S. relations. On each side, he particularly worked on creating a perception of threat: from Buenos Aires regarding Washington’s hemispherical ambitions, and from the United States concerning Argentina’s regional ambitions. By discrediting respective foreign policies to its potential counter-power, the Brazilian official searched to create illusive and close relations in order to manipulate the Southern republics’ balance of power -advantageously for Brazil- by totally neutralizing Argentina.

3.4.1. Rio Branco’s Perception Of The U.S. - For Argentine Purposes

To his legation in Buenos Aires, Rio Branco stressed that the end of revolutions in South America was paramount in order to achieve progress and wealth for all in the region, and therefore avoid any European or North American threats due to instability. As forwarded to his Minister in Argentina: “When the Great European

349 Ibidem, p. 1. 350 Translation from the author: “Pela nossa parte, nao perdemos occasião de inculcar a mais estreita união com o Chile, porque essa attitude é a que convem aos nossos interesses no Rio da Prata (…). Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Henrique Carlos Ribeiro Lisboa, Brazilian legation in Chile, October 5th, 1905, n°2, p. 2. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 351 Translation from the author: “(…) uma aliança secreta, aliança defensiva, entre o Brasil e o Chile”. Ibidem, p. 3.

103

Powers have no more lands to occupy and colonize in Africa and in Australasia, they will turn their eyes towards the countries of Latin America devastated by civil wars, if they are still like that (…)”352. Besides, according to the statesman, the North American policy was not to be considered that trustworthy or as an efficient defensive shield against European powers as he continued his thought “(…) and it is not probable that the so-called Monroe Doctrine helps them (A/N: Latin American countries) because in North America there will also have excesses in population and in imperialist politics and there, today, the right of expropriation of incompetent peoples by the more powerful has already justified itself”353.

3.4.2. Illusive Alliance – A-B-C

Rio Branco worked hard at maintaining cordial relations with Buenos Aires. His aim was creating a feeling of non-aggression, and avoiding reactions from the Argentine Republic that could have been based on a perception of threat, especially since the official announcement of closer relations between Brazil and the U.S and the ongoing Brazilian Navy program. This is why, in January 1905, he instructed his Minister in Buenos Aires to justify the Brazilian Navy rearmament, considered threatening by the neighboring country, as a need to “reestablish our navy power, considerately weakened, after the September 6th revolt in 1893”354. His argument also stressed that “When we were the first navy power in South America, our squadrons were never a danger or a threat to

352 Translation from the author: “Quando as grandes potências da Europa não tiverem mais terras a occupar e colonizar na Africa e na Australasia hão de voltar os olhos para os paizes da America Latina devastados pelas guerras civis, se ainda assim o estiverem (...)”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires, November 22nd, 1904, reservado, n°5-5965, p. 2. Legação em Buenos Aires, Correspondencia Geral Recebida, despachos, 1904-05. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 353 Translation from the author: “(...) e não é provável que os ampare a chamada doutrina de Monroe, porque na America do Norte, também haverá excesso de população, política imperialista e ja alli se sustenta hoje o direito de desapropriação pelos mais fortes, dos povos incompetentes”. Ibidem, p. 2-3. 354 Translation by the author: “Precisamos restabelecer o nosso poder naval, consideravelmente enfraquecido, depois da revolta de 6 de Setembro de 1893”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires, January 9th, 1905, reservado, n°1, p. 1. Legação em Buenos Aires, Correspondencia Geral Recebida, despachos, 1904-05. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro.

104 the Argentine Republic”355 and, once again, requested more contact because “(…) everything recommends an approximation between both (A/N: Argentina and Brazil)”356. Later in the document, Rio Branco justified the Brazilian navy’s expansion by evoking a defensive purpose under a common hypothetical threat (expansionism) to the three main Southern powers: “As well as Brazil, the Argentine Republic and Chile need to have their naval power on equally respectful terms in order to avoid dangers that, in the near future, might arise from the expansionist policy of certain nations”357. However, it was not long before the Press in Buenos Aires began criticizing the opening of the Embassies, fearing the Brazilian rearmament, and describing both events as proof that Brazil became the subaltern of the U.S. in South America358. At the same time, officials in Buenos Aires continued to oppose the Brazilian Foreign Policy of establishing a “union” between Argentina-Brazil-Chile (A.B.C.), at least as long as the initiative came from Rio de Janeiro. For Rio Branco: “It matters to the Argentine Republic to strengthen political relations with Brazil and Chile, and, for our part, we sincerely wish that, but it seems that President Quintana does not have similar respect for the same ideas of his predecessor, and thinks advisable to strengthen them with Peru (…)”359. Despite repetitive refusals from the Argentine Republic, Rio Branco, nonetheless, continued his efforts to demonstrate to Buenos Aires his wish of an alliance between A.B.C. This “union” itself was not the final aim of the Brazilian Minister, as he did not really believe in this political tripod. For him, unilateral relations, and especially with

355 Translation by the author: “Quando eramos a primeiro potência naval da America do Sul, as nossas esquadras nunca foram um perigo ou uma ameaça para a República Argentina”. Ibidem, p. 1. 356 Translation by the author: “(…) tudo aconselha uma política de approximação entre ambos”. Ibidem, p. 2. 357 “Tanto o Brasil como a Rep. Argentina e o Chile precisam de ter em pé respeitavel o seu poder naval para conjurar os perigos que, em future próximo, podem resultar da política expansionista de certas nações”. Ibidem, p. 2. 358 Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires, January 20th, 1905, tel. n°214, 208/2/10. Legação em Buenos Aires, Telegrames Expedidos, 1900 (MAR)-1907 (MAI). Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 359 Translation by the author: “É do interesse da República Argentina estreitar relações políticas com o Brasil e o Chile, e, pela nossa parte, desejamos isso sinceramente, mas parece que o Presidente Quintana não tem a semelhante respeito as mesmas ideias do seu predecessor e acha preferível estreital-as com o Péru (…)”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires, February 22nd, 1905, , n°14-897, p. 3. Legação em Buenos Aires, Correspondencia Geral Recebida, despachos, 1904-05. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

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Chile in this present case, were more vital as he continued his strategy to vilify - also in Santiago - Argentine Foreign Policy in order to get closer to Chilean authorities. His correspondence to his Brazilian Minister in Chile, Henrique Carlos Ribeiro Lisboa better explains: “(…) in the Argentine Republic, the general feeling, not excepting almost all the more influential politicians, is very hostile to Chile”360. One more time, Rio Branco demonstrated his supposed good-will to this A-B-C “union”, however with a tone that separated Argentina from the trio as he showed himself more inclined to Chile: “We understand the advantage for everybody to establish a kind of league between Brazil, Chile and Argentina, at least to not embarrass ourselves in matters that we have or could have with other countries from the continent. But given the inconsistency of Argentine international policy, without any 361 direction (…) we do not have great hope to durably achieve this result”.

