Studies in Intelligence (1999) Secret

Trying To Warm Up the A Futile Fling With Sexspionage in Austria (S)

Kevin C. Ruffner

In his book on sex and , Allen Dulles remarked, "I think it is DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY David Lewis write.s that "sex and spy- worldwide. As long as there is sex, it ing have always been intimately is going to be used." 4 Dulles INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CENTRAL involved. Not only are prostitution refrained from discussing whether the SOURCESMETHODSEXEM PT ION 38211 and espionage two of the oldest pro- CIA used sex as a means of gaining NAZI WAR CR IMES 01 SCLOSORE AC1 fessions, they are also among intelligence, but he did admit that DATE 2007 mankind's most secret and covertly the CIA could not compote with influential activities."' During the the KGB for using sex as a bait for Cold War, the Warsaw Pact countries information. (U) used sex as a key weapon against Western targets. No longer the stuff In 1981, a veteran CIA officer com- of Mara Hari, the 's KGB mented on the difficulties of using During the Cold War, and East Germany's Stasi in particu- sexual approaches with Soviet intelli- the Warsaw Pact lar took "sexspionage" to ncw limits. gence officers stationed overseas: The Communists trained male and countries used sex as a female agents, known as "ravens" and From what [little/ we have key weapon against "swallows," respectively, to attract learned around the globe, they are unsuspecting Western politicians, sci- not restrained by a puritan sexual Western targets. . . entists, intelligence and military ethic only recently dissolving in personnel, and even secretaries. Tak- The Wests efforts at Western society but their firnica- ing advantage of basic human sexual blackmail, vulnerabilities, the Russians and their tions and adulteries are, fir the however, proved allies used these "Romeo" operations most part, confined to the Soviet to extract some of the West's most colony. A man can sleep with a generally halfhearted sensitive secrets.- (U) colleague's wiR much more and unsophisticated. securely than he can have an Western intelligence services were not affair with an outside woman, yet oblivious to the fact that sexual most affairs on the record are with 99 entrapment was a two-edged sword single women. Some overt homo- that could also be used against the sexualt are kept on the payroll for Soviets. The West's efforts at sexual their obvious operational attrac- All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis blackmail, however, proved generally tions.. Being overt, they cannot be expressed in Studies In Intelligence are those of halfhearted and unsophisticated. The blackmailed fir their homosexual- the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Pro fumo affair in Great Britain dur- ity. Sex and money are the main Intelligence Agency or any other US Government ing the early 1960s is the best known handles for the KGB": recruit- entity, past or present. Nothing In the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US attempt of a Western service to use ment offoreigners: Neither is an Government endorsement of an article's factual sexual attraction as a tool to entice a effective weapon against it. 5 (U) staternente and Interpretations. Soviet intelligence officer during the Cold War. The attempt failed, and The CIA, in fact, used sex infre- the ensuing scandal contributed to the quently as an intelligence too1. 6 In Kevin C. Ruffner is on CIA's History downfall of Prime Minister Harold contrast to media speculation and a Staff. MacMillan in 1963. 3 (U) few random cases that came to light during the Congressional investiga- CL BY: 2196985 When asked about sexual entrapment CL REASON: 1.5c tions in the 1970s, the Agency DECL ON: XI by intelligence services in the midst of found sexual entrapment to be DRV FROM: HUM 4-82 the Profumo scandal, former DCI difficult to manage and often

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counterproductive. REDCAP, an We should know the characteris- trouble for political, criminal, or per- early CIA project aimed at inducing tics, habits, weaknesses, (whether sonal reasons; and the blackmail Soviet defections, demonstrated sex or alcohol), places of resi- approach. Cutouts could be useful some of the problems associated with dence, restaurants they frequent, for each of the four approaches. 1° (5) sexspionage. (S) shops they patronize, names and addresses of their secretaries and Sergei Lvovich Shebalin appeared to mistresses ifany. We should even- be an excellent candidate as a RED- REDCAP tually be in a position to find CAP cutout. The son of an admiral those in real trouble, who of them in the Russian Imperial Navy, Sheba- As US-Soviet relations became are fearfid of being recalled. lin attended schools in Leningrad and increasingly hostile by the late 1940s. Once we spot them, we can joined the Red Army in 1939. By the the United States realized that it approach them and win their time of his capture near Stalingrad in lacked intelligence about Soviet inten- confidence. We must first find 1942, Shebalin had been promoted to tions and capabilities in Europe. 'The out who of them are in mess, captain and commanded a battery of Iron Curtain made it even more chal- whether they be in embassy, con- rocket artillery. Spending only a brief lenging, to obtain information about sulate, or purchasing mission. time in German captivity, Shebalin the Soviets: In 1951. CIA launched Each must be dealt with on his became the adjutant to Andrei Vla- Operation REDCAP, "a systematic own merits, in accordance with sov, a Soviet general who raised the and concentrated program of penetra- his character, temperament, men- Russian Liberation Army (ROA) to fight with the Nazis against the Sovi- tion and defection inducement tal equipment, and background. ets. In this position, Shebalin was operations directed at Soviet official They must be approached indi- closely connected with Vlasov's installations outside the USSR." The vidually by our best trained men efforts to recruit Russians to take up new program, expanding on earlier ad who have all the imagination, arms against Communism. 11 (S) hoc efforts to recruit Soviets, had the personality, ingenuity, and lin- following objectives: guistic ability to contact these men after we have finind out all we • Agent recruitment in place for local possibly can about them. 9 (S) intelligence and counterintelligence coverage.

Sergei Lvovich Shebalin • Agent recruitment in place for USSR coverage. I was not easy to approach Soviet • Immediate defection for intelligence officials in the early 1950s. lan- procurement. guage barriers aside, Soviets posted ahrrad distrusted Western motives anu were warned by their own secu- • Agent recruitment for return to the rity services to have no contact with USSR under official cover. Americans, in particular. To over- come these obstacles, the Agency • Immediate defection for employ- used "cutouts" and friendly liaison ment as an agent to be dispatched services as a means of establishing under illegal cover to the USSR. 8 IS) contact with Russians and other Soviet Bloc personnel. The Agency Sergei Lvovich Shebalin, 1954. CIA photo. The program focused on individual used four types of approaches: the (S) Soviets posted outside Soviet terri- "cold" approach; the approach based tory. especially in occupied Austria on information that the target desired In the spring of 1945, Shebalin barely and Germany. .k 1952 paper made to live outside of the USSR; the escaped from the Russians and sought the following observations: approach that the target was in refuge behind American lines.12

