Issue 50, 3d Quarter 2008 JFQ coming next in... Focus on Weapons of Mass Destruction Essay Competition Winners plus Whatever Happened to the “War on Drugs”? Legal Solutions to Terrorist Violence JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY
. . . and more in issue 51, 4th Quarter 2008 of JFQ
Focus on Naval Power
The People’s Liberation Army Navy ISSUE fifty Challenges to Stability
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY , 3 d Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff quarter 2008 by National Defense University Press Institute for National Strategic Studies Use of Military Force National Defense University, Washington, DC by the President 1070-0692(200833)50;1-P
Joint Force Quarterly Inside Issue 50, 3d Quarter 2008 New from NDU Press
JFQ Dialogue Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) . . . from the Institute for National Strategic Studies [email protected] From the Chairman Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. 2 Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq Managing Editor, NDU Press 4 Letters to the Editor LTC Robert E. Henstrand, USA and Its Aftermath Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz Forum Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. by Joseph J. Collins Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley 6 Executive Summary Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick Since 2006, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) has contributed to the On Naval Power By Milan N. Vego Project on National Security Reform’s study of the interagency process. As part of this Associate Editor CDR Margaret Kerr-McKown, USN 8 cooperative effort and in furtherance of the INSS mission to inform the national de- Design Rebecca J. White and Chris Dunham, 18 Hobson’s Choice for the American Maritime Industry: The Navy or Nothing fense policy debate, INSS is publishing selected analyses on national security reform. U.S. Government Printing Office By Douglas T. Tastad Printed in St. Louis, Missouri In this case study, Joseph J. Collins outlines how the United States chose to go to war by 24 Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization By Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase in Iraq, how its decisionmaking process functioned, and what improvements could be made in that process. Finding that U.S. efforts were hobbled by faulty assumptions, 31 China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, Doctrine, flawed planning, and continuing inability to create adequate and Capabilities By Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes security conditions in Iraq, Collins concludes with several NDU Press is the National Defense University’s recommendations to improve the decisionmaking process for cross-component, professional military and 39 Seabased Ballistic Missile Defense By Alan B. Hicks complex contingency operations, such as developing a new academic publishing house. It publishes books, planning charter, improving the interagency planning process, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and 46 Seabasing: Expanding Access By Douglas M. King and John C. Berry, Jr. and strengthening interagency execution. special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, national military strategy, regional security affairs, and global strategic problems. NDU Press is Special Features 43 pages. Available only from NDU Press. Visit the NDU Press part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a Web site for more information on this and other publications:
3d Quarter, July 2008 ISSN 1070-0692 Commentary PUBLISHER ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN 109 Thinking Total Cost Requires Thinking Up Front By Adam B. Siegel DIRECTOR, INSS The Use of Military Force by the President: Defensive Uses Short of War 113 Dr. Patrick M. Cronin By James P. Terry Advisory Committee The Case for JPME Phase Zero: Building a Joint Culture in the U.S. Navy 121 Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC The Joint Staff By David K. Richardson BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman MG Byron S. Bagby, USA Joint Forces Staff College Interagency Dialogue Col Jeremiah D. Canty, USMC Marine Corps War College A. Denis Clift National Defense Intelligence College Col Thomas Greenwood, USMC Marine Corps Command 127 An Interview with Admiral James G. Stavridis, Commander, U.S. Southern and Staff College Command RADM Garry E. Hall, USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces Brig Gen Jimmie C. Jackson, Jr., USAF Air Command and Staff College Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC The Joint Staff Recall Maj Gen Stephen J. Miller, USAF Air War College BG Mark E. O’Neill, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Why a Conversation with the Country? A Backward Look at Some Forward- LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA The Joint Staff 130 RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN Naval War College thinking Maritime Strategists By Karl F. Walling Col David A. Smarsh, USAF Naval Postgraduate School Maj Gen Robert P. Steel, USAF National War College Book Reviews MG Robert M. Williams, USA U.S. Army War College LtGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC National Defense University 140 Off the Shelf By Robert E. Henstrand Editorial Board Richard K. Betts Columbia University Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy 141 Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Reviewed by Todd Manyx Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic 142 Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces Reviewed by Rizwan Ali Douglas N. Hime Naval War College Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College 143 The Highway War: A Marine Company Commander in Iraq Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College Reviewed by Andrew Marvin Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College Joint Doctrine Update John J. Mearsheimer The University of Chicago 144 LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Hudson Institute Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College James A. Schear National Defense University The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or COL Robert E. Smith, USA (Ret.) U.S. Army War College any other agency of the Federal Government. LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
CONTRIBUTIONS About the covers Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians About the covers: The front cover shows a composite of three photos (top to bottom): from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration SH–60F approaching for landing aboard USS Momsen (U.S. Navy/James R. Evans); USS to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected] Hampton surfacing at North Pole (U.S. Navy/Kevin Elliott); and Navy diver descending into “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information, water off coast of St. Croix (U.S. Navy/Glen Hurd). The table of contents shows (left to right): see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. Israeli soldiers training in new IDF Urban Warfare Training Center (Marine Corps Times); Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Estelle Maersk, one of the world’s largest commercial container ships (Maersk International Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Shipping); Airman conducting surveillance for enemy snipers in Kirkuk, Iraq (30th Space Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal Wing/Angelique Perez); and U.S. Army UH–60 dropping leaflets over Kirkuk in support of designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and 10th Mountain Division operations (30th Space Wing/Samuel Bendet). The back cover shows other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security (clockwise from left): Texas National Guardsmen decontaminating after hazardous material policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military exercise at U.S. Coast Guard Station, Galveston (U.S. Coast Guard/Adam Eggers); Army and education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to Air National Guardsmen practicing victim extraction during simulated nuclear attack drill meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. (U.S. Army/Russell Lee Klika); Navy damage control seamen taking samples of simulated anthrax during chemical, biological, radiological drill aboard USS John C. Stennis (U.S. Navy/ Kyle Steckler); and Fox nuclear, biological, and chemical detection vehicle being transported near Baghdad (U.S. Air Force/Jonathan Doti).
Download cover as computer wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu From the Chairman Military Must Stay Apolitical
uring just about every trip I “Are you endorsing any of the candi- foremost citizens of this great country, and make to the field and to the dates? And if so, which one and why?” as such have a right to participate in the fleet, I get asked about the democratic process. As George Washington D challenges I will face leading My answer is simple and always the himself made clear, we did not stop being the military through this upcoming Presi- same: the U.S. military must remain apoliti- citizens when we started being Soldiers. dential transition: cal at all times and in all ways. It is and must What I am suggesting—indeed, what always be a neutral instrument of the state, the Nation expects—is that military person- “Aren’t you worried about having to no matter which party holds sway. nel will, in the execution of the mission work for a new President?” A professional armed force that stays assigned to them, put aside their partisan out of the politics that drive the policies it is leanings. Political opinions have no place in “What if a Democrat wins? What will sworn to enforce is vital to the preservation cockpit or camp or conference room. We do that do to the mission in Iraq?” of the union and to our way of life. not wear our politics on our sleeves. Part of I am not suggesting that military the deal we made when we joined up was to “Do you think it’s better for one party or professionals abandon all personal opinions willingly subordinate our individual inter- another to have the White House?” about modern social or political issues. ests to the greater good of protecting vital Nor would I deny them the opportunity to national interests. And this one, asked of me by a young vote or discuss . . . or even to debate those We defend all Americans, everywhere, Marine at Camp Lejeune a few weeks ago: issues among themselves. We are first and regardless of their age, race, gender, creed,
ADM Mullen (left), Secretary Gates (2d from left), Service chiefs, and combatant commanders meet with President Bush and Cabinet in the White House DOD (Chad McNeeley)
2 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu and, yes, political affiliation. We may be citi- zens first, but we are also Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coastguardsmen by oath—a promise we made to defend the Constitution of the United States “against all enemies foreign and domestic.” We do this by obeying the orders of the Commander in Chief. Obedience to that authority is a military virtue underpinning The National Defense the very credibility with which we exercise our own command and control. University Foundation Now, I know all too well the famous . . . promoting excellence and innovation in education . . . dictum that war is but an extension of politics, and that at the highest levels it is The National Defense University (NDU) Foundation was pleased to support three writing competitions conducted in 2008 by NDU Press. The Foundation congratulates the contes- vital for military leaders to understand tants and winners of the following: the political context of national security decisionmaking. But understanding is not The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating. It is not deciding. Strategic Essay Competition “Political factors may exercise a deter- In the 27th annual competition, the Chairman challenged students in the Nation’s mining influence on military operations,” joint professional military education institutions to think and write creatively about noted General George Marshall, “therefore national security strategy. they must be given careful consideration. The Secretary of Defense Yet soldiers must not assume to lead or to Transformation Essay Competition dictate in such matters.” The Secretary of Defense initiated this competition in 2007 to inspire critical and As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of innovative thinking on how to adapt national security institutions to meet current Staff, I am responsible for providing the and future challenges. President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council with my best and The Joint Force Quarterly Kiley Awards most independent military advice. I have an In honor of the former Director of NDU Press, Dr. Fred Kiley, the most influential essays from input to policy, as do the other chiefs and the 2007 were selected for recognition. Articles were evaluated for their contributions toward the JFQ combatant commanders. We get a chance to mission of continuing joint professional military education and security studies. affect the decisions of our civilian leaders, but we do not make those decisions. And we The final round of the competitions was held May 20–21, 2008, at Fort Lesley do not involve ourselves in political debates. J. McNair, with 24 professors from the joint professional military education colleges As the Nation prepares to elect a new serving as judges. The winners have been posted on the NDU Press Web site at: President, we would all do well to remember the promises we made: to obey civilian www.ndu.edu/inss/press/winners authority, to support and defend the Consti- tution, and to do our duty at all times. The next issue of JFQ (Issue 51, October 2008)
Keeping our politics private is a good will include the winning entries first step. from the essay competitions as a Special Feature.
The only things we should be wearing The NDU Foundation promotes excellence and innovation in education by nurturing high on our sleeves are our military insignia. standards of scholarship, leadership, and professionalism. The National Defense University depends on the NDU Foundation to support university activities that are not covered by Federal appropriations. Many activities at the heart of a sound university environment—such as endowments, honoraria, Michael G. Mullen competitions, and awards—cannot be paid for by government funds. Thus, the NDU Foundation offers Admiral, U.S. Navy Americans the opportunity to invest in the Nation’s security by supporting these activities. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Research and writing competitions are conducted by NDU Press with the generous financial support of the NDU Foundation. The Foundation is a nonprofit 501 (c)(3) organization established in 1982 to support the National Defense University.
For more information, visit the NDU Foundation Web site at www.nduf.org/about ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 3 Letters have been edited for length. Readers may view letters in their entirety by visiting LETTERS TO THE EDITOR the NDU Press Web site at http://ndupress.ndu.edu and clicking on the cover of this issue.
To the Editor: In my experiences as Pacific Fleet, the answers I got were often the other Services, and it only had a small planner for the joint force air component incomplete or troubling. Based on these staff to do it. In less than 15 minutes, I had commander (JFACC) with Pacific Air Forces discussions, and some Navy O–6 briefings I resolved months of angst, suspicion, and and U.S. Central Command, I have been observed at Third Fleet during an exercise, I inter-Service competition conspiracy theo- encouraged by the ability of action officers started coming to some discomforting con- ries that no one I knew could disprove based in the different functional components to clusions about the MOC. on firsthand information. work past Service-centric mindsets to come It seemed that the Navy was inter- This leads me to a few conclusions. up with joint, workable solutions to chal- ested in putting the joint force maritime First, it tells me that despite some notable lenging problems. component commander (JFMCC) firmly in disagreements between the Services on Seemingly, when we approach similar charge of “the Maritime Domain,” includ- the best way to structure the joint force to problems outside of the construct of a joint ing the air above the oceans and littorals, protect the Nation, we are still all very much task force (JTF), we tend to forget the inher- and was going to use the MOC to do it. on the same team when it gets down to ent advantages of working closely with our Rather than allocate excess sorties to the doing the job. Second, it tells me that when sister Services. As a result, we often end up JFACC, the JFMCC would retain control of I feel like someone is not communicating, it planning in a relative vacuum, even when we carrier air, including interdiction sorties, is probably at least half my fault, and even are living next door to one another. I offer and task them out through a maritime more so if I do not ask the right question. a case in point: When I was working as a tasking order (MTO). As an advocate of Third, it tells me that we should be apply- strategist in the Pacific Air Forces Air and functional components and the centralized ing the lessons of the JTF to Phase Zero. Space Operations Center (ASpOC) last year, control of airpower, I was concerned that Why do we treat steady-state operations I learned that Pacific Fleet was developing we were about to create what amounted to differently than other events across the its own operational level headquarters, two JFACCs in the same joint operational range of military operations? Why do we the Maritime Operations Center (MOC), area. I could easily imagine this opening up not have liaisons (not to be confused with to provide command and control in the operational seams in intelligence, command joint assignments) between Service head- maritime domain. This is an outstanding and control, and common support functions quarters outside of a JTF construct? Why enhancement for the joint force; having a that could be exploited by a canny or even do we not plan Phase Zero activities more maritime staff dedicated full-time to opera- lucky adversary—not unlike the operational collaboratively, rather than execute Phase tional level planning and execution can only disconnects of Leyte Gulf in World War II, Zero by Service component? How many make us better able to predict and respond but this time in the sky. opportunities to learn and execute together to events in theater. From my parallel expe- Convinced that it was my job to are we missing by not talking to one another rience in the 13th Air Force ASpOC, I can prevent this, I spent countless hours regularly? attest to the advantages of having a func- researching the potential issues. I looked The sooner we can bring the JTF team- tionally oriented staff that can concentrate up the domain definitions in joint publica- work and mindset to our steady-state opera- daily on “force consumer” issues rather than tions. I read historical accounts of airpower tions, the sooner we can put ex–conspiracy the Service-specific “force provider.” command and control disconnects. I pre- theorists like me to better uses. But I saw a problem in the MOC. pared bullet background papers and essays Seemingly, the Navy and Air Force were not about why we should not assign shared —Major David J. Lyle, USAF talking about it with each other, which did domains to single functional or Service Pacific Air Forces not make sense. The ASpOC construct had components. I prepared a submission for already reached a relative level of maturity publication to share my views and provoke To the Editor: In his article “A Strategy Based and acceptance in the joint force, and it discussion. on Faith: The Enduring Appeal of Progres- seemed that the Air Force should be actively But then, I finally did what I should sive American Airpower” (Issue 49, 2d helping the Navy and Marines steer around have done from the start: I called up the Quarter 2008), Mark Clodfelter correctly their past mistakes and leapfrog onto its folks at the Pacific Fleet MOC and asked points out that the historical record does not advances. At the very least, we should be them what was going on. Was the MOC match the puffery and, at times, exaggerated making sure we are both evolving command being designed to replicate JFACC functions advocacy of some airpower strategists. For and control systems designed to work within the JFMCC? Absolutely not. Would example, in a recently released White Paper together. the MOC seek to put naval sorties on the (December 29, 2007) that “charts US Air But no matter whom I asked in my MTO instead of the air tasking order? Only Force strategy for the next two decades,” Air Force chain, no one had any official outside the joint operational area, not for Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael information about the MOC or could tell joint task forces. Was the Navy intentionally Moseley asserts, “No modern war has been me what its implications would be for the hiding its plans from the Air Force? No, won without air superiority. No future command and control of joint airpower. it was just trying to get its hands around war will be won without air, space and When I asked my action officer contacts in an enormous task before consulting with cyberspace superiority.” Really? The North
4 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu Koreans and Chinese battled us to a stale- the merits of progressive airpower. Yet I am recruitment, ground force excesses—includ- mate during the Korean War without air not exactly sure what side of the debate he ing indiscriminate counterbattery fire, superiority. We lost the Vietnam War even takes. On the one hand, Lieutenant Colonel “terrain denial” strikes, “harassment and though guerrillas did not own a single air- Spinetta notes that “the historical record does interdiction” fires, heavy-handed searches, craft, and the North Vietnamese did not fly not match the puffery and, at times, exag- imprisonment of innocents, inhumane south of the demilitarized zone. Moreover, gerated advocacy of some airpower strate- prison conditions, ubiquitous roadblocks, the United States has enjoyed air dominance gists.” On the other hand, he remarks that early curfews, escalation of force events, and over Iraq for 17 years, yet the strategic situa- “‘ jettisoning’ progressive ideas would further so forth—also certainly have the potential tion in the current conflict is not altogether emasculate Airmen’s inputs on how best to for creating more insurgents than they favorable. run a campaign.” eliminate. Airpower is not a silver bullet that In regard to airpower in Kosovo, the One last point to be made is based on offers cheap and easy military solutions to jury is still out on whether bombing was my involvement in directing (at the opera- foreign policy problems. Nonetheless, fierce the key factor that caused the Serbs to leave tional level) and flying (at the tactical level) and progressive advocacy of airpower serves the province, or whether it helped trigger combat air operations in Iraq and Afghani- an incredibly important purpose: to provide the ethnic cleansing that it was designed stan: the assertion that counterinsurgency policymakers with expanded options. Dr. to prevent. The facts remain that fewer tasks cannot be accomplished “from 30,000 Clodfelter suggests that Airmen “jettison- than 19,000 Kosovar Albanians had fled to feet” is more than simply an inaccurate ing” progressive airpower ideas would stifle Albania before Operation Allied Force began; characterization—it is a blatant cheap shot strategic debate and limit ideas precisely at a 65,000 more had done so 5 days after the and misinforms the reader. time when the United States is struggling to bombing started; and 620,000 were refugees find the appropriate formula for success in a month later. Ultimately, the Serbs expelled —Maj Gen Allen G. Peck, USAF Iraq. Bombing alone may not achieve politi- 800,000 Kosovar Albanians—roughly half Commander cal goals in unconventional conflicts, but of the population—before the air campaign LeMay Center for Doctrine jettisoning progressive ideas would further ended. Development and Education emasculate Airmen’s inputs on how best to run a campaign. To the Editor: In his article “On Airpower, Dr. Corum’s response: Dr. Clodfelter’s criticism of airpower in Land Power, and Counterinsurgency: the Balkans campaigns is a red herring. He Getting Doctrine Right” (Issue 49, 2d Service doctrine ought to provide states that the central premise of progressive Quarter 2008), James Corum asserts that useful guidance for the commander and airpower is a belief that airpower makes “[i]n the Air Force counterinsurgency staff planner. On the very important subject wars quicker, cheaper, and less painful for doctrine, the issue of providing appropriate of equipping the air forces of less developed all sides than a reliance on surface combat. equipment to Third World allies is not even nations, the only comment of the U.S. Air There never was a debate, though, over the addressed.” This statement seems to indicate Force’s new counterinsurgency doctrine is, relative merits of airpower versus ground some unfamiliarity with Air Force Doctrine “The key to Building Partnership Capacity power to combat Serbian aggression; the use Document (AFDD) 2–3.1, Foreign Internal . . . is not finding high or low-tech answers, of ground forces in the Balkans was simply Defense, which discusses this issue in some but the right mix of technology, training, and a political nonstarter. Indeed, President detail, outlining best practices for helping support that provides a Partner Nation . . . Clinton publicly admitted that he was not foreign countries field air forces with the with affordable, sustainable, and capable even considering the use of ground forces right technology for their situations. airpower” (AFDD 2–3, Irregular Warfare, early in the conflict. Furthermore, General Moreover, Dr. Corum seems to hold August 2007, p. 29). Contrast this statement Wesley Clark, an Army officer who wanted a pejorative view of the kinetic use of with the Army/Marine Corps Field Manual to use airpower in a conventional manner, airpower. For instance, he makes the case 3–24, Counterinsurgency, which lists the determined targeting priorities. that “there is a heavy political price to pay basic capabilities needed by a small nation when airpower in the form of airstrikes is air force in counterinsurgency, provides —Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence J. used,” yet he fails to mention similar, and recent and current examples of the effective Spinetta, USAF practically inevitable, consequences of using use of simple airpower technologies, and then 1st Fighter Wing land power in counterinsurgency, especially discusses the advantages and disadvantages when it involves large numbers of American of modifying transports as aerial gunships Dr. Clodfelter’s response: troops in a foreign country. Airpower is (December 2006, pp. E3–E5). among the joint force commander’s most Which of these doctrines provides the I appreciate Lieutenant Colonel Spin- precise, flexible, disciplined, and scrutinized better starting point for the counterinsur- etta’s thoughtful response to my article; I capabilities to apply lethal force. In terms gency planner? hoped that it would engender debate about of potential for insurgent propaganda and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 5 Executive Summary
Within the United States, public awareness of the role and contribution ith this 50th issue, Joint of the Navy is cursory at best. The maritime strategy and our continu- Force Quarterly celebrates its 15th anniversary. While ing effort to get out and talk about it have been very worthwhile. W much has changed since —Admiral Gary Roughead 1993, the interoperability problems and resis- Chief of Naval Operations tance to greater synergy that inspired General Colin Powell to establish JFQ are strikingly resilient. On April 21, 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in speeches at the U.S. Military Academy and the Air War College asserted that the Armed Forces were adapting too slowly to new enemies and that military U.S. Navy (Tiffini M. Jones) leaders were “stuck in old ways of doing business.” Two days later, Admiral Michael Mullen addressed the students of the Indus- trial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College as part of the National Defense University’s Distinguished Lecturer Program. He noted that the combined student bodies included a great many combat- experienced leaders and urged them to think differently about the nature of war and to consider new approaches to national security challenges. The Chairman recommended JFQ as an effective vehicle for professionals to air ideas and outline innovative concepts for securing national security objectives. In this issue, JFQ supports this mandate by examining elements of naval power and some contemporary challenges that make a strong U.S. Navy as important as ever. A spirit of cooperation and innovative thinking is undeniably reflected in the scope and manner in which the new U.S. maritime strategy was developed and coordinated between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Before finalizing the selection of manuscripts for this Forum, JFQ sat down with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, in his Pentagon office. He spoke to the importance of the new maritime strategy and the manner in which it was socialized both within and without the three sea Services. Before reading our Forum articles, readers may wish to skip ahead to the last article in this issue (Recall), which Chief of Naval Operations ADM Gary Roughead speaks during a “Conversation with the Country” in Denver, Colorado addresses the effort to engage the public on naval power and U.S. maritime security. As
6 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu with aviation assets, naval vessels are decreas- longer underpins the Navy, rather the Navy is which the United States is preparing with a ing in number and increasing in unit price, the victim of what industry remains.” sense of urgency. Our fifth essay outlines the forcing difficult choices in the face of mod- In our third and fourth installments, proven and accelerating efforts of the U.S. ernization and utilization demands. Despite JFQ again draws upon Naval War College Navy and its strategic partners to address the reality that the Army, Navy, and Air Force expertise to provide context for the impor- the proliferation of these weapons and their own and operate shipping, the naval power tance of modernizing the U.S. fleet. In potential for terrorist use. Admiral Alan debate bears no resemblance to the ongoing addressing the People’s Republic of China’s Hicks asserts that there is an urgent need for a airpower dispute presented in the last issue (PRC’s) urgent modernization of its navy, ballistic missile defense capability and begins of JFQ. This is not to say that the issues are Drs. Andrew Erickson and Michael Chase his analysis with a review of the emerging less contentious in the realm of naval power; observe that the People’s Liberation Army threat, noting that a maximum of 30 minutes rather, the friction is largely confined to the Navy (PLAN) focus is primarily on a possible spans the detection, decision, and action sea Services and far less exposed to inter- conflict with Taiwan. This said, the PLAN is window between launch and impact. For Service or public scrutiny. also concerned with a wider range of missions many readers, this will be a first introduction Before one can assess the present state of that include nuclear deterrence and protection to the Missile Defense Agency and its inte- naval power, it is important to define terms, of maritime resources. The importance of gration of all missile defense programs and and for this task, JFQ turns to one of its most information in today’s strategic environment, technologies into one Ballistic Missile Defense prolific contributors and reviewers, the Naval combined with the PRC’s tradition of central- System. This agency, with significant con- War College’s Dr. Milan Vego. Professor Vego ized command, has inspired great emphasis tributions from U.S. Navy Aegis systems, is begins his survey of contemporary naval upon command, control, communications, joining an allied coalition to form the founda- power by disabusing readers of the notion computers, intelligence, surveillance, and tion of international cooperation to deter and that naval power and seapower are synony- reconnaissance systems. PLAN publications defeat this critical transnational threat. mous. He then presents the myriad roles of connect this technical modernization with The final article in the Forum is an naval power across the spectrum of conflict the growing importance of joint operations, argument for joint seabasing to compensate and Service core competencies. While some for which they have little experience and for a dramatic reduction in overseas basing may assume that technological advances in numerous impediments. The authors are rights, secure ports, and airfields. The term airpower have supplanted traditional Navy unsure whether technological improvements seabasing is misunderstood even in the joint roles, Dr. Vego makes a convincing case for in command and control will lead to the military community, referring neither to the persistence and scalability of naval power empowerment of junior commanders or if it floating bases nor to an exclusively logistic and how multidimensional military opera- will simply lead to greater centralization. concept to support a major regional conflict. tions place adversaries on the horns of serial The fourth article in the Forum comple- In brief, joint seabasing is the rapid deploy- dilemmas. He concludes with an assessment ments the previous one by assessing the ment, assembly, command projection, of the continuing importance of naval power implications of PRC naval power moderniza- reconstitution, and reemployment of joint in realms that include homeland security and tion for strategy. The Justice Department combat power from the sea. Douglas King deterring the outbreak of large-scale hostili- has noted that technology-focused Chinese and John Berry observe that seabasing must ties abroad. This assessment is reinforced in espionage is “among the most aggressive” be viewed as an interdependent and intercon- the fifth and sixth Forum articles. in the United States, as China’s government nected system of systems—everything from Our second Forum entry addresses attempts to secure by theft what an inef- major combatants to inshore patrol craft, the unfortunate state of contemporary U.S. ficient command economy cannot produce from surface and aerial connectors to cargo seapower and warns that the Navy’s large independently. Despite the influential school handling gear, and from command suites to and growing share of the domestic maritime of thought that predicts the PRC will soon put medical centers. The authors contend that industry does not benefit America’s future to sea a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) joint seabasing must be pursued as a means as a sea power. Lieutenant Douglas Tastad fleet that approaches the quality and quantity of deploying and employing sustained joint, begins with a historical survey of U.S. com- of the U.S. Navy, Drs. Toshi Yoshihara and interagency, and multinational capabilities mercial shipping, then compares this with its James Holmes posit that PLAN technological from the sea. present state and proposes solutions to arrest improvements will reinforce, not undermine, and reverse the industry’s decline. The author Beijing’s commitment to minimum deter- In the next issue of Joint Force Quarterly, argues that domestic seapower’s current rence. Their article examines the history of the Forum will focus on weapons of mass vector prompts questions concerning the China’s SSBN development and attempts to destruction, and the January 2009 edition will Navy’s operational legitimacy and sustain- project the size of, and deployment patterns focus on land power, completing our review of ability. In presenting his remedies, Lieutenant for, its SSBN fleet. The authors expect that the traditional approaches to military power Tastad asserts that the Government must technological obstacles and philosophical through the lens of the operating media: air, overcome its state of denial concerning these principles will inspire the PLAN to maintain sea, and land. The deadline for submissions on problems. He proposes capital investment and its minimalist posture well into the next innovations in land warfare at the operational owner incentives, new maritime technology decade, but outline factors that could chal- to strategic level is September 1, 2008. JFQ research, legislation addressing oversight, and lenge this logic. terror insurance. Lieutenant Tastad concludes The ballistic missile threat is not a future —D.H. Gurney that “the commercial maritime sector no concern; it is a clear and present danger for ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 7 On Naval Power By Milan N. Vego
ll too often, the terms naval This scenario is not going to change economic exclusion zone (EEZ) and activi- power and sea power are used in the future despite claims to the contrary ties there, the extent of the territorial waters interchangeably. But naval by some influential thinkers. The threat of and the rights of innocent passage, and illicit A power, properly understood, major conflict at sea might look distant or fishing. Conventional threats include low- refers to a direct and indirect source of even unlikely today. Yet it would be unwise intensity conflict such as insurgencies and military power at sea. Obviously, the main to exclude the possibility altogether. Very the possibility of a high-intensity conflict components of a naval power are the navy, often, the fact that naval power might play an in various parts of the world, such as the coast guard, and marines/naval infantry important part in conventional deterrence— Persian (Arabian) Gulf, Korean Peninsula, and their shore establishment. The term sea or, in the case of blue water navies such as the or Taiwan Strait. In addition, unconven- power (coined in 1849) originally referred U.S. Navy, in nuclear deterrence—is either tional threats in the maritime domain to a nation having a formidable naval overlooked or ignored. Navies, and coast have dramatically increased in diversity strength. Today, this term’s meaning is guards in particular, perform important and and intensity since the early 1990s. They much broader; it now describes the entirety diverse tasks in peacetime and in operations include transnational terrorism and criminal of the use of the sea by a nation. Specifi- short of war. networks involved in illicit trafficking in cally, a sea (or maritime) power comprises narcotics, humans, and weapons. Piracy political, diplomatic, economic, and mili- The Threat is a growing problem in some parts of the tary aspects of sea use.1 Naval power played The range of threats in the maritime world, particularly in Southeast Asia and an extremely important and often vital role domain is broad. The conventional threats off the east and west coasts of Africa. The in the lives of many maritime nations. in peacetime include claims of the riparian combination of transnational terrorism and states in regard to the boundaries of the piracy can seriously disrupt the flow of inter-
Dr. Milan N. Vego is Professor of Operations in the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College. U.S. Navy (Justin Lee Losack)
Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group vessels perform multiship maneuvers in Atlantic
8 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO national commerce. The potential impact Additionally, naval forces and coast guards during transit on the high seas, through the of such threats on world peace and the need to work with a large number of nongov- 200-nautical-mile (nm) EEZ, in the territo- global economy is enormous.2 There is also ernmental organizations and private volun- rial sea (usually the 12-nm zone offshore), a growing danger to ports/bases and coastal teer organizations ashore. and in ports and their approaches. Hence, facilities/installations from ballistic missiles in a physical sense, three zones of maritime fired by a rogue state or even transnational Operations in Peacetime security exist: the international zone (foreign terrorist groups. Operations in time of peace encompass countries, high seas), the border/coastal zone The threat to port security has increased routine activities, homeland security, protec- (territorial sea plus EEZ), and the domestic significantly in the past few decades due to tion of the country’s economic interests at zone (territorial sea plus ports and their the proliferation of platforms and weapons sea, enforcement of maritime treaties, and approaches). International law fully applies that can be used against ships and port facili- humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. in the international zone, while the country’s ties/installations. Uninterrupted maritime In general, routine duties include maritime jurisdiction is exercised over all vessels, trade is one of the most critical factors for the border laws/customs enforcement, hydro- facilities, and port security in the domestic prosperity of nations. The problem of security graphic surveys, oceanographic research, and border/coastal zones. against terrorist attack is especially acute at salvage, search and rescue, ordnance dis- Coast guards are largely responsible ports located near strategic chokepoints such posal, and marine pollution control. For the for protection of their countries’ EEZs. as the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Gibraltar, most part, these tasks are the responsibil- This broad task includes monitoring and Suez Canal, and Panama Canal. Large ports ity of the coast guard, with naval forces surveillance of the fisheries, maritime safety, are especially vulnerable to various hostile employed in a supporting role. marine pollution reporting, and protection acts because of the difficulties in providing The threats to homeland security from of marine mineral deposits and gas/oil full, around-the-clock protection. Currently, across the sea are increasing in both inten- deposits and installations. The navies are the greatest threat to the security of major sity and sophistication. Specifically, these primarily responsible for protecting friendly ports is from terrorists, operating individu- threats include ballistic missiles, maritime commercial shipping outside of the EEZ. ally or in groups. terrorism, illicit fishing, cross-border illegal immigration, criminal activity in ports/ Responsibilities harbors and at critical installations/facilities a navy cannot carry out all Navies can be employed in routine ashore, piracy, and trafficking in narcotics, the tasks alone but needs activities in peacetime, operations short of humans, and weapons. to proceed in combination war, low-intensity conflict, and high-inten- The threat of ballistic missiles against with other elements of naval sity conventional war (see table). Today and ports/airfields and coastal installations/facil- power, such as a coast guard for the immediate future, naval forces will ities can be countered by creating seabased be predominantly employed in carrying out ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, as multiple and diverse tasks in what are arbi- the U.S. Navy is doing. BMD systems detect A state or territory ruled or controlled trarily called operations short of (regional) and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles by a radical regime and situated close to war. However, a navy, no matter how strong, by physically and electronically attacking maritime trade chokepoints might attempt cannot carry out all the tasks alone but needs bases, launch sites, and associated command to harass shipping, requiring the response of to proceed in combination with other ele- and control systems. As part of homeland naval forces. Protection of shipping requires ments of naval power, such as a coast guard. security, they are intended to provide defense coordinated employment of surface, air, In some cases, the coast guard is an integral against ballistic missiles in the terminal and subsurface forces, as well as a suitable part of the navy; in other cases, the two are phase of their flight.3 command organization both ashore and separate. Optimally, a coast guard should Maritime terrorism has emerged as a afloat. In general, protection of shipping be used primarily for maritime policing (or formidable threat to both civilian and naval should envisage preemptive or retaliatory constabulary) duties in peacetime and for vessels. Large commercial ships are easy strikes or raids against selected targets at carrying out some combat missions in opera- targets for determined terrorists, and the sea or ashore. A major operation in protec- tions short of war and in a high-intensity value of these vessels and cargoes makes tion of shipping would require the execution conventional conflict. In the littorals, the air them attractive to both regional terrorist of a variety of tasks to protect merchant force and army might be employed jointly groups and international organizations that vessels from unlawful attack in international with naval forces. desire to disrupt the economic lifelines of the waters. This broad task can be accomplished A navy also has to interact and work industrial world. Compounding the threat through, among other things, the escort of closely with other elements of the country’s is the use of commercial vessels by criminals merchant ships (sometimes of individual sea power—specifically, the merchant who are often allied with terrorists. There ships, for a specific purpose), coastal sea marine, shipbuilding industries, ocean is also a possibility that weapons of mass control, harbor defense, and mine counter- technology enterprises, and deep-sea destruction (WMD) could be used as terror- measure ships. mining agencies. Additionally, navies need ist weapons. Blue water navies such as the U.S. Navy to cooperate closely with many government Protection of ports encompasses a are sometimes involved in disputes with agencies. This, in turn, requires smooth series of related actions and measures regard- riparian states regarding the rights of inno- and effective interagency cooperation. ing safety of incoming ships and their cargo cent passage through international straits, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 9 FORUM | On Naval Power
Table. Spectrum of Conflict at Sea
HIGH-INTENSITY LOW-INTENSITY PEACETIME OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT CONFLICT
Routine Activities Support of Foreign Policy Support of Insurgency Regional War n Enforcing maritime border laws and customs n Coercive diplomacy Campaign n Vessel traffic service n Naval diplomacy Global War n Search and rescue n Crisis prevention/management Support of n Salvage n Maritime border disputes Counterinsurgency n Ordnance disposal Campaign n Hydrographic survey Support of Military (Theater) n Oceanographic research Strategy Support of n Nuclear deterrence Counterterrorism Homeland Security n Conventional deterrence Campaign n Ballistic missile defense n Ballistic missile defense n Combating terrorism n Security cooperation n Port security n Protecting critical installations/facilities on Support of Peace Operations the coast n Peacekeeping operations n Counternarcotics (drugs) n Peace enforcement operations n Intercepting illegal immigration n Expanded peacekeeping n Countering weapons smuggling operations/peace enforcement n Combating piracy operations n Countering environmental pollution
Protection of the Country’s Economic Interests n Protecting commercial shipping n Protecting fisheries n Protecting offshore oil/gas installations n Protecting seabed mineral deposits n Combating piracy
Enforcement of International Maritime Treaties and United Nations Resolutions on Combating Transnational Terrorism n Nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction n Ensuring freedom of navigation/overflight n Intercepting illicit arms trade n Combating piracy n Eliminating human trafficking
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief n Assistance in the aftermath of natural disasters n Emergency medical assistance n Goodwill activities n Refugee assistance Navy MH–60S Seahawk performs channel guard duty as amphibious n Civilian evacuation assault ship USS Essex transits San Bernardino Straits in Philippines U.S. Navy (Michael D. Kennedy) or in contesting these states’ excessive claims nations through a state’s territorial waters. zones beyond international norms, whether regarding the extent of territorial waters. Passage is considered innocent as long as it by nations or groups, can be expected to This requires the use of naval forces to is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or result in use of force acceptable under inter- ensure freedom of navigation and overflight. security of the coastal nation. In addition, national law to rectify the situation. Normally, a riparian state may exercise juris- freedom of navigation through international Navies are currently extensively diction and control within its territorial seas; airspace for aircraft is a well-established employed in enforcing international treaties international law, however, establishes the principle of international law. Threats to air- that prohibit illicit trafficking in weapons right of innocent passage of ships of other craft through extension of airspace control and humans. Smuggling and trafficking in
10 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO humans have increased worldwide in recent and safety and is on the increase in many and conducted only in exceptional cir- years. The problem is exacerbated by the ever parts of the world, but particularly in the cumstances. One’s naval forces are largely increasing involvement of criminal gangs in waters of Southeast Asia and Africa. In employed as part of the sea and/or air exclu- such trade. Among other things, the smug- Southeast Asia, commercial ships are espe- sion zone and maritime intercept operations gling of migrants by organized crime groups cially vulnerable to piracy due to narrow (MIOs). Exclusion zones can be established disrupts the established immigration policies waterways and countless small islands. in the air, at sea, or on land to prevent the of destination countries. It also involves Navies are often involved in nonmili- transit of oil or other cargo and weapons. human rights abuses; such trafficking is tary actions, such as providing humanitarian An exclusion zone is usually imposed by slavery in all but name. If a ship is engaged assistance and disaster relief, and engaging the United Nations or some other interna- in this activity, it loses its right of innocent in goodwill activities. The first broad task tional body, but it may also be established passage. In December 2000, the United includes such actions as emergency medical by individual countries. Exclusion zones Nations (UN) convention against organized assistance, large-scale evacuation of civilian can be authorized by UN Security Council crime was also related to the protocol to populations, noncombatant evacuation, and resolution and offer a means of simplifying prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking refugee assistance. Emergency medical assis- sea control through the promulgation of an in persons, especially women and children. tance often includes transporting civilians intention to maintain sea denial to cover a This protocol generally justifies interdiction in need of medical help from or to relatively specific area. In diplomatic terms, they are a of commercial vessels on countertrafficking remote locations. way of enhancing coercive action by declar- grounds. It also encourages information- ing a resolve to use combat if necessary. To sharing, interdiction training, and the devel- Operations Short of War be credible, they must be enforceable, and the opment of tighter legislative authority to In one definition, operations short of rights and security of third parties need to be interdict and enforce documentary require- war are described as the use or threatened ensured. Maritime intercept operations are ments on shipping.4 use of military capabilities in combination usually conducted as part of the enforcement Piracy has posed a threat to all nations with other sources of national power across of sanctions by an international body such for as long as people have sailed the oceans. the spectrum of conflict. These operations as the UN or some regional body. The politi- The international community has branded include the threats of use or actual use of cal objective is usually to compel a country piracy as hostile to the human race and military forces in support of foreign policy or group of countries to conform to the treats it as one of the few crimes over which and military (and/or theater) strategy, peace demands of the initiating body. They include universal jurisdiction applies. Piracy is operations, and security cooperation. coercive measures aimed to interdict the punishable by all nations wherever the The principal methods of combat movement of designated items into or out of perpetrators are found and without regard employment of naval forces in operations a nation or a specific sea area. MIOs can also to where the offense occurred. It remains short of war are major and minor tactical be applied by a major naval power or group a serious threat to international commerce actions. Major naval operations are planned of powers to prevent maritime terrorism or
Sailors conduct security sweeps in Persian Gulf navies are currently extensively employed in enforcing international treaties that prohibit illicit trafficking in weapons and humans
illicit trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons. Normally, these operations require the employment of both surface and air forces.5 For example, UN-mandated MIOs were conducted against Iraq by the U.S. Navy and its coalition partners between August 1990 and March 1993. Naval forces can be employed in support of foreign policy, military (theater) strategy, and peace operations. Navies are an ideal tool for providing support of foreign policy. Their main advantages are flexibility, mobility, and political symbolism. Naval forces have diverse capabilities that can be quickly tailored to the situation at hand.
U.S. Navy (Kirk Worley) They are also largely self-sufficient and do ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 11 FORUM | On Naval Power not require extensive land support. Naval coercion might be designed to deter a possible threaten to break out. Aircraft carrier groups forces can be employed in support of the aggressor or to compel him to comply with a and amphibious task forces in particular have country’s diplomatic initiatives in peacetime diplomatic demarche or resolution. a greater chance of success in disputes among and time of crisis, or for naval diplomacy— Naval forces can be used in conflict nation-states than in ethnic conflict or civil actions aimed to create a favorable general prevention, coercive diplomacy, and peace war. To be effective, such a deployment should and military image abroad, establish one’s operations. Conflict prevention includes be accompanied by a clear willingness on the rights in areas of interest, reassure allies diverse military activities conducted either part of the international community to use and other friendly countries, influence the unilaterally or collectively under Chapter overwhelming force if necessary. Otherwise, behavior of other governments, threaten VI of the UN Charter and aimed at either the preventive deployment of naval forces, seaborne interdiction, and, finally, threaten preventing escalation of disputes into armed regardless of size and capability, will rarely the use of lethal force. Deployment of naval conflict or facilitating resolution of armed produce the desired effect. forces during times of tension or crisis to violence. These actions range from diplomatic Naval forces are one of the most effec- back up diplomacy and thereby pose an initiatives to preventive deployment of naval tive and flexible tools in applying coercive unstated but clear threat is an example of forces. The main purpose of the forward diplomacy (popularly called gunboat diplo- naval diplomacy, which can also help in presence of U.S. naval forces in the western macy), which is the use or threat of limited coalition-building. Pacific, Arabian Sea, Persian (Arabian) Gulf, naval force aimed at securing advantage Navies are generally much more effec- and Mediterranean is to prevent the outbreak or averting loss, either in furtherance of tive than armies or air forces in terms of their of large-scale hostilities that might affect the an international dispute or against foreign international acceptability and capacity to national interests of the United States and nationals within the territory or jurisdic- make the desired impact. They can be used its allies or friends. Naval forces deployed tion of their own state. Coercive diplomacy symbolically to send a message to a specific in forward areas should be of sufficient size is conducted both in peacetime and during government. When a stronger message is and combat power to defeat opposing forces operations short of war. Methods used are required, naval diplomacy can take the form quickly and decisively. “show the flag,” retaliatory raids, rescue of employment of carefully tailored forces Under the UN Charter, conflict pre- operations, or direct attack to achieve a with a credible offensive capability, signaling vention should be conducted with strict specific military objective. Visits of warships that a much more capable force will follow, impartiality because all sides in a dispute to foreign ports are one of the most common or it can give encouragement to a friendly have to agree to involve other countries as methods of showing the flag. The aim of such country by providing reinforcement. The mediators. Naval forces can be deployed in visits can range from demonstrating continu- threat of the use of limited offensive action or the proximity of a country where hostilities ing interest in the area to showing resolve in support of a friendly state against threats by a neighboring state. The ships then act as deployment of naval forces to pose an unstated but clear threat ambassadors. Normally, the main purpose of is an example of naval diplomacy such visits is to make a favorable impression on the local populace. The degree to which a show of force can be introduced depends on Marine and Sailor based in Okinawa support the political message to be communicated. operations in Konar Province, Afghanistan Sometimes it can be carried out as a warning to leaders or hostile states. At other times, a show of force by ships can act as a sign of reassurance and a token of support. For example, the United States sent a powerful signal of support to Turkey and Greece by sending the battleship USS Missouri (BB–63) for a visit to Istanbul and Piraeus in April 1946. This was followed by a visit of the aircraft carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVB–42) to Greece in September of the same year. Both countries were under enormous pressure from the aggressive policies of Moscow. The Soviets strongly sup- ported the Greek communists in their civil war and issued demands to Turkey to grant a naval base in the Dodecanese Islands and joint control of the Turkish Straits.6 However, in some cases, a show of force has failed to achieve its intended
U.S. Marine Corps (Luis P. Valdespino, Jr.) Valdespino, U.S. Marine Corps (Luis P. objectives. For example, the employment
12 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO of three U.S. aircraft carriers in the Sea operations, peace-enforcement operations do engagement, including the use of force under of Japan after the intelligence ship USS not require the consent of the warring fac- Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.8 Expanded Pueblo (AGER–2) with its 83 crew members tions involved in a conflict. When used for peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations was captured off Wonsan in January 1968 peace enforcement, naval forces should have are conducted with strictly limited objec- apparently did not offer a great advantage at least limited power projection capabilities tives, such as protecting safe-flight or no-fly to the United States in subsequent negotia- and be ready to engage in combat. zones or relief deliveries. If too intrusive, the tions.7 In March 1996, the Chinese carried Naval forces may also be involved operations are likely to draw multinational out extensive missile firings and exercises in expanded peacekeeping and peace- forces into open hostilities; the naval forces off the coast of Taiwan. However, that enforcement operations. These operations are would then have to be either pulled out or show of force only hardened the Taiwanese larger than peacekeeping operations and can committed to full-scale combat.9 posture and forced the United States to involve over 20,000 personnel. The consent Blue water navies play a critical role in move its naval forces in the Taiwan Strait. of the sides in the conflict is usually nominal, providing support to national and military Naval forces are most extensively used incomplete, or nonexistent. These operations (or theater) strategy as a part of nuclear and/ in support of peace operations, which are include more assertive mandates and rules of or conventional deterrence. Credible nuclear military operations to support diplomatic
Arleigh Burke–class destroyer USS Decatur the tasks of peace enforcement launches SM–3 missile during ballistic missile include implementation of flight test in Pacific sanctions, establishment and supervision of exclusion zones, intervention to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerents efforts to reach a long-term political settle- ment. These actions are conducted in con- junction with diplomacy as necessary to negotiate a truce and resolve a conflict. They may be initiated in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after the conflict. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are the principal types of peace operations. Peacekeeping operations are designed to contain, moderate, or terminate hostilities between or within states, using international or impartial military forces and civilians to complement political conflict-resolution efforts and restore and maintain peace. These actions take place after the sides in a conflict agree to cease hostilities; impar- tial observers are normally sent to verify the implementation of the ceasefire or to monitor the separation of forces. Peace-enforcement operations involve diverse tasks as authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The objective is to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions that have been adopted to maintain or restore peace or order. The tasks of peace enforce- ment include implementation of sanctions, establishment and supervision of exclusion zones, intervention to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerents. The aim is to establish an environment for a truce or ceasefire. In contrast to peacekeeping U.S. Navy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 13 FORUM | On Naval Power deterrence is based on adequate capability deploy sufficiently strong and combat-ready regional understanding, and enhance stra- and the certitude that one nation can and will forces in the area of potential conflict. tegic access. Cooperative activities include inflict unacceptable losses on an enemy who These forces should be concentrated in such assisting host nations in freeing or protecting uses nuclear weapons first. Nuclear-powered numbers as to be capable of quickly achiev- their societies from subversion, lawlessness, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are the ing superiority over the potential opponent and insurgency; assisting in training; com- most survivable component of the country’s at sea. A coastal navy or a major navy oper- bating illegal activities along their coastlines; nuclear forces triad. During the Cold War, ating within the confines of a narrow sea and protecting economic infrastructure.10 these submarines conducted extensive patrols normally cannot obtain sea control without in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, in readi- naval forces operating from a secure base of Low-intensity Conflict ness to fire their sea-launched ballistic mis- operations. In practical terms, this means Navies can be employed to carry out siles. Seabased nuclear deterrent forces con- that the degree of basing/deployment area diverse tasks in support of an insurgency or tinue to have an important role in the nuclear control must ensure full protection of forces counterinsurgency. Duties include blockading deterrence posture of the United States, the from all types of threats. the coast to prevent an influx of fighters and Russian Federation, Britain, France, and the Navies are extensively used in carrying material to the insurgents; attacking insur- People’s Republic of China. out diverse tasks as part of security coopera- gent concentrations in their operating areas The use or threatened use of conven- tion in a given maritime theater. Security or sanctuaries by using surface combatants tional forces is a critical element in conven- cooperation in general is aimed to build and carrier-based aircraft; providing gunfire tional deterrence. Naval forces are highly defense relationships with international support to friendly troops ashore; and provid- suitable for conventional deterrence because partners, promote cultural awareness and ing close air support, transport of friendly of their high mobility and combat power. For a blue water navy, the main method of exercis- ing conventional deterrence is the forward deployment of its striking forces. Among other things, forward deployed forces can consider- ably enhance a nation’s influence and prestige in a given sea area. Presence can greatly help coalition-building, enhance stability, and deter hostile actions against one’s interests. It also provides an initial crisis-response capability. Routine forward presence includes permanently based naval forces overseas and periodic deployment of naval forces in the case of crises, port visits, and participation in bilateral and multilateral training exercises. For example, deployment of powerful U.S. carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups in a certain region, such as the eastern Mediterranean or western Pacific, can send a powerful signal to enemies and friends alike in a crisis. It could prevent the outbreak of conflict, shape the security envi- ronment, and serve as a basis for regional peace and stability. The ability to deploy seabased air and missile defenses forward contributes to force self-protection, assured access, and the defense of other forward deployed forces. Forward deployed U.S. naval forces can provide protection against air and missile threats over a large area of a given maritime theater. Also, by engaging enemy ballistic missiles in the boost and midcourse stages of flight, homeland security is greatly enhanced. Forward naval presence also creates prerequisites for obtaining and then main- taining sea control in certain parts of a Fleet Surgical Team from USS Tarawa conducts humanitarian assistance operations in Bangladesh after Tropical Cyclone Sidr maritime theater. A blue water navy should U.S. Navy (Daniel A. Barker)
14 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO troops and material, and reconnaissance/sur- or losing sea control on the open ocean does not possess control of the sea by virtue veillance. For example, from 1965 to 1970, the would normally have an indirect effect on of having forces deployed in the proximity U.S. Navy conducted a blockade of South Viet- the war situation on land. This effect is far of the area of potential conflict or crisis in nam’s 1,200-mile coastline in an effort to stop more direct and immediate in enclosed or peacetime. In peacetime, any navy, regard- fighters and supplies from flowing by sea from marginal seas, where in many cases the loss less of its size or combat strength, has almost North Vietnam to South Vietnam (Operation of sea control can lead to the collapse of one’s unlimited access to any sea area. Forward Market Time). As part of that effort, Operation front on land and thereby considerably affect presence is conducted with full respect for Sea Dragon aimed to intercept and destroy the outcome of the war. The opposite is also international treaties and conventions and the Vietcong’s waterborne logistics craft. The true: obtaining or losing sea control in a without violating the territorial waters of Navy’s riverine forces conducted Operations marginal sea or enclosed seas is considerably other countries. Yet this does not in any way Game Warden and Sea Lord. influenced by the course of events in the preclude starting the struggle for sea control More recently, naval forces were exten- war on land.12 In contrast to the open ocean, in peacetime because preconditions must be sively employed in conducting military, para- sea control in a typical narrow sea usually created to quickly attain sea control after the military, political, economic, psychological, and cannot be obtained and then maintained start of hostilities.14 civic actions to defeat insurgencies in Africa, without the closest cooperation among all By obtaining sea control, the stronger Southeast Asia, and Colombia. For example, side would create favorable conditions for the U.S. Navy’s special operations forces, oper- carrying out other important tasks at sea. ating from an aircraft carrier, and two Marine navies can carry out Among other things, sea control would Expeditionary Units (Special Operations diverse tasks in support permit the navy to project power on the Capable), operating from amphibious ships, of an insurgency or opposite shore in the littorals or far from conducted a forcible entry deep into Afghan counterinsurgency the home territory; carry out diverse tasks territory to open access for the joint force.11 in support of a friendly army operating on the coast; pose a threat of, and carry out, High-intensity Conventional Conflict the services. Even when the navy is the prin- amphibious assault on the enemy shore; Navies will play a major role in provid- cipal force, it should be directly or indirectly weaken military-economic potential through ing direct and/or indirect support to ground supported by the other services. Very often, attack on the enemy’s maritime trade; and forces in the case of a regional or global con- naval forces would have a relatively higher protect friendly maritime trade. flict. War at sea has almost never taken place degree of independence in carrying out tasks In general, sea control and disputed alone but has been conducted in conjunction to obtain sea control.13 (or contested) sea control can be strategic, with war on land and, in the modern era, in Sea control is inextricably linked with operational, and tactical in scale. Strategic the air. The objectives of naval warfare have armed struggle at sea. In other words, one sea control pertains to the entire maritime been an integral part of war’s objectives. These, in turn, are accomplished by the employment of all the services of a country’s armed forces. In contrast to war on land, the objectives in war at sea are almost generally physical in character. The main strategic or operational objective for a stronger side is to obtain sea control in the whole theater or a major part of it, while the weaker side tries to achieve sea denial. A relatively strong but initially weaker side at sea aims to obtain sea control for itself. When operating in an enclosed sea theater, a blue water navy would try to obtain chokepoint control, while the weaker side would conduct counter-choke- point control. Another operational objective for both the stronger and weaker sides at sea is to establish, maintain, and, if possible, expand control of their respective basing and deploy- ment areas for their naval forces and aircraft, thereby creating prerequisites for planning, preparing, and executing major operations. Sea control essentially means the ability of a force to operate with a high degree of freedom in an ocean area, but often for a Sailors aid crew of Taiwanese-flagged fishing trawler in Indian Ocean after its release by pirates limited time. In strategic terms, obtaining U.S. Navy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 15 FORUM | On Naval Power
Guided missile submarine USS Ohio arrives in Guam during maiden voyage enemy always has the ability to dispute the sea control obtained by the stronger side.17 Disputed (or contested) sea control is usually the principal objective of a weaker but relatively strong navy in the initial phase of a war at sea. When command is in dispute, the general conditions might give a stable or unstable equilibrium. Then the power of neither side preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the command lies with the opponent.18 The objective then can be strategic, encompassing the entire theater, or operational, when control is disputed in a major part of the theater. Disputed sea control exists when the opposing sides possess roughly equal capabilities and opportunities to obtain sea control in a theater as a whole (or in one of its parts) and there is neither significant change in the ratio of forces nor a change of U.S. Navy (Jacob Sippel) the initiative to either side.19 Once disputed theater, while control of a major part of a reach of land-based attack aircraft. Land- or control is obtained, the initially weaker side maritime theater represents operational sea carrier-based aircraft play an extraordinary can possibly try to obtain sea control of its control. Tactical control refers to control role in obtaining sea control in the littorals. own. Denying the use of the sea to an oppo- of a maritime combat sector or zone but Without air superiority, sea control simply nent has often been regarded as the opposite sometimes can encompass a maritime area cannot be obtained. Depending on capabili- of sea control, but this is an oversimplifica- of operations. However, in practical terms, ties, naval forces can take part in the struggle tion. If a weaker side denies control of the the focus should invariably be on strategic or for air superiority. Yet they are not the main sea to a stronger opponent, this does not operational sea control or disputed control, means of accomplishing that objective, espe- mean that it necessarily obtains control not tactical sea control. cially in the sea areas within effective range itself.20 Sea control and sea denial are often In general, sea control can encompass of land-based aircraft. If one side at sea pos- complementary objectives. For example, sea control of the surface, subsurface, and airspace sesses air superiority, it can be very difficult denial may be conducted to help secure use or of any combination of these three physical for the other side to use some aspects of sea of the sea, either in the same geographical media. In the era of sail, command of the sea control for its own purposes. Air superiority area or elsewhere. A fleet operating in one was limited to command of the surface. After over a given ocean area can compensate for or more enclosed or marginal seas might opt the advent of the submarine and aircraft, the those aspects of sea control that naval forces for, or be forced by circumstances to accom- two other dimensions emerged. The degree failed to obtain. Nevertheless, for all its plish, a combination of objectives—general of overall control of a given sea area depends value, air superiority cannot replace control sea control in the enclosed sea theater, and on the degree of control of each of the three of the surface and subsurface.16 contested control in a semi-enclosed sea or dimensions.15 However, experience shows that, parts of the adjacent oceans. during war between two strong opponents Disputed sea control often occurs in at sea, it is not possible to obtain or maintain in practical terms, the focus the initial phase of a war and is character- control of all three physical media to the same should invariably be on ized by an almost-continuous struggle for degree or for extended times. strategic or operational sea control of certain ocean areas. Once control Because of the rather large differences control, not tactical sea control is obtained, however, it is usually not main- in the size of the physical environment and tained for a long period, but may be lost from the proximity of the continental landmass, time to time and then regained. In coastal there is a considerable difference between In general, sea control cannot be or offshore waters, sea control by a stronger obtaining sea control on the open ocean expressed in quantitative terms or various fleet can be disputed even if the major part of and in the littorals. Obtaining sea control metrics (as the U.S. Navy is trying to do); a weaker fleet is destroyed. in the littorals is highly dependent on the it can be recognized only in its effects. Sea When control is in dispute, both sides ability to obtain air superiority. Because of control is always relative in spatial terms. It usually operate at high risk because their the ever-increasing range, endurance, and pertains to the specific part of the theater in strength is approximately in balance. One speed of modern aircraft, ever-larger ocean which a certain degree of control must be side usually controls one or more parts of areas are becoming the areas of employment obtained. Sea control is also relative in terms a given theater, while its opponent controls for both naval forces and land-based aircraft. of the factor of time. It is also relative in terms the remaining part. Each side’s control of a Today, no part of the littoral is beyond the of the factor of force. The relatively strong specific sea area is usually limited in time. In
