Islam and Ethnicity in the Republics of Russia

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Islam and Ethnicity in the Republics of Russia TITLE : ISLAM AND ETHNICITY IN THE REPUBLICS OF RUSSI A AUTHOR : SUSAN GOODRICH LEHMANN, Columbia Universit y THE NATIONAL COUNCI L FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE VIII PROGRA M 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N .W . Washington, D .C . 20036 PROJECT INFORMATION : 1 CONTRACTOR : Columbia Universit y PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Susan G . Lehman n COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 808-1 4 DATE : June 14, 1996 COPYRIGHT INFORMATION individual researchers retain the copyright on work products derived from research funded b y Council Contract. The Council and the U .S. Government have the right to duplicate written report s and other materials submitted under Council Contract and to distribute such copies within th e Council and U.S. Government for their own use, and to draw upon such reports and materials fo r their own studies; but the Council and U.S. Government do not have the right to distribute, o r make such reports and materials available, outside the Council or U .S. Government without th e written consent of the authors, except as may be required under the provisions of the Freedom o f Information Act 5 U .S.C. 552, or other applicable law . 1 The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds provided by the Nationa l Council for Soviet and East European Research, made available by the U . S. Department of State under Title VIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those of the author(s) . CONTENTS Abstract 1 Introduction 2 The 1993 Russian Election Study 4 The Role of Sufism 7 Variation in Religiosity Across Ethnic Groups 1 1 Demographic Characteristics of Religious Practitioners 1 3 Alternative Explanations for Religious Variation 1 5 Implications for Economic and Political Beliefs 1 9 Conclusion 20 Bibliography 22 Tables 25 ISLAM AND ETHNICITY IN THE REPUBLICS O F RUSSIA1 SUSAN GOODRICH LEHMANN Assistant Professor of Sociolog y Columbia University ' Abstract This paper concerns the state of Islam in the 5 Muslim Autonomous Republics i n Russia at the end of the Soviet era . Based on survey data collected by the author in 1993 . it is clear that the strength of Islam both as a religious and social institution varied regionally despite the shared experience of Soviet anti-religious policies . Muslims i n Chechnia and Dagestan were much more likely to report that they actively practice d Islam than Muslims living in Kabardino-Balkaria, Tatarstan . and Bashkortostan . Most importantly religious practice in Russia in 1993 was high among non- traditional groups of Chechens and Dagestani . The young, the urban migrants, the highl y educated, and men reported high levels of active worship . In Bashkortostan, Tatarstan , and Kabardino-Balkaria in contrast, active religiosity was primarily confined to old rura l women with low levels of education . These differences, I hypothesize, are linked to th e Sufi Islam tradition present in Chechnia and Dagestan but absent in the other Musli m regions . From a strategic point of view these data suggest that Islam is less likely t o facilitate Russian/minority conflict in those regions where it is weak, but very likely to facilitate such conflict in Chechnia and Dagestan were it is strong and widespread amon g young urban males . Sufism in Russia contains a strong nationalistic element . which causes Sufi Muslims to view issues of national identification in a less compromisin g manner than non-Sufi Muslims . According to the data, Sufism is less relevant i n determining attitudes toward economic reform which show greater consistency across th e Muslim Republics . ' This article was written with support from National Council for Soviet and East European Research Gran t 808-14, National Science Foundation Grants SBR-94-12051 and SBR-94-02548, the Carnegie Foundation, th e MacArthur Foundation, and the Harvard Russian Research Center . 2 Mailing Address : 420 Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York, N .Y . 10027 3These findings and those of a follow-up study of religious knowledge and practice and ethnic toleranc e sponsored by the U .S. Department of State and conducted in the summer and fall of 1995 in Tatarstan . Bashkortostan, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria are the subject of ongoing research . 