44 Secret Secret Sexspionage 6 6 Because of the high concentration of Soviet troops around Vienna, Shebalin avoided forced repatriation GRALLSPICE by the Americans to the Soviet Union the Agency expected where. no doubt, he faced certain that it could readily In January 1952, Headquarters death For his anti-Communist, pro- exploit the citys approved Vienna Operations Base's Nazi activities) ." He moved around proposal to use Shebalin in its RED- southern Germany using various underworld CAP program and gave him the new names and made his living on the connections. operational cryptonym of GRALL- black market.' 4 German and Ameri- SPICE. 2° The Agency backstopped can authorities arrested Shebalin as a Shebalin as a German national work- VCrhite Russian collaborator in 1945 9 ing in Vienna as a representative of a and again in 1946 for using several German firm purchasing surplus US aliases and having different identity preferred to go to Berlin because of Army materiel for resale in Ger- papers. The US Army's Counter his familiarity with the city during many. This cover allowed Shcbalin Intelligence Corps (CIC) also raided the war, was assigned the following to work with local black-marketers in Shebalin's house in Memmingen in targets: some minor money-changing deals •the fall of 1948. 1 ' (S) and to move freely about the city.21 His monthly Agency salary was $200 • Exploration of Vienna black-market plus 1,000 Austrian shillings. He lit June 1951, the Agency recruited channels for REDCAP possibilities. Shebalin as an agent to handle cross- received another 800 Austrian shil- border balloon operations in coopera- lings per month For housing expenses tion with a Russian emigre • Exploration of the Vienna under- as well as extra funds and supplies for organization in Germany. The world for possible REDCAP operational purposes. Shebalin's Agency observed that Shebalin "loves contacts. Russian wife, whom he married in adventure and interesting deals, loves 1947, remained in Germany with their young daughter because the the black market and plays it with • Spade work and contact man for spe- Agency felt that their presence in rare skill," and was "a combination of cific Austrians already in contact with Austria would harm Shebalin's cover. a sincere anti-Bolshevik and is a one or more Soviets.18 (S) black-marketeer.” 1 6 (S) Consequently, the Agency also paid a small per diem co provide for Sheba- Specifically, CIA wanted Shebalin to lin's family in Germany. 22 (S) Shebalin, who spoke native Russian and excellent German, was deemed make contact with Soviets dealing in the black market as well as with prosti- "reliable" and "genuinely anti-Com- Shebalin's arrival in Austria in mid- munist" after undergoing Agency tutes serving Soviet civilian and April 1952 was less than auspicious testing. Before his recruitment, he military personnel in Vienna. Like and, perhaps, foreshadowed his perfor- had worked for the Amt Blank, a pre- Berlin, the Allies shared occupation mance for CIA; the local police sectors in Vienna—a city in the heart decessor to the West German arrested him as he entered Austria. En of the Soviet-occupied zone of Aus- route to Vienna from Munich, Sheba- Ministry of Defensc. 17 In short. he fit the mold of what the Agency tria. Because of the high lin had to pass German and Austrian concentration of Soviet troops around border controls. At the Salzburg train needed in 1951 CO launch the RED- Vienna, the Agency expected that it CAP program. (S) station, an Austrian official (who had could readily exploit the city's under- served with German Army intelligence world connections. But CIA's during the war) grew suspicious attempts to use Vienna prostitutes as because Shebalin claimed to be a Ger- Operational Tasks possible contacts has thus far fallen man merchant but used outdated US through, largely because we have been Army travel documents to cross into In late 1951, the Agency decided to unable to find a reliable Austrian to Austria. The Austrian then opened send Shebalin to Vienna, Austria, exploit this possibility." Shebalin's Shebalin's baggage and discovered a where he would serve as a "contact own black-market experience in Ger- pistol, whereupon Shcbalin was taken ;nan" and "spotter in the Vienna many seemed a perfect match for his into custody. The Austrian police later REDCAP program." Shebalin, who projected mission in Vienna. (S) released him to the local US Army

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CIC office in Salzburg, which then can intelligence service] in the Through the summer of 1952 C handed him over to CIA's Salzburg Vienna area and that occasional _jind Shebalin considered Operations Base. Shebalin then success could be expected. (5) various schemes for gaining access to returned to Germany to await better Soviets in Vienna, including mailing documentation.' (S) provocative letters to a Soviet officer Shcbalin thought that "it might be in the hope that the fabricated infor- sounder to recruit a number of girls mation would fall into the hands of with the proper mental and physical Soviet intelligence. Faced with the Shebalin in Vienna attributes and then to assist them to incriminating evidence as spelled out establish contact with selected Sovi- in the letters, the officer would be left Shebalin's arrest compounded earlier ets." Both and Shebalin with no choice but CO defect. (S) delays, and he did not arrive in felt that this approach offered "an Vienna until early Ju^e 1952, when excellent chance For success" and Another plan proposed to invite a he flew from Munich to the Austrian was "ideal if suitable girls could be Soviet officer to an American billet or capital. At his first meeting with r discovered."25 (5) his case officer in Vienna, safehouse, place him in a compromis- the two Jdiscussed . how Shebalin ing position, and then have Shebalin, Shebalin proposed that he enroll in a would operate in Vienna and his gen- dressed as a Soviet officer, enter the summer school as "an excellent eral targets. Shebalin said he could - room and place the real Soviet under opportunity to allow him to come approach Russians in Vienna by pre- arrest. The real Soviet's American into normal contact with Austrian tending to be an Austrian door-to- host would then call the CS Army girls, who might be of operational use, door salesman peddling lipstick, military police and have Shebalin and also to establish a circle of Aus- nylon stockings, and other items to arrested for "trespassing" in the trian friends on a level most likely to wives in the Soviet housing areas. American sector. At this point, the be operationally productive." 26 In Likewise. Shebalin felt that he could American host would offer all assis- fact, Shebalin had already made the meet Soviets by frequenting certain tance to the Soviet, still shaken from acquaintance of an Austrian-born Viennese cafes. When the subject of his near escape with the MCB (pre- woman, the wife of an American sol- illicit liaisons between Soviet officers decessor to the KGB). dier in Vienna, who lived above and Austrian women came up. She- said that although these plans "may Shebalin's apartment. At hearing this balin, according to his case officer, seem a bit fanciful and perhaps Holl- news, 3 decided to have She- expressed "real enthusiasm. -24 ,S)( - woodish...it allows us to utilize the balin change apartments to avoid most important weakness .nherent in becoming, too familiar with the the Soviet system—the fear of just In a subsequent meeting, residents.- 7 (S) such a situation which is always possi- and Shebalin expanded on me idea of ble."29 (S) using Austrian women as a bait to entice Soviet personnel. In his notes In a review of Shebalin's first weeks after one meeting, r.. _a wrote: in Vienna, 3 commented that he "appears to De an exceedingly A New Case Officer valuable asset for our REDCAP oper- GRALLSPICE was in complete ations in Vienna." Shebalin's In the meantime, Shebalin placed agreement that the exploitation of knowledge of the Soviet mentality, advertisements in Viennese newspa- Soviet-mistress relationships had his attention to detail, and his will- pers looking for a female Russian- by far the best chance for success. ingness to approach targets, whether language tutor and a maid while he He said that he did not feel that Austrian women or black-market spent his time getting to know the the use of prostitutes was particu- operators, all highlighted his impor- city. He discovered that a large num- larly worthwhile. The difficulty tance co American intelligence. His ber of young Soviet women lived in of sporting such Soviet-Austrian operational deployment had pro- Vienna, "many of whom seem to be mistress relationships was dis- gressed slowly because C very bored and capable of being cussed. and ,[ apointed wanted co resolve Shebalin's cover picked up." 3() Shebalin al:o inter- out that such sporting was the problems and to get a better idea of viewed an Austrian prostitute about ,function of the entire ,4/5 fAmeri- his strengths and weaknesses. 28 (S) the habits of her Soviet and Ameri-