Rio Branco used these negotiations, as a simple subterfuge to maintain ongoing relations with Argentina. By promoting the necessity of an illusive A-B-C “league” (as he called it and not an alliance) against a hypothetical common threat362, the Minister could create the illusion of a common cause for Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and thus argue about closer relations and increases in armament without causing a security dilemma, as happened few years before between Buenos Aires and Santiago. At the same time, Brazilian direct negotiations with Chile, within this A-B-C, could also be perceived as an alliance threat (Rio de Janeiro-Santiago) by Buenos Aires; especially considering that these two countries share borders with the Argentine Republic.

360 Translation by the author: “ (…) Na República Argentina, o sentiment geral, sem exceptuar o de quasi todos os homens políticos de mais influência, é bastante hostil ao Chile”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Henrique Carlos Ribeiro Lisboa, Brazilian legation in Chile, October 5th, 1905, n°2, p. 1. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 361 Translation by the author: “Comprehendemos a vantagem para todos nós de se estabelecer uma espécie de liga entre o Brasil, o Chile e a Argentina, ao menos para se não embaraçarem nas questões que tenham ou possam ter com os outros paizes do continente. Mas dada a inconsistência da política internacional Argentina, sem rumos certos (…) não temos grande esperança de conseguir de modo duradouro esse resultado”. Ibidem, p. 3. 362 CONDURU, Guilherme Frazão. O Subsistema Americano, Rio Branco e o ABC. Rev. bras. polít. int. vol.41 no.2 Brasília July/Dec. 1998.

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3.4.3. Rio Branco’s Perception Of Argentina - For U.S. Purposes

Although Rio Branco worked relentlessly on increasing cordial relations with Buenos Aires for pragmatic purposes, he nonetheless simultaneously continued and even accelerated his anti-Argentina campaign among the U.S. authorities in Washington thanks to a more intense correspondence with his Minister Alfredo Gomes Ferreira during 1905. During the first months, Rio Branco made clear to the U.S. Department of State that “According to Argentinians, they are the first people of South America, and for some among them, the first of both Americas and the World”363. Besides, he highlighted the “(…) dangerous policy followed by the Argentine government and by the Buenos Aires press for some time related to neighboring countries”364. For him, as quoted in a U.S. official document: “(…) no Spanish speaking country is good, and no person of Spanish blood can be believed”365 and “(…) it is certain Baron Rio Branco has no little ill-feeling for Argentina, Peru and Bolivia, and no liking for any of the South American countries other than his own, unless perhaps Chile (…)”366.

3.4.4. Illusive Alliance – U.S. Embassy

By acting so, Rio Branco wanted to be perceived by the U.S. as more prestigious than the other Latin American nations. To do so, he pictured Buenos Aires as the leader of a disruptive and destructive regional foreign policy full of “(…)

363 Translation by the author: “Para os argentines, elles são o primeiro povo da America do sul, e para alguns d’entre elles, o primeiro das duas Americas e do mundo”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Alfredo de Moreas Gomes Ferreira, Washington, January 31st, 1905, n°458, p.2. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 364 Translation by the author: “(…) perigosa politica desde algum tempo seguida pelo Governo Argentino e pela imprensa de Buenos Aires em relação aos paizes visinhos”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Minister Cyro de Azevedo, Brazilian legation in Buenos Aires, March 28th, 1905, , n°21-1663, p. 1. Legação em Buenos Aires, Correspondencia Geral Recebida, despachos, 1904-05. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 365 Minister. D. E. Thompson, U.S. legation in Rio de Janeiro to the Secretary of State, John Hay, Department of State, Washington. Subject: Exchange of Ambassies, United States and Brazil, January 15th, 1905, Microfiche of Records in the National Archives: n°121, Roll 73, Dispatches from the united States Ministers to Brazil, Volume 71, January 3-August 28, 1905, p. 2. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 366 Ibidem.

107 attitude of superiority in South American political affairs (…)”367. He then added, with more assertive words that “(…) in the entire world she thinks she has no peer except in numbers, not even excepting your own great country (A/N: U.S.); in South America she wishes to pose as dictator”368. Rio Branco’s attitude followed his Minister’s advice to London. Already in mid 1904, this feeling was present in Joaquim Nabuco’s report to his Foreign Minister (and close friend) on the international perception toward Latin America: “(…) the Great powers in Europe regard Brazil, the Argentine Republic and Chile, because of the great interests they have in these countries and because of the domestic order that they maintain (…)”369. However, to him, “(…) by the circumstances, all of Latin America suffers from the universal prejudice of the demoralization of some of its States (…)”370 that is to be considered “(…) an international symptom”371. If Europe seemed to acknowledge Brazilian’s stability, other international threats due to this amalgam towards Latin republics had to be considered; even more since the Roosevelt’s Corollary claim. In the same document, Joaquim Nabuco called for action in order to demonstrate that Brazil was to be considered as apart from the uncivilized and anarchic Latin Republics:

“(…) I am a supporter of a constant intelligence between Brazil, the Argentine Republic and Chile, and of our increasing approximation with the United States, and it seems to me that it is advisable to skillfully separate our cause from that of the States, if it can be called such, that so fully discredited the Latin American Republican form”.372

367 D. E. Thompson, U.S. legation in Rio de Janeiro to the Secretary of State, John Hay, Department of State, Washington. Subject: Presentation of Ambassador, March 18th, 1905, Microfiche of Records in the National Archives: n°121, Roll 73, Dispatches from the united States Ministers to Brazil, Volume 71, January 3-August 28, 1905, p. 2. Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 368 Ibidem, p. 3. 369 Translation by the author: “As Grandes Nações da Europa consideram, o Brazil, a República Argentina e o Chile, pelos grandes interesses que tem n’esses paizes e pela ordem interna que se mantem n’elles (…)”. Joaquim Nabuco, Missao Especial junto Ao Sr. Mo. Rei da Italia in Roma to Senhor Barão do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, Rio de Janeiro, April 4th, 1904, particular, REC 42, p. 2-3. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 370 Translation form the author: “(…) pela força das coisas, toda a America Latina sofre no conceito universal da desmoralização de alguns dos seus Estados (…)”. Ibidem, p. 3. 371 “ (…) symptoma internacional”. Ibidem, p. 2. 372 Translation form the author: “(…) sou partidario de uma constante intelligencia entre o Brazil, a República Argentina e o Chile, e de uma approximação nossa cada vez maior dos Estados-Unidos, parece-me que nos convem de modo habil, separar a nossa causa da dos Estados, so se pode chamar assim, que desacreditaram tão completamente a forma republicana na America Latina”. Ibidem, p. 4.

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Rio Branco, via his close relations with Washington, seized the opportunity to appear as belonging to the group of civilized nations. This definitely helped him to achieve other objectives. He mainly used this complicity with the U.S. Department of State to channel Argentina, and in order to fully succeed, his ultimate goal was to be perceived - at all costs -, as having, no longer close, but very privileged relations with Washington. The U.S. Embassy opening, the first official legation of this rank in Rio de Janeiro, helped Brazil to reinforce the illusion, mainly among Argentinian authorities, of a secret alliance with Washington.