1 Introductio n Becoming modern normally means moving to the city and assimilating to a complex of urba n behavior and values ranging from smaller family size and attenuation of extended family ties, t o increasing commitment to education, to linguistic assimilation to the dominant ethnic group, to mor e participatory political attitudes . Often this process of urbanization is viewed as a rational response t o objective, primarily economic, stimuli .' With the focus on economic factors the role of cultura l values, especially ethnic and religious values, tends to be inadequately incorporated into analyses o f the modernization process . Among the important features of modernization among Christian nations has been the tendency towards secularization of religious attitudes . It is understood that newcomer s to the city sometimes adopt fundamentalist attitudes, but in the long run religiosity declines as a population becomes more urban . ' Some have argued that the phenomenon of religious assimilation may differ for Musli m nations . Braibanti observed , The reemergence of Islamic national identity is part of a larger global trend o f developing nations turning to indigenous modes of development . Disenchantment wit h foreign models and growing self-confidence in a national identity encourage suc h "endogeneity ." This search for roots leads inevitably to a reconsideration of Islam .6 Both the survival of religious values during the transition from rural to urban society and th e role of religion in Russian/minority relations have been under-analyzed in Soviet studies . ' More attention has been given to Islam than Orthodoxy . Even then religion is usually viewed only as a component of nationality . ' Silver does note that Islamic regions lag behind Christian regions in th e degree of Russian language assimilation, but variation within the Muslim republics is assumed to b e insignificant or non-existent.' The numerous sovietologists who expressed concern in the seventie s about the Muslim threat to the Union likewise failed to distinguish among the Muslim republics . Thi s 'See, for example, Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1976) . 'Welch, Michael and John Baltzell, " Geographic Mobility, Social Integration and Church Attendance , Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 23 (1984): 75-91 ; Robert Wuthnow, "Recent Patterns o f Secularization : A Problem of Generations?" American Sociological Review, vol . 41 (1976): 850-867 . "Ralph Braibanti, "Recovery of Islamic Identity in Global Perspective," in The Rose and the Rock, ed . Bruce B . Lawrence (Durham: Duke University Programs in Comparative Studies on Southern Asia, 1979) : 185 . 'For an exception see Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Nationalities and Soviet Religious Policies," in The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society, ed. Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger (Boulder: Westview Press , 1990) . 'Robert A. Lewis, "The Mixing of Russians and Soviet Nationalities and its Demographic Impact," i n Soviet Nationality Problems (New York : Columbia University Press, 1971) . 'Brian Silver, " Language Policy and the Linguistic Russification of Soviet Nationalities, in Sovie t Nationality Policies and Practices, ed. Jeremy Azrael, (New York: Praeger, 1978) . 2 assumption of Islam's unvarying nature is peculiar given Bennigsen's detailed scholarship on th e distinctive character of Sufism in the Northern Caucasus of Russia . 1 0 One reason for the lack of differentiation in the analysis of religion in the former Soviet Unio n is that Westerners could not engage in opinion polling until the late 1980s . Even then the size o f samples was usually too small for fine-tuned analysis . A very large scale study of the 1993 Russia n election allows us to do such analysis for the first time . As part of the sample, 1,000 respondent s each were selected from 16 former autonomous republics of Russia. Five of these republics have a n Islamic religious tradition : Tatarstan, Bashkortostan . Chechnia . Dagestan . Kabardino-Balkaria . It turns out that the level of religiosity varies enormously among these Muslim people . This study will make the case that while the transition to urban life generally produces a decline i n religiosity, the character of the dominant type of Islam in a region has a great impact on the rate o f secularization. Bennigsen's hypothesis that Sufi Islam, found in Chechnia and Dagestan . was peculiarly successful in surviving communist attempts at secularization is confirmed . This is in contrast to Jadidist Islam, followed by Tatars and Bashkirs, which was peculiarly weak in staving of f decline in religious observance . In our study 65% of Chechens/Dagestani both believe and practic e Islam compared to 18% of Kabardians/Balkars and 19% of Tatars/Bashkirs . The data demonstrate that at the end of the Soviet period Islam was a widespread and activ e religion which cut a broad swath through the social strata only in those regions dominated b y Sufism . It is particularly noteworthy that in Sufi dominated areas Islam continued to draw activ e support among young men. Among the Kabardians/Balkars . which are influenced neither by Jadidis m or Sufism, the level of religious practice was low while religious belief remained strong . In Tatarsta n and Bashkortostan Jadidism coupled with urbanization led to substantial decline in both religiou s belief and religious practice by the end of the Soviet era . Religious and national identity are often intertwined. Studies of the rate of ethnic assimilatio n in the former Soviet Union have assigned causal significance to the date of Russian conquest, th e experience of deportation, the presence/absence of native language schooling, and variation in level s of inter-ethnic marriage.