46 Secret Secret Sexspionage

can customers, and he visited one of Jalso faced limitations in using At the beginning of 1953, Shebalin's Vienna's hotels where the woman Shebalin. In his first monthly report, life took a dramatic change. On 1 Jan- conducted her basiness. 31 (S) the American case officer noted that uary, Edward Harper, the American "we are still trying to keep GRAN,- vice consul in Vienna, was approached In late August 1952, C— SPICE busy while at the same time by a man who asked for directions to turned over control of Shebalin to a devoting a great deal of thought to the American Military Commission. new officer, giving him a chance to sink his teeth Harper offered to drive the man to the awho had just arrived in into a positive operational assign- office, but he refused, and he gave Vienna from an assignment in Ger- ment." C warned that "we Harper a letter to deliver. Later that many. c_ immediately hit it off cannot expect to keep him satisfied for day, Harper opened the letter and with Shebalin because of C._ much longer just letting him hypothe- found that it was written in Cyrillic. excellent Russian- and German-lan- size." Just months after bringing Realizing that the letter could be guage. skills. The departing Shebalin to Austria, the Agency real- important, Harper went :o the Ameri- Shebalin co be ized that "GR,kLI,SPICE is at an can Consulate and reported the patient because "the development of obvious disadvantage with regards to incident to the duty officer.36 (C) secure defection-type operations developing any likely candidates him- necessitated a great amount of plan- self; first, because he has arrived in Shortly afterwards, E ning and checking, recruiting, and Vienna with no contacts of his own the chief of joint operations at training before actual results could be and, second, because he is unable to Vienna Base, read the translated expected."32 (S) 'ass himself off as an Austrian—his letter: Russian accent is very noticeable." c_ _iadmitted that 'therefore we are Like C. j C 3 faced similar Jam a Soviet officer. I wish to torced to do thi: developing, recruit- problems of how to get REDCAP off meet with an American officer ing, and, to a certain extent, spotting the ground in Vienna and how to with the object of offering certain though GRALLSPICE can perform a employ Shebalin effectively. services. Time: 1800 hours. determined that it would he better to valuable function in the latter respect."34 (5) Date: I January 1953. Place: bring women from the American zones Plankengasse, Vienna 1. Failing of Germany or Austria to Vienna to this meeting, I will be at same target Soviets in the city. The women. who would be taught basic Russian, Pyotr Semyonovich Popov place, same time, on succeeding would be brought to the city "legally or Saturdays. 37 (C) quasi-legally for briefin g and carrying During September 1952, Shebalin out their mission." c.. _jwould pro- managed to keep active. He attended There was no way for the Americans vide the female agents with Prostitute the trade fair, where he purchased to know if this unusual offer was a Registration Cards using the names of Soviet cigarettes and other items for Soviet provocation. By the time that actual Viennese prostitutes. As far as the Agency. At the same time, he C_ .3 read the translated note, it was targeting Soviet officials in the Soviet cased Viennese cafes, hotels, and res- coo late to surveil the meeting place; zone of Vienna, C7 believed that it taurants suspected of being Soviet consequently, Vienna Base opted to would be more secure to go after exist- hangouts, and he met several women meet the letter writer on 3 January ing clandestine Soviet-Austrian liaisons who frequented them. Through 1953. 38 (C) because introducing outside female prostitutes would attract too much these women, Shebalin made the attention. Shebalin, as the go-between. casual acquaintance of a Soviet To avoid exposing an American intel- would recruit the women at such gath- officer. He also began interviewing ligence officer at this first meeting, erings as the Vienna Trade Fair, or several women who had replied to his directed C .3 to use GRALL- through newspaper advertisements. In ad for a maid. In October, Shebalin SPICE as the go-between. This addition. Shebalin pressed C. Jr° returned to Germany co visit his wife would buy time until a CIA case bring over a Young girl from (ler- and to obtain new identity officer not based in Vienna could many, who had been convicted of documents. While at home, he inter- conduct actual debriefings. C. juvenile prostitution, as his first viewed the young German woman as directed Shebalin to establish the subagent.33 (S) his first subagent..' 5 (S) bona fides of the unidentified letter

Secret 47 Secret Sexspionage

George Kiscvalter, as a US Ariny offiCer, 1946. CIA photo. (5)

interviewed him at the first meet- ings. Shebalin knew the Soviet Maj. Pyotr Semyonovich Popov. CIA photo. (S) officer by sight as well as by true name, position, and activity in writer and to ascertain the meaninc one of the CIA's greatest spies. As a Vienna. The Agency feared that the of his term "certain services." C _0 CIA agent from 1953 until his death Soviets might pay attention to Sheba- also wanted Shebalin to elicit the pre- in 1960, Popov, a REDCAP recruit- lin because of his own indiscretions sumed Soviet's motivations and to ment, provided a wealth of (his case officer had already warned obtain as much information about his information on Soviet military and Shebalin when "he childlessly and background as possible:" (C) intelligence organs and their world- dangerously extended his cover" in wide operations. 40 (C) Vienna). Shebalin's past record as a Nazi collaborator and Russian Libera- On the night of 3 January, Shebalin tion Army officer also marked him as met the mysterious individual at the a target for Soviet kidnapping. Con- appointed place. and then the two Exit Vienna, Enter Salzburg sequently, Vienna Base urged men adjourned to a safehouse where Shebalin's removal from Europe.4' and another CIA Shehalin's presence in Vienna became (C) °nicer monitored their conversa- increasingly dangerous as the Popov tion. After three meetings, George case developed. According to one Kisevalter. a CIA staff officer and Agency official in March 1953, In February 1953,C ,Daccompa- Russian speaker, took over from She- "GRALLSPICE's participation in the nied Shebalin to Salzburg where they balm. In rime, it became clear that C. {Popovi project poses an met C_ t, a young CIA Maj. (later lieutenant colonel) Pvotr existing and definitely negative secu- officer who had transferred to Salzburg Semyonoyich Popov. a GRU officer rity risk." Shebalin was intimately from Vienna in December 1952. In stationed in Vienna, would become familiar with Popov because he had their first meeting, C _jnoted that

