THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 30 16-30 July 2009

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-5 Electoral related violence AOG offensive actions are to experience an even split 5-7 Northern Region persisted writ-large and is increasing persistently in between this method and Western Region 8 expected to continue past the Wardak, Herat, Paktya, and IEDs during this period. election. During the period, Paktika. Increased AOG Eastern Region 8-10 Recent press headlines are we witnessed an RPG attack, activity and an extended touting the reported new Southern Region 11-13 attempted assassination, mul- IMF/ANSF joint operation issuance of the Taliban tiple instances of intimida- in Kunduz District are rais- ANSO Info Page 14 Code of Conduct. Prelimi- tion, and attempts to locate ing serious security con- nary information indicates election staff for abduction— cerns in Kunduz and sur- that the document may be all in relation to the country- rounding provinces. In the an attempt to influence YOU NEED TO KNOW wide electoral process. One south, Kandahar and Hel- international and domestic growing area of concern for mand appear to have hit a audiences, with particular • Electoral violence persists electoral security is now ‘saturation point’ in terms emphasis set upon mini- Kapisa, with AOG report- of AOG activity, but high • Conflict levels intensify mizing civilian casualties, edly making efforts to target IMF casualties continue to protecting prisoners from with AOG reliance on the process there (see page be reported. close-range attacks execution, and establishing 2). There is also increased Lastly, data show that AOG Mullah Omar’s dominance • Newly-issued Taliban reporting of a possible are reliant on conducting over the disparate group of Code of Conduct seeks to “spectacular” attack against close-range assaults on tar- AOG that claim to be Tali- protect civilians and cap- undefined target(s) in Kabul gets in all regions, with the ban. tives while submitting all ahead of the election. South being the only region AOGs to central control under Mullah Omar NGO DATA & TRENDS

ANSO is supported by NGO incidents and casualty rates in July were the highest of 2009, with 23 NGO inci- dents reported, including 5 NGO staff killed and 5 more injured. 75% of NGO incidents in July were attributed to AOG. 15 NGO staff have been killed so far in 2009. During this reporting period, 9 NGO incidents were reported, primarily in the Northern and Eastern regions. Incidents appeared to be both targeted and the result of unfortunate circumstances. In the case of the former, an NGO vehicle was ambushed in Balkh Prov- ince, with one staff member being executed and the other being seriously wounded. Khost also did not escape the spate of incidents, with another clinic being set ablaze and an NGO ambulance being stolen in separate incidents. (Past arsons of clinics in Khost were attributed to the Haqqani Network). Most NGO incidents, however, resulted from the general violence that occurs during an armed conflict. Thus, errant NGO rounds struck an NGO compound in Kunduz City; IEDs caused injuries and a fatality for NGO staff in Takhar and Samangan; and an NGO staff member was kidnapped in Samangan. Additionally, an NGO staff member was shot dead in Jalalabad City after a personal dispute, and another NGO employee in Badghis was shot several times when he resisted AOG demands that he provide them with transit, and he remains under medical observation. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL Year to Date 8 KABUL 50 This Report Period 0 Although Kabul remains relatively 40 quiet in terms of AOG-related assisting in the electoral process, 30 incidents, there has been a notice- which includes IO compounds. 20 able increase in the amount of The most likely form of an AOG 10

threat traffic being reported. Al- initiated attack will be a complex 0 though expected, considering the attack on a high profile target, one upcoming elections and the that is most likely involved in the electoral process. In addition, re- propaganda victory that could be AOG ACG garnered from a spectacular AOG porting indicates that the threat of attack on the national capital, kidnapping in the capital remains NGO staff should seek to avoid elevated. It is understood that is difficult to differentiate between AOG and GoA buildings, election-related AOG/ACG would intend to use ACG origin. Two IED detonations have been facilities, as well as organisations both international as well as na- reported in Districts 5 and 11, with a further tional NGO staff members as device being also discovered in District 5. KEY THREATS & CON- bargaining chips in any subse- Three rockets also impact in the Qalai Abdul CERNS quent negotiations, or to simply Rawof Area of District 9 on 24 July. In all in- Complex attacks against high- distract attention from the elec- stances there were no reported casualties. profile targets tions and discredit the govern- NGOs are reminded to ensure that all SOPs Armed Criminal Groups ment. are up-to-date prior to the election in case of a Abductions Despite the calm, there remains rapidly evolving security situation or in the an undercurrent of activity which instance of large scale civil disturbances.

