Roosevelt and the Sultans : the United States Navy in the Mediterranean, 1904
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University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1975 Roosevelt and the sultans : the United States Navy in the Mediterranean, 1904. William James Hourihan University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Hourihan, William James, "Roosevelt and the sultans : the United States Navy in the Mediterranean, 1904." (1975). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1340. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1340 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ROOSEVELT AND THE SULTANS: THE UNITED STATES NAW IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1904 A DissertatioPx Presentee' By William James Hourihan Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY February 1975 History (C) William James Hourihan 1975 All Rights Reserved 11 ROOSEVELT AND THE SULTANS: THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1904 A Dissertation By William James Hourihan Approved As To Style And Content By (Chairman of Committee) (Head of DepartmePxtT (Member) (Member) February 1975 , Roosevelt and the Sultans: The United States Navy in the Mediterranean, 1904 (February 1975) William James Hourihan, B.S., M.A. Northeastern University Directed by: Dr. Robert A. Hart When Theodore Roosevelt became President of the United States in 1901 it was the navy to which he turned as the vehicle for his diplomacy. At first Roosevelt proceeded cautiously. He pushed through the Congress legislation for the construction of new battleships and armored cruisers, and he began bringing the navy's scattered warships together in the Atl antic as a single powerful force . During the win- ter. of 1902-03 this fleet held the navy's first peacetime maneuvers, and by the summer of 1903 Roosevelt's battleships were conducting naval exercises off the Azores in the mid- Atlantic . All of this prepared the way for a naval display which dwarfed anything similar in the past, and which took the American navy in large numbers into the Mediterranean Sea. During the summer of 1904 a total of fourteen warships (60% of the navy's first-class armored ships; and over 30% of the navy's strength, cruiser-class and above), along with a num- greatest ber of support vessels, embarked on this cruise; the demonstration of American naval power ever seen outside of the Western Hemisphere. The heart of the fleet were the six battleships of the Battleship Squadron, the single most powerful unit the navy possessed. The cruise served a number of purposes. It gave Europe a first-hand exhibition of American naval strength. If Roosevelt was to participate on a basis of equality with the great powers he had to establish the robustness and reach of the American navy, and what better way to do this than a cruise by a powerful fleet off the coasts of Europe. Also, on a more practical level, Roosevelt decided to employ the fleet in putting pressure on the Ottoman Empire to settle certain outstanding problems which the United States had long been trying to resolve with Constantinople. However, before this demonstration could take place the fleet was involved in another bit of gunboat diplomacy. The kidnapping of an American in Morocco coincided with the ar- rival of the fleet in European waters, and Roosevelt had no hesitation about using its presence to put pressure on the Sultan of Morocco. For almost two months American warships prowled the Straits area, much to the discomfort of Spain and France. To cruise the Mediterranean with such a large force was in its own right an important and significant employment of United States sea power, but the use of the fleet in aggres- sive naval demonstrations against the Sultans of Morocco and Turkey underlined for Europe the practical capabilities of Roosevelt's navy. What the President established by displaying his battleships at close range to the great powers was a concrete exhibit of America's right to be accepted as an equal. Historians who have dealt with the role of the navy during the Roosevelt years have generally examined two dis- tinct manifestations. The first of these was the physical growth of the navy — a growth which brought the United States to a position as the third largest naval power in the world by the time Roosevelt left office. The second was the sending of the fleet on an epic round the world voyage during Roosevelt's second term. What has been largely ignored , however , was the use of this naval power in the years between 1902 and 1905. The Mediterranean cruise of 1904 was an important chapter in a growing application of the navy as a diplomatic tool, and it represents the culmi- nation of Rooseveltian naval policy in the first three years of his presidency. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ^ CHAPTER I . THE ROOSEVELT NAVY 1 CHAPTER II. PREPARATIONS FOR A CRUISE 24 CHAPTER III. A KIDNAPPING 44 CHAPTER IV. "WARSHIPS WILL BE SENT" 63 CHAPTER V. EUROPE LOOKS ON 84 CHAPTER VI. "PERDICARIS ALIVE, OR RAISULI DEAD" . 107 CHAPTER VII. "A BATTLESHIP TO PLAY WITH" 136 CHAPTER VIII. THE SCHOOL QUESTION 153 CHAPTER IX. ROOSEVELT GAMBLES 167 CHAPTER X. "THE PRIMACY OF THE WORLD" 183 FOOTNOTES 207 BIBLIOGRAPHY 232 iv INTRODUCTION "It is said ... in some quarters that America, being so distant a Power, can have no good reason for inter- ference; but that, surely, is /77 matter for her own decision, not the decision of Europe. She has as much right to her own ambitions, her own purposes, and her own complaints as any other Power. Seated on two oceans, with unlimited wealth, and a population possibly more patriotic than that of any white State, her weight must be felfc m every corner of the world. There was nothing unusual about this editorial opin- ion which appeared in the influential English periodical The Spectator during the summer of 1904. The imperialistic im- pulse held full sway in the world The Spectator ' s readers knew, and the casual racism and unapologetic acceptance of Europe's right to exert its power across the globe was not questioned. This was also a time when diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain were becoming in- creasingly warm after over a century of thinly veiled antago- nism, and, for the most part, Britons were now looking at Brother Johnarhan as an undeclared ally in a world in- creasingly divided by potentially dangerous alliances. Wnat was exceptional about the editorial was that it did not refer to the United States in the Caribbean or South America as one might have expected; nor did it concern American penetration in the Orient — the "ambitions^' which were alluded to lay in Europe, specifically in the Mediterranean. The United States had, in a sense, taken on the status of a world power with its victory over Spain in 1898, and in the acquisition of a fairly substantial colonial burden in the Caribbean and the Far East. But what was the basis upon which this new world power rested? The American army at the turn of the century was a small force composed mainly of regiments more skilled in Indian fighting than in modern war- fare. A large, unwieldy and inefficient militia system existed, but it was an anachronism in the tv/entieth century and could not compare with the well-trained conscript armies of Europe. Only in its navy did the United States possess a respected tool which gave substance to its newly gained great power status. In an age lacking air power and interconti- nental ballistic missiles it was the battleship which was the principal agent of national pride and aggrandizement. When Theodore Roosevelt became President in late 1901 it was the navy to which he turned as the vehicle for his diplomacy. The fleet was to be his "big stick." At first Roosevelt proceeded cautiously. He pushed through Congress legislation for the construction of many new battle- ships and armored cruisers, and he began bringing the navy's scattered warships together in the Atlantic as a single powerful force. During the winter of 1902-03 this fleet VI held the navy's first peacetime maneuvers in the Caribbe an. and by the summer of 190 3 Roosevelt's battleships were con- ducting naval exercises off the Azores in the mid-Atlantic. All of this prepared the way for a naval display which would dwarf anything similar in the past, and which would take the American navy in full force into the Mediterranean Sea. During the summer of 1904 a total of fourteen warships, along with a number of support vessels, were to embark on this cruise; the largest demonstration of United States naval power ever seen outside of the Western Hemisphere. The heart of the fleet would be the six battle- ships of the Battleship Squadron, the single most powerful unit the navy possessed. These were the navy's newest and best armored vessels, and comprised over one-half of its strength in first-class warships. The cruise would serve a number of purposes, both diplomatic and practical. It would give to Europeans a first-hand exhibition of American naval strength. If Roosevelt was to participate on a basis of equality with Europe he would have to establish the robustness and reach of American naval power, and what better way to do this than a voyage by a powerful war fleet off the coast of Europe.