Naval War College Review Volume 67 Article 13 Number 3 Summer

2014 Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War Karl Walling

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review

Recommended Citation Walling, Karl (2014) "Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War," Naval War College Review: Vol. 67 : No. 3 , Article 13. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/13

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 148 Naval wWalling:ar college Counterinsurgency: review Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War

security decisions are made and then M16. Whether one considers the French undone. Gates puts it very well: “While in Vietnam and Algeria or the British in the national security apparatus to deal South Africa, Malaya, Palestine, Kenya, with . . . problems is gigantic, ultimately Ireland, and Northern Ireland (and they all had to be addressed by just eight elsewhere), the most common root of people: the president, the vice president, insurgency, according to Porch, is that the secretary of state, the secretary of other peoples do not wish to be ruled by defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs foreigners. Population-centric opera- of Staff, the director of national intel- tions (Porch does not call them strate- ligence, the director of the CIA, and the gies) designed to win hearts and minds national security advisor.” Duty is an have frequently failed, because insur- interesting window into the thoughts gency is less about grievance resolution and actions of one of those eight. for a “biddable population,” as COIN proponents assume, than about ideology Thomas Hone Formerly of the Naval War College, the Naval or political goals. War among the people Air Systems Command, and the Office of the thus often becomes war against the peo- Secretary of Defense ple, for a variety of reasons, beginning with the fact that Western counterinsur- gents often assume, with good reason, that “the people” are in cahoots with the insurgents, who otherwise would be un- Porch, Douglas. Counterinsurgency: Exposing the able to operate. Therefore, counterinsur- Myths of the New Way of War. New York: Cam- gents seek to divide indigenous societies bridge Univ. Press, 2013. 434pp. $23.88 in the colonial manner so as better to Douglas Porch, military historian and control them, which only undermines academic, currently a distinguished the modern state building that COIN professor of national security affairs advocates seek to achieve. Furthermore, at the Naval Postgraduate School, has a Western tradition that sees guerrillas written a highly polemical and critical and insurgents as terrorists and criminal intellectual history of counterinsurgency, assassins and not as lawful combat- aka COIN. It has been selected by the ants has often led to illegal detention, Army chief of staff for his professional torture, denial of food, extrajudicial reading list, so it is a must-read, at least execution, disappearances, concentra- for Army officers, and more generally tion camps, and other counterproduc- for those who follow a debate in which tive efforts to isolate the people from sobriety and balance are rare virtues. insurgents, gain intelligence, and break According to Porch, COIN’s intellectual the will of the insurgents. In this way, roots lie in nineteenth-century impe- Porch argues that even in victory COIN rialism, which was often justified in usually comes at a heavy moral price. paternalistic ways. Even today, COIN’s Porch also objects to COIN proponents’ mission is to “civilize” indigenous societ- seeing themselves as technicians, apply- ies by importing Western norms and ing the “lessons” derived from historical practices that are often severely at odds cases, especially Malaya. By focusing with local custom or resented because on grievance alleviation as their central they are imported at the muzzle of an concern, these military officers engage

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014 1 Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 3, Art. 13 book reviews 149

in “armed social work,” usually creating philosopher Hannah Arendt and indi- more problems than they solve. Often rectly such thinkers as Edmund Burke well-meaning reforms, like land reform, and Thucydides, calls the “boomerang infrastructure improvement, power effect,” or the “revenge of the periphery” sharing, self-government, demands for —that coercive COIN practices and less corruption, and so on, that form the methods worked out on distant battle- staples of the COIN approach end up fields often return home, in greater or foundering because of the resentment of lesser degrees, in the form of repressive a foreign military presence. Many create measures inimical to free government. dependence relationships with host na- This gets to the heart of Porch’s critique tionals, undermine the sovereignty and of COIN on strategic grounds. First, he legitimacy of local authorities, have neg- argues that COIN is not a strategy but a ative economic impacts, or are wasteful. collection of “lessons learned” and suc- Porch considers one of the most danger- cessful minor tactics that appear to be ous problems with an “armed social transferable across theaters, years, and work” approach to intervention to be the cultures. This is especially true if special politicizing of officers, by taking them operations come to be seen as synony- out of their military roles and giving mous with COIN, so that it degenerates them civic and political responsibilities, into a sort of decapitation strategy. Sec- in a process referred to as “civil-military ond, Porch holds, the case for making fusion.” COIN proponents have often COIN a branch of special operations is argued that the challenges of insurgency weak. It assumes that the special opera- are so complex that military and politi- tors are more adaptable than conven- cal authority have to be fused. Officers, tional forces, but Porch demonstrates proconsuls really, have thus acquired that while adaptation is necessary in forms of political power abroad that they COIN, conventional forces are no worse would never be allowed at home. As they (and sometimes better) at adapting than grew accustomed to wielding political the special operators. Third, there is a power abroad, they sometimes grew serious danger in adapting too much in contemptuous of political authorities at the direction of COIN. Had the United home, hijacking policy and thus damag- States gone whole hog on COIN in ing civil-military relations. Counter- Vietnam, Porch suggests, it might have insurgents in Algeria in the 1950s, for left itself even more unprepared than it example, came to think that the French was for Cold War conflict on the Central republic was a liability to the empire. Front in Germany. Fourth, losers do not To save the empire and the military’s always give the best advice, and much reputation, they believed, they had to of COIN theory is based on the pre- overthrow the republic—arguably the scriptions of losers—like David Galula, worst possible kind of breakdown of a veteran of the French war in Alge- civil-military relations and a complete ria, whose shadow looms large in the inversion of the Clausewitzian ap- Army COIN doctrinal document, Field proach, which subordinates strategy Manual (FM) 3-24. Porch shows that and those who make it to policy and the French in Algeria actually followed political leaders. So the greatest danger Galula’s principles but ultimately lost. is what Porch, directly following the Why? Some of those principles proved