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 2 50

This Report Period 0 40 Several incidents in the west of 30 the province, where traditionally the provincial capital. In addition NGOs conduct operations un- to the latest arrests, AOG public 20 hindered by security concerns, statements in both Kapisa and 10 have raised the possibility that Parwan concerning the election 0 there may be an increase in AOG have resulted in a confused pic- -initiated incidents ahead of the ture of any likely electoral violence due to their contradictory nature. election. In particular, three al- AOG ACG leged suicide bombers were ar- NGO are reminded to avoid all rested in Mahmudi Raqi on 25 official election sites and cam- July. Unconfirmed reports sug- paigning offices and residences in higher degree of awareness in the coming gest that the cell was intending to the weeks ahead. weeks as the arrests in Mahmudi Raqi and the attack official election targets in Of further concern in Kapisa is an attack on the ANP in Hisa-i-Awali Kohistan attack on an ANP vehicle on 29 are unlikely to be isolated incidents. KEY THREATS & CON- July in Hisa-i-Awali Kohistan. In the east of the province, AOG initiated at- CERNS Traditionally Mahmudi Raqi as tacks continue against primarily ANSF targets, AOG-ANSF clashes, especially well as Kohistan I and II have which include DACs, checkpoints, and con- in Tagab and Nijrab been isolated from AOG activities voys. Collateral exposure to attacks on ANSF Electoral related violence which have become increasingly and IMF remain a distinct concern in the east Rocket, IED and mine attacks prevalent in Tagab, Nijrab and and NGO should avoid both government Alasay. NGOs should maintain a buildings and ANSF and IMF convoys. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents PA RW AN PARWAN Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40 Parwan experiences periodic AOG activity; however, the vast rocket and RPG attacks targeting 30 majority of the few recorded inci- security forces. In the capital Cha- 20 dents are confined to the districts harikar, an attack on an ANP 10 of Bagram, Ghorband, Kohi Safi checkpoint on 23 July and an IED 0 and Sheikh Ali. These incidents attack on an ANP vehicle on 28 typically assume the form of IED, July are most likely linked to inter- factional feuding rather than AOG ACG AOG attacks. In both incidents, The main road through Parwan to Bamyan has KEY THREATS & CON- no casualties were reported. The CERNS been an expressed concern for NGOs follow- two events follow a trend of ran- ing a direct attack on an IO convoy in June; AOG-ANSF clashes, especially dom attacks on ANP checkpoints near Bagram Airbase however ,since then there have been no re- and convoys in the districts, one corded IED attacks against civilian vehicles in NGO-targeted criminal abduc- which has not yet translated into tion the province. NGOs are advised to maintain fatalities. IEDs in the Ghorband Valley vigilance along the road, especially through the Ghorband Valley area.

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 The districts of Kajran and Gizab 30 remain a concern following the underline the growing number and strength of AOG in the area. 20 large scale offensives in Helmand. 10 Although yet to threaten Nili, a On 16 July, AOG established a number of incidents in the south checkpoint in the Tamazan Valley 0 of the province have served to of Gizab, which is located only thirty kilometres from Nili. AOG manning the checkpoint were be- AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CON- lieved to be looking for GoA and the relative freedom of AOG movement in the CERNS election officials, most likely with south. High AOG infiltration into the intent to kidnap. In Kajran, It is most likely that the level and frequency of Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran three separate attacks on ANSF Low security presence AOG initiated violence will increase in the on 19, 20 and 24 July, involving weeks prior to the election. Standoff attacks on Clashes between AOG and two attacks on the DAC, and one locals, especially in the south Nili should also not be discounted due to the against an ANP convoy, illustrate proximity of AOG to the capital.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 2 50

This Report Period 0 40 The security situation in Logar of electoral related intimidation 30 Province has not changed signifi- 20 cantly since the last reporting pe- threats against election workers and candidates. The effect of 10 riod. The majority of incidents are 0 comprised of stand off attacks on these threats has ensured that vir- DACs and ANSF checkpoints, as tually all districts have failed to fill well as roadside IEDs and am- official election posts – mainly AOG ACG bushes on ANSF/IMF convoys those administrating the election the organisation, as well as turnout, for the along the Puli Alam-Kabul high- itself. Although it is too early to upcoming elections. speculate whether the posts across way. A further discernible trend Logar province maintains a strategically impor- in recent weeks has been the level the province will be filled in time for the election, the ability of tant location in the central region. Anti- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS AOG to intimidate those intend- government elements are using some of its districts as a logistics base to conduct opera- Abduction ing to apply for election posts and tions in neighbouring provinces. The districts Electoral-related violence earlier reported instances of gen- of concern in this province are Baraki Barak, AOG-ANSF clashes eral threats against the voting public could significantly disrupt Charkh, Khushi and Muhammad Agha.