Recommended publications
  • Instrument of Ratification)1
    Proposed Declaration (instrument of ratification)1 1. In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter, the Russian Federation undertakes to apply the provisions of Part II to all the regional or minority languages spoken within its territory and which comply with the definition in Article 1. 2. In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 2, and Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Charter, the Russian Federation declares that the provisions set out below shall apply to the following languages in the specified territories: Abaza (Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia), Adyghe (Republic of Adygea), Aghul (Republic of Dagestan), Altai (Republic of Altai), Avar (Republic of Dagestan), Azeri (Republic of Dagestan), Balkar (Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria), Bashkir (Republic of Bashkortostan), Buryat (Republic of Buryatia), Chechen (Republics of Chechnya and Dagestan), Cherkess (Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia), Chuvash (Republic of Chuvashia), Dargin (Republic of Dagestan), Ingush (Republic of Ingushetia), Kabardian (Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria), Kalmyk (Republic of Kalmykia), Karachay (Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia), Khakas (Republic of Khakasia), Komi (Republic of Komi), Kumyk (Republic of Dagestan), Lak (Republic of Dagestan), Lezgian (Republic of Dagestan), Mountain and Meadow Mari (Republic of Mari El), Moksha and Erzya Mordovian (Republic of Mordovia), Nogai (Republics of Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia), Ossetic (Republic of North Ossetia), Rutul (Republic of Dagestan), Sakha (Republic of Sakha), Tabasaran (Republic of Dagestan), Tat (Republic of Dagestan), Tatar (Republic of Tatarstan), Tsakhur (Republic of Dagestan), Tuvan (Republic of Tuva) and Udmurt (Republic of Udmurtia) Article 8 – Education Paragraph 1.a.i; b.ii; c.ii; d.ii; e.ii; f.i; g; h; i. Article 9 – Judicial authorities Paragraph 1.a.ii; a.iii; a.iv; b.ii; b.iii; c.ii; c.iii.
    [Show full text]
  • Identity, Autonomy and Conflict in Republics of Russia and Ukraine
    Available online at www.sciencedirect.com Communist and Post-Communist Studies 41 (2008) 79e91 www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud Identity, autonomy and conflict in republics of Russia and Ukraine Karina V. Korostelina Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 3330 N. Washington Blvd., Truland Building, 5th Floor, Arlington, VA 22201, United States Available online 19 February 2008 Abstract This paper discusses the results of the survey conducted in co-operation with the European Research Center for Migration and Ethnic Relations, concerning identity in the Autonomous Republics of Russia and Ukraine. The survey queried 6522 residents of such republics as Bash- kortostan, Karelia, Komi, Sakha (Yakutia), and Tatarstan in Russia, and Crimea in Ukraine. It examined the construction of social identities, common narratives regarding threats and deprivations, confidence in public institutions, the prevalence of views toward national minor- ities as ‘fifth columns’, ethnic stereotypes, ethnocentrism, and other conflict indicators. An early warning model, built on the basis of the results, measured the potential for conflict based on these factors, and found that it was most pronounced in Bashkortostan and Crimea, and to a lesser extent in Tatarstan. Conflict was less likely in Sakha, Karelia, and Komi, although there were still certain indicators that suggested potential problems, including moderate support for independence in these republics. Ó 2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Regents of the University of California. Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; Ethnic; National; Regional and religious identity; Autonomy; Conflict; Stereotypes; Threat; Trust; Deprivation; Ethnic minorities Introduction Since the fall of the USSR, several Autonomous Republics of the Russian Feder- ation have been seeking increased autonomy from Moscow.
    [Show full text]
  • HAJJ of the Tatars from the Past - to the Present
    Man in India 2017 vol.97 N9, pages 17-24 HAJJ of the tatars from the past - To the present Akhunov A., Alavi A., Muhammed A. Kazan Federal University, 420008, Kremlevskaya 18, Kazan, Russia Abstract © Serials Publications. The relevance of the investigated problem is caused by the growing importance of the religious factor in the socio-political and religious-cultural life of the global community and Russia in the XXI century. The purpose of this article is to identify and analyze trends in the development of Tatar religious activities such as Hajj during the XI - XXI centuries. The leading method of the study of this problem is a historical-comparative method: in retrospect the emergence of this institution and the existence under conditions of the different socio-economic formations have been analyzed; a particular emphasis is made on the post- Soviet period. A special attention is paid to the question of organization of the hajj: route construction and different programs, cost factors of trip tickets, etc. It is proved that the system of organization of doing Hajj in the Republic of Tatarstan as an obligatory ritual for every Muslim is now almost developed. In a short time (since the 1990s.) the stage of formation passed, competence centers are defined, and logistics are established, all the requirements of the Islamic religion, the Russian and international legislation are observed. Keywords Hajj, History, Islam in Tatarstan, Muslim religious board in Tatarstan, Relations between the Volga region and the Arab East, Volga Bulgarians References [1] 'Abbas will discuss the questions of expansion of pilgrim communications with Tatarstan' (2010).