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/13 2 150 Naval wWalling:ar college Counterinsurgency: review Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War

counterproductive in practice. Isolat- the strategic environment and adapt ing the people from insurgents sounds COIN doctrine to it. Some might object great in theory, but if it requires putting that this book is written in an angry significant numbers of the people in spirit, highly polemical, and deeply concentration camps or driving them one-sided. They might say that Porch into exile, it is likely to produce more has written two books, not one. The first enemies than friends. Moreover, the is an intellectual history of COIN, in strategic context, the international, which the pattern of making the same social, institutional, and economic mistakes occurs again and again; the environment, was stacked against the second is a critique of special operations French, as it was for them before and for in general, one that seems unnecessary the United States later in Vietnam, and to Porch’s argument and sometimes then again, some might say, in Iraq. In distracts from it. Plenty of insurgencies other words, COIN is not a magic bullet. occur without the presence of foreign When policy makers blunder into wars occupiers, so one cannot blame them or involving unpredicted insurgencies with the problems of counterinsurgency on unexpected strength and resilience, to imperialism or paternalism alone. Porch think that COIN by itself can save them is right that General Petraeus was lucky from the consequences of their policies that the surge in Iraq coincided with the is magical thinking at best. It would be so-called Sunni Awakening against Al far better to rethink the policies that Qaeda and with other developments caused the mess in the first place. in Iraq, but strategic wisdom often in- To be clear, Porch is not arguing that volves taking advantage of good luck. If COIN is bound to fail strategically. Petraeus’s relative success in Iraq did not Sometimes the context is favorable. result directly from his personal role in Sometimes the insurgents have no allies redrafting American COIN doctrine and or sanctuaries. Sometimes their cause applying it intelligently to Iraq, it was has no popular appeal. Sometimes their nonetheless a vast improvement over leaders are inept or so brutal that they the work of his predecessors, who did drive the people away from them. Some- not plan for a potential insurgency and times the incumbents are competent, were slow to confront it—even occa- willing to adapt politically and militarily sionally aggravated it. Arguably the war to meet the challenge. More often than in Iraq, a war of choice, was a strategic Porch admits, counterinsurgents do win, mistake, with American service mem- but not because COIN is a form of war- bers stuck cleaning up the mess until the fare only special operators can under- U.S. government could find a dignified stand. “War is war!” says Porch. A strate- way to leave. Yet no less arguably, there gy appropriate to the context is the most was no alternative to intervening in important element in victory for both Afghanistan, about which Porch says the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. very little, because to fight Al Qaeda, which was sheltered by the Taliban, the These concessions on Porch’s part invite United States in 2001 found it necessary readers to take some critical distance to overthrow the government, though from him. When counterinsurgencies with a high probability that it would go south, maybe the problem is less with have to deal with an insurgency from COIN as such than with failure to assess the Taliban while fighting the terrorists.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014 3 Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 3, Art. 13 book reviews 151

Porch suggests no alternative approach power by nations that are considered for Afghanistan, so his critique has “maritime power states” and “continen- limited usefulness for evaluating U.S. tal power states” and it is an attempt to strategy in that conflict. Afghanistan, apply related lessons to an understand- indeed, is a very tough case for Porch’s ing of current Sino-U.S. relations. critique. It invites readers to ask whether According to the author, traditionally problems there resulted from trying too maritime powers, such as the United much or too little COIN, while domestic States and the United Kingdom, have support in the United States for the war generally adopted a more offensive pos- was high before getting distracted with ture in their quest for sea power, mainly Iraq. Or perhaps the strategic context in terms of gaining “command of the was so challenging that nothing better sea” or in influencing development on than a weak government in Kabul could the continent, as reflected in the works have been expected—implying, perhaps, of American and British sea-power that after scattering Al Qaeda in 2001, theorists Alfred Mahan and Sir Julian the best realistic option would have Corbett. The key to understanding been to withdraw quickly and turn the Mahan, the author holds, is his empha- struggle over to whatever government sis on the aim of acquiring “absolute the Afghans managed to establish, even command of the sea” through decisive if it did not meet many Western stan- fleet engagement, which requires force dards of good government. Or maybe concentration and capital ships capable the problem was that COIN doctrine of superior firepower. This central aim can lead to unrealistic expectations that relegates other aims, such as sea-lane provoke precisely the kind of critique protection, commerce raiding, and naval Porch has written. Had Porch focused blockade, and the building of capabilities more on what is necessary to make requisite for them, to lesser priorities. such expectations more sober—how he Mahan, however, is critically questioned might have rewritten Army FM 3-24, by Corbett, Shi Xiaoqin points out. for example—his book would have been Corbett, for instance, believes “absolute improved substantially. Instead, those command of the sea” is neither pos- who rewrite that manual will have to sible nor necessary, because most of take both Porch’s book and more than the seas, most of the time, are open and a grain of salt into account in devel- contested and accessible for productive oping an approach to COIN that is use and exploitation. As a result, flotilla genuinely sober in its expectations. operations to protect sea-lanes may be Karl Walling important, but building capital ships for Naval War College Monterey Program “decisive fleet engagement” may divert resources away from them. Also, the more the strong side wants a decisive battle through force concentration, the more incentive the weak side has S hi Xiaoqin. Seapower and Sino-U.S. Relations. to avoid such an engagement, through Beijing: Military Science, 2013. 320pp. Ұ42 force dispersion to reduce losses. For Seapower and Sino-U.S. Relations is a Corbett, according to the author, sea comparative study of the quest for sea control should also serve more useful https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/13 4