NGO Incidents WARDAK WARDAK 100 Year to Date 2 80 This Report Period 0 Wardak continues to experience a 60 effort to exert a further degree of rise in the number of AOG initi- 40 control over the local population. ated incidents in all areas except 20 the traditionally tranquil districts Two events in particular illustrate 0 of Bihsud I and II. Although the the point. On 19 July in Chaki vast majority of incidents are di- Wardak, five local elders were rected against IMF and ANSF abducted, and on 25 July in the AOG ACG same district, AOG reportedly targets – specifically along the only be described as a concerted campaign to Kabul to Ghazni highway - the publicly hanged a man who was accused of a number of recent undermine the ANSF and GoA. In the last risk to NGO operations remains reporting period, five further attacks on DACs significant. abductions. The body was left hanging for three days following were reported. Typically, the attacks involved a A number of recent incidents sug- threats by AOG not to remove it mixture of small and heavy weapons fire and gest that AOG are moving be- and is the first recorded public occur during the night hours. The effects of yond their traditional tactics in an execution in the province this the attacks have virtually ensured a bunker year. Separately, in Jaghatu, Sayda- mentality within the ANSF in the district cen- KEY THREATS & CON- tres, with freedom of movement being severely CERNS bad and again in Chaki Wardak, curtailed. The DACs of Day Mirdad, Jaghatu, Abduction AOG, it has been reported, have warned locals to not to participate Nirkh and Chaki Wardak are the most af- Collateral damage from rockets fected. The number of attacks on DACs, as and IEDs in the election process. well as electoral associated violence, is ex- Intimidation efforts AOG attacks on DACs across the pected to continue over the following month. east and south of the province can

Please note: Graphs in this report are current as of 29 July 2009. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents attack in Marz Area, where the initial attack PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 took place. In light of the fact that the sus- This Report Period 0 pects were believed to be local, it could be Traditionally, Panjshir has re- presumed that the attack may have been the mained immune from AOG initi- casualties or significant damage to result of a grievance, rather than an AOG ini- ated incidents; however, on 22 the vehicle. Two days following tiated incident. July a RCIED struck an IMF pa- the incident, eleven local suspects trol in Khenj District, leaving no were arrested in relation to the

BAMYAN NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 50 40 This Report Period 0 Most of Bamyan remains quiet 30 and appears wholly amenable to area itself is reported to have little 20 NGO operations. Anecdotal re- or no security presence, nor medi- 10 porting suggests an increase in cal facilities, in the event of the 0 AOG activity—particularly IED need for such services. —in the northeast districts of On 26 July, an ANP check post Kahmard and Shibar. Also, the came under small arms fire in AOG ACG Kahmard Area, with no casualties putes over resources, rather than established being reported. AOG incidents in KEY THREATS & CONCERNS groups with a national agenda. While Bamyan the northeast of the province tend is mostly a safe district for NGOs, caution Increasing threat of IEDs/mines to be more related to anti- Armed robbery along roadways should be exercised in and around the Ghan- government sentiment and dis- dak Valley in the northeast.