    [Show full text]
  • The Future of the Caucasus After the Second Chechen War
    CEPS Working Document No. 148 The Future of the Caucasus after the Second Chechen War Papers from a Brainstorming Conference held at CEPS 27-28 January 2000 Edited by Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci July 2000 A Short Introduction to the Chechen Problem Alexandru Liono1 Abstract The problems surrounding the Chechen conflict are indeed many and difficult to tackle. This paper aims at unveiling some of the mysteries covering the issue of so-called “Islamic fundamentalism” in Chechnya. A comparison of the native Sufi branch of Islam and the imported Wahhaby ideology is made, in order to discover the contradictions and the conflicts that the spreading of the latter inflicted in the Chechen society. Furthermore, the paper investigates the main challenges President Aslan Maskhadov was facing at the beginning of his mandate, and the way he managed to cope with them. The paper does not attempt to cover all the aspects of the Chechen problem; nevertheless, a quick enumeration of other factors influencing the developments in Chechnya in the past three years is made. 1 Research assistant Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) 1 1. Introduction To address the issues of stability in North Caucasus in general and in Chechnya in particular is a difficult task. The factors that have contributed to the start of the first and of the second armed conflicts in Chechnya are indeed many. History, politics, economy, traditions, religion, all of them contributed to a certain extent to the launch of what began as an anti-terrorist operation and became a full scale armed conflict. The narrow framework of this presentation does not allow for an exhaustive analysis of the Russian- Chechen relations and of the permanent tensions that existed there during the known history of that part of North Caucasus.
    [Show full text]
  • A Female Demon of Turkic Peoples
    Acta Ethnographica Hungarica 64(2), 413–424 (2019) DOI: 10.1556/022.2019.64.2.11 Albasty: A Female Demon of Turkic Peoples Edina Dallos Research Fellow, MTA–ELTE–SZTE Silk Road Research Group, Hungary Abstract: Albasty is one of the most commonly known malevolent beings among Turkic peoples from the Altay Mountains via the Caucasus and up as far as the Volga River. This article focuses on Turkic data from the Volga region (Chuvash, Tartar, Bashkir) and the Eurasian Steppe (Kazak, Kyrgyz, Nogay, Uzbek). Various areas can be ascertained on the basis of verbal charms and folk-belief narratives. On the Eurasian Steppe, for example, Albasty was first and foremost a puerperal demon. In this territory, specialists (kuuču) were called in to keep away or oust the demon at birth. Many recorded legends and memorates concern healing methods and the process of becoming a healer. In contrast, epic texts or narratives are rarer,in the Volga region, yet there are certain verbal incantations against the Albasty, which here is rather a push or disease demon. Keywords: Turkic beliefs, Turkic folklore texts, Turkic demonology, folklore of Inner Asia In this paper, I will endeavour to give an overview of a mythical creature, the concept of which is widespread among most Turkic peoples. This belief has a long history and can also be evidenced in the myths and beliefs of peoples neighbouring the Turks. No other Turkic mythical beast has such extensive literature devoted to it as the Albasty. Although most relevant literature deals with the possible etymologies of the term, there are plenty of ethnographic descriptions available as well.