48 Secret Secret Sexspionage

44 Once again, a new CIA case officer faced the dilemma of what to do Shebalin appeared of than aver- with this Russian agent. an informant stated that ShLoalin had age intelligence" and that he -displays been a director in the Soviet fisheries a more than usual affinity for the division and a colonel in the Red opposite sex." Perhaps drawing on 99 Army as well as a NICVD officer. word that he had heard from Vienna, The local CIC records also noted that observed that 'agent may also Shebalin was considered as pro-Soviet tend to be somewhat rash and indis- by other Russian displaced persons in creet in what he says and does, in reported in the summer of 1953, Bavaria. Through Army contacts, the which case it may be necessary to "due to the sensitivity of GRALL- Agency tried to track down the restrain agent in Salzburg, where the SPICE, he has not been used in any source of these allegations to deter- size of the town would work against operational capacity whatsoever since mine their legitimacy. 48 (S) such conduct.' (5) his arrival in Salzburg at the end of February 1953. GRALLSPICE's Once again, a new CIA case offica position in Salzburg has been that of Given the urgency to remove Sheba- faced the dilemma of what to do with a holding case, that is, to keep him lin from Austria, Salzburg pressed this Russian agent. Salzburg Base 'sweet' and comfortable until his emi- Headquarters for action.° As early appeared to be at loss of how to gration to the U.S." 46 (S) as October 1952, Frank G. Wisner, employ Shebalin, and it expressed CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, certain frustration because Vienna wrote the Secretary of State for infor- As early as 1951, Shebalin had Base initially failed to provide any mation regarding Shebalin's information from its files on its applied to the US Consulate in Munich for a visa, but this had been ineligibility for immigration to the agent.' 3 This meant that _had United Stares." By May 1953, C to ask Shebalin for basic biographical refused. After his departure from Vienna in early 1953, it became clear .3 chief of CIA's Soviet information that could easily have Russia (SR) Division, had also taken been obtained from his file.' In the to the Agency that Shebalin had to be the matter up with the Agency's meantime, Shebalin kept himself removed from Europe in order to Inspection and Security Division. busy by checking out houses for rent safeguard both Shebalin and particu- 3 wrote that "it has been deter- in the Salzburg area, although c larly Popov. The Agency felt that warned him not to enter into any Shebalin could still be productively mined that the entry and legalization rental agreements on his own. She- employed in the United Scans and of the subject in the United States balm alsoalso suggested that he might perhaps later in the Far East, where under Section 8 of Public Law 110, is travel to Linz to check out the black- his prior history was not known.41 highly desirable, the normal time market activities in that city and to (S) delay of several weeks even after the see if prostitutes there could be individual concerned receives his employed against the Soviets. Sus- ..3s1cnt a lot of time preparing Covert Security clearance precludes pecting that this trip might entail Shebalin's application for immigra- its use at this time." 51 Instead, more than simply sightseeing, c tion, coordinating his immigration 3 wanted the Agency to use mentioned in passing that it should status with Munich Operations Base -Special Procedures" co bring Sheba- be borne in mind that in any deal- and CIA Headquarters, clearing his lin and his family to the United ings with such girls the necessary record with the Army's CIC, and try- States and that the "legalization of precautions should be taken against ing to instruct him in the English the subject's residence will be com- contacting any disease." 5 (S) language and American history. At pleted after his arrival." 52 (S) the same time, ,C 3worked on reuniting Shebalin with his wife and Going to America daughter in Salzburg while taking Despite the high level of interest in care of his problems. Shebalin's getting Shebalin to the United States, Shebalin spent most of his time in immigration encountered numerous it was a laborious and time-consum- Salzburg waiting to hear about his hiirdlts which proved frustrating for ing process. Meanwhile, Shebalin's application to immigrate to the C _D For example, the US Army in presence in Salzburg created unfore- United States. As his case officer Germany had a 1948 report in which seen problems. (S)

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Shebalin's Indiscretions the young girl and reported it to his until it seemed to be back almost to newly arrived wife?' (S) normal."66 In mid-August, C _3 took up the issue of what to do with The Agency was aware that Sheba- Shebalin while waiting for his immi- lin's "wandering eye" was a threat to c_ .expressed his "great disappoint- ment' at Shebalin's behavior. He gration case to proceed. He proposed operational security in Salzburg. In to • C , Salzburg Base's April 1953. Shebalin rented a room said that the incidents had co be reported to Washington and that it chief of joint operations, that Sheba- in a cleared residence in Salzburg. could affect his efforts to move to the lin be assigned the task of spotting When C ac asked the Russian how "girls who would go to the Russian he enjoyed his quarters, Shebalin United States. C. 3also told Sheba- zone to try to pick up with Sovs for replied that he found it "very enjoy- lin that "it was definitely bad taste to the purpose of defection. These girls able." He added, "there is even a girl carouse with 16-year-old-girls" and cannot be regular prostitutes, but there...she is the owner's daughter. that he was forbidden to associate with her. Henceforth, Shebalin, his should be smart, up-righteous girls She is 16."" (5) case officer ordered, would "lead with a hig[h] degree of motivation." more than ever a life of complete "But," he added, "still they should Thar comment came back to haunt boredom and inactivity." In addi- have no objection to becoming a both Shebalin and his CIA handler. tion to reading, writing, studying Mata Hari."61 (S) _Jknew that his "agent's life is English, and taking care of his fam- quite boring in Salzburg. He has ily, Shebalin would record his daily C ads° thought that Shebalin nothing to do all day except read, events in a diary which he would give could meet Austrian businessmen to walk, study. and so forth. A continu- to C avery week. While C 3 see who in Salzburg had business rela- ous diet of such activity," expressed his displeasure about this tions in the Soviet zone. Finally, cautioned, "over a long peilou latest breach of security, he also noted EL 3asked his superior, "Have you understandably difficult, especially that Shebalin had had a hard time ever nad a bottle of beer at the Eulen- for a person like GRALLSPICE, who settling down after having "more or Spiegel restaurant? If so. have you is used to a more adventurous life. It less been in a struggle for survival for noticed that it is Czech beer imported is anticipated that more attention will about the last 10 years." 58 (S) into Austria. I would like to send be paid to agent's private life, his GRALLSPICE," cacommented, morale and female companionship. Several months after Shebalin admit- "out to see how that beer is brought because these facets will be most ted the facts of his relationship with in. Probably by train, but somebody directly affected by a _prolonged the girl, he told CIA officials in Sep- has to order the stuff and do corre- period of inactivity.")4 (s) tember 1953 that the grandmother spondence. It might prove to be a planned to report him to the Aus- Czech lead."62 (S) The arrival of Shebalin's wife and trian police as a black-marketeer and daughter in Salzburg in June created as having contributed to the delin- It did not take Shebalin long to iden- new headaches for c 3 55 Shebalin quency of a mino r unless he paid her tify one woman as a potential advised his case officer never to to keep quiet. While not certain as to candidate. At a meeting on 24 marry, but to aiways remain the seriousness of the threat posed by August, Shebalin provided his case engaged. s6 Even more troubling, the grandmother, the Base recom- officer with the name of a divorcee, Shebalin admitted in early July that mended to Headquarters that aged approximately 30, who was "not he slept with the young granddaugh- Shebalin leave Salzburg "as soon as a common prostitute, but still of ter of his former landlady. According possible." 59 (S) 'light conduct." He also learned to Shebalin, the girl had tried to run where the Eulenspiegel restaurant away from home on several occa- obtained its Czech beer, and he vis- sions. Shebalin even tried to help her Hanging Around ited the beer distributor to purchase a to escape from her grandmother and few bottles. 63 In addition co these illegally crossed over the German bor- Even before E ...learned about the tasks, t _ --ppproached Shebalin der to look at a hiy.-ie for wayward blackmail attempt, he reported that with the idea of writing several let- girls in Bad Reichenhall. Shebalin's his "agent's morale took a tumble as a ters in Russian that could be used to current landlady had seen him with result... however, it rose again slowly entice Soviet officers to defect." (S)