3.5. U.S. Foreign Policy Towards South America

Since T. Roosevelt’s inauguration in 1901, the U.S. Foreign Policy had drastically and constantly moved in the direction of South America, under the firm guidance of his Secretary of State: John Hay. Until 1905, the U.S. Department of State, via his legations, was only in charge of monitoring the Southern region balance of power and the evolution of dishonest feelings towards American diplomacy among a few Latin republics. The U.S. President, up to that point, disregarded any actions and did not perceive the region as a crucial matter for his foreign policy, as the Monroe Doctrine, in the U.S. view, already embodied the whole hemisphere. This attitude would definitely change by mid 1905. With the death of the U.S. Secretary of State, John Hay, in July and thanks to his successor, Elihu Root, the 26th President began to work, not anymore on U.S. power, but more on U.S. prestige. With the Embassy opening came a great opportunity to be directly and rapidly aware of Southern intrigues against Washington but also a more precise U.S. foreign policy towards South America. Washington ended a hemispherical and general policy, which was perceived as aggressive by Southern republics, in order to provide a more regional one, to be perceived as softer. This is why, in September 1905, T. Roosevelt requested a Confidential memorandum373 from John Barrett374, former U.S. delegate to Pan-American Conference (1901-02), regarding U.S. relations with South America.

373 Confidential memorandum for the President regarding relations with South America. 1905-09-27. John Barrett to Theodore Roosevelt Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record?libID=o51469. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. Last consulted on January, 15th, 2018. 374 N.B: The U.S. Diplomat was also on duty as Minister to Argentina (1903-1904), Ambassador to Panama (1904-05) and Ambassador to Colombia (1905-06).

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This document, to be understood as a “guide” to Southern Republics and their perception about the U.S., mainly stressed politics and trade aspects of the current exchange situation. Thanks to his vast experience in various Latin countries, the U.S. diplomat analyzed some of the principal “unfavorable factors to the United States”375 concerning its relation with the South, and advised the U.S. President to flatter Southern countries in his next speech to Congress. The dominance of Europe in trade and South America’s “long established and natural association with Europe”376 was depicted as a challenge for U.S. trade because, on the one hand, South America was drastically missing the boat on communications with the U.S, and on the other hand, European colonization left a historical and political heritage with the Old Continent. John Barrett also described the significant decrease of U.S. political influence and the feared American policy in the region due to the superior attitude of patronage from the U.S as he stated: “We should give South America more credit for its actual progress (…)”377. In a paragraph entitled “Suggestions for development of trade and prestige”378, he then submitted 19 ideas to improve U.S. relations and image as he considered them “A great opportunity to legitimize a pro-American sentiment (…)”379. For him, North American prestige depended mainly on one crucial actor in the Southern balance of power: “For the development of a pro-United feeling in South America, it is of a great importance that the United States Ambassador at Rio Janeiro have the confidence and respect of Argentina”380. John Barrett’s memorandum had a great effect on T. Roosevelt. Some of his suggestions were to be found diluted in the 5th President’s annual message to Congress on December 5th, 1905. This was the first time since his inauguration that the Head of the U.S. state spoke directly to South America, in a softer tone. In a long paragraph entitled “Monroe Doctrine”, the President delivered a straightforward message to reassure, one more time, the Southern republics, using a conciliatory tone:

375 Confidential memorandum for the President regarding relations with South America. 1905-09-27. John Barrett to Theodore Roosevelt. Section 1, p.1. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital- Library/Record?libID=o51469. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. 376 Ibidem. Section 1, p.1-2. 377 Ibidem. Section 1, p.2. 378 Ibidem. Section 1, p.2. 379 Ibidem. Section 2, p.1. 380 Ibidem. Section 3, p.1-2.

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“In the first place we must as a nation make it evident that we do not intend to treat it in any shape or way as an excuse for aggrandizement on our part at the expense of the republics to the south. We must recognize the fact that in some South American countries there has been some suspicion lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince all the other nations of this continent once and for all that no just and orderly governments has anything to fear from us.” 381

However, this time, his speech was more loaded with approximation rhetoric as he emphasized: “We desire peace with the whole world, but perhaps most of all with the other peoples of the American Continent”382. Only 12 months after the Roosevelt Corollary’s aggressive statement, and after a long-lasting tradition of aggressive imperialistic foreign policy established by his former Secretary of State, T. Roosevelt seemed to take a step back. He wanted to establish a more prestigious policy in order to regain the Southern republics confidence and improve trade opportunities. For this, T. Roosevelt counted on Elihu Root’s dedication and universalistic aspirations. His newly appointed Secretary of State would be the key element to prestigiously though pragmatically connect North to South more intensively.

3.6. Two Statesmen To Catalyze The Illusive Brazil-U.S. Alliance

For the U.S. authorities, a “bridge” was mandatory in order to approach the Southern Latin republics. Because Washington was convinced that Rio de Janeiro was the center of Southern diplomacy and thanks to good relations with the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, the U.S. Department of State perceived Brazil as the right connection for its new enterprise. In his memorandum, John Barrett already drew the attention that “No American Ambassador at Rio has yet made it his policy to take advantage of this remarkable diplomatic situation there to the advantage of the United States in its relations with the rest of South America as well as with Brazil”383.

381 United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress, December 5, 1905. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905, p. 34. < http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS- idx?type=article&did=FRUS.FRUS1905.TRoosevelt&id=FRUS.FRUS1905&isize=M>. Last consulted on January 13th 2018. 382 Ibidem, p. 34. 383 Confidential memorandum for the President regarding relations with South America. 1905-09-27. John Barrett to Theodore Roosevelt. Section 2, p.1. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital- Library/Record?libID=o51469. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University.