    [Show full text]
  • The Security of the Caspian Sea Region
    16. The Georgian–Abkhazian conflict Alexander Krylov I. Introduction The Abkhaz have long populated the western Caucasus. They currently number about 100 000 people, speak one of the languages of the Abkhazo-Adygeyan (west Caucasian) language group, and live in the coastal areas on the southern slopes of the Caucasian ridge and along the Black Sea coast. Together with closely related peoples of the western Caucasus (for example, the Abazins, Adygeyans and Kabardians (or Circassians)) they play an important role in the Caucasian ethno-cultural community and consider themselves an integral part of its future. At the same time, the people living in coastal areas on the southern slopes of the Caucasian ridge have achieved broader communication with Asia Minor and the Mediterranean civilizations than any other people of the Caucasus. The geographical position of Abkhazia on the Black Sea coast has made its people a major factor in the historical process of the western Caucasus, acting as an economic and cultural bridge with the outside world. Georgians and Abkhaz have been neighbours from time immemorial. The Georgians currently number about 4 million people. The process of national consolidation of the Georgian nation is still far from complete: it includes some 20 subgroups, and the Megrelians (sometimes called Mingrelians) and Svans who live in western Georgia are so different in language and culture from other Georgians that it would be more correct to consider them as separate peoples. Some scholars, Hewitt, for example,1 suggest calling the Georgian nation not ‘Georgians’ but by their own name, Kartvelians, which includes the Georgians, Megrelians and Svans.2 To call all the different Kartvelian groups ‘Georgians’ obscures the true ethnic situation.
    [Show full text]
  • Second Report Submitted by the Russian Federation Pursuant to The
    ACFC/SR/II(2005)003 SECOND REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 25, PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES (Received on 26 April 2005) MINISTRY OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION REPORT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES Report of the Russian Federation on the progress of the second cycle of monitoring in accordance with Article 25 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities MOSCOW, 2005 2 Table of contents PREAMBLE ..............................................................................................................................4 1. Introduction........................................................................................................................4 2. The legislation of the Russian Federation for the protection of national minorities rights5 3. Major lines of implementation of the law of the Russian Federation and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities .............................................................15 3.1. National territorial subdivisions...................................................................................15 3.2 Public associations – national cultural autonomies and national public organizations17 3.3 National minorities in the system of federal government............................................18 3.4 Development of Ethnic Communities’ National
    [Show full text]
  • Genetic Analysis of Male Hungarian Conquerors: European and Asian Paternal Lineages of the Conquering Hungarian Tribes
    Archaeological and Anthropological Sciences (2020) 12: 31 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12520-019-00996-0 ORIGINAL PAPER Genetic analysis of male Hungarian Conquerors: European and Asian paternal lineages of the conquering Hungarian tribes Erzsébet Fóthi1 & Angéla Gonzalez2 & Tibor Fehér3 & Ariana Gugora4 & Ábel Fóthi5 & Orsolya Biró6 & Christine Keyser2,7 Received: 11 March 2019 /Accepted: 16 October 2019 /Published online: 14 January 2020 # The Author(s) 2020 Abstract According to historical sources, ancient Hungarians were made up of seven allied tribes and the fragmented tribes that split off from the Khazars, and they arrived from the Eastern European steppes to conquer the Carpathian Basin at the end of the ninth century AD. Differentiating between the tribes is not possible based on archaeology or history, because the Hungarian Conqueror artifacts show uniformity in attire, weaponry, and warcraft. We used Y-STR and SNP analyses on male Hungarian Conqueror remains to determine the genetic source, composition of tribes, and kin of ancient Hungarians. The 19 male individuals paternally belong to 16 independent haplotypes and 7 haplogroups (C2, G2a, I2, J1, N3a, R1a, and R1b). The presence of the N3a haplogroup is interesting because it rarely appears among modern Hungarians (unlike in other Finno-Ugric-speaking peoples) but was found in 37.5% of the Hungarian Conquerors. This suggests that a part of the ancient Hungarians was of Ugric descent and that a significant portion spoke Hungarian. We compared our results with public databases and discovered that the Hungarian Conquerors originated from three distant territories of the Eurasian steppes, where different ethnicities joined them: Lake Baikal- Altai Mountains (Huns/Turkic peoples), Western Siberia-Southern Urals (Finno-Ugric peoples), and the Black Sea-Northern Caucasus (Caucasian and Eastern European peoples).