50 Secret Secret Sexspionage

Aktbilder pictures also bears out his ability for in displaced persons (DP) camps in clandestine work." 66 (S) Germany had already moved to the United States, while he and his fam- During a meeting at the Base's safe- r superiors at the Base balked at ily still waited. C Zadvised his house on 2 November 1953, A Shebalin's latest activities. Writing in agent to be patient and gave him asked Shebalin "if he knew where one the margins oft_ report, one make-work projects.69 At the same could procure pictures of naked Salzburg official commented that "the time, Salzburg pressed Headquarters women in Salzburg." Seeking the moralists at Headquarters may have for action on Shebalin's part to avoid photographs for another project, slight shock when they see G-1 his complete loss of confidence in the .3hought that Shebalin would be involved in pornography—maybe we Agency and possible "return to DP a good conduit for pornographic should have used the word art pic- circles Germany on own."/ 0 (S) material. Shebalin responded that he tures. Unrealistic as it is, there are believed that he could find these pho- responsible people at Hq who defi- tos through camera shops or houses At Christmastime, Shebalin returned nitely frown on the use of such 'nasty' to Germany with his family to visit of prostitution, hut that "such pic- methods in our ops." The official his mother-in-law in Memmingen. tures are usually passed from friend to added, "I am not advising that we During the holidays, his daughter fell friend since the local populace fears drop this sort of thing—on the con- ill, and she remained in Germany to that a stranger asking for such pic- trary—but when reporting it veiled recover. Shebalin returned to tures may be an agent of the local and otherwise. Victorian terms should Salzburg, where _...7asked him to CID [the US Army's Criminal Inves- probably be used. (Also, we have to list all of his contacts in the Austrian tigations Division.1"6' (S) protect our 1890 nicecics.)"6' (S) city. In mid-January 1954, Shebalin provided the names and basic bio- On 21 November, Shebalin reported graphical information on several that he had been able to obtain some The Koessler Case individuals with whom he had con- promising leads in obtaining the Akt- tact in Salzburg. 71 This simple bilder, a German term for Shebalin's procurement of the Akt- inquiry resulted in yet another coun- pornography, that C _asought. bilder was his final operational terintelligence concern. (S) Putting an advertisement in a local activity in Salzburg before he and his Salzburg newspaper, Shebalin family departed Austria. For the rest Among the four names that Shebalin received 12 responses offering vari- of 1953 and into early 1954, Sheba- provided to E _]the Russian ous forms of Aktbilder of wh ich lin continued his English lessons with reported that he was well acquainted Shebalin felt that three were credi- his case officer while also studying with Gertrude Koessler, a young Aus- ble. C. _Dinformed his agent not to American history and government in trian woman employed by the contact the dealers directly and to preparation for his move to the Salzburg city finance office. Seeing obtain whatever photographs were United States. In the meantime, this, C _a superior penned, available. C jwrote to his superi- c 3 organized Shebalin's finances "Exactly what is the relationship? Is ors that his "agent's energetic way in and converted the Russian's Austrian G-1 laying her? On basis of his past which he went about procuring the funds into American dollars. The propensities, I would think it pornographic photographs would evi- Agency offered Shebalin a six-month likely." 2 The young woman visited dence his desire and his ability for contract at the rate of $3,700 and per Shebalin on several occasions, claim- larger operational tasks than he has diem while in a travel status. Sheba- ing to be a student and a writer for a had to do in Salzburg. Case officer lin would also earn 10 days of annual student newspaper, and sne even gets the feeling that agent realizes leave but no other benefits beyond asked Shebalin if he spoke Russian. only coo well that he has been in employment assistance at the termi- Coupled with other suspicious activi- Salzburg for nine months with hardly nation of the contract. 68 (S) ties,C 3 grew concerned about the an y activity and that when he is given girl's real motives. 73 This marked the such a small task as procuring porno- For the most part, Shebalin's time in beginning of a rather lengthy attempt graphic pictures he takes it to heart Salzburg proved uneventful, but frus- by the Agency to interrogate the and gives it his all to do the job." trating. His immigration paperwork young woman; Salzburg Base's efforts C 3 felt that "agent's secure method moved slowly, and Shebalin even proved fruitless as late as August ot handling the procurement of these lamented that all his Russian friends l954/

Secret 51 Secret Sexspionage

A New World means of targeting Soviets outside the with Major Popov in early 1953. Soviet Union for in-place agent Consistently rated as one of the Within days of learning about Ger- recruitment and eventual defection. Agency's best assets, Popov's loss In reality, approaching Soviets in for- trude Koessler, Salzburg Base finally years later raised questions whether eign posts posed immense difficulties; received word from Headquarters he was tainted from the onset because approving the immigration of Sheba- hence, the Agency tended to use its he had been exposed to Shebalin, a own agents to make these initial con- lin and his family under Section 8 of contract agent. (S) US Public Law 1107'. C. -accom- tacts. Sergei Lvovich Shebalin presented himself as an excellent panied Shebalin, his wife, and By the mid-1950s, the Agency con- daughter as they flew from Salzburg REDCAP agent. Russian-born, She' cluded that sexspionage could not be to Frankfurt, where they transferred balm had served in the Soviet Army consistently or successfully employed on a military flight co Washington. and later as a leading anti-Commu- even in an occupied country like Aus- DC. Arriving at National Airport on nist officer in the Russian Liberation Army. Shebalin emerged unscathed tria. At the end of the Allied 5 FebruJ ry 1954. _a turned Shebalin and his family over to repre- from the war and settled in Ger- occupation of that country in 1955, many, where he, lived on the edges. sentatives of CIA's Domestic CIA reviewed many of the US Army's He drifted into espionage activities Operations Base. ' 6 Shebalin served counterintelligence operations. Like on contract with the Agency in and became one of the Agency's the Agency, the US Army had a Washington until the fall of 1954, agents in Austria. (S) defection program whose "target per- although the Agency quickly deter- sonalities were centered mainly in mined that it could not use the The Agency, however, could not Baden and Wiener Neustadt [in the Russian in an operational context in effectively employ Shebalin because Soviet zone!. Spotters and contact the United States or overseas. (S) he was out of his element in both personnel were usually of a low-level Vienna and Salzburg. While hc con- type such as prostitutes, barmaids, cocted numerous schemes to attract After that point, Shcbalin moved and black-marketeers." CIA noted Soviets, in reality, sexspionage simply with his family to Philadelphia, where that "The Army's defection opera- was not an American forte. It was a he was employed by a local manufac- tions never really seemed to have lesson painfully learned by Shebalin's turing company while studying at a gotten off the ground. Apart from case officers in Austria. local college. An Agency official vis- a Shebalin's third and final case officer the difficulty of the assignment, a ited SheQin in January 1959 and in Austria, observed that the Russian study of [project] files suggests two found him "making a successful and agent was a control problem despite reasons for the failures of these opera- satisfactory adjustment to the Ameri- his attractive attributes. "In gen- tions: the [project] case officers, as can way o'flife.' Agency files eral," C 3wrote, "a pretty close well as the agents, appear poorly ndicate that it had no further con- watch has to be kept on lent lest he trained; so much time was spent on tact with Shebalin after 1960; wander off on his own.'' (S) laborious investigations and compila- , CIA learned from a defec- ironicall y tion of data on Austrians in the target tor in 1972 that the Soviets had listed areas that little time was left to do an Shebalin as an American agent in a Using sex as part of espionage trade- craft requires discipline, training, equally systematic job on the Soviets classified KGB publication. The preparation, and control. it cannot in the area."80 (S) Soviets noted that Shebalin had be turned on and off using ad hoc worked with US intelligence in agents and prostitutes. Shebalin is a Vienna in N53 and that he lived in The Agency summarized that the Line case in point as he enjoyed sam- the United States in 1960. 78 (S) Army's "operations seemed never to pling the wares and ended up putting himself and the Agency in jeopardy. get out of the investigative stage and In the end, the Agency invested into the operational stage." 81 The Review and Assessment heavily with Shebalin with little same epitaph could be written for the direct results. Shebalin proved use- Agency's use of Shebalin and its own During the early 1950s, CIA's RED- ful in only one unexpected case when stillborn sexspionage efforts in CAP projecr appeared to be a good he handled the first Vienna meetings Vienna and Salzburg. (S)