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ Year to Date 8 KUNDUZ 50 This Report Period 1 An INGO found itself affected by 40 an airstrike that occurred near true nature and extent of AOG 30 Kunduz City, targeting AOGs but capabilities may not be revealed 20 until IMF/ANSF increase their being widely reported to have 10 presence and hence their exposure killed civilians. The INGO was 0 affected when stray rounds landed to them. Increased AOG activity JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL in its camp while AOG conducted in Kunduz (which both precipi- a raid on a nearby ANA camp tated the operation and came AOG ACG about in response to it) included near Khanabad. The centrepiece deavours, they are likely to end in bolstered complex attacks in Chahar Darra of an extremely busy reporting AOG sentiment and possibly heightened and Aliabad and an AOG success- period for Kunduz, however, has AOG activity. As a result, NGOs should fully severing the power lines sup- been an extended IMF/ANSF avoid unnecessary travel within and through plying electricity to Kunduz. joint operation which took place Kunduz District in the near term. The situa- AOGs presence was additionally east, north, and west of Kunduz tion is more complicated for organisations felt in the establishment of check- City, extending as far as the ha- based in and operating in Kunduz, with their points both between Khanabad bitually problematic district of range highly dependent on local contacts and and Kunduz and on the Kunduz – Chahar Darra. Overall, the mili- acceptance levels. In another instance showing Puli Khumri road south of Alia- tary operation showed how the the extent of AOG presence in Kunduz, a few bad. The IMF/ANSF operation AOG members requested entrance to an reportedly focused a lot of atten- NGO-run facility and requisitioned a motor- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tion on securing the Kunduz – bike for their use. Although the encounter Military operations Khanabad road; nevertheless, re- reportedly did not entail large amounts of ten- Widespread AOG presence ports of new checkpoints in the sion, it does demonstrate the confidence and AOG-ANSF clashes area continue to surface. What- acceptance of local AOGs. ever the result of these recent en- THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents BALKH BALKH Year to Date 6 50 This Report Period 1 An ambush on an NGO vehicle 40 driving between Sholgara and Ma- for the NGO’s targeting may re- 30 main unanswered, but there are zar city resulted in the execution 20 of one staff member and serious still some pieces of information 10 injury to the vehicle’s other occu- that are relevant to NGOs’ SOPs. pant. The attack seems to have The first is that the attack oc- 0 been targeted at the organisation, curred at dusk (1900 hrs.) when it JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL because the attackers did not steal would have been easier for AOG AOG ACG anything from the vehicle. More- members to take cover, and it also over, the same organisation suf- happened along the main Mazar – fered a complex attack about a Sholgara Road, which the NGO In once instance, an AOG set up a checkpoint week before for what seemed to vehicle might have been predicta- along the main road between Balkh and Aqcha be reasons collateral to local po- bly following. Even though it with the stated aim of trying to find GoA offi- litical disputes. The lack of re- sometimes means lengthier de- cials and those related to the elections cam- porting around the incident means tours and uncomfortable roads, paign. Because this checkpoint occurred late that questions about the rationale varying routes is extremely impor- at night, they found none of their intended tant for wrong-footing AOGs or targets; however, they did succeed in waylaying ACGs that, for whatever reasons, a number of truckers and demonstrating that KEY THREATS & CONCERNS may be seeking to target an NGO they were incapable of mustering such a show Targeting of GoA, IMF, ANSF vehicle. Elsewhere in Balkh, in the daylight hours. They were quickly dis- IEDs AOG activity is still apparent in persed by ANP but, taken together with the Ambushes the west of the province, appar- ambush, reinforce the dangers of travelling at ently focusing on targeting GoA. night.

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 4 TAKHAR This Report Period 1 50 An INGO incident in the western 40 other incidents in Takhar during district of Baharak, bordering 30 this period involved attacks on Kunduz, highlighted the risks fac- 20 ing NGOs working in this rela- ANP checkpoints. Kunduz-based tively stable province. An RCIED AOGs, however, rarely target 10 detonated along the road between NGOs with IEDs, and one such 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Taluqan and Baharak, apparently recent case where they have (north of Kunduz on the road to targeting a marked INGO vehicle, AOG ACG killing one occupant and injuring Sher Khan Bandar) seems to have three more. While the perpetra- been a case of mistaken identity. tors have not been identified, the Assuming that this is a Kunduz- have played decisive roles in averting this kind use of an IED is typical of AOGs based group that was continuing of incident. This particular RCIED strike is indigenous to Kunduz, rather to choose targets consistently, the also indicative of the highly diffuse and local- than Takhar; indeed the only two most reasonable explanation for ised character of threats facing NGOs the INGO’s targeting would be throughout the Northern Region. A similar KEY THREATS & CONCERNS identification with IMF. Target- incident that occurred on the same day (see IEDs in the west of the province ing rationale aside, a decision re- Samangan) superficially appeared to have Attacks on ANP checkpoints garding the organisation’s profile much in common with this event, but in reality Criminal activity and the management thereof and had only the broadest linkages to the Takhar adherence to SOPs could also incident. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 1 BAGHLAN This Report Period 0 50 Activity in Baghlan continues to 40 ANP checkpoint in Khinjan, a focus on the Baghlani Jadid corri- 30 dor with occasional disturbances normally very quiet district. The area surrounding Baghlani Jadid is 20 continuing in remote areas. Most 10 notably, an attack occurred on an also sensitive, in that local AOG activity is heavily tied to that ex- 0 perienced by Kunduz and has JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL KEY THREATS & CONCERNS itself been the scene of ANSF/ AOG ACG Political struggles IMF operations that have led to surge in AOG activity in the coming weeks Targeted attacks on IMF/ANSF prolonged exchanges of fire. due to political events surrounding the elec- AOG-ANSF clashes Both Baghlani Jadid and Dahanai tion. Ghori are expected to see an up-

