THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale
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The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 30 16-30 July 2009 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-5 Electoral related violence AOG offensive actions are to experience an even split 5-7 Northern Region persisted writ-large and is increasing persistently in between this method and Western Region 8 expected to continue past the Wardak, Herat, Paktya, and IEDs during this period. election. During the period, Paktika. Increased AOG Eastern Region 8-10 Recent press headlines are we witnessed an RPG attack, activity and an extended touting the reported new Southern Region 11-13 attempted assassination, mul- IMF/ANSF joint operation issuance of the Taliban tiple instances of intimida- in Kunduz District are rais- ANSO Info Page 14 Code of Conduct. Prelimi- tion, and attempts to locate ing serious security con- nary information indicates election staff for abduction— cerns in Kunduz and sur- that the document may be all in relation to the country- rounding provinces. In the an attempt to influence YOU NEED TO KNOW wide electoral process. One south, Kandahar and Hel- international and domestic growing area of concern for mand appear to have hit a audiences, with particular • Electoral violence persists electoral security is now ‘saturation point’ in terms emphasis set upon mini- Kapisa, with AOG report- of AOG activity, but high • Conflict levels intensify mizing civilian casualties, edly making efforts to target IMF casualties continue to protecting prisoners from with AOG reliance on the process there (see page be reported. close-range attacks execution, and establishing 2). There is also increased Lastly, data show that AOG Mullah Omar’s dominance • Newly-issued Taliban reporting of a possible are reliant on conducting over the disparate group of Code of Conduct seeks to “spectacular” attack against close-range assaults on tar- AOG that claim to be Tali- protect civilians and cap- undefined target(s) in Kabul gets in all regions, with the ban. tives while submitting all ahead of the election. South being the only region AOGs to central control under Mullah Omar NGO DATA & TRENDS ANSO is supported by NGO incidents and casualty rates in July were the highest of 2009, with 23 NGO inci- dents reported, including 5 NGO staff killed and 5 more injured. 75% of NGO incidents in July were attributed to AOG. 15 NGO staff have been killed so far in 2009. During this reporting period, 9 NGO incidents were reported, primarily in the Northern and Eastern regions. Incidents appeared to be both targeted and the result of unfortunate circumstances. In the case of the former, an NGO vehicle was ambushed in Balkh Prov- ince, with one staff member being executed and the other being seriously wounded. Khost also did not escape the spate of incidents, with another clinic being set ablaze and an NGO ambulance being stolen in separate incidents. (Past arsons of clinics in Khost were attributed to the Haqqani Network). Most NGO incidents, however, resulted from the general violence that occurs during an armed conflict. Thus, errant NGO rounds struck an NGO compound in Kunduz City; IEDs caused injuries and a fatality for NGO staff in Takhar and Samangan; and an NGO staff member was kidnapped in Samangan. Additionally, an NGO staff member was shot dead in Jalalabad City after a personal dispute, and another NGO employee in Badghis was shot several times when he resisted AOG demands that he provide them with transit, and he remains under medical observation. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 8 50 This Report Period 0 Although Kabul remains relatively 40 quiet in terms of AOG-related assisting in the electoral process, 30 incidents, there has been a notice- which includes IO compounds. 20 able increase in the amount of The most likely form of an AOG 10 threat traffic being reported. Al- initiated attack will be a complex 0 though expected, considering the attack on a high profile target, one upcoming elections and the that is most likely involved in the electoral process. In addition, re- propaganda victory that could be AOG ACG garnered from a spectacular AOG porting indicates that the threat of attack on the national capital, kidnapping in the capital remains NGO staff should seek to avoid elevated. It is understood that is difficult to differentiate between AOG and GoA buildings, election-related AOG/ACG would intend to use ACG origin. Two IED detonations have been facilities, as well as organisations both international as well as na- reported in Districts 5 and 11, with a further tional NGO staff members as device being also discovered in District 5. KEY THREATS & CON- bargaining