    [Show full text]
  • 4Th NRF Template.Indd
    Project Day Session 215 Language Policy in Russia: the Case Study of Gen the Yakut Language der and Hu Darima Badmatsyrenova Anna Elivanova man PhD, Head of the Foreign Languages Department Postgraduate Student, Senior Instructor Technical Institute Foreign Languages department Se Sakha State University Technical Institute, cur Nerungri, Russian Federation Sakha State University Nerungri, Russian Federation ity Introduction Language policy and linguistic contact in the Russian Federa- According to the population census of 2002 the number of various ethnic groups inhabiting the Russian Fed- tion eration is as high as 180 and represent about 28 million people, i.e. about 20 percent of the population world- Language policy in the wide. They occupy a vast area of Eurasia, from the Bal- Russian Federation tic in the west to the Pacifi c Ocean in the East, and from the Arctic in the North to the Caucasus in the South. The democratic processes started with the Perestroika There are large nations represented by millions of peo- in the former Soviet Union highlighted the drawbacks ple (for example, the Russians comprise 83 percent of in the national policy of the country, which had been the population and are numbered in millions), medi- neglected before. Among them were issues concerned um-number population groups – some 50.000 to several with national identity development and maintenance of hundred thousand (for example, the Yakuts count for minority languages. Most minority languages were in 432.290 people), and minority ethnic groups, from less the process of extinction or endangered. The strive to than 50.000 down to a single person.
    [Show full text]
  • Finno-Ugric Republics and Their State Languages: Balancing Powers in Constitutional Order in the Early 1990S
    SUSA/JSFOu 94, 2013 Konstantin ZAMYATIN (Helsinki) Finno-Ugric Republics and Their State Languages: Balancing Powers in Constitutional Order in the Early 1990s Most of Russia’s national republics established titular and Russian as co-official state languages in their constitutions of the early 1990s. There is no consensus on the reasons and consequences of this act, whether it should be seen as a mere symbolic gesture, a measure to ensure a language revival, an instrument in political debate or an ethnic institution. From an institutional and comparative perspective, this study explores the constitutional systems of the Finno-Ugric republics and demonstrates that across the republics, the official status of the state languages was among the few references to ethnicity built into their constitutions. However, only in the case of language require- ments for the top officials, its inclusion could be interpreted as an attempt at instrumen- tally using ethnicity for political ends. Otherwise, constitutional recognition of the state languages should be rather understood as an element of institutionalized ethnicity that remains a potential resource for political mobilization. This latter circumstance might clarify why federal authorities could see an obstacle for their Russian nation-building agenda in the official status of languages. 1. Introduction The period of social transformations of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Eastern Europe was characterized by countries’ transition from the communist administra- tive−command systems towards the representative democracy and market economy. One important driving force of change in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was the rise of popular movements out of national resentment and dissatis- faction with the state-of-the-art in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Between Integration and Resettlement: the Meskhetian Turks
    BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND RESETTLEMENT: THE MESKHETIAN TURKS Oskari Pentikäinen and Tom Trier ECMI Working Paper # 21 September 2004 EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI) Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor Building) D-24939 Flensburg Germany ( +49-(0)461-14 14 9-0 fax +49-(0)461-14 14 9-19 e-mail: [email protected] internet: http://www.ecmi.de ECMI Working Paper # 21 European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) Director: Marc Weller © Copyright 2004 by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) Published in August 2004 by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) List of Abbreviations.................................................................................................4 I. Introduction...........................................................................................................6 1. Who Are the Meskhetian Turks?...........................................................................9 2. A History of Forced Migration............................................................................11 II. The Meskhetian Turks’ Current Demographic and Socio-Political Situation.......13 1. Georgia...............................................................................................................15 2. Azerbaijan...........................................................................................................19 3. Ukraine...............................................................................................................20 4. Russia..................................................................................................................21
    [Show full text]
  • How Much Land Does a Man Need? by Leo Tolstoy
    Lesson Ideas English Language Arts 6-12 How much land does a man need? By Leo Tolstoy How much land does a man need? is a short story written by Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910). In the story, Tolstoy reflects critically on the hierarchy of 19th century Russian society where the poor were deprived and the rich stayed wealthy. Personal belongings, property, and other forms of material wealth were measures of an individual’s worth and determined social class. Land shortage was a major issue in 19th century Russia, and in his story, Tolstoy associates the Devil with the main character’s greed for land. How much land does a man need? inspires discussion about the concepts of how greed and both socio-economic inequalities and injustices can contribute to our desire to “have more,” even if it means taking risks. The story also calls into question additional topics that students can apply to their own lives such as how we anticipate and justify the consequences of our actions when fueled by greed or other motivations. Many of these themes serve a double purpose as they are also relevant to building gambling literacy and competencies. After all, being able to identify our own tendencies toward greed can help us pause and perhaps rethink our decisions. And being mindful that we are more than our wealth can release us of the burden of comparing our and others’ financial value. Pahom sets out to encircle so much land that by the Brief summary afternoon he realizes he has created too big of a circuit.
    [Show full text]