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3.6.1. An Idealist - Elihu Root

For T. Roosevelt, his former Secretary of War and close friend, Elihu Root, was definitely the perfect representative and a trustworthy actor of this essential switch in Southern U.S. Foreign policy. The American President greatly admired and respected the statesman, his career and skills. In 1902, from his bed in Saint Vincent’s Hospital, in Indianapolis, prior to entering in the operating room, T. Roosevelt had already declared to Elihu Root: “If anything happens, I want you to be Secretary of State. If John Hay becomes President, he would have nervous prostration within six weeks. I do not think he is quite big enough for the job”384. In addition, as Secretary of War (1899-1904), under Roosevelt administration, E. Root already had an eye on Southern American republics (especially Brazil), and their balance of power385. It was only with E. Root that U.S. foreign policy started acting more proactively and bilaterally towards the Southern region, as advised by John Barrett, with “(…) a greater spirit of sympathy and appreciation (…)”386 that “(…) will be pleasing to South American nations and gratifying to the pride of their peoples”387. For his new mission about conquering the feelings and the business markets of Southern republics, E. Root eloquently played the role of peacemaker when he addressed, in January 1906 with the softer tone of a U.S. “Moral Foreign Policy”, a Latin American diplomatic audience during an official dinner organized by Joaquim Nabuco in Washington: “May the independence, the freedom and the rights of the weakest be ever respected equally with rights of the strongest and enlightened public opinion of the Americas which shall everywhere, upon both continents mightily promote the reign of peace; of order and of justice, in every American Republic”.388

384 Transcription of a note from President Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, September 23rd, 1902. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 14, Correspondence and Other Documents, 1897-1903, reel 453. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington D.C. 385 Cf. 1.7.2. Brazilian’s Perception Regarding The U.S. 386 Confidential memorandum for the President regarding relations with South America. 1905-09-27. John Barrett to Theodore Roosevelt. Section 1, p.3. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress Manuscript Division. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital- Library/Record?libID=o51469. Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library. Dickinson State University. 387 Ibidem, p. 3. 388 Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco, Brazilian Embassy in Washington to Senhor Barão do Rio Branco, State Minister of foreign Relations, Rio de Janeiro, February 23rd, 1906, p. 8. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

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This U.S. foreign policy, based on a concept of more idealistic rhetoric, gave paramount importance to Brazil in order to be seen as the Southern region’s representative, and used this as a political facilitator to relate to the rest of the Southern republics. When asking his Admiral of the Navy to reconsider J. Nabuco’s dinner invitation, and giving further explanations to his Congressman, H. C. Lodge, about the meaning of this official dinner, the U.S. Secretary of State depicted clearly how Washington newly perceived Brazil. To George Dewey, E. Root wrote: “The dinner has an important bearing upon the new rapprochement we are endeavoring to bring about between the United States and Brazil and the United States and South America generally (with a few exceptions)”389. For Lodge, he mentioned the “(…) considerable significance with reference to the good understanding between the United States and South America (…)”390. On duty, E. Root pragmatically favored the Brazilian Embassy in Washington to build the U.S. approximation towards South America as the Secretary of State maintained close and personal relations with the Brazilian Ambassador. As confessed in a response to a correspondence wherein J. Nabuco invited E. Root to the 3rd Pan- American Conference to be held in Rio, from July 23rd to August 26th 1906: “It is very gratifying, my dear Mr. Ambassador, to have your great country represented by a gentleman to whom I can write in this strain with the certainty of kindly appreciation and sympathy”391. He thus gave full legitimacy to Brazil, as a political influencer, with, nevertheless, a high enthusiasm of a very pragmatic nature: “(…) the conviction which I feel that in those qualities of the Brazilian nation there is a potentiality of influence for great good to all America and that the exercise of such an influence ought to be encouraged in every way”.

389 Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States to Admiral of the Navy, H. C. Lodge, January 6th, 1906, rec 116, p. 294. Series 3, Letters Sent: 1888-1919, Vol. 1, Reel 363, p. 1. Theodore Roosevelt Papers. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington D.C. 390 Ibidem, p. 2. 391 U.S. Secretary of State, Elihu Root, to Brazilian Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco, November 28th, 1905, Letterbooks, 1899-1909, Box 187, Special volume, 1905 Oct.-Nov., p. 3-4. Elihu Root Papers, Manuscript Division., Washington D.C.

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3.6.2. A Convinced Monroist - Joaquim Nabuco

However, this “flattering diplomacy” or this new form of U.S. approximation almost naturally echoed extremely positively in the office of the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, and in the corridors of the Foreign Ministry in Rio de Janeiro. If the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs had put lots of effort in creating an illusive alliance with Washington, on the level of perception, maintaining the latter was even more challenging because no official compromises, no treaty and no institutionalization were at stake. For Rio Branco, Joaquim Nabuco seemed to be the perfect statesman to work on this difficult task of continuity. His personal characteristics as described with a seductive attitude, highly regarded social abilities, great optimism and vanity392 definitely helped him to conquer Washington authorities. But, his private opinion facilitated his task even more. Already in 1902, he openly proclaimed himself totally pro-United States to Rio Branco: “I am a strong “Monroist”, as I tell you, and because of that, a great adherent to an ever increasing approximation between Brazil and the United States”393. In his credentials to the U.S. President, on May 24th, the first Brazilian Ambassador ever, gave a glimpse of his highest considerations and great enthusiasm (sometimes exaggerated) 394 for the United States: “All wishes from Brazil are indeed for the increase of the huge moral influence that the United States exercises on the course of the civilization and that translates to the existence on the global map, for the first time in history, of a vast neutral peace zone and free human competition. We imagine this influence to be even more largely beneficial in the future, not only for the two Americas, but for the entire world”.395

392 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. Nos desprendemos da Europa tão completamente e definitivamente como a lua da terra: o Americanismo de Nabuco. Revista USP, São Paulo, n°112, p. 75-84, janeiro/fevereiro/março 2017, p. 79. PEREIRA, Paulo José dos Reis. A política Externa da Primeira República e os Estados Unidos: A Atuação de Joaquim Nabuco em Washington (1905-1910). São Paulo: Hucitec/FAPESP, 2006, p. 75. 393 Translation from the author: “Eu sou um forte Monroista, como lhe disse, e por isso rande partidário da aproximação cada vez maior entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos”. Joaquim Nabuco, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London, England to Rio Branco, Geral Consul, Brazilian legation in Berlin, Germany, September, 7th, 1902, 832-1, REC 118, pp. 6-7. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro. 394 BETHELL, Leslie. Joaquim Nabuco No Mundo: abolicionista, jornalista e diplomata. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Bem-Te-Vi, 2016, p. 215. 395 Translation from the author: “Tous les voeux du Brésil sont en effet pour l’accroissement de l’immense influence morale que les Etats-Unis exercent sur la marche de la civilization et qui se traduit par l’existence sur la carte du globe, pour la première fois dans l’histoire, d’une vaste zone neutre de paix et de libre competition humaine. Cette influence nous l’imaginons encore plus largement

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Joaquim Nabuco’s speech matched Rio Branco’s discourse regarding the U.S. moral and global influence. However, the Brazilian Ambassador was more confident about the defensive role played by Washington against Europe as he declared: “(…) such a policy was worth the greatest army and the greatest navy”396. The Ambassador in Washington was well known as a great U.S. foreign policy enthusiast, and he confidently stated: “(…) the Monroe Doctrine means that politically we untie ourselves from Europe as fully and definitively as the moon from the earth”397. In Washington, the high degree of convergence and understanding between the United States and Brazil could be perceived by other foreign delegations. However, in this dynamic, common interests were the key as Washington started to demonstrate clear signs of ambition to enter South America, via Brazil, and Rio de Janeiro wished to continue increasing its autonomy in the region by using the U.S.’ prestige. The close relationship, mutual respect and common interests between the statesmen E. Root and J. Nabuco were also noticed during the preliminary works of the 3rd Pan- American Conference when the ideas of both governments about the substance of this international event converged. For the U.S., “(…) the true function of such a conference is to deal with matters of common interest which are not really subjects of controversy (…)”398. As for Brazilian authorities, best is to “(…) move from the program, if possible, matters of a political nature of which there is no hope of general or unanimous agreement”399.