SAMANGAN NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 2 Recent activity in Samangan is 40 almost entirely based on ongoing terms of intent, this makes the 30 political struggles, which express NGO’s involvement collateral, 20 themselves in occasional emplace- but it points out risks that con- 10 ment of IEDs or small-scale front NGOs working in environ- 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL rocket or grenade attacks. Two ments of political tension (as op- NGO-related incidents occurred posed to the other AOG vs. GoA AOG ACG during this reporting cycle: an dynamic). In such instances, the success of NGOs’ acceptance tion with the GoA and the Takhar incident NGO vehicle was struck by an likely being related to increasing anti-GoA ac- RCIED driving between the two strategies can pose its own prob- lems in that it might serve to in- tivity. The abduction in Samangan involved a most important towns in the national member of an INGO’s staff who was province, Darrai Suf and Aybak; crease their value as political tar- gets even while it deters AOGs. heavily involved in local politics, and it is be- and a local employee of an NGO lieved that this involvement most directly pre- was kidnapped. The attack, which NGOs’ responses are relatively constrained, but they can still cipitated her abduction. This incident points targeted an unmarked but high- to another way in which NGOs can be collat- profile vehicle (white Toyota mitigate exposure to risk by utilis- ing low-profile transportation and erally involved in political activity (in the event, Landcruiser), injured the two oc- the abductee was released unharmed with no cupants and was likely intended to setting clear thresholds for local involvement. Even though the discernable effects on the NGO’s image or vindicate a political narrative or operations). Intelligent, qualified, and politi- embarrass other authorities. In Samangan incident occurred on the same day as the Takhar cally connected national staff have advantages in terms of the skills and opportunities they KEY THREATS & CONCERNS RCIED, it is important to empha- sise the difference between them, bring to the organisation but conversely also Political conflicts expose the organisation to risks associated Criminal activity with the Samangan incident being tied into a local struggle for posi- with political entanglements.

ANNOUNCEMENT: Please see page 15 for employment and training opportunities with ANSO. THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 13 50 This Report Period 0 Much of the Herat countryside 40 Kuhna districts. Few incidents remains exposed to high levels of 30 AOG and ACG activity, with rob- have been recorded in the last few 20 beries, attacks on ANSF, and kid- weeks in the latter area along the napping still commonplace. Two road from Herat to Qal’ai Naw, 10 areas of particular concern remain apparently because of reduced 0 Chisti Sharif and Karokh/Koshki exposure with NGOs and other JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL organizations greatly reducing AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CON- their travel along that route. In CERNS Chisti Sharif, a standoff between meaning that this road is still generally not a Crime two AOG groups (reported in the viable option for NGO movement. Elsewhere AOG activity on the Ghor last bi-weekly) is unabated, cen- in Herat, ambushes targeting IMF along the Road tring on the area of Darrai Takht. road from Herat to Turghundi are an apparent AOG activity on the Qal’ai The AOGs have set up frequent demonstration of increased AOG range and Naw Road checkpoints and closed the road capability. to Ghor at irregular intervals,

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 2 BADGHIS This Report Period 1 50 An NGO employee en route from 40 though the individual’s NGO was the Northern Region to the West 30 was forcibly stopped near Qal’ai not implicated in his capture (nor did the AOG at any point become 20 Naw and forced to return to 10 Murghab and give the AOG aware of his employment status), the incident shows the danger of 0 members a ride. Upon resisting, JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL the man was shot several times collateral involvement, because and is currently receiving medical the employee did choose to travel AOG ACG treatment for his injuries. Al- through unstable areas; it also re- affirms that individuals caught in a Additionally, clashes continue in the eastern KEY THREATS & CONCERNS situation where armed individuals districts of Murghab and Ghormach. Further- Instability in eastern districts are making demands should ac- more, one instance of an IMF airstrike that Criminal activity cede to them to minimize the po- seems to have mostly hit its target, killing Ongoing military operations tential for violent reaction. AOG members, has since been capitalized on by AOGs as the scene of civilian casualties.