52 Secret Secret Sexspionage

Notes Ivanov with Gcnnady Sokolov, The C. [)0/CIC/OG/ Naked Spy (London: Blake Hard- PRB files. (S) backs, Ltd., 1992), pp. 71-72, 87- 1. David Lewis. Sexspionage: The 9 1 ; Alfred Thompson Denning, 7. Throughout the /are 1940s and early Exploitation ofSex by Soviet Intelli- Lord Dennings Report Presented to gence New York: Harcourt Brace 1950s, CIA attempted to infiltrate Parliament by the Prime Minister by agents into Soviet territory. This and Jovanovich, 19 76), p. 3. See Command of Her Majesty September also Markus Wolf with Anne McEl- project, known generically as RED- 1963 (London: Her Majesty's Sta- SOX, failed in most cases. For a yoy, Man Without a Face: The tionery Officer, 1963): (U) Autobiography of Communions discussion of the evolution of one Greatest Spymaster (New York: such operation to penetrate the Times Books, 19971. pp. 123-150. 4. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, Soviet Union, see Kevin C. Ruffner, 1L The Invisible Government (Kew "Cold War Allies, The Origins of York: Random House. 1964), pp. CIA's Relationship with Ukrainian 254-55. (U) Nationalists," in Michael Warner 2. Christopher Andrew and Oleg and Scott Koch, editors, Central Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story 5. Harry Rositzke, The KGB: The Eyes Intelligence: Fifty Years of the CIA outs_ Foreign Operations /inn Lenin o f Russia (Garden City: Doubleday (Washington, DC: CIA, 1997). (S (Mrbachev (New York: Harper St Co., 1981), p. 208. For classi- NF) Perennial, 1990), pp. 450-452. For fied reporting on the sex lives of a lengthy discussion of Soviet moni- Soviet intelligence officers. see 8. CIA History Staff, C._ toring the sexual activities of Western diplomats over a 20-year period, as related by a KGB defec- tor. see '= DO/ sC.IC/OG/PRB This study is on file at the CIA History Staff and at DO/ CIC/OG/PRB. (S) J-60/(760G/ Plk13 files: and FBI Intelligence Divi- 9. !bid. pp. 14-15. sion, C as DO/CIC/OG/PRB (S NF) 10. Ibid. p. 29. 3. Questions remain as to whether , the British chiro- 11. Shebalin was born in 1920 in Len- practor. artist, and socialite, worked DO/CIC/OG/PRB files. ingrad as Rostislav Lvovich Antonov fir the British Security Service (MI- (S) (his father had changed the family 5) or whether he was being used by name after the Russian Revolu- tion). Antonov, in turn, took Capt. Yevgeny Ivanov, Soviet assis- 6. A review of several CIA cases during Shebalin (his mother's maiden tant naval attache in London and the 1960s involving sexual entrap- name) in 1950. For derails on GRU officer, as an "unrecruited ment and Soviet personnel offered the Vlasov and the ROA movement, see agent." Ward's introduction of three insights: sexual relations Sven Steenberg, , a young British between Soviet men and non-Soviet Vlasov, trans. by Abe Farbstein (New York: Alfred A. "showgirl," to both Ivanov and John ‘vomen, especially prostitutes, are Knopf, 1970) and Jurgen Thor- Profumo, the British Secretary of not uncommon; these relations may wald, State for War, proved incendiary. reflect a mechanism of escape from The Illusion: Soviet Soldiers in trans. by Richard Both men fell swa y to Keeler's some persistent problem or exces- Hitlers Armies, and Clara Winston (New York: charms. Ivanov later wrote, "Yet the sive or compulsive sexuality; and Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975). very fact that both my and Jack Pro- that sexual liaison between a Soviet (U) fumds lover was a potential trump and non- Soviet woman is not an card in any future game involving automatic "vulnerability," but may the ill-fated Secretary of State for be considered a "susceptibility" 12. Shebalin's escape from the Soviets is War." Shortl y afterward, the entire because it affords an avenue of recounted in Steenberg, pp. 203-211 case unraveled with Ward's arrest, approach for assessment and manip- and Thorwald, pp. 295-299. (U) trial, and eventual suicide; Ivanov's ulation. a departure from Great Britain; and 13. In fulfillment of the terms of the Prolumds resi gnation. Yevgeny Yalta Agreement, the Americans

Secret 53 Secret Sexspionage

repatriated over a million Soviet 15. Biographical details of Shebalin ls life CIA soldiers who had been German pris- are found in Chief of Station, ARC. (S) oners of war, forced laborers, as well Karlsruhe to Chief. Foreign Divi- as members of the Vlasov Army to sion M and Chief, Foreign Division 21. Shebalids cover was periodically Soviet forces in 1945. By August of S, "Transmittal of PRQ Part I for updated and expanded daring the that year, the US Arm y had returned Sergei Lvovich Shebalin," 29 Octo- time that he lived in Vienna and over 90 percent .,f the Soviet citizens ber 1951, NIGMA-7327, (Secret), in later in Salzburg. He faced continu- in the American zone in Germany. DO Records. Serzei .Lvovich Sheba- ous scrutiny from Austrian officials The remainder, estimated at nearly lin, File C (Secret). 40,000, refused to be returned to (Hereafter cited as Shebalin, File due co questions about his travel documents. For example. see their homeland. American soldiers C Russian informants C "Meeting with forcibly returned these Russians. told the Army that Shebalin had GRALLSPICE on 16 June 1952 man y of whom were former Vlasov Soviet propaganda material in his Contact Report No. 4," 26 June Army members. An unpleasant task, house; instead, the raid revealed scv 1952, M11/7751, (Secret), in DO the forceci repatriation of thousands eral suitcases of vodka that Shebalin Records.. of Russians to the Soviet Union by planned to sell on the black mar- C CIA ARC. (5) the Western Allies in 1945-46 ket. (S) remains controversial to this day. Earl F. Ziemke. The U.S. Army in the 16. Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, 22. Chief of- Station, Vienna to Chieff. Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 FDM, "Transmittal of PRQ, Part!) FDM and Chief, PDS, "Project (Washington, D(;: US Armv Cen- of CACH1NNO 4," 31 July 1951, Outline of CATARATA," 5 Decem- ter of Military History. 1975). MGMA-6603, (Secret), in Sheba- ber 1951, MAVA-9998, (Secret). pp. 284-291 and 413-421. (1..;) lin. File C (S) and C “GRALLSPICE," 11 September 1952, MIL/8673, 14. Among his pseudonyms. Shebalin 17. Shebalin may have also worked for (Secret), both documents located in used the name of Serge; Frohlich in the Gehlen Organization, the prede- DO Records, C. mid-1945. Ironically, the real Ser- cessor to the West German Federal CIA ARC. A copy of a eel Froehlich, a Baltic German, Intelligence Service, where he contract, dared 15 September 1953, served as Vlasov's German liaison debriefed returning German prison- signed by Shebalin is located in DO officer. After the war, Froehlich ers of war about Soviet missile Records, provided information to US intelli- C technology. For information on the _3 CIA ARC. (S) gence on the activities of Russian early years of the Gehlen Organiza- emigres in Bavaria, and he later tion. see Kevin C. Ruffner, "A worked for the nascent West Ger- Controversial Liaison Relationship: 23. Chief of Station, Vienna to Chief, man intelligence service. In 1951, American Intelligence and the Eastern Europe, "GRALISPICE Froehlich tried to recruit Shebalin to Gehlen Organization, 1945-49," Search by Austrian Customs and work for the Americans and later for Studies in Intelligence (Volume 41, Detention by Austrian Criminal the German Am: &wk. The two No. I, (997), pp. 69-84. (5) Police in Salzburg," 30 April 1952, men, who had known each other MAVA-I1159, (Secret), in DO since 1943, had fairly close ties IS. Chief of Station, Vienna to Chief, Records, C because of their work together in the FDM and Chief. FDS, "Project D CIA ARC. See also Vlasov Army. For further details, Outline of CATARATA," 5 Decem- Salzburg to Vienna, 16 April 1952 sce Directorate of Operations ber 1951, MAVA-9998. (Secret), in (Secret), in Shebalin, File C Records, Sergei Bernhardowitsch DO Records. C- (S) Froehlich, file C- 3 3 CIA ARC. A copy of (Secret). and "Froehlich and a the same document is also located in 24. C. "Contact Branch of the Amt Blank, ir.0 Shebalin, File C 3 (S) Report #1- GRALLSPICE, 5 June 1952," 16 June 1952, MIL/7623, "Meeting with GRALLSPICL on (Secret), in DO Records, C 12 July 1952," 9 August 1952, 19. Ibid. CIA MIL/8274, (Secret), in Directorate ARC. (5) of Records 20. Washington to Vienna, 10 January , CiA 1952, WASH 22115, (Secret), and .krchives and Records Center (here- Chief of Station, Vienna to Chief, 25. C._ "Meeting with after cited by document, DO FDM, "Assignment of Cryptonym." GR.ALLSPICE, 9 June 1952, Con- Records. job. box, and folder num- 14 .lanuary 1952, MAVA-10296, tact Report No. 2," 26 June 1952, bers„ind CIA ARC). (5) (Secret), in DO Records, C._ _3 MIL/7750, (Secret), in DO