bienfaisante dans l’avenir, non seulement pour les deux Amériques, mais pour le monde entier”. Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco, Brazilian Embassy, Washington to Johan Hay, U.S. Department of State, Washington, May 24th, 1905, p. 1-2. Microfiche of Records in the National Archives: n°49, Roll 8, Notes from the Brazilian Legation in the United States To the Department of State, Volume 8, January 24, 1901-July 27, 1906, Records of the U.S. Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 396 Translation from the author: “(…) uma política assim valeria o maior dos exercitos e a maior das marinhas”. NABUCO, Carolina. A vida de Joaquim Nabuco, por sua filha Carolina Nabuco. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1929 apud ALMINO, Joao; CARDIM, Carlos Henrique (Organizadores). Rio Branco, a América do Sul e a Modernização do Brasil. EMC, 2002, p. 162. 397 Translation from the author: “para mim, a Doutrina Monroe significa que politicamente nos nos desprendemos da Europa tao completamente e definitivamente como a lua da terra”. Ibidem, p. 162. 398 Elihu Root, U.S. Secretary of State to Delegates of the United States to the Third International Conference of American States, June 18th, 1906, p. 1. International Conference Records. U.S Delegation to Third International Conference of American States. General Records, 1906, Data relating to program to newspaper, clipping of Conference and visit of Secretary Root. Entry 27. Box. n°5. Records of International Conferences, Commissions and Expositions, Record Group 43, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 399 Translation by the author: “(…) para arredar do programa, se for possível, as questões de natureza política sobre que não haja esperança de accordo geral ou unanime”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco, Washington,

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3.7. 3rd Pan-American Conference In Rio De Janeiro

From July 21st to August 26th 1906, Rio de Janeiro benefited from international exposure by hosting the 3rd International meeting among the nations of the Americas. Via E. Root, the United States government chose the Brazilian Federal capital to hold this 3rd reunion. For almost a month, the city’s downtown, recently remodeled, buzzed with the rhythm of its international visitors and official statesmen.

3.7.1. Argentina’s Opposition

Since the beginning of the preparatory work, Argentina started to oppose different aspects of this international event. Firstly, Buenos Aires showed its irritation at Washington’s decision to choose Rio de Janeiro as the Southern city to host this International event. Second, as a sign of protest, the Argentine government threatened to boycott the conference by not sending their announced official representatives: Luis Maria Drago and Roque Saenz Pena. Third, they wanted to oppose, one more time, the U.S. foreign policy, according to Brazilian diplomacy, by “seeking to reach a formula in the Rio de Janeiro Congress by which it is made clear to the United States that its so-called protection of South American countries, in case of any European aggression, was absolutely not necessary (…)” 400. The Argentine republic also negotiated for the Drago Doctrine, as opposed to the Roosevelt Corollary, to be discussed during the International Congress.

March 31st, 1905, n°84, p. 4. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 400 Translation by the author: “(…) procurar chegar a uma formula no Congresso de Rio de Janeiro, pela qual se fizesse comprehender aos Estados Unidos que sua pretendia protecção aos paizes sul- americanos, no caso de qualquer aggressão europea, absolutamente não era necessaria (…)”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco, Washington, March 1st, 1906, n°1, confidencial, reservadissimo, p. 2. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

3.7.2. Rio Branco’s Instructions to Nabuco Prior To The 3rd Pan-American Conference

“(…) against the United States and against Brazil, there is in the Spanish America old preventions that only time will perhaps modify”401. This statement was a part of Rio Branco’s comments on hemispherical affairs as he instructed J. Nabuco during the preparations of the 3rd Pan-American Conference. The Brazilian Foreign Minister’s perception about Latin republics, from Spanish origins, depicted the U.S. and Brazil as sharing the same challenges; the same threat within the continent, and consequently reinforced the idea of both republics being isolated in the Americas. A couple of lines further, Rio Branco confirmed his vision by stating that “Brazil, Chile, the United States, in front of Hispanic American judges will always be bad”402; before explicitly concluding promoting his manipulation skills:

“The best way to obtain the action of Hispano-Americans is to flatter their own self-esteem, and this does not seem bad to a powerful nation like the American one, above all, it will be seen as proof of political abilities. Despite the jealousy and ill will that the Argentinians in general always showed against Brazil, we managed to obtain from their government almost everything we wanted, giving them demonstrations of trust and appraisal and satisfying to some extent their vanity”.403

In his official document, the Brazilian Foreign Minister also came across to J. Nabuco as more reserved and being more careful regarding the U.S. Foreign Policy objectives. Indeed, Rio Branco did not share Nabuco’s opinion about Washington: “We believe that not even the United States with their huge resources could efficiently implement the friendly or paternal politics that they wish to implement, except in the Caribbean

401 Translation by the author: “(…) contra os Estados Unidos e contra o Brasil há na America Hespanolha antigas prevenções que so o tempo poderá talvez modificar”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco, Washington, March 10th, 1905, n°58, p.8. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 402 Translation by the author: “Perante arbitros hispano-americanos estariamos sempre mal, o Brasil, o Chile, os Estados Unidos”. Ibidem, p. 5. 403 Translation by the author: “O melhor meio de obter o concurso dos hispano-americanos é afagar- lhes o amor próprio, e isso não fica mal a uma nação poderosa como a Americana, antes sera tido por todos como prova de habilidade política. Apesar da inveja e má vontade que sempre manifestaram contra o Brasil os Argentinos em geral, temos conseguido do seu governo, quasi tudo o que queremos, dandou-lhe demonstrações de confiança e apreço e satisfazendo até certo ponto a sua vaidade”. Ibidem, p. 8.

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Sea”404. In his instructions to his Minister in Washington, he also invited him to avoid any Monroist declaration during the 3rd Pan-American Conference: “Your Excellency’s declaration about Monroism will not be part of the program but offers a base for your Excellency’s intelligence with Root”405. For Rio Branco, the latter was sufficient and significant enough for his illusive alliance strategy in the service of his signaling policy. Many times during his service, J. Nabuco made complaints about the lack of communication and instructions from his Minister in Rio de Janeiro about Brazilian foreign policy towards the U.S.406 The image and prestige of Nabuco, appreciated by the U.S. diplomatic members and politicians, seemed to be enough to maintain superficial relations with Washington, as wished by his superior. Rio Branco managed to perfectly instrumentalize J. Nabuco’s extremely positive attitude towards Washington and his private friendship with the U.S. Secretary of State in the service of his illusive alliance. However, he showed clear signs of strong inclination towards Europe as his main reference in terms of international affairs and political aspects. To Rio Branco, the 3rd Pan-American Conference was also a way to impress Europe as he warned J. Nabuco: “I do not wish our Congress to be considered by Europe as a debtors’ assembly claiming bankruptcy immunity” 407 . Further in the document, he also stressed, still defending the Old continent, that “the idea of an arbitral court made of Americans to oppose to the one in The Hague, where Americans have and can take part, seems to us unacceptable: it would assume that America constitutes a world apart from Europe”408. For Rio Branco, Europe was still a great influence within the hemisphere, and for Brazilian affairs, as he mentioned that “Only via Europe or the United States that we communicate with some of our neighbors”409.