16 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO the littorals, however, contesting sea control One of the most important tasks of Notes is primarily carried out by submarines, small any navy is to obtain and maintain basing/ 1 surface combatants, coastal missile/gun bat- deployment area control. Without securing Specifically, a sea power encompasses naval teries, land-based aircraft, and mines. control of a basing and deployment area first, power plus all the nonmilitary aspects of the use of the sea, particularly merchant marine, ports/ In general, naval forces can carry out it is difficult if not impossible to prepare harbors, fisheries, shipyards/ship repair facilities operations aimed to secure control of the and execute major naval operations or naval and all maritime-related industries, oil/gas explora- sea areas, operations in areas not under tactical operations. This objective is espe- tion, and marine-related scientific research (for command, and operations in the sea areas cially critical for naval forces operating in an example, oceanographic research, hydrographic 21 under command. Obtaining, maintaining, enclosed or semienclosed sea. It is intended survey, and marine biology). and exercising sea control are related but not to obtain a sufficient degree of security for 2 Department of the Navy, Naval Operations identical terms; they differ in time and the traffic in coastal waters and road/railroad Concept 2006 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government efforts of naval forces. Sea control is obtained traffic on the coast.22 Printing Office, 2006), 9. primarily by the employment of maritime Optimally, control of basing and 3 Ibid., 22. 4 forces in the form of major naval operations. deployment areas should be established Michael Knights, “Maritime Interdiction in In the littorals, these operations will be joint and maintained in peacetime. The extent the Gulf: Developing a Culture of Focused Interdic- tion Using Existing International Conventions,” or combined—that is, not only naval forces of that control is limited only by the mari- Nonproliferation Education Policy Center, Febru- but also combat arms/branches of other ser- time interests of other countries. Control ary 7, 2006, 23. vices will take part. The result of sea control of basing and deployment areas must then 5 Cited in Michael Boyce et al., Maritime should be that forces can carry out the main be maintained in wartime. The physical Forces in Peace & War: Joint & Combined Opera- tasks without significant interference from scope of this control depends on the degree tions, Bailrigg Paper 30 (Lancaster, UK: Centre for the opponent. After sea control is obtained, of sea control obtained in a given sea or Defence and International Security Studies, 1999), it must be maintained. In operational terms, ocean area. Without sea control, one cannot 26. this phase equates to consolidation of stra- maintain control of basing and deployment 6 Ivan Tibor Berend, Central and Eastern tegic or operational success. The degree of areas. At the same time, actions to obtain sea Europe 1944–1993: Detour from the Periphery to the sea control to be obtained and maintained control are far easier if forces operate from Periphery (Toronto: Cambridge University Press, should determine the main tasks assigned secure basing and deployment areas. This, 1996), 34; Jonathan Knight, “American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy,” Politi- to one’s naval forces. Exercising sea control of course, does not preclude obtaining sea cal Science Quarterly 90, no. 3 (Autumn 1975), 451. is carried out through a series of operational control in an area where control of basing 7 Richard A. Mobley, Flash Point North Korea: tasks aimed to exploit strategic or operational and deployment areas does not exist. This The Pueblo and EC–121 Crisis (Annapolis: Naval success. The successful execution of opera- is especially true in the operations of naval Institute Press, 2003), 117–118. tional tasks should expand and reinforce the forces in enemy-controlled sea areas. Then 8 Hans Binnendijk, ed., Strategic Assessment degree of sea control obtained in a certain the basing and deployment area is gradu- 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power (Washington, DC: sea or ocean area in terms of time and space. ally extended by establishing new bases and National Defense University Press, 1996), 135. The struggle for control of chokepoints facilities on the conquered territories.23 9 Ibid., 138. is a unique feature of war for control of a 10 Department of the Navy, 18. 11 typical narrow sea. Straits often serve as the As in the past, naval power will continue Ibid., 13, 20. 1 2 main highways for large-scale invasions. to play a critical and perhaps vital role in pro- Guenther Poeschel, “Ueber die Seeherrschaft (I),” Militaerwesen (East Berlin) 5 (May 1982), 41. Control of a strait/narrows or several straits tecting and preserving a nation’s interests at 1 3 Ibid., 41, 45. can cut off or isolate enemy forces in an sea. This will especially be the case for coun- 14 Ibid., 44. adjacent theater of war. The loss of control tries such as the United States, Great Britain, 1 5 Ibid., 42. of an important strait or narrows on whose Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and 16 Ibid., 43. shores a land campaign is in progress is others whose prosperity and economic well- 17 Ibid., 80. often fraught with danger for fleet forces. being depend on the free and uninterrupted 18 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime For a blue water navy, general sea control is use of the sea. Naval power is undoubtedly Strategy (London: Longmans, Green, 1918), 91. hardly possible without establishing not only a powerful tool in support of foreign policy, 1 9 Guenther Poeschel, “Ueber die Seeherrschaft control on the open ocean but also direct or military or theater strategy, and various peace (II),” Militaerwesen (East Berlin) 6 (June 1982), 71. 2 0 indirect control of several critical passages operations. It is an integral part of homeland B. Mitchell Simpson III, The Development of vital importance to the world’s maritime security. In concert with other sources of the of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977), xix. trade, or by obtaining control of a given country’s military and nonmilitary power, 21 R.K. Turner, “Background of Naval Strategy,” enclosed or semienclosed sea theater. The naval power has a large role in deterring the lecture delivered before the Marine Corps Schools, objective for a weaker side, then, is just the outbreak of large-scale hostilities. Finally, in Quantico, VA, February 16, 1938, 8. opposite: chokepoint control denial. In either the case of a regional or global conflict, forces 22 Petar Zonja, “Odrzavanje povoljnog case, but particularly for a weaker side, this on land cannot ultimately succeed without operativnog rezima u malim morima,” Mornaricki objective would normally require the highest secure use of the sea. Obtaining, maintaining, Glasnik (Belgrade) 1 (January-February 1972), 33. degree of cooperation among naval forces and exercising control of the oceans are tasks 2 3 Poeschel, “Ueber die Seeherrschaft (II),” 74. and the combat arms of other services. that cannot be accomplished without a strong and effective naval power. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 17 Merchant Vessel Manukai operates between California and Hawaii under Jones Act protection Matson Navigation Company Hobson’s Choice for the American Maritime Industry The Navy or Nothing
By DOUGLAS T. TASTAD homas Hobson, born 1544, kept a livery stable in Cam- bridge, England. He was not of T the-customer-is-always-right school. Gentlemen who showed up at his stable for a horse were required to take either the horse nearest the stable door or none. Thus, “Hobson’s choice” became an idiom for no choice at all. Those who work in America’s maritime fields are increasingly funneled into such a choice: defense and government work—or none. The U.S. Navy’s growing share of the American maritime industry carries no benefit. In fact, nothing could be more det- rimental to America’s long-term endurance as the world’s greatest seagoing power. If Great White Fleet helped establish U.S. global presence in 1907 there is one problem vexing the Navy today,
U.S. Navy it is the difficulty of maintaining a reason- ably sized force for a reasonable cost. While Douglas T. Tastad is a Vessel Surveyor at U.S. Army Tank–Automotive Armaments Command, Watercraft there is ample room to improve efficiency Inspection Branch, and a Navy Reserve Lieutenant in the Joint Reserve Directorate at U.S. Joint Forces Command. within the Navy itself, it would be futile
18 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu TASTAD to confront this challenge without also Although delays and overruns were minimal is doubtful. History has proved that such a developing a plan to improve America’s compared with today’s projects, the vessels purely military sea power can be built up by a commercial maritime sector. were nearly delayed past the end of the threat despot, as was done by Louis XIV. . . . [E]xpe- American maritime power has tradition- they were commissioned to fight. Despite this, rience showed that his navy was like a growth ally resembled a pyramid, with a vigorous the six vessels (see table 1) constructed under which having no root soon withers away.”4 commercial shipping and shipbuilding indus- this program served valiantly. One, the Con- Mahan’s policies were eventually try at the base and a powerful Navy at the top. stitution, remains in commission.3 embraced. From a broad naval buildup and Today, the pyramid is inverted. We have an From the Revolutionary War to the the Great White Fleet to a rise of merchant anemic commercial shipping fleet and virtu- Civil War, shipbuilding, shipping, and other shipping and the Jones Act of 1920, prevent- ally no large-scale commercial ship construc- maritime activities boomed on the East Coast. ing foreign shippers from engaging in domes- tion—yet we maintain a preeminent naval While the South’s waterfront was largely tic trade, America’s seapower surged. This force. For perspective, this essay first examines unindustrialized and focused on importing culminated in perhaps the most important the history of the interaction between Amer- manufactured goods and slaves and export- industrial achievement in the modern era: ica’s commercial maritime industries and ing agricultural products, the North had a America’s unparalleled production of mer- the Navy; next, it reviews this relationship’s thriving indigenous industry along its coastal chant and combatant shipping in World War current troubled state; and finally, it ponders rivers and harbors. Not only was this a source II. Between 1939 and 1945, the 100 merchant some solutions for correcting a 40-year slide of friction during the years preceding the shipyards overseen by the U.S. Maritime toward a spear tip without a shaft. Civil War, but a more robust shipbuilding and Commission produced 5,777 vessels of over industrial base also contributed to the North’s 56 million deadweight tons.5 Once built, The Early Years naval and overall military success. This point these ships were sailed into harm’s way by a Even before the Declaration of Indepen- remains instructive for today’s strategists. solid corps of well-trained American seamen dence, America was becoming a powerhouse who delivered the supplies necessary to win of ship construction and the shipping indus- Rise and Decline of Maritime America the war. This leads to the obvious question: try. Notwithstanding the mercantile system Alfred Thayer Mahan framed modern Could we make a similar effort today? imposed on the colonies, one-third of all American naval and maritime strategy in The current state of America’s maritime Great Britain’s oceangoing tonnage was built The Influence of Sea Power upon History. industry is bleak, and its malaise is negatively in American yards.1 As whaling and trade dic- Mahan’s thesis is simple: maritime and naval impacting the Navy. The lack of American- tated a steady demand for vessels, the crafts- power that can win a decisive engagement flagged shipping means that the Navy’s core men, sawyers, and laborers in shipyards had is a requirement for a leading and powerful function of keeping sea lines open has lost reliable employment. The yards themselves spun off business vital to the industrialization Mahan’s thesis is simple: maritime and naval power that can of early America. America’s Revolutionary War Navy win a decisive engagement is a requirement for a leading and began as an improvised organization of a powerful country handful of ships and at its peak comprised 64 mostly small vessels. On paper, its country. One of Mahan’s most repeated some of its legitimacy, if not relevance. Worse, strength was insignificant compared to themes is that seapower “includes not only America is now reliant on foreign operators His Majesty’s Service. Nevertheless, it was the military strength afloat . . . but also the to carry military cargo. On the shipbuilding augmented by a sizable collection of skilled peaceful commerce and shipping from which side, our large-scale industry has deteriorated mariners who exchanged their service alone a military fleet naturally and health- to the point that it is no longer commercially on merchant vessels engaged in trade for fully springs, and on which it securely rests.” self-sustaining. Even the lucrative Navy con- service to their newly formed country as Contemplating the call for a strong Navy in tracts, now accounting for the vast majority privateers on 1,697 vessels. The sacrifices 1889, Mahan wrote, “Can this navy be had of the industry’s revenue, may soon fail to and heroism of these seamen, who were without restoring the merchant shipping? It convince yard owners and many of the last responsible for the interdiction of 2,283 remaining component suppliers to stay in enemy vessels, became key components of business.6 Table 1. The First American America’s naval effort and overall victory.2 Ship construction, component produc- Naval Shipbuilding Program The first American naval shipbuilding tion, and ship registration have now almost program, An Act to Provide a Naval Arma- USS Constitution* Boston, MA completely moved overseas. Foreign firms ment, March 18, 1794, was drafted in response USS United States Philadelphia, PA are leveraging their dominance at sea and to Algerine pirate attacks. It set the tone for in the shipbuilding arena to assume control USS President New York, NY most future shipbuilding programs. The of shoreside operations in the United States. contracts were spread throughout the country USS Congress Portsmouth, NH Unfortunately, even in the midst of this to stimulate the shipbuilding industry and USS Constellation Baltimore, MD decline, entrenched American interests in attract political support. Even the lumber for USS Chesapeake Gosport, VA both the shipping and shipbuilding indus- the vessels was cut and milled in the South tries seem more concerned with defending and then transported to northern shipyards. * Oldest commissioned warship afloat in the world ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 19 FORUM | Hobson’s Choice: The Navy or Nothing their slice of the status quo than seeking the engaging in domestic trade. To ship cargo of producing oceangoing vessels in America.9 bold initiatives to reverse the trend. between two American ports, one must use an These yards, six of which are owned by The largest U.S. employer of mer- American-flagged and -crewed vessel owned General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman, chant seaman is no longer a U.S. shipping by Americans, built in America, and receiving are surviving on government shipbuilding company; it is the Navy’s Military Sealift major maintenance in American shipyards. work that accounts for 70 percent of the entire Command (MSC). In fact, this command Even if a vessel is American-flagged, it can industry’s revenue. Jones Act vessel repair nearly outstrips the next largest employer only engage in nondomestic trade if it does and government programs such as Title XI by an order of magnitude. With precious not meet all these requirements.8 The Jones loan guarantees rounded out the equation.10 few American commercial vessels plying Act legislation has been successful at keeping a Now, even the Title XI loan program has been the oceans today, those civilian mariners large number of coastal-sized ships and barges scrapped. who choose to remain employed at sea are in the American registry, but the numbers of It is telling that the domestic shipping increasingly obliged to work for MSC, with oceangoing ships continue to dwindle. company Horizon Lines continues to operate a few maintaining Maritime Administration The Jones Act has also ensured that some of the 30- and 40-year-old ships once (MARAD) reserve vessels. MSC operates 115 over 200 small shipyards in America con- owned by Sea Land. The fact that some of ships while MARAD holds an additional 49.7 tinue working on commercial fishing boats, these vessels are actually powered with rela- When combined, these figures nearly rival tugs, barges, and smaller craft as well as tively inefficient steam plants, and fuel prices the total privately owned fleet (see table 2). brown water Navy, Coast Guard, Army, and are at an all-time high, speaks volumes about other government contracts. Many of these the industry. Indeed, Horizon Lines touts yards make their way with casual (even work itself as America’s largest domestic carrier. outside of the four large naval release) labor, bare minimum reinvestment, Unfortunately, the five new vessels it is adding shipyards, there are now and niche markets. However, many are also to its aging fleet cannot engage in domestic only eight yards capable of doing quite well, as orders for offshore supply trade because they are being produced in producing oceangoing vessels vessels and other small craft are currently South Korean yards.11 in America strong. The fact remains that these yards are The crux of the problem is that shipping generally not capable of producing the large companies, while vigorously defending the oceangoing vessels that underpin a nation’s Jones Act when it comes to foreign shippers Outmoded Legislation maritime power. entering the domestic trade, are trying to wait The main driver of modern American The largest yards have generally ceased until there is such a capacity shortage and U.S. merchant shipping has been the Jones Act of relying on commercial work or have gone out yards are in such a lowly state that waivers 1920. To understand the current predicament of business. Only three commercial ocean- will be granted for foreign builds. Meanwhile, confronting America in the marine fields, one going vessels were produced in America in large U.S. yards are generally not actively must have a general knowledge of this law. 2006. Outside of the four large naval ship- seeking ways to become competitive. Rather, The Jones Act prevents foreign shippers from yards, there are now only eight yards capable they exploit Navy contracts while waiting for
Table 2. U.S.-Flag Privately Owned Oceangoing Fleet, by Type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Vessel Type No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT Tankers 84 5.5 77 5.2 68 4.3 60 4.4 60 4.4 Roll-on/Roll-off 32 0.6 32 0.6 35 0.7 35 0.8 41 0.9 General Cargo 12 0.3 7 0.1 9 0.2 8 0.2 8 0.2 Container Ship 78 2.9 75 2.9 74 3 78 3.2 74 3.1 Dry Bulk 15 0.8 14 0.7 14 0.7 15 0.7 14 0.6 Total 221 10.1 205 9.5 200 8.9 196 9.3 197 9.2
Ships from Above Totals Able to Engage in Jones Act (Purely Domestic) Trade 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Vessel Type No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT No. DWT Tankers 78 4.9 73 4.9 64 4.3 57 4.1 56 4.2 Roll-on/Roll-off 12 0.2 12 0.2 14 0.3 14 0.3 15 0.3 General Cargo 6 0.2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 Container Ship 32 0.9 29 0.8 28 0.8 28 0.8 29 0.8 Dry Bulk 4 0.2 3 0.1 3 0.1 3 0.1 3 0.1 Total 132 6.4 119 6 111 5.5 104 5.3 105 5.4
Source: Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “U.S.-Flag Oceangoing Fleet 2005,” April 2006, available at
20 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu TASTAD the legislated culling of single hull tankers and production schedule was compressed, and an of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and the sheer age of the U.S. fleet to begin forcing ungainly dual contractor scheme all worked Technology projected that the first DDX will Jones Act shippers to come to them. against the program. These factors certainly cost $3.3 billion with follow-on ships to cost Foreign companies will continue to played a role, but if the contractors had more $2.6 billion a copy in fiscal year 2007 dollars.15 take advantage of the current situation. experience satisfying clients without unlim- This amount of money—for a destroyer, no British Aerospace Engineering and Aker ited resources to cover cost overruns, the matter how advanced—must be approaching Kvaerner (Norway) are now operating outcome would not be so predictable. some kind of limit. several yards in the United States. Aker in Consider the LPD–17, which is the first The Navy is not the only sea Service Philadelphia is probably the most aggressive of the Navy’s new class of helicopter carrier that has been having difficulty completing American yard on commercial new build landing ships. After an $804 million cost a program on schedule and on budget. The projects. Asian and European shipping lines overrun, the vessel was completed for the Department of Homeland Security Inspector may now control as much as 95 percent of astronomical price of $1.76 billion.13 What General recently released a blistering audit U.S. import/export ocean cargo. In a natural level of quality does this kind of money pur- regarding the Coast Guard’s first two new extension, their businesses reach far inland chase? One year after Avondale shipyard in National Security Cutters. The vessels suffer through intermodal logistics networks. Pascagoula, Mississippi, delivered LPD–17, from lengthy delays, serious quality problems, Our commercial competitors have it had to be taken for repairs to its home and a price tag that may well leap to over $500 nearly totally usurped American production station of Norfolk. Among the hundreds of million a copy.16 Once a stimulant within a of cargo vessels and other maritime related systems that were not fully functional, its productive commercial base, government equipment. This means that most of the failed steering system derailed the customary shipbuilding now seems to merely provide technological developments in vessel design, preshipyard sea trials to investigate the extent fixes to junkies who will not clean up and maritime components, and shipbuilding will of repairs necessary. cannot survive in the global marketplace. occur outside the United States. In America, Even before construction of the first the Navy will continue to have to chase tech- Navy DDX, the program is rife with budget Solutions? nological improvements with huge outlays blowouts. “The mission of the DDG 1000 Solutions to the quandary confronting at its in-house and contractor facilities in [guided missile destroyer] Zumwalt Class is to America’s maritime industries are not easily attempts to stay ahead of the curve. provide affordable and credible independent found. The first step, as always, is admitting As our shipbuilding and shipping forward presence/deterrence and to operate as the problem. Yet politicians from both parties industries go, so goes the surrounding indus- an integral part of the Naval, Joint, or Com- and the relevant bureaucracies continue trial and service base. Take port manage- bined Maritime Forces,”14 yet in congressional propagating statements to the effect that we ment, for example. The irony of the Dubai testimony given in 2005, the Under Secretary have a vital, even growing, maritime sector. Ports World saga of 2006 is that there was no competitive American bidder for the British- once a stimulant within a productive commercial base, owned Peninsular and Oriental Steam government shipbuilding now seems to merely provide fixes to Navigation Company (P&O) terminals in America, much less P&O ports in general. junkies who cannot survive in the global marketplace Dubai Ports World was bidding against the Port of Singapore Authority for these opera- Launching of Military Sealift Command dry cargo/ tions on the East Coast of the United States. ammunition ship USNS Amelia Earhart, April 2008
Government Misadventure In most marketplaces, an increase in market share is accompanied by the beneficial effects of increased leverage with suppliers in terms of quality, schedule, and price. Govern- ment contracting may be the exception that proves the rule. One need only look at Navy shipbuilding from the LCS (littoral combat ship) to the DDX (next generation destroyer) to catch a glimpse of an industry devoid of private sector influence. Work on LCS 3 was halted in 2007 when the first vessel’s price came in at $411 million rather than the $220 million target.12 The excuses for the vessel’s projected cost are proliferating at nearly the same rate as the overruns. The plans were not complete when the vessel was put out for bid, the U.S. Navy (Steve Vasquez) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 21 FORUM | Hobson’s Choice: The Navy or Nothing
Under the Clinton administration, roughly Maritime Commission, followed by a merger Both sides have to give up some of their 29,300 small vessels and barges appeared in of these two bureaucracies with the licensing claim to a shrinking market for the stalemate MARAD’s count of the “fleet.”17 This tally and regulatory arm of the Coast Guard. to be broken. Here is a compromise: allow begged the question of how small a rowboat- Recycling a joke about the Department foreign-built ships of over 10,000 deadweight for-hire needed to be before it would make of Agriculture, the number of employees tons to engage in domestic trade, but require the list—and MARAD was obligated to in this bureaucracy should be limited to no American shipyard maintenance for all revise its count. Likewise, the Department of more than the number of merchant seaman work except emergency repairs. Some may Defense and U.S. citizens concerned about billets in the fleet they monitor. It may be argue that this would be the death knell for national security must insist on more than glib to say so, but the job security of the American shipbuilding. However, it must just rearranging the proverbial deck chairs. above three organizations detaches them be pointed out that domestic airlines are not America’s maritime sector needs a course from the success or failure of their mission. required to buy domestically built airplanes, correction that will tangibly revitalize Amer- The focus of a newly formed entity must be a yet Boeing is doing quite well. This approach ica’s large-scale shipping and shipbuilding reinvigorated shipping and shipbuilding base recognizes that increasing the size of Amer- ica’s merchant fleet is critical to the success high barriers to entry into large shipbuilding coupled with the of any plan and that stimulating large vessel fact that domestic producers will be at a cost disadvantage are repair in America is achievable in the short term. While the small number of ships that problems that demand government involvement America might produce over the next decade would probably fall off the order books industries. The waypoints for such a correc- in the United States, and it must be staffed immediately following this change, increas- tion include a reform of the oversight agency with those who have the vision, creativity, ing the ship repair base holds the prospect of responsible, a reformulation of the Jones Act, latitude, and funds to achieve the possible. reinvigorating the infrastructure necessary personnel and vessel stimuli, a new strategy The Jones Act is a sacred cow for many for ship construction. The reality is that for the shipbuilding industry, a way to force in the industry, but regardless of whether revitalization of new ship construction in foreign operators to share cost burdens, and it has contributed to, or merely presided America will require a successful process common sense tort reform. over, the industry’s decline, the industry is spanning decades. If there is little private sector influence in trouble. The act must be reformulated Much has been written about the left in America’s maritime industry, what for progress to be made. As it stands now, impending shortage of seafarers in the government influence there is can only be there is sparse investment in the commer- United States. Currently, we face the inertia described as a failure. The Navy has been an cial maritime sector because no company of declining prospects for a full career in enabler of some bad habits, but the oversight wants to be the last to make an uneconomic the industry leading to fewer applicants. agency with responsibility is the Maritime investment in either a Jones Act vessel or For a prospective sailor, the upfront cost of Administration of the Department of Trans- shipbuilding capacity in a climate where regulatory fees, union dues, and mandatory portation. It is time for institutional reform of the Jones Act appears to be less and less pension plans are as expensive as they have the Maritime Administration and the Federal sustainable. ever been. However, the odds against getting on one’s first ship as an applicant in a sea- man’s union, coupled with the odds against sailing long enough draw a retirement, make a sailor’s personal investment in a career at sea a long shot at best. A reformed Maritime Administration might begin by implementing a program of Merchant Marine personnel and vessel incentives:
n a retirement program akin to the Federal Railroad Retirement Program n removal of state and Federal taxation on revenues of shipping companies and the wages of merchant seaman earned on American- flagged ships in international trade n a Federal health insurance scheme for seamen to level the cost structure for U.S. vessels employing American seamen.
Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter (right) tours English shipbuilding The shipbuilding subset of problems facility to look for practices applicable to U.S. industry facing the maritime industry in the United U.S. Navy (Shawn P. Eklund)
22 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu TASTAD
States will be the most difficult to address. troll for clients by promising massive financial 3 “Formation of the U.S. Navy,” available at Asian shipyards now enjoy economies of scale, rewards and no upfront costs.
Information Technology and U.S. Navy (Christopher S. Borgren II) U.S. Navy (Christopher S. Borgren China’s Naval Modernization
By ANDREW S. ERICKSON and Michael S. Chase
n recent years, the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has become a high priority for senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and high-ranking military officers. For instance, CCP General Secretary, Presi- I dent, and Central Military Commission Chairman Hu Jintao in a December 2006 speech to PLAN officers underscored the need “to build a powerful People’s navy that can adapt to its historical mission during a new century and a new period.”1 Similarly, PLAN Commander Wu Shengli and Political Commissar Hu Yanlin pro- moted naval modernization in an authoritative CCP journal. According to Wu and Hu, “Since the reform and open door policy, along with the consistent increase of overall national strength, the oceanic awareness and national defense awareness of the Chinese people have been raised and the desire to build a powerful navy, strengthen modern national defense and realize the great revitalization of China has become stronger than at any other time.”2 Moreover, Wu and Hu contend, “To build a power- ful navy is the practical need for maintaining the safety of national sovereignty and maritime rights.”3 Such statements emphasize the importance that China’s civilian and military leaders attach to PLAN modernization.
24 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu ERICKSON and CHASE
This growing urgency about mod- This guidance applies with particular force to Combatant Academy, “in the information ernization is focused largely, but by no the modernization of the PLAN. According to age, information has become one of the main means exclusively, on a possible conflict one recent article, for example, “Informatized sources of combat power.”9 over Taiwan. At the same time, Wu and Hu warfare is the mainstream trend in the devel- point out that the navy must be prepared opment of future maritime wars.”6 C4ISR Systems for a wider range of missions, including the Given the Chinese military’s C4ISR protection of maritime resources and energy PLAN “Informatization” shortcomings in the 1980s and 1990s, the security issues. These missions drive PLAN The PLAN is undergoing an impressive PLAN’s informatization drive started from a requirements, not only for the new platforms transformation from what was essentially a relatively weak position. For years, the entire China is putting into service with the navy, coastal defense force to a more offensively PLA, including the navy, faced major short- but also for command, control, communica- oriented force capable of executing a variety comings in its C4ISR capabilities. Despite tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, of regional missions in support of China’s these modest beginnings, C4ISR moderniza- and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. national security interests. As part of this tion has been under way since the late 1990s, Within this context, enhancing modernization program, a number of new when the PLA embarked on a massive effort PLAN information technology and com- surface ships and submarines have entered to modernize, upgrade, and expand its com- munications capabilities is seen as critical service. New surface ships include Russian- munications infrastructure. This ambitious to China’s overall naval modernization built Sovremennyy guided missile destroyers; project was bolstered by the rapid develop- program. According to one recent article, indigenously developed Luzhou and Luyang ment of the civilian IT and telecommunica- “The informatization of shipboard weapons I and II guided missile destroyers; Jiangkai tions industries. One of the key results of the and equipment is the core of maritime joint I and II guided missile frigates; and the upgrade was the construction of a national combat. . . . [T]he Chinese Navy should Houbei-class missile-armed, wave-piercing fiber optics network that provided the PLA vigorously build data links for maritime catamarans. Among the new submarines are with much greater communications capacity, military actions and fundamentally change Kilo-class diesels acquired from Russia and reliability, and security. Beijing also intensi- the way to carry out tasks in the future,” the domestically developed Shang nuclear- fied its efforts to improve its space-based ultimately creating a “networked fleet.”4 powered and Song and Yuan conventional C4ISR capabilities. Indeed, China began an Reaching this goal hinges on narrowing the attack submarines. With the addition of gap between the PLAN and the world’s most these platforms, the navy is improving its the PLAN appears poised advanced navies through the development, surface warfare, undersea warfare, and air to become an increasingly acquisition, and integration of advanced defense capabilities. information technology. The PLAN also appears poised to important part of China’s This emphasis on “informatization” become an increasingly important part of nuclear deterrence posture derives from the expectation that the People’s China’s nuclear deterrence posture with the Liberation Army (PLA) must prepare for addition of several Type 094 fleet ballistic ambitious manned space program, started local wars under informatized conditions, a missile submarines (SSBNs), which will be participating in a variety of international theme that was underscored at the 17th CCP armed with JL–2 submarine-launched bal- partnerships, and moved forward with Congress in October 2007. Specifically, Hu’s listic missiles. According to the 2006 Defense several military space programs. report to the Party Congress declared: White Paper, the PLAN “aims at gradual Space-based C4ISR developments are extension of the strategic depth for offshore particularly crucial for naval informatiza- To attain the strategic objective of building defensive operations and enhancing its capa- tion, especially given the PLAN’s evolving computerized armed forces and winning IT bilities in integrated maritime operations missions. According to the 2007 Department [information technology]–based warfare, and nuclear counterattacks.”7 of Defense (DOD) report on Chinese mili- we will accelerate composite development of China’s leaders perceive their nation tary power, “China seeks to become a world mechanization and computerization, carry to be confronting a strategic environment leader in space development and maintain a out military training under IT-based condi- in which “military competition based on leading role in space launch activity.”10 Navi- tions, modernize every aspect of logistics, informatization is intensifying.”8 This view gation and positioning have been other areas intensify our efforts to train a new type of both highlights the growing importance of of emphasis with implications for military high-caliber military personnel in large information technology in military mod- modernization and navy informatization. numbers and change the mode of generating ernization and places a heavy premium on In addition to using the Global Position- combat capabilities.5 striving for information dominance in any ing System and Global Navigation Satellite future conflict, especially one with a techno- System and working with the European logically advanced adversary. Some analysts Union on the Galileo navigation satellite write about the role of information in a system, China has deployed its own Beidou Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an Assistant Professor in style reminiscent of U.S. publications that navigation satellites. Chinese developments the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval emphasize information superiority and extol in small satellites and maritime observation War College. Dr. Michael S. Chase is an Assistant the virtues of “network-centric warfare.” satellites are also of particular interest from Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at For example, according to three researchers the perspective of naval informatization. the Naval War College. affiliated with the PLAN’s Dalian Naval ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 25 FORUM | Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization
Beyond these improvements in space- Improving military computer net- Beijing is already developing the capabil- based ISR capabilities, the PLA is also making works and making them available to more ity to target U.S. ships with ballistic missiles, major strides in the construction of its com- units have been particular priorities as the such as the medium-range DF–21.16 “China munications networks. Indeed, the expan- PLA expands its communications networks, is equipping theater ballistic missiles with sion of military communications networks another key “informatization” development maneuvering reentry vehicles . . . with radar is a noteworthy aspect of Chinese military that has major implications for the PLAN. or [infrared] seekers to provide the accuracy modernization and one that has major impli- Recent reports indicate that all navy units necessary to attack a ship at sea,” according cations for PLAN informatization. The PLA at the division level and above are now to the Office of Naval Intelligence.17 If sup- reportedly has accelerated the development of connected to military computer networks plied with accurate real-time target data from its nationwide communications capabilities, and that current plans focus on extending China’s growing constellation of ISR satellites devoting particular attention to diversifying coverage to lower-level units.14 In addition, or other sources, terminal seekers and maneu- the means of communication and enhanc- the navy is improving the capabilities of vering warheads could threaten targets such as ing security and antijamming capabilities.11 its ocean survey and reconnaissance ships, airbases and aircraft carriers.18 According to one source: which are responsible for such tasks as sur- Chinese researchers emphasize the veying, gathering meteorological and hydro- importance of linking platforms into an in the coastal military commands, a gigantic graphic information, laying and repairing integrated whole, suggesting that this will optic-cable communication network has been undersea cables, and intelligence collection. remain a focus of defense research and set up, which guarantees the optic-cable commu- development programs. This is considered nication among the headquarters of each mili- Trends in Research and Development particularly important for the PLAN. tary command. Meanwhile, satellite commu- Further technical improvements are likely According to one article, “A platform-centric nication has been applied more widely, which over the next decade. According to the 2007 navy cannot bring into full play the potentials ensures smooth communication between the top DOD report on Chinese military capabilities: of its sensors and weapons,” but “effective commanding organ and the headquarters at dif- networks formed with multiple platforms and ferent levels of the military commands.12 To prevent deployment of naval forces into multiple sensors can enable the resources of western Pacific waters, PLA planners are military strength to grow steadily.” Moreover, Chinese research institutes have also focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges “resource sharing among various platforms “developed a VSAT [Very Small Aperture Ter- . . . . One area of apparent investment emphasis and coordinated allocation of the resources of minal] communication system consisting of involves a combination of medium-range bal- all operational forces can enable the currently mobile vehicle-borne components” as well as listic missiles, C4ISR for geo-location of targets, available resources of military strength to be microwave and troposcatter communication and onboard guidance systems for terminal fully utilized.”19 According to another article, systems, and China is also upgrading some of homing to strike surface ships on the high seas “In order to effectively fuse all C4ISR system its traditional communications systems.13 or their onshore support infrastructure.15 elements and achieve a seamless connection
People’s Liberation Army Navy Luhu-class destroyer Qingdao departing Pearl Harbor, 2006 all navy units at the division level and above are now connected to military computer networks
from sensors to shooters it is necessary to solve the problems of data integration.”20 Such statements suggest that networked sensors and data fusion are also likely to enjoy high priority in the next few years. Unmanned reconnaissance systems appear to be another area of emphasis in Chinese C4ISR-related research. Indeed, recent technical articles indicate that scientists and engineers are conducting research on various types of unmanned aircraft systems.21 Researchers are also working on unmanned underwater vehicles. For example, PLAN researchers are addressing the sonar capabili- ties of remotely operated vehicles,22 which could have applications in ISR and other maritime warfare mission areas. U.S. Navy (James E. Foehl)
26 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu ERICKSON and CHASE
Informatized War at Sea expected to play a prominent role in a variety out, “Although the PLA has devoted consid- Planners realize that rapid improve- of campaigns in which the navy might be erable effort to developing joint capabilities, ments in the PLAN’s hardware will not called on to participate. A major PLA doc- it faces a persistent lack of inter-service be fully effective without corresponding trinal publication, for instance, emphasizes cooperation and a lack of actual experience increases in the ability of its personnel to the need to achieve objectives rapidly in in joint operations.”31 In short, the PLAN operate new systems under combat condi- a complex battle environment by jointly will likely encounter a variety of challenges tions. This requires the navy to make com- implementing an air, maritime, and infor- as it moves forward with the development of mensurate improvements in training. In mation blockade.27 The last entails “actively joint operations capabilities. Nevertheless, it keeping with recent PLA-wide guidance destroy[ing] the enemy’s important ground has already made considerable progress and from the General Staff Department that information installations, disrupt[ing] is clearly determined to further enhance its stresses making training more realistic and the enemy’s satellite and radio channels, ability to conduct joint operations. challenging, the PLAN has emphasized cut[ting] off the enemy’s submarine cables In addition to informatization’s effect training that simulates the actual battlefield and cable channels . . . [and] smashing the on the navy’s ability to conduct joint opera- environment as much as possible. Official enemy’s information warfare capability.”28 tions, the introduction and integration of sources indicate considerable progress in Joint campaigns require joint campaign advanced information technology are also making training more rigorous. command structures, which are responsible likely to influence its approach to command Chinese sources frequently highlight for coordinating service activities in pursuit and control. The Chinese military has a tra- the importance of conducting training under of the overall campaign objectives. Accord- dition of highly centralized command that “complex electromagnetic conditions,” so ing to another major PLA doctrinal publica- derives from a variety of sources, including forces will be prepared to conduct opera- tion, the command and communications the political system, institutional culture, tions in an environment characterized by systems of troops under the same command and organizational structure. Indeed, jamming, electronic attacks, reconnaissance, or participating in coordinated operations Chinese scholars argue that the PLA’s general and electronic deception. A June 2007 North must be interoperable.29 Technical interoper- staff organizational structure is conducive to Sea Fleet exercise reportedly incorporated ability of C4ISR assets is a necessary, though centralized command and control.32 More- several of these challenges.23 The PLAN is insufficient, condition for the development over, for the PLA, unity of command histori- also conducting opposing forces training of joint operational capabilities. cally has meant centralization of command. featuring Blue Force detachments playing the This tradition appears to have considerable role of enemy units and is making extensive some joint exercises have staying power. According to Major Gener- use of modeling and simulation as part of its als Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, for drive to improve training for future informa- focused specifically on example, “All the decision-making power tized conflicts. communications capabilities and command authority on issues concern- Another area of emphasis reflects the ing the overall war situation should be cen- conclusion that the military will have to fight The PLA still faces a variety of tralized to the strategic commander and the jointly in future conflicts. According to the problems, many of them bureaucratic and strategic commanding authorities.”33 PLAN’s official newspaper, “As profound institutional. Perhaps the most important Given the PLA’s long tradition of changes take place in the form of war, future is a highly centralized and hierarchical centralized command, China could choose warfare will be integrated joint operations command structure and organizational to use its improved C4ISR capabilities to under informatized conditions. Training culture that is averse to delegating decision- make centralized command function more is the rehearsal for war, and what kind of a making to lower levels, much less junior efficiently and effectively. Chinese authors war we fight determines what kind of train- and noncommissioned officers. Another have certainly recognized the potential of ing we should conduct.”24 Numerous recent potential roadblock is institutional resistance enhanced communications capabilities to articles highlight the PLAN’s joint training and bureaucratic opposition resulting from enable higher-echelon decisionmakers to activities.25 Some of these joint exercises have the likely tendency of joint campaigns to function more effectively. High-bandwidth focused specifically on communications emphasize the importance of the PLAN, secure communications, for instance, allow capabilities.26 the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, strategic leaders to transmit plans and other and the Second Artillery Corps, through operational documents electronically in Implications for Jointness which supreme headquarters exercises direct real time and hold videoconferences with Successful informatization will have command and control over strategic missile subordinates instead of traveling to the front major implications for the PLAN’s ability to forces, and thereby erode the traditional for face-to-face meetings. According to Peng conduct joint operations and for the future dominance of the army. and Yao: development of its command and control Still another challenge is the PLA’s lack system. PLAN publications consistently of real experience conducting joint opera- Under high-tech conditions and with the aid emphasize the growing importance of joint tions. The only historical example is the of the strategic command automation system, operations, which many authors connect to relatively small-scale Yijiangshan campaign the form of assigning strategic tasks orally, the challenges of informatized operations in in 1955; the rest of the PLA’s warfighting realized only face to face in the past, can now a complex battlefield environment. Indeed, experiences were at most combined arms be actualized between different places, and joint operations and informatization are campaigns.30 As the 2006 DOD report points assigning strategic tasks in the past by written ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 27 FORUM | Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization operations documents can now be completed the total sum of strategic information has participating forces belong to different services through computer networks in real time.34 greatly increased.” and branches, and carrying out operational More broadly, PLA analysts appear to be tasks will require temporary partnerships, There are also strong incentives to engaging in a debate about the advantages and making organization difficult. Consequently, consider decentralizing authority, at least disadvantages of centralized and decentral- there must be centralized control of all service to some extent. Notwithstanding the strong ized command systems. Some authors claim and branch firepower strike forces to assure emphasis on the role of the strategic com- that conducting complex joint firepower the timeliness, continuity, and coordination of mander and the centralized command strikes requires centralized command. They firepower strike operations.35 system, PLA writers suggest that strategic argue that there must be centralized and Other PLA writers appear to favor a decisionmakers should not attempt to unified planning, organization, control, and command and control system that gives micromanage activities at the tactical and coordination to conduct high-efficiency inte- greater autonomy to junior leaders on a more operational levels. For one thing, having grated firepower strikes. They point out that routine basis, not just under emergency con- more information at higher echelons is not command relationships are complex because ditions that impede communications with necessarily better; huge amounts of data higher-level commanders. Indeed, the infor- may simply overwhelm strategic command- having more information matization of the PLAN, especially advances ers. As Peng and Yao argue, “Under the at higher echelons is not in ISR and communications capabilities, high-tech conditions, the glut and overload may offer China the opportunity to employ of strategic information have increased to a necessarily better; huge a more flexible and responsive command large extent the difficulties of strategic judg- amounts of data may and control system that relies on “directive ment. . . . [I]t’s not an easy job to retrieve and simply overwhelm strategic control” and “mission type orders” to meet pick out valuable strategic information when commanders the challenges of joint operations in high- tech regional wars.
Secretary Gates meets with Chinese defense minister in Beijing DOD (Cherie Thurlby)
28 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu ERICKSON and CHASE
Although adopting such an approach forces through the Second Artillery Corps.36 militaries, which Chinese writers suggest would appear to offer significant operational Presumably, the supreme headquarters will take decades to overcome. But it also advantages and complement the PLA’s evolv- would also exercise direct command and raises the issue of distinguishing between the ing doctrine, a number of obstacles threaten control over deployed SSBNs through “ideal” capability the Chinese military seeks such a dramatic transformation. The most the General Staff Department or PLAN for the long term and a “good enough” capa- important of these obstacles are the PLA headquarters. bility for the relatively near term. tradition of highly centralized command and The navy has been working to achieve For the most part, Chinese analysts control and an organizational culture that secure, reliable SSBN communications tend to overestimate U.S. and Western capa- does not appear to encourage junior officers for more than two decades. However, the bilities and portray themselves as backward to take the initiative. If these hurdles could extent to which centralized SSBN command, in comparison. Certainly, many Western be overcome, successful implementation of a control, and communications is possible for observers continue to denigrate PLA capabil- more flexible command and control system China across the range of nuclear scenarios ities and note that even some of the Chinese would require the training and development remains unclear. This underscores another military’s recent achievements are relatively of junior leaders capable of taking the initia- critical problem for the PLAN: ensuring simplistic by American standards. But one tive and seizing fleeting opportunities on the the ability to communicate with SSBNs in should ask whether a relatively simple system battlefield. an environment in which its command and of deconfliction by time or geographic area How this debate will be resolved control system has been degraded. with disparate platforms might actually be remains an open question. To be sure, sufficient for the PLA to achieve its objectives modern commanders have not always used Important Questions under most circumstances. The need for an advances in technology to support the Clearly, the PLAN is serious about the exquisite C4ISR system should not be over- delegation of authority to lower echelons. hardware aspects of naval informatization, stated. In short, if the PLAN has a different On the contrary, in many cases, they have but at least three broader questions remain metric for integrated C4ISR than that of the sought to use technology to improve the unanswered. U.S. Navy, it might achieve an employable efficiency and effectiveness of centralized Are Chinese conceptions of informati- capability with surprising rapidity, especially command and control. It is entirely plausible zation unique? The first question is whether if it pursues one that is relatively crude by that the PLA will pursue this well-trodden there is anything in the Chinese concept of U.S. standards but that is nonetheless suffi- path instead of exploiting technological informatization that is radically different cient to meet China’s operational objectives. advances to implement a directive control from Western characterizations of the role or mission-type orders system, especially of information in modern warfare. It is not of critical concern would be given its institutional predispositions. It evident from Chinese sources that there is asymmetric approaches to remains to be seen how the PLA will adapt anything unique about how Chinese strate- information dominance that its command style to changes in doctrine gists view the importance of information and improvements in information and com- and information superiority. Some writings could offer China presently munications technology. Enhanced IT and are undoubtedly attempts to assimilate unforeseen and potentially C4ISR capabilities could permit the PLA to and repackage ideas that are familiar to disruptive military capabilities delegate greater decisionmaking authority to readers of Western writings on “network- lower-level commanders. At the same time, centric warfare,” information dominance, How will the PLAN resolve two critical the modernization of the communications and related concepts. Nonetheless, it will informatization-related debates? Perhaps infrastructure could just as easily reinforce be important to watch the trends in PLAN most interesting in the Chinese writings strong organizational tendencies to favor writings and practice to see how these examined are the ongoing debates arising highly centralized command and control developments play out in both the short and from increased informatization. One major arrangements, as seems to have happened in long term. Of perhaps most critical concern debate concerns the offense-defense balance some recent U.S. military operations. would be any evidence of radically different, in information warfare. The conceptual goal is These are challenges that the entire asymmetric approaches to informatization obviously full information assurance for one’s PLA must confront, but there are also some and the attainment and exploitation of infor- own forces and complete information denial to service-specific issues that navy command- mation dominance that could offer China the enemy’s forces. The more likely outcome is ers will need to resolve. First, command presently unforeseen and potentially disrup- some position between the extremes, depend- and control of PLAN assets is complicated tive military capabilities. ing on capabilities and geography. One could due to the organizational structure of the How informatized does the PLAN posit that information assurance tends to favor People’s Liberation Army. The command- really need to be? The second broad ques- short-range operations close to home, where ers of the three fleets answer to both PLAN tion centers on how close the Chinese are to one can rely on land lines and high power line- headquarters and regional military com- achieving the so-called informatized force. of-sight communications, while information manders. Second, the deployment of SSBNs The 2006 Defense White Paper established a denial might predominate at long range away will present the supreme command and goal of being able to fight and win informa- from home, where one becomes reliant on sat- the PLAN with special challenges. Again, tionalized wars by the mid-21st century. This ellite communications and long-range signals the supreme headquarters exercises direct reflects a perceived gap between the Chinese that might be jammed or geolocated. It will be command and control over strategic missile armed forces and the world’s most advanced interesting to follow the progress of this debate ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 29 FORUM | Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization in Chinese writings, especially as strides are The overall implication could be December 20, 2006, available at
30 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities
By Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
assuming a more assertive nuclear posture parameters for likely endeavors in this domain. ver the past few years, Western better described as “limited deterrence.” We then attempt to project the likely size and strategic thinkers have debated We take issue with both of these projec- deployment patterns for Chinese SSBNs. what China’s emerging force tions of Chinese nuclear strategy, doctrine, O of fleet ballistic missile subma- and undersea capabilities. We assess China’s Historical Models rines (SSBNs) portends for Beijing’s overall undersea deterrent purely at the strategic level, Five countries have deployed undersea nuclear strategy. One influential school of leaving aside other important questions such nuclear deterrent forces: the United States, the thought assumes that the rudimentary land- as how Beijing might use fleet submarines to Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, Great based missile force that has served Beijing’s support coercion against Taiwan or in other Britain, France, and China. Until now, Chinese needs in the past will continue to do so. contingencies. Our chief finding is that a larger, shipbuilders and weapons scientists have never Others dispute this static model, pointing to more advanced, more capable flotilla of fleet managed to construct the reliable fleet ballistic the introduction of next-generation, land- ballistic missile submarines does not necessar- missile submarine the nation needs to furnish based mobile ballistic missiles and improve- ily signal a break with China’s tradition of min- an invulnerable second-strike capability.2 ments to the People’s Liberation Army Navy imalist nuclear strategy. Indeed, By examining the remaining four histori- (PLAN) submarine and ballistic missile a modest undersea deterrent cal models, we can glimpse possible futures forces. They predict that China will soon would reinforce minimum for China’s seabased deterrent. The United put to sea an SSBN fleet more symmetrical deterrence as Beijing con- States and Soviet Union are obvious choices, with the U.S. Navy in terms of both quality ceives it.1 We first examine given Beijing’s much-discussed rise to great- and quantity. Moreover, it will abandon its historical precedents traditional stance of “minimum deterrence,” for Chinese ballistic Dr. Toshi Yoshihara and Dr. James R. Holmes are missile submarine Associate Professors in the Department of Strategy development, and Policy at the Naval War College. revealing some U.S. Navy (Dean Lohmeyer)
USS Georgia after conversion from ballistic missile to guided missile submarine ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 31 FORUM | China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent power—perhaps superpower—status. But pers to roam their patrol grounds without boats into Atlantic waters, where they could some China-watchers predict that Beijing will tight political supervision and without the threaten American cities. settle for regional power status in Asia, similar luxury of having attack submarines or land- Advances in technology, however, to the status the United Kingdom and France based platforms nearby to defend them from ultimately allowed the Soviet preference for a enjoy. Similar incentives and disincentives— enemy action. The U.S. approach to seabased defensive stance at sea to reassert itself. By the notably misgivings about the reliability of the nuclear deterrence, then, seems offensive in 1970s, a growing body of evidence suggested U.S. nuclear guarantee during the Cold War— nature, confident in U.S. submarines’ capacity that the Soviet navy was reverting to defensive induced London and Paris to develop modest for concealment, and unfettered by geo- deployment patterns. Soviet weapons engineers undersea nuclear deterrents of their own. This graphically based conceptions that safe havens had improved the ranges of the navy’s sub- commends the independent North Atlantic are necessary to protect American SSBNs. If marine-launched ballistic missiles while adding Treaty Organization (NATO)–European deter- Chinese leaders follow the U.S. template, and capabilities such as multiple independently rents to our attention. once the supporting technologies mature, the targeted warheads.7 Rather than venturing United States. In the early Cold War, coming years may see PLAN SSBNs roaming into the Atlantic, Soviet SSBNs were patrolling successive U.S. administrations concluded throughout the Pacific Ocean basin. Arctic waters, where they could still range U.S. that America depended on a large nuclear Soviet Union/Russia. Like the United targets while enjoying the advantage of proxim- force structure. The rationale for a substantial States, the Soviet Union seemed convinced ity to Soviet naval bases. This insight drove the arsenal underwent several phases. In the 1950s, that it needed to hold a maximum number thinking behind the U.S. maritime strategy of this was mostly a matter of offsetting enormous of its adversary’s assets—cities or military the Reagan years, which envisioned U.S. Navy Soviet advantages in geography and manpower, forces—at risk to ensure deterrence. Accord- task forces seizing the initiative in wartime and especially in NATO-Europe. The Eisenhower ingly, the Soviet navy put a sizable fleet of steaming northward into the Norwegian Sea administration briefly flirted with “massive nuclear-powered submarines armed with to threaten Soviet strategic forces in their icy retaliation” against all communist efforts at expansion, however minor.3 By the Kennedy years, massive retaliation had lost credibility— misgivings about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear guarantee the notion of using nuclear weapons against during the Cold War induced London and Paris to develop a Third World insurgency, for instance, was modest undersea nuclear deterrents of their own unpersuasive—and Washington was scram- bling to plug the “missile gap” that seemed to have opened with the Soviet Union’s launch ballistic missiles to sea. Technology— northern “bastions.” of Sputnik in 1957. In the 1960s and 1970s, especially range limitations on the early Should Beijing follow Moscow’s naval strategists developed and refined a doctrine of generations of Soviet missiles—imposed strategy of the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese “mutual assured destruction.” Their logic was constraints on Soviet SSBN deployment pat- SSBNs would shelter within such geographic that no sane leader would risk a nuclear first terns, compelling commanders to send these redoubts as the Bohai Sea or, perhaps, the strike knowing that it would bring an auto- matic, devastating second strike.4 And so the debate went—but “the weapons never left center stage,” notes Law- rence Freedman, whatever the conventional wisdom happened to be at the time. The dom- inant view was that a large arsenal was essen- tial to counter an adversary that commanded overwhelming conventional supremacy and its own massive nuclear stockpile. A powerful submarine force formed the core of the U.S. second-strike capability. By the late Cold War, 18 Ohio-class SSBNs armed with Trident II sea-launched ballistic mis- siles constituted the U.S. undersea deterrent.5 American submariners are famously close- mouthed about SSBN deployment practices. It is fair to say, nonetheless, that successive U.S. administrations developed elaborate command and control procedures to guard against a mistaken release of nuclear weapons from U.S. strategic submarines.6 Yu–6 torpedo being loaded aboard Type–39 Yet political and military leaders also Song–class submarine seem comfortable allowing individual skip- SinoDefence.com
32 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu YOSHIHARA and HOLMES waters within the first island chain that runs an offensive manner and beyond land-based models surveyed here involved putting to sea parallel to the Chinese coastline.8 support. Deployment patterns reflected this, submarine forces to counter a single threat. Britain/France. Britain and France with U.S., British, and French SSBNs enjoying For the most part, the United States and could offer a third model for a China that is considerable latitude to cruise independently Soviet Union sought to deny their opponent a content with regional influence and a second- within range of Soviet targets. By comparison, nuclear advantage that would allow it to wage strike capacity far more modest than those of authoritarian regimes, which place great war without fear of a disastrous counterstrike. the United States or the Soviet Union/Russia. weight on political loyalty, are ill disposed to Britain and France tried to deter the Soviets London and Paris developed independent permit naval officers this degree of control by deploying modest but sufficient nuclear submarine deterrents out of fears that the U.S. over strategic assets. As became apparent in forces. China clearly faces a more complex nuclear umbrella would provide only flimsy the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet leaders preferred geometry. Beijing must worry about not only protection in wartime. That is, Washington to keep submarines closer to home, under a U.S. effort to knock out the Chinese inter- might prove unwilling to expose the Ameri- their watchful gaze. Whether Chinese leaders continental ballistic missile (ICBM) force in can homeland to a nuclear counterattack for will incline to one of these approaches or a Taiwan contingency, but also India, a new the sake of NATO-European allies. Preserving fashion their own remains to be seen. nuclear neighbor that China shares a long the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on Strategic Culture. During the 1970s, border and a tumultuous history with. Like- the Soviet Union—and thereby supplement- Western strategic thinkers disputed whether wise, Russian sites will almost certainly find ing the U.S. security guarantee—helped them there was a peculiarly Soviet way of thinking themselves on the target list for Chinese sub- hedge against possible American waffling. about and executing nuclear strategy. Accu- marines, despite Russo-Chinese cooperation Keeping seabased nuclear forces modest in mulating evidence indicated that, contrary in recent years. How these competing consid- size was imperative in light of meager budgets to the logic of mutual assured destruction, erations will affect the size and operations of and competing military demands in conti- Moscow was pursuing the capacity to fight the PLAN SSBN force remains to be seen. nental Europe. and prevail in a nuclear conflict. Scholars and Technology Dependence. Technology The United Kingdom and France, then, practitioners of nuclear strategy held that the imposed constraints on Cold War SSBN made do with SSBN forces asymmetrical to same logic of nuclear deterrence governed deployment patterns, forcing the great those of the superpowers. Numbers aside, decisionmaking in all countries. If such powers to depart from political and culturally their SSBN deployment patterns seemingly derived strategic and operational prefer- resembled those of the U.S. Navy. The entire the United Kingdom and ences. The Soviet navy preferred a defensive French SSBN force was based at the Atlantic France made do with SSBN stance leveraging geographic and land-based port of Brest, while submarines based in the defenses. Early on, Soviet SSBNs were never- British Isles patrolled the Atlantic and the forces asymmetrical to those theless forced to venture into the Atlantic to North Sea. Neither government required of the superpowers meet their objectives. Western submarines, its submarines to stay within confined geo- similarly, were compelled to patrol in range graphic regions or within range of supporting assumptions were false, U.S. and Western of their targets, limiting their liberty of land-based military forces. Should China nuclear strategy and force structures designed action. Once technological constraints eased, take this approach, it would keep its nuclear for mutual assured destruction might have however, strategic and operational preferences arsenal small but permit its submarine com- been dangerously misguided. Spurred by the grounded in political and strategic culture manders to patrol widely in the Pacific, the debate over Soviet nuclear strategy, strategic were reasserted. Soviet boats were limited to South China Sea, or the Indian Ocean. Targets thinkers began taking into account the effects geographically defined bastions, while U.S., for Chinese SSBNs would include U.S. bases of national traditions, history, and culture on British, and French boats carried on open- in the Pacific; other candidates would include the making of policy and strategy. ocean patrols with relative freedom of action. sites in India and the Russian Far East. Acknowledging the cultural factor did China will undoubtedly confront similar not come easy. Holding Soviet SSBNs back technical obstacles as it develops its first Strategic Considerations and deploying general-purpose naval and effective SSBN flotilla. Once it meets these Judging from these historical cases, land forces to defend them defied offensively challenges, it too may pursue SSBN operations several indices are worth taking into account minded Western sensibilities. At one briefing more in keeping with Chinese strategic tradi- when appraising China’s emerging submarine in 1981, Admiral Thomas Hayward, the Chief tions and preferences. deterrent. of Naval Operations, “found the concepts of Nature of the Regime. Regimes exhibit Soviet strategy so completely different that he China’s Nuclear Posture distinct strategic and operational prefer- expressed disbelief that the Soviets could pos- To test the applicability of the undersea ences. Like their authoritarian counterparts, sibly operate their navy in such a manner.”9 deterrent models postulated above to China, it Western liberal governments possessing But they did. If the Soviet Union and other is necessary to assess the evolution of broader nuclear capacity instituted elaborate precau- powers displayed distinctive styles in subma- Chinese nuclear doctrine and force posture. tions and stringent command and control rine warfare, the People’s Republic of China Over the past four decades, China has carved arrangements to prevent unauthorized probably will, too. out a rather unique niche among the five releases of nuclear weapons. They nonetheless Threat Perceptions. How Beijing views declared nuclear weapon states. Since China evinced a fair degree of comfort with SSBN a threat will clearly shape its SSBN forces and demonstrated its ability to fire ballistic missiles skippers operating far from their shores, in doctrine. Generally speaking, the historical at intercontinental ranges in 1980, its nuclear ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 33 FORUM | China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent posture has remained surprisingly modest and building a lean and effective nuclear force. . . . seeks to shape and respond to the dynamic remarkably resistant to change. China main- It endeavors to ensure the security and reli- security environment. It is within this context tains what many Western analysts call a doc- ability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a that a new generation of SSBNs (known as trine of minimum deterrence, which calls for: credible nuclear deterrent force.11 Type 094s or Jin-class submarines) has entered into China’s strategic calculus. Successive White n strictly defensive posture Such nuclear minimalism has exerted Papers, for example, stress the need to improve n small arsenal significant influence on China’s nuclear nuclear deterrence at sea. The latest version n pledge not to be the first to use nuclear posture, suppressing the size and readiness of envisions the PLAN “enhancing its capabilities weapons the force structure. According to one analyst: in integrated maritime operations and nuclear n commitment not to attack or threaten counterattacks.”13 Beijing is clearly eyeing a nonnuclear states. China’s small but effective nuclear counter larger role for its undersea deterrent. attacking force . . . is significantly smaller, less Official Chinese documents have repeatedly diverse, and less ready to conduct actual opera- Sufficiency Goes to Sea reaffirmed these minimalist principles.10 tions than any of the arsenals maintained by Defense planners in Beijing face several While there is an ongoing debate in the other four nuclear powers recognized under basic questions regarding the future of under- China and the West on the merits of rejecting the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty].12 sea deterrence. What types of force structures nuclear minimalism, authorities in Beijing would Beijing consider viable? What factors appear committed to existing policy. In the Rather than speculate on a nuclear might induce leaders to rely more heavily on most detailed articulation of Chinese nuclear posture not yet in existence, then, for the pur- the PLAN’s nascent fleet of ballistic missile policy to date, China’s latest Defense White poses of this study, we assume that China will submarines? In short, how much is enough? Paper forcefully states: hew closely to its minimalist posture well into Sizing the fleet is both an analytical exercise the next decade. Such an analytical baseline China remains firmly committed to the policy should at least supply policymakers and ana- of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time lysts with some basis to measure the degree of since China demonstrated its and under any circumstances. It uncondition- change if China decides at some future point ability to fire ballistic missiles ally undertakes not to use or threaten to use to depart from minimum deterrence. at intercontinental ranges in nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon It is important to note, however, that 1980, its nuclear posture has states. . . . China upholds the principles of minimalism does not equate to immutability. remained surprisingly modest counterattack in self-defense and limited Qualitative and quantitative changes are clearly and resistant to change development of nuclear weapons, and aims at under way in China’s nuclear posture as Beijing
USS Florida, one of four Ohio-class submarines slated for conversion to conventional weapons U.S. Navy (B.L. Keller)
34 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu YOSHIHARA and HOLMES and an art, not least because of the political In theory, a relatively modest number redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous ramifications of deploying the most destructive of survivable SSBNs should reduce the prob- at-sea SSBN presence.”19 The open-source single platform known to mankind. A large ability that “bean counting” would prompt a literature provides even more disparate esti- SSBN fleet not only would impose a substantial competitive response from the United States. mates concerning the number of SSBNs that financial burden but also could trigger com- In other words, Beijing will likely favor a force the Chinese plan to, or will be able to, build. petitive responses from potential adversaries. configuration that demonstrates restraint in Conservative assessments of China’s strategic Thus, China faces a delicate balancing act that order to maintain a stable deterrent relation- forces tend to agree with the U.S. Intelligence seeks to meet strategic requirements without ship with Washington. Community, while other studies have drawn a unduly alarming other great powers. Accurately determining a quantitative more alarming picture. Simply put, the future Some advantages unique to an undersea ceiling for seabased ballistic missiles that but- size of the fleet is still anybody’s guess. strategic force magnify the relative impor- tresses deterrence while precluding a coun- Some parameters and assumptions tance of SSBNs vis-à-vis land-based missile tervailing U.S. response, however, is a delicate embedded in the historical models set forth forces. A ballistic missile submarine distin- affair. For example, if China possessed 4 Type previously provide useful guidance for guishes itself even from a road- or rail-mobile 094s carrying 12 JL–2 ballistic missiles armed estimating the likely size of China’s future ICBM by its stealth and unlimited mobility with 3 warheads each, then Beijing’s undersea SSBN fleet. First, an underlying principle of and endurance, which generate virtually deterrent would boast 144 warheads.15 If minimum deterrence is that as long as the infinite possibilities in terms of launch loca- China deployed 6 SSBNs with 6 multiple war- number of surviving retaliatory weapons after tions. The survivability of SSBNs reduces heads atop each JL–2, the number of warheads a disarming first strike is not zero, the posture vulnerability to preemption and thus eases the would jump to 432. These figures exclude is credible. As the British and French exam- temptation for Beijing to adopt a destabilizing the ongoing introduction of land-based ples suggest, the threshold for sufficiency nuclear posture that undermines crisis stabil- intercontinental-range missiles that could also might be quite low for China. ity and escalation control, including through be armed with multiple warheads. Such a dra- Second, the only power with the capac- increased dispersion and decentralized matic increase would likely raise concerns in ity to inflict a disarming preemptive attack command and control. Washington, even assuming the United States on Chinese nuclear forces on land and at sea However, the abstract strategic continues to enjoy commanding quantita- simultaneously for the foreseeable future will and operational benefits of an undersea tive and qualitative advantages over China’s be the United States. This reduces if not elimi- nuclear arsenal. While a classic arms race nates China’s requirement to conduct deter- resembling the Cold War probably would not rent patrols against lesser nuclear powers such ensue from such a shift in the nuclear balance, as India, and perhaps even Russia. In other
a ballistic missile submarine distinguishes itself by its stealth and unlimited mobility and endurance, which generate virtually infinite possibilities in launch locations
it is unlikely that U.S. defense planners would words, the SSBN would only have to cope with respond passively to this hypothetical orders- one threat vector across the Pacific. of-magnitude increase in the Chinese nuclear Third, this study assumes that the U.S.