chips in any subse- Three rockets also impact in the Qalai Abdul CERNS quent negotiations, or to simply Rawof Area of District 9 on 24 July. In all in- Complex attacks against high- distract attention from the elec- stances there were no reported casualties. profile targets tions and discredit the govern- NGOs are reminded to ensure that all SOPs Armed Criminal Groups ment. are up-to-date prior to the election in case of a Abductions Despite the calm, there remains rapidly evolving security situation or in the an undercurrent of activity which instance of large scale civil disturbances. NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 40 Several incidents in the west of 30 the province, where traditionally the provincial capital. In addition NGOs conduct operations un- to the latest arrests, AOG public 20 hindered by security concerns, statements in both Kapisa and 10 have raised the possibility that Parwan concerning the election 0 there may be an increase in AOG have resulted in a confused pic- -initiated incidents ahead of the ture of any likely electoral violence due to their contradictory nature. election. In particular, three al- AOG ACG leged suicide bombers were ar- NGO are reminded to avoid all rested in Mahmudi Raqi on 25 official election sites and cam- July. Unconfirmed reports sug- paigning offices and residences in higher degree of awareness in the coming gest that the cell was intending to the weeks ahead. weeks as the arrests in Mahmudi Raqi and the attack official election targets in Of further concern in Kapisa is an attack on the ANP in Hisa-i-Awali Kohistan attack on an ANP vehicle on 29 are unlikely to be isolated incidents. KEY THREATS & CON- July in Hisa-i-Awali Kohistan. In the east of the province, AOG initiated at- CERNS Traditionally Mahmudi Raqi as tacks continue against primarily ANSF targets, AOG-ANSF clashes, especially well as Kohistan I and II have which include DACs, checkpoints, and con- in Tagab and Nijrab been isolated from AOG activities voys. Collateral exposure to attacks on ANSF Electoral related violence which have become increasingly and IMF remain a distinct concern in the east Rocket, IED and mine attacks prevalent in Tagab, Nijrab and and NGO should avoid both government Alasay. NGOs should maintain a buildings and ANSF and IMF convoys. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents PA RW AN PARWAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 Parwan experiences periodic AOG activity; however, the vast rocket and RPG attacks targeting 30 majority of the few recorded inci- security forces. In the capital Cha- 20 dents are confined to the districts harikar, an attack on an ANP 10 of Bagram, Ghorband, Kohi Safi checkpoint on 23 July and an IED 0 and Sheikh Ali. These incidents attack on an ANP vehicle on 28 typically assume the form of IED, July are most likely linked to inter- factional feuding rather than AOG ACG AOG attacks. In both incidents, The main road through Parwan to Bamyan has KEY THREATS & CON- no casualties were reported. The CERNS been an expressed concern for NGOs follow- two events follow a trend of ran- ing a direct attack on an IO convoy in June; AOG-ANSF clashes, especially dom attacks on ANP checkpoints near Bagram Airbase however ,since then there have been no re- and convoys in the districts, one corded IED attacks against civilian vehicles in NGO-targeted criminal abduc- which has not yet translated into tion the province. NGOs are advised to maintain fatalities. IEDs in the Ghorband Valley vigilance along the road, especially through the Ghorband Valley area. NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 The districts of Kajran and Gizab 30 remain a concern following the underline the growing number and strength of AOG in the area. 20 large scale offensives in Helmand. 10 Although yet to threaten Nili, a On 16 July, AOG established a number of incidents in the south checkpoint in the Tamazan Valley 0 of the province have served to of Gizab, which is located only thirty kilometres from Nili. AOG manning the checkpoint were be- AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CON- lieved to be looking for GoA and the relative freedom of AOG movement in the CERNS election officials, most likely with south. High AOG infiltration into the intent to kidnap. In Kajran, It is most likely that the level and frequency of Kiti, Gizrab, and Kajran three separate attacks on ANSF Low security presence AOG initiated violence will increase in the on 19, 20 and 24 July, involving weeks prior to the election. Standoff attacks on Clashes between AOG and two attacks on the DAC, and one locals, especially in the south Nili should also not be discounted due to the against an ANP convoy, illustrate proximity of AOG to the capital.