404 Translation from the author: “Acreditamos que nem mesmo os Estados Unidos com os seus immensos recursos poderiam efficazmente exercer a política amigável ou paternal que desejariam exercer, salvo no Mar das Antilhas”. Ibidem, p. 6. 405 Translation by the author: “Declarações vocencia monroismo não sera objecto do programma mas offerece base da intelligencia vocencia com Root” Ibidem, p. 8. 406 PEREIRA, Paulo José dos Reis. A política Externa da Primeira República e os Estados Unidos: A Atuação de Joaquim Nabuco em Washington (1905-1910). São Paulo: Hucitec/FAPESP, 2006, p. 82. 407 Translation by the author: “Não quizera nosso Congresso fosse considerado pela Europa assembléa devedores reclamando immunidade bancarrota”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco, Washington, March 31st, 1905, n°84, p. 2. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 408 Translation by the author: “A idéa de um tribunal arbitral composto de americanos para oppôr ao da Haya, onde Americanos tem e podem ter parte, parece-nós inaceitavel: importaria supôr que a America forma um mundo a parte da Europa”. Ibidem, p. 3. 409 Translation by the author: “Só via Europa ou Estados Unidos nos communicamos com alguns dos

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For Rio Branco, the 3rd Pan-American Conference was a great opportunity to present to his guests a modern and civilized idea of Brazil to be projected internationally in order to improve national prestige. The U.S. Secretary of State’s visit, as an honored guest invited by the Brazilian authorities, also greatly served Brazilian interests, and nourished, at the same time, rumors of the establishment of a hypothetical (illusive) alliance between Brazil and the United States.410 Although Rio Branco wished E. Root’s visit to be perceived by Latin nations as one more sign of cementing Washington-Rio de Janeiro relations, he did not make any maneuver, nor instructed his delegates, in order to practically achieve this type of relation. As he stated in his instructions prior to the Conference to J. Nabuco with a view of autonomy for Brazil: “Our wish is to tie ourselves down as little as possible by commitments”411. He nevertheless did everything possible to extract as much prestige as possible from this Conference, and Root’s visit, by taking care of every single detail of the organization as he seemed to already prepare Brazil for the 2nd International Conference in The Hague. On the contrary, for the U.S. authorities, the diplomatic move was to be in the opposite direction as, very few days prior the Conference’s inauguration, the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Griscom sent his Department of State an explicit telegram: “He discusses politics in Brazil and makes suggestion for strengthening entente cordiale”412. A couple of days after, in front of the Brazilian Senate, Elihu Root gave a speech that put into practice the previous recommendation:

“So I come to you to say: Let us know each other better; let us aid each other in the great work of advancing civilization; let the United States of North America and the United States of Brazil join hands, not in formal written treaties of alliance, but in the universal sympathy and confidence vizinhos”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco, Washington, March 10th, 1905, n°58, p.6. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 410 BUENO, Clodoaldo; CERVO Amado Luiz. História da Política Exterior do Brasil. UNB, 5a Ediçao, 2014, p. 197. 411 Translation by the author: “O nosso desejo é prender-nós o menos possivel por compromissos”. Rio Branco, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rio de Janeiro to Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco, Washington, March 10th, 1905, n°58, p.5. Arquivo Particular do Barão do Rio Branco, Pasta 14, Relações Exteriores. Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 412 Lloyd Carpenter, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil to the U.S. Department of State, July 16th, 1906, telegrama 1113/2. United States Department of State: Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 3, 1906. M1889, Roll10, 2097. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

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and esteem of their peoples (…).”413

3.7.3. Rio Branco’s Explicit Message To U.S.

On July 23rd, 1906, in the hall of the Saint-Louis Palace, officially renamed the Monroe Palace in memory of the former U.S. President, a crowd of international journalists was nervously waiting for the opening speech the 3rd Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro. Rio Branco stood in front of an audience of diplomats and politicians from different nations of the Americas to give his address. Comfortably seated in the first row, Elihu Root, the honored guest and the first U.S. Secretary of State ever sent abroad for this kind of event414 was also patiently expecting. As perceived in his instructions to J. Nabuco, Rio Branco, almost at the end of his first term at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent an explicit message to his audience, and especially to Elihu Root, as he officially mentioned Brazilian moral and commercial strong ties to Europe, surprisingly enough, during a Pan-American event:

“The openness itself of our territory, mostly uninhabited, some unexplored, and the certainty that we have resources in this continent to live with abundance a population 10, 20 times larger would recommend us to strengthen more and more our relations of great friendship, to seek to develop those of trade with this endless crowd of men and a prodigious source of fertile energies that is Europe. She raised us, she taught us, from her we continuously receive the support and the example, the brightness of science and art, the goods from her industry and the most beneficial lesson of progress”.415

On August 27th, 1906, even during the closing ceremony, Rio Branco reiterated stressing Brazilian bonds to Europe and showed his perception of European

413 ROOT, Elihu, United States. Dept. of State., International American Conference Rio de Janeiro, 1906. Speeches incident to the visit of Secretary Root to South America: July 4 to September 30, 1906. Washington: Govt. print. Off, p. 61. 414 VILLAFANE S. G., Luis Claudio. Nós desprendemos da Europa tão completamente e definitivamente como a lua da terra: o Americanismo de Nabuco. Revista USP, São Paulo, n°112, p. 75-84, janeiro/fevereiro/março 2017, p. 79. 415 Translation by the author: « A própria vastidão dos nossos territórios, em grande parte desertos, inexplorados alguns, e a certeza de que temos recursos para que neste continente viva com largueza uma população 10, 20 vezes maior nós a aconselhariam estreitar cada vez mais as relações de boa amizade, a procurar desenvolver as de comércio com esse inexaurível viveiro de homens e fonte prodigiosa de energias fecundas que é a Europa. Ela nos criou, ela nos ensinou, dela recebemos incessantemente o apoio e o exemplo, a claridade da ciência e da arte, as comodidades da sua indústria e a lição mais proveitosa do progresso ». ASSUMPÇÃO, Embaixador Roberto Luiz de Araújo (org.). Obras do Barão do Rio Branco IX: discursos. – Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012, p. 139.