Xinhua News Agency inventory. ability to degrade the survivability of an PLAN South China Sea Fleet vice chief of staff At present, the forecast number of SSBN would not improve radically over the (right) meets Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Chinese SSBNs remains a subject of conten- coming decade—say, by making the oceans Force chief of staff during PLAN’s first visit to Japan tion. The U.S. Intelligence Community and transparent to U.S. sensors and antisubma- Pentagon project that neither the JL–2 ballistic rine warfare (ASW) weaponry. Since the strategic force will not likely convince missiles nor the Jin-class submarine will enter end of the Cold War, furthermore, America’s Chinese leadership to lean decisively in service until the end of the decade.16 Accord- nuclear attack submarine fleet and ASW avia- favor of SSBNs. Foremost in the thinking ing to the director of the Defense Intelligence tion squadrons—the most potent counters of any political leadership is command Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, to an undersea threat—have atrophied in and control of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. USA, “the 8,000+ kilometer range JL–2 . . . numbers, at rates that many believe will take It is unclear whether Beijing would be likely will be ready for deployment later this decades to reverse. Nor is U.S. ballistic missile willing to delegate operational control of decade.” 17 The Pentagon’s most recent assess- defense in its current state any match for a nuclear-armed submarine to a tactical ment of Chinese military power speculates submerged launched missiles. A counter–sea- commander.14 Like Moscow during the that the JL–2 will achieve initial operational launched ballistic missile capability might be Cold War, Beijing may want to assert closer capability in the 2007–2010 timeframe.18 The decades away from deployment. Under such supervision. Practical considerations such U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence believes circumstances, even if all of China’s land- as technical feasibility and steep financial that the Type 094 may enter service as early as based deterrent was destroyed in a first strike, costs, moreover, could impose burdens that 2008 and that “a fleet of probably five Type 094 only one SSBN armed with multiple reentry China may be unwilling to carry. SSBNs will be built in order to provide more warheads would need to survive a “bolt from ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 35 FORUM | China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent the blue” to conduct a highly destructive shore-based fighter aircraft, and surface com- SSBN patrols along the Asian mainland, retaliatory strike. batants could be poised as “palace guards” to particularly in the Bohai, Yellow, East China, Fourth, Beijing’s high degree of comfort respond quickly against hostile forces seeking and South China Seas and the Taiwan Strait. with the ambiguity surrounding the surviv- to hold China’s SSBNs at risk. Given that it confronts several deterrent rela- ability of its nuclear forces, a longstanding The bastion approach would offer sanc- tionships in Asia, including India, the pres- hallmark of Chinese nuclear strategy, would tuaries within which high-value SSBNs could ence of SSBNs in the South China Sea would further reduce the need for absolute numeri- operate. In theory, sea- and shore-based assets help shore up deterrence on the southern cal guarantees. would be able to identify and hold at bay hostile flank should Beijing see the need.23 This sort These factors suggest that the lower- forces operating near or in the Bohai or Yellow of “expanded bastion” strategy would clearly range estimates are more accurate for China. Seas. The shallowness and complex acoustic open up new options for the People’s Libera- The rule of thumb—familiar to U.S. naval environment of littoral waters, moreover, would tion Army, albeit at greater risk. planners—is that three aircraft-carrier pose serious challenges to high-speed American Most ambitiously, China could deploy expeditionary groups are needed to keep one hunter-killer submarines designed for open- its submarines out into the Pacific in forays fully operational at sea at any given time. Of ocean operations during the Cold War. reminiscent of the U.S.-Soviet undersea com- the remaining two groups, one will be in an However attractive it seems, a bastion petition during the Cold War. Some U.S. ana- extended maintenance period, probably in strategy would entail certain risks. Keeping the lysts have speculated that Beijing might base a shipyard, while the other will be undergo- undersea deterrent in the Bohai area would its SSBNs in the South China Sea, enabling ing training and workups for deployment constrain patrol patterns, thereby increasing them to slip into deeper Pacific waters unde- (and its availability will thus be reduced). the likelihood that the submarines would be tected. Forward deployment would place a Assuming China adopts similar operating detected by enemy forces; forego much of the much larger number of U.S. targets within the procedures, a minimum deterrent posture inherent stealth and mobility of an SSBN; and range of the JL–2 missiles. Assuming China would not demand too much in terms of keep certain targets out of reach due to the manages to develop capable and quiet subma- quantity. Assuming 50 percent of the at-sea longer distances that the missiles must traverse. rines, its patrols in the Pacific would pose the SSBNs fell prey to enemy ASW—a generous To overcome such obstacles, China would have greatest challenges to U.S. defenders seeking estimate in view of the SSBN capacity for to build large, capable naval forces to protect to detect and track lurking SSBNs. Forward concealment and quiet operations—only two the SSBNs lurking within the bastion and to patrols would also force the United States Chinese SSBNs would need to be at sea at any enable the boats to stage a breakout should to devote more of its attack boats to shadow given time to ensure that one survived a first hostile forces seek to bottle them up and hunt Chinese submarines in open waters, thereby strike. Based on the rotating deployment cycle them down in confined waters. The main risk diverting American attack submarines that described above, China would need six SSBNs might otherwise be available for a Taiwan to fulfill the basic demands of minimum only two Chinese SSBNs would contingency or some other flareup. deterrence. Depending on the eventual tech- need to be at sea at any But the PLAN would incur strategic nical quality, reliability, and characteristics and operational risks by permitting such of the Type 094, furthermore, Beijing may given time to ensure that one free-ranging deployments. From a political not need even six boats. If the PLAN adopted survived a first strike standpoint, active patrols within the first an arrangement similar to the U.S. Navy’s island chain or in the Pacific could prove Blue and Gold crew system, which alternates of such an all-consuming strategy of deterrence highly provocative to the United States and crews after each deterrent patrol with a short is that excessive investment in protecting SSBN would almost certainly trigger a competitive maintenance period in between, it might even forces would detract from broader maritime response from Washington. U.S. naval plan- make do with a two-for-one ratio of boats in priorities such as Taiwan-related contingencies, ners would likely see China’s entry into Asian port to at sea. Four fleet boats would serve sealane defense, and secure access to overseas waters as a dramatic change in the threat envi- China’s needs under these circumstances. energy supplies. ronment, especially given the lack of Russian As an alternative to a bastion strategy, deterrent patrols in the Pacific since the Cold Potential Deployment Patterns the strategic submarines could operate more War. Given that the Xia-class SSBN has failed Beyond the question of force sizing, freely along China’s long coastline under to conduct a single deterrent patrol,24 even a Beijing must also consider a range of possible protective cover from naval and land-based modestly forward-leaning deployment pattern deployment patterns. Recently, speculation aviation forces on the mainland. Recent could signal a sea change in Chinese nuclear concerning the logic of a “bastion strategy” studies have postulated that China has already strategy that might significantly heighten for China has emerged among U.S. analysts.20 embarked on an ambitious plan to create American threat perceptions. The Chinese themselves seem intrigued by “contested zones” along its maritime periph- From an operational standpoint, sub- the Soviet Union’s experience in this regard.21 ery. Premised on the concept of sea denial, marine patrols along the mainland littoral or China could seek to replicate the Soviet model such zones would allow Beijing to exercise in Pacific waters would expose PLAN boats to by turning the geographical features of the local superiority in waters and skies within U.S. and allied ASW measures. Throughout Asian coastline to its advantage.22 Beijing the first island chain, which, roughly speak- the Cold War, the United States developed could, for instance, concentrate its SSBNs ing, stretches from the Japanese archipelago to extensive and highly effective undersea within the protective confines of the Bohai the northern Philippines. Under this scenario, detection networks—most notably the Sound and Yellow Seas. Nuclear attack submarines, China might be confident enough to permit Surveillance System (SOSUS)—to track the
36 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu YOSHIHARA and HOLMES location of Soviet submarines. In the Pacific Chinese may keep their options open, alter- build defenses against China.28 If Washington theater, U.S. submarines aided by SOSUS nating among them as security conditions overtly seeks to deny China a retaliatory monitored every movement of Soviet SSBNs warrant. For example, Beijing may be content option, Beijing will almost certainly respond in waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula. In the to rely on a bastion strategy during peacetime, with a larger and faster buildup that includes 1980s, American and Japanese naval forces when no immediate threat is evident. In times its undersea strategic forces. raised ASW to an art form, working together of conflict, it may permit more active coastal Second, China’s more leisurely approach closely to bottle up Soviet forces operating in patrols or slip its SSBNs into open waters to to bolstering its nuclear posture could come the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. signal resolve or counter nuclear coercion from under strain from unforeseen strategic techni- These “legacy” systems and well-devel- an adversary. In sum, even a small undersea cal advances or surprises. For instance, more oped tactics would lend themselves readily to deterrent would give Beijing multiple options capable missile defense systems deployed by ASW against Chinese SSBNs. The ability of the across a spectrum of contingency scenarios. the United States in the coming decades could Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to shake Beijing’s confidence in its retaliatory track a Chinese Han-class submarine that had Larger Undersea Deterrent options. It is conceivable (although highly breached Japanese territorial waters reaffirmed While a restrained nuclear posture is a improbable in the near term) that the advent that the JMSDF has maintained a high level more likely outcome at present, it is neverthe- of space-based lasers and other advanced of ASW readiness. Commenting on the Han less worth exploring how China’s willingness capabilities could radically reshape China’s incident, a former JMSDF chief of staff boasted to retain its minimalist posture could come outlook. The track record of the U.S. missile that Chinese submarines would be unable to under significant pressure in the future. For at defense program to date casts doubt on the slip into the deep waters of the Pacific through least a decade, the U.S. policy community has prospects of a radical breakthrough over the the Ryukyu island chain, to the north or south speculated about the prospects for a shift in next decade. Should such a technological leap of Taiwan, or through the Bashi (Luzon) Strait Beijing’s deterrent posture from minimum to nevertheless occur, SSBNs might emerge as a without being detected by U.S. and Japanese limited deterrence.26 Many Western analysts strategic trump card for Beijing. antisubmarine forces.25 have predicted that China would make the Third, the reconnaissance/precision- Given such potent risks, China will transition to a more flexible capacity, allow- strike complex boasted by the U.S. military probably avoid coastal and blue-water patrols ing it to engage in a broader range of nuclear could alter China’s exclusively retaliatory for the time being—especially during the “warfighting” missions. This would require posture. In July 2005, Major General Zhu initial stages of deployment when training, substantial increases in numbers and types of Chenghu created a sensation when he tactical skills, and doctrine are still immature. nuclear weapons. So, too, China analysts and declared to the foreign press, “If the Ameri- Additionally, Beijing simply might not have policymakers have exhibited greater willing- cans draw their missiles and position-guided enough SSBNs to contemplate riskier, more forward-leaning options. As noted above, it if Washington overtly seeks to deny China a retaliatory option, may content itself with two boats conduct- Beijing will almost certainly respond with a larger and faster ing deterrent patrols at any given time. If so, Chinese strategists could view secondary con- buildup that includes its undersea strategic forces siderations, such as patrols in the South China Sea aimed at India, as a needless distraction ness to reconsider and question the basic ammunition onto the target zone on China’s from the primary mission of deterring the merits of minimum deterrence. Although territory, I think we will have to respond with United States. Unless the range of the JL–2 official policy remains firmly rooted in the nuclear weapons.” He argued that if China is sufficient to reach the continental United status quo, three key factors could challenge faced the prospect of defeat in a conventional States from any location within the first the logic of minimalism. conflict over Taiwan, Beijing would have no island chain, which seems unlikely, operating First, China’s ongoing refusal to choice but to conduct a nuclear strike against farther from American shores may be deemed acknowledge that an adversary’s nuclear American cities. counterproductive. first-strike option could succeed—a Similarly, in a candid assessment of These factors suggest that submarine premise central to the concept of minimum how Chinese calculations might change, Shen deployment patterns will be rather con- deterrence—depends in part on whether the Dingli argues that precision conventional strained. Beijing will likely favor protection United States wants to submit to the logic of strikes against China’s nuclear forces during over effectiveness during the early phases of assured (but minimal) retaliation vis-à-vis a Taiwan contingency could force Beijing to SSBN deployment and will thus pursue some China. There is evidence that some U.S. strat- abandon its no-first-use pledge. He asserts type of bastion strategy. Over time, if the egists have dismissed such a mutual vulner- that “if China’s conventional forces are dev- vessels prove capable of extended patrols well ability, asserting that the United States should astated, and if Taiwan takes the opportunity beyond the coasts, Beijing might be willing direct its ballistic missile defenses specifically to declare de jure independence, it is incon- to relax its protectiveness and permit patrols to negating China’s deterrent.27 Reflecting ceivable that China would allow its nuclear farther forward. such an attitude, one advocate of missile weapons to be destroyed by a precision attack It is important to note that these deploy- defense argues that should Beijing continue with conventional munitions, rather than ment options—the bastion strategy, littoral to exhibit hostile intent toward Washington, use them as true means of deterrence.” 29 In patrols, and open-ocean patrols—are not particularly with regard to Taiwan, the United other words, if the effects of conventional U.S. mutually exclusive. It is possible that the States “may simply have no choice” but to attacks were indistinguishable from those of a ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 37 FORUM | China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent disarming nuclear strike, China’s no-first-use of damage that is nonetheless unacceptable to an Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services policy would become untenable.30 Shen’s stark adversary with a high degree of confidence. Committee, February 28, 2006, 11. 2 18 if sensible conclusion seems consistent with John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s U.S. Department of Defense, Military Power Strategic Sea Power: The Politics of Force Mod- of the People’s Republic of China 2007 (Washington, China’s longstanding worries about nuclear ernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford DC: Department of Defense, 2007), 19. blackmail. In this context, Beijing might University Press, 1994). 1 9 Office of Naval Intelligence, Seapower Ques- regard a much larger SSBN fleet as its only 3 John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of tions on the Chinese Submarine Force, unclassified viable insurance policy against a conventional Foreign Policy,” Department of State Bulletin 30 document obtained under the Freedom of Informa- and/or nuclear disarming first strike. (January 25, 1954). tion Act by Hans M. Kristensen. Clearly, a next-generation undersea deter- 4 For an excellent snapshot of the debates over 2 0 Lyle J. Goldstein and William Murray, rent would give Beijing the strategic option to U.S. nuclear strategy, see Lawrence Freedman, “The “China Emerges as a Maritime Power,” Jane’s Intel- hedge against sudden shifts in the international First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in ligence Review, October 2004, 35. security environment. However, it is important Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the 21 See Dong Qifeng, “Comparative Analysis of to acknowledge that SSBNs are not China’s Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton U.S. and Soviet/Russian Nuclear Submarine Devel- only answer to the strategic dilemmas noted University Press, 1986), 735–778. opment Strategies” [in Chinese], Modern Ships, no. 5 See “SSBN–726 Ohio Class FBM Subma- 11B (November 2007), 34. above. Beijing is actively developing an array rines,” available at
38 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu seabased Ballistic Missile Defense
Rear Admiral Alan B. Hicks, USN, is Program Director and Commander, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense.
By Alan B. Hicks s the 21st century dawns, the world presents a precarious mixture of growing challenges. A The events of September 11, 2001, clearly revealed that Americans are at risk from terrorist attacks throughout the world, even within the borders of their own U.S. Navy (James E. Foehl) country. Earlier terrorist attacks targeted U.S. Government and military personnel and sites, such as the bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole while in port in Yemen. Now, everyday American civilians are at risk. Considering the strategic environ- ment, we face growing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of states or nonstate actors. USS Lake Erie commanding officer CAPT Randall These threats range from terrorism Hendrickson explains ship’s vertical launching to ballistic missiles tipped with WMD, system to media intended to intimidate the United States by holding it, its friends, and its allies hostage. Presently, more than 25 nations have developed chemical and biological WMD. More than 30 nations have ballistic missiles in their arsenals. Not only are forward deployed forces at risk from ballistic mis- siles, but also the U.S. homeland is within range of these threats, which continue to grow in number, range, and complexity. One factor that makes bal- listic missiles desirable as a delivery vehicle for WMD is that the United States and its allies have Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile tip lacked an effective defense undergoes testing at hypervelocity wind tunnel against this threat. (John Lafferty) U.S. Air Force ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 39 FORUM | Seabased Ballistic Missile Defense
Within 30 minutes, an interconti- To deter such threats, the United defense to intercept ballistic missiles of all nental ballistic missile could be launched States must devalue ballistic missiles as ranges and in all phases of flight. from any location in the world and strike tools of extortion and aggression by fielding To develop and field the BMDS, somewhere in the United States. Today, defenses. Although missile defenses are not a the MDA has instituted an evolutionary, over 200,000 forward deployed American replacement for an offensive response capa- capability-based acquisition approach called Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are bility, such defenses are a critical dimension spiral development. BMDS fielding opportuni- at risk from short- to intermediate-range of deterrence. Missile defenses will also help ties are structured to occur in “blocks.” Each ballistic missiles located in North Korea and to assure U.S. allies and friends and to dis- block consists of planned fielded capabilities Iran.1 On July 4 and 5, 2006, North Korea suade countries from pursuing ballistic mis- against specified threats. Block 1, for instance, launched seven ballistic missiles, including siles by undermining their military value.4 is defense of the United States from North a long-range Taepo Dong–2.2 In October of Fighting and winning wars are the Korean long-range threats. Block 2 is defense that year, North Korea detonated a nuclear main missions of the U.S. Armed Forces; of allies and deployed forces from short- to device.3 During the Great Prophet exercise however, deterring wars, one of our strategic medium-range threats (in one theater/ conducted in November, Iranian state televi- priorities, is always preferable. To ensure region, and so on). Blocks 1, 3, and 4 deliver sion reported that dozens of ballistic missiles credible deterrence across the range of capabilities for long-range defenses, while were fired, some capable of striking Israel, threats in the current strategic environment, Blocks 2 and 5 deliver capabilities to address Turkey, and American bases in that region. the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the shorter range threats. These blocks These events demonstrate that ballistic has expressed the need for a “New Triad” deliver element capabilities that are ready for missiles are not a future threat, so there is consisting of improved global strike capabil- continued rigorous testing and full BMDS an urgent need to rapidly deploy a ballistic ity, further developed global missile defense integration. Each block enhances BMDS missile defense capability. systems, and modernized strategic weapons capabilities that were previously fielded. This systems and infrastructure. Also, increased approach allows missile defense capabilities to Deterrence emphasis is needed not only on development be put in play as soon as technically feasible, The emerging missile threat from of American capabilities but also on building but only after a disciplined, robust, techno- hostile states is fundamentally different the capacity of partners to counter threats logical process and demonstrated success. from that of the Cold War and requires and to promote regional stability.5 both a different approach to deterrence and new tools for defense. Today’s rogue leaders Missile Defense Agency to develop and field the view WMD as weapons of choice, not of last The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) BMDS, the MDA has instituted resort. These weapons are their means to was established to integrate all missile an evolutionary, capability- compensate for U.S. conventional strength, defense programs and technologies into one based acquisition approach allowing them to pursue their objectives Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), called spiral development through coercion and intimidation. which will provide integrated, multilayered
Guided missile cruiser USS Lake Erie launches Over time, this spiral development approach Standard Missile–3 to destroy nonfunctioning will integrate all of the segment elements into National Reconnaissance Office satellite, February 2008 a layered missile defense system that is capable of defeating ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flight.
Initial BMDS With the initial fielding in 2004 of Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD), seabased Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) elements, the MDA established a Limited Defensive Capability for the United States against a North Korean long-range missile threat. This is the first priority of the BMDS implementation strategy. Included in this priority is the fielding of protection for deployed forces from shorter range threats with Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) batteries and Aegis BMD engagement ships. To complete the initial BMDS con-
U.S. Navy figuration, the Seabased X-band radar (SBX)
40 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu HICKS completed sea trials and commenced inte- to deploy long-range defenses in Europe. An the operational capabilities of Aegis BMD gration testing. The SBX radar is a unique integrated, layered BMDS will complicate any against a progressively more complex set of combination of advanced X-band radar with attack, reducing the military use of ballistic targets and scenarios, compiling a record of a mobile, ocean-going, semisubmersible plat- missiles, discouraging the proliferation of 12 successful intercepts in 14 attempts. form. The X-band radar tracks and discrimi- such technology, and bolstering deterrence. The flexibility of this capability was nates ballistic missiles and cues other BMDS demonstrated by the recent intercept of an sensors and weapons systems. The mobility Aegis BMD errant U.S. satellite. The satellite was higher, of the platform allows the radar to be repo- To fulfill the seabased portion of the faster, and larger than any previous target. sitioned as needed to provide coverage of initial missile defense capabilities, the MDA, Modifications were made to the Aegis BMD possible threat ballistic missile launches. The working closely with the Naval Sea Systems Weapon System and the SM–3 missile to SBX radar is based at Adak, Alaska. Command and other Navy organizations, accommodate these new target challenges. Also, the first Forward Deployable has brought the Aegis BMD 3.6 Weapon The USS Lake Erie detected the satellite in Radar (AN/TPY–2) was stationed in Japan. System into service. The Aegis BMD element its orbit with the AN/SPY–1 radar. A fire This transportable, forward-based X-band of the BMDS consists of the Aegis BMD control solution was calculated and a SM–3 radar provides early warning, detection, Weapon System armed with the Standard missile was fired. The missile collided with and tracking of ballistic missiles. TPY–2 Missile–3 (SM–3) Block IA missiles. the target, destroying it with lethal force and information is transmitted to other BMDS Aegis BMD 3.6 contributes two major therefore rupturing the hydrazine tank. The sensors and weapons systems, via the BMDS warfighting capabilities to the BMDS. The intercept speed was calculated at approxi- command and control system, to facilitate first warfighting capability provides the mately 22,000 miles per hour. engagement of threats to the U.S. homeland, Seabased X-band radar docked at Pearl Harbor deployed forces, allies, and friends. It is Naval Station for maintenance and upgrade designed to be transportable by ground, air, roll-on/roll-off ship, and rail. The radar con- sists of a solid-state, phased array antenna supported by electronics and cooling units. This Block 1 BMDS configuration (for example, GMD, Aegis BMD, C2BMC, SBX, and TPY–2) was put to a real-world test during the North Korean missile firings. As the situation escalated, the BMDS was turned over to warfighters. Aegis BMD long-range surveillance and track (LRS&T) destroyers patrolled the Sea of Japan to provide early warning to the BMDS of a Taepo Dong–2 launch. The positioning of the TPY–2 radar was accelerated to provide more coverage of a possible launch. The SBX radar was stationed off Hawaii for similar purposes. North Korea launched seven bal- listic missiles, including a long-range Taepo Dong–2, which spurred a limited operational activation of the BMDS that, according to the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Navy (John W. Ciccarelli, Jr.) Ciccarelli, U.S. Navy (John W. “demonstrated a credible operational missile 6 defense capability for homeland defense.” since the North Korean missile firings, the MDA has increased For the first time in U.S. history, we had the capability to defend ourselves from a long- the breadth and depth of missile defenses by adding more range ballistic missile attack.7 forward deployed network sensors Since the North Korean missile firings, the MDA has increased the breadth and engagement of short- to intermediate-range, The second capability is provided by depth of missile defenses by adding more unitary, and separating ballistic missiles in LRS&T installations that can search, detect, forward deployed network sensors. In addi- the midcourse phase of flight with the SM–3 and track ballistic missiles of all ranges, tion to the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, the Block IA missiles. This capability is integrated including intercontinental ballistic missiles, testing and integration of fixed radars in into a weapons system configuration that and transmit the track data to the BMDS via California and the United Kingdom were includes LRS&T. Aegis ships, manned with C2BMC. This tracking data cues other BMDS completed. In 2007, MDA began negotia- naval Sailors and officers, have recently com- sensors, as well as assisting in the fire control tions with Poland and the Czech Republic pleted a series of firing missions to validate solution of the GMD system. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 41 FORUM | Seabased Ballistic Missile Defense
At Sea, on Patrol the United States has shifted emphasis from can influence political events immediately The USS Curtis Wilbur, equipped with preparation for a global war to more frequent on arrival. BMD-equipped ships buy time for the LRS&T capability, made history when it use of expeditionary forces to contain regional negotiation and promote the cohesion essen- began the Nation’s first BMD patrol, arriving conflicts. The rapid proliferation of ballistic tial for allied coalitions. on station September 30, 2004.8 Forward missiles among potential regional adversaries If not already on station, naval ships deployed ships tracking ballistic missiles requires a dramatically increased U.S. capabil- provide the means to bring initial BMD capa- and transmitting track data to the BMDS ity for BMD. National objectives include pro- bility into a theater in a few days with sub- extend the battlespace. Earlier detections tection of forward deployed and expeditionary stantial additional forces within 10 days. This enable earlier GMD fire control solutions, elements of our Armed Forces and the ability greatly eases the demand on airlift and sealift winning back critical reaction time. Earlier to support the defense of friendly forces and to bring in BMD defenses early to protect fire control solutions enable engagements at allies, including important seaports, airfields, the very ports and airfields from which these longer ranges and the opportunity to reen- and population centers. The goal is not only forces must debark. Aegis BMD ships enable gage. Due to their mobility, Aegis ships can actual defense against ballistic missiles but also the combatant commander to concentrate quickly maneuver to different locations for the strengthening of U.S. security relationships available lift on antiarmor, tactical aviation surveillance operations. Undoubtedly, the and reassurance for allies. support, tanks, troops, ammunition, and Aegis BMD LRS&T capability significantly BMD supports broader political goals other reinforcements needed to deter or stop complements the initial BMDS and therefore because it can help discourage the prolifera- the enemy advance in a crisis. devalues the military value of a long-range tion of ballistic missile technology and WMD ballistic missile system. by reducing incentives to develop, acquire, Near-term Capabilities The Aegis BMD engagement capability or use these weapons. Furthermore, the The deployment of Aegis BMD is only supports forcible entry and protects forward ability to extend reliable protection to allies the start of this new Navy core mission; we deployed forces, population areas, debarka- and friends can have a significant mitigating must be prepared for a variety of ballistic tion ports, amphibious objective areas, expe- effect on their desire to produce or acquire missile threats. Depending on the range of ditionary forces, and coastal airfields from their own offensive systems as a deterrent the hostile missile, we may have to engage in the ballistic missile threat. Stationed close against other nations in a region. At the the terminal phase instead of the midcourse to a launch site, these Aegis ships increase same time, it can encourage the willingness phase. Longer-range ballistic missiles may be the engagement battlespace with the ascent of potential allies to act in concert with the more sophisticated and deploy decoys, and phase intercept capability. For homeland United States during a conflict. we need to be able to combat these threats to defense, the engagement capability would Deploying long-range BMD at sea pro- devalue their military use. protect U.S. coastal cities against an off-shore vides a dramatic deterrent and war-winning ballistic missile launch. The MDA, Aegis capability. Because we can position ships BMD, and Navy are aggressively moving out to deploy this engagement capability against maritime BMD is a new short- to intermediate-range, unitary, and separating ballistic missiles on more Aegis capability for preventing wars Missile Defense Agency ships to add to the combatant commanders’ arsenal in times of crisis. closer to anticipated ballistic missile launch points, our Aegis cruisers and destroyers can Deployment provide hundreds of thousands of square The Missile Defense Agency and the kilometers of defended area, encompassing Navy are modifying 18 Aegis combatants to entire geographic regions. The world’s oceans conduct ballistic missile defense operations. permit this forward positioning at sea, At the end of 2007, 10 warships could track enabling the Navy to achieve ascent phase and destroy ballistic missiles while conducting intercept in just the areas we are most likely to other tasks simultaneously; another 7 war- need it (for example, the Sea of Japan, Arabian ships were also available to track ballistic mis- Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea). siles in support of BMDS operations. All 18 Forward deployed BMD ships also ships will have the ability to destroy ballistic provide substantial political and military missiles by the end of 2008. Sixteen of these leverage. Naval forces are mobile. They ships are assigned to the Pacific Fleet. The can arrive on the scene early and sustain remaining two ships are assigned to the Atlan- themselves for days. In fact, naval forces are tic Fleet with the first Aegis destroyer receiv- normally the first on scene when a crisis is ing the BMD upgrade in December 2007. imminent. They provide great operational flexibility. Naval ships project a positive and New Maritime Strategy engaged U.S. image to reassure friends and Maritime BMD is a new capability for to encourage regional stability. They are rela- First ground-based interceptor lowered into silo at Fort Greely, Alaska, 2004 preventing wars. Since the end of the Cold War, tively independent of host nation support and
42 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu HICKS
Terminal Capability. In 2006, the Navy X-band radar, and fire control/communica- improves sensitivity for longer-range targets, and MDA successfully intercepted a short- tions. During the 2008–2010 timeframe, engi- high-speed processing for multiple tracks, and range ballistic missile in the terminal phase neering and testing efforts will continue to robust performance against complex threats. with a modified SM–2 Block IV missile. The develop and demonstrate THAAD and Aegis Both of these discrimination capabilities have success of this demonstration, called Pacific BMD engagement coordination. been tested in earlier flight test missions and Phoenix, resulted in a joint Navy-MDA Over time, more missile defense ele- will be deployed in the 2010–2011 timeframe. venture to deploy a near-term seabased termi- ments and capability upgrades will be devel- Missile Improvements. The SM–3 Block nal (SBT) capability. The Navy is funding the oped and integrated into the BMDS; therefore, IB is the next seabased missile spiral upgrade. modification of existing SM–2 Block IV mis- the number of engagement opportunities The seeker, signal processor, and propulsion siles, and MDA is funding the development, will also increase, enabling layered defense. system of the SM–3 Block IB missile kinetic integration, and test of the SBT capability into In the near future, midcourse (Aegis BMD) warhead (KW) are improved over those of the the Aegis BMD Weapon System. The SBT and terminal missile defense systems (Patriot, SM–3 Block IA. These improvements result in capability is scheduled to deploy in fiscal year THAAD, TPY–2, and Aegis BMD) will coor- sustained high effectiveness against increas- 2009. With the addition of the SBT capability, dinate engagements of short- and medium- ingly longer-range and sophisticated ballistic Aegis BMD has increased its role in the BMDS range ballistic missiles. Integrated, layered missiles. to include not only midcourse engagement of defense will be realized as tracking informa- Since flight test mission (FTM) 04–1, short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles tion is shared among these systems, enabling a the design and development of the SM–3 but also terminal engagement of short- to midcourse engagement opportunity followed two-color seeker has progressed. Early design medium-range ballistic missiles, a significant by terminal engagements. telescopes have been built and tested with contribution to the BMDS and deterrence. Longer-range Threat Set. Longer- the results used to iterate preliminary design. THAAD Interface Testing. Aegis BMD range, multistaged ballistic missiles eject a The Advanced Signal Processor provides has been conducting advanced engineering reentry vehicle (RV) or warhead during their increased capability to support new discrimi- on exchanging track data with the develop- midcourse phase of trajectory. The size of nation algorithms. The SM–3 Block IB Sensor mental Terminal High Altitude Area Defense the RV is much smaller than the missile or preliminary design review was successfully (THAAD) system, which is a land-based element capable of intercepting ballistic integrated, layered defense will be realized as tracking missiles both inside and just outside the atmosphere. It consists of four major compo- information is shared among systems, enabling a midcourse nents: truck-mounted launchers, interceptors, engagement opportunity followed by terminal engagements
RADM Alan Hicks briefs media after cooperative missile stages and challenges the performance conducted in February 2007. Proof-of-design Aegis ballistic missile defense intercept flight test capability of the tracking sensor. Tracking telescopes are in fabrication, and the design the small-sized RV is further complicated by was finalized at the critical design review in other target-like objects in the same vicinity. late 2007. The initial radar returns of all these objects The new propulsion system for the result in a display of a cluster of radar video. KW is the Throttleable Divert and Attitude Objects are difficult to differentiate. These Control System (TDACS), which is a propor- objects, such as other missile sections, separa- tionally controlled propulsion system with tion debris, and hot fuel chuffing (burning multiple thrusters to maneuver the KW to an chunks of solid fuel), must be tracked and intercept. This throttling capability provides identified in the radio frequency (radar) and robust flexibility. TDACS enables the KW to infrared (missile) spectrums. Each object vary its thrust and operational maneuvering must be eliminated from target consideration time. The propulsion system is also easier to in order to correctly identify the RV. produce, thus reducing the per unit missile Tracking Improvements. Aegis BMD’s cost. A prototype TDACS successfully com- improved sensor discrimination involves the pleted a ground test simulating space flight in SPY–1 radar’s signal processor and the SM–3 July 2006. A preliminary design review was kinetic warhead’s infrared seeker. The Aegis conducted in April 2007, and a series of com- BMD Signal Processor provides real-time ponent experiments and tests was conducted discrimination capability, which enables throughout the summer. tracking of individual objects and identifica- The SM–3 Block IB development tion through the use of advanced algorithms. effort is scheduled to support a flight test Two-color sensor technology in the SM–3 in mid-2010. Delivery of fleet deployment seeker provides the capability to sense infra- rounds is expected to begin in 2011. This red information in two distinct wavebands, missile upgrade, in combination with the improving the identification of multiple, BMD signal processor, provides not only
U.S. Navy (Johnny I. Michael) closely spaced objects. The two-color seeker the Aegis BMD but also the BMDS with ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 43 FORUM | Seabased Ballistic Missile Defense significant capability to identify closely spaced life. Modernization of these combat systems modernized fleet. The Navy also benefits objects and improve the probability of kill will maintain their warfighting relevance, from streamlined in-service support as a against advanced threats. continue supportability with new technology, result of the consolidation and reduction in and establish the computing infrastructure the number of combat system configurations. Future Capability and computer program architecture from The Aegis OA program is key to expanding As MDA proceeds with the spiral devel- which additional warfighting capabilities will the Aegis BMD capability to the entire fleet of opment of the BMDS into the next decade, be implemented with the lowest possible cost Aegis ships, with a proposed total of 84 ships. the emphasis will be on a missile defense force and schedule impact. The modernization program also provides the structure that features a persistent, real-time The Navy and MDA are engaged in foundation for implementing Aegis BMD in global detection, tracking, and fire control 80 allied navy ships. capability, as well as upgraded seabased inter- the modernization program Higher Velocity, Longer-range Missile. ceptors with increased range and velocity to The longer-range missile, SM–3 Block IIA, is defeat the long-range ballistic missile threat. provides the foundation for being codeveloped with Japan. The upgrade In response to the MDA’s long-term strategy, implementing Aegis BMD in increases the range and velocity of the missile, Aegis BMD’s future capabilities are focused 80 allied navy ships providing reach, firepower, operational on increasing the seabased missile defense flexibility, and performance—all of which force structure and developing a faster, longer- a joint effort to integrate the Aegis BMD are key warfighting objectives sought in the range, and more agile missile. capability with the Aegis Modernization missile defense mission. With the addition of Open Architecture. Historically, cruisers Program’s Open Architecture (OA) environ- enhanced sensor performance, more hostile and destroyers are decommissioned earlier ment. The endstate of this joint program ballistic missiles can be engaged, with a than their designed service life unless their is a more robust, multimission capability greater probability of kill, which produces combat systems are modernized. If ships’ fielded in modernized Aegis ships. The Navy an increase in the defended “footprint.” The combat systems cannot evolve to match gains a modernized fleet of Aegis cruisers large missile magazine capacity of Aegis ships projected threats, they are relegated to lesser and destroyers and increased operational allows for multiple engagement opportunities duties until scrapped. The Aegis cruisers and flexibility enabled by the option to host per ballistic missile, again enhancing prob- destroyers are at their designed midservice the BMD capability on any ship within the ability of kill. For a given defended region,
Guided missile cruiser USS San Jacinto (foreground) and Russian navy destroyer in Mediterranean U.S. Navy (Justin Phillips)
44 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu HICKS fewer ships are needed to be employed in the Kirishima successfully tracked the separat- participation in developing and deploying BMD role due to the increased reach and ing ballistic missile target. missile defense systems. Multilayered defense firepower of the Aegis BMD SM–3 Block Such international participation con- for the Northwestern Pacific theater will be IIA when combined with the BMDS. The tinued in the follow-on flight test, FTM–11. realized in the near future when Aegis BMD SM–3 Block IIA’s performance provides In this flight mission, the Royal Netherlands (midcourse and terminal), TPY–2 radar, and the necessary flyout acceleration to engage Navy ship HNLMS Tromp tested modifica- PAC–3 are fielded. Allied navies are actively intermediate-range ballistic missiles and some tions to its Signal Multi-beam Acquisition participating in U.S. missile defense flight intercontinental ballistic missiles. Radar for Tracking–L (SMART–L) system. tests. Joint studies have led to research and The ship’s radar searched for, detected, and now joint development. BMD foreign mili- International Efforts tracked the ballistic missile. Tracking data tary sales cases have been established. The The United States and Japan are working were also exchanged with an Aegis BMD potential exists for a global land- and seabased together to build a multilayered regional BMD destroyer. The Spanish navy Aegis-equipped BMD force through a coalition of interna- system. The elements are already in place and Frigate Méndez Núñez participated in tional cooperation. operational, awaiting the Block 2 Engagement FTM–12, using the flight test as a training Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Sequence Groups, which integrate Aegis and preparedness activity to assess the enhances global and regional deterrence, BMD, TPY–2 radar, and PAC–3. future BMD capabilities of their F–100 class. providing an umbrella of protection to In 2006, MDA, in conjunction with U.S. Again, with a minor modification to its Aegis forward deployed forces and friends and Pacific Command, completed deployment Weapon System, Méndez Núñez successfully allies, while performing a strategic role in activities for the TPY–2 radar in Japan. Infor- detected and tracked the medium-range, homeland defense. The Missile Defense mation from the TPY–2 radar will be shared separating ballistic missile target. Agency, with significant contributions between U.S. and Japanese forces. In 2007, the As the success of Aegis BMD continues, from Aegis BMD, and our allied coalition first PAC–3 battery was deployed. more allied navies are actively participating in members are forming the initial foundation In June 2006, USS Shiloh participated U.S. flight tests as preliminary training, proof of international cooperation to deter and in FTM–10 and successfully intercepted a of concept, or predecisional test and training defeat a critical transnational challenge, the medium-range, separating ballistic missile feasibility events to assess the potential of a proliferation of ballistic missiles. JFQ target using the operational Aegis BMD seabased missile defense capability. weapon system. Shortly after FTM–10, Potential Global Seabased BMD Force. the Shiloh deployed with the Aegis BMD– The Aegis Weapon System—with such major certified engagement capability and shifted components as the SPY radar, standard NOTES homeports to Yokosaka, Japan. Meanwhile, missile, and vertical launching system—is 1 the engagement upgrade commenced for the foundation for the Aegis BMD system. In General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Aegis BMD LRS&T destroyers. All Aegis addition to Japan, the Aegis Weapon System Chiefs of Staff, Posture Statement, Testimony before 110th Congress, Senate Committee on Armed BMD LRS&T destroyers homeported in has been sold to Australia, Norway, South Services, February 6, 2007. Yokosaka have been upgraded to the engage- Korea, and Spain. By their procurement of the 2 U.S. Northern Command, press release, July ment capability. basic weapon system, these allied countries 4, 2006. The Shiloh and these Aegis BMD are investing in the prerequisites to a possible 3 BBC News, “North Korea Claims Nuclear engagement destroyers comprise a most BMD capability upgrade. Test,” October 9, 2006. capable BMD Surface Action Group. With the Countries that do not have the Aegis 4 National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense, TPY–2 radar and PAC–3 batteries stationed Weapon System are also interested in BMD. fact sheet, May 20, 2003. in Japan, these BMD assets form a sound The United Kingdom is actively conducting a 5 Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of foundation for a regional BMDS. Upon BMD capability study with the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Posture Statement, Testi- th fielding the Block 2 Engagement Sequence concurrent with a joint research effort of mony before 110 Congress, House Armed Services Groups, the Northwestern Pacific theater will S-band radar technologies. Other countries Committee, February 6, 2008. 6 General James E. Cartwright, USMC, have a robust, multilayered BMDS to provide are investigating the potential of using SM–3 Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Testimony increased protection to our deployed forces, and the vertical launching system with their before Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House friends, and allies against short- to intermedi- air search radars. The Netherlands partici- Armed Services Committee, March 8, 2007. ate-range ballistic missiles. pated in a recent Aegis BMD flight test to 7 Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III, International Participation in Flight determine the BMD potential of its F–124 USAF, Director of Missile Defense Agency, Testi- Tests. Using its time wisely while waiting frigates. More and more nations are express- mony before Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House for its first BMD ship to be modified and ing interest in cooperative studies to support a Armed Services Committee, March 27, 2007. SM–3 missiles produced, Japan is participat- seabased BMD capability as a critical mission 8 Admiral Vernon Clark, USN, Chief of Naval ing in Aegis BMD flight tests now. In June for their navies. Operations, Testimony before Senate Committee 2006, the Maritime Self-Defense Force ship on Armed Services, February 10, 2005. JS Kirishima became the first allied ship to The ballistic missile is a global weapon. participate in a maritime domain aware- MDA has made substantial progress toward ness flight mission, FTM–10. With a minor increasing not only missile defense cover- modification to its Aegis Weapon System, JS age for friends and allies, but also allied ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 45 Seabasing Expanding Access High Speed Vessel Swift enters Naval Station Mayport, Florida U.S. Navy (Patrick J. Cook) By Douglas M. King and John C. Berry, Jr.
Merchant Vessel VADM K.R. Wheeler is part of Military Sealift Command’s off-shore petroleum distribution system U.S. Navy
n the 21st century, information can competitors applying their own naval power United States is confronted by a variety of move almost instantaneously around sought to deny the ocean crossing or, failing strategic challenges and locked in a global the world via cyberspace, and people that, the landing on the far shore. In the first struggle for influence. The ability to over- I can quickly travel great distances by air. half of the 20th century, demonstrating con- come geographic, political, and military The preponderance of materiel, however, still siderable foresight and innovation, U.S. Navy impediments to access has reemerged as a moves the way it has for millennia. Whenever and Marine Corps leaders developed the critical necessity for extending U.S. influence the United States has committed military capabilities necessary to establish sea control and power overseas. Fortunately, the United power beyond its shores, whether to fight foes and project power ashore where and when States possesses an asymmetric advantage or assist friends, the vast majority of the U.S. desired. In the latter half of the same century, joint force—its equipment, fuel, ammunition, the importance of these capabilities waned, Colonel Douglas M. King, USMC, is Director of and sustenance—has been transported by sea. as the United States enjoyed the luxury of Operations and Plans for the Marine Corps Combat For previous generations, projecting extensive overseas basing rights, including Development Command. Lieutenant Colonel John military forces and the resources neces- secure ports and airfields. C. Berry, Jr., USMC (Ret.), is a Senior Analyst sary to support and sustain them overseas In recent years, this network of bases supporting Operations and Plans for the Marine was often a hazardous undertaking. Peer has been dramatically reduced, even as the Corps Combat Development Command.
46 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu KING and BERRY in that endeavor: seapower. The American joint force, as well as interagency and mul- At war’s end, however, the United States ability to cross wide expanses of ocean and tinational partners, to leverage seabasing in had vanquished all naval peer competitors, to remain offshore at a time and place and support of diverse operations. and the role of the Navy and Marine Corps for a duration of its own choosing cannot versus the Soviet Union, a nuclear-armed be contested today to the degree it was in Eurasian land power, was initially unclear. In previous eras. Although small in historical seabasing is surrounded a frequently quoted 1954 Proceedings article, terms—and often stretched thin by current by mythology and Samuel P. Huntington championed the operational commitments—the U.S. Navy misunderstanding, and the utility of the Navy and Marine Corps: is, for the foreseeable future, a navy without resulting confusion has stifled peer. capability development With its command of the sea it is now pos- This asymmetric advantage means that sible for the United States Navy to develop the the Navy-Marine team can use the sea as both base-characteristics of the world’s oceans to maneuver space and a secure operating area Conceptual Origins a much greater degree than it has in the past, to overcome impediments to access. This By the end of World War II, the United and to extend significantly the “ floating base” seabased force—particularly its aircraft car- States possessed an unprecedented ability system which it originated in World War II riers and amphibious ships with embarked to fight its way across the oceans and then . . . . The application of naval power against Marines—is capable of projecting influence ashore. The major components of this sea the land requires of course an entirely dif- and power ashore without reliance on ports control and power projection capability were ferent sort of Navy from that which existed and airfields in the objective area. It can do the fast attack aircraft carrier force, submarine during the struggles for sea supremacy. The so in a selectively discrete or overt manner force, amphibious force, and mobile advanced basic weapons of the new Navy are those to conduct a range of operations—from con- base force. The scope and impact of the car- which make it possible to project naval power ducting security cooperation activities, to pro- riers and submarines have been well recog- far inland. These appear to take primarily viding humanitarian assistance, to deterring nized, but the sheer size and key contribution three forms. . . . Carrier aviation is sea based and, when necessary, fighting wars. This sig- of the latter two components have been less aviation; the Fleet Marine Force is a sea based nificant advantage does not extend to the joint obvious. By 1945, the United States possessed ground force; the guns and guided missiles of force as a whole, however. The sealift that 2,547 amphibious ships comprising 37.6 the fleet are sea based artillery.3 transports the preponderance of joint force percent of the fleet.1 These ships could deliver materiel is still dependent upon secure infra- an attack from the sea by 13 divisions without Huntington’s article was prescient but structure in a potential objective area. Just reliance on forward land bases.2 Similarly, the premature. As the Cold War unfolded, U.S. as the amphibious innovations championed mobile base force was extraordinarily capable, strategy involved the maintenance of a large by the Navy and Marine Corps during the providing an unrivaled ability to support the nuclear arsenal and the basing of significant 1920s and 1930s benefited the entire joint and fleet’s movement through underway replen- Army and Air Force formations overseas Allied force in World War II, the seabasing ishment, seabased maintenance facilities, and to deter the Soviet threat. While a growing initiatives being pursued by the Navy-Marine rapid buildup of advanced bases. Soviet navy highlighted the continued team today are intended to benefit joint, inter- Coast Guard–manned LSTs support operations on agency, and multinational teammates. Leyte Island, 1944 Unfortunately, seabasing is surrounded by mythology and misunderstanding, and the resulting confusion has stifled capability devel- opment. One myth is that seabasing is exclu- sively intended as a means of providing logistic support for major combat operations. A second myth is that seabasing is synonymous with a discarded concept for modular float- ing bases. Another misunderstanding is that seabasing is intended as an overly ambitious replacement for (as opposed to a contributing element to) the global network of U.S. bases. Still another is that one specific program, Mar- itime Prepositioning Force–Future (MPF–F), will satisfy the entire seabasing requirement. Seeking to alleviate this confusion and to promote joint capability development, this article describes the conceptual origins of sea- basing, how the concept has evolved to meet the Nation’s changing security requirements, and the key initiatives that should allow the U.S. Coast Guard ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 47 FORUM | Seabasing: Expanding Access importance of sea control, especially antisub- For more than a decade thereafter, the strategy can be traced directly back to The marine warfare, the emerging naval missions seabasing concept continued to evolve in a Way Ahead and reflects more than 16 years of deterrence, crisis response, and strategic number of documents, including the Opera- of continuous conceptual development con- sealift overshadowed power projection. tional Maneuver from the Sea anthology of cerning the use of naval power to influence Faced with the need to reinforce forward- concepts published by the Marine Corps in events ashore—seabasing. based forces, and blessed with the advantage the mid-1990s, followed by Expeditionary This evolution was not without turmoil, of secure ports and airfields overseas, the Maneuver Warfare in 2001, and two editions and it occasionally generated misperceptions United States invested in strategic sealift of Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a that persist to this day. As an example, for a as opposed to amphibious and mobile base Changing Security Environment, released time the Department of Defense was greatly capabilities—an understandable approach in 2005 and 2007. Similarly, the Navy pub- concerned about its ability to achieve rapid under the circumstances. The amphibious lished the Sea Power 21 series of concepts in victory in two nearly simultaneous major ship inventory, which in 1945 had consti- late 2002 and early 2003. In addition to the combat operations. The Joint Staff concluded tuted more than a third of the fleet, continu- aforementioned Service concepts, seabas- that U.S. forces should strive to “seize the ally diminished throughout the Cold War ing was prominently featured in unified initiative” within 10 days, accomplish initial until leveling off to where it stands today: Navy–Marine Corps documents such as “swiftly defeat” objectives against one enemy roughly 11 percent of the fleet. Naval Power 21 in 2002, the Naval Operating within 30 days, and then commence “swiftly Concept for Joint Operations and Enhanced defeat” operations against a second enemy in Networked Seabasing, both published in 2003, another theater within another 30 days. This unified Navy–Marine Corps and the Naval Operations Concept 2006. became known as the “10–30–30” metric and documents described seabasing For the most part, these documents was subsequently formalized in Strategic Plan- described seabasing not as a specific ning Guidance.6 This emphasis on strategic not as a specific platform but platform—a “thing”—but as an approach for speed to conduct multiple major combat oper- as an approach for organizing organizing and employing seapower to influ- ations diverted intellectual focus away from and employing seapower to ence events ashore. The earlier papers touted the blend of capabilities required to conduct a influence events ashore the advantages of seabased crisis response to range of joint operations. The promising but provide humanitarian assistance following as yet unproven capabilities of the Maritime natural disasters. In later papers, this idea Prepositioning Force–Future appeared to offer Evolving for a New Era evolved further to advocate seabasing as the the only means of achieving the 10–30–30 With the end of the Cold War, the means of proactively and discretely project- criteria, resulting in an almost blind faith Soviet threat to U.S. maritime supremacy ing soft power.5 This theme is highlighted emphasis on that program as the embodiment ended, causing the Navy and Marine Corps in the recently signed maritime strategy, a of seabasing. This myopia became so extreme to reassess their role in a new strategic era. tri-Service effort among the Navy, Marine that MPF–F came to be seen in some quarters This reassessment echoed Huntington and Corps, and Coast Guard. Titled A Coopera- as a replacement for, as opposed to the com- provided the impetus for resurrecting the tive Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, this plement of, amphibious ships.7 Even though seabasing concept, in that the underlying premise of U.S. seapower changed from Gabonese sailors board USS Fort McHenry for “the fundamental purpose of naval forces maritime security training, Port Gentile, Gabon is to achieve command of the seas” to “the fundamental purpose of naval forces is to use command of the seas.”4 This change in premise spawned a post–Cold War naval intellectual renais- sance, reflected in several Department of the Navy White Papers. The first was The Way Ahead, published in 1991, which argued for a new pattern of deployments and force com- position to maintain the forward presence required to support humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief, nationbuilding, security assistance, peacekeeping, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and crisis response. In 1992, . . . From the Sea espoused naval expeditionary operations in the littorals and joint force enabling, and in 1994, Forward . . . from the Sea advocated increased flexibility through seabasing.
U.S. Navy (R.J. Stratchko)
48 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu KING and BERRY the 10–30–30 criteria proved transitory, the viding continuous support, sustainment, and n projecting and sustaining forces in misconception that “MPF–F = seabasing” has force protection to select expeditionary joint distant antiaccess environments proven perniciously enduring. forces without reliance on land bases within n denying enemies sanctuary Another persistent seabasing misunder- the Joint Operations Area. These capabilities n conducting network-centric operations standing stems from an initiative once under- expand operational maneuver options, and n improving proficiency against irregular taken by the Office of Naval Research (ONR), facilitate assured access and entry from the challenges which explored the feasibility of creating sea.9 n increasing capabilities of international mobile offshore bases (MOB) by assembling and domestic partners.12 semisubmersible modules into a variety of Interestingly, this document has four floating bases, to include runways of up to supporting concepts of operation (CONOPS) The 2005 National Defense Strategy 6,000 feet, as much as 3 million square feet covering the spectrum of operations, from also espoused the necessity of revising the of warehousing, and housing for up to 3,000 humanitarian assistance to major combat. It U.S. overseas force posture through a system troops. The MOB was envisioned as a conduit is the first of the nine joint integrating con- of main operating bases, forward operating for resources delivered by strategic sealift and cepts to be elaborated on by such CONOPS.10 sites, cooperative security locations, and joint airlift for further transfer ashore by a variety Furthermore, in March 2005, the seabasing. President George W. Bush noted 2 of landing craft. It was determined that the National Defense Strategy of the United States months later, “We are developing joint sea bases MOB concept was technically feasible but of America emphasized “the importance of that will allow our forces to strike from floating not as cost-effective as existing naval vessels influencing events before challenges become platforms close to the action, instead of being or innovative forms of sealift, such as large more dangerous and less manageable.”11 It dependent on land bases far from the fight.”13 medium speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships.8 stated that the United States faced a time The unintended consequence of this laudable of great uncertainty and had to address an Global Fleet Station but stillborn initiative is the belief by some array of current and potential adversar- parties that the term seabasing is synonymous ies who would likely use a combination experiments have been with the MOB. of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and conducted with partners in In spite of these challenges, what began disruptive methods against the United States. South America and West as a naval concept has gained wider Defense The strategy identified the need to enhance Africa and have been deemed Department consensus, formalized with the eight operational capabilities, many of which highly successful publication of the Seabasing Joint Integrating appeared to make the case for a seabased Concept in 2005. This document defines joint approach to a wide range of joint operations: seabasing as: Implementation Initiatives n strengthening intelligence The Navy and Marine Corps have been the rapid deployment, assembly, command, n protecting critical bases of operation involved in a number of seabasing initiatives, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment n operating from the global commons both operational and programmatic, which of joint combat power from the sea, while pro- have expanded into joint endeavors. The creation of Global Fleet Stations (GFS), for example, is an operational initiative designed to increase the capability and capacity for dis- crete, proactive activities as described in the Naval Operations Concept 2006: “GFS offers a means to increase regional maritime secu- rity through the cooperative efforts of joint, inter-agency, and multinational partners, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations. Like all sea bases, the composition of a GFS depends on Combatant Commander require- ments, the operating environment, and the mission.”14 To date, Global Fleet Station experiments have been conducted with U.S. partners in South America and West Africa and have been deemed highly successful. The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) is a good example of how Service initiatives have expanded to become joint programs. A Navy-led joint acquisition program, the Merchant Vessel 1st Lt. Jack Lummus, of Maritime JHSV combines the Navy–Marine Corps Prepositioning Ship Squadron Three, supports High Speed Connector program with the training in South Korea Army Theater Support Vessel program to U.S. Navy (Lou Rosales) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 49 FORUM | Seabasing: Expanding Access produce a unified—and more integrated shore purposes, as the key enabler for deploy- basing as the means of not only deploying but and cost-effective—solution to the com- ing, employing, and sustaining joint forces also employing and sustaining select joint—as monly shared requirement for intratheater from the sea. Detailed analysis has concluded well as interagency and multinational— connectors. A shallow draft vessel that can that this critical capability can be achieved in a capabilities from the sea. JFQ transport personnel, vehicles, equipment, variety of sea states through the combined use and supplies over operational distances at up of LMSR ships and mobile landing platforms. Notes to 45 knots, the JHSV has a helicopter flight These initiatives, as well as others yet to be 1 deck and a vehicle ramp that allow rapid envisioned, will be employed in combination Naval Historical Center, U.S. Navy Active Ship offloading in austere environments. Four to evolve the capabilities necessary to alleviate Force Levels, available at
50 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater
he setting is Iraq, 2008. Picture car bombs. They quickly question the detainees the following: A vehicle-borne and exploit the house. Jackpot—they get their improvised explosive device guy (a Tier 2 target) and develop leads on a T (VBIED) network has been new target—someone higher up the chain in responsible for several high-casualty attacks the insurgent cell. With minimal coordination on coalition forces and local civilians. But now and shift of close target reconnaissance assets, a cordon is in place, and unmanned aerial they follow up and hit the next target, taking vehicles (UAVs) are overhead. The squad is down a VBIED cell leader, financier, and ready to move in—waiting on the last bit of logistician. The squad also finds three more close target reconnaissance information. The vehicles ready to execute additional bloody primary target is present, and the squad is attacks. The result is that the back of a major cleared to execute. They enter, clear the house, VBIED cell has been broken so it can no longer Combat Camera Company (Jeffrey Alexander) Combat Camera Company (Jeffrey
d and capture six individuals. While clearing the terrorize the community, and leads on other Soldiers perform cordon and search in Iraq 982 house, the squad finds two vehicles rigged as extremists have been developed.
By Raymond T. O d i e r n o , N i c h o e l E . B r o o k s , and Francesco P. Mastracchio
Soldiers enter house during cordon and search
mission in Rubaidah, Iraq (Samuel Bendet) U.S. Air Force ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 51 SPECIAL FEATURE | ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater
If the reader thinks this was a special brigade level provides commanders with an makes it apparent that no single approach operations forces (SOF) maneuver, he would unprecedented level of situational awareness. to ISR management will apply effectively. be wrong. Such operations are happening Commanders now have the flexibility to push To gain understanding and provide the bat- daily with armor, artillery, and infantry units ISR assets to the lowest tactical echelon, which tlespace owners at all echelons situational executing the mission. What enables this is one of the most powerful enablers on the awareness, ISR must be robust and dynamic SOF-like capability with conventional units battlefield today. and controlled at the right headquarters in is the sudden increase in intelligence, surveil- order to get commanders the information lance, and reconnaissance (ISR), analysis, Paradigm Shift and intelligence needed to make decisions and exploitation assets delegated down to the The current environment in Iraq is on a decentralized COIN battlefield. brigade combat teams (BCTs). complex and consists of four interacting con- Comprehensive coordination between We have seen a significant metamorpho- flicts: counteroccupation, terrorism, insur- operations and intelligence from the incep- sis of intelligence operations in Iraq. Indeed, we gency, and a communal struggle for power tion of major operations ensures that critical still have much to learn, but we are on the right and survival. All are occurring in the context collection requirements are as well forecast track. The capacity and capability of our intel- of a fragile state. This situation is further com- and resourced as possible. However, it is ligence systems have improved greatly in just 3 plicated by external influences. Each of these important to note that deliberate planning years. The successes enjoyed by Multi-National four conflicts is in a different stage, depending for ISR support of COIN warfare does not
U.S. Army working dog sniffs for ordnance on truck entering Iraqi village ISR must be controlled at the right headquarters to get commanders the information and intelligence needed to make decisions on a decentralized counterinsurgency battlefield
alter the fact that more immediate and critical requirements emerge and continually evolve. In fact, the ability to retask assets quickly is an important aspect of exploiting operational and strategic opportunities that present them- selves and are in line with the commander’s intent and standing ISR priorities.
Decentralized Control The Iraqi threat environment contains insurgents and militias who at any time might be working with or against each U.S. Air Force (Samuel Bendet) U.S. Air Force other. Moreover, most are consistently Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) are clearly demonstrated on which part of Iraq is being considered, and working against coalition forces. The COIN in the ability to leverage the sophistication of solving only one of these problems in isolation environment’s decentralized nature makes intelligence operations ongoing in Iraq today at tends to make the others worse. Hence, there it imperative that ISR asset control, from the lowest levels of command. is no silver bullet solution; instead, solutions tactical through theater level, be pushed to Employment of ISR, according to the are as complex as the problem set. To confuse the lowest possible echelon, while it is simul- current counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, matters further, these conflicts cross unit, taneously managed by the corps to maintain sets the conditions for the initial success of the provincial, and international boundaries. flexibility. surge in Iraq. Decentralization of ISR assets As the corps manages simultaneous, Decentralized control of intelligence allowed BCT and regimental combat team multidivision operations fighting a full- assets, including aerial collectors regardless (RCT) commanders (faced with vastly differ- spectrum, decentralized counterinsurgency of Service, is a key tenet of COIN doctrine. ent problem sets) to gain and maintain contact across multiple, disparate operating envi- As stated in Field Manual 3–24, Counter- with the enemy. ISR evolved along with the ronments, ISR does not always lend itself to insurgency, “effective COIN operations are fight. The robust ISR currently available at the “streamlining.” The nature of the conflict decentralized, and higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to push as many capa- Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno, USA, is the Commander of U.S. Army III Corps. Lieutenant Colonel bilities as possible down to their level.” Every Nichoel E. Brooks, USA, is Chief, Analysis and Control Element, III Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Francesco P. BCT and RCT has a different operating envi- Mastracchio, USA, is Deputy G2 (Intelligence), III Corps. ronment, and only the commander knows
52 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu ODIERNO, BROOKS, and MASTRACCHIO how to best integrate ISR. In a transformed New ISR Model allocated assets first, leaving the MSCs with military in which BCTs, by doctrine, fight The current ISR strategy breaks assets their apportioned platforms. This gives the autonomously, the concept of decentralizing into two categories: allocated and appor- corps commander flexibility to provide FMV control of ISR to the lowest possible level tioned. This provides needed predictability coverage for his main effort while still provid- applies across the full spectrum of operations. to the major subordinate command (MSC) ing predictable ISR support to subordinate In today’s environment, a commander must while ensuring flexibility. Allocated assets are commands. This model is firmly governed by plan operations based on specific ISR systems used by the corps to fill emerging high prior- the commander’s priorities, from the initial available, and they are often the sole deter- ity requirements in a similar manner to that apportionment of the assets to the creation mining factor in what the unit can or cannot described above. Apportioned assets, however, of the allocated asset targets. Additionally, do operationally. are controlled by the MSCs. The divisions by using a mix of organic, apportioned, and Our commanders must be able to write their own target decks and can count on allocated assets, the MSCs can conduct ISR seamlessly and immediately retask the best their apportioned assets day after day. “soaks,” generate cross-cueing opportunities, available asset if it is not actively engaged The current ISR strategy is possible and achieve tactical successes on par with on a higher priority target to take advantage because of a recent surge of both theater- and unconventional forces. of often fleeting opportunities. Real-time corps-level full motion video (FMV) assets and coordination to facilitate command deci- the commander’s empowerment to division Evolution of ISR sionmaking is crucial. The BCT is the nexus and brigade, along with the division or bri- Today’s division and BCT commanders for ISR operations, and success can be gade’s ability to manage them effectively. Previ- are benefiting from the decision to balance directly attributed to the agility possessed by ously, ground commanders could not plan ISR assets. Spinoffs of early Future Combat the empowered commanders at the lowest operations around ISR availability; instead, System technology and the recognition of level. MNC–I controls its own ISR assets and they submitted requirements and then waited the importance of manned and unmanned those apportioned from higher. The assets to find out if they would get echelons above teaming in the COIN environment, where are then decentralized, either apportioned division (EAD) coverage. At best, they would precision and timeliness are essential, show or allocated down to the lowest level to know 72 hours out if they had been allocated that one tactical UAV platoon per BCT will support operations. This decentralization an FMV asset; at worst, they would find their not be enough to provide the “unblinking eye” of additional ISR enablers at the BCT/RCT asset pulled at the last minute to support a required for success. Therefore, BCTs depend levels allows for mission execution across higher priority corps requirement. on the allocation of corps- and theater-level the spectrum of tasks associated with the Situations routinely arise requiring systems to help them accomplish their counterinsurgency fight. The capabilities sustained FMV coverage beyond a given divi- missions. and ability of conventional forces to conduct sion’s ability to support; the corps provides While still insufficient to meet the sophisticated and other complex opera- demand of the COIN environment, signifi- tions have improved significantly and now one tactical UAV platoon cantly more ISR assets are available to com- complement, but do not replicate, SOF capa- manders in Iraq today than were available in bilities. Corps ISR operations run the gamut per brigade combat team will the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. regarding counter–high value individual not be enough to provide Since 2003–2004, FMV within the corps has targets at differing tiers. The conventional the “unblinking eye” increased tenfold. However, it is not just about force mission set is broad and must be required for success numbers; it is also about improved capability. managed accordingly. For example, during 2003–2004, the corps/
Bombs dropped by B–1B Lancer destroy insurgent torture house and prison in Northern Zambraniyah, Iraq
Company commander briefs LTG Odierno, Commander, Multi-National Corps–Iraq, on his unit’s operations in Baghdad U.S. Air Force (Andy Dunaway) U.S. Army (Curt Cashour) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 53 SPECIAL FEATURE | ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater combined joint task force (CJTF) could count a week in the early stages of the war, and this allocating ISR assets to subordinate divisions, on at most only two UAV systems to meet all allocation was often underutilized since BCT combined joint special operations task forces, corps/CJTF-and-below FMV requirements. commanders did not know in advance when and BCTs/RCTs based on the commander’s Most divisions and BCTs had no capability they would control the asset. Even when the priorities. Corps, as the operational headquar- at all. Today, the corps can count on daily BCT received FMV coverage, the ground ters for coalition forces, is really the highest support from at least 12 FMV systems while control station or the picture remained at level at which this can be done with a true feel each BCT has its own organic FMV support. division level. for what is going on at all levels, and MNC–I This increase in ISR capability is most visible at the BCT level. The BCTs of 2003 division commanders task allocated assets in accordance with had little to no ISR capability, no top secret/ sensitive compartmented information com- priorities and forward unaddressed requirements back to the munications channel, inadequate intelligence corps commander for additional support analysis capability, limited human intel- ligence capabilities, and no properly equipped Today’s BCT has three times the origi- receives virtually all ISR for conventional signals intelligence (SIGINT) platoons. nal analytic capability and twice the human forces in Iraq. Manned by a mix of highly Furthermore, the available digital bandwidth intelligence capability of a 2003 legacy BCT. qualified personnel from all Services, the col- was insufficient to synchronize intelligence Additionally, each BCT has an organic tactical lection management team works to achieve databases within the BCT and did not meet UAV platoon that provides 18 hours of FMV careful coordination with higher, adjacent, requirements for reachback to intelligence coverage a day and can often count on and and lower headquarters, with an emphasis on architectures at echelons above division. In plan for additional FMV support from a corps focusing down by recommending the alloca- fact, couriers were often sent with Flash drives asset allocated to support division operations. tion of ISR assets, executing the commander’s to various command posts to synchronize The BCT SIGINT platoon is equipped to meet guidance, and monitoring ISR operations. intelligence databases. Commanders were today’s battlefield requirement, and Theater But these assets are now as important as any rarely allocated more than an hour of FMV has resourced most BCTs with a cryptologic combat asset in the corps, and they must be support team and SIGINT terminal guidance managed by commanders. teams to augment their organic SIGINT ana- Armed with timely and accurate infor- lytic and collection capability, providing the mation, commanders have the ability to strike ability to tap into vast national resources. with surprise and mass at the right time and Most importantly, the BCT has ample place. ISR assets are allocated largely from bot- bandwidth available to handle internal com- tom-up input from BCTs, RCTs, and divisions
U.S. Marine Corps (Brett Shemanski) U.S. Marine Corps (Brett munications and to provide reachback to divi- and are influenced by the corps commander’s sion and EAD intelligence architectures. BCT understanding of the environment, established commanders can now truly prosecute a multi- priorities, and the combined efforts of the C3 disciplined intelligence fight and use tipping (operations) and C2 (intelligence) in managing and cueing from all collectors to focus FMV the execution of those priorities. Division com- ISR assets better, thereby improving agility manders task allocated assets in accordance and ability to gain and maintain contact with with priorities and forward any unaddressed the enemy. requirements back to the corps commander for Our biggest challenge today is to syn- additional support. chronize the effectiveness and capabilities Corps ISR allocation in support of these of these systems for the mission. The first unaddressed requirements is determined time that BCT commanders experience the based on corps commander priorities, desired windfall of these assets is often when they effect, location, and time of the require- assume responsibility over battlespace in Iraq. ment, as well as other collection parameters. We must develop appropriate simulations and Furthermore, ad hoc or dynamic retasking training scenarios to replicate these assets. of ISR assets is adjudicated by the corps C3 This is truly commanders’ business, and in accordance with the corps commander’s they must be trained and focused on these stated priorities. Again, corps level is where enablers. these decisions are best made because a higher The current system in U.S. Central or more distant command and control node Command is serving us well in support of cannot act quickly enough or with sufficient Operation Iraqi Freedom. The combatant insight into the implications of its decision- commander apportions ISR to subordinate making process. units, including MNF–I and Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC–I), based on his priorities. ISR Impact on the BCT Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposalmen MNC–I can then weight the battlefield with Commanders always want to arrange prepare to destroy weapons cache a mix of theater- and corps-level systems by capabilities in terms of time, space, and
54 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu ODIERNO, BROOKS, and MASTRACCHIO purpose to achieve decisive effect. On any Force subject matter experts as advisors to The Army and Marine Corps need to given day, a conventional BCT commander division staff sections and as key members of develop up-to-date and relevant training might be simultaneously focused on targeting a the intelligence-operations team has been a simulations and scenarios that expose com- cell leader in an IED network, providing secu- combat multiplier. It would also be extremely manders and their units to the vast complex- rity for a very important person convoy, moni- helpful to have these experts at BCT level to ity of ISR operations as part of predeployment toring a potentially violent demonstration, or provide the CAOC and related organizations training. Commanders and their staffs must responding to troops in contact—to name only with insight into the operations they support. know how to fight using all the ISR assets that a few potential operations. All of these missions Tactics are continuously being refined, will be available to them before arriving in require ISR coverage, and only a commander and it is not uncommon to have ISR assets theater. on the ground can make the appropriate deci- guide CAS on station and on target to engage sion about how to allocate assets. the enemy. It is incredibly difficult for com- B.H. Liddell Hart argued in his book Because of the diverse and complex manders to predict when and where units will Strategy that the guerrilla’s most important needs of commanders in a COIN environ- be decisively engaged. The ability to acquire capabilities in surviving and acting on the ment, our BCT commanders need to “own” additional UAV support and CAS is an invalu- battlefield were concealment and mobility. not only their organic ISR assets but also able capability that brings large amounts of Full-spectrum intelligence, surveillance, and theater- and corps-level systems for given firepower to the fight in short order. That said, reconnaissance assets in the hands of com- periods based on the corps commander’s there certainly is no shortage of lethal systems manders closest to the enemy have the best priorities. External agencies do not have the in the air over today’s battlefield. What we chance of revealing where to look for and perspective, agility, or grasp of the full range need is more ISR for ground commanders where to interdict the enemy. On a decentral- of ISR systems in theater to responsively inte- to employ, not more air support. Although ized battlefield, commanders charged with grate ISR assets into COIN operations. armed UAVs are a bonus, systems such as the responsibilities to achieve successful out- A recent combat action in Iraq sup- MQ–9 Reaper should not be designated as comes to complex problems should be given ported by a variety of ISR systems enabled primarily attack platforms until the larger ISR all available means to enable success. Great the successful engagement of a mortar team. void is filled. commanders have traditionally used recon- A counterfire radar acquired an indirect fire ISR is working in Iraq because tactical naissance to disperse the fog of war to gain a point of origin and cross-cued a persistent leaders are maximizing the effectiveness of view of the enemy for timely decisionmaking surveillance platform to maintain contact a limited resource. The optimal use of ISR is and actions. Intelligence, surveillance, and with the threat mortar system. Close air enabled through decentralized control that reconnaissance are some of the best tools support (CAS) arrived on station rapidly and provides the greatest flexibility at the lowest our ground commanders have in breaking gained positive identification in conjunction levels within the command. through that fog. JFQ with a nearby air weapons team (AWT). The BCT Tactical Operations Center diverted a what we need is more ISR for ground commanders UAV to further refine the target; this UAV to employ, not more air support provided clear evidence of mortar tubes being transferred to a second truck. The AWT engaged and destroyed the target with CAS lasing. The UAV facilitated immediate battle damage assessment by verifying target destruction. Control of ISR, especially the UAV, at the lowest possible level was the key. This successful intelligence operation is directly attributed to the enhanced agility (Antonieta Rico) 4–2 SBCT Public Affairs possessed by commanders at the lowest level, enabled with corps assets, to orchestrate FMV assets based on rapid feedback from intel- ligence analysts supporting the commander and tipping and cueing from multidiscipline intelligence sensors.