NGO Incidents LAGHM AN LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 Laghman continues to be a rela- 30 attacks that were common last tively quiet province with only 20 year. There is now doubt about four AOG related incidents. Un- 10 the exact nature of this event as it usually, there were no IED inci- 0 dents reported this period. Of could have been part of a fuel concern to NGOs was an attack theft, rather than an AOG attack. on a fuel tanker on the Kabul- Still, the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway AOG ACG Jalalabad Highway similar to the is considerably more secure than organizer of the Abdullah Abdullah campaign during this time last year. in Dawlat Shah District. The direct fire am- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The major election related event bush has been attributed to AOG and came on Continuing IED threat near DACs in the province was the attempted the same day as a RPG attack on his campaign assassination of the provincial in Nangarhar Province. THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR NANGARHAR Year to Date 7 This Report Period 1 50 In Jalalabad City on 18 July, an off 40 -duty INGO driver and his son local staff should not over night in 30 the district offices if possible. were assaulted, with the driver 20 being shot dead in an apparent Important events for NGO op- 10 non-work related dispute. erations were battles in Achin and 0 Nangarhar saw a number of sig- Nazyan Districts between AOG nificant incidents/ trends this pe- and locals. The locals appear to be riod. There are reports that AOG in conflict with AOG and are try- AOG ACG are short of funds in Nangarhar ing to expel them, which could and plan to rob from or target lead to higher levels of violence Airfield. The attack failed due to alert local NGOs for kidnap to generate and perhaps eventually to the mi- security forces and posed only a minimal threat cash. If true, this would increase gration of AOG from the area. to NGOs. AOG seem set on attacking IMF, the risk to international and local The western districts of Sherzad, and there does not appear to be a specific technical staff of NGOs working Khogyani, and Pachir-Wagam threat to NGOs in the city. Caution is still in the districts and caution is ad- continue to be the centre of AOG urged and very low profile travel for all staff is vised. International and senior activity in Nangarhar. Attacks on advised. IMF are common and a school that was designated as a polling Election campaigning has, with the exception KEY THREATS & CON- of a RPG attack on an Abdullah Abdullah CERNS station in Sherzad was destroyed function in Dari-Noor, gone on without any Kidnap with explosives. International NGO staff are advised to avoid serious security incidents. All local NGO staff AOG attacks on JAF and GoA questioned believe voters will not be targeted facilities the western districts. and none anticipate public disorder associated Increased AOG numbers in the AOG attempted a complex attack with the election. Violence targeted at specific western districts involving a VBIED and BBIED campaigns, regardless, is likely to increase. on the entrance to the Jalalabad

NGO Incidents KUNAR KUNAR Year to Date 6 200 This Report Period 0 Kunar remains the most volatile 150 of the eastern provinces with 59 stallations and convoys. IEDs 100 AOG initiated incidents this pe- continue to be rare in the prov- 50 riod—25 of them occurring in ince. Kunar remains the sight of Manogai District. Most incidents most indirect fire in the region. 0 are direct action and indirect fire The Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway attacks against security force in- and Asadabad District remain relatively secure. NGOs are ad- AOG ACG vised to avoid Manogai, Wata Pur, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS and Ghaziabad districts and to In the only election-related violence reported, AOG operations on Jalalabad- limit international staff to Asada- a primary school in Marawara District that had Asadabad Hwy in Narang Dist. bad City. been designated as a polling station was dam-  AOG Indirect fire aged by an IED.

ANNOUNCEMENT: In the coming months, ANSO will be providing inputs for an incident mapping service to aid NGO management and security procedures. Registrants will receive further information as it becomes available. THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 1 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 Reporting from Nuristan remains 40 infrequent. IMF combat opera- the Bargi Matal District Centre. 30 Bargi Matal continues to be hit tions continued this period after 20 the short lived AOG capture of with sporadic fire, and one INGO has withdrawn its staff from the 10 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS area. There continue to be large 0 Increased military operations numbers of AOG at large in the Large numbers of AOG at large eastern districts and NGOs can expect more combat. AOG ACG

NGO Incidents PAKTYA PAKTYA Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40 The security situation in Paktya continues to deteriorate. The capi- this period was a coordinated at- 30 tal area is particularly volatile with tack by six AOG disguised as Bor- 20 twelve of seventeen AOG initi- der Policemen and armed with 10 ated incidents this period occur- light weapons and suicide vests on 0 ring in Gardez District. Zurmat GOA facilities in the city centre. District had no incidents reported, Due to the alertness of local secu- which is unusual. The major event rity forces, the attack was largely unsuccessful; however, it did AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CON- point to the ability of AOG to and IEDs being common. AOG are conduct- CERNS infiltrate into the city and the ing operations along the highway in both Complex attacks in Gardez City problematic availability of security Khost and Paktya and it has become one of High kidnap and IED threats, force uniforms. the most dangerous roads in Afghanistan. especially along the Gardez- NGOs are advised to avoid road travel in Khost Road The Gardez-Khost Road remains very dangerous with kidnapping Gardez.