120 supremacy: “To countries from Europe, to which we always link and they have to relate to so many moral ties and so many economic interests, we only wish to continue to offer the same guarantees that our constant love of order and progress has been giving to them”416. The Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs seemed to wish to announce an explicit return to a Brazilian diplomacy towards Europe, or at least a new strengthening, announcing a multilateral foreign policy.

3.8. Conclusions

The year 1905 represented the highest peak in diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Brazil that had only been increasing since 1891. During this period, Rio Branco succeeded in accumulating enough confidence from the U.S. authorities to symbolically open respective Embassies in Washington and in Rio de Janeiro. For Rio Branco, this important event concluded his persuasive approximation strategy as the Brazilian Navy rearmament program was officially and publically announced. By maintaining cordial relations with Buenos Aires, Rio Branco “spoke softly” as, at the same time, he used the prestige of Washington as a great hemispherical power, thanks to a sophisticated and modern diplomacy, as a “big stick” to contain Buenos Aires’ hegemonic aggressive, expensive, but also disorganized ambitions. The Brazilian statesman wanted for Brazil to “go far”. Even though the domestic situation of Brazil was asymmetrical compared to the U.S., Rio Branco managed to make this approximation seen as a U.S. acknowledgement of a Brazilian symmetrical position regarding international affairs. In 1906, while Rio Branco was clearly reorienting his foreign policy towards Europe, having achieved all necessary benefits for his national objectives from the pragmatic association, the U.S. authorities were finally making a strategic move into South America, realizing that Brazil was the prefect diplomatic partner with which to link with other Southern republics, and establish a permanent U.S. commercial and

416 Translation by the author: « Aos países da Europa, a que sempre nos ligaram e hão de ligar tantos laços morais e tantos interesses econômicos, só desejamos continuar a oferecer as mesmas garantias que lhes tem dado até hoje o nosso constante amor à ordem e ao progresso ». ASSUMPÇÃO, Embaixador Roberto Luiz de Araújo (org.). Obras do Barão do Rio Branco IX: discursos. – Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2012, p. 149.

121 political presence. However, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs definitely did not picture it the same way. Brazilian-U.S. relations were no longer a priority for Rio Branco as he started to loosen ties.

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CONCLUSION

By the end of the 19th century, two American republics, Brazil and the U.S, began to increase their diplomatic relations in order to reach, during the beginning of the next century, what has been perceived by classic literature as the highest peak in relations, even often characterized as an unwritten alliance. This study aimed to unpack - in detail - the evolution of diplomatic relations between Washington and Rio de Janeiro from 1889 to 1906 to extract the substance of this historical approximation. Even though domestic factors seemed to have played an essential role in this enterprise, the focus of this argumentation was principally based on decision makers (diplomats and politicians) and the influence by changes in the international order and the regional balance of power experienced. As a result, these phenomena literally modified how American nations perceived each other and how they newly related to serve their national interests. The perception of power as a basis of analysis helped me to provide an alternative version to explain why and how the U.S and Brazil maintained close contacts during this period. In the study, it also appeared that perception is definitely to be considered as a key element in analysing international relations among nations, and diplomacy is a powerful and crucial tool that is able to advantageously or disadvantageously reshape this perception. To better understand the respective perceptions of both protagonists, the diplomatic correspondences from the U.S. Department of State in Washington and their legations in Brazil, and from the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro and their legations in Washington and in Argentina were analyzed. The official documents revealed that although the relations constantly increased along the years - especially driven by Brazil –, it also corresponded to Argentina’s more intense search for influence in the hemispherical and regional affairs between 1902 and 1906. Authorities from Buenos Aires perceived their nation as the unique and hegemonic regional power, and responded directly to the U.S. hemispherical hegemonic ambitions. In 1889, the political regime change in Brazil led to a redefinition of its international insertion that principally reoriented its foreign relations towards the

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American continent. Brazilian politicians reactively followed the republican slogan « We are from America and we want to be Americans » in order to establish a continental diplomacy, more distant from any European ideology or influence. While Brazil was turning itself to the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. started to be more active within the international order. Due to significant economic development, they transformed their domestic power accumulation into active political influence within their neighboring countries, mainly in the Caribbean. For hemispherical purposes, the U.S. President, T. Roosevelt (1901-1909), gave a new interpretation to the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and pursued the legacy of continental insertion through Pan-American Conferences and trade. To serve his nation’s interests, the 26th President also established a “Moral Foreign Policy” that - in appearance -served global and modern principles of peace, law, and progress. By the very beginning of the 20th century, the U.S. foreign policy aimed to rapidly strengthen its presence within the hemisphere and gain political influence among Latin nations. It appeared that the foreign policy tools used by the U.S. Department of State were perceived as aggressive and intrusive by most of the American nations. Even the first attempt to concretely act, as a great international power, in hemispherical politics affairs failed due to the unfounded threat of German immigration in Brazil, and consequently the non-necessity of invoking the Monroe Doctrine. Brazil still suffered from the transition of Monarchy to Republic. The nation was disorganized and socially challenged. The economy was extremely fragile and highly dependent on agribusiness. The political system provided a relative stability, and the naval power was very inferior in comparison to the Southern powers of Argentina and Chile. The consequences of the “Security dilemma” that led to a naval rearmament race between the two latter Southern republics and its influences on the regional balance of power, in addition, notably worried Brazilian authorities. By the end of the 19th century, although the new Brazilian republic found itself in a domestic asymmetry compared to the U.S.’ emerging power, the Brazilian diplomatic corps managed to approach the U.S. department of State. Thanks to a skillful, mature, and sophisticated diplomacy, but also due to a clear understanding of changes in the international order and the balance of power dynamic, the Brazilian Minister, Salvador de Mendonça, explicitly tried to build a mutual trade and defensive-offensive alliance with the U.S. between 1891 and 1895. He failed in his

124 attempt. Apparently, the Southern region was not yet concretely on the U.S. foreign policy’s agenda. Before the beginning of the 20th century, Washington was only monitoring the Southern republics by observing hemispheric trade competition, the naval rearmament race, and regional hegemony. If the Brazilian authorities were unsuccessful in creating a special relationship, via a pragmatic alliance, Washington’s diplomacy was also defeated by Rio de Janeiro when it did not succeed in advantageously influencing the flour tariffs between the U.S. and Rio against Argentina. From 1902 to 1904, a series of international actions (Panama, “Bolivian Syndicate” and Venezuela) led by Washington redefined the balance of power in the Americas. It also accentuated the changing perception of power among hemispherical nations. Brazil, already challenged domestically, began to perceive more concrete threats coming from the changes in the international order. On the one hand, Washington was substantially gaining more political influence and international prestige, thanks to its imperialistic behavior, and was significantly making a “Moral Foreign policy” step towards South America. However, The U.S. Department of State still perceived the Southern republics as a whole and not as a group of individual nations to benefit from bilateral relations. At some point, very confidently, T. Roosevelt even thought about sharing the U.S. “sphere of influence” in South America with Germany that he greatly admired. On the other hand, Argentina was taking the leadership of the Southern republics by affirming its very ambitious hemispherical foreign policy. Nonetheless, the Argentine attempts (alliance with the U.S., Drago Doctrine, South American solidarity) to project itself internationally failed due to a series of actions led by a disorganized, disloyal and manipulator manipulative diplomatic corps that was perceived, by Brazil, as untrustworthy and without any concrete foreign policy strategy. The balance of power was very explosive in South America. Argentina directly involved itself in the uruguayan and paraguayan revolutions, and in other southern alliances in order to try to reshape the regional balance of power, and assure its hegemony in the region. The fact that the Argentinian republic naval power, by the 20th century, was almost 3 times superior to Brazil did not favor a positive perception, as military power was understood as paramount for Rio Branco’s foreign policy.