The Way Ahead One initiative that has helped tacti- cal commanders in Iraq integrate theater Soldiers take aim at ISR assets into their operations is the pres- suspected insurgents during ence of Combined Air Operations Center patrol in Taji (CAOC)/Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) ISR liaison officers at division headquarters. Providing these Air ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 55 Employing ISR SOF Best Practices
pecial operations forces (SOF) Airborne ISR was a critical and necessary The JSOTF tactics behind this new com- victories in the war on terror piece, but it alone was not sufficient to target bined team deserve some scrutiny because they have driven a transformation in Zarqawi. Instead, it was focused and directed empower tactical-level operations for offensive Sthe relationship between opera- by a robust all-source intelligence network irregular warfare (IW). This article discusses tions and intelligence. Today, intelligence is employing human intelligence (HUMINT), some of the tactics, techniques, and procedures operations. Perhaps the most famous example detainee intelligence, and signals intelligence based on the collective experience with JSOTFs was the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. (SIGINT). This collection and intelligence engaged in counterinsurgency and counternet- The airstrike that killed Zarqawi was only a analysis was part of a network of personnel, work operations in Iraq and Afghanistan from fraction of the effort to find and accurately systems, and mechanisms woven into the 2004 to 2007. Some of the SOF best practices target him.1 The true operational art behind daily operations of and directed by a joint in using ISR may be applicable and valuable to that strike was a multidisciplined intel- special operations task force (JSOTF). The conventional forces. ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Zarqawi strike was merely the most publi- The SOF–ISR combination was effective (ISR) endeavor coupled with agile SOF that cized of hundreds of successful counternet- because it unified operations and airborne patiently laid bare the Zarqawi network and work operations that used the new combined collections with all other intelligence disci- resulted in a find-fix-finish operation. It took arms team of operations and intelligence, plines under a single commander. The JSOTF more than 600 hours of ISR to track and which highlights surveillance and reconnais- employed airborne ISR as an integral part observe the network that yielded the target.2 sance as its most effective tool. of operations and clearly understood that
By Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L. Cantrell
Soldiers advise Iraqi special operations forces during combat operation in Baghdad Combat Camera Group Pacific (Johansen Laurel) Combat Camera Group
56 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu FLYNN, JUERGENS, and CANTRELL
intelligence was the primary combat multiplier surgical finish operations that emphasize speed to detect, identify, and track him in this low- capability needed to fight the enemy. From to catch a fleeting target. The emphasis on contrast environment. Employing ISR this operational framework, some important the finish was not only to remove a combat- An all-source intelligence network must lessons emerged when employing ISR: ant from the battlefield, but also to take an cue airborne ISR. The most effective airborne opportunity to gain more information on the sensors are full-motion video (FMV) and SOF Best Practices n use the find-fix-finish-exploit-analyze globalized and networked foe. Exploit-analyze SIGINT. However, when applied against the targeting model is the main effort of F3EA because it provides low-contrast enemy, these sensors must have a n synchronize ISR to all-source intelligence insight into the enemy network and offers narrow field of view, and that means they are n pass ISR (weight the main effort) new lines of operations. Exploit-analyze starts not effective as wide area search tools. As such, n conduct ISR processing, exploitation, the cycle over again by providing leads, or airborne ISR requires a start point provided and dissemination as far forward deployed as start points, into the network that could be by other sources. HUMINT and SIGINT are possible observed and tracked using airborne ISR. A prolific providers of start points for airborne n emphasize exploitation and analysis finishing force unified with airborne ISR and collection. The enemy is so well hidden that it n unify organization. an exploit-analyze capability is able to be per- takes multiple sources of intelligence to cor- sistent, surgical, and rapid in operations against roborate one another. SIGINT, for example, can Low-contrast Enemy the insurgent’s network. Airborne ISR became locate a target but may not be able to discern These lessons emerged from trial and the pacing item for operations, but it had to be who it is. FMV can track but not necessarily error tempered by 6 years of constant contact cued by the meticulous work of a robust, all- identify. HUMINT can provide intent but may with an enemy whose nature demanded new source, and collaborative intelligence network. not be able to fix a target to a precise location. approaches. Today’s enemy is a low-contrast foe easily camouflaged among civilian clutter, the global communications revolution has given this insurgent a unlike high-contrast targets such as airfields and warships.3 The insurgent’s primary new complex terrain—an “electronic sanctuary” strength has always been to hide in complex terrain such as mountainous or urban envi- Synchronize ISR However, these disciplines working together ronments. The global communications revolu- Persistent and high-fidelity intelligence are able to focus the spotlight on low-contrast tion has given this insurgent a new complex is the key to defeating a foe whose primary foes, so they can be captured or killed. terrain—an “electronic sanctuary”—in which strength is denying U.S. forces a target. In Airborne ISR’s effectiveness grows actions can be hidden among the innumer- contrast to major theater operations where exponentially when it is cued to and driven able civilian signals that constitute daily cell the purpose is to find and destroy ships, tank by other sources of intelligence rather than phone and Internet traffic.4 It is from this formations, or infrastructure, the most dif- operating alone. Without a robust, collabora- new sanctuary that the enemy coordinates ficult task in insurgencies is finding the enemy. tive intelligence network to guide it, sensors are activities from dispersed networks in order Airborne ISR has become critical to this war often used in reactive modes that negate their to self-synchronize, pass information, and because it offers persistent and low-visibility true power and tend to minimize their full transfer funds. In this way, the insurgent has observation of the enemy as well as an ability potential. These intelligence disciplines provide become “networked coalitions of the willing” that come together temporarily and are thus Use of Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze (F3EA) difficult to destroy.5 Drawing support from their networks, they remain low contrast until Human intelligence, signals time to strike and then quickly blend back into intelligence start point the population. New lines of operation ISR tracking New start points FIND Use F3EA An aggressive targeting model known as find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA) features massed, persistent ISR cued to a pow- ANALYZE FIX erful and decentralized all-source intelligence MAIN EFFORT OPERATORS apparatus in order to find a target amidst INTEGRATED civilian clutter and fix his exact location (see Target exploitation, THROUGHOUT document exploitation, Precise location of enemy figure). This precision geolocation enables detainees Sensitive site exploitation Brigadier General Michael T. Flynn, USA, is Director EXPLOIT FINISH of Intelligence (J2) at U.S. Central Command. Colonel Rich Juergens, USA, is Commander of Joint Capture/kill Task Force–Bravo in Honduras. Major Thomas L. Cantrell, USAF, is a student at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 57 SPECIAL FEATURE | Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices a start point into the enemy network that can those who feel the need to fair-share assets as outlets, and weapons supply points. As a result, be exploited through persistent and patient a way to cover more space and service more the network becomes more visible and vulner- observation. With this type of start point, one priorities. The problem with a low-contrast and able, thus negating the enemy’s asymmetric can mass ISR with confidence that assets are fleeting foe, however, is that enemy actions are advantage of denying a target. Nodal analysis not being wasted. not easily predictable. Without prediction, the uses the initial start point to generate additional next best things are redundancy and saturation. start points that develop even more lines of Mass ISR Piecemeal employment of ISR assets over a operation into the enemy’s network. The payoff Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- large geographic area theoretically allows for of this analysis is huge but requires patience to sance are most effective against low-contrast efficient targeting but often at the expense of allow the network’s picture to develop over a enemies when massed. The insurgent’s ability to effectiveness. Several tactics can be applied to long term and accept the accompanying risk of hide in plain sight demands persistent collec- improve ISR effectiveness against the insurgent. potentially losing the prey. tion in order to detect his presence. Persistent The Unblinking Eye provides an oppor- Vehicle follow is tracking vehicle move- collection requires long dwell times and must tunity to learn about the network in action and ments from the air. These are important be focused using multiple sensors on discrete how it operates. It is long dwell, persistent sur- in illustrating the network and generating parts of the network in order to achieve the veillance directed against known and suspected fix-finish operations. A recent Office of the fidelity of information required for targeting. terrorist sites or individuals. The purpose of Secretary of Defense study over a multimonth this long dwell airborne stakeout is to apply period found that vehicle follows were impor- when the enemy is massed, multisensor observation 24/7 to achieve a tant to building pattern of life and nodal analy- 7 ISR can be spread about; greater understanding of how the enemy’s sis. Vehicle follows were surprisingly central to network operates by building a pattern of life understanding how a network functions. They when the enemy is dispersed, analysis. This is an important concept and has are also among the most difficult airborne ISR must be massed proven itself time and again with hundreds of ISR operations to conduct and often require examples of successful raids. massing of assets to ensure adequate tracking. When the enemy is massed, detection is made Nodal analysis is spatially connecting Airborne ISR effectiveness increases by simpler and ISR can be spread about; con- relationships between places and people by an order of magnitude when massed. A single versely, when the enemy is dispersed, detection tracking their patterns of life. While the enemy combat air patrol (CAP) of ISR is defined as potential is reduced and ISR must be massed to moves from point to point, airborne ISR tracks one platform 24/7 over a target. Use of three be effective.6 and notes every location and person visited. CAPs is generally the best practice for massing Inherent in massing is rejecting the com- Connections between those sites and persons on a target set during the fix and finish phase monly held practice of “fair-sharing” ISR among to the target are built, and nodes in the enemy’s of the operation. This allows mass not only in multiple units. Massing implies focus and low-contrast network emerge. Nodal analysis space but also in time, which equates to persis- priority. Selected parts of the enemy’s network has the effect of taking a shadowy foe and tence. It is not enough to have several eyes on receive focus, which should be unwavering revealing his physical infrastructure for things a target—several eyes are needed on a target for a specified time. This is counterintuitive to such as funding, meetings, headquarters, media for a long period. Three CAPs permit persistent surveillance of a target while simultaneously developing the network’s pattern of life through nodal analysis and vehicle follows. It gives the finishing force commander more options than merely killing or letting an observed enemy go; with sufficient ISR, a ground force commander can demonstrate much greater operational patience, thus allowing a larger insurgent network to emerge. Massing ISR in time and space has operational results that should not be ignored. The Office of the Secretary of Defense study concluded that massed and persistent collec- tion was an important element of success in SOF operations.8 Conventional forces tend to cover disparate targets for a shorter period than SOF, which tend to focus collection on a smaller number of targets for much longer. The conventional force approach reveals a desire to service a large number of targets and units instead of developing the pattern of life of Soldier engages Taliban with AT4 rocket in
Combat Camera Company (Michael L. Casteel) an enemy network. The tendency to think of Afghanistan d
982 persistence in terms of space rather than time
58 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu FLYNN, JUERGENS, and CANTRELL results in sprinkling assets in multiple areas Forward PED personnel developed powerful. Airborne surveillance in some ways rather than focusing them on a limited number a continuity in analysis that was crucial in is like HUMINT in that it provides a means of locations.9 This method attempts to support targeting the low-contrast foe. For example, of direct observation that previously had to a large number of units, rather than a handful airborne FMV was often like a law enforce- be conducted by a specialized surveillance of units, with sufficient collections capability to ment stakeout, and these specialists became operative under significant risk.12 Like a private be effective and operationally potent. This is a intimately familiar with a target’s habits and investigator, airborne FMV can stake out an difficult paradigm shift to make, but in a scarce characteristics. FMV analysts engaged in an insurgent’s house by using the relative safety ISR environment some units may need to go Unblinking Eye atmosphere developed a target altitude provides. This high-tech asset excels at without to ensure that a smaller number can be intimacy to the degree that they could easily the low-tech effect of observing the activity of effective against the higher priority targets. The recognize something unusual and in some individuals. alternative is to make all units suboptimal. cases even detect a visual signature of how the Airborne ISR is the centerpiece of the target walked, traveled in groups, or engaged F3EA because it is tightly synchronized with Conduct Forward PED other people.11 The ability to recognize a tar- a finishing force. This force is tightly coiled A critical enabler in employing ISR was get’s gait, dress, companions, parking patterns, like a snake and ready to take advantage of having forward processing, exploitation, and and so forth became high-confidence targeting fleeting opportunities that are so often found dissemination (PED) integrated into the Tacti- indicators because of the hours of pattern of life on the insurgent battlefield. These operators cal Operations Center (TOC). The Air Force observation. This created an intimacy with the do not employ “whack-a-mole” tactics, but has excelled at building state-of-the-art reach- target that made the FMV sensor all the more exercise operational patience in applying ISR back PED nodes. But the speed and intuition required to cross-cue, target, plan, and react all the intelligence disciplines conferred and contributed their part amidst multiple streams of intelligence and operations in a highly fluid battlespace require to help the operator decide whether to conduct a raid, call an a forward PED presence able to interact in that airstrike, bring in another collection asset, or continue to observe environment. The reachback nodes simply do not have the situational awareness one gains Iraqi special operations forces detain suspected by physically being forward with supported insurgents in Baghdad operations and other intelligence personnel.10 A certain balance between the efficiency of reachback and the effectiveness of being deployed can be attained by sending small “reach-forward” elements to orchestrate and integrate the overall PED effort. PED became critical and far more effective to fast-moving decisionmaking simply by being forward. Forward PED became tightly integrated into the operations tempo. The JSOTF and its subordinate task forces dynamically retasked ISR assets as the operational situation devel- oped in order to quickly react to the emergence of fleeting targets. The forward PED element was critical to this. These PED professionals directed the sensor following the target and as the situation changed would confer with opera- tions personnel as to the best response. PED would rewind and review key events on the fly with operators to assess whether a trigger event had been met, while a reachback element kept eyes on the real-time video and communicated updates to the TOC. All the intelligence disci- plines conferred and contributed their part to help the operator decide whether to conduct a raid, call an airstrike, bring in another collec- tion asset, or continue to observe. The finishing force conducted real-time face-to-face consul- tation among operations, collections, and intel- ligence personnel to exploit opportunities.
U.S. Navy (Michael B.W. Watkins) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 59 SPECIAL FEATURE | Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices to gain greater insight into the network. They geting lines of operation, detainee intelligence while orchestrating reachback support to their have learned that gathering greater fidelity is the key to the “slow, deliberate exploitation of national offices. This effectively decentralized on the network is often more important than leads and opportunities, person-to-person” that those national agencies, pushing the needed a short tactical gain. They allow the target to drive operations.14 Intelligence from detainees intelligence to the tactical level where it was ripen—and when judgment dictates that they drives operations, yielding more detainees for most useful. These specialists collaborated and have observed enough, they strike. This flows additional exploitation and intelligence. A tight fused in a flattened environment where hori- into the exploitation phase and drives the next connection between interrogators and detainee zontal communication is favored over the ver- steps in the operational campaign against the analysts on one hand and all-source intelli- tical. Airborne ISR crews and operators worked network. Multiple targets may be struck at gence, collections, and operators on the other is closely with intelligence analysts while ISR once and, in some cases, yield an abundance of critical to take advantage of raw information. PED personnel coordinated with interrogators, highly useful information on the murky enemy. all in a fast-moving fused process facilitated by The JSOTF took care to exploit sites properly sharing the same physical space. As a result, because they understood that the information the ability to talk to insurgent a fleeting target was not passed around from derived during the exploit-analyze phase would leaders, facilitators, and one organization to another, but moved rapidly lead to more targets. financiers on how the “in house” for full analytical, operational, and organization functions offers exploitation impact. The result was that a target Exploit and Analyze insight on how to take that could go from observation to action within F3EA differs from other targeting models organization apart minutes, providing the agility that counternet- because of its emphasis on exploit-analyze as work and counterinsurgency forces require. the main effort. This recognizes the importance Speed of decision was achieved because of intelligence in fighting the low-contrast Unify Organization this unity of organization was under common foe and aggressively supplying multisource F3EA is best employed under a unity direction and priority. The commander’s intent start points for new ISR collection. More than of organization to ensure speed of decision was the most important thing driving the the other phases, this feeds the intelligence- and speed of action. All elements required for intelligence and operations teams on focused operations cycle in which intelligence leads to success in F3EA were under the single direc- common lines of operations that could change operations that yield more intelligence leading tion of the JSOTF commander. A conscious as the battlespace changed. This unity created to more operations. The JSOTF emphasis on effort was made to eliminate organizational an environment where decisions could be raids is essential to gather intelligence on the seams between key functions that drive the rapidly made, whether to retask ISR assets, enemy network; simply killing the enemy will F3EA process. Early in the war on terror, an conduct a raid, or switch focus based on a not lead to greater effectiveness against their intelligence organization may have led find critical piece of HUMINT. The JSOTF’s F3EA networks. In fact, capturing the enemy for pur- and fix efforts but had to pass finish to a SOF process was therefore very rapid—its ability to poses of interrogating is normally the preferred unit. This represented an “organizational blink” decide and its authorities to act were flattened option. The bottom line of exploit-analyze is where responsibility for actions on the target with no need to seek higher permissions, and to gather information and rapidly turn it into had to be passed across a seam to another this made it fast enough to be effective against operational action by applying it to defeat the organization. The time and spin-up required the enemy. Unity of organization communi- enemy’s network. when that seam was crossed slowed the ability cates intent, minimizes friction, drives focus Target exploitation and document exploi- to finish the enemy. After the finish and site and priority, enhances collaboration, and drives tation are important law enforcement–type exploitation, interrogation and follow-on docu- prioritized, persistent, and focused approaches activities critical to F3EA. Documents and ment or media exploitation were conducted to attack an enemy network. Without it, the pocket litter, as well as information found by still other units, creating additional blinks agility of striking multiple targets per night or on computers and cell phones, can provide in yielding timely intelligence that could be swiftly moving from the patient and methodi- clues that analysts need to evaluate enemy fed back into the targeting cycle. Analysis was cal find to those moments of madness in fix organizations, capabilities, and intentions.13 another disparate effort, relying on skills and and finish are beset by too much friction to be The enemy’s low-contrast network comes to expertise that were mostly geographically feasible. light a little more clearly by reading his email, dispersed, making face-to-face collaboration financial records, media, and servers. Target difficult. No matter how good the intelligence Recommendations and document exploitation help build the gain was, requesting support from multiple Counternetwork operations as described picture of the enemy as a system of systems and organizations for these different functions was here cannot win a counterinsurgency, but they as such enables counternetwork forces to attack neither timely nor did it provide the necessary can provide the space and time needed for it holistically. agility. wider stability operations to enable political Detainee intelligence is another law The JSOTF created a unity of organiza- solutions. The significance in these tactics is enforcement–like function crucial to reveal- tion by bringing elements of the interagency that they not only maintain a rapid operations ing the enemy’s network. The ability to talk to community behind the F3EA functions into a tempo against the enemy, but also are designed insurgent leaders, facilitators, and financiers on common Joint Operations Center. The orga- to gather the maximum information possible how the organization functions offers signifi- nizational imperative was simple: get the best on the enemy network. Armed with this infor- cant insight on how to take that organization people and bring them together face to face in mation, the JSOTF turns up the gain on the apart. In terms of analysis and developing tar- a single location collaborating on a target set low-contrast network and can smartly target
60 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu FLYNN, JUERGENS, and CANTRELL those important and low-redundancy nodes on Intelligence Lieutenant General David Deptula of operations. Without this focus, ISR devolves which the enemy depends.15 Persistence, speed, related in a speech last year, the “Department into a defensive tool conducting “whack-a- and unity are required to be successful. of Defense should aspire to put an end to the mole” tactics. Unlocking airborne ISR’s true The tactics described here can be situation in which sensor systems and the power involves employing this new combined applied at the brigade combat team (BCT) means to interpret . . . are chronically low arms team as a complete package to provide a level. National agencies have recognized the density/high demand assets.”17 A good starting more effective response to the type of enemy power of decentralizing their capabilities and point is to enable Air Force Special Operations the war on terror might bring. JFQ putting them into the hands of those who Command with a robust fleet of airborne ISR. most need them. Most agencies are pushing Special Operations Command and the Theater their reach-forward teams to the lowest level Special Operations Commands alone require NOTES possible. Decentralized control of airborne ISR at least 30 orbits of dual sensor FMV/SIGINT 1 William B. Caldwell IV, Pentagon press brief- at the BCT level also makes sense for those to meet their war on terror commitments. ing, June 9, 2006, available at
uring a September 2007 visit This article highlights the initial role of to Anbar Province in western U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in tribal Iraq, President George W. Bush engagement in Anbar Province and how both Dstated, “Anbar is a huge province. Army and Marine Corps forces adopted the It was once written off as lost. It is now one of engagement strategy and greatly expanded the the safest places in Iraq.” The reason for this security environment, altering the political stunning turnabout was that Anbaris “who landscape in Anbar and other Iraqi provinces. once fought side by side with al Qaeda against Conventional U.S. forces have been critical coalition troops [are] now fighting side by side to the success of tribal engagement in Anbar. with coalition troops against al Qaeda.”1 The Indeed, from the start of the initiative, SOF program that convinced the Anbaris to support worked in close coordination with the conven- the coalition and the Iraqi national government tional forces that were the “battlespace owners.” was called tribal engagement, one of the most Various non–Department of Defense agencies By Thomas R. Searle successful U.S. programs implemented in Iraq. made major contributions to tribal engage- It has been so beneficial that it was extended to ment at critical moments. The government of other provinces, and through the Concerned Iraq played a vital role, but most important, Local Citizens program, the same approach the heroes of tribal engagement have been the has spread to areas where tribal loyalties were Iraqi people. In the face of horrifying reprisals, weaker than in Anbar. Sunni tribesmen have joined their erstwhile enemies, the U.S. and coalition military, and stood up to the al Qaeda terrorists. Without the DOD (Cherie A. Thurlby)
SEAL team secures Air Force One at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq
62 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu SEARLE courage and determination of the tribesmen in am’s fall, their smuggling networks brought those projects, building trust and respect. Over Anbar Province, tribal engagement would not foreign jihadists and weapons into Iraq, but time, these projects increased the prestige and have succeeded. the smuggling tribes were looking to make authority of the sub-sheikhs, thereby under- a profit, not to support religious fanaticism. mining the sheikhs above them. The top tribal Initial Planning With the right incentives, the SOF planners leaders then realized that it was in their and Tribes in Iraq are ancient social organi- reasoned, these tribes would turn on the ter- their tribes’ best interests to ask SOF troops for zations that have survived because they have rorists. The tribes and SOF teams, with coali- CA projects. This indirect approach took more constantly evolved. Economic activity has also tion support, could then force the enemy out time than approaching a top sheikh directly, but changed the tribe, and these changes impacted of the tribal areas. Planners also wanted each was more effective because the senior sheikh both the power dynamics within each tribe tribe to provide a small force to participate in asked for a meeting with the team rather than and intertribal relations. During Saddam’s coalition operations and, with training from the other way around. reign, the tribes along the Euphrates River in the special operations teams, develop the Engaging the tribes was not easy in Anbar Province had a strong tribal structure. capability to conduct unilateral counterterror- early 2004. The SOF troops ruled out trying Unable to subvert these structures, Saddam’s ist and counterinsurgent operations.3 to win “hearts and minds” by simply doing government and the Ba’ath party coexisted The planners believed they could start nice things for the tribes because the tribes uneasily with them. small, and when the first few tribes began did what was in their long-term best interest. In spring 2003, when the United States demonstrating improvements in security and Influencing the tribes meant earning trust and invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam’s regime, U.S. prosperity, other tribes would want to join. respect through commitment and continuity. SOF made contact with some tribes in western This “model city” approach took time, but once At that point, the United States had not yet Iraq, but the collapse of conventional resistance it got rolling, the tribes realized they could pursued the strategy of continuity and com- led to the redeployment of the bulk of SOF. improve their security and economic prospects mitment in Anbar and, accordingly, had not The remaining forces were placed under a new headquarters, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF–AP), on May 1, 2003.2 As 2003 pro- gressed, however, the ineffective conventional resistance gave way to a much more dangerous insurgency and an incipient terrorist resistance to the U.S. occupation. To meet this threat, additional SOF were alerted for redeployment to increase their presence across Iraq, includ- ing in Anbar Province. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), slated to arrive in Anbar in January 2004, began planning during the second half of 2003. The SOF planners considered various indirect methods to defeat the insurgent groups, led by former regime members and foreign fighters who were starting to coalesce under the leadership of Abu Musab al Zarqawi Sunni tribal leader signs declaration of support for and would later become known as al Qaeda in Sons of Iraq program in Al Noor Iraq (AQI). The planners decided to engage DOD (Samuel Bendet) Anbar tribes to gain access to the “human and by supporting the coalition. Any tribal leader earned much trust or respect there. The SOF geographic terrain” in the province and thereby who tolerated insurgent activity was brought troops largely started from scratch.4 deny that terrain to the insurgents and terror- into line by denying his tribe access to the eco- On the ground in Anbar, SOF teams soon ists. In the words of one participant, this was nomic benefits of supporting the coalition. learned that by managing the CA projects, a way to “dry up the lake so you can kill the they were in effect becoming sheikhs, as Iraqi piranha.” SOF planners selected the tribes that Starting from Scratch civilians came to them with their problems. Saddam had oppressed and marginalized as the In 2004, the mainstream Anbar tribes Not wanting to assume responsibility for the best candidates for initial contact. were sitting on the fence or leaning toward the tribal social and political structures, SOF teams Saddam had oppressed these tribes and insurgents and terrorists. The SOF teams modi- shifted their approach and publicly gave the forced them out of most forms of legitimate fied their model city approach with some of the resources to local sheikhs. In doing so, the commerce. They had to rely on smuggling tribes. When they arrived in Anbar, SOF teams teams lost some control over how the resources and the black market to survive. After Sadd- approached lower-level tribal sub-sheikhs and were used and accepted that some sheikhs found out what they needed in terms of civil would enrich themselves. Because of their cul- Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Searle, USAR, is a affairs (CA) projects. The SOF elements then tural awareness, SOF personnel understood the Historian at U.S. Special Operations Command. “under”-promised and “over”-performed on way Iraqi society worked and made use of the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 63 SPECIAL FEATURE | Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province tribal customs to advance tribal engagement. violence all increased the pace of change in Iraq. gency Relief Program (CERP) funds to pay Empowering the sheikhs had the substantial The information gap between predeployment local security forces, which meant that local benefit of reinforcing both the sheikh’s author- intelligence and ground truth had to be bridged. U.S. commanders (SOF and conventional) ity and indigenous Iraqi social structures The SOF teams used the individuals and tribes could no longer unilaterally fund the tribal that could be maintained indefinitely. While whom they were already in contact with to engagement security forces. The intent of this the sheikh was responsible for running the arrange meetings with other tribal elders. In this measure was to shift the onus for local security programs, the SOF teams focused on building manner, SOF expanded the network of people away from the tribes and U.S. commanders indigenous security forces, targeting terror- they were engaged with and the area of which and toward the security forces of the new gov- ists and insurgents, and expanding the tribal they had detailed local knowledge. ernment. But it decreased tribal authority and engagement networks. Early 2004 was a difficult time in Anbar took a valuable tool away from the SOF teams The special operators had to be skillful Province, particularly after four Blackwater working on tribal engagement. purveyors of “carrots and sticks” to win over the contractors were killed in Fallujah in April The centralized recruiting and training sheikhs. The rewards and punishments ranged and their bodies were hanged from a bridge of Iraqi security forces posed special problems from a commitment to reinforce the sheikhs’ and shown on television around the world. in Anbar at that time. To join the Security forces in the event of an al Qaeda attack, to The U.S. Marines, who owned the battlespace Forces, Iraqis would have to go to Ramadi, the denying CA support to an uncooperative in Anbar Province, had arrived with a strong province capital, for processing. As predicted by sheikh, to public gestures of respect and indica- appreciation for the potential benefits of some sheikhs, their tribesmen were subjected tions of American support. The SOF teams engaging the tribes. The heavy fighting in and to suicide bombings at the recruiting facility. arrived with strong cultural understanding but around Fallujah and Ramadi occupied the bulk Moreover, while the security force recruits had to develop the detailed local knowledge of the Marines’ effort, but they encouraged were at the training locations, terrorists could necessary to determine whom to influence and and supported the SOF tribal engagement threaten to harm or kill their families if the how. The teams needed the authority to provide efforts. For example, the Marines reinforced recruits did not drop out of training. Many the precise carrot or stick the situation required. each SOF team with 10 or 12 troops, nearly recruits returned home to protect their families. There were reasons, however, not to the SOF teams arrived with strong cultural understanding but empower the tribes. In the past, U.S. policy- makers were concerned that local loyalties had to develop the detailed knowledge to determine whom to could break Iraq into smaller states.5 After the influence and how fall of Saddam, with a weak central government and al Qaeda terrorists working hard to foment Gaining detailed situational awareness doubling the size of the teams and increasing ethnic and regional strife, it might not have was difficult. Although the tribes are some of what each team could do. Additionally, Marine been wise to reinforce the centrifugal forces the oldest and most stable elements in Iraqi Corps generals met often with tribal leaders in Iraqi society by strengthening the tribes.6 society, they are still dynamic and always evolv- brought in by the SOF teams. These meetings Senior leaders had to decide whether the tacti- ing. The U.S. invasion, fall of Saddam’s regime, significantly enhanced the perceived (and thus cal benefits of working with the tribes in Anbar influx of foreign terrorists, and continuing real) authority of the tribal leaders and the SOF warranted the strategic risks and whether tribal teams that worked with them. engagement was the best use of scarce SOF Iraqi soldiers patrol in In addition to the high level of enemy resources. In late 2004, U.S. leaders substan- Anbar Province activity in Anbar Province in 2004, after the tially reduced the SOF presence in the prov- transfer of sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi ince. Those tribes that had worked with SOF Government in late June, U.S. commanders limited themselves to defensive operations, and could no longer use Commanders’ Emer- some suffered heavy retribution from AQI.
Persistent Presence In 2005, however, senior U.S. leaders increased SOF presence in Anbar. The teams that had operated there in early 2004 returned to the same locations and renewed their con- nections with the local tribes. The SOF deploy- ment schedule of 7 months overseas and 7 months at home station allowed for “persistent presence,” as teams routinely returned to the same villages during each rotation. In 2005, as a partial substitute for the lost CERP funding, the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) authorized SOF and conventional units to establish an indigenous force under
MWHW–2 Combat Camera (James F. Cline III) MWHW–2 Combat Camera (James F. the name “Desert Protectors.” The initial vision
64 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu SEARLE was that the Desert Protectors would bridge the and strategic effects by driving the terrorists and were trying to destroy the tribal system and gap between the government’s forces and tribal insurgents out of safe havens in Anbar Province. their own authority and to replace them with a militias by creating a government-sanctioned The former Desert Protectors, who returned pan-Islamic fundamentalist theocracy. tribal force. The Desert Protectors would home, did just that when many joined the local Confronted with a brutal AQI occupa- provide local intelligence and additional troops police and continued to enhance local security, tion, the tribal sheikhs had ample reasons to to U.S. and Iraqi forces and would help break though not as part of the army. The tribes best look for alternatives. By 2006, the U.S. and the cycle of violence between the tribes and influenced events outside their home areas by Iraqi government policy toward the tribes was the U.S. and Iraqi government forces. Starting setting an example of success that other tribes more sympathetic.10 In late 2005 and early around Al Qaim, the Desert Protectors had a would want to emulate. 2006, U.S. conventional forces improved their rocky beginning, but once it got started, other Another measure of success in 2005 was counterinsurgency operations in several ways. tribes joined. The program grew to hundreds of that some tribes started to police themselves. The U.S. military leadership pushed more of troops from several tribes. In November 2005, This was an important change from 2004 their own forces into Anbar Province, which elements of the Marine 2d Regimental Combat when tribes would only pass along intelligence made the coalition more of a viable long-term Team (RCT) and Army human intelligence and conduct operations against other tribes. force that could win against AQI. More impor- personnel, supported by the Desert Protector The effect was noticeable to the SOF teams tant, coalition forces put increased emphasis forces, conducted a 2-week sweep along the because they were working with the same on providing security for civilians. For Euphrates River in Anbar. Local cooperation tribal leaders again. example, the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, helped apprehend 800 suspected insurgents. with interagency support, secured coopera- MNC–I and the government later Gaining Momentum tion of tribal sheikhs to recruit local police for decided to turn the Desert Protectors into scout The SOF and conventional forces’ suc- Ramadi. With the tribes’ overt support, the platoons in the Iraqi army. The tribesmen, cesses with tribal engagement in 2004 and police force grew from fewer than 200 to 5,000 however, wanted to serve closer to home and 2005 gained even more momentum in 2006. and was critical to breaking AQI’s hold on the secure their families and villages, and many quit During 2007, tribal engagement enabled the city. Likewise, in July 2006, SOF and the 1st rather than join an army unit that was available coalition to drive AQI out of the province Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment, combined to for operations anywhere in Iraq. At the very by increasing security and prosperity of the carry out the first successful police recruiting least, the Desert Protectors may have looked tribes that had joined the program earlier, and drive in the Anbar city of Hit; 150 tribesmen like a failure because they seemed to quit rather the publicity given to the tribal engagement joined the local force as a result. than transition into the army as planned. In the program played crucial roles in this turnabout. U.S. conventional and Iraqi forces also fall of 2005, an unnamed U.S. officer in Iraq told There were also successful U.S. conventional fanned out to small outposts in populated Inside the Pentagon, “The issue is getting [tribal forces] to fight insurgents outside their tribal starting around Al Qaim, the Desert Protectors had a rocky area. . . . So far, the tribal engagement strategy from a military standpoint has not [done] what beginning, but once it got started, other tribes joined it was advertised [to do].”7 This anonymous critic missed the point offensives and AQI mistakes that convinced areas, where they maintained a presence and of tribal engagement, but did identify a key tribes to abandon AQI and assist the coalition backed up the local police. The combination of challenge: how to measure its effectiveness. in the fight against the terrorists. U.S. military prowess and Iraqi familiarity and Some felt that tribal engagement was just a way To the tribes in Anbar Province, AQI ties to the province made them a better long- to generate more kinetic strikes and that the may have originally appeared to be a valu- term bet for the tribes than AQI. Accordingly, measure of success was the number of offensive able ally against the U.S. occupation, but as it support for AQI faded in the province.11 tactical raids conducted by tribal forces outside gained strength, it imposed its will on the local Another major contribution of the con- their home areas. But tribal engagement was a community. After arriving in Anbar, these ventional forces was engaging tribal leaders type of indirect, irregular warfare, important terrorists stressed their support of the local outside Iraq. Many large tribes extended into at all levels, from the tactical to the strategic, tribes in their fight against U.S. forces, but they neighboring countries, and when violence and a better measure of effectiveness was the soon attempted to take control of tribal areas rose, some top tribal leaders left Iraq. The improvement in security within the tribes’ areas and inflicted their own radical occupation on SOF elements in Iraq lacked the rank to get of influence. the tribal people. The organization imposed the attention of these leaders, but general and Since 2004, U.S. SOF and conventional an extreme Islamic fundamentalism that in flag officers from Multi-National Force–West, forces have trained and worked with tribal forces time alienated the local populations.8 AQI also MNC–I, and Multi-National Forces–Iraq to build capacity and capabilities. Although the forced the tribes to provide local women as played critical roles by meeting with key tribal tribal forces’ tactical offensive strikes received wives for the terrorists, and their foreign fight- leaders outside Iraq.12 much attention, the real power of tribal engage- ers were often disrespectful toward the sheikhs Tribal engagement was also challeng- ment, and the subsequent Concerned Local and murdered those who resisted.9 Their ing from a public affairs and information Citizens program, was creating local security extreme brutality intimidated the population operations standpoint. To enlist tribes, the forces that could, with backup from U.S. and in the short run and created an inevitable tribal engagement program needed to be well Iraqi forces, defend their local areas against AQI. backlash. The AQI regime crippled the local publicized. However, any publicity immediately Their security activities had decisive operational economy. The sheikhs saw that the terrorists made the tribes that joined, and the sheikhs ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 65 SPECIAL FEATURE | Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province who led them, high priority targets for AQI. detain or arrest suspects, there was often no and will continue to be effective, not only in Once Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha decided functioning court system or prison to hold con- Iraq but also across the war on terror. JFQ to support the United States and the Iraqi gov- victed criminals. Here again the tribal system ernment, he was tireless in promoting his new has been helpful because a sheikh can pay a cause. He convinced many other sheikhs to “fine” to have the arrested man released. To NOTES side with them as well and gained much pub- avoid having to pay a fine repeatedly, the sheikh 1 Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush licity for the program. AQI eventually assas- will typically either force the released detainee Visits and Thanks Troops in Anbar Province,” Septem- sinated him, but not before he had substantially to cease his insurgent activities or leave the ber 3, 2007; Thomas E. Ricks, “Situation Called Dire strengthened the tribal engagement program. area. In extreme cases, the tribe may even kill a in West Iraq: Anbar is Lost Politically, Marine Analyst As tribal engagement gathered momen- member who repeatedly brings dishonor on it. Says,” The Washington Post, September 11, 2006, A1. tum and conventional forces in Anbar Province Tribal justice is not a complete substitute for a 2 Charles H. Briscoe et al., All Roads Lead to took the lead, SOF shifted to a “connect-the- modern legal system, but it has helped to fill the Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq dots” role of working the seams and pulling gap until a fully functional Iraqi justice system (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, together the many local tribal engagement is in place in Anbar Province. 2006), 420–423. 3 activities across Anbar and in neighboring Ann Scott Tyson, “In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. Military Takes Two Paths,” The Washington Post, provinces. To do this, the SOF presence in Tribal engagement has been crucial in September 15, 2006, 1. western Iraq was increased by adding a Naval driving international terrorists out of Anbar 4 Kurt Wheeler, “Counterinsurgency Success in Special Warfare Task Group of SEALs. The Province. The same methods are being Al Anbar,” Leatherneck, October 2007, 21–22, available 17 CJSOTF–AP commander drew the boundaries employed in other provinces to squeeze out at
66 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu U.S. Marine and Iraqi police officer guard Joint Security Station Qatana in Ramadi
U.S. Marine Corps (Jeremy M. Giacomino)
The Imbalance in Iraqi Security Force Transition
By Scott S. Jensen he United States is currently forces, and command and control forces. While embroiled in a difficult situation the ground force transition is moving forward in Iraq. One key to success will at a measured pace, too little is being done T be an effective transition from to train and transition aviation and aviation U.S.-led security force operations to operations support assets to keep pace with the ground planned, led, and executed by Iraqi security transition. The continued reliance on Ameri- forces.1 Significant gains have been made in the can aviation functions in support of the Iraqi transition,2 but aviation and aviation support ground force transition will lead to an Iraqi functions have not been properly addressed. This has led to an imbalance in joint military Lieutenant Colonel Scott S. Jensen, USMC, was capability that threatens future Iraqi security Commander of Marine Light/Attack Helicopter and leads to undesired risk to Americans. Squadron 269 from October 2005 until May 2007 U.S. security forces in Iraq currently and deployed twice in support of Operation Iraqi operate jointly, which includes ground forces, Freedom. He is currently a student at the Naval aviation and aviation support forces, logistics War College. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 67 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Imbalance in Iraqi Security Force Transition ground force trained and conditioned to inte- this strategy is “to develop the Iraqis’ capacity security objectives as the President’s strategy. grate aviation into their operational construct to secure their country while carrying out a Some highlights include “Iraq’s Joint Forces but completely reliant on American aviation to campaign to defeat terrorists and neutralize the [focusing] on defeating terrorism and insur- support that requirement. insurgency.”4 Among the expectations is “that gency as their primary mission . . . [and] Iraq’s This article identifies the strategic envi- our force posture will change over the next year” Joint Forces [achieving] self-reliance such that ronment that predicates a balanced and time- and that: only minimal external assistance and support sensitive joint security force transition. It high- are needed for accomplishing the primary lights the imperatives for synchronizing various as the political process consolidates and as Iraqi mission.”8 Critical aspects identified by the aviation-related functions with the progress of Security Forces grow and gain experience . . . as Iraqi strategy are that all Iraqi army divisions the ground force transition. It also explores the Iraqis take on more responsibility for security, must eventually come under the control of the time, training, and equipment challenges of Coalition forces will increasingly move to sup- Iraqi government and that part of that self- building a relevant aviation enabler for ground porting roles in most areas . . . [and] while our reliance includes assuming full responsibility forces. Finally, it provides recommendations military presence may become less visible, it will for support functions such as “supply stocks, for synchronizing the Iraqi aviation force tran- remain lethal and decisive, able to confront the fire support capabilities and the Air Force.”9 sition in critical areas. enemy wherever it may gather and organize.5 From both nations’ strategic documents, it is clear that there is a requirement for even- Security Transition Strategy and Policy The national strategy also defines tual transition from an American-led security Some may argue that the initial planning numerous metrics that have been frequently apparatus to an Iraqi-led one. Both strategies for postconflict security and stabilization in addressed.6 Specifically, those measures that specifically identify security, counterterrorism, Iraq was poor. Clearly, more could have been receive the greatest attention are “[t]he quan- and counterinsurgency as the most important done at the strategy and policy level of the U.S. tity and quality of Iraqi units . . . the percent- short-term priorities. Both indicate that there Government to provide a better plan and more age of operations conducted by Iraqis alone will be a certain reliance on specific aspects of assets to transition. Nevertheless, the President or with minor Coalition assistance . . . [and] coalition power prior to a complete transition and his policy advisors sought to correct that offensive operations conducted by Iraqi and to Iraqi security forces. Unfortunately, both are mistake in 2005 by publishing the National Coalition forces.”7 vague on what will constitute reasonable mea- Strategy for Victory in Iraq.3 One objective of The Iraqi National Security Strategy for sures. One says “with minor coalition assis- 2007 to 2010—a policy document released tance”10 and the other says that “only minimal by the Republic of Iraq—supports the same the Iraqi National Security Strategy for 2007 to 2010 supports the same security objectives as the President’s strategy
external assistance and support are needed.”11 This vagueness contributes to the imbalance between the ground forces and the aviation support they receive by providing both nations an excuse to defer the aviation transition to a later time. U.S. Marine Corps (Michael Kropiewnicki) Analysis of the Imbalance Transitioning security responsibility in Iraq is clearly driven by policy that has recently gained urgency at the American national political level. This has led to increased pres- sure on the operational commanders in Iraq to complete the transition as effectively as pos- sible under the shortest timeline. Since 2005, transition efforts—led by the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC– I)—have been broad-based and generally effective. Accounts abound in the press and congressional testimony about the effectiveness Iraqi police officer provides security near South of individual Iraqi battalions, brigades, and in Ramadi Police Station some cases divisions.12
68 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu JENSEN
Published figures indicate growing aviation support functions are hard to come by, supports one division and totals approximately numbers of Iraqi ground forces (along with the and the training is costly and time consuming. 4,500 Marines and over 130 aircraft. This is a associated battlespace) being taken over and Transitioning aviation support for rather large aviation element for only a portion controlled by Iraqi commanders. American security operations thus becomes a difficult of Iraq—and rather small in comparison to teams work at the battalion level and below task. That task was admittedly put on a back what the other Services add to the theater’s on a direct and personal basis to train and burner with a vague recognition that it would aviation support function. Nine hundred Iraqi assist the Iraqi ground forces in assuming take time and come later in the game.16 This air force members and a handful of aircraft responsibility.13 Unfortunately, while a ground approach appears to have provided an excuse pale in comparison. formation controlling its own territory and to delay what would be a costly and demanding Successful ground forces ultimately rely operations is an important measure of success, task—with the caveat that American aviation on a broad spectrum of aviation support to it ignores the need for a fully balanced joint support will be needed past the time when enable the joint security force operations envi- force capable of self-reliance. The level of effort Iraqi ground forces are postured for indepen- sioned by both U.S. and Iraqi policy expecta- given to transitioning Iraqi aviation support— dent operations. This overextended delay has tions. The aviation training has not happened. and the ability of the ground forces to leverage created an imbalance.17 While there has been Soon, the chasm between independently aviation support in their counterterror and some growth in a small Iraqi air force, the operating Iraqi ground forces and a responsive counterinsurgency fight—have not kept pace. actual amount of people, equipment, and train- Iraqi aviation support system will grow so When measuring joint security forces, ing has been minuscule in comparison to the wide that a self-reliant joint security force will ground formations receive priority attention. ground force of the new Iraqi joint force.18 not be a realistic expectation. This imbalance By the very nature of the task, large numbers of As of August 2007, for instance, there is due in part to a failure to integrate joint people are needed to operate an effective secu- were 359,700 ground troops who were trained planning, training, and execution into the rity force. Division-strength formations require in Iraq compared to 900 Iraqi air force per- mantra of the transition—relying on stove- the training and equipping of tens of thousands sonnel.19 The air force operates a handful of piped development of ground forces separate of people. Once the individuals have been iden- small fixed-wing aircraft for ISR and C–130 from aviation forces. This has resulted in half tified, however, they can be trained relatively cargo planes for logistics, and it is receiving of the equation—aviation—relying heavily on quickly. Additionally, compared to aviation 16 Huey helicopters for logistics and troop American support and capabilities. units, they require less technical and lower-cost movement—totaling 45 aircraft in the Iraqi Successful security, counterterror, and equipment. Vast amounts of assets and time are inventory.20 By comparison, the U.S. Marine counterinsurgency operations require a joint being put toward the issue, resulting in training Corps, engaged in what has been identified as force with responsive capabilities capable of teams or advisors being assigned down to the a “supporting effort” in Anbar Province, oper- leveraging available assets, quick to commu- lowest levels of the ground formations.14 Train- ates nearly six full helicopter squadrons, three nicate changing environments, and certain of ing has been consistent with strategic guidance full jet squadrons, one C–130 squadron, and conditions on the ground. When successful, that focuses the joint Iraqi security forces on a full maintenance and command and control aviation support is seamlessly tied to the needs, security, counterterror, and counterinsurgency system.21 The Marine aviation contribution expectations, and requirements of the ground operations. The Iraqi ability to operate on its own receives much of the attention. Taking nothing away from the huge success of these formations of brave Iraqis, those ground forces are operating “independently” while relying— with rare exceptions—on aviation support that has been planned, coordinated, and controlled by and through American Servicemembers. The vast majority of aviation airspace control, fire support coordination, terminal attack control, logistics, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is conducted and controlled by specially trained American troops. The Iraqis’ ability to execute these functions is not improving at a pace that would allow successful integration.15 In stark contrast to ground force training, aviation func- tions generally require money, technologically advanced equipment, and advanced under- standing of specific skill sets not often found in developing countries. Aviation success therefore tends to be measured by the number of “things” Iraqi soldiers during dismounted tactical in the form of radars, airplanes, and communi- movement exercise cations equipment. People capable of executing 55th Combat Camera Company (Timothy Kingston) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 69 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Imbalance in Iraqi Security Force Transition force. In order to enable security operations, and using individual weapons. In a counter- American advisors are making a huge aviation support needs to understand what terror or counterinsurgency fight, aviation mistake by managing the responsibility for information may be required of a ground com- assets become critical eyes and ears for the communicating and controlling the radios mander and how to get it to him. In addition, commanders in the field, as well as a critical used to leverage aviation support. It is past time aviation support must be deconflicted to ensure link for medical evacuation, logistics, and to force the system to function with Iraqi voices safety and security of the aviation force, while fires. Without the skill sets and equipment on the radios. Will this initially lead to frustra- providing flexible support to the ground force. to coordinate and communicate via sophis- tion, confusion, and wasted time? Yes—just While an aviation force that is enabling ticated equipment, there is no way a ground like when young lieutenants and sergeants are operations has a responsibility to support the commander can leverage the aviation enabler. taught to struggle through similar problems. ground force, the ground force has a responsibil- This aspect of transition is not being All involved must realize there will be difficul- ity to meet a specific level of knowledge and executed.23 Instead, the American team ties in the beginning, and American trainers proficiency in using that aviation support. In members supporting Iraqi ground forces are must stand ready to take back the airwaves if a other words, both sides must come together to communicating with, coordinating, and direct- situation becomes too dangerous. However, the increase the synergistic effects of the joint capa- ing aviation assets. In order for there to be an need to relinquish some of that control is nec- bilities of the force. The U.S. model for aviation independently operating ground force, they essary to achieve the desired outcome. Without support of joint operations is effective. Ironically, must be able to communicate and coordinate increasing the communication skills of Iraqi it is not being followed in the transition in Iraq. with their support. In light of both nations’ ground forces, there will not be a balanced aviation transition. ground forces rely on a broad spectrum of aviation support to Aviation-delivered Fires. Based on the current imbalance in transition, an American enable the joint security force operations envisioned by both aviator could eventually deliver fires for an U.S. and Iraqi policy Iraqi commander with no American on the ground to oversee or control the fires. Under Recommendations strategic admission that aviation will transition what guidance and authority will the Ameri- There will be a lag between ground force more slowly than ground forces, at some point can aviator deliver his ordnance? If we are capability for independent operations and there may no longer be enough Americans on not working toward defining rules of engage- aviation force capability to operate and support the ground to execute aviation coordination. ment, risks and mitigation, and the effects those ground forces. That lag time, however, is Even now, Americans supporting Iraqi ground of improper fires execution with our Iraqi critical. It cannot be wasted waiting for aircraft forces rarely have enough information on what counterparts, we could put Americans at risk to be built, systems to be produced, or aviators is happening to provide adequate situational and in situations that may result in a negative to be trained. The period must be focused on awareness to aviation assets and usually cannot strategic impact. deliberate functional planning and training at find the correct Iraqi to pass information from In another scenario, in the absence of the ground force level and within the immature aviation assets. Until there are radios in the trained Iraqi controllers, an American termi- aviation support arena. American advisors hands of and under the direct control of Iraqi nal attack controller could eventually work must look at their transition training programs ground troops, American team members will for an independent Iraqi ground commander, and pursue a more holistic approach based not be able to fully integrate aviation support. executing that commander’s desires for fire on existing models. It is not good enough that Iraqi squadrons are slowly standing up and Iraqi air force C–130 waits to transport executing occasional logistics and surveillance Iraqi recruits to 22 missions. This represents part of the require- training ment but simply misses the larger capability needed to attain mission success as demon- strated by aviation assets enabling current security, counterterror, and counterinsurgency operations. Greater attention must be focused on developing skills in communications, aviation-delivered fires, airspace management, and formal training. Communications. Not enough empha- sis is being placed on communications skills and equipment. By this stage in the ground force transition, purchasing, distributing, and training with communications equip- ment should have been as high a priority as purchasing, distributing, and training with weapons; communications skills and equip- ment knowledge are as critical as integrating U.S. Marine Corps (James P. Aguilar)
70 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu JENSEN support with no American in the process to decision made “not to equip the Iraqi Air Force This implies that Americans will be executing approve targeting, rules of engagement, or with fixed-wing jet fighter or attack (bomber) the mission for a considerable time. risk. This could lead to strategically impact- aircraft. In fact, [MNSTC–I] considers the Americans continue to coordinate and ing perceptions that an American is involved assets unnecessary and incapable of influenc- control the delivery of aviation fires even in delivering fires in ways that conflict with ing the counterinsurgency fight.”25 This is an when these fires are in direct support of Iraqi American policy. interesting conclusion since so many American ground forces. Specific American ground force Fires are some of the most challenging attack aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopter, members train for months prior to coming into combat enablers that aviation assets provide. are committed to counterinsurgency opera- theater in order to be joint qualified enough to Aviation-delivered fires are also a huge combat tions in Iraq. Current operations prove the control the delivery of aviation fires.27 Part of multiplier. Anything that has a major impact need for the Iraqis to pursue a limited attack the Iraqi ground force transition to indepen- on a battlefield also comes with considerable aircraft capability. dent operations must include the control and risks if done improperly. This risk is magnified Assuming the utility of attack aircraft coordination of aviation-delivered fire. in an urban environment or in a counterinsur- in a counterinsurgency, American doctrine Moreover, time must be spent at the gency or counterterror role. and procedures indicate that it takes years designated training areas, with Iraqi ground Current Iraqi air force structure is not to become proficient in the execution of force members controlling American aviation designed to support ground formations in fires aviation-delivered fires,26 particularly those assets when these fires are delivered. This delivered from the air.24 There was a deliberate used to counter an insurgent or terror threat. at this point in the transition, there should be future Iraqi command and control specialists sitting side by side with their American counterparts U.S. Marine Corps (Michael Kropiewnicki)
would provide much-needed proficiency train- ing for American aviation units in theater and familiarize them with the Iraqi forces they are supporting. American controllers qualified as terminal attack controllers could supervise and train Iraqi ground forces, allowing the Ameri- cans to maintain proficiency in the perishable skills of controlling aviation fires. Most impor- tantly, through a deliberate training program modeled after American military schools, Iraqis would be formally trained and qualified to control aviation fires and take one more step toward true independent operations. This type of training should be integrated up the chain of command to introduce and refine the decon- fliction of fires, target approval and coordina- tion, battle damage assessment determination, and rules of engagement training. Airspace Management. Deconfliction of airspace is vital to aviation operations. There are many layers to this task, which begins at the highest levels of air tasking, order development, and targeting, and ends with the individual controllers who communicate with and control aircraft that pass through their assigned airspace. While there is occasional reference to the eventual need for Iraqi control and deconfliction of airspace, not enough action is being taken to ensure that capability once the Female police officers undergo marksmanship Iraqi air force is ready to assume the role as an training in Ramadi independent force.28 This function requires a ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 71 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Imbalance in Iraqi Security Force Transition depth of technical knowledge in procedures and lowest level of joint terminal attack controllers 15 Independent Commission on the Security equipment that can only come with time and or at the staff level of air tasking order and air Forces of Iraq, 72. This assessment was observed training. space coordination order development. The first hand when the author was an aviator during At this point in the transition process, models exist, the training templates are there, four separate flying tours in Iraq beginning at the start of combat operations and ending in May 2007. there should be future Iraqi command and and the experts are in the theater right now.29 His last two tours were as a squadron commander in control specialists sitting side by side with Anbar Province. their American counterparts. These specialists Some may argue that there is not an 16 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on should be completing on-the-job training while imbalance in the security force transition. They Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and observing the process that plans for future may point to documentation that indicates that Investigations, Stand Up and Be Counted: The Con- aviation needs, puts the orders together to get deliberate decisions have established priorities tinuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces aviation assets to end users, and then ensures that did not include the requirements identified (110th Cong., 1st sess., 2007), 98, available at
72 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu The Influence of Just War Perspectives Implications for U.S. Central Command
By Tyler Rauert s terrorism a legitimate method of While state actions that intention- warfare? Can deliberate attacks on ally target civilians for violence are almost civilians intended to further a just universally condemned, no corresponding Icause ever be justifiable? Can they be international consensus exists on how to morally permissible? Morally required? How deal with nonstate actors that do the same. Three quarters of the miseries and else can the weak possibly defeat the strong? Some consider such deeds as crimes, others misunderstandings in the world would These are vital questions to U.S. Central see them as illegitimate acts of war, and still finish if people were to put on the Command (USCENTCOM)—not because others view them as necessary and justifiable shoes of their adversaries and of the way the combatant command might efforts to repel aggression or occupation. The understood their points of view. answer them but because of the reply they last perspective is particularly prevalent in the often receive within the USCENTCOM area Muslim-majority countries of the Near East —Mahatma Gandhi of responsibility (AOR). where groups such as Hizballah and Hamas,1 widely condemned as terrorist organizations in the West, enjoy considerable popular support as legitimate resistance movements. What does this difference of opinion on the legitimacy of violence against civil- ians mean for counterterrorism cooperation U.S. Air Force (John L. Houghton, Jr.) U.S. Air Force
Army M1A1 Abrams tank patrols in Baghdad Tyler Rauert is an Assistant Professor in the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 73 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Influence of Just War Perspectives with the United States from the nations of the resort to force by nonstate actors and, second, they developed in the broader Middle East Middle East and Central Asia?2 Will coop- the limitations on the use of force by these and in the West. eration be half-hearted and only grudgingly players. Such a consensus already exists with While a historical survey of Just War offered under political pressure? Is where regard to state-to-state violence and is the nec- traditions is beyond the scope of this article, it one stands on the issue simply a function of essary first step toward authentic cooperation is worthwhile to note that “every civilization where one sits politically? Not necessarily. to combat terrorism. has tried to impose limits on violence, includ- While “fundamentalist” interpretations exist This consensus-building requires a ing the institutionalized form of violence we on all sides, there are still shared tenets on the serious effort among all parties to listen, call war. After all, the limitation of violence is resort to force and the conduct of hostilities understand, and collaborate, even where the very essence of civilization.”4 These limits that can serve as the foundation on which to differences seem irreconcilable. One such usually include norms regulating the resort to build effective counterterrorism cooperation “irreconcilable difference” is that support for force, the jus ad bellum in the Western tradi- between the United States and the nations of groups such as Hamas and Hizballah is often tion, as well as the conduct of hostilities once the Near East. dismissed as irrational, misguided, or simply the use of force is initiated, the jus in bello. This work first examines the impor- anti-Semitic. That may be, but it is also very An examination of the particular limits on tance of consensus-building to international violence in the two traditions is less important cooperation. It then draws out how divergent today’s threat of global here than an understanding of how the two perspectives on shared principles may inhibit regions approach these limits. international efforts to confront violent non- terrorism is such that Use of Force in the Broader Middle state actors, including the struggle to combat no international effort to East. The Western perception of Just War terrorism. Finally, it suggests methods combat it will be effective in the Muslim world is multifaceted. While for USCENTCOM to bridge this gap and without the voluntary and “most Muslims would agree that interna- increase the effectiveness of counterterror- enthusiastic cooperation of tional norms of behavior in wartime conform ism cooperation between America and the the peoples of the Middle East to Islamic injunctions on humane behavior nations of the region. toward the enemy,”5 and while efforts within and Central Asia the state system to shift international norms International Cooperation closer to regional understandings have at The nature of the international system real and is sustained by reasoned argument times proven successful,6 anticolonial senti- means that the effectiveness of cooperation over and above the emotions and prejudices ments color modern thinking on the just on any issue is largely a function of the level that may also be in play. Likewise, a widely recourse to force and the conduct of hostili- of agreement on the norms underpinning it. held view in the region is that the United States ties. Whether framed in terms of nationalist The customary principles governing conflict considers Hamas and Hizballah to be terrorist arguments or an Islamic idiom, anti-impe- between states, for example, are widely fol- organizations only because they threaten Israel, rialist sentiments predominate in modern lowed not only because they are codified in not because of the methods they employ. This discourse on war and peace throughout the treaties and international conventions,3 but perception is strengthened by past U.S. support broader Middle East. The “Third World also because they make practical sense as self- to resistance movements in the region that context” of much of the Muslim world, where imposed restraints on the use of force. They employed questionable means to achieve their colonial subjugation is bitterly resented, especially make sense when the use of force is goals such as the Afghan resistance against the retains echoes of fear of foreign domination.7 designed to facilitate a return to peace while Soviets. These perceptions diminish the ability Some even argue that “the fundamentalist minimizing losses on all sides without imped- of the United States and other Western nations attack on Western values is . . . the Muslim ing the goals of hostilities. The savagery of to work with the peoples of the Muslim world version of the attack on ‘neoimperialism’ that war is not reduced by international humani- to combat the threat of terrorism. characterizes many Third World polemics tarian law, but by the voluntary compliance against the current international order.”8 that results from acceptance of the norms that Shared Principles, Divergent Foci This pervasive anticolonial sentiment underpin it. The law acts as a guide to imple- A basic agreement on the norms has a significant effect on Just War thought in ment this basic agreement on the practical that underpin limitations on state-to-state the region that often blends national libera- necessity to limit violence during warfare and violence allows international humanitar- tion perspectives with those of Islam. While how to do it. ian law to guide state practice in warfare. the majority of medieval writers in the region Similarly, today’s threat of global ter- At the same time, the tolerance and even focused on legitimate means in warfare, rorism is such that no international effort encouragement of violence by movements modern writers concentrate on the just to combat it will be effective without the such as Hamas and Hizballah, which inten- recourse to force, particularly the justice of voluntary and enthusiastic cooperation, if not tionally target noncombatants, demonstrate the cause, with comparatively little attention the leadership, of the peoples of the Middle a genuine disagreement over such norms to the legitimate conduct of hostilities. “Con- East and Central Asia. They must have own- by nonstate actors. This incongruity makes temporary discussions of jihad,” for example, ership of the international effort alongside the intrinsically motivated cooperation so “now often assert that wars are justified in Western partners. This ownership will be necessary for states to combat terrorism Islamic law when they are conducted to end accomplished only after genuine consensus unattainable. The source of this divergence exploitation and oppression by the superpow- is reached on, first, the justification for the can be found in the Just War traditions as ers or to achieve liberation from the forces of