54 Secret •

Secret Sexspionage

Records, C $4. Chief of Station, Vienna to Chief, 41. C Chief, Soviet Sec- jt, CIA ARC. :Si EE, "GRALLSPICE Progress Report • tion, VOB, to Chief of Mission, for August 1952," 3 September "soy/ I—Security' factors re C 1952, EAVA-3 1 (Secret). DO 26. a_ "Meeting with 30perations," 16 March 1953, Records, C GRAI. LSPICE on 12 June 1952 VIM/1985, (Confidential), DO Contact Report 3." 26 June 1952, .n CIA ARC. This report Records, Jc MI1.17754, ISecrett. in DC) contains two translated attachments .D CIA ARC. Years after provided by Shebalin on "Com- Rea-irds. Popov's arrest and execution, the c ments on the Use of Prostitutes" and • CIA ARC. IS) Agency prepared an assessment of "Summary of GRALLSP/CEs Sug- the case and examined whether gestions on How to Contact Popov's downfall could have beets 27. [ . "Meeting with Females in the Soviet Zone." (S) linked CO Shebalin. See C. GRALLSPECE, 23 June 1952, Con- tact Report No. 6," 27 June 1952, 35. Chief of Station, Vienna to Chief, L!7765. (Secret), in DO EE, "Progress Report for GRALL- Records. C D in DO Records C .CIA ARC. (St SPICE September 1952," 3 October J 1952, EAVA-389. (Secret). DO D. CIA ARC. A Records, C.- copy is also on file in the Counterin- 28. Chief of Station, Vienna to Chief CIA ARC. (S) telligence Center, Analysis Group. FE. -(;RALISPICE Progress (S) Report, June1952', 27 June 1952, 36. C ,"Memorandum for the MAVA-I 1586. (Secret), in 1)0 Records, Record," 15 March 1955, (Confi- 42. 0 3 rdA ARC. iS) dential), DO C. Chief of Operations, SOB, "Con- CIA ARC (hereafter tact with GRALLSPICE 1 on 19 cited a. t MFR, 15 March February 1953, Contact Report #1," 29. C Approaches 1955). The Popov case has been [no date, no file number:, (Secret). to Soviets,- 13 August 1952. MIL' recounted by former CIA officers in DO Records,. C 8294, ;Secret), DO Records. C William Hood, Mole (1.ondon: CIA ARC. (S) CIA Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982) ARC. (S; and John 1. Hart, "Pyorr Semyo- novich Popov: The Tribulations of 43.C. 30. C "Meeting with Faith," Intelligence and National "GRALISPICE 1,27 February GR.-kLLSPICE on 11 August 1952." Seeririry, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 1953, (no classification provided), 21 August 1952, MIL/8347, 1997), pp. 44-74. Both Hood's DO Records, (Secret), DO Records, a hook and Hart's article obfuscate CIA ARC. (U) .0 . CIA Shebalin's identity—the first CIA ARC. 'S) person to meet Popov. Hood's depiction of Shebalin as Alex Koenig 44. C_ -Z "Contact with in Mole is especially vague (see pages GRALLSPICE I on 2 March 1953, 31. C , -. Meeting On 29-30 and 47-51). (C) Contact Report #6," (no date, no 14 August 1952," 21 August 1952, file number), (Secret), DO Records, Mu 8438, (Secret), C. 37. C "MFR," 15 March 1955 :1A CIA ARC. At this meeting, C, (Confidential). (C) ARC. (S) discussed in detail the different names that Shebalin had used since 32. 3 "Meeting of 38. Ibid. 1945. (S) iJ August 1952." 21 August 1952, MIL/8436, (Secret), DO Records, 39. Ibid. 45. C. 3 "Contact with GRALLSPICE 1 on 13 March, CIA ARC. (S) 10. Transcripts of Popov's interroga- Contact Report #9," [no date, no tions (including the first three file number), (Secret), DO Records, 33. a • meetings with Shebalin) and other C._ - Meeting of 22 August 1952." 26 information from this project are CIA ARC. The file is complete with August 1952. MIL/8475, ;Secret), found in DO Records, floor plans and photographs of pro- DO Records, _z CIA ARC spective houses that Shebalin CIA ARC. t 5) (Secret). reviewed in Salzburg. (S')

Secret 55 Secret Sexspionage

46. Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief 51 C Chief, SR Divi- Contact Report #18," [no dare, no EE, "GR_ALLSPICE 1: Progress sion, to Chief, Inspection and file number], (Secret), DO Records, Report for 13 April -31 May 1953," Security Division, "Sergei Lvovich 9 July 1952 [no file numbed. Shebalin," 19 May 1953, (Secret), in CIA ARC. (S) (Secret), DO Records, Shebalin. C_ This mem- , CIA orandum superseded c _3 8 54. Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief, ARC. (5) April 1953 memo ("Preferential FE, "GRA LLSPICE 1, Progress Entry into the United States of Set- Report for 13 April -31 May 1953," gei Lvovich Shehalin") to the same 47.C3 to Chief olMission. "Sov/I- 7 July 1952 [no file nurnber;, office. A copy of this memo is Securiry Factors re C (Secret), DO Records a located in Shcbalin Operation," 16 March 1953, VIM/ C_ CIA 1985. (Confidential). DO Records, (S) ARC. (5)