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 9 KHOST This Report Period 2 50 The situation in Khost continues 40 to deteriorate with serious AOG The Khost-Gardez Road may be 30 the most dangerous stretch of attacks on GOA facilities, IMF, 20 highway in the country, with in- and road construction companies. 10 formation received that IEDs are Two NGO incidents occurred, 0 so numerous that some police with an ambulance being stolen in have stopped reporting them up Musa Khel District and a clinic their chain of command. Seven- being set ablaze in Qalandar Dis- AOG ACG teen IEDs were reported to have trict. The motive for the arson is been found or detonated across however , indirect fire continues to be highly unknown, but the ambulance is the province during this period. inaccurate across the region and is far more of likely to be used for moving con- NGOs can expect more complex a danger to civilians living nearby than the in- traband or as a VBIED. attacks on GOA installations with tended targets. In Wuza Zadran Dsitrict, the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS a serious risk of collateral damage. third serious attack on road construction com- Attacks on NGO facilities Sabari District, in particular, saw a panies along the road this summer occurred Kidnapping rash of direct attacks on security with three employees killed and 13 abducted. forces, with most indirect fire at- NGOs should limit their activities to Khost AOG attacks on GoA and IMF tacks occurring in Bak District; City and fly in and out. THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 1 HELMAND This Report Period 0 100

The province experienced typical 80 activity, displaying the expansive fore during the period. In sum, at 60 nature of the conflict. Although least nine IMF soldiers were killed activity kept to typical patterns, and ten were wounded as result of 40 the lethal nature of IEDs and IED blasts (one during an attempt 20 their effects on IMF came to the to defuse an IED) in the districts 0 of Reg, Nahri Sarraj, Garmser, JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Nad Ali, and Sangin, according to AOG ACG Roadside IEDs ANSO records. Reported IMF AOG-IMF/ANSF clashes activity in the province was low during the period; however, IMF reportedly killed five others during an opera- Significant AOG threat detained 20 AOG members and tion in Garmser on the 20th.

NGO Incidents Year to Date 1 PAKTIKA PAKTIKA 100 This Report Period 0 80 As has been the norm for strife- 60 ridden Paktika, AOG confronted siege of the Gomal DAC on 17 IMF and ANSF, often engaging in July. NGOs should particularly 40 lengthy clashes. On 16 July in Ur- note activity in Sorobi District: on 20 gun District, AOG engaged an 17 July, AOG targeted an ANP 0 IMF convoy for two hours, result- convoy, ending in four AOG and ing in two IMF and two AOG two ANP dead; and on the 18th, a RCIED killed four PSC guards dead. AOG engaged ANA, also AOG ACG on the 16th, in Sar Hawza Dis- when it detonated against them as trict, resulting in four AOG killed they were travelling in the district. after a two hour clash. Addition- The abovementioned clashes dis- riod, AOG shot dead accused GoA/IMF col- ally, five ANP and three AOG play the persistent nature of the laborators in Sar Hawza and Khair Kot. The were killed following a three hour conflict—despite the higher casu- province also did not escape the typical spate alties AOG incur when compared of electoral-related violence: an IED was dis- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS to ANSF or IMF, they continue covered in a presidential candidate’s campaign IEDs to muster—and it is clear that office in Sharan District on the 29th. Civilians Abduction AOGs wish to effect their will were victimised, additionally, in the province: AOG-IMF/ANSF clashes and intimidate the populace; for three, including a child, died in an IED blast in example, during the reporting pe- Barmal District on the 17th.

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 1 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 Information from Nimroz is con- 80 spicuously lacking, in part due to to the overall absence of reporting the cessation of GoA reporting on sources. The few incidents that 60 country-wide incidents, and due did reach ANSO’s radar suggest that AOG are challenging the 40 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS GoA’s writ, especially in Khash 20 Rod District. Regardless of this Suicide attacks in Zaranj and 0 Khash Rod lack of information, NGOs JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Kidnap should consider the province to AOG ACG Prevalent security vacuum be extremely hazardous, even in perceived GoA-controlled areas. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR KANDAHAR Year to Date 4 100 This Report Period 0 80

Kandahar, province-wide, is de- 60 void of any general semblance of tions often occur within the actual 40 security. While ANSO analyses of areas that the activities will take 20 AOG, IMF, and ANSF activity in place in the province; in an exam- 0 the province usually only highlight ple of this, ANBP discovered specific extraordinary activities, 3100 kg of Aluminium powder NGOs should note that the state and 400 kg of gunpowder for sale of the conflict in the province is in a public market in Spin Boldak AOG ACG perilous, and there are no areas District on the 18th (both ele- that can be considered safe ha- ments are common additives for including a 12 year-old girl that failed to head vens for blanket-NGO activity— IEDs). IMF warnings to stop in Panjwayi District. the 18 July killing of two ANP in Moreover, because of the deleteri- AOGs in the south, however, also caused nu- District 7, Kandahar City, and ous instability, civilians are ever- merous civilian deaths, albeit targeted ones: the their subsequent public hanging more being confronted with the corpses of three abductees from Shah Wali serves as an exemplar of this void. psychological and physical reper- Kot were found; and nine civilians, including Additionally, one should recognise cussions of established violence five children, were killed in an IED detonation that AOG planning and prepara- that has quietly settled in the in Spin Boldak District. In conclusion, NGOs south. As is often publicised in operating in the province should continue to ensure that exacting security protocols are ad- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the press, some of the civilian hered to for the unforeseeable future, and Roadside IEDs casualties during the period were due to IMF and ANSF opera- there is no indication that IMF increases will AOG-ANP clashes tions: a total of at least eight civil- further assuage concerns over incident levels. BBIED/SVBIED attacks ians were killed in the province,