74 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu RAUERT imperialism.”9 The logic holds that if a cause ately focused on the prosecution of conflict tion. Others see the UN Security Council not is just, any method necessary to further that over the legitimacy of conflict initiation. as a tool to bring legitimacy to international cause is also just, especially if the partisans One might argue that the preponderance collective action but as simply another way for of the just cause operate from a point of com- of Western thought on Just War during the the strong to exercise dominion. parative military weakness, thus eliminating past century is a refinement and institution- Westerners must ask themselves the need to address considerations of the alization of the limitations on the conduct of whether the just recourse to force has been legitimate means of warfare. hostilities within international humanitarian subordinated in practice to the conduct Emphasis on the justice of the cause, law. While a focus solely on the legitimacy of of hostilities. In the zeal to ensure that all as in the Reformation wars of Europe, to the the recourse to force can lead to an acceptance belligerents abide by the limitations on the exclusion of the means by which the cause of terrible atrocities in the name of a just cause, conduct of hostilities regardless of the justice can be justly pursued, ignores the fact that a focus on the just prosecution of conflict to of one’s cause, has the West rendered justice unspeakable atrocities may be carried out the exclusion of meaningful reflection on the in the resort to force irrelevant? If so, some in the name of an otherwise worthy end. In just initiation of violence carries unintentional of the most important partners in the inter- the absence of fully developed norms on the but nonetheless significant undertones of national effort to combat terrorism may view limitations on conducting hostilities, support neoimperialism. Restraints on the conduct of norms regarding the use of force by nonstate for groups that pursue just causes unjustly violence seem designed to disarm the weak actors as hypocritical at best and a threat to will continue to flourish in the Middle East and entrench the injustice of the strong when their sovereignty at worst. Former European and Central Asia, thus limiting the ability of they are not accompanied by equally stringent colonies may view the limitations on the regional and Western governments to combat limitations on the prior condition of the just methods and means of violence as a way to terrorism. recourse to force. keep the weak from fighting the perceived Use of Force in Western Nations. While The limited analysis of constraints on unjust initiation of hostilities by the strong, there is a strong emphasis on the justice of the recourse to force that does occur in the West whether through “preemption/prevention” conflict in the Near East, the Western concep- smacks of colonialism to many. Arguments for or “humanitarian intervention,” therefore tion of modern Just War theory tends to see the legality of humanitarian intervention and limiting the ability of the two cultures to conduct in a war as independent of the justice preemptive/preventative war can both be seen, work together against a common threat: of a war. This perspective, influenced by the rightly or wrongly, as pretexts for the militar- terrorism. post–World War II creation of the United ily strong to impose their will on the weak. Nations and the decolonization process that Moreover, the claim that the recourse to force followed,10 seeks to “civilize” just and unjust is only justified in self-defense or with Security most Western thought wars alike by asserting that norms governing Council authorization is simply insufficient on political violence is the conduct of hostilities are applicable when- when it comes to nonstate actors whose causes disproportionately focused on ever a situation reaches a certain threshold of are widely seen as just within a given popula- active belligerency. The underlying causes of tion. Many would argue that violent resistance the prosecution of the conflict are seen to have no bearing on its against colonialism or occupation, however conflict over the legitimacy of proper conduct, and therefore most Western broadly those terms are defined, is the para- conflict initiation thought on political violence is disproportion- digmatic Just War—it is self-defense by defini- DOD (Perry Heimer) Signal Company (Ronald A. Mitchell) th 55
Marine gives sack of grain to Somali woman in U.S. and Canadian soldiers board CH–47 Chinook helicopter en route to Tora Bora Mogadishu during Operation Restore Hope region in Afghanistan
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 75 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Influence of Just War Perspectives
Americans must also ask themselves nonstate violence. It is, however, incomplete. To draw out these nascent consensus- whether the relative dearth of construc- International humanitarian law is by and building efforts and engender more effective tive discussion of the just recourse to force, large not designed to deal with nonstate actors international cooperation to combat the particularly by nonstate actors, might give or the acts of violence they commit, and the phenomenon of terrorism, statesmen, soldiers, credence to charges of Western double stan- fact that there is ambiguity concerning groups and scholars should encourage a “process of dards. Upon what principle does the United such as Hamas and Hizballah testifies to the conversation between civilizations, the process States support or deny the right of nonstate need to augment existing norms. of deliberate non-violent adjustment, dialogue actors to take up arms? Upon what principle The consensus-building process and and negotiation between competing sources does it back particular resistance organiza- accompanying international cooperation of norms governing violent conflict.”11 Just tions? Is support based simply on expediency already exist in many respects. For example, War traditions are a good place to start this or does it also have to do with the justice of a significant agreement is emerging on the need process; they are dynamic systems of thought cause and how that cause is pursued? If it is to combat terrorism that is reflected in inter- and practice that offer the guidance of centu- the latter, the United States is in good stead. national conventions and corresponding legis- ries on the justification for and execution of If it is the former, we give credibility to those lation in individual countries. This emerging violence, but they are not fixed dogmas. They who claim that America only condemns as international consensus is a focus of study for did not develop in isolation, and they continue terrorists those who oppose its interests—that the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Near to evolve in concert, more mutually influen- one man’s terrorist truly is another man’s East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies tial than exclusive. They are still evolving and freedom fighter. Such a perception only (NESA Center) and its partners. While con- adapting to shifting international realities. undermines efforts at cooperation to combat crete steps are being taken against terrorist Each culture and tradition must critically a common threat and must be addressed if groups whose causes are not widely seen as examine its understanding of its own Just War the desire to confront the phenomenon of ter- just in the region and around the world, it is norms as well as the concerns of the others. rorism is sincere. more difficult to collectively combat groups Scholars, statesmen, and bearers of with significant support, whose causes are arms in the Middle East and Central Asia Harmonizing Norms perceived as just, such as Hizballah and will be well served to address limitations on It is evident that while the United States Hamas. This ambiguity undermines overall the conduct of hostilities more systemati- and the nations of the Muslim world share counterterrorism cooperation even against cally, even when undertaken in a just cause. basic principles regarding the just use of groups whose causes are not widely seen as While jus in bello considerations do figure force, they differ on which components of just, such as al Qaeda. into some of the discourse on war and peace the various Just War traditions they empha- in the region, they are dwarfed by jus ad size, with the broader Middle East generally bellum concerns. Moreover, the discussion of focusing on the just recourse to force at the the consensus-building the conduct of hostilities that does occur “is expense of the just conduct of hostilities and process and accompanying usually undertaken by modernists seeking the United States tending to subordinate the international cooperation to reinterpret the Qur’an and sunna so that justice of war to justice in war. This divergence already exist in many respects Islamic injunctions correspond to current results in different conceptions of the justice international practice”12 rather than seeking of the initiation of hostilities and limitations of violence, particularly regarding violence against civilians by nonstate actors in what are perceived to be just causes. These differences, however, are not irreconcilable, and they do DOD (Chad J. McNeeley) not indicate that international cooperation to combat terrorism cannot proceed. They simply mean that there is hard work to be done to increase the effectiveness and compat- ibility of cooperation. The divide can be bridged by establish- ing an international consensus on the norms that characterize the legitimate use of force by nonstate actors that encompasses both the resort to force and the conduct of hostilities. The international community has largely established such a consensus on the norms regarding interstate conflict upon which international humanitarian law is built. That ongoing effort is one of the great success stories of modern civilization and serves as GEN Petraeus and ADM Mullen meet in Baghdad a useful guide for norm-setting regarding
76 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu RAUERT to enter into a dialogue about what norms ism and the justification for violence are International Law Enforcement Academies. are or should be shared across civilizations. candidly addressed. Combatant command The command might also invite the Coun- Regional players may also realize a benefit participation in regional center courses and terterrorism Section at the Department of from devoting attention to whether a just other programs might be increased through Justice or the Homeland Security Center of cause is a sufficient reason to commence guest-speaking roles or course participation Excellence for the Study of Terrorism and hostilities or simply one among a number of to allow USCENTCOM personnel more Response to Terror (START) to conduct necessary conditions. contact with regional players. These regional workshops, seminars, and lectures on ter- centers may also be a vehicle through which rorism-related topics in the region. START Moving the Dialogue Forward the command could host events in the already runs a program on intercultural and Similarly, Western scholars and states- region to focus on these issues at forward inter-religious dialogue among U.S. college men can move the dialogue on shared norms locations such as U.S. bases and Embassies forward by more consciously addressing as well as regional states’ defense and civil- concerns of the just recourse to force. There ian universities. USCENTCOM can stimulate is precious little discussion on just recourse USCENTCOM may also consider intercultural engagement in the Western world as opposed to the just establishing fellowships at regional centers on the justification and conduct of violence, with the notable and to allow up-and-coming officers to conduct management of violence often unhelpful exceptions of humanitarian command-specific research on perceptions by leveraging programs intervention and preemptive/preventative war of the justification and management of conducted by other U.S. discussed earlier. Opinion leaders in the West violence in the region or to allow officers should critically examine whether they would returning from duty in the broader Middle Government entities be willing to give up rights they hold dear in East an opportunity to articulate issue- the face of a superior opponent they could not relevant thoughts on their experience. The students. The command might assist in defeat by conventional means. Is the survival command might also sponsor a scholar or expanding this program to include students of a nation, or of democracy, a sufficiently policymaker from the region as visiting from the broader Middle East or sponsor a just cause to allow departures from accepted faculty at a regional center to further the regional pre- or postdoctoral fellow in the norms limiting the conduct of hostilities? exchange of ideas and allow for in-depth START Fellows Program. The U.S. Institute While the United Nations and understanding. of Peace is yet another resource on which similar organizations serve the function of The command can serve its interest U.S. Central Command might seek to intercultural dialogue well on most issues, in fostering dialogue that leads to increased capitalize. USCENTCOM can constructively engage the cooperation to combat terrorism throughout While collaboration with existing process of deliberation over the long-term its AOR by strengthening its collaboration programs in the U.S. Government and just resort to and conduct of violence in the with other elements of national power, par- government-sponsored and -affiliated broader Middle East in a number of ways: ticularly with the State Department’s Office entities enables USCENTCOM to engage of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/ in the process of deliberation over the just n partnering with DOD’s academic CT). The S/CT Regional and Trans-Regional resort to and conduct of violence, they are regional centers that already engage relevant Affairs Directorate builds political will and by no means the only avenues available. The players in the USCENTCOM AOR capacity to combat terrorism among inter- United Nations has initiated an “Alliance of n strengthening relationships and cooper- national partners, making it a natural ally Civilizations,” and the North Atlantic Treaty ation between the command and elements of in any effort to engage parties in the broader Organization offers multiple opportunities for the U.S. Government outside of the Depart- Middle East on the issues of the justification engagement. ment of Defense for and limitations on violence as well as USCENTCOM’s engagement in the n leveraging international programs other terrorism-related issues. process of intercultural deliberation on these n examining the possibilities generated U.S. Central Command can stimulate issues might also be facilitated by building by such initiatives as the joint venture of U.S. intercultural engagement on the justification on the model offered by Sovereign Chal- Special Operations Command and U.S. Stra- and management of violence by leveraging lenge, which represents the kind of interac- tegic Command called Sovereign Challenge, the existing programs on terrorism-related tion necessary to respond to the disagree- a collaborative information-sharing Web topics conducted by other U.S. Government ment over whether terrorism conducted to portal focused on terrorism-related issues. entities. The State Department’s Anti- further a just cause can ever be justifiable. Terrorism Assistance Program already goes USCENTCOM could use the Sovereign Regional centers such as the NESA a long way toward fostering cooperative Challenge Web site as a model for a platform Center and the George C. Marshall Euro- efforts between U.S. and partner nation law to sustain a network of opinion leaders pean Center for Security Studies build enforcement personnel, but USCENTCOM and officials in the region, encourage visits sustained relationships with opinion leaders could also sponsor regional police officers among players in multiple locations, and and government officials in the USCENT- to attend training programs at the Depart- facilitate workshops and exercises. COM AOR and also build regional coopera- ment of Homeland Security’s Federal Law Whatever role the command plays, tion on security issues through an academic Enforcement Training Center, chiefly one of the concrete steps currently being environment where issues such as terror- through its Counterterrorism Division or taken to encourage dialogue and negotiation ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 77 SPECIAL FEATURE | The Influence of Just War Perspectives
among competing sources of norms on 4 François Bugnion, “Just Wars, Wars of DEADLINE violent conflict is taking place in July 2008 Aggression and International Humanitarian Law,” at the National Defense University. The International Review of the Red Cross 84, no. 847 Approaching NESA Center, along with the Inter-Univer- (September 2002), 523–546. 5 Sohail Hashmi, “Saving and Taking Life in sity Center for Legal Studies at the Interna- War: Three Modern Muslim Views,” The Muslim for Issue 52 tional Law Institute, will host an event on JFQ World 89, no. 2 (April 1999), 158. the legal and moral environment to combat 6 See article I of Additional Protocol I to the transnational threats such as terrorism in Geneva Conventions of 1977, which seeks to regu- the Near East and South Asia. This event late the use of violence in struggles for self-deter- and the edited proceedings to follow should mination. The protocol extends the protections and engage the perceptions of the justification responsibilities of international humanitarian law and limitation of violence both in the region (IHL) to insurgents, militias, and other nonstate and in the Western world at length and are actors engaged in armed hostilities against “colo- a forum where the process of deliberate nial domination and alien occupation” as well as conversation and nonviolent adjustment can “racist regimes” that deny the exercise of self-deter- mination. While not adopted by all states, most begin. notably the United States and Israel, Additional Protocol I has profoundly affected the international Addressing the justification for the understanding of just recourse to force and limita- resort to force by nonstate actors and the tions on violence in that it recognizes the legitimacy limitations on the use of force by these players of nonstate actors to commit acts of violence for will not end terrorism, nor will it convince political purposes. This instrument was largely the nonstate actors to give up violence. The test product of actors within the USCENTCOM AOR, of success in this dialogue will not be that Palestinian territories, and other former colonies as one side or another wins the argument over well as the Soviet Union. The role of players from FEATURING: the correct answers to the questions posed the broader Middle East in this IHL development at the beginning of this article, but that the demonstrates the rich and diverse understanding of the justification and limitation of force in the differences are acknowledged, examined, Land Warfare region. Rather than being motivated by Islamic and in some way accommodated over time tradition, the formulation of Additional Protocol so shared norms can be established to enable AND I was colored primarily by nationalism. See James the community of nations to work together to Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and combat the common threat of terrorism. Such Islamic Traditions (University Park: Pennsylvania U.S. Africa Command a process has occurred and continues to occur State University Press, 1997), 615. regarding violence undertaken by states. This 7 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “War and Peace in gives us reason to believe that the same result Islamic Tradition and International Law,” in Just can eventually be achieved with nonstate War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspec- Submissions Due by actors. Such a process is in fact already occur- tives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Tra- ring in subtle ways. Our task is to acknowl- ditions, ed. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), 205. edge this development and constructively September 1, 8 Sohail Hashmi, “Interpreting the Islamic engage in it. JFQ Ethics of War and Peace,” in The Ethics of War and 2008 Peace, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1996), 159. NOTES 9 Mayer, 205. 10 JFQ Issue 53 1 While Israel and the Palestinian territories Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Islam and do not fall within the USCENTCOM AOR, the International Law: Toward a Positive Mutual Featuring: conflict there has reverberations across the Arab Engagement to Realize Shared Ideals,” American and Muslim worlds. It critically impacts the nations Society of International Law, Proceedings of the Global Strategic Outlook in the command’s AOR and is crucial to under- Annual Meeting (2004), 160. 11 James Cockayne, “Islam and International U.S. Transportation Command standing how the peoples of the region understand terrorism. Humanitarian Law: From a Clash to a Conversa- 2 The Middle East and Central Asia includes tion between Civilizations,” International Review all the nations of the USCENTCOM AOR, as well of the Red Cross 84, no. 847 (September 2002), 623. Submissions Due by as Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Turkey. Emphasis in original. 12 December 1, 2008 3 These customary rules were codified over Hashmi, “Interpreting,” 163. time in the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949, and The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our Guide for Contributors. Share your profes- sional insights and improve national security.
78 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu Forty Years of COIN The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories
n an October 31, 2007, speech at Car- cies toward the Palestinians and observes the frequency of attacks and the number of negie Mellon University, retired Army when there are reductions in the frequency casualties they cause, the greater is counter- General John Abizaid warned that “we and lethality of Palestinian insurgent attacks. insurgent success. This definition is justified Ishouldn’t assume for even a minute that This does not mean that factors other than inasmuch as the ability to launch a large in the next 25 or 50 years the American mili- the Israeli government’s response have had no number of attacks and inflict a large number tary might be able to come home, relax and influence on Palestinian insurgent strength. of fatalities suggests a great deal of operational take it easy.”1 If General Abizaid’s assessment In fact, the physical and political environ- strength on the part of insurgents. Reducing is even partially accurate, the U.S. military ment, the insurgency’s level of organization that strength is the overall objective of COIN will be engaged in the U.S. Central Command and unity, and insurgents’ strategies have also operations. With that said, this measure of area of responsibility for a long time to come, played a role. Still, “of all the variables that insurgent strength captures only short-term, probably in some counterinsurgent capacity. have a bearing on the progress and outcome tactical COIN success, not long-term, stra- The Israeli occupation of the West Bank of insurgencies, none is more important tegic COIN success, which is measured at a and Gaza Strip, 40 years old in June 2007, may than government response.”3 This study more general level and is not amenable to the hold lessons for just such a mission. Israel does not develop a comprehensive explana- policy-evaluation approach employed here. is battling an insurgency that is driven by tion for Palestinian insurgent strength, but So the question this article addresses is what Islamist and secular nationalist movements. merely identifies Israeli occupation policies Israeli occupation policies have coincided Its experience against the Palestinian insur- that have coincided with COIN success and with tactical success against the Palestinian gency should be valuable to U.S. policymakers failure. Given limited space, it leaves to future insurgency. and military planners as counterinsurgency research the explanation of why these asso- By this measure of insurgent strength, (COIN) operations in the Middle East ciations exist. Israeli policies have coincided with COIN continue.2 success from the beginning of the occupation This article assumes that the govern- Measuring Israeli COIN Success ment’s response to an insurgency plays a This study uses the frequency of insur- Dr. Nathan W. Toronto is a Middle East Intelligence predominant role in explaining insurgent gent attacks and the number of fatalities they Analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort success. It examines Israeli government poli- cause as measures of COIN success. The lower Leavenworth.
By Nathan W. Toronto Israel Defense Forces (Dan Bronfeld) Israel Defense Forces
Israel Defense Forces soldiers train in Golan Heights
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(1967) until the outbreak of the first intifada insurgent attacks, by year.5 Two points are of the late 1980s and increased dramatically in (1987) and from about 2005 on, but with rela- note. First, there are significant spikes in the the 1990s, and then increasing Israeli COIN tive COIN failure in between. The insurgent number of fatalities in the mid-1990s, after the success in the last 3 years. push that developed after the 1967 Six-Day creation of the PA, and in the early 2000s, after Israel’s occupation policies have been War had largely petered out by the mid-1970s. the beginning of the second intifada, followed most successful in reducing Palestinian Both the frequency and lethality of insurgent by a significant diminution in the number of insurgent violence when they have empha- attacks decreased measurably after 1975 or fatalities in the last few years. These two spikes sized four elements: so, remaining at a fairly low level for the 1970s in fatalities also represent nontrivial increases and most of the 1980s. n reducing international support for the With the outbreak of the first intifada Palestinian insurgency in December 1987, this success waned. Israel in the last 3 years, Israel n hindering insurgent ability to operate experienced increases in the frequency and has reduced the lethality of within the occupied territories lethality of insurgent attacks, both in the insurgent attacks, especially n isolating the insurgency from internal occupied territories and in Israel proper, in the case of Hamas, which Palestinian support increases that were dramatic after 1994 when has essentially ceased using n restricting Palestinian access to Israeli the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) suicide bombers territory. returned to the territories in the form of the Palestinian National Authority (PA). During Reducing International Support this time, the insurgency used the resources in the number of incidents and are not the Even in the presence of significant and infrastructure of the PA to plan and result of a handful of spectacular attacks. internal popular support, external support is execute attacks against Israeli citizens and There is also a slight, though noticeable, usually critical to insurgent success.7 Over the interests.4 In addition, in 1994, the Islamic increase in the frequency and deadliness of 40 years of its occupation, Israel has used two Resistance Movement (Hamas) began using a Palestinian attacks in the late 1980s. main tactics to isolate the Palestinian insur- deadly new tactic: suicide bombing. Second, there are increases in fatalities gency from external support: international It is only recently—since the effective in 1972, 1974, and 1978 that do not represent diplomacy and control of its borders. end of the second intifada, which began in an increase in the overall number of insur- International Diplomacy. Immediately September 2000—that Israel has succeeded gent attacks. Instead, these spikes are mostly following the Six-Day War, most Arab states in blunting the effectiveness of the Palestin- the result of three surprisingly successful were extremely hostile toward Israel. For the ian insurgency. In the last 3 years, Israel has attacks, on May 31, 1972; May 15, 1974; and most part, the frontline Arab states either significantly reduced the lethality of insurgent March 11, 1978, resulting in 25, 31, and 43 continued or increased support for Palestinian attacks, especially in the case of Hamas, which fatalities, respectively.6 Given that no other insurgents. In addition to this, Soviet diplo- has essentially ceased using suicide bombers. attacks before 1994 resulted in more than 20 matic and moral support for Arab states in Figure 1 illustrates these trends in fatalities, these spikes should not be taken general—and the Palestinian cause in particu- relative COIN success and failure during as representative of a trend in Israeli COIN lar—remained high during the Cold War.8 the Israeli occupation. It gives the number failure, as the latter attacks should. In short, This state of affairs began to change as the of confirmed Palestinian attacks in Israel, figure 1 suggests a pattern of Israeli COIN occupation wore on. Of particular importance the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, as well as success in the 1970s, followed by insurgent was Egypt, which expelled Soviet advisors and the number of victim fatalities as a result of effectiveness that increased marginally in began to turn toward the West in the early 1970s9 and which signed a peace agreement Figure 1. Palestinian Insurgent Strength, 1967–2007 with Israel in 1978. With this, one of the prin- cipal supporters of the Palestinian insurgency 600 retired from the fray. In addition, deepening 500 U.S. political support for Israel throughout the 1970s and 1980s blunted support for the Pales- 400 tinian insurgency in the international commu- 300 nity. On top of this, Israel has used international 200 publicity campaigns to excoriate Palestinian attacks and discredit the PLO.10 100 These diplomatic efforts became so 0 effective that, by the end of the second inti- fada, Israel could cut off external material
1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 support for the insurgency nearly at will. For YEAR instance, when Hamas was voted into power in the January 2006 Palestinian elections, Fatalities Number of attacks the international community froze all funds Source: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, “Terrorism Knowledge Base.” As of March 31, 2008, intended for the PA. While Israel initially faced the Terrorism Knowledge Base is no longer available. For more information on how to access this information, visit significant hurdles in isolating the Palestinian
80 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu TORONTO insurgency diplomatically, by the early 2000s, information about co-insurgents.15 The infor- Isolating the Insurgency Israel’s diplomatic efforts had greatly curtailed mation this network provides has constituted Israeli policies designed to drive a wedge international support for the insurgents. Israeli an important advantage for the government between the Palestinian insurgency and the diplomacy did not correlate with early success in combating the Palestinian insurgency, Palestinian population were associated with against the Palestinian insurgency, although it inasmuch as Israel has proven able to identify COIN success in the beginning of the occu- has done so in recent years. and capture insurgents and—occasionally—to pation. Israeli policies, however, have been Border Control. The other tactic that prevent attacks even after insurgents have left unable to isolate the insurgency from internal Israel has used to isolate the Palestinian insur- their base. support since then, hindering COIN success. gency from external support is its control of Targeted Killings. Israel’s effective Three factors have affected this element of international borders. At the occupation’s intelligence network in the territories has Israeli policies: limiting violence against Pal- outset, Israel clamped down on the interna- supported its campaign of targeted killings estinian civilians, economic development, and tional borders of the occupied territories. By during the last two decades. For example, Israeli settlements on occupied land. December 1968, there was a security barrier— Israel has been able to target and kill leaders Violence against Palestinians. Limiting consisting of double fences with mines in of Hamas in recent years, which has coincided violence against Palestinian civilians denies between—along the Jordan River. Control with a dramatic decrease in suicide bomb- internal support to the insurgency in two of the borders not only limited the flow of ings over the same period. Israel’s policy of ways. First, by dealing sharply with attacks by weapons and insurgents into the territories, targeted killings, which began in earnest in Israeli civilians against Palestinians, the gov- but also made cross-border raids by Palestin- December 2000,16 has correlated with Israeli ernment prevents the insurgency from using ian insurgents more difficult.11 COIN success since the beginning of the such attacks as a recruiting tool. Second, by The reintroduction of the PLO into second intifada. the territories in 1994, however, complicated Deportations. Until 1992, when the Israel’s ability to control the borders. The Israeli High Court made the practice illegal, control of the borders not only close relationship between the PA and the Israel occasionally deported Palestinian limited the flow of weapons insurgency facilitated the circumvention insurgent leaders to other Arab countries.17 and insurgents into the of Israeli border controls. In addition, the The trends shown in figure 2 suggest that territories, but also made cross- Israelis gave partial control over border cross- Israel enjoyed more COIN success when it border raids by Palestinian ings to the PA as part of the negotiated peace implemented this policy aggressively. The insurgents more difficult process. Although Israel has tried recently high level of deportations in the late 1960s to regain control over the borders, at least in and early 1970s correlates with early success Gaza it has not experienced total success.12 against the insurgency. By the same token, curtailing Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence, Thus, Israeli border control measures coin- Israel’s concerted deportation efforts in the the government prevents the insurgency from cided with COIN success at the beginning of early 1990s (principally against Hamas) intimidating the population into supporting it. the occupation, but have not done so since coincided with the end of the first intifada: In the early years of the occupation, the mid-1990s. the number and effectiveness of insurgent Israel generally dealt firmly with violent acts attacks decreased during these times. So an by Israelis against Palestinian civilians. For Hindering Insurgent Operations aggressive deportation policy has correlated example, after a bombing at a bus terminal Israeli efforts at limiting insurgent with Israeli COIN success, as have an effec- in September 1968, a mob of Israeli Jews operations in the territories themselves have tive intelligence network and the policy of attacked a number of Arabs who had nothing met with success. The Palestinian insur- targeted killings. to do with it. The government subsequently gency launched a number of transnational terrorist attacks in the first two decades of Figure 2. Israeli Deportation of Palestinians the occupation, suggesting that Israeli poli- cies limited their ability to operate inside the 500 13 territories. Three factors have sometimes 400 coincided with COIN success: Israel’s intelligence network, targeted killings, and 300 deportation policies. 200 Intelligence Network. From the begin- ning of the occupation, Israel developed its 100 intelligence network in the territories.14 The 0 most well-known aspect of this network is
Israel’s employment of Palestinian informants 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 to provide information on insurgent activities. YEAR Two other elements of this network are the Arabic-speaking Israeli agents implanted in Number of deportations the territories for extended periods and the Note: The number of deportations is averaged for 1970 to 1973. insurgents who Israel has induced to divulge Source: Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem), “Statistics: Deportation,” available at
Israel Defense Forces paratroopers conduct combined arms training Israel Defense Forces (Abir Sultan) Israel Defense Forces
82 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu TORONTO the economic situation to Israeli policies. Any Restrictions from the 1970s to the entry of Palestinians from the West Bank into COIN success that Israel has enjoyed since the 2000s. From 1972 to 1989, Israel allowed Israel. Beyond simply reducing movement early years of the occupation has probably not Palestinians to enter Israel without a permit out of the West Bank, this barrier has made it come as a result of Israeli economic develop- as long as they did not stay overnight. Begin- possible for Israeli military operations to have ment policies in the territories. ning in 1989, in response to the intifada, Israel a strategic effect. For instance, the fence has Settlements. Israel’s settlement program required Palestinians in the West Bank and hindered the ability of insurgents to rehabili- has been the single most upsetting occupation Gaza Strip to have individual permits to cross tate cells and infrastructure in the aftermath of policy for the Palestinian population. It has into Israel, and since then Israel has gradu- Israeli operations. In addition to the security done the most to push the population into ally increased the restrictions on Palestinian fence, since the 1990s Israel has increasingly the arms of the insurgency. Figure 3 suggests movement. In fact, Israel on occasion closes made use of checkpoints and roadblocks that when settlement activity was in its early, the territories completely, during which time inside the territories to limit the ability of subdued stages, it did not constitute a hin- no Palestinian can enter or leave, a policy it Palestinians to move. During Operations drance to Israeli COIN success. However, the has used with increasing frequency from the Defensive Shield and Determined Path in 2002, dramatic increase in the number of settlements early 1990s on. As a case in point, for more Israel imposed extended 24-hour curfews on in the mid-1980s—just before the outbreak of than one-third of the days during 2005, the Palestinian cities and large portions of the the first intifada—made it difficult for Israel to Palestinian territories were completely closed. West Bank. While sometimes condemned in limit internal support for the insurgency. Interestingly enough, restrictive policies on the international community, severely restrict- The number of Israeli settlements in Palestinian access to Israel have correlated ing Palestinian access to Israel has occasionally the West Bank reached a plateau in the 1990s, with greater COIN success only before 1972 coincided with greater COIN success. but that did not make it easier for Israel to and after 2005. The more permissive policies deny popular support to insurgents. From in place from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s Lessons Learned 1996 to 2005, the number of Israelis living Israel’s occupation experience holds valu- in West Bank settlements increased by 45 able lessons for U.S. forces based in Iraq and percent.25 Israel has often built settlements on Israel has been particularly Afghanistan. Keeping in mind that the reasons prominent hills and on the best land, which is effective at hindering why particular Israeli policies coincided with irksome to Palestinians.26 In fact, Palestinian Palestinian access to Israel COIN success are not entirely clear, four main hatred for the settlements runs so deep—and since 2002, when construction lessons can be discerned. First, U.S. strategies the economy is so weak and Palestinian-on- began on the security fence in Iraq and Afghanistan may need to put more Palestinian violence has become so rampant— emphasis on isolating insurgents from external that any COIN success that Israel has achieved support. The borders of both countries are in recent years has likely been in spite of its coincided with relative COIN success, and the relatively porous. Indeed, the Palestinian terri- almost complete inability to win the Palestin- increasingly restrictive policies begun in 1989 tories have much shorter borders than Iraq and ian population over from insurgent control. were not followed with decisive COIN success Afghanistan, but an emphasis on controlling the until the end of the second intifada.29 borders at the very beginning of operations in Restricting Access Security Fence. In 2002, Israel began Iraq and Afghanistan may have put insurgents in Another policy associated with COIN constructing a security fence to control the a much weaker position than they are in today. success has been restricting Palestinian access to Israeli territory.27 Israel controlled this Figure 3. Israeli Settlements on the West Bank access most strictly during the first 5 years of the occupation and from the early 1990s on. 140
Israel has been particularly effective at hin- 120 dering Palestinian access to Israel since 2002, when construction began on the security 100 fence near the border with the West Bank. 80 Early Restrictions on Access to Israel. From 1967 to 1972, Israel regarded the territo- 60 ries as closed military areas, permitting little movement into or out of them. By December 1, 40
1968, traffic between the east and west banks 20 of the Jordan River was “nearly eliminated” and Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek had 0 replaced the prewar barriers between East 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 and West Jerusalem, barriers that Israel had YEAR removed following its victory the previous June.28 These border control measures coin- Cumulative number of settlements cided with Israeli COIN success in the early Source: Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem), “Statistics: Data on Settle- years of the occupation. ments’ Population by year, XLS,” available at
Second, the U.S. military has done an external and internal support, hindered the Guerrilla Movement, 1967–1972” (Ph.D. diss., admirable job of hindering insurgent activity ability of the insurgency to operate within University of Denver, 1972), 98–99, notes that a in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the most part, the occupied territories, and restricted Pal- well-developed intelligence network is essential to government success against an insurgency. U.S. forces have maintained the tactical initia- estinian access to Israeli territory. That said, 15 Henriksen, 5, 11–14. tive against insurgent foes, despite limited simply because these policies have sometimes 16 Amira Hass, “What the Fatality Statistics resources in troops and materiel. Israel has coincided with counterinsurgency success Tell Us,” Ha’aretz, September 3, 2003. The Israeli enjoyed greater success when it has aggres- for Israel does not necessarily mean that U.S. Information Center for Human Rights in the Occu- sively targeted insurgent operations. By the leaders should apply them wholesale. What pied Territories (B’Tselem), “Statistics: Intifada same token, U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty it does mean is that the United States should Fatalities,” available at
84 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu he Israeli body politic finds itself in a new and uncertain interna- Israel’s Survival tional security environment as T it faces the prospect of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. The American intelligence assessment that suggests Iran Instincts and halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 has not relieved Israeli fears. Tel Aviv probably worries that American intelligence on Iran’s nuclear weapons program today is just as mistaken as it was on Iraq’s suspected nuclear the Dangers of weapons program in the run-up to the 2003 war. The Israelis assess that Tehran is pressing ahead in its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian nuclear power Nuclear Weapons in infrastructure.1 As Israelis grapple with policy options for dealing with the emerging Iranian threat, they do not like what they see. They find Iranian Hands themselves “between a rock and a hard place,”
Dr. Richard L. Russell is a Professor of National Security Affairs in the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. His most recent book is Sharpening By Richard L. Russell Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addresses UN General Assembly, September 2005 United Nations (Paulo Filgueiras)
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 85 SPECIAL FEATURE | Israel’s Survival Instincts knowing that there is a large gap between Ahmadinejad elaborated that the “establish- weapon could obliterate Israel, whereas Israel Israel’s declarative policy that it will not allow ment of a Zionist regime was a move by the could ‘only damage’ the world of Islam.”8 hostile states in the region to acquire nuclear world oppressor against the Islamic world” To make matters worse, the Iranian weapons and their military capabilities, which and that “skirmishes in the occupied land are public, which the Western press is all too have substantial shortcomings that could part of the war of destiny. The outcome of eager to depict as a demographic youth bulge impact the ability to hold at risk Iran’s large hundreds of years of war will be defined in born after the 1979 Iranian revolution and and widely dispersed nuclear infrastructure, Palestinian land.”4 For those who attributed eager for liberalization and democratization, all of which is located a long reach from Israel. Ahmadinejad’s UN performance to a slip, is across-the-board supportive of the drive Meanwhile, in debates and discussions they were corrected in December 2005 when for nuclear power. As Ramita Navai reported in Washington on the creeping crisis over he argued in a speech to a conference of from Tehran, “Iran’s right to nuclear energy Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons aspirations, Islamic countries in Saudi Arabia that if Euro- and defiance of the West over its nuclear one periodically hears mention of Tel Aviv’s peans established Israel out of guilt over the ambitions is the first issue since the 1979 worries about Tehran. But Israel’s interests Nazi reign, then Israel should be carved out of Islamic Revolution that has galvanized all and threat perceptions are mentioned merely Europe. If that ignorance of history were not political factions, classes and public opinion.”9 in passing and generally receive no sustained enough, Ahmadinejad in another December With this Iranian internal political or deep analysis. The American media, 2005 speech, this time back in Iran, called the landscape, Ahmadinejad’s statements fuel the moreover, with their increasingly thin foreign Holocaust’s extermination of 6 million Jews a fire of Israeli fears about Iran. Some dismiss coverage, rarely cover the Israeli dimension of “myth” that never happened.5 Israeli fears as “overblown,” but as the old quip the Iran crisis. In contrast, the threat posed by Reasonable people in the West end has it, even paranoids have real enemies—and an Iran armed with nuclear weapons receives up scratching their heads pondering the Iran is such an enemy. The Iranians have heavy coverage in Israeli media and fills the purpose behind Ahmadinejad’s bellicose and been extraordinarily consistent and patient in-boxes of Israeli security officials and dip- anti-Israeli outbursts. Some astute Iranian in their sponsorship of Hizballah, which has lomats already heavily burdened by terrorism observers such as Karim Sadjadpour and Ray long waged a guerrilla war against Israel. and the conflict with the Palestinians.2 Takeyh suggest that the Iranian president’s There can be no gainsaying that Iran has been Clearly, a look at the Israeli dimension behavior is aimed at provoking a crisis and Hizballah’s godfather and staunchest foreign of the Iran nuclear crisis is in order. How do scuttling international negotiations over Iran’s backer and that the organization has inflicted the Israelis view Iran? What dangers would nuclear-related activities, especially enriching significant casualties and costs on Israel, not Iranian nuclear weapons pose to the state uranium, as well as asserting his control over to mention the United States. of Israel? What are the Israelis doing today? Iran’s state machinery and gaining political The mood in Israel is that Iran is no What could they do tomorrow? And what influence among the Iranian populace.6 imaginary threat. To the contrary, as Ephraim would be the implications and consequences Kam, a level-headed and insightful Israeli of Israeli security actions for American national security analyst, observes, “Many national security vis-à-vis Iran and the Gulf? some observers suggest Israeli leaders regard the Iranian threat as that the Iranian president’s the gravest strategic threat facing Israel, and Israeli Worry about Iran behavior is aimed at provoking some regard it as liable to endanger Israel’s Few in the business of foreign affairs a crisis and scuttling very existence in the future.” Kam, peering have missed the steady stream of bellicose international negotiations over ahead, adds that “Iran’s possession of nuclear rhetoric coming out of the very loud mouth Iran’s nuclear-related activities weapons is of major significance to Israel: a of Iran’s elected—to use the word extremely new situation would arise whereby for the first generously and loosely—President Mahmoud time since Israel’s establishment an enemy Ahmadinejad. He shattered diplomatic All the while, a curious depiction has state has the capability of fatally wounding decorum at the United Nations (UN) in his turned up in the Western press of Ahmadine- it.”10 first major international address as a world jad’s rival for the presidency, Ali Akhbar The Israelis, moreover, are gravely leader in September 2005. As one commenta- Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom many character- concerned that their capabilities to deter tor characterized the speech, “Ahmadinejad ize as a moderate. Rafsanjani, contrary to the regional adversaries are fraying. Their for- delivered what began as a sermon praising the popular media view, has been in and around midable conventional military capabilities prophets of Islam, Christianity and Judaism the halls of Tehran’s political power more than have not secured a peace with the Palestinian and then descended into anti-American anyone else for over 20 years, during which Hamas–controlled Gaza Strip or a peace in vitriol, conspiracy theories and threats. He time Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities the Fatah-controlled West Bank. And Israeli expressed doubt that the deadly attacks were shielded from the International Atomic confidence in its military forces to secure its against the United States on September 11, Energy Agency. He presumably has more than northern border was seriously threatened by 2001, were really carried out by terrorists.”3 a fair share of vested interest in seeing that Hizballah rockets fired from Lebanon during As if to belabor his ideological zeal, Iran eventually acquires nuclear weapons.7 A the summer 2006 war. The Israelis worry that Ahmadinejad in an October 2005 speech to nuclear-armed Iran under a Rafsanjani presi- Hizballah is a proxy for Iran’s belligerent poli- 4,000 students in Iran said that Israel “must dency would give Israel, and the United States cies and that should Iran get nuclear weapons, be wiped off the map” and that attacks by for that matter, little comfort. It was Rafsan- Tehran would have license to escalate future Palestinians would destroy it. In that oratory, jani who in 2001 “mused that a single nuclear cross-border surrogate guerrilla operations
86 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu RUSSELL against Israel. Tehran would no longer fear “[a]ll options [preventing] Iran from gaining by UN weapons inspections in the aftermath Israeli military retaliation, which the Iranians nuclear capabilities are legitimate within the of the 1991 Gulf War. could deter with their nuclear weapons. context of how to grapple with this matter.”11 Tel Aviv recently demonstrated the The Iranians might further calculate These words are echoes of the Begin Doctrine, continued centrality of the Begin Doctrine in that escalating Hizballah—as well as Hamas initially articulated by former Prime Minister Israeli national security strategy by mounting and Islamic Jihad—operations against Israel Menachem Begin, which holds that Israel will an airstrike in September 2007 against a sus- would play well politically in the Muslim not wait and watch potentially hostile states pected Syrian nuclear facility. Neither Israel and Arab worlds. Tehran’s stance toward the acquire nuclear weapons and will opt for nor Syria has officially acknowledged the Jewish state already wins political support at preventive military means to stop prospective strike, but fragmentary and unofficial report- home and in the greater Middle East. This is threats from becoming realities. ing suggests that Israeli aircraft destroyed true even among Iran’s traditional Arab rivals The so-called Bush Doctrine of the a North Korea–supplied nuclear reactor in such as Saudi Arabia, which, at least for now, United States, announced in the aftermath Syria. Commercial satellite images taken of has not vehemently protested Iran’s cage- of the 9/11 attacks, shares with the Begin the suspected site at Tibnah showed that the rattling performances against Israel because Doctrine a common national security phi- Syrians hastily dismantled facilities after the the Arab states are deeply frustrated by the losophy. Just as the Bush Doctrine appeared attack in a likely attempt to hide evidence Palestinian plight and resent Tel Aviv for its to become a reality with the 2003 war against of a partially built nuclear reactor similar military prowess and for having acquired Iraq, the Begin Doctrine became a reality with to the design used by North Korea.12 The nuclear weapons before any Arab state. The Israelis also have a deep insecurity Israeli sailors paint due to geographic vulnerability, an aspect SAAR 5–class missile of their national security that should not be corvette at Haifa Naval Base, Israel underestimated. Israel is only a narrow swath of territory along the sea, and its principal population and government centers are located in the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem areas. Americans need to remember their Cold War fears of the potential for only 30 minutes warning of the launching of Soviet nuclear- tipped ballistic missiles at the United States. That recollection would give Americans a mere whiff of the Israeli worry about the warning time of only minutes inside the Middle East. Aggravating these acute security concerns is the collective memory of the Holocaust. Israeli society is rightly permeated with the determination to never again allow adversaries to threaten the existence of the Jewish community, which now is most promi- nently displayed in the state of Israel. The U.S. Navy (Kevin S. O’Brien) possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of Iranians, or its security policy surrogates in the Israeli preventive strike on Iraq’s nuclear Israelis probably calculated that no official its guerrilla war against Israel, would present power reactor, called Osiraq, in 1981. That pronouncements would dampen international just such a concrete and existential threat. bold Israeli move has come to epitomize pre- political tension that could have spun the The Israelis will have to worry that someday, ventive military action against an emerging limited attack into a broader regional crisis. either by design or mishap, Iranian nuclear nuclear threat. Unfortunately, the Israeli strike No doubt, though, the Israelis also sought to weapons might find their way from Iranian was only a tactical achievement. Afterward, send a veiled and credible threat to Tehran Revolutionary Guard arsenals into Hizballah, the Iraqis dispersed their nuclear weapons– that Tel Aviv could do the same to Iran’s Hamas, or Islamic Jihad hands. related activities to numerous locations to nuclear facilities and infrastructure. reduce their vulnerability to preemptive For now, Tel Aviv is engaged in a diplo- Preemptive Military Action military strikes, moves that were uncovered matic effort to keep world attention on Iran The Israelis frequently warn that they will not idly stand by as Iran marches toward a nuclear weapons arsenal. Prime Minister Israeli society is rightly permeated with the determination to Ehud Olmert in January 2008 told govern- never again allow adversaries to threaten the existence of the ment officials that “Israel clearly will not Jewish community reconcile itself to a nuclear Iran” and that ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 87 SPECIAL FEATURE | Israel’s Survival Instincts and its nuclear weapons aspirations. Former from uranium mining, to enrichment, to territory—save Syria—is closely monitored and Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom in December research and development, to the Bushehr patrolled by American air and naval forces. 2005 told the cabinet that “in pursuing the nuclear power plant—are all geographically There is a chance that the Israelis would diplomatic course of trying to get the issue dispersed in the large land mass that makes give the United States a heads-up on their moved to the Security Council, Israel must be up Iran, making them extraordinarily dif- military plans in order to reduce the chances careful to ensure that the problem remains an ficult for Israel to strike with one large aircraft of coming to air-to-air blows with American international—not an Israeli—one.”13 Along package as was done in Iraq and Syria. Iran forces operating over Iraq and the Persian a similar vein in portraying the Iran crisis too might have taken steps to maintain and Gulf. Alternatively, the Israelis might opt not as an international one, then–Israel Defense keep hidden redundant infrastructure, espe- to give Washington advanced notice, fearing Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Dan cially for uranium enrichment, in light of the that the Americans would object or try to stall Halutz asserted in January 2006 that “Israel public disclosures, to compound the difficulty the action. As former Deputy National Secu- is in no rush. The whole world condemns for any Israeli military campaign to decisively rity Advisor Chuck Freilich notes, Israel might Iran’s actions—it cannot be perceived as an derail Iran’s nuclear weapons program. “refrain from placing itself in a potential veto exclusively Israeli problem and should not be For all its military prowess, Israel would situation much as it did in 1981, when it did treated as one.”14 Israeli intelligence appears to face enormous difficulties in attempting to not consult or inform the United States prior judge that Iran could have a nuclear weapon destroy a large part of Iran’s suspected nuclear to attacking the Iraqi reactor at Osiraq.”17 by the end of 2009 at the earliest and more weapons infrastructure. The air force must Israel’s security relations with Turkey likely in the 2010–2011 timeframe.15 Israel still fly a long way to attack far removed Iranian over the years have given rise to speculation has some time to play in the diplomatic arena targets. It would have to rely on its inventory that Tel Aviv could use Turkish air bases, or and to nudge Washington into taking military of 25 F–15I aircraft, with a range of 4,450 kilo- airspace for air-to-air refueling, for easier and action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to meters, as the workhorses for an Iranian strike shorter access to Iranian targets. Ankara’s lift the burden from Israeli shoulders. package.16 These aircraft would have to fly political refusal to allow the United States to through potentially hostile airspace—possibly use Turkey as a staging ground for the 2003 Daunting Challenges Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, not to war against Iraq, however, shows just how The application of the Begin Doctrine mention Iran itself—which could consume little an appetite the Turks have for hosting against Iran—as a replay of Israeli preven- fuel for evasive maneuvers and reduce the foreign forces for operations against their tive strikes against Syrian and Iraqi nuclear ranges of Israeli airpower projection into Iran. southern neighbors. Ankara has polite rela- capabilities—would be a profoundly more dif- The aircraft also would have to carry external tions with Tehran and would not want to ficult operational challenge. The Iranians are fuel tanks, reducing the amount of ordnance jeopardize them, especially if Iran is on the no one’s fools, and they have no doubt learned carried. To possibly make matters worse from cusp of acquiring nuclear weapons. Neverthe- from Iraq’s experience in 1981 and Syria’s the Israeli military standpoint, much of the air- less, the Israelis might go ahead and transit experience in 2007. From what can be gleaned space the Israelis would have to fly through to Turkish airspace for strikes against Iran from public information, Iran’s nuclear infra- get to Iranian without Ankara’s permission and risk a major structure components— setback to security ties with Turkey, hoping the political backlash would be fleeting.
Ankara has polite relations with Tehran and would not want to jeopardize them, especially if Iran is on the cusp of acquiring nuclear weapons
Even if the Israelis could overcome these substantial operational challenges and mount a large air assault on Iran’s nuclear infrastruc- ture, they would be even more hard pressed to follow up with the sustained campaigns needed to repeatedly bomb widespread and substantially heavier infrastructure than Iraq had in 1981 or Syria in 2007. As retired Israeli Brigadier General Shlomo Brom assesses, “Based on the past performance of the IAF [Israeli air force], its order of battle that includes only F–15I and F–16C/D aircraft Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter meets with Israeli capable of long range strike, and the deploy- U.S. Navy (Kevin S. O’Brien) Defense Minister Ehud Barak in Tel Aviv, March 2008 ment of its aircraft, it is possible to determine
88 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu RUSSELL that at long ranges (more than 600 km), the that is not without risks but that perhaps has Tel Aviv also could use a variety of IAF is capable of a few surgical strikes, but fewer risks and more rewards than a military behind-the-scenes diplomatic and intelligence it is not capable of a sustained air campaign showdown with Iran and political fallout with channels to privately, quietly, confidently, and against a full array of targets.”18 The Israelis Israel’s security partners—would be to rely on authoritatively convey the same message to mounted such a limited airstrike in 1985 deterrence. The Israelis might calculate that Iran’s Foreign Ministry, intelligence services, against the Palestine Liberation Organiza- no matter how ideologically motivated Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, and regime advisors tion’s headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia, which president and its Revolutionary Guard are, or to ensure that Israeli “red lines” for Iran’s required aerial refueling of F–15 aircraft and 19 travel of more than 4,000 kilometers. The the problem from the Israeli standpoint is that the regime in Tunis strike, however, was a one-time event against sites specifically known and located. Tehran more nearly resembles a circus-like contest for political The Israelis might complement air- power than a unitary decisionmaking body craft operations with naval assets, but these options have limitations, too. The Israelis how warped their perception of reality is, there handling of ballistic missiles and nuclear could employ their Dolphin-class submarines will be no escaping the brutal logic of massive weapons in a crisis, as well as the dangers to launch cruise missiles at Iran from the nuclear retaliation. should Tehran be tempted to transfer nuclear Arabian Sea and also use special operations The Iranians would have to realize that, weapons to a transnational group such as forces, but even these efforts would be shy of notwithstanding the geographic vulnerability Hizballah, are understood by Iranian leader- the payloads needed to level Iran’s nuclear of Israel, they would never be able to achieve ship. The problem from the Israeli standpoint infrastructure. a strategic surprise and launch barrages of is that the regime in Tehran more nearly The Israelis also could tap their sophis- nuclear weapons loaded on ballistic missiles resembles a circus-like contest for political ticated inventory of ballistic missiles to target to decapitate Israeli leadership in order to power than a unitary, contemplative, deliber- Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure in com- prevent Israel from launching its own nuclear- ate decisionmaking body. bination with fixed-wing aircraft operations. tipped Jericho missiles to wipe out Tehran. Some strategists point to Saddam Hus- Public information on Israeli stores of Jericho The Israelis could impress upon the Iranians sein’s restraint in not firing biological and I missiles, with an estimated payload of 450 to this cold-blooded logic—informed by Cold chemical weapons–tipped ballistic missiles at 650 kilograms and a range of up to 500 kilo- War history—via thinly veiled public pro- Israel during the 1991 Gulf War as evidence meters, and Jericho II missiles, with payloads nouncements that stop short of acknowledg- that nuclear deterrence is robust. The late of 750 to 1,500 kilograms and a range of more ing Israel’s nuclear weapons capabilities. national security expert Ze’ev Schiff put the than 1,500 kilometers, is hard to come by.20 http://www.sajed.ir The Congressional Research Service estimates a modest Israeli inventory of about 50 Jericho I and 100 Jericho II missiles.21 In January 2008, Israel test fired a Jericho III missile, which caught Iran’s attention.22 Tel Aviv no doubt hopes the display will help deter Teh- ran’s use of ballistic missiles against Israel. The use of Jericho ballistic missiles in preventive strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would risk depleting delivery systems for Israel’s nuclear weapons deterrent. But Tel Aviv could embark on a clandestine and sizable buildup of its Jericho missile inventories to be able to saturate Iranian targets with ballistic missiles armed with con- ventional warheads.
Brutal Logic of Deterrence The Israelis might throw up their hands and conclude that any military options are simply too hard or risky and offer too limited prospects for success. Tel Aviv could ultimately and reluctantly calculate that the political costs coupled with the slim prospects for entirely eliminating Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastruc- ture rule out unilaterally moving with military Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of means. The easiest and default policy—one Islamic Republic of Iran ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 89 SPECIAL FEATURE | Israel’s Survival Instincts common Israeli lesson of the 1991 war this ners were far from confident that the strike By the same token, the Israelis are well way: “The fact that Saddam did not use chem- would be worth the risks, but they undertook aware of the dangers of Iran using diplomacy ical weapons against Israel even when he was the mission even though they lacked a clear to play for time as their clandestine work under great stress from attacking forces shows picture of its impact, according to a leaked air toward nuclear weapons proceeds. The Irani- that he understood there are some things force research paper.24 In the final analysis, Tel ans, for their part, know well that the cocktail Israel simply could not tolerate, even if Wash- Aviv calculated that it needed to take the risks of public denials, avoidance of incontrovert- ington was opposed to any Israeli response.”23 associated with its poor information picture of ible or “smoking gun” evidence of nuclear But if Saddam simply withheld the use of Iraq’s program, given the grave threat emerg- weapons aspirations, and diplomacy that plays weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against ing in Baghdad. If Tel Aviv was willing to run along with the International Atomic Energy Israel during the 1991 war because coalition these military risks and uncertainties then, Agency all allowed North Korea to cross the forces were not marching on Baghdad and it could do it again against Iran, even if the nuclear weapons threshold. Tehran today is directly threatening his regime, then any mission is more demanding and risky. likely following in Pyongyang’s footsteps. The Israeli confidence in their ability to deter a The Israelis might calculate that the Israelis will probably come to the conclusion, nuclear-armed Iran would be misplaced. threats posed by Iranian retaliation would if they have not already, that a credible threat be manageable; they sustained numerous of American force is needed to backstop The “Sadat” Military Option Iraqi ballistic missile strikes during the 1991 European-American diplomatic efforts and to Israel’s military operations offer no Gulf War and could bet on riding out some prevent Tehran from going the North Korean panacea or easy solution to the Iranian Iranian retaliatory strikes with their Shahab route. The threat of American force is needed nuclear threat, but that does not rule out the ballistic missiles armed with conventional to put Tehran into a fix in which it cannot limited military options that the Israelis do warheads. They might also calculate that indefinitely stall while working to expand have. Falling back onto the logic of deterrence they could weather the international political its uranium enrichment capabilities and its would still leave Israelis insecure vis-à-vis an opprobrium for attacking Iran. Israel has long stocks of enriched uranium. Iran moving closer and closer to a nuclear been accustomed to suffering the slings and Some observers caution against an weapons stockpile. Security could be further arrows of political and diplomatic blowback American or Israeli military option against undermined should Ahmadinejad or his suc- from controversial decisions such as the 1981 Iran and point to the Libyan surrender of its cessors grow in their bellicosity and reckless- attack on Iraq, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, WMD and ballistic programs as a case that ness as they approach their nuclear weapons the 2006 war in Lebanon, and daily regional shows economic sanctions can bring dramatic goal. A more confident and aggressive Iranian criticisms that Tel Aviv, and not current and changes in regime calculus over the costs foreign policy could jeopardize Tel Aviv’s con- past failures of Palestinian leadership, is and benefits of having these programs. To be fidence in its ability to work out red lines and responsible for the tragic plight of the Pales- sure, the international political and economic “rules of the road” for governing deterrence in tinian people. isolation of Muammar Qadhafi’s regime was a a Israeli-Iranian nuclear rivalry. critical pressure that changed his calculus. But In such desperate straits, the Israelis Bleak Diplomatic Prospects the straw that broke the camel’s back probably might reluctantly conclude that they need to Israeli diplomacy will press the Ameri- was Qadhafi’s fear in 2003 that after Iraq, resort to a military move—if only symboli- cans as well as the Europeans with all its the United States would be prepared to wield cally—to reawaken and force renewed politi- strength for a diplomatic settlement to the military force against Tripoli for its nuclear cal attention and pressure on Iran from the Iranian crisis. The diplomatic threat and weapons program, which was internationally United States, Europe, and the world commu- imposition of more international sanctions exposed by the interception of the BBC China nity. The Israelis, in coming to such a conclu- on Iran would be all well and good, but the cargo ship. The combination of political and sion, might have as their model former Egyp- Tehran regime probably would not feel the economic isolation took a decade to hurt the tian President Anwar Sadat’s masterful use of full bite of economic sanctions for a long time. Libyan regime, and the specter of military the 1973 war for seizing political leverage. In The international community has already force against Tripoli tipped the balance ordering the Egyptian attack on Israel, Sadat economically and politically isolated Tehran, toward a surrender of its WMD and ballistic harbored no illusion of militarily defeating and more of the same would have only mar- missiles. Israel, but he aimed at profoundly changing ginal impact. In the short term, the regime One way for the Israelis to slip out of the international political climate to negotiate would wear economic and political sanctions their “rock and a hard place” predicament is to a peace treaty with Israel on honorable terms as badges of honor for standing in defiance press the United States to shoulder the burden. for Egypt. The Israelis might find themselves of the international community, enhancing Tel Aviv might even threaten exercising a with their backs against the wall and thrash Iran’s self-image and shoring up political “Sadat option” to induce the Americans to out to destroy a piece of Iran’s nuclear infra- support for Ahmadinejad’s regime with move militarily against Iran in lieu of Israeli structure and then settle back into a defensive Iranian nationalism. The economic sanction military action. Washington would have to crouch to watch international reactions and to that would hurt Iran the most would be an worry that an Israeli attack against Iran would guard against Iranian retaliation. economic embargo on the purchase of Iranian risk a public opinion backlash in the Muslim This is not a fanciful scenario if one oil, but the economic and political blowback world, including Arab capitals, which would remembers the great uncertainty about the on the Europeans and Americans in a high threaten to reignite the Israel-Arab conflict prospects of preventively attacking Iraq’s petroleum demand environment would likely and further reduce the already bleak prospects nuclear reactor in 1981. Israeli military plan- be too bitter a pill to swallow. for an Israeli-Palestinian peace.