52. Section 8 of the Central Intelli- CIA ARC. See also Vienna to 55. C -0 Memorandum for the gence Agency Act of 1949 (later Director. 31 March 1953, Vienna Record. "Transfer of GRALISPICE amended as Section 7), also known 9784. (Secret), DO Records. C. Vs Wife to Salzburg," 11 June 1953 as the "One Hundred Persons Act," • CIA no file numbed, (Secret), DO stated that the DCI, the US Attor- ARC. (S) Records. C ney General, and the Commissioner „D CIA ARC. (S) of Immigration "shall determine 48. Munich co Salzburg, 20 March that the entry of a particular alien 1953. Mitn,kh 2887. (Secret). DO into the United States for perma- 56. C "GRALLSPICE 1, Records. nent residence is in the interest of Contact Report #28 - Meeting on CIA ARC. For SOB's national security or essential to the 12 June 1953," 12 June 1953 [no reaction to the news of the allega- furtherance of the national intelli- file number], (Secret). DO Records. tions against Shehalin in the Army's gence mission, such alien and his C_ files, six Salzburg to Frankfurt and immediate family shall be given .CIA ARC. (S) Munich, 12 March 1953, Salzburg entry into the United States for per- 1083, (Secret), in Shcbalin, C. manent residence without regard to This same cable is cited 57. C "Contact with their inadmissibility under the as Salzburg to Director, 13 March GRALLSPICE 1.7 July 1952[3] immigration or any other laws and 1953, IN 45697. (Secret), in Sheba- Contact Report #32" Ino date, no regulations, or to the failure to com- lin, C Shcbalin file number]. (Secret). no Reenrric ply with such laws and regulations answered the Agency's questions C._ pertaining to admissibility." The regarding this charge in a polygraph CIA ARC. (S) Director of Central Intelligence, examination. Sec Chief of Base, however, could only admit no more Salzburg to Chief, EE, "LCFLUT- than 100 aliens in a single fiscal 58. Ibid. TERING of GRALLSPICE I," 30 year. See John S. Warner, Acting September 1953, EASA-2174, General Counsel, to Chief, Fl, 59. Vienna to Director, 22 September (Secret), enclosing Chief of Base, "Laws Relating to the Central Intel- 1953, Salzburg 1725 (Secret), and Salzburg co Chief, EE, "LCFLUT- ligence Agency," 6 March 1953, Chief of Base, Salzburg :o Chief, TER Test olGRALLSPICE 1," 28 DO Records, C EE, "Blackmail Attempts on September 1953, EASA-2167. CIA ARC, enclosing GRALLSPICE 1," 24 September (Secret), DO Records. "Text and Explanation of the Cen- 1953, EASA-2166 (Secret), both • CIA tral Intelligence Act of 1949 as documents in DO Records, ARC. (S) C Amended, Provisions Pertaining to , CIA the Establishment of the Central ARC. (S) 49. Vienna to Director : 28 March Intelligence Agency from the 1953, IN 10543, (Secret), in Sheba- National Security Act of 1947 as 60. Chief of Base, Salzburg, to Chief, lin, amended, and a Compilation of c 3 (s) EE, "GRALLSPICE 1: Progress Extracts from Other Statutes Refer- Report for July 1953," 13 August ring Specifically to the Central 50. Frank G. Wisner, Deputy Director, 1953, EASA-1885 (Secret). DO Intelligence Agency or the Director Plans, to Secretary of State, ATTN: Records C of Central Intelligence." (S) Mr. Charles E. Lockett, "Sergey CIA ARC. Case officer Lvovich Schebalin," 24 October C Mcontinued to provide updates 1952, St-.crer), in Shebalin, C.. 53. C.- , "Contact with on the blackmail effort until Sheba- (S) GRALLSPICE 1 23 April 1953 lin departed Salzburg. (5)

56 Secret Secret Sexspionage

61. C “GRALLSPICE 66 ]to COPS, C Meeting 74. Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief, 1 . , Operational Activity," 12 August with G RALLSPICE 1 on 12 EE, "Gertrude Koessler, Suspected 1953, [no tile number, no classifica- November 1953- CR 351," IS Agent," 23 August .954, EASA- 600, DO Records C 16 November 1953, SIM/206. 3659, (Secret), with attachments, in D CLk.ARC. (s) (Secret), DO Records. C Shebalin C (S) CIA ARC. Shebalin providecC Ziwith 62. Ibid. C J made these operational a log detailing his efforts to obtain 75. C 3 Chief, SR Divi- requests of Shehalin on 14 August the photographs in addition to the sion, to the DCI, "Entry of Sergei 1953. C _aexplicitly directed the responses to his newspaper advertise- Lvovich Shebalin into the United Russian to "Tot the girls and obtain ment. (5) States under the Provisions of Sec- the necessary background informa- tion 8, Public Law 110, Eighty-first tion on them. He was to make no Congress," 4 January 1954, (Secret). 67. CO Meeting attemp t at recruitment." See c COPS, C in Shehalir. C. .3 See also 3. "GRAIL SPICE 1: Con- with GRALLSP10E 1 on 16 Direci,ir to Salzburg, 27 January tact Report 439." 20 August 1953. November 1953- CR #52." 16 1954, Director 35896. (Secret), in no file number]. (Secret). E., November 1953, SiM/209, (Secret), Shebalin. C. 2 (S) provided further guidance and cau- DO Record: C tioned him against approachin g girls -7-1 CIA ARC. (S) under the age of 20. See C. 76. C 3 to COPS, "GRALLSPICE 1 Final Report Concerning the Events - GRALLSPICE 1: Con- 68. Director to Salzburg, 23 November tact Report 441," no dare, no file 1953. Director 28077, (Secret). DO for the Period 25 January to 7 Feb- ruary 1954," 25 February 1954, number]. (Secret), both documents Records, .0 SIM/449, (Secret), in :ihebalin, C in DO Records, C. . CIA ARC. See also Chief CIA ARC. (S) ot Base, Salzburg to Chief of Base, (S) Vienna, "GRALLSPICE I 63.'(..,RALLSPICE 1: Finances," I December 1953, SOB/ 77. Chief, Contact Division, 00 to Contact Report #40 Meeting of 24 2399. (Secret), in the same folder. Chief, SR Division, "00/C Case August 1953, - 31 August 1953- (S) 16667 - Status Report on Sergei SIM/12, (Secret). DO Records C Schebalin," 16 .lanuary 1959, [no -3 CIA 69. C 3 to COPS, C 3 Meeting file number], (Secret), in Shebalin, ARC. (S) with GRALLSPICE 1 on 30 C (S) December 1953 - CR #57," 5 Janu- ary 1953, S1/v1133 I, (Secret), DO 6 to Chief of Operations, -CR Records 78. Counterintelligence Information #45—: Meeting with C. 3 CIA ARC. (S) Report, "Rostislav Lycvich Antonov GRALLSPICE 1 on 30 September ," 3 October 1972, 1953." 7 October 1953, SIM/102. SBSR-651, (Secret), in Shebalin, C. (Secret). DO Records. 70. Salzburg to Director, 30 December (S) .D1, CIA 1953, Salzburg 2107. (Secret). DO ARC. The defection letters pre- Records, C pared by Sbebalin are discussed in , CIA ARC. (S) 79. C J to COPS, "GRALLSPICE 1 later contact reports; a Final copy is Final Report Concerning the Events Found in Chief of Base, Salzburg, to for the Period 25 January to 7 Feb- Meeting Chief, EE, "Forwarding of GRALL- 71.C D to COPS," C. ruary 1954," 25 February 1954, with GRALLSPECE 1 on 14 Janu- SPICE 1 Defection Letter," 30 S1M/449. (Secret), in Shebalin, C December 1953, EASA-2719 ary 1954 - CR L#59," 20 January (S) (Secret), DO Records, C. 1954, S1M/375. (Secret). DO CIA Records,. C ARC (S) D CIA ARC. (S) 80. Chief of Station, Austria to Chief, EE, "C. ,J Operational 72. Ibid. Review," 28 July 1955, EAVA- 65. C to COPS, " 3 Meeting 11331, (Secret), DO Records, C._ with GRALLSPICE I on 2 Novem- LL ber 1953 - CR #50," 3 November 73. Salzburg to Director, 25 January ARC. (S) 1953, SIM/190. (Secret), DO 1954, Salzburg 2198, (Secret), DO Records. c Records, C 3 CIA ARC. (S) 2 CIA ARC. (5) 81. Ibid.

Secret 57