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In reaction, the Brazilian Foreign Minister (1902-12) established a new and sophisticated foreign policy at the service of the Brazilian nation. Definitely influenced by his 26 years of duty in Europe and his understanding of the European version of the balance of power, Rio Branco began to maneuver in Washington with the purpose of assuring Brazilian security, autonomy and state strengthening in the Southern region; mainly in reaction to the Argentinian republic’s unstable and unpredictable foreign policy. Firstly, the statesman approached by implicitly acknowledging the U.S. as the hemispherical emerging power and using the same diplomatic language as the U.S. Department of State invoking diplomatic actions for the search of peace and progress on the continent. Secondly, he began to work on a more incisive diplomacy by tightening bonds and playing a role of “intelligence” informing the U.S. authorities about the southern republics’ balance of power. Indeed, in 1903, Washington began to perceive the hypothetical southern republics alliance as a concrete threat against the U.S. hemispherical ambitions. By doing so, Rio Branco wanted, in the first phase, for Brazil to gain confidence from Washington, and be perceived by the authorities as an autonomous nation leading a sophisticated diplomacy grounded on modern and global principles of peace. This increase in relations with Washington also served the Brazilian state to be perceived, by other nations, as maintaining close political relations with the emerging hemispherical power. By 1905, the diplomatic relations, not only between Rio de Janeiro and Washington but also with Buenos Aires, began to greatly increase as a sign that this triple dynamic began to be more essential for Brazil. The nation was still internationally challenged and domestically fragile, especially with regard to defensive means. Rio Branco intensified his work by actively formulating, in the second phase, a manipulative diplomacy while using multilateralism, cordiality and pragmatism. To this effect, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs worked on the level of perception in order to create views of illusive alliances between Brazil and the U.S., as well as between Brazil and Argentina. However, the establishment of these illusive alliances was part of a greater foreign policy strategy. The illusive alliance with Washington served Rio Branco to channel Buenos Aires’ disruptive diplomacy and ambitious interests in South America. In exchange,

126 the U.S. interests were also served by the intelligence provided by Brazil regarding the Argentine republic as a counter-power to Washington’s hemispherical ambitions. Rio Branco wanted his diplomatic relations with Washington to be perceived, especially by Argentina, as highly intertwined in order to create the illusion of a secret offensive-defensive alliance. The political and public use of the upgrade of U.S. and Brazilian Embassies in respective capitals perfectly illustrated Rio Branco’s strategy towards his direct neighbor. At the same time, the Brazilian statesman made relentless efforts to maintain cordial relations with Buenos Aires by also promoting an illusive alliance with the government arguing for a “union” between Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Rio Branco’s strategy was to diminish tensions with Argentina, related to the U.S.-Brazil close pragmatic relations. To establish these illusive alliances, for the U.S. capital, the Brazilian Minister continued his intelligence work regarding the Southern balance of power but he also began to discredit Argentina’s diplomacy and aggressive ambitions towards the hemisphere. For Buenos Aires, Rio Branco spent lots of time maintaining cordial relations with the government motivated by hemispherical hypothetical threats to South America, the U.S. in the first place. During this study, the manner of doing diplomacy and the personal, and often private, relations among diplomats of international legations also appeared to be a crucial aspect to more suitably frame this Brazil-U.S. approximation at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. The prestige of Brazilian diplomacy, the sophistication of its diplomats and the ideology of its foreign policy were highly respected among the U.S. officials, and definitely facilitated the continuity of and increase in relations. Thanks to his well-informed diplomatic corps, Rio Branco managed for Brazil to be perceived by Washington as a strong, trustworthy, and autonomous state doing modern diplomacy, and consequently to be considered on the same symmetrical level as the U.S. regarding international insertion. On the contrary, the Argentine republic’s diplomacy was perceived as disorganized, unstable, offensive, untrustworthy, and mainly at the service of personal, or at least regional hegemonic interests. Rio Branco did not waste time in using that against Buenos Aires by discrediting its behavior in the U.S. Department of State that rapidly perceived Argentina as a counter-power and a troublemaker.

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This study revealed that the concept of unwritten alliance commonly used to characterize Brazil-U.S. relations demonstrated some weaknesses that were challenged in this dissertation in order to alternatively describe this endeavor. At his inauguration in 1902, Rio Branco faced serious national, regional and international challenges and threats. Washington and Argentina were both perceived as incisively firming their respective foreign policy towards the hemisphere and the Southern region, and both foreign policies conflicted. Brazil was greatly struggling with a clear Army and naval international and regional inferiority that put its territorial integrity and autonomy at risk within the Southern region. In order to balance this weakness, Rio Branco worked on a highly sophisticated diplomacy grounded on a very modern perception of international, hemispherical and regional balance of power. By increasing the level of relations between the U.S. and Brazilian governments, Rio Branco established a persuasive approximation policy. However without any explicit or official commitments as in 1906, during the 3rd Pan-American Conference, the Brazilian Minister explicitly demonstrated his admiration for European politics, culture and ideology. Nonetheless, it appeared to have been more highly profitable for Brazil as it instrumentalized this association. For Brazil, as opposed to the U.S., the hypothetical threat was more direct: the Argentine republic’s aggressive regional ambitions. By grounding his diplomacy on a persuasive approximation with Washington, Rio Branco managed to settle preventive actions towards Argentina allowing the Brazilian state to maintain its autonomy, strengthen its sovereignty and gain power in South America while internationally growing its prestige. Rio Branco did not want Brazil to proactively take the lead in South America and definitely did not want Brazil to be perceived as subordinate to the U.S.’ emerging power. On the contrary, he was determined to take full advantage of this relationship for domestic purposes, leading a reactive foreign policy. Besides, by simultaneously keeping cordial relations with Buenos Aires, he also profitably avoided a security dilemma that definitely helped to maintain peace and stability in the region. Argentina was leading a very conservative diplomacy based on national and personal interests that was grounded on opposition to the new hemispherical power: the U.S. It came to the light that Buenos Aires did not take any advantage of this

128 resistance to the hemispherical balance of power switch, as the nation failed in transforming itself into a regional leader.

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