90 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu RUSSELL
The Israelis could become frustrated special operations against Gulf shipping; more 12 William J. Broad and Mark Mazzetti, “Photos with Tehran’s diplomatic obfuscation and aggressive military, financial, and logistic Show Cleansing of Suspected Syrian Site,” The New U.S. and European diplomatic passivity and support for Hizballah; and Iranian intelligence York Times, October 26, 2007. 13 unwillingness to threaten force. Thus, the bombing operations against worldwide Israeli Herb Keinon, “Shalom: Iran’s Nuclear Confi- dence Grows as the World Fiddles,” Jerusalem Post, Israelis could strike out militarily with no and American diplomatic and military posi- January 9, 2006, 16. illusion of severely damaging Iran’s nuclear tions. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khame- 14 Margot Dudkevitch, “Halutz: Iran’s Going infrastructure, but with every intention of nei, warned in April 2006 that if “the U.S. Nuclear Not Just Israel’s Problem,” Jerusalem Post, shocking the international community via ventured into any aggression on Iran, Iran will January 10, 2006, 3. the Sadat option into substantially greater retaliate by damaging U.S. interests worldwide 15 Erlanger. diplomatic, political, economic, and military twice as much as the U.S. may inflict on Iran.”28 16 “Is Nuclear Parity with Iran a Blessing in Dis- pressure on Iran. The Iranians too could take American Sol- guise for Israel?” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December An Israeli military strike against Iran diers, Sailors, Marines, and diplomats hostage, 8, 2005. could also be precipitated by more bellicose much as they did with 15 British sailors and 17 Chuck Freilich, Speaking about the Unspeak- threats and reckless actions from Ahmadine- marines in March 2007. Iran also could aid able: U.S.-Israeli Dialogue on Iran’s Nuclear Program, jad’s regime. Tehran, for example, could and abet al Qaeda operations against the Policy Focus 77 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2007), 11. encourage and operationally support fresh United States. In short, the Israeli “Sadat” sce- 18 Shlomo Brom, “Is the Begin Doctrine Still waves of Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad nario is one for which American policymakers a Viable Option for Israel?” in Getting Ready for a attacks against Israeli interests. In Israeli eyes, and military commanders need to plan in Nuclear-Ready Iran, ed. Henry Sokolski and Patrick escalated Iranian-sponsored attacks would order to be ready for Iranian retaliatory mea- Clawson (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, “prove” that Iran is hostile and that its leader- sures, especially in the U.S. Central Command Army War College, 2005), 142–143. ship lacks prudent restraint. They would area of responsibility. JFQ 19 Whitney Raas and Austin Long, “Osirak also demonstrate the “undeterrable” nature Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy of the Tehran regime. Such attacks might Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” International Security 31, be reminiscent of, or even more spectacular NOTES no. 4 (Spring 2007), 20. 20 than, Iran’s sponsorship—according to former Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 1 Steven Erlanger, “Israelis Brief Top U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation Director “Israel Missile Update,” The Risk Report 11, no. 6 Official on Iran,” The New York Times, December 11, (November-December 2005), available at
U.S. Air Force (Suzanne M. Jenkins) Integration of Coalition Forces into the USCENTCOM
he United States and its coali- By JOHN F. COUTURE tion partners commenced Mission combat operations in the U.S. T Central Command (USCENT- Operation Enduring Freedom, the NATO-led state and transnational aggression in order to COM) area of responsibility in October International Security and Assistance Force establish regional security and stability. 2001 with the launch of Operation Enduring (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and the Combined American multinational military opera- Freedom. Today, well into the seventh year Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) tions go as far back as the Revolutionary War. It of operations, over 180,000 U.S. and 39,000 in Djibouti. This multinational contingent can be argued that the American coalition with coalition troops from 68 nations remain is the primary instrument USCENTCOM France during the revolution may have been engaged in security and stability operations uses to carry out its stated mission of working the deciding factor for victory when France as participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom, with national and international partners to prevented Lord Cornwallis from escaping by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) promote development and cooperation among sea while American land forces surrounded his Training Mission–Iraq (NTM–I) in Iraq, nations, respond to crises, and deter or defeat army at Yorktown, Virginia, in 1781.
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Since that event, the United States has Freedom began, a separate organization, the prepared to perform their assigned missions fought within a multinational context in Iraqi CCC (IC3), was created, which supported upon arrival in the USCENTCOM theater of nearly every major conflict in which it has coalition liaison teams that were sent to Tampa operations. been involved. Alliances and coalitions, and by nations planning operations in Iraq. There are currently 42 U.S. personnel their advantages and disadvantages, are part In January 2003, the Friendly Forces from all Services assigned to the CCC. Origi- of U.S. operations now and will be in the Coordination Center (F2C2), created to serve as nally conceived as a temporary organization, future. Since 2001, USCENTCOM has relied the forward headquarters for coalition-related the CCC is staffed entirely by Active and heavily on coalition partners for prosecution issues, deployed with USCENTCOM’s main Reserve Component personnel assigned to of the war on terror, and this support is para- body to Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar, to begin mount to the command’s success as it contin- operations out of the contingency forward the CCC operates as the 2 2 ues to execute multiple operations within its headquarters (CFH). The F C functioned pri- primary coordination office area of responsibility (AOR). marily as the IC3 forward headquarters, while Since the outset of Operation Enduring the IC3 remained in Tampa to perform the rear between USCENTCOM and Freedom, the responsibility of integrating headquarters function. The CCC continued to coalition militaries the coalition with U.S. forces has rested with operate out of Coalition Village in Tampa to the USCENTCOM Coalition Coordination focus on Enduring Freedom. USCENTCOM on Individual Augmentee Center (CCC) located at command Headquar- In May 2003, USCENTCOM’s orders for periods of 4 to 6 months for Active ters in Tampa, Florida. The CCC supports command and control function, as well as the personnel, and from 6 to 12 months for the strategic objectives of the commander by main body, shifted back to Tampa from the Reserve personnel. The CCC organization coordinating the identification, development, CFH. The F2C2 followed suit by returning to chart is shown in figure 1. and movement of coalition resources neces- Tampa in June 2003, where it merged back sary to satisfy force capability requirements into the IC3. The CCC (Enduring Freedom Sustaining the Coalition within the command’s AOR. focus) and IC3 (Iraqi Freedom focus) operated One of the most intensely debated issues This article provides a brief history of as separate organizations until January 2004, in our country today is the ongoing call for the CCC, introduces the processes and myriad when they combined to become a single CCC. the return of our troops. Although there organizations involved in sustaining the coali- This single organization remains intact is no timeline for the withdrawal of forces tion, identifies recent coalition integration today. Supporting approximately 180 coali- from either Iraq or Afghanistan, it is likely examples, and makes recommendations to tion personnel from 63 nations represented that a substantial American troop presence improve the management of coalition issues. in Tampa, the CCC operates as the primary will remain until security and stability are coordination office between USCENTCOM established in each country, and each govern- CCC History and coalition militaries. The center is also the ment demonstrates the capability to maintain Following Operations Desert Shield and conduit for information exchange regarding a stable environment for its population. A Desert Storm in 1991, planners recognized the the coalition between Washington (including substantial long-term coalition troop pres- need to establish an organization capable of the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], ence is needed as well. While conditions on supporting and integrating coalition nations Joint Staff, and Department of State) and the ground continue to improve in Iraq and into the planning and operations process the AOR. Communications run the gamut Afghanistan, achieving the desired endstate in and of serving as the focal point for all issues from strategic to tactical, with the primary each country will likely take many years. The related to the coalition. The USCENTCOM objective of ensuring that coalition forces are force level requirements necessary to establish CCJ5 (Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate) Figure 1. Coalition Coordination Center conceived and planned this organization, and implemented these plans following the terrorist ★★ Director C5 (Director’s Action Team) attacks of September 11, 2001. By mid-October 2001, the Coalition Coordination Cell was established with a staff of four U.S. person- Command Group Deputy Director ★ nel, and it was soon designated a center as it expanded in size and responsibility. To accom- modate the coalition liaison teams arriving C 1/2/4/6/8/9 in Tampa, USCENTCOM erected Coalition (Resources and Sustainment) C3 (Operations) Village in a parking lot outside of the main C3 HQ/ C3–USCENTCOM Headquarters. Shortly before Operation Iraqi C1 (Administration)/Coalition C2 (Security) Joint Manning Document Administration Air Desk
C6 (Data/Communication C3–USEUCOM C3–USPACOM/ C4 (Logistics) Captain John F. Couture, Supply Corps, USN, is Operations) Ground Desk USSOUTHCOM Navy Desk assigned to the Office of Naval Research. This article was written while he was an Individual C8 (Resource C9 (Coalition Support) Augmentee assigned to the U.S. Central Command Management) Coalition Coordination Center. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 93 SPECIAL FEATURE | Integration of Coalition Forces into the USCENTCOM Mission the appropriate conditions are constantly eval- ment over the long haul. This multilevel Multilevel Engagements uated by commanders on the ground in Iraq approach requires representatives from the The steps of the multilevel engagements and Afghanistan, USCENTCOM Headquar- Department of Defense (DOD), OSD, the process and the participants involved are ters, the Joint Staff, and OSD and scrutinized Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, and command- shown in figures 2 and 3, respectively. As a by the political leadership in Washington. ers in the field to speak with one voice when general rule, consequential discussions with The issues being debated in the United engaging coalition partners about sustaining coalition partners regarding potential troop States are under equally intense deliberation or increasing their contributions. contributions begin with senior-level bilateral in the governments and populaces of its coali- meetings involving representatives from tion partners. Because of a variety of circum- Developing Countries the OSD-Policy (OSD–P), the resident U.S. stances, including established laws, financial It is also necessary for the United States Ambassador, and senior-level country repre- considerations, public opposition, domestic to eliminate the financial barriers that would sentatives including the minister of defense security concerns, and a reluctance to support otherwise prevent many countries from par- (MOD), chief of defense (CHOD), and other U.S. policy objectives in the region, many ticipating in coalition operations. The term government leaders. The bilateral meetings countries are averse to contributing forces. developing country describes partners that provide an ideal forum for the United States to These factors also influence the level of troop require U.S. funding to participate in ongoing formally request military force contributions. and equipment contributions these nations are operations and the war on terror. The Defense Participants evaluate the experience and read- willing to provide and the caveats they place Security Cooperation Agency’s fiscal year iness of the country’s military forces, identify on their troops, which dictate the missions 2008 budget request states that DOD potential missions suited to their capabilities, the troops are authorized to perform. Before and negotiate funding requirements, commit- many nations can even consider a commit- programs for supporting our coalition part- ment durations (for example, two 6-month ment of troops or equipment, the overwhelm- ners and building partner military capacity deployments), and the types of missions the ing majority of our partners require NATO enable coalition partners to participate in country is willing to perform. involvement or the endorsement of the United U.S. operations and conduct counterterror- If the MODs/CHODs participating in Nations (UN) in the form of a UN Security ist operations when they otherwise lack the the bilateral meetings indicate a willingness to Council Resolution. NATO involvement and/ financial means to do so. Their participation contribute forces, the final decision to deploy or the existence of a resolution impart inter- reduces the stress on U.S. forces operating in troops customarily requires the consent/ national legitimacy to the ongoing operations the [war on terror]. approval of their nation’s legislative body (for and provide the political top-cover that coali- example, parliament, assembly, house of rep- tion governments need to participate. Funding these programs ensures the resentatives), which normally occurs within 2 In view of these complications, the continued support of many important coali- to 4 months. United States must continue to maintain a tion partners and helps maximize participa- The CCC’s role is analogous to that long-term view of requirements in Iraq and tion by developing countries that perform of U.S. military Service chiefs. Although it Afghanistan and to use a multilevel engage- missions that would otherwise have to be per- does not actually train, equip, and deploy the ments approach to sustain coalition involve- formed by U.S. personnel. coalition forces, the CCC is responsible for
U.S. and allied officers discuss force planning during joint exercise off coasts of Panama and Honduras as a rule, consequential discussions with coalition partners regarding troop contributions begin with senior-level bilateral meetings
coordinating with the organizations perform- ing those missions. Upon notification of a country’s interest in contributing forces, the CCC engages that country’s senior national representative (SNR), the U.S. Defense Attaché (DATT) assigned to that nation, and the coalition operations offices of the opera- tional commander to coordinate and facilitate the deployment of coalition troops. It is common for the CCC to provide the contrib- uting nation, through the SNR or DATT, with information requested by his legislative body to support the decision to deploy forces. Once the contributing government
U.S. Navy (Lolita Lewis) formally approves the deployment of forces,
94 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu COUTURE formal military-to-military (mil-to-mil) encounter. Following weeks of discussions of the conditions of the increase dictated by discussions are conducted. The discussions with senior U.S. officials and assurances that the president of the contributing nation was are normally hosted by USCENTCOM or the the mission and deployment locations would that his troops be assigned a more aggressive contributing nation and attended by a small not be altered, the contributing government mission in their own battlespace. A significant contingent from the theater command (Multi- agreed to send its forces. The unit eventually amount of coordination and engagement was National Force–Iraq [MNF–I] or Combined deployed 30 days after originally scheduled. necessary to make this possible. Joint Task Force–82), the DATT, the regional Multilevel Engagements Process. After the country’s intentions were combatant command serving the contribut- Shortly after President George W. Bush announced, representatives from the con- ing nation, and the CCC. By the conclusion announced the plan to surge additional forces tributing nation, the associated U.S. Office of these discussions, the following details into Iraq in 2007, one of our largest coali- of Defense Cooperation and U.S. Embassy, regarding the deployment of the coalition tion partners agreed to more than double the USCENTCOM CCC, MNF–I, and Multi- forces are usually finalized: its troop contribution. Its forces had already National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) conducted been performing superbly in Iraq, and one mil-to-mil discussions to decide on a mission n mission n caveats Figure 2. Coalition Initial Integration Process n location n relieve in place/transfer of authority dates Country Commits and Deploys Forces n equipment requirements n training Military-to-military (Mil-to-Mil) USG Request to n funding requirements discussions assess level of Deploy Forces n transportation. training and identify training USCENTCOM Request and equipping requirements for Forces one of the conditions of Mil-to-Mil Planning the increase dictated by the Country Formally Commits president of the contributing Forces for Planning nation was that his troops be USG Requests Formal assigned a more aggressive Commitment of Forces mission in their own Offers/Mil-to-Mil Discussions battlespace Country sends Liaison STEPS TO INTEGRATION Officer to USCENTCOM U.S. Government (USG) Case Studies of Coalition Integration USG Request for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Perfecting the integration process for Foreign Government Offers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coalition partners to operate with U.S. forces is a never-ending task. Considering that it is highly unlikely that the United States will Figure 3. Multilevel Engagement Efforts ever go to war again without a coalition, the current tasks are well worth the work. The fol- FORCE REQUEST lowing examples demonstrate the realities of CFACC > > > > > > > > > > > > MNF–I
coalition warfare. Joint CFMCC MNC–I > > > > > > > > > < < < < < < < < < < Staff Failure to Communicate. An event in FCLCC MNSTC–I the fall of 2007 illustrates the need to keep < < < < < < < > > > > > > > coalition partners involved and informed CFSOCC CJTF–82 when making decisions about forces. A MARCENT CJTF–HOA < < > > coalition unit of 50 personnel was in the
process of boarding an aircraft to begin a 6-month rotation when it was informed that > > > > > > > < < < < < < < OSD–P deployment had been put on hold. The unit’s US government had ordered this delay after CENTCOM CCC/J3/J4/ Coordination/
learning the mission and deployment location J5/J8 Coordination/ < < > > Approval < < < > > > differed from the agreed mission and location. <<>> Approval U.S. commanders on the ground made the Coalition <<>> Department decision based on operational requirements. Country of State <<>> When formulating their decision, they fac- Senior National tored in that the adjustments did not increase Representative the level of risk the coalition troops would ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 95 SPECIAL FEATURE | Integration of Coalition Forces into the USCENTCOM Mission and battlespace location for the forces. constructed six smaller satellite camps to help Building, sustaining, and improving Numerous courses of action were considered, interdict the arms flow and establish a firmer the coalition are evolving processes. Having and the participants eventually agreed that footprint in the battlespace. our partners involved in them is the most the coalition troops would be based near the The deployment was arranged by the effective and lasting method to achieve buy-in border of a neighboring country and assigned CCC, USCENTCOM CCJ3 (Operations and permanency. The Combined Planning the mission of deterring the flow of smuggled Directorate) and CCJ4 (Logistics and Security Group (CPG) was one of the initial coalition- weapons into Iraq. At the time, U.S. and coali- Assistance Directorate), and the U.S. Trans- manned organizations created in USCENT- tion forces were taking heavy casualties that portation Command. After their arrival, the COM. A part of the J5 Directorate, the CPG were attributed to these smuggled weapons, troops were slowly spread out to the outlying consists of U.S., allied, and hand-selected and the mission was (and still is) considered camps. The original troops have rotated out coalition members tasked with advising the critical to prevent the future loss of life. With and been replaced, and discussions to keep USCENTCOM commander with strategic- to the location and mission determined, the the forces through 2008, and possibly beyond, operational-level plans and assessments, and participants laid out the funding, equipment, are ongoing. political-military and civil-military analysis training, and ammunition requirements to Sustaining Coalition Relationships. in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. support the eventual deployment of the forces. The military experience and capabilities of A less formal entity that contributes to the Over the next 6 months, the mil-to-mil most “developing country” coalition partners USCENTCOM mission is the coalition-led participants, various coalition partners, and are not at the same level as their American working group. A current example deals with other organizations pulled together to make counterparts. While it is understandable that the ongoing effort to ensure the consistency the deployment a reality. The all-important operational commanders want and expect and interoperability of Provincial Reconstruc- funding requirements were arranged and the most competent and experienced troops tion Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. coordinated by OSD–P. The CCC brokered available to perform current missions, it is Interoperability between the 25 PRTs in donations of weapons and equipment from also essential for the United States to forge Afghanistan and ISAF forces is critical to their three separate coalition partners. The Office relationships with a focus toward future efficient operation. With 13 different nations of Defense Cooperation, which was intimately operations. The experience gained by develop- in charge of PRTs, however, procedures, familiar with the readiness of the coalition ing nations in today’s conflicts will improve practices, and budgets vary, leading to less- forces, formulated the training requirements their troops’ professionalism, efficiency, and than-optimal tactical-level actions in support in conjunction with MNF–I. The deploying confidence, preparing them to fight in the of strategic lines of operation. To help alleviate forces were trained in country by a mobile conflicts of tomorrow. As operations in Iraq this deficiency, coalition SNRs assigned to training team from U.S. European Command, and Afghanistan continue, the countries’ USCENTCOM developed a plan of attack. and additional training was conducted by value as coalition partners will increase as They set up lessons learned/best practice Task Force Gator when the forces arrived in well. Their experience also improves their briefings by all countries leading PRTs in Kuwait. MNC–I made major improvements nations’ domestic security capabilities and Afghanistan. After each lead country briefs to the camp where the additional troops creates coalition partners that the United the practices and procedures of its particular would be housed and fed, and MNC–I also States can depend on in future conflicts. PRT, a working group made up of SNRs of
Secretary Rice prepares to address multinational troops in Kandahar U.S. Navy (Alisha M. Frederick)
President Bush thanks allies for their dedication during U.S. Central Command Coalition Conference at MacDill Air Force Base
U.S. Navy (Steven Parks)
96 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu COUTURE each lead PRT country determines best prac- With this long-term vision, the United vessels. Every mission accomplished by our tices. Where differences in achieving interop- States must continuously pursue the support coalition partners is one the United States will erability exist, the working group decides the of coalition partners to sustain the fight and not need to perform. However, the Army’s best way ahead and makes a recommendation. explore methods that integrate the strengths “capability gap” approach is effective and This evolution not only assesses multiple ways of the partners’ capabilities to fill the gaps should be followed throughout the Depart- to get things done in a PRT and provide the within our military’s operations. ment of Defense. A particular coalition best procedures across the spectrum but also In 2007, the RAND Arroyo Center pub- partner agreeing to become an expert for a ensures better coalition partner buy-in of the lished a report for the Army entitled Building particular niche requirement for missions in recommended procedures. Enabling partners Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations, future conflicts will pay off in the long run. to take on an issue, come up with a solution, which states: and own the outcome strengthens the coali- the United States must tion while achieving the desired results. Ongoing operations and emerging missions In a March 2006 speech, former Secre- create competing demands for the Army’s capa- continuously pursue the tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that bilities, resulting in requirement gaps that the support of partners to sustain while there are significant differences between Army is unable to fill by itself. Although there the fight and fill the gaps the war on terror and the Cold War, there are are other ways to fill capability gaps (e.g., with within our military’s operations enough similarities to provide useful lessons: other Services, contractors, or increased Army end-strength), national and DOD strategic Both required our nation to gird for a long, guidance emphasizes the need to leverage the Integration of coalition forces to sustained struggle, punctuated by periods of capabilities of allies and partners to fill these support the U.S. Central Command mission military conflict. . . . Both require the use of all gaps. As a supporting entity, it must use its is resource intensive, at times tedious, but elements of national power to defeat the enemy. limited security cooperation resources in a way always enlightening. The full cooperation Both required a transition from arrangements that effectively builds partner army capabilities and close coordination of the entire military that were successful in the previous war to that support Joint requirements. To do this, community are essential to coalition develop- arrangements that were much better suited for the Army cannot work in isolation. Partnering ment and sustenance. Including coalition this new and different era. And above all, both with DOD and other U.S. government agen- partners in planning and decisionmaking required perseverance by the American people cies provides the solution and also enables the at the command by integrating the staff and and by their leadership to be sure. development of partner capacity.2 keeping communication flowing both ways is the only way to ensure partner nation buy-in Rumsfeld noted that there was no timeframe The reality today is that the United and the continued strength of this coalition or for when the war on terror might end, but States embraces any and all countries willing any other. Indeed, the war on terror demands that it could last “a good many years” and to support the coalition, whether they are the cooperation of all nations striving for would require “patience and courage” to see contributing a platoon or a brigade, one air- stability and prosperity in the world. Strong, through.1 craft or a squadron, a single ship or multiple integrated, military coalitions will continue to play a large role in this effort. JFQ
Contributors: Colonel Robert Sprague, Jr., USMC; Colonel Douglas James, USAF; Commander Ron Seits, USN; Lieutenant Colonel James Gray, USA; Lieutenant Colonel Al Crowley, USA; Major Greg Parks, USA; Colonel Joseph H. Moore, USMC; and Jane Couture.
NOTES
1 See Al Pessin, “Rumsfeld Says War on Terror Takes Perseverance of Cold War,” March 2, 2006, available at
Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic (Roger S. Duncan) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 97 Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan army officers train on telecommunications equipment in Germany U.S. Air Force (Nic Raven)
he far northern region of U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) area of T responsibility—the five states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Battling Misperceptions Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—is removed from the current main centers of attention, Iraq and Afghanistan. Simply to focus on Iraq and Afghanistan thus overlooks the security Challenges to U.S. reality in the rest of the command’s area of responsibility. When issues concerning Central Asia are addressed, it is often in the Security Cooperation context of the region being a crossroads or transit area. Whether one focuses on energy reserves and export routes or the stability of in supply lines to forces in Afghanistan, there is a Central Asia tendency to view Central Asia as a part of the world over which states compete. It is in this context that nearly two decades of active U.S. engagement in the Eurasian region have been viewed. In Ameri- can parlance, this territory has often been By Roger D. Kangas cast as “former Soviet colonies,” the “Muslim
Dr. Roger D. Kangas is a Professor in the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.
98 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu KANGAS south,” the “Near Abroad” (borrowing from with other post-Soviet states. As relations security was related to the open access to the Russian portrayal of the region), “the changed, so did this policy, but for at least 5 energy deposits in the region by outside ’stans,” or simply as conduits for engagement years or so, Central Asia was considered part companies and countries. Specifically, could in Afghanistan. In each instance, the Central of Moscow’s sphere of influence. The most American companies participate in the Asian states are defined in relation to Russia or significant consequence was the conduct of exploitation of energy reserves in the region? to the Middle and Near East. Perhaps as fallout the civil war in Tajikistan. The United States Would the United States or its allies be ben- from this confusion, the United States has supported Russia taking the lead on peace eficiaries of energy derived from the region?5 had to deal with misperceptions, suspicions, negotiations and conflict resolution in that In this context, it could easily be overstated and fears that it desires to enter this area and country. Tajikistan was simply more impor- that America was, and is, solely interested in dominate it, setting the terms for political, eco- tant for Russia than for America. the energy resources of Central Asia. nomic, and even cultural development. Second, during most of the 1990s, non- Over the years, official statements and governmental organizations, supported with as U.S. relations with Russia newspaper articles from these states have U.S. Government funding, came to be signifi- pointed to an increasingly negative perception cant actors in carrying out American goals. deteriorated, there was a of the United States and its role. For American This allowed such entities to expand, often renewed interest in Central officials, this trend ought to be viewed as an resulting in Central Asian officials concluding Asia—as a region to pry away opportunity to present the United States in that they actually represented official U.S. from Russia a more favorable light, given that any U.S. policy. At this stage, programs focusing on presence in the region could in theory be democratization, economic liberalization, and Fourth, one could claim that the single contrasted to Russian, Chinese, or Iranian human rights dominated U.S. engagement, issue dominating U.S. Central Asian policy “threats of regional hegemony,” as well as with scant attention to security cooperation. after September 11, 2001, was no longer with an abysmal Soviet legacy that has been Third, as U.S. relations with Russia energy, but security. At the time, many cast as a period of “colonial occupation.”1 Yet deteriorated, there was a renewed interest in believed that the Central Asian states could this healthier portrayal of Washington and its Central Asia—as a region to pry away from provide bases for military operations and interests has not been achieved. The current Russia. Whether one looked at the Silk Road fly-over rights for aircraft. The United States situation thus raises the question of how the Legislation coming out of the U.S. Congress quickly drew up Status of Forces Agreements United States found itself in a relatively weak or an increased discussion on energy pipe- with each of the Central Asian states, as position in the region. More important, how lines that could circumvent Russia, energy well as the Russian Federation, in support did the current perceptions come about? became the buzzword for the region.3 The of Operation Enduring Freedom. In some only time Central Asia and the Caspian instances, this was simply permission to use U.S. Policy in Transition Region were mentioned in the 1999 U.S. airspace and the possibility of using an airport Much has been written on U.S. policy National Security Strategy was with respect in an emergency. In other instances, such toward Central Asia, with a few recent pub- to energy security.4 In this instance, energy as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz lications focusing on the important issue 2 of security cooperation. These works have Presidents of Afghanistan and Tajikistan open carefully laid out the various programs, bridge connecting their countries events, and funding levels since the U.S. Government began such engagement in the 1990s. Moreover, they note how specific secu- rity cooperation efforts have been part of a broader regional policy. Given that American policy has shifted over time and priorities have not been as clearly stated as the regional powers might have wanted, it is not surprising that there is uncertainty as to the intent and success of such programs. In this light, some basic trends can be noted. First, when the Soviet Union collapsed, there was not an immediate rush to recognize all of the successor states as independent enti- ties. Would the Soviet Union reunite? Would these “states” end up as confederated append- ages to the Russian government? When it was clear that Washington was looking at separate countries, it relied on a policy of “Russia first,” which meant that U.S.-Russian relations were deemed more important than bilateral ties Rodgers) U.S. Army (Mark W. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 99 SPECIAL FEATURE | U.S. Security Cooperation in Central Asia
Republic, it included the right to station forces was a more sober assessment of U.S. strategic Over time, practical limitations have in the country. The resources devoted to the interests there with several key publications been consistently noted. The modest number area because of this exercise were tremendous stressing the need to be realistic and more of participants and the continual change in and exceeded past assistance to the region. In precise in what relations with the five diver- personnel who engage in cooperative pro- the eyes of some analysts, this was a moment gent states might be.8 Because nongovernmen- grams mean there still is a familiarization when the United States could have made a real tal organizations have been limited in some process taking place. Not surprisingly, from difference in Central Asia.6 At the same time, countries, overall U.S. presence is now spread the U.S. side, there is a constant stream of new it was not surprising to hear criticisms that the differently in Central Asia—more in Kazakh- faces; personnel rotations dictate that within stan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz 2 to 3 years, those engaged with Central Asian Republic and less in Uzbekistan and programs will have to move on. Central Asian Turkmenistan. Indeed, for the past officers are therefore not sure they even can several years, it appears that Wash- cooperate with their U.S. counterparts. More- ington has entered a new phase in over, participants noted that during training which the acceptance of American exercises, U.S. troops tended to be stationed assistance, and even presence, apart from the Commonwealth of Indepen- cannot be taken for granted. dent States (CIS) units, and the language Shifting priorities and chang- barrier sometimes prevented real bonding. ing levels of importance have Central Asian units are familiar with the underscored U.S. engagement in Russian training approaches, military culture, Central Asia. For the U.S. side, and tactics. Even in U.S./North Atlantic Treaty these phases can be explained by Organization (NATO)-backed exercises, the looking at the evolution of security Central Asians will conclude the day with policy and foreign relations in their Russian counterparts. As one officer general, especially in light of sig- involved in an early exercise noted, “We’re nificant international crises such as of the same school. We know each other.”9 the post-9/11 focus on counterter- Likewise, during U.S.-sponsored conferences rorism and the war in Iraq. For the and programs that take place in the region, Central Asian partners, acceptance U.S. participants often keep to the main of that rationale is less than forth- hotel and regularly dine with their fellow coming. One sees either a lack of Americans, rarely venturing out to socialize understanding in what the United with their local hosts. One area of continuity States would like to do or a belief has been partnerships with National Guard that America might not be as com- units under the auspices of USCENTCOM mitted to the region as it has stated. cooperative programming. Today, there is a bit more familiarity, but the cohesiveness found Problematic Perceptions in the Collective Security Treaty Organization It would be naïve to think that (CSTO) exercises is not necessarily replicated engagement in the region would in Western-dominated drills. be accepted without question and As the sides get to know each other, cynical to assume that it is always some things have begun to change. For received with feigned interest. Those example, there has been a military culture Kazakhstani soldiers transport supplies destined who have worked security coopera- mismatch revolving around how much for Afghan national army U.S. Air Force (Felecia Haecker) U.S. Air Force tion programs since the 1990s note responsibility is given to different ranks. a regular enthusiasm for seminars, Central Asian officers have critically com- Central Asian units are familiar with training opportunities, international mented that “when you send trainers, you the Russian training approaches, military education and training pro- send sergeants, not officers, to train our offi- grams, and the like. Central Asians cers. Is this a sign of disrespect for our mili- military culture, and tactics who have participated in foreign tary?”10 What they do not realize is that the exchange programs (training in U.S. military requires a cadre of well-trained newfound strategic importance of the region the United States or elsewhere) often maintain professional noncommissioned officers in the eyes of the United States overshadowed ties with their newfound colleagues and speak (NCOs) and enlisted personnel—a tradition other goals, such as democracy-building or highly of their American interlocutors. U.S. mil- not found in many post-Soviet armies—and economic liberalization.7 itary representatives in the respective countries thus “non-officers” carry out the work that Finally, U.S. interests in much of Central likewise have been able to forge positive rela- post-Soviet officers would normally do. Such Asia have diminished in recent years in the tions and advance U.S. policy quite effectively, a reaction is to be expected from a region face of the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and while often working with constrained budgets where the military tradition does not include Afghanistan. After the summer of 2005, there and staffing. a professional NCO corps. As this aspect of
100 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu KANGAS the U.S. military is now better known, such or the United States. After a strong showing national sovereignty” as points of departure contrasting views are not as prevalent. by the United States early in this decade, the from their traditional acceptance of the On a broader level, the strategic signifi- second spot is now usually reserved for China. U.S. strategy. This translated into a greater cance of the region for the United States is This is not to say that China is viewed posi- questioning of, and resistance to, security repeatedly questioned. Comparisons between tively. On the contrary, concern is consistently cooperation. Ulterior motives and hidden U.S. action in Southeast Europe versus a expressed that China is “hard to understand” relatively inactive policy in Tajikistan and and could easily have designs on Central Asia. regardless of actual numbers, even Afghanistan prior to 2001 are inevitable. While not perhaps desiring to physically take For example, during the Central Asian Bat- over the countries of Central Asia, China is programs, and intentions, U.S. talion exercise in 1997, Central Asian officials viewed especially by those from bordering engagement policies are not thought the presence of the 82d Airborne countries (Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, viewed at face value Division suggested that the Americans would and Tajikistan) as wanting to be the primary assist in securing the southern border of the actor in the region. agendas—always part of debates on regional region. Given the American unit’s mandate Likewise, in the realm of economic geopolitics—became more prominent in dis- during the exercise, this was viewed as incon- relations, Russia plays a leading role. Again, cussions. In short, the United States has been ceivable. Consequently, when U.S. troops did the subsequent positions have rotated—with viewed as an outside player that might inter- appear in 2001, the actions were seen as ben- even the European Union present in some fere in domestic politics and will not be able to efiting the United States more than regional years. However, after 2005, China moved up to forge lasting and consistent policies. actors. American units, the 82d among them, second place as well. In this category, are engaged in counterterrorism and stabiliza- America is often left out completely, tion operations in Afghanistan, which have although one could look at foreign a positive effect on Central Asian security direct investment and U.S. Govern- and even address the concerns raised prior to ment assistance programs and still 2001. However, the regional security connec- see significant numbers.11 The logic 376 AEW (Lesley J. Waters) tion is often not made in the Central Asian is rather straightforward: regardless media and in pubic statements. In reality, of actual numbers, programs, and the Central Asian region does not score intentions, U.S. engagement policies well in the U.S. National Security Strategy, are not viewed at face value. This is the nor does it place high on the priority lists of concern one should have in hearing USCENTCOM. Even departmental reorga- such criticisms of the U.S. engagement nizations have been cast in this light. With agenda. That the dollar amounts are the shift away from fellow Eurasian states to lower than expectations is understand- C–17 Globemaster III takes off from offices that include Afghanistan and Pakistan, able. The problem arises when such Manas Air Base, Kyrgyz Republic it is clear that the Central Asian countries figures, which are high relative to those will almost always receive little attention of other countries, are deemed ineffective. Such language was put to the test vis-à- compared to these states with high security Part of the answer lies in how the assis- vis Uzbekistan in the early part of this decade. concerns. Thus, for understandable reasons, tance is couched. Use of Western language When the U.S.-Uzbekistan relationship was there is a healthy dose of skepticism on U.S. and concepts often translates into apprehen- deemed a “strategic partnership” in 2002, the intent in the region. sion of American motivations on the part reading from the Uzbek side was quite clear: Much of the skepticism has been articu- of officials in Central Asia. Terms such as the United States is a friend who will work lated by participants from Central Asia in democratization, civilian control of the mili- with us to achieve our primary goals of stabil- seminar exercises at the George C. Marshall tary, colored revolutions, human rights, and ity and security.12 In actuality, the document European Center for Security Studies. To even East-West corridors conjure up images signed by both parties stated obligations and evaluate the relative long-term importance of an America attempting to interfere within commitments that were realistic. It was the of U.S. security cooperation, it was vital to the domestic political arenas in the region. perception within Uzbekistan—especially compare this cooperation to the presence of Naturally, democratization programs ought as it felt confident enough to break away other “outside” actors. When asked to rank to focus on providing assistance to potential from Russia, the CIS, and other regional the most significant external actors in the political actors in a given country, and, of structures—that perhaps it read too much into security and economic realms, Central Asian course, governments in power would be reluc- the rhetoric that accompanied the “strategic officials reflected a striking pattern. With tant to give up their share. Following the 2003 partnership.”13 That the events of May 2005 regard to security, Russia was consistently U.S. invasion of Iraq, Central Asian media in Andijon, Uzbekistan, were considered such placed first. In over 8 years, rare was the and officials were quick to parrot criticisms a threat ran counter to the U.S. (and interna- individual, let alone the country delegation formulated in Russia and China. While not tional) accusations that it was a human rights or course group, who considered Russia to be articulating the “adventurism” arguments tragedy on par with the June 1989 massacre anything less than “most important.” Second expressed in the countries’ media, Central on Tiananmen Square in Beijing. and third places shifted over time. In the late Asians fixated on the issues of “regime The challenge of perception can be illus- 1990s, one saw the presence of Turkey, Iran, change,” “preemption,” and “challenging Iraqi trated by considering what took place after ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 101 SPECIAL FEATURE | U.S. Security Cooperation in Central Asia the events in Andijon. In the first week of of the Uzbek government. For all intents and guage and approach as the strategic partner- May 2005, I was in the city of Andijon, among purposes, the strategic partnership between ship with Uzbekistan. Perhaps with a bit of other cities in the Fergana Valley, lecturing America and Uzbekistan was over. Adding “mirror-imaging,” U.S. policy suggests that to alumni from U.S. Government–sponsored insult to injury, these criticisms were less of the if we simply encourage the Kazakhs to focus programs.14 Two weeks later, and immediately individuals and more of the message. The fact westward, they will adopt our approaches after the violence, I was back in Tashkent. Within this short timeframe, the discussions most acknowledged that the Andijon violence was unfortunate surrounding Andijon among Uzbek officials and the general population focused on the and either preferred not to discuss it or put the blame on an instability that such uprisings might cause overly zealous Uzbek security force in the country. Information was limited, and the initial government estimates of casualties that such conditions were not perceived to be to political and economic reform, as well as and causes were vague. Those with access to placed on other countries, such as Saudi Arabia look to Washington and NATO for security, international media had already been exposed and China, the most often cited comparisons, instead of the CSTO and Shanghai Coopera- to reports by the BBC, in particular, that gave usually resulted in discussion of double tion Organization. more graphic and horrific accounts of what standards—an accusation commonly raised by took place.15 How did this play out in Uzbeki- officials from the region. So What Does This Mean? stan? Initially, as noted, there was confusion The previously mentioned Central If the United States were to pull up as to the actual events. Moreover, at no time Asian groups at the Marshall Center reflected stakes and leave, the region would plod was this seen as anything more than a local this transition. In the summer of 2005, most ahead. Engagement in Central Asia and event perpetrated by members of the so-called acknowledged that the Andijon violence was security cooperation more specifically are not Akromiya group with probable support from unfortunate and either preferred not to discuss existential challenges to America. However, a web of international terrorist cells that had it or put the blame on an overly zealous Uzbek by ignoring opportunities for positive and been working in Central Asia. security force. As Uzbeks had stopped attend- mutually beneficial relationships, Washington Shirin Akiner, a renowned expert on ing Marshall Center courses that year, discus- is missing an opportunity to address key Central Asia, reported on her experience in sions could take place without 16 Kazakhstani performers Andijon shortly after the violence. As this Uzbeks, thus dispensing with ride at opening report questioned the claims of the Western the common courtesy of not of multinational news media and provided some explanation speaking ill of a neighbor peacekeeping and relief as to the Uzbek actions, she was pilloried by who is present. Within a year, exercise other Westerners. However, in Uzbekistan, she however, the tenor of the com- offered what was deemed a middle-of-the-road ments changed. Even officials approach to addressing the problem. Once from the Kyrgyz Republic again, reports originating from Russian media became critical of the West’s found traction in Central Asia. Moreover, the approach to Uzbekistan. The Uzbek government—now distanced from the 400+ Uzbek citizens who had West—began to address more sinister aspects crossed the border in May of the events, including some outlandish sce- 2005 went from “refugees” to narios that suggested Western compliance as “questionable people,” with a precursor to a “colored revolution.”17 As has the concern that they had not been well reported and debated, U.S.-Uzbek been properly screened and relations quickly collapsed, and the base at were now loose outside of Karshi-Khanabad, which was already tenuously Uzbekistan’s grasp. There was a supported, closed down later that year. In the belief that some of the refugees region, this was cast as an American failure were not innocent citizens of to support our strategic ally in a time of great Andijon, but the perpetrators need. At the same time, China and Russia did of the violence itself, contra- declare their support for Uzbekistan, to the dicting the U.S. position. point of even comparing their views with those Thus, it is not surpris- of the United States. ing that as the United States While this event never obtained the level has begun to lavish attention of attention of other acts of violence in the on Kazakhstan, one starts world, it became a watershed moment for those to hear concerns raised by working Central Asian issues. Particularly Central Asians. The shift to after President Islam Karimov refused to meet Kazakhstan as the primary with a delegation of U.S. Senators in late May, country with which to engage Combat Camera Squadron (Jeremy T. Lock) T. (Jeremy Combat Camera Squadron st the U.S. Government stepped up its criticism has included the same lan- 1
102 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu KANGAS transnational threats and help foster stability allowed at Termez in March 2008, suggest that United States still has much to learn. However, in a region that needs it. The irony is that most a more modest and realistic approach is being modest steps that include concrete and long- of this has been said in past years. As early as worked out between the two countries. The term planning—with consistent funding—are the late 1990s, analysts were lamenting the problem is that the Uzbeks do not play by U.S. a promising way to ensure that America can uneven nature of U.S. security engagement rules and continue to ignore calls for loosen- engage Central Asia. After all, a Washington in Central Asia and were offering proposals ing controls on civil society. that is willing to remain active in the region in to fix it. Fred Starr, for example, advocated a The base at Manas dominates U.S. specified areas can still play a constructive role. policy that engaged Uzbekistan and focused relations with the Kyrgyz Republic, and coun- It is imperative that, in this continued on a slow, deliberate policy of reform.18 Sylvia ternarcotics assistance dominates relations engagement, we seek to monitor how our Babus and Judith Yaphe articulated the reason with Tajikistan. Short of those, the Kyrgyz message is being perceived. On the one hand, for avoiding false expectations and under- Republic, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan questionnaires filled out by participants at the standing the broader neighborhood.19 These are not significant to broader U.S. security end of training courses or programs tend to views, and those expressed by other experts, interests and, unfortunately, will be given less be positive, but that can be a function of the generally emphasized a need to understand attention unless and until violence occurs and individual writing what he thinks he ought to the context within which the Central Asian instability results in these countries. It is this say, as the notion of an “anonymous survey” is states operated. Nearly a decade later, these reactive nature of U.S. engagement with coun- looked on with great skepticism. At the other lessons seem to have not been fully learned. tries considered less vital that precludes the extreme, one can rely on a handful of anecdotes Indeed, the engagement challenges today are possibility of truly developing and sustaining (positive or negative) and draw generalized hauntingly similar to those of past years, even an active security cooperation program. Even conclusions about entire engagement pro- factoring in the current situation in Afghani- though the United States has global commit- grams. A constant study of these approaches, stan, which itself has gone on for some time. ments, it does not have to be so unpredictable. plus the inclusion of public statements by offi- Oddly, one could list the key security cials and the media (which reflect official views concerns of all five Central Asian states and for the most part) can offer at least a sampling find them strikingly similar to U.S. concerns. by assessing U.S. security of perceptions of both specific engagement Afghanistan is foremost on their mind as cooperation initiatives over programs and the broader strategic environ- a security challenge, but there are also the time, the decision to continue ment within which they are placed. Moreover, issues of economic development and global or adjust programs can be we must be mindful that while we often integration. From the Central Asian side, a more intelligently made operate under an implicit sense that they want key obstacle to accepting additional U.S. assis- to think and act like us, mirror-imaging can tance is simply that Washington is deemed to result in the sort of misperceptions that have be unreliable, mercurial, and meddling. Alter- Efforts at USCENTCOM over the past 2 arisen in past years. ing these views does not require that America years to coordinate security cooperation in a As for the information that surveys shifts its focus completely, but that it simply longer-term and strategic manner has resulted gather on the United States and the regions returns to basics, fulfills promises, and con- in a better understanding of what the United closer to home, how these questions are tinues to engage with these states as openly States can and ought to do. Moreover, by addressed is shaped by the countries’ cul- as possible. If the United States addressed the assessing U.S. security cooperation initiatives tural and historical processes, as well as the perceptions and concerns of the region in a over time, the decision to continue or adjust information readily available. While the U.S. constructive manner, then advantages for programs can be more intelligently made. Government continually debates funding for both sides could be seen. However, if funding levels continue to drop Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/ Kazakhstan is currently deemed the for engagement in Central Asia, these well- Radio Liberty offices that broadcast in Central most important partner in the region and articulated plans will be wasted. Asian languages, Russian programming is the one with the best chance to more fully Whether or not we think they are valid all-pervasive and accessible. The modest costs integrate with the West. From the Kazakh- and properly reflect U.S. intentions, these associated with supporting American infor- stani side, however, the United States is one of perceived “realities” in American policy toward mation efforts can make a difference and, in several outside powers that must be balanced. the region are common knowledge among the turn, create a more positive environment for As expressed in the “multi-vectored security security officials of the respective countries. security cooperation in Central Asia. After policy,” Kazakhstani officials note that their While one can still hear accounts of “American all, changing perceptions of the United States national interests are best served by cooperat- grand strategies” toward the region, for the in general and of U.S. security cooperation in ing with all sides. If there is a strategic part- most part, the common line of argument is particular has no magic bullet. nership with the United States, it is seen in a that the United States came in with a bang, The United States must stop believing more utilitarian light and not as an expression promised much, and delivered little. Whether that it can reorient the states of Central Asia to of a true alliance. In contrast, while the notion the delivery shortfall was a result of changing the West, at the expense of their other links and of strategic partnership has receded from policies, the limitations inherent in foreign identities. This is not to abandon any hope of U.S.-Uzbekistan discourse, recent actions, assistance, and the difficulties in distribution engagement, but rather to put our presence in including former USCENTCOM commander (including the siphoning off of aid by govern- the region in a proper perspective that is equally Admiral William Fallon’s visit to Uzbekistan ment officials) is irrelevant. After years of intelligible within Central Asia. As much as we in January 2008 and the limited basing rights developing relationships in the region, the wish that people in these countries will want ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 103 SPECIAL FEATURE | U.S. Security Cooperation in Central Asia to be like us, create democratic regimes with or finding itself irrelevant to its future. Rather, delivered to the House International Relations Com- market economies, and see the United States to better engage, the United States ought mittee, April 26, 2006. 9 in a positive light with the best intentions, to reexamine claims of past officials who Central Asian Battalion exercise participant comment to author, July 1999. the reality is different. None of the states is have worked in the region to realize that the 10 Participant response during NATO School so malleable that it can quickly alter past pat- answers are already present.22 True security mobile education and training team in 2003. Similar terns and current interests. It is much better to cooperation is a dialogue that requires a better reactions were seen during a visit on a U.S. Coast understand that the Central Asian countries understanding of how our partners view Guard ship in New York harbor in spring 2002. The 20 have multiple identities. To assume that we things that we assume to be clear. JFQ ship was largely manned by an enlisted crew. While must somehow limit their access to officials other countries send their senior NCOs to courses from outside of the West is a mistaken and designed for those ranks, such as at the NATO School short-sighted policy. In the context of Depart- NOTES in Oberammergau, Germany, the Central Asian mili- ment of Defense regional centers, it is a positive taries are still reluctant to make these changes. 1 Especially in the early 1990s, published works 11 From 1992 to the present, the U.S. Govern- sign that Central Asian officials can participate on Central Asia focused on the disastrous Soviet ment provided nearly $1.4 billion in assistance to all in programs at the Marshall Center, Asia-Pacific legacy. Representative of this thinking is Soviet five states, with Kazakhstan receiving 55 percent of Center for Security Studies, and the Near East Central Asia: The Failed Transformation, ed. William the total, Uzbekistan 25 percent, and the remaining South Asia Center for Strategic Studies—given Fierman (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991). Likewise, three countries the other 20 percent combined. U.S. studies of great power competition emerged, among that these countries must have a better under- Department of State figures. them The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its standing of, and relations with, neighboring 12 John Heathershaw, “Worlds Apart: The Borderlands, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner states in all directions. Making and Remaking of Geopolitical Space in the (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). Integral to a successful solution is U.S.-Uzbekistani Strategic Partnership,” Central Asian 2 For a current and insightful look at the evolu- patience. A generation that is deeply mired Survey 26, no. 1 (March 2007), 123–140. tion of security cooperation in Central Asia, see in a Soviet-like mindset cannot change. Even 13 The public text of the “Declaration on the Michael McCarthy, The Limits of Friendship: Security how they perceive threats to their respective Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework Cooperation in Central Asia (Maxwell Air Force Base, Between the United States of America and the countries is articulated in Soviet-style lan- AL: Air University Press, 2007). In addition, the 21 Republic of Uzbekistan,” dated March 12, 2002, guage. They can be partners in cooperative writings of Jim Nichol that address overall U.S. policy remains on the Web site of the Embassy of the efforts, especially if national security interests toward Central Asia are most helpful, especially his Republic of Uzbekistan to the United States. See correspond, but one should not expect to see recent Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications
104 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies Building Relationships, Enhancing Security
By JOHN D. LAWRENCE
he Near East South Asia Center Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri must build and sustain long-term relation- for Strategic Studies (NESA Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab ships with key regional players to bring this Center) is the preeminent U.S. Emirates, and Yemen. Our region includes 57 about and thus protect and enhance U.S. vital Government institution for percent of USCENTCOM’s countries, and 54 interests. T percent of our alumni come from this area of As both the dynamics of our region building relationships and understanding in the region. Approved by the Secretary of responsibility (AOR). The center also recently and our guidance from the Secretary of Defense in 2000, the center was formally began collaborating with the George C. Mar- Defense changed after 9/11, the NESA Center launched in October of that year. The young- shall European Center for Security Studies to expanded its programs and activities. New est of the Department of Defense (DOD) interface with the Central Asian states. We programs on countering ideological support regional centers, it covers one of the most truly are USCENTCOM’s regional center and for terrorism, increasing and improving diverse and volatile areas of the world, will likely have an office in its AOR in the strategic communication and outreach to the stretching from the western end of North coming year. region, and supporting other strategic goals Africa to the Himalayas—from Marrakech The original concept of the NESA have been implemented, with more coming. to Bangladesh. The region includes that part Center was both simple and controversial. In April 2006, Lieutenant General David of the world where the United States has the It was based on the premise that Arabs and W. Barno, USA (Ret.), was appointed the greatest number of combat troops deployed— Israelis, Pakistanis and Indians, and other more than 250,000 military and civilian rival parties would come together to discuss John D. Lawrence is Acting Chief of Outreach in the personnel in the U.S. Central Command their national security issues in a neutral Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at (USCENTCOM) countries alone. setting for mutually beneficial dialogue. We the National Defense University. Many look at the NESA region and see a confusing sea of ethnic and sectarian conflict Why Focus on the NESA Region? sitting atop oil reserves and wonder how the United States can play a positive role. The n a region with more than 1.8 billion people—nearly 30 percent of the world’s population NESA Center has a clear answer: through n a region that is the birthplace of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism dialogue, building relationships, and constant n a region with a majority of the world’s oil reserves communication and engagement, just as the n a region that stretches from the Sahara to the Himalayas Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated n a region with four nations that have, or are suspected of developing, nuclear weapons in his confirmation hearing. These are the capabilities and that have frictional relationships with some of their neighbors bedrock principles of the center and are n a region rife with ongoing, violent border disputes for the past half-century reflected in everything we do—from seminars n a region with two state sponsors of terrorism (Syria and Iran) as well as transnational and workshops, to sustaining engagement terrorist threats such as al Qaeda with current and former participants, to stra- n a region where U.S. and coalition partners have toppled two repressive regimes in the tegic communication and outreach efforts. past 6 years NESA Center participating countries n a region that produces an overwhelming majority of the world’s opium and heroin include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, n a region where the United States has deployed more than 250,000 military and civilian Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, personnel Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya (new in 2006), n a region at the strategic crossroads and major trade routes of Europe, Asia, and Africa Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 105 SPECIAL FEATURE | NESA Center
NESA Center’s Director. As the first general combating terror and countering insurgency, our backbriefs from trips and seminars, but officer to lead the center—having been the focusing on practical concerns, regional also actively seeking more U.S. participants commander of Combined Forces Command– perceptions, and how radical organizations from a broader spectrum of the Government. Afghanistan (2003–2005) and of Task Force recruit and train. For example, in coordination with the State Warrior, which trained free Iraqi forces in We work closely with the combatant Department and the U.S. Agency for Inter- Hungary (2003)—he brought new vision. commands and in particular with USCENT- national Development (USAID), we held a Some of the changes we have instituted are COM. Our work with and for the command Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) orien- detailed below. What has not changed is the has included: tation in spring 2006, solely for State/USAID/ center’s affiliation with the National Defense DOD officials deploying on PRTs. This was University (NDU), one of the world’s premier n direct support for the annual Eagle the center’s first U.S. Government–only event. professional military education institutions. Resolve and Bright Star exercises At our August 2006 combating terrorism The NESA Center is collocated with NDU, n issue-specific roundtables with experts seminar, we welcomed three U.S. Government and both institutions are committed to pro- from both the government and private sector participants, all from the State Department viding a world-class academic environment n direct support of commander’s confer- (another first). for students. ences beginning in 2002 In his Director’s Message for 2008, n focused workshops with USCENTCOM alumni are the true resource General Barno stated that “sustaining a strong on health security, border security, nonprolif- for the center and for any U.S. personal connection to our alumni will remain eration, and other issues Government personnel who a cornerstone of the NESA experience.” And it n outreach to the senior national repre- is our alumni who are the true resource for the sentatives at Coalition Village. attend center and for any U.S. Government personnel who attend. As of late 2007, our more than Due to the geography of our region, we The Secretary of Defense instructed the 1,500 alumni included the following senior also work with U.S. European Command and five regional centers to increase coordina- military officers: 12 at the three- to four-star U.S. Pacific Command and have begun to tion and cooperation. Although the centers’ level; 47 two-stars, and 145 one-stars. These forge better ties with U.S. Special Operations responsibilities cover the globe and their figures do not include civilian equivalents for Command. We will also support U.S. Africa headquarters stretch across 8,000 miles and these ranks, let alone distinguished U.S. alumni Command when it is fully operational. In many time zones, our work together increases such as General Victor Renuart, USAF (com- addition, we participate with our combatant constantly. Since fall of 2005, for example, mander, U.S. Northern Command), General commands in their theater security coopera- the regional centers’ strategic communica- Kevin Chilton, USAF (commander, U.S. tion planning as well as their annual training tion and public affairs officers have repeat- Strategic Command), and Vice Admiral David program management reviews. edly met to discuss efforts and to exchange Nichols, USN (Ret.) (former deputy com- The NESA Center is strengthening ties ideas and lessons learned. In addition, all mander, USCENTCOM). with the Department of State and other agen- the centers are working to implement the cies as we become a “test bed for interagency Regional International Outreach system, Responsive to Priorities: Jointness jointness.” This includes not only reaching which will facilitate communication among The NESA Center is expanding and out across the Government to inform agen- the centers and, ultimately, with alumni enhancing its programs. As directed by the cies about the center and to share with them across the world. Secretary of Defense and other senior DOD officials, we have focused on strengthen- NESA Alumni Distribution by Core Programs ing strategic communication and outreach Combatant Command Since its inception, the NESA Center’s efforts while at the same time adhering to the core programs have provided the foundation academic standards that have made the center 5% upon which we have built and enhanced such a well-known and respected institution. 11% our mission. We hold 3½-week executive For example, we established a separate Out- seminars for the O–5 to O–7 level and reach Office that handles issues ranging from 2-week senior executive seminars for flag/ communication with alumni to outreach with 12% general officers, as well as minister and government stakeholders. Ambassador-level participants. In response Moreover, we have held programs to our participants’ suggestions, the length dedicated to the war on terror and have con- 54% of both seminars was extended in 2007. tributed to countering ideological support Topics include the American national secu- for terrorism. The center conducts a strategic 18% rity structure and process, the current and listening post war on terror workshop with future regional strategic environment, coun- senior military, police, civilian officials, and terterrorism, proliferation of weapons of critical opinion makers from the NESA region USCENTCOM USEUCOM mass destruction, and disaster management. on issues related to combating extremism. USPACOM USNORTHCOM These off-the-record, not-for-attribu- The 2-day workshop involves intensive dis- USAFRICOM tion seminars encourage a frank exchange of cussions on lessons learned on the ground in views primarily on issues facing the NESA
106 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu LAWRENCE region in the next 5 to 10 years when these The NESA Center not only focuses We also conduct multiday bilateral programs midcareer officials will rise to senior levels. on its region but also takes advantage of its in countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Sri Participants are reminded when they arrive Washington, DC, location to interface with Lanka, and Yemen. that they should speak candidly rather embassies from the region. Center alumni Alumni Symposium. Our biggest than use their government talking points. fill senior embassy positions, but our pro- event in the region thus far was our 5-year Seminars generally contain 35 to 40 par- grams also reach out to the broader embassy reunion in Istanbul, Turkey, in November ticipants from 19 to 23 countries, including community. In 2005, for instance, we inau- 2005, which brought together more than the United States. Plenary sessions bring in gurated a monthly Washington seminar 100 former participants. For 3 intense days, outside speakers—senior U.S. Government series where we bring senior government we discussed recent policy developments officials, specialists from think tanks, and speakers to discuss NESA region strategic (including the Amman Hotel bombings that academics—to help frame broad issues and issues with the diplomatic community, happened less than a week before we met) generate thinking and discussion. The real affording them access to officials they might and caught up with old friends. This was magic happens, however, in the breakout not otherwise meet. a first for the NESA Center, and we plan groups. These faculty-led, open discussions to repeat the event regularly by reuniting draw out the participants in a way that Expanding In-region Programs alumni from a specific year, professional cannot happen in larger groups. One major change of the past 2 years is field, or subregion. During seminars, participant site visits a significant increase in the number of NESA Regional Network of Strategic Studies include the Pentagon, State Department, Center programs held in the region and Centers. Working with counterpart insti- and Capitol Hill. On the visits, partici- overseas. Although these programs stretch tutions, the NESA Center established a pants meet with senior officials, Members regional network of strategic studies centers, of Congress, Hill staffers, and others to participants meet lobbyists, whose goal is to expand strategic dialogue learn their roles in policy formulation. In many encountering the and collaborative research on common particular, the Capitol Hill visit is popular; security challenges. The network initiative not only do participants go to the floor of concept of professional is cosponsored by the Institute for Strategic the House of Representatives to learn about advocacy for the first time Studies, Research, and Analysis (Pakistan); congressional procedures, but they also meet the Center for Strategic Research (Turkey); lobbyists, many encountering the concept budgets, we made a strategic decision to hold and the National Center for Strategic Studies of professional advocacy for the first time. more events. The center’s FY08 in-region and (Jordan). The network of 30+ regional studies Participants are surprised to find that these overseas programs represented a 61 percent centers conducts business through working lobbyists, despite their infamous reputa- increase over FY07 and a more than 90 groups and virtual activities and seeks to tion in the NESA region, are simply people percent increase over FY06. These programs foster writing that reflects viewpoints from advocating for causes in which they believe. can be short, such as a workshop on Iraq’s across the region. The working groups focus Specifically relevant to the NESA region, border security held in Jordan, or a seminar on combating terrorism, nontraditional secu- participants hear from advocates for Israel, on South Asian security, co-hosted with the rity issues, and democracy and governance, Arab countries, and India. Asia-Pacific Center, in Sri Lanka in 2006. among others. Terrorism is a concern to all, par- ticularly in our region. The center conducts NESA Center Director, LTG David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) two 2-week combating terrorism seminars annually that bring together regional coun- terterrorism practitioners. These seminars take a strategic perspective, highlighting how terrorism is part of a broad network of transnational threats. Responding to popular demand, the center will add a third course in fiscal year (FY) 2009. To make progress in countering support for terrorism, we need to look at causes rather than just specific attacks. The role of the NESA Center and the other regional centers is not to tell those in the kinetic world how to do their job. As General John Abizaid, USA, former commander of U.S. Central Command, stated, the fight against terrorism and extremism should be 85 percent nonkinetic, but at the present time, it is 85 percent kinetic. The center’s role is to help policymakers understand how to change this dynamic. NESA Center ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 107 SPECIAL FEATURE | NESA Center
Combatant Command Support Events. n media, both domestic and regional Alumni Community Chapters These programs include a wide variety of events n our network of 30+ strategic studies In direct support of the National Secu- in support of the three combatant commands centers across our region. rity Strategy, DOD, and State Department in the NESA Center region—U.S. Central policy, the NESA Center has launched its Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. The center generates a dialogue that community chapter program, which will European Command. Events may be focused begins with the programs and continues after foster stronger civil-military relations and geographically by subregion or country or by the participants leave. Participants commu- promote regional cooperation among senior- functional topic and are usually 3- to 5-day nicate with us as much as we do with them. level NESA region leaders. In support of the workshops. The center has executed such events In addition, we produce short, nonattributed Office of the Secretary of Defense’s strategic with USCENTCOM annually from 2002 to backbriefs after seminars and trips that we cir- communication policy guidance, the com- 2004, regularly supports the Eagle Resolve exer- culate on a limited basis to senior government munity chapters will serve simultaneously as cise, and will hold a health security workshop in stakeholders. These reports contain key/new outreach activities and increase our already Jordan this August that will be the culmination facts or opinions gleaned from discussions extensive two-way communication with the of 18 months of discussion with USCENTCOM with participants that help senior policymak- region. Active participation in these chapters and other participants. ers stay informed of views to which they would will allow community members to network Track II. These unofficial programs are not otherwise be exposed. Our backbriefs with U.S. officials as well as colleagues in their organized and conducted by a U.S. nongov- generate responses on a routine basis from the country and region. ernmental organization with NESA Center three- and four-star level, sometimes resulting Programs initiated by these chapters involvement. One program brings together in staff action. will continue to advance U.S. security policy, senior military officers from most countries strengthen relationships in local governments, in the Middle East and the United States for Participants and enhance regional cooperation. They semiannual nonattributable discussions on The NESA Center’s ability to generate also will provide a means for the center to strategic issues and military concerns. The programs that bring NESA region participants maintain contact with its alumni community, other program meets three times a year and together is due in large part to participating communicate up-to-date U.S. policy on the brings together approximately 300 Middle countries, whose commitment to the center is Near East and South Asia, and share informa- East officials and nonofficials for intense demonstrated in every seminar when they send tion about activities and promotions of other working group sessions dealing with the us their best and brightest. Importantly, par- community members and chapters. We are Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Gulf security, ticipants are almost equally divided between looking into linking our alumni chapters Mediterranean security, economic develop- military and civilians with more military than to the regional network of strategic studies ment, democracy and culture, cooperative civilians in our USCENTCOM AOR alumni. centers wherever possible. technology measures, and women’s issues. By In addition to our core region, we invite several gathering generally the same group of par- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ticipants over several years—including many member countries to send participants, as our Admiral Michael Mullen stated, “How we stay NESA Center alumni—the program generates region is of vital concern to them as well. engaged around the world, which we must a group not replicable in one-off seminars and The NESA Center also arranges sepa- do, how we build and maintain partnerships, keeps alumni engaged with the center. Besides rate meetings outside of the seminar. For which we must do, will largely determine facilitating critical regional communications, example, counterterrorism specialists attend our ability over the long term to do for the both series have resulted in actionable policy meetings with the Pentagon J5 office dealing nation all that it expects of us.”1 Moreover, in recommendations. with the war on terror. A deputy spokesman February 2006, Ambassador Eric Edelman, for a NATO country foreign ministry spoke Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, made Strategic Communication with the Rapid Reaction Unit in the office it clear that the regional centers should “focus and Outreach of former Under Secretary of State Karen on improving networks and alumni outreach Shortly after DOD stated that strategic Hughes. Also, a one-star participant met with efforts . . . to communicate better.” The NESA communication and outreach should be key a Congressman to whom he had been intro- Center encapsulates these very ideas in its regional center priorities, the NESA Center duced while the latter toured the Middle East. daily activities in the United States, its region, established an Office for External and Strategic While our participants are here, we stress and around the world. JFQ Communications. Now called simply Outreach, the benefits of technology. We loan each one this office handles all communication with: a laptop computer for their time in Wash- ington, provide computer instruction during Note n lunch breaks, and have NDU librarians give alumni after they leave our seminars 1 Gordon Lubold, “For Chairman of Joint n U.S. Government stakeholders in Wash- detailed training on how to use library online Chiefs, A Partner-Builder,” The Christian Science ington and overseas resources, which are available to our partici- Monitor, August 1, 2007. n points of contact in U.S. Embassies pants for the rest of their lives. In addition, overseas, as well as foreign embassies in students receive training on Blackboard (the Washington NDU Web site interface) and the NESA Center n interagency strategic communication alumni Web site, which has a document library community in multiple languages.