NGO Incidents GHAZNI G HAZNI Year to Date 2 This Report Period 0 100 Just as public media are currently 80 ards that civilians must face dur- highlighting, civilian casualties are 60 mounting, especially in areas ing an ongoing conflict, two where IMF seek to contest AOG women and two children died, 40 dominance. Despite a reduction in while six other civilians were 20 wounded, in an apparent AOG reporting sources, it does not ap- 0 pear that the state of the conflict attempt to target the Gelan DAC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL with a rocket—a common occur- in Ghazni will take a turn for the AOG ACG better. In an example of the haz- rence in the South and East. AOGs in the area also are seeking lenge AOG personalities; for example, on 19 to minimize civilian casualties, just July, Andar District residents were warned to KEY THREATS & CONCERNS as in the past, by issuing warnings stock up on essential items, because IEDs Abduction to residents, possibly also with the would be emplaced by early to mid-August in IEDs or ambushes on convoys desire to intimidate collaborators light of upcoming elections. Rocket/RPG attacks or those who would seek to chal- THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 2 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 While reporting from the area has decreased significantly, it appears gar, and Charmestan. Further em- 80 that Uruzgan is likely to experi- phasising the IED threat, IMF 60 have recently reported large dis- ence further erosion of its secu- 40 coveries of cannibalised rockets rity, primarily on the outskirts of 20 the developmental centre of Tirin that were missing ‘nose cones’— Kot. Most importantly, IMF and an essential element of well- 0 ANSF have recently been inun- designed IEDs. JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL dated with IEDs. This continues In sum, NGOs operating in the AOG ACG to be a critical threat, especially in province should consider opera- the area of the Tangi Pass, Mira- tions outside of Tirin Kot to be of the well-known circumspect nature in which bad, Garmab, Deh Rafshan, Lan- high risk, necessitating extensive residents look upon outsiders. Still, locals pos- liaison and development with par- sess only so much ability and desire to resist KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ties in these external areas before AOG inflows and dominance, and AOG along IEDs conducting travel or operations. the western border with Helmand have appar- AOG opposition to NGOs Reportedly, AOG continue to ently been challenging locals to some effect. Suicide attacks face resistance from locals in the outlying areas, similarly, because

AOG INITIATED INCIDENTS

2006 2007 2008 2009 738 709 664 634

533 520

387 381

00000

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC THE AFGHANISTAN NGO OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) ANSO is hosted by inces of: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Phil Priestley - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Mukhtar Hussain - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 Sar-e Pul Farah NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Badakhshan Scott Bohlinger - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Jawzjan Firoz Fahez - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 Faryab To Register with ANSO Ghor contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) [email protected] Farah John Binns - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 Zabul Khisrow Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014

This is because we ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) do not know enough Board. If you have any Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 about the area to feedback, good or bad, let comment on the sig- them know on: nificance of the inci- [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) dents occurring Vacant - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 there. ANSO ACRONYMS Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 If you can help us IMF-International Military COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Forces / AOG-Armed Oppo- Sebastien Hogan - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 understand the prov- ince better, please sition Groups / GOA- Ali Riazi - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Government of Afghanistan contact us. Vacant - [email protected] - 0797 414 100 / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan Na- E. Estoque - [email protected] - 0797 093 073 tional Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED- Improvised Exploding De- vice / AEF-Afghan Eradica- VACANCIES tion Forces / RPG-Rocket ANSO is in search of a few good NGO workers. If you have NGO experience, Propelled Grenade / IDF- Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / an analytical background, and the desire to be challenged, all while being part of VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- a close-knit team, pass your CV to [email protected] vised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan Na- TRAINING tional Border Police / SAF- Small Arms Fire / NDS- ANSO will be conducting its free 1-Day Basic Guard training for NGOs in Ka- National Directorate of Se- bul during the month of August starting on 12 August. Please note that regis- curity (intelligence) / PSC- Private Security Company / tration for the training will be closed as of 9 August 2009. Email opera- DC-District Centre [email protected] for registration details.