108 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu Thinking Total Cost Requires Thinking Up Front
By ADAM B. SIEGEL
merica has developed a 99-cent This is true, for example, when it comes trying to lower—or at least manage and con- shopping obsession that has to U.S. Navy shipbuilding where, despite the tain—the true (long-term) cost to the Nation turned Benjamin Franklin’s best intentions, the process seems focused on of the fleet and its capabilities. A adage “a penny saved is a penny sticker price and today’s bill (the cost to buy) To achieve lower total ownership cost earned” on its head. A price of $100 gives us rather than the full-system cost (the Navy’s and (TOC) often requires investing more dollars pause, but $99.99 seems like a bargain. Com- Nation’s cost to own). The most intense public up front in areas such as: bined with easy access to revolving credit and scrutiny is given to the sticker price, even a disposal culture, our focus on purchase price though most ships conceal the vast majority of n additional decision support analysis overshadows the total cost of many of our pur- their cost in the post-purchase phase: in opera- n higher quality materials and construction chase decisions. We tend to focus on the “cost tions, maintenance, and modernization. n technology to reduce manning to buy” rather than the “cost to own.” More requirements. often than we care to admit, we are—to trot Realities of Cost out another axiom, which predates Franklin— The Navy’s planned shipbuilding “penny wise and pound foolish.” program seeks to increase capabilities while Adam B. Siegel is a Senior Analyst in the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center.
USS San Antonio speeds to last known location of missing fishing vessel off North Carolina, March 2008
U.S. Navy (Erik N. Hoffman) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 109 COMMENTARY | Thinking Total Cost Requires Thinking Up Front
These can contribute to higher upfront costs the 30, 40, or 50 years of manning are the In addition to other reasons for ship- even while fostering much lower TOC. largest single life cycle cost. Each Sailor taken cost growth (such as reduced procurement Additional decision support up front off a ship represents roughly $150,000 in numbers and ever-expanding capability can raise tradeoffs between capability require- lowered costs every year. requirements), these paths toward reducing ments, acquisition costs, and life cycle costs. When buying a home, it would be less TOC contribute to increased sticker prices For example, in net present value terms, does expensive not to have a washing machine or that affect the debate over what and how it make sense to invest in computing technol- dishwasher. But considering the adage “time many ships to buy. ogy to reduce the number of Sailors required is money,” those acquisition savings would to man engine rooms, understanding that quickly be eaten up by either the time and cost The 21st-century Challenge the computing technology will have to be for buying all these systems or the cost of time The cost-to-buy versus cost-to-own sustained through its life cycle? This more and water for washing clothing by hand. But challenge has existed from the first days of intense analysis to help frame a better long- how do we value our time against the capital the U.S. Navy. For that Service, the challenge term result, by definition, creates a higher and operating cost of automatic washing? today is particularly difficult: how to pay for upfront cost. There was a tremendous impact from such tomorrow’s force while paying the costs of When buying a television or refrigera- labor-saving devices in American society. fighting the war on terror. More extensively, tor, we can run to the nearest store and listen Many suggest that the washing machine was this represents the challenge of developing to the salesperson and walk out with a new one of the key inventions that enabled the transformational systems, with leap-ahead appliance, or we can read Consumer Reports move of women from the home workplace to capabilities effective across the warfighting and take time to make a reasoned choice the salaried one. The labor-saving device thus spectrum as part of the Cooperative Maritime based on price comparisons combined with opened opportunities for transformational Strategy for the 21st Century (from chasing understanding preferred features, repair change. down al Qaeda suspects in a speedboat in the history, and energy use. The first certainly Indonesian archipelago to fighting a major takes less upfront investment (time) while the each Sailor taken off a ship war). These systems should be able to grow, second is more likely to have a longer-term adapt, and transform at an affordable price positive result. represents roughly $150,000 through their decades of service. They should Higher quality construction also can in lowered costs every year also be able to further the acquisition of contribute to higher procurement costs1 scalable, flexible, and adaptable 21st-century through designing for the incorporation of What, then, are the potential nonmon- warfighting systems while conducting and future technology upgrades less expensively etary gains of freeing Sailors from doing tasks paying for today’s fight. and using higher quality materials to lower that technology can perform at a lower cost? While balancing today with tomorrow future maintenance requirements. If it does not take a Sailor off the ship, might is always difficult, this challenge is heightened Investment in technologies (frequently, it free time for him to train, pursue education, by a number of issues: information technologies) enables reducing or otherwise become more valuable to the manning requirements. For most Navy ships, Navy? n Budgetary pressures suggest overall limi- tations to discretionary government spending, Model of DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class including within the Department of Defense destroyer, which will deliver improved capabilities, continued (DOD). forward presence, and added n Within DOD, a number of external combat power factors, such as mounting health care and fuel costs, increase fiscal pressure. n The Nation is at war, which requires resources. n Recapitalization requirements continue to increase.2
Thus, there are real requirements for increased procurement funding at a time when such funding will be increasingly dif- ficult to secure. Efforts to reduce total operating/life cycle costs, as per the above, can contribute to increased “purchase”/acquisition prices even as the Navy is expressing sticker shock at increased platform costs. Thus, the Navy and the Nation have choices in seeking to address that shock while lowering long-term costs. U.S. Navy (Dustin Gates)
110 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu SIEGEL
Answering the Challenge Amphibious transport One track might be to seek procurement dock ship USS New York of “cheap” ships, a path toward building ship being constructed with steel from World Trade numbers through less capable, seemingly Center less expensive ships. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) somewhat represents this track. Another approach might seek to cut platform costs through stripping capabilities from plat- forms as they develop to deal with program cost growth. A third path might be to de- emphasize the implications of future costs while taking steps to lower today’s prices. All of these tracks respond to the system’s focus on sticker price—on today’s bill rather than the full system cost and long-term implica- tions of today’s decisions. Tomorrow’s operations and mainte- nance (O&M) expenses are by far the higher cost. While the acquisition community under- stands this and works to include future cost as part of the life cycle cost/TOC portions of acquisition work, decisionmaking often does not fully address all implications of tomor- row’s costs. For example, personnel costs have consistently outpaced inflation since the introduction of the all-volunteer force, yet future costs are typically set, in procurement decisions, at today’s costs.3 Similarly, energy costs have been rising sharply, and most ana- lysts suggest that future liquid fuel costs will
DOD has included the “crude” rather than fully burdened fuel in procurement decisions, which understates the full cost of fuel use by the acquired platform keep growing (which will drive ever-higher costs as oil production peaks and declines in the face of ever-higher demands for it).4 Related to the liquid fuel challenge, DOD has included the “crude” rather than fully bur- dened fuel in procurement decisions, which understates the full cost of fuel use by the acquired platform. Not fully involving these costs in decisionmaking risks—hobbling tomorrow’s fleet with unaffordable operating costs and fostering an ever-worsening death spiral of today’s costs inhibiting investment in tomorrow’s capabilities as avoidable O&M costs—robs investment accounts. There are no easy answers as we seek to solve multiple issues at the same time: procur- ing transformational systems at affordable costs while lowering tomorrow’s O&M bills U.S. Navy (Santos Huante) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 111 COMMENTARY | Thinking Total Cost Requires Thinking Up Front
through sensible investment today. Yet there ment today can lower tomorrow’s O&M costs are programs that have seriously worked as well as total ownership cost. toward balancing these challenges. The CVN–21 Ford-class program, for There is no magic wand we can wave to example, has striven to enable best decision- guarantee optimal total ownership cost deci- making as to which upfront investments make sionmaking, whether for refrigerators in our sense for reducing the full total ownership homes or the future Navy’s ships. One ame- cost.5 In comparison to Nimitz-class carriers, liorative path might be if the Navy would even the Ford-class’ light-emitting diode lights more forthrightly discuss the need to invest might cost more than incandescent light bulbs today to lower tomorrow’s operating costs as up front but will use far less electricity and part of its conversation with the Nation and possibly outlive the five decades the carriers with Congress when it discusses shipbuilding will serve the Nation. Phased Array Radars issues. JFQ cost more than rotating radars up front but require less maintenance while also improv- ing capability. The Electromagnetic Aircraft NOTES Launch system costs more to acquire than 1 Note that increasing attention to “quality a steam catapult but will demand far less processes” (Lean/Six Sigma) and design for produc- manpower while providing improved capabil- ibility, which is “quality construction,” serves to ity (such as by enabling more precise launch reduce (or at least constrain growth in) ship costs. power settings by aircraft and more flexibility For example, within the DDG–1000 program, there in aircraft launch patterns). And due to the is larger space assigned for each deck that provides upfront investment in understanding and additional space between decks for wiring, pipes, developing improved industrial processes, and other infrastructure. This will both lower the Ford-class ships will be less expensive to manpower for wiring the ship and enable lower procure than Nimitz-class carriers due to costs for any future work in those spaces because it will be an easier space to work in. better procurement processes and design 2 Much of the Navy’s force structure dates improvements. Direct from the administrations of Ronald Reagan and With the Amphibious Transport Dock George H.W. Bush. In shipbuilding terms, these To You! (LPD)–17 San Antonio–class, better materials ships are approaching the end of their active service are being used throughout the ship that will life. Thus, procurement growth must occur, or ndupress.ndu.edu enhance warfighting capabilities and reduce Navy force structure will continue to shrink. maintenance requirements. For example, 3 These costs have often not been fully loaded LPD–17s have composite decking material (counting recruitment, training, and retirement Distribution: JFQ is distributed to the rather than wood on the sides of the well deck costs). Analysis of fully burdened personnel costs field and fleet through Service publications area. This composite will not rot or contribute has become more sophisticated in recent years. For distribution centers. Active, Reserve, National to rusting of the hull, nor will it splinter and example, the CVN(X) (now CVN–21) program did Guard units, individuals, and organizations detailed analysis of Sailor cost (including indirect supported by the Services can order JFQ injure Sailors. The San Antonio composite costs such as training infrastructure) to support through the appropriate activity: antenna mast enclosure will lead to more Navy decisionmaking as to investments to reduce Army: Publications Control Officers sub- reliable radar systems and reduce radar cross mit requests for official subscriptions manning requirements in the new aircraft carrier section and maintenance requirements. Just in through www.usapa.army.mil (click costs. “ordering” link on left side of page) the LPD–17, there are many other examples of 4 See “Peak Oil Primer,” Energy Bulletin, avail- H (use IDN: 050042 and PIN: 071781; cite procurement investment to lower TOC, from able at
112 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu The Use of Military Force by the President Defensive Uses Short of War
By James P. Terry U.S. Army U.S. Navy (Tyler J. Clements) U.S. Navy (Tyler
Capture of Tete de Pont, Battle of Churubusco, President Bush visits Sailors returning from deployment in August 1847 support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
urrent military operations in While the President has often sought its history, its development, its present use, HIraq and Afghanistan follow a congressional authorization to ensure a and the efforts by Congress to rein in this long pattern in U.S. history and consistent funding stream, no congressional power that this article is addressed. practice. Congress has exercised declaration of war was requested by the C Uses of Force its prerogative and declared war as provided Commander in Chief in the more than 200 in the Constitution on only five occasions: the military responses the U.S. Armed Forces Under the Constitution, Congress War of 1812; the War with Mexico in 1846; have made beyond the 5 mentioned above. alone has the power to declare war. It is the the 1898 Spanish-American War; World War I In this period of terrorist violence, we can President, however, who is recognized as in 1917; and World War II in December 1941. expect this trend to continue, as the necessity the authority within the executive branch to In all other military engagements, including of immediate action in response to terrorist respond to imminent threats to the United our current conflicts, the President has exer- planning often requires preemptive measures States and its citizens as Commander in cised his independent executive responsibility that cannot await the outcome of congressio- Chief of all U.S. Armed Forces. In fact, as Commander in Chief pursuant to the nal debate. It is to that Presidential authority, most constitutional scholars recognize the authority set forth in Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution to deploy military force on Colonel James P. Terry, USMC (Ret.), is the Chairman of the Board of Veterans Appeals in the Department behalf of this nation and in its defense. of Veterans Affairs. He previously served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department of State and as Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 113 COMMENTARY | The Use of Military Force by the President
President’s broad power to use the military of an act of Congress, or to ensure adher- to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. without formal authorization from Congress ence to a treaty, or to protect citizens and If Congress were to attempt to prevent his use of in defense of national interests short of all-out territory of the United States from a foreign the army for any of these purposes, the action war. As Edward Corwin has stated: adversary, he would be obliged by the Con- would be void.2 stitution to use his power as Commander Under the constitutional scheme, the President in Chief to direct our military forces to that In practice, then, the President’s dis- needed no specific authorization to use force to end. As this duty rests in the Constitution, it cretion to authorize the use of military force defend against a military threat to the United cannot be removed or abridged by an act of is exceedingly broad. Unique opportunities States or to faithfully execute the laws or Congress. President William Howard Taft have presented themselves throughout this treaties of the nation in circumstances under made that point succinctly: nation’s history for expansion and refine- which the law of nations would not require a ment of this authority. These were notably formal declaration.1 The President is made Commander in Chief of evident not only in the declared wars the Army and Navy by the Constitution for the identified above, but also in the Presiden- Therefore, if the President considered purpose of enabling him to defend the country tial determinations to use force in defense military action essential for the enforcement against invasion, to suppress insurrection and of U.S. interests. The status of the United
USIA in practice,the President’s discretion to authorize the use of military force is exceedingly broad
States as a world power and guarantor of the peace has also operated to expand the powers of the President and to diminish congressional powers in the foreign relations arena. Thus, President Harry Truman never sought congressional authorization before dispatching troops to the Korean Peninsula (believing the “Uniting for Peace” resolution of the United Nations General Assembly was enough); President Dwight Eisenhower likewise acted on his own in putting troops in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic; and most significantly, President John Kennedy eschewed asking for any guid- ance in sending thousands of “advisors” into Vietnam in 1962,3 although President Lyndon Johnson did secure passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 before introducing significant ground forces.4 The doctrine of inherent Presidential powers to use troops abroad outside the narrow scope traditionally accorded those powers is actually more vibrant than many realize. President Truman’s Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, explained Truman’s decision not to seek congressional authorization to send troops into Korea:
His great office was to him a sacred and tem- porary trust, which he was determined to pass on unimpaired by the slightest loss of power or prestige. This attitude would incline him strongly against any attempt to divert criticism President Truman proclaims national emergency to defend from himself by action that might establish a against threat of communist imperialism, 1950 precedent in derogation of presidential power
114 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu TERRY to send our forces into battle. The memo- able information on troop dispositions and This view that the President could randum that we prepared listed eighty-seven strength, planning, and resources.10 Within exercise his constitutional authority to instances in the past century in which his the theater of operations, he may requisition deploy forces absent congressional blessing predecessors had done this. And thus another property and compel services from American continued even after our ratification of the decision was made.5 citizens and friendly foreigners, although United Nations (UN) Charter. Despite the the United States is required to provide “just fact it could be argued that after ratifica- An even more extensive list of mili- compensation.”11 He may also bring an armed tary interventions where the President had conflict to a conclusion through an armistice it is in the realm of the political- not invoked congressional authority was and stipulate conditions of the armistice. The detailed in a 1967 study by the Department President, however, may not acquire territory military crisis that Congress of State.6 In that review, the majority of for the United States through occupation,12 has exercised its prerogative the instances in which the President acted although he may govern recently acquired most effectively vis-à-vis the without congressional authority involved territory until Congress provides a more per- President’s authority the policing of piracy, landings of small manent governing regime.13 naval contingents to protect commerce, In addressing direct threats to the and dispatch of forces across the Mexican United States, then, there has been little his- tion, the UN Charter provisions did become border to control banditry. Some incidents, torical opposition to the President’s unilateral our foreign policy, this was clearly not the however, involved the significant exercise of decisionmaking, and, in fact, it has been view of the U.S. Senate, which continued Presidential power. Three are of consider- recognized as essential. As Supreme Court to espouse an independent authority resi- able historic interest: President James Polk’s Justice Joseph Story stated in the early 1800s: dent in the President to enforce the laws use of troops to precipitate war with Mexico and found his constitutional power to be in 1846, President Ulysses Grant’s attempt to Unity of plan, promptitude, activity, and impaired in no way. Senator Alexander annex the Dominican Republic, and Presi- decision, are indispensable to success; and Wiley (R–WI) stated the position: dent William McKinley’s dispatch of forces these can scarcely exist, except when a single into China during the Boxer Rebellion.7 magistrate is entrusted exclusively with the But outside of these agreements, there is the Similarly, the early years of the 20th power. Even the coupling of the authority of power in our Executive to preserve the peace, century witnessed repeated U.S. incursions, an executive council with him, in the exercise to see that the “supreme laws” are faithfully authorized by the President, in Central of such powers, enfeebles the system, divides executed. When we become a party to this America and the Caribbean to further the responsibility, and not unfrequently [sic] Charter, and define our responsibilities by the national and, in many instances, signifi- defeats every energetic measure.14 agreement or agreements, there can be no ques- cant commercial interests. In Panama, for tion of the power of the Executive to carry out example, the United States intervened on Political-military Crisis our commitments in relation to international three separate occasions prior to its entry to It is in the realm of the political-military policing. His constitutional power, however, is remove Manuel Noriega in 1989 in Operation crisis, where foreign policy and national in no manner impaired.16 Just Cause. defense are intertwined in a decision to use In each of the instances above, the military force, that Congress has exercised This was buttressed by the statement of Federal courts largely upheld the expan- its prerogative most effectively vis-à-vis the Senator Warren Austin (R–VT): sive nature of the President’s authority as President’s authority. That has not always Commander in Chief. In fact, it has been been the case, however. In fact, the traditional So I have no doubt of the authority of the the courts that have carefully shaped the power of the President to use U.S. forces President in the past, and his authority in the President’s authority with respect to the without consulting Congress was the subject future, to enforce peace. I am bound to say nature and scope of that power under Article of debate on the Senate floor in 1945. Senator that I feel that the President is the officer under II, both in terms of the President’s inherent Tom Connally (D–TX) remarked: our Constitution in whom there is exclusively authority and the authority to wage and fund vested the responsibility for maintenance of armed conflicts, which are interests shared The historical instances in which the Presi- peace.17 with Congress. For example, the Supreme dent has directed armed forces to go to other Court has clearly stated that the President countries have not been confined to domestic It is with respect to this inherent power possesses all the power and authority or internal instances at all. Senator [Willliam] in the Executive that President Eisenhower accorded by customary international law to Milliken pointed out that in many cases the sought to engage Congress and gain its a supreme commander in the field: “He may President has sent troops into a foreign country support, not because he needed it but invade the hostile country, and subject it to to protect our foreign policy . . . notably in because the political will resident in a united the sovereignty and authority of the United Central and South America. This was done . . front with that body would be persuasive to States.”8 He may establish and prescribe the . in order to keep foreign countries out of there. any adversary in removing any doubt con- jurisdiction of military commissions, unless [It] was not aimed at protecting any particular cerning our readiness to fight. The President limited by the Congress, in territory occupied American citizen. It was aimed at protecting was nevertheless careful to point out that by American forces.9 He may insert covert our foreign policy.15 “authority for the actions which might be agents behind enemy lines and obtain valu- required would be inherent in the authority ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 115 COMMENTARY | The Use of Military Force by the President of the Commander in Chief. Until Congress Power of the Purse The administration also claimed a second can act I would not hesitate, so far as my One of the major factors shaping and prong of authority to respond to the threat Constitutional powers extend, to take what- restricting Presidential decisionmaking with to Saigon: ever emergency action might be forced upon respect to the commitment of forces abroad us in order to protect the rights and security has been congressional power and authority to [It is] not necessary to rely on the Constitution of the United States.”18 fund military activities under Article I of the alone as the source of the President’s authority, President Eisenhower believed the Constitution. It is for this pragmatic reason since the [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] Chinese government would be influenced that Presidents have sought to keep Congress treaty—advised and consented to by the Senate by a united Presidential-congressional engaged and involved with the Executive in and forming part of the law of the land—sets initiative clearly indicating our intent to joint decisions to commit forces to combat. forth a United States commitment to defend defend Formosa (now Taiwan) from Chinese In Vietnam, for example, President Johnson South Vietnam against armed attack, and aggression. In the joint congressional gained congressional approval and funding since the Congress—in the Joint Resolution of resolution that followed, Congress gave the for the war through the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin August 10, 1964, and in the authorization and President authority “to employ the Armed Resolution,21 which was approved unani- appropriation acts for support of the U.S. mili- Forces of the United States as he deems mously (414–0) by the House and by a margin tary effort in Vietnam—has given its approval necessary for the specific purpose of pro- of 88 to 2 in the Senate.22 Coupled with and support to the President’s actions.25 tecting Formosa and the Pescadores against 19 armed attack.” Eisenhower followed the one of the major factors restricting Presidential decisionmaking same process in addressing the 1958 crisis in Lebanon, and President Kennedy did the with respect to the commitment of forces abroad has been same during the Cuban Missile Crisis.20 congressional power to fund military activities While congressional legislation has operated to augment Presidential powers this congressional imprimatur was parallel In December 1972, a bombing cam- in the foreign affairs field much more funding for the war—$400 million initially, paign north of the 17th parallel was initiated frequently than it has to curtail them, disil- although Johnson only requested $125 million by President Richard Nixon to drive the lusionment with Presidential policy in the to implement the resolution.23 North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. context of the Vietnamese conflict led Con- As criticism of the war in Vietnam It was successful, and on January 23, 1973, gress to legislate restrictions, not only with grew, however, the Johnson administra- the President announced the signing of the respect to the discretion of the President to tion, concerned that the Gulf of Tonkin Paris Peace Accords to end U.S. involve- use troops abroad in the absence of a decla- Resolution could be rescinded at any time, ment in the Vietnam War. When attacks by ration of war, but also limiting his economic argued that the President had full author- the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia continued, and political powers through curbs on his ity to authorize “the actions of the United however, the United States responded by authority to declare national emergencies. States currently undertaken in Vietnam.”24 a resumption of bombing in that nation, arguing that it had to retain freedom of action if it was to preclude the North Viet- namese or its communist allies from violat- ing the accords.26 Despite the President’s strong opposi- tion, Congress, after the resumption of bombing in Cambodia, passed amendments to pending Defense Department funding legislation that had the effect of cutting off funds, after August 15, 1973, for any combat activities by U.S. military forces in, over, or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.27 With no American forces to contend with, the North Vietnamese then sent their entire army— absent one division reserved to protect Hanoi—into Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. During the next 2-year period, in which Hanoi’s forces established military and political control over previously noncom- munist Indochina, more people were killed Soldiers inspect Soviet-made by the new communist regimes in these three ZPU–4 antiaircraft gun in Panama countries than in the entire period of U.S. during Operation Just Cause
DOD involvement in Southeast Asia.
116 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu TERRY
The congressional actions vis-à-vis were not unlimited. Using the power of the the President (and succeeding Presidents) had Southeast Asia were followed in 1974 when purse, Congress was quick to restrict Defense to exercise greater stewardship with regard to Congress placed restrictions on U.S. funding funding where it determined U.S. interests operations managed by the United Nations. provisions of the 1972 Trade Agreement with were not well served. When the Byrd legisla- the former Soviet Union, leading to Soviet tion lapsed on September 30, 1994, Congress The Threat of Terrorism disavowal of the agreement. This was followed quickly passed the Kempthorne amendment The attacks by al Qaeda terrorists on in 1976 by congressional curtailment of funds to the FY95 Defense Authorization Act, which the World Trade Center in New York and on (the Clark Amendment) for Angolan factions continued funding limitations. the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on Sep- fighting Cuban troops supported by Soviet Congress likewise showed itself entirely tember 11, 2001, presented new challenges to training and equipment. In 1983, Congress willing to dictate to President Clinton when the Presidency and the effective exercise of limited President Ronald Reagan’s authority it considered that he was not doing enough Commander in Chief powers. Because these to fund intelligence activities in support of in a peace enforcement effort. Senator Robert attacks or threats of attack are often incho- the anti-Sandinistas, and in 1987, after the Dole (R–KS), leading the charge, attempted ate and depart significantly from traditional Central American governments signed a to legislatively compel U.S. actions to lift the peace accord, it cut off all military aid to the arms embargo unilaterally for the Bosnian two other initiatives in 1994, Nicaraguan Contras. Muslims in early 1994 and thus vitiate the UN These lessons were not lost on Presi- resolution establishing the embargo. Senators both of which failed passage, dent George H.W. Bush when Iraq invaded Sam Nunn and George Mitchell, attempting were efforts by Congress to Kuwait in August 1990. Although his to moderate this effort through compromise, interject itself into military advisors urged that he was not required drafted the Nunn-Mitchell amendment to affairs long thought the sole to obtain congressional authorization to the FY95 Defense Authorization Act. This province of the President assist the United Nations in implementing provision, which was enacted, did not lift UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC) the arms embargo unilaterally, but rather 678, which called upon member states to precluded enforcement against the Bosnian warfare between states adhering to the law use all necessary means to implement prior Muslims while continuing U.S. obligations of armed conflict, the sharing of informa- Security Council resolutions, President Bush as they related to the other parties to the tion with Congress and the American people formally requested a resolution of approval conflict. Even though not as severe as Senator must sometimes be delayed as the release of from Congress to support the UN call for Dole’s proposal, this amendment undoubt- information prematurely may preclude the assistance. In January 1991, the Senate, by edly contributed to an earlier-than-planned effective response to an impending threat. the narrow and highly partisan vote of 52 withdrawal from Bosnia by the UN Protection In light of the significant threat to to 47, gave the President that authority.28 Force. democratic values represented by this form In doing so, however, Congress refused Two other initiatives in 1994, both of of nontraditional warfare, several Presi- to authorize President Bush to use force which failed passage, were efforts by Congress dents, most recently President Bush in late beyond ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. to interject itself into military affairs long 2003, have articulated a right to respond The other provisions of UNSC 678, which thought the sole province of the President. “preemptively” when evidence exists of an U.S. Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpat- In S. 5, the Peace Powers Act, and in H.R. imminent threat of terrorist violence.29 This rick and the administration had supported 7, the National Security Revitalization Act, suggests that prior consultation with con- in order “to restore international peace and Congress attempted to restrict the President’s gressional leadership may be limited in such security in the area,” were not supported in authority as Commander in Chief and limit circumstances. the joint resolution that passed Congress, U.S. involvement in future peace operations. The Reagan administration issued and thus President Bush was limited solely In the Peace Powers Act, Senator Dole’s the seminal “preemption” doctrine in to actions designed to restore the status quo initiative would have prohibited U.S. forces 1984. In the words of former Defense ante in Kuwait. from serving under foreign operational Department official Noel Koch, President President Bill Clinton was even more control, even where it might be in the U.S. Reagan’s National Security Decision Direc- harshly treated by the Congress in 1993, when interest, as in Operation Desert Storm. tive (NSDD) 138, issued April 3, 1984, the loss of Pakistani lives in Somalia in June Similarly, in the National Security Revitaliza- “represent[ed] a quantum leap in countering 1993 and then the further loss of 18 U.S. lives tion Act, then–Speaker of the House Newt terrorism, from the reactive mode to recog- in Mogadishu in October 1993 delivered the Gingrich’s bill would have limited the use of nition that pro-active steps [were] needed.”30 death knell to U.S. support for UN peace Defense funds for peacekeeping activities and Although NSDD 138 remains classified operations (unless led by U.S. officers and would have restricted the sharing of intel- to this day, Robert McFarlane suggested with a preponderance of U.S. forces). In ligence with the United Nations. In each case, at the Defense Strategy Forum on March passing the Byrd amendment to the fiscal year had these measures passed, the President’s 25, 1985, that it included the following key (FY) 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, Con- constitutional prerogatives would have been elements: The practice of terrorism under gress sent a strong message that the President’s severely impacted. Despite the failure of all circumstances is a threat to the national enhanced authorities to deploy forces without passage of these measures, there remained a security of the United States; the practice congressional approval in circumstances bipartisan concern in the Congress after the of international terrorism must be resisted where no vital national interest is implicated United Nations Operation in Somalia II that by all legal means; the United States has the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 117 COMMENTARY | The Use of Military Force by the President responsibility to take protective measures or court-sustainable, evidence affirming the be of little utility in responding to a state whenever there is evidence that terrorism is complicity of a specific sponsoring state is whose actions are denied and whose practices about to be committed; and the threat of ter- an impractical standard that contributed to are ultimately designed to eliminate normal, rorism constitutes a form of aggression and the impression—prior to the articulation of lawful intercourse between nations. justifies acts in self-defense.31 NSDD 138 in 1984—that the United States In a democratic society, then, the range While moral justification for this U.S. was inhibited from responding meaning- of options open to a President desiring to policy may be obvious, the more difficult fully to terrorist outrages. This view was protect the Nation’s citizens and resources problem is defining which state support certainly reinforced in 1979 when the U.S. from terrorism is limited. One of the best or linkage warrants a President’s military Government allowed 52 American citizens things a democratic government can do is response, which legal framework supports to remain hostage to Iranian militants for educate the public and its military about the such a proactive policy, and which reason- more than 400 days. As Hugh Tovar has realistic options available in any crisis. Profes- able force alternatives are responsive to the noted, “There is a very real danger that the sor Abraham Miller suggests: threat. It is the link between the terrorist pursuit of more and better intelligence may and the sponsoring state that is crucial to become an excuse for non-action, which The image of an invincible and omnipotent providing the President with the justification in itself might do more harm than action America that can rescue hostages under any for response against a violating state. Covert based on plausible though incomplete circumstance is patently unrealistic. It is a intelligence operatives are necessary for intelligence.”34 mindset that comes from a failure to realize identifying and targeting terrorist training An examination of authorized how lucky the Israelis were at Entebbe and camps and bases and for providing an effec- responses to state-sponsored terrorism from the charges and countercharges of the tive warning of impending terrorist attacks. available to a President requires an under- 1980 election campaign, during which the Unfortunately, as noted by former Secretary standing that terrorism is a strategy that Iranian hostage crisis was played to the hilt.35 of State George Shultz in 1984, “we may never does not follow traditional military patterns. have the kind of evidence that can stand up in In fact, a fundamental characteristic of ter- These valid concerns underscore the an American court of law.”32 rorism is its violation of established norms. need to weigh other long-term values, besides The question, then, from several per- The conduct of warfare is governed by countering the immediate terrorist threat, spectives, is how much information is enough. carefully defined norms that survive despite when determining an appropriate policy. Former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger their frequent violation. The sole norm for George Shultz was correct when he stated that has underscored the very real and practical terrorism is effectiveness. International our policy “must be unambiguous. It must be difficulties military planners face in attempt- law requires that belligerent forces identify clearly and unequivocally the policy of the ing to apply a relatively small quantum of themselves, carry arms openly, and observe United States to fight back—to resist chal- force, over great distance, with uncertain the laws of war. Principal among the laws lenges, to defend our interests, and to support intelligence. He has accurately noted the dif- of war are the principles of discrimination those who put their lives on the line in a ficulty of ensuring success without accurate (or noncombatant immunity) and propor- common cause.”36 information and has echoed the relationship tion. Terrorists, however, do not distinguish While the President should use mili- between public support and demonstrable between the innocent (noncombatants) and tary power only if conditions justify it and evidence of culpability in any resort to force the armed forces of the country in which the other means are not available, there will be by the United States in defending against ter- attack is directed. instances, as occurred after September 11, rorist attack.33 Other considerations in addressing 2001, when the use of force is his only alterna- Although no U.S. President has been terrorist violence include the fact that the tive. In that circumstance, President Bush’s able to define adequately “how much evi- real-time relationship between threat and actions were fully justified as necessary defen- dence is enough,” the demand for probative, threat recognition is often compressed in the sive measures to eliminate a continuing threat terrorist conflict arena. Strategy development to the United States.
an examination of authorized responses to state-sponsored terrorism available to a President requires understanding that terrorism does not follow traditional military patterns
is thus limited with respect to the preattack, Causal connectivity or linkage, the most nonmilitary initiatives that must always be important element in justifying the use of the President’s option of choice. Traditional force in response to terrorist violence, can be means of conflict resolution, authorized by established only if effective intelligence opera- law and customary practice, are precluded tives are positioned to discover who the ter-
George Bush Presidential Library and Museum and Library Presidential Bush George because terrorism by definition is covert rorists are, where they are, and who supports in execution, unacknowledged by its state them. While U.S. intelligence did not preclude Presidents Ford, Nixon, Bush, Reagan, and Carter in sponsor, and practiced with violent effective- the attacks on the World Trade Center and Oval Office ness. Thus, diplomacy and conciliation may Pentagon, it did quickly establish critical link-
118 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu TERRY ages. The perpetrators of the September 11 Department of Homeland Security to address followed in 1976 by the Clark amendment violence, al Qaeda, were protected and given these threats on an institutional basis. From cutting off funds for support to forces fighting safe haven in Afghanistan by the Pashtun these actions, it is obvious that there is a more Cuban troops, supported by the Soviet Union, Taliban militia. heightened sensitivity and increased alertness in Angola. In 1983, funding was cut for the Nor was September 11 the first time the to the possibility of terrorism against Ameri- anti-Sandinistas, and in 1987, all support for United States had been subjected to attack by cans in 2008 than in 1979. These actions will the Nicaraguan Contras was eliminated. It terrorists so clearly linked to a state sponsor. go far in preparing our Presidents to more is likely that Congress, in light of the debate The 1979 attacks on the American Embassy effectively address future attacks, while at the on Iraq in February 2007 in both houses, will in Tehran and the Consulates at Tabriz and same time promoting responsive contingency seek to do the same for Iraq after the elec- Shiraz occurred just 1 week after the Shah planning. tions in 2008. The impact of this use of the came to the United States for medical treat- authority of the purse has forced Presidents to ment. On November 4, 1979, approximately Observations be mindful of congressional interests in each 300 demonstrators overran the U.S. Embassy The elements of the President’s author- case and recognize that a protracted conflict compound in Tehran and took 52 U.S. citizens ity as Commander in Chief under Article II quickly wears thin with both the American hostage for 444 days. and the successful exercise of this authority people and their representatives. As in most developing countries, there in periods short of declared war have clearly The complexity of addressing the ter- were few internal constraints—whether from been affected by a continuum of congres- rorist threat to the United States adds another opposition parties, a critical press, or an sional and public influence, dictated by the layer of intelligence, training, equipment, enlightened public—to pressure Ayatollah immediacy of the threat to national security. and logistic concerns for the President, as Khomeini, the Iranian leader, into upholding The intensity of the political, legal, and Commander in Chief, in considering when the law. In the atmosphere of fervent national- funding debate concerning a President’s and how the military instrument should be ism that accompanied Khomeini’s sweep to decision to commit forces has been directly used. Clearly, military response to terrorist power, forces for moderation were depicted related to the actual threat to the Nation or violence against our citizens and our nation as tools of foreign interests. In such an atmo- its people and, conversely, by the level of has traditionally been strongly supported by sphere, the militant supporters of the clerical political discretion the President has sought Congress and the American people. Because leadership fomented domestic pressure to to inject into the decision to use the military of the inordinate risk to our forces in these violate other recognized norms as well—in instrument. more recent conflicts, however, where the areas such as property ownership, religious When the threat to the United States is terrorist threat does not directly impact vital freedom, and judicial protection. This combi- clear and immediate, Congress has expressed national interests, this support, monetary and nation of revolution and nationalism yielded no objection to decisive action by the Presi- political, will likely be more difficult to obtain explosive results—a reordering of both dent and has placed few restrictions on his and maintain. Iranian domestic society and its approach to use of public funds and the commitment of foreign affairs. Unfortunately, the situation in military forces. It is important to note that The role of the President as Commander Iran has not greatly improved. actions taken where the Nation has been in Chief is the most loosely defined section President Reagan’s pledge upon taking directly subjected to attack, such as after Sep- within Article II of the Constitution. In office of “swift and effective retribution” in tember 11 in Afghanistan, have provided the wartime, Congress has gladly delegated its case of further threats to Americans abroad President the greatest latitude and freedom of responsibilities to the President. In periods of was clearly meant to deter future attacks as action, while those in which a strong policy conflict or terrorist threats short of declared well as reassure a concerned Nation. Given interest but a lesser or more attenuated defen- war, it has retained that level of control, the profusion of incidents throughout the sive requirement, such as in Iraq, have offered through funding restrictions and other leg- world since (to include the 1993 World Trade the President a much narrower opportunity islative enactments, necessary to ensure that Center bombing and the attacks of September to exercise his discretion as Commander in our vital national interests are reflected in the 11), however, it is clear that President Reagan’s Chief. The debate in the House and Senate on actions of the Commander in Chief. JFQ warnings have not turned back the tide of the situation in Iraq in February 2007 clearly disorder. put the President on notice that continued It is clear that the painful lessons of the funding was tied to performance in the war Notes Iranian hostage crisis have spurred subse- on the insurgents, political effectiveness of the 1 See, for example, Edward S. Corwin, The quent administrations to review the entire Nouri al-Maliki government, and the ability President, Office and Powers, 1787–1957: History range of alternatives available for protecting of the Iraqi armed forces to exercise greater and Analysis of Practice and Opinion, 4th rev. ed. limited—but highly visible—national inter- responsibility in the fight. (New York: New York University Press, 1957), ests, such as the safety of American diplomatic Where Congress has determined that 198–201. personnel and property. For example, NSDD the use of the Nation’s military power no 2 President William Howard Taft, quoted in 62 and 63, approved in the Clinton adminis- longer reflects the interests of their constitu- Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign tration, clearly identified specific U.S. interests ents, it has not been reluctant to terminate Relations (New York: Macmillan, 1922), 309. 3 and critical infrastructure for protection in a that funding. In Vietnam in 1973, Congress See discussion in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on the National Commit- more defined way.37 The Bush administration, cut off all funding not only for Vietnam ments Resolution, S. Rept. No. 91–129, 91st Cong., 1st after the September 11 attacks, established the but also for Cambodia and Laos. This was ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 119 The Case for JPME Phase Zero Building a Joint Culture in the U.S. Navy By David K. Richardson
n the two decades since the landmark best track record of setting a joint course over for change and innovation, that the Navy finds Goldwater-Nichols Department of the last 20 years. That said, the current Navy itself with a unique opportunity to change its Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of leadership has openly admitted that a change culture and firmly center itself on the joint path. I1986, each military Service has charted is needed to address the importance of joint- The key question then becomes how a different course in implementing joint ness. In his March 2007 statement before the the Navy makes this course change with concepts within its respective culture. One Senate Armed Services Committee, then–Chief the long view in sight. This article proposes of the most significant challenges created by of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen the creation of a new phase of joint profes- Goldwater-Nichols was the need to expand stated, “Our path is designed to create a change sional military education: JPME Phase Zero. joint professional military education (JPME) in Navy culture so that it values jointness and This new program, a combination of formal programs. The Services, charged with educat- therefore systematically develops a group of classroom instruction and summer training, ing and training their officer corps in both Navy leaders who are strategically minded, will ensure every naval officer is educated in Service-specific and joint matters, continue capable of critical thinking, and skilled in naval basic joint matters prior to commissioning. to struggle with this crucial task of develop- and joint warfare.”2 By aggressively instituting JPME Phase Zero ing the “total officer.” This is especially true Changing a culture is a tough and nebu- in the next few years, the Navy can change its for the U.S. Navy. lous endeavor. It no doubt requires patience culture to value jointness from the ground up Congressman Ike Skelton (D–MO) and, in the words of Peter Schwartz, the “art of and establish itself as the model Service in joint observed over a decade ago that the Navy is the long view.” Today, changes in joint require- education and officer development. the “service that traditionally has been most ments and education are ongoing as all the resistant to change.”1 From not sending its best Services implement the Vision for Joint Officer officers to war colleges, to emphasizing Navy- Development set forth in November 2005 by Lieutenant Commander David K. Richardson, USN, centric and command tours over joint qualifi- then–Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a Surface Warfare Officer currently assigned as a cations, the Navy certainly does not have the General Peter Pace. It is in this climate, ripe 2008 Legislative Fellow in Washington, DC.
CDR Dave Adams, USN, takes command of Provincial Reconstruction Team Khost at Forward Operating Base Chapman U.S. Navy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 121 COMMENTARY | Building a Joint Culture in the U.S. Navy
A Long and Unhappy Engagement sink the U.S. Army’s three river gunboats oper- Since the end of the Goldwater-Nichols What an organization does every day ating on the Pasig River if they entered Dewey’s fight, the Navy’s position has strongly sup- matters. In a very basic sense, daily tasks play zone of influence a second time.”4 ported the concept of the joint force. In a large role over time in defining a culture. This is not to say that the Navy has practice, however, it has taken a long time The Navy has always had a strong culture that always operated alone and far out to sea with to integrate policies that support this public clearly sets it apart from the other Services. This no regard to others. To be fair, at certain stance. This is particularly true with regard to culture has been shaped by the Navy’s unique important points in its history, the Navy personnel policies that impact joint education operating environment and traditional values emerged as a model of joint cooperation. and joint qualification. The history of the Naval such as independent action and initiative.3 Throughout World War II in the Pacific, and War College, the Navy’s premier institution for Over the last two centuries, the Navy’s again in Korea, Navy operational commanders educating naval officers in joint matters, clearly culture of independence has emerged as a and staffs displayed a high level of proficiency highlights this fact. Twelve years after Goldwa- result of forces that are arguably diametrically in joint operations. This expertise, resident in ter-Nichols, an article in Joint Force Quarterly opposed to the concept of jointness. While the the Navy’s amphibious warfare community, painted a grim picture when it reported that other Services tend to train and fight as teams reached its apex in the 1940s and early 1950s of combined arms to accomplish missions on with the highly successful island hopping cam- land, the Navy throughout its history has spent paign and the amphibious landing at Inchon.5 the Navy’s culture of significant time operating independently in Unfortunately, with the emergence of independence has emerged the middle of vast oceans. In naval terms, joint the Cold War, this expertise took a back seat as a result of forces that are operations often meant working with another and remained dormant for decades. The arguably diametrically opposed ship or within a task force at sea. In many cases, resultant Navy culture in the 1980s had a to the concept of jointness integration with forces from other Services did tough time adjusting to sweeping changes not occur until ships operated near land. Until in the joint world. The watershed event in recently, this integration was hardly considered this process occurred with the fight over the “naval colleges still suffer from the conviction an operational way of life for ships outside the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Although of their leaders that their best and brightest amphibious warfare community. every Service argued against its passage, the have no time to attend . . . it sends few of its top On top of this fact, parochialism has Navy’s reaction was particularly vehement. officers to its own war college.”8 always played a major role in the evolution Secretary of the Navy John Lehman argued In writing about the Navy in the century of joint relationships. Services not working that the act would destroy the core strengths before World War II, retired Vice Admiral together or trusting each other can negatively of the American military establishment.6 And James Calvert observed that “the marriage impact operations. Service cooperation perhaps in a telling episode, the Navy set up a “crisis of American industrial power and the Navy reached a low point in 1899 in the Philippines, management center,” the “purported mission” was preceded by a long and fitfully unhappy when Navy Commodore George Dewey “went of which “was to defeat the [Goldwater- engagement; we were slow in developing the so far as to warn General Otis, U.S. Army Com- Nichols] legislation, an activity of question- steel-and-steam warship in our Navy.”9 The mander in the Philippines, that he planned to able legality.”7 dramatic culture shift from sail to steam took a long time to work itself out, but in the end, Airmen and Sailors from USNS Comfort visit students in Guyana American industrial might produced the naval forces that destroyed the Japanese fleet and won the war in the Pacific. The Navy’s culture at the time, cemented in tradition, finally embraced the changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution and emerged as the world’s premier naval force. The culture shift that joint warfare repre- sents to the modern Navy is no less significant than the shift from sail to steam. There are indications in the last few years that the Navy’s “long and unhappy engagement” with the joint world that began with Goldwater-Nichols has turned a corner. A prime example of this shift is the surface warfare community’s recent overhaul of the officer career pipeline. This dramatic change, a policy called “XO–CO Fleet Up,” allows for more flexibility in joint educa- tion and completion of multiple joint tours. Aligned with the Joint Staff’s 2005 Vision for Joint Officer Development, this new career
U.S. Navy (Elizabeth R. Allen) path ensures that surface warfare officers “are
122 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu RICHARDSON better able to excel in the joint arena while visit all JPME institutions on a periodic basis In describing the vision of a “continuum meeting all career milestones.”10 for inspection and assessment. Reporting of joint education,” the Joint Chiefs instruc- The bottom line behind this overhaul directly to the Chairman, the PAJE serves as tion states that “officers receive JPME from was that the surface warfare community was the accreditation authority and plays a critical pre-commissioning through the general/flag consistently failing to meet its quota of senior officer level.”13 This policy implements the representation on joint and combatant com- finding of a previous Joint Staff effort in 1998, mander staffs. This situation developed due leaving it to each Service called JPME 2010. The JPME 2010 require- to many years of neglect with respect to joint to address Service-specific ments team “confirmed that a seamless, flex- officer development. Eventually, something PME, the Joint Staff has ible JPME system is needed for officers from had to be done to correct the shortfall. While aggressively coordinated and pre-commissioning to the general/flag level.”14 the recent shift in policy is a step in the right improved cohesion among the The problem is that although we are over 20 direction, it will be years before this initiative years removed from Goldwater-Nichols, this bears fruit and corrects this portion of the formalized JPME programs vision is not yet a reality. joint manning deficiency. Describing the importance of getting In many ways, this corrective action role in ensuring that joint education is stan- lifelong joint education right, the CJCS Vision illustrates the reactive nature of the Navy’s lead- dardized across various joint educational insti- for Joint Officer Development suggests that ership in addressing shortcomings in the joint tutions. The PAJE, coupled with the MECC “schoolhouses are the petri dishes for organi- world. More importantly, the example involv- process, has made significant strides in the last zational culture.”15 To this point in time, the ing the surface force is only one part of a larger “joint marriage” involving the entire Service. Army B–25 takes off from USS Hornet during Doolittle Raid, 1942 The Navy has come a long way since Com- modore Dewey’s words to General Otis over a century ago, but there is still a long way to go.
No Officer Left Behind It is important to understand that the issue of joint professional military education is only part of a larger and very complex frame- work. Each Service must develop its officers through Service-specific professional military education, in addition to the requirements for JPME. In the 2005 CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the Services “must mentor all officers toward the Joint Officer Develop- ment objective . . . [and] the Services must U.S. Navy develop a no-officer-left-behind attitude.”11 To achieve this vision, the crucial task of integrat- decade in strengthening the JPME Phase I and ing professional military education (PME) with II programs and the institutions that admin- JPME presents a significant challenge. ister to them. Due to this focus and aggressive Leaving it to each Service to address Ser- oversight by the Joint Staff, joint education vice-specific PME, the Joint Staff has aggres- as a whole has improved substantially since sively coordinated and improved cohesion Goldwater-Nichols. among the various formalized JPME programs. However, the JPME Phase I and II pro- A cornerstone of this effort is the Military grams focus only on intermediate- and senior- Education Coordination Council (MECC), level joint education. The intermediate phase which is chaired by the Director of the Joint focuses on majors and lieutenant commanders Staff. Meeting annually with representatives with over 10 years of commissioned service. from every JPME institution, the purpose of The senior level phase focuses on officers with the council is “to address key educational issues over 15 years of service. Strengthening the of interest to the joint education community, intermediate and senior levels of JPME educa- promote cooperation and collaboration among tion is vital to educating the joint force, but the MECC member institutions, and coordi- this only goes so far. Many would argue that nate joint education initiatives.”12 it leaves out the most important part of joint In addition to the MECC, the Joint Staff education—the portion received in the first Soldiers board landing craft during Inchon oversees the formal Process for Accreditation half of an officer’s career. invasion, January 9, 1953 of Joint Education (PAJE), during which teams U.S. Army ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 123 COMMENTARY | Building a Joint Culture in the U.S. Navy
Chairman has left the implementation of the Establish Navy-wide JPME Phase Zero for Midshipmen program, where midshipmen first two phases of the joint education con- for all naval officers during the precommis- spend 1 week with each warfare specialty before tinuum, the precommissioning phase and the sioning phase of training. JPME Phase Zero their junior year (naval aviation, submarines, primary phase, up to the Services. Except for a will fill the current void in the precommis- Marines), a new program called Joint-MID report by each Service chief to the Chairman sioning and primary levels of joint education could expose midshipmen to a joint warfare every 3 years describing the nature of these and, in the process, build the foundation for all command (U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. programs, no oversight or inspection of this future JPME. Simply put, it will set the stage Pacific Command, U.S. Strategic Command, level of joint education is conducted. These for and enhance JPME Phase I and II programs U.S. Central Command, and so forth) for 2 programs are not standardized across the currently in place. The goal of Phase Zero is weeks during their first-class (senior) summer. Services. Furthermore, they are not included This summer experience should be structured in either the MECC or PAJE process. to give midshipmen a first-hand appreciation This lack of attention to initial joint JPME Phase Zero will teach for current challenges in the joint world, as well education is surprising because it allows joint midshipmen the basics of as a reinforcement of the concepts presented in culture to begin to grow in Service-specific joint warfare to give them a the JMO course of instruction they received the “petri dishes” without the same rigorous over- framework on which to build previous academic year. sight given to the dish 10 years down the road. throughout their careers Create a JMO Department at the Naval It is time for this to change. Academy. To execute and teach JPME Phase Zero, a new JMO Department should be not to create joint qualified officers at com- created and staffed by a joint faculty. Smaller missioning, but simply to meet the Chairman’s but similar in construct to current war college vision of the endstate of the precommissioning faculties, the staff should include instructors and primary phases of JPME. Stressing the from all the Services who are senior officers basics only, this includes “an introduction to with considerable joint experience. Staffing this their respective Service . . . knowledge of the department would undoubtedly be a significant basic U.S. defense structure, roles and mis- challenge, but several options are available. sions of other Military Services, the combatant As many have observed, “It has taken command structure . . . and the nature of nearly a generation to grow a cadre of joint American military power and joint warfare.”17 officers and a body of joint knowledge.”19 But To achieve this endstate, the proposal after 20 years of the Goldwater-Nichols joint for JPME Phase Zero consists of the following force, that knowledge and experience do exist. programs: Faculty in this department should be a mix of Joint Military Operations (JMO) basic retired and Active duty personnel. Active duty course of instruction. In the spirit of the JMO officers on the JMO Department faculty should course currently taught at the Naval War College be incorporated into the Navy’s current Perma- for JPME Phase I, it is proposed that this course nent Military Professor program to ensure the be taught in the second-class (junior) year for longevity and consistency of instructors. Finally, all midshipmen. This basic instruction could the chairman of this department should be an be structured as a 3-hour class with no lab time officer of significant stature. This could take (3–0–3). The objective for this formalized course the form of a distinguished chair and could be will be to teach midshipmen the basics of joint a retired flag or general officer with the experi- Former Secretary of Navy John F. Lehman warfare to give them a framework on which to ence of multiple joint commands. opposed Goldwater-Nichols Act legislation build throughout their careers. It will fulfill all The new JMO Department at the Naval DOD (R.E. Kerns) joint learning areas and objectives for precom- Academy should fall under the Division of Soul of the Navy missioning level and primary-level programs Professional Development in Luce Hall (see The U.S. Naval Academy is the Ser- as outlined in the Officer Professional Military figure). This would place the department in the vice’s premier undergraduate educational Education Policy (CJCSI 1800.01C). Textbooks same academic division as the Department of institution and a key commissioning source would include The Armed Forces Officer; Joint Professional Programs, which coordinates mid- of naval officers. Senator John McCain Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces shipman summer training programs and service (R–AZ), a Naval Academy graduate and of the United States; and Joint Publication 0–2, assignments. This would allow fluid coordina- retired Navy captain, recently wrote that the Unified Action Armed Forces. tion between the JMO basic academic course Naval Academy “stands as the very soul of Joint midsummer training. Classroom taught by the faculty and the Joint-MID summer the United States Navy.”16 For these reasons instruction can only go so far. Summer train- program to be executed by the Department of and others detailed below, the academy is ing, where midshipmen visit the fleet and get Professional Programs. A cadre of JMO faculty the right place to implement the Navy’s hands-on experience, “provides some of the should liaison directly with Professional Pro- JPME Phase Zero program. This program most enjoyable, most professionally enriching, grams to lead the Joint-MID summer program. should commence in the next 2 years and most memorable experiences at the Academy.”18 With JPME Phase Zero set up in this follow four specific steps. Building on the current Professional Training manner, the Naval Academy’s JMO Department
124 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu RICHARDSON could execute JPME Phase Zero for Officer Professional Military Education Policy should First and foremost, it aggressively pursues the Candidate School (OCS)/Naval Reserve Officer be modified to include the Chairman of the vision of developing joint officers by attempt- Training Corps (NROTC) graduates as well. Naval Academy’s Joint Military Operations ing to get out in front on the issue of early joint Most naval officers are commissioned through Department in the MECC Principals and education. A second strength of the proposal is these two programs, so developing a program MECC Working Group. This would finally that it standardizes the first joint exposure and that does not include these officers makes little align the precommissioning and primary levels initial joint education of all naval officers. This sense. Therefore, it is proposed that all OCS/ of joint education with the other phases of program could reap huge benefits down the NROTC graduates spend 1 month in tempo- joint education and bring them firmly under line, lay the positive foundation for a Service- rary duty at the Naval Academy in the summer one umbrella. As the Naval Academy model wide joint culture, and enhance JPME Phase I immediately following their commissioning is expanded to other Service academies, the and II education. But the opposite is also true, and prior to reporting to their first duty station. MECC process would strengthen JPME Phase and there are many arguments for why this In an intense summer school experience Zero across the entire military establishment as program would simply not work as proposed. taught by the JMO faculty, these new officers has been done for Phase I and II programs. Congressman Skelton observed that will receive instruction in the JMO basic course Expand the PAJE charter to include “service expertise comes first” and that “finding while living on the Naval Academy grounds. JPME Phase Zero. The Navy’s JPME Phase time for both service and joint training is During the summer months, several wings Zero program should be integrated into the difficult.”20 This is no doubt the case. Tactical of the Naval Academy’s dormitory, Bancroft Joint Staff’s PAJE process to ensure that this proficiency and Service-specific knowledge Hall, are left vacant as midshipmen participate pilot program is given the proper oversight are vital building blocks to understanding in summer programs. The cost savings of and is aligned fully with the Chairman’s vision. joint concepts. Taking this one step further, berthing and messing OCS/NROTC officers Creating a program that simply “checks the the argument can easily be made that joint at the academy is an obvious advantage to this box” would, in the end, do more harm than education does not make sense at all until basic proposal. Additionally, by living in Bancroft good. Therefore, it is imperative that initial tactical proficiency is achieved. Hall and receiving in-residence instruction at certification and accreditation be rigorous. In addition to the issue of tactical profi- the Naval Academy, all commissioned officers Lessons learned must be properly documented ciency, early training and education are a zero would receive the same standardized training for future application in the potential expan- sum game. If JPME Phase Zero is established at prior to reporting to the Fleet. This program sion of the program to other Service acad- the Naval Academy, something over the 4-year could create a bond between every naval officer emies. Implementation and certification of program must be removed or modified. This and the institution that is the “soul of the the Navy’s JPME Phase Zero program should is a contentious subject with passionate argu- United States Navy.” occur no later than 2012. Accreditation should ments on every side. One only has to look at Once established, include Naval occur no later than 2014. the intense battles in the last 50 years over the Academy JPME Phase Zero leadership in the Naval Academy’s curriculum to see that this is MECC process. The Navy’s JPME Phase Zero Zero Sum Game a lightning rod issue. program should be integrated into the exist- The creation of a JPME Phase Zero The case could also be made that the ing MECC process. The Joint Staff’s Officer program in the Navy has many advantages. current Naval Academy curriculum does not need to be modified because it already meets the spirit of what is required for joint training. JPMEJPME Phase Phase Zero Zero and and Proposed a Proposed Naval Naval Academy Academy JMO Department Joint Military Operations Department Midshipmen are introduced to the basics of the other Services throughout initial indoctrina- tion, including their ranks, rates, organization, DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT and platforms. This is reinforced during lec- Luce Hall tures within the curriculum in the Department of Professional Development. Additionally, joint culture is promoted through the Service Academy Exchange Department of Department of Department of Program (SAEP). Dating back to 1949, SAEP Seamanship Joint Military Professional permits a select few midshipmen and cadets and Navigation Operations Programs from each Service academy to spend an entire semester at another academy as exchange JMO Course: students. This program, intended to increase Navigation/ Service JMO–100 (3–0–3) Assignment “the understanding and good relations Seamanship Courses (second-class year) between the service academies and the four services,”21 is a prime example of early pro- Joint-MID Summer motion of joint culture currently in place. Cruise (2 Weeks, Summer Training But does the present level of joint instruc- first class summer) tion and programs such as SAEP go far enough in building a joint culture within the Navy? The answer can certainly be debated, but two key ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 125 COMMENTARY | Building a Joint Culture in the U.S. Navy points bring the shortcomings in the current upon commissioning, early joint education 2 Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chief of Naval system to light. First, only a handful of midship- is too important to trust to computer-based Operations, statement before the Senate Armed Ser- men participate in SAEP, so this hardly qualifies methods. The mere notion of junior officers vices Committee, March 29, 2007. 3 Donald Chisholm, “The Naval Way of War,” as a program that develops a joint culture for learning about joint warfare and what it means lecture delivered at the U.S. Naval War College, every future naval officer. Second, the current to work together in their profession by sitting February 5, 2007. placement and nature of instruction in joint alone at a computer console is, in and of itself, 4 Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The concepts are not comprehensive enough to a contradiction. This proposal also goes against Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of highlight its importance. A few lectures scattered lessons learned from decades of JPME Phase I Modern American Navalism (New York: The Free throughout courses in naval warfare, leadership, and II instruction at war colleges. Some of the Press, 1972), 255. seamanship, and navigation cannot possibly most important parts of joint education lie in 5 Donald Chisholm, interview with author, impress upon midshipmen the significance of the social aspects of the education and the inter- Naval War College, Newport, RI, March 13, 2007. joint warfare and joint education. This is espe- action between officers of different Services. 6 James L. Locher III, “Goldwater-Nichols: cially true when these lectures are conducted by Imagine the benefit of having a JPME Phase Fighting the Decisive Battle,” Joint Force Quarterly 31 junior officers with little or no joint experience. Zero course taught in a seminar format by an (Summer 2002), 39. 7 Ibid., 42. The issues with Naval Academy curricu- experienced, dynamic, and joint qualified Air 8 Leonard D. Holder, Jr., and Williamson lum instruction aside, there is the predominant Force colonel instead having of midshipmen Murray, “Prospects for Military Education,” Joint belief that early joint education can best be sitting at their computers in Bancroft Hall flip- Force Quarterly 18 (Spring 1998), 86. accomplished through less formal means. Even ping through slides with no human interaction. 9 James Calvert, The Naval Profession (New the Chairman’s vision discusses a proposal for York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), 7. online distance education via a Joint Learning Numerous studies and articles in the last 20 10 Terrance Etnyre, “XO–CO Fleet Up,” message Portal, the intent of which is to fill the current years have highlighted various issues with edu- to all Naval Surface Forces, Commander, Naval void and assist junior officers in receiving joint cating the joint force in the wake of Goldwater- Surface Forces, San Diego DTG 071532ZDEC2005. education before they reach JPME Phase I pro- Nichols. Many experts, including retired Admiral 11 Peter Pace, CJCS Vision for Joint Officer grams as lieutenant commanders and majors.22 William Owens, have identified shortfalls and Development (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, The cost savings of this approach alone is hard urged action in addressing early joint education November 2005), 9. 12 Walter L. Sharp, “Military Education Coordi- to discount. at Service academies and other precommission- nation Council (MECC) Minutes,” memorandum, In the end, the determining factor in ing programs. Extensive studies by renowned The Joint Staff, February 9, 2006. think tanks have called for the development of sorting out these approaches boils down to 13 Walter L. Sharp, “Officer Professional Military measures of effectiveness. But measuring the “synergy between service academies and training Education Policy (OPMEP),” Chairman of the Joint jointness of a culture, and the various effects programs, such as Officer Candidate Schools and Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01C, December 22, of certain programs on that culture, is a tough the Reserve Officer Training Corps.”24 But few 2005, A–1. if not impossible task. This could take decades, of these studies have outlined a detailed plan for 14 John B. Driscoll, “Developing Joint Education for which we do not have. The time to act is now. achieving this goal. Joint professional military the Total Force,” Joint Force Quarterly 24 (Spring 2000). education Phase Zero, beginning with the Navy 15 Pace, 5. 16 Predisposition to Jointness as the pilot program, does just that. H. Michael Gelfand, Sea Change at Annapo- The rapidly changing environment in the In the end, Phase Zero will be a small step lis: The United States Naval Academy, 1949–2000 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, post–Cold War and post-9/11 world overshad- forward in a much larger journey. Success of 2006), xiii. ows the arguments against JPME Phase Zero. this program will not be measured for years to 17 Sharp, “Officer Professional Military Educa- The military’s operating environment is becom- come, and even then it will be hard to quantify. tion Policy (OPMEP),” A–A–6. ing more complex with the addition of various But investment in education is never a mistake. 18 Calvert, 119. government agencies and nongovernmental By trusting in the long view, and proactively 19 Michael A. Coss, “Joint Professionals: Here organizations working alongside our forces. Calls addressing the shortfall in precommissioning Today, Here to Stay,” Joint Force Quarterly 38 (3d for an “interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act” are and primary joint education, the Navy can “shift quarter, 2005), 93. increasing. In this environment, an early grasp the rudder” on decades of counterproductive 20 Skelton, 33. of basic joint concepts is more essential than and reactive policies. In the process, Phase Zero 21 D.C. Fuquea, “Service Academy Exchange ever for junior officers. Retired Army Lieutenant will give every naval officer a predisposition to Program (SAEP),” Commandant of Midshipmen General Dick Chilcoat, a former President of jointness, change the Navy’s culture from the Notice 1541, U.S. Naval Academy, November 2, 2004, 1. National Defense University, foreshadowed this ground up, and set the course for the lifelong 22 Pace, 5. fact in 1999: “A strong sense of jointness will be education of the future joint force. JFQ 23 Richard A. Chilcoat, “Revolution in Military even more important tomorrow. The synchro- Education,” Joint Force Quarterly 22 (Summer nization of joint combat power is occurring at 1999), 61. Notes lower levels—brigades, ships, and squadrons . . . 24 Center for Strategic and International Studies moreover, future military operations will increas- 1 Ike Skelton, Whispers of Warriors: Essays (CSIS), “CSIS Panel, Former Defense Secretary ingly include the integration of interagency and on the New Joint Era (Washington, DC: National Cheney Call for Strengthening Professional Military 23 multi-national participants.” Defense University Press, 2004), 15. Education to Respond to Ethical, Technological Chal- Given the increased importance of lenges, New Missions,” news release, CSIS Office of understanding joint concepts immediately External Relations, July 7, 1997.
126 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu Admiral James Stavridis at U.S. Southern Command Headquarters
USSOUTHCOM (Mitch E. Miller)
An Interview with James G. Stavridis
JFQ: Many elements of the much- Department of Defense [DOD] to confront but also the important role of international heralded reorganization of U.S. Southern today’s diverse security challenges through partners in 21st-century security. HHHHCommand Headquarters seem to have close integration and coordination of efforts—be Second, the maritime strategy rightly parallels in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st they military, interagency, multinational, or emphasizes the need to foster and sustain Century Seapower. In fact, the majority of private sector efforts. The Cooperative Strategy these international partnerships over time, the issues addressed in the new naval strategy for 21st Century Seapower is just one of many building trust and capability for steady-state strike readers as the traditional focus areas parallel efforts. For the first time, we have security cooperation as a matter of course, of your command. Is there a relationship integrated our maritime forces under a unified and the desire to respond together in the between these two developments? cooperative strategy—a strategy that recog- case of crisis. So it is no coincidence that nizes not only the obvious benefits of an over- the new maritime strategy runs in conflu- Admiral Stavridis: First, I would argue arching maritime partnership for U.S. forces ence with U.S. Southern Command’s vision that there is great momentum across the entire for the future of security in this part of the world. We clearly embrace the need to build Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.), of Joint Force Quarterly interviewed Admiral Stavridis at U.S. Southern Command Headquarters on April 4, 2008. Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, is Commander, U.S. Southern Command.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 127 INTERAGENCY DIALOGUE | Interview the capability and capacity of our neighbors forth) optimized purely for warfighting to JFQ: Media pundits and some interna- to address the difficult security challenges new internal structures designed for integra- tional security analysts have grumbled over we share together. As for the maritime tion, collaboration, and understanding—all the U.S. decision to establish a geographic role in our hemisphere, a simple look at designed to compete in today’s instant stra- combatant command in Africa, yet it seems geography highlights the importance of the tegic messaging market. as though the cooperative focus in that area maritime domain, since all but two of the Now, changing mindsets is very dif- of responsibility is very similar to that of U.S. nations of the Americas have borders with ficult for any large, complex organization— Southern Command. Has there been signifi- access to the sea—with a significant portion perhaps it is even traumatic. As we proceed, cant interaction between your command and of their population densities within 100 we must respect and develop military U.S. Africa Command over organizational miles of the coast. A flexible, scalable, and Service cultures, shape and prepare our architecture and strategy? persistent maritime engagement capability civilian workforce for new roles, convince is a welcomed and essential part of our secu- our interagency partners of the benefit to Admiral Stavridis: There are many rity cooperation toolset. their respective missions, and reassure our similarities that all geographic combatant Third, as part of DOD transforma- multinational partners of our continued commands share as we focus on today’s tion priorities, U.S. Southern Command commitment to partnering with them. For- security challenges within this century’s is reorganizing to become more of an tunately, U.S. Southern Command is well strategic environment. We all clearly benefit interagency operation. Our reorganiza- suited for this change. from a unique regional perspective and the ability to build cooperative partnerships and regional solutions to transnational problems. our reorganization efforts include multinational and even The establishment of U.S. Africa Command, limited private sector collaboration that will enhance our with its specific focus on a region previously understanding of regional dynamics divided between three commands, will allow improved bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and will foster long-term ben- tion efforts include multinational and even As of this interview, we are already in eficial relationships. Having essentially the limited private sector collaboration that our new provisional structure—a structure entire African continent as a single focus will enhance our understanding of regional that is flatter and more responsive. We have region will allow General [William] Ward to dynamics and magnify the benefits of our a dual deputy-to-the-commander system, combine the efforts of regional experts, both cooperation activities. Our new organiza- one military and one civilian. We are no from DOD and various other agencies, and tional structure and diverse representation longer organized in stovepiped J-codes, but to use them in a coordinated manner with will allow us to partner proactively with the now have six directorates—three mission our partners in Africa. U.S. Government interagency community directorates and three enabling or func- All that being said, yes, there has been and with the sovereign countries in the tional directorates. Interagency representa- a mutually beneficial interaction between region—ultimately improving our collec- tives are integrated throughout the new our two commands as U.S. Southern tive response to regional and transnational structure, their number and focus varying Command reorganizes and U.S. Africa security challenges. We lay out our approach according to the function of the directorate, Command organizes. From numerous staff in a document called “Command Strategy with many in key senior leadership roles. We visits and regular staff video teleconferences 2016,”1 which is well grounded not only in have a fledgling partnering center, where led by our chiefs of staff, to U.S. Joint Forces the Navy’s future vision but also in that of international, academic, and private sector Command’s efforts to synchronize best the rest of the Services. partners can plug into the organization’s practices and highlight areas for improved current operations and collaborate on mutu- efficiencies, we are traveling similar paths JFQ: Please address the most significant ally beneficial initiatives, programs, and and learning from each other. Of course, changes that will be effected in your com- exercises. although similar in some respects, the mand’s reorganization and the contextual In concert with our reorganization, we different natures of our respective regions demands that inspired them. have instituted a new method for strategic have naturally led to some variations in our planning that allows us to widen our focus structures and approaches, but I would say Admiral Stavridis: The most signifi- and enables cultural change. This strategic the similarities between our commands are cant change to our organization is a change planning process is an integral component in the majority. in our cultural mindset. A reorganized in the new organization and provides the structure is just one tool in our overall corporate structure to focus all command JFQ: Given the emphasis of U.S. South- rethinking of U.S. Southern Command and activities, prioritize critical resource ern Command on the “soft power” elements its ultimate transformation for the future. requirements, and measure progress toward of national security, how does your reorgani- This new thinking will take us from a achieving our mission. zation incorporate interagency partners? culture of war to a culture of war and peace, Of course, inherent in the new struc- from a culture of moving people and mate- ture is our ability to conduct military opera- Admiral Stavridis: Although our riel to one of moving ideas. From a rigid, tions with an unbroken and capable military reorganization will certainly take advantage traditional staff structure (J1, J2, J3, and so chain of command and authority. of the soft power elements of national secu-
128 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu STAVRIDIS rity, U.S. Southern Command will remain have a sizeable interagency presence, with ment of their core missions and supporting a DOD geographic combatant command, 17 departments and agencies represented. activities. with the majority of personnel and funding These personnel are integrated into our I am sure that just about every com- sourced by DOD. And our fundamental mission directorates based upon the needs mander throughout history has said, “These mission remains unchanged. However, of our interagency partners and the best are exciting times of change and opportunity.” through expanded interagency integration, use of their functions and specialties. One When it comes to U.S. Southern Command, we hope to improve our regional under- of our task forces, Joint Interagency Task the change this past year has been real and standing and situational awareness in order Force–South, is a model of interagency profound. We are operating with a trans- to execute our mission more effectively. and multinational integration and serves formed structure and a new cultural mindset Ultimately, our new approach will position as a powerful example of the benefits of to meet the security demands of a new world us to have an impact that is more lasting expanded cooperation. As U.S. Southern reality. The opportunities ahead of us seem in all that we do with our partners in Latin Command’s interagency partnerships grow more numerous and potentially more fruitful America and the Caribbean. and as our new cultural mindset and pro- from our new perspective. JFQ Essentially, I think it is really not about cesses mature, we will continue to work with soft power or hard power, but rather what our interagency counterparts to ensure their NOTES some have called “smart power,” which is the integration at the command promotes their 1 ability to dial between the poles of hard and personnel’s professional development and Available at
ADM Stavridis speaks with Soldiers and Airmen
during joint humanitarian and training exercise Combat Camera Squadron st 1
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 129 Why a Conversation with the Country? A Backward Look at Some Forward-thinking Maritime Strategists
By Karl F. Walling
For over a year now, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have engaged in a “Conversation with the Country” to enlighten public opinion about the need for a new maritime strategy for the 21st century. Professor Walling’s address surveys three previous conversations about maritime strategy at decisive moments in American history and explains why it is urgent to engage the country in such conversations today. U.S. Navy (Sally Hendricks)
VADM John G. Morgan, Jr., Deputy CNO for Information, Plans, and Strategy, briefs Texas citizens on new Navy strategy
130 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu WALLING
hy do we need a new case risks ignoring potential enemies until this is not the first time the country has had maritime strategy? Why it is too late to deal with them peacefully. So a conversation—a national discussion— do we need a conversa- engaging old friends and potential new ones about maritime strategy, which almost by tion with the country is as important to prudent strategy as deter- definition must be forward-looking. Some- W ring potential and defeating actual enemies. about it? The simplest answer to the first what paradoxically, however, I look back- question is that the world is changing. Other This too never changes. ward at some forward-thinking maritime possible conflicts loom on the horizon 5, 10, Throughout history, three problems strategists in order to explain why it is only 15, 20 years from now. Whatever happens in have proved paramount in maritime strat- natural, indeed inevitable in a free society current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan egy, which is not simply naval strategy. such as our own, that we have conversations and elsewhere, the Navy and other maritime It necessarily involves the Marine Corps, about maritime strategy. Services must look ahead, lest their current Coast Guard, numerous civilian agencies, strategies prove obsolete, even dangerous to merchant marine, a host of businesses with Building the Moat the American people. interests linked to the sea, and—not to be The first conversation was about Granted, the world is changing—we forgotten—our allies. These problems are: homeland security primarily, so I will call all know that because sometimes the only it building the moat. It occurred during the people who can figure out how to operate n to build a moat to provide for homeland founding era from 1776 to 1825, between those fancy electronic gadgets in our homes security the followers of Alexander Hamilton and are teenage children or grandchildren. The n to guarantee free use of the ocean, the Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton’s followers, big question is what will remain the same. global commons for trade, fishing, and other the Federalists, were often veterans of the How can we make future plans without goods, usually through control of the sea and American War for Independence. Hamilton something stable and predictable to rely denial of its use to likely enemies himself was General George Washington’s upon? n to use the ocean as a highway, paved by right-hand man throughout the war and until There is some good news or some bad ships, to project power from sea to land in Washington’s death in 1798. These veterans news here, depending on how we look at it. order to deter or defeat rivals on their home remembered that on July 2, 1776, 2 days Both the fundamental problems of strategy turfs. before Congress declared independence, the in general and the unique problems of mari- British sent the largest maritime expedition time strategy in particular remain the same. In that sense, a maritime strategy is no less Strategy is about matching means to ends important for preventing wars whenever to achieve objectives at an acceptable level possible than for winning them whenever of cost and risk. Note that strategy need not necessary. be simply military or maritime. A coher- Given the durability of these three ent strategy necessarily involves all tools of problems, it should come as no surprise that diplomacy, information and intelligence, economic power, and what we today call soft power, too. Indeed, one of the best ways to evaluate a strategy is by how well it integrates all these different tools of power and influ- ence. This never changes. Strategy is not simply about war. Indeed, to paraphrase the British strategist Basil Liddell Hart, the aim of strategy is a better state of peace, if only from our own point of view. A responsible strategy not only hedges against the worst-case contingencies, such as war, but also strives to make the best-case sce- narios, such as peaceful cooperation among nations, possible and durable. United States Office of War Information Preparing only for the worst case risks turning potential friends into Above: Thomas Jefferson preferred establishing a coast guard rather than a large navy enemies; focusing only on the best Left: USS Alfred, first battleship owned by United States, commissioned December 23, Dr. Karl F. Walling is a Professor of Policy and 1775, and commanded by John Paul Jones Strategy at the Naval War College.
ndupress.ndu.edu d / Bureau of Ships issue 50, 3 quarter 2008 JFQ 131 RECALL | A Backward Look at Some Forward-thinking Maritime Strategists in history thus far to capture New York City, experiment in what we today call “coop- Rather than confront the great powers with 10 British ships-of-the-line (the aircraft erative security.” That experiment began directly while the American Union was carriers of their age), 20 frigates, and over when Congress adopted the “Unanimous weak, Hamilton proposed a small but for- 100 transports carrying an army about twice Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen midable ocean-going navy capable of tilting the size of the one Washington had to defend United States of America” in 1776 and called the balance of power among the Europeans the city. So no one should be surprised that on the states to unite in resistance against not where they were strongest, in Europe, Washington, who had no navy, was unable to England under what became the Articles of but where they were much weaker, the sugar confront the British invasion at sea. Outnum- Confederation in 1781. However, Congress’ islands in the Caribbean—their most valu- bered on land, he lost more than half of his inability to raise taxes under the Articles able possessions at a time when sugar played army to the British invaders on Long Island undermined the foundation of Americans’ a role in the world economy analogous to and Manhattan and had to abandon the city cooperative strategy, and they were scrapped oil today. Whenever one of the great powers to the British, who occupied it until the end in favor of a new, stronger Constitution in appeared too menacing, the United States of the war. No one is quite sure how, but a would threaten to side with other European fire started as the British moved in, and over a fire started as the British powers against it in the New World. In the 60 percent of the city burned to the ground. moved in, and for these best case, this would prevent war by deter- For these veterans, this was their 9/11, the ring it; in the worst case, it would enable the burning of New York City. veterans, this was their 9/11, United States to cooperate with great powers These veterans also remembered that the burning of New York City to win such wars. Rather than risk war with Washington’s greatest victory, at Yorktown, the United States, each of the great powers Virginia, occurred because France, which 1787. Hamilton’s chief priority was a durable would set a price on American neutrality, became an ally of the United States in 1778, union, so foreign powers could not play open its ports to American trade, and leave lent the United States a navy that defeated the states against each other to reestablish American shipping unmolested. Through a British squadron on the Chesapeake Bay. their empires in North America. Union such a maritime strategy, the United States The French then blockaded a British gar- and a maritime strategy, he believed, were could grow strong, whichever way the winds rison of over 6,000 troops under General essential to secure American liberty by of war blew in Europe and its colonies. Charles Cornwallis at Yorktown. The French guaranteeing American independence. He But Hamilton always thought big. He also brought an army larger than the force of also recognized that the United States was proposed that, decades hence, the United Continental soldiers that Washington sent already a commercial nation that depended States should lead the countries of the to Yorktown. In addition, they moved up the on free use of the sea for its prosperity, but Western Hemisphere, each of which he Chesapeake to Delaware, where they picked that lacked a navy to protect its merchant believed had a right to be independent of its up much of Washington’s artillery for the fleet from great powers, such as England, colonial masters, in erecting a coalition of siege of Yorktown, where Washington was France, and Spain. the New World against the Old World. This able to bombard and starve the British into surrender. News of the surrender shocked Stephen Decatur boards Tripolitan the British government so much that it gunboat, 1804 granted Americans independence—so the British could get out of the quagmire in North America and go back what they did best, fighting the French! The veterans knew that Americans almost lost the War for Independence because they lacked a navy to secure the moat and were able to win perhaps only because France lent them its navy to enable them to get local control of the sea and project ground forces to Yorktown, thus reminding us today of the vital importance of allies, even and especially occasionally difficult ones, for our security from the beginning of U.S. history. Hamilton built on the experience of the war to develop an extremely ambitious maritime strategy that, not coincidentally, played a significant role in the debate over ratifying the Constitution. That strategy can be summed up in a single Latin phrase, E Pluribus Unum (out of many, one), a bold United States Office of War Information
132 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu WALLING cooperative strategy was the first American plans, including his maritime strategy, would about the shores of Tripoli), the Navy was attempt to lead the Free World against the become a threat to liberty at home, but what simply unprepared for the world war that less free world. It was also the foundation of was the alternative? That is always the question arose in opposition to France in the age of the Monroe Doctrine. Some even see it as for strategists. Napoleon Bonaparte. American merchant the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Jefferson’s alternative had two key ships were attacked by both the French and Organization (an alliance named after an assumptions: first, that the Europeans were British navies, each of which aimed to deny ocean) and other American efforts during so dependent on trade with America that the other’s country supplies from the United the Cold War to form and lead a global economic sanctions (that is, American boy- States, with only a few ships in the American maritime coalition against the Soviet Union. cotts and embargoes of trade with Europe) navy to protect them in the open ocean. Unintentionally, Hamilton provoked a would supply a “peaceful means of coercing” Jefferson and his best friend and successor great national conversation, or perhaps we them; and second, that coastal fortresses and as President, James Madison, tried economic should say a national ruckus and rumble. a fleet of gunboats, or what we today would sanctions first against England, then against Settlers on the frontier did not see the United France, and then against both, but the result States as Hamilton did, as an island vulnerable settlers on the frontier did was not what they expected. Americans may to other navies, but rather as a continent. The not see the United States as well have depended on the Europeans more farther they moved from the coast, the more than the Europeans depended on them. they tended to see their security as uncon- Hamilton did, as an island Jefferson’s strategy resulted in an economic nected with the sea, and thus they saw Ham- vulnerable to other navies depression, especially in New England. ilton’s maritime strategy as irrelevant to their Finally, believing there was no choice left needs—this despite their need to ship their call a coast guard, would suffice to protect in 1812, Madison asked Congress to declare produce down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers the homeland from foreign navies. In theory, war on England, though he acknowledged to New Orleans, which was under the control sanctions would deter war or, if war came, that Americans had a right to declare war on of Spain, and through the Gulf of Mexico, enable the United States to bring the Euro- France, too. where the Europeans had their colonies peans to their knees while coastal defenses The result was a disaster. American and naval bases. Moreover, Hamilton’s great kept them away from American shores. shipping was driven from the ocean. New rivals—Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and When Jefferson became President England in particular saw its economy col- their followers—exploited the settlers’ fears of in 1801, he put his maritime strategy into lapse. The ultimate humiliation occurred “big government.” They warned that the con- practice, but there were many unintended when a British army, landed by the British sequence of Hamilton’s strategy would be an consequences. Despite initial successes navy, burned Washington, DC, to the undue concentration of power in the national against what we today might call terrorists ground, including the White House, Capitol, government. As a believer in states’ rights, (the Barbary pirates in the Mediterranean, Library of Congress, and most other govern- Jefferson worried that Hamilton’s ambitious who gave the Marines the right to sing ment buildings. In the meantime, repre- sentatives from New England came within Destruction of Spanish Fleet off a single vote of seceding from the Union, Santiago de Cuba, 1898 so they could make peace with England and pull their economy out of its depres- sion. Jefferson’s maritime strategy almost destroyed the Union, and with it, the Repub- lic in its infancy. Although the early maritime history of the United States almost ended in tragedy, there was a comic conclusion to our first efforts to build a strategic moat. During and after the Napoleonic Wars, the major nations of Latin America began to declare their independence, often modeling their statements on our own Declaration of Inde- pendence. Fearful that such new political principles might breed further revolutions and wars, Tsar Alexander I in Russia formed a “Holy Alliance” among the sovereign heads of Europe to crush revolts begun in the name of freedom not only in Europe but also potentially in Europe’s overseas colonies. In 1823, the question before Presi- dent James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams was what the United Marine Corps ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 133 RECALL | A Backward Look at Some Forward-thinking Maritime Strategists
States should do if the Europeans intervened cans would stand for the principle of non- needs, but they will never do that effectively to recover their colonies in the Western intervention in Latin American affairs, and without understanding what the country Hemisphere. Henceforth, they said, the the Royal Navy, our worst enemy in 1776 wants, which is an important reason to talk Western Hemisphere would be off limits for and 1812, would enforce it, thus enabling the with the country. further European colonization, a principle United States to enjoy the major benefits of a Moreover, although today we tend that promised peace and cooperation with maritime strategy without having to pay for to see the 19th century as the great period Latin America, since both the United States them—a sweet deal if one can pull it off! of American isolation, the reality is much and the newly independent Latin American Is there a moral to this story? Perhaps more complicated. Our political union was nations had a strong common interest in Jefferson paid so much attention to what the devised to enable the original 13 states to preserving their political independence. country wanted (and feared) that he failed cooperate in the common defense. Building The problem was that the United States to frame the maritime strategy it needed. our political union was the fundamental had virtually no navy to enforce Monroe’s Perhaps Hamilton paid so little attention problem of North American interstate doctrine. So Adams and Monroe might to national sentiments that he rejected the relations until the end of the Civil War. seem a bit silly to have declared a moat maritime strategy the Nation needed most Even then, we relied on the silent strategic around the Western Hemisphere when they to avoid the disasters of the War of 1812. cooperation of our former enemy, England, developed no means to defend it. But they Those responsible for framing our maritime to secure the moat required for our internal had solid intelligence that England wanted strategy today must learn from the mistakes growth as well as that of our neighbors the former colonies in Latin America to of both Hamilton and Jefferson. They in South America. From this perspective, remain independent, so it could continue to must convince the country to want what it what Hamilton and Jefferson, indeed all trade freely with them. Thus was born a tacit form of strategic cooperation that lasted throughout much of the 19th century. Ameri-
Americans would stand for the principle of nonintervention in Latin American affairs, and the Royal Navy, our worst enemy in 1776 and 1812, would enforce it
U.S. Army
War Department Clockwise from above: U.S. troops embark for France, 1917; Commodore Perry defeats British fleet on Lake Erie, September 10, 1813; wooden ship built in 1918 for U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation to help revitalize merchant fleet War Department
134 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu WALLING the Founders, had in common is far more call rogue and failed states. Thus, more he seemed to have explained how Britannia important than their differences. They than 100 years before our maritime Services came to rule the waves. Kaiser Wilhelm in understood that the United States had a announced their current cooperative secu- Germany read his book and demanded that powerful interest in preserving and expand- rity strategy, Mahan called for the United Germany build a Mahanian battleship navy. ing a new kind of international system that States to work as part of a maritime coalition So did leaders in Japan, eager as they were to is captured in another Latin phrase found in what he called a “naval consortium” to found an empire of their own. on the back of every American dollar bill: keep the sea lanes open. In the worst case, Mahan had his critics, however. Some a Novus Ordo Seclorum (a new order of however, Mahan was as aware as Roosevelt worried that he was encouraging Americans the ages), or what President George H.W. to catch the imperial disease—that is, to Bush called a new world order, based on when the United States become like their worst enemies almost a such fundamental principles as national entered World War I, it had century before. Others wondered whether independence, sovereignty, freedom of the the best use of a navy was to fight the big seas, and peaceful commercial exchange, the wrong navy battle on the sea; perhaps it would be better first in North America, then in the Western for navies to project power from the sea to Hemisphere, and potentially throughout the that the United States would need a “big the shore and further inland. Still others world. Just as no individual is perfect, no stick” to secure free use of the sea on its own wondered whether battleships, like aircraft country ever lives up to its principles com- with a navy capable of establishing control carriers today, might be too expensive to pletely; but this is the system to which we of the sea. lose. Perhaps attacking an enemy’s com- became dedicated when Monroe proclaimed In Mahan’s view, the key to sea control merce with submarines and other raiders his doctrine, and the system we have been was a big battleship fleet able to risk all to was a better strategy. committed to defend ever since. win all. It would defeat enemy battleship But Mahan was so successful at gen- fleets on the high seas, chase their navies erating public support for his strategy that Commanding the Commons and merchant shipping from the ocean, his critics were generally ignored, at least The second national conversation to protect our own commerce, and deny in America. The result was that when the which I would draw attention is about secur- trade to enemies, who would be blockaded United States entered World War I, it had ing free use of the global maritime commons into surrender. Mahan was so successful the wrong navy. There were no decisive fleet and sea control. It began in the 1890s under at shaping public opinion that not only engagements in that war, only might-have- the leadership of another forward-thinking key American leaders, such as Theodore beens, like the Battle of Jutland. This was maritime strategist, Admiral Alfred Roosevelt, but also leaders abroad bought his not a war to be won through decisive battles, Thayer Mahan of the Naval War College. strategy hook, line, and sinker. He became but attrition, with the U-boat threat coming Mahan was an evangelist—some even say an international celebrity, with honors from close to winning the war for Germany. a propagandist—for the Navy. He believed Oxford and Cambridge in England, where When the United States entered the war, it that commerce was the source of military power, especially in the industrial age. Since U.S. Navy ships move into Lingayen Gulf most commerce in his time moved by sea, preceding landing on Luzon, January 1945 he also believed that whoever controlled the sea would control commerce and with it the foundations of military power. Silent strategic cooperation between the United States and England had enabled the former to become a great industrial nation by the end of the 19th century, but could Americans rely forever on the British? What if England became an adversary? What if England went into strategic decline? What if other powers arose who were less concerned with preserving than with overturning the increasingly liberal international system that had resulted, in part, from de facto Anglo- American strategic cooperation? In all these contingencies, the United States would need to enter the ranks of the great maritime powers, but how? In the best case, as Mahan’s friend and admirer Theo- dore Roosevelt would suggest, the United States might “speak softly,” that is, cooperate with such powers against what we today U.S. Navy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 135 RECALL | A Backward Look at Some Forward-thinking Maritime Strategists had many battleships but few destroyers to nations to cooperate with us both for defen- because they were expensive. The result of convoy merchant, supply, and troop ships sive purposes and to produce a more prosper- the arms control agreements in the 1920s across the ocean. It also had the wrong ous peace, we had to put our money where and early 1930s, as well as unwillingness strategy to win the war, but fortunately it our mouths were; that is, we had to invest the to enforce the Versailles Treaty limiting had just enough spare industrial capacity to financial and other capital required to get German rearmament, however, was that adapt quickly and enable the Allies to win fence-sitters to believe we were serious. This Americans reduced the size of their navy by transporting over 2 million American is what Woodrow Wilson meant when he said while Germany and Japan increased theirs. doughboys to fight in France. So ironically, the noble (but tragically flawed) experiment In this isolationist period, with the country the future war that Mahan had expected to in strategic cooperation embodied in the on its knees in the Great Depression, no win in fleet engagements on the sea was won League of Nations was about extending the one could convince Americans to want or on land by using the ocean as a highway to Monroe Doctrine to the world. plan for much more than homeland security project American ground forces to Europe. But what is the world? Nearly three- based on securing Fortress America with a Is there a moral to this story, too? quarters of it is covered by water. Ninety giant moat around the Western Hemisphere. Public support is clearly essential to sustain percent of its trade, the lifeblood of modern Perhaps only the fall of France in 1940, while a maritime strategy, but sometimes even the economies, moves by sea. The majority of Japan was expanding in China and Indo- greatest strategists—and Mahan was a great its population lives within a few hundred china, with England standing alone and its one—get it wrong. Mahan and his country miles of the coasts. In such a world, the kind fleet vulnerable to capture or destruction by could have benefited greatly from something of leadership that would result in political, the Germans, led American leaders to call as American as apple pie, if not more so. They military, and economic cooperation rather for a different kind of maritime strategy and needed more dissent and the ability to listen than military competition was inherently a different kind of navy. to it, which is another reason to discuss these dependent upon maritime strategy. Planners realized they did not have a matters with the country. Moreover, as Russia navy big enough to fight either Germany succumbed to the German war machine and Power Projection or Japan and that once again they had the England and France struggled to survive its The third national conversation to wrong navy for the war about to come. onslaught, it became increasingly clear that it which I would draw attention concerns Germany could not be defeated through bat- was no longer possible for the United States to using the ocean as a highway to project tleships, nor could Japan be defeated in one exempt itself from the burdens of world lead- American power abroad in the air, on the decisive battle at sea. The nature of the war ership. Although we had benefited more than land, and through space, including cyber- was again a struggle of attrition. Germany we usually acknowledged from tacit strategic space. It began under the leadership of Presi- had to be defeated first by gaining control cooperation in the 19th century, our free- dent Franklin Roosevelt (who had served of the Atlantic Ocean—that is, by defeat- riding, isolationist mentality meant that we as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in World ing the German submarine fleet. Japan had a credibility problem. If we wanted other War I) and Congressman Carl Vinson had to be defeated bit by bit, one island at a (D–GA) in the years immediately before time, by leapfrogging ground and air forces American entry into World War II and has across the Pacific, with the Navy supplying U.S. Navy Task Group 38.3 enters Ulithi anchorage after strikes against Japanese in Philippines continued ever since. a highway paved by ships to enable U.S. After World War I, Americans forces to reach the Japanese homeland. were gung ho for naval arms control So gradually from 1936 to 1940, always agreements, both because they believed making sure not to get too far ahead of arms races caused wars and public opinion, President Franklin Roosevelt and Congressman Carl Vinson called for a decisive change in maritime strategy, for a two-ocean navy capable of winning in both the Atlantic and Pacific, with a diversified fleet designed to win against U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. Moreover, they wanted to use our own submarines to cut Japan off from supplies and to gain control of the sea originally through battleship task forces and later through carrier task forces, so American ground and air forces could be sustained abroad, and to land such forces in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, and across the Pacific. This integrated, or joint, combination of Army, Navy, Air Force, and other Services has been the foundation of American military strategy ever since, but that strategy has always been a maritime U.S. Navy
136 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu WALLING strategy at its core. We are not simply a sailed the ocean blue, in the Niña, Pinta, Several hundred years later, in 1776 continental power blessed with no serious and Santa Maria. He sailed west in the hope in fact, Adam Smith published his great enemies capable of threatening us on land. not so much of proving the world was round economic treatise, Wealth of Nations, the We are also a maritime nation with inter- as of opening trade with the East; but he purpose of which, in part, was to describe ests, allies, and enemies linked to us by sea accidentally discovered a new world, the the consequences and foundations of a around the globe. Western Hemisphere, thus laying the foun- globalized economy. Said Smith, if each Here I must say something about what dations for our global trading system. we call globalization today, a phenomenon Sinking of German cruiser Bluecher in North Sea, January 24, 1915 that owes much to how Franklin Roosevelt planned to promote peace and escape another Great Depression after World War II. Provisionally, let us define globalization as the increasingly rapid exchange of goods, services, people, information, and ideas around the globe. When did globalization begin? I would say in 1492, when Columbus
Roosevelt and Vinson called for a two-ocean navy capable of winning in both the Atlantic and Pacific, with a diversified fleet designed to win against U-boats in the Atlantic
War Department
Periscope view of Japanese destroyer torpedoed by U.S. Navy U.S. submarine, 1942 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 137 RECALL | A Backward Look at Some Forward-thinking Maritime Strategists nation eliminated trade barriers and focused Reserve in the monetary system. By pre- Is there a moral to this story, too? on its comparative advantages, then free- serving confidence that the global trading Roosevelt and Vinson adapted American market competition would lead all by an system will not collapse, both the maritime maritime strategy just in time to avoid invisible hand to unprecedented economic Services and Federal Reserve increase disaster in World War II. We might not be prosperity—as what was once expensive to the willingness of nations to cooperate to so lucky or wise—or both—again. Absent a produce at home became cheaper to buy preserve the system rather than compete to clear threat from the Axis powers, it is not from abroad and what was best produced at destroy it. I cannot think of a better reason certain they could have adapted in time, or home began to command markets abroad. to take maritime strategy seriously than the carried public opinion along with them. How Often forgotten, however, is that there is fact that the invisible hand guiding global- to match strategic needs to public wants is a very visible hand in Smith’s vision of a ization today depends on the visible hand of thus often an urgent question. It must be global free trading system, namely the Royal maritime power, which, in the last resort, is done in time to make an effective difference, Navy, which helped keep the sea lanes open American maritime power. but how? Should we focus on securing our in the 18th and 19th centuries. moat? What is a moat in the age of nuclear After 1945, when England was bank- missiles, and how could a navy supply such a rupt, the United States came to play much what is a moat in the age moat today? What kind of moat is required in the same role as guarantor of last resort an age of international terrorism and illegal for a globalized economy by using its navy of nuclear missiles, and how immigration? Or should we focus on free use and those of its allies to keep the sea lanes could a navy supply such a of the global commons? What does that mean open. In that sense, the role of our maritime moat today? in the age of space and cyberspace warfare? Services is analogous to that of the Federal Or should we focus on projecting power from
USS Missouri fires salvo during Korean War, 1950
U.S. Navy
138 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu WALLING
CNO ADM Gary Roughead prepares to testify before Senate Committee on Armed Services U.S. Navy (Tiffini M. Jones) the sea as far as necessary to defeat a distant a multicultural federation of “diverse intel- enemy, such as al Qaeda in Afghanistan? ligent life forms” striving to preserve some Perhaps we must do all of the above. Fine, but form of freedom under law from those who how do we diversify our strategic portfolio so had turned to the dark side of the force— that we can protect our most vital interests from those who meant to base authority on without becoming overextended militarily, naked power. Direct economically, and politically? What roles If we reflect on the future envisioned in might a variety of allies, both formal and these internationally popular cultural icons, To You! informal, play as we hedge our bets against we can see that it is emphatically not going the worst case while striving to achieve better where none has gone before. We are clearly ndupress.ndu.edu cases? These are just the tip of the iceberg back to the future because the cooperative of the questions we must address to have a approach of the new maritime strategy is as viable strategy in the future. old as Ben Franklin’s remark before signing Distribution: JFQ is distributed to the field and fleet through Service publications the Declaration of Independence that we had distribution centers. Active, Reserve, National The new maritime strategy is an better hang together, lest we hang separately. Guard units, individuals, and organizations effort to answer these and other questions. A strategy of cooperative security, in other supported by the Services can order JFQ It is entitled A Cooperative Strategy for 21st words, is a reflection of our national charac- through the appropriate activity: Century Seapower. Whereas I have spoken ter and some of our oldest traditions. While Army: Publications Control Officers sub- mit requests for official subscriptions mainly about the past, the new maritime no maritime strategy can receive sustained through www.usapa.army.mil (click strategy is focused on the future, so let me public support unless it is consistent with our “ordering” link on left side of page) call attention to the television and film proj- national character, the new maritime strategy (use IDN: 050042 and PIN: 071781; cite ects, Star Trek and Star Wars, both of which emphasizes the elements of our national Misc. Pub 71-1) are vital elements of American soft power, character most likely to prove attractive to old Navy: Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna, New Cumberland, Penn- understood as the attractiveness not only friends and new. JFQ sylvania 17070; call (717) 770-5872, of our way of life, but also of our preferred DSN 771-5827, FAX (717) 770-4360 way of resolving international problems. We Air Force: www.e-Publishing.af.mil or ought not to forget that we call spacecraft email [email protected] “spaceships,” and that by analogy we see Marine Corps: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps (Code ARDE), Federal Building outer space as a vast ocean with an infinite No. 2 (room 1302), Navy Annex, Wash- archipelago of bright stars. In Star Trek, ington, DC 20380; FAX (703) 614-2951, a federation, or coalition, of planets seeks DSN 224-2951 to provide for its members’ security while upholding a principle of nonintervention, or Subscriptions for individuals sovereignty, which is the “prime directive” and nonmilitary organizations: in intergalactic affairs. The republic is also http://bookstore.gpo.gov/subscriptions ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 139 sail in a modern ship of war is not find itself in the lead on these Off the unlike walking into a desert with issues in the Asia-Pacific. a few companions. Everywhere This volume is a collection of Shelf around you is nothing but the essays published by Singapore’s sky and distant horizon. There is Institute of Defence and Stra- By Robert E. Henstrand little outside input and an endless tegic Studies, which researches cycle of work and sleep” (p. 108). and develops comprehensive st Cooperative Strategy for 21 Century Seapower, the first This window into the thoughts approaches to strategic thinking post–Cold War revision of U.S. naval strategy, reminds and feelings of one of the Navy’s in areas related to Singapore’s us of the criticality of the Navy’s mission to national most successful officers of the interests. The contributors are A security: “70% of the world is water, 80% of the world era makes this a captivating read maritime security experts from lives on or near the coastline and 90% of our commerce sails across it.” and is one of the most valuable such regional players as Australia, Secure seas and free-flowing maritime commerce are enduring, vital aspects of the book. Every mili- India, Japan, Singapore, and the national security interests. As we enter the seventh year of the war on tary officer and member of the United States. The fact that the terror, the U.S. Navy now recognizes that conflict prevention is on par joint and interagency warfighting essays are not written from a U.S. with warfighting and seeks to achieve conflict prevention “through team will gain precious insight perspective recommends this into what it is really like com- work to national security planners collective maritime security efforts that focus on common threats manding a U.S. Navy ship and and decisionmakers to inform (proliferation, smuggling, piracy, terrorism, etc.) and mutual interests.” leading Sailors. This book will and assist the implementation of The following two books offer insight into what the Navy does daily surely become required reading in the Navy’s strategy of collective and some of the challenges it faces now and will face in the near future the Navy but should also be read maritime security. as it endeavors to achieve “collective maritime security” among our by all joint warfighters. Unless The book begins with an allies and competitors in the Asia-Pacific region. you are one of the fortunate few introduction (effectively an exec- non-Navy people to have served utive summary) provocatively and offering introspective and at sea aboard a Navy vessel, you entitled “Cooperation or Com- sometimes self-deprecating may never come closer to learning petition in the Maritime Asia- insights, Stavridis shares his suc- what the Navy is really about. Pacific?” The author observes cesses, challenges, concerns, and, that “with the arrival of new best of all, personal stories and powers [that is, India and China], lessons of successful leadership. traditional regional powers may For example, in the opening pages, need to reevaluate their strategies a jaunty Commander Stavridis in light of the new environment.” recounts how after over 20 years In answering the “cooperation of preparing to command his first or competition” question, the Destroyer Captain: Lessons of a ship, he approaches the Barry for author concludes that a balance First Command the first time and suddenly feels “a of hard and soft power might be by James Stavridis curious shortness of breath, for my the best prospect for enhancing Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, heart was beating high, and I had stability in the region (pp. 13–14). 2008 difficulty in swallowing. . . . Am The Evolving Maritime The bulk of the book is organized 224 pp. $22.95 I afraid?” (p. 9). Anyone who has Balance of Power in the into four sections dealing with ISBN: 978–159–114–849–4 taken command or begun a daunt- Asia-Pacific: “Issues, Trends, and Paradigms ing assignment can identify with Maritime Doctrines and in Maritime Asia-Pacific”; t is not often that we get these feelings, and young officers Nuclear Weapons at Sea “National Maritime Doctrines the chance to delve into the can benefit from reading about edited by Lawrence W. and Capabilities”; “The Maritime Ipersonal diaries of our com- how Commander Stavridis met his Prabhakar, Joshua H. Ho, Aspects of Nuclear Weapons and manding officers, let alone a sitting challenges and succeeded. and Sam Bateman Missile Defenses”; and a con- U.S. combatant commander. Yet Despite being an account from Singapore: Institute of Defence cluding section containing two this is exactly the opportunity that 15 years ago, its lessons remain and Strategic Studies, 2006 essays. This book is particularly Admiral James Stavridis has given relevant to the contemporary 320 pp. $75.00 useful for its analysis of maritime us by publishing the journal he operating environment. Admiral ISBN: 978–981–256–828–1 strategy, emergent doctrines, kept from 1993 to 1995, during his Stavridis commanded the Barry naval orders of battle, the role of command of the USS Barry, an at a time when the Navy was he Asia-Pacific is an nuclear naval power in the Asia- Arleigh Burke–class Aegis guided- downsizing, and the operational inherently maritime Pacific, and the implications and missile destroyer. He commanded tempo was picking up. By his T region that encompasses impact of nuclear weapons. the ship on multiple training exer- own account, he and his crew as many vital U.S. security The essays reinforce U.S. under- cises and deployments in support spent nearly 75 percent of the interests today as ever— standing of trends in the region, of operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and 27 months he was in command perhaps, in our globalized such as China’s modernization and the Persian Gulf. away from port. Officers in world, more. The interests of expansion of naval capabilities to This book is not your run-of- today’s operating environment our allies and competitors, as eventually have a viable blue water the-mill autobiography. Writing should thus be able to identify well as challenges to them, will force (chapter 4), and present new in first-person and present tense, with such observations as, “To impact national security, and considerations about emerging the U.S. Navy will most likely naval powers such as India, which is
140 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu determined to “leapfrog capability practical perspectives (those “Military Power and development, challenge the status of politicians and military Warfare” (maxims 22–28) quo, and alter the relative balance of members) and the theoretical highlights the influence that power to its favor” (p. 113). Timely perspectives (those of strate- the outcome of operational and and relevant, this thought-provoking gists) of war and peace. In Gray’s tactical level military execution volume will serve U.S. national secu- opinion, everyone, to include has on strategy. The concept rity planners well. people who formulate and behind this section is disarm- execute policy, seeks shortcuts. ingly simple: military actions Other recently published titles The role of the strategist is to influence strategy. However, the recommended for reading: help politicians understand why points covered delve into more some shortcuts, or analytical profound concepts that can be n Bolt, Paul J., and Albert S. Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims leaps, should be taken with uncomfortable to deal with. Willner, eds., China’s Nuclear on War, Peace, and Strategy caution. Gray clearly states that For example, one of Gray’s key Future. Boulder, CO: Lynne by Colin S. Gray culture influences a strategist’s points is that military excellence Rienner Publishers, 2006. 221 pp. Westport, CT: Praeger perceptions and that the strate- is relative, a simple truth at $52.00 (Hardcover). Security International, 2007 gist is meant to emphasize the face value in that not everyone 186 pp. $39.95 role of cultural matters in both can be the best at everything. n Davis, Lance E., and Stanley ISBN: 0–275–99131–8 analysis and decisionmaking. A However, the ability to make L. Engerman, Naval Blockades particularly interesting lesson is an honest assessment of one’s in Peace and War: An Economic Reviewed by drawn from maxim 2 (“War is available resources can have a History Since 1750. Cambridge, Todd Manyx about peace, and peace can be sobering impact on formulat- UK: Cambridge University Press, about war”) and its discussion ing a realistic strategy. After 2006. 464 pp. $91.00 (Hardcover). t first glance, one might on the cyclical nature of war. all, what politician is likely to think that Fighting The lesson is that while it is publicly declare that his mili- n Elleman, Bruce A., and S.C.M. ATalk could just as easily admittedly irregular in nature, tary is not up to the task? The Paine, eds., Naval Blockades and have been titled Strategy for the proven cycle of war/peace/ author uses a quotation from Seapower: Strategies and Counter- Dummies: Restatements of the war/peace demonstrates that General Rupert Smith to point Strategies, 1805–2005. New York: Obvious. However, that would be idealists are incorrect in believ- out how relative excellence is a Routledge, 2006. 319 pp. $150.00 a mistake. Gray, a professional ing war only creates more war. constant concern for potential (Hardcover). with over 40 years of experience Likewise, those who posit that adversaries: “Armies do not in strategy and defense policy, peace only generates more peace prepare for the last war, they n Erickson, Andrew S., et al., eds., has made a concerted effort to are advocating an ideal, not frequently prepare for the wrong China’s Future Nuclear Submarine capture the basic truths that reality. one . . . [because] governments Force. Annapolis, MD: Naval serve as an “invisible hand” in “Strategy” (maxims 11–21), will usually fund only against Institute Press, 2007. 400 pp. guiding strategists in their daily the book’s lengthiest section, the anticipated primary threat $45.00 (Hardcover). efforts and to distill those truths deals with the practical aspects as opposed to risk, and the to their essence. One of Gray’s of strategic power in which adversary will usually play to n Howarth, Peter, China’s Rising specific goals “is to make explicit political will is converted to his opponents’ weakness rather Sea Power: The PLA Navy’s the assumptions that . . . are military action. It is within this than strength” (p. 103). Submarine Challenge. New York: hidden behind political rhetoric section that the author empha- In “Security and Insecurity” Routledge, 2006. 208 pp. $150.00 and the jargon of experts” (p. 17). sizes his belief that the works of (maxims 29–35), Gray reminds (Hardcover). Ultimately, he seeks to increase Clausewitz (On War), Sun Tzu us that strategy is important everyone’s “understanding of (Art of War), and Thucydides because there is always someone n Swain, Michael D., et al., eds., the nature of war, peace, and (Peloponnesian War) capture the out there who seeks to do Assessing the Threat: The Chinese strategy” (pp. xiii). The study essence of strategic thought and us harm, and therefore it is Military and Taiwan’s Security. of strategy requires knowledge that “people cannot be regarded necessary to have a plan for Washington, DC: Carnegie and consideration of a variety of as educated in strategy unless how to deal with the threat. Endowment for International topics that the author has gath- they are familiar, and more, The problem, as alluded to by Peace, 2007. 432 pp. $22.50 ered into five general sections: with these books” (p. 58). To wit, General Smith, is anticipating (Paperback). “War and Peace,” “Strategy,” see maxim 14: “If Thucydides, who the next enemy will be. “Military Power and Warfare,” Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz did not Fortunately, Thucydides pro- n Winkler, David F., Amirs, Admi- “Security and Insecurity,” and say it, it probably is not worth vides assistance when he notes rals, and Desert Sailors: Bahrain, “History and the Future.” Each saying.” Gray’s point is not that wars tend to be about one the U.S. Navy, and the Arabian section is composed of short necessarily that the best way to of “three principal very broad Gulf. Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti- essays that begin and end with get a new idea is to read an old reasons: fear, honor, and inter- tute Press, 2007. 256 pp. $34.95 quotations used to reinforce the book, but rather that the matters est” (p. 122). (Hardcover). topic at hand. that most affect strategy have “History and the Future” “War and Peace” (maxims remained constant for centuries (maxims 36–40) is directed —R. E. Henstrand 1–10) examines the nature of and that, ultimately, “strategy toward helping strategists war and its relationship with is all about correlating military understand the process of peace. Specifically, Gray notes means with political ends” (p. change and how understanding the differences between the 87). the proper historical lessons
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 141 BOOK REVIEWS can aid their day-to-day focus. formulation of a foreign policy have taken turns at leading Iran tional system. Though this is The most relevant points are toward Iran for each President since the revolution. Regardless not a history of the country, examples of how historical since Jimmy Carter. According to of who has been in power in Takeyh does an admirable job of lessons have been twisted to fit Ray Takeyh, Washington’s strat- Washington or Tehran, however, explaining the historical context the political heat of the moment, egy has been awkward at best and the United States and Iran have of key events and decisions in a often to the detriment of those self-defeating at worst because been unable to mend strained moving, engaging style that will required to execute policy. American leaders and strategists relations. Takeyh notes point- hold the interest of the novice In summary, Gray’s attempt have consistently misread the edly that the confrontational as well as the expert. One area to shed light on the nature of internal politics of Iran. rhetoric employed by not only he does not address is how the war, peace, and strategy is a Takeyh, a senior fellow at the the current American admin- various ethnic and religious great success. Fighting Talk Council on Foreign Relations, istration but also previous ones minorities play into the politi- serves as a primer on topics is one of the most pragmatic works to strengthen the power cal process. In addition to the relating to strategic policy that Middle East experts in America. base of the Iranian conservatives Persian majority, Azeris, Kurds, will help interested parties at all His book sheds light on the at the expense of reform-minded Baluchis, and Arabs constitute levels understand that behind inner political structure of Iran, politicians. But because these small but strategically important political jargon and rhetoric, its own perception of its role in more pragmatic politicians minorities. They have played a more than an invisible hand is the Middle East, and the forces have not been squelched and role in helping Iran influence guiding a strategist’s counsel. that are driving it toward devel- continue to operate in the leg- and build partnerships with JFQ oping a nuclear bomb. He dis- islature and through other gov- neighbors who have the same misses the portrayals of Iran by ernment bodies, Takeyh holds minorities. Major Todd Manyx, USMC, is an a succession of American leaders out hope for change. All military and national Intelligence Officer with over 22 and the media as simplistic and The two timeliest sections security strategists should read years of experience, most recently often harmful to the cause of of Hidden Iran explain how Hidden Iran and keep it on their with a deployment to Anbar Province the progressives and reformers the United States can deal with bookshelves for reference. The in Iraq. in the Iranian political system. Iran on the issues of its nuclear complexities of Iranian politics Takeyh also asserts that con- ambitions and stability in Iraq. are not always apparent to trary to U.S. popular opinion, Takeyh observes that the public Western observers since even Iran’s government is remarkably debate in Iran about nuclear the pragmatic and reform ele- stable and has elements that weapons mirrors the discus- ments in Iran continue to pay want to fully participate in the sions in China, India, and Israel homage to Khomeini’s legacy. It international system. before those nations developed takes a thoughtful observer such Takeyh’s main argument in their nuclear weapons. These as Takeyh to help us understand Hidden Iran is that in order to exchanges revolve around how the country’s factions and understand the country, one nuclear prestige, great power personalities are relevant to its must study its internal factions hypocrisy, and the need for a ambitions in the international and their political debates. Only viable deterrent. Takeyh peels system. Takeyh is optimistic that by deciphering this “hidden back the layers to show that this the United States and Iran can Iran” can we see the real chal- internal debate has not reached reach agreement on a variety lenges the country poses. To the point of no return and that of issues, including nuclear Hidden Iran: Paradox and offer a full appreciation of the the United States can still effect weapons and Iraq, as long as Power in the Islamic Republic political struggles there, Takeyh change in Iran’s nuclear path Washington makes the right begins with a thorough analy- by decoupling the nuclear issue diplomatic moves to help ease by Ray Takeyh sis of the legacy of Ayatollah from other points of contention. the tension. JFQ New York: Henry Holt and Ruhollah Khomeini, who took Takeyh also tackles the thorny Company, 2006 control after the Iranian revolu- issue of Iran’s involvement in Lieutenant Colonel Rizwan Ali, USAF, 272 pp. $25.00 tion in 1979. Takeyh’s brilliant Iraq, noting that Tehran knows is a career officer with extensive ISBN–13: 978–0–80507–976–0 portrayal sheds new light on a stable Iraq is the best route to deployments and travels in Europe, Khomeini’s legacy and shows ending the American occupa- the Middle East, South Asia, Far Reviewed by how his worldview continues to tion. Therefore, Iran’s clerics East Asia, and Africa. He wrote this rizwan ali shape political debates and deci- are pushing for a united Iraq review while attending the National sions in Iran. with a weak federal system and War College. ran is an ancient civilization Among the many unique strong provinces. On both the full of stark paradoxes. It aspects that Takeyh identifies nuclear and Iraq issues, Takeyh Ieschews the West at the same about Iran is that it has always points out that despite the revo- time that it seeks integration had multiple political move- lutionary rhetoric employed by into the international system. It ments. Despite Khomeini’s Iran’s leaders, at its core, Iran’s persists in sponsoring terrorist attempts to eliminate dissent, strategy is very much oriented organizations such as Hizballah, the internal political and theo- toward realpolitik. while its foreign policy has been cratic divisions survived and Hidden Iran focuses closely progressively more realpolitik have found ways to operate on internal politics and how than Islamist. These contradic- within the framework of the Iran views itself in the Middle tions have complicated the Islamic Republic. These factions East and the greater interna-
142 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu to someone else. The author horizon. Denied a stand-up fight differed greatly. Both authors is unflinching in his descrip- or the expected starring role of show war as it is, stripped of its tion of himself; for example, he walking point for the regiment, moonshine glories. Both felt acknowledges that he graduated Delta Company endured the the stress of leading. McDonald near the bottom of his class in fatigue of endless road marches, once calmed his nerves during the Basic School. He admits to the discomfort of an unrelenting an engagement by ordering worrying constantly about his environment, and the dangers of himself to “act like a soldier, company’s readiness despite a unexploded ordnance. goddamnit! At least you can grueling train-up. He does not Folsom’s descriptions of the impersonate an officer!” During hesitate to address occasional engagements that occurred a similar moment of self-doubt, differences with his fellow when Delta eventually met the Folsom summarized his ability Marines; he endured more than enemy are masterful. The battles to lead with the assessment: one dressing down from the are great examples of fire and “They wouldn’t follow me into a battalion operations officer and maneuver and illustrate the bathroom right now, even if they The Highway War: A Marine was the subject of several graffiti devastating effects of a properly had diarrhea.” Company Commander in Iraq slurs at camp in Kuwait. Folsom employed combined arms team. The Highway War is a great by Seth W.B. Folsom sticks to this matter-of-fact The book abounds with lessons read for those interested in Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, approach during his successes for junior leaders as the author Operation Iraqi Freedom or 2006 as well. He describes all of showcases the effectiveness of looking for an unpolished war 424 pp. $29.95 Delta Company’s engagements simple maneuvers and battle story. Readers seeking nonstop ISBN–13: 978–1574889888 (which resulted in zero friendly drills executed to standard. The action will find the book slow. casualties) in stunning detail, star of the book is the company With maneuver warfare long Reviewed by although he neglects to mention itself, well trained by Folsom, his gone in Iraqi Freedom, it is a pity andrew marvin that his leadership earned him a lieutenants, and noncommis- that no memoir of equal caliber Bronze Star. sioned officers. The fact that so describes the difficulties of the ar is by nature a social This style makes The much of what the company did counterinsurgency fight, for activity. Its success Highway War extremely valu- went well, from routine logistics our young leaders need lessons Wdepends on the col- able for Marines and other operations to frequent artillery distilled from those battles as lective actions of small groups warfighters who might soon calls for fire, speaks much of well. Perhaps Major Folsom will working in concert in rifle be engaged in combat. Folsom the technical competence of supply a sequel. JFQ squads, on gun crews, and in expounds on topics as varied individual Marines and junior armored vehicles. Yet command as counseling subordinates, the leaders in Folsom’s company. Andrew Marvin is a Senior is a solitary endeavor, and advantages of Marine close air Folsom concludes by relat- Intelligence Analyst for Science command in war is particularly support, and the importance ing what he did following Applications International lonely, especially when leaders of training, discussing them command. He worked on a Corporation. have time to reflect on the deci- all without seeming didactic. battalion staff, redeployed, and sions they made, the orders they Anyone who has been to war or attended the Naval Postgradu- gave, the men they lost, and the even on a training exercise will ate School. While in school, he enemies they killed. Major Seth identify with Folsom’s steadfast made a brief trip to Iraq to assist Folsom, USMC, does a thorough belief in the importance of sleep with a research project. This is job describing this loneliness during operations. the weakest part of the book, in The Highway War, a memoir The retelling of the invasion but the author uses it to explain of the invasion of Iraq during itself is true to life and therefore how he came to grips with all he Operation Iraqi Freedom. occasionally uninteresting. experienced and learned during Folsom felt the loneliness Following the dictum that the invasion. of command for nearly 2 years war is 99 percent waiting for The rawness of Folsom’s as he held the guidon of Delta something to happen followed recollections, which range from Company, 1st Light Armored by 1 percent pure terror, Delta prosaic descriptions of desert Reconnaissance Battalion. Company spent much of the war garrisons to his coming to terms During this time, he trained in trail behind 3d Battalion, 5th with killing in combat, makes his Marines hard and led them Marines and other lead elements The Highway War a worthy during the long journey from of the invasion, snaking down successor to a series of memoirs the Kuwaiti border to Saddam highways in an endless column that have sought to capture war Hussein’s birthplace of Tikrit. headed for Baghdad. In describ- as an experience, as opposed to He describes both the war and ing this period, Folsom captures war as a series of battles strung its lead-up in detailed prose the uncertainty and detachment together. His approach calls free of exaggeration and self- that modern warfare produces. to mind Charles McDonald’s importance. Often, the fighting is apparent to description of World War II Folsom writes with such Folsom’s Marines only through in Europe in Company Com- bluntness that he occasionally the radio calls of engaged units, mander (Infantry Journal gives the impression of describ- the report of friendly artillery Press, 1947). The parallels are ing something that happened batteries, and smoke on the striking, though the conflicts ndupress.ndu.edu issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 / JFQ 143 Joint Doctrine Update Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division
he joint doctrine development on the NATO Terminology Program at the set of tools and references in one easy to access community continues to place a April 2008 MCTC meeting in Norfolk, Virginia, spot. For access to joint publications, go to the major emphasis on the warfighter where the U.S. delegation completed agreement JDEIS Web portal at https://jdeis.js.mil (dot.mil through comprehensive reviews on 149 proposals for AAP–6, in addition to rec- users only). For those without access to dot.mil T accounts, go the Joint Electronic Library Web of doctrine and its effects on current and ommendations to revamp the NTP Directive. future operations. This quarter, our focus has JDEIS continues to serve as the exclusive portal at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. been on two emerging joint publications (JPs), source of approved joint doctrine as well as a st JP 3–24, Counterinsurgency Operations, and robust portal containing links to other pertinent Joint Publications (JPs) in 1 Draft JP 3–26, Counterterrorism. In May 2007, the content throughout the Joint Staff J7 and the CY 2008 community recognized a doctrinal void in joint force in general. This quarter, a terminol- 2–01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence these areas and approved the writing of the two ogy resources page has been created to more Preparation of the Battlespace publications. These developing JPs will address efficiently house JP 1–02, Dictionary of Military insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and and Associated Terms, and AAP–6, as well 3–02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations counterterrorism. as other key resources to help both doctrine The development of this doctrine has researchers and doctrine developers in the field 3–06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations garnered interest from U.S. Government agen- of standardized terminology. 3–09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and cies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Three new courses have been introduced Procedures for Close Air Support (NATO), and other organizations working to on the Doctrine Networked Education and 3–14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations develop additional related publications. The Training (DOCNET) Web site (www.dtic. 3–17, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, U.S. Government, with the support of the Office mil/doctrine/tointer.htm). JP 3–50, Personnel Techniques, and Procedures for Air of the Secretary of Defense, is working on the Recovery, helps the user understand the Defense Mobility Operations Interim Counterinsurgency Guide for the Department personnel recovery system, includ- 3–24, Counterinsurgency Operations interagency community in its effort to capture ing the roles and responsibilities of various ongoing duties and responsibilities. Concur- parties involved. It walks the user through the 3–26, Counterterrorism rently, NATO is working on allied joint coun- four phases and five tasks of personnel recovery, 3–29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance terinsurgency operations and antiterrorism to and outlines the composition of the Joint Per- 3–40, Doctrine for Combating Weapons of support current and future operations. sonnel Recovery Center and Personnel Recovery Mass Destruction JP 3–24 and JP 3–26 are being developed Coordination Cell. Like all DOCNET courses, it 4–01.5, Transportation Terminal Operations simultaneously to ensure that they are born integrates voiceover with animation and graphi- joint and unified. They will focus on the joint cal elements to deepen the understanding of 4–09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution task force commander and staff while discuss- doctrinal principles involved and how to use the JPs in Final Draft ing the operational level of war along theater information contained in the publication. CY 2008 strategy. They must answer the question of how The interagency coordination course has 3–04, Shipboard Helicopter Operations we translate tactical action to affect the opera- also been updated to reflect the recent revi- 3–11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, tional environment and, over time, reach the sion of JP 3–08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Radiological, and Nuclear Environments theater strategic endstate. Organization, and Nongovernmental Organiza- Our terminologists were busy at the most tion Coordination during Joint Operations. The 3–18, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations recent NATO Military Committee Terminology changes include expanded coverage of intergov- Conference (MCTC). In October, agreements ernmental and nongovernmental coordination, 3–32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations were reached on 70 proposals to update AAP–6, as well as broad coverage of the relationship NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions between the Defense Department and home- 3–57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military (English and French), which is accessible via land security and the Department of Homeland Operations the Joint Electronic Library and Joint Doctrine, Security and civil support. Finally, a course 3–59, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, Education, and Training Electronic Informa- entitled Joint Operations Planning Vignette has and Procedures for Meteorological and tion System (JDEIS). A U.S. recommendation been added, based on a vignette taken from JP Oceanographic Operations to review the underlying policy of the NATO 5–0, Joint Operational Planning. 4–0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Terminology Program (NTP) was unanimously JDEIS developers continue to work with Operations adopted by the two NATO strategic commands J7 to evolve and increase the capabilities and 4–10, Contracting and Contractor and the majority of the member nations. The functionality of the Web site to provide the Management in Joint Operations MCTC provided input to revise the Directive joint force warfighter the most comprehensive
144 JFQ / issue 50, 3d quarter 2008 ndupress.ndu.edu Inside Issue 50, 3d Quarter 2008 New from NDU Press
JFQ Dialogue Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) . . . from the Institute for National Strategic Studies [email protected] From the Chairman Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. 2 Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq Managing Editor, NDU Press 4 Letters to the Editor LTC Robert E. Henstrand, USA and Its Aftermath Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz Forum Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. by Joseph J. Collins Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley 6 Executive Summary Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick Since 2006, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) has contributed to the On Naval Power By Milan N. Vego Project on National Security Reform’s study of the interagency process. As part of this Associate Editor CDR Margaret Kerr-McKown, USN 8 cooperative effort and in furtherance of the INSS mission to inform the national de- Design Rebecca J. White and Chris Dunham, 18 Hobson’s Choice for the American Maritime Industry: The Navy or Nothing fense policy debate, INSS is publishing selected analyses on national security reform. U.S. Government Printing Office By Douglas T. Tastad Printed in St. Louis, Missouri In this case study, Joseph J. Collins outlines how the United States chose to go to war by 24 Information Technology and China’s Naval Modernization By Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase in Iraq, how its decisionmaking process functioned, and what improvements could be made in that process. Finding that U.S. efforts were hobbled by faulty assumptions, 31 China’s New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, Doctrine, flawed planning, and continuing inability to create adequate and Capabilities By Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes security conditions in Iraq, Collins concludes with several NDU Press is the National Defense University’s recommendations to improve the decisionmaking process for cross-component, professional military and 39 Seabased Ballistic Missile Defense By Alan B. Hicks complex contingency operations, such as developing a new academic publishing house. It publishes books, planning charter, improving the interagency planning process, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and 46 Seabasing: Expanding Access By Douglas M. King and John C. Berry, Jr. and strengthening interagency execution. special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, national military strategy, regional security affairs, and global strategic problems. NDU Press is Special Features 43 pages. Available only from NDU Press. Visit the NDU Press part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a Web site for more information on this and other publications:
3d Quarter, July 2008 ISSN 1070-0692 Issue 50, 3d Quarter 2008 JFQ coming next in... Focus on Weapons of Mass Destruction Essay Competition Winners plus Whatever Happened to the “War on Drugs”? Legal Solutions to Terrorist Violence JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY
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The People’s Liberation Army Navy ISSUE fifty Challenges to Stability
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